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NEXT STEPS IN HUMAN EXPLORATION 

TO MARS AND BEYOND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2013 

Serial No. 113–30 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

MARK TAKANO, California 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Steven M. Palazzo, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11 

Statement by Representative Donna Edwards, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 14 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Louis Friedman, Co-Lead, Keck Institute for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval Mission Study and Executive Director Emeritus, The Planetary 

Society 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 

Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Staff Scientist, Lunar and Planetary Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29 

Dr. Steven M. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy, Cornell University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 35 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 37 

Mr. Douglas Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 45 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 47 

Discussion .................................................................................................................

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Louis Friedman, Co-Lead, Keck Institute for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval Mission Study and Executive Director Emeritus, The Planetary 

Society ................................................................................................................... 82 

Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Staff Scientist, Lunar and Planetary Institute ............ 88 

Dr. Steven M. Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy, Cornell University ................................................................................................................... 94 

Mr. Douglas Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions ................................ 103 
Page

IV 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Report submitted by Dr. Paul Spudis .................................................................... 120 

Article submitted by Dr. Paul Spudis .................................................................... 144 

Article submitted by Dr. Paul Spudis .................................................................... 156 

Article submitted by Dr. Paul Spudis .................................................................... 158 

Article submitted by Dr. Paul Spudis .................................................................... 164 
(1) 

NEXT STEPS IN HUMAN EXPLORATION TO 

MARS AND BEYOND 

TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven M. 

Palazzo [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 

LAMAR S. SMI1l-!, Texas 

Cl1A1RMAN 

([onllreS5 of the 'Ilnitn1 ~tate5 

iItoUS[ of 'RqJrcsrntatiucs COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BU'LDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

(202) 225-6371 

www.i.de.nce.Il~lJse.gov 

Subcommittee on Space 

Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013 

2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

RAI'IKING MEMBER 

Dr. Louis Friedman, Co-Lead, Keck Institute for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval Mission Study 

and Executive Director Emeritus, The Planetary Society 

Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Sta./fScientist at the Lunar and Planetary IllSritute 

Dr. Steve Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy at Cornell University 

Mr. Doug Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013 

2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine possible options for the next steps in human space flight 

and how these options move the United States closer to a human mission to Mars and beyond. In 

particular, the Committee will explore whether the Administration's proposed asteroid rendezvous 

mission is a better precursor for an eventual manned mission to Mars compared to Apollo-like 

follow-on missions to return to the Moon. 

Witnesses 

• Dr. Louis Friedman, Co-Lead, Keck Institute for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval Mission 

Study and Executive Director Emeritus, The Planetary Society 

• Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Staff Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute 

• Dr. Steve Squyres, Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy at Cornell University 

• Mr. Doug Cooke, Owner, Cooke Concepts and Solutions 

Overarching Ouestions 

I. Is the proposed Asteroid Retrieval Mission (ARM), a lunar landing mission, or another mission 

better as a precursor for an eventual human mission to Mars? 

2. What things could we learn and capabilities would we develop from a Moon landing that we 

could not learn from the proposed Asteroid Retrieval Mission? 

3. How do different destinations or missions affect a strategic approach with our potential 

international partners as well as technical architectures? 

Background 

Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident in February 2003 and the subsequent investigation 

into its cause, President George W. Bush announced a new "Vision for Space Exploration" on 

January 14, 2004, to reinvigorate and redirect NASA's human exploration program beyond the 

International Space Station. The plan focused on the next steps for low-Earth orbit and beyond 

Earth orbit. It also provided a generalized vision that the Administrator could use to "implement an 

integrated, long-term robotic and human exploration program structured with measurable 

milestones and executed on the basis of available resources, accumulated experience, and 

1 
4 

technology readiness."J The plan included four main goals and objectives: to implement a sustained 

and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system; to extend human presence 

across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation 

for human exploration of Mars and other destinations; to develop the innovative technologies, 

knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for 

human exploration; and promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further 

U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.2 The Constellation Program was born out of the 

New Vision for Space Exploration and the work for this new program began with NASA's budget 

request for fiscal year 2005. 

After his appointment as Administrator in April 2005, Dr. Mike Griffin ordered a review of 

NASA's exploration architecture called the "Exploration Systems Architecture Study" (ESAS) to 

carry out this vision. After the completion of the study, NASA began, with the concurrence of 

Congress, to restructure the exploration program with an emphasis on acceleration of the 

development of capabilities to ferry astronauts to the International Space Station.3 The study 

recommended the development of a Space Shuttle-derived launch architecture4 and an exploration 

vehicle that was capable of carrying cargo and crew to the Space Station as well as crew to the 

Moon and Mars.5 Congress codified the majority of the ESAS plan in the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration Reauthorization Act of 2005, understanding the milestone schedule was 

based primarily on the ability to "go-as-we-can-afford-to-pay." 

In 2009, President Obama ordered a review of the Constellation program and acting NASA 

Administrator Chris Scolese established the "Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee" 

(the Commission), also known as the "Augustine Commission" for its chairman, Norman R. 

Augustine. The charter for the Commission called for an "independent review of ongoing U.S. 

human space flight plans and programs, as well as alternatives, to ensure the Nation is pursuing the 

best traject0!I for the future of human space flight--one that is safe, innovative, affordable, and 

sustainable." The Commission released its final report on October 22,2009.7 

The Commission found that "the ultimate goal of human exploration is to chart a path for human 

expansion into the solar system,,,g but that "since Constellation's inception, the program has faced a 

mismatch between funding and program content,,9 and "[ d]ifferences between the original 

Constellation program planning budget and the actual implementation budget, coupled with 

technical problems that have been encountered on the [programs], have produced the most 

significant overall impacts to the execution of the Constellation program.',JO The Commission 

offered five options for the future of the human exploration program, two of which complied with 

1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration·The Vision for Space Exploration, Februory 2004. Retrieved at 

http://www.nasagov/pdf/55583rnain_vision_space_explorationZ.pdf 

'Ibid 

3 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Exploration Systems Architecture Study (pg 59). Retrieved at 

http://www.nasagov/pdf!l40632main_ESAS_02.pdf 

'Ibid 3 atpg717 

, Ibid 3 at pg 714 

6 Charter of the "Review oru.s. Hwnan Spaceflight Plans Committee". retrieved at 

http://www.nasagov/pdf/354415rnain.... Charter%20-%20SignedO/020-O/020Clean.pdf 

7 Final Report of the "Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee". Retrieved at: 

http://www.nasagov/pdf/396093main....HSF_CrnteJinalReport.pdf 

, Ibid. 7 at pg 9 

9 Ibid. 7 at pg 58 

10 Ibid 7 at pg 59 

2 
5 

the FY20 I 0 budget profile of the Obama Administration for the Constellation program,lI however, 

neither of these two options would "permit human exploration to continue in any meaningful 

way.,,12 

As a result of this review, President Obama offered a budget for fiscal year 2011 that proposed to 

cancel the Constellation program. 13 Later that same year, Congress authorized some of the changes 

to the human exploration program sought by the President14 as outlined in a speech on April IS, 

20 I O. In this speech at the Kennedy Space Center he revealed his strategy for the future of human 

exploration which canceled a return mission to the Moon, saying, "I understand that some believe 

that we should attempt a return to the surface of the Moon first, as previously planned. But I just 

have to say pretty bluntly here: We've been there before ... Early in the next decade, a set of crewed 

flights will test and prove the systems required for exploration beyond low Earth orbit. And by 

2025, we expect new spacecraft designed for long journeys to allow us to begin the first-ever 

crewed missions beyond the Moon into deep space. So we'll start -- we'll start by sending 

astronauts to an asteroid for the first time in history. By the mid-2030s, I believe we can send 

humans to orbit Mars and return them safely to Earth. And a landing on Mars will follow.,,15 

Current Law and National Space Policy 

On June 28, 2010 the President announced a new National Space Policy which outlined priorities as 

well as principles and objectives for the extension of human presence deeper into the solar system. 

Although both President Obama and the Administrator have repeatedly said the United States will 

not be going back to the Moon, 16.17 current law, derived by numerous NASA Authorization Acts 

over the last decade, requires lunar missions as destinations or at the very least, precursors to other 

missions. The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 directed NASA to: 

... establish a program to develop a sustained human presence on the Moon, including a 

robust precursor program, to promote exploration, science, commerce, and United States 

preeminence in space, and as a stepping-stone to foture exploration of Mars and other 

destinations. 18 

Additionally, the 2005 Act required the Administrator to: 

... implement an exploration technology development program to enable lunar human and 

robotic operations consistent with section 101 (b)(2}including surface power to use on the 

Moon and other locations/9 

11 http://www.nasagov/pdf7345955main_8_Exploration_o/020FY_2010_UPDATED_final.pdf. Note the significant change in the 

budget projection fOT the Constellation program from the FY 2010 budget profile on page EXP-2. 

12 Ibid 7 atpg 16 

13 President's Budget Request for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Fiscal Year 2011. Retrieved at 

http://www.nasa.gov/news/hudgetl201I.hnnl 

14 Public Law 111-267: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Reauthorization Act of2010 

" Speech by President Oboma at Kennedy Space CenteT on ApTil 15, 2010 

ht!p;lIwww.nasagov/newsimcdiaitransiobama ksc trans.htrnl 16 Ibid. - -

17 Oral Testimony of Administrator Charles Bolden before the House Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Space, April 

24,2013. 

18 51 USC 20302 19 51 USC 70502 

3 
6 

Following the reorganization ofthe Constellation program, Congress endorsed additional 

requirements for NASA's human exploration program in the 2008 Act, including a requirement 

for the Administrator to create a "Stepping Stone Approach" to exploration: 

In order to maximize the cost-effectiveness of the long-term exploration and utilization 

activities of the United States, the Administrator shall take all necessary steps, including 

engaging international partners, to ensure that activities in its lunar exploration program 

shall be designed and implemented in a manner that gives strong consideration to how those 

activities might also help meet the requirements of foture exploration and utilization activities 

beyond the Moon. The timetable of the lunar phase of the long-term international exploration 

initiative shall be determined by the availability of funding. However, once an explorationrelated project enters its development phase, the Administrator shall seek, to the maximum 

extent practicable, to complete that project without undue delays. 20 

At present, there is no plan for NASA to return humans to the Moon. According to NASA 

Administrator Bolden, there is no money in the Administration's budget for such a mission.2

! 

Next Steps 

As NASA prepares to take the next steps in human exploration of the solar system there are many 

unanswered questions about the correct path to Mars and beyond. The Apollo Program was not a 

straight shot to the Moon; it included several precursor missions to test new capabilities and gain 

experience on the way to the Moon including Projects Mercury and Gemini. In much the same way, 

NASA will need to acquire new capabilities to travel to Mars and beyond. 

The two most commonly discussed possibilities for precursor missions to Mars involve manned 

missions to the Moon or an asteroid. 

Lunar Mission 

The "Vision for Space Exploration" called for a return to the Moon by 2020 as a stepping stone to 

other locations and NASA has continued various lunar science projects such as the Lunar 

Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL). The 

Constellation program was ideally suited for landing on the Moon with the inclusion of a lunar 

lander called the "Altair" in the "system of systems" approach to exploration. Since the 

cancellation of the Constellation program, there is no longer a lunar lander under development. 

There are several compelling reasons for using the Moon as a training ground and test bed to 

prepare for more complex missions. Landing on the Moon would develop technical capabilities for 

landing on and launching from a large celestial body, something NASA has not done for more than 

four decades.22 Establishing a semi-permanent or permanent presence on the Moon such as the 

lunar outpost referenced in the NASA Authorization Acts of2005 and 2008,23 would give 

astronauts an opportunity to work and live in an environment radically different from Earth, in 

much the same way explorers on Mars would. Ultimately, operating on another planet will require 

20 51 USC 70504 

" Oral Testimony of Administrator Charles Bolden before the House Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Space, April 

24,2013. 

"The last time humans landed on the moon was Apollo 17 on December 7,1972. 

23 51 USC 70505 

4 
7 

training and preparation, the Moon seems like a 10 gical place to do this training. "On the 

international front, there appears to be continued enthusiasm for a mission to the Moon.',24 

Asteroid Mission 

The National Space Policy issued by President Obama in April 20 I 0, and released fonnally later 

that year, envisioned sending humans to an asteroid by the year 2025 beyond lunar orbit into "deep 

space.,,25.26 The National Research Council issued a report last December which stated that "[t]he 

committee has seen little evidence that a current stated goal for NASA's human spaceflight 

program-namely, to visit an asteroid by 2025-has been widely accepted as a compelling 

destination by NASA's own workforce, by the nation as a whole, or by the international 

community.,,27 

The Administration proposed a revised asteroid mission with the FY20 14 budget request. The 

mission concept proposed by the Administration features a robotic capture and redirection of a 

small near Earth asteroid (NEA) to a deep retrograde lunar orbit for astronauts to visit rather than 

sending Astronauts to an asteroid in deep space. 

The proposed Asteroid Retrieval Mission (ARM) has multiple stages. First, using the Near Earth 

Observation Program will identify an appropriate asteroid passing near Earth based on size, 

composition, and orbit while simultaneously developing advanced solar electric propulsion 

technology. NASA will then need to develop and build a robotic probe to launch to the target 

asteroid in time to intersect its orbit. This probe will then "dock" with the asteroid while also 

stabilizing its rotation and ferry it to a retrograde lunar orbit. Finally, NASA will launch a crewed 

Orion capsule aboard the SLS in order to rendezvous and explore the asteroid, potentially on the 

initial manned flight of the new vehicle and capsule. 

The mission concept is based on a study by the Keck Institute for Space Studies (Keck Study) at the 

California Institute of Technology in partnership with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The Keck 

Study estimated a mission of this size and scope would cost approximately $2.6 billion.28 The 

Administration believes that the mission will actually cost less than this, and NASA plans to 

provide a revised estimate of the mission's cost this summer. NASA's FYl4 budget request also 

proposes three new initiatives totaling $105 million, but NASA has not identified a budget profile 

for this mission beyond FY 2014. 

2~ASA's Strategic Direction and the Need for a National Consensushttp://W\.\-w,nap.edufcatalog.php?recordJct-=18248 

"Ibid 15 

"Ibid 17 

"Ibid 24 

28 Brophy, J., Friedman, L., & Culick, F. (2012). Asteroid Retrieval Mission Feasibility Study. Keck Institute Jor Space Studies, • 

Retrieved, ITom http://www.lpi.usra.eduisbagidocumentsiAsteroid percent20Retum percent20Feasibility percent2020I 20530.pdf 

5 
8 

Appendix- Reports on Space Exploration 

1986 - The National Commission on Space (Paine Commission Report) 

http://www.nasa.gov!pdf/383341main 60%20-

%2020090814.5.The%20Report%200f''1020the%20National%20Commission%200n%20Space.pdf 

1987 - NASA Leadership and America's Future in Space: A Report to the Administrator (Ride 

Report) 

http://history.nasa.gov/riderep/main.PDF 

1990 - Advisory Committee on the Future ofthe U.S. Space Program (Augustine Commission 

Report) 

http://www .hq.nasa.gov / office!paofHistory/augustine/racfup I.htrn 

1991 - The Synthesis Group (The Stafford Report) 

http://history.nasa.gov!staffordrepfmain toc.PDF 

1991 - Office of Technology Assessment: Exploring the Moon and Mars 

http://history.nasa.gov/32992.pdf 

1993 - The National Space Council Report on the U.S. Space Program 

http://history.nasa.gov!33082.ptl.pdf 

2004 - President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy 

(Aldridge Commission Report) 

http://history.nasa.gov!aldridge commission report june2004.pdf 

2009 - Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee (Augustine Commission Report) 

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396093main HSF Cmte FinalReport.pdf 

6 
9 
10 

Chairman PALAZZO. The Subcommittee on Space will come to 

order. Good afternoon. Welcome to today’s hearing titled ‘‘Next 

Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond.’’ In front of you 

are packets containing the written testimony, biographies, and required truth-in-testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. 

Before I begin, I do want to take a moment to express our 

thoughts and prayers on behalf of this Committee for those in 

Oklahoma who have just gone through the recent tornadoes. As 

Americans came to their fellow Americans in aid for Hurricane 

Katrina, Super Storm Sandy, we expect nothing less from us in our 

friends’ time of need. 

I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

I would also like to take a moment and remember Astronaut 

Sally Ride, the first American woman in space, who was honored 

last night at the Kennedy Center for her tireless work promoting 

the Nation’s space program and her devotion to STEM education 

for our Nation’s children. 

Over the last decade, the human exploration program at NASA 

has been plagued with instability from constantly changing requirements, budgets, and missions. We can’t continue changing our 

program of record every time there is a new President. This committee is consistent and unwavering in its commitment to human 

exploration, a tradition that I am confident will continue into the 

future. 

Congress issued steady guidance in the 2005 and 2008 Authorization Acts that directed NASA to base exploration progress on 

availability of funds. In accordance with the Authorization Act of 

2010, NASA is developing the most powerful exploration vehicle 

and advanced crew capsule since the Apollo era. The SLS and 

Orion will take our astronauts deeper into space than ever before. 

I am committed to the success of these assets and ensuring their 

continued on-time development and appropriate prioritization moving forward. 

I, and many on this Committee, are frustrated that the Administration insists on cutting its funding request for the SLS and 

Orion. Reductions in these programs make me question the Administration’s sincere commitment to their success. If nothing else 

comes out of this hearing, I hope it is clear to those inside and outside the Administration that this Committee is devoted to human 

exploration and we intend to ensure this year’s authorization reflects that commitment. 

Numerous studies and commissions have provided Congress with 

recommendations for purposes and goals for exploring space. We 

don’t need another study, we need action. As we move forward in 

the next few months with the NASA Authorization Act, Congress 

must address our path to Mars and beyond so there will be no 

question as to where we are headed and how we will get there. 

As we venture further into the solar system, there must be a 

plan in place for the capabilities, skills, and technologies needed to 

land humans on Mars and return them safely to the Earth. Today, 

we will discuss the best way to take our first steps toward Mars 

and the path we should follow to get there. The two most commonly referenced possibilities for next steps are an asteroid mis-
11 

sion and a lunar mission. We have a panel of experts with us today 

that will be able to speak to both of these options. 

The last three NASA Authorization Acts have created a clear legislative record supporting a return to the Moon with a sustained 

human presence as a training ground for venturing further into the 

solar system. There are many advantages to returning humans to 

the Moon and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today 

about what we may gain from a return to the surface of our closest 

celestial neighbor. 

Additionally, this year the Administration proposed to capture an 

asteroid and move it to a nearby orbit as technology demonstration 

and exploration training opportunity. Prior to this year, NASA has 

not presented Congress with any indication such a mission would 

be in development. I still have many questions about the budget 

profile, technical plan, schedule, and long-term strategy as NASA 

has yet to even complete a mission formulation review. I am not 

convinced this mission is the right way to go and that it may actually prove a detour for a Mars mission. 

Today, we have one of the scientists who wrote the study which 

became the basis of the asteroid mission, and I look forward to 

hearing his thoughts. 

Human exploration has always had its challenges, but the U.S. 

has always risen to the occasion. This country was built by people 

who dream big and do hard things. I believe the decisions we make 

today will determine whether the United States maintains its leadership in space tomorrow. In the future, as in the past, I hope we 

will be able to focus mission priorities and goals to ensure our best 

chance of success. 

And of course, if I may, I would just like to introduce my friends 

with the partners with Stennis who are here. I know several of you 

all may be with the citizens for the exploration of space. Thank you 

all for being here and it was great to have a little tongue twister 

while you are in the audience. Just say call it Moon. Why don’t we 

just do that? Lunar, lunar, lunar, okay. I got it. 

I now recognize our Ranking Member, the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms. Edwards, for an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE CHAIRMAN STEVEN PALAZZO

Before we begin, I would like to take a moment to recognize Astronaut Sally Ride, 

the first American woman in space, who was honored last night at the Kennedy 

Center for her tireless work promoting the nation’s space program and her devotion 

to STEM education for our nation’s children. 

Over the last decade, the human exploration program at NASA has been plagued 

with instability from constantly changing requirements, budgets, and missions. We 

can’t continue changing our program of record every time there is a new President. 

This Committee is consistent and unwavering in its commitment to human exploration, a tradition that I am confident will continue into the future. Congress issued 

steady guidance in the 2005 and 2008 Authorization Acts that directed NASA to 

base exploration progress on availability of funds. 

In accordance with the Authorization Act of 2010, NASA is developing the most 

powerful exploration vehicle and advanced crew capsule since the Apollo era. The 

SLS and Orion will take our astronauts deeper into space than ever before. I am 

committed to the success of these assets and ensuring their continued on-time development and appropriate prioritization moving forward. I, and many on this Committee, are frustrated that the Administration insists on cutting its funding request 

for the SLS and Orion. Reductions in these programs make me question the Admin-
12 

istration’s sincere commitment to their success. If nothing else comes out of this 

hearing, I hope it is clear to those inside and outside the Administration that this 

Committee is devoted to human exploration and we intend to ensure this year’s authorization reflects that commitment. 

Numerous studies and commissions have provided Congress with recommendations for purposes and goals for exploring space. We don’t need another study, we 

need action. 

As we move forward in the next few months with the NASA Authorization Act, 

Congress must address our path to Mars and beyond so there will be no question 

as to where we are headed and how we will get there. 

As we venture further into the solar system there must be a plan in place for the 

capabilities, skills, and technologies needed to land humans on Mars and return 

them safely to the Earth. Today we will discuss the best way to take our first steps 

toward Mars and the path we should follow to get there. The two most commonly 

referenced possibilities for next steps are an asteroid mission and a lunar mission. 

We have a panel of experts with us today that will be able to speak to both of these 

options. 

The last three NASA Authorization Acts have created a clear legislative record 

supporting a return to the Moon with a sustained human presence as a training 

ground for venturing further into the solar system. 

There are many advantages to returning humans to the Moon and I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses today about what we may gain from a return to the 

surface of our closest celestial neighbor. 

Additionally, this year the Administration proposed to capture an asteroid and 

move it to a nearby orbit as a technology demonstration and exploration training 

opportunity. Prior to this year, NASA had not presented Congress with any indication such a mission would be in development. I still have many questions about the 

budget profile, technical plan, schedule, and long-term strategy as NASA has yet to 

even complete a mission formulation review. 

I am not convinced this mission is the right way to go and that it may actually 

prove a detour for a Mars mission. Today we have one of the scientists who wrote 

the study which became the basis of the asteroid mission, and I look forward to 

hearing his thoughts. 

Human exploration has always had its challenges, but the United States has always risen to the occasion. This country was built by people who dream big and do 

the hard things. I believe the decisions we make today will determine whether the 

U.S. maintains its leadership in space tomorrow. In the future, as in the past, I 

hope we will be able to focus mission priorities and goals to ensure our best chances 

of success. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good afternoon and welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses. I really 

appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that you called this hearing on Next 

Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond. I have to say I 

don’t know what the rest of Congress is doing, but this Subcommittee and our Full Committee have been quite active in our 

oversight. We have held hearings recently on near-Earth objects, 

exoplanets, as well as previous hearings that we have held on Mars 

and planetary science. And these issues have only deepened my enthusiasm for what NASA does and wetted my appetite for the 

places that our astronauts, our humans, might explore in the future. 

Human exploration is indeed a big part of NASA and its inspiring mission. It is also an important catalyst for advancing our Nation’s innovation agenda and for demanding the types of skills and 

educated workforce that contribute to our Nation’s economic 

strength. I want to ensure that others share my enthusiasm and 

excitement and one day experience the thrill, the absolute thrill, of 

American astronauts, of humans traveling to and exploring a surface far beyond our Earth and then returning safely home. That is 

something that the United States of America has not done in four 
13 

decades and I don’t want another four decades to pass before we 

explore deep space again. 

That is why I am delighted to hear that NASA Administrator 

Charles Bolden speak more often more recently about Mars as an 

ultimate destination, at least in the next 20 years, for human exploration. Today’s hearing will examine potential interim steps en 

route to that ultimate destination. 

Successive NASA Authorization Acts have authorized a steppingstone approach to human exploration. The Moon, near-Earth asteroids, and other points are among the destinations that can be considered to help prepare for eventual human exploration of Mars. 

The Administration’s recent proposal to capture a near-Earth asteroid, bring it into translunar orbit—lunar orbit, and to potentially 

send humans there is yet another possible step, but before we look 

at interim steps, we need first to understand what it takes to get 

to Mars. 

Learning how to deal with extended space travel, protecting ourselves from harmful radiation, and surviving on another planet are 

a few challenges that come to mind for humans. Is there a plan to 

get there and to address these and other challenges? What should 

Congress expect to be included in a credible and measured roadmap to achieve the goals of sending humans to Mars? Such a guide 

can help us determine whether one or more interim steps make 

sense and which one—how an interim destination would move us 

forward along the roadmap and which destination or destinations 

are most effective in enabling progress towards a Mars goal. 

We have an impressive group of witnesses here today, Mr. Chairman, with deep expertise in these issues that we are discussing, 

and so I thank you for joining us and I look forward to your testimony and to learning from you. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DONNA EDWARDS

Good afternoon and welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today on ‘‘Next Steps in 

Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond.’’ 

The hearings this Subcommittee and the Full Committee have recently held on 

near Earth objects and exoplanets, as well as previous hearings held on Mars and 

planetary science, have only deepened my enthusiasm for what NASA does and 

wetted my appetite for the places that our astronauts might explore. 

Human exploration is indeed a big part of NASA and its inspiring mission. 

It’s also an important catalyst for advancing our nation’s innovation agenda and 

for demanding the types of skills and educated workforce that contribute to our nation’s economic strength. 

I want to ensure that others share in my excitement and one day experience the 

thrill of American astronauts traveling to and exploring a surface far beyond our 

Earth, and then returning safely home. 

That is something that the United States of America has not done in four decades, 

and I don’t want another four decades to pass before we explore deep space again. 

That’s why I’m delighted to hear the NASA Administrator, Charles Bolden, speaking more often about Mars as the ultimate destination for human space exploration. 

Today’s hearing will examine potential interim steps en route to that ultimate 

destination. 

Successive NASA Authorizations Acts have authorized a ‘‘stepping stone approach’’ to human exploration. The Moon, near Earth asteroids, and Lagrangian 
14 

points are among the destinations that can be considered to help prepare for eventual human exploration of Mars. 

The Administration’s recent proposal to capture a near Earth asteroid, bring it 

into trans-lunar orbit, and to potentially send humans there is yet another possible 

step. But before we look at interim steps, we need first to understand what it takes 

to get to Mars. 

Learning how to deal with extended space travel, protecting ourselves from harmful radiation, and surviving on another planet are a few challenges that come to 

mind. 

Is there a plan to get there and to address these and other challenges? 

What should Congress expect to be included in a credible and measured roadmap 

to achieve the goal of sending humans to Mars? 

Such a guide can help us determine whether one or more interim steps makes 

sense, how an interim destination moves us forward along the roadmap, and which 

destination or destinations are most effective in enabling progress toward a Mars 

goal. 

We have an impressive group of witnesses here today with deep expertise in the 

issues we are discussing, so thank you for joining us and I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. I now recognize 

the Chairman of the Full Committee for a statement. 

Mr. Smith? 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Human history is punctuated by great advancements in the exploration of the world around us. We have long sought out the next 

frontier, which may well be the exploration of our solar system. No 

doubt humankind will continue to push the boundaries of the 

known universe. 

Not long ago, the exploration of Mars was considered science fiction. Today, with two active Martian robotic missions ongoing, it is 

no longer science fiction at all. Space exploration goes beyond rockets and avionics; it is about hope for the future. Human space 

flight represents the aspirations and ambitions of the American 

people. 

Few sights are more inspiring than when a rocket lifts off a 

launch pad and disappears into the sky. Investments in the Space 

Launch System and Orion crew capsule manifest the ingenuity of 

the American people and the next steps in space exploration. 

Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin transfixed America and the 

world when they landed on the Moon in 1969. The Apollo program 

was proof that we are not permanently tethered to our home planet. It was a reminder that humans will always be explorers. 

As our space program prepares for the next step to Mars, Congress must ensure that there is a strategic plan in place. NASA 

should have a well-thought-out and convincing plan before committing scarce resources. The trip to Mars will not be a direct one. We 

will need to train for it before we send a crew, much like the Apollo 

missions. 

One option for training would be a set of lunar missions. Congress has a long history of support for lunar landings and exploration. To me, there is no better way for our astronauts to learn 

how to live and work on another planet than to use the Moon as 

a training ground. Another option presented by NASA this year is 

an asteroid retrieval mission. It is difficult to determine what advantages this may offer without a plan to evaluate. 

The Administration originally proposed a mission to an asteroid 

in deep space. A recent National Research Council report found lit-
15 

tle support for the proposal. Without a consensus for the original 

plan, NASA haphazardly created a new asteroid retrieval mission. 

Unfortunately, NASA did not seek the advice of its own Small Bodies Assessment Group before presenting the mission to Congress. 

If NASA had sought the advisory group’s advice, they would have 

heard it was ‘‘entertaining, but not a serious proposal.’’ Maybe that 

is why they didn’t ask. 

As this Committee begins to draft the NASA Reauthorization 

Act, we must be mindful of the impact it will have on the future. 

The policies we put in place today will affect our capabilities many 

years from now. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LAMAR SMITH

Human history is punctuated by great advancements in the exploration of the 

world around us. We have long sought out the next frontier, which may well be the 

exploration of our solar system. No doubt humankind will continue to push the 

boundaries of the known universe. 

Not long ago, the exploration of Mars was considered science fiction. Today, with 

two active robotic missions on-going, it’s no longer fiction. Space exploration goes beyond rockets and avionics; it is about hope for the future. Human space flight represents the aspirations and ambitions of the American people.Few sights are more 

inspiring than when a rocket lifts off a launch pad and disappears into the sky. 

Investments in the Space Launch System and Orion crew capsule manifest the 

ingenuity of the American people and the next steps in space exploration.Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin transfixed America and the world when they landed on the 

Moon in 1969. The Apollo program was proof that we were not permanently tethered to our home planet. It was a reminder that humans will always be explorers. 

As our space program prepares for the next step to Mars, Congress must ensure 

there is a strategic plan in place. NASA should have a well thought out and convincing plan before committing scarce resources. The trip to Mars will not be a direct one. We will need to train for it before we send a crew, much like the Apollo 

missions. 

One option for training would be a set of lunar missions. Congress has a long history of support for lunar landings and exploration. To me, there is no better way 

for our astronauts to learn how to live and work on another planet than to use the 

moon as a training ground. Another option presented by NASA this year is an asteroid retrieval mission. It is difficult to determine what advantages this may offer 

without a plan to evaluate. 

The Administration originally proposed a mission to an asteroid in deep space. A 

recent National Research Council report found little support for the proposal. Without a consensus for the original plan, NASA haphazardly created a new asteroid retrieval mission. Unfortunately, NASA did not seek the advice of its own Small Bodies Assessment Group before presenting the mission to Congress. 

If NASA had sought the advisory group’s advice, they would have heard it was 

‘‘entertaining, but not a serious proposal.’’ Maybe that’s why they didn’t ask. As this 

Committee begins to draft the NASA Reauthorization Act, we must be mindful of 

the impact it will have on the future. The policies we put in place today will affect 

our capabilities many years from now. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee for 

a statement. Ms. Johnson? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much and good afternoon. I would 

like to join the Chairman and Ranking Member Edwards in welcoming our witnesses for today’s hearing. It is a distinguished 

group of experts and I look forward to their testimony. 

The topic of this hearing is an important one as it touches directly on the future direction of the Nation’s human exploration 
16 

program. I expect that it will be a lively discussion and that it really should be because it just gives us further evidence that NASA 

space exploration activity is both human and robotic matter and 

thus worth discussing, maybe even arguing about. 

As my colleagues know, I have long been a supporter of human 

exploration. It pushes technological innovation, advances our understanding of the universe, challenges our best and brightest, and 

inspires millions of our young people. It also is a very visible symbol of our commitment to the very peaceful commitment to our 

outer space. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that NASA and 

its programs provide one of the most positive images of the United 

States abroad and that is as much as we could hope for. 

Yet it is evident that despite clear policy direction and successive 

NASA Authorization Acts, NASA’s human exploration program still 

has an air of tentativeness about it. For example, the International 

Space Station, which I strongly support, is currently the lynchpin 

of our human exploration and spaceflight program. However, we 

still lack a clear picture of the ways it will be used to advance the 

Nation’s exploration goals. 

In addition, the Space Launch System and the Orion crew vehicle are transportation systems that will be needed for whichever 

path we take in our human exploration program, yet they currently 

are being funded at levels significantly below the authorized budgets and are being forced to make progress under the funding profile 

that is anything but typical of challenging development programs. 

If we—if they are essential to the success of the exploration program, then their priorities should be reflected in the resources they 

are given. 

Finally, of course, if our Nation’s exploration program is to succeed, we need to have a clear roadmap to follow. That, too, is lacking at present. Mr. Chairman, we can criticize NASA, we can criticize the current or previous Administrations; the reality is we also 

need to look at our own actions. I believe that many of our colleagues see the benefits both tangible and intangible that we have 

reaped from our past investments in NASA and successive Congresses have directed NASA to undertake an exciting and inspiring 

initiative and human expiration of our solar system with Mars as 

an obvious and challenging goal. That is as it should be. It is a goal 

worthy of the great Nation that we are and one that will lead to 

good things for our country even if its attainment winds up taking 

longer than some of us would like. 

Yet at the same time we appear to be unwilling to make the investments that NASA will need to make it if it is to succeed. And 

we are even failing to deliver the funding we do provide on any 

kind of predictable basis. This is unfair to the hard-working men 

and women of NASA and its contracted team and it is unduly increasing risk and winds up costing us more down the road. Yet I 

am afraid that we seem poised to repeat that pattern again as we 

consider this year’s authorization and appropriations for NASA. We 

have just forced NASA to take a significant cut to its Fiscal Year 

2013 budget as a result of sequestration, and some of the House 

seem prepared to extend those cuts into Fiscal Year 2014 and beyond. 
17 

If Congress actually carries through with such shortsighted cuts, 

it will make all of the earnest protestations of support for exploration that we may hear today sound very empty indeed. I hope 

that as we prepare to move forward with our NASA reauthorization, this Committee at least will make sure that NASA has the 

resources it will need to carry out the very challenging task that 

this Nation has given it. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good afternoon. I would like to join the Chairman and Ranking Member Edwards 

in welcoming our witnesses to today’s hearing. It is a distinguished group of experts, 

and I look forward to their testimony. 

The topic of this hearing is an important one, as it touches directly on the future 

direction of the nation’s human exploration program. I expect that it will be a lively 

discussion, and that is as it should be, because that is just further evidence that 

NASA’s space exploration activities, both human and robotic, matter-and thus are 

worth arguing about. 

As my colleagues know, I have long been a supporter of human space exploration. 

It pushes technological innovation, advances our understanding of the universe, 

challenges our best and brightest, and inspires millions of our young people. It also 

is a very visible symbol of our commitment to the peaceful use of outer space. In 

fact, it’s not an exaggeration to say that NASA and its programs provide one of the 

most positive images of America abroad that we could hope for. 

Yet it is evident that despite clear policy direction in successive NASA Authorization Acts, NASA’s human exploration program still has an air of tentativeness about 

it. For example, the International Space Station, which I strongly support, is currently the linchpin of our human spaceflight program. However, we still lack a clear 

picture of the ways it will be used to advance the nation’s exploration goals. In addition, the Space Launch System and Orion crew vehicle are the transportation systems that will be needed for whichever path we take in our human exploration program. Yet, they currently are being funded at levels significantly below their authorized budgets, and are being forced to make progress under a funding profile that 

is anything but typical for challenging development programs. If they are essential 

to the success of the exploration program, then their priority should be reflected in 

the resources they are given. 

Finally, of course, if our nation’s exploration program is to succeed, we need to 

have a clear roadmap to follow. That too is lacking at present. 

Mr. Chairman, we can criticize NASA. We can criticize the current or the previous 

Administration. The reality is we also need to look at our own actions. I believe that 

many of our colleagues see the benefits, both tangible and intangible, that we have 

reaped from our past investments in NASA. And successive Congresses have directed NASA to undertake an exciting and inspiring initiative of human exploration 

of our solar system, with Mars as an obvious and challenging goal. That is as it 

should be-it is a goal worthy of a great nation, and one that will lead to good things 

for our country, even if its attainment winds up taking longer than some of us 

would like. Yet, at the same time we appear to be unwilling to make the investments that NASA will need for us to make if it is to succeed. And we are even failing to deliver the funding that we do provide on any kind of predictable basis. 

That is unfair to the hardworking women and men of NASA and its contractor 

team. And it unduly increases risk and winds up costing us more down the road. 

Yet I’m afraid that we seem poised to repeat that pattern again as we consider this 

year’s authorization and appropriation for NASA. We have just forced NASA to take 

a significant cut to its Fiscal Year 2013 budget as a result of sequestration, and 

some in the House seem prepared to extend those cuts into FY 14 and beyond. If 

Congress actually carries through with such short-sighted cuts, it will make all of 

the earnest protestations of support for exploration that we may hear today sound 

very empty indeed. I hope that as we prepare to move forward with our NASA reauthorization this Committee, at least, will make sure that NASA has the resources 

it will need to carry out the very challenging tasks that this nation given it. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 
18 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our panel of witnesses. Our 

first witness is Dr. Louis Friedman, Co-Lead of the Keck Institute 

for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval Mission Study and Executive 

Director Emeritus of the Planetary Society. Our second witness is 

Dr. Paul Spudis, Senior Staff Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary 

Institute. Our third witness is Dr. Steven Squyres, the Goldwin 

Smith Professor of Astronomy at Cornell University and Chair of 

the NASA Advisory Council. Our final witness is Mr. Doug Cooke, 

an Aerospace Consultant with Cooke Concepts and Solutions. Prior 

to his current position, Mr. Cooke served as the Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Mission Directorate at NASA. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each after which Members of the Committee have five 

minutes each to ask questions. Your written testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Friedman, for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. LOUIS FRIEDMAN, 

CO-LEAD, KECK INSTITUTE FOR SPACE STUDIES 

ASTEROID RETRIEVAL MISSION STUDY 

AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR EMERITUS, 

THE PLANETARY SOCIETY 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. It is an honor to be here again. The very 

holding of this hearing on next steps to Mars underscores the point 

that human exploration has a goal and a direction. Mars is the 

only human accessible world to study the possibilities of either indigenous past life or potential future life. The asteroid retrieval 

mission about which I am talking and which was first studied by 

the Keck Institute for Space Studies creates a first step beyond the 

Moon, the only one that is now capable—that we are now capable 

of performing and the only one which we can afford within the current space program budget. 

This mission represents an opportunity to sustain American 

leadership in robotic and human space exploration with technological innovation and engineering prowess. While other nations 

dream of duplicating the American achievement of a half-century 

ago, the Administration’s new plan has the U.S. looking beyond the 

Moon on a path that will eventually take humans to Mars later in 

this century. The new initiative is not a giant-step, Apollo-like 

crash program; instead, it follows a flexible and cost-effective path 

using stepping stones into the solar system. The stepping stones 

are literally and figuratively provided by the near-Earth asteroids. 

A robotic spacecraft using solar electric propulsion will rendezvous with a very small asteroid in an orbit that is close to 

Earth’s orbit around the Sun. Redirecting that asteroid to the desired orbit in Earth-Moon space will take several years with the 

highly efficient but low continuous thrust provided by solar electric 

propulsion systems. The mission will serve as a key test, a key 

technological test, for higher levels of power of solar electric propulsion that will be needed for the Moon and Mars. 
19 

The asteroid retrieval mission can be done soon with a launch 

perhaps four or five years from now. It depends of course on finding a good target but this we can do. Hundreds of asteroids this 

small have already been discovered, although they are hard to see 

and generally have been ignored and while observers focus on larger objects. Yet we know there are millions of them and a dedicated 

observation program will find enough candidates and the right 

combination of traits for attractive targets for this mission. Increases in the observation program, particularly at the Catalina 

Sky Survey in Arizona and Pan-STAARS in Hawaii are expected 

to increase the rate of discovery 5- to 10-fold in a few years. 

The small asteroids under consideration for this mission pose no 

danger to Earth. Even if one did impact, it would burn up harmlessly in the atmosphere. In addition, the asteroid would be put on 

a trajectory that does not intercept Earth even if control of that 

spacecraft were lost. Nonetheless, the asteroid is big enough to be 

an interesting object to explore. 

Exploring asteroids is important to understand what they are 

made of and how they hold together. We may someday have to divert one. Exploring them and discovering new ones is also important scientifically because these small bodies of the solar system 

hold vital clues about the origin and history of the planets. Protection and science are two reasons to explore but these objects offer 

one more reason for exploration which intrigues many now, and 

that is prospecting and the potential for possible commercial utilization. 

The feasibility of the asteroid retrieval mission caught some in 

the space community by surprise. But the use of solar electric propulsion technology, the capture of non-cooperative objects in space, 

the discovery of near-Earth objects, and the application of the clever techniques of celestial mechanics that make up this mission are 

all developments that NASA has been working—NASA and other 

space agencies have been working on for years. 

The asteroid and lunar orbit may be the first stepping stone on 

the flexible path to Mars. Asteroids and Sun-Earth Lagrangian 

points could be the next, then an asteroid further away closer to 

Mars, then a Martian moon, and then Mars itself. I believe this is 

the direct and only sustainable way to Mars. 

This project will not just unify NASA with science, technology, 

robotic, and human components, but it will unify many others globally with a great adventure. Europe, Japan, Russia all have asteroid mission plans and solar electric spacecraft in operation. They 

could join in the mission development. After an asteroid is in place, 

even private spacecraft developers could be invited to explore and 

test new prospecting ideas there and maybe create a new commercial industry for utilization of space resources. Meanwhile, NASA 

again will be leading the world into space moving on to new accomplishments on more distant asteroids, perhaps on the Martian 

Moons, and then on Mars itself. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Friedman follows:] 
20 

1 

Asteroid Retrieval: A Stepping Stone to Mars 

Statement of Dr. Louis Friedman to the Space Subcommittee of the U.S. House 

of Representatives Committee on Science, Technology and Space 

Mr. Chairman, Member of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to once again appear before this Committee to 

discuss the U.S. space program. I am pleased to present a summary of the 

Keck Institute for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval Mission study and its 

implications for the human space exploration beyond the Moon and specifically 

to Mars. 

I applaud the Subcommittee's consideration of this topic. Even though the 

nation has not taken and cannot afford to take a specific commitment to send 

humans to Mars at this time, the very holding of this hearing underscores the 

fact that human space exploration has a goal and a direction. Mars is the only 

human-accessible world to study possibilities of either indigenous past life or 

potential future life. 

This Subcommittee does not need me to dwell however on the difficulties, costs 

and exigencies of a human Mars mission. It will require technical developments 

and scientific understanding which we do not yet have. There are many steps 

we must take before we can initiate the humans to Mars project. The Asteroid 

Retrieval Mission creates a first step (beyond the Moon) - the only one we are 

now capable of performing and the only one which we can afford within the 

current space program budget. 

This mission may be one of the most exciting and interesting one in the history 

of exploration; certainly, at least, since the Apollo project. It represents an 

opportunity to sustain American leadership in robotic and human space 

exploration with technological innovation and engineering prowess. Since the 

last heroic Apollo mission, no human has ventured beyond low Earth orbit (a 

distance roughly equal to that from Los Angeles to San Francisco), let alone 

back to or beyond the Moon. While other nations dream of duplicating the 

American achievement of a half century ago, the Administration's new plan has 

the U.S. looking beyond the Moon on a path that will eventually take humans to 

Mars later in this century. The new initiative is not a giant-step, Apollo-like 

crash program; instead it follows a flexible and cost-effective path using 
21 

stepping stones into the solar system. The stepping stones are literally and 

figuratively provided by near-Earth asteroids. The special cleverness enabling 

the first step is to use a robot to go out and capture one of these stepping 

stones and bring it to just beyond the Moon so that we can reach it without 

building new rockets or crew systems beyond those already now being 

developed. There is no other affordable way to step onto the path to Mars. 

2 

The scheme is audacious, yet both reasonable and feasible. A robotic 

spacecraft using solar electric propulsion will rendezvous with a very small 

asteroid (about 25 feet in diameter, but still relatively heavy at about 1.5 

million pounds) in an orbit that is close to the Earth's orbit around the Sun. The 

asteroid would be captured in a large high-strength bag or container deployed 

once the spacecraft has rendezvoused with the asteroid. Redirecting the 

asteroid to the desired orbit in Earth-Moon space will take several years with 

the highly-efficient, but low continuous thrust provided by the solar electric 

propulsion system. Solar electric propulsion is now frequently used in space 

missions, scaling it up to the required in this mission is a technology 

development step that has been planned for many years. This mission will 

serve as a key test for even higher levels of power and propulsion for 

spacecraft of the future needed to support human missions to the lunar surface 

and ultimately to Mars. Using a gravity assist from the Moon, the asteroid will 

be put into a high lunar orbit that extends beyond the Moon, and in fact, even 

beyond the Earth-Moon Lagrangian point. It could then be the target for the 

first trans-lunar human mission, with a goal of doing this by 2025. 

This Asteroid Retrieval Mission can be done soon, with a launch perhaps four or 

five years from now. It depends of course on finding a good target, but this we 

can do. Hundreds of asteroids this small have been discovered although they 

are hard to see and generally have been ignored while observers focus on 

larger objects. Yet we know there are millions of them and a dedicated 

observation program will find enough candidates with the right combination of 

traits to be attractive targets for the retrieval mission. Right now, we have a 

few - enough to be certain we can do the mission, but still looking for more 

optimal ones. Currently about a dozen asteroids are discovered per year 

smaller than 10 meters, and of these perhaps 1-3 have orbits which are 

accessible and characteristics suitable for a retrieval mission target. Increases 

in the observation program, particular with the Catalina Sky Survey in Arizona 

and the Pan-STAARS observatory in Hawaii are expected to increase that rate 

five to ten-fold over the next few years. 
22 

3 

In addition to increased discovery rates, steps are being taken to engage the 

world-wide professional and amateur communities in rapid follow-up 

observations which permit the accurate characterization of the object's physical 

properties. The value of this approach was demonstrated recently with the 

discovery of asteroid 2013 EC20, found by the Catalina Sky Survey on March 7. 

Within hours the JPL Near-Earth Object program office had calculated a 

preliminary orbit and requested follow-up through the Smithsonian Minor Planet 

Center. Within a day a number of observations, including from the NASA 

Infra-red Telescope Facility, enabled a description of the asteroid's 

characteristics to be made including its spin rate. During close passage by Earth 

one week later, radar observations were obtained allowing its size to be 

determined. That particular asteroid would be fine for a mission to retrieve it 

by 2021 except that it is smaller than desired - only 2-3 meters, the size of a 

SUV. But the process of characterizing this object so quickly after its discovery 

gives us confidence that we will find excellent target candidates before needing 

to launch the Asteroid Retrieval Mission. 

The small asteroids under consideration for the mission pose no danger to 

Earth: even if one did impact, it would burn up harmlessly in the atmosphere. 

In addition, the asteroid would be put on a trajectory that does not intercept 

Earth, even if control of the spacecraft were lost. 

While a 5-10 meter asteroid is a small celestial object, it is still a big enough 

place for astronauts to conduct science measurements and human operations 

to study its characteristics and determine its potential as a source of resources 

They can even bring samples back to Earth. After a 50+ year hiatus (1972 to 

approximately 2025) humans will again be visiting a celestial body and taking 

new steps deeper into the solar system. In addition to the scientific benefits, 

the robotic-human synergy will contribute to industrial and technological 

advances. But, for me, the biggest advantage will be to the popular interest -

we will be doing something important and exciting with humans in space again. 

Near-Earth asteroids (those whose orbits intersect or pass very close to Earth's 

orbit) are a subject of increasing attention and importance. The remnant of 

one that fell in Chelyabinsk, Russia, last month reminded us of the potential 

danger of an impact, one that could be a lot larger and inflict much more 

damage. Those are rare - the last noticeable one to inflict damage on Earth 

was 100 years ago in Siberia, and the most famous one of all that led to the 
23 

extinction of the dinosaurs (and thousands of other species) was 65 million 

years ago. But the significance of these objects in Earth's and human history 

is undeniable. 

4 

Exploring asteroids is important - to understand what they are made of and 

how they hold together. We may someday have to divert one. Exploring 

them and discovering new ones is also important scientifically because these 

small bodies of the solar systems (of which the Near-Earth asteroids are the 

most accessible) hold vital clues about the origin and history of the planets. 

Protection and science are two reasons to explore - but these objects offer one 

more reason for exploration that intrigues many now: prospecting. The 

asteroids are a potential source of water and volatiles for space ventures 

(perhaps as fuel depots later this century) and possibly of metals and minerals 

for commercial exploitation. Two private entrepreneurial companies are 

currently raising money to begin such prospecting, and one more is raising 

money to observe such asteroids with a space telescope. 

The feasibility of the Asteroid Retrieval Mission caught some in the space 

community by surprise. But the use of solar-electric propulsion technology, the 

capture of non-cooperative objects in space, the discovery of Near-Earth 

objects, and the application of the clever techniques of celestial mechanics that 

make up the mission are all developments that NASA and other space agencies 

have been working on for years. Even the idea of re-directing a small asteroid 

was considered in several studies in the past decade. What was new was that 

recent advances in solar electric propulsion technology make this mission 

feasible for the first time in history, enabling these ideas to be applied to the 

flexible path moving humans beyond the Moon recommended by the Augustine 

Committee and adopted by the Administration for human space exploration. 

That we could enable the first step on that path with existing systems, 

deferring the cost and risk of true interplanetary flights until after these 

achievements, was the surprise. The robotic asteroid retrieval places the risk 

of human space flight where it belongs: on new exploration. 

In our KISS study we quoted a cost, never independently verified, of $2.6 

billion. This was the result of a quick study, actually within NASA, with 

assumptions never vetted by the study team. I actually applaud the group who 

did this cost - because they made so many conservative assumptions to really 

test the idea's feasibility. Our KISS study did not have the resources to 

examine the cost estimate - but I can tell you that many of us thought it was 
24 

5 

much too conservative. Based on my 40+ years of experience as an aerospace 

engineer on many planetary projects I believe that the cost estimate for this 

project will be less than two billion dollars. Without any of the complications of 

a Mars landing system, entry or descent, or a rover, or a suite of science 

instruments, surely this mission will cost less than the Mars Science Laboratory. 

But that is a question for NASA and JPL to answer. 

Most space enthusiasts, like me, wish we could jump to Mars. Unfortuantely, we 

have neither the money nor the knowledge for such a commitment now. But a 

series of steps, as outlined in The Planetary Society road map and similarly 

described by the Augustine Committee on Human Space Flight in 2009, can 

steadily increase capabilities to go deeper into interplanetary space. As we 

achieve longer flight times, more capable crew habitation modules and life 

support systems, and more knowledge about both the interplanetary and 

Martian environment we will bring the Mars goal closer. The asteroid in lunar 

orbit may be the first stepping stone, asteroids in Sun-Earth Lagrangian points 

could be the next, then an asteroid further away, closer to Mars, then a Martian 

moon (Phobos or Deimos) and then Mars itself. I believe this is the direct and 

only sustainable way to Mars. 

This project will not just unify NASA with science, technology, robotic, and 

human components, but also it will unify many others globally, with a great 

adventure. Europe, Japan and Russia all have asteroid mission plans and solar 

electric spacecraft in operation. They could join in the mission development. 

After the asteroid is in place even private spacecraft developers could be invited 

to explore and test new prospecting ideas there and maybe create a new 

commercial industry for utilization of space resources. Meanwhile, NASA will 

again be leading the world into space, moving on to new accomplishments on 

more distant asteroids, perhaps on the Martian moons, and then on Mars itself. 

Dr. Louis Friedman is Co-Lead of the Keck Institute of Space Studies (KISS) 

Asteroid Retrieval Mission study and is Executive Director Emeritus of The 

Planetary Society. KISS is a privately funded institute at the California Institute 

of Technology, supported by the W.M. Keck Foundation. 
25 

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY 

DR. LOUIS D. FRIEDMAN 

Dr. Friedman is a native of New York City. He received a B.S. in Applied Mathematics 

and Engineering Physics at the University of Wisconsin in 1961, an M.S. in Engineering 

Mechanics at Cornell University in 1963, and a Ph.D. from the Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Department at M.l.T. in 1971. His Ph.D. thesis was on Extracting Scientific Information from 

Spacecraft Tracking Data. 

Dr. Friedman worked at the AVCO Space Systems Division from 1963-1968, on both 

civilian and military space programs. From 1970 to 1980 he worked on deep space missions at 

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California. He performed mission analysis and 

navigation system studies for pre-project definition of Mariner Venus-Mercury, Voyager and 

Galileo and was the program development leader for Venus Orbital Imaging Radar, which later 

became Magellan. He led the development and design for the Halley Comet Rendezvous-Solar 

Sail proposal and was the leader of the post-Viking Mars Program in the late 1970s. In 1979-80 

he originated and led the International Halley Watch. He was manager of Advanced Planetary 

Studies at JPL. Dr. Friedman is the author of more than 20 technical papers on Celestial 

Navigation, Astrodynamics, Mission Analysis and Design, and Mission Planning. He is the 

author of the book Starsailing: Solar Sails and Interstellar Travel, published by John Wiley, 

Inc. 

In 1978-79, Dr. Friedman was the AIAA Congressional Fellow on the staff of the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. He worked there on Space Policy, 

Operational Remote Sensing legislation, NASA program oversight and technology innovation on 

the railroads. He is a member of the American Astronautical Society, the Division for Planetary 

Sciences of the American Astronomical Society, Sigma Xi and Fellow of the American 

Association for the Advancement of Science, the British Interplanetary Society and the American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He is a National Fellow member of the Explorers 

Club. 

Dr. Friedman left JPL in 1980 and co-founded The Planetary Society with Carl Sagan and 

Bruce Murray. He was Executive Director of the Society for 30 years and remains on the Board 

of Directors. The Society is a non-profit, popular society seeking to inspire the people of Earth 

to explore new worlds and seek other life, through research, education and public participation. It 

is the largest space interest organization in the world. While at the Society he worked on the 

Mars Balloon development, international Mars rover testing, a Mars microphone, and the joint 

educational project with LEGO Red Rover Goes to Mars. He led Cosmos I, the attempt to fly 

the first solar sail and was the Principal Investigator of the Living Interplanetary Flight 

Experiment (LIFE) on the Russian Phobos Sample Return mission was lost in orbit following 

launch in Nov. 2011. This experiment was to have been the first instance of purposely sending 

life from Earth to interplanetary space. He has traveled on field expeditions to Kamchatka, the 

Arctic and Antarctic, tours to observe Halley's Comet, Belize and to several places in the former 

Soviet Union. 
26 

Dr. Friedman lectures in the U.S. and abroad about planetary missions and space 

exploration programs, has written many popular articles about planetary exploration and space 

policy as well as op-eds in major newspapers. He has frequently testified to the U.S. Congress 

about programs and policies in space exploration. 

Currently, he is co-leader of the Keck Institute for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval 

Mission Study at Caltech. His is also writing a book examining the implications of robotic 

interstellar precursor missions using nano-spacecraft and solar sails on future human space flight. 

May 2013 
27 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Friedman. 

I now recognize our next witness, Dr. Spudis, for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. PAUL SPUDIS, 

SENIOR STAFF SCIENTIST, 

LUNAR AND PLANETARY INSTITUTE 

Dr. SPUDIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Chairman 

and Members of this Committee for this opportunity to share my 

thoughts on the appropriate next steps for human exploration of 

space. 

The past 50 years have witnessed some enormous accomplishments of our national space program. We have surveyed the entire 

solar system and launched hundreds of spacecraft making us more 

knowledgeable, prosperous, and secure. Despite this history of accomplishment, we lack a clear long-term direction forward and our 

space program is withering away. 

To find a sustainable path forward, we must consider the utility 

and purpose of human spaceflight. Although much can be accomplished in space using robotics, many tasks require the presence of 

people who combine high-level cognitive abilities with intricate 

manual dexterity. I believe our long-term goal should be to possess 

the ability to go anywhere we choose in space to do whatever job 

or study we can imagine. Such capability requires an affordable, 

extensible space transportation system, one built incrementally 

over variable timescales to prevent fluctuations in funding from 

preventing its completion. 

One can imagine two very different approaches to spaceflight. 

One conducts a public spectacle, a one-off flags-and-footprints mission to some new and exotic destination. The other approach uses 

incremental yet cumulative building blocks that enable the gradual 

extension of human reach beyond low-Earth orbit. The former produces a media event while the latter links capability with progress 

and creates lasting value. A transportation system that can access 

the lunar surface can also access all other points of cislunar space, 

the domain of nearly all the world’s satellite assets. 

The experience of building International Space Station and the 

servicing missions to the Hubble Space Telescope have demonstrated that people and machines working together in space can 

accomplish much more than is possible through the launch of 

smaller, custom-built expendable spacecraft. Our current template 

of design, launch, use, and eventual abandonment of space-based 

assets can be transformed into one of building and maintaining 

large, extended, and distributed space systems of unprecedented 

power and capability. This capability will produce enormous economic and societal return. It will create new wealth, not simply 

consume it. 

To achieve these ends, I believe that a return to the Moon to access its—and use its material and energy resources is the next best 

step for human spaceflight. The Moon is important for three reasons: one, the Moon is close. It is easily and constantly accessible 

while its proximity permits early development before human return 

using robots remotely controlled from the Earth. The Moon is interesting. It retains a unique record of its own history and processes 

as well as those of the Earth-Moon system, the Sun, and the gal-
28 

axy. This record gives us insights into the past and future of our 

home planet. 

But most importantly, the Moon is useful. Its material and energy resources can break the logistical chains of the Earth. Several 

recent missions have discovered and confirmed abundant water at 

the lunar pole, all close to locations of near permanent sunlight. 

This relationship enables our long-term presence on the Moon 

where we can extract water for use as life-support consumables, energy storage, and most significantly, to manufacture the most powerful chemical rocket propellant known, hydrogen and oxygen. 

Water, oxygen, energy, and rocket fuel are vital enabling assets, 

provisions that will not have to be launched from the surface of the 

Earth, the deepest gravity well of our solar system. Harvesting 

these resources from the Moon creates our first off-planet coaling 

station in space. 

We are not capable of sending humans to Mars now or in the 

near future in either a technical or a financial sense. We need a 

cohesive intermediate goal, one with specific, scalable activities and 

benefits that help assemble a permanent space system, a system 

that will open the way to Mars and all the planets. The Moon affords us this opportunity and the incentive to create such a system, 

a transcontinental railroad in space. Included with my submitted 

material is an architecture showing how we can incrementally and 

affordably develop the system. 

We went to the Moon in the 1960s to prove that it could be done. 

We return to the Moon 50 years later to prove that we can use its 

material and energy resources to create new capabilities and commerce. A cislunar transportation system, developed and powered 

with lunar resources, will extend our reach into deep space and 

revolutionize the paradigm of spaceflight. This effort is not ‘‘been 

there, done that.’’ It is a wholly new, untried, and necessary pioneering enterprise in space. 

I thank the Committee for its attention. I welcome your comments and thoughts and I am happy to answer any questions you 

might have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Spudis follows:] 
29 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittce on Space 

Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond 

Testimony submitted by: 

Dr. Paul D. Spudis 

May 21, 2013 

I thank the Chairman and members of the Committee for this opportunity to give you my thoughts 

on the appropriate next steps for the human exploration of space. This testimony is my personal 

opinion and does not necessarily represent the views of my employer, the Universities Space 

Research Association. 

The United States has a fifty-year history of accomplishment in space, with a wide variety of 

satellite and human missions to virtually all of the destinations in this Solar System. We have 

surveyed the planets from Mercury to Neptune (and soon, Pluto), landed on the Moon multiple 

times, established a permanent research facility in Earth orbit and deployed a constellation of 

satellites that have made our lives safer, more productive and interesting. Despite these notable 

achievements, our civil space program has no long-term focus; it is in disarray, with confusion 

about objcctives and confounded by America's lack of ability to launch humans into space. To 

confront these issues, I believe that we must step back and address the more basic question of 

why we undertake human spaceflight and what we hope to achieve by it. 

What is the goal of human spaceflight? I believc it is to possess the ability go anywhere, at 

anytime, to do any job in space that we can imagine. Although much can be accomplished in 

space with robotic spacecraft, some tasks - including some scientific observation, the repair and 

maintenance of complex equipment, along with innovative, adaptive problem solving - require 

the presence of people, who combine high-level cognitive abilities with intricate manual 

dexterity. Creating the capability to send people and machines wherever necessary requires the 

development of an affordable and extensible space transportation system, one that can be built 

incrementally so as to prevent the almost certain future budgetary fluctuations from precluding its 

completion. 

How can such a space capability be created and nurtured? One can imagine two space 

programs: one being a public relations spectacular, in which some dramatic goal or destination is 

announced and achieved, and the other being a continuing, gradual and permanent extension of 

humanity'S reach into space. An example of a PR-type program would be the "space race" of the 

1960s, with the primary purpose of beating the Soviets to the Moon and not the development a 

long-term, affordable space faring system. This type of effort may well achieve its immediate 

goal, but it leaves behind a programmatic and capability vacuum once its objective is satisfied. 

The latter program, speeifying a gradual human expansion into space, is typified by the Space 

Shuttle and International Space Station, which - although technieally flawed in some ways -

retained the basic philosophy that the best approach to creating a permanent space faring system 
30 

is through the achievement of a gradual and incremental series of milestones. This style of 

program develops long-term capability and provides practical payback on investment (value for 

cost) over time, by designing and carrying out shorter, pre-defined milestones. APR-centered 

program is most likely to fail in the long-term because typically it delivers on short time scales, 

lacks continuity and is subject to the whims of the politieal marketplace. 

Since the cancellation of the Vision for Space Exploration in 2010, our national space program 

has drifted, guided by no long-term strategic direction beyond a vague statement of a nebulous 

goal of a human Mars mission sometime in the next 30 years. The so-callcd "Flexible Path" for 

human exploration, in which we abandon specific destinations and goals for the supposed 

development of the technology and ability to go anywhere, has in fact taken us nowhere. 

Technology development as a goal unto itself has not produced anything of enduring value - we 

will get new technical development and lasting public benefit by satisfYing the requirements of 

going somewhere and doing something. 

2 

Because we do not possess even the rudimcnts of a true space transportation system, a human 

mission to Mars will be decades - not years - away, and as such, Mars should not be 

characterized as our "ultimate goal." Our long-range ambition is to go everywhere, not simply to 

Mars. To do so, we must think in terms of building the permanent and adaptable systems needed 

to become "space faring." Contra the Augustine (2009) report, this is best accomplished through 

the selection of concrete and distinct intermediate objectives - space destinations nearer to Earth 

than Mars where specific and useful activities can be undertaken that will help us to develop 

and extend the new capabilities needed to sail on the ocean of space. To accomplish this goal, we 

need a significant destination that is achievable on realistic time scales (10-20 years). To check 

and assure our progress, and to provide thc necessary motivation for continuation of the program, 

the path we select must have a number of intermediate milestones. 

The Moon is the next logical goal for America in space. 

We are fortunate to have in our own space "backyard" a miniature planet of surprising complexity 

and utility. I believe that the Moon offers three principal benefits as the next destination for 

human spaceflight. 

The Moon is close: At 400,000 km away, the Moon is the celestial object closest to our home 

planet. Moreover, because it orbits the Earth, is it also the most accessible body in space. There 

is a launch opportunity to the Moon every day of the year, an attribute shared only with getting to 

low Earth orbit. Planning trips to near Earth asteroids is very difficult, as launch windows open 

for very short time periods and if the window is missed, the mission must be delayed, typically for 

many months. 

The Moon is also easy to get to: transit times are short (typically, around 3 days), there is the 

capability for mission abort (in case problems develop on the spacecraft), and it requires less 

energy to get to the Moon than to go to any other planet. 

Because the Moon is only 1.5 light-seconds from Earth, wc can remotely operate machincs and 

robots on the lunar surface from control centers on Earth, uniquely permitting us to deploy and 
31 

3 

operate a substantial robotic presence there prior to human arrival. We can pre-deploy habitats 

and fuel depots using telerobotics, allowing us to go the Moon with less restrictive logistical 

constraints than were possible during the Apollo missions of the previous century. We need no 

new technology to go to the Moon; existing systems can be adapted with minimal modification to 

return us to the lunar surface. Thus, we can focus technology development efforts on systems 

designed to perform new tasks and accomplishments never before achieved. 

The Moon is interesting: The Moon is a natural laboratory to study the processes involved in 

creating the rocky planets of our Solar System. It has been shaped and molded by the processes 

of impact (the collision of solid bodies), magmatism and volcanism (heating, melting and remelting ofthe interior) and tectonism (the deformation of solid surfaces). These processes occur 

on all planets, including the Earth, and study oflunar geologic history over the last 40 years has 

greatly illuminated our understanding of Earth's history and planetary evolution. 

Unique among all space objects, the Moon preserves facets of the history of the Earth-Moon 

system, specifically by acting as a "witness plate" to record our impact bombardment. By 

studying the impact record ofthe Moon, we reconstruct that history for the Earth as well, 

including the possible preservation of evidence for impact-caused mass extinctions evident in the 

terrestrial fossil record. A comparable record is not present on any other object of the Solar 

System. Because the Moon has no atmosphere or global magnetic field, it also retains a record of 

particles emitted by the Sun and galaxy over the last four billion years, permitting us to better 

understand the solar and galactic output of radiation and particles through time phenomena that 

greatly affect Earth's climate and habitability. 

The Moon is a valuable platform for observing the universe. It is a geologically stable base on 

which extremely sensitive instruments can be emplaced, with a dark, clear sky that affords us one 

of the best views of the universe, and a place where Earth's radio noise is perpetually silenced on 

the lunar far side. The Moon also offers a unparalleled surface environment for laboratory study, 

with its partial-gravity (116 that of Earth), hard vacuum (_10.7 Pa, a trillion times less dense than 

atmospheric surface pressure on Earth) and thermal extremes difficult to achieve on Earth (dark, 

cold areas ncar the poles are only 25 degrees above absolute zero, colder than the surface 

temperature of Pluto). Such an environment permits a wide variety of experiments to be 

conducted that would be impossible or extremely difficult to accomplish elsewhere, on Earth or in 

spacc. 

The Moon is useful: In the past few years, we have made new and astounding discoveries about 

the material and energy resources of the Moon. A fleet of international spacecraft have orbited 

and hit the Moon, revealing that areas near the lunar poles contain abundant quantities of water 

ice and other useful, volatile substances. Additionally, these valuable deposits are located next to 

zones of near-permanent sunlight, illuminated for more than 90% of the year, permitting the nearconstant generation of electrical power from solar arrays. Thus, we have discovered areas on the 

Moon that permit us to stay on its surface for extended periods of time. 

Water is the most useful and enabling substance for space faring. It provides critical life support 

consumables (drinking and eating), it may be used as radiation shielding (by jacketing habitats 

with water-filled enclosures), and can be cracked into its component gases (hydrogen and oxygen) 
32 

4 

for breathing. Water is also a medium for energy storage reversible electrical generation, a 

process in which water is cracked into its component gases using electricity provided by solar 

power during daylight, and is then re-combined into water, generating electricity during the night. 

Finally, if water is separated into its component gases and these gases are cryogenically converted 

into liquid form, we create the most powerful chemical rocket propellant known, LOX-hydrogen. 

This use of water allows us to re-fuel spacecraft on the Moon and eventually, export rocket 

propellant to space. As the Moon's gravity well is much shallower than Earth's, requiring far less 

energy to launch, lunar propellant production and export can be used to create a permanent spacebased transportation infrastructure. 

What is our "mission" on the Moon? The principal goal is to use the Moon to create new space 

faring capability. The discovery of hundreds of millions of tons of water ice at the poles indicates 

that large-scale harvesting oflunar water is possible. Such a development would create the first 

off-planet fueling depot, a coaling station for our space fleet. This is a paradigm shifting 

development for space logistics. By learning how to use the material and energy resources of the 

Moon, we will take our first steps towards space permanence, developing the ability to go 

elsewhere in the Solar System. Instead of single shot, one-off missions to some destination, after 

which the program and all of its valuable developments are abandoned, we build an extensible, 

maintainable and reusable space transportation system. We went to the Moon in the 1960s to 

prove that it could be done; we return to the Moon 50 years later to use its material and energy 

resources to create new capabilities and commerce. This effort is not "been there, done that" - it 

is a wholly new, untried, pioneering enterprise in space. 

The Moon is reachable under a variety of budgetary environments and constraints. We can 

structure a lunar return to incrementally build capability over time. There should not be a "large 

pill" that must be swallowed whole immediately; the key to such development is to craft a 

program that uses small, incremental steps that work together as an extended, large-scale system. 

Ao example of such an architectural approach is described in the supplementary materials that I 

attach to my testimony. This approach not only achieves the goals I advocate with the flexibility 

desired, but fits under a reasonable projection of the existing civil space budget. 

A space transportation system that can go to the lunar surface and re-fuel there can reach any 

other point in cislunar space (the volume of space encompassing Earth and Moon). This region is 

the "pay zone" of space, the place where virtually all our scientific, economic, and national 

security satellite assets reside. The most useful satellites are located in regions of space well 

above the altitude of low Earth orbit (-200 km). Weather and communications satellites are 

found in geosynchronous orbit, about 36,000 km high. National security satellites need a variety 

of high-energy orbits, many of them above LEO. None of these orbits are reachable by humans, 

with either existing or projected spacecraft. 

A return to the Moon to produce rocket propellant from lunar ice creates a refuelable, space-based 

transportation system that can access not only the lunar surface, but all of the points of cislunar 

space as well. Such a development would revolutionize spaceflight. Satellites would no longer 

be limited in power and capability. We could assemble large, powerful distributed space systems 

in these high orbits using people and machines, transported there by our expanding permanent 

space transportation system. 
33 

5 

The experience of building the International Space Station, as well as missions sent to service and 

extend the life of the Hubble Space Telescope, show that people and machines working together 

in space can build systems much larger and more capable than those launched on a satellite from 

the Earth, even on the largest launch vehicles. As long as we are restricted to what we can lift up 

from the surface of Earth - the deepest gravity well in the inner Solar System - we will always be 

mass- and power-limited in space and thus, capability-limited. By developing the resources of the 

Moon, we greatly mitigate the high cost and difficulty of bringing everything with us from Earth. 

We become capability-unlimited, permitting the development of new, and as yet undreamed of 

capacities. And we gain the means to go the planets - not only to Mars, but to all the interesting 

destinations that our Solar System offers. 

I thank the Committee for its attention, I welcome your comments and thoughts and I am happy to 

answer any questions that you might have. 

Attachments 

These papers can be downloaded from: http://www.cislunarnext.orgiSitelHome.html 

I. Using the Resources of the Moon, Space 2011 paper 

2. The Moon, National Defense University paper 

3. Cislunar brochure 

4. Develop Cislunar Space Next 

The following is available from: http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon!2011l0S/destination-moonor-asteroid! 

5. A Comparison of Human Lunar and Asteroid Missions 
34 

PAUL D. SPUDIS is a Senior Staff Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute in Houston, Texas. 

He received his education at Arizona State University (B.S., 1976; Ph. D., 1982) and at Brown 

University (Sc.M., 1977). His research focuses on the processes of impact and volcanism on the 

planets and studies ofthe requirements for sustainable human presence on the Moon. He was 

Deputy Leader of the Science Team for the Department of Defense Clementine mission to the 

Moon in 1994, the Principal Investigator of the Mini-SAR imaging radar experiment on India's 

Chandrayaan-I mission in 2008-2009, and a team member of the Mini-RF imaging radar on 

NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter mission (2009-present). He was a member of the White 

House Synthesis Group in 1990-1991, the President's Commission on the Implementation ofU. S. 

Space Exploration Poliey in 2004 and was presented with the NASA Distinguished Public Service 

Medal that same year. He is the recipient of the 2006 Von Karman Lectureship in Astronautics, 

awarded by the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics and a 20 II Space Pioneer 

Award from the National Space Society. He is the author or co-author of over 100 scientific papers 

and five books, including The Once and Future Moon, a book for the general public in the 

Smithsonian Library of the Solar System series, and (with Ben Bussey) The Clementine Atlas o/the 

Moon, new edition published in 2012 by Cambridge University Press. 
35 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Spudis. 

I now recognize our next witness, Dr. Squyres. 

TESIMONY OF DR. STEVEN M. SQUYRES, 

GOLDWIN SMITH PROFESSOR OF ASTRONOMY, 

CORNELL UNIVERSITY 

Dr. SQUYRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today. 

The topic of this hearing is the Next Steps in Human Exploration 

to Mars and beyond. My recommendations to the Committee today 

are as follows: first, affirm that Mars is and will continue to be 

NASA’s long-term goal for human exploration of space; second, at 

all future milestones on the road to Mars, direct the Agency to 

focus on activities that clearly serve the goal of landing humans on 

Mars, operating there, and returning them safely to Earth; third, 

adopt cislunar space as the next milestone whether ongoing studies 

show that it is possible to direct a small asteroid there or not; finally, dictate no milestones beyond cislunar space without first assuring ample funding to achieve them. I will address each of these 

in turn. 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 stated that ‘‘a long-term objective for human exploration of space should be the eventual international exploration of Mars.’’ I agree. In fact, in my view Mars 

should be the long-term objective for human exploration of space 

weather carried out internationally or by NASA alone. 

Alone among the planets, Mars is enough like Earth that we can 

imagine life once taking hold there, as a vast and growing body of 

scientific knowledge shows that the Martian surface once possessed 

many of the essential ingredients that are required for life. So 

sending human explorers to Mars to learn whether life ever 

emerged there is a goal that is worthy of a great national space 

agency. 

The most useful milestones on the way to Mars are the ones 

that, when met, help retire risks that will be faced on the way to 

the Martian surface and back. In the 1960s we didn’t go to the 

Moon all at once. Instead, the capabilities to land humans on the 

surface of the Moon and return them safely to Earth were built up 

systematically over a series of Mercury, Gemini, and early Apollo 

missions. I am convinced that the even more challenging capabilities that will be necessary to achieve a similar goal of Mars must 

also be built up step-wise. And at each step along the way it will 

be crucial to examine all the activities that might be conducted 

critically and pare them down to the minimum necessary to assure 

progress towards Mars. 

Many of the most important capabilities that are going to be necessary for human missions to Mars can be developed in cislunar 

space. This work can be done far enough from Earth to progress 

towards a true deep space capability can be demonstrated but close 

enough to Earth that a safe return in the event of an anomaly is 

facilitated. Moreover, given the performance capabilities of the 

Space Launch System and the Orion crew capsule, cislunar space 

is the only significant destination below low-Earth orbit that can 

be reached for the foreseeable future. It is the sensible next step 
36 

simply by process of elimination. And I reach this conclusion 

whether NASA’s ongoing efforts to study redirection of a small asteroid to lunar orbit bear fruit or whether they do not. 

After cislunar space, the choice of the next milestone becomes 

more difficult. Personally, I am not persuaded that any physical 

destination like the lunar surface, an asteroid, or a Martian Moon 

is truly necessary to get to Mars, function there effectively, and return safely. Others on this panel may disagree. But while we can 

debate the relevant merits of such destinations, my most important 

message to this Committee today is that I believe that no realistic 

step beyond cislunar space should or can be usefully identified 

right now. 

The fundamental barrier to making an intelligent choice today is 

that NASA is being asked to do too much with too little. This overtaxing of the Agency is chronic, it is severe, and it is getting worse. 

It is manifested clearly even in NASA’s near-term plans. 

To be more specific, the current development schedule for SLS 

and Orion calls for a flight rate that is so low that I believe it is 

a cause for serious concern. In a fiscal environment where even 

next step to cislunar space cannot be carried out at an adequate 

pace, I feel that for Congress to dictate any subsequent milestones 

today would be unwise. Unless NASA’s funding is increased substantially, any attempt to specify milestones beyond cislunar space 

today would amount to an unfunded mandate, and if NASA is directed to do something it is not funded to do, I predict that the result will be wasted effort and a delay in achieving the ultimate goal 

of humans to Mars. 

I would like to conclude my opening remarks today on a positive 

note by pointing out that the solution to the mismatch between 

NASA’s aspirations and its budget may be international partnerships. This was the case for establishment of a permanent Earthorbiting laboratory and the International Space Station that resulted is a magnificent example of what space agencies can accomplish when they work together. 

If no major funding increase for NASA can be found, then I believe that the Agency should aggressively seek out international 

partners for the human exploration to Mars, but if that happens, 

I feel that neither Congress nor the Administration can expect to 

dictate what the next milestone after cislunar space should be unilaterally. Instead, that milestone will have to be negotiated fairly 

and equitably with those international partners. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Squyres follows:] 
37 

Statement of Steven W. Squyres 

Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy 

Cornell University 

Before the Subcommittee on Space 

United States House of Representatives 

May 21, 2013 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today. My name is Steven W. Squyres, and my title is Goldwin Smith Professor of 

Astronomy at Cornell University. I have participated for the past thirty years in a number 

of NASA solar system exploration missions. Recently I chaired the planetary decadal 

survey for the National Research Council, and I am currently the Chairman of the NASA 

Advisory Council. The views that I express today are my own, and do not represent the 

opinions of the National Research Council, the NASA Advisory Council, or any other 

organization. 

Recommendations to the Committee 

The topic of this hearing is the next steps in human exploration, to Mars and beyond. 

My key recommendations to this committee today are as follows: 

Affirm that Mars is and will continue to be NASA's long-term goal for human 

exploration of space. 

At all future milestones on the road to Mars, direct the Agency to focus narrowly 

on activities that clearly serve the goal of landing humans on Mars, operating 

there, and returning them safely to Earth. 

Adopt cis-lunar space as the next milestone, whether ongoing studies show that it 

is possible to redirect a small asteroid there or not. 

Dictate no milestones beyond cis-lunar space without first assuring ample funding 

to achieve them. 

I will explain my rationale for each of these recommendations in the sections below. 

Why Mars? 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 stated that "A long term objective for human 

exploration of space should be the eventual international exploration of Mars." I agree. In 
38 

fact, I believe that Mars should be the long-term objective for human exploration of 

space, whether carried out internationally or by NASA alone. 

Mercury, Venus, and the giant planets and their moons present environmental obstacles 

to human exploration that will be insurmountable for decades to come. But what makes 

Mars unique is not just its relative accessibility. Alone among the planets, Mars is enough 

like Earth that we can imagine life once taking hold there. A vast and growing body of 

scientific knowledge shows that the martian surface once possessed many of the essential 

ingredients required for life. Ifby exploring Mars we could show that life emerged there 

-- and therefore that it emerged twice in just this one solar system - it would take no great 

leap of faith, logic, or anything else to conclude that life may be commonplace 

throughout the cosmos. 

One could ask whether it is necessary to send humans to Mars to answer this question. 

Despite having devoted my career to exploring the solar system with robots, I am a strong 

advocate of human exploration, particularly at Mars. Humans have an extraordinary 

ability to function in complex environments, to improvise, and to respond quickly to new 

discoveries. Robots, in contrast, do best when the environment is simple and well 

understood, and the scientific tasks are well defined in advance. Because the capabilities 

of humans most surpass those of robots in complex environments, the exploration value 

that humans add is in proportion to the complexity of the environment to be explored. 

And there is no planetary environment where humans can operate in the foreseeable 

future that is more complex than the martian surface. 

We also must not underestimate the inspirational value of human explorers on Mars. I 

can tell you from personal experience that NASA's long-lived Spirit and Opportunity 

Mars rovers were designed and built by people like me who grew up watching the Apollo 

lunar landings on television, and dreaming of sending spaceships to Mars one day. 

Sending humans to Mars would surely provide an even more compelling inspirational 

spark for the next generation of scientists, engineers, and explorers. 

To put it simply, sending human explorers to Mars to learn whether life ever 

emerged there is a goal worthy of a great national space agency. 

Why Intermediate Milestones? 

It is not hyperbole to say that sending humans to Mars and returning them safely to Earth 

will be the most technically difficult task in human history. When attempting something 

so difficult, there is great value in setting intermediate milestones against which progress 

can be measured and demonstrated. 

The most useful milestones are ones that, once met, help retire some of the many 

risks that will be faced on the way to the martian surface and back. In the 1 960s, we 

didn't go to the Moon all at once. Instead, the capabilities necessary to land humans on 

the lunar surface and return them safely to Earth were developed systematically over a 
39 

series of Mercury, Gemini, and early Apollo missions. I am convinced that the even more 

challenging capabilities that will be necessary to achieve a similar goal at Mars must also 

be built up stepwise. 

A more difficult question is whether any ofthesc intermediate milestones must involve a 

physical destination - a solid solar system body that astronauts can visit and where they 

can work. Physical destinations have intrinsic appeal; indeed, they are integral to our 

notion of what exploration means. But if our real goal is the surface of Mars, then we 

must critically examine the idea that milestones along the way must involve specific 

bodies where we can plant a flag or leave a mark in the soil. 

Possible Intermediate Milestones 

A number of possible intermediate milestones on the way to Mars have been discussed 

over the years. These include: 

Cis-lunar space 

The lunar surface 

A near Earth asteroid 

Mars orbit 

The martian moons Phobos and/or Deimos 

I will address the prospective merits of each of these in tum. 

Cis-lunar space: Many of the capabilities and systems necessary for eventual human 

missions to Mars can be tested and validated in cis-lunar space. These include deep space 

life support and habitability systems, advanced propulsion, complex ground and space 

operations, and rendezvous in a variety of gravitational settings. All of these can be 

exercised far enough from Earth that progress toward a true deep space capability can be 

demonstrated, but close enough to Earth to facilitate a safe return in the event of an 

anomaly. 

The lunar swface: Others on this panel will argue persuasively for the merits of a return 

to the lunar surface, so I will not dwell on it here. Most significantly, the Moon is the 

only potential destination on the way to Mars with sufficient gravity to permit anything 

resembling Mars-like surface operations. Ifwc truly require an intermediate milestone 

where astronauts can walk, the Moon is the only choice. I am not convinced, however, 

that such a milestone is absolutely necessary. It was not for Apollo, and we actually know 

much more about the surface of Mars today than we did about the surface of the Moon 

before Apollo 11. 

Near Earth asteroids: NEAs are important targets for scientific exploration. Asteroids 

contain clues regarding the formation and earliest evolution of the solar system. 

Practically, NEAs present both an opportunity and a threat. Mining of asteroids could 

yield raw materials of considerable value for use in space, because they need not be lifted 
40 

from the Earth's gravity well. And we know that asteroids have impacted the Earth in the 

past with devastating effects, and will do so again in the future unless we develop an 

understanding of these bodies sufficient allow us to prevent such an event. 

The relevance ofNEA exploration to the ultimate goal of sending humans to Mars must 

be questioned, however. Certainly a mission to such a body would require operations for 

long periods of time in deep space, well beyond the Earth-Moon system. The same can be 

said, however, for any flight far into deep space, whether an asteroid is present along the 

trajectory or not. Perhaps more persuasively, proximity operations techniques that could 

be developed and demonstrated at small asteroids would also be useful for exploration of 

Mars' two small moons, Phobos and Deimos. 

Mars orbit: Just as the ability to operate in lunar orbit was necessary for Apollo, the 

ability to operate in Mars orbit will be necessary for a mission to and from the martian 

surface. Like Apollo 10, a mission to Mars orbit could demonstrate all elements of a 

Mars surface mission other than landing, surface operations, and ascent. Mars orbit is 

also an ideal location for real-time operations of robotic assets on the martian surface, 

dramatically increasing their potential science return. So clearly Mars orbit is a valuable 

potential milestone on the way to the martian surface. 

Phobos and Deimos: Operations in Mars orbit would also permit exploration of the 

martian moons Phobos and Deimos. These objects, which are probably captured 

asteroids, are scientifically interesting in their own right. More importantly, we can 

expect their surfaces to be littered with martian rocks, particularly ones ejected from the 

planet during the early, more Earth-like phase of its history. So they present a scientific 

opportunity that is complementary to what can be achieved on the planet. Again, 

however, it is not clear that they represent a truly necessary step on the way to the 

martian surface. 

NASA's New Asteroid Initiative 

NASA has recently announced a particular variant of the cis-lunar space milestone that 

would include rendezvous with a very small asteroid that has been redirected to lunar 

orbit. Because this initiative is part of the President's FY , 13 budget request, it is worth 

particular consideration by this committee. 

To evaluate the merits of this initiative, it is useful to break it down into its constituent 

parts. It has three elements: 

Searching for a potential target asteroid 

Capturing a small asteroid and redirecting it to lunar orbit 

Rendezvous with the redirected asteroid in cis-lunar space 

In my opinion, the first element, searching for a target asteroid, has great value. I 

have already described how NEAs pose potential threats, resources, and opportunities for 
41 

scientific study. The search for a target asteroid for this initiative will inevitably lead to 

discovery and characterization of many objects. In my opinion, the goal should not be to 

find a single target whose properties potentially allow it to be redirected. Instead, the net 

should be cast widely. using assets that are capable of finding such a target to 

characterize the popUlation of NEAs as fully as possible. 

Moving on to the third element, I will argue below that cis-lunar space is the logical 

next place to send humans beyond low Earth orbit. My conclusion is dictated by 

practical considerations and by a long-term focus on Mars, and is independent of whether 

a small asteroid has been redirected there or not. 

The second element, asteroid capture and redirection, is where important questions and 

concerns lie. Dcspite some encouraging preliminary studies, we do not know how to 

capture and redirect an asteroid, even a vcry small one. To their credit, in all of the 

briefings I have seen on this topic, NASA has described existing concepts for redirecting 

a small asteroid as "notional". The President's FY'13 budget request includes funds to 

study these concepts, and to assess their feasibility. The results of this assessment must be 

examined critically, and NASA should not be afraid to abandon the idea if the results 

are not favorable. The first and third elements of the initiative each have sufficient value 

on their own even if the second element proves infeasible. 

Concerns 

Sending humans to Mars will be extraordinarily difficult and costly. With such a 

challenging long-term goal in a budget-constrained environment, I feel that it is crucial 

that the milestones on the road to Mars be true milestones, not off-ramps. Stating it 

differently, the activities we engage in on the way to Mars should be ones that enable 

reaching that goal, not delay reaching it. 

Again, Mercury, Gemini, and the early Apollo flights provide a good model. The tasks 

carried out on those flights werc aimed very directly at preparation for the eventual 

Apollo landing missions. None of their major activities were superfluous. I believe that 

the goal of sending humans to Mars will be best served by milestones that maintain a 

similar focus. So at each step along the way it will be crucial to examine proposed flight 

activities critically, and to pare them down to the minimum necessary to assure progress 

toward Mars. 

As I noted above, any of the potential candidate milestones could make at least some 

useful contributions to the long-term goal of Mars. Choosing among them becomes a 

matter of practical implementation and budget considerations. 

In my opinion, the first milestone should be to return humans to cis-lunar space. Of 

course, such a milestone has only modest value in and of itself; it would serve largely to 

rc-assert capabilities we had forty years ago. But if we really are going to Mars, I believe 

it is an essential next step. 
42 

My conclusion is based as much on simple practicality as it is on the work that can be 

accomplished thcre. The only vehicles currently in development by NASA to support 

human exploration beyond low Earth orbit are the Space Launch System (SLS) and the 

Orion crew capsule. Given the performance capabilities of these vehicles, cis-lunar space 

is the only significant destination beyond low Earth orbit that can be reached. It is the 

next step in part simply by process of elimination. 

If a small asteroid can be redirected to lunar orbit by the time astronauts get there, the 

rendezvous possibilities it would offer would make a lunar orbital mission more 

interesting and challenging. The relevance of such a rendezvous to the goal of putting 

humans on the surface of Mars remains to be demonstrated, in my opinion, and should be 

scrutinized. But I believe that lunar orbit is the sensible next step beyond low Earth 

orbit whether a small asteroid has been redirected there or not. 

After cis-lunar space, the choice becomes more difficult. I am personally not persuaded 

that any physical destination like the lunar surface, an asteroid, or a martian moon 

is truly necessary to get to Mars, function there effectively, and return safely. Others 

on this panel may disagree. But while we can debate the relative merits of such 

destinations, my most important message to this committee is that I believe that no 

realistic next step beyond cis-lunar space can or should be identified today. 

The fundamental barrier to making an intelligent choice of a milestone beyond cis-lunar 

space now is that NASA is being asked to do too much with too little. This overtaxing 

of the agency is chronic, severe, and getting worse. It is manifested clearly even in 

NASA's near-term plans. 

To be more specific, the current cost-constrained development schedule for SLS and 

Orion calls for: 

In 2014, an orbital test flight of an Orion capsule with no crew, to be launched on 

a Delta 4 Heavy. 

In 2017, a lunar flyby test flight of an Orion capsule with no crew, to be launched 

on a 70-mctric ton SLS. 

In 2021, eight years from now, the first flight of a crew in an Orion capsule, again 

launched on a 70-metric ton SLS, on a mission to orbit the Moon. 

Subsequent missions would occur on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, with a launch roughly 

every two years. 

I believe that the low flight rate projected for SLS and Orion is a cause for serious 

concern. No human-rated launch system in NASA's history has flown so infrequently. 

With such a low launch rate it will not just be difficult to maintain program momentum; it 

will be difficult to keep flight teams sharp and mission-ready. 
43 

In a fiscal environment where even the next step to cis-lunar space cannot be carried 

out at an adequate pace, I feel that it would be unwise for Congress to dictate any 

subsequent milestones. Unless NASA's funding is increased substantially, any attempt 

to specify milestones beyond cis-lunar space today would amount to an unfunded 

mandate. Unfunded mandates are the bane of any government agency. They can be 

particularly crippling for an agency like NASA that is tasked with attempting things that 

have never been done before, with the uncertainties regarding schedule and budget that 

invariably result. If NASA is directed to do something it is not funded to do, I predict that 

the result will be wasted effort and a delay in achieving the ultimate goal of humans on 

Mars. 

A Possible Long-Term Solution 

I would like to conclude my testimony on a positive note, by pointing out that the 

solution to the mismatch between NASA's aspirations and its budget may be 

international partnerships. This was the case for establishment of a permanent Earth 

orbiting laboratory, and the International Space Station that resulted is a magnificent 

cxample of what space agencies can accomplish when they work together. 

If no major funding increase for NASA can be found, then I believe that the Agency 

should aggressively seek out international partners for the human exploration of Mars. 

But if that happens, I feel that neither Congress nor the Administration can expect to 

dictate what the next milestone after cis-lunar space should be unilaterally. Instead, that 

milestone will have to be negotiated, fairly and equitably, with those international 

partners. 
44 

Steven W. Squyres is Goldwin Smith Professor of Astronomy at Cornell University, and 

is thc Principal Investigator for the science payload on the Mars Exploration Rover 

Project. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1981 and spent five years as a postdoctoral 

associate and research scientist at NASA's Ames Research Center before returning to 

Cornell as a faculty member. His main areas of scientific interest have been Mars and the 

moons of the outer planets. Research for which he is best known includes study of the 

history and distribution of water on Mars and of the possible existcnce and habitability of 

a liquid water ocean on Europa. 

Dr. Squyres has participated in many of NASA's planetary exploration missions, 

including the Voyager mission to Jupiter and Saturn, the Magellan mission to Venus, and 

the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous mission. Along with his current work on MER, he 

is also a co-investigator on the Mars Exprcss, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter and Mars 

Science Laboratory missions, a member of the Gamma-Ray Spectrometer Team for the 

Mars Odyssey mission, and a member of the imaging team for the Cassini mission to 

Saturn. 

Dr. Squyres chaired the most recent planetary decadal survey for the National Research 

Council. He has also served as Chair of the NASA Space Science Advisory Committee, 

and is currently Chair of the NASA Advisory Council. His awards include the American 

Astronomical Society's Harold C. Urey Prize, the Space Science Award of the American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the American Astronautical Society's Carl 

Sagan Award, the National Space Society's Wernher von Braun Award, and the 

Benjamin Franklin Medal of the Franklin Institute. He is a fellow ofthc American 

Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
45 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Squyres. 

I now recognize our final witness, Mr. Cooke. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DOUGLAS COOKE, 

OWNER, COOKE CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS 

Mr. COOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to discuss this exceedingly important 

subject. I strongly believe that an enduring, long-term strategy for 

human spaceflight should be developed now with the carefully defined missions that significantly contribute to long-term goals. This 

strategy does not exist today. Once developed, national will is crucial to sustain the strategy with budget stability; otherwise, we 

may watch other space-faring nations pass us by when the United 

States should have led the way. 

We first need to address the questions initially without regard 

for specific budget. What are the geopolitical goals that we want to 

achieve with human spaceflight? What is this country’s long-term 

vision for future human space exploration? And how do we collaborate with international partners to achieve this vision? If crafted 

properly, an organized process would obtain and prioritize the exploration objectives from a spectrum of stakeholders. The strategy 

would then address appropriate objectives for each destination, including those for advanced scientific discoveries, development of 

critical technologies, and preparing for Mars exploration and others. A widespread advocacy for the strategy would occur with 

stakeholder participation in the process. 

There is a broad international consensus that Mars is a human 

exploration destination that we should ultimately aspire to. To develop this strategy, we should ask: what is needed to send people 

safely to Mars in capabilities, technologies, human research, et 

cetera? A preferred path could then be chosen through a series of 

carefully selected missions and destinations that must effectively 

address these exploration goals and objectives. 

Regardless of the actual sequence of missions, the current development of the Space Launch System and Orion MPCV are critical 

to success for the strategy. The strategy must be flexible with the 

anticipation that it should be responsive to discoveries, budget realities, and emerging technologies. 

Asteroids are certainly very interesting objects for scientific 

study. They can provide information on the formation of our solar 

system, and cataloging them is important to understand their 

threat to Earth. The current President budget request included a 

challenge to retrieve an asteroid and move it to near-Earth space 

to be investigated by astronauts. It is a clever concept and such a 

mission would undoubtedly demonstrate technologies and capabilities. However, there is not a recognizable connection to a long-term 

strategy. It does not appear to be based on consultation with stakeholders, nor are there visible opportunities for international participation, although I am told these are in work. It appears to be a 

very complex mission with the potential for growing more complex 

and more costly. As currently defined, the mission definition does 

not convey a mature concept that should be supported with significant funding without further understanding of its value to longterm human exploration strategy competing with other mission 
46 

destinations. I believe that robotic missions are currently a more 

cost-effective way to study asteroids. 

In preparing for Mars, the next generation of explorers must 

learn how to survive in other hostile environments. The Moon is an 

alien world with partial gravity like Mars, yet is only a 3-day journey from Earth. Human lunar exploration will provide opportunities to test technologies, to experience living and working on another planetary surface, to use lunar resources, and to identify 

commercial opportunities. The Moon is a truly unique nearby destination where scientists can learn about the history of the inner 

solar system over the past 4.5 billion years. We now have incredible new information derived from recent robotic missions— 

LCROSS, LRO, and GRAIL—that can help guide further lunar exploration. I believe the United States should provide leadership in 

exploring the Moon as an important step in any long-term exploration strategy. 

Relevant, near-term missions to Mars may be closer than previously thought. For instance, the mission proposed byInspiration 

Mars, while I think it is very challenging, may provide such an opportunity, more difficult but on the order of what would be needed 

for a mission to one of the more difficult-to-reach asteroids, a mission to the fascinating Moons Phobos and Deimos are possible. 

Mars surface exploration is the ultimate goal that can be reasonably envisioned today. 

I propose that the following steps be taken to develop a unified 

and enduring U.S. human space exploration strategy: conduct an 

open process including stakeholders to develop the strategy and exploration objectives; reestablish lunar exploration as a valued nearterm part of the strategy; identify other near-term mission opportunities that most effectively contribute to long-term exploration 

goals; identify opportunities to combine resources and capabilities 

with international partners to achieve these objectives; and endeavor to ensure U.S. leadership in human space exploration. 

Once again, I thank you for inviting me here to get my views. 

I also want to thank this Committee and the Subcommittee and 

your staff for a continued bipartisan support for human spaceflight. 

I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooke follows:] 
47 

Hearing of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Space 

"Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond" 

Tuesday, May 21, 2013 

Testimony of Douglas R. Cooke 

Cooke Concepts and Solutions 

Thank you Chairman Palazzo, Ranking Member Edwards, and members of this Subcommittee 

for this opportunity today to discuss the exceedingly important subject of our Nation's future in 

human space exploration. This is a topic close to my heart, and one I am privileged to be here 

today to discuss. Congress has an important role to play in helping to establish U.S space 

policy, so I thank this Subcommittee and indeed the full House Committee on Science, Space 

and Technology for its continued support for our Nation's space program. 

Before I begin, let me be clear that my testimony today is based on my personal views and 

experience. Although I have business affiliations as disclosed to this Subcommittee, I am not 

representing anyone other than myself during today's hearing. My testimony is based on my 

perceptions and programmatic experiences as well as past engineering studies and the 

collective knowledge from many exceptional colleagues over the years, including my colleagues 

testifying here today. 

Throughout history, great nations and societies have been at the forefront of exploring the 

frontiers of their time. Egypt, Greece, Rome, Scandinavia, China, Spain, Portugal, France and 

England were leaders in exploring our world and consequently were viewed as the leading 

world powers of their eras. Then they retreated from exploration and prominence in the world. 

What decisions did they make and where are they now? In the case of China, what decisions 

are they currently making? Britain became great in the 17th century through its exploration and 

mastery of the seas. America's greatness in the 20th century was evidencE)d in its mastery of 

the air and initial steps space exploration. Great nations have always led exploration. For this 

and future generations, the frontier is space. Other countries will explore the cosmos, whether 

the United States does or not. Those nations will be the great global economic powers in the 

years and centuries to come. I believe America should look to its future - and our leaders 

should consider what that future will look like if we choose not to lead space faring nations. For 

the foreseeable future, space travel is going to be difficult and dangerous. Critics often claim it is 

too expensive, but this is the United States of America, and human space exploration is an 

important strategic component of maintaining leadership in the world. It is one I have dedicated 

my entire career to supporting. 

A long-term strategy for U.S. human space exploration based on discussions like these today 

can have a momentous effect on the future of the United States and our global partnerships. 

American leadership in space technology and exploration will ensure that the United States 

maintains stature in the world, developing and maturing innovative 21 st century technologies 

1 
48 

that are vital to the industries, which will contribute to the health of our economy. If crafted 

properly with the input from a spectrum of U.S. stakeholders, including the government, 

industry, private and academic communities, as well as the international space community, the 

strategy for human space exploration can identify and achieve many important national 

objectives including advanced scientific discoveries, development of critical technologies and 

capabilities, technically preparing for Mars exploration, continued sustained human presence in 

space, economic expansion, strengthening and enhancing global partnerships, and inspiring our 

people. Our Nation needs a unified and broadly-agreed upon long-term strategy for human 

space exploration - a strategy that does not exist today. 

Developing an enduring U.S. long-term strategy for human space exploration is extremely 

important to me personally, because human space flight has been my lifelong passion, 

beginning with the earliest flights of Yuri Gagarin, Alan Shepard, Gus Grissom, John Glenn and 

all those who followed. I was fortunate to have been given meaningful and significant 

opportunities during my 38 years at NASA, contributing to Space Shuttle, Space Station, Human 

space Exploration and other programs. I had significant leadership roles in planning for the 

future of human space flight for over 20 years. I make these points to reinforce the importance 

that I give this subject and the needed direction that should come from serious planning efforts. 

By holding this hearing, Members of this Subcommittee recognize that the Nation's vision and 

strategy for human space flight needs to be more clearly defined if our efforts are to result in a 

meaningful and desirable future. In my opinion, the current strategy continues to be ill-defined, 

hostage to frequent policy shifts over recent years and the lack of a widely accepted long-term 

strategy. Individual missions proposed in this environment have no apparent context. 

Today, NASA i! building the capabilities and technologies needed to send humans further from 

our home planet than ever before. In terms of a long-term strategy, there is a broad 

international consensus that Mars is a destination that we should ultimately aspire to for human 

space flight. It is a destination that we are reasonably certain is achievable with further 

preparation. However, currently there is ~ a long-term strategy for the steps to get there. 

Any near-term mission that enables future travel to Mars must be couched in terms of how it fits 

into a long-term strategy, and it should have clearly defined rationale and objectives. It should 

be the most efficient and effective solution for how to achieve those objectives. 

NASA's human exploration programs need stability in budgets and direction to make efficient 

progress in critical vehicle developments. It is counterproductive for NASA scientists and 

engineers, who are working to build the vehicles and support structures needed to get to our 

ultimate destination of Mars, when they are frequently told to switch gears and develop new 

transportation systems and technologies for changing missions and destinations. What is truly 

needed is a national consensus about what our long-term national space strategy should be and 

the destinations we will go to, as well as the precursor missions that are needed to succeed. 

We need to coalesce around a unified vision and the strategy needed to achieve it. We need to 

find the national will to sustain pursuit of that strategy over many years, regardless of changing 

2 
49 

political winds. Otherwise we will never get out of low-Earth orbit (LEO) and we will watch other 

space faring nations pass us by, with missions to the Moon and planets where the United States 

should have and could have led the way. 

And let me be clear, I believe developing a national space strategy is the responsibility of the 

President and his Administration and equally the responsibility of this Congress giving 

consideration to ideas from vital stakeholders in many communities, including industry, 

academia and international realms. More importantly, any strategy needs to inspire the 

American public to participate in the journey for greatness. 

Therefore, in my testimony today, I will discuss an approach to reaching consensus on a longterm exploration strategy, and I will discuss meaningful first steps that I believe can be 

supportable by the international space community and the public. I will also address the 

questions you outlined in your invitation for me to appear before you today. 

Current State in Human Space Flight Planning 

Today, NASA's human space flight programs include the International Space Station (ISS), the 

Space Launch System (SLS), the Multipurpose Crew Vehicle Orion (MPCV), and their 

supporting programs. 

In terms of a human exploration program, the ISS is a unique capability that is utilized for 

research needed to better understand human health and safety on long space missions. It is 

also to be used to demonstrate needed technologies and reliability of systems for exploration 

missions. Since the retirement of the Space Shuttle we are solely reliant on the Russians until 

future 'commercial crew" suppliers develop the capabilities needed to provide that service to 

NASA. In turn, NASA has turned its focus to developing the next-generation human space flight 

transportation systems. These next-generation systems, developed by NASA, are what will 

advance the Nation's knowledge and capabilities in space. 

Currently, NASA is developing the SLS to provide the required heavy-lift payload capacity 

(mass, volume and diameter) necessary to launch the large spacecraft for human exploration 

missions beyond LEO. A heavy-lift launch capability has other potential uses for science 

missions, and other national security government customers. The Orion MPCV is being 

developed as a deep-space crew transportation vehicle (capsule) with systems required to 

support astronauts for those missions, whether they are backup capabilities for ISS 

transportation or more importantly longer-term missions to destinations beyond LEO. The 

design and systems are necessarily much more complex than those needed for transportation 

to and from LEO. An important point to make is that regardless of the uncertainty of the longterm strategy, a heavy-lift vehicle (SLS) and an interplanetary capable crew vehicle (MPCV) are 

essential to any human space flight strategy, regardless of the exact beyond-LEO destinations 

3 
50 

While these programs continue to make progress in development, I strongly believe that a longterm strategy for human space flight should be developed now to layout a preferred path for the 

future of U.S. human space flight and that time is of the essence. 

Good Examples of Exploration Strategies 

There are good examples that exist for laying out long-term space flight programs. The Apollo 

Program, the Mars Science Program, and the NASA Science Directorate have benefitted from 

clear objectives being set to achieve ultimate goals. 

The Apollo Program consisted of a number of objectives that led to the human lunar landings. In 

simplified form, these included: 

Ranger Program: Obtain first close-up lunar images to characterize the surface 

Lunar Orbiter Program: Obtain lunar maps from orbit to provide Apollo landing site data 

• Surveyor Program: Achieve first lunar controlled landings to demonstrate soft landings 

and further characterize the lunar environment 

Mercury Program: Determine whether humans could survive and work in the space 

environment 

• Gemini Program: Demonstrate rendezvous and docking. Demonstrate ability to conduct 

space walks and work in an EVA suit 

• Apollo Program: Perform final Saturn, Apollo capsule and lander tests; and demonstrate 

operational capabilities leading to lunar landings 

The Mars Science Program has been planned for years based on inputs and objectives from 

Decadal surveys and forums such as Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG), 

which assemble objectives from constituents of the science communities, technologists, and 

human space flight. It has laid out meaningful missions to achieve these objectives. 

Measurements for each mission are developed in formulation committees made up of these 

constituents. Instruments for each objective on a mission are competed. An important feature is 

that the Mars program strategy is flexible, in that it is adaptable, changing with compelling 

discoveries from ongoing missions. 

Developing a Rational Long-Term Exploration Strategy 

Learning from these experiences and others gained through years of planning for the future of 

human space flight, leads me to advocate the following approach. 

To begin with, the strategy's ultimate long-term goals need to be widely accepted within the 

broad space flight community. These ultimate goals should include answering fundamental 

questions: 

1.) What are the large geo-political goals that we want to achieve with human spaceflight? 

2.) What should be our country's long-term vision for future human space exploration? and, 

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3.) How do we envision collaborating with international partners, considering their aspirations 

and strategies to achieve this vision? 

I believe the first 2 questions, at a minimum, should initially be answered without the constraints 

of specific budgets and schedules. Instead, we should acknowledge our ultimate aspirations. 

The title of this hearing includes the words " ... Mars and Beyond: Any long-term human space 

flight strategy that speaks to "and beyond" will certainly include missions to Mars. Mars is 

globally accepted as an ultimate human space flight goal based on the fact that it is the planet 

most like our own; habitable with known systems, and can be reached within foreseeable 

technological capabilities. Once achieved, going "beyond" Mars may be less daunting. 

The next step is to determine what we need to learn in order to send people safely to Mars. In 

other words, first work backwards from Mars. 

What are the science and exploration objectives? 

What are the critical technologies and capabilities needed for travel to Mars and back? 

What are the human frailties and how do we address them? 

What are the environments we will encounter and how do we protect for them? 

What performance is required of systems? 

What are the optimal destinations for testing and demonstrations to prove out 

capabilities and new technologies 

Which intermediate destinations produce the best potential for exploration and science 

return/discoveries in their own right? 

What precursors are required, including robotic and human missions, testing and 

potentially other programs? 

Second, it is essential to develop the most logical strategy based on collaboration with 

international partners, with whom the United States would work to develop complementary 

aspirations, capabilities and needs. Solicitation of inputs and collaboration with interested 

stakeholders through an organized process would also be required. Decision makers would 

thus become better informed and better able to assemble important mission objectives, and 

envision greater potential for achievements at each potential destination. These objectives 

would be solicited from stakeholders, including the science community (all disciplines), applied 

science experts, Congress, the Administration, exploration advocates and experts, academia, 

international partners, private industry, media, education specialists, public affairs experts, etc. 

If leaders were aware of the entire spectrum of possible objectives, missions could be designed 

to be more effective, by satisfying as many important objectives as practical. Based on this 

process, options would then be developed for mission sequences to destinations; options, which 

most effectively address the established needs, goals and objectives. This consultative process 

would likely result in more widespread advocacy for the strategy by enabling a broad spectrum 

of stakeholders to be a part of the process as they provide valued input into key mission 

decisions. 

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Third, it is important develop a long term-budget strategy for the United States' human space 

flight exploration plan. In my view, the budget strategy should not initially be tied strictly to dates 

for missions, since the timeline for some intermediate missions and human Mars missions 

extend too far beyond a near-term 5 year budget run-out, thereby making budget projections 

unrealistic and subject to criticisms of "cost growth" in later years. NASA programs, even 

internal to NASA, are often forced to make such unrealistic budget estimates. These complex 

developments are "rocket science." Inevitably technical unknowns are discovered and the 

programs are forced to develop alternatives - usually with success, but frequently with "cost 

growth". More importantly, budget instability, including budget cuts cause the development 

schedules to slip, which can contribute to significant "cost growth." We have seen these factors 

affect overall cost and schedule too often in the past. The current flat budget without built-in 

inflation, changing policy and budget priorities, and instability therefore make any long-term 

budget estimation for a Mars mission, for example, self-defeating and unrealistic. Instead, a 

better approach is to evaluate NASA long-term budget priorities, including evolution and 

completion of programs to get a sense of how to proceed. There is a tendency to continue 

programs, because they have momentum and constituency. However, for progress to be made 

on the long-term path, decisions have to be made to end programs when they reach a point of 

diminishing returns in achieving planned objectives. This is necessary to free funds for the 

important next steps on the exploration path. This needs to be accounted for in planning. 

Finally, based on the shorter budget horizon of five years, the United States must rank order its 

mission objective priorities, choosing only those missions which contribute most effectively to 

the nation's long-term strategy goals. Considering both the look-back from Mars and the nearterm path forward, the United States must choose a preferred path through a series of missions 

and destinations that most effectively address the nation's agreed-upon exploration goals and 

objectives. In executing this strategy, NASA must take advantage of existing capabilities 

(Examples: ISS, SLS, Orion, applicable science mission developments and operational 

approaches), as well as existing technologies if practical. NASA should not lock-in every 

possible new technology, instead concentrating on developing the most enabling technologies. 

Like the Mars Science Program, the human space flight strategy should be flexible with the 

anticipation that it should be driven by exploration and science discoveries as well as budget 

realities and emerging technologies. 

Figure 1 illustrates notional decision paths that could be options in this process. A key point is 

that the heavy-lift SLS and the long-duration Orion MPCV are necessary capabilities, regardless 

of the path that is ultimately taken- visiting an asterOid, cis-lunar exploration, or traveling to 

Mars. 

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TIme 

Figure 1-Possible Strategy for Architecture Pathways 

Initial Destination Possibilities 

Asteroids 

The President's FY 2014 budget proposal included a challenge to send humans to an asteroid 

by 2025. The mission currently being proposed includes three separate elements: the detection 

and characterization of candidate near-Earth asteroids; the robotic rendezvous, capture, and 

redirection of a target asteroid to the Earth-Moon system; and the crewed mission to explore 

and sample the captured asteroid using the SLS and the Orion crew capsule. Each mission 

element is supposed to contribute to a human Mars mission in the 2030s, and the intent is to 

leverage on-going exploration, scientific and technology development activities across the 

Agency. 

In my opinion, the publicly discussed rationale for this mission has not been compelling or 

convincing, nor does there seem to be a recognizable connection to a long-term strategy or 

supporting stakeholder support. It would seem that the science community should be one of the 

primary beneficiaries of such a mission. However, in researching this, published news articles 

have indicated that there is not an apparent expectation for significant scientific return from 

planetary sCientists. 1 At a panel of the recent Humans to Mars Summit, the NASA Science 

Mission Director is quoted as saying, "We've been very clear that this is not a science-driven 

mission.,,2 Therefore to me and others, it is not apparent that the Administration's asteroid 

retrieval proposal was developed based on consultation with stakeholders in the broader space 

community. It is also not apparent that there are meaningful opportunities for international 

participation. For example, were potential international partners consulted about this new 

1 View relevant article: http:(!wwwsciencemag.org!content!340!6133!668.summary 

2 View source of quote: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2294/1 

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mission? Personally, I do not know of any prior consultations. The problem this creates is that 

NASA spent many years persuading international partners to join the Agency in its lunar 

mission, encouraging them to take lead roles on certain elements of a lunar architecture, and 

now NASA is telling them a completely different story. 

As for the cost of this new near-term mission, my impression is that the only cost estimate 

available is a $2.68 estimate that was included in a Keck Institute study. The problem is that 

this estimate is not NASA owned. However, a commitment to significant near-term funding and 

diverted resources to study this mission is expected without understanding the impact or 

understanding how the mission fits a long-term strategy. The President's FY 2014 budget 

request included $105M for this mission in order to further evaluate costs, technology needs etc. 

- funding that is certainly being diverted from somewhere else in the NASA's already tight 

budget. Therefore, in my view, the mission objectives, definition, and rationale for an asteroid 

retrieval mission, as currently envisioned, do not convey a mature concept worthy of acceptance 

without further understanding as to value to the future of human space flight as compared to 

other options/destinations before diverting significant funding. 

Additionally, I believe there are potential technical issues with the proposed mission. The yetto-be-chosen asteroid must be relatively small, on the order of 7 to 10 meters, according to the 

NASA mission description. As I understand it, a small asteroid is difficult if not impossible to 

characterize from Earth. The makeup and stability of the object may not be known in advance. 

If it is tumbling, it may not be retrievable. Additionally, the spacecraft needed to retrieve the 

asteroid will be complex. Although NASA is working to understand this, the complexity of such 

a spacecraft and mission will undoubtedly increase as time goes on, and with complexity, costs 

will rise. In fairness, this is the norm for most complex space development programs, especially 

those that tackle so many "unknowns." In my view, this mission, as currently envisioned, has 

many more unknowns than a human lunar mission would have. 

Furthermore, I point to the 2012 National Research Council's (NRC) report "NASA' Strategic 

Direction and the Need for a National Consensus" which noted the following: 

"Finding: Human Exploration. The committee has seen little evidence that the current 

stated interim goal for NASA's human space flight program -- namely, to visit an asteroid 

by 2025 -- has been widely accepted as a compelling destination by NASA's own 

workforce, by the nation as a whole, or by the international community. Although 

asteroids remain important subjects for both U.S. and international robotic exploration 

and study, on the international front there appears to be continued enthusiasm for a 

mission to the Moon but not for an asteroid mission. This lack of national and 

international consensus on the asteroid-first mission scenario undermines NASA's ability 

to establish a comprehensive, consistent strategic direction that can guide program 

planning and budget allocation. The current program has significant shortcomings in the 

pursuit of the stated goal of the asteroid mission. There has been a long-standing 

general agreement that a human mission to Mars should be the long-term goal of the 

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human space flight program, even though a near-term commitment to such a program is 

still pending. " 

This finding is consistent with my observations, and one that I trust this Subcommittee will take 

under advisement given the Committee's long-held trust in the work and value of the NRC. 

Although the NRC's report was published prior to the President's announcement of the current 

asteroid retrieval mission, the shortcomings and issues cited in the above excerpt are still 

relevant in my view. 

After the President first proposed a human asteroid mission in April 2010 - which is not the 

same mission as has been proposed in the FY 2014 request -- the NASA Explore Now 

Workshop was conducted in August, 2010 to develop objectives for human asteroid missions. 

A finding of this workshop was that a survey telescope is needed, positioned in orbit around the 

Sun between the orbits of Venus and Earth in order to increase the number of catalogued 

objects. The activities outlined in this workshop for human missions are as follows: 

Test Hardware Systems: High Performance Propulsion, Long Duration Habitats, 

Radiation Mitigation, ISRU 

Sample Handling and Curation 

Deploy Scientific Instruments for On-going Operations (Subsurface Drilling, Core 

Sampling) 

Test potential threat mitigation techniques 

Characterize Physical and Chemical Properties of near-Earth objects: Mass, shape, 

density, porosity, spin, strength, mineralogy 

This workshop was organized to develop mission objectives from interested stakeholders 

according to the process outlined earlier. 

The study of asteroid missions over the subsequent years has led to an understanding of the 

difficulty of human missions travelling to an asteroid in its natural orbit. This includes the need 

to identify interesting targets, characterize the targets as to what could be learned scientifically 

as well as to whether the object is safe to visit with a human crew. Due to the difficulty of 

characterizing asteroids from Earth, my understanding is that a robotic mission may be needed 

in advance of any human mission to characterize the candidate asteroid - leading to yet another 

cost for this mission. Also problematic is the fact that opportunities to visit given asteroids can 

occur infrequently due to their specific orbits. Therefore, the time between a robotic 

characterization mission and a human mission to a specific asteroid could take years, and even 

then the robotic mission could find that the asteroid is not a good candidate. Granted, an 

asteroid mission would offer the chance to test the SLS and Orion vehicles and human factors 

during the mission. However, the question is whether this is the most cost effective way of 

accomplishing these objectives or whether similar testing of SLS/Orion capabilities would be 

better served with other missions, tests, and destinations. 

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Asteroids are certainly very interesting objects for scientific study. They can provide key 

information on the formation of our solar system, and cataloguing of these objects is important 

to understand their threat to Earth. However, I believe that robotic missions are currently a 

more cost-effective way to study asteroids. That is not to say that the proposed asteroid 

retrieval mission is uninteresting. Rather, it is a clever concept, and it would make for a good 

public affairs event. Such a mission could undoubtedly demonstrate technologies such as solar 

electric propulsion and orbital mechanics techniques. But I question whether this mission 

represents the most effective expenditure of precious funds in demonstrating these capabilities. 

The cost ($2+ billion?) would likely be funded largely at the expense of other human space flight 

needs. These needs include the fully developed SLS, including the upper stage that provides 

the needed capacity for beyond-LEO exploration. These funds could potentially help fund an 

internationally developed lunar lander, whereby NASA could collaborate with other countries 

which have shown interest in a human lunar mission. In the end, Congress and this nation must 

ask whether this proposed asteroid mission really represents the best next step in reaching the 

goal of human exploration of Moon, Mars and other known human exploration goals. 

The Moon 

I believe there is great value in returning to the Moon and establishing at least a modest outpost 

there as a first major precursor to a human Mars mission. 

If humans are indeed going to go to Mars, the next generation of explorers is going to have to 

learn how to survive in other forbidding, faraway places across the vastness of space. The 

Moon is a crucially important stepping stone along that path - an alien world with partial gravity, 

like Mars, yet one that is only a three-day journey from Earth. Human lunar exploration will 

provide opportunities to test new technologies, experience living and working on extraterrestrial 

surfaces and learn ways to use resources found in space - all with the goal of safely preparing 

crews for missions to Mars and beyond. 

It is also clear that human space exploration will be most successful when the shared 

aspirations of the international community are realized. A global exploration strategy maximizes 

resources and talent applied to the endeavor, benefitting all of us in space and on Earth. For 

this reason, the lunar mission which is already broadly agreed upon amongst our international 

partners is the logical next major step in our long-term U.S. space strategy. 

Human missions to the Moon have been studied in detail for many years. For example, a 

workshop was conducted in April, 2006 to develop objectives for lunar exploration. The 

workshop's invited 166 attendees consisted of many of the listed space constituencies as 

described in the process I proposed earlier in this testimony. They generated hundreds of lunar 

objectives which were then vetted with over one thousand subject matter experts worldwide in 

various stakeholder organizations and forums, including international conferences and domestic 

forums, the 10 NASA Centers, NASA HQ Mission Directorates, the NASA Advisory Council, the 

Lunar Exploration Advisory Group (LEAG), Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group 

(MEPAG), the Lunar Commerce Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Next Generation 

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Space Explorers Conference, the NewSpace 2006 Conference, etc. These objectives were 

consolidated into 188 objectives and organized into themes. 

The subsequent themes and objectives were adopted and tailored by 14 international space 

agencies, including NASA, becoming the foundation of the current international interest in 

exploring the Moon. Representatives from these agencies organized initially to develop the 

Global Exploration Framework and Global Exploration Strategy. This group has evolved into the 

International Space Exploration Coordination Group, which is developing the Global Exploration 

Roadmap. They are continuing to assess exploration options as a part of that roadmap. 

Through the process of developing lunar objectives beginning with the 2006 workshop, the 

following example objectives give a sense of what lunar exploration can offer: 

Compelling scientific questions: 

What is the history of the Sun from solar wind particles deposited in the regolith? 

What is the history of the inner solar system and Earth-Moon system over 4.5 

billion years 

Impact history correlation with extinctions and changes on Earth 

Planetary processes and geological characteristics of the Moon: volatiles, 

volcanism, plate tectonics 

What is the accessibility of useful resources? What are the processes to extract 

them and potential uses in missions? 

Water!ice at the poles, other volatiles and materials 

In Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) process development and use 

What can be leamed of the universe from the Moon? 

Far side radio astronomy shielded from Earth's radio noise 

Astrophysics and astronomy 

Stable platform! no atmosphere for space! Earth observations 

Large lunar disc diameter to achieve large apertures for phased arrays 

Monitoring space weather away from Earth's environment and magnetic field 

People learning skills to live and work on another planetary body 

Opportunities for significant commercial and international collaboration 

Using, testing, and maturing of planetary systems that will benefit Mars exploration 

(habitation, life support, power, thermal, Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA), mobility, etc.) 

Development of surface operational approaches and techniques 

Development and use of surface mobility and EVA capabilities 

Human health and safety in a hazardous planetary environment, including temperature, 

dust, radiation, partial gravity, no atmosphere, meteoroid, etc. 

Characterize environments 

Measure human response and performance 

Yet unknown opportunities for exploration and discovery 

The Moon is a truly unique destination due to its size and diversity and the fact that it is 

undisturbed by wind and water. As a result, scientists can learn about the history of the 

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inner/near Earth solar system over the past 4.5 billion years. Informed by the vetted lunar 

objectives described above, NASA studies were performed to choose potential landing sites and 

mission scenarios to obtain the greatest possible return towards those objectives. This is a 

major reason for having well-established objectives. 

Adding to this information we now have incredible new information on the Moon derived from 

the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS), Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 

(LRO), and the Gravity Recovery and Internal Laboratory (GRAIL). The following and other 

achievements have been possible: 

Lunar water-ice and other volatiles and minerals were identified and mapped 

• Three dimensional lunar maps have been generated 

• To enable safe landings, high resolution images have been made of the most 

compelling potential landing sites, which were requested by lunar scientists and 

exploration experts 

Knowledge of the Moon's irregular gravitational field 

These and other data are now available to inform future human lunar exploration missions. 

Objectives developed over the past seven years should be updated based on this new 

knowledge. Far more compelling landscapes and locations than visited by Apollo astronauts 

are possible based on this combined detailed information. Modern technologies can enable 

astronauts to safely land in more hazardous, but more scientifically interesting terrain than was 

possible 40 years ago. The Moon therefore provides a unique nearby opportunity which I 

believe should be an exceptionally important step in any long-term human space flight strategy. 

I believe the United States should provide leadership in this endeavor. 

In Moscow last June, the International Space Station Advisory Committee received a Russian 

briefing on Russia's human exploration strategy, with Russia space officials actually making a 

plea with the United States representatives to partner with Russia in leading lunar exploration. 

While the other international agencies support human exploration of the Moon, the United 

States / NASA has now reversed course, backing out of previous international collaboration in 

such a venture. The current NASA position, as stated publicly, is that ifthere ever is an 

international lunar mission, NASA will not lead the mission, but will participate. 

Mars 

Mars has always been a source of inspiration for explorers and scientists. Robotic missions 

have found evidence of water, but whether life exists beyond Earth still remains a mystery. 

Robotic and scientific robotic missions have shown that Mars has characteristics and a history 

similar to Earth's, but we know that there are striking differences that we have yet to begin to 

understand. Humans can build upon this knowledge and look for signs of life and investigate 

Mars' geological evolution, resulting in knowledge applicable to the evolution of our home 

planet, Earth. 

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Mars missions have also been studied for many years. Mars robotic missions continue to 

provide incredible information that makes the planet an ever more compelling location for 

people to travel to and advance the science knowledge that is accessible with human 

capabilities. However, Mars missions where a human actually lands on the Martian surface will 

require advances in a number of technologies and capabilities to significantly reduce the mass 

and improve success of the mission -- technologies I am confident will be developed over time. 

Relevant nearer-term Mars human missions may be closer than previously thought. For 

instance, the mission proposed by "Inspiration Mars," while very challenging, can potentially 

provide a nearer-term mission, which could demonstrate the ability to send people out to Mars 

distances with a Mars flyby trajectory and a non-propulsive free return to Earth. This mission 

could demonstrate a subset of the needed technologies for a full Mars mission. It would require 

much less mass and hardware launched from Earth than a full Mars mission. 

More difficult, but on the order of what would be needed for a human mission to one of the more 

difficult to reach asteroids, is a mission to Mars' moons, Phobos and/or Deimos. These are 

destinations in the Mars vicinity, with the opportunity to collect samples from these moons and 

potentially Mars samples ejected through impacts over their history. Tele-operating robots on 

the surface of Mars with short communication times as compared with robotic missions 

controlled from Earth would also be an important opportunity. These preliminary missions could 

enhance the public and stakeholder interest to pursue the actual landed missions on Mars. 

Landing of crews on the surface of Mars is the ultimate goal for the U.S. human space flight 

strategy - at least the ultimate goal that can be reasonably envisioned today. Landing on Mars 

will be a significant step beyond a Mars flyby and missions to Mars' moons, but it is a goal I 

believe we must ultimately aspire to achieve successfully. Perhaps the progression from a Mars 

flyby mission, to exploration of Mars' moons, to Mars surface landings is the sequence of Mars 

missions that should be pursued in a long-term strategy. 

Moving Forward 

In my personal opinion, the following steps should be taken as soon as possible to develop a 

unified and enduring U.S. human space exploration strategy: 

• Conduct an open process including stakeholders as outlined above to develop a longterm human and robotic space exploration strategy; 

Reestablish lunar exploration as a valued near-term part of that strategy; 

• Identify other near-term opportunities that can effectively contribute to long term needs, 

goals and objectives to achieve missions to the Mars surface; 

Engage international partners and identify opportunities to combine resources and 

capabilities in achieving these goals; and 

• Endeavor to maintain U.S. leadership in human space exploration. 

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Conclusion 

The preceding is a brief discussion of a process and examples of supporting information that I 

believe need to be a part of the development of an informed long-term human exploration 

strategy. Much more supporting information exists from years of studies at NASA and external 

to NASA. This is just a sample. My hope is from this testimony one can envision what should 

be considered in the path forward, leading to decisions for a long-term exploration plan. The 

fact that this Subcommittee is conducting this hearing with this panel illustrates the perceived 

need and an initial step on a small scale of beginning the process I am proposing. 

My fear is that although based on an interesting external study, the current asteroid retrieval 

mission was apparently chosen in isolation without the benefit of a process involving 

stakeholders and without the perspective of a long-term exploration strategy. Such a significant 

shift in near-term focus/destination also risks offending some of our long-term international 

partners who were already onboard with a lunar mission. Only time will tell if they are willing to 

join us on the asteroid retrieval mission if that idea persists- or if roles unique to their 

capabilities can be identified and negotiated. Based on experiences during the Space Station 

redesign in the early 1990's and observing reactions from retiring the Space Shuttle without a 

replacement, I believe that imposing a solution with minimal input or communication with key 

stakeholders and partners does not provide a satisfactory or supportable approach. 

Although I have stated my specific views here, I too am only one constituent of the space 

community. Therefore, if the United States and NASA does what I think is the right thing in 

soliciting feedback on a long-term strategy from the broader space community; I would gladly 

submit these same views as part of that inclusive process. 

Once again, thank you Chairman Palazzo, Ranking Member Edwards, and members of this 

committee for inviting me to give my views. I also want to thank this committee and your staff 

for your continued bipartisan support for human space flight, even through difficult times. I 

welcome your questions. 

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Douglas R. Cooke 

Douglas R. Cooke is an aerospace consultant for Cooke Concepts and Solutions. In 2011, he 

retired from NASA after a 38-year career at Johnson Space Center and NASA Headquarters. 

He advises on company strategies, program management, proposal development, program 

strategies, and technical matters. His experience at NASA was in engineering and senior level 

program management positions in the Space Shuttle, the ISS, and Human Exploration 

Programs. During his career, Mr. Cooke has held major leadership responsibilities and had 

achievements during critical periods of each of these human space flight programs. In Mr. 

Cooke's last three years at NASA, he served as the Associate Administrator of the Exploration 

Systems Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters. In his last year at NASA, he led efforts 

within NASA to adopt the current vehicle designs for the Orion and the SLS. As Associate 

Administrator, Mr. Cooke was also responsible for the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, Lunar 

Crater Observation and SenSing Satellite, Commercial Cargo and Crew, Human Research and 

Exploration Technology Programs. Prior to this he was deputy of the same directorate, since it 

was formed in 2004. He has been in leadership positions for most of NASA's advanced studies 

in human space exploration since 1989, including the White House studies "The 90 Day Study" 

in 1989 and the 'Synthesis Group Report, America at the Threshold" in 1990. He also had 

several high priority detail assignments to other NASA centers and NASA Headquarters. Mr. 

Cooke was NASA technical advisor to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in 2003. Mr. 

Cooke has also been a member of the ISS Advisory Committee. 

Mr. Cooke has received the Presidential Distinguished Rank Award, Presidential Meritorious 

Rank Award, NASA Distinguished Service Medal, three NASA Exceptional Achievement 

Medals, NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, NASA Exceptional Service Medal, two JSC 

Certificates of Commendation, a number of NASA Group Achievement Awards, and the Space 

Transportation Association Lifetime Achievement Award. Most recently he was awarded the 

Texas A&M Outstanding Aerospace Engineer Alumni Award. Mr. Cooke received a B.S. in 

aerospace engineering from Texas A&M University. 

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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Cooke. 

A vote has been called. The Committee will recess until ten minutes after last vote. The Committee stands at recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman PALAZZO. The Subcommittee on Space will come back 

to order. I want to thank again the witnesses for being here and 

being available for questioning today. I also want to remind Members that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes. 

The Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The 

Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Mr. Cooke, Congress has consistently affirmed that NASA should 

develop an exploration architecture to go to the Moon, Mars, and 

beyond on a timetable determined by available funding. NASA receives roughly 17 billion a year and approximately 3–1/2 billion of 

that is devoted to exploration systems and support infrastructure 

and even more under the previous Administration. Last month, the 

NASA Administrator indicated that we cannot return to the Moon 

because NASA does not have the funding to do so, arguing that 

NASA has no money for a lunar lander. My question is: could 

NASA establish an exploration architecture and development profile that could accommodate a lunar architecture under the current 

funding profile if schedule was not a driver? 

Mr. COOKE. There are a couple of factors that I would like to 

bring up. One, the existing profile is a flat profile as I understand 

it still with no inflation, which is problematic. So I think the situation would be improved if there were even inflation. And I think 

we were seeing that back when I was at NASA. I think NASA can 

definitely put together architectures that fit a funding profile. We 

have done it—we have always done it. 

I guess a question I would have is if an asteroid retrieval mission is going to cost $2 plus billion according to the Keck study, where 

is that money coming from? Is that new money? If it is not new 

money, it is coming from somewhere, and so is it coming out of existing human spaceflight programs? Is it coming out of technology? 

And if $2 billion—plus billion is available, could it be better spent? 

Could it be better spent on an upper stage for SLS that brings it 

to full capability or could we partner with internationals to develop—collaborate and develop a lander for the Moon? 

If we have a long-term exploration plan, as I was making a plea 

for, you understand—you can understand how those things fit into 

it and what is the best expenditure of funds. So I don’t know specifically what the plans are and where the money is coming from 

for the asteroid retrieval mission, but it seems that an alternative 

would be to do—would be to put that money toward lunar exploration. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Do you believe it is necessary to develop a 

lander in parallel with the development of SLS and Orion or could 

the lander be developed at a later date? 

Mr. COOKE. I believe that in everything we do we phase our 

spending, and in fact even in the SLS program as we initially laid 

it out in 2011, things were phased. We chose the components that 

we did. We knew we had to get the core stage built, which was 

new. We—everything—every choice that we made in terms of the 

engines and boosters and that sort of thing were phased in order 
63 

to fit under the funding profile. So we—that is something that is 

always done is you phase your developments to fit under that line. 

So certainly, as some of the costs come off of development on a 

rocket or efficiencies are found in space station operations, for instance, money like that could then be phased into development of 

a lander. It doesn’t have to be at the same exact time. We don’t— 

I mean we phased money and spending to develop as we could. 

So driving towards your point, you can phase your developments 

within a funding line to achieve long-term what you are looking to 

do. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Now, Exploration Systems Architecture 

Study has considerable international input. The witnesses before 

us today agree that international cooperation will be necessary for 

any mission. Understanding that you no longer work for NASA, do 

you know whether international input was sought for the asteroid 

retrieval mission? 

Mr. COOKE. I am not aware that it was. In fact, one of the concerns I have is that it seems like the process is reversed on this 

asteroid retrieval mission where the mission is announced and then 

you go figure out the rationale and how to partner on it. And so 

I am not aware or have seen evidence that there was international 

consultation going into the announcement. 

Chairman PALAZZO. And my last question for Mr. Cooke, the cancellation of the Constellation Program was a huge blow to our Nation’s exploration program and created a significant uncertainty for 

our industry partners. How can Congress ensure that the SLS and 

Orion are not political footballs in the next Administration and are 

part of a stable, long-term plan for exploration? 

Mr. COOKE. In my written testimony I made the point and I 

made it briefly in my oral today that we have looked at various scenarios and what steps could be taken in destinations and missions 

in achieving Mars landings down the road. The SLS and Orion are 

critical components no matter what that path ends up being. If we 

are going to travel beyond Earth orbit, you need that capacity in 

a launch vehicle and you need a deep space crew vehicle with the 

systems designed for those kind of missions that are totally different than what is needed—they are a step well beyond what is 

needed for to and from Earth orbit I will point out as well. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. I now recognize Ms. Edwards for 

five minutes. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you very much to our witnesses. I really appreciate 

your patience today. 

I want to start with Dr. Friedman. Dr. Friedman, many of us 

have had questions about the scientific capability that we gain in 

terms of asteroid retrieval mission and how that then contributes 

to going to Mars. And so I wonder if you could very quickly give 

us a sense of what the science is that is so different than what we 

would get from Moon—from, you know, a lunar landing and mission if that were the interim step that was chosen? 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, thank you for the question. First of all, it is 

important to understand that of course the mission—the asteroid 

retrieval mission wasn’t selected for—or its rationale is not for 

science. If it was, then we have a robotic sample returns and we 
64 

do missions to asteroids for science purposes. This is part of the 

human spaceflight program and its primary rationale is a step for 

humans to take in space. 

Having said that, of course, the aspect of what humans could do 

on an asteroid to delve into the surface to bring back—to conduct 

experiments related to future resource utilization, to perhaps drill 

a little bit to do experiments related to asteroid science would contribute greatly not only to the knowledge about asteroids themselves and their relationship to solar system studies but also to 

what the structure and composition and strength of an asteroid is 

and the diversity of them so that we can—someday, we might have 

to deflect one for purposes of planetary protection. 

So there will be a lot of human-related science experiments on 

such an asteroid retrieval mission, but it is important to understand that the real reason for doing it is the human capability of 

being able to go beyond the Moon, to be able to go on longer flight 

time missions, to be able to take larger systems with them for 

longer life support as a first step beyond the Moon and then to 

more subsequent larger steps after that. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. So I am trying to appreciate then the 

critical technologies that are necessary with whatever the interim 

step it is that we choose, whether it is an asteroid retrieval or it 

is a lunar landing and lunar mission. And so I wonder if each of 

you very quickly could outline what those critical technologies are 

so that when we are trying to figure out how do we make the investment in next step to Mars that we are investing in all the right 

critical technologies whatever the chosen interim destination? And 

so if we could just kind of go down the line, that would be great. 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I think the fundamental one is related to 

life sciences and life support for human spaceflight. Once you are 

outside of the Earth’s radiation environment and into deep space, 

both the length of the system and microgravity and the radiation 

exposure are key questions. I think that is the dominant one for 

long duration human spaceflight. 

The other big technology that unfortunately is going to have to 

wait for more robotic missions to Mars is the entry, descent, and 

landing on Mars. That is huge. That is an unsolved problem. It is 

not going to be—you can’t learn it on the Moon, you can’t learn it 

on an asteroid; you can only learn that on Mars itself. And I think 

what we are doing in the robotic missions for exploration of Mars 

is the other key technology. Solar electric propulsion technology is 

a long duration flight, but that we do know how to do. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So could I hear from the other witnesses whether 

or not it is a lunar mission or an asteroid retrieval? 

Dr. SPUDIS. Well, one of the key things that you want to develop 

to go to Mars, in fact, to do any kind of planetary exploration is 

the ability to solve some of your logistical problems, and that 

means learning how to use the materials and energy that space 

have to offer rather than bringing everything we need with us from 

the Earth. And I contend that the Moon is an ideal place to do this 

because it is close enough that we can begin to start doing this 

robotically with teleoperated machines that could basically pave 

the way for human arrival later. 
65 

Now, survival on a planetary surface—all planetary surfaces are 

hostile. There is no second Eden. There is no second Earth. They 

are all required—require us to protect the crew from radiation, 

from the environment, and to create our own life-support 

consumables. That can be done on the Moon and that can be 

done—in fact, a lot of the key technologies we would use there we 

would use on a trip to Mars eventually anyway. 

The other main technological area is learning how to effectively 

explore planetary surfaces, and that includes using both humans 

and machines synergistically so that each one builds on the value— 

on the benefits of the other. That is another experiment that can 

be done on the Moon because it is a little planet of great complexity. So that is the way I look at it. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thanks. And could we hear very quickly from Dr. 

Squyres and Mr. Cooke? 

Dr. SQUYRES. Yeah, just very briefly I agree with Dr. Friedman 

that the two most challenging technologies required to send humans successfully to Mars and bring them back are, first of all, 

deep space, life-support, and habitation; and second, entry, descent, 

and landing to the Martian surface and assent. 

I will point out that to me the connection between particularly 

the asteroid retrieval mission, which involves proximity operations 

with a rock that would fit comfortably into this hearing room, I see 

no obvious connection between that and any of the technologies or 

capabilities that are required for Martian exploration. 

Mr. COOKE. I would agree with most of everything that has been 

said. I would add that the Moon is unique in that it is a planetary 

surface that has partial gravity like Mars. It has a dust environment that you have to learn to deal with. You can develop surface 

operational techniques in a partial G environment in space suits 

learning those techniques and how to explore and how to get the 

most out of the missions. So it—and we—in 2006 we had a conference that laid out objectives for the Moon and there are many 

things that you could do there that would contribute to long-term 

human exploration. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Chairman Smith for five 

minutes. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I, too, want to thank our witnesses today. They have just 

been excellent in what they have said in their responses to the 

questions that have already been addressed to them. Several more 

questions though I would like to ask, and the first one, Mr. Cooke, 

is addressed to you. This is asking you to speculate a little bit, but 

I have really not heard anyone answer the question as to why some 

NASA officials would ignore their own experts—that is those on the 

Small Bodies Assessment Group—and sort of forge ahead haphazardly with this asteroid retrieval mission. Do you have any idea 

why they would have chosen to do that? 

Mr. COOKE. Well, I don’t have any direct information. I am concerned that it was announced without a process that I outlined earlier. 

Chairman SMITH. Yeah. 
66 

Mr. COOKE. I think that a healthy process gets inputs from your 

stakeholders and—in terms of objectives and long-term goals and 

that helps you defined what missions are. I don’t see that that has 

happened here and I don’t know exactly—I have no first-hand information— 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. COOKE. —as to how that occurred. 

Chairman SMITH. Other than just a bad judgment call or something like that? 

Mr. COOKE. Well, I mean to me it would seem that if we are 

going to go after an asteroid, it would have—it would be a—there 

would be science objectives and it has been said publicly that this 

is not a science-driven mission. And so I don’t see the stakeholder 

objectives having driven a mission that should—you would think of 

benefit to science. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cooke. 

Dr. Spudis, there are already two asteroid—robotic asteroid retrieval missions by NASA and by Japan who actually, as you know, 

retrieved an asteroid in 2010 I think. Is there any more to be 

gained by an astronaut actually being on an asteroid? And we are 

talking about an asteroid literally the diameter of the table you all 

are sitting on, 7 to 10 meters. And why can’t those robotic missions 

achieve the same goals as an asteroid would? A while ago Dr. 

Friedman said, well, an astronaut could drill down into the asteroid, but a robot can do that, too. But is there any value added to 

having an astronaut land on a 7 to 10 foot diameter asteroid over 

a couple of robotic—— 

Dr. SPUDIS. There might be but it is not clear to me at this stage 

that there is. One thing that keeps getting overlooked in terms of 

asteroids is that right now we have roughly 45,000 near-Earth asteroids right here on Earth in the terrestrial meteorite collection. 

Chairman SMITH. Um-hum. 

Dr. SQUYRES. And in fact the largest one is a meteorite named 

Hoba, which is three meters across and 60 tons. It has been—it 

was found by a farmer digging in a field in Africa and can’t be 

moved because it is too heavy. So we actually have an NEO right 

here on the Earth right now for study. It is a nickel metal meteorite. 

Fundamentally, meteorites are fairly homogenous. That is one of 

the interesting things about them. Most of the meteorites are 

chondrites, which mean they are debris left over from the accretion 

of the solar system and they have the same chemical composition. 

They have been heated, they are not heated to varying degrees, 

and they are—one of the reasons we use them as standards in 

planetary science is because we can compare planetary compositions to meteorites because they don’t vary very much. 

Now, one of the key assumptions of a human doing field science 

either on the Moon or on the Earth or anywhere else is categorizing the diversity in understanding the processes that he is uncovering by sampling, and that is applicable on the Moon, it is applicable on Mars, it is applicable on the Earth; it is not necessarily 

applicable to a homogenous rock or a homogenous rubble pile. 

So the answer to your question is I think we would learn something. No space mission is valueless. But in terms of what we 
67 

would actually learn in comparison to a robotic sample return, I 

don’t think we would learn that much more. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you. 

And Dr. Squyres, last question, as far as our efforts if we were 

to embark upon this asteroid retrieval mission is there any reason 

to believe that our looking for a nonhazardous 7-meter-diameter 

small asteroid is going to help us in our efforts to try to detect larger and more dangerous asteroids that, if they were to impact 

Earth, could do us a lot of damage or is there a better more direct 

way to try to detect those types of asteroids? 

Dr. SQUYRES. The kind of search techniques that one would use 

to find a target for the asteroid retrieval mission will inevitably 

turn up many, many other objects, some of which will have characteristics that will make them considerably more hazardous to 

Earth than the target that could actually be deflected and placed— 

redirected into orbit around the Moon. So I believe that the—one 

of the truly valuable components of the asteroid retrieval mission 

is the search for a target because not only will it conceivably come 

up with a target that you can actually redirect but it is inevitably 

going to find a whole bunch of other rocks that, on ensemble, 

maybe much important—much more important both as scientific 

targets and as objects for future study. But as a threat itself, I 

think the object you are going to find, as Dr. Friedman has pointed 

out, is not something that we need to worry about. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Posey for five minutes. 

Sir? 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, so much of what we gain from space every day is 

unappreciated by the general public. We all know that. And I just 

think about the tragedy yesterday, without the weather satellites, 

the early warning that we had, how horrible that could have been 

if it had been more spontaneous how much more horrible it had 

been—it could have been. 

I think it is unfortunate that we don’t really have any space 

plans right now that inspire the general public. For better or 

worse, the public that I am familiar with is absolutely totally 

under-excited about the prospect of going to an asteroid, and I 

think we need to have a more robust program. I think I agree with 

three out of four of you to make it a national priority. 

And, you know, funding is always the issue and funding is the 

issue because the NASA budget, as small as it is in comparison to 

other budgets, is still the biggest pinata. It is the one they go at 

for totally nonrelated programs because all the Members of the 

body are not sold on the necessity of it as a matter of return on 

investment, as a matter of national defense, as a matter of survival 

for our species ultimately. 

And my question to the four of you would be how you think we 

could better move this space message down the field among our colleagues in the general public? If the general public was more excited about it, Members of Congress would be more excited about 

it and we wouldn’t be really limited to underfunding even the 

smallest possible missions. So we can start with you, Mr. Friedman, and go on down the line until we run out of time. 
68 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, thank you. That is a key question and it is 

one that I have worked on my whole career as Executive Director 

of the Planetary Society until I retired from that position. Public 

interest is key. It is actually the thing more than science, as I tried 

to say, more than any other aspect that has gotten me so interested 

in this asteroid retrieval mission because even in the last Administration with a full and dedicated commitment to building a lunar 

program and going back to the Moon, the lunar landing, we forget, 

slipped all the way out to 2028 and that is if the funding had been 

maintained, which it wasn’t going to be maintained. Where would 

it have been by now in the 2030s? 

The joy of the asteroid retrieval mission I think has got me so 

excited is is we actually begin the process in just a couple of years 

from now. We are going to be looking for the asteroids this year. 

We are going to be launching the mission to the asteroid in three 

or four years from now. We are going to be towing it in an exciting 

venture that people will be excited about, something never been 

done in the history of the space program before. We will be engaging the public and human spaceflight, prepping the target in the 

way we did with Gemini and Mercury before we went to Apollo. 

And we will be achieving human missions to the destination in a 

much-sooner timescale rather than having to wait two or three decades. I want to get to Mars quickly. I made that clear. But this is 

the only way I think that we can engage the public and maybe 

drive up the money that goes with that. 

Dr. SPUDIS. It is an interesting question because the premise sort 

of assumes that, unless you have an exciting activity, that people 

won’t support something, and yet our society is filled with valuable, 

critical things that we all agree are needed that people don’t get 

excited about. And so I think really your challenge is to show the 

public that they are getting value from the money spent. And that 

is why I believe that building an extensible, reusable system, a 

space-faring system that allows us to do all the things we want to 

do at various spots in space is the way to go. And one way to do 

that is to go back to the Moon and learn to use those resources. 

That is the way I advocate. There may be other solutions. 

But fundamentally, I think the key thing we need to do to become a space-faring people is to develop that system. The things 

that we get from that, the benefits from that will be self-evident. 

I mean right now you mentioned the weather satellites. There is 

communications. We depend on space assets for many aspects of 

our modern technical civilization, so what we really seek is public 

support, not necessarily excitement. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I think that the best way to maintain public support is with an unwavering focus on Mars as the destination. The 

night that the Curiosity rover landed on Mars, thousands of people 

turned out in Times Square in New York City at 2:00 in the morning just so they could watch it on the big screen. It has captured 

the public imagination. It has captured public interest. And so I 

think the best way to maintain that interest is to maintain an unwavering focus on Mars as the ultimate destination and show how 

each milestone along the way is connected to reaching that destination. 
69 

Mr. COOKE. I would agree with that. And the Mars program has 

done an incredible job of making people aware of what is happening and getting them excited about it, and it is a model, I think, 

for what we do. I think a key aspect of this is having a plan that 

people recognize. We don’t have one right now, a long-term plan on 

how to get to Mars. I think we need one with defined steps that 

are exciting, that we know will make a—will have achievements 

that contribute to the ultimate goal. And if we have a wide range 

of stakeholders including the science community and including the 

public and including media, including academia and private industry as a part of the—of defining that set of objectives and goals, 

then you build in advocacy from those groups that also are part of 

the plan. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for five 

minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Holy cow. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I have been—I would just like to ask a fundamental question 

here because we have been talking about mission to Mars, okay, 

mission to Mars and different approaches to mission to Mars and 

what—I would like to ask the panel whether or not they think a 

mission to Mars is worth the cost or not. I mean if we do a mission 

to Mars—and correct me if I am wrong—we will have to defund 

most of the—I mean if we are going to do it now, start now and 

go directly into a mission to Mars, we are going to have to defund, 

you know, asteroid detection and then deflection. I mean we might 

as well forget that. I mean that is expensive. Debris cleanup which 

unless we don’t—unless we clean up the debris, of course, we may 

end up having our own use of near space being cut off from the future satellites because debris is knocking our satellites out of the 

air, no more GPS communication satellites, et cetera. Or how about 

space astronomy, which we know there is some very important 

projects moving forward with various telescopes that could give us 

a really in-depth view of the universe. 

You know, reading the—I mean unless we think that the tooth 

fairy is going to leave all the money under the pillow in order to 

accomplish a mission to Mars, is it really worthwhile, the vast expense and the canceling of programs like this in order for us to 

take off and start heading on a Mars mission now? I will just go 

right down the line. That is fine. 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Well, thank you, Congressman. You and I have 

been Mars supporters for a long time but I think you are quite 

right in asking exactly that question. Certainly, I haven’t heard 

any of us advocate canceling programs in order to go to Mars right 

now. I tried to make clear in my statement that we not only don’t 

have the money to do it but I don’t think we have the complete 

technical knowledge or the scientific understanding. What we are 

building up with the robotic mission to Mars, what we are building 

up with taking humans into more complex endeavors in space, but 

as—and technical steps has to be done. We go to Mars when we 

can afford it. I think that is one of the things that—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we can’t afford it now. Next? Thank you 

for that answer. 
70 

Dr. SPUDIS. There—you can sort of imagine two ways that you 

might go to Mars. And one way you could go to Mars is like we 

went to the Moon with Apollo. We design a spacecraft, we develop 

an architecture, we launch everything that we take—we need for 

the voyage from the surface of the Earth, an enormously difficult 

and mind-bogglingly expensive thing to do considering how much 

it costs to launch stuff and you need at least one million pounds 

in LEO to go to Mars with chemical propulsion. The other way that 

you might go to Mars is to have it be a logical extension of an expanding space-faring system, so you build it with building blocks. 

You start with small pieces that basically access the various spots 

in cislunar and then go to Mars when you have that system in 

place ready to support a Mars mission. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But that is not just saying that we are now 

going to start—this is our project, we are starting going to Mars 

and that is how we are doing it. 

Dr. SPUDIS. No, it is—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And you said you build it into your existing 

projects. 

Dr. SPUDIS. Yeah, it is one of the destinations that you plan 

to—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So I take it your answer to my question is 

now, we should not start on a way to Mars right now as a project 

on its own? 

Dr. SPUDIS. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SQUYRES. Despite the fact that I have spent my entire career 

devoting my efforts to robotic exploration of the surface of Mars, I 

am personally a strong supporter of the eventual human exploration of Mars. Two reasons: first, humans are far more capable explorers then robots are. What our magnificent state-of-the-art Opportunity rovers accomplished in 9–1/2 years on Mars, Paul Spudis, 

who is an experienced geologist, could have done in a good week. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, I think we all agree that eventually 

human beings are going to go to Mars and we are—because we are 

on this Committee, we love that vision and hopefully it may be in 

our lifetime maybe, but eventually isn’t the question. The question 

is should we start right now a program at NASA that is engaged 

in spending significant sums of money that specifically as a Mars— 

manmade Mars mission? 

Dr. SQUYRES. My answer is yes in the following sense—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Dr. SQUYRES. —that the next logical step, I believe, on the road 

to Mars is to reestablish our capability to operate in orbit around 

another object, specifically the Moon—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Um-hum. 

Dr. SQUYRES. —and that is the next logical space—next logical 

place for human spaceflight, and I think we should embark on that 

as soon as possible. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And that was as part of a Mars overall— 

Dr. SQUYRES. To eventually get us to Mars, yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think we can do some of these things without necessarily having the Mars in the background but, as we just 

heard, building it into a program. What about yourself? 
71 

Mr. COOKE. I would submit that we are already on that path in 

certain ways. It is not necessarily a well-defined path but, for instance, everything that we learned from Mars robotic missions is 

applicable to our knowledge base that contributes to what we need 

to know to go to Mars. I would say also that the work that is being 

done on International Space Station right now in terms of understanding human frailties and how to address those, many of those 

in fact that human research program is aimed at what you need 

to know about people and their ability to survive in order to go on 

long missions like to Mars. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. COOKE. So I would say we are already on that path that 

needs to be more coordinated and to understand the intermediate 

steps better. And another part—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And would you then suggested that we 

should be channeling the money out from this asteroid detection 

and perhaps a debris cleanup and—or defund the—for example, the 

astronomy projects we heard about? You would then be supportive 

of channeling that money into a direct program that is going to 

Mars? 

Mr. COOKE. I would not stop all these programs. It is a matter 

of priorities and we—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right. It is a matter of priorities. 

Mr. COOKE. And we need to establish in light of a well-thoughtout, long-duration human spaceflight plan that is coordinated with 

robotic missions and coordinated with these other things to establish what steps can be taken when. It is not all or nothing in my 

opinion. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having this hearing and I believe that the last gentleman was right. 

We have to establish our priorities, and if we try to prioritize something that today has not come, we are doing a big disservice to the 

young people who are depending on the technologies that we can 

put in place right now and utilize if we end up not having the astronomy or the debris cleanup that we need to utilize space simply 

because we have mission unaccomplishable in mind in terms of 

Mars. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Schweikert for five minutes. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in some ways 

the extension of where Dana was going, all right, let’s deal with 

sort of the reality of our world up here. I mean we have a, you 

know, government that is being consumed by mandatory spending, 

you know, our entitlement state. You know, it is just—it is math. 

It is not political. It is the reality of where we are at. 

So I come to the four of you gentlemen. You are all brilliant. You 

all have your expertise, but if you listen to each other, you all have 

very different visions. If I came to you and said help us build a box 

of decision-making with the resources we actually have, I am not 

asking you what you think it should be; first, what would you do 

to analyze saying this is what resources, this is our timeline, how 

would you build that decision-making model? Start on my left, and 

it is more do I need to put all of you in a room and the last man 
72 

standing wins? Do—is it—I, you know, what is the appropriate 

process here? 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Well, if we use that approach, I am at a big disadvantage so I would rather not—I will try some other one. The 

mission to the asteroid, which I have been speaking about, doesn’t 

replace missions to the Moon or mission to Mars. It is part of a 

step of technology development and capability in space. The mission—the only mission it replaces is the one that was going to 

empty space, lunar orbit. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Let me sort of rephrase my box on the question. 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Okay. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Do we actually have both, in your opinion, a 

structure between those of us and Congress, those who are the expertise in space and NASA and the exploration world—I am sorry; 

we have a lot of echo coming—to say here is what we have resources for, here is what is rational within that, here is where we 

are going technology on the curve, here is how we lay it out. 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Without taking into account sequestration, which 

I don’t understand, I think you have the existing program right 

now could take these first steps and accomplish the SLS Orion asteroid retrieval, humans taking a first step beyond the Moon in the 

existing program. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Doctor? 

Dr. SPUDIS. In order to figure out how to get where you are 

going, you have to know where you are going to begin with. And 

I look at as—I looked on it as your job as part of the national leadership to sort of set the long-term strategic direction. How we get 

there is a way—is an implementation decision. In the way you— 

you should oversee that but I don’t think Congress should necessarily define it. What you should do is ask for specific technical 

advice and then weigh the options and then make your decisions 

on that basis. 

I—you know, I wish I could say there is some magic bullet that 

I can give you guys that would tell you instantly that this is the 

path we need to follow and there you would be. We all have different views on how to get there. We all want to do that. But my 

basic observation is that if you craft a program with small incremental steps that all work together, eventually, you can build any 

kind of capability you want under any kind of budgetary environment because effectively you are building it with small steps. You 

are not trying to take big chunks out of it. 

Dr. SQUYRES. Two messages, sir. The first one is that I believe 

that all four of us would agree that the logical next step is lunar 

orbit. It is going there to reestablish the capability to operate in 

deep space and to do the kinds of tasks that are going to be necessary for any of the pathways that we are talking about. So all 

of us, I believe, agree on the next step: orbit the Moon. Okay. 

Beyond that, my plea to you, my heartfelt plea is please do not 

dictate—please do not mandate another step for NASA beyond 

lunar orbit unless there is ample funding to pay for it. As I remarked in my opening comments, that would amount to an unfunded mandate, and that is the bane of government agencies. 

What that would result in, I believe, would be dilution, dispersion 
73 

of efforts, wasted effort, and eventually is going to take longer to 

get to where we want to go. 

Mr. COOKE. Once again, I think that we need to have a well-established, long-term plan that is derived by stakeholders, and we 

all understand what it is so we know what steps we can take and 

we need to look at the near-term budget run-out and figure out 

what is the best expenditure of those funds in making our way 

down that path and come up with a preferred path but understand 

what constraints you have and try to work within those bounds. 

Also as a part of this we need to understand what exit criteria 

we have for programs. That is something we don’t do most often 

because we have a program, we want to keep funding it. But there 

is a time when you get to a point of diminishing returns in a program and then you say, well, we want to make these next steps so 

you free up those funds to go to those next steps. So there is—there 

can be logical paths. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. So also the willingness to cancel something 

once it has either lived its life or—— 

Mr. COOKE. Right. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. —not going anywhere. 

Mr. COOKE. So that we can invest in what comes next. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. All right. Thank you. At this time, we are 

going to go into a second round of questions if there is no objections. None being heard. 

My first question is are—and since we have been talking about 

an asteroid retrieval mission, we have also been talking about how 

we are going to get back to Mars and the Moon seems to be, I 

guess, the majority consensus of—would be a good first step in that 

direction. My question is are you aware of any other countries that 

are trying to get to the Moon right now? And if so, what countries 

could they be and what are their expectations? What is driving 

their lunar mission? And that is for everyone and we will start 

with Dr. Friedman. 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Well, Russia has two lunar missions they are 

planning in this decade but they are both robotic and they, other 

than that, vaguely talk about humans going to the—having—reinvigorating their manned program with a future lunar destination 

but no active program going on in that. I believe no country has 

a human program to the Moon. There is talk about Russia, there 

is talk about China, but they don’t have any human program and 

they are a long way off from doing that. 

Dr. SPUDIS. Well, as a matter of fact, there is a—a lot of the new 

discoveries about the poles of the Moon have been discovered by a 

fleet of international lunar orbiters in the past five years. I was involved in the Indian Chandrayaan-1 mission. We flew a payload on 

that mission to map the poles of the Moon with radar. The Japanese had an enormous satellite that orbited the Moon and mapped 

it, the Kaguya. China sent two spacecraft to the Moon. Orbiters are 

getting ready to send a lander this year, I believe. ESA has sent 

spacecraft, European Space Agency. There is a lot of international 

interest in the Moon. 
74 

In terms of human missions, there was a great deal of interest 

and support in the European Community for our lunar effort before 

it was canceled. A lot of them were very upset by that. I have a 

lot of colleagues in ESA and European countries who really didn’t 

understand why the Moon was just discarded without any thought 

or any debate. And yet they are still interested in the Moon. They 

see the value of going there. They still want to go there with people. 

The other big player is China and they clearly have a vigorous 

lunar program. They have a vigorous manned program. Clearly, 

that is on their strategic horizon. I don’t know what their ultimate 

goals are. I suspect at this stage it is largely to show they can do 

it like we did it 50 years ago, but if—they can see the value of 

going back to the Moon just like anyone else here can. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I think Dr. Spudis has done an admirable job of 

summarizing the robotic missions to the Moon taking place lately, 

basically everybody is doing it. There is enormous interest on the 

part of all major national space agencies, and I have nothing further to add with respect—I have no particular insights regarding 

the plans of other space agencies for human exploration of the 

Moon. 

Mr. COOKE. There have been discussions since about 2006 with 

13 other space agencies with NASA in developing lunar objectives 

and participating in that. And in fact, about a year ago, I was on 

a committee where Russians came in and proposed that the U.S. 

join with them in leading lunar exploration—human lunar exploration. I think there is very widespread support and interest in 

lunar exploration and I believe a lot of our international partners 

are looking for us to be leading them. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I definitely agree there are international 

partners looking to us for space leadership, and hopefully, in the 

days and years and decades to come, we will be able to provide it. 

Now, for example, if one of these countries does achieve human 

lunar mission, and say perhaps it is China and they create some 

kind of infrastructure on the Moon, and the United States or international partners have no participation in this, do you see any concerns that, you know, them having infrastructure and the United 

States and NASA not having any infrastructure could be—is that 

a warranted question? And we can just go down the line if anybody 

wants to volunteer. 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. The United States and the Soviet Union spent 

nearly $300 billion of today’s kind of money translated to the past 

on missions to the Moon. As soon as they got there, they quit. As 

soon as the United States got there, they quit. There has been very 

little drive either in the science community or technical community 

to spend anywhere near those kinds of sums of money. I do not believe the Chinese will find any more gold on the Moon than the 

United States or the Soviet Union did. 

Dr. SPUDIS. Well, we didn’t know at that time that there was 

gold on the Moon and the gold is at the poles and it is in the form 

of water, which is the most useful commodity you can have to create capability and spaceflight. Now, I don’t think it is something 

that—having the Chinese going to the Moon is something we 

should worry about but it might be something to worry about if we 
75 

are not there as well, because fundamentally, if you are on the 

frontier and you are the only one doing something, then it is your 

worldview, your political economic system, your values that determine the values on the frontier. If we are not there, whose values 

will be determining that? 

Dr. SQUYRES. If we all agree that our long-term focus is Mars 

and getting humans to Mars in a logical stepwise fashion is the 

goal of our human spaceflight program, I see no particular concerns 

one way or the other with the Chinese going to the Moon. I don’t 

think that measurably affects our ability to do what we really want 

to do, which is send humans to explore Mars. 

Mr. COOKE. So one point on this is that great nations have always explored, and if China is going to the Moon and we are not— 

and we are muddling around somehow, we are not going to be leading. And so I think there is a point in all of that. I think the United 

States should aspire to be leaders in space exploration. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Well, thank you. And since this is going to 

be our last round of questions, I am going to take a little liberty 

with time and I encourage my Members to do the same. 

This question is for Mr. Cooke and Dr. Friedman. The Keck 

study proposed to the use of advanced hall thrusters for the mission concept as opposed to other forms of solar-electric propulsion. 

What advantages would hall thrusters offer that other types of 

thrusters such as VASIMR do not? Dr. Friedman or Mr. Cooke? 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Well, this is a little bit out of my expertise so I 

am going to have to relay what others have told me, and that is 

that the—both the efficiency and the availability, the hall thrusters 

having been used in space and now being developed and usually 

scaled up to this kind of a mission, VASIMR is certainly the kind 

of thing we should look to in the future when we get to the surface 

of other worlds and certainly on Mars missions. But I think for the 

fact that we want to do this mission in just three or four years, hall 

thrusters are here now and they are available, and so they are efficient enough. They can be scaled to the right power level now. 

Mr. COOKE. I believe that hall thrusters probably have the most 

experience in terms of electric propulsion. I actually used to fund 

VASIMR when I was at Johnson Space Center and it certainly is 

very interesting technology and uses more readily accessible fuels 

than the xenon that is required for electric propulsion. The question I have is have we by default somehow made a decision that 

electric propulsion is exactly the right way to get to Mars? There 

is also nuclear thermal propulsion, there is nuclear electric, there 

is—we do need high-efficiency propulsion but I think we are using 

electric propulsion in this case because it is most readily available 

and it is in the form of hall thrusters. But I am not sure that the 

decision—or discussions have been made—or had—or the arguments made to that that is absolutely the right propulsion technique for Mars—eventual Mars—human Mars exploration. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for allowing us to go on a bit because I think this is really the core of 

what it is that we have got to come to some agreement about over 

these next several weeks. I think it has been a shame that NASA 

as an agency and the industry has not had the kind of concerted 
76 

direction both from the Congress and from various Administrations 

that really is appropriate to the task that is in front of the Agency. 

I share Dr. Squyres’ concerns about, you know, aligning the 

budget and the workforce to the work that we are charged with 

doing. I think it has been quite unfortunate that the Agency has 

been put in a position of having a lot of ideas thrust into its basket 

and none of the money that is required to perform at the—in the 

kind of way that we need it to. 

And so Dr. Squyres, I know that you talked about the importance 

of human exploration and how that can serve the task of galvanizing the collective spirit of all of us that then will allow for the 

match of the money with that spirit and excitement and so I appreciate that. And so I want to explore what is going on with SLS and 

Orion because, Dr. Squyres, as you indicated in your statement 

that no human-rated launch system in NASA’s history will fly as 

infrequently as that projected for SLS and Orion and the effect of 

such a low launch rate, as you stated, would make it difficult to 

maintain program momentum and to keep flight teams sharp and 

mission-ready. 

And Mr. Cooke, you indicated in your statement that SLS and 

Orion are essential to any human spaceflight strategy. So I wonder 

if you can comment about how funding to date, which has been 

lower than what has been authorized, has impacted your position 

on this and if SLS and Orion are critical regardless of the interim 

strategy. Aren’t we putting NASA behind the 8 ball by not adequately funding SLS and Orion? 

Dr. SQUYRES. I am deeply worried about this as I noted in my 

written testimony. If you look at the current plans for SLS and 

Orion, they call for an Orion flight, no crew on board, in 2014 

launched not on SLS but on a Delta IV Heavy to go far from the 

Earth, come back, and reenter and validate that part of the system. 

Next, we hope in 2017 would be another flight again with no crew 

on board. And then finally, the first flight with an actual crew on 

board would be eight years from now in 2021 at the earliest to 

probably orbit the Moon, which is I think, as I said, a logical next 

step, and then a flight right after that that is maybe something 

like every two years or so as we can afford to do it. If you look back 

at every human-rated flight system that we have ever had over 

NASA’s history, none has flown so infrequently and I am deeply 

concerned about this. 

You can quibble all you want about whether SLS is the right design, whether Orion is the right design, but those decisions have 

been made. What I now see is a program that is not funded at an 

adequate level to allow that system to be proven out in—at a logical pace. And that is why I beg of you as a committee not to pile 

more objectives on NASA beyond what they are already trying to 

do because they don’t even have enough money to do what they are 

trying to do now. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So if we came to a conclusion that Mars is the 

next ultimate destination and we need a launch vehicle, wouldn’t 

it make sense given that we know that is what we need to make 

those investments that we have to make to keep us on a pathway 

but to do it in a way that ensures that, you know, forget the eightyear path, that there are some number of events, of activities that 
77 

ensured safety and mission teams that were able to provide the 

kind of support that they need and to be mission-ready? It would 

seem to me that we would need to really—if that is our goal, that 

we would really need to frontload what we are doing so that we 

could stay on a pathway that would result in any kind of success 

over the next decade. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I think there are two elements. I think the first 

element is, as you say, to more adequately fund SLS and Orion so 

that they can be developed and proven out on a pace that really 

supports, I think, a safe pathway towards developing these cislunar 

orbit capabilities that we have talked about as the next step. And 

the other is that, in parallel with that, begin to sensibly and aggressively pursue international partnerships that may provide 

other pieces of the puzzle. 

I stress, however, that if we intend to involve international partners in a deep, meaningful way in this adventure to Mars, we need 

to recognize that those international partners should have a seat 

at the table when it comes to the negotiating what the steps beyond lunar orbit ought to be. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Mr. Cooke? 

Mr. COOKE. I think you are definitely on the right path. Once 

again, those—the capability, for instance, for SLS with its capacity, 

it is not only just lifting mass but it is also volume of payloads and 

diameters that you need for the kind of human spaceflight elements that we are going to launch down the road and a deep space 

crew vehicle is—has capabilities that are incredibly important as 

well. The flight rate is dependent and is driven totally by funding 

at this point. They are going through the development, which is a 

cost, but then you—then the recurring units that you get to when 

you actually start flying missions, of course, they are expensive. So 

the flight rate in itself is driven by funding. 

And I will go back to a point I made earlier, the fact that they 

definitely need more funding. I also believe that starting with inflation because the effect of flatlined budget with no inflation increase 

means that your buying power is decreasing and it is compounding 

interest. So as you work down the years, your buying power goes— 

is actually going down. You are able to afford less and you are flying less. And so the inflation aspect of the funding is a first step 

in that discussion. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In the last two decades we have had two dozen or more programs 

to nowhere, programs that were started under one Administration 

or one Congress and canceled or funding stopped by the next or another, and I think one of the biggest fears that we all have is that 

we will have more of those, that whatever direction we ultimately 

agree to go in tomorrow that the next day or the next Congress or 

the next Administration might decide to cease and pivot into another direction, which Constellation, for example, was a waste of $9 

billion. 

Congressman Culberson has proposed the REAL Space Act that 

basically would set up a board of directors comprised of astronauts, 

eminent scientists, and such, and that board would appoint an ad-
78 

ministrator for a term of ten years. I don’t know if it is a rolling 

ten years, how they will do it, but try and give some sustainability, 

some continuity to our space assets and their aspirations in our 

programs. 

And I realize, you know, nobody in the near future is going to 

figure out how to make chicken salad out of chicken manure, but 

I wonder how you feel Culberson’s plan would work in reality, if 

you think that would be part of the answer that might help us sustain our programs. And we can start with Mr. Friedman. 

Dr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I am not sure that that is a magic bullet, 

but certainly we all want stability in the program, and anything 

that the Congress can do to add to that, which of course means 

would they really be giving up their year-by-year funding authority 

on programs? 

I think the key to sustainability really relates also to your first 

question, which is that public interest. We—if the program is exciting and bringing back results while it is undergoing, not some distant future but something that we can do in the current decade, 

the next decade and making—setting distance records and speed 

records and new accomplishment for human spaceflight, learning 

new things in other worlds, that will—that is the only way we can 

sustain the space program, and to me, that is going to be the key 

to have a publicly exciting, interesting program. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. 

Dr. SPUDIS. Yeah, I would certainly agree with that in the sense 

that regular milestones on short timescales are critical. You need 

to craft a program that provides paybacks that can be seen under 

reasonable lengths of time, five years, four years, something like 

that. If you don’t have the program structured that way, you are 

trying to bite off too big of a chunk. I need a giant 50-ton lunar 

lander and I have got to have it by this date. You are not going 

to go anywhere. You are going to consign yourself to future programs to nowhere. 

So what I have tried to do is to look at this from a systems point 

of view. How can I craft a program where I use small pieces? Each 

one is not particularly expensive in itself but can be operated together as a complex system. And I think that can be done. And one 

of the values of going to the Moon is that it is close enough to 

where you can do that. You can actually use robotic systems to create bigger, complex systems out of small pieces so that gives you 

the ability to start returning regular progress on very short 

timescales, and I think that is the key to long-term sustainability. 

Dr. SQUYRES. I am not personally familiar enough with Mr. 

Culberson’s proposed plan to comment on whether it is the key to 

maintaining programs—— 

Mr. POSEY. No, not the key. No program is perfect but just, you 

know, your initial thoughts. 

Dr. SQUYRES. Well, I agree with the previous two speakers that 

establishing and maintaining stability in this program is critically 

important. And while the money that gets wasted is a big problem, 

I think another very big problem has to do with squandering our 

most precious resource. The most precious thing that NASA has is 

not SLS, it is not Orion, it is not the Curiosity rover. It is the 

NASA workforce and the knowledge base that they possess. And 
79 

what I see when I see NASA changing direction on timescales of 

a few years is I see demoralization of that workforce and I see erosion of that workforce. And I am constantly discouraged when I see 

immensely talented young engineers and young scientists who currently work for NASA deciding that the best place for them to pursue their goals in space is someplace else. And if we cannot maintain a continuity of vision and a continuity of purpose within the 

Agency, we are going to lose that workforce, we are going to lose 

that capability, and NASA will no longer be able to do what it currently can do. 

Mr. POSEY. Well, they did that after Apollo and they are doing 

it after Shuttle, and I don’t think anybody at NASA actually laid 

a hand on the vehicles but all the people that did are looking for 

jobs now. They are out of work and they are not going to come back 

when you call them to come back. It is a tremendous loss of talent 

and personnel. 

Mr. COOKE. I have read that plan that you mentioned and I 

think it has merit and it should—it merits discussion. I go back to 

the fact, though, that you need a stable, strategic plan on human 

spaceflight as well, and then that sort of a structure could then be 

one you would have confidence perhaps and to manage it. So I 

think that is important. 

And I will use an example of where stability has made a huge 

difference in a program and it was space station. In the late ’80s 

and early ’90s, there—the funding was up and down, very much 

like what is going through on SLS and MPCV Orion. And we went 

through a redesign. I was in the middle of all that. I led the engineering under Brian O’Connor and then Bill Shepherd, but we 

came out of that with an approach and we got stable funding for 

a number of years. And whereas the program before Space Station 

Freedom was redesigning and renegotiating contracts every year, 

we had stable funding that we were able to plan against and actually make progress. And I think without that stability in funding 

that we got back then—it was $2.1 billion a year I believe—we 

might not have made it. And the space station is a credit to everyone who ever worked on it because it is an incredible feat. But the 

stability—that is an example of where stability turned a program 

around in my view. 

Mr. POSEY. And that was sustained by at one time one vote in 

the House. 

Mr. COOKE. Yes, it was. And it was right at that time, it was, 

yeah. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members 

of the Committee may have additional questions for you and we 

will ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will remain 

open for two weeks for additional comments and written questions 

from Members. 

The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(81) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
82 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Louis Friedman 
83 

support. In addition to harnessing greater financial resources, it will also 

add to the technical assets that can be engaged on the project. 

a. NASA can accomplish a human mission to Mars without the 

international community - but it most likely will not. I believe 

international cooperation is a prerequisite for the broad public interest 

and political support that will be necessary to sustain such an 

undertaking. That was proven on the International Space Station. 

b. The Asteroid Retrieval Mission (ARM) is of course not an approved 

project and therefore any international cooperation arrangements 

would have been very premature. However, in the KISS study, we 

included presentation and discussions with the European Space Agency 

and their Near-Earth Objects study office had representation in the 

study. We also presented the ARM to an international meeting of 

space agencies and industry and held preliminary discussions about 

potential international interest with representatives from Europe, 

Japan and Russia. It is of course also to be understood that unlike 

Moon or Mars landings, robotic asteroid retrieval is a much lower cost 

mission - it will be the full human asteroid mission that will bring in 

the larger elements of international cooperation. 

2. Generally speaking, which mission is more attractive to the scientific community, the asteroid retrieval mission, 

or a lunar landing? What has been studied more thoroughly by the scientific community? 

2. The planetary science community is of course more familiar with and has 

studied more the idea of humans landing on the Moon than have they 

considered about an human asteroid mission. This is a natural result of 

there having been already 6 human landings and more than 100 other 

robotic missions to, around and on the Moon. To the larger science 

community - including physics, chemistry, life SCiences, materials SCience, 

etc. I would hesitate to say whether another Moon landing would or would 

not be more attractive than the asteroid retrieval. However, we must keep 

in mind that the purpose of the asteroid retrieval is not science - it is the 

development of human space flight, including the advancement of 

engineering and technology to extend human space flight beyond the Moon. 

3. How will a dedicated survey program that focuses on identifying non-hazardous 7-10 meter asteroids affect the 

existing survey program to identify larger asteroids that could harm the planet? 

3. A dedicated survey program looking for any size asteroid will inherently find 

every size asteroid. Years ago in testimony to the House Science Committee 

it was noted that looking for large objects (potentially hazardous) would 

increase our discovery of small objects. The reverse is even truer, since the 

telescopes and other instrumentation necessary to find small objects will be 

more powerful and increase the discovery and characterization rate of all 

objects. The proposed program for asteroid observation increase is a giant 

step forward for asteroid discoveries - of potentially hazardous, potentially 

commercial and potentially scientific interest. 
84 

4. In his written testimony, Mr. Cooke mentioned that an additional "robotic mission may be needed in advance of 

any human mission to characterize the candidate asteroid." Is this true? Does NASA account for this in their 

Asteroid Retrieval Mission? 

4. Mr. Cooke is probably correct in asserting that a precursor visit to the human 

asteroid target may be necessary. The ARM actually is exactly that - it will 

serve to completely characterize the target asteroid, and maximize the 

probability of safety and good planning of astronaut operations there. I 

doubt that it will be necessary to have a precursor to the precursor, that is to 

the ARM - since the planning of the robotic mission can be done in a robust 

and reliable way building on the expected knowledge from Earth-based 

observations about the target asteroid. 

To the Questions from ReD. Edwards: 

When I tell my constituents about the great work NASA does, the subject of how NASA affects everyday lives often 

makes its way into the conversation. In considering your knowledge of what technologies will be needed for 

human missions to Mars, could you describe how some ofthose potential technologies and capabilities might find 

their way into the mainstream? Is there any way to predict the possible economic impact of these potential 

innovations? 

1. Predicting how the results and experience of great scientific and technical 

ventures will affect individual lives is truly a hard question. We do these 

things precisely because we don't know how or in what ways benefits come 

home. Imagine a life without satellites -now used every day by everyone 

for communications, weather prediction, navigation, land use decisions, etc. 

Imagine a life without quantum physics which we every day employ in our 

computers and controls of household appliances and automobiles. Imagine 

not knowing about the effect of a runaway greenhouse on planetary climate 

or of the behavior of atmospheric dust storms. We did not predict such 

practical benefits from the first space probes, from quantum physics theory, 

or from planetary missions to Venus and Mars. In addition to practical 

benefits new knowledge alters our perspective about ourselves. Knowing 

whether the Earth goes around the Sun or Sun goes around the Earth makes 

no difference to my practical daily life - but it sure alters my view of life and 

the universe. Similarly, I cannot name a single "product" from the Apollo 

program that gave me any personal benefit - except that the Apollo program 

created in me a desire and the means to enter the fields of science and 

engineering and gain expertise which has helped my country create some of 

the greatest achievements of human history. I would like to think my 

experience in space exploration has been a positive contribution to the 

nation's economic growth. I hope our current younger generation has similar 

opportunities. 

To what extent can potential international partners contribute key enabling technologies to an eventual human 

mission to Mars? When should potential international partners be asked to participate? 

2. Concerning international partners, I have described general benefits of 

international cooperation in response the questions from Rep. Palazzo. With 
85 

respect to citing particular benefits we know that Europe, Russia and Japan 

have comet and asteroid mission program and have developed science 

instruments which could help ARM and asteroid exploration. One example is 

a neutron mass spectrometer used on U.S. missions but supplied by Russia. 

This has been valuable on Mars and Moon missions. In addition to science 

sensors, both Europe and Japan are studying potential capture mechanisms 

for asteroids, and Japan has experience with landing and sampling a nearEarth asteroid. Russia has experience with electric propulsion and in fact 

supplies solar electric engines to U.S. industry in other satellite programs. 

Experience by Canada with the robotic arm could also assist in asteroid 

capture and in the robotic elements of the human mission. ESA is 

developing a crew support vehicle which should also assist human 

exploration of the asteroid. In short, there are number of engineering and 

science opportunities where international cooperation can increase the 

capabilities of ARM and potentially reduce U.S. costs for human asteroid 

missions. 

To what extent does NASA understand the operations required to support a human mission to a near Earth 

asteroid? . 

3. NASA certainly understands what are and how to do the operations for a 

human mission to a near-Earth asteroid. However, they do not have 

currently have the capabilities for such a mission, unless the robotic asteroid 

retrieval is first achieved. We do not have either the propulsion or crew 

support vehicle to reach a near-Earth asteroid except for one brought to 

Earth-Moon space. With the asteroid in lunar orbit, NASA can perform 

human operations and science there; they have emphatically proved that 

with their operations at the International Space Station and with the shuttle. 

A human mission to a near-Earth asteroid is a step beyond low Earth orbit 

but without the much harder complexities of lunar landing and surface 

survival and Mars entry and descent. It will require an extension of current 

capabilities and NASA will have to develop techniques, devices, and new 

robotic and human operations to carry it out. That is the purpose of this 

step to develop new capabilities to take humans further into space for 

longer periods of time. 

Would the technologies and capabilities developed for an asteroid capture and retrieval mission enable a next step 

to Mars, or would other interim steps be required before undertaking a human mission to Mars? 

4. The Asteroid Retrieval Mission is the only way to enable a human mission to 

an asteroid - at least for the next 15 years and the technologies and 

capabilities developed on the human mission to the asteroid are a necessary 

precursor to human flight to Mars. It will be the first step toward 

interplanetary space beyond the Moon. Specifically, the mission will prove 

out a significant advancement in SEP technology, demonstrate proximity 

operations beyond LEO and EVA with a potentially hazardous asteroid, And 

expose the astronauts to the radiation environment beyond low Earth orbit, 
86 

for several (3) weeks - helping to answer one of the principal questions for a 

human interplanetary flight. The astronaut's operational experience at the 

asteroid is the same as would be required at the Martian moons which 

many think will be a precursor to landing on Mars. 

To what extent does the asteroid capture and retrieval mission differ from a human mission to a non-relocated 

near Earth asteroid? How are the capabilities and operational activities required for sending humans to a near 

Earth asteroid different or similar to those required for sending humans to a relocated asteroid? Does the 

relocated asteroid initiative satisfy the rationale given for the President's goal that he stated in 2010? 

5. The Asteroid Retrieval Mission is a precursor to relocate an asteroid so that it 

can be reached by humans within the next ten years. There is no way we 

could otherwise conduct a human asteroid mission - the relocation is 

necessary. The human mission to the asteroid relocated to lunar orbit would 

be a several week mission instead of a 6-9 month mission. A return to Earth 

would take only days instead of months. Nonetheless it would contain all 

elements of the longer duration mission to an asteroid further away, not 

relocated, including exposure to cosmic ray radiation. 

a. To some extent whether the mission to the asteroid relocated in lunar 

orbit satisfies the President's goal of a human mission to an asteroid 

by 2025 or not is a matter of semantics. Strictly speaking, it does. 

However, in my opinion, a human mission to a near-Earth asteroid 

located in its natural orbit further out in interplanetary space is still a 

necessary step on the way to Mars. We will undoubtedly want a series 

of steps with regular milestones as we build up the capability for 

human to Mars mission - much as we did throughout the Gemini and 

Apollo program building up to the human lunar landing in 1969. 

The inspirational value of a human spaceflight has been a critical means for establishing interest in space and for 

attracting the next generation to STEM education and careers. The National Academies report, NASA's Strategic 

Direction and the Need for a National Consensus, stated that "The committee has seen little evidence that a urrent 

stated gaol for NASA's human spaceflight program-namely, to visit an asteroid by 202S-has been widely accepted 

as a compelling destination by NASA's own worli/orce, by the nation as a whole, or by the international 

community." What is your response to the flnding of the National Academies? 

6. I agree completely with the National Academies conclusion that an asteroid is 

not a compelling destination for human space flight. Mars is the only 

compelling destination. But we cannot achieve Mars in one giant step - we 

need to build up that capability and achieve interesting and valuable 

milestones along the way. The asteroid mission is very interesting and very 

valuable. And the asteroid retrieval makes it possible. 

To the question from Rep. Kilner 

At the hearing, it was evident that evolving space propulsion will be a key enabler for any human mission to Mars. 

What are your thoughts on the need to develop space propulsion technologies that will enable the various 

necessary human exploration missions on the pathway of missions leading us to Mars? To your knowledge, are 

these technologies being addressed by NASA and are they, in your opinion, adequately prioritized in the agency's 

current and planned future budgets? What are the key factors that need to be considered in estimating the time to 

develop, test and field these technologies and in assessing the cost versus benefit of each? 
87 

One of the major benefits of the Asteroid Retrieval Mission is electric 

propulsion development. It scales up by a factor of 4 from current operating 

deep space systems. Another factor of 4 would enable human missions with 

electric propulsion leading to Mars. Many in the space community want 

nuclear power for large power systems, but debate about political 

considerations and safety issues render this uncertain. Meanwhile solar 

electric systems are proving more and more capable, and with enough 

development we still may be to carry out the human to Mars mission. I 

personally do not think enough is being done with nuclear power sources, but 

I do think NASA is dOing a good job with solar electric development. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you and all the members of your subcommittee for the 

opportunity to discuss the subject with you. I again ask you to reconsider the 

prohibition for NASA to develop the ARM that is included in the proposed 

Authorization legislation. I do not believe I am being hyperbolic in stating that 

without the early milestones for human exploration offered by the asteroid retrieval 

and subsequent human mission to it, interest and support for the American space 

program will wither away under the blanket of budget constraints. 

Sincerely, 

Louis Friedman, Ph.D. 

Co-leader, Keck Institute for Space Studies Asteroid Retrieval Study 

and Executive Director Emeritus and Co-Founder, The Planetary Society 

2660 Paloma Street 

Pasadena CA 91107 
88 

Responses by Dr. Paul Spudis 

Responses to Questions for the Record 

Paul D. Spudis 

15 June 2013 

Questions from Chairman Palazzo 

Paul Spudis Response to QFR Page 1 

1. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 requires NASA to work towards 

establishing a lunar outpost on the Moon. Is this a necessary step to training for a 

mission to Mars? 

I think that it is. The tasks that we need to master on a human Mars mission may all be 

addressed and solved in the course of establishing a permanent outpost on the Moon. 

Moreover, we now know that the material resources of the Moon - specifically, water at 

the poles - can be harvested and used to support a Mars mission. I look upon a lunar 

effort in relation to the Mars mission as one of learning to crawl before we try to walk. It 

is a valuable and necessary learning experience before interplanetary flight is attempted. 

2. Generally speaking, which mission is more attractive to the scientific community, 

the asteroid retrieval mission, or a lunar landing? What has been studied more 

thoroughly by the scientific community? 

It probably depends on which segment of the scientific community you ask, but the value 

of a lunar outpost has been thoroughly studied and documented at length for the past 40 

years, by a wide variety of groups, panels and committees. The value oflunar return has 

been clearly demonstrated beyond any doubt. In contrast, very little attention has been 

given to human asteroid missions. Much of what we would like to learn scientifically 

about asteroids can and is being addressed on a variety of robotic missions. Because of 

the nature of asteroids (randomized piles of homogeneous rubble), there is much less 

value to human visits there than the same to the Moon, which is a miniature planet of 

considerable complexity, requiring human field work to study properly. 

3. Given NASA's notionally Oat budget for the foreseeable future, the Asteroid 

Retrieval Mission will necessarily crowd out other priorities. Rather than spending 

money on this type of mission, should resources be redirected to an SLS second 

stage and a lunar lander? 

An SLS second stage is required for any trips beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) and 

development of that rocket stage is clearly a priority activity. Unless we have an Earth 

departure stage, no one is going anywhere beyond LEO, either to an asteroid, an L-point, 

the Moon or Mars. The optimum design of a lunar lander is dependant on the chosen 

architecture; one emphasizing the use of lunar water to make rocket fuel would dictate a 

smaller, lighter (and cheaper) lander than an architecture in which the lander is discarded 

after each use. If the decision is made to build a lunar surface outpost, the architectural 

dccisions made previously under the Vision for Space Exploration should be re-examined 

and possibly re-scoped to be congruent with the envisioned mission on the Moon. 
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Paul Spudis Response to QFR Page 2 

4. Your written testimony noted the shift to the "flexible path" for human 

exploration that focused on the development of technology rather than a destination. 

What were the most important exploration technology achievements of the past 

three years? How do you think these achievements would have differed if our space 

program were guided by a specific destination? 

My point in bringing up the "flexible path" was to illustrate that it is fUJt the best way to 

achieve genuine spaceflight capability. The experience with technology development 

within NASA for the past couple of decades is not edifying; much research money has 

been spent, but few if any of those developments have seen use in actual spaceflight. I 

believe that we get our best return on technology investment when we are trying to 

develop systems, equipment or procedures to solve actual problems that arise in specific 

circumstances (Le., real flight systems designed to go somewhere). Almost all of the 

great technical innovations for which NASA can claim credit (e.g., medical sensor 

instrumentation, flight software, inertial guidance, digital autopilots) were the result of 

such a genesis. 

5. Your written testimony noted the potential perils of a public relations-centered 

space program. How can we ensure the development of capabilities that will enable 

missions to Mars on an incremental basis without a national security imperative 

such as the space race of the 1960s? 

Although there may well be national security imperatives that eventually compel us to 

undertake a human Mars mission, we cannot count on their advent. In such an 

environment, I suggest that the best way to prepare for missions to planetary destinations 

is to make the development of an incremental, permanent space faring ability our central 

goal. This can be done by gradually extending our "reach" first into cislunar space (the 

volume of space from Earth to the lunar surface). A spaceflight system that can access 

all of these points can also take us to the planets. A key part of such a strategy is to focus 

on learning how to use the material and energy resources of the Moon to refuel 

spacecraft, supply and provision long-term human voyages, and create new space 

systems and capabilities. 

6. NASA requested $20 million in this year's budget to increase observation efforts 

of near-Earth objects. Less than 1 percent ofall the objects that fall in the 7-10 

meter range have been identified and catalogued. What is your confidence that we 

can find an object ofthe appropriate size, orbit, and rotation necessary for this 

mission within the next 10 years? What evidence do you have to support your 

confidence level? 

I suspect that such a discovery is likely, but it would be dependent on the level of effort 

expended. The more small NEOs that you find, the better the odds that you will identify 

one that we can access easily and that possesses the compositional characteristics that we 

decide are required. A dedicated space-based telescope to search for NEOs is the most 

desirable solution, but also the most expensive ($20M would only be a down-payment; 
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Paul Spudis Response to QFR Page 3 

such a mission would cost -$200-300M). An Earth-based instrument is a close second 

choice, but a large fraction of small NEOs will never be detected by it. My suspicion is 

that you will likely find an object that will at least appear to be suitable. 

7. One of the difficulties of the Asteroid Retrieval Mission is the challenge of 

categorizing the objects of interest. What is the scientific value of a human 

encounter with a 7-10 meter asteroid that is not a carbonaceous chondrite? 

Presumably, the value of snagging a carbonaceous chondrite is that it is this class of 

meteorite that contains significant amounts of water (up to 20 wt.%). While true, water 

in asteroids is present in the form of chemically bound water, not free water as in the 

lunar polar ice. As a result, extraction of such from asteroid materials is more complex in 

process and requires more energy for extraction. It is unclear whether the ARM as 

currently envisioned even contemplates any attempt to extract water or other resources. 

Assuming that some different type of asteroid was retrieved, it could be studied up close 

and sampled, but as it would most likely consist of known meteorite types, we would not 

learn much more from this effort than we currently understand from study of meteorites. 

8. What lessons could NASA learn from long-duration missions on the moon? Do 

you see any scientific value in such an endeavor? 

The principal value of long-term human presence on the Moon is to learn how to live and 

work effectively on an alien world. Much of what we would like to do on the Moon is 

known in principle, but attempts to put theory into practice always develops difficulties 

and uncovers unknowns, often of surprising value. Living and working on the Moon -

extracting the resources we need for sustainable presence there - is invaluable 

preparation for journeys to the planets. But beyond this, a permanent return to the Moon 

has immense scientific value in and of itself. The Moon retains a critical and fascinating 

record of its own history and processes as well as recording the same for the Earth-Moon 

system, the Sun and the galaxy. This rich and complex story can be accessed and 

reconstructed in detail by humans and robots working together on the lunar surface. 

9. Your written testimony stated that there is a launch opportunity to the Moon 

every day of the year. How does this compare with launch opportunities for other 

frequently discussed destinations, such as near Earth asteroids? How does this 

affect NASA's ability to test technologies in a safe manner? 

Accessibility is an important consideration for missions to any space destination. The 

Moon is easily accessible because it is already in Earth orbit whereas the other planets 

and asteroids orbit the Sun on their own paths. Thus, we cannot simply depart for an 

NEO or Mars or Jupiter when we want to, but must wait for a time when the orbits of 

both the Earth and our destination bring the bodies to a point which we can reach them 

with the proper impulse and timing. Such an occurrence is infrequent; a launch window 

to Mars opens only every 24 months. Some opportunities are better than others (e.g., it 

takes less energy to reach Mars on some occasions than on others). All the planets tend 

to orbit the Sun in the same plane, but many NEOs have orbital planes inclined to the 
91 

Paul Spudis Response to QFR Page 4 

orbit of the Earth, making launch windows even less frequent and/or requiring more 

energy to reach them. The net effect of these complications means that missions to such 

destinations must be planned carefully to depart on time, lest a launch window is missed 

and additional costs are incurred, awaiting the next opportunity. Moreover, this relative 

inaccessibility means that in case of emergencies, abort scenarios are more complicated 

and risky during interplanetary flight than in cislunar flight. 

10. How can the Moon's resources be used to create new space faring capabilities? 

Do we already have the technology needed to make use of those resources once we 

reach the Moon? 

I describe some of the value of the resources ofthe Moon in my submitted testimony and 

the supporting documents. In brief, water is the most valuable material to have in space. 

It can support human life as a consumable and, split into its component oxygen and 

hydrogen, used for breathing air. Water can jacket space habitats to protect crews from 

galactic and solar radiation. It is a medium of energy storage, in which by day, electricity 

generated form solar arrays can crack the water into its component gases and at night, be 

recombined to generate electricity. But its most important use to create spaceflight 

capability is its use as propellant - liquid oxygen and hydrogen are the most powerful 

chemical rocket fuel combination known. Water on the Moon is present in known 

locations and the technologies we require to extract and use it are well known and have 

low risk and high degrees of heritage. We can begin to use lunar water from the moment 

we arrive back there. 

11. Your testimony discusses how the Moon's environment is well suited for 

laboratory study. What types of experiments can be conducted on the Moon that 

would be impossible or difficult to accomplish elsewhere? How much infrastructure 

would be required to conduct such experiments? 

There are many fields of science and engineering research that require the environmental 

conditions that are present naturally on the Moon. Any process that utilizes high vacuum 

(10.7 Pa, or about one-trillionth the atmospheric density of Earth's surface at sea level) 

can be performed on the Moon. Communities conducting research in superconductors 

have expressed interest is using the extreme low temperatures found near the poles to 

conduct fabrication experiments not currently possible on Earth. For the astronomical 

community, the far side of the Moon (easily accessible at any pole) is the only known 

place in the universe that is permanently shielded from the radio noise and static of the 

Earth, both naturally occurring (Le., the ionosphere) and artificial (Le., human-caus.ed). 

The hyper-quiet seismic background on the Moon permits the emplacement of extremely 

sensitive instruments, including interferometers at optical wavelengths, able to achieve 

resolutions of micro-arc seconds. Such a telescope could resolve "star spots" (i.e., 

sunspots on neighboring stellar objects) and the full disks of Earth-sized planets orbiting 

nearby stars. The possible experiments are limited only by our imaginations. Many of 

these studies can be undertaken early in lunar return, either as dedicated instruments 

deployable by human crews or within laboratory facilities that can be emplaced on the 

Moon early in outpost history. 
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Paul Spudis Response to QFR Page 5 

Questions from Ranking Member Edwards 

1. When I tell my constituents about the great work NASA does, the subject of how 

NASA affects everyday lives often makes its way into the conversation. In 

considering your knowledge of what technologies will be needed for human missions 

to Mars, could you describe how some of those potential technologies and 

capabilities might find their way into the mainstream? Is there any way to predict 

the possible economic impact of these potential innovations? 

Prediction ofthe economic or societal value of a given technology is difficult, but the 

historical evidence suggests that it is significant and usually, inevitable. Some of the 

most valuable technical spin-offs we've received from the space program are in the field 

of medical science and technology. Keeping people healthy in space has required us to 

understand better how the human body functions under stress and in unusual 

environments. Developing new and compact sensors have revolutionized medicine and 

many other areas of life on Earth. As a society, we take for granted the enormous role 

that space assets play in our daily lives. Human spaceflight has been critical in many of 

these developments. I don't believe that there is a simple, straight-forward way to predict 

possible economic payoffs - many of our most valuable developments were completely 

unexpected. 

2. How should Congress measure progress on near-term and long-term goals in 

human exploration? 

Any space effort should be planned from the outset to provide a number of intermediate 

milestones and accomplishments to allow Congress and the nation to assess how we are 

progressing and what areas of the effort require modification or augmentation. 

Moreover, these dates for achievable milestones should be set at intervals appropriate for 

governmental terms of office, on the order of every 2-4 years. Much shorter than this and 

it's doubtful that significant progress can be made; much longer and it is likely that a 

program can get into trouble before it may be recognized and corrected. Congress 

requires the agency to submit an operating plan and also report on past progress and this 

practice should continue. Allowances should be made for potential technical setbacks 

and difficulties as well as actual funding levels lower than had been originally 

anticipated. 

3. Does the Nation have the industrial capacity and workforce knowledge and skills 

needed to pursue a sustained and dedicated goal of a human mission to Mars? If 

not, what is needed to ensure the necessary industrial capacity and workforce skills? 

At this point, I think not. We have seen an erosion and deterioration in our hightechnology industrial base in the last 20 years and I believe that this is a cause for 

concern. In part, this is a natural result of the end ofthe Cold War, a great source of 

technical innovation, but it also reflects America's current position as the world's sole 

superpower, making us somewhat complacent about the societal value of technical 
93 

Paul Spudis Response to QFR Page 6 

research and development. In my opinion, the best way to foster high levels of technical 

achievement is to set, attempt and accomplish difficult goals; human spaceflight beyond 

low Earth orbit qualifies as such. If the nation desires to lead the world in technical 

innovation and development, it must conduct such projects to build up these industries, in 

both material and intellectual tenns. I include both infrastructure and human capital in 

this fonnulation. 

4. To what extent can potential international partners contribute key enabling 

technologies to an eventual human mission to Mars? When should potential 

international partners be asked to participate? 

We can and should make our journey into space an international collaboration for a 

variety of reasons. It wi\l not only reduce the total cost burden to ourselves but can also 

strengthen ties with allies and reduce tensions with potential adversaries. International 

partners should be made part of the effort at the earliest stage at which we have clearly 

decided to proceed in a certain direction; this gives them a voice in implementation 

decisions and makes their commitment to the project more concrete and certain. The 

international community was deeply involved in and committed to the previous lunar 

return effort under the Vision for Space Exploration and the partners were mystified by 

our abandonment ofthat effort. Such a fiasco should not be repeated in the future. 

5. Would a human mission to the Moon require a further interim step (i.e., to a near 

Earth asteroid) prior to sending humans to Mars, or would knowledge gained from 

a human expedition to the Moon be sufficient? 

In my opinion, lunar return would be sufficient. We are acquiring already the needed 

knowledge on human physiology and psychology for long-duration spaceflight from 

current International Space Station missions. We are learning from various robotic 

missions that the radiation hazard for interplanetary travel is also a solvable problem. 

What's missing is actual experience in both exploring planetary surfaces (so as to 

maximize our exploration effectiveness on Mars) and in the use of in situ 

(extraterrestrial) resources, in order to "live off the land" once we get there. Producing 

fuel and consumables from local materials will greatly reduce risk and cost for future 

planetary missions and it is essential that we gain some practical experience in this vital 

skill. Lunar return can allow us to address both of these crucial areas, much more so than 

an asteroid visit or a journey to some point in free-space, such as an L-point mission. 

I thank the committee for inviting my testimony and for their questions and interest. 
94 

Responses by Dr. Steven M. Squyres 

House Subcommittee on Space 

Hearing Entitled 

"Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond" 

Responses by Steven W. Squyres to 

Questions for the Record 

June 22, 2013 

Questions submitted by Rep_ Palazzo: 

1. Has NASA developed a roadmap for the future of human exploration which 

defines key milestones and decision points for an expanded human presence in 

the solar system? 

No. 

Would a formal roadmap for future missions be helpful for NASA? 

Yes. In my opinion, developing a credible roadmap for human exploration beyond 

the Earth-Moon system should be one of the Agency's highest pnorities. 

2. NASA has a long history of working with international partners on large-scale 

programs and missions. What role should the international community play in the 

next steps to Mars? 

I believe that significant international participation will be necessary to enable 

human exploration of Mars under any plausible future NASA budget. 

a. Can NASA accomplish a mission to Mars without the international community 

or is it a prerequisite? 

The answer depends on the NASA budget. With an adequate budget, NASA 

could accomplish a human mission to Mars without international partners. With 

any likely budget, however, I believe that substantial international participation is 

a prerequisite. 

b. How was international cooperation coordinated under the Exploration Systems 

Architecture Study (ESAS)? 

International cooperatfon played little part in the ESAS study. The study stated 

that "encouragement of international participation is an acknowledged Level 0 

requirement". However, the architecture that was produced by the study involved 

no significant contribution from any international partners. 

c. How was international cooperation coordinated under the Asteroid Retrieval 
95 

Mission (ARM)? 

To my knowledge there has been little serious discussion of international 

involvement in ARM to date. 

3. Generally speaking, which mission is more attractive to the scientific 

community, the asteroid retrieval mission, or a lunar landing? What has been 

studied more thoroughly by the scientific community? 

A lunar landing has been better studied by the scientific community. I cannot 

assess which one is viewed more favorably. 

4. Which mission, the Asteroid Retrieval or Lunar mission, represents a better 

investment for Exploration Technologies? 

That is a difficult question. I feel that the long-range goal of exploration 

technology should be to develop the capabilities necessary to explore the surface 

of Mars. Neither an asteroid retrieval mission nor a lunar surface mission is 

clearly necessary or enabling for Mars exploration. I would say that a lunar 

surface mission is probably somewhat more relevant. 

a. What capabilities are more necessary for a Mars mission, improved proximity 

operations or landing and ascent stages? 

By "proximity operations", I presume that this question refers to the kinds of 

proximity operations that could be demonstrated by near a redirected asteroid. 

Under that presumption, landing and ascent stages are more important. I should 

note, however, that because of the martian atmosphere, these stages 

(particularly for entry, descent, and landing) must be fundamentally different for 

Mars than for the Moon. 

b. Which is more important for a Mars mission, deep space transit or in situ 

resource utilization? 

In my opinion, the answer is deep space transit. In situ resource utilization 

(ISRU) at Mars could be extremely valuable someday. However, I believe it 

would be unwise to base any near-term architecture for human exploration of 

Mars on the assumption of successfullSRU. 

c. How should these choices be evaluated in the context of a flat (or slightly 

increased) budget profile? 

My most important point is that it should be left to NASA to propose what the key 

elements of a roadmap for the human exploration of Mars should be. The goal of 

that roadmap should be to get human explorers to Mars as quickly and efficiently 

as possible. My guess is that the most important new developments required to 
96 

enable such a roadmap will be (a) advanced propulsion, (b) improved deepspace habitation systems, and (c) a human-rated entry, descent and landing 

system for Mars. None of these are enabled by either a lunar landing or an 

asteroid retrieval mission. So I suspect that any sensible get-to-Mars-soonest 

roadmap will not involve either ARM or a lunar landing. 

5. Given NASA's notionally flat budget for the foreseeable future, the Asteroid 

Retrieval Mission will necessarily crowd out other priorities. Rather than spending 

money on this type of mission, should resources be redirected to an SLS second 

stage and a lunar lander? 

I would not favor redirection of ARM funding to a lunar lander. Using ARM funds 

to improve the performance and flight rate of SLS would be valuable. 

6. NASA requested $20 million in this year's budget to increase observation 

efforts of near Earth objects. Less than 1 percent of all the objects that fall in the 

7-10 meter range have been identified and catalogued. What is your confidence 

that we can find an object of the appropriate size, orbit, and rotation necessary 

for this mission within the next 10 years? What evidence do you have to support 

your confidence level? 

Current knowledge of the properties and distribution of 7-10 meter objects is not 

good enough for me to provide a quantitative answer to this question. We won't 

really know unless we look. 

7. One of the difficulties associated with the Asteroid Retrieval Mission is the 

challenge of categorizing the objects of interest. What is the scientific value of a 

human encounter with a 7-10 meter asteroid that is not a carbonaceous 

chondrite? 

The scientific value of a human encounter with a 7-10 meter non-carbonaceous 

asteroid is modest at best, and it is low r;onsidering the cost. A good benchmark 

is the OSIRIS-REx mission, which will visit a SOD-meter carbonaceous asteroid, 

study it in detail, and select and return a sample. Because the OSIRIS-REx 

target asteroid is carbonaceous and large enough to be compositionally diverse, 

the scientific value of the sample is likely to substantially exceed that of any 

sample from a 7-10 meter non-carbonaceous asteroid. The cost of OSIRIS-REx, 

including launch, will be approximately $1 billion. The cost of redirecting an 

asteroid and sending humans to visit it will be substantially greater. 
97 

Questions submitted by Rep. Edwards: 

• In your written statement, you indicate that lunar orbital activities would 

offer opportunities toward retiring the risks of a potential, future human 

mission to Mars. Is it your view that surface operations on the Moon or a 

near Earth asteroid are not necessary for preparing to send humans to 

Mars? 

Yes. 

• Would you see a robust testing and demonstration program in cis-lunar 

space, carried out using the SLS and Orion, followed by a human mission 

to orbit Mars as a possible pathway toward achieving the goal of sending 

humans to land on Mars? 

Yes. 

• When I tell my constituents about the great work NASA does, the subject 

of how NASA affects everyday lives often makes its way into the 

conversation. In considering your knowledge of what technologies will be 

needed for human missions to Mars, could you describe how some of 

those potential technologies and capabilities might find their way into the 

mainstream? Is there any way to predict the possible economic impact of 

these potential innovations? 

It is easy to oversell the merits of NASA's technological spinoffs. The 

situation today is vel}' different from the early 1960s when computer 

technology was in its infancy. Today consumer demand drives innovation 

at a dizzying pace, often making NASA a user rather than a developer of 

key technologies. Many of the remaining innovations necessal}' to put 

humans on the surface of Mars are rather Mars-specific, and many of 

them would have little obvious utility in evel}'day life. Moreover, the 

innovations that do find their way into evel}'day life are often unexpected, 

and therefore difficult to forecast. So rather than consumers benefitting 

from a burst of technological spinoffs from a Mars initiative, I think it is 

more likely that specific vehicles and hardware developed to support Mars 

missions could find other uses that would benefit the nation. For example, 

heavy-lift launch vehicles or on-orbit propellant depots (if part of the Mars 

architecture) could also have important national security uses. 

• What are the most important considerations in establishing a sustainable 

human exploration plan, and how should Congress measure progress on 

near-term and long-term goals in human exploration? 

The most important considerations, in my opinion, are finding a compelling 

and achievable long-range goal, and matching program content to budget. 
98 

Without the former, it will be difficult to maintain program momentum. 

Without the latter, the result will be inefficiency and delay. Congress 

should measure progress by assessing accomplishments vs. milestones 

in a roadmap that NASA has generated and that has been agreed to by 

the Congress. It would be a mistake, in my opinion, to measure progress 

by assessing accomplishments vs. Congressionally-mandated milestones. 

• To what extent can potential international partners contribute key enabling 

technologies to an eventual human mission to Mars? When should 

potential international partners be asked to participate? 

I believe that international partners can make important, even enabling 

contributions to a human mission to Mars, just as they have for the 

International Space Station. Potential partners should be approached 

regarding participation as soon as NASA has produced a viable roadmap 

for Mars exploration. 

• What information about the Mars environment is needed to ensure the 

safety of a human mission to the planet? 

The most important information deals with the radiation (both on the 

martian surface and in transit), and with the potential toxicity of martian 

surface materials, particularly the ubiquitous fine-grained dust. 

o What are the risks if a robotic sample return mission is not 

conducted prior to undertaking a human mission to Mars? 

I believe the risks are low compared to other risks that inevitably 

must be accepted in conducting a human mission to Mars. For 

more details, see my responses to Rep. Stockman's questions. 

o Are robotic outposts on Mars needed for extended scientific and 

environmental studies in preparation for human missions? 

Robotic outposts on Mars are highly desirable. In fact, enormously 

valuable robotic outposts already exist or are planned: Spirit, 

Opportunity, Phoenix, Curiosity, and InSight are all examples. In my 

view, these missions are providing information that is adequate for 

the planning of future human landed missions. 

• To what extent are NASA's technology development activities devoted to 

enabling deep space exploration? 

To a substantial extent. I feel that the current Space Technology program 

is well aligned with the long-term goals of the Agency. 
99 

What is the likely timeline for achieving the necessary technological 

capabilities to send humans to one or more interim destinations (e.g. 

Moon, near Earth asteroid). and eventually to Mars, if NASA has to 

operate under flat or declining budget levels? 

I believe that the technological capabilities necessary to get to interim 

destinations and Mars can be developed fairly quickly. It is important to 

distinguish, however, between having enough funding to bring 

technologies to maturity, and having enough funding to actually implement 

those technologies in flight. We clearly have the technology today to 

create a launch vehicle with capabilities like the Saturn V - we had it forty 

years ago. But we do not have the resources to actually build and fly one. 

With flat or declining budgets and no major infusion of international 

support, I believe that it will take two decades or more to get to the lunar 

surface or a near Earth asteroid, and that Mars is out of reach effectively 

indefinitely. 

• To what extent does the asteroid capture and retrieval mission differ from 

a human mission to a non-relocated near Earth asteroid? 

There are at least three major differences: 

1. A mission to a near Earth asteroid would have to venture much 

farther from Earth. 

2. A non-relocated asteroid would probably be much larger than a 

relocated one, so its surface would be likely to offer far greater 

scientific diversity and opportunities for discovery. 

3. There would be no spacecraft affixed to the asteroid that would 

allow for controlled worksite stabilization of crewmembers during 

extravehicular activities. 

o How are the capabilities and operational activities required for 

sending humans to a near Earth asteroid different or similar to 

those required for sending humans to a relocated asteroid? 

Referring to the three differences noted above: 

1. The requirements for propulsion, life support, and radiation 

protection would be substantially more challenging for a 

mission to a near Earth asteroid. Vehicles with capabilities 

well beyond those of Orion and a 70-metric-ton SLS would 

be needed. 

2. At a near Earth asteroid, there would be a much stronger 
100 

motivation to conduct extensive extravehicular activities that 

are focused on scientific exploration and discovery. 

3. Without an attached spacecraft, new techniques and 

equipment for crew translation and worksite stabilization 

during extravehicular activities would be needed. 
101 

Questions submitted by Rep. Stockman: 

The long-time top priority of the Decadal Survey has been a Mars sample return 

mission. To bring to Earth samples of Martian soil, water and atmosphere for 

detailed study. 

• What are some answers necessary for a human landing that a completed 

Mars sample return may provide? 

I do not feel that any are truly necessary, but there are some that would be 

valuable. One is whether the ubiquitous fine-grained martian dust would 

pose health threats if ingested or inhaled. In the absence of such 

knowledge, I believe that this risk could be addressed by making 

reasonable worst-case assumptions based on the substantial knowledge 

that already exists regarding the health effects of fine-grained particulates 

on Earth. Another is whether or not there is extant life on Mars that poses 

a threat to human life. I view this as being sufficiently unlikely that it does 

not constitute a risk to the crew that is significant relative to the other risks 

they will inevitably face. 

• Do you agree a sample return is a key precursor for a human landing? 

No. I think that a sample return mission would be valuable, because of the 

answers that could be provided to the questions I noted above. But I feel 

that a human landing could be carried out at an acceptable level of risk 

without answers to these questions. 

• Because the 2018 MAX-C caching rover was cancelled and replaced with 

a non-specified mission "Curiosity-2" rover, would you agree a key priority 

for Mars precursor missions should be to assure that sample collection 

and caching becomes the primary mission of the 2020 rover? 

Yes. 

• Are there any potential non-biological toxins on Mars we should learn 

more about? 

As noted, there could be adverse health effects from ingesting or, 

particularly, inhaling martian dust. Learning more about this potential 

hazard could be valuable, but I do not see it as a necessary prerequisite to 

a human landing. 

• Do you expect the 2020 Rover Science Definition Team will follow the 

Decadal Survey and make sample collection and caching its primary 

mission? 
102 

I have not been parl of the Science Definition Team deliberations, so I 

have no basis for any expectation. I hope that they will follow that 

recommendation, because it represents the consensus view of the 

planetary science community as expressed in the Decadal Survey_ 
103 

Responses by Mr. Douglas Cooke 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Space 

Answers to Questions for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Donna Edwards 

Answers Submitted by Douglas R. Cooke 

1. During the question and answer session ofthe hearing, you noted that "we 

need to understand what exit criteria we have for programs." Please 

elaborate on what exit criteria might be considered for human exploration 

and operations programs? Would exit criteria be applied across all 

exploration and operations programs or would they need to be specific to 

individual programs? 

Answer: In order to most effectively spend under constrained budgets over multiple program 

developments, I believe NASA should develop exit strategies for large operational programs. 

Programs and missions should be planned with specific well thought out objectives. Once it is 

believed that a mission has satisfactorily achieved these objectives or is reaching a point of 

diminishing returns, it should be phased out and terminated to make room in the budget for the 

next high priority program(s). This is true particularly for large high cost programs and missions. 

This process should be well planned in order to make an efficient transition to the next program. 

An example is the phasing out ofthe Russian MIR program so the Russians could focus on the 

ISS program. The Apollo Program was phased out in favor of the Space Shuttle development. As 

a current example in Human Space Flight, I believe the ISS program should be addressed in this 

manner. A long term research, technology demonstration, hardware test program should be in 

place to achieve long term exploration and other objectives. NASA and Congress could measure 

progress against this plan and determine when ISS should be retired or turned over to other 

entities. This would also be true of a future human lunar program. When preparation for Mars 

human missions is complete at the Moon, and other important scientific objectives are met, the 

program would be retired or assets given to commercial entities for example. The U.S./NASA has 

not always performed transitions well, but it is necessary to make progress in long term 

exploration with multiple related programs and missions operating within constrained budgets. 

2. When I tell my constituents about the great work NASA does, the subject of 

how NASA affects everyday lives often makes its way into the conversation. 

In considering your knowledge of what technologies will be needed for 

human missions to Mars, could you describe how some of those potential 

technologies and capabilities might find their way into the mainstream? Is 

there any way to predict the possible economic impact of these potential 

innovations? 
104 

Answer: I believe that knowledge and discoveries returned from the missions; many ofthe 

technologies, such as advanced life support, energy related technologies, radiation protection, 

advanced avionics and software; as well as human research and many other achievements will 

benefit people here on Earth. The economic benefit is always difficult to predict, but the history 

of these benefits is probably a reasonably good measure of what to expect in the future if we 

continue to aggressively explore space. 

3. What are the most important considerations in establishing a sustainable 

human exploration plan, and how should Congress measure progress on 

near-term and long-term goals in human exploration? 

Answer: To develop a long term exploration plan, an important early step is to begin to involve 

all stake holders and partners, both domestic and international in developing near and long 

term exploration objectives. NASA needs to establish what is needed in technology and 

capability development for missions to Mars, and then layout how to satisfy these needs 

beginning with meaningful near term steps. In written testimony I laid out a way to approach 

this. In NASA we always talked about having "a plan for the plan." NASA needs a plan and 

process for developing a long term exploration plan. With this Congress could measure the 

development of the exploration plan or roadmap, and then could measure progress along the 

resulting exploration plan, with its important milestones. 

4. What are the essential components of a Mars human mission architecture? 

To what extent can a future architecture be designed with sufficient 

flexibility to respond to incremental fmdings from robotic missions? 

a. The President set the goal of sending humans to orbit Mars by the 

mid-2030s. When do architecture decisions need to be made to meet 

that timeframe? Does an overall plan with decision milestones exist? 

At what point in time should we reasonably expect NASA to identify 

its Mars architecture following a consensus and commitment made to 

conduct a human mission? 

Answer: The essential components of a Mars human architecture begins with a plan including 

specific steps in how to prepare for Mars missions. These steps include human research, 

technology developments, and vehicle developments. The steps also include missions to specific 

intermediate destinations with their own rationale based on detailed, well vetted, objectives for 

how they contribute to the experience needed for Mars exploration. Each of these intermediate 

destinations would additionally have their own unique detailed objectives. Vehicle capabilities 

begin with SLS and Orion. The missions and destinations should be a step by step evolutionary 

progression in development and testing of capabilities. Ultimately the in-space and Mars 
105 

vehicles must be designed and developed. Decision points must be included in the plan and 

flexibility is needed to address unexpected but welcome discoveries, accommodate changing 

policy and budgets, etc. As missions are conducted to specific destinations discoveries will likely 

be made that cause us to want to focus on that location. On the other hand, exit strategies are 

needed to determine when we have reached a point of diminishing returns as described earlier. 

Robotic missions will provide data to identify specific landing sites for where we want to send 

people to explore. Decisions need to be made in the near term to develop the long term plan 

and determine the critical schedule path for development of technologies and capabilities. This 

plan does not exist, which is why I think it is so important. There are technology roadmaps and 

developments, but I do not know how they address a long term exploration plan, since it does 

not yet exist. Some tall pole technologies may not yet be underway. By implementing the 

process in (3) above the timing should become clear on when these activities need to begin. 

5. To what extent are NASA's technology development activities devoted to 

enabling deep space exploration? What is the likely timeline for achieving 

the necessary technological capabilities to send humans to one or more 

interim destinations (e.g. Moon, near Earth asteroid), and eventually to 

Mars, if NASA has to operate under flat or declining budget levels? 

Answer: NASA should be asked to show how technology programs are addressing exploration 

high priority needs in a timely manner. There are technologies in the Advanced Exploration 

Systems organization HEOMD, which are likely aligned. I am not current on the technologies 

being developed in the Space Technology Office. Technologies are adequate or nearly at-hand 

for near term destinations, including the Moon for short to moderate stay times. More 

advanced closed loop life support is needed for long missions for long term lunar stays, asteroid 

missions, and Mars missions. In all cases radiation protection needs to be better understood 

outside Earth orbit for long missions. Advanced in-space propulSion is needed for longer 

missions as well. For missions to the Mars surface there is a more extensive list. Declining 

budgets, including flat budgets with no increases for inflation are crippling over the long term as 

this leads to ever worsening lost buying power. This is true for all programs, not just exploration 

programs. 

6. To what extent can key enabling technologies or systems for an eventual 

human mission to Mars be provided through international participation in 

the mission? 

Answer: I think that international collaboration is essential and inevitable in long term space 

exploration. especiallv on complex and costlv endeavors. The collaboration on ISS has oroven to 
106 

Exploration planning through the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG). 

The international partners are very capable in augmenting U.S. capabilities. 

7. To what extent does NASA understand the operations required to support a 

human mission to a near Earth asteroid? 

Answer: I believe NASA understands basic operational capabilities to go to an asteroid, 

demonstrated in robotic missions. What is not well known is how to interact/attach/ stationkeep/ protect for loose dust or rocks, and provide safety to crews under these conditions. 

8. What information about the Mars environment is needed to ensure the safety 

of a human mission to the planet? 

a. What are the risks if a robotic sample return mission is not conducted 

prior to undertaking a human mission to Mars? 

b. Are robotic outposts on Mars needed for extended scientific and 

environmental studies in preparation for human missions? 

Answer: This question would likely lead to some level of debate. I believe that significant 

information exists about Mars from the extensive return from excellent Mars missions over the 

years. On the latest mission a radiation measurement device was flown to the Mars surface. For 

the first time scientists know the effect of the atmosphere on surface radiation dosage rates. 

What may be needed is further data on the toxicity of the Mars soil. Another possible concern is 

whether there might be forms of life/bacteria in water under the surface. However, these can 

potentially be protected for through designs. There could be a debate over whether a sample 

return is required. Even if a sample is returned, would you find a sample that completely 

identifies the hazards for all locations? I never believed we needed a sample return before 

sending people. It is a matter of risk and design complexity. The more you know, the less 

uncertainty and complexity you have to design for. I think we are close to knowing enough 

about Mars now to send people. The more data that is provided by science missions, the better 

we will know where on Mars we want to send people to explore. 

9. To what extent does the asteroid capture and retrieval mission differ from a 

human mission to a nonrelocated near Earth asteroid? 

a. How are the capabilities and operational activities required for 

sending humans to a near Earth asteroid different or similar to those 

required for sending humans to a relocated asteroid? 

b. Does the relocated asteroid initiative satisfy the rationale given for the 

President's goal that he stated in 201O? Ifnot, why not? 
107 

Answer: The human asteroid mission that was initially envisioned would have been a mission to 

a larger asteroid in its own orbit. I believe that a larger asteroid could be characterized better 

from asteroid survey assets than a small one. This better characterization would help provide 

information on the value of exploring the specific asteroid. Therefore the mission would likely 

be more interesting scientifically than the current asteroid retrieval mission. The capabilities for 

the human portion of the mission are potentially different. Travelling to an asteroid in its orbit 

would be closer to the characteristics of a Mars in-space transit mission in mission length and 

vehicle capabilities. The human portion of the retrieval mission could be a potentially short 

mission to a laGrange point or lunar orbit. On the other hand, I believe the retrieval spacecraft 

is complex and will not contribute in any significant way to further steps in human exploration, 

except perhaps in flying the electric propulsion technology. Although sized larger than what has 

been flown on science missions, the solar electric capability is still smaller scale than what is 

required on a human scale mission. In the end NASA has a proposed mission to an asteroid, but 

it is significantly different from a development stand point, and probably from a science 

standpoint than the original asteroid mission announced in 2010. 
108 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Space 

Answers to Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall 

Answers Submitted by Douglas R. Cooke 

The Augustine Commission report found that under the existing funding levels, the Constellation program 

would face significant delays, and that the Ares I and Orion would likely not reach the International Space 

Station before the Station's planned termination. Did the Administration lower its budget request for 

NASA prior to the release of the Augustine Commission report? If so, how did that affect the Augustine 

Commission's assessment of the Ares schedule? 

Answer: The 2009 budget request forthe Exploration Systems Mission Directorate was lowered from 

2008 projected run-out levels. This reduction effectively eliminated the anticipated early funding wedge 

for development of the Ares V heavy lift rocket and the ALTAIR lunar lander. It did not affect Ares I or 

Orion planning at that time. This reduction was prior to the establishment of the Augustine Committee. 

The Augustine Committee recognized NASA's need for more funding to implement these programs. 

Although the ISS end date was still on the books as 2016, NASA's previous administrator was planning to 

propose extension of the ISS to 2020, but the time had not come yet to do it. This was similar to the 

current situation, where there is serious talk of extending the ISS beyond 2020, but it has not yet been 

done. Similar to the situation with Orion and Ares I, the "Commercial Crew" implementation is now 

facing a short series of missions to ISS, if ISS is not extended beyond 2020. 
109 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Space 

Answers to Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Steven Palazzo 

Answers Submitted by Douglas R. Cooke 

1. Has NASA developed a roadmap for the future of human exploration which defines key 

milestones and decision points for an expanded human presence in the solar system? 

Would a formal roadmap for future missions be helpful for NASA? 

Answer: NASA has not to my knowledge developed a road map for future human exploration, 

defining key milestones and decision points. NASA has announced one specific mission, the 

Asteroid Retrieval Mission, and a vague reference to eventual human exploration of Mars. As I 

advocated in my written testimony such a roadmap is absolutely needed. In my written 

testimony I outlined a process for developing a roadmap. A roadmap for Human Space 

Exploration would be helpful not only for NASA, but for its stake holders and the public. I believe 

a road map is needed to inspire the country to be motivated to adequately fund and implement 

these programs. 

2. The NASA Authorization Act of2008 requires NASA to work towards establishing a 

lunar outpost on the Moon. Is this a necessary step to training for a mission to Mars? 

Answer: I believe that it is important to explore the Moon for its own sake. There is much more 

to be learned beyond what we currently know about our nearest neighbor in space, that directly 

informs us about important aspects of the history and evolution of our home planet Earth. We 

should be learning from the recent lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (lRO), lunar Crater 

Observation and Sensing Satellite (lCROSS) and Gravity Recovery and Interior lab (GRAil) 

missions to inform our planning for lunar exploration. These missions have discovered much 

more than we learned from Apollo, and they have generated more new questions that can only 

be answered by exploring the Moon. We should establish a presence on the Moon that would 

prepare us for missions to Mars, while we are exploring and learning about the Moon. We 

would be preparing for Mars by learning to live and work in a hostile environment that includes 

temperature extremes, vacuum conditions, low gravity, radiation and dust. We need to develop 

systems and machines that will operate in these environments with high reliability before 

committing astronauts to the longer, more distant missions to the Mars surface. We need to 

develop efficient operational approaches including scientific operations in these environments 

to make the most of the time there. Although the Mars environment has differences, human 

operations on the Moon would provide the experience and lessons for evolving the systems and 

designs for use on Mars. We would learn what to issues to address in deSigns. Developing 

systems that extract and utilize in-situ resources can also be developed on the Moon, with its 

diverse resources. We can learn to rely on these extraction systems for reducing materials 

launched from Earth, thus reducing mission cost. Past studies have shown these technologies 

are enabling for missions to Mars. It is as important to learn to rely with confidence in these 

capabilities as it is to develop the systems. This confidence is needed before engineers will be 
110 

willing to count on them for mission fuel and habitat consumables of water and air. We can gain 

that confidence from experience gained at the Moon. 

3. Is the International Space Station being used appropriately as a test-bed for future deep 

space missions? How can NASA improve utilization of the ISS for this purpose? 

Answer: The intent at NASA is to utilize the International Space Station (ISS) to prepare for 

human exploration. There is a Human Research Program that is making progress in learning how 

to keep humans healthy in the space environment. It includes experiments and research on ISS. 

What is needed is an ISS integrated plan for all research, systems testing and technology 

demonstrations that would result in more efficient development of exploration capabilities. 

Although this plan has been in work for some time, it is not complete and has not begun 

implementation to my knowledge. This work has not appeared to have had very high priority 

within the program. I believe this plan should have been in place and ready to implement when 

the ISS assembly was completed. An ISS integrated test and research plan would be valuable in 

getting the most out of ISS, and in demonstrating progress and achievements against that plan. 

An associated issue is that the time available for ISS crew research is a small percentage of the 

crew time spent on orbit. In my view, this needs to be addressed to make the ISS as productive 

as is possible. Together the plan and demonstrated progress would help inform how long the ISS 

operations should be extended. 

4. NASA has a long history of working with international partners on large-scale programs 

and missions. What role should the international community play in the next steps to 

Mars? 

a. Can NASA accomplish a mission to Mars without the international community or 

is it a prerequisite? 

b. How was international cooperation coordinated under the Exploration Systems 

Architecture Study (ESAS)? 

c. How was international cooperation coordinated under the Asteroid Retrieval 

Mission (ARM)? 

Answer: I think that international collaboration is essential and inevitable in long term space 

exploration, especially on complex and costly endeavors. The collaboration on ISS has proven to 

be exceptional in developing complementary capabilities, has enabled program stability, and has 

been a positive in international relationships. There is already excellent collaboration in human 

exploration planning through the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (lSECG). 

This group evolved from initial international exploration meetings we started in 2006. The 

coordination is among 14 space agencies across the world. International development of flight 

elements and systems will be needed in order to share cost of missions. The collaboration will 

have to be coordinated carefully to minimize risk of default or delays by any partner and to 

ensure success of the programs. There are examples of how this type of collaboration has 

worked in the past. NASA bought from Russia the docking systems for U.S. docking, the initial 

FGB spacecraft for ISS, and has paid for Soyuz flights. I am sure this helped Russia in lean times. 
111 

Early on they had difficulty obtaining the funding to complete the Service Module. On the other 

hand, we did not have the budget to develop our own complete crew return vehicle early on, 

and we funded some relatively minor changes to the Soyuz to fit the crew return need. But all 

this has worked out and they have been a good partner. Italy built the mUlti-purpose logistics 

modules (MPLMs) and one of the node structures. The MPLM was a needed element that 

defrayed costs for NASA. In the early 90s the Canadians had funding difficulties in development 

of the ISS arm. We helped them with that. They, as well as all of the other partners have done 

well. The U.S. and its partners have learned to adapt to these situations and help each other in 

the process. We have had our own difficulties and changes in policy that have created problems 

for the other partners. In 1993, NASA announced a redesign of Space Station Freedom. Then the 

U.S. brought the Russian partnership onboard. These were considered major disruptions by the 

international partners. More recently the administration changed policy from developing a 

human lunar capability to visiting an asteroid, and then retrieving an asteroid. These are difficult 

changes for the international partner agencies who take years to persuade their governments to 

pursue these programs. Their processes are not unlike the normal process in the U.S. It is 

especially difficult for the partners, when they are out of the decision process that seriously 

affects their planning and their programs. 

a. I think that NASA can accomplish a mission to Mars without international partners, but I 

think that we should include them. The collaboration can help bring their capabilities to 

offset costs. Collaboration and commitments help to stabilize the programs in each 

country, although changing political support in all countries, including the U.S. creates 

risks. I think collaboration can also be very good for international relationships. It is also 

very helpful to have them as a part of the mission architecture planning process as we 

have learned over the past few years in the ISECG process. 

b. ESAS did not include international participation. However, since the Moon is a logical 

next step in human exploration, this future was bought into by the international 

agencies. 

c. I don't believe international partners were consulted for the ARM mission concept. They 

were not consulted for the 2020 asteroid announcement either. I believe NASA is 

working with them on this plan now. 

5. The International Space Station partnership is a great example of leveraging the 

international community to accomplish great feats in space exploration, but it also 

demonstrates how dependence on international partners can leave U.S. exploration 

vulnerable to foreign actions and decisions. For instance, Russian financial problems and 

schedule delays impacted its commitments to the ISS program. How should the U.S. 

seek international participation in a manner that leverages partner investments, but does 

not put them on the "critical path?" 

Answer: This is an important debate to have. I have outlined much of our experience in question 

4 above along the lines of the concern expressed in the question. There are risks with these 

collaborations for all parties, due to evolving space policy in multiple countries, changing 
112 

funding and technical problems. In addition, there are integration costs for the programmatic 

and technical negotiations and interactions as well as the associated travel expenses. Decisions 

will have to be made weighing the benefits of collaboration versus the risk and expense in the 

case of default or delays. The risk has to be recoverable financially. An important point is that 

the international partners want to be on the critical path. This is often important for them to sell 

a program to their governments. Partnerships have to be weighed on a case by case basis 

considering all these factors. Another important point is that if the U.S. believes the road map 

and program are an important part of its future, than the U. S. should lead the entire effort in 

order to maintain control of the benefits and risks to the best of our ability. The safest route but 

potentially the most expensive when viewed from the outset is forthe u.s. to develop all 

elements on the critical path. If we do not own the critical path, then recovering from problems 

arising from critical hardware developments in these partner agreements can be very costly and 

can offset any expected savings. Assigning important hardware developments that do not 

threaten the basic mission critical path is a possible solution. 

6. Do you think the United States should lead an intemationallunar mission? 

Answer: Yes, the U.S. should lead an international lunar mission for many reasons. It is 

consistent with a continued leadership role in space and national prestige. We would control the 

risks and benefits as described in (5) above. NASA has the unique experience in knowing what is 

required to lead and manage this kind of massive program. Our partners look to us for 

leadership in this. I think our public would be disappointed in anything less. 

7. Of the two main possibilities discussed at the hearing, which of these missions, the 

Asteroid Retrieval or Lunar mission, represents a better investment for Exploration 

Technologies? 

a. What capabilities are more necessary for a Mars mission, improved proximity 

operations or landing and ascent stages? 

b. Which is more important for a Mars mission, deep space transit or in situ resource 

utilization? 

c. How should these choices be evaluated in the context of a flat (or slightly 

increased) budget profile? 

Answer: I personally believe that a lunar mission is by far better suited as a precursor for a 

mission to Mars. The lunar mission accomplishes what is described in question 2 above. I think 

that as we seriously consider going to Mars, we will decide to go to the Moon first to prepare 

and will go there for its own sake. The asteroid retrieval mission will employ unique in-space 

operational capabilities, some of which will be important for the long term. The asteroid mission 

will require development of a mission-unique retrieval spacecraft capability that will not be of 

any real benefit to future human exploration that I can envision other than for use of a soler 

electric capability. It will be expensive and complex. I believe the complexity of the capture will 

drive costs of the spacecraft significantly. Asteroids are of interest scientifically. In my view a 

small asteroid or part of an asteroid of the type described as an object for this mission cannot 
113 

compare with the diversity of composition and information that is possible when exploring the 

Moon. I am not a scientist, so I would suggest asking about his facet of the discussion from 

representatives of that community. My view is based on past discussions with scientists. 

a. After developing a heavy lift vehicle (SLS) and a deep space capable crew capsule that 

can enter Earth's atmosphere at high velocities, planetary landing and ascent vehicles 

are the next key capabilities needed for exploring planetary bodies like the Moon and 

Mars. Proximity operations for asteroids have already been demonstrated by robotic 

spacecraft. Science spacecraft have been deployed to Lagrange points. 

b. Both in-space transit advanced technology and in-situ resource technology are 

important for Mars exploration. They are both important in reducing the amount of fuel 

that must be launched from Earth to perform the mission. Advanced in-space transit 

capability, whether solar electric, nuclear electric, or nuclear thermal rocket technology 

can reduce the in-space launched mass by a factor of about 2. It is a huge enabler, 

probably the biggest enabler. Using fuel produced on Mars from in-situ resources for 

the crew ascent from the surface to Mars orbit can reduce the amount of launched 

mass from Earth by about 30 to 40%. I would put the highest priority on in-space 

propulsion technology, but in-situ resource technology is very important. 

c. I would fund both according to the priority in (b), however, I would also scrutinize the 

rest of the technology budget in terms of relative priorities for exploration. 

8. Given NASA's notionally flat budget for the foreseeable future, the Asteroid Retrieval 

Mission will necessarily crowd out other priorities. Rather than spending money on this 

type of mission, should resources be redirected to an SLS second stage and a lunar 

lander? 

Answer: I believe the highest priority near term is to develop an upper stage that puts the 

performance of SLS in the range of 100 to 130 metric tons to LEO, more correctly in the beyond 

Earth orbit (BED) throw capacity in the range of 40 to SO metric tons. The next priority is to 

develop lander capability, possibly in partnership with international parties depending on U.S. 

funding availability. The concern is that the asteroid retrieval spacecraft will be funded at the 

expense of priorities such as SLS and landers. 

9. Private sector entities have suggested mining asteroids, and Dr. Friedman's testimony 

stated that "[a]fter the asteroid is in place even private spacecraft developers could be 

invited to explore and test new prospecting ideas there and maybe create a new 

commercial industry for utilization of space resources." Is the Asteroid Retrieval Mission 

an effort to subsidize the development of technologies for the private sector, much like 

commercial cargo and crew? 

a. Should NASA subsidize private sector efforts in both low earth orbit and deep 

space? 

b. If so, is NASA organized in an appropriate manner to facilitate this work, or is a 

model built on NSF's grant structure more appropriate? 
114 

Answer: I don't know if the motivation for this mission is to benefit the private sector in asteroid 

mining. NASA should be asked this question. I don't believe the current survey capability exists 

to characterize a small asteroid to know if it is of interest either SCientifically or from a resource 

standpoint. The best that can be done is to determine whether it is stable or not and to 

determine its orbit for potential rendezvous. Certainly if NASA develops a capability to 

successfully retrieve asteroids, the design would be available to these entities. The question is 

whether doing this is more important than an exploration mission with the potential for new 

discoveries that benefit the entire public. Demonstrating and proving technical capabilities and 

then making them available to the public is a model that NASA has used in the past. Most times 

it has been in the form of benefits from capabilities developed closely aligned with use in 

ongoing NASA missions or technology developments. A lunar example of this might be as 

follows: in the course of an Exploration mission to set up a small in-situ resource experiment to 

prove out a resource extraction technique that could be provided to entities interested in lunar 

mining. 

a. I don't think that NASA should subsidize the private sector at the expense of major high 

priority exploration and science missions. I don't think that NASA should do this on a 

large scale or subsidize entities to develop critical capabilities central to NASA's mission. 

Small scale subsidies through grants and other methods for research and developments 

have been beneficial, when they were envisioned to be of mutual benefit to NASA 

objectives. 

b. NASA currently has the ability to use these methods. 

10. Dr. Spudis' written testimony noted the shift to the "flexible path" for human exploration 

that focused on the development of technology rather than a destination. What were the 

most important exploration technology achievements of the past three years? How do 

you think these achievements would have differed if our space program were guided by a 

specific destination? 

Answer: I believe that the majority of NASA technology funding should be focused on mission 

needs and development schedules. I believe that the mission directorates should develop the 

performance and schedule requirements for critical technologies that are then carried out in the 

technology programs. The mission directorates should have their own technology programs that 

are adequately funded to support their long term plan for missions. I think technology 

developments have been progressing, but I no longer know what the priorities are or what has 

been achieved in the last three years. 

11. A report issued last December by the National Research Council about NASA's strategic 

direction stated, "[t]he committee has seen little evidence that a current stated goal for 

NASA's human spaceflight program-namely, to visit an asteroid by 2025-has been 

widely accepted as a compelling destination by NASA's own workforce, by the nation as 

a whole, or by the international community. On the international front there appears to be 

continued enthusiasm for a mission to the Moon but not for an asteroid mission." Why is 

this mission any different than those identified by the NRC? 
115 

Answer: The human asteroid mission that was initially envisioned would have been a mission to 

a larger asteroid in its own orbit. A larger asteroid could be characterized better from asteroid 

survey assets, and I believe would likely be more interesting scientifically than the small asteroid 

to be retrieved by the current asteroid retrieval mission. I believe that in general, current 

robotic asteroid missions are providing good scientific return for the cost. I do believe that the 

international community is logically more interested in exploring the Moon for the reasons 

mentioned in question 2. There is also more potential for a substantial role for them in lunar 

missions from hardware development to providing astronauts. Through ISECG, International 

partners have participated in developing a broad range of lunar exploration, science, resource, 

outreach, commercial and other human lunar exploration objectives. 

12. NASA's Small Bodies Assessment Group also commented on the potential asteroid 

mission, stating, "[w]hile the participants found it to be very interesting and entertaining, 

it was not considered to be a serious proposal because of obvious challenges, including 

the practical difficulty of identifying a target in an appropriate orbit with the necessary 

physical characteristics within the required lead time using existing or near- to long-teon 

ground-based or space-based survey assets." Do you agree or disagree with their 

assessment and why? 

Answer: I would not question the findings of this group as I assume they are more 

knowledgeable on this subject than I am. I do think their finding is believable. I understand there 

are few known viable objects that are potential targets for this asteroid retrieval mission. That is 

why I understand funding is being requested for augmenting the asteroid survey budget; so they 

can find more potential targets for this mission. 

13. What lessons could NASA learn from long-duration missions on the Moon? Do you see 

any scientific value in such an endeavor? 

Answer: NASA can learn significant lessons from missions to the Moon that will reduce risks in 

sending astronauts to Mars and other distant destinations. I believe that there is the potential 

for significant scientific return from the Moon. The lRO mission objectives included high 

resolution photography and mapping of potential landing sites that were identified by science 

and exploration experts as the most interesting locations to explore. As stated in the response 

for question (2): 

I believe that it is important to explore the Moon for its own sake. There is much more to be 

learned beyond what we currently know about our nearest neighbor in space, that directly 

informs us about important aspects of the history and evolution of our home planet Earth. We 

should be learning from the recent lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (lRO), lunar Crater 

Observation and Sensing Satellite (lCROSS) and Gravity Recovery and Interior lab (GRAil) 

missions to inform our planning for lunar exploration. These missions have discovered much 
116 

more than we learned from Apollo, and they have generated more new questions that can only 

be answered by exploring the Moon. We should establish a presence on the Moon that would 

prepare us for missions to Mars, while we are exploring and learning about the Moon. We 

would be preparing for Mars by learning to live and work in a hostile environment that includes 

temperature extremes, vacuum conditions, low gravity, radiation and dust. We need to develop 

systems and machines that will operate in these environments with high reliability before 

committing astronauts to the longer, more distant missions to the Mars surface. We need to 

develop efficient operational approaches including scientific operations in these environments 

to make the most ofthe time there. Although the Mars environment has differences, human 

operations on the Moon would provide the experience and lessons for evolving the systems and 

designs for use on Mars. We would learn what to issues to address in designs. Developing 

systems that extract and utilize in-situ resources can also be developed on the Moon, with its 

diverse resources. We can learn to rely on these extraction systems for reducing materials 

launched from Earth, thus reducing mission cost. Past studies have shown these technologies 

are enabling for missions to Mars. It is as important to learn to rely with confidence in these 

capabilities as it is to develop the systems. This confidence is needed before engineers will be 

willing to count on them for mission fuel and habitat consumables of water and air. We can gain 

that confidence from experience gained at the Moon. 

14. NASA officials assert that the asteroid retrieval mission is the only stepping stone to 

Mars which the country can afford right now. How could NASA reprioritize its budget to 

use both schedule flexibility and rolling development projects to meet milestones to 

Mars? 

Answer: While pressing on with developing SLS and Orion, NASA's initial need is to develop a 

long term exploration plan or roadmap leading to exploration of Mars, according to a process 

such as the one I outlined in written testimony. Then near term mission options could be 

compared to see how they best fit that plan. With exciting mission possibilities viewed from a 

long term plan perspective and supported by stake holders, the most valued possibilities will 

emerge and have a logical rationale. This could motivate advocacy for more adequate funding 

downstream. 

15. How can the Moon's resources be used to create new space faring capabilities? Do we 

already have the technology needed to make use of those resources once we reach the 

Moon? 

Answer: Lunar resources are varied. We have much better information now that results are 

coming back from the LRO mission. Years of technology funding have been investing in ISRU 

technologies. Capabilities have been tested for extracting these resources, so many of the 

techniques exist. Initial use would likely be to augment mission consumables to improve the 

efficiency of the mission. Ultimately they could possibly be extracted by commercial interests. 

The resources such as Hydrogen and Oxygen can provide fuel for ascent vehicles. Oxygen can be 

produced to augment breathing air. 
117 

16. Your written testimony states that NASA should concentrate on developing the most 

enabling technologies for a Mars mission. 

a. What criteria should be used to determine which technologies will be the most 

useful to a Mars mission? 

b. Are there any enabling technologies that NASA is not currently working on? 

c. Are there any specific technologies currently being developed that you think 

should be put aside? 

Answer: The most logical priorities for technology development are those that are needed to 

protect astronauts from the environments of low gravity, radiation, and dust, along with those 

needed to reduce mission mass and enable the mission. The 5LS vehicle is essential to launch 

the masses needed for a mission in the lowest number of launches to reduce cost and overall 

mission risk. Even with the development of key mass-reducing technologies, six or more 

launches are needed to lift what is needed for a Mars mission. This mass is equivalent to the 

weight of the existing ISS. Key technologies include shielding and other mitigation techniques for 

radiation, advanced in-space propulsion, Mars aerobraking technology, closed loop life support 

systems, advanced lightweight avionics, advanced EVA suits and systems, Mars entry and 

landing systems, 15RU, surface nuclear power systems, and cryogenic storage and in-space 

transfer. All of these technologies are high value and enabling. These technology areas have 

been known for a long time, having been identified in numerous studies over the years. Progress 

is being made, but some of these get little funding. More detailed lists are available. These 

technology areas should be compared with current technology development portfolios to see 

where the shortcomings exist and where lower priority technologies are being pursued. I am not 

aware of the latest portfolio to provide more specific advice. 

17. What additional technologies would be required for a mission to one of Mars' moons that 

are distinct from those required for a mission to Mars? 

Answer: Almost all of the capabilities and technologies needed for Mars Phobos and Deimos 

missions are encompassed by those needed to land and return from Mars. The Mars in-space 

human transit vehicle could achieve rendezvous with the moons. In fact missions to the Mars 

moons would provide an interesting stepping stones on the way to a Mars landing. Work would 

have to be done on rendezvous and to operate in this very low gravity environment. I believe 

that most of the technology developments for Mars landed missions are more difficult. 
118 

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Space 

Answers to Questions for the Record Submitted by Representative Steve Stockman 

Answers Submitted by Douglas R. Cooke 

Your testimony covered the privately-funded 'Mars Inspiration' fly-by mission; planned to launch in 

2018. 

I. From this mission, what would be some of the possible advances in technology and 

physiological knowledge we may gain, which would be applicable for a Mars landing 

mission? 

2. Do you think 'Mars Inspiration' might increase public pressure on NASA to take sooner 

the 'giant leaps' of building a lunar research base and then actually landing, not just 

orbiting Mars? 

3. What would be some important ways NASA could cooperate and assist with to help 

make 'Mars Inspiration' a success? 

Answer: 

1. If the Inspiration Mars mission moves forward, it will have to address the advancement of 

heat shield materials and design to cope with the high heating from Mars return entry 

velocities. It will also develop further closure of life support systems to reduce consumable 

mass and volume during the mission. Radiation protection forthe crew for approximately 

500 days will have to be addressed. These are major areas that will be useful for future 

human exploration missions to Mars and other destinations. Other aspects of the design in 

communications and operations will contribute the experience for follow on missions. 

Physiological, psychological and medical experience will also be valuable experience for 

follow on missions to Mars. 

2. A major objective of the Inspiration Mars program as I understand it is to demonstrate that 

missions to the Mars vicinity are possible in the near term, and to inspire the public to 

support further human exploration missions that are increasingly complex leading to human 

exploration of the Mars surface. 

3. Inspiration Mars is already working with NASA to find areas where NASA expertise, existing 

capabilities, and capabilities in development can benefit the mission, as well as to 

understand how capabilities developed by inspiration Mars, such as those in (1) above can 

benefit long term NASA exploration needs. These are being worked through traditional 

Space Act Agreements. 
(119) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
120 

REPORT SUBMITTED BY DR. PAUL SPUDIS

AIAA SPACE 2011 Conference & ExposHlon 27 ~ 29 September 2011, long Beach, California AIAA 2011-7185 

Using the resources of the Moon to create a permanent, 

cislunar space faring system 

Paul D. Spudis I 

Lunar and Planetary Institute, Houston, TX, 77058 

Anthony R. Lavoie2 

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL, 35811 

We have previously described an architecture that extends human reach beyond low 

Earth orbit by creating a permanent space transportation system with reusable and 

refuelable vehicles. Such a system is made possible by establishing an outpost on tbe Moon 

that harvests water and produces rocket propellant from the ice deposits of the permanently 

dark areas near the poles. Our plan is affordable, flexible and not tied to any specific launch 

vehicle or family of vehicles. Robotic assets are teleoperated from Earth to prospect, 

demonstrate and produce water from local resources. Tbese robots are launcbed separately 

over several years, allowing the program to be implemented under constrained and 

uncertain funding conditions. In addition, the stepwise, incremental approach encourages 

and facilitates international and commercial participation. Humans arrive only after we 

bave begun water production. Once there, the human mission begins to explore the potential 

for possible, practical, and affordable use of regolith for material production for outpost 

sustainment and growth. Consistent with the overarching goal to see if we can learn how to 

live off-planet, another objective of human activity on the Moon will be the experimentation 

of biological systems and their interaction and performance in the lunar environment. Our 

arbitrarily defined end stage is a fully functional, human-tended lunar outpost producing 

150 metric toones of water per year - enough to export water from the Moon to orbiting 

propeUant depots and create a permanent, extensible reusable transportation system that 

allows routine access for people and machines to all points of cislunar space. This costeffective architecture advances technology and builds a sustainable space transportation 

infrastructure. By eliminating the need to launch everything from the surface of the Earth, 

we fundamentally change the paradigm of spaceflight. This lunar outpost serves as the 

vanguard for studying the practical employment of techniques, processes, and systems that 

allow bumanity to effectively extend its reach off-planet. 

Nomenclature 

CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle 

CL Cargo Lander 

CTS Cislunar Transfer Stage 

CWS Cislunar Way Station (fuel depot) 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoE Department of Energy 

EEL V Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

EH ExcavationIHauler 

ESAS Exploration Systems Architecture Study 

GEO Geosynchronous Orbit 

GPS Geographic Positioning System 

HL Human Lander 

HLV Heavy Lin Vehicle 

1 Senior Staff Scientist, Lunar and Planetary Institute, Houston TX 77058. Senior Member. 

2 Senior Engineer, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville AL 35811 

1 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Copyright © 2011 by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. AI! rights mserved 
121 

ISRU 

LCROSS 

LEO 

LW 

LM 

LRO 

Mini-SAR 

MJ 

MEO 

MT 

NASA 

NOAA 

PSLV 

RFC 

RFT 

RHL 

RML 

RTG 

RWTL 

SPP 

SSM 

VSE 

WEFS 

WlE 

WPS 

WT 

In Situ Resource Utilization 

Lunar Crater Observati<m and Sensing Satellite 

Low Earth Orbit 

Low Lunar Orbit 

Lunar Module 

Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 

Miniature Synthetic Aperture Radar (Chandrayaan-l) 

Moon Mineralogy Mapper (Chandrayaan-I) 

Medium Earth Orbit 

Metric ton (1000 kg = 2200 Ibs.) 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency 

Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (India) 

Rechargeable Fuel Cell 

Rover Fuel Tanker 

Robotic Heavy Lander 

Robotic Medium Lander 

Radioisotopic Thermal Generator 

Robotic Water Tank Lander 

Solar Power Plant 

Shuttle Side-Mount (launch vehicle) 

Vision for Space Exploration or "the Vision" 

Waler Electrolysis and Fuel Storage 

Water Ice Explorer 

Water Processing and Storage 

Water Tanker 

I. Introduction 

A key part of the 2004 Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) was learning how to use off-planet material and 

encrgy resources to create new space faring capability"'. The Moon was selected as the initial destination for 

the human spaceflight program because it contains the raw materials needed to do this. The Moon's proximity and 

accessibility allows us to conduct a significant amount of this work in relative safety with robotic machines 

teleeperated remotely from Earth and from cislunar space prior to human arrival. 

The objective of the Vision was not a series of Apollo-style expeditions or a human Mars mission but rather the 

extension of human reach to all of the Solar System, for the myriad of purposes imagined over many years. The high 

cost of launch to orbit is one barrier to widespread activity in space. Despite numerous and continued attempts to 

lower launch costs over the last 30 years, a cost plateau has been reached at around $5000ikg (based on the price of 

the two cheapest existing launch services, India's PSLV and SpaceX's Falcon 9.) Launch cost is a "Catch-22" 

problem: costs are high because volume (traffic to LEO) is low and volume is low because costs are high. In the 

future we may expect to see some improvement in launch cost numbers but a drop by f.ctors of 2 or 3 (rather than 

by orders of magnitude) is most likely. 

One approach to break this impasse is through the use ofIn Situ Rcsource Utilization (ISRU) to create new space 

faring capability by learning how to use what we find in space to sustain and extend our presence there. In contrast 

to the problem of launch cost, this approach has only recently been seriously considcred. The architects of the VSE 

specifically included a return to the Moon as the first destination beyond low Earth orbit because of its resource 

characteristics and its proximity. Our objective in returning to the Moon is to learn how to live and work 

productively on another world. The Moon possesses the material and energy resources necessary to learn new skills 

to create new space faring capabilities. Its proximity to the Earth permits easy and routine access to its surface for 

just such an endeavor that, if successful; will serve as the catalyst and the true historical starting point for human 

expansion off-planet. 

These goals are very ambitious and quite unlike those of any previous space program so there is no a priori 

guarantee of success. Lunar return under the VSE is an engineering research and development project; it is not 

known how difficult the extraction and use of off-planet resources might be. But because the amount of leverage 

provided through the use of space resources is so great, this effort is a task worth attempting. If the ultimate rationale 

2 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
122 

for human spaceflight is to create new reservoirs of culture off-planet, it follows that learning to adapt and usc the 

resources of space becomes essential and a critical skill necessary for the future survival of the human race. 

Thus, our challenge is to craft an architecture that attempts the never-been-done with funding at less-than-usual 

levels. We believe this is possible through the development of an incremental, cumulative architecture that uses 

robotic assets for early and continual accomplishment. We go back to the Moon in small, discrete steps, interlocking 

with and building upon each other. We scale our return to the Moon to match the resources available. In lean years, 

we make less (but still positive) progress, while more money allows an accelerated pace of effort. The key to success 

is to make the incremental steps small enough such that progress is made even in the most financially constrained 

times. We go when we can, as best we can. But we go. 

II. The Mission on the MOOD 

The mission.statement of lunar return is provided by the VSE founding documents: We go to the Moon to learn 

how to live and work productively on another world. We do this by using the material and energy resources of the 

lunar surface to create a sustained human presence there. Specifically, we will harvest the abundant water ice present 

at the lunar poles with the objective of making consumables for human residence on the lunar surface, and 

propellant, initially for access to and from the Moon, increasing the production with time for eventual export to 

support activities in cislunar space. This architecture focuses initially on water availability and conversion into 

propellant because propellant is the holy grail of rocket mechanics; propellant mass is by far the dominant term in 

the rocket equation and is the most significant factor in cost for human missions. The availability of lunar 

consumables and propellant allows us to routinely access all the levels of cislunar space where our economic, 

national security and scientific satellites reside. 

This mission objective defines the architecture oflunar return. We stay in one place to build up capabilities and 

infrastructure in order to stay longer and create morc. Thus, we build an outpost; we do not conduct sorties]. We go 

to the poles of the Moon for three reasons: I) near-permanent sunlight near the poles permits almost constant 

generation of electrical power from photovoltaics, obviating the need for a nuclear reactor to survive the l4-day 

lunar night; 2) these quasi-permanent lit zones are thermally benign compared to equatorial regions (Apollo sites), 

being illuminated at grazing solar incidence angles and thus greatly reducing the passive therm.lloading from the 

hot lunar surface; 3) the permanently dark areas near the poles contain significant quantities of volatile substances, 

including hundreds of millions of metric tonnes of water icc. 

We return to the Moon gradually and in stages, making use of existing assets both on Earth and in space. We 

emplace small robotic assets on the lunar surface first. These robots will establish a communication/navigation 

satellite system around the Moon, prospect for promising volatile deposits, conduct demonstration experiments to 

document the physical state and extraction potential of water, and conduct the initial preparation of the outpost site. 

In the second phase, larger, more capable robotic machines (also operated from Earth but with more autonomy) will 

begin production of water in quantity, which is then converted into its component hydrogen and oxygen and made 

into cryogenic liquids for rocket propellant. The third phase involves emplacing the elements and infrastructure of 

the lunar outpost, including a habitat, roads and landing pads, solar power arrays and distribution grid, thermal 

control systems, and communications systems. In the fourth phase, humans arrive on the Moon, where they live in a 

pre-emplaced outpost and begin using previously landed robotic machines to increase production and extend 

operations. This work proceeds as resources and technical development permit; schedule is the free variable. Our 

objective is to produce surplus water that is exported to cislunar space (e.g., Earth-Moon L-I) for processing into 

propellant and other products. Because this phase coincides with human lunar return, we also begin to use lunar 

resources to supply materials such as metals, glasses, and ceramics for use at the outpost. Finally, in the fifth phase, 

we study the biological interaction and practicality of supporting plant growth in the lunar environment as well as 

develop a transition plan to commercial or international interests in an effort to allow the foothold on the Moon to 

enter a new phase of growth toward extending the human reach off-planet. 

Will this architecturc be practical and cost effective compared to launching products from Earth? Only time will 

tell, but it is possible that this foray into the unknown for the explicit purpose of extending human reach could be 

similar to other life-changing technological events in human history. Thus far, we have concentrated on the 

production of water and cryogenic propellant derived from it. However, that is only the beginning of our use oflunar 

resources. Once humans are on the Moon, we will exploit what is there, including structural fabrication using local 

resources, experimenting with large structures for plant cultivation, ceramics manufacture and use, metal extraction 

and processing experiments, and prospecting for other usable resources in the local environment. A significant goal 

of lunar return is also to learn whether it is feasible to export lunar products to Earth orbit or beyond in addition to 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
123 

answering the question of local resource usefulness at an outpost on a planetary body. By laying out our objectives 

and specific aims beforehand, we create an architecture that is actually more flexible and sustainable than one that is 

designed to the still poorly understood requiremeots of a human Mars mission and staged completely from the 

surface of the Earth in an "Apollo" mode of operation. We have the knowledge, technology and assets to begin this 

lunar resource work now. 

III. Destination Moon 

The Moon is the closest planetary object to Earth and it contains the necessary material and encrgy resources to 

create new space faring capability. The proximity of the Moon to Earth is a key attribute: because round-trip lighttime between Earth and Moon is only 3 seconds, we can control robotic machines on the lunar surface from Earth to 

accomplish a variety of tasks. This relation is crucial; it permits early and significant accomplishment on the Moon 

prior to human arrival. We use the proximity of the Moon to set up a functioning, productive lunar surface 

installation before the first human Crew arrives. With constant availability of a launch window and relatively low !!.V 

requirements, our Moon is the most accessible extraterrestrial body. This accessibility adds significant flexibility to 

our operational plans, as we can send or retrieve assets to and from the Moon at any time. 

In the last two decades, an increasing variety of new sensors have explored the Moon from orbit and significantly 

changed our perception of its history, processes and composition. Our earlicr understanding about the Moon as a 

volatile-poor object with a harsh and unforgiving surface environment came from studies of the Apollo samples and 

data. These samples are bone-dry; hydrogen found in returned lunar soil samples is present at a few parts per million 

concentration levels. Although we had tantalizing suggestions that water might be prescnt near the permanently dark 

areas near the poles4

, previous data were inconclusive. In addition, we lacked high quality images and topographic 

maps of the poles to fully understand their lighting and thermal conditions. 

New data from a variety of missions have documented the nature and occurrence ofwatcr on the MoonS

-

7 and the 

unique lighting' and thermal environment' near the poles. Measurement of the surface temperatures' near the poles 

show large areas with temperatures lower than 100 K; some permanently dark areas are as cold as 25 K. These 

"cold traps" serve to collect and sequester water molecules and ice deposits may build up here over the billion year 

time scales of polar evolution. In addition to cold traps, the new mapping data show areas of near-permanent sun 

illumination' close thc poles. Some areas are illuminated more than 90% of the lunar year (Fig. I). Because darkness 

is primarily caused by local topography, eclipse periods occur at irregular intervals and have durations ranging from 

a few hours to a few tens of hours. For this study, we assume solar illumination for 80% of the lunar day, a 

conservative estimate that is valid for identified placcs near both polcs. Periods of darkness are easily 

accommodated through temporary transition to power from batteries or rechargeable fuel cells. In addition to being 

suitable localities for solar arrays, these lit regions are also thermally more benign (surface temperatures on the order 

of _500 ± 10° C) than the equatorial regions, permitting extended operations for almost the entire 708-hour lunar 

day. 

Water is present in the polar areas in several different modes of occurrence. Thin layers of water molecules are 

widespread ovcr the high latitudes; the Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M') documented the presence of water' poleward 

of about 65° latitude, with amounts increasing with increasing latitude. Additionally, the impact of the LCROSS 

spacecraft in October 2009 kicked up a plume of dust, water vapor and ice partiCles'; water is present in this locality 

at concentrations between 5 and 10 weight percent. Finally, the Mini-SAR radar mapper' on Chandrayaan-l found 

dozens of craters at both poles that appear to contain nearly pure (90-100%) deposits of water iee; estimates for the 

north pole suggest that up to 600 million cubic meters of water ice may occur within these craters (Fig. 1). The new 

data indicate the presence of pervasivc and significant water ice at the poles of the Moon. For the purposes of this 

study, we assume a concentration of 10 wt.% water within our resource mining prospects. This is a very 

conservative estimate; our productivity and output will be commensurately higher with greater water concentrations. 

Thc polar regions contain resources of materials and cnergy that permit us to use the Moon as a logisties base for 

space faring within and beyond the Earth-Moon system. 

4 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
124 

Figure 1. Resources map of the north pole of the Moon. 

summer; craters shOl'\'ing anomalous radar behavior 

At present. \vc do not know the optimum location 1'01' the lunar oUlpost based on the 

illumination but existing data show several areas near the poles (Fig. 1). optimum 

locations, we conduct surfac0 reconnaissance at in our program, 

IV. Launch Vehicles 

of using 

LEO. Tw'o other approaches use existing Shuttle 

to create nc\\, capablc in tv,;o or three pieces, arc then assembled 

in low Earth orbit for trips outvvanL Two concepts and Shuttle side-mount - take advantage of 

thl: space industrial base, including tooling and assembly facilities, as \vcll as the processing and 

Space Center, to create new vchides that can deliver tens tonnes to LEO, 

is that we launch \yhat is needed to go to the Moon complete and no depots J:rc 

is thut there is some new vehicle development needed, 

multiple launch vehicles, the best available LV assets to meet payload and 

EEL V to laullch surface robotic clemcnts, These arc coupled 

depots both LEO and described bclO\v ill lhe Architecture section, to make 

maximum of the launch asscis by significantly incrcaslng lunar landed mass capability. A Delta IV Heavy 

ano large Atlas V (551) can place 1-2 MT on the surface of the Moon. This payload delivers significant capability to 

American lnstHulc ofAcl"On<lutics and Astronautics 
125 

the lunar surface. We begin by conducting detailed robotic site exploration and characterization of the poles. We 

know enough to pick promising landing sites, however, strategic knowledge about the physical state, distribution, 

conditions and quantities of lunar volatiles must be gathered from a lander and rover mission. 

The development of a heavy-lift vehiclc adds capability and flexibility to our architecture but is not a 

requirement for early missions, although we recognize that other strategic considerations (such as preservation of 

HLV infrastructure) may require the near-term development of such a vehicle. A Shuttle-derived vehicle has the 

least impact on existing facilities and thc least amount of new development and thus, lower total cost. A single 

Shuttle side-mount (SSM) can launch about 70 MT to LEO and place 8-9 MT (including lander) on the lunar 

surface. Two SSM launches can fly an entire human lunar mission; this is a valuable capability for a lunar return 

program. Once we have established a foothold on the Moon and have thc capability to at least partly supply 

ourselves from lunar materials, the need for a very heavy lift vehicle lessens. In fact, the best time for the creation of 

propellant depots is after we are able to supply them with lunar propellant. Such an approach makes human 

planetary missions easier; the dead weight of propellant (at least 80% of the total mass of the spacecraft for a human 

Mars mission) need not come from the deep gravity well of Earth. 

Much of the current debate about launch vehicles stems from the mission or objective of human flights beyond 

LEO. We believe that the fundamental objective of such flight is to extend human reach and presence from its 

current limitation in LEO to all levels of space beyond. To that end, we are agnostic on the need for any specific 

launch vehiclc solution; our goal is to make complete dependence on such vchicles unnecessary as rapidly as 

possible through the use of off-planet rcsources. If a heavy lift vehicle is available early in the program, we will use 

it. If one is not, we will use other launch vehicles. Because we must scope the total effort within an assumed budget 

profile that would be available to NASA for any launch vehicle development as well as all mission hardware 

development, we developed an architecture that accomplishcs the goal while fitting under the budget. We assume 

that a medium heavy lift launch vehicle (-70 MT) will be available during the later phases of our program (when 

humans are needed on the Moon.) Our particular architecture uses such a vehicle and reflects the cost of its 

development and operations, but other solutions are possible within the assumed budget wedge used by the 

Augustine Committee" (2009). We couple this medium heavy lift capability with use of a LEO propellant depot to 

leverage a much larger payload on the surface (12mT of payload on the lunar surface - not including the lander) as 

opposed to a much larger launch vehicle (-150 MT), the approach proposed for Constellation. We assume that 

commercial launch vehicles should be able to supply the depot with water, which the depot will convert into 

propellant. 

V. Architecture Summary 

We have described our architectural approach and elements in some detail prcviously14, Here we summarize the 

basic features of the architecture, its phasing in time and its programmatic implications. In short, we envision 

landing robotic spacecraft on the Moon to characterize its resources in detail, demonstrate that water can be 

extracted, processed and stored, and begin to set up a resource processing system that is largely automated and 

supervised under human control from Earth. These assets are gradually built and expanded, leading to the robotic 

emplacement of the lunar outpost elements: habitats, power systems, thermal control systems, navigation and 

communication, along with surface infrastructure such as roads and landing pads made from fusing the lunar soil by 

microwave. In effect, we emplace the lunar outpost robotically so that when people arrive, they move into a turn-key 

facility. Human presence is needed to maintain and repair the processing machines, expand and extend surface 

operations and conduct local exploration. We envision a remotely operated, robotic mining station; we send people 

to cannibalize common parts, fix problems, conduct periodic maintenance, upgrade soft goods, seals, valve packing, 

inspect equipment for wear, and perform certain logistical and developmental functions that humans do best. 

A key attribute of our architecture is flexibility - because we build surface infrastructure in increments with 

small pieces (Table I), we emplace and operate surface facilities as opportunity and capability permit. International 

and commercial partners can participate at whatever level they desire, since we use sman, incremental pieces, This 

allows a broader, more integrated participation in lunar return than was possible under previous agency plans. 

Smaller units (rovers and experiments) can be grouped together and launched on one large HLV or they can be 

launched separately on smaller EEL V s. Such flexibility allows us to create a foothold on the Moon irrespective of 

budgetary fluctuations. 

In our architecture, commonality occurs at the component level, with common cryo engines, valves, avionics 

boxes, landing subsystems, filters, and connectors to allow maximum use of the assets that are landed on the surface. 

This is significant because the lifetime of the landed elements in the hard environment of the lunar surface (dust, 

6 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
126 

\\,lthout kHJ maintellance, \\ollld be l()\v that 

a 

system must be 

pos.itional aCl:ura;:y (w!lhin 100 30) 

Institute or Al'rona\ltk~:, 
127 

Figure 2. I'llase 

Earth 

demo 

of IUII.r retunI arcilitect!!re. Orbit.! assets include Ihe lllllar .!llnminav s),stem alld 

depot. Surface elements include 1)l'OSI)~ctil1g rovers eadt pole) and ,Yater extraetion 

American of ."\CmfIHllllCCi and l\StfOIEIU.tlC' 
128 

emplacement and checkout. 1fno commercial providers emerge, a separate NASA mission can send water to the fuel 

depot. 

B. Phase II: Resource l\lining, Processing and Production 

The next phase moves us from resource exploration and suppotiing assets to actual \vaLer production (Figs. 3,4). 

We incrementally add excavators, dump haulers, soil processors and storage tanks to get, haul and store the water. 

Power stations generate electricity at the permanently illuminated (> 80%) peaks; equipment periodically connecL<; 

to these stations to recharge their batteries. OUI goals arc to learn how to remotely operate these machines and begin 

to produce and store water for eventual usc when people arrive. The processed water is easily stored in the 

pennanent shadow arcas. During this phase we also land our first electrolysis units to begin practicing the cracking 

of water, making the cryogcns, and storage of liquid fuels. Because we would be learning an operational cadence as 

we go, it might take several months or a year to get into a smooth rhythm which results in maximized amounts of 

propellant produced per unit time. Large unkno\\,I1s related to transit time between source and use site, thermal 

profiles, power profiles, lighting, sensor perfoJ:1nance, mctal fatigue, lubrication perfolll1ance, and feedstock density 

remain to be discovered. 

Figure 3. Phase 2 of the lunar return architecture. In Phase 2, we emplace and begin to use the water 

harvesting and processing units. Each Janding adds capability to the processing stream with the aims of 

continually increasing production levels. 

9 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
129 

Figure 4. Phase 2 IUIlar retum arehiled"rc \C~'!lt!i!lUle<l). 

prOCt~Sslng stre:uu the aims of em,til"",Ii" 

we .dd a sccond propellant depot 

ACnlnmli!lCSand J\stronmmc's 
130 

Figure 5. Pllase III iuvolves landing llm! installing tbe pieces of Ihe lu"ar 

manipulators build the ami create supporting infrastructure, snch as 

berms. The llOm.n habitat operational prior to the arrival of crew. 

II 

Aenmautics Dnd Astronautics 

Robotic rovers and 

pads, roads, and blast 

mobile human rover (;.L5 

local mobility to access 
131 

The second Heavy Cargo mission will bring the habitat to the Moon. While it is envisioned that ultimately the 

human habitable areas at the outpost will be significantly larger than a single 12 MT module, initial needs are to 

have sufficient habitable volume to support 2-4 crew for a short period of time, with the crew size tradable with 

duration. Included in either this mission or the prcvious one would be the radiators and heat rejection equipment, as 

well as a fully-operational Environmental Control and Life Suppnrt System. 

D. Pbase IV: Human Lunar Return 

During this phase, we prepare the outpost site, emplace the elements, and connect the pieces to create a "turnkey" facility, ready to use by arriving human crew (Fig. 5). These pieces include the power and thermal control 

systems, habitats, workshops, landing pads, roads, and other facilities. The initial outpost can support a crew of four 

for visits of several weeks each at least twice per year. The arriving crew will interact with. repair, service and 

operate the previously emplaced robotic assets in ensure maximum efficiency. At least part of the crew will have 

time to conduct local surface exploration and other science-related tasks. By the time of arrival of the first human 

crews, we plan fOf the production of ISO MT of water per year, enough to completely supply the lunar transportation 

system with propellant. 

The lander for human missions is closer to a LM-class system (-30 MT) rather than Constellation's Altair-scale 

lander (-50 MT). Its primary mission is to transport crcw to and from the lunar surface. It does not contain 

significant life-support systems, as the crew wiIllive in pre-emplaced surface habitats while on the Moon; unlike the 

Altair lander, this lander is merely a mechanism for transport. This lunar taxi becomes a permanent part of the 

cislunar transportation system. It is re-useable and fe-fuelable with lunar produced propellant and can be stored on 

the lunar surface or at the cislunar transport node. Because of the similarity in size and functionality for the HL and 

RWTL, it is important to develop eommon components so that the parts count for lunar surface maintenance can be 

minimized. Specifically, we again envision both landers using a common reusable cryo engine developed in part or 

totally by the RHL development, with both vehicles using a mUltiple engine complement for reliability and 

redundancy as well as cost. Single engines are designed to be serviced or changed out on the Moon, thus 

maximizing the lifetime of the vehicles in which they reside. 

We also use a cargo variant of the human lander. It is launched on a HLV and can deliver 12 MT of payload to 

the lunar surface, with fueling at the LEO Fuel Station. Once on the surface, it will be used fOf scrap parts (another 

reason for a common parts list). The lander has a dry mass of 8300 kg, a propellant mass of 22000 kg and a payload 

capacity of 12000 kg. It is launched from the LEO station using a Cislunar Transfer Stage (CTS), which requires 

about 60,000 kg of cryo propellant to take the lander to the Moon. The CTS is another candidate for reusability, 

although we assume that it is non-reusable, at least initially. Once lunar propellant production is up and running, we 

can reuse this element by rendezvousing in LLO with the Cislunar Way Station. Future studies ean examine the 

possibility of later reuse of the cargo landcr to ship goods back to the Earth, or to LEO, or even to LI as a staging 

area, depending upon the specific needs at the time. Note that this architecture does not presume full success with 

extracting lunar resources except for refucling for human Earth return. As this concept matures, and our 

understanding of the logistics, cost, and sustainability of this approach solidifies, lunar refueling can expand 

significantly (as much as the demand will allow) including incorporation of the cargo landers. 

E. Phase V and beyond: Human Habitation of the Moon 

Once the outpost has been established (Fig. 6), initial human occupancy will consist of periodic visits designed 

to explore the local site and to maintain and assure the proper operation of the mining and production equipment. 

These visits will be interspersed with the landing of additional robotic assets as our intention is to continually 

increase the production of water with the aim of exporting water to cislunar space. Our architecture stops after 30 

missions and at a production level of 150 MT of water per year, the threshold for the production and expnrt of 

surplus product. 

Initially, the first objectives for the crew will be to assurc the propellant and water production chain, including 

periodic maintenance and optimization of the operations concepts and timelines. With subsequent cargo deliveries, 

the crew will examine production techniques, procedures, technologies, and tools that al10w a full revision of and 

expansion of the next step in utilization. Although many studies have been conducted on this activity, many 

unknowns need to be addressed, starting with basic technologies and technology applications in the lunar 

environment. In addition, techniques, tools, and extensive physical and metallurgical analysis of the properties of the 

final products need to be examincd to obtain the best products for as yet undefined applications. Our objective in 

these ISRU efforts lead to the development of a pressurized surface habitat in which 90% of the mass of the 

structure uses local materials. This phase is vitally important to extending human reach in space, and so will be a 

long-term plan, although it is important to realize that habitat upkeep and propellant supply chain management has 

12 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
132 

material lllV(;5tigatic111 

biological interaction and 

j()ng term lDgi~ticalllc:c(b 

Cart 

Beacons 

Pressurized 

ISRU·fabrica!ed Structure 

Portable Communication 

Terminal 

Fig:urc 6 Fiual configuration of the \yorking outpost~ r('au~ 

outpost will be nul' investment ill it Scycra! 

procc:-);;ing ant icipatc that the federal 

and repc,lt customer for lunar l1(1t only for future NASA mission;.; hcyond the 

such as the Department or ih::fcnsc. A.dditionaHy. international 

commercial bllycri \\ elL \Vl1cll1er jllc j~tci!itics arc 

marketS and Jhcl, is 

111l'innlnrl"nL The cri~ica! pnint 

space part of our economic spbere. hn,'lh"rI11nrc. 

the C'xperimcnt undcsirah1c outcomes ~md pitfalls :;0 that others C;)t1 

w!ll enable tIll: commercial 1.0 wk,.:- O\(T m,my of the lunar and ,'-.crviccs. Transition to c\.)Hl1nercial 

activity may be early or late in nutpost development. \Vc recognize that part of NASA's ultimate 

file 

kct:plng 

and t:llhancc the nation's commercial and industrial ha:-,\"~ and we- hav.: aUc-mpkd it) encourage sHch 

where possible. 

yt 'HSSIO~'i SEQCE:>iCE 

and ,",urf'acc clemL'nts dc~cr!ht:d <1bDVC 

individual pieces small is that 

13 

of Acml1antlcs and Astronaltlics 
133 

Element 

Water ranker Rover 

Human M1:ssJOn 1 

Cargo 

10 SO 50 SO 50 50 100 

I 5 86 

50 50 SO 100 

Earth -

VI!. Cost 

Co~b in Tabh:: '2 and ddaib 

outpo~l capahle or 

l'~tahlishcd l11duding 

14 

and i"tlOnmlUC' 

100 150 150 

functioning lunar 

can be 

of 5(;,65 
134 
135 

system that can access the entire Moon, but more importantly, we will have the capability to routinely access all of 

our space assets within cislunar spacel6: communications, GPS~ weather, remote sensing and strategic monitoring 

satellites. These satellites will then be in reach to be serviced, maintained and replaced as they age. 

We have concentrated on the water production attributes of a lunar outpost because the highest leveraging 

capabilities that are most easily exploited are associated with the availability of propellant. However, there are other 

possibilities to explore, including the paradigm-shifting culture to eventually design all structural elements needed 

for lunar activities using lunar resources. These activities will spur new commercial space interest, innovation and 

investment. This further reduces the Earth logistics train and helps extend human reach deeper into space, along a 

trajectory that is incremental, methodical, sustainable and within projected budget expectations. 

Instead of the current design-build-Iaunch-discard paradigm of space operations, we can build extensible, 

distributed space systems, with capabilities much greater than currently possible. Both the Shuttle and ISS 

experience demonstrated the value of human construction and servicing of orbital systems. What we have lacked is 

the ability to access the various systems that orbit the Earth at altitudes much greater than LEO MEO, GEO and 

other locations in cislunar space. 

A transportation system that can access cislunar space, can also take us to the planets. The assembly and fueling 

of interplanetary missions is possible using the resources of the Moon. Water produced at the lunar poles can fuel 

human missions beyond the Earth-Moon system, as well as provide radiation shielding for the crew, thereby greatly 

reducing the amount of mass needed to be launched from the Earth's surface. To give some idea of the leverage this 

provides, it has been estimated that a chemically propelled Mars mission requires roughly one million pounds (about 

500 metric tonnes) in Earth orbit". Of this mass, more than 80% is propellant. Launching such propellant from 

Earth requires more than five Ares V -class launches, at a cost of almost $2 billion each. This does not establish true 

exploration capability. A Mars mission staged from the facilities of a cislunar transport system can use the 

propellant of the Moon to reduce the needed mass launched from Earth by a factor of five. 

This return to the Moon is affordable and can be accomplished on reasonable time scales. Instead of single 

missions to exotic destinations, where aU hardware is discarded as the mission progresses, we instead focus on the 

creation of reusable and extensible space systems, flight assets that are permanent and useable for future exploration 

beyond LEO. In short, we get value for our money. Instead of a fiscal black hole, this extensible space program 

becomes a generator of innovation and national wealth. It is challenging enough to drive technological innovation 

yet within reach on a reasonable timescale. 

Propellant and water exported from the Moon will initially be used solely by NASA, both to support lunar surface 

operations and to access and service satellites in Earth orbitl6 and to re-fuel planetary missions, including human 

missions to Mars. Over time, other federal agencies such as the Defense Department (intelligence satellites) or 

NOAA (weather satellites) may need lunar propellant for the maintenance of their space assets. Additionally, 

international partners or other countries may require propellant for access to their own satellites and space platforms. 

Finally, lunar propellant would be offered to commercial markets to supply, maintain and extend the wide variety of 

commercial applications satellites in cislunar space as well as enabling other emerging space ventures. 

The modular, incremental nature of this architecture enables international and commercial participation to be 

easily and seamlessly integrated into our lunar return scenario. Because the outpost is built around the addition of 

capabilities through the use of small, robotically teleoperated assets, other parties can bring their own pieces to the 

table as time, availability and capability pennit. International partners can contemplate their own human launch 

capability to the Moon without use of a Heavy Lift vehicle. This feature becomes politically attractive by simply 

providing lunar fuel for a return trip for the international partners. This flexibility makes international participation 

and commercialization in our architecture much more viable than was possible under the previous ESAS 

architecture. 

We have described only the initial steps of lunar return based on resource utilization. Water is both the easiest and 

most useful substance by far that we can extract from the Moon and use to establish a cislunar space faring 

transportation infrastrueture. Once established, we imagine many different possibilities for the lunar outpost. It may 

evolve into a commercial facility, which manufactures water and propellant and other commodities for sale in 

eislunar space. It could remain a government laboratory, exploring the trade space of resource utilization by 

experimenting with new processes and products. Alternatively, it could become a scientific research station, 

supporting detailed surface investigations to understand the planetary and solar history recorded on the Moon. We 

may decide to internationalize the outpost, creating a common use facility for science, exploration, research and 

commercial activity. By emphasizing resource extraction and use ear1y~ we create new opportunities for flexible 

growth and evolution beyond our initial operational capability. 

16 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
136 

IX. Conclusion 

We desire to extend hwnan reach in space beyond its current limit of low Earth orbit. The Moon has the material 

and energy resources needed to create a true space faring system. Recent data show the lunar surface richer in 

resource potential than we had thought; both abundant water and near-pennanent sunlight is available at selected 

areas near the poles. We go to the Moon to learn how to extract and use those resources to create a space 

transportation system that can routinely access all of cislunar space with both machines and people. Such a goal 

makes our national space program relevant to national security and economic interests as wen as to scientific ones. 

This lunar outpost serves as the vanguard for studying the practical employment of techniques, processes, and 

systems that will allow humanity to effectively extend its reach off-planet. 

This return to the Moon is affordable under existing and projected budgetary constraints. Creation of sustainable 

space access opens the Solar System to future generations. Having access to the Moon and the ability to use its 

resources is more important than how we go or how soon we get there. This architecture can relax schedule to fit 

any monetary or programmatic shortfall, as well as accelerate schedule if funding increases. But regardless of 

program pace, our goals and tactics remain the same; open the space frontier for a wide variety of purposes by 

harvesting the material and energy resources of the Moon. The decisions we make now will detennine if our longdelayed journey into the cosmos can begin and be sustained over time. 

Appendix 

A. Cost assumptions and Ground rules 

1. The cost of crew to ISS is not budgeted in this portfolio, consistent with the funding profile provided to the 

Augustine Commission for a lunar architecture. 

2. This architecture relies upon a Design To Cost philosophy at NASA such that perfonnance and to a certain extent 

risk is secondary to cost; NASA is undergoing that paradigm shift evaluation now. This architecture has robust 

perfonnance margins such that perfonnance can be sacrificed if cost growth is too high. All cost in Real-Year 

dollars. 

3. The Heavy Lift Development cost thm first flight (including KSC DDTE) but not including cost of any future 

flight is $9.4B for a 7SmT LV. Profile shows dip in the middle to get KSC pad modifications perfonned early. This 

is consistent with the current planning for the SLS Program. 

4. Heavy Lift Operations cost is $1.2B per year (from HLLV Ops cost in Implementation Plan) plus $lSOMlyr for 

upgrades, assuming 2 flights and flight sets, and includes all KSC and MSFC costs to launch 2 flights per year (any 

mix of crew and cargo). 

S. Lunar resource processing will be procured from private endeavors when and if they can first demonstrate 

viability on the lunar surface. In the interim, this architecture assumes that NASA will develop resource producing 

capabilities and use them throughout the 16-yr duration of this architecture. Viable demonstrations by commercial 

entities win reduce the cost of the total architecture, but are not assumed here. 

6. The fuel producing infrastructure on the Moon (EH, WPS and WEFS) has a 10 yr life with on-site maintenance. 

7. The acquisition approach for the various landers is assumed to be one contractor for the robotic landers (RML 

and RHL), and one contractor for the larger landers (RWTL, HL, and CL). Because of similar designs, parts, 

components, tooling, and test systems, certain cost savings can be realized. These have not been shown and 

constitute hidden cost margin for the DDTE of three of the Slanders. 

8. The acquisition approach for the various power systems is assumed to be a single contractor. All power systems 

on the robotie landers to support lunar water extraction and electrolysis are a single, modular design with only one 

DOTE cycle. 

9. All transport from LEO to LLO (except for the robotic landers) will use the CTS. The variable mass ofpaylo.ds 

will be accommodated using propellant offioad. 

10. JSC Ops Cost (prior to frrsthwnan mission) includes development of EVA suits and all JSC activily supporting 

Flight and Mission Ops (from FY02 cost of $4S0M including everything for Shuttle). There is probably margin in 

this allocation, but we have not studied this number in detail. 

11. This architecture assumes two CEVs per year cost $SOOM total. 

12. The Rovers (WT, RF1) have a IS yr life with on-site maintenance. 

13. The Solar Power Plants have a 20 yr life. 

14. JSC Ops cost (after the first human mission) for Ops for two erewed missions per year assumes worst-case 6-

month stays and costs $400M/yr (see cost of Shuttle program, above in #10). 

IS. The RHL DDT&E will include a new cryogenic engine that will also he used for RWTL, HL, and CL. 

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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
137 

16. All Atlas 551 launches except LEO Fuel Station include $50M for water to the LEO Fuel Station, assuming a 

launch cost of -$5000Ikg. 

17. Cislunar Transfer Stage Ops cost is $400Wyr for two missions, either crew, cargo, or mix, including hardware, 

integration, and flight support. 

18. The cost of the first flight of the Water Processor System includes the DDT&E cost for the Solar Power Plant 

and the Robotic Heavy Lander. 

19. The Atlas 551 cost is assumed to be $200M; Atlas 40 I is assumed at $150M (reference cest data from ULA web 

site) 

20. Year 13 has three heavy-lift launches. Assume that the LV hardware for the first launch is paid for with prior 

year dollars (only one launch in previous year) and stored for a while. 

21. The LLO Way Station should be as close to the LEO Fuel Depot design as possible, with a goal to be exact, 

leading to one DDTE development for modular assets in LEO and LLO. The LEO asset is three identical, modular 

units. The acquisition approach for these assets is a single contractor. 

22. The HL is derived with the same basic structure and systems as the CL, developed at the same time. 

23. The Outpost Power Grid is the same basic design as the Power Plants, but with the ability to transport them. 

24. Management, Integration, and SE&I are 10% of the cost of all the pieees unless specified. When there is only a 

single piece launched, the cost of those three pieces is embedded into that element cost. 

25. All Elements include between 25 and 30% cost margin as part of their cost allocation. Cost growth is addressed 

by a reduction in performance down to a floor, and then schedule slippage for the architecture. 

26. All integration activity for integrating more than one element into a launch is performed by NASA. 

B. Costing of individual missions 

Mission 1: 

Launch Cost: $150M (Atlas 401) 

Launch Payload: 

Comm Satellites 

Upper Stage Solid 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Tot.1 Mission Cost: 

Mission 1: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RML First Unit 

RML Second Unit 

WIE First Unit 

WIE Secend Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req' ts 

Tot.1 Mission Cost: 

Mission 3: 

Launch Cost 

Launch Payload: 

RML Third Unit 

Water Demo Pkg 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

Several 

one 

Multiple communication satellites in LLO 

lOOOkg 

$250M (including upper stage solid) 

$0 (Included in payload cost) 

$400M 

$200M (Atlas 55!) 

$500M 

$125M 

$400M 

$ lOOM 

2 WIE's, one to each pole 

lOOOkg 

$1 125M 

$175M 

$50M (Nuclear) 

$50M (Upper Stage solids) 

$1600M 

$150M (Atlas 401) 

$125M 

$400M 

Water Demo Package 

500kg 

$525M 

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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 4: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

LEO Fuel Station 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 5: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RHL First Unit 

WP&SP First Unit 

PP First Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 6: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RML Forth Unit 

Water Tanker 

Final payload: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 7: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RHL Second Unit 

EH First Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 8: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RHL Third Unit 

WEFSP First Unit 

$50M 

$25Msolid 

5750M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$2400M 

LEO Fuel Station part 1 

8000kg 

$2400M 

$0 (included in payload cost) 

None 

52600M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$2000M 

$500M 

$200M 

WP&SP unit plus PP on the surface 

2300kg 

$2700M (including upper stage solid) 

$370M ($IOOM more than 10%) 

$50M (IO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

53120M 

$150M (Atlas 401) 

$125M 

$250M 

Water Tanker (rover) on the surface 

$375M (including upper stage solid) 

$40M 

None 

5565M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$400M (2x the nth copy cost for the 2nd unit) 

$1000M 

Excavator/Hauler on the surface 

2300kg (may be more than 1 piece) 

$1400M 

$140M 

$50M (lO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

51790M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$200M 

$700M 

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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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PP Second Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 9: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RML Fifth Unit 

RFT First Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 10: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

LLO Way Station 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 11: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

LEO Fuel 2nd copy 

LEO Fuel 3m copy 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 12: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RWTLFirst Unit 

$50M 

WEFSP and PP on surface 

2300kg 

$950M 

$IOOM 

$50M (lO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

S1300M 

$150M (Atlas 401) 

$125M 

$200M 

Rover Fueling Tanker on surface 

500kg 

$375M 

$40M 

None 

S565M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$800M (mostly a copy of LEO Fuel Station) 

LLO Way Station in LLO (lO,OOOkg fuel) 

8000kg 

$800M 

$IOOM (Included in payload, plus complicated ops) 

$50M (lO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

S1l50M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$600M 

$600M 

LEO Fuel Station Phase 2 in LEO (75,000kg fuel) 

16000kg 

$1200M 

$IOOM (some included in payload cost) 

$50M (1 O,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

S1550M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

$2100M 

CTS First Unit $0 ($1.8B DDTE entered elsewhere) 

RWTL Support Cart $150M 

Final payload: Reusable Water Tank Lander on surface 

Final Payload Mass: 5020 kg 

Payload cost: $2250M 

PM, SE&I, etc $200M 

Special Req'ts $150M (30,000kg of water for fuel) 

Total Mission Cost: $2600M 

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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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Mission 13: 

Launch Cost: $0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

Launch Payload: 

HPLC: 

Personnel Transfer Vehicle 

Outpost Power Grid 

Portable Comm Terminal 

LSRS Heavy 

$2000M 

$200M 

$IOOM 

$IOOM 

$150M 

$IOOM 

HL Support Cart 

Logistics supplies 

Cargo Lander I st unit 

CTS 2nd Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 14: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RHL Fourth Unit 

WEFSP 2nd Unit 

PP Third Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Pay load cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 15: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

$0 ($2500M DDTE entered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit cost entered elsewhere) 

Human Power & Logistics Cluster on surface 

1O,000kg 

$2750M 

$400M ($125M Extra for complex integration) 

$300M (60,000kg of water for fuel) 

$3450M 

$200M(Atias 551) 

$200M 

$175M 

$50M 

WEFSP #2 and PP on surface 

2300kg 

$625M 

$50M (Repeat, so cost below 10%) 

$50M (lO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

$725M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

Habitat First Unit $3000M 

Cargo Lander 2

nd unit 

CTS 3rd Unit 

$0 ($300M Unit cost entered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit cost entered elsewhere) 

Final payload: Habitat #1 on surface 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 16: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

HL First Unit 

CTS 4th Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

10,000 kg 

$3000M 

$300M 

$300M (60,000kg of water for fuel) 

$3600M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

$2 100M 

$0 ($200M Unit Cost entered elsewhere) 

Human Lander (reusable) on surface 

1O,000kg 

$4000M 

$200M (easier than 10% bccause of R WTL synergy) 

$300M (60,000kg of water for fuel) 

S4500M 

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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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Mission 17: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

Block 2 CEV )'t Unit 

CTS 5th Unit 

Misc Payload 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 18: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RHL Fifth Unit 

EH Second Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 19: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RHL Sixth Unit 

WP&SP 2nd Unit 

PP4th Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 20: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

RHL Seventh Unit 

WEFSP 3rd Unit 

PP 5th Unit 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 21: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

$0 ($6925M DOTE for Block 1& 2 covered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit Cost entered elsewhere) 

$50M 

First Human Mission to Outpost 

1000kg 

$350M 

$0 (included in payload cost; Ops cost covered elsewhere) 

$150M (30,000kg of water for fuel) 

$500M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$200M (unit cost) 

$225M (unit cost) 

Excavator/Hauler #2 on the surface 

2300kg (may be more than 1 piece) 

$625M 

$50M (duplicate of Mission 7, so <10%) 

$50M (lO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

$725M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$200M 

$125M 

$50M 

WP&SP #2 plus PP on the surface 

2300kg 

$575M (including upper stage solid) 

$50M (duplicate of Mission 7, so <10%) 

$50M (lO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

$675M 

$200M (Atlas 551) 

$200M 

$175M 

$50M 

#3 and PP on surface 

2300kg 

$625M 

$50M (Repeat, so cost below 10%) 

$50M (lO,OOOkg of water for fuel) 

$725M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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Habitat Second Unit $600M 

Cargo Lander 3ni unit $0 ($300M Unit cost entered elsewhere) 

CTS 6th Unit $0 ($200M Unit cost entered elsewhere) 

Final payload: Habitat #2 on surface 

Final Payload Mass: 1O,000kg 

Payload cost: $600M 

PM, SE&I, etc $60M 

Special Req'ts $300M (60,000kg of water for fuel) 

Total Mission Cost: $960M 

Mission 22: 

Launch Cost: $0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

Launch Payload: 

Block 2 CEV 2nd Unit 

CTS 7th Unit 

$0 ($ covered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit Cost entered elsewhere) 

Misc Payload 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 23: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

$50M 

Second Human Mission to Outpost 

1000kg 

$350M 

$0 (included in payload cost; Ops cost covered elsewhere) 

$150M (30,000kg of water for fuel) 

$500M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

Block 2 CEV 3ni Unit 

CTS gthUnit 

$0 ($6925M DOTE for Block 1& 2 covered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit Cost entered elsewhere) 

Misc Payload 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 24: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

$50M 

Third Human Mission to Outpost 

1000kg 

$350M 

$0 (included in payload cost; Ops cost covered elsewhere) 

$150M (30,000kg of water for fuel) 

$500M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

Block 2 CEV 4th Unit 

CTS 9th Unit 

$0 ($6925M DOTE for Block 1& 2 covered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit Cost entered elsewhere) 

Misc Payload 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 25: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

Unpress ISRU Lab 

Cargo Lander 4th unit 

CTS 10th Unit 

Final payload: 

$50M 

Fourth Human Mission to Outpost 

1000kg 

$350M 

$0 (included in payload cost; Ops cost covered elsewhere) 

$150M (30,000kg of water for fuel) 

S500M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

$1500M 

$0 ($300M Unit cost entered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit cost entered elsewhere) 

Unpressurized ISRU Lab on surface 

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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Special Req'ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

Mission 16: 

Launch Cost: 

Launch Payload: 

IO,OOOkg 

$1500M 

$IOOM 

$300M (60,000kg of water for fuel) 

S1900M 

$0 (Heavy Lift cost entered elsewhere) 

Block 2 CEV 2'd Unit 

CTS 71h Unit 

$0 ($ covered elsewhere) 

$0 ($200M Unit Cost entered elsewhere) 

Misc Payload 

Final payload: 

Final Payload Mass: 

Payload cost: 

PM, SE&I, etc 

Speeial Req' ts 

Total Mission Cost: 

$50M 

Fifth Human Mission to Outpost 

1000kg 

$350M 

$0 (included in payload cost; Ops cost covered elsewhere) 

$150M (30,000kg of water for fuel) 

$500M 

Acknowledgments 

We thank Ben Bussey, John Gruener, Larry Kos, Steve Mackwell, Don Petti~ Andy Prince, and Jerry Sanders 

for helpful discussions and reviews of earlier drafts of this paper. This is Lunar and Planetary Institute Contribution 

Number 1635. 

References 

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htto:llwww.spaceref.eom/news/viewpr.html?pid=13404 [cited 14 January 2004] 

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and TeChnology, Washington DC, http://www.spaceref.comlnews/viewsr.html?pid=19999 [cited 20 March 2006] 

3Clarke A,C., The Exploration a/Space. New York: Harper, 195]. 198 pp. 

4Spudis P.D., Ice on the Moon. The Space Review, http://www.thespaccrevicw.com/articIeI7401l [cited 6 November 2006] 

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37, L06204, 2010, doi:1O,102912009GL042259 

7Wooden D. et al., LCROSS: Volatiles and Exosphere Associated with a Pennanently Shadowed Region in Cabens NLSI Lunar 

Forum 2010, http://lunarscience2010.arc.nasa.gov/nodel199 

8Bussey D.B.l, lA. McGovern, P.D. Spudis, C.D. Neish, H. Noda, Y. Ishihara, S.-A. Sorensen, Illumination conditions of the 

south pole of the Moon derived using Kaguya topography. Icarus 208, 2, 2010, 558-564 

9Paige D.A. et at, Diviner Lunar Radiometer Observations of Cold Traps in the Moon's South Polar Region. Science 330, 2010, 

479-482. 

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13 Augustine Committee, Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation. NASA Washington DC, 2009, 

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14Spudis P.D. and Lavoie T., Mission and Implementation of an Affordable Lunar Return. Space Manufacturing 14. Space 

Studies Inst., Princeton NJ, 20 II, in press. 

!.5RLEP_2 Study team, Robotic Lunar Exploration Program Mission 2 Study, NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, 

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16Spudis P. D., The New Space Race, Space Ref, http://www.spaceref.cominews/viewnews.html?id-1376 [cited 9 February 

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NASA SP-6107, 1997, NASA-JSC, Houston TX, 147 pp. 

24 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronauties 
144 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY DR. PAUL SPUDIS

Chapter 12, Toward a Theory ojSpacepower, C.D. Lutes and P.L. Hays, eds., Institute For National 

Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, p. 241-251, 201 I. 

The Moon: Port of Entry to Cislunar Space 

Paul D. Spudis 

If God wanted man to become a space-faring species, 

He would have given man a Moon. - Krafft Ehricke' 

One can imagine many possible missions and destinations for America's civil space 

program. Voyages to the planets, large scientific instruments at orbitallibration points, 

and continued use of the International Space Station (ISS) are all possible missions of 

both machines and people from many countries in the coming decades. With the 

imminent completion of the ISS and retirement of the space shuttle, a national discussion 

has emerged as to both the purpose and rationale for human spaceflight. 

The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) outlined by President George W. Bush in 20042 

and endorsed by Congress in 20053 and 20084 (under different parties) called for human 

missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), including a return to the Moon. The inclusion of 

the Moon has drawn comment from the space community, many of whom think that 

since the Apollo program ended over three decades ago, it was included as a way to 

regain valuable experience. In fact, the Moon is the critical element of the VSE. It is 

where we willieam how to use what we find in space to create new spacefaring 

capability. 

Why the Moon? 

The Moon has a major advantage over other potential destinations beyond LEO as it is 

both close and easily accessible. Only a 3-day trip from Earth, the Moon is close enough 

for existing space systems to reach. Additionally, it is only a 3-light-second round trip 

between Earth and Moon, which allows robotic missions on the lunar surface to be 

controlled remotely from the Earth in near real time. The Moon's low gravity permits 

landing and operations with a minimal expenditure of energy. 

The Moon is a scientific laboratory of unique character. Its location near Earth ensures 

that it records the geological history of this part of the solar system. Such history 

includes the impact of solid objects and the solar wind and their possible changes with 

time. It holds a historical record of cosmic radiation, including nearby supernovae. The 

Moon's timeless surface preserves a record of ancient events, and whatever is preserved 

on the lunar surface must have also affected the Earth. This record is long gone from our 

dynamic terrestrial surface but remains preserved on the static, ancient lunar surface. 

The Moon has the material and energy resources needed to support human presence and 

to begin building a long-lasting transportation infrastructure. Its surface is covered by a 

very fine-grained soil that is useful as radiation shielding and building material.5 Oxygen 

extracted from lunar materials can support life and be used for rocket propellant. Light 
145 

elements, such as hydrogen, helium, and nitrogen, are present in the lunar soil in low 

concentrations, but in enough quantity to permit their extraction and use. More 

importantly, we now find that significant amounts of hydrogen are present in soils at high 

latitudes and that the polar areas may contain water ice in permanently dark areas. 

Because the spin axis of the Moon is nearly perpcndicular to its orbit around the Sun, 

some areas at the poles are in near-permanent sunlight. This is a unique asset: areas in 

constant sunlight for power generation are proximate to shadowed terrain enriched in the 

light elements, such as hydrogen. Another asset unique to the Moon is its far side, the 

only place in our solar system permanently shielded from Earth's radio noise. Here we 

can scan the sky to observe the universe in entirely new areas ofthc spectrum. 

The Moon is the first, but not the last, destination in the VSE. It is not only an important 

destination in its own right, but also an enabling asset. The objective of this program is 

to go to the Moon to learn how to use off-planet resources to create new capability and to 

make future space flight easier and cheaper.6 Rocket propellant made on the Moon 

permits routine access to cislunar space by both people and machines, and is vital to the 

servicing and protection of national strategic assets and for the repair and refurbishing of 

commercial satellites. The United States cannot afford to forfeit its lead in the access of 

cislunar space. There are serious national security and economic ramifications if our 

leaders fail to recognize the importance of the Moon to our future in space and herc on 

Earth. 

Spaceflight: The Current Template 

Fifty years of space travel have been possible because we accepted the iron rules of 

spaceflight that are dictated by the rocket equation.7 In brief, this requires a significant 

expenditure of energy to get something out of the deep gravity well in which the Earth 

resides. As it is very expensive to escape this gravity field, thc things we launch into 

space are made as small and low in mass as possible. As long as this mode of operation 

prevails, we are mass- and power-limited in spacc and therefore, capability-limited. 

These limitations greatly restrict what we can do in space. 

The prevailing rules of spaceflight have led to the development of a template of 

operations for satellites and other space assets. For a given mission, a specialized, 

usually custom, spacecraft is designed. The spacecraft is built to exceedingly fine 

standards, with numerous environmental tests and retests. It is launched on an 

expendable vehicle into a specially designed orbit and in most cases is unreachable by 

other spacecraft. If all goes well, it is operated for as long as possible and ultimately 

abandoned. The entire process is then repeated. Sometimes, by incorporating the results 

from previous missions, the design is improved. 

Because each satellite is eventually thrown away, space operations are expensive and 

difficult. If it were possible, these assets would bencfit greatly from servicing, 

maintenance, and expansion. A system that routinely accesses orbiting satellites with 

servicing robots and people would fundamentally change our approach to spaceflight. 

The difficulty in developing this capability is that the machines and propellant we would 
146 

need to do this must also be lifted up from the deep gravity well, again at great cost and 

difficulty. The greatest mass of this system is rocket propellant. 

Ifwe develop a source of rocket propellant in space (so that we do not have to lift it up 

from Earth's surface), a new type of operational template might be possible. Instead of 

one-off designs and throwaway assets, we would think about long-term, extensible, and 

maintainable modular systems. The availability of a source of rocket propellant in LEO 

would completely change the way engineers design spacecraft and the way companies 

and the government think about investing in space assets. It would serve to dramatically 

reduce the cost of infrastructure in space to both government and the private sector, thus 

spurring economic investment (and profit). 

Cislunar Space: Where All Our Assets Reside 

The various altitudes and levels of orbit around the EarthS create very different 

environments and capabilities and hence are utilized by many different types of satellites 

designed to take advantage of the opportunities they offer. The closest zone is LEO, a 

space lying roughly within 2,000 kilometers (Ian) from the Earth, with most satellites 

operating around 200 to 300 Ian. It is within this zone most human and robotic space 

activity occurs. All satellites must at least pass through this zone before arriving at their 

final destinations. 

LEO has many advantages for a variety of missions, including being where orbits are 

closest and easiest to get to. It is largely below the Van Allen radiation belts, so 

spacecraft and instruments are protected from hard radiation. Robotic satellites carry out 

a variety of scientific missions including orbital remote sensing of Earth and its 

atmosphere. Extended human missions are undertaken in LEO, both on temporary orbital 

spacecraft such as the shuttle and permanent facilities such as the ISS. Orbital periods 

are low (on the order of 90 minutes) and repeat passes occur at least twice a day over the 

same area from inclined orbits (and on every pass from an equatorial orbit). 

Medium Earth orbits (MEO) range from 2,000 Ian up to about 35,000 Ian altitude. 

Orbital periods become much longer, which is useful for space applications that require 

long visibility times, such as global positioning systems (GPS). Typically, such 

applications are achieved using constellations of multiple satellites, such that two or more 

assets can work in tandem to achieve the desired result. MEO comprises the Van Allen 

radiation belts and thus is a difficult environment in which to maintain satellite life. 

Highly elliptical orbits (REO) are very elongated (thousands of kilometers at apogee, the 

high point of such an orbit) and have very long orbital periods. Because of their very 

long dwell times at apogee, these orbits are used in some national security missions, as 

they can "hover" over specific areas for long periods of time. Satellite radio also uses this 

zone of cislunar space. 

Geosynchronous orbits occur around 35,000 Ian altitude; their periods coincide with the 

rotation period of the Earth, and thus the satellites appear twice a day over the same spot 
147 

on the Earth's surface. A perfectly equatorial orbit at 35,786 km is a geostationary orbit 

(GEO), in which a satellite appears to be stationary in the sky. These orbits are widely 

used by all nations for a variety of communications purposes and for global weather 

observation and monitoring. GEO is one of the most valuable places in Earth orbit. 

Beyond GEO are the Earth-Moon libration points (also called Lagrange points)9; L 1 

through L3 are in line with the Earth-Moon baseline, while L4 and L5 trail and lead the 

Moon in its orbit around the Earth. Except for the occasional scientific mission, such as a 

solar wind monitor, the L-points are not used by spacefaring nations at present. These 

points are of great value for transportation nodes and logistics depots. Because they are 

gravitational equipotential points (or weak stability boundaries), 10 all points in cislunar 

space can be reached from the L-points with minimal changes in velocity. After the Lpoints, the Moon is the next dominant feature in cislunar space. Both lunar orbit and the 

lunar surface are possible destinations; both are easily accessed using minimal additional 

energy from GEO or the Lagrange points. 

All zones of cislunar space have practical and theoretical uses. II All are accessible with 

existing systems, but only once. To continually revisit a given space asset, we must build 

a duplicate of the system that originally got us there. For example, if a communications 

satellite in GEO stops working, the only alternative is to design, build, and launch a 

completely new satellite. There is no way to send either servicing crews or machines to 

repair or upgrade the balky equipment. In short, if the fundamental premise of being a 

spacefaring nation is the ability to routinely conduct missions anywhere in space for a 

variety of purposes, we are actually quite far from that capability. 

The Value of the Moon 

Rock and soil samples returned by the Apollo missions taught us the fundamental 

chemical makeup of the Moon. It is a very dry, chemically reduced object, rich in 

refractory elements but poor in volatile elements. Its composition is rather ordinary, 

made up of common rock-forming minerals such as plagioclase (an aluminum-calcium 

silicate), pyroxene (a magnesium-iron silicate), and ilmenite (an iron-titanium oxide). 

The Moon is approximately 45 percent oxygen by weight,I2 but this oxygen is tightly 

bound to metals in the surface rocks. Light elements, including hydrogen and carbon, are 

present in small amounts-in a typical soil, hydrogen makes up between 50 and 90 parts 

per million by weight, with similar quantities of carbon and nitrogen. Soils richer in 

titanium appear to be also richer in hydrogen, thus allowing us to infer the extent of 

hydrogen abundance from the titanium concentration mapped from orbit. 

Lunar materials offer many possible uses. Because radiation is a serious problem for 

human spaceflight beyond LEO, the simple expedient of covering surface habitats with 

soil can protect future inhabitants from both galactic cosmic rays and even solar flares. 

Lunar soil (regolith) can be sintered by microwave into very strong building materials, 

including bricks and anhydrous glasses that have strengths many times that of steel.13 

Whcn we return to thc Moon, we will have no shortage of useful building materials. 
148 

Because of its abundance on the Moon, oxygen is likely to be an important early product. 

The production of oxygen from lunar materials simply involves breaking the very tight 

chemical bonds between oxygen and various metals in minerals.14 Many different 

techniques to accomplish this task have been developed; all are based on common 

industrial processes easily adapted to use on the Moon. Besides human life support, the 

most important use of oxygen in its liquid form is rocket fuel oxidizer. Coupled with the 

extraction of solar wind hydrogen from the soil, this Rrocessing can make rocket fuel the 

most important commodity ofa new lunar economy. 5 

The Moon has no atmosphere or global magnetic field, so solar wind (the tenuous stream 

of gases emitted by the Sun, mostly hydrogen) is directly implanted onto surface dust 

grains. Although solar wind hydrogen is present in very small quantities over most of the 

Moon, it too can be extracted from the soil. Soil heated to about 700°C releases more 

than 90 percent of its adsorbed solar gases.

16 Such heat can be obtained from collecting 

and concentrating solar energy using focusing mirrors. Collected by robotic processing 

rovers, solar wind hydrogcn can be harvested from virtually any location on the Moon. 

The recent discovery that hydrated minerals are abundant at higher latitudes suggests that 

water is being created constantly at the lunar surface. 17 Some of this water migrates to 

the poles where it may be concentrated in abundance, thereby making its potential 

collection and use much easier. 

The Department of Defense-National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

Clementine mission in 1994 made global maps of the mineral and elemental content of 

the Moon. It mapped the shape and topography of its surface with a laser altimeter and 

gave us our first good look at the intriguing and unique polar regions. 18 Clementine did 

not carry instruments specifically designed to look for water but an ingenious 

improvisation used the spacecraft communications antenna to beam radio waves into the 

polar regions; the resulting radio echoes, which were observed using antennas on Earth, 

indicate that material with reflection characteristics similar to ice is found in the 

permanently dark areas near the south pole.19 This discovery was supported subsequently 

by the discovery oflarge amounts of hydrogen near both poles2o by a neutron 

spectrometer flown on NASA's Lunar Prospector spacecraft21 in 1998. 

Water is added to the Moon over geological time by the impact of comets and waterbearing asteroids. Because the Moon's axis of rotation is nearly perpendicular to the 

plane of the ecliptic (the plane in which Earth and Moon orbit the Sun), the Sun is always 

near the horizon at the poles. If you are in a hole, you never see the Sun, and if you are 

on a peak, you always see it-the Sun goes around, not up and down. Depressions near 

the poles never receive sunlight; these dark areas are very cold--only a few degrees 

above absolute zero.22 Any water that gets into these polar cold traps cannot get out, and 

over time, significant quantities can accumulate. Our current best estimate is that over 10 

billion cubic meters of water exist at the poles/3 an amount roughly equal to the volume 

of Utah's Great Salt Lake. Although hydrogen and oxygen can be extracted directly from 

the soil as described above, such processing is difficult and energy-intensive. Polar water 

has thc advantage of being in an already concentrated form, greatly simplifying scenarios 
149 

for lunar return and habitation. Broken down into hydrogen and oxygen, water is a vital 

substance both for human life support and rocket propellant. 

The poles of the Moon are useful from yet another vital resource perspective: the areas of 

permanent darkness are proximate to areas of near-permanent sunlight. We have 

identified several areas near both the north and south poles that offer near-constant 

illumination by the Sun?4 Moreover, such areas are in darkness for short periods, 

interrupting longer periods of illumination. An outpost or establishment in these areas 

will have the advantage of being in sunlight for the generation of electrical power (via 

solar cells) and in a benign thermal environment (because the sun is always at grazing 

incidence, the surface temperature remains a near-constant _50° ± 10°C);25 such a 

location never experiences the temperature extremes found on the equator (from 100° to 

-150°C) and thus, thermal control is much easier, making the poles of the Moon inviting 

"oases" in near-Earth space. 

Besides its material and energy resources, the Moon is an operational laboratory where 

we can experiment with and learn how to conduct planetary surface exploration, 

utilization, and habitation. The Moon is a world, alien yet familiar, that allows us to learn 

the skills needed to make other worlds part of humanity's universe. Those skills can be 

summarized by the words "arrive, survive, and thrive." We need to develop a system that 

allows access to the lunar surface on a routine basis. Thus, we require long-lived 

reusable subsystems and equipment that can take advantage of products made from lunar 

resources. To survive on the Moon, we must protect humans and equipment from the 

harsh surface environment and make consumables. Water production protects habitats 

and supports people with drinking water and breathable oxygen. But for permanent 

human presence on the Moon, we must not only survive, but also thrive. This means that 

we must make "a profit": some product that we make on the Moon must exceed the value 

of the investment in building surface infrastructure. In the near term, such a product is 

likely to be lunar water, the currency of cislunar space. Water exported from the Moon 

can be used to make rocket propellant to fuel a transportation infrastructure and thereby 

lower the costs of spaceflight. 

Lunar Return: Incremental Steps 

Although we possess enough information now to plan a lunar return, we should conduct 

new robotic missions to reduce programmatic risk and to generate program milestones. 

The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO?6 is now mapping the Moon in detailcollecting information on the physical nature of the surface, especially the exotic and 

poorly understood environment of the polar regions. LRO is mapping the polar deposits 

of the Moon using imaging radar to "see" into the dark regions. Such mapping will 

establish the details of water ice locations as well as its thickness, purity, and physical 

state. The next step is to land small robotic probes to conduct chemical analyses of the 

polar deposits. Although we expect water ice to dominate the deposit, comets are made 

of many different substances, including methane, ammonia, and organic molecules, all 

preserved in the polar regions and all potentially useful resources. We need to inventory 

these substances and determine their chemical and isotopic properties as well as their 
150 

physical nature and local environment. Just as robotic missions such as Ranger and 

Surveyo?7 paved the way for Apollo, a new set of robotic precursors will make 

subsequent human missions safer and more productive. 

As soon as robotic orbiters and landers have documented the nature of the deposits, 

focused exploration and research should be undertaken to develop the machinery needed 

to harvest and process the resources of the Moon. We must understand the physical 

nature of the polar deposits and how we might extract water from its (currently unknown) 

native state. This could mean excavating and moving dirt and/or developing schemes 

that remove the water in place. A variety of mining and extraction processes can be 

experimented with using robotic missions, thus paving the way to industrial-scale 

activities and commercialization of the production of hydrogen and oxygen from lunar 

materials. 

Forty years ago, America built the mighty Saturn V to launch men and machines to the 

Moon in one fell swoop. This technical approach was so successful that it has dominated 

the thinking on lunar return for decades. One feature ofneariy all architectures of the 

past 20 years is the initial requirement to build or rebuild the heavy lift launch capability 

of the Saturn V or its equivalent. However, parts of the Saturn V were literally 

handmade/s making it a very expensive spacecraft. Development of any new launch 

vehicle is an enormously expensive proposition. What is needed is an architecture that 

permits lunar return with the least amount of new vehicle development possible (and 

hence, the lowest possible cost.) Such a plan will allow concentration of effort and 

energy on the most important aspects of the mission: learning how to use the Moon's 

resources to support space flight beyond low Earth orbit.29 

To deliver the pieces of the lunar spacecraft to Earth orbit-lander, habitat, and transfer 

stage-the architecture should use existing launch assets, including shuttle-derived 

components augmented by existing expendable boosters. Assembled into a package in 

space, these items are then transferred to the Moon-Earth Ll. The L1 point orbits the 

Earth with the Moon such that it appears "motionless" in space to both bodies. Because 

there is no requirement for quick transit, cargo and unmanned mission elements can take 

advantage of innovative technologies such as solar electric propulsion and the weak 

stability boundaries between Earth, Sun, and Moon to make long, spiraling trips out to 

LI, thus requiring less propellant mass launched from Earth.30 These unmanned cargo 

spacecraft can take several months to get to their destinations. The habitat module can be 

landed on the Moon by remote control and activated to await the arrival of its occupants 

from Earth. Previously landed robotic rovers and robots become part of the surface 

infrastructure and can be used telerobotically to prepare and emplace outpost elements. 

The human crew is launched separately in the crew exploration vehicle and uses a 

chemical stage and a quick transfer trajectory to reach the L1 depot in a few days. There, 

the crew can transfer to the lunar lander, descend to the surface, and occupy the preemplaced habitat. Because the outpost elements are already on the Moon, the lunar 

lander does not have to be the 50-metric-ton behemoth called for by the Exploration 
151 

Systems Architecture Study,31 but rather a much smaller, reusable version-its only job is 

to transfer the crew from LIto the lunar surfacc. 

The preferred site for a lunar outpost is at one of the almost pennanentiy sunlit areas near 

a pole of the Moon. The south pole is attractive from the perspective of both science and 

operations, but final selection should await complete surveys of the poles, so as to locate 

the outpost as close as possible to the highest grade resources. The strategy on the Moon 

is to learn how to mine its resources and build up surface infrastructure to pennit everincreasing scales of operation. Each mission brings new components to the surface, and 

the size and capability of the outpost grows over time. 

Resource utilization on the Moon will expand with time. Initially, demonstration 

production levels of a few kilograms of product (water, oxygen) will document the 

difficulty of mining and processing. After we detennine the optimum techniques, our 

initial production goals are to make consumables (water for drinking, air, and shielding, 

in that order); this requires production levels of hundreds of kilograms. Once this is well 

established, we can begin to make rocket propellant. Initial propellant production at the 

metric ton level can support extended exploration around the lunar outpost and perhaps 

ballistic flights to other locations on the Moon. A major breakpoint will come with the 

production oftcns to hundreds of tons of propellant; at such a level, we can export our 

surplus propellant to depots in cislunar space, making it available for commercial sale to 

many different users. It is the ultimate realization of this act that creates a cislunar 

economy and demonstrates a positive return on investment.32 

In addition to its technical advantages, this architecture offers important programmatic 

benefits. It does not require the development of a new heavy lift launcher. Costs in 

space launch are almost completely dominated by the costs of people and infrastructure. 

Creating a new launch system requires new infrastructure, new people, and new training. 

Such costs make up significant fractions of the total program. By using existing 

systems,33 we concentrate our resources on new equipment and technology, all focused 

toward the goal of finding, characterizing, processing, and using lunar resources as soon 

as possible. The use of the Ll point as a staging depot allows us to depart at any time for 

both the Earth and Moon; the energy required to go nearly anywhere beyond this point is 

very low. The use of existing, low-thrust propulsion technology (that is, solar-electric) 

for cargo elements pennits us to use time as an asset, not an enemy. We will acquire new 

technical innovation as a byproduct of the objective, not as a critical requirement of the 

architecture. 

A New Template for Spacefaring 

By mining the Moon for water, we establish a robust transportation infrastructure capable 

of delivering people and machines throughout cislunar space. Make no mistake: learning 

to use the resources of the Moon or any other planetary object will be a challenging 

technical task. We must learn to use machines in remote, hostile environments while 

working under difficult conditions to extract ore bodies of small concentration. The 

unique polar environment, with its zones of near-pennanent illumination and pennanent 
152 

darkness, provides its own challenges. But for humanity to live and work in space, we 

must learn to use the material and energy resources available off-planet. We are 

fortunate that the Moon offers us a nearby "safe" laboratory where we can take our fIrst 

steps toward using space resources. Initial blunders in operational approach or feedstock 

processing are better practiced at a location 3 days from the Earth than one many months 

away. 

A return to the Moon to learn how to use its resources is scalable in both level of effort 

and the types of commodities to be produced. We begin by using the resources thilt are 

easiest to extract. Thus, the logical fIrst product is water derived from the polar deposits. 

Water can be produced there regardless of the nature of the polar volatiles; ice of 

cometary origin is easily collected and purifIed. If the polar materials are composed 

instead of molecular hydrogen, this substance can be combined with oxygen extracted 

through a variety of processes from rocks and soil to make water. Water is easily stored 

and will be used as a life-sustaining substance or retained in a separated, cryogenic state 

for use as rocket propellant. 

The world relies on a variety of satellites in cislunar space---weather satellites, GPS, 

communications systems, and a wide variety of reconnaissance platforms. Commercial 

spacecraft makes up a multi-billion-dollar market, providing telephone, Internet, radio, 

and video services. America has invested billions in space hardware. Yet at the moment, 

we have no infrastructure to service, repair, refurbish, or protect any of these spacecraft. 

They are vulnerable to severe damage or permanent loss by accident or intentional action. 

If we lose a satellite, it must be replaced. From redesign though fabrication and launch, 

such replacement takes years and involves extraordinary investment in the design and 

fabrication to make them as reliable as possible. 

We cannot access these spacecraft because it is not feasible to maintain a human-tended 

servicing capability in Earth orbit; at thousands of dollars per pound, the costs of 

launching orbital transfer vehicles and propellant are excessive. Creating the ability to 

refuel in orbit by using propellant made from lunar materials will revolutionize the way 

nations view and use space. Satellites will be repaired rather than abandoned. Assets can 

be protected rather than written off. Very large satellite complexes can be built and 

serviced over long periods, creating new capabilities and expanding bandwidth (a critical 

commodity of modern society) for a wide variety of purposes. And along the way, there 

will be new opportunities and discoveries. We will become a true spacefaring species. 

A return to the Moon with the purpose oflearning to extract and use its resources creates 

a new paradigm for space operations. Space becomes a realm in our economic sphere, 

not an exotic environment for arcane studies. Such a mission ties the American space 

program to its original roots, making us more secure and more prosperous. It also 

enables new and broader opportunities for science and exploration. A transportation 

infrastructure that can routinely access various points of cislunar space can take humanity 

to the planets. We will learn to use what we fInd in space to create new spacefaring 

capabilities. A cislunar transportation system, fueled by lunar propellant, will be the 

transcontinental railroad of the new millennium.34 
153 

Chapter 12 Notes 

1 Krafft A. Ehricke, "Lunar Industrialization and Settlement-Birth of a Polyglobal 

Civilization," Lunar Bases and Space Activities o/the 21st Century (1985), 827-855. 

2 George W. Bush, "A Renewed Spirit of Discovery," press release, Executive Office of 

the President, Washington, DC, 2004, available at 

<www.spaceref.comlnews/viewpr.htrnl?pid= 13404>. 

3 NASA Authorization Act of2005, S.1281 ENR, available at 

<www.govtrack.us/congresslbill.xpd?bill=s 1 09-1281.> 

4 NASA Authorization Act of 2008, H.R.6063 ENR, available at 

<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-biniquery/D?cII0:6:.Itemp/-c 11 OUMnxII::>. 

5 P.D. Spudis, The Once and Future Moon (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1996). 

6 J. Marburger speech to the 44th Robert H. Goddard Memorial Symposium, March 15, 

2006, available at <www.spaceref.cominews/viewsr.htrnl?pid=19999>. 

7 "Tsiolkovsky Rocket Equation," available at 

<http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Rocket_equation>. 

8 "List of orbits," available at <http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilList_oCorbits>. 

9 "Lagrangian point," available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilLagrangian....Point>. 

10 W.W. Mendell, "A Gateway for Human Exploration of Space? The Weak Stability 

Boundary," Space Policy 17 (2001), 13-17. 

11 T. Cremins and P.D. Spudis, ''The Strategic Context of the Moon: Echoes of the Past, 

Symphony of the Future," Astropolitics 5 (2007), 87-104. 

12 G. Heiken, D. Vaniman, and B. French, eds., The Lunar Sourcebook: A User's Guide 

to the Moon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 

13 L.A. Taylor, E. Hill, and Y. Liu, "Unique lunar soil properties for ISRU microwave 

processing," in Space Resources Roundtable 2005 (Houston: Lunar and Planetary 

Institute, 2005), 2075, available at <www.lpi.usra.edulmeetings/leag2005/pdfl2075.pdf>. 

14 D.M. Burt, "Mining the Moon," American Scientist (November-December 1980),574-

579. 
154 

15 P.D. Spudis, "Augustine Commission and Space Exploration: Objectives before 

Architectures, Strategies before Tactics," Spaceref.com, available at 

<www.spaceref.comlnews/viewnews.html?id=1349>. 

16 L.A. Haskin, "Water and Cheese from the Lunar Desert: Abundances and Accessibility 

of H, C, and N on the Moon," Second Conference on Lunar Bases and Space Activities 

of the 21 ,I Century, 1992, available at <http://tinyurl.comly88d6mm>. 

17 C. Pieters et aI., "Character and Spatial Distribution of OHIH20 on the Surface of the 

Moon Seen by M3 on Chandrayaan-I," Science 23 (October 2009). 

18 S. Nozette et aI., "The Clementine Mission to the Moon: Scientific Overview," Science 

266 (1994),1835-1839. 

19 S. Nozette et aI., "The Clementine Bistatic Radar Experiment," Science 274 (1996), 

1495-1498. 

20 W.C. Feldman et aI., "Polar Hydrogen Deposits on the Moon," Journal of Geophysical 

Research 105 (2000), E2, 4175-4195. 

21 A. Binder, "Lunar Prospector: Overview," Science 281 (1998), 1475-1476. 

22 A.R. Vasavada, D.A. Paige, and S.E. Wood, "Near-surface Temperatures on Mercury 

and the Moon and the Stability of Polar Ice Deposits," Icarus 141 (1999), 179-193. 

23 P.D. Spudis, "Ice on the Moon," TheSpaceReview.com, 2006, available at 

www.thespacereview.comlarticlel7 40/1. 

24 D.BJ. Bussey, P.D. Spudis, and M.S. Robinson, "Illumination Conditions at the Lunar 

South Pole," Geophysical Research Letters 26, no. 9 (1999), 1187. 

25 Heiken, Vaniman, and French. 

26 "Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter," available at <http://iunar.gsfc.nasa.govl>. 

27 D.M. Harland, Paving the Way for Apollo 11 (Berlin: Praxis, 2009). 

28 M. Gray, Angle of Attack: Harrison Storms and the Race to the Moon (New York: 

Norton, 1992). 

29 Spudis, "Augustine Commission." 

30 V.R. Bond et aI., "Cislunar Libration Point as a Transportation Node for Lunar 

Exploration," AAS/AlAA Spaceflight Mechanics Meeting, 1991, AAS-91-103. 
155 

31 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, "Exploration Systems Architecture 

Study," 2005, available at <www.nasa.gov/explorationinews/ESASJeport.html>. 

32 D. Wingo, P.D. Spudis, and G. Woodcock, "Going Beyond the Status Quo in Space," 

SpaceRef.com, 2009, available at <www.spaceref.comlnews/viewnews.htrnl?id=1334>. 

33 F. Zeglar, B.F. Kutter, and J. Barr, "A Commercially Based Lunar Architecture," 

AIAA Space 2009 Conference and Exposition, AlAA 2009-6567, available at 

<http://tinyurl.comlI9efn5>. 

34 Spudis, "Augustine Commission." 
156 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY DR. PAUL SPUDIS
157 
158 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY DR. PAUL SPUDIS
159 

Develop Cislunar Space Next PAUL D. SPUDIS 

rhl' retirenlent l~fthe Space 

Shuttle, our national spaL:C 

transportation system, acct:'llluaU:s the absence of national 

kadcrship in the c\mcrican 

civil Since 

cnrrent admlnistraticn in 

2010, confusion and Ullcercommercia! sectors, confu~ 

sion ru!t::s supreme 

gcsts a differellt appl\l'1Ch. 

file RelllUeblltc 

1'hc rca! dc-bate should nN be 

about launch vehicles or 

purpose of our civil space 

Di ffcrcnt ratlona1l's 

port. 

Long-lerm aspir<ltil1!1S, sllch a 

hum,lll Illis\iollS to \lars or 
160 

the t'JCC ifmnn: funding hc~ 

Objrcthf.'s 
161 

Spac-; Shultk and lukr" 

l1Jtiomd Spucc St,ltioH 

tcmp!ak' \\ould dCH:lnp 

cHid launch night ~knJL'llb 

dc"igm.'J j~,j' continuou:-. 

vice and W;; \\l)1l1d 
162 

Points that are 

equilibrium oCtile l\'foon and 

EUlth gravity, to low lunar 

orbit, and to the lunar surface. 

In order to fuel and provision 

this space Heet, staging nodes 

and supply and propellant 

depots are required in various 

places in cislunar space, including such possible i0cations as LEO, the Earth-Moon 

Ll and L2 libratian points. 

low lunar orbit and on the 

lunal' surface. Ports of call are 

all the places we may go. 

Initially, those ports are satellites in various orbits that 

require service, maintenance 

and replacement with larger, 

more capable systems. Later, 

OUf harbor will be the surface 

of the Moon, to harvest its 

resources, thereby creating 

morc capability as ·well as 

developing the ability to provision ourselves and the expanding lransportation nct-

\vork by utilizing what is 

found in space. Reliable and 

frequent access to any place 

in the solar system, not singular trips to a couple of desti~ 

nations, should be our ultimate goal. 

In the past few years, a series 

of international missions to 

the Moon has demonstrated 

that the lunar surface contains 

significant deposits of water 

ice near both of its poles and 

at cCliain pole locations offers 

near-permanent sunlight. The 

l'vtoon is close enough to 

Emth so as to permit nearly 

instantaneous remote control 

of robotic machines from opcrators on Earth. These facts 

allow us to set up remotely 

controlled, robotic rcsourceprocessing outposts on the 

Moon and begin the production water, the most useful 

suhstance in space. Water 

can support human life, serve 

as a medium for energy storage, and is the most powerful 

chemical rocket propellant 

known, Thus, the Moon 

serves a critical role in the 

development ofds.lunar space 

-" it is our 1Irst "offs.hore supply base" for our emergent 

space navy. 

Custom designing and building mission-specific vehicles 

and elements forfeits the op~ 

tion of going everywhere and 

doing everything, Byadopting an incremental, cumula~ 

tive space taring model, ·we 

enable missions to Mars and 

AlA,-/ /-lous/On5,'ectionlJori::ons March / April 2012 Page 8 

many other destinations. This 

alTordablc mode! will sustain 

repeated trips by using the 

infrastructure and propellant 

resources provided by a spa.::e 

-taring navy. Building a serics of anc~otT spacecrat1-

huge launch vehicles to dash 

to Mars for expensive, unsustainable stnnts ~ wi!! keep us 

locked into our current predicament. 

The space program needs 

rethinking 

It is the mindset of tile space 

program that needs rethinking -- not the next destination, not the next launch 

vehicle, and not the next 

spacecraft. How do we exit 

this endless discussion loop? 

First, we need to understand 

and articulate true choices s{) 

people can undcrstand and 

evaluate the dit1erent approaches and requirements, 

Second, we need to develop 

architectural approaches that 

fit the requirements for fiscal 

and political ·'sustain-ability." 

Finally) we need to get such 

plans in front of the national 

leadership. 

IContilll/cd r)!1 pag!! I)) 
163 

(Conflllued/rom page 8) 

A cost~eftective. sllstainable 

human spaceflight program 

must be continuous. incremental and cumulative. It 

must continually expand am 

reach, creating new capabili~ 

ties over time, while contributing to compelling national 

economic. scientific and security interests. Building a lasting and reusable space transportation system based around 

the development and use of 

lunar resources does that, 

\\hereas a series of singular 

destination missions will not. 

The original intended purpose 

of the Space Shuttle system 

was to incrementally move 

into the Solar System ~ first a 

Shuttle to-and-from LEO, 

then a Space Station as a 

jurnping off platform, and 

then going beyond LEO into 

cislunar space. The ShuttJederived heavy-lift cargo variant was always envisioned to 

go beyond LEO and on to the 

Moon. Decommissioning the 

Shuule, the only proven operational heav)' lift human 

launch capability, with no 

replacement in hand to get 

U.S. astronauts into and back 

mistake is to usc this crisis to 

adopt a new approach to the 

problem of human spaceflight. 

The right answer 

The right answer is to adopt 

the principle that we are going 

somewhere with the purpose 

of gradually yet continuously 

expanding Iwman reach in 

space. [nitially, we develop 

an architecture using smaller 

launch vehicle assets, launching more frequently, and making these pieces \vork together 

to build up new and expanded 

capabilities throughout cis!u~ 

nar space. By taking these 

steps, America can fly spacecraft, create new commercial 

markets, acccss and protect 

the fnternational Space Station and expand human reach 

beyond LEO. 

It is not only important for 

America to lead in space, but 

to be seen to lead. Other 

space faring nations are pursuing expansion beyond LEO 

into cislunar space; some of 

these powers do not share our 

values or belief in free marexist on the new irontier, 

there is no assurance that they 

wi!! emerge spontaneously. 

Having Amcrica actively involved in human expansion 

into space is likewise no guar~ 

antee that such values \vill 

prevail here, but such a system is more likely to develop 

and take hold if we are present and active in this grand 

and necessary endeavor. We 

may not worry about this 

now, but the future is always 

in question, By developing 

cislunar space next, our values and the societal paradigm 

of free markets, rule of law 

and democratic pluralism is 

much more likely to prevail 

on the new frontier of space, 

To stand do\VTl the dcvclop~ 

ment of cislunar space for the 

better part of a decade is detM 

rimenlal not only to our national interests, but to the fu~ 

ture interests of the world and 

to generations yet unborn. By 

ceding this territory to others, 

we endanger our future by 

forfeiting technological advancement and economic 

development of the solar system to those who understand 

its potential and who are wi!l~ 

ing to lead. 

A1A.l HOllstOIl Sc(:fioll Hori;:ons A1arch / .lpril20l2 PaRe 9 

sociales, reproduced with per~ 

mission and thanks 
164 

ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY DR. PAUL SPUDIS

Destination: Moon or Asteroid? 

Operational, Scientific and Resource Utilization Considerations 

By Paul D. Spudis 

Reprinted from: 

The Once and Future Moon Blog 

Air & Space Magazine, Smithsonian Institution 

http://blogs.airspacemag.comimooni 

August 31- September 2, 20 II 

Submitted as supplementary material to the testimony of Dr. Paul D. Spudis 

House Subcommittee Oil Space Hearing Next Steps in Human Exploration to Mars and Beyond 

May 21,2013 
165 

Moon,'ri\sterold 7 PJrti 

Tre Dnily Planet Letters To Ean:h 

201[ 

Moon or Asteroid? Part I: Operational Considerations 

Tweet 18 

Lockheed~Martin's Plymoulh Rock mission concept 

Part h Operational Considerations 

0'1 Air AirRecon 

Tbe rurrent controversy over the direction of 0111' national space program has many dimensions but most 

of the discourse has focused on the means (governmenl vs. comlllerciallauneh vf.'hklcs) not the ends 

(destinallons and activities). Near-Earth ooje-cts (NEO, Le., nsteroJds) hecame the next destination for 

human f'xploratiol1 as an alternative to tlw Moon when the Augustine commitl('(' advocated a "H~'xible 

path" in their 2009 report. The reason for going to an asteroid instead of the Moon 'was thu.t it costs too 

muc.h money to devc>lop a lunar lander \\'herens asteroids, having extrenwly 1mv surfa(,e gravily, don't 

l't'l{uire one, The administration embraced and supported this change in directio1l and since then, the 

agency has been stUdying pos$ible NEG missions and how to conduct them, 

On ihe surface, it might seem that NEO missions answer tIw requirements for future human 

destinations. NEOs arf' beyond 10\',7 Earth orbit, they require long transit times and. so simulate the 

duration of fUlure Mars missions, and (wait for it).,. we've never \isited one with people. Ho""vever, 

ilttp ! ibiog5.,lif'fHC~11;dg.LQm !moon{ 2011 J08!d\'~tli1.:;t[OI1 -nlOOn-Or-<1stHQld/ 

• About 
166 

Destination: Moon or Asteroid? Part I: Operational Considerations I The Once and Future Moon 

detailed consideration indicates tbat NEOs are not the best choice as our next destination in space. In 

this post and two additional ones to come, I will consider some ofthe operational, scientific and resource 

utilization issues that arise in planning NEO missions and exploration activities and compare them to tbe 

lunar alternative. 

Most asteroids reside not near the Earth but in a zone between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. the 

asteroid belt 'The very strong gravity field of Jupiter will sometimes perturb the orbits of these rocky 

bodies and hurl them into the inner Solar System, where they usually hit the Sun or one of the inner 

planets. Between those two events, they orbit the Sun, sometimes corning close to the Earth. Such 

asteroids are called near-Earth objects and can be any of a variety of different types of asteroids. 

Typically, they are small, on the order of tens of meters to a few kilometers in size. As such, they do not 

have significant gravity fields of their own, so missions to them do not "land" on an alien world. but rather 

rendezvous and station-keep with it in deep space. Think "formation flying" with the International Space 

Station (ISS) without the option to dock. 

The moniker "near Earth" is a relative descriptor. These objects orbit the Sun just as the Earth does and 

vary in distance to the Earth from a few million km to bundreds of millions ofkm, depending upon the 

time of year. Getting to one has nothing to do with getting to anotber, so multiple NED destinations in 

one trip are unlikely. Because the distance to a NED varies widely, we cannot just go to one whenever we 

choose -launch windows open at certain times of the year and because the NED is in its own orbit, these 

windows occur infrequently and are of very short duration. usually a few days. Moreover, due to the 

distances between Earth and the NED, radio communications will not be instantaneous, with varying 

time-lags of tens of seconds to several minutes between transmission and reception. Thus, the crew must 

be autonomous during operations. 

Although there are several thousand NEOs, few of them are possible destinations for human missions. 

This is a consequence of two factors. First, space is very big and even several thousand rocks spread out 

over several billion cubic kilometers of empty space results in a very low density of objects. Second, many 

ofthese objects are unreachable, requiring too much velocity change ("delta-v") from an Earth departure 

stage; this can be a result of either too high of an orbital inclination (out of the plane of the Earth's orbit) 

or an orbit that is too eccentric (all orbits are elliptical). These factors result in reducing the field of 

possible destinations from thousands to a dozen or so at best. Moreover, the few NEOs that can be 

reached are all very small, from a few meters to perhaps a km or two in size. Not much exploratory area 

there, especially after a months-long trip in deep space. 

That's another consideration - transit time. Not only are there few targets, it takes months to reach one 

of them. Long transit time is sold as a benefit by asteroid advocates: because a trip to Mars win take 

months, a NED mission will allow us to test out the systems for Mars missions. But such systems do not 

yet exist. On a human mission to a NED, the crew is beyond help from Earth, except for radioed 

instructions and sympathy. A human NED mission will have to be self-sufficient to a degree that does not 

now exist. Parts on the ISS fail all the time, but because it is only 400 km above the Earth, it is relatively 

straightforward to send replacement parts up on the next supply mission (unless your supply fleet is 

grounded, as currently it has been). On a NED mission, a broken system must be both fixable and fixed 

by the crew. Even seemingly annoying malfunctions can become critical. As ISS astronaut Don Pettit 

puts it, "If your toilet breaks. you're dead." 

Crew exposure is another consequence of long flight times, in this case to the radiation environment of 

interplanetary space. This hazard comes in two flavors - solar flares and galactic cosmic rays. Solar 

httn:llbloos.airsnacemao,com/moonf2011108fdestlnation-moon-or-asteroldf 

5/15/13 7:05 AM 

i are his own, and do not retlel 

II Smithsonian lostltulion. 

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flares are massive eruptions ofbigh-energy particles from the Sun, occurring at irregular intervals. We 

must carry some type ofbigh-mass sbielding to protect the crew from tbis deadly radiation. Because we 

cannot predict wben a flare might occur, this massive solar "storm sbelter" must be carried wherever we 

go in the Solar System (because Apollo missions were only a few days long, the crew simply accepted the 

risk of possible death from a solar flare), Cosmic rays are much less intense, but constant. The normal 

ones are relatively harmless, but bigh-energy versions (heavy nuclei from ancient supernovae) can cause 

serious tissue damage. Although crew can be partly sbielded from this hazard, tbey are never totally 

protected from it. Astronauts in low Earth orbit are largely protected from radiation because they orbit 

beneath the van Allen radiation belts, which protect life on the Earth. On the Moon, we can use regolith 

to shield crew but for now, such mass is not available to astronauts traveling in deep space. 

When tbe crew finally arrives at their destination, more difficulties await. Most NEOs spin very rapidly, 

with rotation periods on the order of a few hours at most. This means that the object is approachable only 

near its polar area. But because these rocks are irregularly shaped, rotation is not the smooth, regular 

spin of a planet, but more like that of a wobbling toy top. If material is disturbed on the surface, the rapid 

spin of the asteroid will launch the debris into space, creating a possible collision hazard to the human 

vebicle and crew. The lack of gravity means that "walking" on the surface of the asteroid is not possible; 

crew will "'float" above the surface of the object and just as occurs in Earth orbit, each touch of tbe object 

(action) will result in a propulsive maneuver away from the surface (reaction). 

We need to learn bow to work quickly at the asteroid because we don't have much time there. Loiter 

times near the asteroid for most opportunities are on the order of a few days. Why so short? Because the 

crew wants to be able to come home. Both NEO aud Earth rontinue to orbit the Sun and we need to make 

sure that the Earth is in the right place when we arrive back at its orbit. So in effect, we will spend 

months traveling there, in a vehicle with the habitable volume of a large walk-in closet (OK, two walk-in 

closets maybe), a short time at the destination and then months for the trip home. Is it worth it? That 

will be the subject of my next post. 

Destination: Moon or Asteroid? 

Part II: Science Considerations 

Part III: Resource Utilization Considerations 

Po.<i!OO By; Paul D. Spudis - Lunat ~plnnltion,Lu!Ull" Re!iOllIUsJ...unarSci~Spw:e and Society,spoce Politics,space Transponarion! Unk I C(lmmenl~ 

(33) 

33 Comments 

1. Can you really pick a destination if the question of "why go?" has not been even properly discussed yet 

? 

You will get a bunch of different people coming into the discussion with a ton of different assumptions 

about that, without any hope of understanding .. which keeps being the case in space advocacy circles. 

Comment by ken - August 31, 2011 @ 10:46 am 

2. Can you really pick a destinatfon if the questfon oJ"why gor has not been even properly discussed 

yet ? 

hnp:!/blogs.alrspacemag.com/moon/2011/08/c:lestinatjon-moon-or-asteroid/ 

5/15/13 7:05AM 

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Destination: Moon or Asteroid? Part!l: SclentH'ic ConsIderations I The Once and Future Moon 

the sk'Yare oveIWhelmingly from the small asteroids that orbit the Sun (the exception is that in meteorite 

collections, some come from larger bodies, including the Moon and Mars). 

Moreover, we have flown by almost a dozen small bodies, orbited two, impacted one and "'landed" on two 

others. Thousands of images and spectra have been obtained for these rocky objects. The chemical 

composition of the asteroids Eros and Vesta have been obtained remotely. We have catalogued the 

craters, cracks, scarps, grooves and pits that make up the surface features of these objects. We have seen 

that some are higblyfragmental aggregates of smaller rocks, while otbers seem to be more solid and 

denser. In addition to these spacecraft data, thousands of asteroids have been catalogued, mapped and 

spectrally characterized from telescopes on the Earth. We have recognized the compositional variety, the 

various shapes, spin rates and orbits of these small planetoids. We now know for certain that the most 

common type of meteorite (chondrite) is derived from the most spectally common type of asteroid (Stype) as a result from the Hayabusa mission, the world's first asteroid sample return. 

In short, we know quite a bit about the asteroids. What new knowledge would we gain from a buman 

mission to one? 

Although we have Oiterally) tons of meteorites, extraterrestrial samples without geological context have 

much less scientific value than those collected from planetary units with regional extent and clear origins. 

Many different processes bave affected the surfaces of the planets and understanding the precise location 

and geological setting of a rock is essential to reconstructing the history and processes responsible for its 

fonnation and by inference, the bistory and processes of its host planet. 

Most asteroids are made up of primitive, undifferentiated planetary matter. They have been destroyed 

and re~assembled by collision and impact over the last 4.5 bilJion years of Solar System history. The 

surface has been ground-up and fragmented by the creation of regolith and some details of this process 

remain poorly understood. But in general terms, we pretty much know what asteroids are made of, how 

they are put together, and what processes operate upon their surfaces. True enough, the details are not 

fully understood, but there is no reason to suspect that we are missing a major piece of the asteroid story. 

In contrast, planetary bodies such as the Moon have whole epochs and processes that we are just now 

uncovering - in the case of the Moon. water has been recently found to be present inside, outside and in 

significant qnantity at the poles, relations that have enormous implications for lunar history and about 

which we were nearly totally ignorant only a couple of years ago. 

Most NEOs will be simple ordinary cbondrites - we lrnow this because ordinary chondrites make up 

about 85% of all meteorite falls (an observed fall of a rock from the sky). This class of meteorite is 

remarkable, not for its diversity but for its uniformity. Chondrites are used as a chemica1 standard in the 

analysis of planetary rocks and soils to measure the amounts of differentiation or chemical change during 

geological processing. In themselves, chondrites do not vary (much) except that they show different 

degrees of heating subsequent to their fonnation, but not enough heatiug to significantly change their 

chemical composition. 

Some NEO asteroids are pieces of bigger objects that experienced chemical and mineral change or 

differentiation. Vesta (not a NEO, but a main belt asteroid) has reflection spectra similar to known, 

evolved meteorites, the eucrite group. These rocks suggest that some asteroids are small. differentiated 

planetoids, having volcanic activity that dates from the very beginning of Solar System history. Moreover, 

since we have pieces of the Moon and Mars as meteorite fragments, some NEOs may consist of material 

blasted off these planets. However, given that most NEOs are inaccessible to human missions, the 

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5/15/13 7:06AM 

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Smithsonian Instltution. 

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Destination: Moon or Asteroid? Part II: Scientific Considerations I The Once and Future Moon 

likelihood. that we could visit one of planetary derivation is small (curious that the most interesting of the 

NEOs appear to be those derived from some bigger (planet-sized) object.) In broad terms of meteorite 

science, multiple small samples from a variety of asteroid types are preferable to many bigger samples of 

a single specimen, exactly the opposite of what a human mission will provide. 

What specifically would a crew do during a NEO visit? An astronaut OD a planet typically would explore 

the surface, map geological relations where possible, collect representative samples of the units and rock 

types that can be discerned. and collect as much mapping and compositional data as possible to aid in the 

interpretation of the returned samples. In the case of a NEO, many of these activities would not be 

particularly fruitful. The asteroid is either a pile of rubble or a single huge boulder. Chondritic meteorites 

are uniform in composition, so geological setting is not particularly instructive. We do have questions 

about the processes of space weathering, tbe changes that occur in rocks as a result of their exposure to 

space for varying lengths of time. Such questions could be addressed by a simple robotic sample 

collector, as the recently approved OSIRIS mission plans to do. 

One question that could be addressed by human visitors to asteroids is their internal make-up and 

structure. Some appear to be rubble piles while others are nearly solid - why such different fates in 

different asteroids? By using active seismometry (acoustic sounding), a human crew could layout 

instruments and sensors to decipher the density profile of an asteroid. Understanding the internal 

structure of an asteroid is important for learning how strong such objects are; this could be an important 

factor in devising mitigation strategies in case we ever have to divert a NEO away from a collision 

trajectory with the Earth. As mentioned in my preceding post, the crew had better work quickly -loiter 

times at the asteroid will probably be short, on the order of a few days at most. 

Although we can explore asteroids with human missions, it seems likely that few significant insights into 

the origins and processes of the early Solar System win result from sucb exploration. Such study is 

already a very active field, using the samples that nature has provided us - the meteorites. Sample 

collection from an asteroid will yield more samples of meteorites, only without the melted fusion crusts 

that passage through the Earth's atmosphere creates. In other words, from this mission, scientific 

progress will be incremental, not revolutionary. 

In contrast, because they yield information on geological histories and processes at planet-wide scales. 

sample collection and return from a large planetary body such as the Moon or Mars could revolutionize 

our knowledge of these objects in particular and the Solar System in general. Many years prior to the 

Moon missions, we had meteorites that showed impact metamorphic effects but the idea of impactcaused mass extinctions oflife on Earth only carne after we had fully comprehended the impact process 

recorded in the Apollo samples from the Moon. The significance of impact-related mineral and chemical 

features were not appreciated until we had collected samples with geological context to understand what 

the lunar samples were telling us. 

Of course, science being unpredictable, some major surprise that could revolutionize our knowledge may 

await us on some distant asteroid. But such surprises doubtless await us in many places throughout the 

Solar System and the best way to assure ourselves that we will eventually find them is to develop the 

capability to go anywhere in space at any time. That means developing and using the resources of space 

to create new capabilities. I will consider tbat in my next post. 

http://blogs.alrspacernag.com!moon/2011/09/destinatlon-moon-or-asterold-part-ii-scientilk-consideratfonsf 

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Destination: Moon or Asteroid? Part Ill: Resource Uturzatlon ConSiderations j The Once and Future Moon 

capability. Our ultimate goal in space is to develop the capability to go anywhere at any time and conduct 

any mission we can imagine. Such capability is unthinkable without being able to obtain provisions from 

resources found off-planet. That means developing and using the resources of space to create new 

capabilities. 

One of the alleged benefits of asteroid destinations is that they are rich in resource potential. I would 

agree, putting the accent on the word "potential." Our best guide to the nature of these resources comes 

from the study of meteorites, which are derived from near Earth asteroids. They have several 

compositions, the most common being the ordinary chondrite, which makes up about 85% of observed 

meteorite falls. Ordinary chondrites are basically rocks, rich in the elements silicon, iron, magnesium, 

calcium and aluminum. They contain abundant metal grains, composed mostly of iron and nickel. widely 

dispersed throughout the rock. 

The resource potential of asteroids lies not in these objects, but in the minority of asteroids that have 

more exotic compositions. Metal asteroids make up about 7% of the population and are composed of 

nearly pure iron-nickel metal, with some inclusions of rock-like material as a minor component. Other 

siderophile (iron-loving) elements including platimun and gold make up trace portions of these bodies. A 

metal asteroid is an extremely bigh~grade are deposit and potentially could be worth billions of dollars if 

we were able to get these metals back to Earth, although one should be mindful of the possible 

catastrophic effects on existing precious metal markets - so much gold was produced during the 1849 

California Gold Rush tbat the world market price of gold decreased by a factor of sixteen. 

From the spaceflight perspective, water has the most value. Another type of relatively rare asteroid is also 

a chondrite. but a special type that contains carbon and organic compounds as well as clays and other 

hydrated minerals. These bodies contain significant amounts of water. Water is one of the most \lSeful 

substances in space - it supports hnman life (to drink, to use as radiation shielding, and to breath when 

cracked into its component hydrogen and oxygen), it can be used as a medium of energy storage (fuel 

cells) and it is the most powerful chemical rocket propellant known. Finding and using a water-rich NEO 

would create a logistics depot of immense value. 

A key advantage of asteroids for resources is a drawback as an operational environment - they have 

extremely low surface gravity. Getting into and out ofthe Moon's gravity well requires a change in 

velocity of about 2380 mls (both ways); to do the same for a typical asteroid requires only a few meters 

per second. This means that a payload launched from an asteroid rather than the Moon saves almost 5 

lon/s in delta-v, a substantial amount of energy, So from the perspective of energy, the asteroids beat the 

Moon as a source of materials. 

There are, however, some difficulties in mining and using asteroidal material as compared to lunar 

resources. First is the nature of the feedstock or "'ore," We have recently found that water at the poles of 

the Moon is not only present in enonnous quantity (tens of billions of tons) but is also in a form that can 

be easily used - ice. Ice can be converted into a liquid for further processing at minimal energy cost; if 

the icy regolith from the poles is heated to above 0° C, the ice will melt and water can be collected and 

stored. The water in carbonaceous chondrites is chemically bound within mineral structures. Significant 

amounts of energy are required to break these cbemical bonds to free the water, at least 2-3 orders of 

magnitude more energy. depending on the specific mineral pbase being processed. So extracting water 

from an asteroid, present in quantities of a few percent to maybe a couple of tens of percent, requires 

significant energy; water~ice at the poles of the Moon is present in greater abundance (up to 100% in 

certain polar craters) and is already in an easy-to-process and use form. 

http:// blogs.airspacemag.com f moon 12 011/091 destlnation-moon-or-asteroid ~ part-Hl-resource-utilization-considerationsl 

5/15/13 7:07AM 

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Destination: Moon or Asteroid? Pan HI: Resource Utili:lation Considerations! The Once and Future Moon 

The processing of natural materials to extract water has many detailed steps, from the acquisition of the 

feedstock to moving the material through the processing stream to collection and storage of the derived 

product. At each stage, we typically separate one component from another; gravity serves this purpose in 

most industrial processing. One difficulty in asteroid resource processing will be to either devise 

techniques that do not require gravity (including related phenomena, such as thenna! convection) or to 

create an artificial gravity field to ensure that things move in the right directions. Either approach 

complicates the resource extraction process. 

The large distance from the Earth and poor accessihility of asteroids versus the Moon, works against 

resource extraction and processing. Human visits to NEOs will be of short duration and because radio 

time-lags to asteroids are on the order of minutes, direct remote control of processing will not be 

possible. Robotic systems for asteroid mining must be designed to have a large degree of autonomy. This 

may become possible but presently we do not have enongh infonnation on the nature of asteroidal 

feedstock to either design or even envision the nse of snch robotic equipment. Moreover, even if we did 

fully understand the nature of the deposit, mining and processing are highly interactive activities on 

Earth and will be so in space. The slightest anomaly or miscalculation can cause the entire processing 

stream to break down and in remote operations, it will be difficult to diagnose and correct the problem 

and re-start it. 

The accessibility issue also cuts against asteroidal resources. We cannot go to a given asteroid at will; 

launch windows open for very short periods and are closed most of the time. This affects not only our 

access to the asteroid but also shortens the time periods when we may depart the object to return our 

products to near-Earth space. In contrast, we can go to and from the Moon at any time and its proximity 

means that nearly instantaneous remote control and response are possible. The difficulties of remote 

control for asteroid activities have led some to suggest that we devise a way to "tow" the body into Earth 

orbit, where it may be disaggregated and processed at our leisure. I shudder to think about being 

assigned to write the environmental impact (if you11 pardon the expression) statement for that activity. 

So where does that leave us in relation to space resource access and utilization? Asteroid resource 

utilization has potential but given today's technology levels, uncertain prospects for success. Asteroids 

are hard to get to, have short visit times for round-trips, difficult work environments, and uncertain 

product yields. Asteroids do have low gravity going for them. In contrast, the Moon is close and has the 

materials we want in the fonn we need it. The Moon is easily accessible at any time and is amenable to 

remote operations controlled from Earth in near-real time. My perspective is that it makes the most 

sense to go to the Moon first and learn the techniques, difficulties and technology for planetary resource 

utilization by manufacturing propellant from lunar water. Nearly every step of this acti,,;ty - from 

prospecting, processing and harvesting - will teach us how to mine and process materials from future 

destinations, both minor and planetary sized-bodies. Resource utilization has commonality of techniques 

and equipment, the requirement to move and work with particulate materials, and the ability to purify 

and store the products. Learning how to access and process resources on the Moon is a general skill that 

transfers to any future space destination. 

111ere was a reasun that the Moon was made OUI'" first destination in the original Vision for Space 

Exploration. It's close, it's interesting, and it's useful. Establishing a foothold on the Moon opens up 

cislunar space to routine access and development. It will teach us the skills of a space faring people. It 

makes sense to go there first and create a permanent space transportation system. Once we have that, we 

get everything else. 

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