1

 It is well-settled that Petitioner has no federal liberty interest guaranteeing that he

remain in a particular prison, or preventing his transfer to another correctional facility, either

within the same state or interstate. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247 (1983); Beshaw v.

Fenton, 635 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).

1

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSE PARRA, )

Petitioner, )

v. ) C.A. No. 05-321 Erie

) District Judge McLaughlin

U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, et al., ) Magistrate Judge Baxter

Respondent. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that Petitioner’s “Motion prohibiting Bureau of Prisons

from transferring him until final disposition of petition for writ of habeas corpus” [Document #

7] be denied.

II. REPORT

On October 27, 2005, Petitioner, Jose Parra, an inmate currently incarcerated at the

Federal Correctional Institution at McKean, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus 

On November 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for injunctive relief requesting that he

not be transferred from FCI-McKean1 until his petition for writ of habeas corpus has been

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2

 Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 -

521(1972) quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). If the court can reasonably

read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite

failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence

construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454

U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir.

1969)(petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a

measure of tolerance”); Smith v. U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v.

Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). 

2

decided by this Court. Document # 7. This Court will liberally construe2 this motion as one

seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. 

The four factors that must be shown for the issuance of a temporary restraining order are

the same as those required to issue a preliminary injunction. Fink v. Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, 646 F.Supp. 569, 570 (M.D.Pa. 1986). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the

District Court must consider: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the extent of

irreparable injury from the alleged misconduct; (3) the extent of harm to the movant; and (4) the

effect on public interest. Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 1995);

Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir.

1990). The preliminary injunction remedy "must be reserved for extraordinary

circumstances...." Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co. Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1990).

If the record does not support a finding of both irreparable injury and a likelihood of

success on the merits, then a preliminary injunction cannot be granted. Marxe v. Jackson, 833

F.2d 1121 (3d Cir. 1987). Irreparable injury is established by showing that a plaintiff will suffer

harm that "cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial." Instant Air

Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989)("The preliminary

injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm"). The plaintiff bears this

burden of showing irreparable injury. Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 848 (1989). In fact, a plaintiff must show immediate irreparable injury, which is more than

merely serious or substantial harm. ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir.

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 Petitioner argues that this Court should grant him injunctive relief because if he is

transferred to another federal prison within another federal district he would be forced to re-file

his habeas corpus petition in the district having jurisdiction over his new warden. Petitioner is

mistaken in this contention. Petitioner’s transfer to a prison within another district will not

deprive this Court of jurisdiction over the pending petition. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,

441 n. 14 (2004) explaining Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (“The objective of habeas

relief may be in no way impaired or defeated by the removal of the prisoner from the territorial

jurisdiction of the District Court.”). 

3

1987). The case law provides some assistance in determining that injury which is irreparable

under this standard. "The word irreparable connotes 'that which cannot be repaired, retrieved,

put down again, atoned for...'." Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir.

1994)(citations omitted). Additionally, "the claimed injury cannot merely be possible,

speculative or remote." Dice v. Clinicorp, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 803, 809 (W.D.Pa. 1995). An

injunction is not issued "simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury...." Acierno,

40 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted). 

Petitioner has not alleged that the Bureau of Prisons intends to transfer him. Petitioner’s

request for preliminary injunction is merely speculative. In order to obtain injunctive relief, a

petitioner must demonstrate that there is an irreparable injury that “is actual and imminent” not

“remote or speculative.” Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 322 (2d Cir. 1995); see

also ECRI, 809 F.2d 223. Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that he will suffer

irreparable harm3 in the immediate future, the motion for injunctive relief should be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner’s “Motion prohibiting

Bureau of Prisons from transferring him until final disposition of petition for writ of habeas

corpus” [Document # 7] be denied.

In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (c), and Local

Rule 72.1.4B, the parties are allowed ten (10) days from the date of service to file written

Case 1:05-cv-00321-SJM-SPB Document 11 Filed 12/15/05 Page 3 of 4
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objections to this report. Any party opposing the objections shall have seven (7) days from the

date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to timely file objections may constitute

a waiver of any appellate rights. 

S/ Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: December 13, 2005

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