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80–760 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–31] 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 

AFGHANISTAN 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 17, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 17, 2013, Recent Developments in Afghanistan ..................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 17, 2013 ..................................................................................... 43 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Commander, International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces—Afghanistan ................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr. ............................................................................ 50 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 47 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 48 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 69 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 69 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Barber ......................................................................................................... 76 

Mr. Carson ........................................................................................................ 76 

Mr. Enyart ........................................................................................................ 78 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 74 

(1) 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 17, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets 

to receive testimony on the recent developments in Afghanistan. 

Today we have with us General Joseph Dunford. 

General Dunford, thank you for your leadership. Thank you for 

the great job you are doing. Will you please convey our best to 

those men and women that you are serving with there in Afghanistan when you return? 

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Great. 

The NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] mission has entered a period of transition. Although NATO has not fully 

transitioned security efforts of Afghan lead, President Obama already has announced the withdrawal of half of the U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan by this time next year. 

In my view, the President’s approach is fraught with unnecessary 

risk. Nevertheless, on my recent trip to the region, I was impressed 

with how far the Afghan security forces have come. Their capabilities and willingness to fight for their country are remarkable. 

The fundamental question before us is how the United States 

will continue to preserve U.S. national security interests after 

2014. One of the key components to answering this question, in addition to the President’s forthcoming decision on post-2014 troop 

presence and mission set will be the Bilateral Security Agreement 

that the Administration is currently negotiating with the government of Afghanistan. 

After over 10 years of war, the American people are understandably war-weary. Clearly, the situation in Afghanistan and the region is challenging and complex. But Afghanistan is directly connected to our vital national security interests, so we must get this 

right. We owe nothing less to the victims on 9/11, the U.S. troops 

and their families who have served and sacrificed and our sons and 

daughters who may have to return if we get this wrong. 
2 

The simple justice that comes from that principled position cannot be overstated. 

General Dunford, again, we are extremely grateful for your service to our country and for the job that you are performing right 

now in the most critical part of the world. I look forward to your 

testimony. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman McKeon can be found in 

the Appendix on page 47.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share in your comments 

about the outstanding job General Dunford has done and the job 

that our troops have done in a very, very difficult environment. 

I have been there many times myself and I have seen the 

progress, and not just in Kabul, not just in the capital, but out in 

some of the tougher regions, down in Helmand, down south in 

Kandahar and other places. Our men and women have done an 

amazing job and they did it by putting their lives on the line and 

going out there and cleaning up places that needed to be cleaned 

up and giving the Afghan people the chance in a more stable future. 

So we definitely recognize the service, the sacrifice, and the outstanding job that they have done and admire the progress that has 

been made. 

I also want to say that I thank General Dunford, I heard some 

of his comments yesterday. I think it has been clear for some time 

what our goals are in Afghanistan. I have always had a great frustration that people say we don’t know what we are doing there. We 

know exactly what we are doing there. 

We want to make sure that we have an Afghan government that 

can stand, that can be stable, that has security and governance 

without us, because we cannot have a permanent presence there. 

We want to deny Al Qaeda the ability to return to Afghanistan and 

use it as a safe haven. And really that second goal is tied directly 

to the first of having an Afghan government that can stand and 

survive against the Taliban, against potential AQ [Al Qaeda] elements. I think that has been clear from the start. 

Those are modest, realistic goals. We are not going to eliminate 

the Taliban from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The question is 

can we contain them and what is the best strategy for containing 

them? And the best strategy for containing them is doing our level 

best to train the Afghan security forces to be in a position to do 

that. And I think we have made enormous progress on that front 

and we are headed in the right direction. 

But part of doing that is making it clear that eventually we are 

going to leave. Eventually they are going to have that responsibility. We cannot be a permanent crutch. We have to transition. 

And we have seen that. 

As we have moved from district to district and province to province, we have turned over slowly and gradually and I think very 

intelligently greater responsibility to those Afghan national secu-
3 

rity forces. We haven’t just said, woop, you are on your own and 

pulled out. We have been transitioning in a way to build their 

strength, capability and durability. 

Now there are no guarantees, no doubt about that. This is a 

very, very difficult part of the world. It will be a very, very difficult 

part of the world 5 years from now, 10 years from and, odds are, 

20 years from now. But we have put the Afghan national security 

forces in the best possible position to be able to, at a minimum, 

hold, to stop the Taliban from taking back over the government 

and giving Al Qaeda a safe haven. 

And as we go forward, we have to try to envision what our role 

is going to be. And I will agree with the Chairman, I think the single most important thing right now is to get that Bilateral Security 

Agreement to eliminate some of that uncertainty as to what exactly 

our role is going to be post-2014. 

I know General Dunford is working hard on that. I know General—sorry, President Karzai is not always the easiest person to 

work with to get there, but I know that is a huge priority. 

But at the end of the day, we cannot stay in Afghanistan forever 

for a wide variety of reasons, but the only one I will point out here 

is that if we do, the Afghan government will never truly be sovereign, will never truly be stable and will never truly have the respect of the Afghan people that it needs to be the sustainable government that we need it to be. 

So I think the path the President and General Dunford and others have put us on, though not easy, though not full of guarantees, 

it is the best, smartest path to put us in a direction where we can 

have the security goals that we strive for in that very, very difficult 

part of the region. 

I thank General Dunford again for his service. I look forward to 

his testimony and to the questions from the panel. I yield back, 

thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Dunford. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE 

AND UNITED STATES FORCES—AFGHANISTAN 

General DUNFORD. Good morning, Chairman McKeon, Ranking 

Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning and represent the men and women of the U.S. Forces—Afghanistan. 

Thanks to your leadership and support, they are well trained and 

well equipped. Their extraordinary courage and performance reflects that support. U.S. Forces—Afghanistan remains focused on 

denying safe haven in Afghanistan to Al Qaeda terrorists who attacked our Nation on 9/11 and denying the Taliban who harbored 

them the ability to overthrow the Afghan government. 

We recognize that our national interests in the region are served 

by a secure and stable Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors. I 

appear before you this morning confident in the cardinal direction 

of the campaign. My confidence is based on the very real progress 
4 

we have made since the surge of forces that began in late 2009. 

And that surge has allowed us to move the campaign forward. 

The constant pressure we have exerted on the remnants of Al 

Qaeda in Afghanistan has disrupted their ability to plan and conduct operations in the West. Our coalition Afghan partner operations have pushed the Taliban away from populated areas and 

prevented them from meeting their campaign objectives in 2012. 

While they remain resilient, they are less of an existential threat 

to the Afghan government than they were in 2011. Most significantly, our efforts since 2009 have provided the Afghan forces the 

time and space they need to grow and assume the lead. 

Today the Afghan forces have recruited and fielded most of their 

authorized strength of 352,000. They are leading approximately 80 

percent of all combat operations currently being conducted. And 

they have lead security responsibility for territory where nearly 90 

percent of the population lives. 

Later this Spring, in line with the plan outlined at the Lisbon 

and Chicago summits, Afghan forces will be in the lead for combat 

operations across the nation. Today’s hearing truly comes at an inflection point in the Afghan campaign. There are many reasons to 

be optimistic. 

That said, there are significant challenges we must overcome to 

meet our objectives. Up to this point, it is fair to say we were focused on growing the size of the Afghan national security forces. 

We are now focused on improving the quality of the forces. In the 

months ahead, we will focus on a wide range of issues to include 

leadership development, ministerial capacity, aviation, and the systems to process these and the institutions necessary to support the 

modern professional army. 

In the coming months we will also need to address very real political and psychological factors that will affect the outcome of the 

campaign. With regard to political factors, we are at a point in the 

campaign where there is real tension between increasing aspirations of Afghan sovereignty and the reality of operations conducted 

in accordance with the U.N. [United Nations] Security Mandate, 

the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Military Technical Agreement. 

Properly managing that tension is now a campaign imperative. 

The psychological aspect of the campaign is equally important 

right now. Psychology will influence the performance of the Afghan 

forces this summer and affect the critical elections of 2014. We confront growing uncertainty in Afghanistan and in the region. Many 

Afghans have told me they no longer fear the Taliban as much as 

they fear what will happen after 2014. 

One Afghan described it to me as the Y2K [year 2000] effect. 

There is a growing sense that December 2014 is a cliff for the Afghan people. That dynamic must be addressed with a credible, compelling narrative of U.S. commitment. Absent confidence in the 

hope for a brighter future, Afghan leaders, the Afghan people, and 

regional actors will continue to hedge and plan for the worst case. 

The behaviors associated with that mindset have the very real potential to undermine the campaign. 

In closing, there is a great deal to be optimistic about at this 

point. But we are in the decisive phase of transition. The progress 

we have made to date provides real opportunity but not inevi-
5 

tability. There will continue to be challenges that will test our will 

and our endurance. But in the end, if we define winning as completing political and security transition, while rendering Al Qaeda 

operationally ineffective, if we define winning as setting the conditions for the Afghans to exploit the decade of opportunity that will 

come in 2015, I firmly believe that we can win. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this 

morning. And Chairman, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the 

Appendix on page 50.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. You know when 

I was there in theater a few weeks ago, it was the most encouraging trip I have had, the time you spent with us, the briefings 

that we had, the things that we were able to see as we traveled 

to different regions. I just felt more positive than I felt in the other 

visits I have had there. Although each of them seems to, I have 

seen improvement. 

And one of the things I heard there was that when the war started there were about 1 million Afghan children going to school and 

probably none of them were girls. And now it is over 8 million and 

a lot of them are girls. When I was there the time before, they 

opened a school down in Marjah. When I had been there before we 

couldn’t go to Marjah. 

And the Marines were firmly in control and the school was open. 

They had 500 kids that were really excited about the opportunity 

of going to school. About a third of them were young girls. Not a 

school like our kids go to here in America, just a humble building 

out of adobe with a few classrooms and a couple of tents and 10 

teachers and 500 kids. But it was great for them. And I just, I was 

really optimistic when we left. 

You know I think if we can continue to have a presence there, 

if we can get this Bilateral Security Agreement, if we can have 

enough security that we can go in and teach them how to use new 

agricultural methods. I looked at each of their little plots, you 

know, as we were flying around. That could become a prosperous 

country. It could be a very good story in the future. Probably when 

none of us are still around. 

It would be based though, on what you have done to this point. 

What you and Admiral Cunningham and the efforts you are making now on that Bilateral Security Agreement. Because I think if 

we don’t get that, if we don’t leave a presence, if we end up like 

we did pulling out of Iraq then none of that, I fear, will be able 

to come to pass. 

In your view General, when would you like to see the BSA [Bilateral Security Agreement] concluded, assuming it wasn’t yesterday? 

If the negotiations drag on, what are your concerns from a military 

options and planning perspective? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, thank you. As you alluded to, the 

Bilateral Security Agreement is critical. That will inform our presence post-2014. The U.N. Security Mandate will expire in December 2014, so our presence post-2014, will be based on the agreement that we make with the Afghan government. 

There are really two issues with the Bilateral Security Agreement. One is the internal audience and that is to address this idea 
6 

of uncertainty and lack of confidence that the Afghan people have 

about the future. And from my perspective the Bilateral Security 

Agreement will be the physical manifestation of our commitment 

post-2014 and really form the foundation of an effective narrative. 

I mentioned in my opening comments that we needed a clear, 

compelling narrative for the future to help overcome the Taliban 

message which has been one of abandonment and this Y2K effect 

that I described. 

The other reason why the Bilateral Security Agreement is important is because our coalition partners are very much looking to the 

United States to lead with regard to post-2014. And they are going 

to need the time to generate the political will in their capitals and 

do the detailed budget planning, just as we have to do, for a post2014 presence. 

Originally the Agreement was to have that signed not later than 

November of 2013. When President Obama met with President 

Karzai in January they agreed to accelerate that timeline. We are 

now cautiously optimistic that we would get that in May or June. 

I think it is very important that we get that before the 2013 fighting season. 

As the Afghans go into the 2013 fighting season, and they are 

absolutely going to be in the lead as we go into the 2013 fighting 

season, the information environment in which they will operate in 

2013, will be very much informed by the sense of commitment that 

we provide about post-2014. And again, I believe that the cornerstone of that commitment is the Bilateral Security Agreement. 

I think it is very, very important, both from a psychological perspective inside the country, as well as for our ability to form a coalition post-2014. And I would strongly recommend we do that. I 

think that the coalition that we have had over the past several 

years has been very effective and I think we want to continue to 

incentivize our coalition partners to participate with us as we go 

into the post-2014 mission. 

The CHAIRMAN. Given that NATO has a planning recommendation of 8,000 to 12,000 troops for the post-2014 presence in Afghanistan, at what level can you conduct your train, advise, and assist 

mission there? 

General DUNFORD. Chairman, NATO has given us planning guidance for 8,000 to 12,000 troops that would allow us to be in the 

four corners of Afghanistan. It would allow us to provide an advise, 

assist effort at the corps level, and the zone level for police, the 

corps level for the army, and the zone level for police. It would also 

allow us to have an advice and assist effort inside of Kabul on the 

institutions, where they grow officers, where they grow non-commissioned officers, and where some of the sustainment training 

takes place in Kabul. 

So that 8,000 to 12,000 window would allow us to do that. And 

I would highlight that there are really two missions post-2014. One 

of which is the train, advise, assist mission. The next big mission 

is the counterterrorism piece which is not included in those NATO 

numbers. My assumption is that that will be a U.S. with perhaps 

a coalition of the willing. But the NATO mission is specifically not 

for counterterrorism. And then we would also need additional 

forces to support the U.S. interagency specifically the State Depart-
7 

ment’s mission post-2014. So the 8,000 to 12,000 for NATO refers 

specifically to the train, advise, and assist mission post-2014 and 

not the other aspects of U.S. presence that may be in position after 

2014. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this was mentioned, the Bilateral Security Agreement is 

the key to that. Not to ask you to play psychologist for the moment, 

but where do you think President Karzai is at on doing that? He 

seems, it is kind of up to him. If he wanted to sign it, he could sign 

it tomorrow. What is our best approach collectively as a country to 

get President Karzai to where he needs to be on that agreement? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks Congressman. Over the last several 

weeks we have had direct engagement by President Obama, Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel on the Bilateral Security Agreement. And Ambassador Cunningham, our U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and I, also routinely engage, not less than once a week 

with President Karzai. I think that level of engagement is going to 

be required. President Obama spoke to President Karzai within the 

last week and addressed the Bilateral Security Agreement. 

I think it is important that President Karzai understand that Afghanistan actually needs the Bilateral Security Agreement more 

than we do. As important as it is for our national interests, as important as it is that we continue to have a presence post-2014 to 

ensure a stable and secure Afghanistan for our interests, certainly 

the presence of coalition forces post-2014 is absolutely and inextricably linked with a future Afghanistan in stability and security. 

As well as the resources that were pledged in Chicago and Tokyo 

are certainly associated with our ability to have a presence post2014. 

So I think at this point the negotiation is to ensure that we are 

entering into a Bilateral Security Agreement as mature partners. 

We are both recognize that it is in our mutual interest to sign the 

Bilateral Security Agreement. And I think that is the framework 

that we are trying to provide right now asto ensure that there is 

clear recognition that this is something that the coalition needs to 

have, this is something the United States needs to have, what is 

most important is, that the future of Afghanistan is linked to the 

Bilateral Security Agreement. 

My sense is, Congressman, that the people in Afghanistan absolutely recognize that. There is uniform support for our presence 

post-2014, because I think there is a recognition that one, the security environment will still be threatened. But also there is a recognition that the international community needs to be there in 

some presence post-2014 for political transition and economic development as well. 

Mr. SMITH. And can you talk a little bit about the relationship 

right now between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is problematic I 

understand. What might be able to be done to get it to a better 

point where they can coexist better as we are drawing down? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, at the strategic level, state-tostate, we are at a downpoint in the relationship between Pakistan 

and Afghanistan. 
8 

And that has been exacerbated by some cross-border firing incidents of late in a recent incident where there was a dispute about 

a border post that Pakistan was providing some—that was enhancing with some construction and Afghanistan took objection to it. 

What we have to do and what we are doing is, at the tactical 

level, establishing an effective military-to-military relationship not 

only between the coalition in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but, more 

importantly, one of the objectives we have before the end of 2014 

is to have a constructive bilateral security, bilateral military-tomilitary relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

As difficult as it is right now at the strategic level, we have made 

a lot of progress at the tactical level in terms of that military-tomilitary relationship. 

We signed, in November, a tripartite border SOP, standard operating procedure,that allows us to bring the military together to 

solve these border disputes in a way that will prevent them from 

being strategic issues. 

President Karzai, 10 days ago in one of my meetings, approved 

my invitation of General Kayani and senior leadership from Pakistan to come to Kabul to meet with the minister of defense and 

senior leadership from Afghanistan. 

So I think these military-to-military exchanges that will develop 

a relationship of trust and a common understanding of the security 

issues along the border are the best way to mitigate the security 

challenges even as the strategic issues are being worked. 

But I think that today between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it will 

take a concerted diplomatic effort on the part of the United States, 

and I know Secretary Kerry is personally engaged in doing that, 

to bring those two countries together and ensure that the rhetoric 

that we have seen over the past several weeks does not become 

manifest in violence. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And, General, thank you for your leadership and I was sitting 

here just listening very carefully and I saw where the lady, the diplomat, was killed along with three, I think, soldiers and maybe an 

Afghan translator delivering books to a school and it kind of brings 

me to a point. 

You used the words that ‘‘We are in a decisive phase.’’ I have sat 

here for almost 20 years and especially since we went into Afghanistan and remember generals like yourself, who I have great respect 

for, using words like ‘‘fragile,’’ that ‘‘We are making progress.’’ 

But it is always ‘‘We are making progress and things are fragile.’’ 

Well, the American people are financially broke. Yes, they would 

like to see an Afghan—Afghanistan, excuse me, that, you know, 

has got trolleys and everything else going for it. 

But when you have a country like ours where we can’t even fix 

the schools in the third district of North Carolina, the home of 

Camp Lejeune, we can’t even fix the roads. 
9 

The point is, ‘‘We are in a decisive phase’’—How long are we 

going to be ‘‘in a decisive phase’’? Is that 1 year? Is that 5 years? 

Or is it something we just don’t know? 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman. When I referred to the 

decisive phase, I really am talking about the period between now 

and December 14. What is different I think about today than over 

the past decade is, one, the performance of the Afghan Security 

Forces and the progress we have made since 2009 is real. 

In 2009—or 2008, I visited the Helmand Province and, at that 

time, there was one Afghan soldier for every 10 United States marines in Helmand Province. Today, there are three Afghans to 

every member of the coalition across the country. 

In 2008, we were leading 100 percent of the operations with, at 

best, an Afghan face on a coalition capability. Today, the Afghans 

are leading 80 percent of those operations and this summer they 

will be leading 100 percent of the operations across the country. 

We are now transitioning to the Afghan Security Forces providing security. The other thing that I would offer that is different 

about today is that 80 percent of the violence that occurs in Afghanistan today is where 20 percent of the population lives. 

We have successfully pushed the Taliban away from the populated area and inhibited their influence which had been there in 

some great amount just some short years ago. 

So, from my perspective, Congressman, if we are able to complete 

our transition to the Afghan Security Forces, then with a fairly 

limited investment post-2014 sustain the gains that we have made 

over the past few years, we will be in good shape. 

If we are able to provide oversight now and support as the Afghans conduct political transition in the spring of 2014 with inclusive, free and fair elections, we will be in a good position to transition politically at the end of 2014. 

And by staying engaged then diplomatically in the future, we 

will also be able to sustain the progress that we have made politically. 

So, Congressman, I think this is a significantly different period 

than it has been at any other point in the campaign. I absolutely, 

as I mentioned in my opening comments, can see our way through 

completion of our objectives. 

We came here originally to preclude Al Qaeda from operating out 

of Afghanistan and attacking the West. We can do that with our 

campaign plan as it currently stands. 

We came here to leave behind a stable, secure Afghanistan where 

Taliban could not return and we are at the point now, as a result 

of Afghan Security Forces growth, and the political transition that 

is ongoing, from meeting that objective. 

But I think more broadly as we think about what we should do 

in Afghanistan, we also need to look at Afghanistan’s position in 

the region. 

And, from my perspective, what would really be dangerous is for 

us not to finish the job in Afghanistan and to leave a sanctuary in 

Afghanistan from which Pakistan could be stabilized. 

And I think, as you know, Congressman, because you were, in a 

very helpful way, working on our challenges with Pakistan, the 
10 

nexus of extremism in that region with nuclear weapons is absolutely the area where we have vital national interest. 

Mr. JONES. General, really quickly because I have 36 seconds, at 

what point will you and the others in the leadership make a decision as to the number of troops that we need to have after 2014? 

General DUNFORD. This spring, I will recommend to the President a range of numbers, Congressman. My recommendation will 

be that we refine that range after the Afghans assume the lead this 

summer. 

So in the fall of 2013, they will have been in the lead for the first 

time. We are not, in our last fighting season in Afghanistan, we are 

in our first fighting season in support. The Afghans are in the lead. 

And I think in the fall we will both have a feel for the Afghan 

Security Forces after their first summer. And we will also see what 

conditions are set for political transition and more specifically the 

elections that will take place in April. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you so much, General, for your service to our country. 

I have two questions I would like to get in during my allotted time. 

One is following up on my good friend and colleague, also from 

North Carolina, Congressman Jones’ question. Page 15 of your testimony, you talk about the Afghan Infrastructure Fund for critical 

infrastructure projects you say in the power, water and transportation and rule of law sectors. 

And then you talk about that these are, ‘‘Carefully selected, assessed and coordinated’’ and then you name several government 

agencies. What are examples of infrastructure projects that still 

need to be done? 

Because being from the poorest county of all 100 counties in 

North Carolina, I, too, share the concerns of Congressman Jones 

with regard to these further infrastructure projects when we have 

water, sewer, transportation problems and school problems right in 

North Carolina. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thank you. The major projects 

that we have in the Afghan Infrastructure Fund are related to 

power and transportation. From my perspective, one of the goals 

that we have set is we need to make sure that the gains that we 

have made are enduring, that they are sustainable. 

And so the basic fundamental transportation and power investments that we are making really are critical to economic development that will actually allow the Afghans to stand on their own 

and then alleviate the need for us to continue to support Afghanistan in the future. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. So these are projects you anticipate are near 

completion or are there any new projects that will be starting from 

scratch during the remaining time that we are there? 

General DUNFORD. No, Congressman, we have identified the 

projects that will take place between now and 2014 and we are in 

the process of completing those. And any projects that would take 
11 

place after that would obviously take place in conjunction with the 

Afghan government. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you, sir. On another note, I 

wanted to ask you the Afghan Army’s Special Operations Command numbers more than 10,000. Do we anticipate this force being 

able to further U.S. counterterrorism objectives against Al Qaeda 

in Afghanistan as the U.S. minimizes its presence beyond 2014? 

Are you comfortable with what their special operations command 

can do with regard to counterterrorism efforts? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I am and a key assumption we 

make about he post-2014 environment is that we will work very 

closely with the Afghan National Security Forces to ensure that our 

gains are sustainable. 

The investment that we have made in the Afghan Security 

Forces is for exactly the reason that you highlight is so they then 

can provide security post-2014 with minimal support from the 

United States to include dealing with the terrorist threat that 

originally emanated from Afghanistan. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, thank you very much for your service. The people 

of South Carolina have a special appreciation of your service, of the 

military significance of Afghanistan. 

We have had a presence of the South Carolina Army National 

Guard, the largest deployment since World War II, nearly 1,600 

troops, led by our Adjutant General Bob Livingston. 

It really developed into an extraordinary situation of personnel 

at forward-operating bases all over the country where there was a 

relationship established with Afghan brothers where they felt like 

they were making such a positive difference. 

I have been there 11 times and, indeed, I have seen the substantial progress. I just hope it can be sustained. 

At the same time, I am concerned though about the green-onblue attacks, the insider attacks, that have created mistrust between our forces. What is being done to avoid and reduce these attacks? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first thanks for your many visits to Afghanistan. And with regard to the insider threat, for me 

that is first and foremost a force protection issue. It is one of the 

most important things to me as a commander and it certainly 

proved to be insidious in 2012. 

As a result of the insider threat attacks that took place in 2012, 

my predecessor ordered a detailed study into the causes of the insider threat and potential mitigation measures. Since the fall, we 

have significantly increased the counterintelligence capability both 

inside the Afghan forces as well as the U.S. forces. 

We have changed our tactics, techniques and procedures. Every 

time now there is a coalition meeting, engagement with Afghan 

counterparts, we have what we call a guardian angel, an overwatch 

to ensure that someone who is not actually participating in the 

event is there to provide security for our members. 
12 

We have a team in Afghanistan today going around training on 

behavioral change so that our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines have situational awareness and can recognize when a threat 

is starting to build as they are conducting a meeting or some other 

engagement in Afghanistan. 

Our predeployment training has been tooled to address this 

threat and, as importantly, the Afghan leadership has taken this 

seriously, as well. They recognize that this could be a threat to the 

coalition. This could shatter the will back—back in the capitals, to 

include back here in the United States, and they have taken measures to also improve it. 

I am cautiously optimistic that we have made a—we have made 

significant progress with the insider threat. Last year at this time, 

we had 20 attacks. This year we have had three during that same 

period of time, but it is not something that we can be complacent 

about. And I can assure it, it is something that—it is—I an engaged with on a routine basis. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you, and that is really reassuring. As 

a member of a military family, what you say has just great meaning to all of us. 

Thank you. 

I am also concerned about the Afghan National Security Forces 

not having the capability to sustain transitional facilities and 

equipment. This goes beyond operations and maintenance, and includes administrative and financial shortcomings. 

Are there plans for ISAF [International Security Assistance 

Force] to work with Afghans to develop a plan to extend U.S. support contracts to assist and mentor the security forces in building 

critical sustainment capabilities that will enable the continued tactical success? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, it is really two pieces to that 

issue. You know, I think it is fair to say to date that we have focused on growing the quantity of the Afghan forces, and I refer to 

shifting to quality improvement. 

Part of that is building at the ministerial level the capacity to 

budget, to plan, to program, and to provide oversight for infrastructure in—in all levels of command. 

So, we have a concerted effort right now to do that. With regard 

to funding, the money that was pledged in Chicago at the Chicago 

Conference by the international community for Afghan National 

Security Forces post-2014 includes funds for the contracts to sustain the infrastructure that you highlighted, Congressman. 

Mr. WILSON. And that is reassuring. 

And, finally, we have enduring core interests in Afghanistan. 

Could you identify what you believe they are? And by a level of priority. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think the reasons that we 

went to Afghanistan still remain. 

Number one is, we don’t want it to be a sanctuary from which 

Al Qaeda can threaten our interests, as they did on 9/11. And we 

don’t want the Taliban to return with their form of oppression that 

they exhibited in the 1990s to Afghanistan because they provided 

safe haven to the Al Qaeda on 9/11. 
13 

The other interest that we have is a regional interest. Afghanistan’s stability and security is critical to our interests across the region. 

As I mentioned, we have a nuclear state next door that has its 

own extremist threat inside of its borders. And I think it is very 

important that we provide stability and security in Afghanistan to 

preclude Afghanistan from being used as an area from which attacks can be conducted in a destabilizing way in Pakistan in the 

future. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] Mr. Maffei. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you. Thank you to the chairman. 

General, thank you for your service. And I—of course, I think 

every member of this committee wants to thank the men and 

women under your command. 

I am—I guess I want to associate myself to the comments of Mr. 

Jones. And my concern is, the ranking member referred to the need 

for the stable government in Afghanistan, and the fact that if we 

stay forever, we won’t have that. But there is a bit of a chickenor-egg problem. How can you—we have to stabilize the government, 

and at the same time, be leaving and looking like that—making 

sure that government has as much credibility as possible. 

So, one question I want to ask. When I was there in 2009, admittedly a while ago, there was a lot of concern about corruption within the government of Afghanistan. 

Are—is there a military role to play there? And are you working, 

and have you seen a reduction in corruption within the Afghan government? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there is absolutely a role for us 

to play. We have two areas that we focus on. 

Number one is, I think I have an obligation to ensure that any 

money that is provided to the Afghan National Security Forces is— 

achieves the intended effect. And so, we work very hard inside the 

Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that we 

have transparent, accountable processes for any money that is 

spent on the Afghans. 

That is U.S. taxpayer dollars. I recognize the need to be good 

stewards of that funds, and so we focus on that. 

The other area that we focus on is contracting. And any contracts 

that we let with people to provide support for the United States to 

U.S. forces, as well as the coalition, are areas that we need to pay 

particular attention to. 

And then more broadly, we support the framework—the mutual 

accountability framework that came out of Tokyo, which provides 

the standards and the metrics that Afghanistan must meet in order 

for international assistance to continue to flow past 2014. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Excellent. Thank you for that answer. 

I am extremely confident in your ability and the ability of your 

men and women to execute this so-called decisive phase until the 

end of 2014. My concerns are more in whether it can be sustained, 

and whether it can be sustained without a major U.S. presence. 

You have identified one of the goals as a stable and secure Afghanistan where the Taliban cannot return. 
14 

Just to clarify, you mean could not return as the government? 

Not that there would be no Taliban at all, but could not return as 

the government? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity to 

clarify that. 

That is absolutely what I mean, is that the Taliban could not return as a government. My assumption is that at some point, this 

conflict has to be resolved with a political process that would include all Afghans being part of that political process. 

Mr. MAFFEI. And you really think that is possible within that 

current timeframe? 

General DUNFORD. No, I do not, Congressman, believe that that 

is possible within—between now and 2014. What is possible is that 

the government of Afghanistan can be stable and secure enough 

and more importantly, the Afghan security forces can be capable 

enough to preclude the Taliban coming back in a way that they 

were there in the 1990s. 

Mr. MAFFEI. So, if my understanding of you is correct, that although we may draw down and we may not be the leader of the 

combat missions, there will be a necessary U.S. military presence 

in Afghanistan of some size until that occurs? Until we get to that 

point? 

General DUNFORD. Our—to be clear, Congressman, our presence 

post-2014 will not be to fight the enemy, it will be to provide advice 

and advice assisted training to the Afghans as they provide security in Afghanistan post-2014. 

And I believe, based on the trajectory that they have been on 

over the last few years, that they will be able to do that post-2014. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Looking at some of the stuff we are working on— 

as the chairman mentioned, schools, certainly a worthy project— 

and other members have mentioned the infrastructure. But of 

course, we do have those needs here. 

Are we nation-building in Afghanistan? Is that a term you are 

comfortable with? Or—and if you are not comfortable with it, why 

aren’t you comfortable with it? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we do not have a comprehensive nation-building plan in Afghanistan. It is far more limited 

than nation-building. 

What we are doing is supporting a counterinsurgency effort with 

projects that will assist in economic development and political transition. 

Mr. MAFFEI. And will those projects continue, and can they continue without a direct military presence? In other words, can 

USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and 

others take over where the military leaves off, as we, at some 

point, start drawing down in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, absolutely. Our plan now is, 

over time—and we are in the process—well into the process right 

now—of transitioning security of those projects to Afghan National 

Security Forces. 

Mr. MAFFEI. And you have confidence that that can occur by the 

end of 2014? 

General DUNFORD. It is occurring today, Congressman. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Okay. Thank you very much, General. 
15 

I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. 

General, good morning. 

What—can you give us some insight into what the current analysis is on the size of the Afghan security that will need to be put 

in place, or left in place whenever all of these things do occur? And 

what is the anticipation of when Afghanistan can actually pay for 

that security force themselves versus needing international help? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the current plan is—we have 

352,000 authorized Afghan security forces today. And added to that 

is the local police, which are authorized at a number of 30,000. 

The international community has pledged support for those 

forces through 2016. We also have requested—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. At those levels? 

General DUNFORD [continuing]. At those levels. And we have requested to do that through 2018 at 352,000, at which point the assumption is that the Afghans would then be responsible. 

The funds are, in part, from the United States. These were funds 

that were pledged in Chicago at the Chicago Conference. At that 

time, $4.1 billion was pledged; $1.3 billion from our international 

partners, $500 million from the Afghans themselves, and the 

United States pledged to provide the balance of those funds. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And as your team monitors the ability of those 

countries to fulfill those promises, are there—do you anticipate 

that that money will, in fact, be in place? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, my assumption is that the elections in 2014 and the performance of the Afghan security forces 

over the next year are actually—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. [Off mike.] 

General DUNFORD [continuing]. Are going to be—the money that 

is going to come from Chicago and Tokyo pledges is conditional 

based on progress, would be my assumption. And so, I don’t understate the importance of the elections in 2014—in effect, a political 

transition—in ensuring that those—the money that was pledged, 

both in Chicago and Tokyo, Tokyo being development funds, Chicago being security funds; but I think they are all conditional based 

on progress over the next 18 months. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. I appreciate that. 

On the Bilateral Security Agreement, can you tell us where the 

choke points are between us and Karzai on that issue? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are a couple—I would 

prefer to—if we could discuss that in private or in a classified 

form—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

General DUNFORD. We are at a pretty sensitive point in the negotiations right now, led by the State Department. 

There are a couple of issues. One, I can talk about, which is jurisdiction. And that is obviously a red line jurisdiction of U.S. personnel post-2014. 

Some of the other issues are more sensitive and may be more 

suited—— 
16 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I think I was mainly concerned with the 

issue of how we—how American troops fall under Afghan law, or 

don’t fall under Afghan law post—that was obviously a bid deal in 

Iraq, and moved into different directions, so—but you are dealing 

with that one specifically? You think you could—you think—anticipate we will be able to get that one done, probably? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, from a best military advice perspective, I wouldn’t recognize—I wouldn’t recommend at all that we 

be there post-2014. Absent a Bilateral Security Agreement that addresses—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

General DUNFORD [continuing]. Properly addresses the issue of 

jurisdiction. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you speak to us a little bit about the economic development with respect to the huge mineral reserves and 

other hard—and other resources that Afghanistan has? Is there 

any progress being made at contracts with other private sector entities or other countries in order to develop those resources? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are some basic contracts 

right now to begin exploration and assessment of how to exploit 

those minerals. But I would offer to you that the progress has been 

very slow. 

One of the aspects has been the security environment over the 

last several years, and is not much of an incentive right now for 

companies to come in and invest in Afghanistan. 

I believe we have an opportunity to turn that right now. Certainly the Afghan government is working that pretty hard. And our 

State Department is also working that pretty hard to make sure 

that people understand, and are able to make a much more realistic risk assessment about the prospects of investment, and successful investment in Afghanistan. 

Mr. CONAWAY. General, I want to make sure I thank you and 

your team, as well, and all those thousands and thousands of 

Americans who have served. 

It is instructive that your predecessors testifying like this, this 

room would have been packed. And I think it is instructive that the 

American people are, as the ranking member said, weary. But we 

cannot allow that weariness to drive bad decisions in us and to do 

things that are—here at the end game, cause us not to do what we 

need to do. 

So thank you for your team’s willingness and strength of purpose 

to stick with this deal and see this through to the right conclusion. 

So, thank you. 

General DUNFORD. Thank—thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Dunford, it 

is good to see you and thank you so much for your leadership. 

Having been to Afghanistan on a number of occasions, and focused largely on the role of women in building a civil society there, 

I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the role that ISAF plays 

in helping the Afghans to integrate women into their national 

forces, both the Army and the Navy. 
17 

The fact that I can even ask you this question means that there 

has beenprogress. I certainly recognize that. However, we also 

know that in terms of numbers, there are about 1,700 women serving in the Afghan national police, 430 in the Afghan national army. 

We have had an opportunity to speak to a number of those 

women who have made what is an incredibly difficult decision to 

serve in that fashion. And I don’t know whether we have what I 

might call some leverage, obviously, with the Bilateral Security 

Agreement. There may be some opportunities we have there to 

push harder on that issue, along with the coalition. 

What role do you think they can play in—that the women can 

play really in being integrated into the force and how important is 

that? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, first, you do have the numbers right. That is the current state, both in the Afghan army and 

the Afghan police. I know that you know from your visits that we 

have folks specifically addressing the gender issue, both in our 

NATO training mission Afghanistan as well as at the ministerial 

levels in Afghanistan. 

To be honest with you, the progress is slow and I project it will 

remain slow over the next couple of years as we have some very 

real and fundamental cultural issues associated with women participating in the Afghan police and the Afghan national army. 

There are family reasons why they are discouraged from doing that 

and then there are cultural accommodation issues that cause them 

to be discouraged from doing that. Some of the latter pieces, the 

accommodation issues, are the ones that I think we can make the 

most progress on, in other words, facilities that would be suitable 

to have both males and females in the police and in the army. Education and training that can facilitate a command climate where 

women in the army and the police could be more welcome. 

But I very much think this is a heavy lift and one that will take 

some years. I can tell you that it is not only part of the U.S. mission and a task for the U.S. piece, but it is very heavily emphasized 

when I wear my NATO hat, that is part of the specific guidance 

we receive from NATO for the International Security Assistance 

Force mission. 

So we have made progress, as you pointed out, and we, in fact, 

even have general officers both in the police and in the army, but 

my projection is this—the pace of change for the police and the 

army may lead the rest of society, but it will certainly take place 

in the context of the pace of change culturally in the rest of society. 

And I think we are at a point where we are talking about a decade’s long process. 

One of the things that the Chairman mentioned in his opening 

remarks, though, was the difference between young people who go 

to school today and young people who went to school 10 years ago. 

And he is exactly right. We have 8 million in school today where 

we had less than a million in school 10 years ago. 

The other statistic I think that is important in this conversation 

is that 60 percent of the Afghan people are 25 years or less at this 

particular time. And so the percentage of them that are educated, 

the percentage that have a more open view, I think, is increasing, 

and that bodes well for making improvements in these areas. 
18 

But Congresswoman, I wouldn’t be, I think, honest with you if 

I told you I thought that change would be immediate. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, I certainly appreciate that, General. 

But I also wonder, given all the constraints, and we understand 

that, is there a role though within the agreement, and even within 

the funding of OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations], which we 

really have not received that funding yet, that we can dedicate 

some of that funding in a way to make sure that some of the goals 

that even the Afghan national forces have identified for the country 

are realized or at least that there is a timetable for that? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we have currently both resources and structure dedicated towards this mission and we can 

go back and take a look and see if increased resources and/or emphasis in our structure would make an improvement. 

I do believe, right now, that both the police and the army are serious about addressing this. You asked why is it important? It is 

obviously important to tap into the full resources of the Afghan 

people as they provide security for the nation in the future. And 

I also think, as we have seen in this country, often the military by 

accommodating these kinds of issues, actually creates positive 

change in society as a whole. 

But I am not sure right now whether additional resources or 

structure would actually affect the pace. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And also to the female engagement 

teams that have played such a significant role in hoping to bring 

those changes about in Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Dunford, 

thanks so much for your service in the United States Marine Corps 

and certainly now in Afghanistan. 

Could you describe to us where we are right now in this draw 

down in terms of total numbers, and how the mission has changed 

from the direct combat role to advise and assist and where we are 

in that transition? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I can. 

We have just under 60,000 U.S. forces on the ground in Afghanistan today. We will have 34,000 in February of 2014. We are now 

at the point where the vast majority of U.S. forces, with the exception of one combat brigade that really is providing some fore protection across the country, are all in a train, advise and assist 

mode. 

So when you come to visit us next, what you will see in an Afghan unit of about 600 or 700 are 15 or 16 members of the coalition 

in an advise and assist level. If you went to a single province in 

Afghanistan, there will be thousands of individuals in Afghan security forces providing security inside of that province. There will be 

hundreds of coalition forces providing advise and assist in training 

to that unit. 

As we move forward to what we call Milestone 2013, which will 

be in May or June of this year, at that point, the Afghans will be 

completely in the lead. We will provide by exception combat support in the form of aviation support, logistics support, intelligence 
19 

and command and control. But we will not be conducting combat 

operations except in under extraordinary conditions. 

And frankly, that is for two reasons. One is because we are at 

the point where we have transitioned security to the Afghans and 

the other reason, that we have already reorganized U.S. forces on 

the ground in a security force assistance construct. So the numbers 

of combat forces that we actually have on the ground are very, very 

limited. 

Mr. COFFMAN. How are we doing in terms of mitigating greenon-blue violence? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we have increased our counterintelligence capability both inside of U.S. forces in the coalition as 

well as Afghan forces. We have changed our tactics, techniques and 

procedures. We have changed our pre-deployment training. In effect, we currently have on the ground a mobile training team that 

is addressing behavioral change so that our forces are better able 

to detect a threat. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Tell me what—how—what your recommendation 

is going to be for our footprint after 2014 and how would that mission change from even advise and assist? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are really three pieces of 

the mission post-2014. There is the advise and assist for the Afghan security forces. There is the counterterrorism mission. And 

then there is the support that we will provide to the U.S. Government interagency, specifically to State Department post-2014. 

I believe we should be in the four corners of the country and providing advise and assist at no lower than the core level to the Afghan army and no lower than the zone level for the Afghan police. 

I think we should also be in Kabul at the institutional level, providing ministerial capacity-building efforts, as well as some of the 

institutions necessary to sustain an army post-2014. 

I, at this point, am an advocate of a range in numbers because 

I believe that our post-2014 presence should be informed by a number of interdependent variables. The performance of the Afghan 

forces this summer is one of those variables. The effectiveness of 

our political transition in 2014 is one of those variables. 

And what we project to be the security environment, the strategic landscape, if you will, post-2014, the strength of the Taliban, 

where we are with regard to reconciliation and the strength of Al 

Qaeda all should inform our post-2014. 

And then, finally, where we are with regard to regional actors 

and specifically where we are with regard to our relationship with 

Pakistan and where Afghanistan is with its relationship with Pakistan should inform our post-2014 presence. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Can you tell me about the village stabilization— 

your assessment right now. The village stabilization program has 

had mixed results from the analysis that I have come in contact 

with. Can you tell me about your assessment of that? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, over the past year, the VSO 

program, Village Stability Operations, and the Afghan local police, 

which is a part of Village Stability Operations, have actually not 

had mixed reviews. In fact, they are extraordinary successful. 

And I think my perspective on their success is less important 

than the Taliban’s perspective on the success of the Afghan local 
20 

police. It is clearly, as we read the intelligence, the most feared aspect of the security architecture because the Afghan local police 

now are very carefully vetted. They are inextricably linked with 

local leadership at the district level—at the village level. 

And they are part of the overall infrastructure of the Ministry of 

the Interior. The Afghan local police work directly for the district 

police chief. 

These are all changes, Congressman, that I think we have made 

in the past 18 months as a result of the things that we have 

learned from a decade of war. But I an actually very, very high on 

the Village Stability Operations and the Afghan local police program and I think it is a key part of our ability to help the Afghans 

as they provide what we call layered security. And that is merely 

the integration of all elements of the Afghan national security 

forces to achieve the desired effect province to province. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was busily reading 

one of the documents and I missed it. 

General, thank you so much for your service and for your men 

and women that are in the field and all that they are doing in a 

difficult situation. 

You answered one of my questions just a moment ago, but I 

would like to go back over it. And that is the criteria on the judgment that you will be making. You went through five or four, 

maybe five specific things, one of which I think I had not heard before and that is the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

I think you said in response to Mr. Wilson that one of the issues 

was whether we needed to protect Afghanistan—protect Pakistan 

from Afghanistan. And I found that to be new and if that is one 

of the reasons, it seems to me to be a new one, and could you expound on that? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I can. I don’t think it is new. 

It may be a point of emphasis for me. I think we have always 

looked at regional stability and security in a broader context from 

Afghanistan. We have always considered that we have critical national interests both in Pakistan and in the region. And what I was 

suggesting, because this is certainly my perspective as I look at it 

now, is that we, a few years ago took a look and realized that security in Afghanistan was inextricably linked to security in Pakistan. 

And all I I am saying is as we make a transition, we need to 

think about the future of Afghanistan in the context of regional 

stability and specifically security and stability inside of Pakistan. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So that, we should stay in Afghanistan if we 

perceive Afghanistan to somehow become a threat to Pakistan. Previously we thought that certain regions of Pakistan were a threat 

to Afghanistan. And this is the flip side. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. I am not saying we should stay in Afghanistan because of Pakistan. What I am saying is the issue is inextricably linked. So I think it is fair to say if there is a threat today 

from Pakistan, it affects security and stability in Afghanistan. And 

in the future, were we not to see this through and provide stability 
21 

and security to Afghanistan, I believe it is reasonable to expect, 

that based on what we see today, that there will be sanctuary for 

extremist elements inside of Afghanistan that could adversely affect Pakistan. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. There have been a couple of questions on 

infrastructure and I would like pursue that a little more. There basically it appears to me to be two different types of infrastructure. 

One is the military infrastructure and the other is the humanitarian economic infrastructure. Could you go into that a little bit 

more? Specifically in your testimony you said we expect to save 

$1.3 billion by downsizing the military. How much are we actually 

going to be spending in the, in the present year and I guess into 

the next year on military construction? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman I would like to take that for the 

record, the exact amount that we will be spending on military construction, if I could please. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And similarly on the economic infrastructure? 

General DUNFORD. The Afghan Infrastructure Fund is the re- quest is for $359 million for this fiscal year coming. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. Thank you very much, that will, I 

will yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. General first, thanks for 

your service and for your team and what you are doing. I think it 

is a lot easier to go in on the beginning of a long war like we have 

in Afghanistan, or the middle of that war, it is tough to bring it 

home and to make it end and to do it the right way and actually 

win. So thanks for what you are doing. And I think people didn’t 

understand what you are up against. 

I think you were unfairly criticized by some of our colleagues, if 

you can call them that, in the Senate yesterday, for not giving the 

number of troops that you are going to recommend in the future. 

I think you have to take in the political, all the different machinations and ramifications of the entire environment there. And things 

that you say here do reverberate and have an impact back in, incountry. I think you have to keep that in mind. 

That being said, if you could just break down, let’s say there is 

no United States in Afghanistan post-2014. Let’s say we come back 

and say all right, General, we will give you 3,000 troops and you 

say, thanks but no thanks. What does Afghanistan and Pakistan 

look like in 2014? And if you wouldn’t mind taking that to 100,000- 

foot level, what does it look like for the entire area? For 

transnational terrorism, for nuclear terrorism, for that entire region and the impact on Iran and the United States going forward. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we have two missions. One is 

to address the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, the other is to provide security and stability in Afghanistan to preclude the Taliban 

from coming back. If we had no U.S. forces post-2014, both of those 

objectives would be at risk. 

As I was alluding to earlier with regard to Pakistan, I am increasingly concerned and I think so is the leadership in Pakistan, 

increasingly concerned with the extremist threat to Pakistan’s sta-
22 

bility and security. Pakistan is obviously a nuclear nation and the 

nexus of extremism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan would absolutely affect our vital national interests in the region. 

So from my perspective, stability and security in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan is inextricably linked and our vital national interest, 

we do have vital national interests in that part of the world. We 

do have threats that could emanate from that part of the world 

that could affect our security back here at home. And no presence 

post-2014, not insuring that we have stability and security in Afghanistan, not insuring that the stability and the security is linked 

to a plan for security and stability in Pakistan, would adversely effect, from my perspective, our vital national interests. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, General. Let’s just loop to one thing that 

you mentioned in your testimony yesterday, too. Senator Ayotte 

talked about Section 841 authorities. In 2012, the NDAA [National 

Defense Authorization Act], do you know what Section 841 does? 

Anybody who does not? It prohibits DOD from contracting with 

anybody that we think is an enemy, enemy combatant or just an 

enemy. It allows us to terminate and nullify those contracts. 

So the question is, you support the effort, what do you think 

about having that exact same rule apply to other agencies within 

the U.S. Government in contracting with Afghan enemies or any 

other enemies? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman thanks. And thanks for your 

support of that legislation from NDAA 2012, that did provide, that 

brought us with the ability to immediately stop contracting with 

anyone that we identified was providing resources to the enemy. 

And I think expanding that to all other government organizations, 

USAID, the State Department, as well as the Department of Defense makes absolute sense. And I would support anything that 

would prevent resources from going to the enemy. 

Mr. HUNTER. General, that is all I got. Thanks for your service. 

Hope you get time to grab a beer back here before you head back. 

I yield back Mr. Chairman. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. [Presiding.] Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Madame Chair. General, statements 

made by the, Chair McKeon as well as the, my colleague the gentlewomen from San Diego, spoke about the progress that we have 

assisted in terms of Afghan women and girls. And as you know the 

NDAA last year required a plan for promoting the security of Afghan women and girls, and I think that is something that everyone 

has really bought into including President Karzai. 

I have recently been informed that your command plans to eliminate one of the programs that is directly supportive of this goal and 

that is the Family Response Unit. It is an Afghan Police Unit designed to investigate cases of domestic abuse. And you know you 

have Afghan female investigators to look into these cases. And I 

think that is one of the critical points that we are making especially in terms of the NDAA. 

And I think the elimination of programs such as this would run 

contrary to the NDAA and would weaken the protection of the 

women. Do you know anything about this? Can you comment about 
23 

it? Or can you commit to at least reviewing the status of this program and to get back to me? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I would like to commit to reviewing the status of the program and getting back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much. Also sort of in the same 

vein. One of the things that I noticed in your written statement, 

you are talking about the contractor drawdown that we will be seeing in Afghanistan. And I think you are saying approximately a reduction of 25,000 by the end of the calendar year 2013. And if I 

am reading that correctly, it is about 25 percent. So are you anticipating that by the end of calendar year 2013, the reverse will be 

that we will have 75,000 contractors still remaining in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I will go back, first of all on 

the first part of it, I am confident about the percentage of drawdown and some specific decisions that we made in the last few 

weeks will allow us to experience that drawdown in contracting. I 

will go back and check the exact numbers, but at or about 75,000 

sounds right. And I will confirm here later today, the exact number. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Can you tell me, that of the contractors, the 

75,000 that would remain, what the plans are for their security? 

As far as on your troops or the ISAF is concerned? 

General DUNFORD. There is a wide range of contractors. If you 

are referring to the contractors that work specifically for U.S. 

Forces Afghanistan, we will provide security to them in the same 

way that we provide for our own forces. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And do you know how many of the 75, or the approximately 75,000 would be those which would be reporting directly to you or to the United States, and therefore, one that we 

would provide security for? 

General DUNFORD. That general number sounds about right for 

those that are involved, either supporting international security 

force assistance, the ISAF, or United States Forces—Afghanistan. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Is there any anticipated time for the actual 

drawdown of those contractors? Or is this a number that we expect 

to remain in Afghanistan for a while? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we would drawdown those 

contractors commensurate with the drawdown of forces. Although 

I would expect that as long as we have U.S. forces in Afghanistan, 

we are going to have some contracting support. What that contracting support would be on a pro share basis relative to the overall force structure. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So we, when we are say at the end of 2014, do 

we have an anticipated number that will be there in terms of our 

forces as well as the contractors that we have there? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we don’t have a specific 

number for post-14 right now. The President is still deliberating on 

that decision. I haven’t yet provided my best military advice to the 

President. I expect to do that via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

here in the coming weeks. 
24 

But I don’t expect that number to be available in the immediate 

future. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And General could you respond in writing as to 

the types of services that you would expect that the contractors 

who may remain in Afghanistan post-2014, what types of services 

that they would be performing? 

General DUNFORD. I will do that Congresswoman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, I yield back, Madame Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. General, most of the questions that I havebeen answered. But I just want to, I know you 

know this, and remind Americans, that we still have a young man 

that was fighting for our country that is a POW [prisoner of war] 

over there and just as we transition out of Afghanistan, making 

sure that all of the leadership of that country understand that the 

safe return of all Americans in uniform and contractors is necessary for us as a country. 

And just briefly, we talk a lot about the nuclear threat in the 

area. Could you speak briefly to the biological threat? Other weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear? Is that something that 

we are seeing any proliferation of? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman I don’t have visibility on the 

latter threat and I will take that for the record and provide you 

with a response. With regard to PFC Bergdahl, I can tell you that 

we won’t forget PFC Bergdahl and we pay very close attention to 

any information that might lead to his location and eventual return 

back home. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. SCOTT. [Off mike.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I am familiar 

with all of the contributions that have been made by our international allies in Afghanistan, particularly the Polish battle group 

serving in Ghazni Province. 

And my question for you is that, as I understand, other nations 

are providing about one-third of the forces in Afghanistan. And so, 

what do you believe are the lessons that we have learned from 

those multilateral relationships? 

And how do you expect those relationships to be exported to 

other areas of the globe that we would like to influence, particularly those areas where we have little or no physical presence, for 

example, Africa? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thank you. First of all, in 

terms of integrating coalition, we have learned a tremendous 

amount over the last 10 years that it is applicable to the future. 

First of all, I think we are learning to take capabilities and limitations from each one of the countries and properly integrate them 

to achieve the effect that we need to have in performing a certain 

mission. 

There are strengths and weaknesses for each one of our coalition 

partners that we can complement by providing enabling support, 
25 

for example, and sometimes it is a small thing like providing medical evacuation capability to a country could actually cause that 

country, then, to provide a significant role in advising and assisting 

Afghans or, in some cases, combat capability. 

I think another important lesson that I—that we should learn is 

the value of enduring military to military relationships over time. 

And I will just give you one brief example I think that highlights 

the most important lesson learned. 

In 1996, as a Battalion commander, I had a Georgian platoon 

serving with me at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. And it was part 

of a Partnership for Peace program. We had 19 former Soviet Bloc 

nations that came to the United States to begin to learn not only 

our tactics, techniques and procedures, but more importantly, some 

of the cultural issues about a modern, professional army. 

Today I am proud to tell you that there are 1,500 Georgians in 

the Helmand Province. They are battle space owners. They have 

been conducting complex counterinsurgency operations and where 

they are today versus where they were in 1996 is nothing short of 

profound. And I think it came from that investment in coalition 

partners over time. 

Mr. ENYART. I an very glad to hear you say that, General, because the Partnership for Peace program has been a tremendous 

success, in my view, and I think the fact that 1,500 Georgians are 

owning battle space in Afghanistan is saving the United States 

Government 4,500 soldiers, 1,500 on the ground, 1,500 getting 

ready to go and 1,500 in reset. 

So I appreciate those remarks. The Marines, I think, pride themselves on being our Nation’s quick reaction force, or what I would 

term a quick reaction force. That may not be your doctrinal word, 

but that is the word—the term I will use. 

Can you tell me, particularly from your experience as the past 

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, what has been the 

impact on Marine Corps readiness to serve as our Nation’s quick 

reaction force with the deployments to Afghanistan, which may not 

have necessarily been in conformance with your doctrine? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for that question. And 

I can tell you from my recent experience as Assistant Commandant 

what the impact of our contingency operations over the last few 

years has been. 

We pride ourselves on being a force of readiness, the Marines, 

the term we use is not a doctrinal term but it is a 911 force, we 

have used that for some decades. 

But the significant challenge has been that our home station 

readiness has been adversely affected as we have correctly provided 

all the equipment, all the people and all the training focused on 

those forces that deployed to Iraq and subsequently to Afghanistan. 

What that did was degrade home station readiness to the point 

where, typically, two-thirds of the forces that are at home station, 

Camp Lejeune, Camp Smith, Camp Pendleton in California, Cherry 

Point and so forth, two-thirds of those forces are at a degraded 

state of readiness, typically in C3, C4. 

And as you know, one being the best, four being the lowest, typically two-thirds of the force has been at C3, C4, largely because of 
26 

personnel or equipment shortfalls associated with our contingency 

operations forward. 

Mr. ENYART. General, one last quick question. In response to a 

previous question, you indicated that the United States, of course, 

has vital interest in that part of the world. And the obvious interests, to me, are preventing terrorism, preventing a base for terrorism, as well as controlling nuclear weapons in that part of the 

world. 

What other, if any, vital interests do you see that we have in 

that part of the world? 

General DUNFORD. When it comes to vital interests, Congressman, defined as the security of our Nation, it is that nexus of extremism and nuclear weapons that is our vital national interest in the 

region. 

Mr. ENYART. So you don’t see any other particular—— 

General DUNFORD. I see other national interests, economically, 

diplomatically, politically, but in terms of vital national interests 

where there could be a physical threat to the well-being of our Nation, that being the definition, it is the nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons. 

And either one of those individually, but certainly where there 

is a nexus, that would be a threat to our vital national interests. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, thank you 

so much for your service and particularly as it relates to Afghanistan. 

Recently, an Afghan army outpost was overrun by the Taliban. 

And that Afghan unit was rated as one of the strongest and most 

capable units the U.S. transferred authority over to. And I guess 

I am concerned about the fact that that is one of the most capable 

units and they were overrun and that compound was destroyed. 

Are we getting a real accurate assessment coming to you, that 

is, are you getting an accurate assessment with regards to the reliability of the Afghan National Army, in particular in the ability to 

defend itself? And obviously, as we look forward to leaving Afghanistan, I want to make sure that we are leaving it in a way that they 

can defend itself. Can you answer that? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first of all, from my personal 

experience, bad things happen in good units on occasion. In this 

particular case, it was a basic failure of leadership, nothing more, 

nothing less. There were fewer people at that observation post than 

there should have been. 

The Minister of Defense and the senior leadership in Afghanistan 

have taken corrective action. That individual that was the Battalion Commander was relieved of his duties following this particular incident because it did not reflect the capabilities and capacities of the Afghan National Security Forces, it reflected the commander’s decision and the failure to properly provide resources 

based on the mission that they were assigned. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, it is good to hear that it was identified as to 

what the initial problem was. And that the Afghan National Army 

has taken the proper steps to reinforce the issue in regards to not 
27 

happening again. And you are right, bad things do happen to good 

units. 

My concern as we move forward is Afghan army and police 

forces, are they sustainable in the long haul? Meaning, we have 

trained them to be self-sufficient organizations, take care of themselves once we leave, but do they have the close air support, the 

maintenance, logistics, and the casualty evacuation that we would 

expect them to have to be successful? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, that absolutely is our focus 

now as we approach 2015, is to ensure that what we are doing is 

sustainable over the long-term. 

Of the functional areas you mentioned, the one that won’t be addressed by the end of 2014 is aviation. It will take until 2015 or 

until 2016 before the aviation piece is there in a sustainable way. 

And so there are some gaps that will exist post-2014. 

But by and away, the majority of what we call enablers, the 

things that you referred to, we will have those fielded and we will 

be well along the way towards integration by 2014. 

But again, I would emphasize that in order for our gains that we 

have made over the last couple of years to be sustainable, some 

post-2014 advise, assist mission is going to be necessary. That is 

where we are at this point. 

We have, as you correctly identified, we have grown the quantity 

of the force, they are in the fight, all the statistics that I outlined 

earlier are real with regard to what they are doing on a day-to-day 

basis, both with regard to conducting operations and securing the 

people. 

But today they are not sustainable. And there are some things 

that we need to do over the next couple of years to make sure that 

they are sustainable. Part of it is this ministerial capacity building 

that I spoke about. 

They don’t have, today, the ability to plan, program and budget 

in a way that will sustain the army into the future. Part of it is 

their logistics infrastructure and making sure that we have distribution all the way down to the lowest tactical level from Kabul. 

And those areas are areas that are still weak. 

Intelligence is another area that we still continue to have to 

make progress and command and control is another area that will 

need to be addressed over the next couple of years. 

But we have clearly inside of U.S. Forces—Afghanistan, in the 

ISAF, we have clearly shifted our focus now on addressing those 

things from a quality perspective that will ensure that the Afghan 

capability is sustainable over time. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, and it is—as you know, obviously, particularly those outposts that are—Afghanistan does not necessarily 

have roads in most of those areas, so they are going to be dependent, obviously, upon transportation by helicopter to get the supplies 

they need to make sure that they can stay supplied, resupplied, but 

also have those assets to support them in a combat mission. 

So I would suggest or I guess we are going to wind up keeping 

assets there in that particular enabling area of aviation to be able 

to supply and resupply them? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I don’t anticipate post-2014 

providing that kind of support. The aviation support that I would 
28 

expect to provide post-2014 would be close air support in some geographical areas where there would be some difficulties. 

They currently have 26 helicopters that will grow to 50 helicopters for the conventional forces by the end of 2014. We also have 

a special mission wing that will be 30 additional helicopters. 

We have some Cessna aircraft out there right now to help them 

move people and supplies around a battlefield and there have been 

four C–130s [Hercules tactical airlifters] approved to be delivered 

to the Afghans as excess defense articles over the course of the 

next 2 years. Deputy Secretary of Defense made that decision. 

So with regard to what we would probably describe as assault 

support, I would expect the Afghans to be providing their own assault support and also using ground transportation where appropriate. They certainly have already, for example, retooled their casual evacuation system to rely primarily on ground transportation 

and local hospitals. 

So it doesn’t look like ours does, but it is effective in an Afghan 

context. So I don’t expect that we would provide much in that category that you described post-2014. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, once again, I thank you and please pass on 

our thanks to all the troops that are currently serving over there. 

Having had a son in Afghanistan, those are really tough conditions 

to operate under, so I really do appreciate it. Thank you. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you. 

Mr. COOK. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the 23rd of March, 

the U.S. Government transferred the Parwan Detention Facility 

over to Afghan control, General,along with its detainees. How 

many were turned over? How many detainees turned over at 

Parwan? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman at the, on the occasion of the 

transfer on 23 March, we had 390 detainees that were at that time 

under U.S. custody and control. And they were subsequently transferred to Afghan custody and control. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And how about at the Bagram facility that was 

transferred over on the 25th of March I believe it was? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman it is probably, maybe some confusion in the reports. The Parwan facility is at Bagram, so when 

we talk about the Detention Facility at Parwan it is synonymous 

with Bagram. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. 

General DUNFORD. And that number that I provided to you was 

the number of detainees that we held on that date. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, thank you. It was referred to as Parwan 

and also as Bagram, that was a little, that was a little confusing 

to me. Thank you. How many of those detainees, if any, have been 

released from Afghan custody? 

General DUNFORD. Of the 390 that we turned over the 23rd of 

March, none have been released to my knowledge at this point. 

They were entered into the Afghan legal process at that time, 

which will take some time. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Was that the Afghan civilian process or the military process? 
29 

General DUNFORD. They are using evidence-based legal framework for their processing detainees which is consistent with the Afghan law that applies to all Afghan citizens, whether it be military 

or civilian. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. The U.S. is negotiating a Bilateral Security Agreement with the government of Afghanistan. And we 

want to do so, want to have that in place by June or July of 2013 

as I understand it. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would like to see that Bilateral Security Agreement signed in the very near future. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How are things going with it? Does it appear that 

we are on track to meet that deadline? 

General DUNFORD. I think both, and I would base my assessment 

on the support that I see within Afghanistan as well as the conversations I have had with members of the team that are doing negotiations. I think we are very close to addressing all the technical 

aspects of the agreement in a way that satisfies both Afghanistan 

and the United States. 

What I can’t predict is the political environment that may affect 

the timing of the signing of the BSA, specifically what the political 

calculus might be in Kabul about the timing of the BSA. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Back in 2012 the U.S. signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan which recognized the government or the country of Afghanistan as a non-NATO ally. And then 

in the negotiations for the Bilateral Security Agreement, the government of Afghanistan has raised the issue of mutual defense. 

Can you enlighten us a bit about how the Strategic Partnership 

Agreement and that designation of being a major non-NATO ally, 

can you explain to us, how those two agreements on that particular 

issue, would be consistent with each other? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you know, with regard to the 

Bilateral Security Agreement and mutual defense that obviously is 

still being worked. But I would offer to you, and I think you know 

this, that in order to have a mutual defense treaty, we would have 

to have something that was ratified by the Senate. In the Bilateral 

Security Agreement is not intended to be a treaty ratified by the 

Senate that incurs a security obligation to the United States. So 

that is, the details of that are still being worked. 

Non-NATO ally status provides a category that facilitates the exchange of foreign military sales or excess defense articles and those 

kinds of things. If you are a non-NATO ally you have special status 

legally, where it can facilitate some of the military-to-military programs that we have. I can get you the exact details on that. But 

that, generally speaking, is the significance of being a non-NATO 

ally. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, thank you. Last but not least, does the, 

would the U.S. jurisdiction or control over our forces post-2014, include also jurisdiction and exclusive control over the 75,000 contractors? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman it would not automatically do 

that. And that aspect of the BSA negotiation is ongoing. But the 

Status of Forces Agreement would not relate specifically to contractors unless it was negotiated separately. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 
30 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you 

one for being here today. I was curious, what is your sense of loyalty of the national militaries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, towards 

their leaders? 

General DUNFORD. I can probably better speak to the loyalty of 

the Afghan forces as opposed to the Pakistani forces. Certainly at 

the counterpart level, the Minister of Defense, Chief of the General 

Staff and the senior leadership that I deal with on a routine basis, 

are very much committed to the future of Afghanistan. They believe in Afghanistan. There is a lot of discussion about factionalism 

in Afghanistan amongst the senior leadership. Were that to occur, 

it wouldn’t occur because they want it to occur. They absolutely 

would like to see a cohesive, National Army, for the people of Afghanistan, for the nation of Afghanistan. Their vision for Afghanistan is very much consistent with what our vision for Afghanistan 

would be. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And the other question I have, I know we have 

significant medical assets at Bagram. And I am curious what will 

become of that facility and what type of care will the people of Afghanistan get or the military of Afghanistan get, particularly once 

we leave? 

General DUNFORD. One of the areas that we are working on very 

hard, and we talk about enablers in general, is the medical capability of the Afghan forces. And so in terms of developing their capability to provide services that are consistent, not similar, not exactly the same, but consistent with what we provide to our forces, 

they have made a lot of progress. 

In fact they recently identified someone to serve as in effect their 

Surgeon General, a uniformed General Officer, as their Surgeon 

General who now sits on the general staff to work these kind of 

issues. So with regard to field hospitals, medical training for personnel at the lowest active level, as well as a National Military 

Hospital which has been constructed for more serious injuries, I 

would describe their medical capability at this point, as maturing. 

But it is one of the areas that we are working on as we talk about 

a sustainable Afghan solution. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. General will we have a need or obligation to stay 

longer with medical assets do you think? 

General DUNFORD. Not for the Afghans specifically Congressman. 

The medical support that we would provide post-2014 would be 

largely for U.S. and coalition forces and certainly on a humanitarian case-by-case basis, we would do what we always do, in terms 

of providing support for Afghans. But we wouldn’t plan, and train, 

organize and equip specifically to provide care for Afghans. That 

will be something that they will sustain themselves after 2014. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, General. I yield back my time. 

Mr. COOK. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, and thank you, General, for appearing 

before us today. This is an issue that we have all monitored very 

closely. And I for one, are grateful to see us drawing down in a serious way. I would support a more aggressive effort but appreciate 

very much the planning that is going into this. 
31 

I wanted to go in a slightly different direction. As I am sure you 

know we are currently running into an issue that we also confronted in Iraq. That insurgent murders of allied indigenous translators who were on the payroll of coalition armed forces. My hometown of Lowell, Massachusetts has a small community of Iraqis 

who sought refuge in our country after helping us in our effort in 

Iraq and whose lives and the lives of their families were very much 

at risk as we drew down. 

So this is an issue which was brought to my attention very shortly after I first took office. Senator Kennedy, the then-dean of our 

delegation, also played a key role in expediting visa approvals for 

Iraqi translators in 2008. Today however, according to an article 

this week in the New York Times, thousands of Afghan applicants 

are caught in an approval process that lasts for more than 2 years. 

As many as 5,000 were waiting to begin the process as of last fall, 

and a number of these translators work with Special Operations 

Command putting their lives in even greater danger by participating in dozens if not hundreds of high-risk missions. 

I recognize that this is an issue really that the State Department, is within the State Department’s purview and not ISAF, but 

to the extent you can, can you please outline some of the measures 

that ISAF takes in collaboration with the Afghan National Security 

Forces, to protect Afghan translators, both during and after their 

service with ISAF? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswomen, when they are serving with 

us, we provide them the same standard of protection we provide to 

our own forces. And I would just echo your comments, they have 

been absolutely critical to our success over the past 10 years. And 

some incredibly committed and brave young Afghans and some not 

so young Afghans have provided us with extraordinary support to 

allow us to accomplish the mission. 

And so I an very supportive of them, and in the cases of those 

that have applied for visas to be able to get to the United States, 

we have, in some cases, on a case-by-case basis, insured that their 

paperwork was properly completed and forwarded from the Embassy in Kabul so at least they were back here and competing for 

the visa applications back here. Once they are no longer in our 

service, we do not provide them with security. And in many cases 

they are at great risk, which I think highlights the importance of 

the visa program in insuring that we try to do that as expeditiously 

as possible. Because these are individuals that we owe a debt of 

gratitude to. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well I appreciate that. And I know I have seen 

some of the families that are in Lowell, Massachusetts who helped 

our effort in Iraq, making their way to this country is not an easy 

one. They need a lot of support once here, but I encourage you, just 

in recognition of sort of maintaining the integrity of our effort, that 

we do everything we can to help the Afghans who have helped us, 

especially those translators. 

I also want to associate myself with the comments that have 

been made about supporting, helping support the gains that have 

been made for women and girls in Afghanistan. I have been part 

of several trips that have really focused on those gains. You spoke 

about the numbers of young people now going to school. 
32 

We visited a school in Northern Afghanistan in which hundreds 

of girls were coming through on any given day, obviously with the 

support of their families, putting their families at risk, as they 

were their young people. 

But tremendous gains that have been made. And I, for one, 

would hate to see us walk away—or be seen as waking away from 

those gains. They have been so important—have elevated the sight 

lines of young girls. 

We asked, ‘‘What do you want to do?’’ They want to do exactly 

what our young daughters want to do, and that is just the result 

of exposure to education. So I encourage you, in your capacity, to 

do everything you can as we begin to draw down our effort. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Mrs. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, as you know, the President’s budget request 

was submitted to Congress last week without a final request for 

OCO operations in fiscal year 2014. 

Secretary Hagel was also here last week. Testified he was delayed to provide you enough time to fully assess requirements for 

force levels. 

Of course, we are interested in getting the details as soon as possible on the NDAA over here for early June. The President’s budget 

was submitted 2 months late. Do you believe you will have—you 

will be able to make those recommendations to the White House 

in time for the budget request to be finalized in the next few 

weeks? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, the decision really is—once 

the President makes his decision about the drawdown, we will then 

be able to provide the right budget fidelity. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. And let me ask you this. We had General Madison here a couple weeks ago, and he made the comment about his 

concern overall in the military—as he was retiring—about budget 

austerity leading the mission in our military, and no longer strategic types of outlooks. 

And does the fiscal uncertainty affect your planning in 2014 and 

post-2014? 

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, the biggest thing that I am 

concerned about in terms of the fiscal environment is not so much 

the money that we spend in Afghanistan. I have been assured by 

the Congress and by senior leadership in the Department that as 

long as we have men and women in harm’s way in Afghanistan, 

they will be properly resourced. 

Where I see the greatest risk is on—at home station training, in 

the preparations that our young men and women have before they 

deploy. And I think the impact on readiness is real. It is occurring 

right now, and is something we all ought to be concerned about. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
33 

General, as we transition the role of the Afghan National Security Forces, they, I think, move to a more regular role, shall we 

say, in terms of military police, everyday stuff, that is going to be 

significantly different from what they are doing now. 

And yet, we have seen that many of the challenges that we have 

had are—to use the vernacular of my neighborhood—they are ‘‘inside jobs.’’ They are people who have infiltrated and seek to do 

harm, and in such a fashion, destabilize not only the local situation, but frankly, they undermine the credibility of the security 

forces there and the perception of the American public with respect 

to Afghanistan’s ability to sustain itself and to take care of itself. 

What are you doing differently that hasn’t been done in order to 

minimize those risks? What have we learned from that situation? 

And what are we doing differently to ensure that that doesn’t happen in the future? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for that question. 

I think it is fair to say, as we grew the quantity of the force over 

the last several years, the vetting process was completely different 

than it is right now. And that is the critical piece, is properly vetting individuals that come into the police and the army. 

We do have a much tighter, and the Afghans specifically, have 

a much tighter vetting process now, where local leadership vouch 

for young men and women that serve, or that volunteer to serve 

in the Afghan police, in the Afghan army. Biometric data is taken 

on each one of those individuals, and leadership has much more 

oversight over the individuals as they come back from leave, as an 

example. 

We are paying particular attention to individuals who have gone 

on leave who may have been influenced when they were on leave 

when they return. 

So, I think the critical piece to address the challenge you talked 

about is properly vetting individuals before they join, and then ensuring that once they come back from extended leave periods, that 

they are also then vetted before returning back to the units. And 

both of those steps have been taken. And I think that has, in large 

part, been part of the success of mitigating the insider threat that 

you refer to—the insider threat being on the Afghan side. 

Mr. GALLEGO. What have we learned, and what is different 

now—very recently, we had a situation where a State Department 

employee—very young—was killed on what I would consider a fairly humanitarian mission in terms of delivering school books. And 

the situation is tragic, and someone argued that that is not necessarily—it wasn’t necessarily part of the core mission in the security interests of the United States. 

What is different about—it is clear that this strategy has two 

prongs. I mean, at some point, you are worried about the security, 

but you are also trying to build a relationship on sustainability, 

long-term. 

What have we learned from that, and what happens going forward—— 

General DUNFORD. Congressman—— 

Mr. GALLEGO [continuing]. In a situation like that? 

General DUNFORD [continuing]. That tragic loss of life was in a 

mission that was outreach to the Afghan people. They were, I 
34 

think, as you know, delivering school books in—trying to participate in a mission to do that. 

That is part of our long term plan for the State Department. I 

would expect that the U.S. State Department will continue those 

types of outreach programs post-2014. It is what our brave young 

men and women in the State Department do every day around the 

world. I think that incident highlights that Afghanistan does remain a dangerous place. There is still violence occurring in Afghanistan, and there will be for the foreseeable future. But it also highlights the need for brave Americans to be out there, and doing the 

things that we need to do to bring stability and security to Afghanistan. And she was very much a part of that. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Cook. 

I apologize, General, but there was another committee meeting, 

so some of us just joined late here. 

But one question—and I apologize again if you have already gone 

over it, but in terms of the drawdown—I mean, a part of it, obviously, is logistical in terms of equipment and, you know, transporting—I assume, lots of materiel back to the U.S. or outside of 

Afghanistan. And I know—you know, in Iraq, there was definitely 

sort of a—almost like a triage-type decision made in terms of, you 

know, types of vehicles that would be left behind. 

Others, like MRAPs [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles], 

that were considered, you know, more valuable and moved out. And 

I was just wondering if you could sort of give us a quick snapshot. 

Mr. Hagel, when he was here the other day, you know, was really adamant that, you know, people should not accept—or expect instant savings from the drawdown, because, frankly, there is a pretty big bill to pay in terms of just executing the drawdown. 

And, you know, maybe just sort of help me, you know, in terms 

of how that is going. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are really three parts to 

the drawdown: there is the retrograde of equipment that actually 

will come back here to reset, in large part, the United States Army 

and the Marine Corps, but each of the Services. 

There is then the base closure piece that is taking place. And 

then there is the retrograded materials, and so forth—materiel reduction. 

With regard to retrograde, the Services identified to us those 

items that will be returned back to the Services. In other words, 

based on either the condition of that particular piece of equipment, 

or the need for that piece of equipment coming back. They will 

identify that for us to send home. 

I feel confident that those items that have been identified to 

reset the Services will come home by the end of 2014. But I think 

what Mr. Hale mentioned is really an important point, because at 

that point, the reset process begins. And so the OCO money necessary to reset that equipment will be required for some period of 

time after that equipment leaves Afghanistan. 

It will take, in many cases, 90 days for that piece of equipment 

to return back to the United States, at which point, it will either 
35 

return to a home station, or be inducted into depot-level maintenance. 

In any case, there will be maintenance required to reset that vehicle to a serviceable condition to ensure that it is ready for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to use it before they deploy it 

for another contingency. 

So that is an important part of it, and I think that is why we 

are going to continue to need services funding for some 2 to 3 years 

after we draw down all the equipment inside of Afghanistan. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And how about the base closures which you mentioned? I mean, is that—I mean, can you give us sort of some general sense of how many of them closed and how many will—how 

many more will be closed? 

General DUNFORD. Again, Congressman, we have closed, I think, 

on the order of 400, more than 400 bases. And we have a little 

more than 100 to go. And I will confirm those exact numbers for 

you, but it is somewhere in the order of four-fifths of the bases that 

we had at one point have all been closed right now, so we are proceeding a pace in terms of closing those bases. 

Some of the larger, more complex bases, the ones that remain— 

some of those will remain post-2014, so we still have a fair amount 

of work to do. 

But I think we have a very detailed plan. I am comfortable that, 

again, we will get the equipment out by the end of 2014. But I 

think some of the base closure and materiel reduction efforts that 

will take place will probably take place after 2014. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, this really must be almost a historic sort 

of effort in terms of just the amount of materiel that you are going 

to be moving around. And, obviously, you know, the number of installations that are being closed. And, you know, Iraq was sort of 

a similar kind of challenge. I mean, did that experience provide 

some help in terms of doing this maybe a little, you know, more 

efficiently or smarter? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, absolutely. Our experience in 

Iraq informed Afghanistan, but we, in Iraq, we had Kuwait. And 

so we were able to bring all the vehicles down there and stage 

them and so forth. 

I would say that Afghanistan—the degree of difficulty is significantly greater in Afghanistan than it was in Iraq as a result of geography. And so, while we learned many lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan is its own set of unique problems that we are dealing with. 

But I think it is historic. And frankly, I always tell people, among 

the things I lay awake at night, despite the complexity of this particular issue, and despite the magnitude of the issue, this is not 

one of those areas that I lay awake at night, because we have extraordinarily capable young men and women that are working 

these logistical issues. And although I get routine updates to track 

our progress, I feel very comfortable that in this, what I describe 

as the science of war, we are in pretty good shape. 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dunford, thank you so much for joining us today. 

Thanks for your service to our Nation. 
36 

It is always been my privilege to travel down range to see our 

great men and women that are serving there—our marines, our 

sailors, our soldiers, our airmen. They are doing a fantastic job, 

and I appreciate what you are doing in leading ISAF, especially 

through these challenging times in transition. 

I did want to speak a little bit about that transition as we look 

at what you are faced with. Obviously, with the drawdown and 

with the fighting season coming up, and then trying to manage not 

only that combat effort, but also managing the resources that you 

have in theater there, trying to get some of those elements back 

home. 

I know that General Allen testified, and his words were, 

‘‘Throughout history, insurgencies have seldom been defeated by 

foreign forces. Instead, they have been ultimately beaten by indigenous forces.’’ And in the long run, our goals can only be achieved 

and then secured by Afghan forces. Transition then is the linchpin 

of our strategy, not merely the way out. And I know that you are 

faced with that as far as that. 

Tell me, where we are right now, what are the largest gaps that 

you believe are there with the Afghan National Security Forces? 

And how do you believe those gaps will be bridged or what might 

even be left as we begin to ramp down and have some kind of residual force there as we go forward? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks. And I would echo General Allen’s comments about the defeat mechanism being the indigenous forces and that is exactly our approach in terms of growing 

the capabilities and capacities of the Afghan National Security 

Forces. 

Where we are right now is that aviation is one of those gaps that 

you asked about. Logistics is one of those gaps that you asked 

about. Intelligence, command and control, and then leadership. We 

have got a significant deficit in leadership. We are short some 

10,000 non-commissioned officers in the army, some 6,000 in the 

police. There is inconsistency in the quality of leadership across the 

police and the army that will take time, and that is certainly something that the Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Interior 

are both working on over time. I believe we will be in the right trajectory in most of those areas before the end of 2014. We will still 

need an advise and assist effort to address some of the ministerial 

capacity issues that I have spoken about, planning, programming, 

budgeting, and all the things that really need to be put in place 

to sustain our progress over time. 

The one area where we will still have a significant gap post-2014 

is in aviation. We won’t see that gap closed until 2015 or 2016. But 

in most of those other areas, our effort is to accelerate the pace of 

fielding what we describe broadly as enablers, which are those 

functional areas that I spoke about. And I think we will be pretty 

close to where we need to be by the end of 2014, with certainly 

some work, particularly in terms of integrating capabilities, some 

work left to be done after 2014. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask you this, just yes or no, then you don’t 

believe then that the gaps, as they exist today, or where they will 

be as we begin to move to a residual force would be fatal to the 

long-term stability of Afghanistan? 
37 

General DUNFORD. I don’t, Congressman. I believe that the trajectory that the Afghan security forces will be on post-2014, given 

the projections that we make about the security environment within which they will be operating, will allow them to be successful 

in effecting security transition and provide security to the Afghan 

people post-2014. 

I do think, from time to time, aviation support we will continue 

to provide intelligence support, command and control, but I think 

that is the nature of advise and assist. So I would caveat my comment by saying that based on the limited support that we will support post-2014, I am confident in the Afghan capability to provide 

security. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask you this. As far as retrograde, I know 

it is a challenge trying to get equipment out of there, determining 

which equipment we keep, which we may send to the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces]. 

How is that progressing? I know the packed GLOC [Ground 

Lines of Communication] as opened up a little bit, but certainly not 

with enough flow to get to the Port of Karachi to where we could 

really get equipment out like we need to. 

Obviously flying costs and the efforts through the northern 

routes are also very, very expensive. Where do you see things with 

our force structure in the retrograde? Have there been discussions 

about how much we can leave there? I know the different branches 

want to be able to take some things home because that is critical 

to their reset. 

Give me your vision where we are today, where we need to be 

to make sure that the retrograde is taking place in good pace along 

with our drawdown. 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first, with regard to the equipment that we will bring out. I have pledged to the Services that 

whatever they need to reset, we will retrograde. And that is our 

plan is based on what the Services identify as important and we 

will make sure that that happens. 

As you know, from my recent experience, I am sensitive to the 

needs of the Services as well as the requirements that we have forward, and we will balance those over the next 2 years. 

We don’t have a capacity issue with regard to getting the equipment home. But you correctly identified the real issue, which is the 

cost. And so we have plenty of capacity. We could move all of our 

equipment out by air or multimodal, flying it to a port and then 

bringing it back home by ship. But it is significantly less expensive 

were we to bring it out across the ground lines of communication. 

As an example, I think the total cost for our retrograde is on the 

order of $6 billion if we don’t have the GLOCs available, and closer 

to $4 billion if we do. And I can get those exact figures to you, but 

it is not insignificant, the amount of money that would cost us if 

the GLOCs are not available. 

We have had 2 months of successful proofs of principle moving 

equipment both from Afghanistan to Pakistan and through the 

Port of Karachi and back home. As well as having equipment that 

had been backlogged inside of Pakistan has now been freed up and 

brought into Afghanistan. 
38 

This next 2 months will be critical. We will start to see the velocity that we will need to have on those ground lines of communication. But we have worked through the technical aspects of getting 

through the various checkpoints and customs and security pieces of 

movements across the ground lines of communication, and I think 

we are in pretty good shape as we look towards the next couple of 

months. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford, 

thank you for your service to our country and please convey to the 

men and women that you lead how proud we are of them and how 

much we support them and want them home safely. We appreciate 

their effort very, very much. 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And yours as well. On page 15 of your testimony, 

you outline one of the definitions of victory as an operationally ineffective Al Qaeda deprived of a safe haven from which to plan and 

conduct operations outside the area. How do we stand today with 

respect to achieving that goal? 

General DUNFORD. Inside of Afghanistan, Congressman, the operations that we have conducted with our Special Operations 

Forces have effectively disrupted Al Qaeda. 

There is a small presence in the northeast part of the country, 

a small Al Qaeda presence, but I do not assess them as having the 

capability to plan or conduct operations outside of Afghanistan at 

this time. And it is largely as a result of the operational tempo of 

our Special Operating forces, which virtually, every night, are conducting operations to disrupt those Al Qaeda remnants. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I know what is supposed to happen when those 

Special Ops forces are no longer in the country doing that. What 

do you think will happen? When the Afghan forces are responsible 

for achieving that objective, how do you assess their readiness to 

do that? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think there are a couple of 

variables. One is the capabilities of the Afghan security forces and 

I am confident in their development over time that they will be 

able to provide security inside of Afghanistan. 

But a critical piece of addressing the enemy situation in Afghanistan is going to be where Pakistan is with regards to supporting 

the enemy inside of Pakistan, as well as the progress of political 

transition inside of Afghanistan. So those are all preconditions to 

our ability to have a sustainable security environment over time. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand these goals are integrated, they all 

relate to each other. I notice that the fourth goal is that constructive ANSF-Pakistani military relationship. How does the Taliban 

fit? If that relationship between the ANSF and Pakistan is optimal, 

from our point of view, how does that alliance deal with the 

Taliban and what is their relationship with the Taliban? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, one of the developments that I 

have seen certainly in the last few months, and I have met with 

General Kayani in Pakistan twice now since arriving in Afghanistan, is there is a growing recognition inside of Pakistan that the 
39 

linkage between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban has a destabilizing effect, not only inside of Afghanistan but inside of Pakistan, as well. 

In fact, it has been described to me by the Pakistanis as their 

desire to break the nexus between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan 

Taliban to try to support the turning of the Afghan Taliban politically inwards toward Kabul so they can deal with the very real 

threat they have inside of Pakistan. 

Pakistan has lost over 15,000 killed or wounded since 9/11 dealing with the threat. Just in the past couple of weeks, inside the 

Khyber Agency, they were involved in a very difficult fight where 

hundreds have been killed and wounded as they deal with the TTP 

[Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan] threat. 

So from my perspective, the military-to-military relationship that 

Afghanistan and Pakistan has post-2014 will be helpful in dealing 

with what is now, I think, commonly understood to be a mutual 

threat to their security. And I actually have—although there are 

some concerns about the strategic relationship between those two 

countries, I actually have a degree of optimism about our ability to 

affect a constructive military-to-military relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan because of their common understanding of 

the threat post-2014. 

Mr. ANDREWS. That would be like—best news we could anticipate 

for the future of the region. I noticed that the attrition rates for 

the Afghan forces still are about twice what the goal is. What has 

been the most effective attrition reduction strategy that you have 

seen in country thus far? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, from my perspective, it is 

about leadership. And when I came into the United States Marine 

Corps in the 1970s, both the United States Marine Corps and the 

Army had significant attrition problems. And we fixed those problems with leadership. We fixed those problems by holding leaders 

accountable and to standard. 

And that is exactly the most effective way to deal with the attrition problem in the Afghan forces. There are really two pieces of 

it. One is good vetting, as individuals are recruited to come into the 

service. And then once they are in, ensuring that we have the proper command climate within which those individuals—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. So is there a range of results that some units that 

are well-led have very low attrition and others that have very high 

attrition? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there is a direct correlation between leadership and attrition. 

I will give you an example. The Minister of Defense recently 

identified 30 general officers to be reassigned or relieved of their 

duties. He gave us that list of names. When we did a correlation 

of those names and units, we found that there was a direct correlation between high attrition levels in those units and the failure of 

those individuals to perform to standard. 

So absolutely a relationship between the two. And again, I think 

today we have an inconsistency in leadership across the Afghan 

forces that will be addressed over time. 

Mr. ANDREWS. General, thank you very much for your service. 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Rogers. 
40 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to see you 

again. Thank you for your service and thank you for your hospitality a few weeks ago when I was in Afghanistan. 

I am going to be parochial here. I have the Anniston Army Depot 

here in my district, several thousand great Americans who have 

done a real stand-up job in supporting our military in both theaters 

and been over there side-by-side with them on many occasions trying to make sure that their equipment worked. 

And as a result, I am focused a little bit on FMS [foreign military 

sales] with Afghanis. Are there any foreign military sales planned 

with the Afghanis to try to help them with the equipment we are 

going to leave behind or not at present? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we are still refining the plans 

for FMS for Afghanistan. I would be happy to stay in contact with 

you and provide those details over time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. I serve on the Readiness 

committee with Mr. Wittman who just talked to you about retrograde. And I know part of the tour you gave me over there was 

looking at retrograde. 

One of the things that has come up since I have gotten back is 

whether or not the costs for bringing the equipment back, transportation, which you were just talking about with Mr. Wittman, has 

become so onerous that that may be a big factor in whether or not 

we bring some of the stuff back. Is that going to be the primary 

factor on whether or not we can use it again? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the Services are making a 

case-by-case decision on each piece of equipment. And one of the 

factors is obviously the requirement back home. Another factor is 

the condition of the equipment that is in Afghanistan. And then 

the costs of transporting that equipment home. 

But we have a very close dialogue with the services. In fact, I 

think with regard to the Army we are doing weekly VTCs [video 

teleconference] with the Army to track the equipment that they 

need to bring back home. 

So cost is one of the variables, but it is just one of the variables. 

The real issue is achieving the desired end state, which is enhancing the readiness of our home station units. And so it is all being 

balanced in a way that I think is appropriate. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Last question I have got—and you may not 

know the answer to this, because the President’s budget just came 

out—but do you know if that budget request adequately funds the 

transportation cost that you expect in the retrograde, or is it too 

early to tell? 

General DUNFORD. Congressman, it is too soon to tell. We have 

not got the details of the actual OCO piece of that budget which 

would cover the transportation cost you refer to. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you for your service and I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Well, seeing no—Colonel Kline, you have no questions 

at all? 

General, on behalf of the committee, first of all, I had a couple 

of questions but you have already answered. You have been extremely patient. I want to thank you very much for our visit that 

we had over there. It was really an eye-opener. I was very, very 

impressed with the American military, primarily Army units. Your 
41 

leadership, the Afghans, it was—very, very concerned about the 

politics, but that is something we will discuss outside this room. 

But, I wanted to give you a chance if you had any final comments you wanted to make. It has been a long morning. You have 

answered every question conceivable, I think, and I appreciate your 

patience. 

So you have the last word. 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman. 

The only comment I have is I actually do appreciate the opportunity to come here today to testify. And one of the reasons is I am 

concerned that perhaps Afghanistan is in the rearview mirror in 

some ways to the Afghan people, and I very much appreciate the 

House Armed Service Committee ensuring that, that is not the 

case. 

We still do have nearly 60,000 young men and women that are 

in harm’s way, and what I want to do is the same that thing you 

want to do, ensure that they have the wherewithal to accomplish 

the mission until the very last day that they are in Afghanistan. 

And so I appreciate the support of the committee in making sure 

that we do that, and I appreciate your visit. And we welcome any 

members of the committee to come over and visit. One, I think it 

means a lot to our forces forward deployed. They know by your 

visit that you actually care about what support they have, and I 

also think it just reaffirms the commitment of the American people 

to what they are doing, and let’s them know that what they are 

doing is important. 

And I would tell you that at the end of the day is really all they 

ask for, they just ask that the American people recognize and support what they are doing in Afghanistan. And I think with that 

support they will do whatever it is that we ask them to do. 

So thanks very much. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, General. 

On behalf of the committee, thanks again. 

Semper Fi. 

This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 17, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 17, 2013 

(47) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Recent Developments in Afghanistan 

April 17, 2013 

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony on the recent developments 

in Afghanistan. Today, we have with us General Joseph Dunford. 

General Dunford, thank you for your leadership and service to the 

Nation, and thank you for joining us today. 

The NATO mission has entered a period of ‘‘transition.’’ Although 

NATO has not fully transitioned security efforts to Afghan lead, 

President Obama already has announced the withdrawal of half of 

the U.S. forces in Afghanistan by this time next year. In my view, 

the President’s approach is fraught with unnecessary risk. Nevertheless, on my recent trip to the region, I was impressed by how 

far the Afghan security forces have come. Their capabilities and 

willingness to fight for the future of their country are remarkable. 

The fundamental question before us is how the United States 

will continue to preserve U.S. national security interests after 

2014. One of the key components to answering this question—in 

addition to the President’s forthcoming decision on post-2014 troop 

presence and mission set—will be the Bilateral Security Agreement 

that the Administration is currently negotiating with the Government of Afghanistan. 

After over 10 years of war, the American people are understandably war-weary. Clearly, the situation in Afghanistan and the region is challenging and complex. But Afghanistan is directly connected to our vital national security interests and we must get this 

right. We owe nothing less to the victims on 9/11, the U.S. troops 

and their families who have served and sacrificed, and our sons 

and daughters who may have to return if we get this wrong. The 

simple justice that comes from that principled position cannot be 

overstated. 

General Dunford, again, we are extremely grateful for your service to our country. I look forward to your testimony. 
48 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Recent Developments in Afghanistan 

April 17, 2013 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share in your comments about the 

outstanding job General Dunford has done and the job that our 

troops have done in a very, very difficult environment. 

I have been there many times myself and I have seen the 

progress, and not just in Kabul, not just in the capital, but out in 

some of the tougher regions, down in Helmand, down south in 

Kandahar and other places. Our men and women have done an 

amazing job and they did it by putting their lives on the line and 

going out there and cleaning up places that needed to be cleaned 

up and giving the Afghan people the chance in a more stable 

future. 

So we definitely recognize the service, the sacrifice, and the outstanding job that they have done and admire the progress that has 

been made. 

I also want to say that I thank General Dunford, I heard some 

of his comments yesterday. I think it has been clear for some time 

what our goals are in Afghanistan. I have always had a great frustration that people say we don’t know what we are doing there. We 

know exactly what we are doing there. 

We want to make sure that we have an Afghan government that 

can stand, that can be stable, that has security and governance 

without us, because we cannot have a permanent presence there. 

We want to deny Al Qaeda the ability to return to Afghanistan and 

use it as a safe haven. And really that second goal is tied directly 

to the first of having an Afghan government that can stand and 

survive against the Taliban, against potential AQ elements. I think 

that has been clear from the start. 

Those are modest, realistic goals. We are not going to eliminate 

the Taliban from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The question is 

can we contain them and what is the best strategy for containing 

them? And the best strategy for containing them is doing our level 

best to train the Afghan security forces to be in a position to do 

that. And I think we have made enormous progress on that front 

and we are headed in the right direction. 

But part of doing that is making it clear that eventually we are 

going to leave. Eventually they are going to have that responsibility. We cannot be a permanent crutch. We have to transition. 

And we have seen that. 

As we have moved from district to district and province to province, we have turned over slowly and gradually and I think very 

intelligently greater responsibility to those Afghan National Security Forces. We haven’t just said, woop, you are on your own and 

pulled out. We have been transitioning in a way to build their 

strength, capability, and durability. 
49 

Now there are no guarantees, no doubt about that. This is a 

very, very difficult part of the world. It will be a very, very difficult 

part of the world 5 years from now, 10 years from and, odds are, 

20 years from now. But we have put the Afghan National Security 

Forces in the best possible position to be able to, at a minimum, 

hold, to stop the Taliban from taking back over the government 

and giving Al Qaeda a safe haven. 

And as we go forward, we have to try to envision what our role 

is going to be. And I will agree with the Chairman, I think the single most important thing right now is to get that Bilateral Security 

Agreement to eliminate some of that uncertainty as to what exactly 

our role is going to be post-2014. 

I know General Dunford is working hard on that. I know President Karzai is not always the easiest person to work with to get 

there, but I know that is a huge priority. 

But at the end of the day, we cannot stay in Afghanistan forever 

for a wide variety of reasons, but the only one I will point out here 

is that if we do, the Afghan government will never truly be sovereign, will never truly be stable, and will never truly have the respect of the Afghan people that it needs to be the sustainable government that we need it to be. 

So I think the path the President and General Dunford and others have put us on, though not easy, though not full of guarantees, 

it is the best, smartest path to put us in a direction where we can 

have the security goals that we strive for in that very, very difficult 

part of the region. 

I thank General Dunford again for his service. I look forward to 

his testimony and to the questions from the panel. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 17, 2013 

(69) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

General DUNFORD. In Fiscal Year 13 (FY13) United States Forces-Afghanistan 

(USFOR–A) spent $16.5M on construction for U.S. Forces in minor military construction, life/health/safety construction, and repairs. There is an additional $14.1M 

remaining. USFOR–A spent $178M on humanitarian/economic reconstruction, with 

an additional $400M remaining. [See page 21.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

General DUNFORD. Neither Afghanistan nor any of its regional neighbors carries 

out chemical or biological weapons programs. Extremist groups have developed and 

employed limited quantities of crude poisons; however, extremists have not shown 

the ability to develop or procure highly potent biological or chemical weapons. 

Both Pakistan and Iran are capable of producing radiological material, and limited quantities of radiological material may be accessible in the former Soviet Republics north of Afghanistan. The potential exists for this material to be used in 

conjunction with conventional explosives to form a radiological weapon; however, we 

have not witnessed such an attack, and we consider the threat of such an attack 

to be low. 

Finally, we are unaware of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons proliferation in the region. [See page 24.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

General DUNFORD. The Family Response Unit (FRU) program is an Afghan Ministry of Interior program and is not being eliminated. Over 300 Afghan personnel 

remain assigned to the FRU in all 34 provinces and large districts. Currently, 22 

contractors provide advisory support to the FRU program. Due to drawdown limitations affecting the contractors’ security, logistics resupply, and effective FRU mentor 

auditing/oversight, International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF’s) NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) decided to de-scope the advisory contract. However, the FRU program will remain an active Ministry of Interior Program. [See 

page 23.] 

General DUNFORD. Our assessment can only be given for contractors supporting 

the United States portion of the mission. Given United States Forces—Afghanistan’s 

(USFOR–A’s) current understanding of the mission, completion of retrograde, troop 

mix, and base structure, I anticipate requiring less than 13,000 contractors in support of the force. The mission support areas accomplished by contractors will include 

base support/logistics/maintenance, communications support, construction, training, 

translation services, intelligence effects services, transportation and Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operators. Depending on the final Force 

Management Level (FML) and mission assignments, other areas of support may be 

required as well. [See page 24.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 17, 2013 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, on April 16th, 2013, at the Senate Armed Services Committee, you highlighted the fact that there is growing fear and uncertainty within 

Afghanistan. With our focus shifting to a handover of security responsibilities, can 

you highlight the key areas and milestones that will need to be reached in order 

to reduce the probability of the Taliban succeeding in their ‘‘fear campaign’’ against 

the Afghanistan National Security Forces? 

General DUNFORD. There are two key areas that will help counter the Taliban’s 

‘‘fear campaign,’’ which is based upon the narrative of ‘‘abandonment’’ by the West. 

The first is the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). The BSA is the physical manifestation of our public commitment to Afghanistan after the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) mission ends in 2014. A BSA between the U.S. and Afghanistan will not only help instill confidence in the Afghan people regarding their future, but will also help provide our coalition partners the political capital necessary 

to garner support and incentivize commitment to the post-2014 mission. Greater 

commitment on the part of the international community will further negate the Afghan population’s anxieties and the Taliban’s narrative regarding abandonment. 

The second key area to countering the Taliban’s ‘‘fear campaign’’ comes in the 

form of a successful 2013 fighting season for the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF). This summer the ANSF will have the lead for security operations across 

Afghanistan, with ISAF in support. A confident and successful ANSF after the 2013 

fighting season will drive down Afghan fears regarding security and establish a secure environment in 2014 that permits free, fair, and inclusive elections. With confidence in the ANSF to provide security and a successful 2014 election that results 

in a peaceful transition of presidential power, the people of Afghanistan will have 

gained a major victory over the Taliban. The people of Afghanistan will have 

achieved the political stability and confidence to take advantage of a decade of opportunity. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, most accounts portray the Taliban as a unified entity, but 

is the Taliban monolithic? Are there particular strains within that organization that 

are more willing to take concrete steps towards reconciliation, and conversely, are 

there hardline elements that are intractable? 

General DUNFORD. There is friction among different groups of Taliban members. 

This friction is caused by personal grievances, tribal differences and some ideological 

differences. Senior leaders have internal debates as to how to proceed in terms of 

talks with the United States. While there is debate, very few Taliban have actually 

taken steps towards reconciliation, and we assess there are only a handful now who 

are considering a break from the Taliban, but not enough to fracture the organization. The hardline elements firmly believe the Taliban can achieve their goals 

through military means and see no reason to engage in ‘‘peace’’ talks with the 

Unites States. 

Both the moderates and the hardliners may shift their position in the coming 

months based on factors which include, strength of ANSF, strength of the Afghan 

government—particularly the success of the 2014 presidential election and the composition of the new government—and the commitment of the international community toward Afghanistan and enduring troop numbers. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, is Pakistan a positive or negative force in getting the 

Taliban to the negotiating table? 

General DUNFORD. There are indications that the Government of Pakistan is 

reaching out to the Government of Afghanistan to build a foundation of cooperation. 

In November, Pakistan played a positive role when it hosted the Afghan High Peace 

Council, the only entity President Karzai authorizes to negotiate with the Taliban. 

However, I believe we need to remain fully engaged with Pakistan to continue to 

play a positive role in determining a long-term political solution between the 

Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, as our forces draw down, how do you see the mixture of 

regular and special forces evolving? As one of the ‘‘SOF Truths’’ is that most operations require non-SOF assistance, are you confident that the remaining assets will 
74 

have the support they need? Additionally, can you game out for this Committee potential outcomes of the Afghan Presidential 2014 election? 

General DUNFORD. SOF depend on general purpose force (GPF) enablers for continued operations supporting the current ISAF mission as well as the post-2014 mission in Afghanistan. GPF enabler support provides unique capabilities that are either not organic to SOF formations or are not organic in the quantity required to 

conduct special operations across a country the size of Afghanistan. Enabler support 

to SOF includes: ISR, force protection, MEDEVAC, forward medical support (e.g. 

forward surgical teams, Role II and III hospitals), route clearance packages, rotary 

wing lift and fires, fixed wing fires, and base infrastructure support. Planners from 

SOF and GPF have been working closely to analyze the impact of the force drawdown and ensure that the reduction of GPF enabler support are properly mitigated 

or their impacts are minimized. 

The International Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC–A) staffs recently completed an analysis of the 

drawdown with a particular focus on identifying functional and geographic gaps, including the loss of enabler support to SOF. This analysis was briefed to me, and 

I am confident that our drawdown plan provides an adequate mix of SOF and GPF 

enablers to meet mission objectives. For the post-2014 mission, we are planning a 

force structure of SOF and GPF that will provide sufficient enabler support. However, if national leadership directs force levels below what we have recommended, 

there will be an impact on critical enabler support. With lower force levels and a 

reduced GPF footprint, there will be less GPF enablers available from which SOF 

can draw; this will limit SOF’s ability to meet all expected objectives within the currently planned timelines for the post-2014 mission. 

The 2014 Afghan Presidential election outcome is best left to the Afghan people. 

Our mission is to ensure that ANSF are in the lead and are capable of providing 

security for the Afghan people moving forward. I would defer further comment on 

the Afghan elections to the State Department. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, in last year’s NDAA, Congress provided expanded authority to donate non-excess equipment to the ANSF. Has ISAF utilized 

this new authority? If so, to what extent? What types of equipment have been transferred? 

General DUNFORD. To date the International Security Forces-Afghanistan (ISAF) 

and United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) have not exercised this authority. We appreciate the expanded authority granted in last year’s National Defense 

Authorization Act and expect that ISAF and USFOR–A will, over the course of the 

next 20 months, find these authorities useful as retrograde activities continue. We 

continue to track ANSF requirements that can be cross-matched against available 

non-excess material. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, have you seen any decrease in the overall readiness of the U.S. forces that are being deployed to Afghanistan? Are they getting the 

training and equipment they need to operate in theater? 

General DUNFORD. U.S. Forces in Afghanistan are receiving all the equipment 

they need to successfully execute their missions of training and advising the Afghan 

National Security Forces. Moreover, U.S. Forces are properly equipped to protect 

themselves from insurgent attacks or take the lead in security operations, when necessary. 

Units and personnel are receiving the appropriate training prior to arriving in 

theater. Upon arrival in theater, U.S. Forces pre-deployment training is augmented 

with in-theater/regional specific training to prepare units and personnel for the diversity of the mission environment. I am concerned that the effects of sequestration 

may negatively impact future home station pre-deployment training. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, what are your top concerns and challenges with 

the reset and redeployment of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan? Furthermore, how do 

you ensure that we leave a secure footprint for the enduring conventional and Special Operations Forces that will operate in Afghanistan post—2014? 

General DUNFORD. The resetting of each Service’s equipment represents our biggest challenge as it is essential to future military readiness. Each Service will identify equipment that will be processed, returned, reset and placed back into the fleet. 

Once the last piece of equipment leaves Afghanistan, it is really at this point that 

the reset process begins since OCO funding for reset will be needed for 3 years beyond that date. Consequently, Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds will be 

a necessity for all Services after we drawn down all the deployed equipment to bring 
75 

it back to fully mission capable standards. As we reduce our footprint in theater, 

we are reviewing options for our enduring presence locations that are within range 

of high-quality medical care; maintaining ground and aerial quick reaction forces to 

provide support; and ensuring Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

assets are in place to protect the force. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, in light of Pakistan’s repeated and extended closures of cargo transportation routes to the Port of Karachi, what are your concerns 

about our continued heavy reliance on Pakistan for logistical support for operations 

in Afghanistan? What other options beyond existing Northern Distribution Networks (NDN) is ISAF exploring? 

General DUNFORD. Equipment is currently flowing through the Pakistan Ground 

Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC) and I believe these routes offer the best option 

for removing our equipment from Afghanistan. If required, we could move all of our 

equipment out by air or by a combination of other means, but at a higher cost from 

a fiscal and time perspective. We plan to maximize our usage of the PAKGLOC as 

the most cost effective and efficient means. In addition the arrival of a CENTCOM 

Material Retrograde Elements (CMRE) late in FY 2012 to oversee our retrograde 

efforts will be helpful in managing the PAKGLOC. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, with regard to the troop drawdown strategy, 

what are specific conditions on the ground, relating to both Afghan National Security Force capabilities and the capabilities of the enemy you will be examining to 

manage the U.S. troop drawdowns? What are the largest gaps in the capabilities 

of the Afghan National Security Force today that need to be improved by 2014 for 

the Afghan security forces to maintain a stable Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. I will be specifically examining the combat effectiveness and 

confidence of the ANSF to protect the people with minimal support from the coalition. In terms of the enemy, I will examine signs of their increased isolation from 

the people and leadership conflicts that can create opportunities to divide them. 

These factors will help me determine my recommendation to the President on future 

troop drawdowns. 

Our long-term goal is to build sustainable processes with the ANSF. The largest 

gap in capabilities of the ANSF today is close air support and that won’t be addressed until after 2014. It will take until 2016 or 2018 before the sustainable air 

support program will be sustainable. I would emphasize that in order for our gains 

to be sustainable, we must maintain our train, advise, and assist mission at the 

Corps level post-2014. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General, two years ago General Petraeus testified before this committee saying, ‘‘As a bottom line up front, it is ISAF’s assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much 

of the country and reversed in a number of important areas. However, while the 

security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. Moreover, it is clear that much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan 

partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the expected Taliban spring 

offensive.’’ General with the effort to draw down our forces by the end of 2014, are 

we still willing to concede that our progress is fragile and reversible? It seems that 

outside of the Taliban and the terrorist networks operating in and around Afghanistan our biggest enemy is time. Do you have enough time to execute a sound, measured, responsible drawdown while still maintaining a force capable of training the 

ANSF to take the lead and keep the Taliban and terrorist networks from resecuring 

a foothold in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Each day the ANSF is growing stronger and more confident. 

I have no doubt they will perform commendably during this fighting season. Thus, 

while I would not call our progress to date fragile, I would call it reversible. For 

that reason, it will be important for the U.S., our coalition partners, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to honor the pledges made 

at Chicago and Tokyo. 

I think we have a measured and reasonable approach for our drawdown while we 

shift our mission focus to train, advise, and assist in support of the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF). ISAF is engaged down to the battalion level with the ANSF 

in the lead for the first time this summer. We are already at the point where the 

vast majority of U.S. forces are in a train, advise, and assist configuration. I am 

confident the ANSF, with our support, can keep the Taliban and terrorist networks 

from resecuring a foothold in Afghanistan during our drawdown. 
76 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER 

Mr. BARBER. General Dunford, Pakistan’s internal stability and economic development during and after the upcoming elections will undoubtedly affect our drawdown 

of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In your testimony, you mentioned insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. If we continuously have to engage terrorist forces in Pakistan, 

with increasing chaos in the region, our transition from Afghanistan will be challenging. What sort of relationship would you like to see with the next Pakistani government, that will help to protect our interests in Afghanistan and how should we 

engage Pakistan in the coming months and after the election? 

General DUNFORD. We recognize the historic significance of the upcoming election 

as a true watershed moment with the first transfer of power from one democratically elected civilian government to another. Regardless of which party wins, we 

will continue to positively engage with the new Pakistani government as before. 

From a U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR–A) perspective, we will continue our 

positive military-to-military relationship with Pakistan to further our national interests in the region. 

Mr. BARBER. General Dunford, thank you for appearing before the Committee for 

this important update. Sir, you mentioned in your testimony and I complete agree 

that border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan is interdependent upon both 

countries’ efforts; however, their relationship has ebbed and flowed over time. It 

seems to me that for decades Pakistan has focused its regional strategy on its borders—whether competing with India for nuclear dominance, or seeking to influence 

what happens in Afghanistan. We saw this during the eighties with the Soviet invasion, and over the past ten years as we have sought to bring down the Taliban and 

Al Qaeda. As Pakistan continues to depend on U.S. military and economic support, 

how can we encourage more Pakistani involvement in border security, our efforts 

to defeat the Taliban, and end the war in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. ISAF strongly encourages Pakistan and Afghanistan to discuss 

border issues within the Tripartite Commission. In November 2012, the Tripartite 

Commission approved the Tripartite Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The 

framework of the SOP serves as a tangible demonstration of security cooperation 

and strategic outreach. The SOP defines the Border Coordination Area to ensure 

common reporting standards, establishes a uniform set of protocols to enhance coordination and communication on both sides of the border, minimizes cross-border 

incidents, mitigates incidents of fratricide, and establishes information sharing requirements. We need to continue to encourage both parties to abide by the SOP to 

better manage border tensions and more effectively control the border in denying 

the Taliban freedom of movement. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON 

Mr. CARSON. Do you believe that President Karzai or any future President of Afghanistan can be a unifying figure that can successfully dissuade the Afghan people 

from violence? Or do you believe this type of persuasion is going to have to come 

from local officials and religious figures? How is the United States military addressing the strengths and weaknesses of top Afghan officials to promote a more secure 

country? 

General DUNFORD. President Karzai can be a unifying figure for the Afghan people. For example, he has sought to build consensus by holding a National Consultative Peace Jirga in 2010 declaring that the doors of peace will remain open to all 

those who renounce violence, cut links with terrorist organizations, return to a 

peaceful life, and respect the Afghan Constitution. This assembly led to the establishment of the Afghan High Peace Council. These efforts address concerns across 

a wide, multi-ethnic body. 

As with any federal government, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) would function more efficiently with the support of local officials. 

At the local level, ISAF supports GIRoA’s Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation 

Process (APRP) which encourages insurgents to abandon extremism. APRP aims to 

build trust and confidence among Afghans who have been fighting their government 

and each other for far too long. 

In its advisory mission with the security ministries, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan 

(USFOR–A) and the International Security Forces—Afghanistan (ISAF) are working 

to increase institutional capacity, while also supporting the Afghan government’s 

program to combat corruption. Reducing corruption is essential to enhancing the legitimacy of the government and thereby strengthens the abilities of top Afghan officials to promote security. Our partners in the Ministries of Defense and Interior 
77 

have demonstrated a willingness to remove corrupt officials and enhance the legitimacy and strength of their institutions in providing security to Afghanistan. 

Mr. CARSON. What impact does corruption have on the safety and security of our 

forces in Afghanistan today? To what degree are corrupted officials, troops and police complicit in attacks on our forces and what steps are being taken between now 

and 2014 to address this corruption? 

General DUNFORD. Corruption has an indirect impact on the safety and security 

of our forces. There is little direct evidence tying corrupt officials, troops, or police 

to attacks on our forces. However, corruption does contribute to an environment 

under which insurgents, criminals, and lethal aid transit Afghanistan’s borders and 

move within the country. Multiple efforts to address corruption, including prudent 

force protection measures, engagement with Afghan security ministries, fielded 

forces, working with inter-agency partners and the International Community to improve internal controls and external verification mechanisms have been underway 

for several years, and will continue through 2014 and beyond. As we transition to 

a Security Force Assistance role and later to the post-ISAF mission, anti- and 

counter-corruption efforts will increasingly rest with the Afghans themselves. 

Mr. CARSON. While we have had special forces units based in Afghanistan, there 

have been occasions when specialized units have been brought in for missions targeting high-value targets—like Seal Team Six with Osama bin Laden. How will the 

change in our force structure and mission impact our pursuit of high-value targets 

in Afghanistan post-2014? 

General DUNFORD. The use of a specialized SOF unit from outside Afghanistan 

to conduct a mission like the Osama bin Laden raid in Pakistan has been extremely 

rare. The vast majority of our missions pursuing high value targets (HVT) are done 

by forces present in Afghanistan. For our post-2014 mission, we have planned a 

highly capable SOF force structure that can conduct the full range of special operations, to include pursuing HVTs. This planned force will be smaller than our current force which will reduce the number of targets that we can pursue at any given 

time. Our planners have designed the SOF structure in accordance with specific restrictions from national leadership regarding the types of targets that we are authorized to engage post-2014; this allows us to maintain a smaller force. However, 

SOF will continue to train, advise, and assist (TAA) Afghan special security forces 

(a mix of Afghan SOF and special police units) at the ministerial, institutional, operational and tactical levels. This will enable the Afghans, who will be clearly in the 

lead for their own security, to pursue Afghan-designated HVTs. 

In this regard, we view our post-2014 TAA and counter-terrorism (CT) missions 

as being inextricably linked. Finally, as with the Osama bin Laden raid, United 

States Central Command (USCENTCOM) retains the capability to bring in specialized units for short-notice missions to pursue HVTs if outside of Afghanistan. 

Our biggest concern for this capability will be the availability of bases from which 

such a force can operate on short notice. While we feel confident that we will retain 

sufficient bases to support these missions, this is subject to the results of the ongoing Bilateral Security Agreement negotiations between the United States and Afghanistan. 

Mr. CARSON. In 2010 there were reports that upwards of $1 trillion worth of mineral deposits have been found within Afghanistan. These are obviously of significant 

interest to the international business community, which is seeking inroads for lucrative mining contracts. However, we also know from history that such mineral deposits often become grounds for serious internal and regional conflicts. What risks do 

you see in this area and do you believe that foreign military or security forces will 

attempt to set up operations in Afghanistan to protect their national business interests brought in for mining operations? Are issues involving these minerals causing 

any challenges for you? 

General DUNFORD. The greatest challenge at this point is for Afghanistan to have 

a sustainable legal, physical and security infrastructure that will encourage investment, while allowing the Afghan people to leverage the mineral wealth in developing their economy. It is unlikely a foreign military force will establish a significant presence in order to secure its extractives investment. The cost of the military 

operation would make Afghanistan a more costly place to do business than a competing mineral rich nation. Most likely, companies will use indigenous Afghan security (e.g. Afghan Public Protection Force) forces for security. The international business community has some reservations about investing in Afghanistan’s mineral 

wealth given the absence of a legal framework that enables predictability, transparency and oversight. Without a more attractive investment climate, the business 

community will question the risk and profitability of investing in Afghanistan. 
78 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART 

Mr. ENYART. What are the lessons learned with multilateral relationships in Afghanistan and how can we export what has been learned to other areas where we 

have little or no physical presence like AFRICOM? 

General DUNFORD. Many of our coalition partners bring unique strengths to ISAF. 

The coalition has become quite proficient at leveraging the strengths of each contributing nation. This synergy strengthens the ISAF mission and it increases the pride, 

political will, and commitment of our partners. We have learned to provide enabling 

support to overcome some of our partners’ limitations and take advantage of their 

strengths. For example, providing something as simple as medical evacuation support might permit a country to play a significant role in advising and assisting Afghan forces or a combat mission. 

Another important lesson learned is the value of enduring military-to-military relationships. When I was a battalion commander at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 

in 1996, I had a Georgian platoon serving with me under the NATO Partnership 

for Peace program. In all there were 19 former Soviet bloc nations that came to the 

United States to begin to learn our tactics, techniques and procedures and some of 

the cultural dynamics that make modern, professional armies. Today I’m proud to 

tell you that there are 1,500 Georgians in Helmand Province; they are battlespace 

owners and they are conducting complex counterinsurgency operations. Where they 

are today versus where they were in 1996 is nothing short of profound. I think it 

came from our investment in our coalition partners over the decades. These lessons 

are easily applied anywhere and do not require an actual physical presence. Nearly 

any willing partner can make a consequential contribution. 

Mr. ENYART. What has been the impact on USMC in terms of readiness as QRF? 

General DUNFORD. As a former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, I believe this question would be best answered by the current Commandant of the Marine Corps or the Joint Staff. 

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