U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

82–467 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–52] 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S CHALLENGES 

IN ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING PERSONS 

FROM PAST CONFLICTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

AUGUST 1, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

CRAIG GREENE, Professional Staff Member 

DEBRA WADA, Professional Staff Member 

COLIN BOSSE, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, August 1, 2013, Department of Defense’s Challenges in Accounting 

for Missing Persons from Past Conflicts ............................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, August 1, 2013 ....................................................................................... 23 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2013 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S CHALLENGES IN ACCOUNTING FOR 

MISSING PERSONS FROM PAST CONFLICTS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Military Personnel ................................................................. 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel ........................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Cole, Dr. Paul M., Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education Fellow, 

Central Identification Laboratory, Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command 

(JPAC) ................................................................................................................... 4 

Farrell, Brenda S., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cole, Dr. Paul M. .............................................................................................. 48 

Davis, Hon. Susan A. ....................................................................................... 29 

Farrell, Brenda S. ............................................................................................. 30 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘Accessions with Possible U.S. Human Remains FY 03–FY 13,’’ by Dr. 

Paul M. Cole .................................................................................................. 61 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S CHALLENGES IN ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING PERSONS FROM PAST CONFLICTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL, Washington, DC, Thursday, August 1, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:02 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON MILITARY PERSONNEL 

Mr. WILSON. The hearing will come to order. Everyone is welcome to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel on the topic of the 

Department of Defense’s challenges in accounting for missing persons from past conflicts. 

Today the subcommittee will continue its oversight on the important issue of POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] recovery. Last August, Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo and I had 

the opportunity to visit the Joint Personnel Accounting Command—JPAC—headquarters, as well as a field recovery team on 

the side of a mountain in Vietnam. 

I was extremely impressed with the professionalism and work 

ethic of our service men and women as they worked in extreme 

heat and dangerous conditions to recover the remains of missing 

persons from a jet crash site. There were many dedicated military 

personnel involved in this effort. 

The joint U.S.-Vietnamese team was inspiring for its determination of recovery of remains. They shared the desire for the fullest 

possible accounting with the many family members of those who 

are still missing. 

We, as a nation, owe the proper emphasis, resources, and priority 

of effort to account for our missing persons from past conflicts and 

to bring closure to their family members. That is why this subcommittee, then chaired by Representative Susan Davis, in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 required the 

Secretary of Defense to increase significantly the Department’s capability and capacity to account for missing persons, with the objective that the POW/MIA accounting community could identify at 

least 200 missing persons annually, beginning in fiscal year 2015. 

In May 2012, after 3 years of little apparent progress by the Department of Defense toward achieving the 2010 mandate, this committee directed a Government Accountability Office review. There 
2 

have been approximately nine studies over the past decade on ways 

to provide and improve the accounting community’s effort to include a recent internal review of JPAC’s procedures conducted by 

Dr. Paul Cole, who is employed as a fellow at JPAC. 

Our goal today is to better understand the ability of the POW/ 

MIA accounting community to meet the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 and to help 

the Department build the capability and capacity to identify 200 

missing persons per year by fiscal year 2015. 

I would like to welcome the distinguished witnesses, Ms. Brenda 

S. Farrell, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office; and also Dr. Paul M. Cole, 

Ph.D., Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education Fellow with 

the Joint Personnel Accounting Command, Central Identification 

Laboratory, U.S. Pacific Command. 

Mrs. Davis, do you have any opening remarks? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

MILITARY PERSONNEL 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want to 

welcome also Dr. Cole and Ms. Farrell. We appreciate your being 

here with us today. 

As we know, this hearing is the first of several that the subcommittee is planning on the effectiveness and the efficiency of the 

POW/MIA accounting community. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that the next hearing we hold will include 

the appropriate representatives from the Department of Defense. 

Ultimately, it is the Secretary of Defense’s responsibility for ensuring that the Department meets the legal requirements to achieve 

at least 200 identifications a year beginning in 2015. 

And therefore it is only appropriate that we have the representatives from the Department of Defense before the subcommittee to 

understand what actions, if any, the Department is undertaking to 

truly address the concerns that have been raised in the Cole report 

and in the recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] report 

that we will be hearing about today. 

The culture of service instills within each service member that 

no one should be left behind on the field of battle. And we have 

a moral responsibility to those who are missing and remain unaccounted for to be returned home to their families and their loved 

ones. As the GAO report makes clear, weak leadership, fragmented 

organizational structure, and the lack of clearly articulated roles 

and responsibilities have hampered the effectiveness of this community for years. Given the current budget situation, we can no 

longer afford to let these concerns slide. 

So it is time we focus our attention on how to make the POW/ 

MIA accounting community more effective and efficient to be able 

to meet the goal of identifying at least these 200 sets of remains 

a year by 2015. 

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and having an 

open and productive dialogue on the issues and challenges that our 
3 

two witnesses have identified within the POW/MIA accounting 

community. 

And again, I want to thank you all for being here. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Davis can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

I now ask unanimous consent that Representatives Richard 

Nugent, Colleen Hanabusa, and Congresswoman Jackie Speier be 

allowed to ask questions during the hearing. Without objection, so 

ordered. 

Ms. Farrell, we will begin with your testimony. As a reminder, 

please keep your statements to 5 minutes. We have your written 

statement as well as Dr. Cole’s for the record. 

STATEMENT OF BRENDA S. FARRELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. FARRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Davis, and members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to 

discuss GAO’s recently issued report on the Department of Defense’s missing persons accounting mission. As you know, we conducted our review of DOD’s [Department of Defense] efforts to increase its capability and capacity to account for missing persons in 

response to a mandate driven by this subcommittee. 

For the past decade, DOD has accounted for an average of 72 

persons each year. Congress mandated DOD to increase its capability and capacity such that it could account for at least 200 missing persons annually by 2015. We were mandated to review DOD’s 

efforts to reach that goal of 200. 

My main message today is in the title of our report, ‘‘Top-Level 

Leadership Attention Needed to Resolve Long-Standing Challenges 

in Accounting for Missing Persons from Past Conflicts.’’ While more 

than a dozen DOD organizations, known collectively as the accounting community, have a role in accounting for the missing, the 

Under Secretary for Policy and the U.S. Pacific Command are the 

two top-level leadership organizations. 

My written statement is divided into three parts. First, we reported the need for DOD to examine options to reorganize the accounting community. Top-level leadership has been unable to resolve disputes between accounting community members in areas 

such as roles and responsibilities and developing a communitywide 

plan, as outline in our report. Further, the community is fragmented in that the community members belong to diverse parent 

organizations under several different chains of command. No single 

entity has overarching responsibility for communitywide personnel 

and other resources. 

A majority of the community members we surveyed conveyed a 

lack of confidence about the organizational structure. Not a single 

organization ranked the current structure as the most effective organizational option. 

Moreover, illustrating a disconnect between leadership’s perspective and the rest of the community, only two organizations, the two 

top-level leadership organizations I have noted—the Under Sec-
4 

retary for Policy and PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command]—responded 

that the current structure greatly enabled the appropriate senior 

leadership involvement. 

The second part of my statement addresses the need for DOD’s 

guidance to clearly articulate roles and responsibilities for all accounting community organizations. Disagreement over roles and responsibilities, where DOD’s guidance is broad or vague enough to 

support different interpretations, have led to discord, lack of collaboration and friction among the community members, and particularly between DPMO [Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office] that reports to the Under Secretary for Policy and 

JPAC, a subordinate command of PACOM. 

For example, JPAC views itself as having the lead on operational 

activities, such as conducting investigations and recovery missions. 

And JPAC officials express concerns with DPMO’s plans to conduct 

some operational activities. 

We found overlap and duplication efforts have led to inconsistent 

practices in key areas, such as equipment and artifact identification and analysis and research and analysis. 

The last part of my statement addresses the need for DOD to finalize the communitywide plan to develop increased capability and 

capacity as required by statute. Communitywide planning has been 

impeded by disputes and by a lack of coordination among members 

of the missing persons accounting community. 

DPMO and JPAC developed two competing proposed plans, neither of which encompass the entire accounting community. Both 

plans call for an increased capability and capacity and for a new 

satellite remains identification laboratory in the continental United 

States. 

However, the two plans differed as to which organization would 

have control over much of the increased capability and capacity. 

And each plan favored the organization that authored it. 

The other members and their resource needs were not mentioned 

in either proposed plan. We made recommendations in each of 

these three areas to DOD along with six other recommendations. 

And DOD generally concurred with all of our findings and recommendations. 

Let me conclude by noting that prompt action on the part of 

DOD to address these recommendations is critical because the 2015 

timeframe is rapidly approaching and, importantly, families have 

been waiting for decades to discover the fate of their loved ones. 

Chairman Wilson, this concludes my remarks. I will be pleased 

to take questions when you wish. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell. 

We proceed to Dr. Cole. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL M. COLE, OAK RIDGE INSTITUTE 

FOR SCIENCE AND EDUCATION FELLOW, CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND (JPAC) 

Dr. COLE. Congressman, thank you for the opportunity to be here 

today and your colleagues. I will just submit my prepared state-
5 

ment for the record and just have a couple of opening statements 

to make. 

The first one is, again, to thank you for the opportunity to be 

here. I need to state a couple of things for the record. I am not an 

employee of the Department of Defense. I am a participant in the 

ORISE [Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education] scholarship 

and fellowship program. So I don’t represent the Department of Defense, JPAC, the Central Identification Lab, or anybody else for 

that matter, except for me. So I am not a DOD employee. 

I would like to just briefly summarize what I did and what I was 

asked to do. I came to JPAC from a management consulting background. And I was asked to look at, not the science of the identification process, but the business side of it, how is it done, and to 

look at the process to identify where there could be some improvements, efficiencies, that sort of thing. 

So I want to emphasize when I talk about what I do and what 

I found. I have profound respect for the missing. My father is a 

World War II and Korea War veteran. And every time I look at a 

photograph of the missing people we are working with from World 

War II, I always think it could have been him. So it is a very personal thing. And I have worked with families of the missing over 

the years since I first got involved with this issue in the early 

1990s. So if it sounds like I am just being dispassionate, I hope 

that doesn’t give the wrong impression that I don’t have respect for 

the issue we are working with. 

But what I did was broke the identification process up into four 

parts. Think of it this way. You have procurement. Well, let me 

start over. What is the end product? The end product is an identification. It is in the form of a written product, if you have never 

seen one. It is in a binder. It is in a, you know, black cover and 

so forth. That is what JPAC does. It produces identifications. 

Now, how do they get the information for that identification? It 

starts on this end with a procurement of remains. You have to find 

them. Then, that is the procurement step, then they must come 

into the laboratory. That is the inbound logistics part. Now, that 

is the recovery teams that Congressman Wilson referred to who are 

out digging in the jungles and so forth. 

Then there are laboratory operations that occur within the CIL 

[Central Identification Laboratory] that produce the identification. 

So there are four parts. So when I talk about procurement, that 

means finding the remains. Inbound logistics, that is the recovery 

operations. Lab operations is the actual identification process— 

where the scientific director, who is the only one in the Department 

of Defense who has the authority to sign off on an identification finally says, ‘‘These remains are this person,’’ and then the identification report itself. 

So what binds this all together—I have it here. I wrote an SOP 

for that, a standard operating procedure, to bind all those pieces 

together into one coherent production process. Along the way, I 

identified—I don’t want to use that word. The result revealed some 

problems in the identification process; those I addressed in the 

SOP. 

So the ones that you saw in the information value chain report, 

that is actually a problem statement. The SOP that I have here is 
6 

supposed to be the solution statement. And that is what I was 

asked to do. I stand by the report that I did. 

And that concludes my comments and look forward to having a 

discussion with you. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cole can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Dr. Cole. And I want to 

thank you and Ms. Farrell for your thoroughness, your obvious appreciation of how significant this issue is, and we are just very 

grateful that you have provided this information. 

Ms. Farrell, the GAO report provides DOD nine recommendations for executive action in order to improve the accounting community’s efforts and efficiencies. If DOD implements the recommendations, will the department be able to build the capacity 

and capability to meet the fiscal year 2010 mandate of identifying 

at least 200 persons a year? 

Ms. FARRELL. Our report does make nine recommendations. At 

the top of the list is the recommendation for DOD to examine its 

organizational structure to determine if it is the right structure to 

help it increase its capability and capacity by 2015. We think that 

this is an examination that needs to be made quickly. And, from 

that, it should flow the roles and responsibilities of who is going 

to do what and by when. 

Right now, the DOD does not have a plan of how they are going 

to increase their capability and capacity to reach that 200. So the 

first thing they need to do is have a road map of how they are 

going to get there. They may have to make adjustments. They may 

find that the feasibility of 200 is not realistic. Or they may find 

that they can do more than the 200. But right now, they do not 

have that roadmap. 

Mr. WILSON. And I really appreciate your clarity in regard to organizational structure. And I am confident this committee will be 

looking into that. 

And, Dr. Cole, I appreciate your candidness, the report that you 

did. And you originally, to do a snapshot of JPAC operations to 

help provide for its standard operating procedure, SOP. Has the 

SOP been completed? Is it being utilized? What recommendations, 

indeed, could be provided? And I appreciate you giving a step-bystep analysis, too. 

Dr. COLE. Certainly, thank you. Yes, I completed my assignment 

and submitted the SOP to the command. After that, I had nothing 

to do with it. It was amended quite a bit. So the SOP was signed, 

and it is in effect. It is on the portal of the JPAC. You can look 

at it. But it varies significantly from the one that I have submitted. 

One of the things that was very important in the information 

value chain study was the identification of areas where there were 

no accountability measures. The Department of Defense requires 

every element of the Department of Defense to have a reportable 

metric, a quantifiable metric to report, right? So I put those into 

the SOP where they were missing. 

Unfortunately, quite a few of those were taken out in the final 

version. So, yes, short answer to your question is yes. But the 

version that you see on the portal is, sort of, rather alien to me. 
7 

Mr. WILSON. And with the metrics that you identified being 

taken out, which metrics were they? 

Dr. COLE. It was primarily in the procurement side. And that is 

the investigative team missions. There was just nothing there. 

When you would ask—I did my methodology for this was to do 

written surveys and follow up with face-to-face interviews and so 

forth. But, more importantly, I looked at the products of each of the 

sections at JPAC. 

Just to give you a contrast, with regard to the laboratory, I was 

given a free hand. I looked at hundreds of the identification packets, right? With respect to the J2 [now known as Research and 

Analysis (R&A)], which is responsible for the investigative team 

missions, they denied me access to almost everything. And I was 

lucky to have a look at about 20 of their field reports. 

So, from that, I was able to see that at the end of the field report—you know, I have been a government consultant in addition 

to other things. You generally have to say what you did for the 

money. That part was missing. There was no so what section to 

any of these. And there were certainly no quantifiable metrics in 

those reports. So in the SOP, I hate to say made up—but I constructed an accountability ladder that would allow these metrics to 

be collected, quantified, and reported. And that is what was missing, and the one that you can see on the Web site. 

Mr. WILSON. And, again, you are continuing being candid. And 

we all appreciate that, because we all, who are here, have such a 

profound interest that this program be successful. 

And, concluding my questions, Ms. Farrell, the nine recommendations—and I think I already know your answer. It is 

called organizational structure. Which of the GAO recommendations do you feel is most important to achieve the goals of identification of remains? 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, Mr. Chair, I think all the recommendations 

are important to help increase the capability capacity. But I think 

we would put deciding if the status quo is the correct structure in 

place to help increase that capability and capacity or if there 

should be a more centralized chain of command. And once that is 

decided, then the next step would be whether you stay with the 

status quo or decide to make a change in the structure to more 

clearly define the roles and responsibilities. 

Mr. WILSON. And I sincerely appreciate your efforts promoting 

accountability. 

And we now proceed to Congresswoman Susan Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to follow up with your question, actually, to Mr. Cole. And maybe this is just—so what is going on? 

Dr. COLE. Well—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Could you talk a little bit about procurement, particularly? And is there a problem with training? Are there other responsibilities that get in the way? What do you think is going on? 

Dr. COLE. Well, first I have to give full disclosure. I am not a forensic scientist, right? I am an economist. I am a failed scientist. 

I am an economist and management consultant. So I looked at this 

from a business perspective. So if you want to know anything about 
8 

the, you know, forensic anthropology and the archaeology and 

things like that, unfortunately, I can’t answer that. 

But I can tell you about the organization of it. The search for 

human remains is actually a very complicated—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mm-hmm. 

Dr. COLE [continuing]. Issue, right? But there is a—I can’t remember the fellow’s name now, but there is a famous forensic anthropologist from Ohio State University who wrote the ten commandments of forensic anthropology. The first one is that human 

remains are always found by accident. It is very difficult to have 

a systematic way to search and get results for this. But it can be 

done. 

So the first thing I would point out that—and it is in my report. 

I think there was an absence of a meaningful methodology in the 

procurement process. And it lacked, as I mentioned, accountability. 

But there was also a lack of structure in that an analyst should 

never be allowed to invent the world that they analyze. You know, 

that you end up in a logic loop that way. And there is also no accountability if you invent your own problem. 

So I suggested in this SOP, for example, that every year the commander of JPAC should establish something that I call the Command-Authorized Research Program. Unfortunately, the acronym 

was CARP. I couldn’t come up with a better one. 

But that would say that we are going to look at Papua, New 

Guinea this year. Or we are going to look for big bombers in Europe. But it gives a teleological, an end-oriented structure for the 

process. 

That was missing entirely. So what happened, well it is still 

going on, actually, is that the researchers sort of come into the office and say, ‘‘Well, this is what we are going to do today. This is 

what we are going to look for.’’ So they lacked a—in fact, if you 

read the methodology that is in—I reprinted the entire thing, I 

can’t think of a more salient example of opaque sophistry than that 

methodology that was presented by the J2. 

So it needed instruction from the top. ‘‘Go do this.’’ And that was 

missing. 

And also the methodology, because any observation is pointless 

if it is not against a standard. So for every section in JPAC, I 

looked for best international practice and held each section accountable to best international practice in their particular field. 

And we are not the only country that does this mission. It may 

be unique for the Department of Defense, but there are other countries that do it and they do it very well, and we can learn from 

them. So I used that as a standard and saw that there was a tremendous disconnect between the procurement program at JPAC 

and the best international practice being used by other countries. 

So let me stop there and see if that is answering your question. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And what about the community as a whole and their 

interaction with this? What did you find—I guess maybe I will just 

go to Ms. Farrell because you had—— 

Dr. COLE. That exceeded my mandate. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, our mandate did focus on the total community 

and JPAC is obviously a key player. JPAC, as you know, reports 
9 

to PACOM, also the Central Identification Lab is the laboratory for 

JPAC. But that is just one player, as I noted in my opening. 

The other major coordinating authority is the Under Secretary 

for Policy that has the Deputy Assistant Secretary who oversees 

work related to developing policy, coordinating policy and overseeing the missing accounting programs community. 

There are other players such as the Life Sciences Equipment 

Laboratory that reports to the Air Force Materiel Command. That 

is another chain of command we have got. Now we are up to three 

chains of command. 

The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory falls underneath the Army Surgeon General. So we have got, again, another 

chain of command. 

This is where you need the two major coordinating bodies, being 

PACOM and the Under Secretary’s office, to step in at times when 

there have been disputes about which plan to proceed or what are 

the overlapping roles and—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. And how do you see that process, then? How do they 

establish those priorities? Because obviously there are a lot of different ways to approach. And this has been going on, of course, for 

a long, long time. 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, it has. DPMO was established in 1993. And 

what our report is saying, the top leadership coordinating bodies 

are not stepping in to resolve those disputes, and it is not clear 

where this particular mission falls in terms of priorities. 

Again, there is no communitywide plan that would help lay out 

goals, metrics, such as what Dr. Cole is referring to. We too believe 

that metrics can help guide an agency to reach their goal, and if 

they need to make adjustments, then they can use that plan to do 

so. 

But right now, it is not clear where this particular accounting 

mission does fall in terms of priorities with the Department. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

And we will now proceed with questions from the members who 

are here. And I appreciate everyone being here. We will be on a 

very strict 5-minute rule. And it will be administered by Craig 

Greene, so we know it will be done properly. 

And we begin with Dr. Joe Heck of Nevada. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being 

here. 

Dr. Cole, I wonder if you could help me try to understand to the 

best of your ability some of what appears to be personality clashes 

in the process in which you were engaged. Because looking at Colonel Thoma’s memo of 30 January 2012, he said some ‘‘contentious 

material and personalization’’ within the report. 

And Major General Tom’s memo of I guess it was February 3rd 

of 2012 seems rather harsh in its assessment of the process in your 

report. 

What was it that was in the report or your interactions, if any, 

with these two officers that caused them to have such, I guess, 

such angst over the report that you generated? 

Dr. COLE. The short answer, Congressman, is that I wish I knew. 

I had very cordial relations with both the commander of JPAC, 
10 

General Tom, and Colonel Thoma. There was never any personality 

conflict or anything like that, from my perspective. 

But then again, when you are in the management consulting 

business, you kind of grow thick rhino hide, so I am kind of used 

to that. 

But let’s go back to what the purpose of this was. The purpose 

of this report was to be a management document for the top management. There were supposed to be maybe two or three people 

who would see this. 

And as far as the comments that there is personalization in the 

information value chain report, bear in mind, I did this from interviews and surveys. There is very little of my own judgment in this. 

And if it does sneak in, it should have been taken out. There 

wasn’t an editing process, for example. There wasn’t a verification 

process. There wasn’t a review process. 

What you have seen is basically a data dump from me, which I 

am not going to take it back. I wish I had written the draft a little 

bit better. But the personalizations in there came from interviews. 

It was what the colleagues at JPAC were saying about the product 

produced by somebody else. 

For example, if I say, ‘‘Congressman, you produce a widget for 

me,’’ and I think this widget is broken, I never use it, that is what 

you see in that matrix at the end of the report. So that was supposed to then be used by the JPAC command to say we have a dispute between two recipients of a product and the producer of a 

product. Resolve that. Get rid of the waste and the misunderstanding. 

So I could see that that could be a bit contentious, but as far as 

the speculation about why people kind of took offense to the report, 

I could only speculate. 

Dr. HECK. Who did you report to during the process? 

Dr. COLE. It was the—as you see in my opening statement, I 

refer to two Deputy Commanding Officers. One was the Commissioning DCO, and that was Colonel John Sullivan. And the second 

was Colonel Thoma, who came in late in the game. He was there 

about 3 months toward the end. 

So it was Colonel Sullivan. And I spent well over—we kept track 

of it. It was nearly 40 hours of consultation just with him on this 

report. 

Dr. HECK. And during the time that you were doing the research 

and generating the report, were there interim updates? 

Dr. COLE. Absolutely. 

Dr. HECK. And at any time during your providing those interim 

updates did there seem to be any concerns or backlash from any 

of those—— 

Dr. COLE. I never got any feedback. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. No further questions. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Dr. Heck. 

We now proceed to Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo of Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you for calling this hearing on such an important topic. The recovery of remains of our POWs or MIAs is important to our military 

community, as well as to their families. 
11 

And I want to thank you. I found that the trip that I took with 

Chairman Joe Wilson to the lab with remains in Honolulu, and our 

trip to the jungles in Vietnam, where incidentally we personally 

climbed down hills with the crew. And I was just very—it was an 

eye-opener for me. I didn’t know that there was such a vast team 

working on this. 

We were at a site where two American pilots had crashed into 

a mountain and they were excavating and finding out what they 

could. And there were the pictures of the two pilots. We went to 

the site. 

I did ask one of them, I said, ‘‘Are families interested in this?’’ 

And the lead of the team there said, ‘‘In some cases, yes. They even 

come to the site to see how we are doing. Others, I guess it has 

been so many years, that it is even hard to find relatives.’’ 

But all in all, I was very, very impressed with this trip and with 

the amount of time and money that we put into this. And I want 

to thank the Chairman for inviting me on that trip. It was an eyeopener for me. 

I understand there have been many challenges in this endeavor. 

However, I know Major General McKeague and have full faith in 

his capabilities to resolve the failures in the JPAC office. He is a 

proven leader and I look forward seeing the positive impacts of the 

reforms that he will need to make. 

I have a question for both of you. I appreciate the data provided 

in the report and the recommendations to help the POW/MIA accounting community to improve operations. But I am curious to 

know if, through your interactions and awareness of the operations 

today, is the community engaged and postured to increase the accountability? And what steps has JPAC office taken or will take to 

improve the operations? 

I guess we will begin with you, Miss—— 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, thank you. 

Again, in order for DOD to meet this mission, it is going to take 

the collaboration of the entire accounting community. If JPAC 

alone were to develop or update its current operational plan and 

how it plans to proceed to address the goal of 200 and it does not 

take into account what the other key players have to do in order 

to finish the mission, they will not be able to say in 2015, ‘‘Yes, we 

have met that goal.’’ 

It is very important that all of the community be included in the 

planning, have goals, understand their roles and responsibilities, 

how they are going to leverage off of each other in order to attain 

that goal. And right now they are not positioned to do so. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I see. So you don’t have too much faith in this. 

Is that what I am hearing? 

Ms. FARRELL. At this point there is not a plan for the community 

to reach that goal. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And Mr. Cole? 

Dr. COLE. I politely disagree with that assessment. The answer 

to every great question is ‘‘it depends.’’ And it depends on what 

kind of identifications you want to produce for 200. 

If you want to produce 200 identifications solely from field operations, and that is a procurement process of bringing new remains 
12 

into the laboratory, the flow of remains right now, you see in my 

statement, it is way too low. 

The field operations have failed. That is—in fact, it is important 

to emphasize that is what is dysfunctional at JPAC. I never said 

that the entire command was dysfunctional. 

Now, if you want to make 200 identifications from disinterments, 

you could do that. We are making 30 to 50 a year right now from 

the disinterments from the Punch Bowl of Korean war unknowns, 

well, Congress changed the name of all this to missing persons in 

2009. 

But there is a lot of what I call DOD interference—maybe that 

is too strong of a word—in the scientific approach to the disinterments from the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific. If they 

had a free hand in the World War II exhumations, for example, if 

the Department of Navy would stop blocking the exhumation of the 

Arizona, for example, or the Inora Maru, there would—the flow of 

human remains into the laboratory would be in the hundreds. 

And it is very low cost. In fact, it is revenue neutral for the lab 

because it is reimbursed from an open Army allotment. Right? 

So it is not from a field. You could do it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Cole, my time is up here, but I just wonder, 

what are the recovery numbers now? 

Dr. COLE. Sorry, I have those, but may I respond later with that? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Clearly. Yes. 

Dr. COLE. Absolutely. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I just—— 

Dr. COLE. The accessions numbers are on the—I think the last 

page of my prepared statement. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. All right. 

Well, thank you very much. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you Congresswoman Bordallo. 

We now will proceed with Congressman Austin Scott of Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have questions for both of you, so I am going to try to move 

fairly quick. 

Dr. Cole, I listened to your testimony and you talked about the 

quantifiable metrics. I mean, the question is, quite honestly, or I 

think your statement is, without those metrics, how do you hit the 

goal that you have? And maybe the DOD doesn’t or won’t accept 

the metrics. 

But more importantly, you talk about other countries that are 

doing this and that other countries have a better model. 

Which country do you believe has the best model and the best 

practices that we could mirror with minor modifications in the 

United States to help improve this process? 

Dr. COLE. Once again—that is an excellent question, by the way. 

I wanted to make a distinction between the procurement process 

and the laboratory operations. 

The laboratory operations, the JPAC still are—that is the international standard. That is the gold standard. Others aspire to be 

like the JPAC CIL. So they write the regs [regulations] ; they write 
13 

the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] regs, that 

sort of thing. 

The procurement side, on the other hand, the two outstanding 

examples are, first, Argentina, where they recover victims from the 

Dirty War. That is an incredibly politically charged environment 

they work in. They have a very small budget. And so they have to 

produce results, because if they go out and make a—it is always 

a big media show. If they dig in them wrong place and find nothing, then the opposition says, ‘‘See, these people don’t know what 

they are doing.’’ 

The other one that is incredibly impressive is the activities in 

Bosnia to recover and identify the remains from the war there. 

I was in Sarajevo a year ago to take a look at how that operation—because the attempts by the Serbians to disguise the massacres and to move remains from various open graves and that sort 

of thing, and to be able to sort that out, they are extremely wellorganized. 

So their procurement process in Argentina and in Bosnia, we 

could learn a lot from them. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Thank you for that question. 

Ms. Farrell, if you were in control, what would the idea of structuring the chain of command look like? 

Ms. FARRELL. It would be more centralized. GAO is not presenting here is the organizational structure that DOD should go to. 

We are noting that with these multiple chains of commands, the 

focus has been on disputes, rather than unity of command. The 

focus has not been on what are the requirements and what are the 

resources needed for those requirements. 

We present five possible options for the organizational structure 

in our report that we surveyed members of the accounting community, and those are possibilities. There could be another structure. 

But the ones that we present have a more centralized chain of command. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you have a preference in those five recommendations? 

Ms. FARRELL. No, we do not. 

Mr. SCOTT. But do you? 

Ms. FARRELL. No, I do not. There is never one right way. There 

can be multiple ways to go. 

But, I mean, we looked at possible mergers. We looked at whether the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness should perhaps be in charge instead of the Under Secretary of Policy. 

There are advantages and disadvantages with each of these options. But this is a choice that DOD has to make. 

Mr. SCOTT. The bottom line is it is important to put the right 

person in charge—and that we have a centralized chain of command for it, I gather, from what you have said. 

Mr. Chairman, out of respect for time and other members, I will 

yield the remainder of my time. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Congressman Scott. We now 

proceed to Congresswoman Niki Tsongas of Massachusetts. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, I appreciate very much your testimony today 

and sort of highlighting the many challenges, if not dysfunctions, 

that are currently in place. 
14 

It is not an easy thing to shed light on something—to shed that 

kind of dysfunction on an area that is so important not only to our 

families, but as I recently learned, to those who have served with 

some of those who were lost. 

I represent Concord, Massachusetts, and earlier this week one of 

my constituents, retired Navy Captain Thomas Hudner, returned 

from a sadly unsuccessful trip to North Korea aimed at locating the 

remains of his wingman, Ensign Jesse Brown, who was the U.S. 

Navy’s first African-American aviator. 

Ensign Brown was tragically shot down over the Chosin Reservoir battleground in 1950. Captain Hudner valiantly crash-landed his own plane in a bold attempt to rescue his friend, when it 

was clear that he would not be able to free himself from the wreckage of his plane. 

And unfortunately, it proved impossible. And so, at the age of 88, 

Mr. Hudner returned to North Korea to uncover the location of his 

friend, but was thwarted by a flooding from recent monsoons. 

So we see—we know how important it is to the families of those 

who have lost loved ones, but clearly also to those who have served 

with them as well. So I appreciate all the effort you are bringing 

to sort of making this process more functional and more successful. 

Mr. Cole, you have mentioned the fact that our roles on the production side are not always consistent with international standards. And in response to Mr. Scott, you highlight Argentina and 

Bosnia. 

What do they do that we could do? I mean, what is the difference? 

Dr. COLE. Pretty simply, Congresswoman, they use scientists. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Scientists to? 

Dr. COLE. When they go into a field to look for remains, they 

have a strategy to look for them, and they use archaeologists and 

anthropologists. 

Until recently, the JPAC model for procurement was to use historians. Now, according to the Daubert standard, a historian is not 

a scientist. This has been adjudicated you know in the courts in 

this country. 

So the difference is, if you look at how—when Australia, when 

looking for the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty] missing from World War I, the team consisted of battlefield archaeologists. When the Argentines go looking for the victims of the Dirty War they use—I have met the guys who do it— 

archaeologists and anthropologists. 

For years, the JPAC procurement method has been to send historians into the field to look for human remains. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And do you know why we don’t adhere to the 

international standards and use archaeologists, rather than historians? 

Dr. COLE. I can only tell you it was partly because there was no 

SOP; there was no direction to say do it a different way. And that 

department was left to itself. They were assigned authority by the 

JPAC commander in 2005 to take complete control of the procurement program. They ran it themselves. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So to change that SOP, the standard operating 

procedure, where would that have to come from? 
15 

Dr. COLE. You do it like that. There is a, well I wrote a procedure 

into the standing operating procedure to amend the SOP. It can be 

done on a semiannual annual basis. It is a very simple thing. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And do you think the goal of locating 200 remains 

annually is doable, were we to shift to that kind of process? 

Dr. COLE. Yes. I will tell you why. Because I once said to the 

commissioning DCO, I said, ‘‘I am willing to be in charge of that 

department and you hold me accountable to it. I can do this.’’ 

So my personal reputation, yes. And the skill, the tremendous 

skill that you find at JPAC is, if it is channeled in the right direction, these are really good people. What has been missing is this 

management and leadership which has been pointed out by the 

GAO. Instead of saying, come in to the office and figure out what 

you want to do today, I say to you, ‘‘Congresswoman Tsongas, go 

to PNG [Papua New Guinea] and look for bombers,’’ you know, that 

sort of thing. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Cole. 

Dr. COLE. Thank you. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And thank you for your analysis. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Ms. Tsongas. 

We will now proceed to Congresswoman Kristi Noem of South 

Dakota. 

Mrs. NOEM. Thank you. 

I thank both of you for being here. 

Dr. Cole, Austin Scott and Representative Tsongas have both 

brought up a topic that I was concerned about and thinking about 

as well, is these other countries. 

Can you tell me what their procurement numbers are per year 

that they are outperforming the United States by in Argentina and 

Bosnia? What kind of results are they gathering compared to what 

we are gathering? 

Dr. COLE. Well, unfortunately, that is not the correct—we are not 

comparing—— 

Mrs. NOEM. I understand we have different budgets, different 

numbers of people—— 

Dr. COLE. Yes. In Argentina, you are looking for hundreds, 

maybe thousands. In Bosnia, it is probably, you know, tens of thousands. 

In the United States, listen, this is part of the problem is that 

the list in the United States includes everyone who was classified 

by the War Department and after Korea as non-recoverable—not 

unrecovered, they were casualty status 6, non-recoverable. 

So we have all of the losses at sea and so forth are still on the 

U.S. list. 

The lists for Bosnia and Argentina are very refined. 

Mrs. NOEM. So you are saying potentially procurement that we 

have in front of us could be more difficult compared to what they 

are facing? 

Dr. COLE. No. Ours could be much, much more—— 

Mrs. NOEM. Much easier? 

Dr. COLE [continuing]. Much more focused, if we would prioritize 

the search list, just like they have done in those countries. Because 

one of the key differences in all of this is we have a lot more money 

than they do. 
16 

So we can afford to do things that they can’t. 

Mrs. NOEM. Could you tell me a little bit about your report, when 

it was amended, who it was that actually amended that report? 

Dr. COLE. You mean the SOP? 

Mrs. NOEM. Yes. 

Dr. COLE. Just to be clear, no one amended—— 

Mrs. NOEM. You said it appeared foreign to you, the one that 

is—— 

Dr. COLE. That is the SOP. The SOP. 

Mrs. NOEM. Yes. 

Dr. COLE. I don’t know who did it. 

Mrs. NOEM. So you turned it over to whom specifically? 

Dr. COLE. It was a deliverable to the commissioning deputy commanding officer. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. And then from there, you had no indication 

of what you knew they were going to be doing with it. Your job was 

done. You turned it over to—— 

Dr. COLE. Well, I was hoping that I would be involved and at 

least see what the revisions were. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. 

Dr. COLE. I sort of talked to the guy who edited the thing, but 

that was it. 

Mrs. NOEM. And then once it was edited, you are saying it is 

posted online, as well. But it is in its amended form, not in the 

original form. 

Dr. COLE. Well, that is their prerogative. You know, as a management consultant, my job is not to tell someone how to run their 

business—to say, ‘‘If you want to run it like this, this is what it 

looks like. If you want to run it like that, it looks like that.’’ So this 

was my attempt to say, ‘‘If you want to run this business according 

to best international standard, do this.’’ 

Mrs. NOEM. Do you believe that they are implementing the SOP? 

Dr. COLE. No. 

Mrs. NOEM. As amended? 

Dr. COLE. No. 

Mrs. NOEM. So why take the trouble to even go forward and 

amend it as they have if they are not planning on following it? 

Dr. COLE. You are asking the wrong guy. 

Mrs. NOEM. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. Farrell, I have a question for you. You talked about changing 

the chain of command and making it much more centralized. Do 

you believe the DOD has the authority to do that within itself to 

centralize that chain of command if they believe that would make 

them much more accountable and much more effective in what 

their job in front of them is? 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, I believe they do. I mean, some positions are 

established, as you know, by statute. But the statute does not say 

how DOD has to organize the accounting community. DOD has 

looked—a few years ago, there was a 2006 IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study that raised some questions about DPMO not 

being accepted, and perhaps there should be steps taken. And we 

know that there was some examination but not an indepth examination following that as to whether or not the DPMO should stay 
17 

with the Under Secretary for Policy or be moved to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness. 

Mrs. NOEM. Do you believe that there are some actions that 

could be taken by Congress that could have some impact on centralizing that chain of command as well? 

Ms. FARRELL. I think what you are doing today by providing 

oversight and focusing on the issue is desperately needed. I think 

timeframes are needed for DOD to move ahead in order to reach 

the 2015 goal. I think the issue that Dr. Cole brought up about priorities is a—one of the findings in our report that although DOD 

has developed criteria to categorize those that are feasible for recovery from Vietnam, they have not done so for the other 73,000 

from these other conflicts. So there is much that has to be done in 

order to move forward to 2015. 

Mrs. NOEM. Are you aware of any consequences that have been 

laid out if those timeframes are not met with the levels of 200 findings per year? 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, the findings from our report are to help DOD 

address the issue of how you are going to reach that goal of 200. 

Right now, I think there is enough evidence that shows there is a 

total lack of confidence by those in the accounting community that 

the status quo has the capacity and the capability to get there or 

that steps will be taken with the current status quo. And, again, 

action needs to be taken with time frames instead of waiting until 

2015 and focusing on this. Three years have passed, and now is the 

time to send in some interim steps in order to get there. 

Mrs. NOEM. Thank you. I appreciate you both being here. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mrs. Noem. 

We now proceed to Congressman Colleen Hanabusa of Hawaii. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you for letting 

me participate in this hearing. 

Like Ms. Tsongas, I have a personal interest. I have a husband 

whose cousin, a West Point grad, is still MIA in the Korean War. 

And we have been watching JPAC as a result of that. 

So first, I think one of the critical issues,and Ms. Farrell, I will 

begin with you,has been that we are not in a contained situation. 

It is not like just Bosnia and looking for remains or Argentina, and 

geographically defined. I think the GAO report makes it very clear 

that one of the issues we have is that for PACOM’s jurisdiction, 

and for World War II, we are looking at numbers of about 80,000 

people that are out there, however they may be classified. 

Dr. Cole says, you know, we should focus. I understand what he 

is saying, but the result is, there is a lot. And there is also the inability to access in certain areas. Because my understanding is one 

of the problems we have that, for example, other countries in Asia 

may not have, is they may have better relationships into the areas 

where they are trying to procure, using Dr. Cole’s statement. 

I think that is also something that GAO report concluded, as 

well. Am I correct? 

Ms. FARRELL. If you are talking about there needs to be agreements or some type of mechanisms in place other than what 

PACOM has taken steps with EUCOM [U.S. European Command] 

or their area responsibility, you are absolutely correct. 
18 

Ms. HANABUSA. And even within the PACOM jurisdiction, to get 

to certain areas to procure where there would have been, obviously, 

remains historically defined, you still have to have relationships 

with those areas and the ability to send in archaeologists or historians or anyone that we need to start the first step with this procurement. That is also understood, right? 

Ms. FARRELL. Correct. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Now, your focus of your report is that there 

needs to be—the community working together. But you do not 

make a recommendation as to how they would work together. 

So who would make that decision—not GAO. But who would 

make that decision as to how this community will finally focus and 

get together? 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, I think currently, it is up to the Secretary 

of Defense and the Deputy Secretary. We do know that after our 

report was issued, the Under Secretary for Policy did brief Secretary Hagel regarding the findings and, specifically, the recommendation on examining options for the organizational structure. And we know that taskings were sent out to DPMO to look 

at details regarding implementation cost, if any, that would be associated with these various options and report back. 

We do not know the status of that. And we do not have any documentation that shows exactly what they are looking at. But this is 

an issue, because it does involve so many chains of command, 

would have to be, at least I would think, up at the Deputy Secretary level. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Dr. Cole, you come to JPAC as a fellow originally. Is that correct? 

Dr. COLE. That is correct. I still am. 

Ms. HANABUSA. You still are a fellow. And how long are you 

going to be at JPAC? 

Dr. COLE. Depends on what happens today, I think. 

[Laughter.] 

But the ORISE fellowship program provides for a 5-year maximum. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I see. 

Dr. COLE. And I am into 31⁄2 years. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Three-and-a-half years. 

Okay, Dr. Cole, who exactly, either were the person who brought 

you, or you directly report to as the fellow? 

Dr. COLE. I report to lab management. No one brought me to 

JPAC. I was a management consultant and working the telecommunications business in Africa for 12 years. Before that, I was 

with the RAND Corporation. And when I was with RAND, I did a 

lot of work with the CIL–HI [U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory–Hawaii], the Central Identification—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. I am running out of time. I am sorry to put you 

off. 

Dr. COLE. Yes. So that is how I came back to that. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So that would have been the—— 

Dr. COLE. CIL–HI. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Okay. Now, your report, so I understand it, is 

you are not critical of the lab functions. You believe the lab func-
19 

tion is really the state of the art. You are critical of the procurement aspect of it. Is that also correct? 

Dr. COLE. No, I am not critical of anything. I reported the findings. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So you feel that the way JPAC is functioning— 

I thought you said they were inefficient. But maybe the word is inefficient is in the procurement portion of it. 

Dr. COLE. That is correct, ma’am. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So the—everything else—in other words, if they 

were to get more remains to work on, then you feel that everything 

else would fall into place, the four steps. And you would have the 

identification—— 

Dr. COLE. Reasonably well, yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So you don’t take issue with the identification report, which is your end product. You are just saying that there is 

not enough done in terms of the procurement aspect of it. 

Dr. COLE. That is correct. The identification step—for example, 

there—that is confirmed by external consultants. And then there is 

a DOD procedure called the AFIRB, the Armed Forces Identification Review Board. If there is a problem with that identification, 

there is a process to review it. So there is a lot of internal controls. 

Also, there is accreditation in the lab that looks after a lot of those 

procedures. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Chair, my time is up. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. And, Ms. Hanabusa, thank you very much. 

And we now proceed to Congressman Rich Nugent of Florida. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me sit in on 

this very important hearing. And I want to thank both of you for 

being here. I do not sit regularly on this subcommittee. But I do 

have great interest—you know, I have three sons that currently 

serve in the United States Army, and have had a brother in Vietnam and myself serving. 

So I am concerned when I hear from the GAO, obviously, that 

you have two organizations that seem to have competing interests. 

When we have a single common goal, is to recover the remains of 

our missing servicemen. And you hit on a couple of areas, in particular, in regards to chain of command. And so, I guess, I am trying to figure out, A, this all falls under DOD, correct? 

Ms. FARRELL. Correct, the accounting community in DOD. There 

are other stake holders, such as the State Department. But we are 

talking about the community within DOD. 

Mr. NUGENT. So, really, the Secretary of Defense has the ability 

to—or does he have the ability to consolidate those two under one 

chain of command for the purpose of, at least, accountability to 

take the turf war out of it? Does he have that ability? 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, he does. And that is part of what we presented in terms of various options of how the Secretary could reorganize the accounting community to have a more centralized chain 

of command. You still would probably have some key players outside of that chain. Because this is quite a process. I mean, it starts 

with DPMO. And in terms of—they are the ones that maintain the 

list that has the 83,000 on it. 

Mr. NUGENT. Right. 
20 

Ms. FARRELL. And it ends with DPMO. And they are the ones 

that decide, ‘‘Okay, this person is accounted for.’’ And they come 

off. But there are so many players between. I mean, JPAC is one 

player. We have mentioned the Armed Forces DNA lab, the military services with their casualty offices, as well. So you would 

never be able to get everything under one chain. 

Mr. NUGENT. I understand. 

Ms. FARRELL. But the major players, we feel that it could be 

much more streamlined and under a more centralized chain of command. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that. 

Dr. Cole, I hate the term, ‘‘procurement.’’ I understand why it is 

what it is, obviously. I just—I don’t care for the term. But the recovery of remains, and I agree with you that you really need to 

have a focus as to where you are going to look. Because, you know, 

you talked about ships that have been sunk. Obviously, you know 

where the remains are located within the body of that ship, but it 

gets more difficult obviously when you are looking at single remains or a remains of an aircraft that is down. 

Ms. Hanabusa touched on the aspect of some areas we can’t get 

into. North Korea is a difficult one in regards to dealing with them. 

So I would think that by focusing, let’s say, in Vietnam, it would 

be—for JPAC or DPMO to target an area that we know we have 

a number of remains that are more recent than Korea and more 

recoverable than North Korea, that we would target and look to recover as many remains. Because we do know, from DPMO, that 

those that we believe are there in Vietnam. 

Why wouldn’t they take that as a goal to meet that 200 but to 

target a particular area and say, ‘‘Okay, we have done as much in 

that area as we can unless something happens’’? Why wouldn’t we 

do that? 

Dr. COLE. I agree with you about the prioritization. The way that 

it is being approached at the Central Identification Lab, I know a 

little bit about this because since I did this report, what I have 

been working on is something called the Solvability and Resolvability Project. 

The identification is based on biological evidence. So what we are 

doing is a review of all of the biological evidence from the missing 

persons and the unknowns to see if we can build a common database of the two. 

The recovery locations, that is a matter of what I described earlier. That is the Command-Authorized Research Program. It says 

start here. That is, as you will see from my statement, that is happening now in Papua New Guinea. It is a zone-by-zone recovery effort. 

But that is exactly the kind of methodological approach that has 

been missing and really needs to be implemented. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate your comments. And Mr. Chairman, 

my time has expired and I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Congressman Nugent. And 

thank you for your family’s past and current service. 

We will be concluding with Congresswoman Jackie Speier of 

California. 
21 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to sit in 

on this hearing as well. I too am very concerned about this issue 

and appreciate the chair and ranking member taking this issue on. 

I am really very saddened by the reports, by the conclusions and 

by our gross inability to do something that seems so straightforward. And it is like we are the gang that can’t shoot straight, 

so to speak. 

It sounds like this is a gross turf battle that has been going on 

for a very long period of time, that we have studies dating back to 

2006 that make recommendations that seem pretty logical and 

should be embraced and we move forward. 

I mean, if we can go to war and succeed and yet we can’t recover 

the remains when there is a systematic way of doing so, how can 

we explain it to the American people? How can we explain it to the 

families? To, as Congresswoman Tsongas said, to those that served 

with them? 

Let me start with the numbers—83,000. Dr. Cole, you suggested 

that there is a prioritization here. Of that 83,000, are we talking 

about some that are lost at sea that are unrecoverable, and if so, 

should we reduce that number to something that is more realistic? 

Dr. COLE. The short answer is yes. It should—the issue is not to 

take people off a list, saying we are not going to do research. It is 

to prioritize how we are going to allocate resources. 

So for example, from World War II, there are approximately 

78,000 who were given the casualty status 6, which is non-recoverable. Of those, approximately 55,000 are associated with at-sea incidents. So that would leave 23,000 someplace else. 

So the at-sea incidents are the ones that I would say should be 

looked at first to determine if we want to pursue those. And then 

if the decision is, say, half of them or whatever, then focus on the 

ones that are associated with losses on land. And then, to work 

that way. 

In Korea, actually it is a very productive place to work. The recoveries that were done in the 1990s, you will see from my statement, produced over 100 identifications from the recoveries there. 

So getting back into North Korea could actually be very productive. 

But that list, as well, if memory serves me right from my RAND 

report, there are approximately 350 at-sea losses in Korea. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay, so one of the very first things we should do 

is really kind of look at that number and target those areas where 

we could be most efficient and effective at recovery? 

Dr. COLE. If I could be—politely disagree with you, please. What 

should happen first is the creation of a coherent list because there 

isn’t one right now. 

And so, for example, in 2009, Congress changed the accounting 

methods. There is only one right now. And that is to recover the 

remains and if they are not identifiable by visual inspection, they 

have to be identified by a practitioner of an appropriate forensic 

science. 

That is only one authorized accounting method. Now, you are not 

going to recover a lot of these remains that were lost at sea. But 

yet the mission now, as stated, is they can’t be taken off the list 

until their remains are recovered. So at the time, they were unre-
22 

coverable, the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 2010 

changed that to non-recovered. It is a great distinction. 

So I think there has to be a review of who is on the list now, 

who are we looking for, and to reconcile some of the cases that we 

know will never be resolved. That is the first step, in my view. 

Ms. SPEIER. And you also recommended that we need more scientists involved in this process and less historians. 

Dr. COLE. Not more scientists, more scientific approach to the 

matter. Because at the end of the day, the identification report by 

law is produced by forensic evidence, not by circumstantial information. And this is a consequence of NDAA 2010 that has been in 

force since October 2009. 

Ms. SPEIER. Dr. Cole, I would like to get a question to Ms. 

Farrell. My time is almost up. 

Ms. Farrell, it appears that you did a survey and that overwhelmingly it was the view of those who participated that a more 

centralized chain of command is desperately needed. Is that where 

the crux of this really comes in? 

Ms. FARRELL. That is the crux of it. 

We administered the survey to 17 organizations. We received a 

single response from each organization. We did not receive a response from the Defense Intelligence Agency that has a role in 

terms of providing intelligence-sharing to non-intelligence agencies, 

as well as the cost assessment and program evaluation group did 

not respond. 

But overwhelmingly, 12 of 14 thought that another organization 

would be more effective. We also saw disconnects between the top 

leadership in terms of PACOM and the Under Secretary for Policy’s 

office believing that the current structure allows ample opportunity 

for senior leadership involvement, which shows a disconnect with 

the other organizations that were noting the exact opposite, in 

terms of no confidence that the current organizational structure 

could increase its capability and capacity to reach the 200. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. My time is expired. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Ms. Speier. 

And I would like to thank both witnesses today. I appreciate actually both of you were very candid. Dr. Cole, thank you for your 

emphasis with Ms. Speier about a coherent list. That just must be 

done and, goodness, thank you, Ms. Farrell, in regard to structure. 

We will be having a follow-up hearing with DOD personnel, and 

I truly look forward to them addressing the issue and maybe— 

hopefully, actually letting us know that there has been a structural 

advance and reform. 

Again, thank everyone, the subcommittee, for being here. I want 

to thank the professional staff. They have just been so effective on 

this extraordinary issue, which has been so clearly identified as of 

concern to families, but also for service members, the people they 

have served with, but also the reassurance that we indeed leave no 

one behind. 

And that is what I saw, the commitment that I saw, and determination, when I visited the hillside, with Congresswoman 

Bordallo, in Vietnam. 

We are now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 9:10 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

AUGUST 1, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

AUGUST 1, 2013 

(27) 

Statement of Hon. Joe Wilson 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Military Personnel 

Hearing on 

Department of Defense’s Challenges in Accounting for 

Missing Persons from Past Conflicts 

August 1, 2013 

The hearing will come to order. Everyone is welcome to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel on the topic of ‘‘The Department 

of Defense’s Challenges in Accounting for Missing Persons from 

Past Conflicts.’’ Today the Subcommittee will continue its oversight 

on the important issue of POW/MIA recovery. Last August, Congresswoman Bordallo and I had the opportunity to visit the Joint 

Personnel Accounting Command’s (JPAC) headquarters as well as 

a field recovery team on the side of a mountain in Vietnam. I was 

extremely impressed with the professionalism and work ethic of 

our service men and women as they worked in extreme heat and 

dangerous conditions to recover the remains of missing persons 

from an airplane crash site. There are many dedicated military 

people involved with this effort. The Joint U.S.-Vietnamese team 

was inspiring for its determination of recovery of remains. They 

share the desire for the fullest possible accounting with the many 

family members of those who are still missing. We, as a nation, 

owe the proper emphasis, resources, and priority of effort to account for our missing persons from past conflicts and to bring closure to their family members. 

That is why this subcommittee, then chaired by Rep. Susan 

Davis, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 required the Secretary of Defense to increase significantly the 

Department’s capability and capacity to account for missing persons, with the objective that the POW/MIA accounting community 

could identify at least 200 missing persons annually beginning in 

fiscal year 2015. 

In May 2012, after 3 years of little apparent progress by the Department of Defense toward achieving the 2010 mandate, this committee directed a Government Accountability Office review. There 

have been approximately nine studies over the past decade on ways 

to improve the accounting community’s effort, to include a recent 

internal review of JPAC’s procedures conducted by Dr. Paul Cole 

who is employed as a fellow at JPAC. 

Our goal today is to better understand the ability of the POW/ 

MIA accounting community to meet the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and to help 
28 

the Department build the capability and capacity to identify 200 

missing persons per year by Fiscal Year 2015. 

I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses: • Ms. Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and 

Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office; and • Dr. Paul M. Cole, Ph.D., Oak Ridge Institute for Science and 

Education Fellow with the Joint Personnel Accounting Command, Central Identification Laboratory, U.S. Pacific Command. 
29 

Statement of Hon. Susan A. Davis 

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Military 

Personnel 

Hearing on 

Department of Defense’s Challenges in Accounting for 

Missing Persons from Past Conflicts 

August 1, 2013 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to welcome Dr. Cole and Ms. 

Farrell. Thank you all for being here with us. 

I understand this hearing is the first of several that the Subcommittee is planning on holding on the effectiveness and efficiency of the POW/MIA Accounting Community. Mr. Chairman, I 

hope that the next hearing we hold will include the appropriate 

representatives from the Department of Defense. 

Ultimately, it is the Secretary of Defense’s responsibility for ensuring that the Department meets the legal requirement to achieve 

at least 200 identifications a year beginning in 2015. Therefore, it 

is only appropriate that we have the representatives from the Department of Defense before the Subcommittee to understand what 

actions, if any, the Department is undertaking to truly address the 

concerns that have been raised in the Cole report and the recent 

GAO report. 

The culture of service instills within each service member that 

no one should be left behind on the field of battle. We have a moral 

responsibility to those who are missing and remain unaccounted for 

to be returned home to their families and loved ones. As the GAO 

report makes clear, weak leadership, fragmented organizational 

structure, and the lack of clearly articulated roles and responsibilities have hampered the effectiveness of this community for years. 

Given the current budget situation, we can no longer afford to let 

these concerns slide. It is time we focus our attention on how to 

make the POW/MIA Accounting Community more effective and efficient to be able to meet the goal of identifying at least 200 sets 

of remains a year by 2015. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and having an open 

and productive dialogue on the issues and challenges that our two 

witnesses have identified within the POW/MIA Accounting Community. Thank you again for being here today. 
30 

GAO·13·810T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Military 

Personnel, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. House of Representatives 

DOD'S POWIMIA MISSION 

Capability and Capacity to 

Account for Missing 

Persons Undermined by 

Leadership Weaknesses and 

Fragmented Organizational 

Structure 

Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
31 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Davis. and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to discuss GAO's 

findings and recommendations about the Department of Defense's (DOD) 

missing persons accounting mission from our recently issued report. 

DOD's POW/MIA Mission: Top-Level Leadership Attention Needed to 

Resolve Longstanding Challenges ;n Accounting for Missing Persons 

from Past Conflicts.' DOD reports that more than 83,000 persons are 

missing from past conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, the Persian 

Gulf, and World War II. Since the early 1970s, DOD has identified the 

remains of and accounted for approximately 1,910 persons. Several DOD 

components and organizations, collectively known as the missing persons 

accounting community, have a role in accounting for missing persons. 

Between 2002 and 2012, DOD accounted for an average of 72 persons 

each year. In 2009, Congress established an accounting-for goal in 

Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010. 2 This act required the Secretary of Defense to provide such funds, 

personnel, and resources as the Secretary considers appropriate to 

increase Significantly the capability and capacity of DOD, the Armed 

Forces, and commanders of the combatant commands to account for 

missing persons, so that the accounting community has sufficient 

resources to ensure that at least 200 missing persons are accounted for 

annually, beginning in fiscal year 2015. 3 The law also added all World 

War II losses to the list of conflicts for which DOD is responsible, thus 

increasing from about 10,000 to 83,000 the number of missing persons 

for whom DOD must account 

In 2012, in a committee report to accompany a bill for the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the House Armed 

Services Committee mandated that we review DOD's efforts to increase 

its capability and capacity to account for missing persons.4 Our resulting 

1GAO, DOD's POW/MfA Mission. Top-Level Leadership Attention Needed to Resolve 

Longstanding Challenges in Accounting for Missing Persons from Past Conflicts, 

GAO-13·619 (Washing1on, D.C.: July 17, 2013) 

2National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-84, §541 

(2009) (appended as a note below 10 U.s.C. §1509). 

3!n this statement we refer to this statutory requirement as the accounting-for goal. 

4H.R. Rep No. 112-479 at 153 (2012) 

Page 1 GAO·13·810r 
32 

report focused on DOD's efforts to accomplish the missing persons 

mission in accordance with the accounting-for goal established by 

Congress. In my statement today, I will focus on three key issues we 

identified in our report, specifically: (1) the accounting community's 

organizational structure, (2) the lack of clarity regarding community 

members' roles and responsibilities, and (3) DOD's planning to meet the 

statutory accounting-for goal. Our full report also discusses challenges in 

other areas, such as processes for conducting operations outside of U.S. 

Pacific Command's (PACOM) area of responsibility, criteria for prioritizing 

potentially recoverable missing persons, and communication efforts 

among community members. 

To identify and assess DOD's efforts to accomplish its mission to account 

for missing persons, we analyzed guidance and requirements, discussed 

accounting efforts and the structure of the community with community 

members, and surveyed accounting community members and other DOD 

stakeholder or leadership organizations. Our work underlying this 

statement was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards from June 2012 to June 2013. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope and 

methodology are contained in our recently issued report. 

Page 2 GAO-13-810T 
33 

Background Many DOD organizations, collectively known as the missing persons 

accounting community, have a role in accounting for the missing, as 

discussed below,5 The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD 

Policy) and US, Pacific Command6 (PACOM) are the two top-level 

leadership organizations in the accounting community. 

USD Policy is responsible for developing, coordinating, and 

overseeing the implementation of DOD policy to account for personnel 

unaccounted for as a result of hostile acts. The Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs, 

who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is 

responsible for, among other things, exercising policy, control, and 

oversight for the entire process of accounting for missing persons; 

monitoring and advocating for program funding requirements and 

resources for the mission; and leading and coordinating related 

communications efforts, such as the public outreach program. 

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) is 

responsible for, among other things. overseeing archival research and 

standardizing procedures for methodology and prioritization; rendering 

final analytic judgments as to what constitutes fullest possible 

accounting for each case by identifying possibilities for future action, 

or determining when no further pursuit is possible; and defining, 

maintaining, and enumerating accounting lists. The DPMO Director is 

responsible for overseeing the execution of DPMO's mission and 

duties. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of 

War/Missing Personnel Affairs serves as the DPMO Director and 

reports to USD Policy in that capacity as well. 

5Section 1509 of Title 10 of the Untted States Code defines the members of DO~'s 

Prisoner of War/Missing in Actton accounting community, who are assigned roles by 

statute or by DOD directives and Instructions. See 10 U.S.c. §§ 1501(a) and 1S09(b)(2); 

DOD Directive 5110_10, Defense Prisoner of WarlMissing Personnel Office (DPMO) 

(Sept. 21, 2005); and DOD Directive 2310.07E, Personnel Accounting-Losses Due to 

Hostile Acts (Nov. 10, 2003, certified current as of Aug. 21, 2007). While many of these 

organizations have responsibilities outside of the missing persons accounting mission, 

only their roles for this mission are described here 

6PACOM is one of DOD's six geographic combatant commands. PACOM's area of 

responsibility encompasses about half of the earth's surface, stretching from the waters off 

the west coast of the United States to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to 

the North Pole. 

Page 3 GAO·13·810T 
34 

PACOM exercises authority over the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in 

Action Accounting Command (JPAC), which is responsible for 

conducting operations in support of achieving the missing persons 

accounting mission. In 2003 JPAC was established as a Joint 

Command by the merger of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting with 

the Central Identification Laboratory - Hawaii in order to achieve unity 

of command, permanence of operational elements, and efficiency and 

effectiveness in the use of DOD's resources, as well as to strengthen 

the command and control of military forces in achieving the fullest 

possible accounting. JPAC's functions include analysis, archival 

research, investigations. recoveries, repatriations, identifications, and 

reporting. The Central Identification Laboratory is the laboratory 

component of JPAC. 

The military services have a role, with their service casualty offices 

serving as the primary liaison for families concerning miSSing persons 

recovery and accounting. Officials from these offices also assist 

families and help explain the methods used to account for their 

missing loved ones. Additional activities include gathering family 

deoxyribobucleic acid (DNA) reference samples, coordinating 

responses to family inquiries and concerns, and maintaining family 

contact information. 

The past conflict accounting section of the Armed Forces DNA 

Identification Laboratory conducts DNA analyses of remains of 

missing persons from past military conflicts for JPAC and its 

laboratory component, the Central Identification Laboratory, and 

maintains the past conflict accounting family reference sample 

database, to include processing of all DNA references. The Armed 

Forces DNA Identification Laboratory is part of the Armed Forces 

Medical Examiner System, which reports to the Army Surgeon 

General. 

The Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory provides technical and 

analytical support to the accounting community, and is primarily 

tasked by JPAC's Central Identification Laboratory to analyze and 

identify life science equipment-related artifacts that have been 

recovered and may potentially be related to missing persons cases. 

The Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory is part of the Air Force 

Materiel Command. 

In addition to these members of the missing persons accounting 

community, many other organizations playa role in the missing persons 

accounting process. including the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Page 4 
35 

Accounting 

Community's 

Fragmented 

Organizational 

Structure Exacerbates 

Weaknesses in 

Leadership 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and 

the State Department In addition, family and veterans organizations 

serve as constituency groups to the accounting community, 

The department's response to the accounting-for goal established in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 brought into 

sharp relief longstanding disputes that have not been addressed by toplevel leaders, and have been exacerbated by the accounting community's 

fragmented organizational structure, As I will describe in more detail later 

in this statement, leadership from the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy and Pacific Command have been unable to resolve disputes 

between community members in areas such as roles and responsibilities 

and developing a community-wide plan to meet the statutory accountingfor goal, Further, the accounting community is fragmented in that the 

community members belong to diverse parent organizations under 

several different chains of command, With accounting community 

organizations reporting under different lines of authority, no single entity 

has overarching responsibility for community-wide personnel and other 

resources, For example, although the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs has statutory 

responsibility for policy, control, and oversight of the entire accounting 

process, JPAC-which performs investigations, recoveries, 

identifications, and other key functions-falls under the authority of 

PACOM, rather than reporting to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs, As a result, no 

single entity can implement or enforce decisions without obtaining 

widespread consensus, We have previously reported that having a single 

designated leader is often beneficial because it centralizes accountability 

for achieving outcomes and can accelerate decision-making,7 

Concerns have arisen over the years, both within and outside of DOD, 

with regard to whether the current organizational structure of DOD's 

missing persons accounting community enables the community to most 

effectively meet its mission, For example, a 2006 Institute for Defense 

Analyses study concluded that significant improvements could be made 

7 GAO. Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO·12-1022 (WashIngton, D,C.: Sept. 27, 2012) 

PageS GAO·13-810T 
36 

by increasing the lines of coordination in the accounting community and 

recommended that the community acknowledge DPMO as the leader in 

the accounting effort The study also described some of the problems 

associated with the current organization; for example, that DPMO does 

not have tasking authority over the other organizations, and that while 

there are multiple lines of authority, no one organization has effective 

authority over execution of the entire mission. 

In our July 2013 report, we found that a majority of accounting community 

and DOD stakeholder organizations believe that an alternative 

organizational structure for the accounting community would be more 

effective. We administered a questionnaire asking representatives from 

each accounting community organization whether various options for 

reorganizing the missing persons accounting community could improve 

the community's ability to meet its mission. 8 One question asked 

respondents to rank five organizational options that would best enable the 

accounting community to meet its mission. We found that 12 of the 13 

survey respondents who answered the question ranked an option with a 

more centralized chain of command as the most effective in enabling the 

accounting community to achieve its mission. Ten of these 12 

respondents ranked the current organizational structure as the least 

effective or second least effective option for achieving the mission of the 

accounting community. 

Responses to our questionnaire also demonstrated a lack of confidence 

about the current organizational structure among many community and 

DOD stakeholder organizations. For example, 13 of the 14 survey 

respondents indicated that the current organizational structure did not 

enable or only somewhat enabled the community to develop the required 

capability and capacity to achieve the accounting-for goal. In addition, 12 

respondents indicated that the current organizational structure did not 

enable or only somewhat enabled the community to collectively determine 

necessary resources. Furthermore, 9 respondents indicated that the 

current organizational structure did not at all enable the accounting 

community to define and agree on their respective roles and 

responsibilities. 

8This questionnaire is reprinted in appendix! of our July 2013 report, along With a 

summary of the responses. For more details on the organizations that responded to the 

questionnaire and how we administered it, please see the scope and methodology section 

in appendix II of our July report. See GAO-13-619. 

Page 6 GAO·13·810T 
37 

In contrast, not a single organization we surveyed ranked the current 

organizational structure as the most effective organizational option, and 

only three organizations-USD Policy, PACOM, and JPAC-ranked the 

current organizational structure as the second most effective 

organizational option, Illustrating a disconnect between leadership's 

perspective and the rest of the community, only two organizations in our 

survey-USD Policy and PACOM, the two top-level leadership 

organizations in the accounting community-responded that the current 

structure greatly enables appropriate senior leadership involvement USD 

Policy and PACOM stated that all of the organizational options, including 

the current organizational structure, offer access to DOD senior 

leadership, In addition, senior officials from these offices questioned 

whether the benefit of reorganization would result in real change and 

would be worth undergoing turmoil in the organization, While we 

recognize that a reorganization may pose challenges, such as creating 

the potential for short-term impacts on operations due to disruption.' our 

findings in our July 2013 report show that the majority of accounting 

community members and other stakeholders lack confidence in the status 

quo, and we believe that the potential benefits of reorganizing andlor 

clarifying roles and responsibilities could outweigh those challenges, 

We recommended in our July 2013 report that the Secretary of Defense 

examine options for reorganizing the accounting community, to include 

conSidering organizational options that provide a more centralized chain 

of command over the accounting community's mission, DOD concurred 

with this recommendation, stating that it will consider options for 

reorganizing the accounting community, ranging from maintaining the 

status quo to consolidation of DPMO and JPAC, as well as examining 

whether the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory might also be included 

in this consolidation, DOD explained that the consolidated organization 

could be placed under the Office of the Secretary of Defense or a nongeographic combatant command to facilitate its worldwide mission and 

avoid competition for resources with a geographic combatant command's 

war-fighting priorities, 

9GAO, Government ReorganizatIOn- Potential Benefits and Drawbacks of Merging the 

Nationa' Marine Fisheries Service into the Fish and Wi/dlife Service, GAO-13-248 

(Washington, DC, Feb, 14, 2013) 

Page 7 GAO·13·810T 
38 

DOD Guidance Does 

Not Clearly Articulate 

Roles and 

Responsibilities for 

All Accounting 

Community 

Organizations 

While DOD is working to revise its existing guidance and develop new 

guidance, the roles and responsibilities of the various members of the 

missing persons accounting community are not all clearly articulated in 

existing DOD directives or instructions, We have previously reported on 

the need for collaborating agencies to work together to define and agree 

on their roles and responsibilities, 10 DOD has established several 

directives and instructions related to the missing persons accounting 

program,11 However, none of this guidance clearly delineates the specific 

roles and responsibilities of all the organizations comprising the missing 

persons accounting community in the four key areas that we examined for 

our July 2013 report: (1) equipment and artifact identification and 

analysis, (2) research and analysis, (3) investigations, and (4) family 

outreach and external communications, Disagreements over roles and 

responsibilities where the guidance is broad or vague enough to support 

different interpretations has led to discord, lack of collaboration, and 

friction among the community's members, and particularly between 

DPMO and JPAC, For example, JPAC views itself as having the lead on 

operational activities, such as conducting investigation and recovery 

missions, and JPAC officials expressed concerns with DPMO's plans to 

conduct some operational activities, Moreover, the lack of clarity in the 

guidance has given rise to overlapping and fragmented efforts among 

accounting community members, We have previously reported that 

overlap in efforts may be appropriate in some instances, especially if 

agencies can leverage each others' efforts, In other instances, however. 

overlap may be unintended, may be unnecessary, or may represent an 

inefficient use of US government resources, 12 As described in table 1, in 

11lncluding: DOD Directive 2310.07E, Personnel Accounting-Losses Due to Hostf{e Acts 

(Nov. 10,2003. certified as current as of Aug. 21, 2007); DOD Instruction 231005, 

Accounting for Missmg Persons, Boards of Inquiry (Jan. 31,2000, incorporating 

administrative change Mar. 14,2008); DOD Directive 5110.10 Defense Prisoners of 

WariMissing Personnel Office (DPMO) (Sept. 21, 2005); DOD Instruction 

Accounting for Personnel Lost in Past Conflicts-The Armed Forces Identification 

Board (AFIRB) (Mar, 14, 2008): DOD Instruction 1300,18, DOD Personnel Casually 

Matters, Policies, and Procedures (Jan. 8, 2008, incorporating change Aug. 14,2009). 

12GAO, Humanitan'an and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better 

Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts, GAO~ 12-359 (Washington 

D.C.: Feb, 8, 2012) 

Page 8 GAO· 13·81 or 
39 

implementing the accounting mission, we found that overlapping and 

duplicative 13 efforts have led to inconsistent practices and inefficiencies in 

four key areas. 

Table 1: Identified Areas of Overlap and Duplication in the Accounting Community That Have Led to Inconsistent Practices 

and Inefficiencies 

Accounting Community Organizations Areas of Overlap'-an·Ci Duplication Identified 

The Joint Prisoner of War/Missing In Action 

Accounting Command and the Ufe Sciences 

Equipment Laboratory 

Equipment and Artifact Identification and Analysis Overlap 

The Joint Prisoner of War 1M is sing in Action Accounting Command's Central 

Identification Laboratory has a capability to analyze life support equipment that 

overlaps with the analysis that the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory provides 

Equipment and Artifact Identification and Analysis Duplication 

The Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command's Centra! 

Identification Laboratory has requested duplicate analyses by sending resolved 

=~~-~~-~~~~-~--c- cases to the Ufe Sciences Equipment Laboratory for analysis and reporting. 

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Research and Analysis Overlap 

Office and the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office and the Joint Prisoner of 

War/Missing in Action Accounting Command have overlapping operational 

functions that include research and analysIs responsibilities 

Action Accounting Command 

Investigations Overlap 

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office and the Joint Prisoner of 

War/Missing in Action Accounting Command have overlapping operational 

functions that include investigation responsibilities 

cT"'h-e-oOo-e7fe-n-se-:C:pr7is-o-ne-r-o7f W::-;-a-;r/MC;C-is-;si-ng-P;;:e::-:rCCso::-:n"n-:CelC--~F-::-am=ily-;O=utC:-re:-:aCCc;:Ch and-External Communications Overlap-c-------

Office, the Joint Prisoner ofWar/M!ssing in Action The Defense Prisoner of War 1M is sing Personnel Office, the Joint Prisoner of 

Accounting Command. and the service casualty WarfMissing in Action Accounting Command, and the service casualty offices all 

offices playa role in family outreach and external communications. The servIce casualty 

offices serve as the primary liaison for families; the Defense Prisoner of 

War/Missing Personnel Office conducts periodic updates and annual government 

briefings for families; and the Jo!nt Prisoner of War/Missing In Action Accounting 

Command hosts numerous private tours for family members and 

operational briefings and individual family meetings at 

events. 

Today, I will highlight one of those areas equipment and artifact 

identification and analysis. JPAC and the Life Sciences Equipment 

Laboratory disagree about the laboratory's roles and responsibilities for 

equipment and artifact identification and analysis, and DOD guidance is 

vague regarding those responsibilities. As a result, the interactions 

13Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same 

activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries 

Page 9 GAO-13-810T 
40 

between JPAC's Central Identification Laboratory and the Life Sciences 

Equipment Laboratory have been inefficient and ineffective and have led 

to underutilizing government resources, as the following example 

demonstrates. JPAC and Ufe Sciences Equipment Laboratory officials 

disagree about roles and responsibilities in terms of which conflicts and 

types of equipment the Ufe Sciences Equipment Laboratory can analyze. 

JPAC officials told us it is unlikely that they would forward case work to 

the Ufe Sciences Equipment Laboratory for conflicts other than Vietnam, 

and that they do not send ground equipment" remnants to the equipment 

laboratory, regardless of conflict. Conversely, Life Sciences Equipment 

Laboratory officials stated that their capabilities can support analysis of 

cases for conflict periods ranging from World War I through current 

military operations for all military services, and that their mission includes 

analyzing artifacts recovered at aircraft crash or ground action loss sites. 

Further, a 2004 memorandum of agreement between JPAC and the Life 

Sciences Equipment Laboratory states that the Ufe Sciences Equipment 

Laboratory has the capability to provide analysis for equipment from 

World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War, and current day conflicts. 

Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory officials expressed concern that 

JPAC and its Central Identification Laboratory are trying to exclude the 

Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory from the accounting process by 

downplaying its potential contributions. This example shows how the lack 

of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has led to disagreements and 

inefficient and ineffective interactions among community members. 

Since 2010, DPMO has attempted to address issues surrounding the 

accounting community organizations' roles and responsibilities by 

developing new guidance or revising existing guidance, but these efforts 

have not been completed. DPMO has drafted a revision to DOD Directive 

2310.07E and has also drafted a new DOD instruction to provide more 

clarity with regard to roles and responsibilities. As of May 2013, however, 

neither the draft instruction nor the revised directive had been finalized, 

because the drafts had been stymied by disagreements among 

community members regarding their respective roles and responsibilities 

as stated in the drafts. Both DPMO officials and JPAC officials said they 

have made progress in addressing these areas of disagreement, and 

DPMO officials stated that they hoped to have the draft directive finalized 

by September 2013 and the draft instruction published by March 2014. 

equipment includes servicemembers' persona! gear such as helmets, body 

armor, canteens, and weapons 

Page 10 GAO~13·810T 
41 

Development of 

Community-wide Plan 

Is Impeded by a 

Fragmented Approach 

to Planning and 

Disputes among 

Community Members 

Because the drafts of these documents are still under revision, it is 

unclear whether the final guidance will clarify the roles and responsibilities 

sufficiently to address the four areas of overlap and disagreement 

summarized in table 1 above, Until DOD issues its revised directive and 

new instruction that more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of all 

the accounting community organizations, these areas of inefficient 

overlap may continue, and the disputing factions within the accounting 

community may continue to hinder future progress. 

Consequently, we recommended in our July 2013 report that the 

department revise and issue guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities 

of accounting community members and negotiate a new memorandum of 

agreement between the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory and JPAC. 

DOD concurred with both of these recommendations. 

While DOD has made some progress in drafting a community-wide plan 

to increase its capability and capacity to meet the statutory accounting-for 

goal, as of June 2013 DOD had not completed a community-wide plan. 

We have previously reported that overarching plans can help agencies 

beUer align their activities, processes, and resources to collaborate 

effectively to accomplish a commonly defined outcome. 'S However, our 

July 2013 report found that community-wide planning to meet the 

accounting-for goal established by Congress has been impeded by 

disputes and by a lack of coordination among members of the missing 

persons accounting community, with DPMO and JPAC developing two 

competing proposed plans, neither of which encompassed the entire 

accounting community In response to a December 2009 memorandum 

from the Deputy Secretary of Defense directing the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs to 

begin planning to meet the accounting-for goal, USD Policy and PAC OM 

allowed the development of these two competing proposed plans for 

obtaining additional funding and resources to meet the mandated 

capability and capacity. According to DPMO officials, neither the Joint 

Staff nor USD Policy provided oversight or intervention in the 

disagreement. These officials stated that such oversight and intervention 

could have helped JPAC and DPMO to resolve their impasse by 

improving communication, interaction, and cooperation, Both plans called 

15GAO·09·904SP 

Page 11 GAO·13-810T 
42 

for increased capability and capacity and for a new satellite remains 

identification laboratory located in the continental United States. However, 

the two plans differed as to which organization would have control over 

much of the increased capability and capacity, with each plan favoring the 

organization that authored it. The other accounting community members 

and their resource needs were not mentioned in either proposed plan. 

The dispute conceming the competing proposed plans was resolved 

through DOD's Program Budget Review Process in January 2011, after 

being assessed by a DOD-wide team led by DOD's Office of Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation. In a DOD resource management 

decision, 16 DOD programmed more than $312 million in proposed 

additional resources over fiscal years 2012 through 2016 in support of 

JPAC's plan, including an additional 253 personnel-reflecting a greater 

than 60 percent increase over JPAC's 2011 level However, key parts of 

JPAC's plan are not being realized. For example, JPAC has been unable 

to conduct the number of investigation and recovery missions called for in 

the plan, in part due to an inability to hire the additional personnel who 

had been authorized and also in part due to the budget reductions and 

expected furloughs associated with sequestration. As of May 2013, the 

JPAC plan, which does not incorporate the larger accounting community, 

is DOD's only plan to increase capability and capacity to account for 

missing persons, 

While the community has taken some recent steps to draft a communitywide plan as directed by the 2009 memo from the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, we found that disagreements between JPAC and DPMO 

hindered progress in developing the community-wide plan. According to 

both DPMO and JPAC officials, the areas of disagreement included topics 

such as (1) the division of research and analysis responsibilities between 

DPMO and JPAC; (2) determination of the appropriate levels of effort for 

each of the various conflicts; and (3) agreement on a policy to address 

lower priority cases that have been on JPAC's list of potential recovery 

sites for a long time. As of June 2013, DPMO and JPAC officials said that 

the areas of disagreement had been informally resolved and needed to 

be documented. DPMO had developed a draft of the community-wide 

plan, but DPMO officials explained that the draft would not be sufficiently 

comprehensive to share for review among the community members until 

16000, Resource Management Declsion 700 (Jan. 2011). 

Page 12 GAO·13-810T 
43 

it incorporated the informal agreements that have recently been resolved 

The officials stated that they now plan to finalize the community-wide plan 

by the end of calendar year 2013. 

In the absence of a community-wide plan, the members of the accounting 

community have had varied success in independently identifying and 

obtaining funds and resources to help meet the accounting-for goal. 

Moreover, there is no community-wide process to provide resources for 

the missing persons accounting mission. Each member organization of 

the accounting community has its own processes for requesting 

resources, because they belong to diverse parent organizations. and 

these processes are not integrated or coordinated. Until DOD finalizes a 

community-wide plan that addresses the resource needs of community 

members as well as changes in planned operations, the accounting 

community will be challenged to justify the resources it needs to increase 

DOD's capability and capacity to account for at least 200 missing persons 

a year by 2015, and DOD's ability to achieve that required increase may 

be at risk. 

We recommended in our July 2013 report that the department finalize the 

community-wide plan to develop the increased capability and capacity 

required by statute, with the support and participation of all community 

members. DOD concurred with our recommendation. In total, our full 

report contains nine recommendations with which DOD generally 

concurred. The report also contains DOD's comments, which state the 

steps the department plans to take to implement our recommendations. 

In conclusion, while we are encouraged that DOD generally concurred 

with all nine of the recommendations in our July 2013 report, we note that 

prompt action on the part of the department to address these 

recommendations is critical, because the 2015 timeframe for DOD to 

meet the accounting-for goal is rapidly approaching. Further, as time 

passes, the information needed for missing persons recoveries continues 

to deteriorate. Families have been waiting for decades to discover the 

fate of their loved ones, and the weaknesses that we identified in DOD's 

capability and capacity to account for missing persons jeopardize the 

department's ability to provide some measure of closure to those families 

whose loved ones are still missing as a result of their service to their 

country. 

Page 13 GAO-13-810T 
44 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(351855) 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Davis, this concludes my prepared 

remarks. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other 

Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

For future questions about this statement, please contact Brenda S. 

Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at (202) 512-

3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this 

statement include Margaret Best, Assistant Director; Renee Brown, Terry 

Richardson, Leigh Ann Sennette, Cheryl Weissman, Allen Westheimer, 

and Michael Willems. 

Page 14 GAO·13·810T 
45 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary jf you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
46 

GAO's Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone 

Connect with GAO 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO's website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select .. E-mail Updates." 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and information is posted on GAO's website, 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TOD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card. 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information 

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates Listen to our Podcasts 

Visit GAO on the web at w\wJ.gaogov. 

Contact· 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

." "'.: Please Print on Recycled Paper. 
47 

Short Bio for Brenda S. Farrell 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

U.S. Government Acconntability Office 

farrellb@gao,gQy 

In April 2007, Ms. Farrell was appointed to serve as a director in GAO's Defense 

Capabilities and Management Team where she is responsible for military and civilian 

personnel issues, including related medical readiness issues. Prior to her appointment 

with the Defense Capabilities and Management Team, Ms. Farrell served for 14 months 

as an Acting Director for GAO's Strategic Is..<;ues Team where she was responsible for 

overseeing three major bodies of work related to strategic human capital management, 

govemment regulation, and decennial census issues. Before joining the Strategic Issues 

Team, Ms. Farrell was an Assistant Director for DefE'nse Capabilities and Management 

and led military personnel engagements encompassing military pay and benefits, Reserve 

and National Guard mobilization issues, and senior military officer requirements and 

career development. Ms. Farrell began her career at GAO in 1981, and has served in a 

number of issue areas associated with national security issues. She received her 

bachelor's degree in sociology from the University of Louisville. In 2000!2001, she 

attended the National Defense University, Industrial College of the Armed Forces and 

eamed a master's degree in national resources strategy. Ms. Farrell completed the 

leadership development program at Eckerd College in 2004, and in 2005, she completed 

the Senior Executive Fellow Program at Harvard University. In March 2007, she 

graduated from the CAPSTONE program at the National Defense University for newly 

appointed general and flag officers being the first GAO SES to complete this program. 

Ms. Farrell was the project director for a seminar on organizational transfonnation, cosponsorpc\ by GAO, the World Bank, and the INTOSAI Development Initiativp, held in 

November 2007, for the heads of Supreme Audit Institutions. Most notable is 

Ms. Farrpll's body of work on DOD's Personnpl Security Clparance Program that helped 

lead to the rprnoval of this program from GAO's High Risk List in 201 L To datp, this 

program is the only DOD area to be removed thp high risk list Ms. Farrell was the 

recipient of a GAO meritorious award for sustained extraordinary performance leading 

multiple, highly complex, defense reviews, as well <L'> numerous other awards including 

several Results through Teamwork awards, and awards for high quality products. 
48 

EMBARGOED lJ~T1L 08hOO I August 2013 

JOINT POWIMIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND 

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FOR nm HOUSE ARMED 

SERVICES COMMITTEE MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE 

SUBJECT: JP AC Information Value Chain and Standard Operating Procedure 

STATEMENT BY: Paul M. Cole. PhD. ORISE Fellow. Central Identification 

Laboratory. Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command. Joint Base 

Pearl Harbor-Hickam. Honolulu. Hawaii 

1 AIJGUST 2013 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Davis. and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for the invitation to appear before this Subcommittee today. This hearing marks 

the third time I have been extended the privilege to testify befiJre Congress conceming 

POW/MIA issues. In 1992. I appeared before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA 

Affairs "Hearings on Cold War. Korea and WWIl POWs." In 1996. I testitied before the House 

Committee on National Security's Military Personnel Subcommittee's "Status of POW/MIA 

Negotiations with North Korea" hearings. 

Today. I appear in my personal capacity to discuss the Joint POW/MIA Accounting 

Command (".IPAC") draft Information Value Chain Study nyC Report"). and JpAC Standard 

Operating Procedure ("SOP"), both of which I produced. My prepared statement and testimony 

today, which represent my personal views and opinions, do not reflect the views or opinion of 

the US Government. Department of Defense, JP AC or anyone else. 

This statemcnt provides the Committee \vith a bricf overview of the purpose and utility of the 

SOP and IVC Report project. The statement ends with a discussion of some improvements that 

have been implemented at JPAC as well as a summary of issues that in my vicw require further 

attention. 

The origin of my involvement with the prodnction of the rvc Reporl and SOP began after 

March 2010 when the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education r'ORISE") appointed me 

as a Fellow at the .IPAC Central Identification Laboratory (".IPAC-CIL" or "CIL"). 

My initial assignment was to assess the process used by the .IP AC-CIL to locate. recover and 

identify human remains associated with the Korean War. The objective was to assess the 

identification process from a business perspective in order to determine whether the process 

could be made more efficient. 
49 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO I August 2013 

In May 2010, senior JPAC-CIL managers were asked to brief the Commanding General 

JPAC e'CGJPAC") MG Stephen Tom about my work on the Korean War identification process. 

At approximately thc same timc LTC Timothy Duffy, the Joint Chiefs of Stan' Vice Chairman's 

advisor on the POW/MIA Accounting Community, was motivating thc command group to 

produce a JPAC SOP. 

In May 2010 the CGJPAC offered me the opportunity to produce the JPAC SOP and IYC 

Report. My skill sets and experience with similar projects with thc Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. the RAND Corporation. the World Bank, UNDP. USAID. other NGCYs 

and private clients were a good fit with the proposed project. so I accepted the assignment 

(hereinafter the ·'Project"). For the purpose of the Project, I repoi1cd directly to Col. John 

Sullivan. JpAC Deputy Commanding Of1icer ("commissioning DCO"). 

The commissioning DCO advised the directors and deputy directors of JPAC's various 

sections and detachmcnts. repeatedly in writing and again in several meetings. that this was a 

command-authorized Project under the direct supervision of the commissioning DCO. 

The concept for the Project was to "take a snapshot" of Jl'AC's operations and procedures. 

The purpose of the "snapshot" was to provide a detailed, empirical dataset on which to base the 

envisaged SOP. The commissioning DCO expressed preference for an assessment of the "inputs 

and outputs" in the JpAC production process. A simplified version of the Leontieflnpnt-Output 

Model was selected as the appropriate analytical method for this analysis. 

The product of the Lcontief Input-Output analysis was intended to contribute to the JPAC 

senior management and command's ability to identify excess production, reconcile disputes and 

eliminate waste. The production and consumption matrix produced for the Project is attached as 

an annexure to the rye Report. The Leonticf rnput-Output analysis also produced quantifiable. 

empirical data that were used to draft the SOP. 

JpAC's Congressionally-authoriz.ed product. the identification of human remains. requires an 

information-intensive production process. The production process requires Knowledge Workers 

who have the skill sets and experiencc necessary to coliect, process, package. distribute and 

interpret information with optimal effect. The initial research step, therefore, was to survey the 

various JPAC sections and detachments to determine the pattern and effectiveness of 

communication and infonnation flow within the organization. The result of that exercise 

indicated that a problem with the creation and transfer of information existed within JP AC. 

The Leontief Input-Output Model therefore needed to be complemented by an assessment of 

JPAC's information value chain. The concept of supply chain management in manufacturing is 

familiar to most managers. A similar management concept the Information Yalue Chain 

("IYC"), addresses the creation. processing, and transfer of information within a knowledgebased organization. An IVC assessment was selected as the appropriate analytical method. 

The data in the IYC Report were generated by a series of written surveys and face-to-face 

interviews with the directors and deputy directors ofJPACs various sections and detachments. 

2 
50 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO I August 2013 

During the course of the Project, Congress made two fundamental changes that alfected 

every aspect of the Accounting Community in generaL and JPAC in particular. NDAA 2010, 

which changed the status of all pre-enactment POWs and MIAs to "missing persons," also 

eliminated two methods of identification, As of October 2009, when H,R, 2647 (111111) was 

signed into law, only one method to account for missing persons was authorized, NOAA 2010 

defined "accounted 1'01'-' as the "meaning given such term in section 1513(3)(13) of Title 10. 

United States Code." viz, 

The remains C!l thl:! person {Ire recovered and. f.f' not ide11l(fiable through '."[Slia/ means as lhose (~f the 

missing person. (.Ire identffied as those (~l the rnissing person by a practitioner (?f an appropriate forensic 

science. 

Congress eliminated all other accounting methods including "fullest possible accounting," The 

single authorized accounting method signiticantly enhanced the importance of scientific 

evidence while downgrading the roJe of circumstantial information in the identiiication process. 

An IYC survey revealed that 60 percent of .II' AC's sections disagreed with the single authorized 

accounting method. After four years. the single accounting method has yet to be fully 

implemented. 

With regard to the Project's products, in contrast to media reports. the IYC Report docs not 

conclude and I do not share the view that the entire .IP AC operation is "dysfunctional" The lye 

report clearly and repeatedly states that the Investigative Team program. which is the 

procurement step in the .IPAC production process, has been and continues to be dysfunctional. 

The distinction between procurement and laboratory operations is essential to understanding 

JPAC operations. The dysfunctional procurement program is controlled by the J2 section. now 

knO\\in as Research and Analysis (,'R&A"). which has had sole responsibility f()r the 

procurement of human remains since 2005, The IYC Repmi concludes that the J2iR&A's 

procurement program. not .!PAC. is dysfunctional. 

The IYC Report states that an evaluation of the .IPAC-CIL·s scientific competence exceeded 

the scope of the Project. Assessments by competent authorities. however. confirm that the 

scientific integrity of the JPAC-CIL has not been compromised and that laboratory operations 

are not dystLl!1ctional. The dysfunctional .l2lR&A plays no role in laboratory operations. 

The commissioning DCO was briefed or consulted in excess of thirty hours during the course 

of tbe Project. The CGJP AC. who was briefed on numerous occasions. also requested several 

memoranda and other Project products, In addition. the commissioning DCO organized and 

chaired a day-long off-site conference for deputy directors of all .II' AC sections where the 

interim tlndings of the project were presented and offered to the participants for comment and 

feedback, 'vYith the exception of the commissioning DCO's comments, no feedback or comments 

from any of the other participants were provided after any of these events, 

On 21 September 2011, a draft of the lVC Report and the tinal draft of the .IPAC SOP were 

submitted to the CGJPAC. No comments or feedback were provided, 

3 
51 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO I August 2013 

In late January 2012, the draft IVC Report was posted to an internal JP/\C share point by 

incoming DCa Col. Alan Thoma ("Incoming DCO"). The incoming DCO posted the report to 

the internal JPAC share point prior to reading it. The incoming DCO's letter concerning this 

event is attached as an annexure to this statement (below). 

Following the posting of the report. the CGJPAC advised me that he had read the IVC Repol1 

and intended to use it. On 3 February 2012. the CGJPAC "disavowed" the IVC Report. The 

CGJP/\C did not include me on the distribution list. I was advised about the CGJPACs letter by 

a third party. A copy of the CGJPAC's letter is attached to this statement (below). 

The CGJPACs letter included, infer alia, the following concerns about the IVC Report: 

I do !lot endorse It or any part of it I do not tind merit in the finding. conclusions or recommendations. 

Some parts of the ICVR (sic) are poorly written, reneet a bias. and contain findings and 

recommendations that go beyond the intended scope of the report 

The CGJPAC expressed none of these concerns to me prior to disavowing the IVC Report. 

No evidence to support the tinding of "bias" in the CGJPAC's letter has been presented. 

Following the CGJpAC's "disavowal," within a shOli period of time one or more 

unauthorized releases of the IVC Report occurred. This is how the draft IVC Report appeared in 

the public domain. 

The motives for the unauthorized release(s) have yet to be revealed. To my knowledge. no 

disciplinary action was taken against any of the persons responsible for the unauthorized 

disclosures. I did not make any unauthorized release of the IVC Report. In fact, just the 

opposite is true. I protected the IVC Report because it was designed and intended to be a c1osehold, top management document, available to perhaps two or three senior JPAC managers. If it 

were made public. the IVC RepOli would lose its utility as a management tool. And so it has. 

Due to the unauthorized leaks. the Ive Report came to the attention of several parties outside 

ofJPAC, including the media. Were it not for this chain of events. the probability that we would 

be meeting here today is rather remote. 

With regard to the SOP, the purpose of the IVC Report was to reveal problems in the JPAC 

production process. The purpose of the SOP was. in part. to provide solutions to those problems. 

The original draft of the SOP addressed several process problems that were revealed hy the IVC 

Report. Unfortunately, several important solutions in the draft SOP were not implemented. 

After the draft SOP was submitted. I did not see the document again until the official version 

had been signed by the CGJPAC and posted on the JPAC portal. I was not involved with the 

revision of the SOP. A comparison of the original draft SOP and the final text signed by the 

CGJP AC reveals fundamental differences. For example, the original draft SOP required the J2 

section to report quantifiable mctrics as well as to implement several basic accountability 

measures. All of the proposed 12 accountability measures and reportable metrics were removed 

from the draft SOP after it was submitted to the CGJpAC. 

4 
52 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO I August 2013 

With regard to "military tourism:' the tenll was tlrst used by the CGJP AC to describe the 

activities of the J2's Investigative Team mission program. "Military tourism'" is a toxic cocktail 

of improper research methods facilitated by weak mm1agemcnt. poor leadership and absence of 

accountability. The young employees who participated in "military tourism" should not be held 

accountable, as they lacked the experience, integrity or seniority to decline to participate. In 

contrast. over a number of years various JPAC commanders. managers, and senior stafT members 

were well aware that "military tourism" was taking place. Various managers and participants 

were aware of the expense, nature and poor results that "military tourism" produced. The 

commanders, managers and senior staff who approved requests tor or participated in "military 

tourism" should be held accountable for any travel that was unnecessary or excessive. 

The fundamental, chronic problem that continues to plague JPAC concerns the low quantity 

and marginal quality of remains comiug into the JPAC-CIL as a result of the failure of the 

J2/R&A Investigative Team program's procurement activities. The accessions acquired annually 

since 2005 arc sufficient to allow the CIL to produce only a small percentage of the 200 

identifications Congress required JPAC to make per year beginning in FYI5. 

In order to produce 200 identifications per year from accessions obtained from field 

activities, a minimum of 250 sets of high-quality human remains should be accessioned by the 

.IPAC-CIL per year. Between 2005-2013, JPAC"s Investigative Team procurement program, 

which should have produced a minimum of2.250 high-quality accessions, produced only 595, an 

average of less than 59 accessions per year. a cumulative shortfall of at least 1,655 accessions. 

The IVC Report concluded that the J2/R&A problem was inef1iciency, not economy of scale. 

Despite the fact that growth was contraindicated, the JPAC command group signiticantly 

increased the human resources and funding for the J2's "military tOllrism" program. The 

CGJPAC designated 2013 as the "Year of the J2," with the expectation that the results generated 

would be measured in increased accessions in 2014. The wisdom and requirement for sllch an 

investment were questioned at the time, to no avail. Today, the results speak for themselves. 

The "Year of the J2'" has produced no meaningful increase in sites dcsignated for excavation. 

One may anticipate, however. that this failure will be attributed to sequestration. 

When the identifications deriving ti'om disinterments, the K208 collection, and remains 

found by third parties (aka "lmilateral turnovers") arc deducted ii'om JPAC"s total annual 

production, the number of identifications produced from remains acquired by et10rts attributable 

to the Investigative Team procurement program is in the high teens. perhaps low twenties. This 

is an unacceptably low retum on an investment of tens of millions of dollars. 

The situation at JPAC following the leak of the IVC Report has not been all doom and 

gloom. Various improvements some large, some smalL others inchoate have been initiated 

or realized. Earlier this year, the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLDLAB) accreditation of the JPAC-CIL was renewed for another tlve years. The JPAC-CIL. which 

became the second US Government laboratory to be accredited to the international standard by 

ASCLD-LAB, is still the only skeletal laboratory in the USA to be so accredited. During the 

5 
53 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 081100 I August 2013 

timeframe of the IYC Report the JPAC-CIL was asked by Ms Kathryn Condon, Executive 

Director of the Army National Cemeteries Program, to come to the assistance of Arlington 

National Cemetery in order to resolve some of the problems that had come to light there. These 

achievements are further confirmation that the scientific integrity of the JPAC-CIL's laboratory 

operations is uncompromised as well as consistent with best international practice. 

The original draft SOP created an Investigation Decision Board ("IDB") that was assigned 

the responsibility to assess Investigative Team proposals in order to deter "military tourism." 

Before it was implemented, the SOP was amended by the command group to allow the J2. the 

section that presents to the IDB. to select its own agenda, vote on its own proposals, then 

evaluate the results. Other voting members were added, including External Relations and 

J5/Policy, which lack the skill sets to evaluate investigative mission proposals. The current IDB. 

while t1awed. is an incremental improvement over the previous system that had no controls 

whatsoever. The integrity and effectiveness of the IDB could be improved rather easily, should 

the will exist to do so. 

Another area of improvement concerns the production of field maps. A properly-trained 

JPAC-CIL Recovery Leader is now responsible for conducting site assessments on Investigative 

Team missions, which includes mapping and evidence collection. The quality and reliability 

problems in field map production that were identified in the IYC Report have been successfully 

resolved by this solution. 

Progress has also been made on the JPAC-CIL's program of disinterment for the purpose of 

identiilcation. The JPAC-CIL is on track to make at approximately 30 identifications per year 

from the disinterment of Korean War unknowns from the National Memorial Cemetery of the 

Pacific. Ironically. the success of the disinterment for the purpose of identification program 

continues to divert attention li'om the failure of the Investigative Team procurement program. 

There is, however. a serious problem in the disinterment program that needs to be resolved. 

Prior to the disinterment of an unknown for the purpose of identification, the JPAC-CIL 

Scientific Director must determine that there is a high probability that the unknown may be 

identified llsing current forensic scientific methods. DoD policy, which worked ,veil aHcr its 

implementation in 1999, stated that the disinterment decision should be based on the merits of 

each casc, derived from scientific evidence and circumstantial information. During the course of 

the lye Project, it became clear that clements within the DoD as well as certain lobbyists were 

determined to change DoD policy in order to undermine the JPAC-CIL disinterment program. 

The on-going interference in the JPAC-CIL's disinterment program creates confusion, 

introduces needless complexity and drags out the decision-making process unnecessarily. Were 

it not tor this interference, the number of identifications from disinterments could be increased 

considerably. This is due, in pmi, to the fact that a disinterment for the purpose of identification 

is the most information-intensive of all of JPAC's activities. Denying the JPAC-CIL the 

6 
54 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO I August 2013 

authority to disinter unknowns based on scientific merit is prejudicial to the interests of the 

families of the missing in general. and the WWII families in particular. 

There have been a few noteworthy improvements in the remains procurement effort, though 

the source of the innovation dcrives from sections other than J2/RA. An important effort to 

reverse the downward trend in the quantity and quality of accessions of remains was initiated by 

the JPAC Operations Directorate (J3), which has successfully created and implemented a new 

model for JPAC investigations in Papua New Guinea (,"PNG"). 

In September 2013. an overhead imagery project led by the J3 will begin to conduct mapping 

of aircraft crash sites in PNG. 

The project will utilize a relatively new technology, a multi-band synthetic aperture 

radar, or MB-SAR, which has been used to detect command wires for IEDs in Iraq 

and Afghan. JPAC will attempt to use MB-SAR to penetrate foliage in order to find 

concentrations of metal on the surface which may be WWII aircraft wreckage. 

The use of a contracted forcc in rNO to perform an initial site visit will be the beginning of a 

systematic effort to clear PNG zone-by-zone. 

The intent is to use a contractor in Bum1a to provide a similar service as well as to 

capitalize on the recent success of an advel1ising campaign that lISCS a telephone 

hotline to receive tips and leads. 

These types of innovation. which have produced initial successes, bode well for the future. 

Finally. various media reports stated the IVC Report somehow concluded that JPAC was 

"snookcred" by the DPRK into excavating "salted" sites. (A site is "salted" when remains are 

collected then buried with the intent to deceive the JPAC recovery teams.) First, the JPAC-CIL 

scientists were perceptive enough to determine that the sites were salted. Second. the JPAC-CIL 

scientists were skilled enough to determine that the salted sites included remains that were parts 

of some of the samc individuals represented in the K208 collection that had bcen unilaterally 

tumed over by the DPRK in the early 1990·s. 

By combining the remains recovered from salted sites with the remains from the K208 

collection, JP AC -CIL scientists have thus far been able to produce over one hundred 

identifications olKorean War missing. 

DoD's negotiating strategy toward the DPRK and the type of compensation paid could help 

minimize the salting problem. One option would be to pay the DPRK for the remains to be 

turned over without going through the charade and expense of "finding" remains in salted sites. 

Nonetheless, the performance with regard to the salted sites in the DPRK is an example of 

the JPAC-CIL's scientific ingenuity and skill that should make the entire Accounting 

Community as well as every member of this Subcommittee proud. 

I look forward to your questions and thank you again for the oPPOliunity to appear today. 

7 
55 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO I August 2013 

JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND 310 Viorch8tih?f Avp 

Juiqt BGse PC3rl Homor H'c\{nm. Hn\o\'f)i ';:'n8f),1-5fi30 

30 Jan 1~': 

From: Cornn;u~d.fJr, ,:nint POVli/MIA AC(;:()l,rltifly Cumoldflu 

TO' 

Subj JPI\CS INFOR!,llATION vALUe CHAIN REPORT : DRAFT) 

'L Tbi:::: letter Y;:, to provide clorific-Dticm and pen;~cctiV(; on tbo'] rlr',qf\ r1~~:;f1s~3mOI"lt tlt!c;-(J 

".1 PAC $ !nfcrrna!.iof) '.l8Iue Chcllfl Rep';)f! (IVeRf e·ther',.vise referred to as the Efficienc1' 

Study, 

2~ The IVCR draft report \vas the result of 3 DeO 

effiLienciB:::. 'rvithln the command in ardor tn dr:tnrminc~ 

t(J lrxJk at the: rrtJ~o~;;(;~ -rJjY! 

ilTlprOV8'fTGnts oo.Jlri tc 

(t'1~d8 dS Vi'e movt; lO\\16rds an incrc03sod :cm;:::D, constraio(,,'ti om/ironment 1 he 

res'Jlts of ~he assessment were to he used as a too! JrAC senior mansqement tc 

sUPfJVI[ fulUie r.;larH!il~V cUf1~iJer<::!UumL \Nhat W'a5 po:'.:)ted \,vas <.1 ravl}. uncefl,50red rJri:jfL 

c()r~tBinir'B; some contE.'ntlous matB'rial ar'ci r:>E!f"S0t18liL3l!fJrl not inlenue-:J fur o;..~ef! 

distflbuiion or rJi~sGminrJti{)n. My int{-mt \.V;)~ 10 lJ&C; 8ny p,olnntia; "nt.lmJnt~:;·' vvithin the 

draft dGcument during the Tiger Te~m effort l1owBver. I t3ii&j to ~>rGperly co'-,sidBr the 

n!'l'fJrA ollilA rApnrl .qn(i 'ully !'e'.llew It~ content t:ef:)rB it Bveii"bl8 for the> nOw 

Team's usc. T8kcn 8S ;:) ' .... holt;. 1 .::;houlC: not havfio inc·l!1d~Kl AH Ti96r T88m n;:;::ourCt:< 

As such, I ha'le rernoved the report from thn Shnrf~P0int :flnd ht)'",'e postponl"'!.:1 Ul£: nqnf 

T""m '0 a lalBr date. I am <llso Ie ~ho Comm8nm,r JPAC I)-,at the 

document not be Induded :n future p1annmg 

n'~ urorllVCR i~ nul an appro'ied JPAC producL It hl'Jb flot been reviewe,; f1(JI' 

hy th~ Cornn1@nd~f JPAC; trl-?reforlS-: iT fj(J~'F. not h;:)vl!=? COf'llm8nd 

nn,n",,','n<'lnt [lnd it ShO_lld not be cited DS: on <1utholit<1tivr]: tOGurGe: for decision making 

about efndencle!3 or rY'OCe~5e5 E~vithin the command Becau.se of thh~ and its content, 

th;o ff'!-,nrl sh()ulrj bA ~'Ylsjfjp.rElrl scltlsitivR ,omri hCln(lIRd a~ FOLIO It sr,ould not he' 

ccpig,j or distnbut8-fJ, especiail',( outside ot JPAC. The Ccrnmander .JPAC 'Nil! rG'.,;IO' ..... 1 

the document and make nnv Llrther decisjons reqardinq It upon his ret.Jnl 

4. I apoloq!ze tor ony undue friction I :::ause(j. 

toierance, patience ·3nd hard \lvork "Until the~l ore 

8 
56 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO I August 2013 

JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND 

310 WORCHESTER AVENUE 

JOINT BASE PEARL HARaOR-HICKAM HI 9'68$3 

MEMORANDUM FOR JPAC STAFF 

S,Jbj: DISAVO'NAL OF ORAn l-FFICIE'<Cv s rUDY 

1. The ,jra'9: ass.essment entitled ".jPAC's Inform9tion \/'~Iue Ch8in RCiJort OVeR)" O~hGf)J.+SC 

kr\uwn Js the Efficienr,y SttJdy I:;:, hereby disavo\"led, Rnd rey:;defJ in :ts e-ntirety. It fI1'-'Y rot be 

usee for any puq::.',,:}sc:. The f}·~lfcssio!'.gl tt:1putatlolls of our :=.t.att iirB n~)t to bE (:{)rtsidered s.ullied, 

2 I ha'.'8 Ca:}(soncllty ruviavII'ed 1hH draf~ IC\lR In its 8I!Ure:lty'. Bec~=;b!:>B ~he 'sport 'NH$ r~leJ=l:,;;.ed 

prio;'" \0 my approval. the"'o may be 8 be·icf :h~t I Dfldorsc tho report Thi .. is '-Iot trV('". Tho draft 

ICVR WRS rnistRkf;nly released b~fQre my reviE:!\,l snd approv;3. ClD not em:lGn:,e it or any part of 

it. I do not find r'lwnlln the f'nd11g. Gt)r1ciusinn:; or !er ..... 'm-n.f!onda!.i(.1rl":,_ .SGrn~ p~rts (If thp. ICVR 

are poorIY·'J'lntten. reffect a bl3S, and conta·n find rgs -9'ld rc:cOll'''lr"lerK.lDt!OnS H·_ill go beyond tho 

intended SCOp'3 of the report. I concur with the Deputy C ... ')rnm~nder':s re,:::omrnen<lation that ihm 

dran not hoG {:orl~id(:((:d In futurB plfl;",'! ng Hffmts, I':J lndudH the1'q€'f Tearn 

3. ThH Comrn.:ll'Id lNil! no~ r::on!'iidar ,';1ny arlegal{)rs. findinH5 Qf rf;!'o,·mmnv~ndations frnm the 

report. T'1ercfcre, the Ccrnrr"and does rot ro~ui(o or (::,:(PCCl JJ)'{ "cbI,Ht2! to the aUcQ.ations 8'1<1 

finding!') Df the report The Oomm3nd doe-s not com:;ider he ()!;t~,~;Jnding reputaiH:m. integrity' 

af,d pmfHSStor1i:dJsr"l) of ttl£? JPAC lA:"lm 10 be If) !-In',,- way ltirl"l:--ihed b'~' tillS dr{3ftl'ep(lrt. E~r:,h 

member of JPAC las 'A'orkcd hard 10 e.arn 1hcir valuflblc professional reputation, and, it IS:O DC 

re::,pected 

4. Unfortunate:'l :hc dmft Efficiency Report. or parts of it, rn<J'l ha'flB boen sh.Jred outside of 

~JPA.G" The draft repc:·rt i:; market': F()VO and I dir!:;'G that. no furihH G[.)p'~'~ng m :;h~rlng uf l'JB 

draft repvrt be made. II oJt3ide parties 6sk 3bout the drsft rep,::r, 3'1 members 0" :he JPAC 

l~)r.m1 wil! inform ~h~ r8q~JB'$lor tlmt Hm ICVR hal::i- bOOn l:i::::.i:l'.'owod by the (:ofwnanc 8nd I.V·I! not 

be s1ared anI; ::/l()u!d defer.::i the prowc wort..;. tha: ,JPAC doe5 tv bring cio'3\If)3 to the (f3m!lI~::; ,~f 

It,E' Ini~~lng 

/Jr:-L _ 1;,---:--t; STE-~.TOM 

Maj·or G .. mt'!ra!, Un't£.;d Sla18s AfT'll}' 

COI~1rmmder. Joint rOVV/MI,\ 

A;::'co;I'1/ing CQrnmanrl 

9 
57 

EMBARCOED UNTIL OShOO I August 2013 

CURRICUl,UM VITAE 

NAME: Paul M. Cole, Ph.D. 

PROFESSION 

Political Economist! Management Consultant 

EDUCATION: 

PhD. Johns Hopkins Nitzc School of Advanced International Studies. 1990 

• American Foreign Policy (Major Field) 

International Relations Theory (First Minor Field) 

European Studies (Second Minor Field) 

• MA Equivalency Exam in International Economics 

• Professional certification in French and Swedish 

MSFS. Edmund Walsh Graduate School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 1981 

• Dual concentration in International Economics and Force and Diplomacy 

Winner of the Horace Porter Essay Competition 

• Professional certitication in French 

BA. Gustavus Adolphus College. 1979 

International Studies (Major) 

Languages (French. Swedish) and History (Minors) 

KEY QUALIFICATIONS 

Dr. Cole provides economic analysis and management consulting services to business. 

govemments and academia. Since March 2010. he has been a visiting ORISE Scientific Fellow 

at the ASCLD-Lab accredited Central Identification Laboratory, located at the Joint POW/MIA 

Command. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. Honolulu. Hawaii. 

Dr. Cole's academic training includes three inter-disciplinary degrees (BA. MSFS and PhD) that 

were built around international economics and analytical techniques. For more than a decade. he 

applied these skills at three of the world's most influential think tanks. the Rand Corporation and 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Carnegie Endowment. I Ie taught at 

Georgetown University and the University of Southern California. 

In the 1980s. Dr. Cole specialized in the economics of defense, political-military aJTairs and 

high-technology sector analysis, with particular attention on political economy. security policy 

and international relations. Since 1993, Dr. Cole has focused on private sector business. with 

emphasis since 1996 on the telecommunications sector. 

10 
58 

EMBARGOED UNTIL 08hOO 1 August 2013 

Dr. Cole was resident and worked in Africa from 1998-20 I O. 

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT 

Visiting Fellow. Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education. Central Identification 

Laboratory (CIL). Joint POW-MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), Joint Base Pearl-Hickam. 

www.jpac.pacom.mil 

Researched, designed. produced and a Standard Operating Procedure (SoP) for the entire JPAC 

command. 

Primary investigator and author of a year-long JPAC Information Value Chain study that focused 

on how to improve efficiency within the accounting command. 

Represent the Central Identitication Laboratory on the DoD Defense Forensic Enterprise steering 

group. 

Designed, created and populated several databases dealing with biological material, particularly 

the use of databases to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the identification process. 

On-going analysis of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) as well as various DoD 

Directives and Instructions, to determine implications for the CIL. 

AFFILIATIONS 

Non-Resident Fellow, Institute tor Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (lNEGf\·1A, 

\\\V!:t,lll,;gLna.cllm) Dubai UAE 

Board Member, Scandinavian National Council, Gustavus Adolphus College, S1. Peter, MN 

Editorial Board, Reflections Turkey (\\w\V.rcnc~.ljol1?lurk~y.c()tll), Istanbul, Turkey 

## END ## 

II 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

AUGUST 1, 2013 

(61) 

FY 

04 

FY 

05 

FY 

06 

FY 

07 

FY 

08 

FY 

09 

FY 

10 

FY 

11 

FY 

12 

FY 

13 

Disinterment 2 7 3 3 1 11 2 6 18 25 

Unilateral 19 28 24 25 26 21 24 9 25 21 

Joint 47 41 32 27 29 24 30 22 26 15 

Æ