By order of the Bank ruptcy Appe llate Panel, the prec edential effec t of t his de c isi on is l im ite d to thec as e an d p ar tie s p ur su an t to 6th C i r
. B A P L B R 8 0 1 3 -1 (b). S

ee a l s o 6 th C i r
. B

A P L B R 8 0 1 0 -1 (c).
F ile Nam e: 08b0002n.06

BA NK RU P TC Y A P P ELLA TE P AN EL OF THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

Inr e : W ILLIA M D A

N IE L A Z B ILL,
Debtor.

W ILLIA M D A

N IE L A Z B ILL, Ap pe lla nt,

v. No. 06-8074
L . CRAI G KEND RI CK, Trustee,

Appellee

.
Appea l from the United States B ankruptc y Court for the E astern D istrict of Kentuc ky , Covington Division.

No. 98-21474. Arg ued: Novembe r 14, 2007
Dec ided and F iled: March 11, 2008
B e fo re : G REG G, PAR SON S, a nd WHI PPL E, B a nk

ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l Judg e s.

____________________ CO UN SEL
ARG UED: Cy

nth ia L . E ff ing e r, SEI L L ER W ATE RMA N, L ou isv ill e , K e ntu c ky , f or Ap pe lla nt. Br ian M. Ellerman, AD AMS, STEP NER, WOL TERMANN & DUSI NG, Coving ton, Kentucky , for Appellee

. O N B RI E F: David M. Cantor, Ambe r E. Trbonja , SEI L L ER WATERMAN, L ouisvill e, Kentucky , for Appe llant. Dennis R. Will ia ms , A D A M S, ST E PN E R, W OL TERMANN & DUSI NG, Covington, Ke ntucky , for Appe llee.2 ____________________ OP IN ION

____________________ MARCI A PHI L L I PS P ARSONS, Chi ef Ba nkruptcy Appellate Panel J udg e. After Wil liam Da nie l A zbil l ( “ De bto r” ) r e c e ive d a dis c ha rg e a nd his c ha

pte r 7 ca se wa s clo se d, he fi le d s uit in s ta te

c ourt to c oll e c t th e pr oc e e ds of a c e rt if ic a te of de posi t th at he h a d n ot d isc los e d a s an a sse t in his bankruptc y

case
. When the Unit ed S tates t rustee learne d of t he suit, he had the Debtor’ s bankruptcy

case reope ned. The appointed cha pter 7 trustee then re ache d a settlement with the de fenda nt in the state c ourt

a c tio n, a c omp ro mis e that w a s a

pp ro ve d b y

the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt . T he De bto r m ov e d to set aside the ba

nkruptcy court’s or der a

pproving the settlement, but the court denied the motion. For the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e AF F I RM the or de r o f t he ba nk ru ptc y c ourt

. I. ISSU ES ON AP P EAL Did the bankr

uptcy court c ommit reversible e rror in denying the Debtor’ s motion t o set aside the orde r appr oving the compromise bec ause: (1) the Debtor had insuffic ient notice of the chapte r 7 trustee’ s motion t o approve compromise; (2) the ce rt i fi ca t e of deposit was not proper ty of the Debtor’ s bankruptcy

estate; o r (3) the Debtor c ould have c laimed the ce rtificate of deposit as

e x e mp t ? II. JU RI SDI CT ION AND STANDARD OF RE VI EW Th e B a nk ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pa ne l of the Sixth Cir c uit ha s jur isd ic tio n to de c ide thi s a pp e a l. The United States District Court for the E astern D istrict of Kentuc ky has authorized appe als to the Pa ne l, a nd a fi na l ord e r of

the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt may be a pp e a le d a s o f r ig ht p ur su a nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 158(a) (1). The bankruptc y court’s order deny ing the Debtor’ s motion to set aside order a pproving compromise is a final, appea lable order

. See I n re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc

. , 119 F.3d 349, 354 (5 th C ir . 1 99 7) ; In re Mo orhe ad Cor p ., 208 B.R. 87, 89 (B .A.P. 1st Ci r. 1997), aff’d , 201 F.3d 428, 1998 WL 1267445 (1st Cir. Feb. 4, 1998) (unpublished table de cision). Denial of a motion to alter or a

mend a judgment under Fe dera l Rule of Civil P roce dure 59( e), made a pplicable to bankr

uptcy case s by Fe dera l Rule of Ba

nkrupt cy P ro ce d u re 9023, is reviewe d only for a buse of discr etion. Coc k re l v . S he lby Cou nty Sc h. Di st. , 270 F.3d 1036, 1 0 4 7 (6t h Cir. 20 01 ). L ike wi se , be c a

us e a “ ba nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s de c isi on to ap pr ov e or dis a pp ro ve a se ttl e me nt r e sts in the sound discretion of the ba nkruptcy judge [,] [a] revie wing court will not disturb or set aside the3

decision unless it achie ves such a n unjust result as to amount to an abuse of discretion. ” Olson v. Anderson (

In re Ande rson) , 377 B.R. 865, 868 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 2007). “Ge nera lly , a court ‘abuse s its discr etion only when it r elies upon clea rly err oneous finding s of fa ct or whe n it improperly applies the law or uses an e rrone ous leg al standar d.’” Id

. (q u o t i n g Fleischut v. Nixon De troit Diesel, Inc ., 85 9 F .2 d 2 6, 30 (6 th C ir . 1 98 8) ). A c ourt a lso a bu se s it s d isc re tio n “ if

the re vie wi ng c ourt

ha s a definite a nd firm conviction that the trial court c ommitt ed a c lear err or of judg ment in the conclusion that it reac hed base d on all of the a ppropriate fac tors.” Belfance v. Black River Pe troleum, Inc. (

In

re He ss) , 2 0 9 B. R

. 7 9 , 8 0 (B

. A. P

. 6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Bowling v. Pfi zer, Inc

. , 10 2 F .3 d 7 77 (6 th Cir. 1996)). Although the bankruptc y court’s or der de ny ing the Debtor’ s motion t o set as i de the or der approving compromise is the onl y order on appea l in this case, the or der a ddresse s the substance of the Debtor ’s objections to the compromise. A ccor dingly , we must also re view the ba nkruptcy court’s f indings of fac t a

nd conclusions of law re lative to those objections. See G enCorp, Inc. v . Am. In t’ l U nd e rwr ite rs , 178 F.3d 804, 833 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] s a gene ral matter , the appe al from the denial of a Rule 59(e) m otion is treated as an appeal from the underly ing judgment its elf.” ). F urther, notwithstanding the fac t that an order of this ty pe would ordinarily be reviewe d strictly for a buse of discretion, beca

use it e ncompasses the bankruptc y court’s only finding s and conclusion s o n t he objections, we revie w it accor dingly

. See Coc krel , 270 F.3d at 1047 (orde r deny ing motion to alter

or ame nd summary

judgme nt is reviewe d de novo ); In re Ande rson , 377 B.R. at 868 ( “Whether the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s dis c re tio na

ry de c isi on is b a se d u

po n a n e rr on e ou s in te rp re ta tio n of the law i s a leg al question that is review ed de novo .”). The ba nkruptcy court’s f indings of f

act, including whether the Debtor had ade quate notice of the motion to compromise and whe ther the D ebtor a cted in bad f aith, are re viewed unde r the

c le a rl y e rr on e ou s st a nd a rd . F e d. R. B a nk r. P. 8 01 3; see BP

Care, Inc. v . Thompson , 398 F.3d 503, 51 4 n .8 (6 th Cir . 200 5)

. “ A fin din g of fa c t is c le a rl y e rr on e ou s ‘w he n altho ug h the re is e vid e nc e to support it, the review ing c ourt on the entire evidenc e is le ft with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.’” Riverv iew Trenton R.R. Co. v. DSC, Lt d

. (In r e DSC , Ltd.) , 486 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2007) (q u o t i n g An de rso n v . Ci ty of B esse me r Ci ty , 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct . 1504 (1985))

. Th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l aw, inc lud ingwh e the r t he c e rt if ic a te of de po sit is proper ty of the e state and w hether it can be claimed as ex empt, are revie wed de novo

. Id . “Unde r4

a de novo standard of

revie w, the re viewing cour t d ec ides an issue indepe ndently of, and w ithout d ef er en ce to, the trial court’ s determination.” Me nn inge r v . A c c re dit e d H om e Le nd

e rs ( In re Morgeson) , 3 7 1 B. R

. 7 9 8 , 8 0 0 (B

. A. P

. 6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Treinish v. N orwest Bank Minn., N.A. ( In re Pe ria nd

ri) , 266 B.R. 651, 653 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 2001))

. III . F AC TS On Dece m ber 2, 1996, the Debtor’ s business, J ude Custom Sy stems, I nc. (“ J ude”) , filed a petition for re lief under

chapte r 11 of the B ankruptc y Co d e. T h e ch apter

11 trustee who w as
a pp oin te d b y

the c ourt re qu e ste d th a t th e De bto r l e a ve Jude ’s bu sin e ss pr e mis e s, bu t per mit te d h im to retrieve persona l items. One of the items w hich the Debtor purportedly

retrie ved wa s a $100,000

cer tificate of deposit (“CD” ) issued by Fi ft h T hird Ba nk on J une 19, 1989, in the name of “Jude Custom S y stems, I nc. Pension Plan.” The CD ha d a maturity date of Dec ember

8, 1989. On J anuar

y 5, 1998, the Debtor , indivi d u al l y , filed a voluntar y petition for re lief under

c ha pte r 7 of the Bank rup tcy Cod e . H e did no t li st the CD on

his sc he du le s. He re c e ive d h is discharg e on June 30, 1999, and the ca se wa s closed on Jul y 21, 1999. Ov e r t wo y e a rs la te r, on

Oc tob e r 5 , 2 00 1, the De bto r fi le d a sta te c ourt a c tio n a g a ins t F if

th Third B ank to collec t the proce eds fr om the CD. The Debtor a lleg ed in the ac tion that because he

wa s th e la st re ma ini ng pa rt ic ipa nt in the Jude Cus tom

Sy ste ms Pe ns ion

F un d, he wa s su c c e sso r i n interest to the pension fund and thus entitled to redee m the CD. Fifth Third B ank denie d the exis tence of the CD. On Fe bruar

y 16, 2004, Fifth Third Ba nk took the deposition of

the Debtor

in the state cour

t action. The Debtor te stified that he knew the CD exist ed prior to f iling his persona l bankruptcy case , and that he h ad at t em p t ed to cash it. He also testified that he did not list the CD in his personal ba nk ru ptc y c a se be c a us e “ it wa s p e ns ion

mon e y ” a nd

he ha d b e e n to ld t o “ le ave it l a y ” or “ it w ou ld g et conf iscated.” (Appe llee’s App. at 13.) The Jude Custom Sy stems, I nc. Pension Plan Ag ree ment (the “ Plan”), sig ned by the Debtor on behalf of Jude as employ er, shows that the Debtor was a ppointed trustee at the Plan’s inception in 1986

. Ac crua l of bene fits under the Plan c ease d on J une 19, 1991. B y amendment to the Plan dated Oc tober 14, 1997, sig ned by the Debtor

as trustee and on beha l f o f J ude, the Plan wa s te r mi n a te d a s o f D e c e mb e r 3 1 , 1 9 9 7

. T h e Pl a n p r o v id e d f o r d is tr ib u ti o n o f e xc e s s f u n d s upon te rm inatio n a s f

oll ow s:5 I n the eve nt of Ter

mination of Plan, ex cess f

unds as deter

mined under Se ct ion 12.07, shall . . . be allocated on a pr o-rata basis among the Participants in the Plan as of the da t e o f t ermination base d on the prese nt value of the Acc rued B enef it, subject to the I RC 415 li mits of t h e P l a n a s p r o v i d e d

u n d e r A rt i c l e V II. (Appe llee’s App. at 33). I n his 2004 deposition, the Debtor testified that a ll oth er P lan par ticipants had bee n paid. When a sked whether he had any paper work e stablishing that he w as entitled to the CD, the De btor responde d, “No. But if I ’m the last one in, Iboug ht it, I paid eve ry body out, it becomes mine. I t’s part of the settlement we settled out. I paid eve ry

body what they

had coming .” (A

ppellant’s App. at 13.) Prior to trial in the state cour t action, the United St ates trustee lear ned of the suit, prompting him to file in the bankruptc y court on J anuar y 6, 2006, an emer g ency motion to reope n the Debtor ’s chapte r 7 ca se to administer t he C D as an asset of t he estate. The United St ates trustee stated in the mot ion that a lth ou g h F if

th T hir d B a nk

ha d n ot a dmi tte d the e xiste nc e of the CD , it wa s w ill ingto pay a portion of the fac e value to the bankruptc y estate to pa

y cre ditors if the ca se we re r eopene d. Th e mot ion

a lso state d, ba se d o n th e De bto r’ s d e po sitio n testimo ny , th a t th e De bto r i nte nti on a lly fa ile d to lis t the CD in his ba nk ru ptc y c a se a nd

that, t he re fo re , h e sh ou ld n ot b e a llo we d to be ne fi t from his fra

udul en t b eh av ior. Be fore filing the motion, the United States trustee notified the Debtor’ s state cour

t counsel of his intention to file the motion and mailed him a courte sy copy , as ref lected in the motion’s ce rtificate of ser vice. No obje ction was filed to the T rustee’ s motion, and on J anuar y 18, 2006, the bankr

uptcy court orde red tha t the case be re opened. L . Craig Kendr ick was then appointed c hapter

7 trustee ( “Truste e”)

. On Marc h 30, 2006, the Trustee filed a motion to approve a compr omise of the state c ourt action with Fif

th Third Ba

nk. The motion stated that althoug h Fifth Third B ank maintains that the CD was paid out a ccor ding to its terms, the bank was willing to se ttle the litigation for $17,500. T he Trustee asser

ted that it was a f

air a nd rea sonable settlement whic h wo u l d av o id expenditure of substantial funds for attorney fee s an d l i t i gati on costs. Notice of the motion was serve d upon the Debtor’ s former bankruptc y counsel, the Debtor’ s counsel in the state c ourt ac tion, and the Debtor at his addre ss list ed with t h e cl erk of the bankr

uptcy court. No obje ction to the motion was filed. On April 24, 2006, the ba nkruptcy court issued a

n order approving the compromise. On April 28,The De btor did not appea l the order approving the compromise. 1
Th e De bto r did no t a lle g e a ny g ro un ds fo r re lie f e nu me rate d in F e de ra l Rul e of Civil 2 Procedur e 60, such a s mistake, newly discovere d evidenc e, fr aud or misre prese ntation, made applicable to bankruptcy

proce eding s by

Fe dera l Rule of Ba

nkruptcy Procedur e 9024.

6 20 06 , th e Tr

us te e ma ile d a c op y of the or de r to the De bto r, a g a in to t he a dd re ss l ist e d w iththe c ourt , and to his former

counsel. None of the mailing s to the Debtor or to his counsel wer e re turned. On May 1, 2006, the Debtor ’s state c ourt counsel f ile d a n o t i ce o f ap p ea ranc e in the b an kru p t cy

ca s e a s co u n s el o f r ec o rd fo r t h e De b t o r. Al s o o n M ay 1 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e D eb t o r, t h ro u gh counsel, filed a

motion to s et aside the order approving comprom i s e, contending that: (1) he was
no t pr op e rl y

se rv e d w iththe mot ion

to a pp rov e com pro mise ; ( 2) the CD wa s n ot a n a sse t of his bankruptc y

estate; a nd (3) the CD w as exempt beca use it was pension funds. A ft er a hea ring on J une 13, 2006, the ba

nkruptcy court issued a memorandum of opinion a nd order on Aug ust 28, 2006, denying the Debtor’ s motion i n all respe cts. The c ourt held that the De btor had suff icient notice of the motion to approve c ompromise, the Debtor ’s intere st in the CD was prope rty of the e state, and beca use the De btor intentionally omitted this interest fr om his bankruptcy schedule s, he could not claim the CD exempt. The Debtor timely appea led this order. 1 IV . D ISC USS ION Procedural Issue

s Th e De bto r’ s mo tio n to se t a sid e the or de r a pp ro vin g the c omp ro mis e did no t sp e c if y the ru le of pr oc e dure on

wh ic h th e De bto r r e lie d, a nd the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt did no t spe c if

y un de r w ha t r

ule it considered the motion. Be cause the motion sought a substantive c hang e in the bankr uptcy court’s jud g me nt a

nd wa s f ile d wi thi n te n da

y s of the e ntr

y of the jud g me nt, we wi ll tre a t it a s a mot ion to

a lte r o r am e nd the jud g me nt pur su a nt to Fe de ra l Rule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 59 (e ), ma de a pp lic a ble to bankruptc y

proce eding s by

Fe dera l Rule of B ankruptc y Procedur e 9023. Coc k

re l v . S he lby Cou nty 2 Sc h. Di st. , 270 F.3d 1036, 1047 (6th Cir. 2001) (motion f or rec onsideration filed within ten da y s of fi na l ju dg me nt g e ne ra lly

tr e a te d a s mo tio n to a lte r o r a me nd ); Barger v. H

ayes County Non-Stock Co- Op ( In re Ba rg e r) , 219 B.R. 238, 244 (B .A.P. 8th Ci r. 1998) ( “Courts have g ener ally viewed a ny mot ion wh ic h se e ks a su

bs tanti ve c ha

ng e in a jud g me nt a s a Rul e 59 (e ) mot ion if it is ma de wi thi n te n da y s of the e ntr

y of the jud g me nt c ha lle ng e d. ” ); In re No-Am Corp. , 223 B.R. 512, 513 (B ankr. W

. D. M i ch

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g In re Bark er-Fowler Elec . Co. , 141 B.R. 929, 935 (B ankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (motion for r econside ration of or der dire cting turnover of tax refund t re at ed as made under7

Rule 59(e) ). The Sixt h Circuit Court of Appea l s has held that motions to alter or amend “may be g ra nte d if the re is a

c le a r e rr or

of law, ne wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e , a

n in te rven ingc ha

ng e in controlling law, or to pre vent manife st injust ice.” GenCorp., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwri ters Co. , 178 F.3d 804, 834 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The De btor argued in his m o t i o n t o s et aside that approva l of the compromise or der w as le g a l l y e r r o n e o u s b e c a

u s e t h e C D w a s n o th i s p r o p e r t y o r p r o p e rt y o f h i s e s t a t e u n d e r

1 1 U. S.C. § 5 41 a nd , a lte rn a tiv e ly , wa s e lig ibl e fo r e xemp tio n. Th e De bto r a lso a sse rt e d th a t th e c omp ro mis e order should be set aside be cause he re ceive d inade q u at e n o t ice of the motion to approve the compromise. In ruling on the Debtor ’s motion, the bankruptc y court not only addre ssed the notice issue, but also ree valuated its a pproval of the compromise in light of the D ebtor’s pr operty -of- theestate a nd exemption arg uments. Be cause the bankr uptcy co u rt ruled on the D ebtor’s unde rly ing substantive objections to the compromise, we will a lso r eview the bankruptc y court’s order reje cting t he De btor’s objec tions to t he compr omise. See G encorp, I nc. , 1 7 8 F

. 3 d

a t 8 3 3 ( “ [A ]s a

g e n e r al matter, the a

ppeal f rom the denia l of a Rul e 59(e) mot ion is trea ted as an appea l from the under ly ing jud g me nt i tse lf

.” ); A b b s v
. Sullivan , 9 63 F .2 d 9 18 , 9 25 (7 th C ir . 1 99 2) (“ Th e pr e mis e of [a R ule 59(e) ] motion is that the j udg ment was wrong in some respe ct. This makes a challeng e to the denia l of the mot ion

a c ha lle ng e to t

he jud g me nt itse lf

. . . . ” ); see also Munoz v . Small Bus. Admin. , 644 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981) (appeal from final j udg ment “dra ws in question all ear lier non-f inal order s and all ruling s which produc ed the judg ment”). Notice to the Debtor F e de ra l Ru le s o f B a nk

ru ptc y Pr oc e dure 90 19 (a ) an d 200 2( a )( 3) g ov e rn the no tic e that mu st be g iven in c onnection with a motion to approve a compr omise. Rule 9019(a) pr ovides that: “On

mo t i o n by

the trustee a

nd afte r notice a

nd a hea ring , the cour

t may approve a compr omise or settlement. No t i ce sha ll be g iven to cre ditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, a nd indenture trustees a s provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as t he court may direc t.” Rule 2002(a )(3) provides for

20 day s n otice by

mail of a he aring on approva l of a c ompromise or settlement of a

c o n t r o v e r s y. I n th is c a se , th e De bto r d oe s n ot d e ny that no tic e of the mot ion to a pp ro ve the c omp ro mis e
wa s g ive n to him . He c on te nd s, ho we ve r, that noti c e wa s in e ff e c tiv e be c a

us e he wa s n ot pr op e rly

serve d with notice

. The De btor notes that the ce rtificate of ser vice f or the motion listed an outdatedTh e mot ion wa s ma ile d to the De bto r at the a dd re ss the De bto r ha d pre vio us ly lis te d w ith 3 the cour t clerk in c onnection with his bankruptcy case . I f this addre ss was no long er a ccur ate at the tim e h is c a s e w a s r e o p e n e d , th e d e b to r h a d th e a f f ir mati v e d u ty to f il e a s tate me n t w it

h the cour t cler k reg ardingany

chang e to his addre ss. See Fe d. R

. Ba nkr. P. 4002. I n this reg ard, the Debtor has neve r maintained that he did not have notice that his bankruptcy case was re opened. Th e D e b t o r i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e m o t i o n t o a p p r o v e c o mp r o m i s e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s e n t t o h is curr ent addr ess, the one g iven by him at his Februa

ry 16, 2004 deposi t i o n
. I n this deposition, t he Debtor state d that he wa s curr ently stay ing w ith his ex -wife , at 11 Overlook Circle, Wilder, K e n tu c ky , a n d h a d b e e n th e r e f o r a p e r io d o f th r e e mo n th s
. T h e r e c o r d r e f le c ts th a t t h e D e b to r ’ s e xwife, Car oly

n Azbill , was listed as a

cre ditor on the mailing matrix and was serve d with the motion to approve compromise, as w ell as all other f ilings, at the Wilder, Ke ntucky addre ss.
8 addre ss for him, and ar g ues that ser vice on his f

ormer ba nkruptcy counsel c annot constitute servic e 3 beca use he w as no l o n ger c ounsel of re cord. A s to service on his state court c ounsel, the De btor admits that the T ru stee notice d counsel, but maintains that counse l never rec eived a

copy of the mot ion a nd tha t se rv ic e on

thi s c ouns e l is ir

re le va nt b e c a us e he wa s n ot c ouns e l of re c or d in his bankruptc y

case at the time the motion was filed. The ba nkruptcy court found that the Debtor ha d actua l n o t i ce o f the motion to approve compromise by

virtue of his state court c ounsel’s re ceipt of the motion. The bankruptcy court observe d that t h e Debtor’ s state cour t counsel had f

iled an appe ara

nce in the ba

nkruptcy case and the motion to set aside on May 1, 2006, three day s after the trustee ha d mailed the orde r appr oving the compromise, sug g esting that the Debtor and his counsel ha d sufficie nt notice to take a ction. Notice is ade quate whe n althoug h a par t y d i d n o t rec eive f

ormal notice, a ctual notice w as
rec eived. See Creditors Comm. of Park Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Samue ls ( In re Park Nursing C tr., Inc.) , 7 6 6 F. 2 d 2 6 1 , 2 6 3 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g Mullane v. Cent. Hanove r Bank & Trust C o. , 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct . 6 52 (1 95 0) (h old ingthat a ru le of no tic e in b a nk

ru ptc y is a de qu a te , a

nd a ff or ds du e pr oc e ss, if i t i s r e a s o n a

b l y c a l c u l a t e d t o a c h i e v e a c tu a l n o t i c e a n d a p r o c e d u r e t o s e t a s i d e t he or de r i s
a va ila ble fo r o ne wh o f

a ils to r e c e ive no tic e )) ; see also Bay oud v. Me d. Ctr. Hosp. of Garland, Inc. ( In re Am. De v. Int’l Corp.) , 188 B.R. 925, 934 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that third party non-debtor who asser ted he did not re ceive forma l n o t i ce of settlement ag ree ment prior to hea ring had ac tual

no tic e be c a

us e he kn e w o f s e ttl e me nt b e fo re the mot ion wa s f ile d a nd ha d o pp or

tun ity to o bje c t) ; In re Glinz , 66 B.R. 88, 91 (D .N.D. 1986) (holding that unsecur ed cre ditors c ommitt ee was not entitled to relief de spite lack of f ormal notice of

hear ing o n s et t lement wher e attorne y repr esenting committee was pr esent, a nd no showing was made that he could have ma de any argument with 20Also, as set for th in footnote 3 su

pr a , the Debtor was living with his ex-wife at the time and 4 the re cord indicates that she re ceive d notice of the motion to approve compromise.

9 d ay s n o t i ce b y m ai l t h at h e co u l d n o t h av e ma d e wi t h ac tu al n o t i ce re ce i v ed at h ea ri n g )

. “ In bankruptc y , a proce dural rule requiring notice is a dequate ly complied with when a party does re ceive actua l notice and ha s some available reme dy to set aside the judgme nt, whether or not the party has

rec eived f

ormal notice.” In re B.I

.B. Co. , 165 B.R. 293, 295 (M.D. F la. 1994) (ci t i n g In re P ar k Nursing C tr., Inc. , 766 F.2d at 263)). Ba sed on the record before us, we a re una ble to conclude that the bankr uptcy court’s f inding that the Debtor

had ac tual notice of the motion to approve compromise is clea rly err oneous. At no po int , e ith e r b e fo re the ba nk ru ptcy c ourt or duri ng thi s a

pp e a l, h a s th e De bto r a sse rt e d th a t he did not have a ctual knowledg e of the motion to approve compromise. The cer tificate of service on the motion reflec ts that the Debtor, his fo rm er b an k ruptcy counsel, a

nd his state court c ounsel who subsequently

beca me his bankruptcy

counsel we re se rved, a

nd none of these mailings w ere returne d as undeliver able. And, while not deter minative, the promptness of state co u rt counsel’ s filing of 4 his notice of appe ara

nce an d m o tion to set aside supports the bankruptc y court’s f inding that the Debtor ha d actua l notice. Also importantly , there has been no asser tion that the Debtor was pre judiced by

the alleg ed failure to properly

notice him since the ba

nkruptcy court c onsidered his substantive objec tions to t he compromise in conne ction with his moti on to set aside. See In re Park Nursing C tr., Inc. , 766 F.2d at 263. Acc ording ly , the bankr uptcy court did not abuse its discre tion in refusing to alter, amend or

se t a sid e its order app rovingthe c omp ro mis e on the ba sis that th e De bto r d id n ot h a ve a de qu a te notice. As se t of theEs tat e The De btor asser

ts that the C D was never

proper ty of his bankruptc y

estate be cause it was in the name of the J ude Custom Sy stems, I nc. Pension Plan. He c ontends that his belief that he was
succe ssor in interest to the P lan as the onl y rema ining benefic iary does not constitute owner ship for purposes of his ba

nkruptcy petition, and that at best it can be argued that the CD repre sented a n asset that c ou ld become his property

post-petition. T h e D e b t o r ’ s b a n kr

u p t c y e s t a t e c o n s i s t s o f h i s l e g a l a n d e qu i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s i n a l l p r o p e rt y. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)

. “L eg islative history indicates section 541 is intended to be g iven a br oad10

definition to include ‘all kinds of prope rty , including tang ible or intang ible proper ty , cause s of ac tion . . . , and all other

forms of pr operty

specifie d in section 70a of the Ba nkruptcy Act . .

. . [I ]t includes as prope rty

of the e state all prope rty

of the debtor, even that neede d for a fre sh start.” In re J

ohnston , 209 F.3d 611, 613 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (quoting H .R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977)). This broa d definition of the estate includes “all leg ally rec og nizable inter ests althoug h they may be conting ent and not subject to posse ssion until some future time.” In re Ry erson , 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 ( 9th Cir. 19 84 ). Th e Un ite d Sta te s Sup re me Court ha s state d, “ [T]he te rm ‘p ro pe rt y ’ h a s b e e n c on str

ue d mo st g e ne ro us ly

a nd a n in te re st i s n ot o utside its re a c h b e c a us e it i s n ov e l or

c on tin g e nt o r b e c a

us e enjoy ment must be postponed.” Se ga l v . R oc he lle , 3 8 2 U. S

. 3 75, 379, 86 S. Ct . 511, 515 (1966). “In fac t, ever

y conce ivable int ere st of t he debtor, future, nonposse ssory , conting ent, spec ulative, and derivative, is within t he re ach of § 541.” In re Yoni kus , 996 F.2d 866, 869 ( 7th Cir. 1993). Pursu ant to the Plan, upon termination which oc curr ed in 1997 prior to the De btor’s bankruptc y

filing, e x cess f

unds were t o be distributed on a pr o-rata basis among the re maining pa rt ic ipa nts . With th e Plan te rm inate d, the De bto r w a s e nti tle d to a t le a st a pr o- ra ta sh a re of the CD with all other par

ticipants of t he P lan. I f t he Debtor was indee d the only rema ining pa

rticipant in the Plan, he is e nti tle d to the e nti re CD

. Con tr a ry to the De bto r’ s a rgume nt, the de fi nit ion

of e state is broade r than owne rship. Whether he w as entitled to a shar e or to the w hole CD, he had a leg al interest in the CD at the time of his ba nkruptcy filing and this interest wa s proper ty of his bankruptc y estate. Exe mpt Nature of CD as Pension Funds Fin a ll y , th e D e b to r

a s s e rts th a t i f

th e CD is p r o p e rty

o f th e b a n kr

u p tc y e s tate , it is e xe mpt pursuant to Kentuc ky

Revised Statute § 427.150 and 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) be cause it is p ar t of a pensi o n p l an . Debtors a

re pe rmitted to ex empt cer tain proper

ty from the ba

nkruptcy estate. “ An

e xemp tio n w ith dr a ws a n in te re st f ro m th e ba

nk ru ptc y e state , a nd c on se qu e ntl y

fr om t he c re dit or s, for the be nefit o f t h e debtor s.” In re Alam , 359 B.R. 142, 146-47 ( B.A .P. 6th C ir. 2006) (c iting W ic he ff v . B au mg

ar t ( In re W ic he ff) , 215 B .R. 83 9, 84 2 (B .A .P. 6th Cir . 199 8) ). A s ta te c a n c ho os e wh e the r i ts r e sid e nts may us e the a va ila

ble fe de ra l e xemp tio ns se t for th in 11 U.S .C. § 5 22 , o r u se its own state exemptions

. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). Kentuc ky has ele cted to opt-out of the f eder al exemptions , and debtor s are only entitled to claim any

exemptions allowable u n d er s t at e law and

u n d er non-bankr

uptcy fede ral law

. See Ky . Re v. Sta t. A nn . § 42 7. 17 0; In re Be ltz , 2 6 3 B

. R. 525, 52 7- 28 (B a nk

r. W.D . K

y . 2 00 1) . Pe ns io n fun ds may be e xemp t un de r K e ntu c ky Re vis e d St a tut eAl tho ug h n ot a dd re sse d b y the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt , th e Pa ne l qu e sti on s w he the r t he CD wo uld 5 have e ven qualifie d for a

n exemption under Kentucky Revised S tatute § 427.150(f) in light of the termination of the pe nsion plan prior to the De btor’s bankr uptcy filing.

11 § 427.150 to the extent nec essar y for the support of the Debtor and his depende nts. In re Pe klenk, 106 B.R. 119, 121 (B ankr. W.D. Ky . 1989). 5 The De btor had an aff

irmative dut y to disclose all of his assets to the bankr uptcy court. 11 U. S.C. § 5 21 (1 ); Browning v. Levy , 283 F.3d 761, 775 (6th Cir. 2002)

. Even those assets which ar e believed to be worthless or unavailable to the ba nkruptcy estate must be r eporte d. In re Yoni kus , 974 F.2d 901, 904 ( 7th Cir. 1992). I f a de b t o r i s u n ce rt ain as to his interest in any proper ty , the asset should be schedule d with an appr opriate e x p l an at i o n. Am . S tat e Ba nk v . M on tgo me ry

( In re Montgomery

) , 86 B.R. 948, 959 (B ankr. N .D. I nd. 1988), abrogated on other gro u n d s b y United Sta te s v . W alt e rs ( In re W alt e rs) , 176 B.R. 835, 875 (B ankr. N.D. I nd. 1994). “T h e b an k rupt cy proce ss provides that the debtor must first list such property and cla im such exempti ons. Next, t he tr us te e ha s an o pp or

tun ity to re vie w the c la im fo r e xemp tio ns
. Th e n, up on the tr us te e ’s ob je c tio ns , the bankr uptcy court de termines the leg itimacy of t he claim or, if the trustee has no objec tions, the exemption is then g rante d.” In re Yoni kus , 974 F.2d at 905 n.9. The Debtor ups et t his process whe n he fa ile d to lis t hi s in te re st i n th e CD a s a n a sse t on his sc he du le s. Prior to his bankruptcy

filing, the Debtor kne w about the CD a s he had r etrieve d it f rom the

rec ords of Jude and had e ven at t em p t ed t o cash it. Also prior to his bankruptc y filing, the Debtor knew that the Plan ha d been te rminated, a nd presumably as settl or, t rustee, and s igna tor to the Plan, he knew of the Plan’s provisions that entitled him at a minimum to a pro-ra t a s h ar e o f the CD. There fore , despite any possible uncer tainty of t he Debtor as t o the extent of his interest in the CD, it should have bee n listed as an asse t on his schedules. B y his ow n a dmi ssi on , th e De bto r i nte nti on a lly did no t li st the CD a s an a ss et in his ba nk ru ptc y c a se . H e te sti fi e d th a t “ the y tol d me to le a ve it g o unti l a ll the ba nk ru ptc y is a ll o ve r i n
c a se the re wa s so me pr ob le ms c ome up wi th i t. T he mon e y mig ht b e pu t in

so me fu nd that c ou ld be take n out of or it woul d g et conf iscated. I was told to leave it lay .” (A ppellee’ s App. at 13.) Whe n a sk e d w ho g a ve him that inf or ma tio n, he sta

te d, “ Pr ob a

bly my a tto rn e y s or m y

inv e stm e nts [si c] or somebody .” (A

ppellee’ s App. at 13.) I n completing his schedules, the D ebtor wa s not free to unilaterally decide to omit the C D from his asse ts based on his belief that it shoul d not be made12

available to satisfy

the claims of c reditors. See I n re Robinson , 292 B .R. 59 9, 61 1 (B a nk r. S.D . O hio 2003). F e de ra l Ru le of B a nk

ru ptc y Pr oc e dure 10 09 (a ) p ro vid e s th a t de bto rs may a me nd the ir schedule s as a matter of course at any time be fore the case is c losed. This c ase wa s cl o s ed l ong befor e the De btor’s attempt to claim the CD as e x empt. Tec hnically , th er ef o re, the claim of

e xemp tio n w a s late a nd

sh ou ld n ot b e a llo we d o n th a t ba sis . H ow e ve r, des pi te the f a c t th a t Ru le 10 09 (a ) spe c if

ic a lly re fe rs to a me nd ingsc he du le s be

for e a ca se is closed, some c ourts have he ld that the re is n o d if

fe re nc e be tw e e n a

c a se wh ic h h a s n ot b e e n c los e d a nd a re op e ne d c a se wi th re sp e c t to amende d exe m p t i o n claims

. See I n re Goswami , 304 B.R. 386, 392-93 ( B.A .P. 9th C ir. 2003); Towers v. Boyd (

In re Boy d) , 243 B.R. 756, 766 (N .D. Cal. 2000) (“ [F ] o r the purpose s of filing amendments, ther e is no d i fferenc e betwe en an ope n case and a r eopene d case , and [a debtor in a reope ned ca se does] not need the c ourt’s per mission t o ame n d

. ”)

. E ven thoug h a debtor in a reope ned ca se ca

n amend his exempti o n schedule , he does not have an a bsolute rig ht to have the exemption allowed. Courts may “re fuse to allow a

n amendment whe re the debtor ha s acte d in bad faith or whe re pr operty

has bee n conce aled.” Luc ius v . M c Le mo re , 741 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1984) (c i t i n g Doan v. Hudgins ( In re Doan) , 6 72 F .2 d 83 1, 83 3 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 2) ); In re Lundy , 2 16 B .R. 609, 610 (B ankr. E.D . Mich. 1998). The ba nkruptcy court e x plicitly

found that the De btor could not justify his failure to list the CD as an a sset. T h e co u rt rea soned that “intentional c oncea lment of assets bar s the debtor’ s exemption claim . . .” (Appellant’s A pp. at 87.) F rom this rea soning, w e infe r that the ba nkruptcy court believed t he Debtor’s non-disclosure of t he C D t o be int entional and in bad f aith. We review this finding for clea

r er ror. In re J

ohn Richards Home

s Bldg. Co. , 439 F.3d 248, 254 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Ba d faith may

be found w hen a de btor attempts to conce al an a sset. In re Kae lin , 308 F.3d 885, 890 (8 th C ir . 2 00 2) ; In re Ar

no ld , 2 52 B .R. 77 8, 78 5 (B.A. P

. 9t h Cir. 20 00 ); Go ld v . G utt ma n ( In re Guttman) , 237 B.R. 643, 651 (B ankr. E.D

. Mich. 1999). Concea lment of an a sset will bar exemption of that asse t. In reKae lin , 3 0 8 F. 3 d a t 8 9 0 (c i t i n g In re Doan , 6 72 F .2 d at 83 3) ; se e als o I n r e Robinson , 292 B.R. at 609. The De btor admi t t ed t o i n t entionally omitti ng the CD bec ause he was told it may be confiscated. Also, at anothe r point in his deposition when asked whether he list ed the CD a s an asse t in his bankruptcy

case , the Debtor

replied, “ No, bec ause it wa s pension money . L et me tell y ou
a bo ut p e rs on a l ba

nk ru ptc y . I did tha t th ro ug h b a d advic e . I

did n’ t ow e the mon e y

Ifo un d o ut.13

Every body was pa id. I just got a ba d strike for nothing .” (A ppellee’ s App. at 12.) A ccor ding to the bankruptc y

court, “ the cumulative eff ect of this testi mony

is that the Debtor obviously considere d the C.D. to be his persona l property , an asse t that he should be a b le to reta in beca use he ha d been ill-advised in filing his bankr uptcy . The De btor considere d the C.D. to be his, treate d it as his, and attempted to ca sh it.” (Appellant’ s App. at 86.) Th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s fi nd ing that the De bto r int e nti on a lly c on c e a le d th e CD in b a d f a ith is supported by

the Debtor ’s deposition testimony and is, there fore , not clear ly err oneous. More over, the cour t’s ref usal to permit the exemption is not le g ally err oneous. As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the bankr

uptcy court’s r efusa l to alter or se t aside its prior orde r. V. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, the ba nkruptcy court’s or der is AF FI RMED.