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BORDER SECURITY OVERSIGHT, PART III: BORDER 

CROSSING CARDS AND B1/B2 VISAS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 14, 2013 

Serial No. 113–77 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

Vacancy 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on November 14, 2013 ...................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. John Wagner, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field 

Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Mr. John P. Woods, Assistant Director, National Security Investigations Division, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22 

Mr. Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, 

Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 28 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 30 

Mr. Juan Osuna, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. 

Department of Justice 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 53 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 55 

APPENDIX 

The Hon. Jason Chaffetz, a Member of Congress from the State of Utah, 

Opening Statement .............................................................................................. 88 

SFL Opening Statement ......................................................................................... 92 

(1) 

BORDER SECURITY OVERSIGHT, PART III: 

BORDER CROSSING CARDS AND B1/B2 VISAS 

Thursday, November 14, 2013, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Gosar, Bentivolio, Tierney, 

Speier, Lujan Grisham, and Welch. 

Also Present: Representatives Lynch and Kelly. 

Staff Present: Brien A. Beattle, Majority Professional Staff Member; Molly Boyl, Majority Parliamentarian; Lawrence J. Brady, Majority Staff Director; Daniel Bucheli, Majority Assistant Clerk; 

John Cuaderes, Majority Deputy Staff Director; Jennifer Hemingway, Majority Deputy Policy Director; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Majority Counsel; Laura L. Rush, Majority Deputy Chief Clerk; Sang 

H. Yi, Majority Professional Staff Member; Jaron Bourke, Minority 

Director of Administration; Devon Hill, Minority Research Assistant; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; and Julia Krieger, Minority 

New Media Press Secretary. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The committee will come to order. 

I would like to begin this hearing by stating the Oversight Committee mission statement: We exist to secure two fundamental 

principles: first, Americans have a right to know that the money 

Washington takes from them is well spent and, second, Americans 

deserve an efficient, effective Government that works for them. Our 

duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to 

protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold Government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to 

know what they get from their Government. We will work tirelessly 

in partnership with citizen watchdogs groups to deliver the facts to 

the American people and bring genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. 

That is the mission statement of the Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee. 

I want to welcome everybody to today’s hearing, which is entitled 

Border Security Oversight, which is our third in a series, Border 

Crossing Cards and B1/B2 Visas. 

I would also like to welcome Ranking Member Tierney, other 

members of this subcommittee, and those in the audience who are 

2 

joining us today and those able to watch the proceedings via television. 

Today’s proceedings are the third in a series of hearings designed 

to assess U.S. border security efforts, as well as challenges in obtaining operational control, particularly of the Southwest border. 

On June 27th of this year, the subcommittee received testimony 

from officials at Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, and the Government Accountability Office. 

During that hearing, the subcommittee learned about the variety 

of emerging threats to U.S. border security, ranging from increasing number of what are called OTMs, also known as Other than 

Mexicans, coming across the Southwest border. When I visited the 

Eloy Detention Facility in Arizona, OTMs accounted for more than 

900 inmates out of nearly 1600. 

New challenges at our border include drug cartels, use of ultra 

light aircrafts and tunnels. We heard about potential fraud in the 

asylum application process, while at the same time we are seeing 

a 434 percent increase in the last five years in the Credible Fear 

category in the request for asylum and flaws in the Government’s 

issuance and administration of the B1/B2 and the entry/exit program, which, despite the law, we still don’t have. 

Back in the 1990s, there was a law mandating that we implement an entry/exit program. We still don’t have an entry/exit program. In fact, yesterday the Judiciary Committee also held a hearing about the lack of an entry/exit program. 

In light of testimony this subcommittee has received, it is imperative to examine the potential flaws in our immigration system, especially the process and procedures relating to the issuance and enforcement of border crossing cards and the B1/B2 visas. 

B1 and B2 cards are non-immigrant visas for persons who want 

to enter the United States temporarily for business, a B1; tourism, 

pleasure, or visiting, a B2; or combination of both purposes, often 

referred to as a B1/B2. 

According to the Department of State, more than 5.3 million B1/ 

B2 non-immigrant visas were issued in the fiscal year 2012. That 

is a one-year number. In 2008, the number of B1/B2 visas issued 

by the Department of State has skyrocketed. In 2008, the State Department issued 3.5 million B1/B2 visas, representing an approximate 55 percent increase in the issuance of these visas from 2008 

to 2012. Likewise, the State Department issued 1.3 million border 

crossing cards in fiscal year 2013, continuing to issue millions of 

border crossing cards over the last three years. By my best calculation, and I would appreciate the panel’s clarification here, we have 

issued—when you get a border crossing card, it is good for 10 

years. We have nearly 9 million of these cards that are out there. 

That is a lot of cards. And without an entry/exit system, and questions about how you verify and then how you enforce this are the 

questions in part that we have to deal with today. 

Now, we were issuing a lot of cards during the Bush Administration, but as best we can tell, we are now issuing approximately 

more than 300,000 cards per year under the Obama Administration. I would like to understand why that is. Why this sudden increase, dramatic increase, by 300-plus thousand more of these 

cards going out the door each year. And when you get a card, it 

3 

lasts for 10 years. We want to have some clarification and some understanding. If those numbers are not accurate, you take issue with 

those, I would like to know. I have been seeking this information 

and, quite frankly, it has been frustrating because I have sent most 

of you hear this panel letters to your organizations seeking clarification and, for the most part, getting a fairly incomplete answer. 

Let me go back to my prearranged comments. 

Border crossing cards are only issued to applicants who are citizens and residents of Mexico and ‘‘must demonstrate that they 

have ties to Mexico to compel them to return after a temporary 

stay in the United States.’’ Today I am interested in learning what 

the standard is for determining what types of ties are considered 

strong enough to qualify for a border crossing card. 

On July 17th, 2013, this subcommittee received testimony about 

rampant fraud in the asylum application process. Likewise, various 

reports, including from the Government Accountability Office, have 

previously identified the risk of potential fraud in the application 

and use of B1/B2s and border crossing cards. I hope we will discuss 

what steps the Department is taking to prevent fraudulent applications and the use of B1/B2s and the border crossing cards. GAO 

went out of its way to point out some flaws. We would like to know 

what sort of progress you have made over the years on this. 

Integrity in the issuance of the B1/B2 and border crossing cards 

is critical, and the enforcement of the law is just as important. But 

reports of visa overstays remain a challenge. In Mr. Woods’ written 

testimony today, submitted to this committee, he wrote ‘‘In fiscal 

year 2012, the CTCEU received 38,355 B1/B2 violator leads.’’ An 

automated vetting process closed nearly 24,325 cases, but still 

leaves ‘‘14,010 potential violators.’’ In other words, the subcommittee is being told right now, in terms of just B1/B2 violators, 

there are approximately 14,000-plus violations, and yet very limited resources and personnel in order to be able to enforce that. 

These are questions that we have on this committee. 

I have serious questions about fraud and the process and the potential lack of enforcement. Do we know where these B1/B2 violators are? What are we doing on the enforcement side of thousands 

of violators? 

On April 2nd, 2013, members, including myself, Mr. Bentivolio, 

who is here with us, traveled to Yuma and Nogales, Arizona to see 

for ourselves what was happening. I visited the Eloy Detention Facility in Arizona, as did Mr. Bentivolio, and we were briefed by 

prison and ICE officials. We also visited various ports of entry in 

Yuma, Nogales, Naco, and other places. 

Based on our conversations with Customs and Border Patrol officers in Yuma, Nogales, and Naco, they had concerns about serious 

flaws in the issuance and enforcement of the B1/B2 and the border 

crossing card. I was also told the asylum applicants have received 

notice to appear for a court date before an immigration judge. 

When I visited with the ICE officers, they told me that if they 

apply for the asylum and the administrative judge believes they 

have reason to go before the judge and hear their case out, in Phoenix, if you, today, go through that process, there are only three 

judges, and guess what? Your court date is going to be in 2020. In 

the meantime, what do these people do? We have given no assessVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:19 Feb 24, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\86722.TXT APRIL
4 

ment as to whether or not they have credible fear. But guess what? 

They are going to get free health care; they are going to get free 

education; and they are probably going to apply for a worker card, 

just because they stepped foot into the United States and said I 

have some credible fear. And we don’t have a process in order to 

go through and assess that, at least in Phoenix, until 2020. That 

is what I was told. 

We also heard concerns from officers on the ground on the Southwest border that Customs and Border Patrol does not currently 

have a fully-implemented outbound exit capability to maintain data 

on exit from the United States into Mexico. 

All of these statistics, personal accounts, and new reports point 

to an alarming trend that suggests there may be serious flaws in 

our legal immigration system, in addition to showing where some 

of the newest threats may be emerging. We hope to not only discuss the potential flaws in the system, but solutions. 

I want to emphasize that I commend and support the hard work 

and dedication of our law enforcement officers, Customs and Border Patrol, ICE, State, the Department of Justice. We have a lot 

of really good men and women who every day work on this issue. 

They care about the Country; they care about doing the right thing. 

They are working hard in very difficult conditions. We want to 

make sure that they are well compensated. Just introduced a bill 

to help with ICE, particularly, and their compensation. I think the 

union is very excited about that. 

I have a number of things I want to add to this, but my statement is getting a bit long, so let me yield to the gentleman from 

Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chaffetz, and thank all the witnesses for being here today. 

This hearing is the third in a series of subcommittee hearings focused on the immigration system of this Country, and I thank the 

chairman for his commitment to the topic. 

Our Country continues to debate the need for serious reform for 

our Nation’s immigration laws. I hope, similarly, that the chairman 

will encourage his leadership to undertake serious consideration of 

reform, if not this year, then early next year. There are many ways 

that we can deal with a lot of the issues that were brought up in 

the opening statement of the chairman by taking on serious consideration of reform, and I hope we do that. 

Our focus today is on border crossing cards and B1 and B2 visas, 

more commonly known as business and tourist visas. These visas 

allow tourists and business visitors from around the world to enter 

the United States for legitimate purposes, such as seeking medical 

treatment. Border crossing cards allow certain Mexican nationals 

to enter the United States temporarily if they stay within a certain 

distance from the border and help support border communities. 

However, as with other types of visas, these programs can be 

abused. Border crossing cards can be used fraudulently to allow unauthorized persons to enter the United States. Tourists can overstay their period of admission. And as we all well know, four of the 

9/11 hijackers entered the United States and overstayed their 

visas. 

5 

In May this year, we learned that one person arrested after the 

Boston Marathon bombings had been able to return to the United 

States an on expired visa. It is imperative that the departments 

and the interagencies continue to improve their collective efforts to 

protect our Country against public safety and national security 

threats. 

Today’s hearing seems to be focused on a broader topic: the challenges with identifying and taking action against all visa overstays. 

So as we consider this important topic, it is important to first seek 

to understand the nature and the scope of the problem, and to 

avoid any rhetoric that often substitutes for serious discussion. 

First, contrary to some of the rhetoric, visa overstays appear to 

be a shrinking problem. According to Robert Warren, who is the 

preeminent demographer and the former Director of Statistics at 

the Immigration and Naturalization Service for nearly a decade, 

and John Robert Warren, the professor at the University of Minnesota, the number of annual non-immigrant visa overstays in the 

United States has dropped 73 percent over nearly a decade. 

There is a chart that we have, if you could put it up. Thank you. 

[Chart.] 

That chart indicates that visa overstays, while still an ongoing 

challenge for enforcement, is a shrinking problem. The study is important not only for its result, but because its office developed a 

methodology for estimating overstays that is widely accepted and 

used by other entities such as the Pew Hispanic Center. 

Second, identifying visa overstays seems to be largely a data collection problem. We are talking about a problem of record collecting 

and record keeping, essentially matching records of people who 

enter with records of people who leave. As far back as 2003, the 

Government Accountability Office, GAO, has reported that the department lacked an accurate list of visa overstays. The GAO has 

reported that the data on overstays has inherent limitations due to 

the challenges of collecting departure information, particularly at 

the United States land ports of entry. The reason for that: our border control systems are simply not geared towards the exit side as 

much as they are towards the entry side. I look forward to learning 

more about how the entry/exit system can be improved in light of 

these challenges. 

Nonetheless, on April 2011, the General Accountability Office reported that the Department of Homeland Security’s arrival and departure information system contained 1.6 million unmatched 

records. While the Department reviewed and resolved 863,000 

records, it prioritized just over 1900 cases based on public safety 

or national security concerns. In 266 cases the individuals just 

could not be located. This may seem a small figure relative to the 

number of border crossings and potential overstays, but it is important nonetheless and shows the importance of pre-screening and 

vetting. 

This is not a problem that will be solved by more guides or guns 

and gates, as we often hear from the context of border security. 

The solution will require sound strategy, interagency coordination, 

and proper oversight, which is the role of this subcommittee. 

The Department appears to have taken some steps to improve 

the exit/entry system, and the Senate-passed comprehensive immiVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:19 Feb 24, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\86722.TXT APRIL
6 

gration reform bill would require the Department to take additional steps, including stepped up enforcement. It is a shame that 

the speaker has so far refused to take up consideration of this and 

other related measures, and again we hope that that situation will 

change. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Does any other member wish to make an opening statement? The 

gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, is recognized. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the ranking member, as well, for convening this hearing. 

This hearing will examine the many challenges we have to address as part of a wider immigration reform: the tracking of those 

who enter legally, but overstay their visas. Congress has long mandated the establishment of an effective system to ensure that those 

who come here temporarily actually leave when their visas expire. 

Unfortunately, carrying out this requirement has proven to be a 

challenge both for the Department of Homeland Security, as well 

as its predecessor organization, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 

Today, approximately 40 percent of undocumented immigrants 

currently in the U.S. originally entered with valid visas. While I 

understand that a study by the Center for the Immigration Studies 

found that the number of yearly visa overstays has dropped dramatically over the last 10 years, it is important that we fully understand what is working right and what is not working. Ultimately, though, only a comprehensive reform of our immigration 

system will give us the sustainable results that the American people need and deserve. 

Indeed, I believe, as Mr. Tierney mentioned, the Senate version 

of the immigration bill does contain language to address this problem; however, the speaker’s recent statement makes the adoption 

of that language highly unlikely. 

Ultimately, we need to address every aspect of this issue. This 

means reforming our legal immigration system so it will work better, addressing the status of the estimated 11 million undocumented persons currently here; taking on the employers who exploit undocumented workers; and making our borders secure, more 

effective, and better tracking those who enter. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for coming. I look forward 

to this hearing and their testimony on the steps they have taken 

and need to take to ensure a more effective entry and exit system. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

Does any other member wish to make a statement? Otherwise, 

members will have seven days to submit opening statements for 

the record. 

Now, I would now like to recognize our panel. Mr. John Wagner 

is the Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Office of Field 

Operations at U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Mr. John P. 

Woods is Assistant Director for National Security Investigations 

Division at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Mr. 

Edward J. Ramotowski is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa 

Services at the U.S. Department of State; and Mr. Juan Osuna is 

7 

Director of Executive Office for Immigration Review at the United 

States Department of Justice. 

I thank you four gentlemen for being here. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. If 

you would please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate it if 

you would limit your verbal comments to five minutes. We are 

pretty generous with that in a hearing like this. Your entire written statement will be made part of the record and there may be 

times during this hearing where we ask for additional information. 

If you agree to provide us that information, it too will be entered 

into the record as best we can. 

I thank you gentlemen. We will start with Mr. Wagner. You are 

now recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN WAGNER 

Mr. WAGNER. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Tierney, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to appear today to discuss border crossing cards 

and B1/B2 visas. 

In concert with our partner, CBP works to ensure that any risk 

factors where document deficiencies are addressed before boarding 

a commercial conveyance to the United States and all land border 

travelers are properly credentialed and risk-assessed before admitted into the United States. 

I would like to begin today by discussing the important steps we 

have taken to enhance security at the land borders, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. 

The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, also known as WHTI, 

was fully implemented in June of 2009. Prior to WHTI, a person 

could use one of thousands of different documents with varying levels of security to demonstrate both their identity and citizenship 

status. Today we have limited that number to a handful—such as 

the U.S. passport card, border crossing cards, lawful permanent 

resident cards, trusted traveler cards, and enhanced driver’s licenses—that all have stringent physical security features—radio 

frequency identification, or RFID chips, and biometrics in our databases. 

The use of travel documents with RFID allows us to verify the 

photograph of the traveler and validate it against the issuing database in real time. It also allows quick and efficient querying of law 

enforcement databases and terrorist indices. For non-U.S. citizens, 

these travel documents also allow us to confirm the fingerprint biometrics taken at time of issuance against the traveler presenting 

the document. At the land border, this is typically done in a secondary inspection environment. 

8 

Since the implementation of WHTI, over 23 million RFID WHTIcompliant documents have been issued. Our query rates of these 

documents, of the travelers crossing the border, has risen from 

about 5 percent to over 97 percent today. So when a traveler arrives at the land border, they are all subject to inspection by a CBP 

officer. The officer will review the results of the database queries, 

compare the photograph on file with the traveler, review the travel 

document authenticity, and question the person to determine the 

purpose and intent of their travel. This is a risk assessment to determine whether any further inspection is necessary based on concerns for national security, identity, customs, agriculture concerns, 

and, for visitors, any indications that they may not comply with the 

terms of their admission. 

At the Southwest land border, a citizen of Mexico presenting a 

B1/B2 visa in the from of a border crossing card may be admitted 

by CBP for a limited visit to the United States. They are able to 

stay up to 30 days within the geographic border zone. The border 

zone was established in 1953 to promote the economic stability of 

the border region by allowing for freer flow of travel for Mexican 

visitors with secure documents. Today, the zones are within 25 

miles of the border in California and Texas, 75 miles in Arizona, 

and 55 miles in New Mexico. These zones were determined based 

on the distance of major economic centers from the border. 

Now, while we do not record the exit from the U.S. of these travelers, a preliminary review of our entry data shows that roughly 

90 percent of all border crossing cardholders do in fact return to 

Mexico, as they do have subsequent entries into the United States 

during a certain time period thereafter. 

If the citizen of Mexico intends to travel beyond the border zone, 

they must first go through a secondary inspection at the port of 

entry, where a CBP officer will interview the person regarding the 

purpose and intent of their travel, perform additional database 

queries, compare the fingerprints electronically against the fingerprints taken by Department of State during the BCC issuance and 

against the biometric watch lists. The person must also demonstrate ties to Mexico, such as proof of residence or employment 

in Mexico. At the conclusion of the interview, CBP will issue the 

traveler an I–94 admission document with the duration of their authorized visit to the United States. This is a similar inspection 

process that would occur had the same individual arrived at an airport in the U.S. 

BCC restrictions are reinforced through the staffing of checkpoints on major highways and interstates by U.S. Border Patrol 

agents who verify travelers’ documents. If a traveler is encountered 

outside of the border zone area without proper documentation, he 

or she is found in violation of the terms of their admission. 

Other travel documents that are authorized in lieu of a passport 

at the land border are trusted traveler program cards such as 

Nexus, Sentry, and Global Entry. CBP has worked with the Government Printing Office to ensure the physical security of these 

cards and the inclusion of RFID chips to ensure that they are validated and queried upon each arrival in the U.S. As you are aware, 

these programs allow for expedited processing of low-risk travelers, 

9 

allowing CBP officers to refocus their efforts on travelers we know 

less about. 

So, in conclusion, CBP also operates and monitors a visa hotlist, 

a tool to re-vet previously issued visas against lookout records to 

identify persons whose eligibility for a visa or entry to the United 

States has changed since issuance of that visa. Relevant information that is uncovered is passed to Department of State, ICE, or 

other agencies, as appropriate. This continuous re-vetting by CBP 

has resulted in revocation of over 3,000 visas by Department of 

State since this inception in March of 2010. 

Visa and document security is a critical element of CBP’s later 

approach to securing our borders. CBP, in cooperation with our 

Federal partners, foreign counterparts, and the travel industry continue to apply innovative solutions to enhance current efforts to 

mitigate threats to our Country. 

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify today, and 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Wagner follows:] 

10 


Insert offset folio 1 here 86722.001

TESTIMONY OF 

JOHN WAGNER 

Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner 

Office ofField Operations 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Department of Homeland Security 

BEFORE 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security 

ON 

"Border Security Oversight, Part Ill: Border Crossing Cards and B-IIB-2 Visas" 

November 14,2013 

Washington, DC 

1 
11 


Insert offset folio 2 here 86722.002

Chainnan Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and distinguished Members ofthe Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the dedicated men and women of 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss our efforts to detect and deter 

nonimmigrant visa violations, while securing and facilitating legitimate international travel. We 

appreciate the Subcommittee's leadership and your continued efforts to ensure the security of the 

American people. 

As the unified border security agency of the United States, CBP is responsible for securing our 

Nation's borders while facilitating the flow oflegitimate international travel and trade that is so 

vital to our Nation's economy. Within this broad responsibility, our priority mission remains to 

prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. We recognize that those 

who pose a national security or public safety threat may seek to violate immigration laws, by 

way of overstaying the authorized period of admission, in order to remain in the United States. 

To detect and deter fraudulent visa activity and nonimmigrant status violations, CBP works in 

close partnership with our Federal partners, including U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the Department of 

State (DOS). We also work closely with state and local law enforcement, the private sector, and 

our foreign counterparts to improve our ability to identil)r and address risks, including potential 

overstays at the earliest possible point. 

In concert with our partners, CBP strives to ensure that those seeking to visit the United States 

for short tenn business or pleasure are appropriately vetted, and any document deficiencies are 

addressed before boarding a flight or other conveyance bound for the United States, and before 

admission at a United States port of entry (POE). 

CBP processes nearly one million travelers each day as they enter the United States. CBP and its 

partners work daily to address risk at multiple stages: the initial application to travel and predeparture targeting; the arrival at a POE; and finally, the exit or departure from the United States. 

Application to Travel to the United States 

In general, foreign nationals wishing to travel to the United States need to either apply for a visa 

from DOS at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate, or a travel authorization from CBP via the Electronic 

System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). CBP and the National Counterterrorism Center play an 

important role in each of these processes. 

Nonimmigrant Visa Process 

Travelers seeking nonimmigrant visas (NIVs) to temporarily travel to the United States must 

apply to DOS under specific visa categories, including those for business, pleasure, study, and 

employment-based purposes. Visitor visas include nonimmigrant visas for persons who seek to 

enter the United States temporarily for business (the B-1 visa), pleasure (e.g., tourism) (the B-2 

visa), or a combination of both purposes (B-IIB-2 visas). The U.S. government desired to 

increase its ability to facilitate legitimate travel to the United States while simultaneously reduce 

the risk of issuing a visa to a known or suspected terrorist (KST). The Kingfisher Expansion 

(KFE) program leverages technology to provide speed and accuracy to the visa adjudication 

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process. KFE reviews 100% of all visa applicants to identify any connections to terrorism by 

comparing applicant data to classified data holdings. In addition, KFE enables classified 

collaborative terrorist dossier containing input from multiple federal partners. As of 15 June 

2013, the State Department uses KFE to vet all visa applicants. In most instances, the DOS 

consular officer will interview the visa applicant to determine eligibility. In every case, DOS vets 

visa applicants through a number of systems. DOS consular officers then adjudicate the visa 

application. Applicants for B-1 and B-2 visas must demonstrate that they have ties to their home 

country that would compel them to return after a temporary stay in the United States. 

In order to identifY persons whose eligibility for a visa or entry to the United States has changed 

since the issuance of that visa, CBP operates and monitors the "Visa Hot List," a tool to re-vet 

previously issued visas against lookout records containing derogatory information. Relevant 

information that is uncovered is passed to DOS, ICE, or other agencies as appropriate. This 

continuous re-vetting by CBP has resulted in the revocation by DOS of more than 6,300 visas 

since the program's inception in March 2010, including 3,814 referrals that were matches to 

records in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). In addition, NCTC's Kingfisher Expansion 

program also conducts recurrent vetting by continuously comparing visa applicant biographic 

data against NCTC's classified holdings. 

To further enhance visa-screening efforts, ICE, CBP and DOS are collaborating on an automated 

visa application screening process that broadens the scope for identifYing potential derogatory 

information prior to visa adjudication and issuance, and synchronizes reviews of the information 

across these agencies. The program is presently being piloted at 20 posts overseas where ICE 

officers assigned to the Visa Security Program are able to monitor the efficacy of the program. 

This process can be used as a precursor to, and in conjunction with, the current DOS Security 

Advisory Opinion (SAO) and Advisory Opinion (AO) programs. The joint program leverages 

the three agencies' expertise, authorities, and technologies, including CBP's Automated 

Targeting System (A TS), to vet visa applicants prior to the adjudication of their applications by 

DOS. This program significantly enhances the U.S. Government's anti-terrorism and anti-fraud 

efforts by improving the existing visa-application process and denying inadmissible applicants 

the ability to travel to the United States. Since the program began in pilot in January 2013, over 

2.2 million visa applications have been screened and 1,386 have been identified for consular 

officer review for SAOs, AOs or refusal, including 1,013 for security related reasons. 

Electronic System/or Travel Authorization (ESTA) 

The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows citizens of participating countries! to travel to the 

United States without a visa for stays of 90 days or less, if they meet all requirements. Visitors 

I The 37 countries currently designated for participation in the Visa Waiver Program are: Andorra, Australia, 

Austria, Belgium, Brunei, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 

Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the 

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 

Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. With respect to all references to "country" or "countries" in this 

document, it should be noted that the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, Section 4(b)( I), provides that 

"[wJhenever the laws ofthe United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar 

entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan." 22 U.S.c. § 3303(b)(I). 

3 
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traveling to the United States by air or sea and intending to apply for admission in accordance 

with the VWP must first apply for travel authorization through eBP's online application system, 

EST A. Through this process, eBP incorporates targeting and database checks to identiJY 

individuals who are ineligible to enter the United States under the VWP and those who may pose 

an overstay risk, or who may present a national security or criminal threat if allowed to travel. 

eBP also continuously reviews EST A applications for new derogatory information, to identify 

persons whose eligibility for entry into the United States has changed since the EST A 

authorization was initially approved. 

Traveling with a B-11B-2 Nonimmigrant Visa 

The issuance of a B-IIB-2 pleasure or business nonimmigrant visa allows the bearer to apply for 

admission at any designated air, land or sea POE but does not guarantee admission to the United 

States. Aliens admitted to the United States may travel in a B-IIB-2 status. These nonimmigrant 

visas can be issued to individuals of any nationality, who may generally stay up to six months 

and travel anywhere within the United States. 

It is important to clariJY the difference between the visa expiration date and the length oftime a 

visitor is granted permission to remain in the United States. A visa is issued to a traveler by a 

DOS consular officer at an American embassy or consulate; it authorizes the individual to travel 

to a United States POE within a specific period of time, to apply for admission in the stated 

nonimmigrant classification, such as a visitor for business or pleasure. The traveler must apply 

for admission on or before the expiration date ofthe visa. While some visas may be used only 

once, others authorize mUltiple uses. eBP officers are authorized to admit a traveler into the 

United States if the individual is admissible, or determine that the traveler is inadmissible. If a 

visitor is admitted to the United States, the eBP officer will determine the length of the traveler's 

stay in the United States. On the passport admission stamp or paper Form 1-94, the CBP officer 

records both the date admitted and the date by which the visitor must depart the United States; 

the length of time between the admission date and the required departure date is known as the 

period of admission (which in certain circumstances may be extended). 

Importantly, there are circumstances that can serve to void or cancel the period of visa validity. If 

a visitor violates the terms of his or her admission, by overstaying the date of his or her 

authorized stay, the visa becomes void per Section 222(g)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act (INA). If a person engages in activities inconsistent with the visa classification (such as 

engaging in unauthorized employment), on the next application for admission, the traveler could 

be found to be inadmissible to enter the United States; and processed accordingly? If in the case 

of an applicant who files an application for an extension of stay or a change of status before the 

expiration of his period of admission, pursuant to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

policy, the alien is considered not to have overstayed in that event. In any event, the burden of 

Accordingly, all references to "country" or "countries" in the Visa Waiver Program authorizing legislation, 

Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S,c. 1187, are read to include Taiwan. 

2 See INA § 235(b)(I) and 8 C.F,R, § 235.3 (regarding processing procedures), 

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proof is upon the applicant that he/she is eligible to enter the United States under the 

classification for which they applied admission.3 

National Targeting Center 

CBP leverages all available advance passenger data, including the Passenger Name Record 

(PNR) and Advance Passenger Information System (A PIS) data, previous crossing information, 

intelligence, and law enforcement information, as well as open source information in its visa 

security efforts at the National Targeting Center (NTC). Starting with the earliest indications of 

potential travel, including United States-bound travel reservations, EST A applications, visa 

applications, and passenger manifests, and continuing through the inspection and arrivals 

process, the NTC is continually analyzing information gleaned from these sources using CBP's 

Automated Targeting System (A TS). 

With pre-departure targeting support from the NTC, the CBP Regional Carrier Liaison Group 

(RCLG) in Miami, New York, and Honolulu, and Immigration Advisory Program (IAP)4 officers 

work in partnership with foreign law enforcement officials to evaluate potential risks, including 

possible overstays, presented by non-watch listed travelers, and then work in coordination with 

commercial air carriers to issue no-board recommendations to the airline to keep suspected highrisk passengers from traveling to the United States. In FY 2012, CBP identified 9,506 passengers 

who were inadmissible to the United States and were denied boarding at foreign departure 

locations and has already identified 5,212 thus far in FY 2013. The NTC vetting process for 

international passengers continues while the flight is en route to the United States in order to 

identity any travelers who, although they may not be national security risks, may need to be 

referred for a more thorough inspection at the POE upon arrival in the United States. 

Admission to the United States 

In accordance with the Immigration and Nationality ActS and other federal laws applicable at the 

border, all persons arriving at a POE to the United States are subject to inspection by CBP 

officers. Ifa traveler qualifies for an exemption to the inspection requirement, the examination 

continues for other laws and regulations that CBP enforces.6 CBP officers conduct the 

immigration, customs, and agriculture portions of the inspection and examination process. 

For all nonimmigrants, the CBP officer must determine why the individual is coming to the 

United States, what documents are required, and how long the individual should be permitted to 

stay in the United States. A traveler seeking to enter the United States but who is not a U.S. 

citizen, national, or Lawful Permanent Resident is generally required to present a valid passport 

and valid U.S. visa, unless the traveler qualifies for an exemption to the visa requirement listed 

in 8 C.F.R. § 212.1. Exceptions to the visa requirements exist for, among others, nationals of 

3 See INA §214(b). 

4 The lAP is currently operational at eleven airports in nine countries including Amsterdam, Doha, Frankfurt, 

London Heathrow and Gatwick, Madrid, Manchester, Mexico City, Panama City, Tokyo, and Paris. 

S See INA § 235, codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1225. 

6 See 8 C.F.R. § 235.1 (noting requirements for individuals such as members of NATO forces). 

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countries designated under the VWP and certain citizens ofCanada.7 Travelers entering the 

United States under the VWP by air or sea must have a valid passport and an approved EST A. 

The EST A must be obtained prior to travel to the United States. 

Canadian citizens must present a valid passport when entering the United States by air. But 

Canadian citizens arriving to the United States from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean or Bermuda, 

by land or sea, are not required to do so and may instead present one of the following travel 

documents: Enhanced Driver's License (EDL), Trusted Traveler Card (NEXUS, SENTRI or 

FAST), or approved documentation such as an Enhanced Tribal Card or Secure Certificate of 

Indian Status. 

Border Crossing Cards (BCC) 

While citizens of Mexico are generally required to present both a passport and U.S. visa when 

applying for admission, an exemption from the passport requirement exists when a Mexican 

citizen presents a valid Border Crossing Card (BCC) at a land or sea port of entry. A BCC, which 

is a form ofB-IIB-2 nonimmigrant visa, may be issued by DOS to Mexican citizens who reside 

in Mexico and who wish to cross into the United States temporarily for purpose of business or 

pleasure. The BCC also allows Mexican citizens to enter the United States at the land border 

without issuance of a Form 1-94, Arrival/Departure Record if they plan to remain within a 

defined border zone along the U.S. southern border. BCC holders enter the United States under 

the same terms as a B-1 or B-2 nonimmigrant, except that their period of admission is limited to 

30 days if they are admitted without a Form 1-94. If a citizen of Mexico who is admitted as a 

visitor for business or pleasure desires to travel outside of the border zone, he or she presents the 

BCC and is issued a Form 1-94. This border zone is defined in terms of miles from the U.S.-

Mexico land border and varies depending on the state. The border zone was established in 1953 

to promote the economic stability of the border region by allowing for freer flow of travel for 

Mexican visitors with secure documents.8 The current BCC border zone is within 25 miles of the 

border in California and Texas; within 55 miles of the border in New Mexico; and within 

75 miles of the border in Arizona.9 

To obtain a BCC, applicants are vetted extensively by DOS. The vetting process includes 

collection of biometric and biographic information, such as fingerprints, photographs, and other 

information regarding residence, employment and reason for border crossing; an interview; and 

security checks to identifY any terrorism concerns, disqualifYing criminal history, or previous 

immigration violations. The BCC includes many security features such as vicinity-read Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) technology and a machine-readable zone. Using these features, 

CBP is able to electronically authenticate the BCC and compare the biometrics of the individual 

presenting the BCC against DOS issuance records in order to confirm that the document is 

currently valid and that the person presenting the document is the one to whom it was issued. 

The BCC is acceptable as a stand-alone document only for travel from Mexico by land, pleasure 

7 See 8 C.F.R. § 212.I(a)(I) (describing visa exemptions for Canadian citizens). 

8 See 78 Fed. Reg. 35.103 (June 12, 2013) (amending the border zone in New Mexico). 

9 See 8 C.F.R. § 235. I (h)(I)(describing the border zone). 

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vessel, or ferry. Together with a valid Mexican passport, it meets the documentary requirements 

for entry at all land, air, and sea POEs. 

BCCs have increased security in processing travelers by providing CBP with an enhanced ability 

to affirmatively identifY an individual and conduct admissibility checks. Additionally, in each 

southern border state, CBP Border Patrol immigration checkpoints within the border zone assist 

in preventing individuals traveling with a BCC but no Form 1-94 from continuing beyond the 

border zone. 

Departure from the United States and Overstays 

The vast majority of individuals who enter the United States depart prior to the end of their 

authorized period of admission. Foreign nationals who remain in the United States beyond their 

authorized period of admission are referred to as "overstays". To support determinations on who 

has left the country within their authorized period of admission, DHS has recently enhanced its 

biographic entry/exit system and is working to further refine statistics related to entry/exit. The 

2013 DHS Appropriations Act transferred the entry/exit mission to CBP from the former DHS 

US-VISIT program. Since obtaining this mission in March, CBP has created an entry/exit 

transformation office dedicated to enhancing the ability of CBP and DHS to better match entry 

and exit records and identifY overstays. 

DHS relies on information in the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) to indicate 

when a B-1 or B-2 nonimmigrant alien has overstayed his or her authorized period of admission. 

ADIS aggregates data from multiple source systems, such as TECS, APIS, the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), and the Computer Linked Application 

Information Management System (CLAIMS3). ICE analysts use these databases to determine if 

an alien is, in fact, out of status and has not moved into another visa category or received 

additional immigration benefits. ICE then prioritizes and addresses overstay leads for national 

security and public safety risks. Individuals who overstay their period of admission may be 

subject to sanctions, such as revocation of existing visas, denial of visa renewals, and denial of 

admission to the United States. 

Enhanced Biographic Exit System 

The Department has in place a functioning and robust exit/entry system, and is continuing to 

improve this enhanced biographic system in various ways. These improvements will 

significantly enhance DHS's existing capability to identifY and target for enforcement action 

those who have overstayed their period of admission and who represent a public safety and/or 

national security threat. 

Currently, CBP collects nearly 100% of all departure data from foreign nationals who depart the 

United States via air and sea ports of entry. Air and sea carriers provide manifest data as to who 

is on an aircraft or vessel leaving the United States. They are required to provide specific sets of 

data, including name and passport number, and they must report the data within strict time 

frames or face significant fines for delay or inaccuracy. 

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CBP closely monitors APIS data accuracy and there are approximately 250,000 arriving and 

250,000 departing air passengers processed through APIS each day. Over 99.6% of the date of 

birth information transmitted in APIS is correct and confirmed by CBP officers during Primary 

inspection. Overall, 92% of arrival APIS records are confirmed as transmitted during the Primary 

inspection, and in most cases the remaining modifications are merely technical changes from a 

Passport to a Lawful Permanent Resident card. CBP has made substantial progress improving 

APIS data quality over the last several years and will continue these efforts. 

The data collected from the carriers is matched against entry data to determine who has 

overstayed their authorized period of admission to the United States. DHS maintains ADIS 

specifically for this purpose. ADIS receives other DHS data pertinent to a person's lawful 

presence--such as immigration benefit information from CLAIMS3 or information from SEVIS 

on nonimmigrant students in the United States. 

The enhanced biographic exit system that is being implemented will further build on these 

capabilities by, among other things: 

• Taking full advantage of and enhance the existing automated entry-exit capability 

that produces information on individual overstays; 

• Incorporating and using biometric information, as technologies mature and DHS 

can implement an affordable biometric air exit system; 

• Allowing DHS to take administrative action against confirmed overstays through 

visa revocation, prohibiting VWP travel, and placing individuals on lookout lists; 

• Further supporting the administration and enforcement of U.S. immigration laws 

by identifYing that those who overstay in the United States; and 

• Better enabling DHS to maintain a focus on individuals who may wish to do us 

harm while facilitating the legitimate travel of those who do not. 

The first phase of the enhancement to the biographic exit system was completed in April 2013, 

and included automating connections between DHS data systems, thereby refining ICE's ability 

to more effectively target and prioritize overstay leads of concern. Subsequent phases of the 

enhanced biographic exit plan are in motion and include database modernization; further 

investments in targeting and prioritization capabilities; and increased functionality between 

biometric and biographic repositories including document validation, which will dramatically 

improve the ability to successfully match entry and exit records biographically. 

As part ofthese efforts, CBP has developed innovative ways to collect biographic exit 

information in the land environment. For example, CBP and the Canada Border Services Agency 

(CBSA) have partnered to create a biographic entry/exit system on the shared land border by 

exchanging entry information, so that information collected on entry to one country is 

automatically recorded as an exit from the other. 

This program began on June 30, 2013. CBP since has collected over one million records from 

Canada. We receive approximately 10,000 to 15,000 new records per day from our Canadian 

counterparts that are matched with U.S. entry information at a rate of over 98 percent. The 

program currently exchanges data only on third country nationals (including those who may be 

lawful permanent residents), but will expand to include citizens of both countries in June 2014. 

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Using available interfaces which already existed with Canada, this was developed at virtually no 

cost. 

CBP is developing a southern border strategy plan that will analyze the existing opportunities 

and short and long term options for the development of out-bound exit capability on the southern 

border. The strategy is designed to complement the current CBP national outbound strategy, with 

its focus on interdiction of illegal currency, firearms, and drugs by introducing new tools and 

operations designed to identifY overstays. 

The strategy will be similar to the Canadian effort in that we will seek new ways to partner with 

Mexico to obtain critical biographic information without negatively affecting trade and travel. 

For example, CBP is working with Mexico on exchanging Mexican data collected as part of 

flight departures from Mexico-where we can identifY travelers who have departed via the 

southern land border but then flew internationally from Mexico. Unfortunately, it is not feasible 

to simply replicate the northern border solution at the southern border. Mexico does not have 

fixed physical structures at ports of entry to process travelers entering Mexico for immigration 

purposes, nor does it have data collection procedures similar to the United States and Canada. 

As DHS continues to implement its enhanced biographic system, it is also exploring ways to 

incorporate additional biometric technologies into its entry/exit systems. For instance, CBP has 

partnered with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to develop a test facility 

which will allow CBP to test a series of operational concepts for biometric exit (as well as 

additional entry concepts) in a closed environment. This facility will be complete in early 2014 

and CBP will commence testing at that time using new emerging biometric technologies, such as 

facial recognition technology and iris scans. The objective of the testing is to identifY biometric 

technology that can fit seamlessly into the existing operational environment for travelers 

departing the United States from international airports. As noted above, the Department's 

continuing efforts to improve the entry/exit system a system should not be construed to mean 

that DHS does not already have a functioning exit/entry system in place. 

Despite significant challenges, over the past several years, DHS has implemented and now 

manages a fully-functioning entry/exit system in the air and sea environments, and is continuing 

to enhance capability for land. While the United States did not build its border, aviation, or 

immigration infrastructure with exit processing in mind, the Department of Homeland Security 

has worked to bring the existing biographic system to a level of fidelity equal to, or nearly equal 

to, a biometric system while continuing to pursue a more cost-effective biometric solution. 

Conclusion 

Visa security is a critical element ofCBP's layered approach to securing our borders. DHS, in 

cooperation with its Federal partners, foreign counterparts, and the travel industry, is working to 

apply innovative solutions and make strategic security investment decisions that enhance current 

efforts to address terrorism and visa violation activities today while prioritizing the capabilities 

needed for the implementation of a future biometric exit system. These efforts enhance CBP's 

multilayered approach to screening and identifYing potential travelers to the United States who 

may pose a threat to the homeland. 

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Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

10 
20 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Appreciate it. 

Mr. Woods, you are now recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS 

Mr. WOODS. Chairman Chaffetz and Ranking Member Tierney, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you and have an opportunity to discuss ICE’s efforts to 

identify and target for enforcement those who have overstayed 

their period of admission and who represent a public safety or national security threat to this Country. 

ICE’s Overstay Analysis Unit utilizes biographical entry and exit 

records stored in the Arrival and Departure Information System, or 

ADIS, to identify international travelers who have remained in the 

United States beyond their authorized period of admission. In this 

process, ICE vets the ADIS potential violators against a multitude 

of other DHS data sets to enhance accuracy of the data and determine prioritization of the potential leads. This analysis supports 

the Department’s commitment to enhance its vetting initiatives 

across the full mission spectrum of Homeland Security. 

The analysts validate two types of non-immigrant overstay 

records: out-of-country overstays and in-country overstays. The outof-country overstay records pertain to visitors who have stayed beyond their authorized period of admission and subsequently depart 

the United States. The Overstay Analysis Unit validates these violations based on their reported departure dates and creates a biometric and biographic lookout for these subjects should they attempt to reenter the United States in the future. 

The in-country overstay records pertain to visitors who remain in 

the United States with no evidence of departure, change or 

addressment of their immigration status upon expiration of their 

terms of admission. The Overstay Analysis Unit reviews and validates the ADIS system identified violations based on ICE identified 

categories of interest. The Overstay Analysis Unit makes overstay 

and status violation referrals to the HSI Counterterrorism and 

Criminal Exploitation Unit, or CTCEU, who in turn attempt to 

identify and locate leads within the United States where the overstay violator may be located by special agents in the field for investigation of their status and ability to lawfully remain in the United 

States. 

HSI prioritizes its cases for investigation from several potential 

violator categories. The first, of course, is like I said, the ADIS 

leads from the Overstay Analysis Unit that provides non-immigrant visa overstay leads and potential visa waiver program country violators. Another source is admitted watch list leads. This includes the records of individuals who, at the time of admission to 

the United States, were subject of a watch list record containing 

derogatory information that did not render the individual inadmissible to the United States, but did warrant monitoring of their 

visit. 

Additionally, CTCEU monitors individuals who, after entry, had 

their visas revoked by the Department of State. Although these individuals may still be within their lawful period of admission, an 

investigation is warranted to determine whether a violation of the 

terms of their admission has occurred. 

21 

And then, finally, due to the duration of status admission period 

provided to foreign students in the F, J, and M categories, the 

CTCEU conducts recurrent vetting of the Student Exchange Visitor 

Information System to actively monitor and determine whether 

new derogatory information is developed or obtained on an active 

student which may warrant further investigation. 

The HSI CTCEU is the only national program dedicated to the 

enforcement of non-immigrant visa violations and is responsible for 

identifying and targeting those non-immigrant visa holders who 

could pose a threat to our national security or public safety. Each 

year, the Unit analyses the records of hundreds of thousands of potential violators and, as stated in your opening remarks, chairman, 

in fiscal year 2012 the CTCEU received over 38,000 B1/B2 potential violator leads and, through an automated vetting process, 

closed more than 24,000 of those cases, identifying either a subsequent departure from the United States or an adjustment of status 

through USCIS. More than 14,000 violator leaders were identified 

for investigation and approximately 1,000 cases have been initiated 

thus far that have made HSI CTCEU national security criteria. 

Again, we continue to make great progress in our ability to identify and target for enforcement action those who have overstayed 

their period of admission and who represent a public safety or national security threat to our Country. Technological advances have 

created unprecedented opportunity for law enforcement to identify 

and mitigate national security and public safety threats in a more 

efficient and expeditious manner than ever before. 

I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to be here 

today, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may 

have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:] 

22 


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STATEMENT 

OF 

JOHN P. WOODS 

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATiONS 

HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTiGATIONS 

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

HEARING ON 

BORDER SECURITY; EXAMINING Bl!B2 VISAS 

AND BORDER CROSSING CARDS 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

NOVEMBER 10:00 AM 

2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 
23 


Insert offset folio 12 here 86722.012

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney and distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to prevent the exploitation of our nonimmigrant 

visa system. Through specific intelligence and the use of sophisticated data systems, ICE 

identifies and tracks millions of foreign students, tourists, and temporary workers who are 

present in the United States at any given time. Visa overstays and other forms of nonimmigrant 

status violations bring together two critical areas of ICE's mission-national security and 

immigration enforcement. My testimony today will focus on the process of identifying, tracking 

and investigating overstays. 

Overstay Analysis Unit 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is focused on enhancing its vetting 

initiatives across the full mission space of homeland security by providing real-time biographic 

and biometric data to its front-line operational components while continuing to set leading 

biometric policies and standards. To this end, ICE's Overstay Analysis Unit (OAU) analyzes 

biographical entry and exit records stored in DHS's Arrival and Departure Information System 

(ADIS) to support the Department's ability to identify international travelers who have remained 

in the United States beyond their authorized periods of admission. DHS' Automated Biometric 

Identification System (!DENT) and ADIS provide person-centric information and enable DHS to 

search biometric and biographic data against government databases to establish and confirm the 

identities of individuals that DHS has already encountered. DHS's Office of Biometric Identity 

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Management (OBIM) supports DHS components by returning any linked information from a 

match against its database to aid in their vetting of individuals already encountered by DHS to 

identify known or suspected terrorists, national security threats, criminals, and those who have 

previously violated U.S. immigration laws. 

The OAU analyzes and validates two types of nonimmigrant overstay records: out-ofcountry overstays (OCO) and in-country overstays (ICO). OCO records pertain to visitors who 

stayed beyond their authorized admission period and subsequently departed the country. The 

OAU validates these violations based on their reported departure dates and creates biometric and 

biographic lookouts for these subjects. The lookouts are posted in two separate databases: DHS' 

!DENT Secondary Inspection Tool and TECS I, in order to alert and notify Department of State 

consular officers and CBP officers of a subject's violation before he or she is granted a visa or is 

readmitted to the United States. ICO records pertain to visitors with no evidence of departure or 

adjustment of status upon expiration of the terms of their admission. 

The OAU makes overstay and status violation referrals from three unique sources, which 

apply to typical overstay violators, admitted watchlist subjects, and Visa Waiver Program (VWP) 

violators. The first source, nonimmigrant overstay leads, is used to generate field investigations 

by identifying foreign visitors who violate the terms of their admission by remaining in the 

United States past the date of their required departure. The second source, admitted watchlist 

leads, monitors records for individuals who, at the time of admission to the United States, were 

I TECS, formerly known as the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, is U.S. Custom and Border 

Protection's (CBP's) primary law enforcement and anti-terrorism data base system which contains enforcement, 

inspection, and intelligence records. 

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the subject of a watch list record containing derogatory information that did not render them 

inadmissible to the United States, but did warrant monitoring their visit. The third source is the 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit's (CTCEU) Visa Waiver Enforcement Program 

(VWEP). 

The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

The CTCEU is the first national program dedicated to the enforcement of nonimmigrant 

visa violators. Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of potential 

status violators after preliminary analysis of data from the Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System (SEVIS) and the OAU along with other information. After this analysis, 

CTCEU determines potential violations that warrant field investigations and/or establishes 

compliance or departure dates from the United States. Between 15,000 and 20,000 SEVIS and 

ADiS records are analyzed each month and, since the creation ofthe CTCEU in 2003, over 

two million such records have been analyzed using automated and manual review techniques. 

Today, through the CTCEU, ICE proactively develops cases for investigation in 

cooperation with the Student and Exchange Visitor Program and OAU. These programs enable 

ICE special agents to access information about the millions of students, tourists, temporary 

workers, and other nonimmigrants present in the United States at any given time, and to identifY 

those who have overstayed or otherwise violated the terms and conditions of their admission. 

ICE special agents and analysts monitor the latest threat reports and proactively address 

emergent issues. This practice, which is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting 

specific risk factors based on intelligence reporting, including travel patterns and in-depth 

4 
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criminal research and analysis, has contributed to DHS's counterterrorism mission by initiating 

and supporting high-priority national security initiatives based on specific intelligence. 

In order to ensure that the potential violators who pose the greatest threats to national 

security are given top priority, ICE uses intelligence-based criteria developed in close 

consultation with the intelligence and law enforcement communities. ICE chairs the Compliance 

Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP), comprised of subject matter experts from other law 

enforcement agencies and members of the Intelligence Community who assist the CTCEU in 

maintaining targeting methods in line with the most current threat information. The CEAP is 

convened on a tri-annual basis to discuss recent intelligence developments and update the 

CTCEU's targeting framework in order to ensure that the nonimmigrant overstays and status 

violators who pose the greatest threats to national security are targeted. 

The third unique source for overstay and status violation referrals is CTCEU's VWEP. 

Visa-free travel to the United States builds upon our close bilateral relationships and fosters 

commercial and personal ties among tourist and business travelers in the United States and 

abroad. VWP, the primary source of nonimmigrant visitors from countries other than Canada 

and Mexico, currently allows eligible nationals of 37 countries 2 to travel to the United States 

without a visa and, if admitted, to remain in the country for a maximum of90 days for tourism or 

business purposes. Prior to the implementation of the VWEP in 2008, there was no national 

2 The list of designated VWP countries can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 217.2, with the most recent designation being 

Taiwan in October 2012. Consistent with The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 4(b)(I), 

22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(I), all references to "country" in the Visa Waiver Program authorizing legislation, section 

217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.s.C. § 1187, are read to include Taiwan. 

5 
27 


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program dedicated to addressing overstays within this population. Today, ICE regularly 

scrutinizes a refined list of individuals who have been identified as potential overstays who 

entered the United States under the VWP. One of the primary goals of this program is to identifY 

those subjects who attempt to circumvent the U.S. immigration system by obtaining travel 

documents from VWP countries. 

In Fiscal Year 2012, the CTCEU received 38,335 BI1B2 violator leads. An automated 

vetting process closed 24,325 cases leaving 14,010 potential violators. The most common 

reasons for closure were subsequent departure from the United States or adjustment of 

immigration status to that ofa lawful permanent resident. A total of985 prioritized leads were 

sent to the field resulting in 253 arrests that met CTCEU's national security criteria. The 

remaining cases were referred to Enforcement and Removal Operations for possible enforcement 

action or closed. 

CONCLUSION 

ICE is proud of the good work accomplished over the last ten years to protect the 

integrity of our visa system. We are committed to promoting national security and have made 

significant progress in identifying visa overstay violators by working closely with our 

international, federal, state, local, and tribal partners to combat visa fraud and protect the 

integrity of our visa system. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testifY today and for your continued support of 

ICE and its law enforcement mission. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions at this time. 

6 
28 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Ramotowski, please. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. RAMOTOWSKI 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Good morning, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking 

Member Tierney, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for calling this hearing today and for your 

continued commitment to the Department’s twofold mission: to 

keep America safe while we welcome legitimate visitors who grow 

the U.S. economy and create jobs. 

The B visitor visa, which permits travel to the United States for 

temporary business and pleasure, is central to these efforts. Like 

most of my consular colleagues, I have adjudicated thousands of B 

visas during my 27-year career as a Foreign Service officer, and 

during that time I have witnessed tremendous advances in the 

tools that we employ to adjudicate visas efficiently and, most importantly, in a way that protects the security of our Nation’s borders. 

Our highest priority in adjudicating visitor visa applications is 

the safety of American citizens at home and abroad. Together with 

our partner agencies, we have built a layered visa and border security screening system that rests on enhanced training, technological 

advances, biometric innovations, and expanded data sharing. Security remains our primary mission, and for us every visa decision is 

a national security decision. 

Visas also play a significant role in maintaining our Country’s 

economic security. International tourism has a significant impact 

on the U.S. economy and, according to Department of Commerce 

figures, creates one new American job for every 65 additional visitors that we bring to our shores. 

The Department strives to ensure that the B visa application 

process is straightforward. Every post provides detailed visa application instructions on its website, both in English and in the local 

language. The B visa application begins when the applicant completes the online non-immigrant application form. This application 

requires the completion of biographical data, information on the 

purpose and destination of travel, and answers to a series of questions that could signal potential grounds of inadmissibility. 

Like all these applicants, B category visitors must qualify under 

the provisions of U.S. law and may be denied on grounds including, 

but not limited to, previous immigration violations, membership in 

terrorist organizations, and criminal activity. In the B visa category, applicants must also overcome a statutory presumption of 

immigrant intent. Most B visa applicants must be interviewed by 

a consular officer. This personal interview affords the applicant an 

opportunity to present evidence establishing the veracity of his or 

her application. At the same time, a personal interview allows the 

adjudicating officer to elicit information necessary to establish the 

applicant’s eligibility for the visa category, to reconcile any discrepancies in the information provided by the applicant, and to delve 

more deeply into any potential grounds of inadmissibility. 

All these applicants are vetted through a full suite of security 

checks. The visa software used to process visitor and other visa categories will not permit the issuance of any visa until all results 

29 

have been vetted by a cleared and trained U.S. citizen consular adjudicator. The Department, DHS, and other partner agencies work 

hand-in-hand to ensure that consular adjudicators have immediate 

access to the full range of relevant data on visa applicants in a 24/ 

7 global environment. Likewise, the Department provides other 

agencies immediate access to our own data. 

In partnership with DHS and the FBI, we have established the 

largest fingerprint screening program in the globe. Visa applicants’ 

fingerprints are vetted against DHS and FBI databases at the time 

of adjudication, and they are later verified by Customs and Border 

Protection officers when the applicant appears at a port of entry. 

The Department uses facial recognition technology to screen all 

these applicants against a watch list of photos of known and suspected terrorists obtained from the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, as well as against the entire gallery of visa applicant photos 

contained in our consular database. 

Launched during the summer of 2013, the Kingfisher Expansion 

Program is our new method of conducting interagency 

counterterrorism screening. All visa applications are now reviewed 

by the National Counterterrorism Center in a highly classified environment and can be referred immediately for a Washington-based 

interagency review if warranted. 

In conclusion, we have built strong partnerships with DHS and 

other law enforcement agencies to ensure that real-time flow of information necessary for keeping our borders secure. Finally, we 

maintain a sophisticated, highly trained staff of multilingual adjudicators who provide the cultural awareness, knowledge, and objectivity necessary to ensure that the visa process essential to our economic security also remains the frontline of border security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Ramotowski follows:] 

30 


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DEPARTMENT 

WRITTEN STATEMENT 

OF 

IWW ARD J. RAMOTOWSKi 

DEPlJTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR VISA SERVICES 

DEPARTMI:NT OF STATE 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECliRITY 

HEARING 

ON 

SECURING THE U.S. BORnER, B1IB2 VISAS ANn BORDER CROSSING 

CARns 

NOVEMBER 14, 2013 
31 


Insert offset folio 18 here 86722.018

Good morning Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. I thank you for calling this hearing today and for 

your unwavering commitment to the Department's twofold mission to keep 

America safe while welcoming legitimate visitors who grow the U.S. economy and 

create jobs. Consular officers worldwide balance both goals each day as they 

adjudicate thousands of B nonimmigrant visitor visas and Border Crossing Cards, 

and I am glad to have the opportunity to elaborate on this process today. 

Most foreign visitors in the B nonimmigrant category are admitted through the 

Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals of certain designated countries to be 

admitted to the United States for a period of up to 90 days without obtaining a 

visa. I In addition, Canadian citizens can be admitted to the United States in the B 

category, and most other nonimmigrant categories, without a visa. Accordingly, 

this statement focuses on the Department's processes with respect to those foreign 

visitors who do require a visa or a Border Crossing Card for admission to the 

United States. 

I will begin with an overview of the B category, including trends in demand for 

visitor visas as well as the application and interview processes. I will then describe 

the multi-layered security screening processes we have created in tandem with our 

I The following 37 countric!> ar~ Visa Waiver Jlrogram participants: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Czech 

Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, San 

Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia. South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. Taiwan (please see note below) and the 

United Kingdom. 

With respect to all references to "country" or "countries" on this page, it should be noted that the Taiwan Relations Act 

of 1979, Pub. L. ~o. 96· 8, S<:ction 4(0)(1), pr(l\"ides that "[wlhenever the laws of the United States refer Pf rdate to 

foreIgn counrrIes, natJons, states, governments, or similar entities, such [l'rmS shall include and such laws shall apply WIth 

respect to TaIwan." 22 C.S.c. § 3303(b)(1). ~"\ccnrdmg-ly, all rdt'rcnces to "country" or "countril'~" in the \'i~a \X-';uvcr 

Program authorizing legislatlOt1. Section 217 of thl~ Immigration and .:-..iatinnahty ,\ct, 8 U.S.c. 11S7, are read to inch.H.k 

Taiwan. Thls is consistent \Vlth the Unitt:J Stares' one-China policy, under whtch the United States has mBintaincd 

unoftlc!<ll relations wirh TaIwan SltlCl' 1 c)79. 

2 
32 


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interagency partners. I will conclude by describing the processes for both B visa 

refusal and issuance, along with a physical description of the visa foil and the 

Border Crossing Card. 

The B Visa Category 

The Department adjudicates visa applications submitted by foreign persons who 

seek to travel to the United States for a wide variety of reasons, including for 

immigration as well as a host of temporary purposes such as study, work, and 

international exchange. The overwhelming majority of nonimmigrant travelers 

applying for a visa seek to enter the United States for temporary business or 

pleasure, purposes generally covered by the B nonimmigrant classification. 

Citizens of Mexico can also qualifY for Border Crossing Cards (BCCs), which are 

B visas issued in card form to facilitate travel across the U.S.-Mexican border. B 

visa travel includes temporary travel for medical treatment, participation in 

amateur sports and arts events, and a number of other activities. Formal study and 

employment involving compensation from a U.S. source are generally prohibited 

on a B visa. In FY 2013,77 percent of all nonimmigrant visa issuances were in the 

B visa categories: nearly 5.8 million of these were issued as B 1 (business visitor), 

B2 (visitor for pleasure), and combined B l/B2 visa foils, while nearly 1.3 million 

were issued as BCCs to citizens of Mexico. 

Receipt of a visa from the Department of State indicates that an individual has 

been approved to apply for admission to the United States; however, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) officers make the final admissibility determination at 

ports of entry. 

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33 


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B Visa Trends 

Rapidly rising incomes in countries such as China, Brazil, and India have fueled 

B visa demand as their citizens increasingly seek to visit, shop, and do business in 

the United States. According to the Department of Commerce, 66 million 

international tourists visited the United States in 2012, generating an all-time 

record $168 billion in revenue, an increase of 10 percent from 2011. Commerce 

does not yet have complete FY 2013 data, but reports that as of July 2013, tourist 

spending has risen 9 percent over the 2012 figure. International tourism has a 

significant impact on the U.S. economy, creating one new American job for every 

65 visitors that travel to the United States. 

The Department is proud to playa key role in facilitating secure travel for the 

approximately one-third of visitors to the United States who require a visa (the 

other two-thirds enter pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program or are Canadians or 

otherwise visa-exempt). In January 2012, President Obama issued an Executive 

Order tasking the Department with increasing nonimmigrant visa capacity in China 

and Brazil by 40 percent and ensuring that 80 percent of nonimmigrant visa 

applicants worldwide were being interviewed within three weeks of receipt of 

application by the end of 2012. 

State has exceeded President Obama's goals. During the past twelve months, on 

average, more than 90 percent of applicants worldwide were interviewed within 

three weeks of submitting their applications. In key markets such as China, 

consular officers are keeping interview wait times to an average of five days while 

managing an average annual workload increase of 23 percent over the past three 

years. Consular officers in Brazil have brought wait times down by 98 percent, 

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from a high of 140 days in Sao Paulo, to just two days in September 2013, while 

also managing an eleven percent jump in annual workload between 2011 and 2013. 

The Department's success is partially attributable to the introduction of secure, 

streamlined processes such as the Interview Waiver Pilot Program (IWPP), which 

allows consular officers to waive in-person interviews for certain nonimmigrant 

visa applicants who are renewing their visas, and whose biometric data we have on 

file. IWPP is operational at more than 90 visa processing posts in more than 50 

countries, and consular officers have already waived interviews for more than 

500,000 of these low-risk visa applicants. The pilot has been particularly 

successful in China, where it constitutes 30 percent of Mission China's visa 

renewal workload. Of course, these applicants are subject to all of the security 

checks conducted for any interviewed applicant. State also concluded an August 

2013 validation study of the IWPP, which showed that BI/B2 visa issuances under 

the IWPP present no greater risk of overstay than interview-based B lIB2 visa 

issuances. 

The Department also increased staff in key markets in order to meet the 

requirements of the Executive Order. By the end of 20 12, State had created more 

than 40 visa adjudicator positions in China and 50 in Brazil. With these staff 

increases, State met the President's Executive Order target of a 40 percent capacity 

increase in Brazil in June 2012 and in China in November 2012. These positions 

are funded by the application fees paid by visa applicants. State also spent 90 

million dollars to upgrade and expand its existing consular facilities in China ($17 

million) and Brazil ($73 million) in fiscal year 2012. In China, State opened a new 

consulate building in Guangzhou in July 2013. Mission China also signed the 

leases for new properties in Wuhan and Shenyang. Both facilities are expected to 

5 
35 


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open by October 2015, and each is planned to have 25 windows, an improvement 

over Shenyang's current six windows. In Shanghai, the Department is continuing 

its work to renovate space adjacent to the consular section. The project is expected 

to be completed in December 2013 or January 2014. In Beijing, a former consular 

section facility was reopened in May 2012 to augment services being provided in 

the primary.consular section there. State will also open new consulates in Brazil in 

Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, and relocate the Recife consulate to a larger 

facility in FY 2015. In Mexico, State plans to move the consulate general building 

in Monterrey to a new, larger space in 2014. 

B Visa Processing 

The Department places a premium on conducting the outreach necessary to ensure 

that the visa application process is transparent. Every embassy and consulate 

provides detailed visa application instructions on its website, both in English and 

the host country language. Consular employees worldwide also engage regularly 

with local media, travel agencies and other stakeholders to ensure that accurate 

guidance is broadly accessible. 

The B visa application begins when the applicant completes the online DS-160 

nonimmigrant visa application. The DS-160 requires the applicant to provide 

biographical data and information on the purpose of travel and destination, and to 

answer a series of questions regarding prior criminal and other activity which 

could signal potential grounds of inadmissibility. The DS-160 is a web-based, 

interactive form that collects information from applicants and then makes the data 

electronically accessible to the consular adjudicator through the Consolidated 

Consular Database. The form provides consular and fraud prevention officers the 

6 
36 


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opportunity to analyze data in advance of the visa interview, enhancing their ability 

to make decisions. The online forms offer foreign language support, but applicants 

must respond in English to facilitate information sharing between the Department 

and other government agencies, which are able to vicw visa-application data in 

foreign and domestic locations. The online application forms are "smart," meaning 

that certain answers to questions will trigger follow-up questions. The system will 

not accept applications if the questions have not been answered fully and 

"irregular" answers are flagged to ensure that consular officers address them in the 

interview. 

Before an appointment can be scheduled, the applicant must pay the machine 

readable visa (MRV) fee (which is cost-of-service based and currently set at $160). 

At most of our posts, fee payment and appointment scheduling are handled offsite 

through a Global Support Strategy (GSS) contract. In some cases, GSS contractors 

also collect applicants' biometrics (fingerprints and photos) prior to their visa 

appointments and provide courier services for the issued visas. The biometrics are 

verified by American consular officers at the interview. All of these measures 

assist in limiting the amount of time that each applicant spends in the consular 

section, as well as limiting the number of visits. 

On the day of the visa appointment, applicants may go through several steps before 

beginning their interview with a consular officer. Depending on a post's volume, 

applicant pool, and physical layout, a local employee may confirm the accuracy of 

data submitted on the DS-160 and a cleared American employee may capture 

fingerprints (or verifY fingerprints for applicants whose full prints were collected 

offsite by GSS contract employees). At small posts with light workloads, the 

adjudicator may perform all of these functions. 

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37 


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The B Visa Interview 

Like all visa applicants, B category visitors (which include Bee applicants) must 

qualify under the provisions of U.S. law, primarily the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (INA), and are inadmissible on grounds relating to, among others, 

previous immigration violations, membership in terrorist organizations, controlled 

substance trafficking, and other forms of criminal activity. I will discuss the 

processes we have in place to screen for these grounds of inadmissibility in a 

moment. However, B visa applicants are most commonly refused under INA 

section 214(b), under which all visitor (and most other) visa applicants are 

presumed to be immigrants (and thus ineligible for a nonimmigrant visa) unless 

they satisfy the consular adjudicator that they qualify for the visa category for 

which they are applying. In the B visa context, applicants normally must 

demonstrate intent to return to their place of habitual residence following a limited 

period of time visiting the United States, during which they will not engage in 

activities inconsistent with the visa classification, such as accepting unauthorized 

employment. Applicants generally overcome the presumption of immigrant intent 

by demonstrating ties to their place of residence, such as employment, property 

and family relationships, and an explanation of the proposed travel that is 

legitimate and credible, taking into account their current life situation. 

Most B visa applicants must be interviewed in person by a consular officer. The 

brief interview affords the applicant an opportunity to present evidence 

establishing the veracity of his or her application. At the same time, a personal 

interview allows the adjudicating officer to elicit information necessary to establish 

the applicant's eligibility for the visa category in question, to reconcile any 

8 
38 


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discrepancies in the infonnation provided by the applicant, and to delve more 

deeply into any potential grounds of inadmissibility. 

Consular adjudicators receive exhaustive training in both the application of visa 

law and the language spoken in the host country through the Department's Foreign 

Service Institute. Individual posts also provide training on cultural nonns, 

economic and social trends, and fraud patterns. The consular adjudicator brings 

this combined knowledge to bear in assessing the totality of facts asserted by each 

individual applicant. When the facts presented by the applicant support the stated 

purpose of travel and make sense in tenns oflocal nonns, the consular adjudicator 

will generally approve the application, if no grounds of inadmissibility are present. 

Refusals under INA 214(b) tend to occur when an applicant's purpose of travel 

does not appear consistent with the B visa category (for example, when a student 

or work category visa would be appropriate) or when the facts presented, evaluated 

in light of the adjudicator's knowledge of local nonns, fail to overcome the 

statutory presumption of immigrant intent. 

Waiver of Visa Interview 

Since 9/11, a risk-based approach grounded on greater and more effective domestic 

and international infonnation sharing has become a key principle of visa 

processing policy. This approach enables the United States to channel more 

resources toward the prevention of high-risk travel while simultaneously increasing 

the number of legitimate visitors arriving by land, air, and sea. The Electronic 

System for Travel Authorization (EST A) prescreening process for Visa Waiver 

Program (VWP) travelers, international infonnation sharing arrangements, Global 

Entry, which expedites the movement of low-risk, frequent travelers who proceed 

directly to automated kiosks upon arrival in the United States, and interagency 

9 
39 


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counterterrorism and eligibility checks are examples of how U.S. agencies can use 

information collected from visitors and/or governments in advance of travel to 

accomplish complimentary and mutually re-enforcing goals of preventing terrorists 

and serious criminals from traveling to the United States while facilitating the 

entry of legitimate visitors. 

In January 2012, the Department and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

initiated the two-year Interview Waiver Pilot Program (IWPP) to streamline 

processing for low-risk visa applicants. The worldwide pilot program allows 

consular officers to waive in-person interviews for certain nonimmigrant visa 

applicants who were previously interviewed and thoroughly screened in 

conjunction with a prior visa application, and who are renewing a previous visa 

within four years of its expiration. The pilot program also allows consular officers 

to waive interviews for qualified Brazilian applicants falling into specific age 

ranges, even when applying for visas for the first time. 

All IWPP applications are thoroughly reviewed by a commissioned consular 

officer, with the applicant's fingerprints, photograph, and biodata undergoing 

extensive database checks. Consular officers have been directed to require an 

interview for any applicant who might otherwise qualifY for the IWPP, ifthe 

application is not immediately approvable upon paper review, including if database 

checks reveal potential grounds of inadmissibility or other possible concerns. State 

concluded an August 2013 validation study of the IWPP, which showed that BI/B2 

visa issuances under the IWPP present no greater risk of overstay than 

interview-based BI/B2 visa issuances. 

Security Screening 

10 
40 


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The Department has built a visa system that leverages state-of-the-art technology, 

extensive information sharing, highly-skilled and trained officers, and interagency 

cooperation to facilitate legitimate travel and trade without compromising our 

nation's security. Whether screening a case during the course of a visa interview 

or as part of the IWPP, every consular adjudicator has access to the full suite of 

screening results. The nonimmigrant visa software used to process visitor and 

other visa categories will not permit the issuance of any visa until all results have 

been vetted by a cleared U.S. citizen designated by the Department as a consular 

adjudicator. Whenever adjudicators issue over a database "hit," they must cite the 

reason for doing so (for example, receipt of approval to waive grounds of 

inadmissibility from CBP), and consular systems alert supervisors whenever an 

adjudicator issues over an exact match. 

Under the Biometric Visa Program, before a visa is issued, the visa applicant's 

fingerprints are screened against two key databases. The first database is the 

DHS's Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which has a 

watchlist containing available fingerprints of known and suspected terrorists, 

wanted persons, and immigration law violators. The second database is the 

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation's (FBI) Next Generation Identification (NGI) 

system (formerly called the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 

System [IAFIS]), which contains more than 75.5 million criminal history records. 

More than 10,000 matches of visa applicants with records on the IDENT watchlist 

are returned to posts every month, normally resulting in visa refusals. In 2011, 

IAFIS returned more than 66,000 criminal arrest records to posts. 

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41 


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The Biometric Visa Program partners with DHS' Office of Biometric Identity 

Management (OBIM) (formerly the US-VISIT Program) to enable CBP officers at 

airports to match the fingerprints of persons entering the United States with the 

fingerprints that were taken during the visa application process at overseas posts 

and transmitted electronically to DHS IDENT. This biometric identity verification 

at ports of entry has essentially eliminated the previous problems of counterfeit and 

photo-substituted visas, as well as the use of valid visas by imposters. 

The Department was a pioneer in the use of facial recognition techniques and 

remains a leader in operational use of this technology. Consular officers use facial 

recognition technology to screen all visa applicants against a watchlist of photos of 

known or appropriately suspected terrorists obtained from the FBI's Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC), as well as the entire gallery of visa applicant photos 

contained in the Department's Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). Currently, 

more than 109 million visa applicant photos are enrolled in our facial recognition 

database. Facial recognition screening has proven to be effective in combating 

identity fraud. 

All visa applicants are checked against our automated Consular Lookout and 

Support System (CLASS), which contains 27 million records of persons found 

ineligible for visas, or against whom potentially derogatory information exists. 

CLASS employs strong, sophisticated name-searching algorithms to ensure 

matches between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information 

contained in CLASS. This robust searching capability, which takes into account 

variations in spelling, has been central to our procedures since automated lookout 

system checks were mandated following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. 

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42 


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CLASS has grown more than 400 percent since 2001 -largely the result of 

improved sharing of data among the Department, federal law enforcement 

agencies, and the intelligence community. Almost 70 percent of CLASS records 

come from other agencies, including information from the FBI, DRS, DEA, and 

the intelligence community. CLASS contains unclassified records on known or 

appropriately suspected terrorists (KSTs) provided by the Terrorist Screening 

Database, which is maintained by the TSC, and holds unclassified data on KSTs 

nominated by all U.S. government sources, including records created by the 

Department of State. We also run all visa applicants' names against the CCD in 

order to detect and respond to derogatory information regarding visa applicants and 

visa holders. The CCD contains more than 143 million immigrant and 

nonimmigrant visa records, going back to 1998. A system-specific version of the 

automated CLASS search algorithm runs the names of all visa applicants against 

the CCD to check for any prior visa applications, refusals, or issuances. We also 

provide a feed of CCD data to several partner agencies, and CCD access to several 

others. These partners in turn provide us with information on possible visa 

ineligibilities related to subjects, which we then use to screen visa applicants. 

In 2011, we deployed the Enterprise Case Assessment Service, a visa fraud 

tracking tool that provides a platform to store fraud-related research that used to be 

stored outside of consular systems. Should fraud be confirmed during the course 

of a visa interview, consular officers can record that data in this tool, and it will be 

permanently available to consular officers worldwide should the referenced 

individual re-apply for a visa. 

KingfISher Expansion (KFE) 

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43 


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Kingfisher Expansion, or KFE, is a new U.S. government system for conducting 

interagency counterterrorism screening of all visa applicants. The Department 

launched KFE in June 2013 in partnership with the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC), and in coordination with our partners at DHS (including CBP and 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the FBI, and the FBI's TSC. 

KFE checks are initiated when a U.S. embassy or consulate submits electronic 

"vetting packages" - consisting of visa applicants' electronic visa applications as 

well as the automated visa cases created in post software - to the NCTC. In an 

automated process, NCTC compares vetting package data to its holdings in a 

highly classified environment, and responds to posts within minutes with 

"red-light/green-Iight" responses. KFE red-light responses trigger a 

Washington-based interagency review of the case. 

In addition, KFE conducts post-issuance, continuous reviews of all holders of valid 

visas against emerging threat information. Continuous check "hits" are reviewed 

by our KFE partners and forwarded to the Department for revocation consideration 

when appropriate. 

A 20 II comparison of pilot results suggested that KFE could, potentially, reduce 

counterterrorism SAO volume by as much as 80 to 85 percent, and associated 

administrative costs by as much as $55 million annually. While we have yet to hit 

this volume reduction target, KFE's early impact has been positive and 

substantial. The public relations benefit to the United States of not delaying tens 

of thousands of qualified applicants cannot be quantified but will also be 

substantial, especially in the Middle East and South Asia. 

PATRIOT 

14 
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Insert offset folio 31 here 86722.031

PATRIOT is a pre-adjudication visa screening and vetting initiative employing 

resources from ICE, CBP, and State, established to identify national security, 

public safety, and other eligibility concerns relating to visa applicants prior to visa 

issuance. PATRIOT will provide consular officers with a single, unified 

recommendation from DHS components (ICE and CBP) regarding the eligibility 

and admissibility of each individual visa applicant. PATRIOT currently is 

undergoing testing at 20 Foreign Service posts. 

The PATRIOT check is planned to operate in conjunction with KFE. PATRIOT 

utilizes software to automate searches of online visa applications and visa case data 

against DHS holdings, and employs a team of agents, officers, and analytic 

personnel from ICE and CBP who perform manual vetting of possible derogatory 

matches to those holdings. PATRIOT will provide consular officers with a 

synopsis of analytic findings and recommendations on admissibility through an 

automated response package sent to State. PATRIOT screening and vetting 

operations are conducted by ICE and CBP personnel in the Washington, D.C. area. 

Interagency Cooperation with the Visa Security Program 

The Visa Security Program (VSP), under which DHS establishes Visa Security 

Units (VSU) staffed with ICE special agents at certain overseas consular posts, is 

another valuable component of the U.S. government's overall border security 

program. We have a close and productive partnership with DHS, which has 

authority for visa policy under section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, and are 

fully supportive of the mission and the future of the VSP. 

IS 
45 


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The VSP uses the visa application and interview processes as well as the 

aforementioned PATRIOT vetting to detect and combat terrorism, criminality, and 

other threats to the United States and the traveling public. ICE special agents 

assigned to VSUs provide on-site vetting of visa applications and other law 

enforcement support to our consular officers. When warranted, DRS officers 

assigned to VSUs will conduct targeted, in-depth reviews of individual visa 

applications and applicants prior to issuance, and recommend refusal or revocation 

of applications to consular officers. We work very closely with DRS to ensure to 

the maximum possible extent that no terrorist receives a visa or is admitted into our 

country. Currently, 19 VSUs are active at posts in 15 countries. 

B Visa Refusal 

Based on the information obtained from the DS-160, the visa interview, and 

multiple layers of security and fraud screening, the visa adjudicator determines 

whether the applicant is eligible for a visa under the INA. Those who are found 

ineligible are informed of the grounds for refusal verbally and in writing, with the 

exception of those denied on certain criminal or security-related grounds, in which 

case the grounds may not be provided, consistent with applicable law. The 

Department requires that a supervisory consular officer review at least 20 percent 

of the refusals made in the consular section each day. The grounds of 

inadmissibility, consular adjudicator notes, and any supporting documentation are 

maintained in the CCD, where they are accessible to future Department 

adjudicators as well as CBP, ICE and USCIS. 

A refusal under INA section 214(b) depends on the circumstances of the particular 

travel and the applicant at that time. Consequently, individuals denied under 

16 
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Insert offset folio 33 here 86722.033

section 214(b) may reapply at any time and might not be found ineligible, if the 

applicant is able, during a subsequent interview, to present new facts or 

information that were not presented initially and that establish the applicant's 

eligibility. Applicants found inadmissible on criminal and other grounds may only 

receive a nonimmigrant visa if eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 

section 2l2(d)(3)(A) and the consular adjudicator or the Department recommends, 

and CBP approves, a waiver. Consular adjudicators and the Department 

recommend such waivers when the applicant is otherwise qualified; does not pose 

a threat to national welfare or security; and advances a U.S. government interest, 

which may include travel of representatives of foreign governments, travelers 

coming at U.S. government invitation, or travel that furthers U.S. economic, 

cultural, or humanitarian interests. Consular adjudicators recommend waivers to 

CBP's Admissibility Review Office (ARO) using the Admissibility Review 

Information Service (ARIS) via the CCD. 

B Visa Issuance 

Applicants whom an adjudicator finds to be qualified for a B visa and who are not 

found otherwise inadmissible based on security and fraud checks may be issued 

visas. It is Department policy to issue maximum validity visas, as determined on 

the basis of reciprocity, whenever practicable, absent a specific reason for issuing a 

shorter validity. Under the principle of reciprocity, insofar as practicable, the 

Department will not issue visas to nationals of a given country with a validity 

period in excess of the visa validity afforded to U.S. citizens visiting that same 

country for a similar purpose. 

17 
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In the case of an issuance, the consular adjudicator also enters notes supporting the 

decision along with relevant scanned documents into the CCD for use by future 

Department adjudicators as well as CBP officers at ports of entry. 

Lincoln Foil 

Aliens approved for travel to the United States are issued a "Lincoln visa foil" in 

their travel documents. The Lincoln foil is printed on a medium-weight security 

paper imprinted by ink jet with the recipient's photo and biographic data. The ink 

is absorbed deeply into the paper's substrata to prevent removal or alteration of the 

imprinted data. The central visual element of the visa foil is our sixteenth 

president as enshrined at the Lincoln Memorial. 

Locally Employed Staff (LE Staff) are generally responsible for visa printing, but 

only designated U.S. citizen adjudicators may authorize issuance ofa visa (and 

thus electronically enable its printing) and assume responsibility for visa foils, 

which must be controlled at all times. The accountable consular officer (ACO, 

designated in writing by the consular section chief) must maintain inventory 

records offoils received, their use and disposition, and periodically (at least 

quarterly) verifY the inventory on hand by conducting a physical count. When foil 

shipments are received, the ACO physically counts the packages offoils, verifies 

the sequence of serial numbers and records the first and last numbers in an 

electronic ledger. The ACO dispenses the foils in consecutive order to employees 

responsible for printing visas and must verifY the numbers on each sheet of foils 

handed out for daily visa production, maintaining a daily electronic record of all 

foils issued, spoiled or returned to secure storage. The ACO must also record the 

numbers of foils destroyed or transferred to other posts. 

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Border Crossing Cards 

Recognizing that frequent, sometimes daily, travel across the border is a way of 

life for many in the Southwest, the United States developed a border crossing card 

in the 1940s to be used by Mexican citizens in lieu of the combined passport and 

visa generally required of foreign visitors. The basic laminated card, which 

contained the bearer's photograph, was initially issued by the former Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS) free of charge and with indefinite validity. 

Although the card underwent a series of permutations, it contained virtually no 

security features and was easily counterfeited. The Illegal Immigration Reform 

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) mandated that any BCC 

issued after April 1, 1998 contain a biometric identifier and be machine readable. 

By then, it had become evident that many BCC holders lived far from the border 

and/or used the cards for travel into the United States beyond the border region (in 

other words, for B visa purposes). Agreeing that the BCC and the B visa had 

become inextricably entwined, State and INS formed a partnership to implement 

the IIRIRA directive: State would adjudicate all applications for BCCs as a subset 

ofB visas, while INS (and, subsequent to 2003, DHS) would produce the cards 

through its Integrated Card Production System (ICPS). 

In its July 2007 report "Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but More 

Needs to be Done to Prevent their Fraudulent Use," the GAO recommended that 

the Department reassess security features and redesign travel documents on a 

regular basis. The recommendation dovetailed with Department planning for the 

BCC replacement cycle, as Mexican citizens who had received 1 O-year validity 

BCCs in the wake ofIIRIRA would soon be applying for replacement cards, 

19 
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Insert offset folio 36 here 86722.036

offering the Department an opportunity to design a new generation of Bees. This 

also led to the Department taking over production of Bees in addition to the 

adjudication. On October 1,2008, the Department issued its first Bee with Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID), also referred to as the DSP-150. 

Today's Bee incorporates (RFID) technology, state-of-the-art security features 

and laser engraving. The card's design is reminiscent of the Southwest topography 

of the United States, with a distinctive color and geometric design. The 

photograph on the Bee card is laser engraved into the mUltiple layers of the card, 

becoming an integral part of the card material. Although the Bee is designed to 

be read by either RFID or by Machine Readable Zone readers, it is also critical that 

the card be secure on "face value" for inspection as well. To provide easy visual 

and tactile verification, and to enhance the integrity ofthe card, the Department 

uses state-of-the-art technology to embed an optical variable device (OVD), or 

kine gram, inside the card, rather than stamping it on the surface. The embedded 

OVD overlaps the lasered photograph with the personalized data, and any attempt 

to alter the OVD will destroy the integrity of the card. The embedded OVD is 

easily recognizable on the face of the card by sight and touch, and provides for 

quick inspection and verification that the card is genuine. The Department is 

working on a redesign and update to the Bee, which will be the fourth version 

since taking over production of the Bee. The Department worked proactively 

with DHS's Forensic Document Laboratory to ensure that the version four Bee 

will include the most state-of-the-art security features available on a full 

poly carbonate, laser-engraved card that includes innovative counterfeit-deterrent 

features not previously used in secure document design. 

20 
50 


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To meet CBP's operational needs at land and sea ports of entry, the BCC contains 

a vicinity-read (RFID) chip which serves as a pointer to a stored record in a secure 

DHS database. There is no personal data recorded on the chip; the chip contains 

only a number that can be read by authorized CBP readers mounted at traffic lanes 

at ports of entry. The number points to the database; personal information of the 

card holder is relayed to CBP officers' screens as the card holder approaches the 

inspection booth. Because the card design does not include any technology that 

would encode or encrypt 

bio-data, identity data cannot be tampered with or manipulated, eliminating the 

possibility that a new or false identity could be associated with the card. 

Layered Security and Data Sharing 

As I have previously stated in my testimony, the Department embraces a layered 

approach to security screening to contribute to border security. The Department 

and DHS continue to work hand in hand to improve procedures and upgrade 

systems devoted to supporting the visa function. DHS receives all of the 

information collected by the Department during the visa process. DHS's OBIM 

(formerly US-VISIT) is often cited as a model in data sharing because the 

applicant information we provide, including fingerprint data, is checked at ports of 

entry to confirm the identity of travelers. DHS has broad access to our entire CCD. 

A menu of reports tailored to the specific needs of each particular unit is supplied 

to elements within DHS, such as ICE agents assigned to VSUs. 

Our systems are specifically designed to facilitate comprehensive data sharing with 

our partners. We give other agencies immediate access to more than 15 years of 

21 
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Insert offset folio 38 here 86722.038

visa data for these purposes, and they use this access extensively in the course of 

conducting law enforcement and/or counterterrorism investigations. 

Working in concert with DHS, we proactively expanded biometric screening 

programs and integrated this expansion into existing overseas facilities. In 

partnership with DHS and the FBI, we established the largest fingerprint screening 

program on the globe. These efforts require intense ongoing cooperation from 

other agencies. We successfully forged and continue to foster partnerships that 

recognize the need to supply accurate and speedy screening in a 2417 global 

environment. As we implement process and policy changes, we are always 

striving to add value in both border security and in operational results. Both 

dimensions are important in supporting the visa process. 

Conclusion 

The Department recognizes that the United States' long-term interests and security 

are served by continuing the flow of commerce and ideas that are the foundations 

of our prosperity and security. The B visitor visa is the cornerstone of this flow, 

enabling ever-increasing numbers of visitors to experience U.S. culture and 

contribute to our economy. 

The Department has been able to facilitate this important flow of legitimate 

travelers even while maintaining national security as its number one priority. We 

have incorporated multiple biographic and biometric checks, supported by a 

sophisticated global information technology network,into the visa adjudication 

process. We have built strong partnerships with DHS, other law enforcement 

agencies, and other relevant agencies to ensure the real-time flow of information 

22 
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necessary for keeping our borders secure. Finally, we maintain a sophisticated, 

highly trained staff of multilingual adjudicators who provide the cultural 

awareness, knowledge, and objectivity necessary to ensure that the visa function, 

essential to our economic security, also remains the frontline of border security. 

This concludes my testimony today. I will be pleased to take your questions. 

23 
53 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Osuna. 

STATEMENT OF JUAN OSUNA 

Mr. OSUNA. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Tierney, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the 

Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, 

or EOIR. 

Our agency is responsible for conducting civil immigration removal proceedings through our immigration courts located around 

the Country and our appellate level court, the Board of Immigration Appeals. While our judges have no role in determining the 

guilt or innocence of aliens charged with criminal wrongdoing at 

the border or in the interior, we are certainly affected by law enforcement activity at the border and beyond. Every alien that the 

Department of Homeland Security formally charges with being removable from the U.S. results in another case for EOIR, and our 

trial and appellate judges are responsible for deciding whether the 

person should be removed from the U.S. or whether he or she merits some sort of relief from removal. 

With 348,000-plus proceedings pending at the end of fiscal year 

2013, we are currently managing the largest caseload the immigration court system has ever seen. Overall, there are 252 immigration 

judges located in 59 immigration courts around the Country. Many 

of our courts are located near or along the southern border, including San Diego, El Paso, and Harlingen, Texas; and along the northern border, including Seattle, Detroit, and Buffalo. Some courts are 

located within INS–ICE detention centers, thereby making the adjudication of those cases involving detained aliens at those facilities 

much more efficient. These include the border locations of East 

Mesa California, Eloy, Arizona, where I think you visited, Mr. 

Chairman, and Port Isabel, Texas, along the southern border; as 

well as Batavia, New York along the northern border. 

In order to address the immigration courts significant caseload, 

EOIR requires adequate resources. Most crucial is the ability to 

properly staff our immigration courts with the immigration judges 

and support staff needed to most efficiently and fairly process 

cases. For fiscal year 2013, EOIR was funded at $289.1 million 

post-sequestration, which is more than $13 million below the fiscal 

year 2012 funding level. The resources that the President’s budget 

requests for fiscal year 2014 are essential to our ongoing efforts to 

recruit, train, and equip top-quality immigration judges and support staff. 

The highest priority cases for EOIR are those involving detained 

individuals, and the agency focuses on the efficient and timely adjudication of such cases. These individuals are often detained by 

DHS because they have criminal convictions that may make them 

deportable from the Country and because they may pose a risk of 

flight or a public safety risk. In addition, detention is expensive 

and it implicates a liberty interest for the individuals detained. 

Therefore, these cases always rise to the very top of our priority 

list. 

54 

In this world of limited resources, however, placing a high priority on the adjudication of the detained cases has implications for 

the non-detained side of the docket, including some cases initiated 

as a result of a person seeking asylum in the U.S. EOIR, however, 

understands that its mission includes a timely adjudication of all 

cases, detained and non-detained, and strives to complete every 

case as quickly as possible within the constraints of due process. 

The utmost priority for every type of case is that the facts are 

fully considered and every application of law is correct. As with all 

hearings before our tribunals, EOIR is very focused on protecting 

the integrity of immigration proceedings. The agency has a robust 

and active program for identifying and referring claims of fraud encountered by immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and we work very, very closely with our partner agencies to 

identify and take action against those individuals who perpetrate 

fraud against the court system. This program also allows us to 

safeguard aliens from falling prey to a growing notario problem, 

which is a problem that every agency has to deal with that deals 

with immigration cases. 

The complaints and requests for assistance that our fraud program receives each year are almost evenly divided between unauthorized practice of immigration law complaints and fraudulent 

claims perpetrated against the Government. As an illustration of 

our fraud program, we are currently a participant with the FTC in 

the Sentinel Network, which is a consumer protection network, and 

we have referred about 70 cases to the Network of potential fraud 

in the last couple years. 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Tierney, and other distinguished 

members, despite the large caseload that EOIR faces, we continue 

to make great strides. Our adjudicators and staff are dedicated professionals who work every day to ensure efficient and fair immigration court proceedings, both at the trial and the appellate levels. 

While we face the demands of a large and increasing caseload, with 

your continued support we are confident that we can continue to 

meet that challenge. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I 

look forward to answering any questions you might have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Osuna follows:] 

55 


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ilepartmtnt of JU~:j'lite 

STATEMENT OF 

JUAN P. OSUNA 

DIRECTOR 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & GOVERNMENT REFORM 

SlJBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

HEARING ON 

"BORDER SECURITY 

PART Ill: BORDER CROSSING CARDS AND BI/BZ VISAS" 

PRESENTED 

NOVEMBER 2013 
56 


Insert offset folio 41 here 86722.041

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Tierney, and other distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the 

Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). While 

maintaining the largest caseload the immigration system has ever seen, EOIR continues 

to effectively and efficiently carry out its adjudicatory mission. 

EOIR administers the Nation's immigration court system, composed of both trial 

and appellate tribunals. Removal proceedings before EOIR begin when the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) files a formal charging document, called a Notice to Appear 

(NTA), with an immigration court. EOIR's immigration judges decide whether the alien 

is removable from the United States based on the DHS charges and, if removable, 

whether the alien is eligible for and merits relief or protection from removal. EOIR is 

responsible only for civil immigration proceedings, and EOIR's adjudicators have no role 

in state or federal criminal proceedings. EOiR's immigration judges, for example, do not 

determine the guilt or innocence of aliens charged with criminal wrongdoing at the 

border or in the interior of the country. 

Overall there are now 252 immigration judges in 59 courts around the country. 

Many of our courts are located near or along the southern border, including in San Diego, 

California; EI Paso, Texas; and Harlingen, Texas. Some courts are located within DHS 

detention centers, including the border locations of East Mesa, California; Eloy, Arizona; 

and Port Isabel, Texas. 

The appellate level ofEOIR is the Board ofimmigration Appeals (BIA), which 

sits in Falls Church, Virginia. The BIA consists of IS Board Members, supported by a 

staff of attorney advisers, and is headed by a Chairman. The BIA has nationwide 

jurisdiction and hears appeals of the immigration judge decisions. When appropriate, the 

BIA issues binding precedent decisions interpreting complex areas of immigration law 

and procedure. Either an alien or DHS may file an appeal with the BIA. An alien who 

loses an appeal before the BIA may seek review of that decision in the applicable federal 

circuit court of appeals. 

EOIR's third adjudicatory component is the Office of the Chief Administrative 

Hearing Officer (OCAHO). The Chief Administrative Hearing Officer heads a tribunal 

comprised of administrative law judges, who handle and adjudicate cases related to 

illegal hiring and employment eligibility verification violations, document fraud, and 

unfair immigration-related employment practices. Although there is a much smaller 

volume of these cases relative to the immigration courts, OCAHO case receipts doubled 

between FY 2008 and FY 2012. 

Each immigration court's caseload is tied directly to DHS enforcement and 

detention activities. DHS determines both detention space allocations and the filing of 

charging documents. As such, EOIR is in regular and continuing contact with DHS to 

anticipate and respond to caseload trends. Through this close coordination, our two 
57 


Insert offset folio 42 here 86722.042

departments are able to explore additional ways of handling the removal adjudication 

process more efficiently. In tum, we can focus our resources on those case involving 

detained aliens, our highest priority cases. 

Pending Caseload 

We recognize the continuing public interest in EOrR's pending caseload. At the 

end ofFY 2012, EOIR's immigration courts had 327,431 proceedings pending, marking 

an increase of more than 29,000 proceedings pending over the end of FY 2011. In FY 

2013, that pending caseload grew by approximately 21,000 proceedings, reaching 

348,343 proceedings pending, our highest caseload to date. The pending caseload is 

directly tied to both the number of cases that DHS files in the immigration courts and 

EOIR's ability to complete those cases with available resources. 

As I noted above, EOIR's highest priority cases are those involving detained 

aliens. These individuals are often detained by DHS because they have criminal 

convictions that may make them removable from the United States. Others are detained 

because they pose a danger to the community or are a flight risk. As such, the agency 

prioritizes the efficient and timely adjudication of these cases. 

Asylum and Convention Against Torture (CAT) 

Placing a high priority on the adjudication of detained cases has implications for 

the non-detained side ofthe docket, including some cases initiated as a result of persons 

seeking asylum in the United States. EOIR understands the importance of providing a 

meaningful process for those seeking protection from persecution and preserving the 

integrity of the asylum process. 

All EOIR staff understand the importance of asylum claims, and ofthe need to 

decide these life-changing cases quickly while still taking the appropriate time to 

consider all ofthe relevant facts and applicable law. While we take seriously our 

responsibility to decide cases in an expeditious manner, the utmost priority for every type 

of case is ensuring that every fact is considered and every application of law is correct. 

There are two types of asylum processes - defensive and affirmative. The 

defensive asylum process applies to aliens who are in removal proceedings before EOIR 

and who request asylum before an immigration judge. The process is called "defensive" 

because it can provide aliens with relieffrom removal from the United States. The 

affirmative asylum process applies to aliens who initially file asylum applications with 

DliS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USC IS). Affirmative asylum 

applicants whom USCIS does not find to be eligible for asylum and are not in lawful 

status are referred to immigration court, where immigration judges conduct a de novo 

hearing of their asylum cases. 

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DHS is authorized to utilize expedited removal for aliens at the border who are 

without proper immigration documents or who have engaged in fraud or 

misrepresentation, when certain conditions exist. Generally, aliens subject to expedited 

removal do not have a hearing before an immigration judge. To ensure that those who 

may qualifY for asylum or Torture Convention protection are not returned to countries 

where they would be subject to persecution or torture, USCIS asylum officers conduct 

non-adversarial screening interviews, known as "credible fear" interviews, of aliens 

subject to expedited removal who, while in DHS custody, express a fear of persecution or 

torture if they return to their home country. On the basis of that interview, USCIS 

asylum officers determine, in accordance with the statutorily-defined standard, whether 

there is a "significant possibility" the alien can establish eligibility for asylum or Torture 

Convention protection. EOIR has a very limited role in the expedited removal process. 

If DHS finds that an alien has established a credible fear of persecution or torture at the 

credible fear interview, the alien is taken out ofthe expedited removal process and 

referred for removal proceedings before EOIR, during which the alien can pursue asylum. 

IfDHS finds that the alien does not have a credible fear of persecution or torture, the 

alien may request that the screening decision be reviewed by an EOIR immigration judge, 

who may either agree with DHS, in which case the alien is removed without any further 

EOIR involvement, or find that the alien has a credible fear of persecution or torture, in 

which case the alien is taken out ofthe expedited removal process and referred for further 

proceedings before EOIR. 

Fraud, Abuse, and Attorney Disciplinary Issues 

EOIR has a robust and active program for identifYing and referring claims of 

fraud encountered by immigration judges and the BIA. This program serves to protect 

the integrity of immigration proceedings and to safeguard aliens from falling prey to 

fraud. EOIR's Fraud and Abuse Program makes referrals for investigation of 

immigration fraud complaints it receives from EOIR staff and adjudicators, respondents 

in EOIR proceedings, and members of the public. The complaints and requests for 

assistance the Fraud and Abuse Program receives each year are almost evenly divided 

between unauthorized practice of immigration law (UPIL) complaints and fraudulent 

claims perpetrated against the government. 

Because EOIR has no authority to conduct investigations or prosecute, UPIL 

complaints are referred to federal, state and local law enforcement, and bar associations 

for investigation and prosecution. EOIR also files complaints ofUPIL fraud with the 

Federal Trade Commission's Consumer Sentinel Network (Sentinel) and collaborates 

with USCIS's Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate and other government 

agencies in combating fraudulent immigration activity. EOIR consistently is among the 

top-ranked government agencies in referring UPIL fraud to Sentinel. 

EOIR also regulates the professional conduct of immigration attorneys and 

representatives in order to protect the public, preserve the integrity of immigration 

proceedings and adjudications, and maintain high professional standards among 

3 
59 


Insert offset folio 44 here 86722.044

immigration practitioners. EOIR's Disciplinary Counsel investigates complaints 

involving alleged misconduct associated with practice before EOIR's immigration courts 

and the BlA to determine whether an attorney or representative has engaged in criminal, 

unethical, or unprofessional conduct. If the EOIR Disciplinary Counsel determines that a 

complaint has merit and that disciplinary sanctions should be imposed, the EOIR 

Disciplinary Counsel can issue confidential discipline or initiate formal disciplinary 

proceedings. Since the program's inception in 2000, EOIR has disciplined more than 

I , I 00 attorneys. 

Budget and Resource Impact 

It is critical that EOIR maintain the ability to properly staff our immigration 

courts with the immigration judges and support staff needed to most efficiently and fairly 

process cases. In 20 I 0, the Department and EOIR placed a great emphasis on the hiring 

of new immigration judges in order to address the rapidly rising caseloads. The effort 

met with great success, increasing our immigration judge corps and adding more law 

clerks to assist the judges. 

Unfortunately, the current partial hiring freeze continues to have a significant 

negative and worsening impact upon EOIR's core mission, increasing the number of 

cases pending adjudication and extending court dockets further into the future. More 

than 100 immigration judges more than one third of the immigration judge force are 

eligible to retire in FY 2014 alone. 

The Department continues to seek the resources necessary to hire additional 

immigration judges, BIA attorneys, and other staff, to provide them with sufficient 

training and tools, and to continue pursuing other improvements that will benefit the 

immigration court system and the parties who appear before EOIR. For FY 2013, EOIR 

was funded at $289.1 million, post-sequestration, which is more than $13 million below 

the FY 2012 funding level. The resources the President's Budget requests for EOIR for 

FY 2014 are essential to our ongoing efforts to recruit, train, and equip top-quality 

immigration judges and court staff. 

Immigration Judge Training. Conduct & Professionalism 

EOIR has a well-established and effective means of training its judges for the 

substantive rigors of their jobs. An Assistant Chief Immigration Judge (ACIJ) for 

training is responsible for enhancing and maintaining adequate training programs for 

immigration judges and other court staff. EOIR now provides new immigration judges 

with six weeks of training, in order to ensure that they are ready to hear cases fairly and 

promptly. Further, they are assigned a mentor immigration judge to assist them 

throughout their first year on the bench. They are also required to take and pass an 

immigration law exam before they can begin adjudicating cases. A formalized review 

process is included as part of a new immigration judge's probationary period, which 

typically lasts two years. Ifperformance issues arise, EOIR offers counseling, and 

4 
60 


Insert offset folio 45 here 86722.045

additional training and mentoring before more formally disciplining an immigration 

judge. 

EOIR also goes to great lengths to ensure that both new and experienced 

immigration judges receive continuing education. EOIR continues to rely on many of its 

established methods of training to bolster and fine-tune the immigration judges' 

knowledge, such as video and webinar trainings. 

EOIR also employs an ACIJ for conduct and professionalism, who serves to 

promote and preserve the integrity of the immigration judge corps. EOIR continues to 

monitor immigration judge performance through an official performance work plan and 

evaluation process, through a corps of l3 ACIJs who oversee the daily operations of the 

courts. Further, the agency remains committed to ensuring that any allegations of 

misconduct involving immigration judges are investigated and resolved, promptly and 

appropriately. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Tierney, and distinguished Subcommittee Members, 

despite the large case load that it faces, EOIR continues to make great strides. Our 

adjudicators and staff are dedicated professionals who work every day to ensure efficient 

and fair immigration court proceedings, both at the trial and appellate levels. EOIR faces 

the demands ofa large and increasing case load, but, with Congress's continued support, 

we are confident that EOIR will effectively meet that challenge. 

Thank you for your interest and for the opportunity to speak with you today. I am 

pleased to answer any questions you might have. 

5 
61 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

I will now recognize myself for five minutes. 

I don’t want to spend the bulk of my time trying to get you to 

respond to lettres that we send you, specifically to Homeland Security. I have a problem when I send you a letter in July asking for 

some basic information and I get the response last night, after 

hours, to which most answers are we’ll get you this information 

later. My colleagues, I think in a very sincere way, are trying to 

point out that these overstays are less of a problem, but when I ask 

the Department of Homeland Security to provide a document describing the total number of overstays, the response was Homeland 

Security will provide more specific information on overstays by the 

end of the calendar year. I asked this question in July. This is the 

answer you gave me last night. I don’t know how anybody can 

make the case that this is less of a problem or even more of a problem when Homeland Security can’t even tell me what the numbers 

were in 2009. 

I also don’t understand, from Homeland Security, why, when I 

issue a letter on August 26th, I get no response. I have had no response. 

Mr. Woods, why do I not get answers to the questions we ask? 

Mr. WOODS. Chairman, I will take your concerns back to the Department. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No. You are the representative from Homeland 

Security. What is intolerable to this committee, and it has happened on both sides of the aisle, is we don’t get answers to very 

basic questions. Don’t tell me you are just going to carry the message back. I carried the message to the secretary and to the Department. Why don’t you have answers to those questions? Why do 

these letters go unanswered? 

Mr. WOODS. It is my understanding that your July letter was answered last evening, and I apologize for the delay in that letter. It 

went through a lengthy clearance process. There were many questions to answer, and it is my understanding—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Most of the answers are we are going to get you 

the answers later. 

Mr. WOODS. It is my understanding that the Office of Immigration Statistics is committed to publishing the overstay rates by the 

end of this calendar year. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I asked for them back in—do you have the numbers for 2009? 

Mr. WOODS. I do not have the numbers for 2009 right at this 

time. From what I understand at the time—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What I want you to understand and take back, 

look, I am sure you are a very nice gentleman. You are the person, 

though, that your agency put up here in front. It is nothing personal. But when I ask for this in writing, in letter, trying to be 

nice, polite, give you plenty of time, in July, it should be a clue that 

when we come and have a hearing in November that I might ask 

you this question. You take up half my time trying to get you to 

do what we asked you to do politely just in writing from what the 

statistics are in 2009. This is what is so terribly frustrating about 

trying to interact with this Administration, it is the lack of information about this. 

62 

Now, let me go to the Department of State, Mr. Ramotowski. 

Help me understand this definition of—in order to get a border 

crossing card, Mexico, these are for Mexican citizens to come to the 

United States, they have to demonstrate ties to Mexico. We believe, 

as a Government, that they will want to go back to Mexico. Can 

you define what that is? Because I am having a hard time finding 

what the definition and the leniency that maybe somebody from 

the Department of State is going to give somebody to get one of 

these border crossing cards. What does it take? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, we evaluate each and every 

visa application on its own individual merits and, as you pointed 

out, the law requires each applicant to demonstrate that they are 

not an intending immigrant. So the consular officer will evaluate 

that applicant’s case based on their circumstances. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you know the average time that the application is reviewed? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. It varies by country. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, we are talking about just Mexico, because I 

am just talking about just border crossing cards, which are only 

available—— 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. In Mexico, that is correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ.—in Mexico. So it doesn’t vary by country, it is 

only Mexico. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Okay. For Mexico, the average time would be 

in the neighborhood for three to four minutes for a consular interview. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And what documentation is required to make 

this? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. What is required is our DS–160 electronic visa 

application form, and the consular officer is entitled to request any 

other document that he or she needs in order to make a decision. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. As a minimum, what documentation do you need? 

As a Mexican. A Mexican comes up, filed his application. What documentation do they need to provide as a minimum? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. As a minimum, as I said, the application is the 

only required document. If the consular officer doubts the applicant’s answers—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So there is no passport, no—— 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. A passport is required, yes, in addition to the 

application form. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Birth certificates? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Birth certificates are not required unless the 

officer has reason to doubt the identity of the individual that is 

standing before them. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So they must have a Mexican-issued passport. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. That is correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is the opportunity or what are the latitude 

that they have to waive that requirement? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. A passport cannot be waived. A Mexican citizen has to travel to the U.S. with a passport and a border crossing 

card. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And my last question, I have gone over my time 

here, unfortunately, and we are going to come back with several 

rounds here, I promise you that, why such a dramatic increase? We 

63 

have nearly 300,000-plus, more than 300,000 border crossing cards 

issued in the Obama Administration than the Bush Administration. I just want to know why. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. I think there are several reasons for that, Mr. 

Chairman. Visa demand, border crossing card demand in Mexico 

tends to be cyclical because the cards are issued for a period of 10 

years, and when you come to the end of a 10-year period, a larger 

group of applicants are renewing their cards. Another reason is 

that overall travel demand to the United States has been increasing. We are seeing that in a number of countries around the world. 

Private industry and cities, States, and towns have been heavily 

promoting the U.S. as a tourist destination. Demand dropped drastically after the 9/11 attacks and it is now recovering. 

Finally, with respect to Mexico, initially border crossing cards 

were mainly issued in our five border consulates, and the consulates and the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City issued standard 

visas. But now Mexico has converted to issuing the border crossing 

card, B1/B2 visa card exclusively, so you are going to see, simply 

because we have shifted more of the demand in Mexico to these 

cards, and the reason for that is the card helps CBP at the border 

because it contains an RFID chip, which enables the CBP officer 

to get that data as a car drives up to the border. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And perhaps we will have time to explore why 

the rejection rates are so different between the two administrations. 

But I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Woods, first of all, let me add some comments to the chairman’s request for documents and whatever. It is very difficult for 

us to determine any materials around here as an oversight unless 

the Department is cooperative and gets us those materials. He has 

a phone, so if for some reason they can’t be answered, you are busy 

doing your bureaucratic ping pong over there or whatever, which 

I understand you are forced to go through, and that ought to be revised, somebody could contact the committee, let them know where 

they stand on that process, offer what it is they have in the meantime. Actually, some of these responses, please contact the Department of State to obtain the information. Well, that could have been 

given the first day, to reroute him to where he should go, instead 

of waiting months and now have to start all over again with a different Department. 

This is a bipartisan request in terms of that. When a request for 

information is made, if you legitimately don’t have the information, 

then pick up the phone or pay a little visit, we are not that far 

away, and explain why not. And if you are redirecting it to another 

department, that is two minutes. That ought to be given immediately on that so people can start in a different direction on that. 

That is one message I would like you to take back and issue on 

that, and then we can try to get going. 

I did put up a chart there which indicated from some very, I 

think, credible individuals that at least from 2000 to 2009, the nonimmigrant visa overstays seemed to have a trend downward, significant trend downward, and I know the Pew Hispanic Center 

64 

trends project indicates that there is an uptick. They say not a significantly determinative uptick in the last couple of years on that, 

but it would be helpful for us to know what those numbers are, 

coming from the source on that. But if we assume, at least, that 

that 73 percent decline from 2000 to 2009 is reliable information 

on that, can you tell me what you say accounts for that trend? 

Mr. WOODS. Sir, I think there is a multitude of reasons that account for that trend. We have much more robust vetting up front, 

before people are issued visas, to determine what their intentions 

are in coming to the United States. So if they are intending immigrants, the State Department does not issue visas. Additionally, we 

do have a targeting enforcement program that identifies those people who are public safety and/or national security threats to go out 

and arrest them and remove them from the United States. We 

have a robust recurrent vetting process that CBP handles on a 

daily basis with all the active visas, and determines those individuals that may, up-front, be not admissible to the United States; it 

may be a potential oversight. So there are a multitude of reasons, 

a layered approach here. 

Additionally, they now understand that the Bureau of Office of 

Immigration Statistics within DHS will be issuing the fiscal year 

2012 statistics this year. We are in the process of pulling the raw 

data of the fiscal year 2013 so that we can provide them a sideby-side comparison. This way they can see whether the actual 

trend is upward or downward. But we hope that we are committed 

to publishing the fiscal year 2012 data by the end of this calendar 

year and then have the fiscal year 2013 data shortly behind that, 

or hopefully maybe contemporaneously with it. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Are you maintaining records indicating 

a large increase in the number of rejected applications? 

Mr. WOODS. We don’t maintain records on applications, that 

would be the Department of State that handles the applications. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Ramotowski, are you maintaining any records 

on that, indicating whether there has been an increase in the number of applicants for visas or not? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes, we maintain records on that, and globally 

visa demand has increased in recent years. In Mexico, however, for 

fiscal year 2013, demand has been down by approximately 14 percent for border crossing cards and B visas. So, again, demand fluctuates by country and over time. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

So back to you, Mr. Woods, even if it is going down, we saw that 

trend, there are still some people coming in and overstaying, so the 

issue gets back to the information we take on entry versus the information we get on exit. Now, the Senate bill, the total comprehensive reform immigration did provide that the Department of 

Homeland Security establish an automated exit system that would 

collect biographic information from departing foreign visitors at air 

and seaports by the end of 2015 and require the Department of 

Homeland Security to establish an exit system for collecting biometric information at 10 airports, which would later be expanded 

to 30. 

Is that something that the Department feels would be useful in 

addressing this issue? 

65 

Mr. WOODS. I am going to defer to Customs and Border Protection; they run the ports of entry and would be setting up that program. But I can say this before, that we have, over the last two 

years, enhanced our interconnectivity with the CBP and the CIS to 

better validate overstay records through both biographical and biometric matches, and our match rate is up substantially to show 

that we can validate those records at this time, and that is the reason we will be publishing the fiscal year total status this year. But 

I will defer to CBP for the—— 

Mr. TIERNEY. The later is to you, Mr. Wagner. Can you tell us 

whether or not that proposed system would be useful or helpful on 

that, or whether it actually can be done, practically speaking? Can 

we get that kind of an exit system up and operating so it would 

be effective? 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes, happy to address that. We were given the responsibility for the entry/exit mission in April with our, this past 

year, appropriation, so we are busy working on setting up an entry/ 

exit program management office that will set up a demonstration 

and prototype lab over the course of the next year. We will be looking at the different technologies, the different biometrics. Really, 

the key here, it is not so much the technology, it is where you put 

it in that process to make it meaningful. Right now, today, we do 

biographic entry/exit tracking, so the addition of biometrics into 

that is not going to get us additional records in the air and sea environment; it is going to confirm the biographic data that we already have today. But we have to put it in such a place that we 

have confidence that that person who registered their biometrics, 

whatever that is, actually boarded that aircraft or boarded that 

conveyance to leave the United States, and they didn’t just turn 

around and walk right out of the airport, thereby then just defaulting to the same exact system we have in place today. 

So we want the information. We want to get it, we want to use 

it, but we want to do it in such a way that it doesn’t cause gridlock 

at the airports and that it is done in a meaningful way, that it 

doesn’t end up jeopardizing or looking at the expenditures to do 

this and thus jeopardizing even our authority to collect this type 

of information. So we will be working over the course of the next 

year to determine what the concept of operations are, what are the 

right different biometrics to do this, and then looking at running 

a demonstration at a port of entry, at an airport, sometime in 2015. 

So we have some concerns with the time lines in the bill. We have 

some concerns, of course, about the funding of what it would cost 

to do this. We are asking for a little bit more time over the course 

of next year to really do this right and doing it meaningful. 

Land borders is a whole different set of challenges. We would 

struggle with finding the right type of biometric to collect on inbound without really creating gridlock and capacity issues at the 

ports of entry that already experience wait times now, and that is 

just on the inbound case. On the outbound case even more difficult 

because the infrastructure is not there and the physical infrastructure is not there. In a place like San Ysidro, we have 20-something 

lanes of inbound. There are only a handful of lanes going out into 

Mexico. So to replicate the inbound and outbound process will be 

quite costly and quite tremendous of a project to take on. 

66 

Now, what we are doing, we are collecting all the inbound biographical data at the land borders. What we started with Canada 

this past year is an exchange of their inbound data for our inbound 

data, and we are able to exchange those biographical records so we 

have a confirmation via entry into Canada that that person did in 

fact depart the United States; and we are exchanging that data 

today now on all non-U.S., non-Canadian citizens. We will be expanding that to U.S. and Canadians at some point next year. 

Mr. TIERNEY. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, just one. 

So are you going to do a cost-benefit analysis? It seems to me the 

cost of replicating an exit system similar to the entry system is 

going to be huge. 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes. We will look at those considerations. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Gosar. 

Mr. GOSAR. I will just keep you on the hot spot, because you just 

led me into some questions. When you are looking at these biometrics, are we going to share them with all law enforcement 

throughout State, local, and Federal entities? 

Mr. WAGNER. We would share them with any permissible use of 

sharing any information. 

Mr. GOSAR. So we would actually engage them. So not just looking at ports of entry, airports, port waterways, but we would work 

with local entities? I am from Arizona, by the way, so that is why 

it is a pointed question for us. We seem to have this disconnect by 

looking and working with local and State law enforcement officials. 

You would share these biometrics so that we have numerous ports 

of looking at the biometrics of overstays? 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, as with any information we would collect, we 

would share it with whatever is a permissible use of the information we have. 

Mr. GOSAR. Okay. 

Mr. Ramotowski, some of the things that we have seen lately in 

forged documents, even leading in Florida to two mass murderers, 

actually, or murderers being allowed out of jail. In replication of 

this chip and this border crossing aspect, what is our dimension of 

forgery? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. One of the biggest advances in both visas and 

border crossing cards was including the biometric fingerprint, 

which is a tremendous link to the applicant’s true identity, and 

that has cut forgery by a tremendous amount. We also have at all 

of our embassies and consulates designated fraud prevention officers, and at the larger and medium-sized ones we have dedicated 

fraud prevention units who work continuously with our visa officers, with diplomatic security, special agents, with law enforcement 

agents from other U.S. Government agencies to investigate fraud 

scams, immigration scams, and to detect trends in alien smuggling 

and other risks to our national security. That information is continuously communicated to our visa officers so that they have upto-date information about the applications that they are handling. 

Mr. GOSAR. Are they having harder times in regards to supporting documents being forged? The cross-link here is incredible. 

67 

What you can do with a computer and Adobe printer is just amazing. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes. We put a lot of effort in training our officers to detect fraudulent documents, but we also train our officers 

to focus in their interviews on the applicant and his or her purpose 

for traveling so that they can detect whether the applicant’s story 

makes sense in the cultural context in which they are applying. 

Does the planned travel fit the applicant’s profile? Does it make 

sense given their ties to the country that they are applying in? We 

want our officers to focus on the whole picture, and not just one 

specific set of documents. 

Mr. GOSAR. Would it be easier in the border crossing cards to 

have a uniform, some type of agreement between border States of 

distance that would be uniform that everybody would accept? 

Would that be helpful in regards to the border crossing cards? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Let me clarify, sir, that the border crossing 

card that we issue in Mexico is also a B1/B2 visa, so an individual 

can be admitted by Customs and Border Protection to travel anywhere in the Country. 

Mr. GOSAR. Mr. Osuna, a real curiosity I have here. What does 

it really take to get somebody here on a political amnesty aspect 

out of this Country? Would you say three felonies? Would that 

take—— 

Mr. OSUNA. Congressman, are you asking what it takes to get 

somebody removed? 

Mr. GOSAR. Yes. 

Mr. OSUNA. Well, the immigration laws have various provisions 

based on criminal activity. So DHS can charge somebody with 

being removable from the Country based on drug convictions, 

crimes of violence, a long list of what are called aggravated felonies, which are pretty severe, because if somebody is convicted of 

an aggravated felony and an immigration judge finds that they are 

removable for an aggravated felony, they are actually not eligible 

for any sort of relief from removal, like asylum and things like 

that. So the laws already provide some fairly robust enforcement 

provisions that are pretty unforgiving for people who commit 

crimes in the U.S., and there is a long history going back on that. 

There are other provisions that are also in the grounds of removability not based on criminal convictions, overstays and things like 

that. But for the criminal grounds that the judges handle, those 

are pretty harsh and intended to be pretty harsh provisions in the 

law already. 

Mr. GOSAR. Well, there must be an exception to that rule down 

in Arizona in regards to a gentleman that was an Iraqi political 

asylum aspect. Maybe you are familiar with the gentleman. I 

mean, three prior felonies, tried to blow up the Social Security 

building on 2011, right down from my office. And we are trying to 

figure out what it actually takes for a political asylum person, 

when they convict aggravated felonies—this guy spent time in jail 

in Arizona—and why it takes such a long time to get some adjudication here. 

Mr. OSUNA. I am not familiar with that particular case. It may 

be a case that was not in our court system. It may not have been 

brought to us yet, but, again, if it is a case that you are interested 

68 

in, we can certainly look into it. If it is in our court system, we can 

try to get you some information. I would caution, however, that we 

are somewhat limited, especially if it is an asylum case, of what information we can give out, but I am happy to get back to you on 

that. 

Mr. GOSAR. I would like that, because it seems to me that that 

is that integration that I was talking to Mr. Wagner about. It 

should be in your court system. And it should not be if, it should 

be it is in your court system, and that we have a follow-through 

in regards to that, because the safety of people are at stake. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. If you would indulge me for one moment. I just 

want a point of clarification from Mr. Ramotowski. You said that 

they get a border crossing card that is also a B1/B2, and then you 

went on to say which allows them to travel throughout the United 

States. Could you help clarify that? Because I don’t think that is 

accurate. Maybe I just heard it wrong. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes, and I will also defer to my colleague in 

CBP regarding the admission process. But in Mexico, the border 

crossing card that we issue is a border crossing card and B1/B2 

visa, and it replaces the B1/B2 visa in Mexico and is only issued 

in that country. So when they apply for admission to CBP, they can 

be admitted on the card, the B1/B2 border crossing card for travel 

anywhere in the Country. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. My understanding was when you get a border 

crossing card you are limited to entry to certain miles, depending 

on which State you are involved and engaged in. You are telling 

me that is not the case? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. That is not the case. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can you help clarify this, Mr. Wagner? Because 

that doesn’t sound right to me. 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes. We can admit them, CBP can admit them into 

that border zone under certain conditions; they can stay up to 30 

days, they can’t work, but they can travel within that border zone, 

which is different by State, as you mentioned. If they want to go 

beyond that zone, they can use the B1/B2 aspect of that visa and 

apply with CBP to go beyond that zone. We will bring them into 

a secondary inspection environment, we will collect their fingerprints, we will match them up against what Department of State 

had taken when they issued the visa, we will run, of course, the 

fingerprints against a watch list, we will do additional database 

queries, we will ask them for ties to Mexico to demonstrate that 

they intend to return to Mexico, and if there are no risk factors 

present or if we don’t feel there are any factors that would call into 

question that they don’t intend to honor the terms of that admission, we can admit them for up to six months to anywhere in the 

United States on the B1/B2 aspect. Pretty much the exact same 

process as if that person had gotten onboard a plane and flown into 

an airport in the United States, the same type of inspection process 

and we would do the same type of admission, and we can admit 

them to any part of the United States. 

Now, we are going to question them about where they are going, 

why they are going, how long they intend to stay, what they intend 

to do there, and it is the answers to those types of questions which 

69 

we factor in with the ties that they are demonstrating to make that 

judgment about the person, that they don’t intend to not comply 

with the terms of that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for a generous five minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. 

I want to thank the witnesses for coming forward and helping 

the committee with its work. 

Mr. Woods, I have to say, as a threshold matter, though, the lack 

of information coming to Congress is just inexcusable. This was our 

request to you for 2009 data. We are, up to now, debating comprehensive immigration reform, okay, which prospectively would 

place great responsibility on your Department, and for you to just 

abjectly refuse to give information from 2009—this isn’t top secret 

information, this is 2009 data—so that we can make a good decision is just inexcusable. And maybe DHS is being cute; maybe they 

think this is helping them. But from my side of the dais, it gives 

me low confidence in the information you are providing, number 

one; it gives me low confidence in reliability of the responsibility 

that we might give you in comprehensive immigration reform; it 

gives me low confidence in your ability to carry out those functions; 

and it really hurts the whole idea of comprehensive immigration 

reform, because you all will be handling it, and you can’t even give 

us data from 2009 so that we can make a good decision. You are 

hurting this process. 

I know it is not you individually, but it is the people who sent 

you here. And if they think they are being cute by stonewalling 

Congress, you are hurting your cause. If you really believe in immigration reform, you couldn’t do worse to throw a monkey wrench 

into this whole process, because now we don’t trust you. We don’t 

trust you with the responsibility. You can’t even give us 2009 data 

that was asked for six months ago. I mean, give me a break. Give 

me a break. So that is what we are faced with. 

And, you know, I am the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee 

on the Federal Workforce, and I know how hard, I know how hard 

the Federal employees at the Department of Homeland Security 

are working, the rank and file, the Border Patrol people, the ICE 

people. I know how hard they are working; we work with them on 

a daily basis in my office. This has become a huge responsibility 

for the average member of Congress, this whole immigration piece. 

I know how hard they are working. And by stonewalling and giving 

us this, zero; waiting since August for some basic information from 

2009, we get nothing, we get we’ll get back to you later. You make 

all those hardworking employees look bad. You make them look 

bad, and that is disgraceful because I know how hard they are 

working. It is not indicative of the work that they are doing. 

I just think that you owe us better, and we are not getting it and 

there will be consequences. There will be consequences. I wouldn’t 

doubt any member of Congress who says I don’t want to engage in 

serious and deliberate immigration reform because the people who 

are required to carry it out are so incompetent that they can’t give 

us data from 2009; how can we trust them? That is going to be the 

response. And how do I respond to that, as someone who thinks 

70 

that comprehensive immigration reform is necessary? You are hurting our cause. 

Mr. Osuna, can I ask you how long does it take if someone is detained today—I have this data here that tells me there are about 

348,000 cases that are pending. And if I go back last year and the 

year before, it seems like the backlog is getting bigger and bigger 

by like 30,000 cases every year, so we are burying ourselves. I appreciate your efforts here and I understand the workload on individual judges, but I am just trying to get a sense of what does that 

mean for someone who is detained today? When could they expect 

their case to be heard, what is the wait time on that? 

Mr. OSUNA. Congressman, detained cases, as I mentioned, are 

our highest priority. I look at the immigration court system as a 

little bit of a two-track system right now, because we do treat the 

detained caseload quite differently than the non-detained caseload. 

The nature of the cases are often very different. The nature of the 

cases in the detained context, you see fewer applications for relief 

because, as I mentioned, many of those individuals have criminal 

convictions, so they are not eligible for a lot of relief from removal. 

So they are put on a separate track; they tend to move very, very 

quickly. I believe that the numbers that we have are that about 90 

percent of those cases are adjudicated within about a month of the 

person being detained. 

Mr. LYNCH. For which category of cases? 

Mr. OSUNA. For the detained caseload. Somebody detained today 

can expect to have a hearing before an immigration judge in roughly about a few weeks, about a month. I will verify those numbers 

and get you some more exact numbers, but they tend to move very, 

very quickly. There are cases that go beyond that. Sometimes cases 

tend to be a little bit more complicated than they first seem. But 

generally speaking, when you are talking about people detained at 

Eloy, at the Port Isabel—— 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay, let’s go to a non-detained individual. 

Mr. OSUNA. They tend to move a lot slower, and it varies significantly from court to court, so I can’t give you an average number 

of how long somebody would have to wait. 

Mr. LYNCH. Can you get it to me? 

Mr. OSUNA. We can get you some more information on that, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. That would be helpful, because these are big numbers and they are getting bigger every year, so at some point that 

has to affect the time frame, right? 

Mr. OSUNA. The time frame, yes. And the time frame does depend on a number of factors: Is the person represented or are they 

not represented by a lawyer? Are they applying for relief? Is it a 

complicated asylum application or is it a more straightforward 

what we call cancellation of removal application? 

Mr. LYNCH. All right. Well, since I have to wait for the information anyway, why don’t we try to break down what the categories 

are for me and for the committee, and tell me what the wait time 

for those individual categories are? Would that be okay? 

Mr. OSUNA. We will get you that information, yes, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. That will be great. Thank you, Mr. Osuna. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence. 

71 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And thank you for the comments. You can see 

this is a bipartisan issue. We have been focused on Homeland Security, but let me also point out that this is also pointed to the Department of Justice. For Mr. Lynch here, on August 26th I sent a 

letter to the Department of Justice asking this very question that 

the gentleman from Massachusetts is asking. We have had no response. Please provide all documents describing the average length 

of time and longest length of time for a notice to appear before an 

immigration judge for an asylum proceeding. I have had no response. So when you say you are going to get back to us, and I 

asked for that very question that Mr. Lynch just asked, and I 

asked for that in August and it is now November and you haven’t 

provided this. When will you provide that information to this committee? 

Mr. OSUNA. Mr. Chairman, I believe we provided some responses. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Some, but not to that one. 

Mr. OSUNA. We will provide you with that information as quickly 

as we can. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No. I want a date from you personally. I want a 

commitment from you. 

Mr. OSUNA. We can provide you that information in the next few 

weeks. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You pick the date. You pick the date. You tell me. 

Mr. OSUNA. I think we can get that information fairly quickly, 

so let me get you—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, I want you to give me a date. I want you to 

give me a date. What is reasonable? I asked in August and you 

have had a running start at this. 

Mr. OSUNA. We will get you that information as quickly as we 

can. I am not trying to—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. It does, it sounds like you are playing games with 

me. How about December 10th? Is that reasonable? 

Mr. OSUNA. We will do our best to get you that information by 

December 10th. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Okay. 

Mr. Lynch, do you care to weigh in on this? 

Mr. LYNCH. No, let’s try for December 10th. That’s as good a day 

as any. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Thank you. We will now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, 

Mr. Welch. 

Oh, I think we are going to actually recognize Ms. Kelly first. My 

apologies. 

Ms. Kelly. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ramotowski, according to your written testimony, nearly 5.8 

million B1 and B2 visas were issued by the State Department’s Bureau of Affairs in 2013. While that number may seem small when 

compared to the 1 million travelers who cross our Nation’s borders 

each day, it is still a significant number. I would like to discuss the 

steps that the Department takes to prevent and detect public safety and national security threats at the beginning of the process, 

when the applicant applies for a B1 or B2 visa. According to your 

testimony, after an applicant submits their B visa application, their 

72 

biographical and biometric information is checked against several 

databases to search for disqualifying information. Just how many 

database does a consular’s office query on a given application? You 

can just give me a ballpark if you don’t know the exact. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. I would estimate that at least six major databases. And those databases draw information from the whole constellation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies across the 

United States Government. So it is not really a question of how 

many databases, but where is the data coming from. And we share 

all of our visa application data with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and we, in turn, draw from them information 

about individuals who may represent a national security threat, either for criminal purposes or terrorism or other national security 

concerns. 

In addition to that, we check the applicant’s fingerprints against 

both the FBI and DHS fingerprint databases, and we have the 

world’s largest facial recognition program, where we screen the applicant’s photograph against photographs of terrorists provided by 

the FBI and also our entire database of prior visa applicants to see 

if perhaps we have a case of identity fraud, an individual who may 

have applied under a different name before. 

So we have an extensive series of checks to help our consular officers make the best possible decisions. 

Ms. KELLY. Now, are these all State-owned or controlled databases? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. No. Many of the databases belong to partner 

agencies, such as Homeland Security, the FBI, and the intelligence 

community. As I noted in my remarks, just in June of this year we 

started a major new security vetting program in cooperation with 

the National Counterterrorism Center, which is the U.S. Government’s central coordination point for terrorism information, and 

visa cases are now being sent for screening there. And they have 

the ability to check very highly classified materials and send an 

alert to the consular officer in advance so that an individual who 

is a potential threat would not be issued a visa. 

Ms. KELLY. So each separate entity is responsible for maintaining and updating their own database? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. That is correct. 

Ms. KELLY. Who has the responsibility for ensuring interoperability and that your consular officers have the access they need? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Well, we work, again, with our partner agencies on that. There are interagency committees that work to ensure 

that the databases can talk to each other, that they are not sent 

down for maintenance at a critical time when lots of applicants are 

applying for visas or arriving at airports. We get very good cooperation from our partners in that respect. 

Ms. KELLY. Is this type of vetting any less rigorous for applicants 

for border crossing cards? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. No, it is absolutely the same for all applicants, 

whether you are applying for a B visa or a border crossing card 

combined with a B visa or other types of U.S. visas. 

Ms. KELLY. Okay. According to your testimony, after an applicant submits their application, a consular officer must interview 

them. I think we can all agree that the interview serves an imporVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:19 Feb 24, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\86722.TXT APRIL
73 

tant role in the vetting process. However, the Department has recently unveiled an Interview Waiver Pilot Program, which waives 

the requirement of in-person interviews for certain applicants renewing their visas and whose biometrics have already been collected. Can you explain how the Department can assure us that it 

will still be able to identify and deny high-risk applicants? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes, certainly. The Interview Waiver Pilot Program was developed in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security signed off on it, and what it does is it allows 

the interview to be waived for low-risk applicants who are seeking 

to renew a visitor visa. All of those applicants, no matter how 

many times they are renewing a visa, are checked through all of 

the databases that I mentioned earlier; they are all checked. The 

only thing that would be waived would be the interview if nothing 

unusual comes out of the actual database checks. And this benefits 

travelers who visit this Country frequently, respect our immigration laws, often are supporting U.S. businesses, and we don’t really 

need to use our limited resources—and an interview is our most 

labor-intensive and expensive resource—on that group of applicants. We would rather have our officers talk to first-time applicants and anybody who has a database issue. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. My time is up. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this hearing. 

I live, of course, in Vermont, and our issues are mainly on the 

northern border, and we are very fortunate in Vermont to have excellent relations with our Canadian friends. 

Mr. Wagner, I know you came up to Vermont and visited with 

Senator Sanders and members of my staff. I appreciate you doing 

that. I wanted to ask you a little bit about the Nexus card. 

As you know, my colleagues, that is similar to the border crossing card and it allows pre-screened Canadian and U.S. travelers expedited processing in designated processing lanes. Applicants who 

are approved get issued a photo ID and an RFID chip, and they 

each pay $50. It is non-refundable, so this is a self-financed program. And it is incredibly important to Vermont because the Canadian impact on our economy is enormous. We hosted over 2.5 million Canadian visitors in 2011. Canadian visits accounted for 200 

million to our economy and the trade across our border contributes 

to about 19,300 jobs. 

We are hearing anecdotal stories about wait times that I think 

are detrimental to the economic back and forth between Canada 

and Vermont. Some of our ski areas are dependent for 50 percent 

of their visits on Canadian visitors. We don’t have specific wait 

time reports, that is not something that the CBP does, but we are 

hearing anecdotally that a lot of folks are waiting from 30 minutes 

to an hour. 

So this program, the Nexus program, can be a win-win, because 

obviously it expedites the free flow and the quick passage. Number 

74 

two, it reduces the demand on your folks, who have a lot to do and 

little time to do it. So we need to get those Nexus lanes opened. 

I want to ask you, Mr. Wagner specific suggestions do you have 

that would help us to get those Nexus lanes open and operating 

more effectively for Vermonters and for Canadian visitors? 

Mr. WAGNER. Thank you. Nexus is one of the key ways we manage the traffic on the border, along with the Sentry program and 

the Global Entry program at the airports, and, like you mentioned, 

we know more about those people, we can take the time to go 

through a very thorough risk assessment of the people, including 

their biometrics, and when they do then come to the border, we can 

expedite the inspection process to some extent and we can give 

them, where available, the designated or dedicated infrastructure 

for them to use by that dedicated lane. 

So really it is a matter of us marketing it and getting the information out and being available to do the application approvals and 

the interviews and get people enrolled in the program. We would 

be more than happy to work with your staff locally to come up with 

ways to market it better and come up with ways to be more available to get it done, but then it just boils down to what is the percentage of people with the Nexus cards using that port of entry, 

and can we afford to dedicate the infrastructure just to their exclusive use without really impacting too bad the non-members. 

Mr. WELCH. I mean, that is a practical problem. There is no 

value in having a Nexus card if you have to stay in the standard 

line. And I know you have resource issues, but there must be some 

suggestions you might have to let folks with the Nexus card be 

processed more quickly. Because if they have to stand in the regular line, they are not going to get the card. 

Mr. WAGNER. Absolutely. We have to get a higher percentage of 

people enrolled, so we have to find where those people are and get 

them those marketing materials and get them that information, get 

them to understand the benefit that they get. The more people enrolled in Nexus is better for us. We look at a place like San Ysidro, 

our busiest border crossing on the southwest border. We do 35 to 

40 percent of that entire traffic through those Sentry lanes. All the 

time we save we can reinvest to doing a more thorough inspection 

on everyone else, so it is in our benefit to do it. So I really look 

forward to working with you. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, we are on the same page, but we would like 

to make that program work. The folks who have the card are starting to get a little frustrated. That is detrimental to our businesses 

and to them. So I would welcome your very concrete suggestions 

on what you can do, what we can do to make that Nexus program 

more widely used and then more efficiently administered. 

Mr. WAGNER. Absolutely, and we absolutely look forward to 

working with you on that. 

Mr. WELCH. Well, can you get back to me with some concrete 

suggestions about what we can do and what help you might need 

from us, what things you can do administratively? I know your 

folks are working hard. We appreciate that. 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. WELCH. But we have to make this thing work. 

75 

Mr. WAGNER. Absolutely agree. We have about 875,000 people 

enrolled in Nexus. It is a key way we manage the border and how 

we segregate the traffic at the points of entry between the trusted 

traveler status, someone with just an RFID-enabled document 

versus everybody else, much like a toll booth, where you have Easy 

Pass, exact change, and everyone else. By segregating that traffic 

by virtue of the vetting status or the facilitative nature of their document, it just increases the throughput through those ports of 

entry. 

Mr. WELCH. My time is up. I yield back. I thank you and I look 

forward to hearing from you. 

Mr. WAGNER. I will get back to you. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We now recognize the gentlewoman from New Mexico for a very 

generous five minutes. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the chairman bringing this issue to the Oversight Committee’s subcommittee, and I appreciate the panelists for being here 

today. 

I am interested in both issues, the accountability and security 

issues, but balancing that clearly with the intent of the business 

and tourist visas to make sure that folks who should be crossing 

can cross and that we can reap the benefits of that relationship. 

Specifically, I understand that this year the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency submitted a rule change that would extend 

the border commercial zone in New Mexico from 25 to 55 miles. 

Now, a New Mexico State University study estimates that extending the border commercial zone from 25 miles to 55 miles could 

generate 51 million in new sales for New Mexico businesses, potentially create 343 jobs, and increase tax revenue by 2.57 million. 

Now, we are one of the poorest States in the Country. Every single new job and every single new dollar of additional revenue, 

whether it is in my district or somewhere else in the State, is vital. 

Additionally, border community families also benefit, since this allows them to travel further distances to visit loved ones and family. 

Mr. Wagner, can you talk to me a little bit about the challenges 

your agency faces in balancing the quick travel and commerce, 

which I see as a clear benefit to a State like New Mexico, the public safety and security issues, and the—well, I really want you to— 

I don’t know how much time I have to talk about the prudent balance of the taxpayer dollars here, but we also want you to be accountable when you talk to us about those security measures. 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, thank you for the question. That is exactly 

it, the challenge before us. The vast majority of travelers we encounter at the ports of entry are honest law-abiding returning citizens to the U.S. or visitors to the United States for a variety of 

purposes, and our role is to ferret out those few unlawful people 

or people with bad intentions coming in and prevent that from happening. So there are a variety of approaches we take to be able to 

do this and, like you mentioned, without creating the gridlock and 

shutting down the port of entry so people can’t come visit those 

areas and can’t come work and study or even return home from a 

trip abroad. 

76 

So it is a matter of doing a lot of, say, pre-departure analysis and 

vetting and getting secure credentials issued to people either via 

border crossing card or a passport card or one of our trusted traveler programs; having confidence in that program that you have 

done a thorough risk assessment of the person, the biographical 

vetting, the biometric vetting, the interview with someone; having 

a facilitative type technology in place at the border so we can readily identify that person and match them up that they are the true 

document holder and that that document is valid. So when we read 

those RFID-enabled cards at the border, one thing we do on our 

systems queries, we are doing all of our law enforcement queries; 

any previous violations, any wants and warrants, any terrorist 

database hits, but also validating against the originating source, so 

we will ping Department of State to say is this a valid border crossing card, is this a valid U.S. passport card. Up will come the picture that Department of State took when they issued that card, 

and we will be able to compare that picture against the person. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. So some of the new initiatives will clearly 

provide those benefits so that you can balance that. But given the 

problems in getting them to be fully materialized or implemented, 

do you think that your agency sometimes makes tradeoffs to balance these priorities? 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, it is a balance because we recognize the support to the economy that CBP has, and the more legitimate people 

we can get in, the better it is for the Country; the more jobs it creates, the more travel and tourism is good. But it is also very damaging if we let the wrong person in, so we have to make sure we 

are ferreting out those people. But these systems are in place today 

with the RFID. What we are working on now is segregating that 

traffic by virtue of a risk assessment status so a Sentry lane on the 

southwest border; someone with just a facilitative document with 

the RFID chip, but not necessarily the preapproval or pre-vetting 

that has been done, and giving them a section; and then putting 

everyone else in the remainder lanes. And this increases the 

throughput of that overall port of entry because of the less time we 

need to spend with each one of those. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. And, Mr. Wagner, I very much appreciate 

the in-depth explanation of the streamlining of the processes and 

a reassurance that that streamlining and those efforts doesn’t in 

any way minimize the security or the accountability. But I think 

it points to a broader issue for me that I think is important about 

this hearing, which is we know that there are economic benefits. 

Looking at New Mexico as an example, I can only imagine the rule 

change for broadening those commercial zones around the Country, 

but really talking about comprehensive immigration reform so that 

this becomes a priority, that all of these issues at the border are 

a priority; that we are figuring out a way to deal with the 11 million, we are bringing in incredible revenue, we are affecting the national debt, and we are finally, instead of incrementally looking at 

one issue from another and balancing and having tradeoffs in this 

design, maybe it is time that we focus on immigration reform and 

do that in a comprehensive manner so we can get beyond these 

kinds of hearings and debates. 

77 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We now recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier, for five minutes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am pretty perplexed, as 

are some of my colleagues, about the inability to get straight answers. 

Let me ask this. During the subcommittee hearing in June, a 

question was asked about whether Customs and Border Protection 

monitors cardholders once they enter the U.S., and Customs and 

Border Protection official responded that the agency does not. So, 

Mr. Wagner, would it be safe to say that the border crossing card 

operates on a sort of honor system, as some might suggest, or is 

that an oversimplification? 

Mr. WAGNER. We do not monitor people once they are admitted 

into the United States, as far as from the Customs and Border Protection perspective. Now, before we admit them we do a series of 

risk assessments and evaluations of that person, and it is a judgment call whether or not, in our opinion, that they intend to honor 

the terms of that admission. So we will look at the database queries; we will look for previous violations; we will ask people about 

the ties to their home country; we will ask them about where they 

are going, where they are staying, what they are going to do here. 

If they are flying in, do they have a return ticket home. If they are 

driving across the border, what is in the trunk of their car; is it 

just a suitcase that would be appropriate for a one-week trip, or 

are there household possessions in there? But it is through this 

questioning and this analysis and this review that we make a judgment determination on the person whether or not they intend to 

comply with the terms of that admission. But we do not follow 

them around the U.S. to see that they actually go and do the 

things. We don’t do that. 

Ms. SPEIER. So the border crossing cards, though, are typically 

restricted to 25, 55, or 75 miles from the border, depending on the 

State, correct? 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes, that is correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. So we put this so-called restriction on it, but 

we don’t monitor it. So if they violate it, we wouldn’t know. Nor 

do we care? 

Mr. WAGNER. Absolutely we care. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, why do we have a restriction that we don’t enforce? It is bogus. 

Mr. WAGNER. We enforce it through—we have border patrol 

checkpoints at the top end of those zones, which are on the highways, which then help restrict and we will ask people for their documentation, their approvals to proceed inland, into the U.S. beyond 

those border zones. But it is the same as if someone flew into one 

of the airports. We ask the same type of risk assessment questions; 

the purpose and intent of their travel, how long they intend to stay 

here, and do they have the ties back to their home that we feel 

they don’t intend to abandon. It is a similar process to that. 

Ms. SPEIER. But from my perspective, if we are going to fix immigration reform and we are serious about it, we have to do something about monitoring those that are using border crossing cards, 

those that are here on tourist visas, or otherwise it is just a sieve. 

78 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, what you mean by monitoring, while they are 

here and what they are dong, or at the point of their departure 

from the U.S., where we then record it and match it up with the 

inbound record to see if they then did overstay? I am a little confused about the question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, that wasn’t a question, that was just a statement. 

Mr. Wagner and Mr. Woods, I would like to ask whether the Department undertakes continuous monitoring of any class of visa 

holder admitted to the United States. 

Mr. WOODS. There are several monitoring ways of non-immigrant 

visas. Like I said in my opening remarks, in ICE, we currently vet 

students who are in the United States under the E, F, J, and M 

categories for any derogatory information because they are admitted for duration of status; they don’t get six months or 30 days, 

they get duration of status, as long as they maintain their status 

as a student. So we currently vet those individuals through the intelligence community and other DHS databases to see if there is 

any derogatory information. 

Additionally, in CBP all other visa holders are vetted daily 

through their super query process to determine derogatory information. So if any information is raised, it is forwarded to the appropriate agency, mostly to ICE, and we enforce the laws, and when 

we identify they have violated their status or has new derogatory 

information, it is placed under investigation to determine whether 

they are allowed to remain in the United States. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Ramotowski, how susceptible are border crossing 

cards to document fraud? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. The Department of State has been continuously improving the border crossing card over the years, and early 

next year the fourth version of the card will be produced, which 

has state-of-the-art features to prevent counterfeiting or misuse. 

Border crossing cards, as I mentioned, are adjudicated in exactly 

the same way that a B visa is adjudicated elsewhere in the world 

because it is a combined border crossing card and B1/B2 visa, so 

our officers are trained to detect fraudulent documents, they are 

trained to look for discrepancies in a visa applicant’s story, they are 

trained—— 

Ms. SPEIER. I understand that you do all those things, but I am 

just asking a fundamental question: How often are they susceptible 

to fraud? How often do you come across fraudulent border crossing 

cards? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Actually, fraudulently altered cards, it is not 

very often. I don’t have the exact figures on that, but it is not common. More common would be an imposter trying to use it. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman. My understanding is 

that in fiscal year 2009, more than 13,000 fraudulent border crossing cards and 4500 fraudulent passports were intercepted by Customs and Border Patrol. 

Did the gentlewoman have any other additional comments? 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, I guess in the theme of things, thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for answering my question that I would have assumed 

79 

that the witnesses could have answered. I guess that number to me 

seems relevant. Now, how many border crossing cards do we actually issue a year I guess is the next question. Do you happen to 

know that? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. In Mexico, the total number for fiscal year 

2013 was 1,283,319, which is a 14.1 percent drop from the year before. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. So it seems like, Mr. Chairman, that is not 

a significant number when there are 1 million, but the point that 

that begs, of course, is that we have a million of these cards issued 

and there is virtually no monitoring going on. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, I thank the gentlewoman, and to follow up, 

if she will further yield, my concern is we have nearly 9 million 

cards that are currently valid. When you get a border crossing 

card, it is valid for 10 years, and if you add up year by year and 

assume that each one is valid for 10 years, we have close to 9 million of these; and that is the concern. It is the number one visa 

that we issue, is this category. In fact, it accounts, I believe, for 

more than 50 percent of all the visas we give out fall into this B1/ 

B2, and the border crossing card we basically hand them out by the 

millions. 

All right, I would now like to recognize myself. 

Let’s go back to Mr. Ramotowski. The one and only document 

that we ask in order to get a border crossing card from somebody 

who is from Mexico is a passport, a Mexican passport. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What do you do to validate that that is a real 

Mexican passport? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. If our interviewing officer has any suspicions 

about the validity of the passport, it can be sent to our Fraud Prevention Office—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you check any of the numbers against any sort 

of database? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Mexican passport numbers are not in our 

database. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We don’t query against a Mexican database of 

any sort? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. We are working to expand our—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Sorry, just yes or no. I have to move faster here. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. We don’t query against directly against a 

Mexican passport database. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So the authenticity is just up to the individual in 

what you told me is three to four minutes of a review. They are 

looking at this passport and they are just making a physical assessment, yeah, looks valid. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. If they have any doubt at all, Mr. Chairman, 

they can refer it to our fraud prevention specialists, who will take 

all the time that they need—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What cooperation do we get from the Mexican 

government to validate their passports? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. In my experience, we get very good cooperation 

with Mexican authorities. 

80 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But what do they do other than being nice? I am 

sure they are very nice. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. They provide information as to whether the 

passport is a valid Mexican document—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. How do they do that? If they are not querying a 

database, how do you do that? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. The Fraud Prevention Office consults with 

Mexican passport offices in the major cities of Mexico—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would love to follow up with you on that, because I am not convinced that we have a process that works in that 

category. I worry about that. 

If somebody here maybe gets a border crossing card, comes and 

commits a crime, let’s say it is a DUI in Utah, would that information go into a database and do they query that? Are they matching 

the records? I guess what I am worried about is that we have a 

database of fingerprints. How do they match those two up? 

Mr. Woods, you are shaking your head yes. Would you care to 

tackle that? 

Mr. WOODS. If someone is arrested in Utah for DUI and they 

have a border crossing card, besides being out of status and violating their 55 mile or 75 mile radius from the border, they would 

be either A, through secure communities, identified to ICE for removal, and depending on how their criminal case goes and the conviction, maybe use the conviction and remove them as a criminal 

alien, depending, or we could move them administratively as a violator of the—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Okay, let’s go to those administrative violations. 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And the number I have is a few years old; I 

haven’t gotten an updated one. How many ‘‘fugitive aliens’’ do we 

have? That was a category that Homeland Security used some time 

ago. Do you still have that category or did you redefine it, and how 

many people fall into that category? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, a fugitive alien is a person who has already 

been put in removal proceedings—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But has not left the Country. 

Mr. WOODS. Has been ordered deported from the United States. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. WOODS. By an immigration judge and has not left the Country. I don’t know the exact number today. I know, like you said, 

a few years ago it was around the 400,000 figure. I think it is a 

lot lower today, but I could get back to you with the exact number. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can you give me a date? 

Mr. WOODS. I can give you probably that number within two 

weeks. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I appreciate that. There is some definitive answer. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

What would cause somebody to lose their border crossing card? 

Is there any violation? What is the standard by which somebody 

would lose their border crossing card? I guess that is for you, Mr. 

Ramotowski. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. At the time of application, if the officer has 

any doubt—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, no, no. No, no, no. They have been issued one. 

81 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Okay. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. It is valid for 10 years. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. It is valid for 10 years. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When, how do they lose—— 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. If the Department becomes aware, as Mr. 

Woods stated, of immigration violations or any criminal activity 

that that individual may have—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. If you stay more than 30 days, do you lose your 

border crossing card? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. If we become aware of it and you violate immigration law, yes, we will revoke that card. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And part of my question is how many have you 

revoked. Again, we ask for stats and don’t necessarily have them. 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes. I will have to get back to you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would love to know how many have been revoked. I guess what I am not convinced is that systems and computers talk to each other to the point that we actually know that 

this is happening. Somebody goes beyond their threshold, whether 

it be in time or in distance. To point Ms. Speier, what kind of enforcement there is. 

Now that we have—and I believe the number is fairly significant, 

what are we doing to pursue those people that have violated that. 

Mr. Woods, ICE has very limited resources. You have hundreds of 

thousands of fugitive aliens, hundreds of thousands of them. And 

then you have people on the list of people who have violated their 

border crossing cards. How do you pursue them? How many people 

do you have, for instance, in the ICE Overstay Analysis Unit, how 

many people are in that group and what sort of resources do you 

have to pursue and actually deport these people? 

Mr. WOODS. Currently, between Federal employees and contract 

analysts, we have approximately 68 individuals of Federal employees and another 50 contract analysts who analyze the data that is 

in ADIS to determine the overstay records and identify and 

prioritize them and validate those numbers. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You have hundreds of thousands of people that 

you are trying to track down, and you have just about 100 that are 

pursuing them? 

Mr. WOODS. These are the individuals that look at the data; 

these are not the individuals that actually track them down. They 

look at the data and prioritize those cases and then send them over 

to our Investigations Branch, which we have approximately 6700 

special agents in the field and a small number of them are dedicated—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I am sorry, how many in the field? 

Mr. WOODS. Sixty-seven hundred. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Okay. 

Mr. WOODS. And we have a number of them that are dedicated 

to the enforcement of overstay violations. But we take these numbers—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. How many are pursuing the overstays? 

Mr. WOODS. Percentagewise, approximately 3 to 5 percent of the 

programmatic area is spent on actual overstays. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So let’s assume it is 5 percent of 6500 are pursuing hundreds of thousands of people. 

82 

You know, I am one that wants to fix legal immigration. We can 

make the fence as big and wide and far as you want, but if you 

don’t fix legal immigration it is never, ever going to work. Most 

people, as you all have said and I believe, that come here, they 

come here legally, lawfully; they are good, honest, decent people. 

But what I worry about is you have fugitive aliens by the hundreds 

of thousands. You have people who aren’t willing to play by the 

rules. In fact, they break the rules, but there is no consequence; 

there is no follow-through. And, again, a lot of good men and 

women who are out there trying to do it, but they just feel overwhelmed by the process. And then when somebody comes and 

claims asylum, for instance, and then they get a court date in 2020, 

I mean, we don’t really know who this person is, whether it is valid 

or not. 

Last question, then I will yield, because I have gone way passed. 

When somebody goes through the process and their asylum has 

been denied, who has primary responsibility to find that person 

and make sure that they actually leave the Country? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. ICE does. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you do that? Because your field agents have 

told me they don’t. 

Mr. WOODS. It depends on the case. If the person is in custody 

and detained at the time that they are ordered removed, they go 

into enforcement removal operations for removal from the United 

States. And depending upon the issuance of a travel document to 

remove them, their length of stay in custody or whether there is 

an alternative detention method until they are properly removed. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I want to make sure, when you get back to me 

by, say, the end of the month—you said two weeks, we will be a 

little lenient there, with Thanksgiving and all—the reality is—and 

I have talked to agents on the ground in Arizona, and they say this 

is a loophole, that they actually don’t have primary responsibility 

for going out and pursuing those that don’t qualify for asylum. If 

you can clarify this for me. Again, talking to people who are wearing badges and wearing uniforms, but I want to clarify from the 

Department and the agency. Perhaps they needed some education 

and I can get back to them. Help me clarify. I want to make sure 

that particularly with the asylum, that this is also the case. 

Mr. WOODS. If an individual is before an immigration judge, they 

are under the docket control of a deportation officer. That deportation officer tracks that case to its final conclusion. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But my understanding is not everybody shows up 

for that asylum hearing. They could show up in 2013, they get assigned a time in 2020. I don’t think I can remember what I am supposed to do on which day and which time in 2020. They may have 

easily moved or gone to a different place. They just showed up in 

this Country. So the ability for them to even remember, be served 

noticed, there are undoubtedly by the thousands of people who 

don’t get notice, don’t remember, and should be deported, but we 

have lost these people, there is no track of them. We don’t know 

where they are, what they are doing, correct? 

Mr. WOODS. If those individuals are outside of custody and not 

adhering to some sort of alternative detention method, whether it 

would be an anklet bracelet or whatever, no, we don’t track their 

83 

movements. But they do have reporting requirements. If they fail 

to report to their deportation officer, they are looked for and removed. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And I help you say that with a little smile on 

your face, because the reality is—— 

Mr. WOODS. Honestly, there has to be a prioritization going on 

here. You want to remove the person who is the heinous criminal, 

that is the aggravated felon. If you have an individual with no 

criminal history, with no other identifiers except that they did 

claim asylum, those persons do fall to the lowest priority and those 

people are not sought after as rigorously as someone who is an aggravated felon that may be on the street, that needs to be brought 

back into custody and removed from the United States. So like I 

said from the beginning, we look at national security and public 

safety first and we prioritize those cases. Once we prioritize those 

cases, we use our infinite resources to determine who is of highest 

priority and go after those individuals and make sure they are removed. Last year we removed 400,000 people from the United 

States based on our appropriations, and we made sure those individuals were of the highest classifications to make this Country 

safer. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And I appreciate that. You have to prioritize 

things, there is no doubt in my mind, but I worry that this is the 

loophole, this is the problem. 

And I appreciate the indulgence of the ranking member here. 

There are no other members here, we are given multiple rounds, 

so with your continued indulgence, I will continue on for a few 

more questions. 

What I would love to know and have some sort of sense is is 

there any way to actually pursue these people. How many people 

are actually going out there and doing this? You know, in Utah, for 

instance, we have less ICE officers than we do counties, so the 

number of resources that we have that can actually be applied to 

this are so few and far between; and these ICE agents, they are 

obviously pursuing people that are at the highest of the food chain 

and working closely with the U.S. marshals and others if they are 

wanted for other crimes and whatnot. But this becomes terribly 

complicated, and this is the worry, that we essentially give out 8 

million, 9 million of these cards and there is no exit. We have no 

idea if these people have left. 

And I just don’t understand why this is so difficult. We talk 

about air and sea. Air works pretty well. I go through international 

travel, I did in the last two days, and it was amazing how quick 

we went through the system. But when you are talking about on 

the land, these ports of entry, it is very difficult. 

Mr. Wagner, I need to ask you about the process for minors. You 

will issue border crossing cards to minors, correct, Mr. 

Ramotowski? 

Mr. RAMOTOWSKI. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Wagner, do you know, if you are a minor, can 

you cross the border unaccompanied, with no adult? 

Mr. WAGNER. No. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I will let you get back to me. I can tell by your 

physical response that maybe you want to come back. 

84 

Mr. WAGNER. If you are in the custody of an adult, we can ask 

for do you have legal custody or guardianship of that child. I don’t 

believe there is a prohibition against a minor crossing the border 

by themselves, but it may bear the question from us, depending on 

how old they are, what are you out here doing. But let me get back 

to you on it. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And this is my concern. I went down to Naco, Arizona. I watched it myself. I watched dozens of kids probably in the 

third, fourth, fifth grade, pretty young, crossing the borders all by 

themselves. And the agent there told me, oh, they do it everyday. 

I don’t understand where a minor shouldn’t—you know, they are 

not supposed to go watch an R rated movie, let alone cross an 

international border. And the liability that we have by having 

somebody who is eight years old or ten years old crossing an international border, and the liability that can happen. Would you 

please get back to this committee? I want to understand the process for minors, particularly as it is for unaccompanied minors. 

Also, the other thing that I worry about, we hear horrific cases, 

they are not great in number, at least I hope they are not great 

in number, where you have people who are going through divorce 

and other sometimes tumultuous type of activities, and kids are 

brought south, going south on the border; and we don’t check. You 

have somebody standing there, have a little turnstile. There is no 

checking. I don’t want to drone on here, but it seems to me an easy 

process. When I go buy a turkey sandwich at my Gandolfo’s deli, 

you can tell how many times I got a turkey sandwich. Given the 

radio frequency embedment of these chips, the ability to scan a 

card, I don’t see any reason in any delay further, given that it is 

law, the proper appropriations, that there can’t be, southbound, a 

way for people to scan those cards and just keep on going, so that 

we have some idea. Right now we are operating in the dark, in the 

blind. We have no idea how many people actually abide, if they 

leave on time, and that is a shame for the people who are doing 

it legally and lawfully. 

Mr. Wagner? 

Mr. WAGNER. Well, it would be a matter of replicating the inbound infrastructure and personnel requirements and resources to 

be able to replicate that in an outbound environment. So we can 

certainly put those figures together and look at what that would 

cost to deploy that type of infrastructure, but again, in a place like 

San Ysidro, with 20-plus lanes of inbound, there are only four to 

six lanes going outbound. It would be a matter of extending that 

footprint and building that infrastructure and having the resources 

to put in there to be able to do it and looking at what the congestion and the traffic would be by doing that and whether or not the 

land is even available. So it would be a tremendous process to undertake and a tremendous program to undertaken, at great cost to 

do it. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, given that the Congress had already passed 

this law more than 10 years ago, I do think that the American people have spoken that, yes, they want to have this happen. It is the 

current law; it should happen. It may take people a little bit longer 

to go, but I don’t think it is going to take much longer. If you come 

in, scan your card, go to the next person, we are supposed to be 

85 

reviewing these people, not just letting them flow with no review. 

I mean, I have seen you there with scanners on cars. You are reading license plates, correct? 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes. And we can actually read documents going 

outbound, too, but it takes an officer being there to stop the person 

to do it and then make sure they are the cardholder, too. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So you do have the capability. You do do it with 

vehicles. 

Mr. WAGNER. Absolutely. We have a lot of license plate readers 

out there. We have some fixed options, we have some mobile options that do it. We are just not doing it 100 percent of the time 

at 100 percent of the locations. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When I can return my National car, they come 

up, pop the number, print me out a receipt, walk around the car, 

next. 

Mr. WAGNER. It is a resource issue at that point, but we are not 

even fully resourced to handle the inbound traffic that we have 

today, much less take on the additional responsibility of the outbound piece. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And I think we need that. We have a bigger obligation for this Country to make sure we get it right, rather than 

we get it fast, and that is my deep concern. 

Listen, I do have lots more questions, but I appreciate you taking 

your time here today. 

Unless the ranking member has an additional comment, I want 

to thank the men and women who do a hard, difficult job within 

your departments and agencies. I appreciate you for having the 

willingness and guts to come before Congress. Waking up to testify 

before Congress is not exactly necessarily your best day, and I understand how difficult a time. I appreciate the staff and the preparation that it takes for this. 

We do, on a bipartisan manner, ask that you respond to our letters in a thoughtful way. We can avoid a lot of these hearings if 

you just have some good dialogue. We are asking for stats and 

metrics so we, on both sides of the aisle, can respond and look at 

the same numbers and have the same discussion. Rather than 

some nebulous study done, we want to hear from you how this 

works, what happens. It is the only way we can assess it and try 

to improve it. We are going to debate and have differences on what 

is valid and how we should do things, but when we operate in the 

blind and you can’t provide the basic metrics, it is terribly frustrating. And I don’t understand the games that the legislative liaisons sometimes play. Some have been very good, very responsive, 

and we appreciate that and we should probably do a better job of 

highlighting it when it does work well. But I tell you, in this instance, trying to get some basic numbers has been terrible, it has 

been awful. 

With that, I want to again thank you for your time. Appreciate 

everything you do, and please do what you can to send word back 

how much we appreciate the men and women who are doing the 

hard work out in the field, on the border, chasing down the bad 

people. And we thank you so much for your time today. 

With that, we will adjourn this committee. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(87) 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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Opening Statement of Chairman Jason Chaffetz 

Subcommittee on National Security 

"Border Security Oversight, Papt III: Border Crossing Cards and BIIB2 Visas" 

November 14,2013 

Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing, titled: "Border Security 

Oversight, Part III: Border Crossing Cards and B lIB2 Visas." I would also like to 

welcome Ranking Member Tierney ofthe Subcommittee, and members of the 

audience. Today's proceedings are the third in a series of hearings designed to 

assess U.S. border security efforts, as well as challenges to obtaining operational 

control of the southwest border. 

On June 27th ofthis year, the Subcommittee received testimony from 

officials at Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and the Government Accountability Office. 

During the hearing, this Subcommittee learned about the variety of emerging 

threats to U.S. border security, ranging from: 

• The increasing number of OTMs - also known as Other than 

Mexicans coming across the southwest border. When I visited the Eloy 

Detention facility in Arizona, OTMs accounted for 900+ inmates out of 1,599. 

• New challenges at our border, including drug cartels' use of ultra light 

aircraft and tunnels. 

• Potential fraud in the asylum application process, while, at the same 

time, we are seeing a 434% increase over the last five years in "credible fear" 

requests for asylum; and 

• Flaws in the government's issuance and administration ofB! and B2 

visas and entry/exit program. 

In light of testimony this Subcommittee has received, it is imperative to 

examine the potential flaws in our immigration system especially the process and 

procedures relating to the issuance and enforcement of Border Crossing Cards and 

B IIB2 visas. The Bland B2 cards are nonimmigrant visas for persons who want 
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to enter the United States temporarily for business, a B 1, tourism, pleasure, or 

visiting, a B2, or a combination of both purposes, a BIIB2. 

According to the Department of State, more than 5.3 million BIIB2 

nonimmigrant visas were issued in Fiscal Year 2012. Since 2008, the number of 

BIIB2 visas issued by the Department of State have skyrocketed. In 2008, the 

State Department issued 3.5 million BIIB2 visas, representing an 

approximately 55% increase in the issuance ofBlIB2 visas from Fiscal Years 2008 

to 2012. 

Likewise, the State Department issued 1.3 million Border Crossing Cards in 

Fiscal Year 2013, continuing to issue millions of Border Crossing Cards during the 

last few years. Border Crossing Cards are only issued to applicants who are 

citizens and residents of Mexico, and "must demonstrate that they have ties to 

Mexico to compel them to return after a temporary stay in the United States." 

Today I am interested in learning what the standard is for determining what 

types of ties are considered strong enough to qualify for a BCC. 

On July 1 t\ 2013, this Subcommittee received testimony about rampant 

fraud in the asylum application process. Likewise, various reports, including from 

the Government Accountability Office have previously identified the risk of 

potential fraud in the applications and use ofBI1B2s and Border Crossing Cards. I 

hope we will discuss what steps the Departments is taking to prevent fraudulent 

applications and use ofB IIB2s and Border Crossing Cards. 

Integrity in the issuance of the B 1182 and Border Crossing Cards is critical. 

And the enforcement of the law is just as important. But reports of visa overstays 

remain a challenge, and in Mr. Woods' written testimony submitted to this 

Subcommittee today, he wrote, "in Fiscal Year 2012, the CTCEU received 38,355 

BIIB2 violator leads. An automated vetting process closed 24,325 cases leaving 

14,0 I 0 potential violators." In other words, the Subcommittee is being told that, 

right now, in terms of just BIIB2 violators, there are approximately 14,000 

violators. This represents a real problem. I have serious questions about fraud in 

the process and the potential lack of enforcement. Do we know where these BIIB2 

violators are? What are we doing on the enforcement side for the thousands of 

B 1182 nonimmigrant violations? 

2 
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On April 2, 2013, Members, including myself, and Committee staff traveled 

to Yuma and Nogales, Arizona, to assess the federal government's most recent 

efforts to secure the border. I visited Eloy Detention Facility in Arizona and was 

briefed by prison and ICE officials. I also visited various ports of entry in Yuma 

and Nogales.Based on our conversations with CBP officers in Yuma and Nogales, 

they had concerns about serious flaws in the issuance and enforcement ofB1182 

and Border Crossing Cards. 

I was also told that asylum applicants have received Notice to Appear for a 

court date before an Immigration Judge (tell story - Phoenix, 2020). Today I'd 

like to hear from our witnesses about the average length of time for a Notice to 

Appear before an Immigration Judge. 

Likewise, we heard concerns from officers on the ground on the Southwest 

border that CBP does not currently have a fully implemented out-bound exit 

capability to maintain data on exit from the United States into Mexico. 

All of these statistics, personal accounts, and news reports point to an 

alarming trend that suggests there may be serious flaws in our legal immigration 

system, in addition to showing where some of the newest threats may be emerging. 

Today, we hope to not only discuss these potential flaws to the system but 

solutions to ensure a more effective system. I want to emphasize that I commend 

and support the hard work and dedication of our law enforcement officers and of 

CBP, ICE, State and the DOJ. 

In trying to facilitate a productive discussion, on August 26th, 2013, I sent a 

letter to the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice asking 

questions about the immigration process, including fraud in the asylum process, the 

percentage of asylum seekers who do not appear at their scheduled immigration 

court proceedings, the average length of time, and longest length of time, for a 

Notice to Appear before an Immigration Judge for an asylum proceeding. 

The due date for a response and production of documents was September 9th , 

2013. Here we are, more than two months later, and the Department of Homeland 

responded last night, and failed to answer many of my questions. This is not 

acceptable, and the Subcommittee hopes to hear some of the answers today, as well 

as an explanation for why you were unable produce a sufficient and timely 

response to this Subcommittee. 

3 
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We are eager to hear your thoughts about how to improve the B lIB2 and 

Border Crossing Card process in the United States. 

4 
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SFL Opening Statement for November 11.2013 OGR-National 

Security Subcommittee Hearing: 

Border Security Oversight. Part III: Border Crossing Cards and 

BIIB2 Visas 

THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. CHAIRMAN FOR THE TIME AND FOR CONVENING 

THIS HEARING. 

THIS HEARING WILL EXAMINE ONE OF THE MANY CHALLENGES WE HAVE TO 

ADDRESS AS PART OF IMMIGRATION REFORM: THE TRACKING OF THOSE WHO 

ENTER LEG ALL Y, BUT OVERSTAY THEIR VISAS. CONGRESS HAS LONG MANDA TED 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT THOSE WHO 

COME HERE TEMPORARILY ACTUALLY LEAVE WHEN THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO. 

UNFORTUNATELY, CARRYING OUT THIS REQUIREMENT HAS PROVEN TO BE A 

CHALLENGE, BOTH FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND ITS 

PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATION, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 

SERVICE. TODAY, APPROXIMATELY FORTY PERCENT OF UNDOCUMENTED 

IMMIGRANTS CURRENTLY IN THE U.S. ORIGINALLY ENTERED WITH VALID VISAS. 

WHILE I UNDERSTAND THAT A STUDY BY THE CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES 

FOUND THAT THE NUMBER OF YEARLY VISA OVERSTAYS HAS DROPPED, IT IS 

IMPORTANT THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT IS WORKING RIGHT AND WHAT 

IS NOT WORKING. 

ULTIMATELY THOUGH, ONLY A COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF OUR IMMIGRATION 

SYSTEM WILL GIVE US THE SUSTAINABLE RESULTS THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 

NEED AND DESERVE. WE NEED TO ADDRESS EVERY ASPECT OF THIS ISSUE: THIS 

MEANS REFORMING OUR LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM SO IT WILL WORK BETTER, 

ADDRESSING THE STATUS OF THE ESTIMATED 11 MILLION UNDOCUMENTED 

PERSONS CURRENTLY HERE, TAKING ON THE EMPLOYERS WHO EXPLOIT 

UNDOCUMENTED LABORERS, MAKING OUR BORDER SECURITY MORE EFECTIVE 

AND BETTER TRACKING THOSE WHO ENTER. 

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK OUR WITNESSES FOR COMING. I LOOK FORWARD TO 

HEARING THEIR TESTIMONY ON THE STEPS THEY HAVE TAKEN, AND NEED TO 

TAKE, TO ENSURE A MORE EFFECTIVE ENTRYIEXIT SYSTEM. 

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN. I YIELD BACK.