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A LINE IN THE SAND: ASSESSING DANGEROUS 

THREATS TO OUR NATION’S BORDERS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 16, 2012 

Serial No. 112–123 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management ........................................................................ 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Roger F. Noriega, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The 

George Washington University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Mr. Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy 

Center: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 30 

Mr. Marc R. Rosenblum, Ph.D., Specialist in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Letter From Chairman Michael T. McCaul to Thomas Donilon ...................... 54 

(1) 

A LINE IN THE SAND: ASSESSING DANGEROUS THREATS TO OUR NATION’S BORDERS 

Friday, November 16, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, Marino, 

Keating, and Davis. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come to order. 

The first order of business, I would like to say what a pleasure 

it has been working with my Ranking Member, Mr. Keating, over 

this Congress. 

I believe this will be our last official hearing of this Congress, 

and I just want to say thank you for that. 

The committee will come to order. The purpose of this hearing 

is to discuss the findings from the subcommittee’s Majority investigative report, entitled ‘‘A Line in the Sand: Confronting Crime Violence and Terror At the Southwest Border,’’ and having issues 

identified in the report may impact American National security. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

International terrorist networks are expanding their ties to ruthless Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and creating risks to 

our Nation’s borders and a possible attack on our homeland. These 

are findings from our subcommittee’s investigative report released 

yesterday: The Majority report, entitled ‘‘A Line in the Sand: Confronting Crime Violence and Terror At the Southwest Border,’’ describes the growing concern that terrorist organizations will exploit 

burgeoning relationships with Latin American drug traffickers to 

infiltrate the Southwest Border undetected. 

Specifically Iran is attempting to cement relations with certain 

Latin American countries to expand its influence and challenge the 

United States. Iran has cultivated stronger relationships with Venezuela. Examining travel between the two countries, according to 

Ambassador Roger Noriega, former Assistant Secretary of State for 

Western Hemisphere Affairs, direct commercial flights from Caracas to Tehran continue despite claims to the contrary. 
2 

Iran also tries to flout international economic sanctions by using 

Venezuela as a major destination to ship its exports. Far more 

alarming than increasing political and economic ties, Iran is also 

attempting to lay the foundation for military and covert operations 

within the United States by partnering with Mexican drug cartels. 

No better example illustrates this danger than the Iranian Qods 

Force’s attempts to work with the Los Zetas drug cartels to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the United States on American 

soil. 

Some estimate that Hezbollah sympathizers operating in the 

United States could number in the hundreds. 

Iran’s strategic migration and its relationship in Latin America 

are a clear and present danger to American National security. 

Should tensions mount over Iran’s nuclear program, these relationships could possibly result in strategic platforms for Iran to unleash terror operations on the U.S. homeland. 

In addition, concerns increasingly exist that terrorist organizations are attempting to corrupt drug traffickers and other aliens 

entering the United States. For example, according to news reports 

from earlier this year, Osama bin Laden sought operatives with 

valid Mexican passports to enter the United States to conduct terror attacks. Bin Laden believed these operatives could more easily 

blend into American society and unleash terror attacks without 

warning. Threats at our Southern Border also persist from the increasing sophistication of drug cartels. From elaborate underground tunnels costing over $1 million to constructing submarines 

used to circumvent our maritime security, these cartels will stop at 

nothing to ensure their products enter our homeland. 

U.S. Border Patrol faces an ever-persistent challenge of identifying and apprehending special-interest aliens, those aliens from 

countries designated by intelligence agencies as potential threats to 

our security. For fiscal years 2006 to 2011, Border Patrol officers 

apprehended nearly 2,000 special-interest aliens. With the 

Caldero ́n government’s tough stand against organized crime in 

Mexico, we have also witnessed the increasingly ruthless violence 

that the cartels employ to strike fear into those attempting to stop 

them. 

For example, in May 2012, 23 residents of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, 

were brazenly executed, nine of the bodies hung from a bridge at 

a busy intersection only a 10-minute drive from Texas. 

Unfortunately, some of this violence has even spilled into American soil. Since 2009, Mexican drug traffickers have fired upon 

nearly 60 Texas law enforcement officers. Kidnappings in 2009 also 

spiked in McAllen, Texas, and all these threats were making the 

Southwest Border increasingly dangerous. 

Despite these growing threats, efforts to secure the Southern 

Border have been mixed. Border Enforcement Security Teams, or 

BEST teams, have combined Federal, State, and local resources 

and have had a significant positive impact since their creation in 

2005, such as seizing over 13,500 weapons and investigations, resulting in over 4,500 convictions. The Texas Department of Public 

Safety initiatives have also had an effect in reducing border crime, 

apprehending illegal drugs and fostering improved law enforcement 

relationships resulting in improved information sharing. 
3 

However, with these successes, our efforts to secure the border 

have experienced challenges, the most high-profile of which, the Secure Border Initiative Network, or SBInet, failed to meet expectations and resulted in little return to its $1 billion investment. Due 

to the challenges with SBInet, the administration abandoned the 

goal of securing the Southern Border to instead focus first on the 

Arizona border. But we still may be years away from effectively securing Arizona, and no definite time frame for securing the rest of 

the Southern Border exists. DHS reported in late 2011 that it could 

respond to illegal activity along 44 percent of the Southwest Border, leaving 7,500 border miles inadequately protected. 

Given all the threats outlined in the subcommittee’s report, this 

approach is unacceptable. The 9/11 Commission wisely cautioned 

us about a failure of imagination, and this criticism should be considered when securing our border. The next Congress and administration need to develop an achievable plan to comprehensively secure our Southern Border. 

By identifying the threats to our border and developing a plan 

to better secure them, this hearing can be a first step towards a 

significant issue that we will need to address in the next Congress, 

reforming our immigration system. I hope our witnesses today can 

share specific ideas on how we can better secure our borders and 

mitigate the grave threats that we see from Iran and Latin American drug cartels. 

With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating. 

[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

NOVEMBER 16, 2012 

International terrorist networks are expanding their ties to ruthless Mexican drug 

trafficking organizations and creating risks to our Nation’s borders and possible attack on our homeland. These are findings from our subcommittee’s investigative report released earlier this week. The Majority report, entitled A Line in the Sand: 

Confronting Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border describes the growing concern that terrorist organizations will exploit burgeoning relationships with 

Latin American drug traffickers to infiltrate the Southwest Border undetected. 

Specifically, Iran is attempting to cement relations with certain Latin American 

countries to expand its influence and challenge the United States. Iran has cultivated stronger relationships with Venezuela. Examining travel between the two 

countries, according to Ambassador Roger Noriega—former Assistant Secretary of 

State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, direct commercial flights from Caracas to 

Tehran continue despite claims to the contrary. Iran also tries to flout international 

economic sanctions by using Venezuela as a major destination to ship its exports. 

Far more alarming than increasing political and economic ties, Iran is also attempting to lay the foundation for military and covert operations within the United 

States by partnering with Mexican drug cartels. No better example illustrates this 

danger than the Iranian Qods Force’s attempt to work with the Los Zetas drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States on American 

soil. Some estimate that Hezbollah sympathizers operating in the United States 

could number in the hundreds. 

Iran’s strategic migration and its relationships in Latin America are a clear and 

present danger to American National security. Should tensions mount over Iran’s 

nuclear program, these relationships could possibly result in strategic platforms for 

Iran to unleash terror operations on the U.S. homeland. 

In addition, concerns increasingly exist that terrorist organizations are attempting 

to corrupt drug traffickers and other aliens entering the United States. For example, 

according to news reports from earlier this year, Osama bin Laden sought 

operatives with valid Mexican passports to enter the United States to conduct terror 
4 

attacks. Bin Laden believed these operatives could more easily blend into American 

society and unleash terror attacks without warning. 

Threats at our Southern Border also persist from the increasing sophistication of 

drug cartels. From elaborate underground tunnels costing over $1 million to construct to mini-submarines used to circumvent our maritime security, these cartels 

will stop at nothing to ensure their ‘‘products’’ enter our homeland. 

U.S. Border Patrol faces an ever-persistent challenge of identifying and apprehending ‘‘special-interest aliens’’—those aliens from countries designated by intelligence agencies as potential threats to our security. From fiscal years 2006 to 2011, 

Border Patrol officers apprehended nearly 2,000 special-interest aliens. 

With the Caldero ́n government’s tough stand against organized crime in Mexico, 

we have also witnessed the increasingly ruthless violence that the cartels employ 

to strike fear into those attempting to stop them. For example, in May 2012, 23 residents of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico were brazenly executed; 9 of the bodies hung from 

a bridge at a busy intersection only a 10-minute drive from Texas. 

Unfortunately, some of this violence has even spilled onto American soil. Since 

2009, Mexican drug traffickers have fired upon nearly 60 Texas law enforcement officers. Kidnappings in 2009 also spiked in McAllen, Texas. All of these threats are 

making the Southwest Border increasingly dangerous. 

Despite these growing threats, efforts to secure the Southern Border have been 

mixed. Border Enforcement Security Task Forces—or BEST teams—have combined 

Federal, State, and local resources and had a significant positive impact since their 

creation in 2005, such as seizing over 13,500 weapons and investigations resulting 

in over 4,500 convictions. Texas Department of Public Safety initiatives have also 

had an effect in reducing border crime, apprehending illegal drugs, and fostering improved law enforcement relationships resulting in improved information sharing. 

However, with these successes, our efforts to secure the border have experienced 

challenges. The most high-profile of which, the Secure Border Initiative Network or 

SBINet, failed to meet expectations and resulted in little return on its $1 billion dollar investment. Due to the challenges with SBINet, the administration abandoned 

the goal of securing the Southern Border to instead focus first on the Arizona Border. But we still may be years away from effectively securing Arizona and no definite time frame for securing the rest of the Southern Border exists. DHS reported 

in late 2011 that it could respond to illegal activity along 44 percent of the Southwest Border, leaving 7,500 border miles inadequately protected. 

Given all of the threats outlined in the subcommittee’s report, this approach is 

unacceptable. The 9/11 Commission wisely cautioned us about a failure of imagination and this criticism should be considered when securing our border. The next 

Congress and administration need to develop an achievable plan to comprehensively 

secure our Southern Border. By identifying the threats to our border and developing 

a plan to better secure our borders, this hearing can be a first step towards a significant issue that we will need to address in the next Congress: Reforming our immigration system. I hope our witnesses today can share specific ideas on how we can 

better secure our borders and mitigate the grave threats from Iran and Latin American drug cartels. 
5 
6 
7 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your kind remarks, and it has been a pleasure 

this Congress. I think we have set some record for the number of 

hearings, and I think we have had some fruitful results. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the multitude of 

threats that must be considered when securing our Nation’s borders. From keeping illegal goods and contraband out of our country 

to ensuring that our border communities are shielded from the violence spurred by drug-trafficking organizations occurring in Mexico 

and serving as the last line of defense between our country and its 

neighbors, the work that occurs at our borders on a daily basis is 

nothing short of phenomenal. 

Putting things in perspective, by all accounts, our borders are 

safer now than they have been. In the past 3 years, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection has increased the number of Border 

Patrol agents from approximately 9,100 in 2001 to more than 

18,500 today, and border apprehensions have decreased by 53 percent. 

The brave men and women who work tirelessly to ensure our 

border security are indeed to be commended. 

I would like to especially thank and honor those who have paid 

the ultimate sacrifice while working to keep our borders safe and 

secure. 

Two threats that our witnesses will discuss in particular are 

whether spillover violence from Mexico has impacted the United 

States and whether Iranian-sponsored terrorism has found roots in 
8 

Latin America. Statistics and evidence show that in many respects 

progress has been encouraging. According to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s and anecdotal evidence from communities across the 

border States, U.S. border communities are safer places than they 

were a short time ago. The crime rates that are there are less than 

some of our own cities here in the country, particularly even here 

in the District of Columbia. 

Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State in its 2009 and its 

2011 country reports on terrorism has maintained that, ‘‘there are 

no known operational cells of Hezbollah or al-Qaeda in the Western 

Hemisphere.’’ Activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, however, worldwide and including possible Latin American activities 

bear continued scrutiny. We must not divert our attention overall 

from the threat of homegrown terrorist threats, and we should be 

mindful of General Barry McCaffrey’s testimony in front of this 

committee on the importance of comprehensive immigration reform 

and its relationship to border security. 

Therefore, the likelihood that terrorists will seek to enter the 

country via the Southwest Border cannot be ruled out, but it is 

lower on the probability scale. In fiscal year 2006 through fiscal 

year 2011, only .5 percent of aliens apprehended at the Southwest 

Border were from special-interest countries. 

While progress has been made, we must remain vigilant and 

never rest on our laurels. That is why I would like to thank our 

witnesses for appearing today. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. 

Other Members are reminded opening statements may be submitted for the record. We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses here today. I would like to go ahead and introduce them. 

Mr. MCCAUL. First, we have Ambassador Roger Noriega, former 

assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs and a 

former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States. 

He coordinates the American Enterprise Institute’s program on 

Latin America and writes for the institute’s Latin American Outlook Series. 

Next, we have Mr. Frank Cilluffo, who is an associate vice president at the George Washington University, where he directs the 

Homeland Security Policy Institute. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, he was appointed by the President to the 

Office of Homeland Security and served as a principal adviser to 

Secretary Tom Ridge. 

Next, we have Mr. Douglas Farah, who is the International Assessment and Strategy Center senior fellow of financial investigations and transparency. He specializes on transnational criminal 

organizations and armed groups in their efforts on states and corruption, terrorism, terror finance and proliferation, illicit financial 

flows in the Western Hemisphere. 

Last, we have Dr. Marc Rosenblum. He is a specialist in immigration policy at the Congressional Research Service and associate 

professor of political science at the University of New Orleans. At 

CRS, Dr. Rosenblum focuses on policies related to immigration enforcement at the border and within the United States. 

I would like to thank all of you for being here today. 
9 

The Chairman now recognizes Ambassador Noriega for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ROGER F. NORIEGA, VISITING FELLOW, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a full 

statement, and I will summarize briefly. I applaud the subcommittee for its continued efforts to study and expose the menacing cooperation between narco traffickers and Islamic terrorist 

group Hezbollah. 

Focus on the border is essential, of course, but we need to look 

down-range to find the roots of some of these problems. There is 

a growing body of evidence, for example, that this narco-terrorist 

collaboration in this hemisphere is aided and abetted by the hostile 

governments of Venezuela and Iran. 

To put it bluntly, this is not just criminal activity, Mr. Chairman; 

it is asymmetrical warfare being supported by two very determined 

foes of the United States. 

So how is it being waged? Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in Mexico, Central America, and South America 

and really around the world, as a means of raising funds, sharing 

tactics, and reaching out and touching U.S. soil. One instructive example of the complexity and scale of these operations is the pending criminal case again Lebanese drug lord Ayman Jouma. Jouma 

was indicted in November 2011 for managing a sophisticated cocaine-smuggling and money-laundering scheme that channeled millions of dollars per month to Hezbollah as well as back to the cartels. His network involved Colombian narco-traffickers, the deadly 

Mexico gang Los Zetas, and other criminal associates, businesses, 

or banks in the United States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Africa, 

Europe, and Lebanon. 

But traditional threats persist as well as. In recent years, Mexico 

has arrested numerous individuals associated with Hezbollah engaging in criminal activities, including smuggling of persons across 

the Southwest Border of the United States. Just in September, 

Mexicans intercepted a Lebanese-born U.S. citizen who was convicted in 2010 of channeling $100,000 to Hezbollah. That same 

man is suspected of working with Hezbollah operatives in Central 

America. 

Far from our border, Venezuela serves as a significant role as a 

nexus for narco and terrorist collaboration. On Venezuela’s Margarita Island, for example, Hezbollah agents operate numerous 

businesses and safe houses. In addition to fundraising activities, 

Hezbollah provides terror training on the island for recruits from 

Venezuela and other Latin American countries. It is not wellknown that the world’s most powerful cocaine smuggler and head 

of Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel, Joaquin Archivaldo ‘‘El Chappo’’ 

Guzman, conducted his business from Venezuela for much of the 

year 2010, living in a suburb of Caracas and on Margarita Island 

until early last year under the protection of security officials of the 

Venezuelan government. 

Margarita Island is not an isolated example of how Venezuela 

serves as a platform for this cooperation. 
10 

Using that country as a safe haven, two parallel terrorist networks proselytize, fundraise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf 

of Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas. Hezbollah 

operatives and their co-conspirators hold senior positions in the 

Venezuela government from which they launder millions of dollars 

using regional banks and state-run enterprises in Venezuela to provide—as well as providing travel documents—weapons and 

logistical support to terrorist operatives and cocaine smugglers 

throughout the hemisphere and right up to our border. The Venezuelan state-owned airline Conviasa helps move personnel, weapons, and contraband in and out of our hemisphere from Damascus 

and Tehran. 

Mr. Chairman, Hugo Cha ́vez is an able broker between 

Hezbollah and the narco-traffickers because I believe his regime is 

a narco-state. To be precise, U.S. officials have fresh compelling information implicating Cha ́vez himself, his National Assembly president, his former minister of defense, his army chief, his newly-appointed deputy minister of interior and dozens of other senior military officials in cocaine-smuggling and money-laundering activities. 

These cartels engage routinely in lucrative schemes involving 

Hezbollah front companies that operate in Venezuela. 

Cha ́vez is also a strategic ally, as you mentioned, with Iran, and 

he carries out, helps them carry out their asymmetrical battle to 

our doorstep through its proxy Hezbollah. They have laundered 

about $30 billion to the Venezuelan economy to evade international 

sanctions and 70 companies, some of which have been sanctioned 

by Western authorities for their involvement in supporting Iran’s 

illicit program, operate suspicious industrial facilities in various locations throughout Venezuela. That is the tip of the iceberg, Mr. 

Chairman. 

So what are some of the recommendations for addressing this 

problem? Very, very briefly, I think we need a strategy, we need 

the adequate resources, and we need action. 

This summer, the House passed Representative Jeff Duncan’s 

bill to require the Executive branch to provide Congress with a 

strategy for countering this threat. The Senate is expected to make 

small changes and return that measure within days to the House 

for final approval. I hope it passes. Once the Executive branch produces the required strategy, I hope Congress will appropriate law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies the resources they need to 

respond urgently and effectively. 

As an immediate measure, further administrative action can be 

taken now to sanction banks for on-going money-laundering 

schemes. Also, the involvement of Venezuelan officials and staterun entities in drug trafficking and terrorism must be publicized 

and punished in the form of Federal indictments. After years of 

work on the subject, I think it is fair to ask the Justice Department 

who or what is holding up these indictments. Congress is right to 

demand answers, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:] 
11 

1 ‘‘Ties Between Hezbollah and Mexican Drug Cartels Revealed,’’ by Rebecca Anna Stoil, The 

Jerusalem Post, December 15, 2011 http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=249684. 2 ‘‘Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network Linked to Drug Trafficker Ayman 

Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South America,’’ U.S. Department of the Treasury 

press release, June 27, 2012 http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 

tg1624.aspx. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER F. NORIEGA

NOVEMBER 16, 2012 

Mr. Chairman, I applaud you and other Members of the subcommittee for your 

continued efforts to study and expose the evolving threats to the U.S. homeland that 

are developing beyond our borders. The subcommittee’s published reports on this 

subject contain a sobering and insightful appraisal of the menacing cooperation between narcotraffickers and the Islamic terrorist group Hezbollah in our hemisphere. 

As a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, I head a project to examine and expose the dangerous alliance between the 

Venezuelan regime of Hugo Cha ́vez and Iran. To date, we have conducted dozens 

of interviews with experts from throughout the world and with eyewitnesses on the 

ground in the region regarding Hezbollah’s offensive in the Americas. We also have 

obtained reams of official Venezuelan and Iranian documents, only a few of which 

we have published to support our conclusions. In addition, I have worked for most 

of my professional life to understand and obstruct the illicit production and distribution of illegal narcotics and associated crimes of deadly drug syndicates. 

While much attention has been paid to the bloody confrontation between authorities in Mexico and several Central American countries with the transnational narcotrafficking organizations, there is virtually no recognition of the simple fact that, for 

the last 6–7 years, much of the cocaine from South America makes its way northward with the material support of the government of Venezuela. 

Also, although some have taken note of anecdotal evidence about the troubling 

links between narco-traffickers and global terrorist group Hezbollah, most observers 

have failed to follow that evidence to Iranian-backed Hezbollah elements that operate throughout Latin America, right up to our Southwest Border, from a safe haven 

in Venezuela. 

Some may assess this narco-terrorist phenomenon as a marriage of convenience 

between different criminal elements or just another modus operandi of powerful 

international drug syndicates. In my view, such interpretations overlook a growing 

body of evidence that this narco-terrorist alliance in our neighborhood is aided and 

abetted by Venezuela and Iran—two regimes bound together by a relentless hostility 

against U.S. security and interests. In other words, it is not just criminal activity— 

it is asymmetrical warfare. 

Focusing on improving security at our borders is important, but far from sufficient. This narco-terrorism will exact an increasingly terrible price from our neighbors and our Nation until our National security establishment recognizes that the 

mayhem on our border is being sponsored by hostile states. Once our policymakers 

face this fact, they can begin to fashion a more effective response. 

KEY OBSERVATIONS

Allow me to describe some of the elements of this narcoterrorist network, followed 

by a fuller discussion to provide the necessary context to understand why this threat 

is extraordinarily dangerous. 

• Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in Mexico and Central and 

South America as a means of raising funds, sharing tactics and ‘‘reaching out 

and touching’’ U.S. territory. 

• The criminal case against Lebanese drug lord Ayman Jouma is very instructive. Jouma was indicted in November 2011 for a sophisticated cocaine-smuggling and money-laundering scheme benefiting Hezbollah.1 His network involves criminal associates and corrupt businesses in Colombia, the United 

States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Lebanon. In June 2012, VenezuelanLebanese dual citizens Abbas Hussein Harb, Ali Houssein Harb (sic), and 

Kassem Mohamad Saleh and several Venezuelan and Colombian companies 

were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for their role in Jouma’s 

narco-terrorist operation.2

• In recent years, Mexico has arrested numerous individuals associated with 

Hezbollah engaging in criminal activities—including smuggling of persons 
12 

3 ‘‘Exclusive: Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into the U.S.,’’ Washington Times, March 

27, 2009. 4 ‘‘Mexico Extradites Suspected Hezbollah Member,’’ September 11, 2012 http:// 

latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/09/11/mexico-extradites-suspected-hezbollah-member/. 5http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/05/world/fg-israel-arms-boat5. 6http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/americas/chavez-appears-to-use-venezuelanfuel-to-help-syrias-assad.html. 7One of the 9/11 attackers had ties to a man traveling on an authentic Venezuelan passport 

bearing the name ‘‘Hakim Mohamed Ali Diab Fattah.’’ Diab Fattah was detained by the FBI 

and deported to Venezuela; when the FBI asked the Venezuelan government for access to this 

man, authorities there claimed that he never entered the country. 

across the U.S. Southwest Border.3 For example, in September, a Lebaneseborn U.S. citizen, convicted in 2010 for a credit card scheme that raised 

$100,000 for Hezbollah, was arrested in Me ́rida by Mexican authorities. Rafic 

Mohammad Labboun Allaboun, an imam from a mosque in San Jose, California, was traveling with a falsified passport issued by Belize. He was extradited to the United States.4

• In Venezuela, our sources report that Hezbollah cells and representatives of 

the Mexican Sinaloa cartel operate in key cocaine transit corridors in that 

South American country. Margarita Island, best known as a Caribbean tourist destination, is a safe haven for terrorists and drug smugglers. We believe 

that it is here that Mexican kingpins and Hezbollah chiefs have planned their 

collaboration. 

• It is a little-known fact is that the world’s most powerful cocaine smuggler 

and head of the Sinaloa cartel, Joaquı ́n Archivaldo ‘‘El Chapo’’ Guzma ́n conducted his business from Venezuela for much of 2010, living in a suburb of 

Caracas and on Margarita Island until early last year under the protection 

of Venezuelan security officials working for Cha ́vez. 

• Not coincidentally, Hezbollah agents operate numerous businesses and safe 

houses on Margarita Island. In addition to fund-raising activities, Hezbollah 

provides terror training on the island for recruits from Venezuela and other 

Latin American countries. 

• Margarita Island is not an isolated example of this cooperation. Two Hezbollah 

networks proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran 

and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas. 

• One of these parallel networks is operated by a Lebanese-Venezuelan clan, 

and another is managed by Mohsen Rabbani, a notorious agent of the Qods 

Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps who is wanted for his role 

in the 1992 and 1994 Buenos Aires bombings against the Israeli Embassy and 

Jewish community center, respectively. 

• Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semitic allies hold important senior positions in the Venezuelan government and run a network that provides 

logistical and material support to terrorist operatives. 

• In recent years, the Cha ́vez regime has sent weapons to Hezbollah (ammunition, grenades, rockets, etc., intercepted in 2009 by Israeli commandos) 5 and 

shipped refined fuel to Iran and Syria.6

• Thousands of authentic Venezuelan travel documents have been provided to 

persons of Middle Eastern descent in the last decade, and numerous Latin 

American governments have detained many Iranian and Lebanese persons 

carrying Venezuelan passports.7

• The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular service from 

Caracas to Damascus and Tehran—providing Iran, Hezbollah, and associated 

narco-traffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, contraband, and other materiel. 

• Hugo Cha ́vez is able to broker ties between Hezbollah and narco-traffickers, because his regime has become a narco-state. 

• To be precise, U.S. officials have fresh, compelling information implicating 

Cha ́vez, his head of the National Assembly (Diosdado Cabello Rondo ́n), his 

former Minister of Defense (Henry de Jesu ́ s Rangel Silva), his army chief 

(Cliver Alcala ́ Cordones), and his newly-appointed deputy Minister of Interior 

(Hugo Carvajal), and dozens of other senior military officials in trafficking in 

cocaine. 

• These elected officials and active-duty and retired military officers are responsible for transporting tons of cocaine to Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, the United States, west Africa, and Europe. 

• It is no surprise that corrupt Chavista officials, including Cha ́vez’s closest advisors, engage routinely in lucrative schemes involving Hezbollah front com-
13 

8 ‘‘The Further Narco-Terrorist Ties of the Cha ́vez Government,’’ by Douglas Farah, November 

12, 2010 http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/543/the-further-narco-terrorist-ties-of-the-chavezgovernment. 9 ‘‘5 Things to Watch for in Venezuelan Kingpin Walid Makled’s Trial,’’ by Elyssa Pachico, 

Latin America Monitor, July 31, 2012 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0731/5-things-to-watch-for-in-Venezuelan-kingpin-Walid-Makled-s-trial. 

panies, Colombian guerrillas, narco-traffickers, Venezuelan financial institutions and even powerful state-run entities. 

• Cha ́vez also is a key ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is carrying its 

asymmetrical battle to our doorstep. Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid his first 

visit to Caracas in September 2006, Venezuela has become one of Iran’s most 

important allies in the world—certainly Tehran’s closest partner in our neighborhood. 

• Venezuela has helped Iran launder at least $30 billion to evade international 

sanctions. Seventy Iranian companies—many of them fronts for the IRGC 

that have been sanctioned by Western governments for their support for 

Iran’s illicit nuclear program—operate suspicious industrial facilities in Venezuela co-located with military and petrochemical installations. 

• The two governments also cooperate in nuclear technology and the exploration for uranium, notwithstanding U.N. sanctions. 

DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND

VENEZUELA’S PIVOTAL ROLE

In light of the pivotal role being played by the Venezuelan regime in sustaining 

this narcoterrorist threat, it is important to bear in mind that this is not just another developing country that is unable to control its territory. Venezuela is an oilrich state that has collected about $1.1 trillion in oil revenue in the last decade. It 

also is not just an isolated hostile state led by a bombastic populist: Venezuela has 

collected more than $25 billion in loans from China in the last 18 months, and has 

purchased at least $9 billion in arms from the Russians in the last decade. 

Cha ́vez’s diplomats have systematically undermined the region’s oldest political 

forum while creating others that consciously exclude the United States. He also has 

used ‘‘checkbook diplomacy’’ to create a loose alliance of nearly two dozen states in 

the region that either share his radical views, are dependent on his largesse, or 

both. 

With the success of the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia, about 6 or 7 years ago, South 

American narco-traffickers had to adjust their smuggling routes. They had to look 

no farther than Caracas. Cha ́vez doled out lucrative drug-trafficking deals as a 

means to secure the loyalty of military subordinates and to generate billions in revenue and make them complicit in his corrupt regime. As described above, dozens 

of senior military officials closely associated with Cha ́vez have been implicated in 

narco-trafficking crimes. The Venezuelan Ca ́ rtel del Sol is headed by Diosdado 

Cabello, National Assembly president and ruling party vice chairman, and other active-duty and retired military officers who are among Cha ́vez’s closest collaborators. 

That military syndicate operates parallel to a civilian network known as the 

Ca ́ rtel Libane ́s, which was formed by Walid Makled Garcı ́a. According to journalist 

and narco-terror expert, Douglas Farah, ‘‘The supplier of the cocaine [to the Makled 

cartel] was the FARC in Colombia... Venezuelan sources say Makled was also 

the a key tie in the corruption and drugs world to the Shiite Muslim communities 

in Isla Margarita and the Guajira, groups that have a strong financial relationship 

with Hezbollah.’’8 Makled is wanted in the United States for cocaine smuggling; 

after being detained in Colombia, he gave a series of media interviews implicating 

dozens of Venezuela officials in cocaine smuggling. Colombia surprised many observers by extraditing Makled to Venezuela, where his closed-door trial began in April 

2012.9

Even before Cha ́vez won power in 1998, he established intimate links to the Colombian guerrilla group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas)— 

which wages a terrorist war against a democratic government and ally of the United 

States. For many years, FARC commanders and troops have operated in and out 

of Venezuela with the complicity of the Cha ́vez regime. A principal activity of the 

FARC today is the transportation of cocaine to safe havens operated by the Venezuelan military for transport to the United States and other countries. 

In September, pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003, President Obama determined that Venezuela was one of three 

countries in the world (along with Bolivia and Burma) that ‘‘failed demonstrably 
14 

10See the September 14, 2012, Presidential Memorandum at this site: http:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/presidential-memorandum-presidential-determination-annual-presidential-d. 11http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195546.htm. 12 Jose ́ R. Ca ́ rdenas, ‘‘The Cha ́vez Model Threatens Ecuador,’’ AEI Latin American Outlook 

(March 2011), www.aei.org/outlook/101037; Douglas Farah, Into the Abyss: Bolivia under Evo 

Morales and the MAS (Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009), 

www.strategycenter.net/files/2011/10/06/20090618lIASCIntoTheAbyss061709.pdf (accessed 

September 27, 2011). 13Douglas Farah, ‘‘Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Security,’’ Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, July 7, 2011, www.homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/ 

Testimony%20Farah.pdf (accessed September 27, 2011). 14 ‘‘Notorious Iranian Militant has a Connection to Alleged Assassination Plot Against Saudi 

Envoy,’’ by Peter Finn, The Washington Post, October 14, 2011. 15 ‘‘Sanction shows U.S. weakness, says Iran minister,’’ Iranian Students’ News Agency, June 

1, 2011; ‘‘Iran Warns of Street War in Tel Aviv If Attacked,’’ Fars News Agency, November 8, 

2011. 16 ‘‘Iran Seeking to Expand Influence in Latin America,’’ by Joby Warrick, The Washington 

Post, January 1, 2012. 

during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international 

counternarcotics agreements . . . ’’10

In the last 4 years, the Russians have sold at least $9 billion in arms to Venezuela and will complete construction of a factory in Maracay that can produce 

about 25,000 assault rifles per year. The latest $4 billion Russian line of credit announced in June will go toward arming Chavista militias—shock troops loyal only 

to him and meant to intimidate the opposition. 

Venezuela’s internal security apparatus has been organized and directed by Cuba, 

a country designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

That same report cited Venezuela’s ‘‘economic, financial and diplomatic cooperation 

with Iran . . . ’’11 Cha ́vez’s aides make no secret of on-going oil shipments to a 

third terrorist state, Syria. A regime with intimate ties to three of the world’s four 

terror states would have to try quite hard not to be a threat. Just as Hezbollah, 

Cuba, Syria, and Iran are considered terrorist threats to U.S. National security interests, Venezuela’s crucial support for each of them should be, too. Although this 

support may not pose a classical conventional threat, it is precisely the kind of 

asymmetrical tactics that our enemies favor today. 

Cha ́vez also has served as the principal interlocutor on Iran’s behalf with other 

like-minded heads of state in the region, primarily Rafael Correa (of Ecuador) and 

Evo Morales (of Bolivia), both members of the Cha ́vez-sponsored Bolivarian Alliance 

for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and both of whom have established dubious 

networks with criminal transnational groups.12 According to recent Congressional 

testimony by investigative journalist Doug Farah, this has led to ‘‘the merging of 

the Bolivarian Revolution’s criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the 

criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical extremist groups (Hezbollah in particular) supported by the Iranian regime.’’13 Such ties are invaluable to groups like Hezbollah, 

as they afford them protection, safe havens in which to operate, and even diplomatic 

status and immunity. 

IRAN’S DANGEROUS GAMBIT NEAR OUR BORDERS

To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional wisdom about 

its ambitions, strategies, and tactics and follow the evidence where it leads. For example, in the aftermath of a bizarre plot discovered in October 2011 in which Iranian agents conspired with supposed Mexican drug cartel leaders to commit a terrorist bombing in the heart of our Nation’s capital,14 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, revealed that ‘‘Iranian officials’’ at the highest levels ‘‘are 

now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States . . . ’’ General Clapper 

also reported that Iran’s so-called ‘‘supreme leader’’ Ali Khamenei was probably 

aware of this planning. 

Iranian officials have made no secret of the regime’s intention to carry its asymmetrical struggle to the streets of the United States. For example, in a May 2011 

speech in Bolivia, Iran’s Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi promised a ‘‘tough and 

crushing response’’ to any U.S. offensive against Iran.15 At the same time that Iran 

caught the world’s attention by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad announced a five-nation swing through Latin America aimed at advancing its influence and operational capabilities on the U.S. doorstep.16

The intelligence community’s fresh assessment of Iran’s willingness to wage an attack on our soil leads to the inescapable conclusion that Tehran’s activities near our 

homeland constitute a very real threat that can no longer be ignored. 
15 

17 Iranian companies sanctioned on repeated occasions by the U.S. Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.N. Security Council (United Nations Security Council Resolutions 

1747, 1803, 1929), the European Union (2008, 2010, 2011), the United Kingdom (2007, 2008), 

Germany (2005), and Japan. 18This organization was founded in Argentina in 1972 to unite Muslims, namely the Syrian 

and Lebanese communities, in Latin America and has spread rapidly throughout Latin America, 

with offices in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Guadalupe Island, Antigua, and Uruguay. It is overtly anti-Israel; supportive of anti-American regimes in the Middle East and Latin 

America; and used as a platform for Hezbollah to raise money, recruit supporters, and solicit 

illegal visas. 19 ‘‘Reis-Jomhour-e Arzhantin Dar Sazeman-e Melal: Tehran Ba Mohakemeh-ye Maqamatash 

Dar Keshvar-e Sales Movafeqat Konad’’ [The President of Argentina: Tehran Should Accept 

Continued 

Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program and emboldened 

by inattention from Washington in Latin America, Iran has sought strategic advantage in our neighborhood. It also is preparing to play the narco-terrorism card—exploiting its partnership with Venezuelan operatives, reaching into Mexico, and activating a decades-old network in Argentina, Brazil, and elsewhere in the region. 

Today, a shadowy network of embassies, Islamic centers, financial institutions, 

and commercial and industrial enterprises in several countries affords Iran a physical presence in relatively close proximity to the United States. Iran is well-positioned to use its relationships with these countries to pose a direct threat to U.S. 

territory, strategic waterways, and American allies. Iran also has provided the Venezuelan military with weapon systems that give Cha ́vez unprecedented capabilities 

to threaten its neighbors and the United States. 

Notably, a half-dozen Iranian companies sanctioned by the United Nations, U.S. 

or European authorities have built suspicious industrial installations at various 

sites in Venezuela.17 These facilities were important enough to attract secret visits 

by Iranian Major General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the Revolutionary Guard Corps aerospace commander who previously headed Iran’s missile program, in July 2009 and 

November 2011. 

VENEZUELA’S HEZBOLLAH-NARCO NEXUS

It is said that wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind. In the case of Venezuela, Hezbollah blazed the trail in Venezuela, establishing a network of commercial enterprises meant to raise and channel funds and hide its financial tracks. 

These activities have exploded in the last 6–7 years, as Hezbollah’s activities in the 

region gained the active complicity of the Venezuelan government, the backing of 

Iranian security forces and notorious Muslim radicals, and the cooperation of powerful Mexican and narco-trafficking syndicates that reach onto U.S. soil. 

Research from open sources, subject-matter experts, and sensitive sources within 

various governments has identified at least two parallel, collaborative terrorist networks growing at an alarming rate in Latin America. One of these networks is operated by Venezuelan collaborators, and the other is managed by the Qods Force of 

the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. These networks encompass more than 80 

operatives in at least 12 countries throughout the region (with their greatest areas 

of focus being Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile). 

The Nassereddine Network.—Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali, a native of Lebanon who became a Venezuelan citizen about 12 years ago, is Venezuela’s secondranking diplomat in Syria. Nassereddine is a key Hezbollah asset because of his 

close personal relationship to Cha ́vez’s Justice and Interior Minister, Tarik El 

Aissami, and because of his diplomatic assignment in Damascus. Along with at least 

two of his brothers, Nassereddine manages a network to expand Hezbollah’s influence in Venezuela and throughout Latin America. 

Nassereddine’s brother Abdallah, a former member of the Venezuelan congress, 

uses his position as the former vice president of the Federation of Arab and American Entities in Latin America and the president of its local chapter in Venezuela 

to maintain ties with Islamic communities throughout the region.18 He currently resides on Margarita Island, where he runs various money-laundering operations and 

manages commercial enterprises associated with Hezbollah in Latin America. 

Younger brother Oday is responsible for establishing paramilitary training centers 

on Margarita Island. He is actively recruiting Venezuelans through local circulos 

bolivarianos (neighborhood watch committees made up of the most radical Cha ́vez 

followers) and sending them to Iran for follow-on training. 

The Rabbani Network.—Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, who was the cultural 

attache ́ at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 

oversees a parallel Hezbollah recruitment network.19 Rabbani is currently the inter-
16 

Trial of Its Authorities in a Third Country], Asr-e Iran (Tehran), September 25, 2010, 

www.asriran.com (available in Persian, accessed September 29, 2011). 20 ‘‘Din va Siasat Dar Amrika-ye Latin Dar Goftegou Ba Ostad Mohsen Rabbani’’ [Religion and 

Politics in Latin America in Conversation with Professor Mohsen Rabbani], Book Room 

(Tehran), May 3, 2010. 21 ‘‘The Terrorist ‘Professor,’ ’’ Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011. 22Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nissman, Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA 

Case (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, 2006), 

www.peaceandtolerance.org/docs/nismanindict.pdf (accessed September 27, 2011). 23 ‘‘Goftegou Ba Sarkar-e Khanom-e Ma’soumeh As’ad Paz Az Keshvar-e Arzhantin’’ [Conversation with Lade Ma’soumeh As’ad Paz From Argentina], Ahlulbayt (Tehran), June 13, 2011. 24Marielos Ma ́ rquez, ‘‘ ‘El Islam es una forma de vida’: Sheij Suhail Assad,’’ DiarioCoLatino, 

August 27, 2007. 25 ‘‘Sourat-e Jalaseh’’ [Agenda], Iranianbrazil (Brazil), March 17, 2010. 26 ‘‘Aein-ha-ye Ramezani Dar Berezil’’ [Ramadan Traditions in Brazil], Taghrib News (Qom), 

September 5, 2010. 27 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘‘Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies 

Supporting Hizballah in Tri-Border Area,’’ news release, June 10, 2004. 28 ‘‘The Terrorist ‘Professor’ ’’ Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011. 

national affairs advisor to the Al-Mostafa Al-Alam Cultural Institute in Qom, which 

is tasked with propagation of Shia Islam outside Iran.20 Rabbani, referred to by the 

important Brazilian magazine Veja as ‘‘the Terrorist Professor,’’21 is a die-hard defender of the Iranian revolution and the mastermind behind the two notorious terrorist attacks against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 that killed 

144 people.22

At the time, Rabbani was credentialed as Iran’s cultural attache ́ in the Argentine 

capital, which he used as a platform for extremist propaganda, recruitment, and 

training that culminated in the attacks in the 1990s. In fact, he continues to exploit 

that network of Argentine converts today to expand Iran’s and Hezbollah’s reach— 

identifying and recruiting operatives throughout the region for radicalization and 

terrorist training in Venezuela and Iran (specifically, the city of Qom). 

At least two mosques in Buenos Aires—Al Imam and At-Tauhid—are operated by 

Rabbani disciples. Sheik Abdallah Madani leads the Al Imam mosque, which also 

serves as the headquarters for the Islamic-Argentine Association, one of the most 

prominent Islamic cultural centers in Latin America. 

Some of Rabbani’s disciples have taken what they have learned from their mentor 

in Argentina and replicated it elsewhere in the region. Sheik Karim Abdul Paz, an 

Argentine convert to Shiite Islam, studied under Rabbani in Qom for 5 years and 

succeeded him at the At-Tauhid mosque in Buenos Aires in 1993.23 Abdul Paz is 

now the imam of a cultural center in Santiago, Chile, the Centro Chileno Islamico 

de Cultura de Puerto Montt. Another Argentine convert to radical Islam and 

Rabbani disciple is Sheik Suhail Assad, who lectures at universities throughout the 

region and recruits young followers to the cause.24

A key target of the Rabbani network—and Hezbollah in general—is Brazil, home 

to some 1 million Muslims. Rabbani travels to Brazil regularly to visit his brother, 

Mohammad Baquer Rabbani Razavi, founder of the Iranian Association in Brazil.25

Another of his principal collaborators is Sheik Khaled Taki Eldyn, a Sunni radical 

from the Sao Paulo Guarulhos mosque. Taki Eldyn, who is active in ecumenical activities with the Shia mosques, also serves as the secretary general of the Council 

of the Leaders of the Societies and Islamic Affairs of Brazil.26 A sensitive source 

linked that mosque to a TBA network cited by the U.S. Treasury Department as 

providing major financial and logistical support to Hezbollah.27 As far back as 1995, 

Taki Eldyn hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and 9/11 mastermind Khalid 

Sheik Mohammed in the TBA region. 

According to Brazilian intelligence sources cited by the magazine Veja, at least 

20 operatives from Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic Jihad are using Brazil as 

a hub for terrorist activity.28 The fact that Brazil is set to host the FIFA World Cup 

tournament in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016 makes it an inviting target 

for international terrorism. U.S. officials should be approaching Brazilian officials 

to discuss the potential threat of Venezuelan-Iranian support for narcoterrorism. 

Unfortunately, most U.S. diplomats are as indifferent to this reality as their Brazilian counterparts. 

CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP REQUIRED

Mr. Chairman, our project has shared substantial information about these aforementioned threats with U.S. Government officials—either directly or through Members of Congress. Too often the attitude we have encountered in the Executive 

branch has been one of skepticism or indifference. 
17 

29 ‘‘Top U.S. General: Venezuela not a Threat,’’ by Frank Bajak, The Associated Press, July 

31, 2012 http://bigstory.ap.org/article/top-us-general-venezuela-not-threat. 

Apparently, this indifference has left senior U.S. officials uninformed on the subject. For example, President Obama told a Miami journalist in July 11, ‘‘[M]y sense 

is that what Mr. Cha ́vez has done over the last several years has not had a serious 

National security impact on us.’’ U.S. General Douglas Fraser (USAF), regional commander of U.S. Southern Command, subsequently supported the appraisal that Venezuela does not represent a threat to U.S. National security.29 ‘‘As I look at Iran 

and their connection with Venezuela,’’ said Fraser, ‘‘I see that still primarily as a 

diplomatic and economic relationship.’’ Mr. Chairman, I believe the foregoing discussion of the facts on the ground will lead most reasonable observers to a very different conclusion. 

Important exceptions to Executive branch neglect is the work of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the 

Department of the Treasury to sanction numerous Venezuelan officials and entities 

for their complicity with and support for Iran and international terrorism; in addition, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, has investigated and prosecuted key cases to attack this international conspiracy. 

Inexplicably, according to law enforcement sources, State Department officers systematically resist the application of sanctions against Venezuelan officials and entities, despite the fact that these suspects are playing an increasingly important role 

in Iran’s operational capabilities near U.S. territory. 

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that Congressional attention, such as this hearing, 

is essential to encourage Executive branch agencies to act. For example, sanctions 

against Venezuela’s state-owned petroleum company for transactions with Iran were 

the direct result of pressure by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, acting in 

part on information uncovered by AEI’s project. 

This summer, the House passed H.R. 3783, ‘‘Countering Iran in the Western 

Hemisphere Act of 2012,’’ legislation authored by Representative Jeff Duncan (R– 

SC), to require the Executive branch to report to Congress on Iran’s activities in a 

host of areas and to provide a strategy for countering this threat. I understand that 

this bill enjoys bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate—where Senator Robert 

Menendez (D–NJ) is a leader on this issue—and the bill may be approved with several amendments before Congress recesses. 

I believe that such a thorough, Congressionally-mandated review will require the 

Executive branch to apply additional needed intelligence resources to collect on subject matters in Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Central America, and beyond. 

Once National security officials study the scope and depth of the problem, I hope 

for a whole-of-Government response to protect our security, our interests, and our 

allies against the threat posed a narco-terrorist network in the Americas. Once Congress receives this report, perhaps this challenge will be treated as a budgetary priority so that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the resources required 

to respond urgently and effectively. 

Of course, our project at AEI is prepared to cooperate with this policy review by 

providing the subcommittee documents and analysis regarding suspicious transactions and installations operated by Iran in Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, 

and elsewhere in the region. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The involvement of Venezuelan officials and state-run entitites in drug trafficking and terrorism must be publicized and punished in the form of federal 

indictments. Sanctions by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign 

Assets Control are good interim measures. However, in the case of Venezuelan 

officials and state-run entities, indictments are much more meaningful. The Department of Justice headquarters should be asked to explain why such prosecutorial actions have failed to meet this extraordinary lawlessness by the Venezuelan narcostate. 

• Congress should demand U.S. diplomats be more cooperative with law enforcement and intelligence efforts aimed at exposing and punishing criminal behavior and terrorist activities in the region. Specifically, the Department of State 

must be more cooperative in raising this phenomenon with our neighbors. We 

also must find a way to talk about this problem with our friends in a way that 

it is not misunderstood as an accusation against those governments that are 

trying to confront the problem. 
18 

• Congress should give U.S. intelligence and security agencies the resources required to expand their capabilities to confront extra-regional threats and crossborder criminality. 

• U.S. National security agencies, led by the Department of State, should increase 

the dialogue and cooperation with regional and European military, intelligence, 

and security agencies on the common threat posed by the Venezuelan-Iranian 

alliance. 

• Congress should use its oversight functions to determine if U.S. Northern and 

Southern Commands, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Drug Enforcement Administration have adequate programs and funding to support U.S. anti-drug cooperation with Mexico and Central America. 

CONCLUSION

As I stated before another panel of this committee 16 months ago, the ‘‘Hezbollah/ 

Iranian presence in Latin America constitutes a clear threat to the security of the 

U.S. homeland . . . In addition to operational terrorist activity, Hezbollah also is 

immersed in criminal activity throughout the region—from trafficking in weapons, 

drugs, and persons . . . If our Government and responsible partners in Latin 

America fail to act, I believe there will be an attack on U.S. personnel, installations, 

or interests in the Americas . . . ’’ as a result of this dangerous conspiracy. 

The narco-terrorism on our doorstep, backed by Venezuela and Iran, demands a 

response from those whose job it is to keep us safe. Our Government must take effective measures—unilaterally and with willing partners—to disrupt and dismantle 

illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. It is certainly a real 

honor to have such a man of distinction as yourself at this hearing. 

Next, the Chairman calls on Mr. Cilluffo for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, Mr. 

Davis, Mr. Long, Mr. Marino, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

The topic of the hearing and what I consider your excellent report, ‘‘A Line In the Sand,’’ are unquestionably issues of National 

importance, and they do indeed have significant implications for 

U.S. National security. 

I am often amazed by the way how little attention the Americas 

seems to get, whether good news, bad news, but especially the troubling situation in the region seems to get inside the Beltway, and 

to me, I hope this helps ring a bit of a bell that we need to focus 

more of our time and effort on some of these challenges. 

I have got an awful lot of territory to cover in a very short period 

of time, 5 minutes. As you probably noted, I just came under the 

wire on the maximum length on my prepared remarks; that rule 

is probably created for me or people like me since I have never had 

an unspoken thought. But I will try to be very brief and pick up 

on a couple of points because everybody here brings an awful lot 

to the table. 

First, my views are highly consistent with the findings and recommendations of your report, but I want to elaborate on a couple 

of very brief points. The fact that terrorists exploiting our borders, 

whether by air, land, or sea, has long been a profound concern of 

our National security community. If we just look back to the 1999 

plot, Ressam’s plot, the Millennium plot; obviously, after 9/11, you 

saw how hijackers were able to exploit our aviation systems. One 

of the things that is interesting is after these attacks, and by no 
19 

means perfect, but we have put a lot of effort into enhancing our 

aviation security and improving our intelligence, terror travel data, 

and the like. But I think we need to think about borders a little 

differently today. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned lack of imagination. When you 

deal with cyberspace, for example, traditional concepts of border 

are irrelevant; they are moot in many cases where someone can 

anonymously cloak and step foot and come to this country without 

ever stepping foot into this country. 

Mr. Keating, you mentioned I think a very important point; we 

have to remember that there been over 50 plots of homegrown 

Jihadi-based terrorism in the United States that didn’t necessarily—some were foreign fighters, they traveled overseas to receive training—but many of whom reside in the United States. I 

might note CRS did an excellent report and some of the colleagues 

are here to discuss that further. 

But the bottom line is drug-trafficking organizations, there is an 

old joke. The old joke was if you want to smuggle in a tactical nuclear weapon, just wrap it in a bale of marijuana. The reality is, 

is our ability to seize drugs is not as robust as we would like it to 

be. We are seeing what I consider, and conventional wisdom went 

along the following when you are dealing with drug-trafficking organizations and foreign terrorist organizations, drug-trafficking organizations would not bring about more heat because they are financially motivated by working with foreign terrorist organizations, who are obviously ideologically motivated. I would argue in 

most cases that is still the reality. But not in all. 

You mentioned the assassination plot on Ambassador al-Jubeir. 

The reality is you are seeing a fractioning to one extent or another 

of both drug-trafficking organizations and foreign terrorist organizations. It is this divergence that I think we need to really keep 

our eyes on and the convergence. 

You increasingly see foreign terrorist organizations turning to 

criminal activity, kidnapping and ransom, drug trafficking, organized crime activity, probably best exemplified by al-Qaeda and the 

Islamic Maghreb, the broader Sahel in Africa. I mean, it is a whole 

swoop from east to west where you have a hybrid of criminal enterprises, drug-trafficking organizations and Jihadi-based foreign terrorist organizations. Look at the Haqqani network in the FATA. 

Right here, is that a state? Is it a state within a state? In essence, 

they have usurped authorities of a state. Basically, you have got a 

narco-state. Guinea-Bissau, same thing in the Sahel, Mauritania, 

Mali, these are all countries that are falling under the power and 

sway of criminal enterprises. 

But you are also seeing drug cartels turning to terrorist tactics 

to achieve their objectives. If you see the beheadings, if you see the 

violence, if you see the TTPs, terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures, they are increasingly learning, increasingly engaging in 

terrorist activities. This is a big concern. 

So you have both of those trends occurring while at the same 

time, you have the potential for convergence and hybrid threats. If 

you just think about the reach that these drug-trafficking organizations have in the United States, remember smuggling is smuggling 

is smuggling is smuggling whether you are smuggling drugs, weap-
20 

ons, people; those same routes can be exploited by the same individuals. 

The question is, is: How do we keep the heat? How do we keep 

disrupting? How do we ensure that we don’t see that marriage— 

that ugly marriage—that is, in fact, occurring between these organizations? 

I am already over my time. I promised I never had an unspoken 

thought, but Lebanese Hezbollah, big issue, we have done a lot of 

work on the government of Iran, and I am happy to get into that 

during Q and A. 

The one other point I would like to make is the Caribbean. It is 

not only the Southwest Border. The Caribbean gateway is a big 

concern. If you look back to the Dudus Coke case, he had distribution routes from Miami through New York. He had protection inside Jamaica. It was very difficult to be able to seize him and arrest him. 

Then you have got Abdullah el-Faisal. Abdullah el-Faisal is one 

of these so-called Jihadi rock stars, a bridge figure. His fingerprints 

can be found on multiple foreign terrorist cases aimed at the 

United States. 

So I just put a little caution there; it is not just the Americas, 

it is also the Caribbean gateway, and we have got to think about 

these issues differently. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO

NOVEMBER 16, 2012 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. The subject 

matter of this hearing and of the subcommittee’s report titled, ‘‘A Line in the Sand: 

Confronting Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border,’’ are unquestionably issues of National importance. Your sustained focus on these challenges, especially at a time when the U.S. and global economies dominate the headlines, is to 

be appreciated. My own written remarks address the hemispheric threat and its implications for the U.S. homeland; and include proposed recommendations for action 

to meet the threat, moving forward. I think you will find that our respective 

conceptualizations of the threat and the means and methods of combating it, as reflected in your Report (‘‘A Line in the Sand’’) and in my statement below, are in 

sync and complement one another. Indeed, we are clearly jointly concerned about 

Iran/Hezbollah’s presence in the Americas, the relationship of same with Mexican 

drug cartels, the potential for future and more nefarious such cooperation and collaboration, and the significant sources of threat and already-existing challenges in 

this country that emanate from the U.S.-Mexico border—just to name a few points 

of agreement and intersection. Likewise, a mix of both strategic and tactical steps 

are needed in order to address the threat ecosystem more effectively, including an 

approach that encourages and leverages enhanced interagency cooperation. 

DEFENDING U.S. BORDERS: EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND THREAT

The exploitation of American borders—by land, sea, and air—has long been of profound concern to U.S. authorities and the general public alike. Consider the Millennium plot of December 1999 in which Ahmed Ressam sought to enter the United 

States from Canada by car in a plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport. 

Thanks to the vigilance of an astute U.S. border official at the tip of the spear, the 

attack did not materialize. Such a mixture of luck and skill saved the day in that 

case; but what is needed is a system that offers defense-in-depth and that keeps the 

threat as far away as possible from the Continental United States in the first place. 

This is all the more challenging an end-state to achieve at a time in history when 

the nature of borders has changed, due in part to technological advances. Indeed, 
21 

to the extent that our borders ever created watertight compartments, they are now 

more porous in character than ever. Consider cyberspace, where traditional conceptions of border security simply do not translate. In a domain without traditional 

physical checkpoints, our adversaries can cloak themselves in anonymity and seek 

to do us harm, often without tipping off the target or stepping foot into that country. 

Though the United States has begun to direct substantial resources toward redressing its vulnerabilities in this area, much remains to be done. Correspondingly, we 

have invested much in aviation security and in supporting measures and tools such 

as travel data and intelligence. While an imperfect situation, we have made substantial strides over time in terms of shoring up our posture in these areas. However, the task at hand must not be underestimated, especially because the threat 

also emanates from within. Over 50 ‘‘homegrown’’ jihadist plots have been discovered since 9/11. 

In addition to an evolution in the manner in which to think about borders, a separate but related phenomenon, not new but intensified, has occurred—a convergence 

of the forces of crime and terror. According to conventional thinking and analysis, 

terrorists (motivated by ideology) and criminals (motivated by money/profit) would 

not cooperate and collaborate. Why? Because criminals such as drug traffickers seek 

to do business, and associating with terrorists could jeopardize that goal by drawing 

the full attention of U.S. (and other) law enforcement authorities dedicated to 

counterterrorism. While terrorists and criminals may have undertaken their operations separately in past and often continue to do so at present, there are today significant and concerning counter-examples. Consider the thwarted 2011 plot, sponsored by Iran, to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, 

with Mexican drug cartel hit-men serving as the hired killers. This case is in fact 

indicative of a broader trend in which terrorists are turning increasingly to crime/ 

criminals and criminals such as drug cartels are increasingly turning to terrorist 

tactics. Grisly news reports from Mexico in recent months, that highlight beheadings and other brutal violence perpetrated by the cartels, have offered ample evidence of the latter proposition. As to the former, we have seen foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) turn more and more to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and organized 

crime in order to support terrorist activities. This phenomenon is best exemplified 

by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the larger Sahel region of Africa, 

as well as the Haqqani Network (HQN) operating in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). For its part, HQN has effectively become a state within 

a state, usurping the traditional prerogatives of government. One of the upshots of 

the power that HQN, AQIM, and other terrorist groups have accumulated (at the 

expense of government authorities) is that the lucrative Golden Crescent—the drug 

routes from Asia/Africa into Europe—is firmly under their control. 

For the U.S. homeland, this convergence of the forces of crime and terror is particularly concerning because the pipelines and pathways used to smuggle drugs into 

this country can also be used to smuggle in people (including terrorists) and weapons. Put another way, smuggling is smuggling is smuggling. Terrorists can tap the 

distribution networks and routes that drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have 

established. The reach of DTOs is expansive and stretches throughout the Continental United States. An old joke, which still serves as a stark reminder of the dangers that we face today, is that the easiest way to smuggle a tactical nuclear weapon into the United States is to wrap it in a bale of marijuana. The threat picture 

grows yet more complex and vivid when we contemplate further just which terrorist 

organizations are now heavily involved in the drug trade. Consider Lebanese 

Hezbollah (Iran’s chief proxy) which has expanded its illegal narcotics activities 

from its original foothold in the Bekaa Valley to the Tri-Border Area of South America, west Africa, and Europe. With this kind of reach, Hezbollah is well-poised to 

do Iran’s dirty work (or its own)—including in the Americas. 

Relationships between and among terrorist groups are also becoming more overt 

and strategic in nature. There exists substantial evidence of cooperation and collaboration between and among groups with U.S. and Western targets ever more in their 

sights and aspirations. These terrorist groups include al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, 

the Sahel, and Somalia, as well as jihadist forces based elsewhere in Africa, Pakistan, and beyond. Despite U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts that have yielded 

a good measure of success, these terror affiliates remain committed to carrying forward the mantle of bin Laden, and to exploiting both ungoverned and under-governed spaces. The latter tactic pre-dated the Arab Spring, but evidenced reinforcement and magnification thereafter. The tragic violence in Benghazi, directed against 

U.S. personnel and interests (and those of allies) further proves this point. As the 

Commander of U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham, stated earlier this week, 
22 

1 ‘‘US Commander: Libya attack linked to Qaeda in Maghreb,’’ Reuters (November 14, 2012) 

http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/us-commander-libya-attack-linked-to-qaeda-in-maghreb. 2 Joby Warrick, ‘‘In Iran, drug trafficking soars as sanctions take bigger bite,’’ The Washington 

Post (November 1, 2012) citing Michael Braun http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/in-iran-drug-trafficking-soars-as-sanctions-take-bigger-bite/2012/10/31/12ff0930-1d81- 

11e2-b647-bb1668e64058lstory.html. 3Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 6, 2012) http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Fraser%2003-13-12.pdf. 4Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon Cardash, and Michael Downing, ‘‘Is America’s view of Iran and 

Hezbollah dangerously out of date?’’ FoxNews.com (March 20, 2012) http://www.foxnews.com/ 

opinion/2012/03/20/is-americas-view-iran-and-hezbollah-dangerously-out-date/. 5Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Hizbullah narco-terrorism: A growing cross-border threat’’ IHS Defense, 

Risk and Security Consulting (September 2012) citing Placido, and State Department http:// 

www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Levitt20120900l1.pdf. 6Testimony of Mitchell D. Silber before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Homeland Security, Iran, Hezbollah, and the Threat to the Homeland (March 21, 2012) http:// 

homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Silber.pdf. 7 Cilluffo, Cardash, and Downing. ‘‘Is America’s view of Iran and Hezbollah dangerously out 

of date?’’ 

‘‘ . . . it appears to me very likely that some of the terrorists who participated in 

the attack in Benghazi have at least some linkages to AQIM.’’1

SPOTLIGHT: HEZBOLLAH, IRAN, AND THE AMERICAS

There is thus little cause for complacency as toxic forces converge and cooperate 

in multiple spots across the globe, more than ever before. As the former head of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) testified earlier this 

year, both Iran’s Quds Force and Hezbollah ‘‘are now heavily involved in the global 

drug trade... Their participation in that effort presents them with myriad opportunities with which to build their terrorist and criminal capacity in the Western 

Hemisphere and elsewhere.’’2 Likewise, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, General Douglas M. Fraser, has observed convergence—based on convenience—between terrorist and criminal organizations in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.3 Unfortunately, these developments are matched by 

a disturbing (even if understandable) shortcoming on the U.S. side. For the past 

decade, U.S. Government analysts have focused on al-Qaeda, resulting in a lesser 

reservoir of U.S. intelligence on, and perhaps even a blind spot, regarding Hezbollah 

and their networks and activities.4

As an astute analyst of these issues, Matthew Levitt, has observed, Hezbollah’s 

‘‘expansion into the South American narcotics industry began in the early-1980s but 

grew significantly in the following decades.’’ Hezbollah now derives ‘‘major funding’’ 

from these activities and ‘‘facilitates drug trafficking for other smuggling networks, 

including those of the Colombian terrorist group FARC.’’ Former assistant administrator for intelligence in the DEA, Anthony Placido, reinforced the point in 2010 testimony noting, ‘‘Drug trafficking organizations based in the tri-border area have ties 

to radical Islamic organizations such as Hizbullah.’’ And as Levitt writes further, 

‘‘Over time, Hizbullah leveraged its criminal ties to support operational objectives, 

including trading drugs for intelligence from Arab-Israeli (and sometimes JewishIsraeli) criminals and,... moving weapons or explosives through drug smuggling 

networks.’’ Cross-fertilization of forces is also noted in the 2011 State Department 

Country Reports on Terrorism, which underscored that ‘‘ideological sympathizers in 

South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and ideological 

support to... terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.’’5

These developments draw warranted attention to the risk posed by hybrid threats, 

where an adversary acquires from a third party the necessary access, resources, or 

know-how needed to attack or threaten a target—all of which could be used strategically against the United States. Against this background, the New York City Police 

Department has expanded its decade-plus focus on core al-Qaeda (AQ), affiliates, 

and the homegrown threat (inspired by AQ), to include Iran and Hezbollah.6 In 

doing so, NYPD continues its efforts to build a robust and independent counterterror posture for the City of New York. In turn, the Los Angeles Police Department 

recently elevated the Government of Iran and its proxies, notably Hezbollah, to a 

Tier I threat.7

Clearly, much as we might wish state-sponsored terrorism to have fallen off the 

map, it has not. Indeed, both the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 

and the Director of National Intelligence have underscored concern about Iran and 

their proxies, suggesting respectively in recent testimony that ‘‘Iran remains the 
23 

8Matthew G. Olsen, ‘‘Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape’’ Hearing before the 

House Committee on Homeland Security (July 25, 2012) http://homeland.house.gov/sites/ 

homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Olsen.pdf. 9 James R. Clapper, ‘‘Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’’ (January 31, 2012) http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf. 10 Reuters, ‘‘Nasrallah: Iran could strike U.S. bases if attacked’’ The Jerusalem Post (September 3, 2012) http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=283706. 11 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, ‘‘Indictment 

charges 4 with conspiracy to support Hezbollah 6 others charged with related crimes,’’ Press Release (November 24, 2009) http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0911/091124philadelphia.htm. 12 ‘‘Terrorists have been arrested on the border, security chief says,’’ Associated Press (September 13, 2007). 13Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 

International Relations (April 3, 2001) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/ 

testimony4.3.01lcilluffo.pdf. 14Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the 

Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime (December 13, 2000) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/ 

testimony- 12.13.00lcilluffo.pdf. 15Douglas Farah, ‘‘Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in 

Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority’’ U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (August 2012). 

foremost state sponsor of terrorism’’;8 and that Iran is ‘‘now more willing to conduct 

an attack in the United States.’’9 Concern about Iran and its proxies, as reflected 

above, is all the more disturbing given Iran’s on-going drive to achieve nuclear 

weapons capability, and the recent statement of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Sayyed 

Hassan Nasrallah to the effect that there will be no distinction drawn between 

Israel and the United States in terms of retaliation, should Israel attack Iran to halt 

its progress toward the nuclear goal: ‘‘If Israel targets Iran, America bears responsibility.’’10

Note that Hezbollah’s nexus with criminal activity is greater than that of any 

other terrorist group. In the United States, there were 16 arrests of Hezbollah activists in 2010 based on Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations in Philadelphia, 

New York, and Detroit. And the organization has attempted to obtain equipment 

in the United States including Stinger missiles, M–4 rifles and night vision equipment.11 These links, including with drugs and cartels, generate new possibilities for 

outsourcing, and new networks that can facilitate terrorist travel, logistics, recruitment, and operations. After all, the distribution routes are the same regardless of 

what is being moved illicitly. Authorities have noted significant terrorist interest in 

tactics, techniques, and procedures used to smuggle people and drugs into the 

United States from Mexico. According to Texas State Homeland Security Director, 

Steve McCraw, Hezbollah operatives were captured trying to cross the border in 

September 2007.12 Thus, the old assumption that Hezbollah and others would avoid 

linking up with drug traffickers, in order to avoid drawing attention (and potentially 

heat) from law enforcement officials, no longer applies. 

Instead we have seen a troubling hybridization and convergence of such forces, 

pursuant to which ‘‘terrorists look to criminals’’ and vice versa, while ‘‘criminals 

emulate businesses.’’ Regrettably, as noted more than a decade ago, ‘‘The linkage 

between terrorists and narcotics is strong, and getting stronger... Suffice it to 

say narcotics provide a substantial source of funding and have deepened the connection between terrorists and organized crime. Kidnapping is also nothing new to terrorists. They have been taking hostages since day one to gain media attention and 

ransom money. But there is a new twist—more and more terrorists take hostages 

for money—not for publicity. Kidnapping has become big business. The $64,000 

question is how much money is going into their coffers to further their terrorist 

campaigns and how many of these organizations are transforming into outright 

criminal enterprises.’’13 The cross-walk between terror and crime may therefore be 

murky. By way of example, ‘‘Abu Sayyaf is a good example of an ideologically-driven 

group that have transformed into a criminal enterprise.’’14

Also noteworthy, particularly with an eye to the future, is the growing activity 

among the Bolivarian axis states of Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela— 

and between them and external actors, including Iran and Russian organized 

crime.15 Such is another dangerous variation on the theme of convergence and cooperation between state and non-state actors with postures that are hostile to the 

West generally and to the United States in particular. For example, Venezuelan 

President Hugo Cha ́vez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad established 

the IRISL (Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines) Group to facilitate and obscure 

activity between the two countries and third-party criminal enterprises—including 
24 

16Douglas Farah, ‘‘Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Security’’ Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security (July 2011) http://www.strategycenter.net/ 

research/pubID.249/publdetail.asp. Sandra Warmoth, ‘‘Iran’s Expanding Footprint in Latin 

America.’’ Small Wars Journal (May 2012) http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irans-expanding-footprint-in-latin-america. 17Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, and Bert B. Tussing, Mexico and the Triple Threat 

(October 20, 2011) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrieflMexicoTripleThreat.pdf. 18 Richard Marosi, ‘‘Controversial Muslim cleric is arrested while sneaking into the U.S.’’ Los 

Angeles Times (January 27, 2011) http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/local/la-me-bordercleric-20110127. 19 CNN Wire Staff, ‘‘Drug raid targets baggage handlers, airline workers in Puerto Rico’’ CNN 

(June 7, 2012) http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/06/us/puerto-rico-airport-arrests/index.html. 

drug trafficking organizations. Although the IRISL Group and its offshoots are on 

the radar of the United States and its allies (having already been blacklisted by the 

Treasury Department), this is a threat that bears careful and active watching, in 

order to remain ahead of the curve and on proactive rather than reactive footing.16

Spillover effects from Mexico are also in evidence in the United States, up to and 

including the northeast and northwest regions of this country, where Mexican drug 

trafficking organizations have established a presence. As noted in the subcommittee’s Report, ‘‘A Line in the Sand,’’ Mexican cartels now have an established presence in more than 1,000 U.S. cities. If not challenged by action on our part, there 

is no logical reason why we should expect that number to decrease. In fact, it will 

grow. Narco-trafficking in Mexico is big business, and the Mexican drug cartels have 

become so powerful that they threaten, if not effectively supplant, the state in certain parts of the country. If we continue to observe an increase in the strength and 

position of the cartels in Mexico, we should expect to observe an increase in their 

reach into the United States. Alone, the drug threat poses a serious threat to the 

United States. That threat becomes truly grave, however, when you consider its potential to move beyond narcotics. Mexico now grapples with a triple threat—a mixture of crime, terrorist tactics, and insurgency—that is at once adaptive, lethal, and 

determined.17 Cartels and other criminals there have adopted the violent tactics, 

techniques, and procedures of terrorists. Meanwhile terrorist groups have undertaken a range of illicit activities. This convergence of forces with differing motivations (profit, ideology, etc.) has already yielded a case in which a ‘‘controversial 

imam’’ was smuggled across America’s Southwestern Border by smugglers based in 

Mexico.18 And as the subcommittee’s Report (‘‘A Line in the Sand’’) notes, intelligence from the 2011 raid on bin Laden’s compound found evidence that bin Laden 

wanted to exploit Mexican smuggling routes into the United States. The concern 

among U.S. security and intelligence officials is that this type of activity could become more institutionalized, for instance if major Mexican drug cartels were to ally 

and partner with terrorists. Recall the plot targeting Ambassador Al-Jubeir. 

Mexico, however, is not the only avenue of approach. If you were to take a map 

of the Americas and trace the points of origin, transit routes, and destinations of 

drug trafficking and other illicit smuggling operations, you would see a spider-web 

of conduits—including some that pass through U.S. territory. The DEA has noted 

that Puerto Rico is becoming a principal entry point for drug trafficking into the 

United States. From the perspective of the cartels and terrorists, Puerto Rico is a 

perfect target and opportunity. As a U.S. border, the island is under-protected, receiving too little resources and attention—a fact evidenced by a growing drug-related murder rate (more than five times the National average); and the fact that 

for the second time in 3 years, major smuggling rings were recently uncovered at 

San Juan’s Luis Mun ̃ oz Marı ́n International Airport. These rings were responsible 

for shipments to New York, New Jersey, Florida, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Massachusetts; and highlight the fact that once drugs, weapons, individuals, or materials make it to the island, they are within the United States—just hours from the 

major population centers of the East Coast.19

In addition, we are also witnessing growing hybrid threats in the Caribbean. At 

times, the hybrid threats emanate from a blending of criminal activity and community resources. Witness the case of the Jamaican drug lord Christopher ‘‘Dudus’’ 

Coke. Coke rose to his position after the death of his father, a gang leader with considerable influence in the Jamaican Labour Party. In Jamaica, ‘‘Dudus’’ Coke controlled the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood of Kingston and exercised considerable influence within Jamaican populations both on and off the island. Eventually Coke 

leveraged this community of influence to establish a global trafficking ring that connected Kingston, Miami, and New York. Before being convicted earlier this year in 

New York, he pleaded guilty to charges that included the trafficking of more than 

3 tons of marijuana and 30 pounds of cocaine; Coke effectively ran a state within 
25 

20 ‘‘Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Jamaican-Based Drug Kingpin with Narcotics and Firearms Trafficking Crimes.’’ Press Release. U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York 

(2009) http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August09/cokechristophermichaelidictmentpr.pdf. United States of America v. Christopher Michael Coke. Sealed Indictment S15 

07 Cr. 971 (RPP) (2009) http://www.americanthinker.com/Christopher%20Coke- 

%20Indictment.pdf. Kareem Fahim, ‘‘Jamaica Strains to Fill Void Left by Gang Bosses’’ The New 

York Times (2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/americas/ 

01jamaica.html?lr=1&ref=christopherlcoke. Carlin DeGuerin Miller, ‘‘Christopher ‘‘Dudus’’ 

Coke Extradited, Pleads Not Guilty in U.S. Court’’ CBS News (2010) http://www.cbsnews.com/ 

8301-504083l162-20008897-504083.html. Richard Esposito, Mark Schone, & Luis Martinez. 

‘‘U.S. Report: Jamaican Prime Minister Is ‘Known Criminal Affiliate’ of Hunted Drug Lord.’’ 

ABC News (2010) http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/jamaica-christopher-dudus-coke-escaped-security-forces-assault/story?id=10737428. Jason Horowitz, ‘‘Renewed Questions about Firm’s Involvement in Jamaican Extradition Case’’ The Washington Post (2010) http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052604233.html. Ed 

Pilkington, ‘‘Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke handed 23-year U.S. jail term for drug trafficking’’ The 

Guardian (2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/08/christopher-dudus-coke-jail- term. 21 ‘‘Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal’’ BBC News (2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 

uklnews/6692243.stm. Madeleine Gruen, ‘‘Abdullah al-Faisal: Extremist Ideologue with Influence in the West.’’ NEFA Backgrounder. New York, NY; The NEFA Foundation (2009) http:// 

www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefalalfaisal1009.pdf. 22 Cara Buckley and William K. Rashbaum, ‘‘4 Men Accused of Plot to Blow Up Kennedy Airport Terminals and Fuel Lines’’ The New York Times (2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/ 

03/nyregion/03plot.html. Jerome P. Bjelopera, ‘‘American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a 

Complex Threat.’’ Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service (2011) http://www.fas.org/ 

sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf. 23Frank J. Cilluffo, Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp, Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones (October 1, 2010) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/ 

reportlforeignfighters501.pdf. 

a state—a fact that landed him on the Department of Justice’s list of most dangerous drug traffickers.20

At other times, the hybrid threat represents a blending of criminal activity with 

terrorist narrative and incitement. For example, Jamaica is also home to Abdullah 

al-Faisal, a prominent jihadist imam who preaches violence and calls for the murder 

of Americans, Jews, and Hindus. A jihadi ‘‘rock star’’ on YouTube and other internet 

sites, al-Faisal inspired Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid (the failed shoe bomber), 

Jermaine Lindsay (one of the 7/7 bombers that struck London), and Faisal Shahzad 

(who sought to detonate a car bomb in Times Square); and likely others too.21 It 

is also worth noting the Caribbean ties present in the 2007 plot to bomb the jet fuel 

artery at New York’s JFK airport. Two of the perpetrators were from Trinidad and 

Tobago, but more importantly, the plotters repeatedly travelled to Trinidad for 

moral and financial support from the extremist Muslim group Jamaat alMuslimeen.22

This last point brings variants of the threat back to and within the United States, 

where bin Laden’s ideology and narrative continues to inspire a small but dangerous 

constituency. As indicated above, well over 50 home-grown U.S. jihadi terrorism 

plots have been discovered since 9/11. In addition, as foreign fighters return to their 

respective homelands (U.S. included) battle-hardened and armed with Western passports—10 feet tall in the eyes of those who admire their exploits—these returned 

fighters pose a direct threat to Western security given their familiarity with potential targets they may select to attack. Where foreign fighters are concerned, socalled ‘‘bridge figures’’ are of special importance, as they ensure that the fighter pool 

is replenished, by helping to inspire, radicalize, and motivate. These figures exude 

charisma, and exhibit cultural and linguistic fluency as well as other skills that propel them to positions of leadership, guidance, and prominence. This was the role 

Abdullah al-Faisal played.23 He and others like him, illustrate both the actuality 

and potential for the Caribbean to serve as a threat gateway to the United States. 

A concerted and comprehensive U.S. effort to counter our adversaries’ narrative is 

the largest missing dimension of our counterterrorism statecraft. 

THE CYBER THREAT—WHICH KNOWS NO BORDERS

The threat has also taken hold in the cyber domain, where our adversaries may 

be surfing in the wake of ‘‘Anonymous’’ and other such groups in order to learn from 

and perhaps also exploit their actions. Here, foreign states—China, Russia, North 

Korea, Iran—are our primary concern. What Iran may lack in cyber capability (notwithstanding heavy investment in that area) it makes up for in intent. Together 

with cash, Iran and others who wish to do us harm can go far, simply by buying 

or renting the cyber weapons and tools they need or seek. Bear in mind that cyber 

threats manifest in nanoseconds. Protecting critical infrastructure and building re-
26 

24Shaun Waterman, ‘‘U.S. authorities probing alleged cyberattack plot by Venezuela, Iran’’ 

The Washington Times (December 13, 2011) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/ 

13/us-probing-alleged-cyberattack-plot-iran-venezuela/?page=all. 25 Cardash, Cilluffo, and Tussing, Mexico and the Triple Threat. 26Steven Dudley, ‘‘Can Colombian expert reform Mexico’s troubled police force?’’ The Christian 

Science Monitor (July 13, 2012) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-AmericaMonitor/2012/0713/Can-Colombian-expert-reform-Mexico-s-troubled-police-force. 

silience in relation to it, should therefore be at the top of our priority list. Consider, 

for example, ‘‘reports that Iranian and Venezuelan diplomats in Mexico were involved in planned cyber-attacks against U.S. targets, including nuclear power 

plants.’’24 The scenario is especially concerning, keeping in in mind that Hurricane 

Sandy and other recent storms have highlighted this country’s shortcomings in 

terms of resilience. Mother Nature may be a formidable adversary, but just imagine 

the level of damage and destruction that a determined and creative enemy could 

wreak. 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

To fight back effectively against the complex multi-dimensional threat outlined 

above, a multi-dimensional response that incorporates law enforcement, intelligence, 

diplomatic, and other measures, is needed. • Mexico’s Triple Threat and U.S. Spillover.—There is more that the United 

States could do in terms of border security and enforcement, with the aim of 

tackling spillover effects of Mexico’s triple threat of crime, terrorist tactics, and 

insurgency. Whether it is drugs or weapons being trafficked, the illicit enterprise operates like a business. This presents opportunities for U.S. and counterpart authorities to exploit for the purpose of counter-attack. For example, careful and comprehensive mapping of the movement of weapons and funds by 

Mexican drug-trafficking organizations operating with the United States would 

generate additional opportunities to disrupt and seize flows of arms and money. 

As a prerequisite to capitalizing on these potential opportunities, we would need 

to develop the intelligence needed to better track, locate, and seize cash and 

weapons before they reach the border—at which point the task of intercepting 

them is much harder since efforts to conceal are then at their peak.25

In addition to this type of painstaking and patient work that supports operations, we must also do the hard strategic thinking required to further develop 

a comprehensive—meaning multi-dimensional and multi-instrument—plan to 

work with Mexico to help create and reinforce the institutional and social foundations and developments needed to achieve strategic success in the long run. 

On this there is, perhaps, a window of opportunity. On December 1, Presidentelect Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto of Mexico will be sworn in. Although Nieto’s campaign 

promises to lower the level of drug-related violence gave rise to concerns about 

his willingness to tackle the threat posed by the cartels, his appointment of retired Colombian police chief General Oscar Naranjo as a security advisor suggests that Nieto is committed to a broad strategic fight against the cartels. 

Naranjo is a veteran of Colombia’s drug war and led that country’s intelligence 

efforts against the cartels. President-elect Nieto seems intent on bringing the 

lessons learned from success in Colombia (efforts this country supported) to 

Mexico.26 As we did in Colombia, we must work with our Mexican allies, as well 

as allies across Central and South America, and the Caribbean, to combat this 

threat and strengthen regional security writ large. 

This undertaking will be especially challenging at a time of domestic and international economic turbulence and restraint. Although policy without resources 

is rhetoric, we must try to work smarter and better. Strategy and doctrine in 

Mexico, in the United States, and in the region, must evolve and keep pace with 

the triple threat that is lethal and determined. Until our thinking ripens across 

the board, so as to lay the groundwork for a posture that is powerfully suited 

to the threat climate the United States, Mexico, and our regional allies will continue to play catch-up to the mix of forces at play. The challenge is further magnified because facts on the ground will continue to change and there will no 

doubt be other important developments that shake up the equation moving forward. Against this background, the best and most effective thing that we can 

do at this point is increase our awareness through better region-wide intelligence and analysis. We must have a rich picture of what is happening in the 

Americas and the Caribbean. We must be able to look beyond our own borders. 

• Iran/Hezbollah.—Disruption should be our goal here, though Iran and its proxies are no doubt expecting as much. Keeping eyes and ears open at home and 

abroad to glean indications and warnings (I&W) of attack will be fundamental, 
27 

27Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; and Subcommittee on 

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies (April 26, 2012) http:// 

www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Iran%20Cyber%20Testimony%204.26.12%20Frank%20Cilluffo.pdf. 28Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs (July 11, 2012) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Testimony%20- 

%20SHSGAC%20Hearing%20-%2011%20July%202012.pdf. 

as will outreach to and partnership with State and local authorities and communities, where the rubber meets the road. Searching for I&W will require 

fresh thinking that identifies and pursues links and patterns not previously established by U.S. officials. In part, this entails hitting the beat hard, with local 

police tapping informants and known criminals for leads—bearing in mind the 

interconnections between Iran/Hezbollah and gangs/cartels. As criminal and terrorist networks increasingly support and reinforce one another, the post-9/11 

shift of U.S. law enforcement resources away from drugs and thugs toward 

counterterrorism may be in need of some recalibration, to better serve both 

counterterrorist and counter-narcotics aims. 

At minimum, red-teaming and the production of additional threat assessments 

should be pursued, to include modalities of attack (such as cyber, see more 

below) and potential consequences. The upside of today’s grim operating presumptions, including the perception that the United States is fair game as subject of attack, is that the intersection of threat vectors (terrorists, drug traffickers, etc.) provides additional opportunities to U.S. intelligence and law enforcement authorities to exploit for collection and other purposes.27

• Counter-Radicalization in a Borderless World.—Addressing specific outbreaks of 

violent Islamist extremism will not prevent its virulent spread—including to 

and among Americans (‘‘home-grown’’ terrorist cases)—unless the underlying 

extremist ideology is exposed, unpacked, dissected, and combated. Government 

agencies currently involved in various aspects of the mission of combating violent Islamist extremism (CVIE) do not represent systemic failures so much as 

the complete lack of a system at all. Without clear interagency directives instructing how to distribute resources and coordinate aspects of the mission, individual, and broader agency efforts are improvised. As a result, an inconsistent 

and haphazard approach to dealing with the force underlying today’s terrorist 

threat is all but guaranteed. 

Counter-radicalization is an essential complement to counterterrorism. Elements of a cohesive National strategy could incorporate a range of approaches 

that have proven effective in other contexts. The power of negative imagery, as 

in a political campaign, could be harnessed to hurt our adversaries and further 

chip away at their appeal and credibility in the eyes of their peers, followers, 

and sympathizers. A sustained and systemic strategic communications effort 

aimed at exposing the hypocrisy of Islamists’ words versus their deeds could 

knock them off balance, as could embarrassing their leadership by bringing to 

light their seamy connections to criminal enterprises and drug trafficking organizations. Imagine the groundswell that could be achieved if the tragic attack 

on Pakistani teenager Malala Yousufzai, and the many others who have been 

similarly targeted by al-Qaeda and the Taliban, were similarly recognized 

world-wide—and the impact of these incidents thus multiplied thousands-fold. 

Brokering infighting within and between al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and the broader jihadi orbit in which they reside, will damage violent Islamists’ capability to 

propagate their message and organize operations both at home and abroad. Locally-administered programs are especially significant, as many of the solutions 

reside outside the U.S. Government and will require communities policing 

themselves. In the last year or 2, the United States has made some headway 

on these fronts, including through the efforts of the Department of State’s Office 

of Strategic Counterterrorism Communications—but we could do more and we 

could (and should) hit harder, especially when our adversaries are back on their 

heels. Indeed, now is the time to double down rather than ease up on the pressure. In short, we must encourage defectors, delegitimize and disaggregate our 

adversaries’ narrative, and above all, remember the victims.28

• Securing Cyberspace, the Borderless Domain.—Cyber threats manifest in nanoseconds. Our response measures must be almost as quick. This means developing and implementing an ‘‘active defense’’ capability to immediately attribute 

and counter attacks and future threats in real-time. Despite multiple incidents 

that could have served as galvanizing events to shore up U.S. resolve to formulate and implement the changes that are needed, and not just within Government, we have yet to take those necessary steps. Officials in the homeland secu-
28 

29Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Homeland Security (September 20, 2012) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/ 

testimony9.20.12lCilluffo.pdf. 

rity community should therefore undertake contingency planning that incorporates attacks on U.S. infrastructure. At minimum, ‘‘red-teaming’’ and additional threat assessments are needed. The latter should include modalities of 

attack and potential consequences. Working together with DHS Intelligence and 

Analysis colleagues, the Department’s National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) could and should do more in terms of threat and intelligence reporting, especially in relation to critical infrastructure, where DHS is well-positioned to add real and unique value given the Department’s relationship with 

and responsibilities towards the private sector. 

The United States should also develop and clearly articulate a cyber-deterrence 

strategy. Such a deterrence policy should apply generally, and also in a tailored 

manner that is actor/adversary-specific. A solid general posture could serve as 

an 80 percent solution, neutralizing the majority of threats before they manifest 

fully. This, in turn, would free up resources (human, capital, technological, etc.) 

to focus our limited resources and bandwidth on the high-end of the threat spectrum and on those which are most sophisticated and persistent. To 

operationalize these recommendations, we must draw lines in the sand. Preserving flexibility of U.S. response by maintaining some measure of ambiguity 

is useful, so long as we make parameters clear by laying down certain markers 

or selected redlines whose breach will not be tolerated. More investment needs 

to be made in our offensive capability as well, in order to support the foregoing 

proposals in terms of practice and at the level of principle (to signal a credible 

commitment). Cybersecurity by definition is transnational in nature and will require some level of transnational solutions, yet it must not be approached like 

an arms control treaty (i.e., attribution and verification are still a ways away).29

It is my privilege to have been afforded the opportunity to tender the above 

thoughts for consideration by Congress and the next administration. Thank you to 

both the subcommittee and its staff for your leadership and hard work on the pressing issues before us today and covered in your Report, ‘‘A Line in the Sand.’’ I would 

be pleased to try to answer any questions that you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, sir. 

I just want to agree with you, state for the record we actually 

had a hearing on the Caribbean, calling it the third border and the 

threat from that region. They are not just going across land borders. They are going by sea as well. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Farah for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, 

INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, and Ranking Member 

Keating, for the opportunity to participate in this. I have spent a 

lot of time on the ground in Latin America, particularly Central 

America and northern South America, and what I am seeing closely tracks with what your excellent report came up with. 

I would like to step back a little bit from what Ambassador 

Noriega said to perhaps a little larger lens view. I believe what we 

are seeing today is something that is fundamentally reordering the 

threat to the U.S. homeland, and that is the emergence of multiple, 

criminal state actors in Latin America, primarily grouped into the 

self-identified Bolivarian alliance led by Venezuela, now operating 

in conjunction with transnational organized crime groups, 

extraregional actors, such as Iran and terrorist groups. States such 

as Iran, that traditionally have had little interest or influence in 

Latin America, have become important players, as you have noted, 
29 

led by Hugo Cha ́vez and including Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Evo 

Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. 

The intentions of Iran in the region have long been subject of debate, but today, it is clear the goal of Iran’s presence is at least at 

a minimum two-fold, to develop the capacity and capability to 

wreak havoc in Latin America and possibly the U.S. homeland if 

the Iranian leadership views this as necessary to the survival of its 

nuclear program and to develop and expand ways to avoid international sanctions that are increasing crippling their economic life. 

With the emergence of criminalized states, we face the prospect 

of transnational organized crime networks facilitating weapons of 

mass destruction for terrorists under the protection of one or more 

states, thus greatly increasing their chances of success. 

Cha ́vez and his allies have allowed Iran to open financial facilities, front companies and dedicated shipping lines to evade sanctions on its nuclear program. At the same time, Iran is carrying out 

multiple mining activities that directly benefit its missile and nuclear programs in Latin America while moving aggressively to expand intelligence-gathering capabilities and military access. Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua have all granted hundreds 

of Iranian citizens passports from their respective countries, freeing 

these individuals to travel in almost untraceable ways as agents of 

the Iranian region. 

While Iran’s revolutionary rulers view the 1979 revolution in 

theological terms, as a miracle of divine intervention in which the 

United States as the Great Satan was defeated by the Allah, the 

Bolivarians view it from a secular point of view, as a road map to 

defeat the United States, the evil empire, through asymmetrical 

warfare. 

Iran’s revolution serves as a model for how asymmetrical leverage, when applied by Allah or humans, can bring the equivalent of 

David defeating Goliath on the world stage. I go into some detail 

on the relationship of this in my full testimony in the role that 

Carlos the Jackal, one of the most wanted terrorists in the world 

until his arrest in 1994, has played since his conversion to Islam 

in prison, where he is serving a life sentence, infusing the concept 

of radical Shi’a Islam and Marxist revolutionary dialectic together 

into something that President Hugo Cha ́vez has picked up on and 

gone forward with. 

The emerging military doctrine of the Bolivarian revolution, officially adopted in Venezuela and now spreading to Bolivia and Ecuador, explicitly embraces the use of weapons of mass destruction 

and nuclear weapons against the United States. This is occurring 

at a time when Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America is growing 

and when Cha ́vez announced his successful completion of a project 

to build drones in Venezuela with Iranian help. 

Cha ́vez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts and 

strategies articulated in this book, ‘‘Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules, and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare,’’ by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge Verstrynge. 

The tract is an explicit endorsement of the use of WMD for the destruction of the United States. Cha ́vez liked the Verstrynge book 

so well that he had a special pocket-sized edition printed and distributed to his Armed Forces as part of their official military doc-
30 

trine. You can see here the Venezuelan flag and officer corps in 

there, and it is pocket-sized, so they can carry it with them and 

study. 

The road ahead will require enhanced resources in this time of 

scarcity and a much better understanding of the ground game of 

those who wish us harm. They have the clearly-stated intention of 

carrying out asymmetrical attacks against us. It would be foolish 

to assume that the capacity lags far behind. 

In addition to the vulnerabilities presented by having states 

granting legitimate travel documents to hostile state and nonstate 

actors, the Southwest Border in the Caribbean, as noted, remained 

relatively easy points of entry. The almost unlimited pool of violent, 

well-armed, and increasingly well-traced members of gangs both in 

Central America and Mexico, which are truly now by bidirectional 

and binational, present an almost unlimited labor supply for those 

who wish to do us harm as well. 

I think one of the things that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in 

the opening was the submersibles, which also present now the ability to carry 10 tons of cargo, any cargo, any place, all the way from 

Ecuador to northern—past California into northern United States, 

presents an extraordinary challenge because we simply cannot find 

the submersibles. 

Expanded human intelligence and advanced field research by experts in the region are, I think, fundamental. Given the hundreds 

of billions of dollars in legitimate commerce and the legal flows of 

millions of people across our border, the task of finding and interdicting illicit products, weapons, or individuals at the border itself 

is more daunting than finding a needle in a haystack. Intelligence 

generated before they arrive at the border area is vital. This intelligence-driven effort must combine law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the capacities of the Special Operations 

Command and other DOD entities with the international cooperation channeled through the State Department. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH

NOVEMBER 16, 2012 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, thank you for the opportunity to 

participate in this important hearing on the threats to our Nation’s borders. It is 

a matter of utmost importance to the security of the United States, and something 

that has long been the subject of my on-going field research in Central and South 

America. My own investigations in recent months have led me to many of the same 

concerns your report raises, particularly relating to the activities of Iran and 

Hezbollah in the region. 

I believe that what we are seeing today is the emergence of multiple criminalized 

state actors in Latin America, primarily grouped into the self-identified Bolivarian 

Alliance led by Venezuela, now operating in conjunction with Transnational Organized Crime groups (TOCs), extra regional actors such as Iran, and terrorist groups. 

In recent months there has been increased awareness of the flow of South American cocaine through Venezuela to West Africa, particularly through Mali, Guinea 

Bissau, and other fragile states—possibly benefitting not only the traditional regional TOC structures and their Colombian and Mexican allies, but several terrorist 
31 

1For a detailed look at this development see: Antonio L. Mazzitelli, ‘‘The New Transatlantic 

Bonanza: Cocaine on Highway 10,’’ Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida 

International University, March 2011. 2The FARC is the oldest insurgency in the Western hemisphere, launched in 1964 out of Colombia’s Liberal Party militias, and enduring to the present as a self-described Marxist revolutionary movement. For a more detailed look at the history of the FARC see: Douglas Farah, 

‘‘The FARC in Transition: The Fatal Weakening of the Western Hemisphere’s Oldest Guerrilla 

Movement,’’ NEFA Foundation, July 2, 2008, accessible at: http://www.nefafoundation.org/ 

miscellaneous/nefafarc0708.pdf. 

entities including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Hezbollah,1 and the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC).2

As the subcommittee’s report notes, the case of Ayman Joumaa, the Lebanese national and Hezbollah supporter, provides clear evidence of new types of overlap 

among criminal and terrorist groups which, in years past, did not easily mix. Yet, 

Joumaa was able to work on behalf of Latin America TOCs, including Los Zetas, 

and Hezbollah, dealing in both cocaine and weapons. These ‘‘alliances of convenience’’ among highly-trained groups with complementary skill sets, with the new 

levels of State protection being offered, presents a much more dangerous and volatile panorama in the hemisphere, and specifically for our borders, than we have traditionally confronted. 

Just as telling, as the committee’s report notes, is the willingness of at least some 

senior members of the Iranian government to engage the services of a person they 

thought belonged to Los Zetas, Mexican drug trafficking organization in order to kill 

the Saudi ambassador to the United States on U.S. territory; an act of war. This 

is something that should give us pause. It speaks to willingness of the Iranian regime to cross U.S. borders, and the sense that it can do so with impunity. It also 

shows their awareness of the abilities of Mexican organizations to carry out operations inside the United States, and the willingness of some in the Iranian regime 

to make a significant leap to work through a criminal organization with which it 

has no religious or political affinity at all. This shows that many of the ‘‘lines in 

the sand’’ that we thought existed (the U.S. border; terrorist and TOC group divisions) have been largely erased. 

As I recently wrote in a monograph published by the U.S. Army War College, 

which addresses some of the same issues this subcommittee’s report does: 

‘‘This (emerging Latin American) threat includes not only traditional TOC activities 

such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, but others, including the potential 

for WMD-related trafficking. These activities are carried out with the participation 

of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leaders are deeply enmeshed in 

criminal activities. These same leaders have a publicly-articulated doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as 

legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction. 

‘‘This emerging combination of threats comprises a hybrid of criminal-terrorist, and 

state- and non-state franchises, combining multiple nations acting in concert, and 

traditional TOCs and terrorist groups acting as proxies for the nation-states that 

sponsor them. These hybrid franchises should now be viewed as a tier-one security 

threat for the United States. Understanding and mitigating the threat requires a 

whole-of-Government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy, and programming. No longer is the state/non-state dichotomy viable in tackling 

these problems, just as the TOC/terrorism divide is increasingly disappearing. 

‘‘These franchises operate in, and control, specific geographic territories, which allow 

them to function in a relatively safe environment. These pipelines, or recombinant 

chains of networks, are highly adaptive and able to move a multiplicity of illicit 

products (cocaine, weapons, humans, bulk cash) that ultimately cross U.S. borders 

undetected thousands of times each day. The actors along the pipeline form and dissolve alliances quickly, occupy both physical and cyber space, and use both highlydeveloped and modern institutions, including the global financial system, as well as 

ancient smuggling routes and methods. 

‘‘Most of the goods and services that generate this wealth pass through geographic 

regions that are often described as ‘stateless’ or ‘lawless.’ However, these regions are 

far from ungoverned. In fact, they represent a powerful component of the threat 

from TOCs and other non-state actors which control them, either at the expense of 
32 

3Douglas Farah, ‘‘Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism and Criminalized States in 

Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority,’’ Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, pp. 1–2. 4These include recently founded Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 

(Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Cariben ̃ os—CELAC), and the Bolivarian Alliance 

for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Ame ́rica— 

ALBA), as well as the ALBA Defense School, inaugurated in 2011 in Warnes, Bolivia, to develop 

a joint military doctrine and training. 5 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Statement for the Record: 

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6. 6 Univisio ́n, La Amenaza Iranı ́, aired December 8, 2011. 7 National Security Council, ‘‘Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing 

Converging Threats to National Security,’’ Office of the President, July 2011. The Strategy grew 

out of a National Intelligence Estimate initiated by the Bush administration and completed in 

Dec. 2008, and is a comprehensive Government review of transnational organized crime, the 

first since 1995. 8The phrase ‘‘dangerous spaces’’ was used by Phil Williams to describe 21st Century security 

challenges in terms of spaces and gaps, including geographical, functional, social, economic, 

legal, and regulatory holes. See: Phil Williams, ‘‘Here be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security,’’ Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened 

Sovereignty, Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas editors, Stanford University Press, 2010, 

pp. 34–37. 

weak host states and their neighbors, or in alliance with stronger ones which host 

them, tolerate them, or use them as instruments of statecraft.’’3

States that traditionally have had little interest or influence in Latin America 

have emerged as important players over the past decade, primarily at the invitation 

of the self-described Bolivarian states seeking to establish ‘‘21st Century Socialism.’’ 

This bloc of nations—led by Hugo Cha ́vez of Venezuela, includes Rafael Correa of 

Ecuador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua—seeks to break 

the traditional ties of the region to the United States. To this end, the Bolivarian 

alliance has formed numerous organizations and military alliances—including a 

military academy in Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. military training—which 

explicitly exclude the United States.4

Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state sponsor of terrorism, 

has expanded its regional political alliances, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, 

and military, intelligence, and informational programs via the Bolivarian axis. 

The intentions of Iran in the region have long been a subject of debate; but today 

there is a much clearer indication available, to both the intelligence community and 

investigators on the ground, that the goal of Iran’s presence in the region is twofold: To develop the capacity and capability to wreak havoc in Latin America—and 

possibly the U.S. homeland—if the Iranian leadership views this as necessary to the 

survival of its nuclear program; and, to develop and expand the ability to avoid 

international sanctions that are increasingly crippling the regime’s economic life. 

As DNI James Clapper recently stated, ‘‘some Iranian officials—probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have changed their calculus and are now more 

willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived 

U.S. actions that threaten the regime. We are also concerned about Iranian plotting 

against U.S. or allied interests overseas.’’ 5

A recent Univision documentary La Amenaza Iranı ́ (The Iranian Threat) showed 

Iranian diplomats in Mexico, working with their Venezuelan and Cuban counterparts, to try to develop the capacity to carry out a sophisticated cyber attack against 

U.S. military, nuclear, and economic targets. The documentary shows military training provided by Hezbollah to Venezuelan militias directly under the control of 

Cha ́vez, with weapons and ammunition provided by the Venezuelan military. It also 

identifies by name the leaders of Hezbollah in Venezuela.6

This press for expanded ties comes despite the almost complete lack of cultural 

or religious ties to the region, linguistic affinity, or traditional economic logic and 

rationale in the relationships. 

While it is true that TOC penetration of the state threatens the rule of law, as 

the administration’s TOC strategy released in July 2011 notes,7 it also poses significant new threats to the homeland. Criminalized states frequently use TOCs as a 

form of statecraft, bringing new elements to the ‘‘dangerous spaces’’ where non-state 

actors intersect with regions of weak sovereignty and alternative governance systems.8 This fundamentally alters the structure of global order. 

The possibility of TOC networks facilitating the transfer of weapons of mass destruction for terrorists, as described in the NSC strategy document, is very troubling, but assumes that the TOC groups and terrorists are in confrontation with 

states and their multiple law enforcement and intelligence tools. With the emer-
33 

9For a look at the weapons transfers see: ‘‘Los ‘rockets’ Venezolanos,’’ Semana (Colombia), 

July 28, 2009. For a look at documented financial and logistical support of Cha ́vez and Correa 

for the FARC see: ‘‘The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Secret Archives of ‘Rau ́l 

Reyes,’ ’’ An IISS Strategic Dossier, International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2011. To 

see FARC connections to Evo Morales see: Douglas Farah, ‘‘Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo 

Morales and the MAS,’’ International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009: http:// 

www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20090618lIASCIntoTheAbyss061709.pdf. 10Douglas Farah, ‘‘Iran in Latin America: Strategic Security Issues,’’ International Assessment and Strategy Center, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts 

Office, May 2011. 11For a more detailed look at this debate see: Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?, op cit., in which the author has a chapter arguing for the view that Iran is a significant 

threat: http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.204/publdetail.asp. 

gence of criminalized states, we face the prospect of TOC networks facilitating such 

transfers under the explicit or implicit protection of one or more states, thus greatly 

increasing the chances of success. Parts of this pipeline are already being developed 

in Latin America. 

As the state relationships consolidate, the recombinant criminal-terrorist pipelines 

become more rooted, and more dangerous. Rather than being pursued by state law 

enforcement and intelligence services in an effort to impede their activities, TOC 

groups (and perhaps terrorist groups) are able to operate in a more stable and secure environment, something that most businesses, both licit and illicit, crave. 

Rather than operating on the margins of the state, or seeking to co-opt small 

pieces of the state machinery, the TOC groups in this construct operate in concert 

with the state on multiple levels. Within that stable environment a host of new options open up. These range from the sale of weapons, to the use of national aircraft 

and shipping registries, easy use of banking structures, the use of national airlines 

and shipping lines to move large quantities of unregistered goods, the acquisition 

of diplomatic passports and other identification forms; and, access to sensitive law 

enforcement, military, and intelligence information and capabilities, to include those 

shared with the United States, Interpol and, other international entities. 

We are already seeing multiple other types of transfers that greatly benefit terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. 

Each leader in the Bolivarian bloc of nations has publicly and privately supported 

the FARC rebels in Colombia—a prototypical hybrid organization that is both a designated terrorist organization and TOC group that produces some 90 percent of the 

cocaine consumed in the United States. This support, in the form of money, weapons, sanctuary, and joint business enterprises helps FARC-produced cocaine flow to 

the outside world, and helps the FARC to survive the military battering it has undergone at the hands of the Colombian military and police.9

Cha ́vez and his allies have allowed Iran, a state sponsor of terror, to open financial facilities, front companies, and dedicated shipping lines to evade sanctions on 

its nuclear program. At the same time, Iran is carrying out multiple mining activities that directly benefit its missile and nuclear programs in Latin America, without 

normal transparency, and with no public scrutiny, while moving aggressively to expand intelligence-gathering capacities and military access.10

Several hundred Iranian citizens have been given Ecuadoran ce ́dulas or national 

identity cards, which allow them to travel to many places in Latin America as Ecuadoran rather than Iranian nationals. Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua 

have all granted hundreds of Iranian citizens passports from their respective countries, freeing those individuals to travel in almost untraceable ways. It also gives 

the individuals access to the Colo ́n Free Trade Zone (CFTZ) in Panama, and to other 

relatively unmonitored FTZs in the region, which has greatly enhanced Iran’s ability 

to circumvent international sanctions aimed at crippling the Iranian nuclear program. 

The most common assumption among those who view the Iran-Bolivarian alliance 

as troublesome (and many still do not see it as a significant threat at all), is that 

points of convergence of the radical and reactionary theocratic Iranian government 

and the self-proclaimed socialist and progressive Bolivarian revolution are: (1) An 

overt and often stated hatred for the United States and a shared belief in the need 

and methods to destroy this common enemy; and (2) a shared acceptance of authoritarian state structures that tolerate little dissent and encroach on all aspects of a 

citizen’s life.11

These assumptions are true, but do not necessarily recognize the broader 

underpinnings of the relationship. While Iran’s revolutionary rulers view the 1979 

revolution in theological terms as a miracle of divine intervention in which the 

United States, the ‘‘Great Satan,’’ was defeated, the Bolivarians view it from a secular point of view as a roadmap to defeat the United States as the Evil Empire. 
34 

12 ‘‘ ‘Jackal’ book praises bin Laden,’’ BBC News, June 26, 2003. 13 In addition to Operation Titan there have been numerous incidents in the past 18 months 

of operatives being directly linked to Hezbollah who have been identified or arrested in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Aruba, and elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean. 14 Brian Ellsworth, ‘‘Venezuela Says Building Drones with Iran’s Help,’’ Reuters News Agency, 

June 14, 2012, accessed at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-venezuela-irandrone-idUSBRE85D14N20120614. 15 Verstrynge, born in Morocco to Belgian and Spanish parents, began his political career on 

the far right of the Spanish political spectrum as a disciple of Manuel Fraga, and served as a 

national and several senior party posts with the Alianza Popular. By his own admission he then 

migrated to the Socialist Party, but never rose through the ranks. He is widely associated with 

radical anti-globalization views and anti-U.S. rhetoric, repeatedly stating that the United States 

is creating a new global empire and must be defeated. Although he has no military training 

or experience, he has written extensively on asymmetrical warfare. 

To both, Iran’s revolution has strong political connotations, serving as a model for 

how asymmetrical leverage, when applied by Allah or humans, can bring the equivalent of David defeating Goliath on the world stage. 

I want to go into some detail on this issue because I believe it is fundamental 

to understanding why this threat we face must be taken seriously, and to underscore that this threat has direct bearing on our border security. 

Among the first to articulate the possible merging of radical Shite Islamic thought 

with Marxist aspirations of destroying capitalism and U.S. hegemony was Illich 

Sa ́nchez Ramirez, better known as the terrorist leader ‘Carlos the Jackal’, a Venezuelan citizen who was, until his arrest in 1994, one of the world’s most wanted 

terrorists. He converted to Shite Islam in prison. 

In his seminal 2003 book Revolutionary Islam, written from prison where he is 

serving a life sentence for killing two French policemen, Sa ́nchez Ramirez praises 

Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks on the United States as a ‘‘lofty feat of arms’’ 

and part of a justified ‘‘armed struggle’’ of Islam against the West. ‘‘From now on 

terrorism is going to be more or less a daily part of the landscape of your rotting 

democracies,’’ he writes.12

In this context, the repeated, public praise of Cha ́vez for Sa ́nchez Ramirez can be 

seen as a crucial element of the Bolivarian ideology and an acceptance of his underlying premise as important to Cha ́vez’s ideological framework. Acolytes of Sa ́nchez 

Ramirez continued to develop his ideology of Marxism and radical Islamism rooted 

in the Iranian revolution. 

The emerging military doctrine of the ‘‘Bolivarian Revolution’’—officially adopted 

in Venezuela and rapidly spreading to Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador—explicitly 

embraces the radical Islamist model of asymmetrical or ‘‘fourth-generation warfare,’’ 

with its heavy reliance on suicide bombings and different types of terrorism, including the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. This is occurring at a time when 

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America is growing and becoming more identifiable,13

and when Cha ́vez has announced the successful completion of a project to build 

drones in Venezuela with Iranian help.14

Cha ́vez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts and strategies articulated in Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of 

Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Perife ́rica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orı ́genes, 

Reglas y E ́ tica de la Guerra Asime ́trica), by the Spanish politician and ideologue 

Jorge Verstrynge.15 The tract is a continuation of and exploration of Sa ́nchez Ramirez’s thoughts, incorporating an explicit endorsement of the use of weapons of mass 

destruction to destroy the United States. Verstrynge argues for the destruction of 

United States through series of asymmetrical attacks, like those of 9/11, in the belief that the United States will simply crumble when its vast military strength cannot be used to combat its enemies. 

Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written directly in relation 

to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves beyond Sa ́nchez Ramirez to embrace all strands of radical Islam for helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy. 

Central to Verstrynge’s idealized view of terrorists is the belief in the sacredness 

of the willingness of the fighters to sacrifice their lives in pursuit of their goals. Before writing extensively on how to make chemical weapons and listing helpful places 

to find information on the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs that ‘‘someone with a high school education could make,’’ Verstrynge writes: 

‘‘We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical warfare to guerrilla warfare, 

although it is important. However, it is not a mistake to also use things that are 

classified as terrorism and use them in asymmetrical warfare. And we have super 

terrorism, divided into chemical terrorism, bioterrorism (which uses biological and 
35 

16 Verstrynge, op cit., pp. 56–57. 

bacteriological methods), and nuclear terrorism, which means ‘the type of terrorism 

uses the threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.’ ’’16

In a December 12, 2008 interview with Venezuelan state television, Verstrynge 

lauded Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is 

‘‘de-territorialized, de-stateized, and de-nationalized,’’ a war where suicide bombers 
36 

17 Bartolome ́, op cit. See also: John Sweeny, ‘‘Jorge Verstrynge: The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,’’ www.vcrisis.com, Sept. 9, 2005; and ‘‘Troops Get Provocative Book,’’ Miami 

Herald, Nov. 11, 2005. 18 Juan Pauliler, ‘‘Que busca la academia military del ALBA?’’ BBC Spanish Service, June 15, 

2011. 19 Robin Yapp, ‘‘Iran defense minister forced to leave Bolivia over 1994 Argentina bombing,’’ 

The Telegraph (London), June 1, 2011. 

act as ‘‘atomic bombs for the poor.’’17 In his interview with Univisio ́n, Verstrynge 

said his model was specifically drawn from Hezbollah’s experience. 

Cha ́vez liked the Verstrynge book so well that he had a special pocket-sized edition printed and distributed to the armed forces officer corps with express orders 

that it be read cover to cover. It has since been adopted as official Venezuelan military doctrine. Even more worrisome, copies of the book have been found over the 

past year, for the first time, in FARC camps in Colombia, indicating the doctrine 

is being passed on to Venezuela’s non-state proxy. 

To further ingrain this teaching, and explicitly to eradicate any vestiges of U.S. 

military doctrine in the region, Cha ́vez and other Bolivarian leaders, in conjunction 

with Iran, have recently opened a new military academy to teach Bolivarian military doctrine, operating in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The ALBA Defense School is going 

to teach the ‘‘beautiful projects and experiences that unite our military,’’ said 

Nicola ́s Maduro, Venezuela’s foreign minister. This includes, he said, the doctrines 

of Jose ́ Martı ́, the hero of Cuban independence; Simo ́n Bolivar, the hero of South 

American independence; Eloy Alfaro, an Ecuadoran revolutionary; and, Augusto 

Ca ́sar Sandino, a Nicaraguan revolutionary.18

Bolivian President Morales, speaking at the inauguration of the facility, said the 

School would prepare the peoples of the region to defend against ‘‘imperialist 

threats, which seek to divide us.’’ He said that the ‘‘Peoples of the ALBA are being 

besieged, sanctioned, and punished by the imperial arrogance just because we are 

exerting the right of being decent and sovereign.’’ He added that, ‘‘We must not 

allow that the history of colonization repeats and that our resources are the loot of 

the empire.’’ 

Iran’s interest in the project, which it supports financially, was made clear when 

Iranian defense minister Ahmad Vahidi arrived in Bolivia for the school’s inauguration, despite having an Interpol Red Notice issued for his arrest as a result of his 

alleged participation in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. His public appearance at a military ceremony the day before the school’s inauguration set off an international scandal and sharp protests from Argentina, which had asked Interpol to 

emit the Red Notice. Vahidi quietly slipped out of Bolivia.19
37 

This is not an encouraging panorama and it has many direct implications for U.S. 

National security. Where, in the not distant past, drug traffickers, coyotes, and 

bulk-cash smugglers routinely crossed our Southwest Border, today a much larger 

group of illicit actors are opening up multiple new ways to cross our border undetected. 

The traditional human smuggling routes continue to function efficiently under the 

control of Los Zetas, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13) gang, and other increasingly 

violent actors whose primary, if not sole, motivation is economic. The budding alliances among Mexican gangs such as the Barrio Azteca and the Central American 

gangs such as the MS–13 along with the expanding reach of Los Zetas in the human 

smuggling business all auger ill for border security. 

The traditional border vulnerabilities remain while new ones continue to arise. 

The willingness of multiple criminalized and corrupt states in the region to issue 

legitimate passports (including diplomatic passports) to officials and agents of a 

state sponsor of terrorism such as Iran makes securing the U.S. border ever more 

complex. As the relationships among traditional TOC’s and terrorist groups mature 

in places like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and relationships are built and 

knowledge exchanged, it will become a significantly more complex challenge to detect and deter those seeking to cross our borders to do us harm. 

The road ahead will require enhanced resources in a time of scarcity, and a much 

better understanding of the ‘‘ground game’’ of those who wish to hurt us. They have 

a clearly stated intention to carry out asymmetrical attacks against us; it would be 

foolish to assume the capacity lags far behind. 

The demonstrated willingness of the Iranian government to reach out to Mexican 

TOCs in order to perpetrate attacks inside the United States shows just how blurry 

many of the TOC-Terrorist lines have become, and they are likely to get blurrier. 

The implications of this new paradigm are often still not clearly understood by policy makers and often are dismissed by some who do not understand the pace at 

which the world is changing. Hearings like this one are a necessary first step in 

advancing a debate that is very late in getting started. 

In addition to the vulnerabilities presented by having states granting legitimate 

travel documents to state and non-state actors who are plotting attacks against the 

United States, the Southwest Border remains a relatively easy point of entry. The 

almost unlimited pool of violent, well-armed, and increasingly well-trained gang 

members who operate daily from our border, south to the Northern Triangle of Cen-
38 

tral America (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala), is truly bi-directional and bi-national. Not only do members cross the border regularly, as the report notes, but they 

also maintain structures in hundreds of U.S. cities (as well as in Canada), giving 

them broad reach to carry out harmful activities on behalf of whomever will meet 

their price. 

Expanded human intelligence and advanced field-based research by experts in the 

region’s cultural and political history are necessary to further understand the challenges, predict their evolution, and suggest countermeasures. Many of the TOCs and 

terrorist groups use low-tech methods to plan, communicate, and move their resources. Given the hundreds of billions of dollars in legitimate commerce, and the 

legal flow of millions of people across the border, the task of finding and interdicting 

illicit products, weapons, or individuals at the border itself is more daunting than 

finding a needle in the haystack. Intelligence generated before they arrive at the 

border area is vital to successful interdiction (and to minimizing the disruption and 

negative economic consequences on legitimate movements). Such intelligence will 

not always be electronic, nor will it likely derive from a single agency, source, or 

data stream. Timely warning and interdiction will increasingly require a more 

whole-of-Government coordinated approach, as opposed to a lane or command-centric one. 

This intelligence-driven effort must combine law enforcement, the intelligence 

community, capacities of the Department of Defense, and international cooperation 

through the Department of State. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

which has been a leader in this field, was able to detect the attempted attack on 

the Saudi ambassador before it happened through an informant on the ground. 

Other parts of the law enforcement and intelligence communities were then able to 

broaden out the information and take action. Iran’s broader actions in the hemisphere can only be curtailed by working with partner nations such as Colombia, 

Brazil, Peru, and Mexico to scale back Iran’s illicit activities, limit their sanctionsbusting efforts, and create an environment in which they do not have unfettered access. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Farah. 

The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Rosenblum for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MARC R. ROSENBLUM, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN 

IMMIGRATION POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Keating, Members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to be here 

today to testify on behalf of the Congressional Research Service. 

I also have a full statement that I would like to submit for the 

record, and it includes a couple of figures that I hope you have in 

front of you because I will refer to them in my spoken remarks. 

My statement draws on a new report that I am co-authoring with 

my colleagues, Jerome Bjelopera and Kristin Finklea. 

I want to also thank them for their help. 

My statement will discuss key threats to U.S. borders, including 

terrorists, transnational criminals, and unauthorized migrants. I 

will describe a model to evaluate threats, and I will discuss some 

policy options Congress may consider. 

While certain border threats are overlapping, Congress and DHS 

face trade-offs in how they allocate enforcement resources. How 

members understand and evaluate border risks may shape their 

policy preferences for enforcement at versus away from the border, 

between versus at ports of entry, at the Southwest versus other 

borders and related questions. 

With respect to border threats, unauthorized migration mainly 

from Mexico and illegal drug flows, mainly from Latin America, 

emerged as major policy concerns in the late 1960s. The 1993 

World Trade Center bombing made counterterrorism a third focus, 

and it became the top concern after 9/11. The 2002 Homeland Secu-
39 

rity Act charged DHS with preventing the entry of terrorists, enforcing immigration laws, preventing illegal drug flows and criminal activity and securing U.S. borders, among other responsibilities. 

As Figure No. 1 in my statement illustrates, these elements in 

DHS’s mission are distinct but partially overlapping. At the core of 

the diagram, all three circles overlap, describing convergent 

threats, such as drug traffickers, unauthorized migrants, and terrorists who use the same smuggling routes or techniques. Yet the 

peripheral areas of the figure are important because particular policy responses may be more appropriate to combat unique threats. 

For example, most unauthorized migrants do not fall into the 

other categories. None of the 9/11 hijackers or known post-9/11 interests entered the United States illegally. While most migrants 

enter between ports of entry or by overstaying non-immigrant 

visas, illicit drugs are often smuggled into the United States hidden within cargo containers or in private vehicles. As a result, enforcement tools targeting illegal migration likely do not reduce 

drug smuggling and vice versa. 

Another set of enforcement measures may be ideally designed to 

combat terrorism. Analysts rely on risk models to evaluate different threats. A basic model describes risk as the function of the 

likelihood of an event and its potential consequences. 

Figure No. 2 in my statement illustrates unlikely events that 

would have modest consequences are especially low-risk threats. A 

likely event with severe consequences is a high-risk threat. The 

model doesn’t provide unambiguous risk assessments, however, because our estimates of likelihood are highly uncertain and because 

consequences are complex, uncertain, and often subjective. 

In addition, because all of these threat actors are strategic and 

may adapt their behavior in response to enforcement, any particular risk assessment only represents a snapshot at a point in 

time. 

Despite these challenges, many would agree that the threat of 

terrorists bringing a weapon of mass destruction into the United 

States is a relatively low likelihood risk but could have catastrophic 

consequences. Conversely, many would describe unauthorized migration as a higher probability but lower consequence threat. 

Immediately after 9/11, the convergence of immigration control, 

the war on drugs and the urgency attached to the war on terror 

meant that DHS could take an all-of-the-above approach to border 

security. But questions about how to allocate scarce resources are 

more pressing in the current fiscal climate. Members of Congress 

may ask whether policies should aim to prevent unauthorized migration in general or whether policies should target terrorists and 

criminal organizations? 

Certain border security policies appear designed with the more 

generalized set of goals in mind. Indeed, the Secure Fence Act defines zero illegal inflows as part of DHS’s statutory mission. Some 

analysts doubt that goal can ever be achieved. 

Where can DHS reap the greatest return on enforcement investments? Lawmakers concerned about illicit drugs may favor increased spending for more CDP officers, scanners, and drug-sniffing dogs at ports of entry and for efforts to disrupt money laun-
40 

1The Aliens Act of June 25, 1798 (1 Statutes-at-Large 570), and the Alien Enemy Act of July 

6, 1798 (1 Statutes-at-Large 577), respectively. Three laws passed prior to June 1798 concerned 

Federal naturalization provisions. 2 Respectively, the Immigration Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Statutes-at-Large 1213); the Act of 

May 22, 1918 (40 Statutes-at-Large 559); the Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Statutes-at-Large 

987); Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101–649). 3See U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), ‘‘Border Patrol History,’’ http:// 

www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/borderlsecurity/borderlpatrol/borderlpatrollohs/history.xml. Also 

see Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006). 

dering and to detect and prevent southbound flows of money and 

guns. For counterterrorism, priorities might include intelligence 

collection, as everybody here as discussed, and investments in DHS 

information systems, such CDP’s automated targeting system and 

US–VISIT. Some Members may emphasize resiliency to an attack. 

Counterterrorism and counternarcotics work may involve partnerships with allies abroad. 

With respect to migration, some have argued for years that the 

greatest deficiency in America’s immigration control system involves employment verification and work-site enforcement rather 

than border security. With net unauthorized migration flows now 

around zero, two key questions are how recent enforcement policies 

have contributed to this recent trend and how unauthorized flows 

will respond as the U.S. economy recovers. 

These are the types of policy choices that may be informed by an 

assessment of border threats. 

I thank the subcommittee again for this opportunity and look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Rosenblum follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARC R. ROSENBLUM

NOVEMBER 16, 2012 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the committee: Thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Congressional Research 

Service. My statement draws on a new report that I am co-authoring with my CRS 

colleagues Jerome Bjelopera and Kristin Finklea; and I want to thank them and acknowledge their role, along with several other colleagues at CRS, in preparing this 

statement. 

Pursuant to the committee’s request, my statement today will consist of three 

parts. First, I will discuss key threats to U.S. borders. Second, I will describe selected threat scenarios. Third, I will discuss some policy options Members of Congress may consider with respect to border security in the next 4 years and beyond. 

THE COMPLEXITY OF THE BORDER SECURITY MISSION

America’s National security concerns at the border long predate the post-9/11 

focus on ‘‘homeland security,’’ though the nature of border threats has changed over 

time. The first Federal immigration laws, passed in 1798, authorized the President 

to arrest or deport any alien deemed dangerous to the United States, and any adult 

male alien from a country at war with the United States.1 Over the course of the 

20th Century, laws expanded to exclude anarchists (in 1903), aliens considered a 

threat to public safety during times of war (1918), communists (1950), and terrorists 

(1990).2

The mission and focus of U.S. border enforcement has also changed over time. The 

Border Patrol was established in 1924 and focused initially on preventing the entry 

of Chinese migrants and on preventing alcohol inflows during prohibition, with the 

majority of agents stationed on the Northern Border.3 Unauthorized migration, 

mainly from Mexico, emerged as a major policy concern beginning in the late 
41 

4See CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, coordinated by Marc R. Rosenblum. 5See CRS Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy: Issues for 

Consideration, by Lisa N. Sacco and Kristin M. Finklea. 6 Calculations from data available at CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Control Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum; and Syracuse University Transactional 

Records Access Clearinghouse, ‘‘National Trends in Apprehensions and Staffing,’’ http:// 

trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/141/include/rep141table2.html. 7 Calculations from data available at Department of Justice, ‘‘Drug Enforcement Administration,’’ http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975l2002/2002/html/page100-103.htm; and CRS 

Report R42440, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: FY2013 Appropriations, by 

Nathan James, Jennifer D. Williams, and John F. Sargent, Jr., Coordinators. 8See CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends; CRS 

Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by 

Ruth Ellen Wasem. 9Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings, September 2012, http:// 

www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k11Results/NSDUHresults2011.pdf; The White House, Office 

of National Drug Control Policy, ‘‘Remarks by Director Kerlikowske before the Inter-American 

Drug Abuse Control Commission,’’ http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/news-releases-remarks/ 

remarks-by-director-kerlikowske-before-the-inter-american-drug-abuse-control-commission. 10Pub. L. 107–296, § 402. 

1960s.4 The year 1970 also marked the beginning of America’s ‘‘war on drugs.’’5 Border Patrol staffing climbed eleven-fold between 1975 and 2011,6 and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) budget expanded about five-fold (in constant dollars) during the same period.7 Despite these increases, however, the estimated unauthorized population in the United States grew from about 1.7 million in 1979 to 

about 12.1 million in 2007, before declining to about 11.5 million in 2011.8 About 

22.5 million individuals were current (past month) illegal drug users in 2011, representing a slight per capita increase since 2002, but a decline of about one-third 

since the 1970s.9

With the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing 

in 1995, and the interception of the millennium bomber in 1999, counterterrorism 

became a third important focus of U.S. border security during the 1990s—and the 

top concern after September 11, 2001. Thus, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security and charged the new agency with, 

among other responsibilities, preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons, securing U.S. borders, immigration enforcement, and customs enforcement (including preventing illegal drug flows).10

As Figure 1 illustrates, these elements in DHS’ border security mission are distinct but partially overlapping. The ‘‘criminal networks’’ circle in Figure 1 includes 

characteristics that are unique to that threat, including trafficking organizations 

that specialize in drug smuggling. The circle intersects with ‘‘unauthorized migrants’’ where these threats relate, as in the case of drug trafficking organizations 

(DTO) that expand into migrant smuggling. At the core of the diagram all three circles overlap, describing convergent threats—DTOs, unauthorized migrants, and terrorists who use the same smuggling routes or techniques, for example. 
42 

11 CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 

1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 12 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2011, pp. 13–16, www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf. 13Some people may object to describing unauthorized migrants as ‘‘threats to border security.’’ 

Nonetheless, illegal migration flows threaten certain U.S. interests, even if people disagree 

about the scope or gravity of the threat. In addition, given that DHS’ mission includes preventing the entry of terrorists, illegal drugs and contraband, and unauthorized migrants, a comWhile one may be drawn to the core of Figure 1, the peripheral areas of each circle are also important because threats encompass distinct features, and certain policy responses may be more appropriate to combat particular threats. For example, 

while there is some degree of overlap among unauthorized migrants, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists, the great majority of unauthorized migrants do not 

fall into the other categories. None of the 9/11 hijackers or known post-9/11 terrorist 

threats (e.g., Richard Reid, the ‘‘shoe bomber’’; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the 

‘‘underwear bomber’’; and Faisal Shahzad, the ‘‘Times Square bomber’’) entered the 

United States illegally. And while most unauthorized migrants enter the country between ports of entry or by overstaying nonimmigrant visas,11 many illicit drugs are 

smuggled into the United States hidden within cargo containers, private vehicles, 

or in other non-commercial vehicles.12 As a result, the enforcement tools targeting 

unauthorized migration—personnel and infrastructure between ports of entry, worksite enforcement, Secure Communities—likely do little to reduce narcotics smuggling, and vice versa. Another set of enforcement measures may be ideally designed 

to combat terrorism, and yet another to prevent other border threats, such as fraudulent goods. 

TYPES OF THREATS AT U.S. BORDERS

Border threats may be divided into actors and goods. 

Threat Actors 

Any person who intends to harm the United States, or whose presence may lead 

to harmful consequences, may be a threat and a potential target for border enforcement policies. Three general types of threat actors are terrorists, transnational 

criminals, and unauthorized migrants,13 although certain actors may fall into more 
43 

mon framework for understanding these inflows may be helpful for making border policy and 

allocating DHS resources. 14 In addition, some people may threaten U.S. interests without falling into any of these categories, including for example a legal migrant who (knowingly or unknowingly) carries a virus 

that threatens U.S. public health. 15 Anthony F. Lemieux and Victor H. Asal, ‘‘Grievance, Social Dominance Orientation, and 

Authoritarianism in the Choice and Justification of Terror Versus Protest,’’ Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, vol. 3, no. 3, (November 2010), p. 196. See also: Ryan Hunter and Danielle 

Heinke, ‘‘Radicalization of Islamist Terrorists in the Western World,’’ FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (September 2011), pp. 27–29, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011. 16Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat 

(New York: Random House, 2007), p. 16. Also see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 

72–75. 17 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 13. 18Thomas F. Ditzler, ‘‘Malevolent Minds: The Teleology of Terrorism,’’ in Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions, ed. Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004), p 197. 19 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 

House, 2005), pp. 9–10. 20Frank E. Hagan, ‘‘ ‘Organized Crime’ and ‘organized crime’ Indeterminate Problems of Definition,’’ Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 9, no. 4 (Summer 2006), p. 135. See also James O. 

Finkenauer, ‘‘Problems of Definition: What Is Organized Crime?’’ Trends in Organized Crime, 

vol. 8, no. 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 65. 21Diego d’Andria, ‘‘Investment Strategies of Criminal Organisations,’’ Policy Studies, vol. 32, 

no. 1 (January 2011), p. 3. 22Klaus von Lampe, ‘‘Re-Conceptualizing Transnational Organized Crime: Offenders as Problem Solvers,’’ International Journal of Security and Terrorism, vol. 2, no. 1 (2011), p. 11. 23Finkenauer, ‘‘Problems of Definition,’’ p. 67. 24Toine Spapens, ‘‘Macro Networks, Collectives, and Business Processes: An Integrated Approach to Organized Crime,’’ European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice, 

vol. 18 (2010), pp. 210–212. 25See for example, Phil Williams, ‘‘The Terrorism Debate Over Mexican Drug Trafficking Violence,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 24, no. 1 (April 2012). 26See: Moise ́s Naı ́m, ‘‘Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office,’’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, 

no. 3, (May/Jun 2012), pp. 100–111. 27 INA §§ 212(a)(6)–(7); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227 (a)(6)–(7). Also see CRS Report R41104, Immigration 

Visa Issuances and Grounds for Exclusion: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 

than one category.14 These actors may be broadly distinguished and categorized by 

their motives and their behavior. • Terrorists.—A defining feature of terrorists is that they are motivated by particular grievances about aspects of the societies that surround them,15 and they 

articulate their views ‘‘on moral grounds.’’16 Based on their grievances and 

ideologies, terrorists generally have goals other than personal monetary gain.17

Terrorists often seek to instill fear among a targeted population to ‘‘destroy the 

collective confidence individuals invest in social institutions and... national 

leadership.’’18 Terrorists use violent tactics to direct public attention toward 

their grievances, gain recruits, or coerce people.19 Terrorists also promote their 

causes by fashioning propaganda. • Transnational criminals.—In contrast with terrorists, criminals generally are 

non-ideological, and fundamentally motivated by the pursuit of profit.20 People 

also participate in criminal organizations for reasons that involve other sorts of 

personal gain, such as ‘‘belonging to a powerful and even prestigious entity,’’21

or because of kinship, ethnic ties, or friendship.22 Profit incentives drive criminals to ‘‘provide goods and services that are illegal, regulated, or in short supply.’’23 They devote resources to enhancing their market-related activities, 

which can involve carving out and defending turf, devising novel smuggling 

techniques, managing and protecting supply chains, eliminating rivals, laundering money, and shielding their secrets from ‘‘competitors’’ (such as rival 

gangs and law enforcement).24 Violence plays a key role in criminal behavior, 

but it is rarely ideologically-driven.25 In addition, criminals may secure access 

to markets by corrupting or intimidating public officials or gaining influence 

over state activity.26

• Unauthorized migrants.—In addition to terrorists and certain criminals, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines as inadmissible, among others, any 

alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, arriving 

at an illegal time or place, or not in possession of a valid unexpired visa or 

other entry document.27 Unauthorized migrants—like legal migrants—may be 

motivated by some combination of employment opportunities, a general desire 

to improve their economic circumstances, family connections, and dangerous or 
44 

28See for example, Elizabeth Fussell, ‘‘Space, Time, and Volition: Dimensions of Migration 

Theory,’’ in Oxford Handbook of International Migration, ed. Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. 

Tichenor (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 25–52. 29See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal 

Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William Kandel. Also see for example, Lesley Williams Reid, 

Harald E. Weiss, and Robert M. Adelman, et al., ‘‘The Immigration-Crime Relationship: Evidence Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas,’’ Social Science Research, Vol. 34, no. 4 (December 2005: 

pp. 757–780. 30Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010, p. 6, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 

assets/qhsrlreport.pdf. 

difficult conditions in their home countries, among other factors.28 Apart from 

immigration-related offenses such as illegal entry or the use of fraudulent documents to obtain employment, some unauthorized aliens never commit a criminal 

offense.29

The differences among terrorists, transnational criminals, and ‘‘regular’’ unauthorized migrants are summarized in Table 1. 

Illegal Goods 

Any good that is smuggled in or out of the country is illegal and may pose security 

risks. Illegal goods fall into two categories distinguished by their inherent illegitimacy: Goods that are always illegal and categorically prohibited, and those that are 

potentially legal but illegitimate because they are smuggled to avoid enforcement of 

specific laws, taxes, or regulations. 

• Categorically prohibited goods include certain weapons, illegal drugs, and counterfeit goods.—Among illegal weapons, ‘‘high-consequence weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’’ are considered one of the primary threats to homeland security.30 Concerns over WMDs entering the United States generally involve worries over terrorists’ use of these weapons, yet some have raised concerns that 

criminal networks may—for the right price—attempt to smuggle WMDs or related materials. Illegal drugs comprise another set of illicit goods that challenges U.S. border security, as many drugs consumed in the United States are 
45 

31 CBP seized an average of 13,717 pounds of drugs each day in fiscal year 2011; see Customs 

and Border Protection, On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2011, March 7, 2012, http://cbp.gov/ 

linkhandler/cgov/about/accomplish/typicalldaylfy11.ctt/typicalldaylfy11.pdf. 32See CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by 

Shayerah Ilias and Ian F. Fergusson. 33 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Intellectual Property Rights Fact Sheet, http:// 

www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/factlsheets/trade/iprlfactlsheet.ctt/iprlfactlsheet.pdf. In fiscal year 2011, ICE and CBP had 24,792 seizures of counterfeit goods—25% more 

than in fiscal year 2010; see U.S. Customs and Border Protection, IPR Seizure Statistics, http:// 

www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/priorityltrade/ipr/iprlcommunications/seizure/. 34 International Tax and Investment Center, The Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and How 

to Tackle It, http://www.kangaroogroup.eu/DBlbeelden/bookletlillicitltradeltobaccolproducts.pdf. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Cigarette Smuggling Linked 

to Terrorism, June 18, 2004, http://www.atf.gov/pub/genlpub/cigarettesmuggling.pdf. 35 Cross-border movement of money is not inherently illegal, but certain practices are. In general, the movement of $10,000 or more out of the United States is illegal unless it is declared 

and reported; see 31 U.S.C. § 5332, 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a). 36Office of National Drug Control Strategy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics 

Strategy, June 2009, p. 25, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swblcounternarcoticslstrategy09/swblcounternarcoticslstrategy09.pdf. 37William Booth and Nick Miroff, ‘‘Stepped-Up Efforts by U.S., Mexico Fail to Stem Flow of 

Drug Money South,’’ Washington Post, August 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/25/AR2010082506161.html. In fiscal year 2011, CBP seized an 

average of $345,687 in undeclared or illicit currency each day—over $126 million total; Customs 

and Border Protection, On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year 2011, March 7, 2012, http://cbp.gov/ 

linkhandler/cgov/about/accomplish/typicalldaylfy11.ctt/typicalldaylfy11.pdf. 38See CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border, by Vivian S. Chu and 

William J. Krouse; and CRS Report RL32842, Gun Control Legislation, by William J. Krouse. 39See for example, DHS, Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine, Washington, DC, April 2011. 40Sven Ove Hansson, ‘‘From the Casino to the Jungle: Dealing with Uncertainty in Technological Risk Management,’’ Synthese, no. 168 (2009), p. 424. 

produced abroad and smuggled into the country.31 The smuggling of counterfeit 

and pirated goods into the United States has also been identified as a threat 

to border security.32 This smuggling violates intellectual property rights (IPR) 

and ‘‘threaten[s] America’s economic vitality and National security, and the 

American people’s health and safety.’’33

• Illegal via Smuggling.—Goods that are not categorically prohibited are still illegal if they are smuggled into or out of the United States. For instance, alcohol 

and cigarettes, while generally legal and regulated in the United States, are 

sometimes smuggled to circumvent taxes or to evade other laws. Proceeds from 

the smuggling of cigarettes have been linked to the financing of terrorist operations abroad.34 Other legal products, such as textiles or agricultural products, 

may be mislabeled to avoid tariffs or circumvent quotas. Illegal outflows are 

also a concern, particularly as they relate to transnational criminal organizations. Bulk cash smuggling35 is one of the primary means by which criminals 

move their illicit proceeds out of the United States.36 Between $20 billion and 

$25 billion in bank notes may be smuggled across the Southwest Border into 

Mexico each year.37 Analysts also believe that Mexican DTOs purchase firearms 

in the United States and smuggle these weapons to Mexico, where they may 

contribute to trafficking-related violence.38

UNDERSTANDING BORDER THREATS AND RISK

A fundamental challenge for border security policymaking is the uncertainty and 

fear surrounding border threats: Many different threats exist, threat actors do not 

announce their intentions or capabilities, and our understanding of the underlying 

issues is imperfect. Thus, rather than attempting specific predictions about where, 

when, and how border threats will be realized, analysts often rely on probabilistic 

risk models as a framework for analyzing different types of potential threats.39

The standard components of many risk models include estimates of the likelihood 

of a threat (or adverse event) and the potential consequence of the event. Risk is 

modeled as a positive function of these two components, so that risk increases with 

the likelihood and potential consequences associated with a particular threat (see 

Figure 2). Put another way, this model of risk may be understood as ‘‘as the statistical expect[ed] value of an unwanted event that may or may not occur.’’40
46 

41See for example, National Research Council, Committee on Methodological Improvements 

to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Agent Risk Analysis, Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008). Also see Barry Charles Ezell, Steven P. Bennett, and Detloff von 

Winterfeldt, et al., ‘‘Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk,’’ Risk Analysis, vol. 30, no. 

4 (2010). 42 Ibid. 43See CRS Report 42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, 

by Marc. R. Rosenblum. 44See for example, the White House, ‘‘Drug Availability Estimates in the United States, 

2012,’’ http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/daeuslreportlfinall1.pdf. 

Thus, as Figure 2 illustrates, events that are unlikely to occur, and that would 

have low consequences if they did occur, are especially low-risk threats. Conversely, 

an event that is likely to occur, and that would have severe consequences, is an especially high-risk threat. Threats exist between these two extremes, including highlikelihood, low-consequence threats and low-likelihood, high-consequence threats. 

DHS employs this general framework for many of its risk management programs, 

including for example the Homeland Security Grant Program and the Strategic National Risk Assessment. Some experts have raised questions about whether this type 

of risk model is the right approach to understanding border threats.41 An alternative approach, based on game theory, places more emphasis on strategic planning 

by terrorists and other threat actors, who may attempt to exploit weakness in U.S. 

defenses.42

Likelihood of Border Threats 

Historical data may allow analysts to calculate past frequencies and use them to 

estimate probabilities. In the case of unauthorized migration, for example, CBP and 

the legacy INS have used apprehensions of unauthorized migrants by the Border 

Patrol as a proxy to estimate unauthorized inflows.43 Apprehensions and survey 

data also may offer insight into illegal drug flows, in this case by analyzing drug 

seizures and data on the availability of illegal drugs within the United States.44

Yet deriving probabilities from historical observations is problematic because 

measures of past frequencies are only of known frequencies and not actual flows. 

For instance, while data from the National Seizure System indicate that over 1.7 
47 

45Data provided to CRS by the National Drug Intelligence Center. Data cover seizures of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA, and methamphetamine. 46Mark Jablonowski, Precautionary Risk Management: Dealing with Catastrophic Loss Potentials in Business, the Community, and Society (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). 47 Ibid. 48See for example DHS Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon, p. 20, http:// 

www.dhs.gov/dhs-risk-lexicon. 49 NRC, DHS Risk Assessment; Ezell et al., ‘‘Probabilistic Risk Analysis.’’ 50See for example, Charles Meade and Roger C. Molader, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, Santa Monica, 

CA, 2006, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technicallreports/2006/RANDlTR391.pdf; also see 

Continued 

million kilograms of illegal drugs were seized along the Southwest Border in 2010,45

this is not indicative of the total amount of illicit drugs smuggled across the Southwest Border and into the United States for that time period. Any estimates of illegal 

inflows—whether of drugs, unauthorized migrants, or some other illicit flow—are 

just that: Estimates. 

Learning from past history is even more problematic when it comes to extremely 

rare events like attempted terrorist attacks. Probability models based on historical 

frequencies are poorly equipped to describe one-in-a-million chances, or to distinguish among, say, probabilities of one-in-a-million versus one-in-a-billion or one-inone-hundred-thousand.46 Especially when the stakes are high, as with terrorism, 

rare event probability models may not generate precise predictions about future 

likelihood.47 Partly for this reason, the intelligence community often describes likelihood in terms of qualitative ranges, such as ‘‘remote,’’ ‘‘unlikely,’’ ‘‘probable,’’ etc.48

More generally, historical analysis is limited because ‘‘past performance is no 

guarantee of future results.’’ Changes to the underlying model may invalidate longterm probabilities. Scientists use long-term frequencies to calculate the probability 

of severe weather, for example; but some people believe that rising temperatures 

and sea level may have altered climate dynamics so that probability models describing ‘‘500-year’’ floods and ‘‘100-year’’ storms may no longer be accurate. Similarly, 

some social scientists believe changes in U.S. and Mexican labor markets and demographics, along with the decades-long escalation in U.S. enforcement, may have fundamentally altered regional immigration dynamics. 

Analysts may improve upon historical frequencies by relying on subject field experts to make more informed predictions about the expected frequency of future 

events. With respect to the threat of terrorism, for example, Federal law enforcement, security agencies, and elements within the intelligence community use intelligence analysis to estimate the likelihood of a terrorist attack. This involves many 

factors aside from historical frequency, such as probing and evaluating the motives 

of threat actors, their organizational structures, and their capabilities, as well as estimating the impact of broad social, political, or economic forces on these actors. Analysts may look at similar data along with U.S. market forces to estimate the future 

likelihood of illegal drug flows and other contraband; and they may examine market 

and social forces to model future migration flows. 

The Strategic Adversary Problem 

Regardless of the methodology, a fundamental challenge to estimating the likelihood of border threats is that threat actors like unauthorized migrants, 

transnational criminal organizations, and potential terrorists are strategic adversaries who may adapt their behavior in response to U.S. border enforcement efforts.49 In this regard, risk models for border security differ in important ways from 

risk models for natural disasters, industrial failures, or financial markets, for example. The strategic adversary problem means that any effort to describe the likelihood 

of a given threat must account for given security conditions. And any particular risk 

assessment can only represent a ‘‘snapshot’’ at a single point in time within a constantly evolving dynamic system. 

Potential Consequences of Border Threats 

Border threats may result in a range of potential consequences, and policymakers 

may disagree about how to evaluate them. The process of evaluating consequences 

includes at least three discrete tasks: Defining the scope of a threat (i.e., the types 

of consequences), measuring the potential impact, and attaching value to the impact. 

• Defining consequences.—The first step in evaluating the potential consequences 

of a given threat is to define its scope: What type of impact may occur? Many 

traditional risk assessment methodologies limit their analysis to concrete criteria, including in particular direct economic costs and loss of life.50 An advan-
48 

Sara Clucking, ‘‘DHS S&T Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA),’’ International Symposium on 

Bioterrorism Risk, October 6, 2009, http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/ibtr/subpages/pastConf/ 

20082009/albuquerque/6dhs3.pdf. 51Department of Homeland Security, The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of 

PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach Toward a Secure and Resilient Nation, December 

2011, p. 5, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.- 

pdf. 52For more information on organized retail crime, see CRS Report R41118, Organized Retail 

Crime, by Kristin M. Finklea. 53For instance, Federal law enforcement has reputedly traced the illicit proceeds from the 

theft and resale of infant formula to terrorist organizations and insurgent groups, including 

Hezbollah; see testimony by David Johnson, Section Chief, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Combating Organized Retail Crime: 

The Role of Federal Law Enforcement, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 5, 2009. 54Fiscal impacts are just one of three main types of economic effects, along with the effect 

of migration on native-born wages and its effect on economic growth. 55See CRS Report R42053, Fiscal Impacts of the Foreign-Born Population, by William A. 

Kandel. 56For a discussion of motive or purpose, see: Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age 

of Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 22–23. 

tage to defining consequences narrowly in this way is that both of these criteria 

are easy to quantify (i.e., in dollars and in the absolute number of lost lives). 

An alternative approach considers a wider scope of consequences. In its Strategic National Risk Assessment, for example, DHS has conceptualized six broad 

categories of potential consequences: Loss of life, injuries and illness, direct economic costs, social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impact.51 An advantage to adopting this more expansive definition is that, for certain types of threats, these additional consequences may be at least as important as economic and mortality effects. On the other hand, psychological and sociological effects may be far more difficult to define and quantify. 

• Measuring consequences.—Within any given category of consequences, a second 

challenge is how to measure the impact of a given threat. How close in time 

and space must a given consequence be to attribute it to a particular security 

incident? For example, what are the economic consequences of a transnational 

retail crime network?52 Retailers incur direct economic costs from the loss of the 

pilfered goods, and also may incur second-degree costs from security spending 

to prevent merchandise loss. There may be third-degree costs if the criminal 

network sells the stolen products and use the proceeds to further additional 

criminal operations.53 Are economic costs limited to the duped retailer, or do 

they also include the costs to public and private security agencies charged with 

investigating the crimes and related criminal activities? Partly for these reasons, analysts disagree—often by wide margins—about the potential consequences of different types of threats. In the case of unauthorized migration, 

for example, even when the analysis is limited to the narrowest economic question of fiscal impact,54 estimates of net effects vary by wide margins.55

• Valuing Consequences.—How one evaluates consequences depends on who is 

making the judgment. For example, the smuggling of counterfeit medication impacts a range of individuals from law enforcement officers, to individuals consuming the counterfeit drugs, to the legitimate manufacturer. Consumers may 

place the greatest value on the potential health consequences of consuming the 

counterfeit product, while manufacturers may perceive the issue primarily in 

economic terms based on lost sales revenues and reputational costs. A distinction also may be drawn in terms of the motives of threat actors.56 What is more 

threatening: Terrorists who intend to harm U.S. interests, drug traffickers who 

intend to earn illicit profits but cause mayhem in the process, or an infectious 

disease outbreak that is not motivated by malicious intent? Ultimately, how one 

defines the scope of a threat (i.e., what categories of consequences are considered) and how one weighs each category are inherently subjective considerations. There is no ‘‘correct’’ way to value the loss of a human life, for example, 

or the destruction of a particular ecological habitat, or disregard for the rule of 

law. 

DISCUSSION OF SELECTED THREAT SCENARIOS

Lawmakers may use information about estimated likelihood and potential consequences of threat scenarios to develop their own ‘‘maps’’ of border risks in order 

to set enforcement priorities. At a general level, for example, many people would 

agree that certain threat scenarios involving terrorist attacks against the United 
49 

57See for example, testimony by Michael Fisher, Chief, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Office of Border Patrol, before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Measuring Border Security: U.S. Border Patrol’s New Strategic Plan 

and the Path Forward, 112th Congress, 2nd sess., May 8, 2012. 58 U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2011,’’ July 31, 2012, http:// 

www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/index.htm. On terrorism in Latin America, see CRS Report 

RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel. In addition, 

out of 40 post-9/11 terrorist plots identified in one recent study, none had a nexus with the 

Southwest Border; see James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, ‘‘40 Terror Plots Foiled 

Since 9/11: Combating Complacency in the Long War on Terror,’’ The Heritage Foundation, 

backgrounder No. 2604, September 7, 2011 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/ 

40-terror-plots-foiled-since-9-11-combating-complacency-in-the-long-war-on-terror. 59Over 90% of Mexicans attempting to cross the border eventually succeed after a first apprehension; see David Fitzgerald and Rafael Alarco ́n, ‘‘Migration: Policies and Politics’’ in Mexico 

and the United States: Strengthening the Partnership, edited by Andrew Selee and Peter H. 

Smith. New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming. 60 Ibid. 61See for example testimony by Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security, Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at America’s Northern Border and 

Ports of Entry, 112th Congress., 1st sess., May 17, 2011. Also see Stewart M. Powell, ‘‘Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas from Mexico?’’ Houston Chronicle, December 2, 2011 http:// 

www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-Texas-from2341185.php. 62 CRS analysis of data provided by U.S. Border Patrol Office of Legislative Affairs. Specialinterest countries are defined based on a list of 35 special interest countries identified by CBP 

in 2004. These numbers should be interpreted with caution because the vast majority of aliens 

from special-interest countries have no ties to terrorist groups, and because these data do not 

reflect aliens from special-interest countries who evade detection. 63See CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli. 64 Charles Meade and Roger C. Molader, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist 

Attack, RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, Santa Monica, CA, 2006, http:// 

www.rand.org/pubs/technicallreports/2006/RANDlTR391.pdf. 65The White House, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, November 2009, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/NationallStrategylforlCounteringlBioThreats.pdf. 66 ‘‘The Reckoning: America and the World a Decade After 9/11.’’ New York Times, September 

8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/sept-11-reckoning/viewer.html. 

States are low likelihood risks but could have very high consequences, while the 

threat of unauthorized migration flows is more likely, but has lower consequences.57

With respect to the likelihood of terrorist threats at the Southwest Border, the 

State Department reports no known operational cells of Hezbollah or al-Qaeda in 

the Western Hemisphere;58 and CRS is not aware of any publically available evidence of ties between Mexican DTOs and homegrown terrorists. Terrorists may see 

crossing the Southwest Border between ports of entry as a high-risk strategy, because 30–50% of unauthorized Mexican border crossers are apprehended at least 

once while attempting to enter the United States.59 The apprehension rate is about 

twice as high for aliens crossing between ports of entry as for those who attempt 

to enter through a port without inspection or using a fraudulent document.60 And 

anecdotal evidence suggests that apprehension rates are probably lower still at the 

Northern Border and coastal borders. Thus, some analysts consider other modes of 

entry to be at greater risk of terrorist incursion.61 This intuition is backed up by 

data on apprehensions of unauthorized aliens from special interest countries: 2.3% 

of aliens apprehended at the Northern Border in fiscal year 2006–fiscal year 2011 

were from special interest countries, compared to 0.05% of aliens apprehended at 

the Southwest Border.62

A terrorist attack involving WMD may be particularly unlikely because of the 

technical and practical challenges to obtaining WMD materials and designing a delivery system.63 Yet the potential consequences of a successful WMD attack on U.S. 

soil are sufficiently catastrophic that lawmakers may take such a threat very seriously. One estimate suggests that a 10 kiloton nuclear detonation at the Port of 

Long Beach, CA would kill 60,000 people in its immediate aftermath and cost more 

than $1 trillion dollars.64 The release of a lethal biological agent in an unprotected 

population could cause untold number of deaths and economic costs exceeding $1 

trillion dollars.65 Even without WMD, the 9/11 attack claimed 2,753 lives in New 

York City alone, and has been estimated to have caused $55 billion in destroyed and 

damaged property. The broader economic impacts likely ranged between $40 billion 

and $122 billion.66

On the other hand, with respect to the likelihood of unauthorized migration, even 

in a year in which apprehensions of unauthorized migrants fell to a 4-decade low, 
50 

67 U.S. Border Patrol, ‘‘Apprehensions/Seizure Statistics—Fiscal Year 2011,’’ http:// 

www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/borderlsecurity/borderlpatrol/usbplstatistics/fylprofilel- 2011.ctt/fylprofilel2011.pdf. This number includes an unknown number of repeat apprehensions, so the number of unique individuals apprehended likely was substantially less than 

340,000. 68This discussion does not include an analysis of the social, psychological, and cultural effects 

of a terrorist attack or of unauthorized migration. These effects are subjective and difficult to 

quantify, but some people may view them as important. 69See CRS Report R42053, Fiscal Impacts of the Foreign-Born Population, by William A. 

Kandel. 70One recent study concludes that the overall economic impact of unauthorized migration is 

‘‘close enough to zero to be essentially a wash’’; see Gordon Hanson, ‘‘The Economics and Policy 

of Illegal Immigration in the United States,’’ Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, December 2009, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Hanson-Dec09.pdf. 71See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal 

Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William Kandel. Also see for example, Lesley Williams Reid, 

Harald E. Weiss, and Robert M. Adelman, et al., ‘‘The Immigration-Crime Relationship: Evidence Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas,’’ Social Science Research, Vol. 34, no. 4 (December 2005): 

pp. 757–780. Available data make it difficult to estimate the criminality rate exclusively among 

unauthorized migrants. 72 CRS analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data; also see CRS Report R41075, 

Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, by Kristin 

M. Finklea. 73 As noted above, uncertainty about the likelihood of different illegal flows and inherent subjectivity about their consequences mean there is no ‘‘right’’ answer to this question. 74See Pub. L. 109–367, § (2)(b). 75See for example, testimony by Doris Meissner, Director, U.S. Immigration Policy Program, 

Migration Policy Institute, before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, Securing the Border: Building on the Progress Made, 112th Cong., 

1st sess., March 30, 2011. 

the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended 340,252 unauthorized migrants in fiscal year 

2011.67 This number overstates the number of unique individuals apprehended, 

since it includes an unknown number of repeat apprehensions; but it may understate unauthorized inflows because it excludes people who successfully enter the 

United States (by crossing the border between ports of entry, being smuggled without inspection through a port, using fraudulent documents to enter through a port, 

or entering legally and then overstaying or otherwise violating the terms of a visa). 

Yet the consequences of unauthorized migration may be considered less severe 

that those associated with terrorist threats and some other illegal flows.68 From an 

economic perspective, for example, while research on fiscal effects reaches conflicting 

findings,69 the weight of economic research suggests that the overall impact of unauthorized migration is not highly significant.70 Likewise, from a public safety perspective, while a large proportion of Federal inmates are foreign-born, research by 

CRS and others suggests that the overall criminality rate among the foreign-born 

(i.e., including legal and unauthorized migrants, at the Federal, State, and local 

level) likely is no more than—and possibly is below—the native-born rate.71 Even 

within the border region, while violence has increased on the Mexican side of the 

border, violent crime rates have not significantly increased in U.S. border cities or 

in other metropolitan areas where there has been an identified presence of Mexican 

DTOs. And there was no significant difference between average violent crime rates 

in border and non-border metropolitan areas in fiscal year 2000–fiscal year 2010.72

POLICY OPTIONS

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the convergence of immigration control, the 

war on drugs, and the urgency attached to the war on terror meant that DHS took 

an all-of-the-above approach to border security. But even when budgets are expanding, Congress and DHS face trade-offs among the different elements of DHS’ mission. As budgeting has grown tighter in the current fiscal climate, policymakers face 

increasingly hard questions about how to set priorities and where to allocate scarce 

resources. Members of Congress may ask whether border security and other DHS policies 

should be designed to prevent unauthorized migration in general, or whether policies should be tailored to target terrorists, transnational gang, or illegal drugs.73

While DHS prioritizes counterterrorism, certain border security and immigration 

control policies may have been designed with a more generalized set of goals. Indeed, the Secure Fence Act defines zero illegal inflows as part of DHS’ statutory 

mission.74 Many analysts doubt that an open country in a globalized economy can 

ever achieve a 100% interdiction rate—and some question whether such a standard 

is even worth aspiring to.75 Moreover, even at current interdiction levels, the population of unauthorized migrants in the United States has declined by about a million 
51 

76See Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, ‘‘Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011,’’ DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, March 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ 

oislilllpel2011.pdf; Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, ‘‘Net Migration 

from Mexico Falls to Zero—and Perhaps Less,’’ Pew Hispanic Center, May 3, 2012, http:// 

www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/; 

Scott Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts ‘‘The Decision to Emigrate From Mexico,’’ 

presentation at the Society of Government Economists annual conference, November 6, 2012. 77Total illegal drug seizures along the Southwest Border increased from 1.1 to 1.7 kilograms 

in 2005–2010; see CRS Report 41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and 

Measuring Spillover Violence, coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea. According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), 8.9% of Americans aged 12 or older used an illicit drug in 2010, 

the latest year for which data are available, up from 8.3% in 2002; see NIDA, ‘‘Drug Facts: Nationwide Trends,’’ http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/nationwide-trends. 78One recent study found that illegal inflows fell about 60 percent between 2004 and 2010, 

with 40% of the reduction due to a stronger Mexican economy, 30% of the reduction due to increased U.S. border enforcement, and 30% of the reduction due to the weaker U.S. economy; 

see Scott Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts ‘‘The Decision to Emigrate From Mexico,’’ 

presentation at the Society of Government Economists annual conference, November 6, 2012. 79See for example, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (Jordan Commission), U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1994). 

people since 2007, and net inflows apparently have declined to about zero or become 

somewhat negative.76 In contrast, illegal drug flows do not appear to have declined 

over this period.77 It is difficult to estimate changes in the likelihood that terrorists 

will cross the Southwest Border. 

In addition to setting overall priorities, Members of Congress may consider where 

DHS may get the most effective return on future enforcement investments. Lawmakers concerned about illegal drug flows, for example, may favor increased investments at ports of entry, such as more CBP officers, non-intrusive inspection scanners, and drug-sniffing dogs. In addition, DHS and other law enforcement agencies 

may combat traffickers’ business models by taking additional action to disrupt DTO 

money-laundering schemes and to detect and prevent southbound flows of money 

and guns. 

For Members focused on counterterrorism, priorities might include continued investments in DHS information systems, such as the CBP Automated Targeting System, US–VISIT, and the Automated Commercial Environment, along with investments in intelligence collection programs to ensure that the right data are being 

analyzed. In addition to terrorism prevention, some Members may also emphasize 

investments in resiliency, or the ability to survive and manage a terrorist attack. 

With respect to both counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts, some of the most 

important work may involve bilateral and multilateral partnerships with allies 

abroad. 

With net unauthorized migration flows at around zero, two key questions for 

Members concerned about unauthorized migration are how recent DHS policies like 

increased border personnel, CBP’s consequence delivery system, and ICE’s Secure 

Communities program have contributed to these recent trends; and the degree to 

which unauthorized flows will increase as the U.S. economy recovers and new hiring 

resumes.78 For many years, some have argued that the greatest deficiency in America’s immigration control system involves employment eligibility verification and 

worksite enforcement, rather than border control.79 And some believe that it will be 

impossible to achieve further reductions in unauthorized migration without revisions of existing visa categories and avenues for certain unauthorized migrants to 

qualify for legal status—though others believe that enforcement should be further 

strengthened before Congress considers broader immigration reforms. 

CONCLUDING COMMENT

In sum, DHS’ border security mission is broader than any single type of border 

threat. And policies to combat terrorism, criminal networks, unauthorized migration, and other illegal flows likewise are broader than border security per se, as they 

include enforcement within the United States and abroad. Understanding the differences among these threats, their relative risks, and how policies may be designed 

to respond to them is a logical starting point for a conversation about how to allocate scarce enforcement resources. 

I thank the committee again for this opportunity to testify and look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you Dr. Rosenblum. 
52 

The Ranking Member has to leave here shortly so he will be recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for just allowing me to do that. 

I had two areas I just wanted to focus on, it is very hard—you 

covered so much ground—to focus in on areas. But one of them 

that I think you will have some concern with is the issue the challenges we face with different Federal agencies and how they coordinate and don’t coordinate with each other as well, how some have 

greater abilities to deal with these issues and others don’t. For instance, DEA has some I think some statutory abilities that other 

agencies don’t have, to follow some of these things. 

I just want to ask the panelists, whoever wants to step up, how 

best can we coordinate these different agencies so that we are 

working together on this issue? I think it is an important issue. 

That is why I want that to be the really one of my two questions. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Sir, if I could take the first stab at that. Well, you 

are exactly right. The DEA does have authorities that Congress 

wisely provided to them to treat the terrorism issue as it runs parallel with drug trafficking. They have a task force that brings all 

of the various agencies, intelligence, law enforcement, and others 

together to coordinate some of their work. 

It has to be treated, though, as a higher priority. 

I think Representative Duncan’s legislation, which passed unanimously in the House and enjoys bipartisan support in the Senate, 

would be an important part of getting all of the agencies to do a 

whole-of-Government assessment and produce a strategy and hopefully elevate this as a priority. You see some U.S. Attorneys putting 

in vast hours on these things, and unless Justice treats it as a priority, you are not going to see indictments coming forward. So I 

would just suggest that that is extraordinarily important. 

Then the State Department, really, I worked there for 10 years, 

some of these people are long-time friends, at least acquaintances, 

and if they, if you did a report on the State Department, you would 

title it ‘‘head in the sand’’ because they completely—they drag their 

feet. They prevent law enforcement from doing its work, and I have 

specific examples of all that. If they said there aren’t operational 

cells, it isn’t lack of imagination; it is lack of vision that is being 

on display there. I have seen that statement before, and I just have 

to disagree with it. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Keating, if I can also expand on that really 

quickly. 

In addition to looking at the alphabet soup in the various agencies and departments at the Federal level, obviously, State and 

local play a significant role here. When you look at LAPD, they 

would probably have a better position on some of the government 

of Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah activities in the United States. 

So we have got to continue to the support and look to ways that 

we can improve our fusion centers between Federal, State, local. 

But let me also add one other set of issues. In addition to the 

agencies, you have got doctrinal challenges. Is this a counterterrorism issue? Is it a counterinsurgency issue? Is it a counter-crime 

issue? The reality is, it is all of the above. What you want to be 

able to do is bring out the best of all of those entities. So, however 
53 

we structure it, we have got to start thinking doctrinally how do 

we address these issues as well. 

I would just add, the Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA, I 

would argue is, if not the top, is one of the top agencies in the 

world when it comes to human intelligence. I will tell you all the 

technology in the world we need to bring to bear, it is going to take 

multiple intelligence disciplines and sources. But at the end of the 

day this is still a humint business. It is about human intelligence. 

I would like to see that tapped in a greater way to get at the priority that Ambassador Noriega discussed. 

Mr. KEATING. I know we did grant them greater authority, and 

they do have ability to talk about and to investigate some of the 

issues we have talked about in terms of laundering and other 

issues, and that information could be valuable if it is transferred 

successfully among agencies. 

I do want to just touch base on the second thrust I have. As a 

committee, we have to have a way of measuring resources in how 

we go forward. I am worried about when you have so many diverse 

issues all coming together, I am worried that the metrics that are 

involved may not be such that we can look at things. Are we always going to be looking at apples and oranges? Could you comment on how effective the metrics are—how effective that is now 

in being able for us to utilize that to see if resources are being effective or not, or how they could be changed to make us, put us in 

a better position so we can evaluate where our resources go? 

Maybe, Dr. Rosenblum, I can start with you. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Thank you. I know this is a question that many 

Members of Congress have been focused on, and I think it is an important and good question. I can speak most directly to immigration control metrics and that component of border security. DHS 

for almost 10 years now has been building its biometric database, 

US–VISIT, that tracks people who are apprehended anywhere 

along the border, and they have developed much better capacity to 

measure, for example, how people who come through different enforcement pipelines, what their recidivism rate, what their re-apprehension rate is, although those data aren’t public, but it is 

something that Congress has expressed an interest in, and I hope 

that we will have a chance to look at those data and to be able to 

evaluate programs through those data. 

I think as you get into these more complex threats and certainly 

with terrorism and the nexus in Latin America, again, it comes 

down to intelligence because on those kinds of issues, what we 

have to measure—with migration we have got people to count, we 

can count apprehensions. So the measurement is less of a problem, 

and it is the analysis. With some of these more uncertain things, 

we need the intelligence so that we know we are looking at the 

right things. 

Mr. KEATING. I would just, a final comment. I am glad that I 

don’t know which one of our witnesses just a moment ago had said 

that local law enforcement has to be a part of this. I agree that it 

does. 

We were in the port of Houston with one of our field visits that 

came back to us very strongly that COPS programs, other ways to 

make sure there are resources at the local level, make sure they 
54 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

1 Congressmen Michael T. McCaul (TX–10) Henry Cuellar (TX–28), Tom Graves (GA–09), Jeff 

Duncan (SC–03), and Robert Turner (NY–09). 2Mexico.—(Mexico City) U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Anthony Wayne and Country Team; National Security and Investigations Center (CISEN) Director Jaime Domingo Lo ́pez Buitro ́n and 

staff; and Secretary of Public Security, Genaro Garcia Luna and staff. Colombia.—(Bogota) U.S. 

Ambassador to Colombia Peter Michael McKinley and Country Team; Narcotics Affairs Eradication Chief Alexandra Z. Tenny; Narcotics Affairs Aviation Chief Ted Harkin; Major General 

Jose Perez Mejia, Chief of Defense; Melgar Base Commander Col Losada; Pijaos Base Commander Col Ramirez; Narcotics Affairs Interdiction Chief Michael Schreuder; Narcotics Affairs 

Jungla Advisor William Worley; and Narcotics Affairs Rural Police Advisor Roberto Valles. 

Paraguay.—(Ciudad Del Este) U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay James Thessin and Country Team; 

and Chief of Paraguayan National Police—Counter Terrorism Unit Carlos Humberto Benitez 

Gonzalez. Argentina.—(Buenos Aires) Charge d’Affaires Alexis Ludwig and Country Team; Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA); and Minister for Foreign Affairs He ́ctor Marcos 

Timerman. 

are available, are important front-line issues for intelligence and 

enforcement, but particularly for intelligence purposes. So I am 

glad you brought that point up. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for taking me out of turn, 

and I yield back my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you as well. 

Let me first commend the committee staff for putting together 

this report, which we had written this 5 years ago. This is the second volume, if you will, of ‘‘A Line in the Sand.’’ 

I would like to submit it, without objection, into the record,* as 

well as a letter that we sent to the administration, to the Assistant 

to the President for National Security Affairs, after we took a delegation, led a delegation down to Latin America to look at the very 

issues that we are discussing here today. I would like to enter that 

into the record as well. Also state that this letter was sent on October 5, and we have yet to receive any sort of response from the administration. 

[The information follows:] 

LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL TO THOMAS DONILON

OCTOBER 5, 2012. 

Mr. THOMAS DONILON, 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Executive Office 

Building, Washington, DC 20501–0005. 

DEAR MR. DONILON: We recently returned from a bipartisan Congressional Delegation (Codel)1 overseas, which included stops in Mexico, Colombia, Paraguay, and 

Argentina. Based on this trip the Delegation developed several observations and recommendations listed below for your consideration. 

The purpose of the trip was to examine the Iranian and Hezbollah presence in 

South America, the threat to the Southwest Border from terrorists and drug cartels, 

and to acquire information about the terrorist pipeline from the Middle East into 

South America. In each country we met with the U.S. country team, foreign leaders, 

and other key officials to gain more insight on this evolving threat, which ultimately 

affects the security of our homeland.2

MEXICO

OBSERVATION.—The Government Accountability Office concludes only 873 

miles of our 1,969-mile border with Mexico is under operational control and only 129 

miles are under full control. This problem is compounded by the fact that the Mexican government does not have the capacity to effectively control much of their side 

of the border. Recognizing this concern, the Mexican government passed a law to 

build its border patrol capacity. However there is no funding available for this initiative. 

RECOMMENDATION.—The U.S. Government should redirect some of the Me ́rida 

initiative funds to help Mexico build its capacity to control their side of the border. 

RECOMMENDATION.—The U.S. Government should pursue with Mexico a bilateral strategy deploying unused U.S. Department of Defense assets returned from 
55 

Iraq and Afghanistan such as unmanned aerial vehicles, tethered aerostats, and integrated fixed towers along each side of the border. The information gathered by 

these shared technologies should be symmetrical, managed respectfully, and have 

clear protocols concerning how it will be used. 

RECOMMENDATION.—Continue to foster cooperation between the Governments 

of Colombia and Mexico so that Mexico has the benefit of Colombia’s experience 

dealing with drug cartels. The U.S. Government should help facilitate regular meetings between the two countries. 

RECOMMENDATION.—Continue pursuing with Mexico a shared biometric system that could be used to track human smuggling of Special Interest Aliens (SIAs). 

OBSERVATION.—Qods Force and Hezbollah are in Mexico and fully aware of the 

porous border between the United States and Mexico. The Mexican government 

shares our concerns. Mexico considers the Arbabsiar case a success story because 

it highlighted the close information-sharing relationship between the United States 

and Mexico. The Mexican government stated the case was an ‘‘eye opener;’’ the 

threat is still here, but it’s not known how large. 

Qods Force and Hezbollah are actively researching human smuggling routes and 

establishing relationships with drug cartels who have knowledge of known routes 

into the United States. These relationships between Iran, Hezbollah, and organized 

criminal organizations could potentially assist in strikes against the homeland. 

RECOMMENDATION.—U.S. intelligence agencies, in conjunction with CISEN, 

should develop as a priority mission with additional resources and authorities targeting Iran and Hezbollah operatives in Mexico and throughout the region. This priority targeting should help provide U.S. operational entities some advance notice of 

possible terrorist attacks against the homeland. 

COLOMBIA

OBSERVATION.—Although Plan Colombia has had considerable success in combating the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a narco-terrorist organization, the war has yet to be won, and challenges remain. The FARC continues 

to adapt and rebuild itself along the borders with Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador. 

There does not appear to be a strategy to combat the emerging threat of FARC operations in other countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia. Additionally, activity by 

smaller drug and criminal organizations has increased in the region. 

RECOMMENDATION.—The United States should increase efforts to assist Colombia interdict and eradicate cocaine, enhance information sharing, provide continued resources for Colombia’s special operation forces, and send advisors to assist Colombian officials reform their judicial system. 

OBSERVATION.—Cocaine is the ‘‘Center of Gravity’’ in Colombia’s fight against 

the FARC. Cocaine funds terrorist organizations. South America is considered a 

‘‘cash cow’’ for terrorist operations. 92% of FARC activity occurs where cocaine is 

grown. The FARC is the first leg in the supply chain for cocaine bound for the 

United States and operates and owns complete supply lines into the United States. 

An example of the nexus between the FARC and the Mexican drug cartels is the 

November 2011 indictment of the Ayman Joumaa network. Joumaa is the alleged 

leader of an international drug-trafficking and money-laundering network that coordinated multi-ton shipments of cocaine from Colombia to the Los Zetas Mexican 

drug cartel. He also laundered hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds back 

to the Colombian suppliers and Hezbollah. These actions underscore major links between terrorist organizations and major South American narcotics money-laundering organizations. 

RECOMMENDATION.—As cocaine use in the United States is a large funding 

source for terrorist organizations, the administration should expand telegraphing 

this fact to the American public, and make the point that those who use cocaine 

fund terrorists. 

OBSERVATION.—Venezuela is a safe haven for not only Iran and Hezbollah, but 

also the FARC. The Colombian government has evidence of a Venezuelan Army helicopter providing operational support to the FARC. The Colombian government also 

has evidence of Venezuelan government officials working for the FARC narco-terrorist organization. Additionally, Hezbollah is connected to communities in Colombia 

where the FARC is operating, which provides support back to the terrorist organization. Hezbollah is also purchasing cocaine from the FARC. FARC weapons were 

found to be from Russia and Venezuela. 

From these observations, we conclude the FARC is operating with Iran and 

Hezbollah in Venezuela, and the Venezuelan government is complicit in these operations. 
56 

RECOMMENDATION.—The U.S. Government should consider designating Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism. 

PARAGUAY

OBSERVATION.—The Tri-Border region is identified as a center that finances Islamic terrorism. Hezbollah has a well-known and established presence in the TriBorder region. Additionally, Iranian government officials have been found entering 

Paraguay with Venezuelan passports and meeting with Hezbollah operatives. Shops 

are owned and operated by Hezbollah and in one particular mall you must be a 

Hezbollah sympathizer in order to rent space in that location. A sizable amount of 

profits from these shops go to the Middle East to fund terrorists. 

While the region is mainly known for illicit financing and money-laundering activities, it was reported in December 2006 that Ali Muhammad Kazan, a leader in 

Hezbollah’s political structure and who served as a commanding member of counterintelligence for Hezbollah was present in the Tri-Border region. According to the 

2011 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the Barakat Network in the 

Tri-Border area is another example of drug money being funneled to Hezbollah. Although the total amount of money being sent to Hezbollah is difficult to determine, 

the Brakat network provided, and perhaps still provides, a large part of the $20 million sent annually from the Tri-Border Area to finance Hezbollah and its operations 

around the world. 

Unfortunately, high levels of corruption within law enforcement and the judicial 

system, along with weak terrorism-related laws, continue to exacerbate and allow 

these terrorist organizations to operate in the region. 

RECOMMENDATION.—The U.S. Government should increase resources and 

work more closely with the Paraguayan government to aid in building a more trusted and capable law enforcement and legal system and establish more effective terrorism-related laws related to financing of terrorist organizations. 

RECOMMENDATION.—While the Codel was in Paraguay, the Brazilian government recently announced they plan to send 10,000 troops to the lawless Tri-Border 

region in part to address these transnational criminal and terrorism-related security 

threats. The U.S. Government should support these efforts and work with the Brazilian government in sharing information that could target and dismantle these 

Hezbollah financing operations. 

ARGENTINA

OBSERVATION.—Hezbollah and Iran launched two terrorist attacks from the 

Tri-Border region in 1992 and 1994, which destroyed the Israeli embassy and the 

Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires. These terrorist attacks were against soft 

targets. The planners of the attacks have not been brought to justice. Of the six Iranian citizens accused of plotting these attacks, one suspect in particular, the Minister of Defense of Iran, was recently in Bolivia to open up a military school. The 

Bolivian government apologized and claimed to not have known about the connections between the Iranian Minister of Defense and the terrorist attacks. 

RECOMMENDATION.—The U.S. Government should work with Argentina to 

bring to justice the individuals alleged to have carried out the terrorist attacks 

against the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Cultural Center. 

RECOMMENDATION.—With these terrorist bombings serving as an example, 

the U.S. Government should recognize the reality of Hezbollah and Iran’s capability 

to leverage sympathizers in Latin America to become operational and attack soft 

targets without difficulty. 

OBSERVATION.—There are indications that bimonthly flights are still occurring 

between Iran and Venezuela. Interpol has not been able to learn what cargo is on 

these flights. Clearly these flights are a direct pipeline between the two countries 

that could be used to transfer weapons, nuclear material, and terrorists. 

RECOMMENDATION.—The U.S. Government should regularly monitor these 

continuing claims of flights between Iran and Venezuela, and arbitrate its frequency, potential cargo, and other suspicious activities. Additionally, the United 

States should demarche the Venezuela government and request they abide by transparent flight requirements. 

OBSERVATION.—There have been indications that Iran is proactively reaching 

out to many countries in Latin America, including Argentina, to establish relationships, increase trade, fund infrastructure projects, spread its ideology, and build 

stronger cultural ties in the region. Although publicly denouncing Iran, there is increased concern Argentina will be more open in its relationship and establish larger 

trade with the Iranian regime. In addition, Iran has stated its intention of opening 

up companies in Argentina. 
57 

RECOMMENDATION.—The U.S. Government should closely monitor Iran’s activity throughout Latin America and work with our allies in the region. 

We are deeply concerned Iran and its surrogates are conducting operations in the 

Western Hemisphere. The alarming connections between Iran, Venezuela, 

Hezbollah, the FARC, drug cartels, criminal organizations, and Iranian sympathizers throughout Latin America could be leveraged by Iran to carry out terrorist 

attacks in the United States and against our allies in the region. Given Iran’s recent 

efforts to intervene in Latin American affairs, the U.S. Government should not 

downplay the implications of the recent decision on June 5, 2012 by Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to be removed from the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty of 1947. This Western Hemispheric defense doctrine recognizes that an attack on a Western Hemispheric nation 

is an attack against us all, and any unraveling of a Western Hemispheric defensive 

treaty threatens the sovereignty of the United States and our allies throughout the 

Western Hemisphere. In accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, the United States 

should send a strong signal to the world that any effort by Iran and its surrogates 

to enroot operations in the Western Hemisphere is dangerous and a threat to our 

peace, safety, and prosperity. 

We welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with you more fully. If you 

have any questions or would like additional information on these observations and 

recommendations, please contact Dr. R. Nicholas Palarino, Staff Director or Mr. 

Brett DeWitt, Professional Staff Member for the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management, House Homeland Security Committee, who accompanied 

us on the Codel. 

Sincerely, 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management. 

Mr. MCCAUL. This is an area that I know Mr. Duncan shares my 

concerns. I believe, Mr. Cilluffo, as you stated, this is an area that 

has gone largely ignored, overlooked, and yet it is right in our 

backyard, and we talk about the Middle East a lot. We talk about 

North Africa and Egypt and Libya. Yet some things are happening 

not too far from here that I think the American people just have 

no idea the threat level that it presents to us. As you look at the 

tension between Israel and Iran right now and how that has 

heightened to a flash point that I don’t think I have seen as great 

in my lifetime. As that tension heightens, so does the tension 

across the world and in this hemisphere. If, God forbid, there is a 

strike from Israel into Iran, the retaliation will be certain, and it 

will be swift, not just against Israel but in the entire Middle East, 

and it will also expand into this hemisphere. It will light up 

Hezbollah operatives I think in Latin America. It will also light up 

Hezbollah cells in the United States. Many people don’t even realize that there are Hezbollah cells in the United States. 

When I was a former AUSA chief of counterterrorism that was 

our job to find out where they are. You don’t know what you don’t 

know. Where are these cells? What we found was Hezbollah is actually pretty sophisticated and, in some ways, more so than alQaeda. 

They are certainly probably better-financed. So when we went 

down to Latin America, Mr. Duncan and I, we went to the Tri-Border Area, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, and we saw a huge 

Hezbollah presence, billions of dollars being sent from that area, 

that region, to Hezbollah to Iran. 

We also saw that there are satellite nations of Iran in Latin 

America, certainly Venezuela being one of the biggest, and then Bolivia and Ecuador and Cuba. They are even talking about disavowing a treaty from 1947 that deals with the Monroe Doctrine 

where an attack on one is an attack against all. Why would these 
58 

states want to violate that treaty or get out of that treaty? It is because of the influence of Iran in the region? 

So I guess my question is that we were always told, and Ambassador Noriega, I think you put it, you hit the nail on the head by 

saying, when it comes to the State Department, it is the head in 

the sand. Because when we were down there, we got briefings from 

the chief of station, which were pretty good, but the local security 

guys, better, and then we went to the Jewish community center 

that was blown up by Hezbollah, and these guys probably gave us 

the best briefing that we got down there, most likely wired into 

Israeli intelligence, which is probably the best when it comes to 

Iran. 

But then when we talked to our own State Department, amazing 

how the threat is downplayed, how the terrorism word is not even 

used. I think it has been taken out of their vernacular, and even 

though you have this large Hezbollah presence down there, they 

don’t seem to care. It is like diplomacy outweighs threat; diplomacy 

outweighs looking at this as a counterterrorism issue. So I think 

that was to me the line in the hearing, the head in the sand. They 

need to get their head out of the sand and look at this problem. 

So my question to the panel is: We were always told, you know, 

yeah, Hezbollah is down there, but they are just finance support 

cells; it is nothing to get too worried about, so don’t overblow this 

problem. It is not really a problem. 

Well, then we saw the Qods Force operative in Mexico, the aligning with what he thought was a Los Zetas cartel member to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington and to hit the embassies in Argentina, both the Israeli and Saudi embassies. The first 

time we are seeing this theory that there couldn’t possibly be a 

threat to suddenly seeing an operative, an operation. 

So I guess, again, my final question is: Can you discuss the sortof unholy alliance that we are seeing now and marriage between 

these Hezbollah Qods Force, more radical Islamic groups, and the 

drug cartels, that are largely finance and I understand that, but 

discuss that and then also is it possible that they could become 

operational in the future, particularly in light of the situation between Israel and Iran currently? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. If I could jump in, well, Mr. Chairman you are exactly right, Ahmad Vahidi is the minister of defense of Iran. He 

said, if Iran were attacked by anyone, that there would be a tough 

and crushing response. He said that on May 2011, in Bolivia, 

where he was inaugurating an academy on asymmetrical warfare 

that is being funded by Iran. Just one example, Mohsen Rabbani 

is a cleric who is wanted for his role in the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires. He travels on documents provided him by 

Venezuela. He is not supposed to be able to travel at all because 

there is a red notice, an Interpol red notice, but he travels in this 

hemisphere on a regular basis, and we have been able to place him 

through our sources at least a couple times in the last 18 months. 

So that exists. 

The Jouma case that I referred to involves all of these different 

criminal elements and really a global enterprise, where Jouma 

played a role bringing Colombian cocaine to the Los Zetas through 

Central America, taking the money there, commingling it with a 
59 

used car enterprise, those cars, that value was then exported to Africa, converted to cash, so you launder the resources, and then 

flown back to the Western Hemisphere. This is a terrifically sophisticated mechanism that is going to reach out and touch us in a serious way if we don’t get ahead of the curve and start to block some 

of these moves on their part. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. Cilluffo. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, to build on one of the previous 

questions as well regarding metrics, I think before jumping in the 

specifics, it is worth remembering the terrorism, what gets measured gets done, but are we measuring what matters? But more importantly, terrorism is a small numbers business. If you look back 

to 9/11, we weren’t talking about hundreds of thousands of people, 

so it is worth factoring in the vulnerabilities that can be exploited. 

You don’t need big numbers to cause catastrophic effect. 

So in terms of the Lebanese Hezbollah marriage in the Tri-Border Area, I think General Fraser, head of Southern Command put 

it best, they are working together mostly alliances of convenience, 

but it is those alliances of convenience that can cause real significant damage to our U.S. National interest, our National security. 

I might note that LAPD recently elevated the government of Iran 

and its proxies to a Tier I threat, at par and even to al-Qaeda, its 

affiliates, and those inspired by al-Qaeda. That is a significant development. 

NYPD has done much the same. 

In addition to the points that Ambassador Noriega brought up, 

Nasrallah, the head of Lebanese Hezbollah has stated himself and 

his quote was, if Israel targets Iran, America bears responsibility. 

So clearly, they are going to light up and tap some of those networks. 

I might also note there have been a number of arrests, JTTF arrests in the United States. In 2010, there were 16 significant arrests of Hezbollah sympathizers trying to access stinger missiles, 

night vision equipment. So this isn’t something that we need to be 

worrying about. This has occurred. 

So the question is, if you see these pieces come together and 

should a triggering event cause, yes, I think that is a significant 

issue the United States needs to be concerned about. 

I might also note that they are pretty sophisticated in terms of 

trade craft, so that is just something to bear in mind. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Farah. 

Mr. FARAH. I would echo what Ambassador Noriega said. I think 

that but if you look at Iran’s history in the region, we tend to look 

at the attack on, the attempted attack on, the Saudi Ambassador 

as sort of a crossing or a sea change in how they behave. But it 

is not really. If you look at the 2007 attempted attack on the JFK 

fuel facilities, that was also an Iranian plot. It didn’t get a lot of 

publicity, but the Irani connection, but Mr. Kadir who was running, involved in the plot out of Guyana was sent to the western 

hemisphere at the same time Mohsen Rabbani was and he was 

working the northern tier as Mohsen Rabbani was working Argentine sphere, and part of the money for that, and it is documented 
60 

in our core documents, for that attack were put into the mosque 

that Mr. Kadir was running in Guyana. 

So I think they have been waging an asymmetrical campaign 

against us for a long time, and we are not taking it seriously. 

The other thing that one has to pay attention to is simply the 

breadth of their activities. Many of them are small, but taken together, they are quite significant. The number of businesses that 

are opening in Panama in the Colon Free Trade Zone is astounding. They are buying Panamanian citizenship for $10,000; as Panamanian citizens, then opening businesses in the Colon Free Trade 

Zone, with extremely broad capabilities for acquiring dual-user, 

moving whatever they want through that particular area. 

If you look at the Univision report from last year on ‘‘La 

Amenaza Iranı ́,’’ they documented and filmed Iran’s attempts to 

hack our major National security networks from a Mexican university in conjunction and with Venezuela asking for anything that 

was taken to be shared back with them. 

So I think that we at least—our assumption is that this is all 

starting now, when in reality, there was a meeting in Tehran in 

1983, where they made the decision to expand into Latin America 

using guns, automatic weapons, grenades, fusiles, y grenadas, you 

know, weapons and grenades to take over the region. So I think 

that the idea that they are somehow unprepared or that this is a 

new thing for them and they are suddenly scrambling to position 

themselves is nonsense. They have been doing this for 20 years. 

They are in places where we are only beginning to look to see 

where they are. I think the potential to light us up if they felt necessary is huge. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me follow up. This isn’t about cyber, but there 

was an attack recently by Iran, a cyber attack on Aramco in the 

Saudi peninsula, 30,000 computers compromised, and at the same 

time, an attack against our financial institutions in the United 

States. So it really is astounding, and you are correct; it is not 

some science fiction thing. It is happening right now. 

Then these flights going back between Caracas to Tehran. What 

is on those planes? We can’t monitor those planes. Speculation uranium is on these flights. What if it came back weapons grade into 

this hemisphere and smuggled across the border? That is a nightmare scenario for a lot of us. 

Mr. FARAH. I would say perhaps even more dangerous than those 

flights are the unregulated shipping, which have much more significant capacity and are even less monitored than the flights are, 

in their ability because of state-to-state transaction, there is no 

way of knowing what is on those planes as they leave. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Just one last question, Ambassador, you said you 

have a lot of friends in the State Department. So given all this 

mounting evidence, why do they continue to have their head in the 

sand on this? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, I should add I had a lot of friends in the 

State Department about 20 minutes ago, but maybe fewer. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Sorry, they are not still there. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, they conflate this, Mr. Chairman, with other 

issues that we have with these countries. 
61 

For example, Venezuela, they don’t want to mud wrestle with 

Hugo Cha ́vez, and they think that if we do, it elevates him. It is 

a wonderful theory. Seven years ago it might have had some validity, but it has been disproven, as we see that we try to studiously 

ignore him, that he is galloping forward at this staggering alliance 

with Iran, for that matter with PRC, buying $9 billion of weapons 

from the Russians. The Cubans essentially run the internal security apparatus. I don’t know what else he could do if we were to 

try to provoke him. 

The other thing is there are countries like Mexico and Brazil that 

are just so sensitive about talking about this issue, and part of it 

is every time we raise it, they read it, misread it, as an accusation. 

The fact is we can all up and down this table give examples of the 

things the Mexicans have done right in fighting this issue. But for 

some reason, we can’t, they are not doing their job at the State Department to find a way to have a serious dialogue about this, so 

but the Mexicans are more open and the Brazilians are more open. 

The Brazilians are going to host the Olympics and the World 

Cup in the next 3 or 4 years, both events. If you ask a lot of these 

foreign ministry types in Brazil, they will tell you the terrorism is 

an invention of the United States Government to intervene in our 

internal affairs. Well, it is going to come unfortunately in the manifestation, it will manifest itself in another way if they don’t do 

something serious to address this issue. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The Brazilians, when we were down there, absolutely right, did not want to acknowledge any of this, but at the 

same time, while we were there, sent 10,000 troops to the Tri-Border Area. So it is not a threat, but we are going to send 10,000 

troops to the Tri-Border Area, while you are there. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Mr. Chairman, some of the best work being done 

on this is by the Brazilian police, by the Brazilian security agencies. But at the political level, it is completely Sergeant Schultz; 

they know nothing about anything. 

One other example, Argentina, a country where 144 people were 

the victims of Hezbollah violence not so far in the distant past, is 

engaging in talks right now with the Iranians. What are they up 

to? Well, there have been vast transfers of cash, at least a quarter 

of a billion dollars from Venezuela to Argentina. We know that 

Ahmadinejad asked Chavez to intervene with Nestor Kirchner, the 

former president of Argentina, to turn back on the sort of a nuclear 

cooperation that he had they had back in the 1990s before those 

bombings. 

Now these talks are, I believe, to launder the reputations of two 

potential candidates for president of Iran to succeed Ahmadinejad, 

who are indicted by Argentina. 

So mark my words, this will involve some sort of transaction, 

very high-priced soybean exports from Argentina to Iran, and you 

are going to see Argentina find a way to lift those indictments so 

they don’t have a black mark against the next president of Iran. 

This is the sort of stuff the State Department needs to know about 

and engage on. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Everybody needs to know about it. I can tell you, 

meeting with the ambassador from Argentina was hardly a friendly 

experience as well. Very anti-American, was my sense. 
62 

So I have gone way past my time. 

I would like to now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Cilluffo, you indicated, I believe, that our efforts to seize 

drugs is not as robust as perhaps they could and should be. 

How intertwined is drug trafficking with the whole threat and 

engagement of terrorism in the areas? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Davis. 

Looking at the Americas specifically or—I mean, if you look globally, you are starting to see more and more foreign terrorist organizations engaging in criminal activity, from drug trafficking all the 

way through to organized crime activity, kidnapping and ransom. 

I mean, if you look at the Sahel and the Maghreb, a lot of examples 

there. If you look at FATA, if you look at all these un- and undergoverned spaces. 

In the Americas, in particular, I wouldn’t say it is—they have 

different aims and objectives, for the most parts. But that is almost 

missing the real question. 

The real question is, is: Will they exploit some of those networks, 

distribution networks and opportunities? I think the answer is yes. 

Because you do see a Lebanese Hezbollah presence in the Tri-Border Area, and even in Colombia, and in other places. You do have 

drug trafficking organizations who can smuggle, you name the 

good; if there is the demand, they will find the way to get it 

through. 

I actually think back to Kosovo, during the campaign there. I 

wrote a long piece that was politically incorrect, I guess. It was titled ‘‘And the Winner is... the Albanian Mafia.’’ Here you had 

criminal entities smuggling both Serbs and Croats for the same 

amount of money. They put a tax, another 10 percent on when the 

tides turned and others were—asked to be smuggled out. 

So at the end of the day, the way I think you look at it, look at 

it as a business enterprise, look at it as a P&L, and in this case, 

very specifically, movement of product. If you add those together, 

and if you have flare points that can trigger that, that is a pretty 

toxic and dangerous blend. 

Mr. DAVIS. So let me ask the panel, given the fact that there is 

such a serious opportunity and relationship between the two, is 

there any way that we can attack the issue from another vantage 

point of looking at the drug problem as much as we look at the 

threat of terrorism and how we can impact one by perhaps impacting the other? 

Mr. FARAH. If I might, I would say, in relation to your previous 

question, I would say that the other—you now have clear—for the 

first time it has been—we have had anecdotal evidence for a long 

time, but I think now in judicial cases that Hezbollah is directly 

engaging with the FARC, which is another designated terrorist organization, to move cocaine for the Mexican cartels. So it is much 

more than a passing relationship. They are now integrally involved 

in the movement and transshipment. 

If you look at the Lebanese Canadian Bank case, which is the 

outgrowth of the Joumaa case that you mentioned in your—you 

look at in your paper, that is a multibillion-dollar enterprise that 
63 

was collapsed by taking the cocaine trade out of it. So I think that 

multimillion enterprise for Hezbollah collapsed when you took the 

cocaine out of it. So I think that the relationship there is profound 

and deep. 

I think if you want to get at that, I think the best model you 

have is the Special Operations Division of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration. They are able to use specific authorities, unique 

authorities to go after, in a judicial manner also—and judicialize 

what they find and what they are able to collect from some of their 

foreign colleagues on the same targets and use that in judicial 

court systems to bring about indictments and in many cases convictions. 

So I think that that, coupled with some of the special authorities 

that the Special Operations Command has in the region, the ability, the resources they provide on the intelligence-gathering front, 

particularly, have to be melded and expanded. I think right now we 

have sort of little stovepipes of excellence that need to be broadened out and can be broadened out considerably to make that joint 

fight. I don’t think you have to choose either/or. I think if you— 

because you see them so often together that if you use the hybrid 

model the DEA has done so well, you can actually do both at the 

same time. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Davis, I mean, a hybrid threat does require 

a hybrid response. It is all of the above. We have to attack it from 

all fronts. There is a CT component, a counternarcotics component, 

a counterinsurgency component, and we have to address the demand issues as well. So we need to look at it holistically. 

The problem is, is we are not moving quickly enough or treating 

it with the urgency I believe it deserves. 

Mr. DAVIS. I guess one of the reasons that I asked the question 

is that I believe that sometimes money is just as potent a rationale 

as ideology; that there are some individuals who become a part of 

the action based upon ideology in terms of what they believe and 

there are others who are recruited because there is the resource. 

I mean, there is the lure of money which attracts them just as easily as an ideological bent. 

So thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Just to make a brief clarification. 

We met with the Argentinean Minister of Affairs—of Foreign Affairs, not the Ambassador. So just to make that clarification for the 

record. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Did you get a phone call? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. It was still—still was not a very friendly 

meeting, though. 

With that, now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. I know Mr. Duncan was here. I know he certainly would have many questions for you. If we could just wait 

just a minute. 

Okay, great. 

Mr. FARAH. Sir, if I could just add, Mr. Davis, to your comment 

on the money. 
64 

I think the money over time has become the defining motivator 

for the vast bulk of these transactions. If you look at how groups 

evolve, particularly the FARC in Colombia, it went from being a 

very ideological organization until it got into the drug trade and it 

is now essentially a major drug cartel with very little ideological 

content left in them. The reason for joining the Zetas or any number of the organizations in Mexico is entirely devoid of ideology. If 

you look at how these groups operate, I would argue that, although 

Hezbollah, I think, was quite successful for many years in not becoming de-ideologicized through the drug trade, it now has as well. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. If I could just say, there are actual foreign terrorist organizations—Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines went from a 

very ideological organization to a huge criminal enterprise. Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan, you have got camps, some of whom are 

criminally motivated, financially motivated. But Willie Sutton said: 

Why rob banks? That is where the money is. So, yeah. 

Mr. MCCAUL. See Mr. Duncan has arrived. The Chairman now 

recognizes him for questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just say again how much your leadership on this issue 

has meant. It is an issue I have been following, as the panel knows, 

for a very long time. We will talk in a minute about the threat assessment bill I have residing over in the Senate. 

But it was a very informative trip when we went down to investigate this issue. You are spot on when the Chairman says, you 

know, we hear one thing from the Department of State, but when 

we talk with the boots on the ground, so to speak, whether it is 

the Paraguayan police force or the folks in Argentina, the Israelis 

and the Jewish community, it is a different story. I walked away 

from that CODEL wondering why it is a different story. Why we 

are hearing the ‘‘head in the sand’’-type analogy from State and 

why we are hearing something different from the folks who are actually impacted. 

I raise awareness to what I believe, if I remember correctly, we 

just discovered a Hezbollah training camp in Nicaragua. What we 

were told in South America, that most of the Hezbollah activity 

was financial transactions. But we saw tremendous money, financial transactions happening in the tri-border region and Cuidad del 

Este. 

My thought is, I don’t believe that training camp in Nicaragua 

was training bank tellers or folks on financial transactions. 

So it is—there is more going on in South America and Latin 

America and in this Western Hemisphere than just financial transactions that are going to assist Hezbollah’s activities, terrorist activities around the world. 

The Iranians and their proxies are here in this hemisphere for 

a reason. It is time for America to truly get their head out of the 

sand and raise awareness to the issue and start understanding the 

issue and come up with a counterterrorism strategy to address that 

real threat. 

I think the Chairman was right, if Israel does take some action 

to assess or address their existential threat in that region, I believe 

we will see some activity here and we better be aware of it and better know how to deal with it. 
65 

So I went down after that hearing, after that trip to Latin America to assess this, I went down to the border, because I wanted to 

understand the United States-Mexican border. From South Carolina, you are a long ways removed from that. So I went to Arizona 

and tried to understand the threats, the challenges that CBP has 

down there. I walked away with a tremendous respect for what 

they are trying to do. 

Because when we think of the Southern Border in South Carolina, we think of flat desert terrain, easy to put fences up. What 

I saw was a different topography with the mountains and the corridors. The fencing comes up to the foots of the mountain and we 

have basically corridored the bad guys coming into this country to 

have to come through the mountains. But when we helo’d over 

those same mountains, I looked down and I saw what looked like 

cow paths through the mountains. I asked, ‘‘Well, what kind of animals, what kind of cattle ranches are in this area?’’ They said, ‘‘No, 

Congressman, the trails you see are the bad guys. These are the 

smugglers and the folks coming into this country.’’ 

The challenges are real. We have got to figure out a way to address those challenges. I think the first step in really addressing 

the threat of terrorism would be countering the Iranian threat in 

the Western Hemisphere bill. Appreciate the ambassador mentioning that. I would encourage anyone that can contact the Senate 

and see if we can get this thing hotlined over there to pass. 

So on to my question. 

Do you have—and I guess this is for Ambassador Noriega—do 

you have any recommendations for ways we can go about strengthening our relationships with our fellow stakeholders in Latin America? See, I met with the Honduran government officials here in 

Washington last spring and that was the conversation I had. 

I think that the Chairman mentioned the distrust—or maybe it 

was Mr. Farah mentioned, if we bring this subject up with Mexico 

or with some of the Latin America countries, they think we are 

questioning their integrity or questioning something else. 

So how do we strengthen that? How do we get them to be willing 

allies with us and show that this is a neighborhood, we are all residents in this neighborhood and we have got to work together to address that threat? So how do we go about doing that? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, Congressman Duncan, you were out of the 

room when I addressed that same point and made the point that 

you just made, which was that when we raise these issues with 

Mexico or Brazil, they see it as an attack on their integrity. We can 

all cite examples where the Mexicans have done precisely the right 

things to fight terrorism and want to be on the same side with us. 

The Brazilians, the best informed on these issues are Brazilian 

security folks. But if you talk to the political folks and certainly the 

people in the Foreign Ministry, the problem doesn’t exist. 

This is what diplomacy is all about, quite frankly, and we have 

to communicate what we know about this threat and why it is important to them. 

Another thing, just vis-a ́-vis Mexico, lot of people talk about 

Mexico’s drug war. It is not Mexico’s drug war, it is our drug war. 

Mexico is fighting it. If we had the kind of political leadership 

across the political spectrum talking in those terms, the Mexicans, 
66 

frankly, their confidence in us as an ally—they would be treated 

as a wartime ally, quite frankly—would go up exceedingly. It would 

open this kind of serious dialogue about the dimensions of this 

threat. So that certainly has to happen. 

In the cases of other countries, they think we have everything 

wired. If you go talk to security officials in Peru or Chile or Colombia, they think the United States knows everything and that it 

must not be a problem, particularly when our ambassadors don’t 

raise it. So we have to change that. 

I think, quite frankly, bipartisan Congressional leadership, like 

we have seen behind the legislation that you are moving, will make 

a difference. It has to be bipartisan leadership to say: Look, we are 

not making accusations against the State Department. What do 

you need to do a better job in engaging these countries on this 

threat? 

Because Hezbollah is here for—in the Western Hemisphere—for 

one reason: Because we are here. We are the target. Menacing 

Nicaragua is not their objective. It is to threaten us. 

So we have to—I think the appraisal is part of that. The only 

thing—only concern I have about your bill is it gives them 6 

months to come up with a strategy. I know they will need it. It is 

going to be an eye-opening experience for a lot of these folks. 

But we need a strategy today. There are some—some action-oriented things that we can do right now. We can bring indictments, 

we can expose the Venezuelan state as a narco-state. The U.S. attorneys have, you know, hundreds of man-hours in on this. 

You have an oil company in Venezuela that has taken in a trillion dollars over the last dozen years. That can be used to hide— 

that entity in itself can be used to hide vast transactions. 

If we can put those indictments forward, it will signal not only 

to the bad guys, but to the good guys that we are serious about this 

problem. 

It may have serious consequences, which is important. The administrative actions are not sufficient because, let’s note, Cha ́vez 

has promoted people who the Treasury Department has on their 

list of supporters of terrorism and narco-trafficking. He promoted 

his Minister of Defense, head of his army after they were designated by the U.S. Treasury Department. So those are not enough, 

we need to get serious with indictments. 

Mr. FARAH. Could I just add, sir? I think that Ambassador 

Noriega is right. But I think that you see a sea change in Brazil 

relating to Bolivia particularly. They have a strong alliance. Why? 

Because they now recognize 90 percent of the cocaine they are receiving, and they are the second-largest consumer nation in the 

world, is coming from Bolivia. So suddenly the ideological affinity 

is diminishing and they are suddenly saying: Holy cow, we now 

know where this is coming from. They are taking much stronger 

actions against Bolivia. 

So to go to the point of Ambassador Noriega, I think when it is 

in their self—when they understand yourself what is in their selfinterest, they will take on these issues. We have been very unwilling or unable to communicate what their self-interest—why it is 

not just our problem, but their problem. I can’t tell you how many 

times, even with the Colombians, with whom we have a very good 
67 

relationship, when I was talking about the Iranian issue, I said: 

What does the U.S. Embassy say about them? They say: Nothing. 

I say: Why not? They say: Well, we never gave it to them. I said: 

Why not? They said: Because they never asked for it. It wasn’t that 

they were trying to hide it, it was just there was no interest so it 

doesn’t go anyplace. 

I think that that is—that lack of curiosity on our part diminishes 

greatly our ability to understand the regional context. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is right. 

Well, my time has expired. I just would say for the record, Mr. 

Chairman, I believe the Brazilians sent 10,000 troops up to the TriBorder region when they heard you were there. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thanks for that confidence in my strength. 

You know, it was also interesting to see the FARC given safe 

haven in Venezuela. When we were in Colombia, they would go 

across the border, not unlike in Pakistan, and they would protect 

them. The Iranian influence between Venezuela and the FARC is 

very real, and it is clear. 

I think these training camps that you mentioned, that is not for 

financial purposes. They are here for a reason, and I don’t think 

it is to be in Nicaragua or Bolivia or Ecuador, it is because we are 

here. We have to be aware of this threat. 

So I want to thank my colleagues for being here. 

Mr. Duncan, your intense interest in this issue, and the bill that 

I co-sponsored, I sure hope we can get that passed through the 

Congress and signed by the President. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. The committee now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:24 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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