UNITED

. STATES

CRYPTOLOGIC

HISTORY

SPACE S'URVEILLANCE

SIGINT PROGRAM {C)

HkNBLB ftA e6M1NT eHitNNBLS ONLY

Claaaified by NSA/CSSM 123-2

Review in November 2010

p..pproved for Release by

NSA on 02-28-2013, FOIA

rase #48025
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Contents of this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated

outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the permission of the Director,

NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to

the Editor, History and Publications Staff, M62.
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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series

Number 3

SPACE SURVEILLANCE SIGINT PROGRAM (€)-

H.D. Wagoner

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

1980

HA~DLE VIA COl'4INT CHANNELS ONLY

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Contents

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//f (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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Foreword ~~~~~--------__~_-Ll-----------------------------

Introduction ~-~~---------------L~L_L-------------- _

Chapter I BACKGROUND OF THE ~SSPROGRAM, 1957-196l

Beginnings ...~~L-------------------_:---/---J..------- -- _

Req~ir{ment8 for sDr~lntelligence .-~./--~ L -.·.·.- ...•----------------

DOD-NASA ~oJec Agreement ------------------------------j----------------------- r_-_.L -------------_

Chapter II NSA'S PLANNING AND ORGANIZING TO E"~CtrrE THE

SSS PROGRAM, 1961-1964// /

Planning ---------------------------------......---;...--...-.4-------- ..., _ The Grey Book _:-~---/.--------------------- ...--- _

Developing the Final Technical Development Plan J~-----L----------------------------------

SSS Management Program -------------------J...,-----~~------------:-------------- _ PERT Adopted ----------------------~-----J-----~-U-----------_:----- _ S S" Re . / / . . .. pace 19IDt qUlrements ----------_:~-----i--------------------~----------------------- SSS Program Priorities and Funding_...- L U _

Program Review, April 1964 -------...-...-----i~----- ...-------------~------------------ _ Chanter III CONSTRUCTING AND EQUlPPING/THESTATIONS

.. ~,:o-_: -_:'--~~--------..---_- _

~----~--------------------------------~-------------------------- Stonehouse L ..------------------------------_

IProgram Status in the Second~-----!----------------------------------------------------- Half of 1966 and 1967 _

Chapter N COMPLETION AND CERTAIN LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

Accomplishments and Culmination/__---_--...--_...-----... _

Lessons Learned --------------4--~------...----__ ----.. _ Illustrations and Photographs

Figure 1-Estimated Relative Value of Proposed SSS Facilities _

Figure 2-Planne~ / IStonehouse System/Phasing (September 1962) .:.

Figure 3-Control and Data-Flow Diagram ...----------------------------------------

Figure 41 rDiagraDl-----------7~----------------------------------------

Figure 5-Stonehouse SysteDl DiagraDl__--- ~-----------------------------------_-- _ Figure 6-Personnel Manning Table (Septemb~r /1962) _

Figure 7 Stonehouse Fundin~ F"timate (September 1962) _ Figure 8 _

Figure 9 __ _

Figure 1 _~-- _

Figure 121 ~---_------------------------------------------- _

Figure 13- . lopla _

Figure Figure 15-Fiscal 1~ Status of SSS Program, ~---_-------------------------------------------------- April 1968 _

Abbreviations and Acronyms _

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3

5

5

7

8

9

14

18

19

19

20

20

30

31

32

32

32

33

37

47

47

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

49

61

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Foreword

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tei- The Space Surveillance Sigint Program came into emtence in the early 19608

when both the United States and the Soviet Union were racing to get .atellites launched and

were preparing for unmanned and manned exploration of outer space.

(S-CCO) As with many programs, technology advances at such a rapid rate that policy

governing its use is often left far behind. So it was with the SSS program: the capability to

exploit signals emanating from foreign space vehicles existed, but a program for managing this

collection activity was very much needed.

(U) (EO! !Q) This history was originally prepared in draft in 1968, and a limited number of

copies were circulated throughout the Agency. We are indebtl!<lt~ Iwho

served as project officer of the SSS program, for reviewing t 18 b18tOry and locatmg the

photographs used, and t~ Iof tb.eHilltory and Publications Staff for performing

the copy editing and seeing the manuscript through the printing process.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 Vincent J. Wilson, Jr.

Chief, Cryptologic History and Publications Staff

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INTRODUCTION '(b)(1 )

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

-tSt-The Space Surveillance Sigint Program was developed by NSA during 1960-1961 in an

effort to provide an adequate U.S. collection capability

to meet high priority Sigint requirements relating to

Soviet space activities. It was intended to make the

best possible use of existing knowledge\and hardware

to supplement the Sigint collection, processing, and

reporting capabilities which then applied to.the Soviet

II/program. These resources were already cons..id~

NSA to be inadequate to cover SovietlL......;-.-:-~

activity. Within these resources the ability to detect

the launch of earth satellites or other space .vehicles

was very limited.

"'fS.l.... The SSS program, as originally submitted to the Department of Defense f01;/ review,

proposed establishment of I // land c::::::::J

Stonehouse systems. They were./to be capable of

collecting signals from space vehicles, tracking such

vehicles, and performing preliminary on-site processing

of intercepted signals. They/were to employ improved,

high-speed communications to make near real-time

reporting possible. As a/result of review and guidance

by the DOD (DDR&E), the program was revised to

eliminate two of the proposed Stonehouse deep-space

systems and to/modify or defer some equipment for

thel Isystems. The deletions made it possible

to complete the reduced program within a DODimposed expenditure ceiling of $40 million.

(u) By careful management, the SSS program was held within the imposed fund limitations

and was completed almost on schedule. The installed

systems performed very creditably, considering that

various compromises had been necessary; that some of

the systems/wer.e given operational tasks before testing

could be completed; and that operations were handicapped/by shortages of adequately trained and experienced maintenance personnel. Logistic problems also

Jometimes made it difficult or impossible to obtain

adequate spare parts when needed. These problems

and accomplishments are summarized more fully in

Chapter IV.

(U) Chapter I presents the developments

from 1957 to 1961 which led up to the SSS program.

Chapter n describes the planning and organizational

phase of the SSS program between 1961 and 1964.

Chapter m summarizes the major steps in the preparation of sites, fabrication of equipment, delivery,

installation, testing, manning and initial tasking of

the various systems, as well as some of the problems

which developed.

te+- As is the case in the writing of most

histories, it was difficult to determine where to begin

the history of NSA's Space Surveillance SIGINT

Program. In retrospect, it seems that the launching of

the first Russian Sputnik in 1957 had given adequate

warning that a well-organized and well-managed effort

was needed to make sure that the U.S. would be able

to collect and exploit radio signals (and any other

exploitable electromagnetic emissions) which might be

transmitted by the U.S.S.R.'s space vehicles. Such an

effort would supplement the information obtainable by

active surveillance under the Air Force's Spacetrack,

Army's Doploc, and Navy's Spasur Programs.

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CHAPTER I

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Background of the SSS Program, 1957-1961 (U)

Beginnings (U)

In the fall of 1957 John E. Libbert,

technical advisor to the USAF's Elint Coordinating

Group (AFCIN-Z), attempted to define the "exact

nature of, and responsibilities for, exploiting of Elint

data originating in, and associated with, earth satellite

vehicles." He concluded that:

· .. 11. Present Elint activity concerning ESVs is adequate to

cope with current military requirements.

· .. 12. Exhaustive scientific and/or technical exploitation of

ESV Elint data could provide vital data on a vast number of

subjects not now included as military matters, for which at

present there appears to be no defined responsibility asaigned

within the U. S. Government.

· .. 13. Present DOD Elint facilities could undertake some or

all of the exploitation possibilities but would require augmentation accordingly.

· .. 14. Both as regards present ESVs and particularly thOlle

expected in the future, clarification must be obtained as to

responsibilities for, and eItent and nature of, Elint exploitation

of ESV activities.

Recommendations:

· .. 15. It is recommended that policy and other guidance be

obtained from appropriate DOD and other governmental boards

and agencies. I

t€r In January 1958, W.M. Holaday, Director of Guided Missiles, DOD, recommended

that immediate steps must be taken to prepare a plan for the

coordinated application of our national capability to accomplish

tracking, data collecting, and computing necesaary to obtain

muimum information from the various satellites the U.S. and

U.S.S.FL will launch.

He requested that the Secretary of the Navy establish

a working group

with appropriate Army and Air Force representation as well

as representation from the IGY (International Geophysical Year)

group of the National Academy of Sciences to asa_ this problem

on the national basis and draw up a plan which can be put into

effect at the earliest practicable date....2

f€7 Roy W. Johnson, DirectQl'6ftbeAd~

vanced Research Projects Agency (.l\RPA) added shortly

thereafter that.

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...r am also much concerned about our ability to track and

interpret data from the nen U.S.S.FL satellite that may be

launched and, more importantly, to ascertain that •• U.S.S.FL

satellite has been placed in orbit in the evenf\ it is not

immediately announced by the U.S.S.FL It would be very

embarrasaing to us for the U.S.S.&. to announce that\ they had

had a third satellite up for a number of weeks or montlls and we

not [be] aware of, or able to show that we new of, its existence.

He urged that the satellite tracking review group

consider

whether we can, at present, or with any reasonable mli.ans at

hand in the Departments, discover any new U.S.S.&. satellitea,

whether they are announced or not and whether th~y are

radiating or not. I should be advised of any specific actio~\ that

need to be taken to improve or solve the problem. l

-fer Late in April 1958, the Director of

ARPA called attention to the fact that:

. ..various intelligence components of the Department of

Defense and elsewhere are engaged in considerable prograID8

with the capability of detecting and tracking sateUite vehicl~.

The intelligence community has, in addition, a considerable

responsibility for and a high interest in certain upeca of the

information to be collected and disseminated under the plan to

be formulated by the Satellite Tracking Review Group.

3. I suggest that it might be useful if an intelligence representative, possibly the Chairman of the Interagency Guided

Missile Intelligence Committee were invited to participate actively in the planning of the Satellite Tracking Review Group.'

II

(C+- The primary source of intelligence to

be obtained from the electronic emissions from space

vehicles Willi I I between them and ground

stations, although communications from manned vehiCles. voice (or other) would also yield intelligence.

I I IIUntil September 1958 it was therefore outside

'NS'A'ii'Tbut not the SCAs') province. Then NSCID No.

6 (new series) assigned national responsibilities for

Elint as well as Comint to NSA, although the new role

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was subject to certain reservations. In the following

months NSA attempted to work out with the services,

JCS, and DOD an acceptable definition of its Elint

responsibilities, to integrate the Elint functions and

resources it had acquired into the NSA organizational

structure, and to make a start at developing needed

plans and programs to carry out the Sigint mission. 6

f€'T In September 1959, Colonel C.P.

Richman, USAF, NSA Elint Coordinator, summarized

the actions which he believed NSA should take

including:

a. Continue to develop detailed technical data concerning

thOBe intercept facilities under the coordinating jurisdiction of

'Space Track' (-'96L) which will be of UlIiatance to NSA in

exploiting transmissions from foreign satellite or space

vehicles....

b. Develop within NSA a detailed plan for the employment of

NSE (National Sigint Establiahment) resources to meet the

requirements for information from subject vehicles. Pending the

final approval of usm of such requirements (see d. below) thOBe

requirements submitted by the ARPA panel and approved in

principle by US18, should be aasumed as the basis for such

planning. NSA plan should include:

(1) Collection aspect....

(2) Exploitation aspect - data presentation and reduction.

(3) Communications aspect - to include tie-in with Space

Track as appropriate.

(4) Financial support to implement.

Such NSA planning must be completed within the short~t

possible time. As soon as it is relatively firm within NSA-prior

to formal coordination with the cryptologic services-the/plan

should be discuBBed with appropriate Space Track persoIUlel for

the purposes of determining in which areas mutual asaiatance or

common use of facilities might fill gaps in either progr.m. As of

now, six weeks from date appears to be about the proper time

for such discUBBion. COBa should be action.

c. Consider the question of NSA liaillon with/or at Space

Track, ....Ope action.

d. Continue by all meaDB possible to expedIte usm early

consideration of the space requirements currently in GMAIC.

This may be done by the NSA members of the various committees which deal in this area-GMAIC, iSpace Surveillance

Committees, etc. I have personalJ\ urged Colonel McFarland to

expedite the pUllage to usm. 7

tet- There" were also internal efforts within

NSA (Prod) to secure additional equipment for intercept stations currently taSked/wit;! Ispacevehicle collection requirements. is equipment was

intended to provide a "quick and dirty" operational

capability to obtain directional bearings from signals

emitted by Sovietr---l, satellites, and space probes

within four to six~.I

(U) Early in 1958 the Advanced Research

Projects Agency (ARPA) was directed by the Secretary

of Defense

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... to undertake rellearch.i ~rimentation, and s)'IItem development to obtain at th.e earli.eet practicable date a space

surveillance s)'lItem capable of "tiafying\ the military requirements of the various semcee anti commands.

The project was named Shepherd.

(U) ARPA soon! encoUntered so much disagreement with the servict!a that it made little progress

with Project Shepherd. When the pe"onnel assigned

to that project tried to reorient it, only one tentative

program, "Advanced Sensors," was programmed by

ARPA, and/ in the end, funds for that \were withheld

because the services indiVidually were funding parallel

programs. There was, however, a "lack. of common

purpose/and communications" in these activities which

were attributed, by anlnstitute for Defense Analysis

(IDA) study,. to the absence of an"effective management groUp!'9

1'Sr During 1960 the space surveillance

projects then under way amounted to about $21.2

million. There were also other programs not specifically part of space sUrveillance which might\ aid it,

including BMEWS, Midas, Saint, Vela and Nik.e-Zeus.

The Midas program was developing an ability to detect

__ ---Jt and to react to launching of new

satellites or space probes as well asI I Project

Saint was intended to demonstrate the feasibility of

satellite inspection by means of co-orbital maneuven

and close up observation. Project Vela had as one of

its missions I • Iin

space and a related mterest m tracltiDg vehlcles

leaving the near-earth region which might carry a test

I r

(U) Other programs covered long-range detection (over-the-horizon radar), radar research, radar

discrimination, and optical and infrared research.

Although there had been little contact with NASA, it

was considered important from both an economic and

scientific basis that an advanced program in space

surveillance be coordinated with NASA activities of

mutual interest. 10

(U) ARPA indicated to IDA analysts that

the need for work on an advanced detection system

was not completely clear. It felt that there was a need

to obtain suitable requirements from the services and

that these requirements could not be "firmed up"

without estimates of performance costs and probable

performance .value. This was another way of saying

that "an operational analysis should be performed by

or for the military commands as a basis for generating

firm requirements." The responsibility for developing

sound requirements was transferred to NORAD. The

IDA analysts were afraid that NORAD might accept
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In the spring of 1960, NSA learned

that two multipurpose satellite track~g statioDs being

built by the Collins Radio Company in Dallas, Texas,

for ARPA would Dot be needed for the U.S. satellite

program and could be made available to the intelli-

(8) Possibly the most critical and controversial aspect of the space intelligence requirements

was that of timelineBS-how rapidly space-related

Sigint must be produced and delivered to the consumer. Ideally the USAF wanted to have prelaunch

notification that a space vehicle w~s to be launched,

the time of launch, and orbital and trajectory data

either before launching or within a few minutes

following launch and before the vehicle's first pass

over the U.S., U.S. possessions, or.U.S. installations

elsewhere. Other requirements specified that, for refined scientific data, the intelligence was required in

varying periods from a few minutes after launch to a

matter of several weeks later. In the case of intelligence to be derived fro~ ~ransmitted by a

space vehicle or communications with the vehicle from

a ground station, the requirements that intelligence

be distributed to the consumer within minutes of

initial intercept meant, among other things, that the

material intercepted must either be processed at the

point of intercept and results communicated directly

to the consumer by high-speed electrical means, or

that the intercept be relayed electrically to NSA for

central processing on a "real-time" basis and almost

immediately distributed to the consumer. Unfortunately, however, existing communications systems were

<not capable of handling this type of communications

load, nor was NSA prepared to process the material

"on line," even though it could be delivered by

electrical means. The alternative-preliminary processing at the point of intercept to extract early

warning information (including tracking data for use

by oth.er sites) and selection or compression of material

to be forwarded to NSA electrically-seemed more

feasible\.but still posed difficult problems.

A lmowledge of current Soviet mtllreat and activities is Deeded

to evaluate what I tma:Y~lle expected when RJD

lyatema are replaced by operationAl we.ponalyatema. Requirement requl!llts the following iDformationbe proVided:

the views of various groups for costly new systems

before the need for such was fully determined.

The IDA study briefly examined the

problem of intelligence requirements and responsibility

and concluded that a

Requirements for Space Intelligence (U)

fS1- The first Priority National Guided

Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Objectives as of

mid-1960 covered:

hich-Ievel decision on theae matten of the respoDilibility of

the intellicence community and the lIQurce of support for rellearch

and development to meet pure intelligence requirements must

be forthcoming in the immediate futur.e.

The main points covered were sutnmarized as follows:

A. An operational analysiB of the Ipace surveillance miaaion,

to obtain a coat-effectiveneaa relatioDilhipfor deriving practical

requirements, is long overdue.

B. CoDiliderable effort ($21.2 million) al~ady exists in the

form of projects directly oriented towarda satellite lurveillance.

However, the efforts appear quite uncoordinated.

C. There is a serious lack of effort towards obtaining an

improved capability to detect and track foreign. space probes,

and to obtain satellite configuration.

D. Immediate selection is necessary of an effect;ive management acency to coordinate the various efforts, review their

PJ'0fJW8, and maure that no gaps remain uncovered.

E. There are many other programs in the DefeDile Department

which are related to space surveillance. Efforts in these.must be

coordinated with surveillance and research and development.

F. The need to begin immediate procurement of an advanced

ltateo()f-the-art surveillance sensor iB uncertain. More econ6mical

IOlutioDil may be pouible and should be carefully conaidereci.

G. The role of the intelligence community in the surveillance

miaaion iB poorly undentood. Clarification of thiB role and

specification of the proper lOurce of intelligence R&D support

are ne<:ell8&ry.1\

H. Soviet activities in and relating to space which contribute

significantly to, or are indicative of, Soviet military capabilities.

1) Space vehicles with a weapon delivery capability.

2) Reconnaiaaance, weather, communicatioDll, ECM, Elint,

geodl!llY, and navigation latellites.

3) Maneuverable vehicles, whether manned or not.

4) Space platforms.

5) Space ordero()f-battle inventory.

Second priority objectives were:

Soviet exploitation of space for Icientific and paychological

purpolle8 to include:

(1) Biolorical probea and ntellitee.

(2) MaDDed Ipace vehicles.

(3) Lunar and planetary probee (manned and unmanned). 12

-fST There were also specific statements of

requirements for intelligence regarding the Soviet

space programs, including a USAF requirement submitted in January 1960, which stated that:

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1. Intercept resources available to the United States for

current SigiDt operations have only limited application to the

intercept of transmiuions from foreign space vehicles. Sigint

operations against such vehicles therefore demand the employment of special techniques and resources not currently in the

SigiDt inventory.

2. Intercept systems capable of detecting the existence of nonradiating space vehicles are not the responsibility of the National

Security Agency. However, there is a reuonable chance that the

launch of ESVs and space probes will continue to be detected by

Comint and Elint detection and tracking of radiating vehicles.

3. Continued study is neceasary before intercept plans can be

formulated in detail. The extremely wide range of po88ible ESV

orbits and space-probe trajectories present a complex of intercept

problems rather than a single one.

4. Since it is imp088ible to forecast the detailed nature of

transmiuions from space vehicles, and these may vary considerably from one vehicle to another, there is a need for effective

engineering support at the intercept sites in order that transmisaions detected by search can be exploited at the earliest

ible st e.

$70 million, and that additional manpower resources

would be required.

(U) Prod (Gens) representatives agreed

that data reduction and data processing related to the

space program would involve a major RID effort, and

proposed that RID representatives participate in developing an exploitation plan. RID agreed to cooperate

in this approach. 17

tat- The collection plan was verbally approved by DffiNSA on 13 December 1960, and Lieutenant General Donald N. Yates, USAF, Deputy

Director, Defense Research and Engineering, OSD,

was briefed on 14 December on NSA's "U.S. Comint/

Elint Requirements Study for Collection of Foreign

Earth Satellite and Space Vehicle Transmissions." He

indicated that OSD would support prompt action on

the collection plan. IS

The requirements study referenced

concluded, among other things, that:

lation atl I~ould be operational bv June

1962. Proiect I I was to Drovidel

During the summer and fall of 1960,

Prod representatives made a study of requirements for

(U) DOD gave preliminary/ approval to this

proposal and agreed to provide the additional $1.5

million needed for the modificatioris considered necessary. An NSA-USAsA-USAFSS-SigC Engineering

Working Group was/established to work on the

project. IS

fS1- B~the time the alterations were made

in thelcontract, the estimated completion

date was changed to February 1962. It was expected

that the station at1/ r could be

operational in early spring 1962 and that the instalgence community. NSA (Cosa) s,ndSignal.Corps tep~

resentatives investigated and evaluated the sta~tis Of

the surplus equipment, fIond concludedthat NSA ~hould

take over the ARPJ\contract. Theyrecommenc!.ild that

certa~ m...od.ifi<:ati~ns be mad..ei~the. e.. riP~~nt, aD..i d

that It then be mstalled at sItes m/ / land I lIt was expected that the equipment would be

operational in July 1961 and would. provide a current

state~f-the-art collection capability for the two intercept stations selected. This project was/designated as

I I

transmIssIons from space probes. The system VIsualized by Prod representatives was to be assembled

almost entirely from off-the-shelf equipment. NSA

RID representatives, however, expressed reservations

about the Prod view that little RID effort would be

required. They thought more development work would

be needed on most of the equipment. RID representatives concluded that the collection plan was a good,

clear-cut plan of what could be done to enhance

intercept collection from ESVs, and that the plan

should allow NSA to prepare OSO/OSD and DDR&E

for future resource requirements, which would follow

if the implementation plan was approved. It was

roughly estimated that the collection plan might cost

about $30 million, the processing plan an additional

c. Almara, thiopia.

7. SpeciaJ intercept facilities are required fO~::r.__...Ir8Dd

beaconry intercept and for tracking on these signili.

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8. Intercept facilities must poueu relativPly broad freqU~IlCY

/pectrum cover!(e./ \\\ I

-ter Headquarters, NORAD/CONAD ci>ncurred in the conclusions of the "NSA Comint Eli.tlt

Requirements Study tor Collection of Foreign Earth

Satellite and Space Vehicle Transmissions," and rec,\

ommended that it be approved and implemented. \It

also stated that a "corollary requirement of NORAD

is real-time (or near real-time) transmissions of dat.

from proposed central processing centers to NSA to

NORAD."20

DOD-NASA Agreement (U)

On 13 January 1961, the Defense

Department (DDR&E) and the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration signed an "Agreement...

on Functions Involved in Space Surveillance of U.S.

and Foreign Satellites and Space Vehicles." This

agreement referred to an earlier "Operations Plan for

Outer Space," of 11 June 1960. Areas of interest in

the space surveillance field were defined:

a. Military requiremenu for space lurveillance.... can be

briefiy summarized as the ground environment required in

support of manned and unmanned military space systema and

the detection. identification, and tracking of all space vehicles

launched by foreign govemmenu which might have miuiona

inimical to the interest of the United Stat.. The s,.tem

developed agamat these requiremenu must have the potential

capability of supporting counterattack or neutralizing action

against enemy space vehicles. There is a continuing military

requirement to augment our intelligence capability to provide

information, pre- and post launch on the physical and electronic

characteristics, and nature and purpose of foreiln Ipace Ihotll.

The data collection, analysis, and distribution Iystems in support

of these requirements must be secure, must normally operate in

real-time, and must be reaponaive to the demands impoeecl upon

them by interested military operational commands. These requirements will be met by the Department of Defense procrams.

. . . Plan of Action-DOD

The Department of Defenae, through the JCS, haa uaigned

to CINCo NORAD the operational control of the military Ipace

detection and tracking. The central data collection and cataloging center to meet DOD requiremenu will be eatabliahed within

the NORAD COCo It will take over the military functiona and

reaponaibilitiea presently han4Jed experimentally by the Spacetrack Center in Cambridge. NORAD will uaure operational

control of military space detection and tracking sensors primarily

serving iu new miaaion.

... The Department of defenae procram will provide for aUImentation of its space vehicle intelligence etlort. including

electronic lurveillance and "ezamination of foreiln Ipace vebicles,

and improve photorraphic .~ other methods for determination

of potential military capabilities of the foreign objects....

Notes

'(U) MlR by John E. Libbert. "Elint Exploitation

of ESV.,.. 'Z'l Nov 1957.

2(U) MemorQdum from W. M. Holaday for the

Secretary of the Navy, "Satellite Tracking," 18 Jan 1958.

3(U) Memorajdum from Roy W. Johnaon, Director,

ARPA, for the Secretary of th~ Navy, "Satellite Tracking," 10 Mar

1958.

'(U) Memorandum from Roy W. Johnaon. ARPA,

for the Secretary of the Navy,"Satellite Tracking." 25 April 1958.

Memorandum from William J. Pond, NSA

Rep, GMIC (Guided Mialile ln~elligence Committee). for Prod-()6,

\1\\ I

'f&l-- D/F fromOps (Frank C. Austin) to DirlProd

with ~ies to RID, Csfc. Co~p, "Reconnaiuance Satellites and

Space Sllrveillance." 11 May 1959.

Memorand\I1D from Colonel C.P. Richman,

USAF, to Mr. Austin, Opa. ;'Surveillance of ESV and Space

Vehiclea,"\l Sept 1959.

'(U) D/F from Gena to Coaa. "Urgent Requirement

for EJigh Re.olution, Long Range P/F Equipment," 26 Oct 1959.

'IU) Space Surveillance Program Review, by D.

t>uke\.and D.\.L. FiBher, lnatitu~e for Defenae Analysis, RNearch

ad Engineering Support Division, February 1961, (Contract SDSO, Technical neport 61-3) pp. ~~3.

10(U) Space Surveillance Program Review, Institute

for Defe~e Anal)'Bia, February 1961, pp. 3-17.

"CUj Ibid., pp. 3~17.

IZ(Ul Guided MiMile and Astronautics Intelligence

Committee. "Priority National ~uided Miuile and AatronautiCll

Intelligence Objecti"..... 26 June 1960.

uCU) PR No. 7-60, USAF Requirement AFCINIC'H.2... A3-59-.. 13H274.)-{) .... 9, CRLS 9... ·1& :~J: 196!. 14(UW9b10y.- MlR by LTJG USN. Coaa2. "NSA Propoeal for \ Use of TIro artY: oot Antenna

Statiolll," 1 Apr 1960; (U) "Memorandum from ARPA for Aaaiatant

SecreUry of Defenae, Special Operationa, "Possible Intelligence Use

of Two4o-Foot. Antennu," 31 May •. 1960.

IS(U)~ M-.ge from DIRNSA to CUSASA, USAFSS,

"ProjectC \ 12 SePt\IEO' "GO 09066/02.

"(U)~\. MlR b)' LTJ IuSN, Coaa24 Project Engineer, "Project I' 17 Nov 1960.

17(U) \. MlR by Howard C. Barlow, Deputy Director,

RID, "Meeting onl I' 8 Dec 1960.

'ICU) DIP from Gens to Dir/Prod. "Space Exploitation Program," 22 Dec 1960; (U) D/F from Dir/Prod to Dir RID

and Tcom, "Space Exploitation Program," 'Z'l Dec 1960.

"(S-eee+- NSA, "United States Comint/Elint Requirements for Collection of Foreign Earth Satellite and Space Vehicle

Tranamiuiona." Dec 1960.

zolU) Meeaage from AF SSO CONAD to DIRNSA,

14 Feb 1961, AGI 14213OZ.

SECRET 7

IlhNDLB JAA OOMHi'£ CIlMf.NBLS OtHJY
DOCID: 4035912

SECRET

\1:> )(1)

(fS)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(S)-P. L. 86-36

CHAPTER II

(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

NSA's Planning and\\Organizing to Execute the SSS

Pro.gram,\\1961-1964 (U)

The draft funding plan also stated

Planning (U)

Early in 1961, NSA reviewed NO';

RAD's draft Development Plan for NORADSpace

Detection and Tracking System (Spadats) 496L\ SPO

dated 16 January 1961 at the oral request of DDME,

and commented that:

1. . .. While certain firlt priority national intelligence objectives can be lati.efied through active radar and optical tracking.

the identification and pUrpolle of the vehicle iI unlikely to\derive

from theae lources. The National Security Agency propoHl that

a Comint/Elint capability can but latilfy the firlt prjor;ty

requirementl for information concerning preparation to launch.

launch itlelf. initial orbit or trajectory and identification of the

military or Icientific nature of the operation.

2. To be effective. the Space Detection and Tracking S)'Item

(Spadatll under NORAD will require information on an imll1ediate bui.e which contributea to a determination of the nature

and pUrpolle of each vehicle. In mOlt cues, thi.e information will

derive from lucceaaful intercept and analYli.e of commUDicatioDl

and electroniCi tranamillioDi. ThUI, the NORAD plan. . . anel

the NSA plan... are compatible and mutually IUpportini. A

truly effective United States Ipace lurveillance l)'Item therefore

requirea implementation of both the Ipace detection and trac:ltinl

l)'Item and the Sigint collection and anal)'li.e l)'Itema. The North

American Air DefeDie Command had concurred in and evidenced

Itrong IUpport for the NSA plan for an improved Sigint collection

l)'Item....' .,.

(U) It was pointed out that while NSA

had scheduled completion of its "minimum capability

Sigint collection and analysis system (Phase I)" to

become operational by 1 January 1964 in order to

coincide with NORAD's target date for Phase I of

Spadats, it would be necessary to have supplemental

funds available for this purpose in FY62, since none

were in the NSA FY62 budget or could be included

before the FY63 budget. A summary of the time

phasing and budget estimates to cover the program

was attached, and DDR&E was advised that a detailed

funding and development plan would be forwarded in

about 30-60 days. NSA propoHd that the NSA plan

8 SICRI'f

be.come Part n of\a Departmenf\of Defense Plan for

Space Surveillance.

(6) To expedite and improve coordination

of the efforts by Cosa, Gens\ and RID to develop and

secure approval of adequate\planning,\programming,

and fundmg documents for an NSA Space. Exploitation

Program (Spexpro), NSA este.blished a planning board

under the'chairmanship of Mr.J pf

Gens. The\following\ were designated as members:

I0':8- 1i J. Boucher~ ::DG~teeley; Cosa T. I

Dewey.

(~ The gr~)Up, the Space Surveillance

SigintPlanning Board (SSSPB), was to serve between

1 March and 1 June 1961.lt was expected to complete

a detailed fiscal plan by 1 May 1961 and a detailed

technical plan by 1 June\.1961 ; specific responsibilities

for the prOgram could then be assigned. 2

(8) The SSSPBsubmitted a SSSPB Draft

Funding Plan for Space Surveillance Sigint to the

Deputy Directori NSA, on Tl April 1961, with copies

to the afl'ectedorgaIlizations in NSA and to the SCAs,

whose representatives had helped to prepII:re the plan.

Total construction and equipment cO$ts were estimated

to \..be $79,313,000, with yearlyO/Mcosts of

$17,.191,000 throughFY64 and $20,828,000 thereafter.

These estimates covered 1 \1sites, 1 1

Stonehouse sites and. the National Cent.er. It was

planned that

with th\::~::~to~:!lervJCeI wk:~e:::::~edmir ~~; i ;

----lnitiiFD'"..Wiwl;t all pouible aldlla in their inventory. BecaUie of th.OGA

new lkil1lI necellary to make thil I)'Item work. certain NSA

civilian, ~d NSA or SeA contract peraoDDel will become part

of the initial deployed package.

that:

Th~ \2collection objectiYe will be to record all wanted

lipa1I in the _ I The OD4ite Pl'OC*liq
bGA

(.bl (11

(bl (3 I -8BeRB'f

objective will ... to. derive orbital elements aDd perform initial

aipal aDd! IdAlyaia with computer ...iatance in order

to determine tllp<*lble initial anawera conceming the purpoM

ot the apace vehicle. The reporting objective will be to ..tiafy

NORAD locatioD \.requirements ao their active aenaora may

acquire the vehic1eUd, m.ore importaDt, to identify the purpoM

of the vehicle. Additionally, the orbital elements will be puHd

to other penment ait.eII. foracquiaition purpoaea. Each aite will

be connected toud throughNSA by both l()().wpm and 2400-

bit-per-HCODd communicatioll8.. NSA Pf0C*8ing and reporting

will pick up whe~ the ~ividual atationa atop, hut in thia cue

withm a few minu.teB innet_ry iDatancea.

The Stonehouae aitee ..,nn be eeaentially collection activitiee

with enough pro<*aing capability to direct efficient collection

eflolta at the aite aDd to provide a meaaure of technical reponm,

to NSA and a minimum \.eleetrical Sigint product reportm,

capability for eepecially aignifu:ut itema,)

The Grey \B~ok (U)

In May 1961, the SSSPB completed

and distributed a more detailed Development and

Funding Plan fOT Space. SUTlJeil'ance Signal Intelligence, which became\known as\.."the Grey Book." This

included an abstract\.which summarized the SSSPB's

major conclusions and recommendations:

PreHnt cryptologic reaoUrcee agaiDat foreip. apace vehicl_. are

defieient in frequency apectrum coverage,'in ae.-itivity, in ability

to follow targets, and in quick-reaction prOcMam,. A ayatem haa

been deaigned to remedy theee defieienci. ao u. to meet thoae

national requirements for apace aurveillance which can beat be

met through Sigint; that ia,. earlieat detection of\launch time,

place and direction, earlieet .-ment 01\ vehide'a probable

purpoM, and continuing information on vehicle activity and

performance. Thia data, acquired by the puaive \. electronic

aenaora of the National SigintEBtabliahment, will be of critical

importance m alertm" guidiDt, and aupplemenUq th.e active

aenaora (radar, etc.) availableta NORAD to pel'form ita apace

aurveillance miuion u tuked by DOD.

out, including the fact that "the U.S.S.&. UBuredly

poseeBBes the propulaion capability rjuired to place

_ along with a

probable requirement for reconnaissance aatellitea"(or

targeting mobile and deployed strategic forces." NORAD's estimate of the Soviet threat was quoted, with

the prediction that by late 1964 the U.S.S.R. could

have between 50 and 150 major useful vehiclea in

terrestrial orbit, including:

Bombardment 30

~connaissance 60

Communication Command .0

Jamming .0

Navigation, Weather, Communication, etc. 24

Scientific 12

.~ Sigint objectives were described in the

Grey Book as follows:

1. The overall objective of the Space Surveillance SiliDt

ayatem ia to fulfill Priority National Intelli8ence Objectivee and

to ..tiafy the requirements of NORAD, other commanda, aDd

USIB &genciee by intercepting, locating, and analyzing the

electromagnetic emiuiona of foreign apace vehiclea. The ayatem

ia deaiped to perform partial proceaam, on aite, with immediate

backup by the NatioDal Center, to report on a naar-real-time

buia: (a) the place and time of launch, and (b) the uture,

location and probable purpoM of the vehicle....

2. Further objectivee, to be ..tiafied by continued collection

aDd Pf0C*8ing on at leut a aampling buia are:

a. To confirm or deny reponed uture, pUrpoM, and

activity of the vehicle.

,

...... I

I I n. TO _Jat m monlt0nDI U.l::I. apace vanlaea, u tUDe

. . . . While the equipment will conaiat larrely of ata~f-theart equipment, it ia deeigned to permit updatm, in the ~­

11NU period with a minimum of wute. The utional uture of

the plaD ia UDdencored by the fact that! I

I J

by Soviet

The potential military threat poled

progreu in apace technoiOlY wu pointed

permits and if required.

(~ It was noted that moat of the continuing requirements, unI~e NORAD'a early-warning requirement, would be satisfied by NSA'a National

Center through fusion of information collected by the

various apace collection aites with information from

other BOUrces.

It was emphasized that, in the .leetion of propoaed aites, purely technical CODBiderationa

had to be compromiaed by the availability of land,

logiatic:a, and economica, and that emting Silint

atationa were .lected in every cue "except where the

technical requirements would be UDduly comproSBGRBT 9
DOCID: c-,...,,.,...,. 'r''''' Ol'Jbft~t

({p)(1 )

(b.••.•.•.l.··.33.....1-.50. U.. SC 403 4 0 a~~7I2i6-36

(b) (1)

(b) (3)

OGA

(b)(1 )

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

f'#-~ At ,however,

the two 4...o-foot dish antennaS\aC~Uired\fr...om.A.RPA

would be substituted fori \ \ lantennas.

~~. Recording equipment at thel

-ft1T.Jffr A field processing and\analysis system

was to. include a signal analysis unit, tracking programmer, signal proce88ing unit, computer\and ancillary equipment, computer displays, orbit and trajec-

::!dete'mination I ..... I d . luuuu~ ! 'Ihe p~ apecd;'" lhal eachO o site would be connected with the National Center

at NSA by two secure duplex communication links.

One would be a 100-word-per-minute link to be used

for intelligence reporting, exchanging alerts or tip-offs,

orbital element information, technical support and, if

necessary, raw tracking data. The other/was to be a

2400-bit-per-second data link cap.!lbleof transmitting

selected,I 1Buffer storage was to be

provided at both ends of the data link to permit input

to, or output from, computers.

ffi+ The entire system was to have a Space

Surveillance Sigint (SSS) Center at NSA Headquarte18,operating on a twenty-four-hour basis, which

would exercise control, provide technical support, and

perform analytic and reporting functions.

(U) It W8& estimated that the complete

SSS system would requ1re 649 military personnel, 186

civilian employees plus 109 contract personnel, or a

total of 944 people. Personnel procurement was to

start in FY62 in order to meet the 1 January 1964

target data for full operation. It was also pointed out

that training of personnel would need to start long

before the system was completed. It was planned to

set up a rotation system between the field sites and

the National SSS Center.

10 jJECRB'F

ffl1 Military construction and equipment

procurement costs forFY62/64 were estimated at

about $78.5 xnillion, annual operating costs at about

$20.9 million. These costs did not includelL...-~ _

I Iror which construction and equipment

costs were estimated to be about $12.1 million, with

operating costs about $3.76 million.

..(.Gt-- There were apparently doubts within

NSA regarding the validity of some of the requirements

the SSSPB plan was trying to meet-particularly the

early-warning requirements stated by NORAD. If

these were not considered valid or urgent, it would be

possible to stretch out the Spacol program over a

longer period, thereby reducing the rate of expenditure

required.·

(e) During May and June 1961 the SSSPB

plan was reviewed by the NSA Scientific Advisory

Board (NSASAB) and members of three of its panels

who asked a variety of questions regarding some of the

plans, assumptions, and conclusions. The NSASAB

was apparently convinced that collection of Sigint

from space vehicles was feasible and desirable. It

recommended, however, that the NORAD requirement

for near-real-time reporting by 1964 befurtb.e.r...iIlY~::,.. ..

tigatedanda88eslled;s~~t 11 )

Dr. Fubini, D/DDR&E,a.18o raised a Ibj (3)

number of questions regardiIlgNSA's proposed plans:

Why did NSA think tile space vehicles would transmit?

Why should itBByBtem be considered "operational"?

Had '~deception" heen considered? The answers prepared by the SSSPB were that the SSS system was a

general purpose system intended to meet NSA's intelligence requirementB, which would exist even if there

were no NORAD, and that the system was "operational" to the extent that some of its features were

designed in direct support of NORAD. It was conceded

that while a few vehicles would not emit signals,

almost all others would do so. It was also not correct

to assume that NORAD was concerned only with socalled "black" vehicles but rather with all vehiclea

from an order-of-battle point of view, that it must

consider all Soviet vehicles as potentially hostile until

they were identified. Also NORAD and the JCS

operational commanders recognized that a great majority of the Soviet military vehicles would be active

reconnaiBBance satellites, mapping vehicles, etc.-.II.

fSt- Other questions asked were: How do

we relate to NORAD? Are we prepared to use its
DOCID: 4035912 0"(b)(1 )

(;0)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SECRET •

outputs, or are we trying to duplicate all its work?

NSA replied that:

Spadatl will detect apace vehicle. uaing active and optical

equipment at certain .itel. but will have limitatioDII u to

detection raDlre timelinea, and identification ability:

.. ////////

..... """"='"~~,....-....,.......,...lIOnly by uaing data Jrom both

ayatelDll can NORAD maintain reasonably complete and timely

.pace order of battle, including information on .vehicle purpoee

and performance. Approximate vehicle poeition informatiol1 ill

required to auillt the Sigint collection operation; when./ thill

information ill available from NORAD;/we will ule it. TIle

I.....--_-----.~~~I --:-:=~~-::,,:,-:- ----Jlwe do not plan to duplicate

NORAD facilitiel.

(5;) How dependent would the NSA SpacoVSSS program be on the availability of /prelaunch

information? Could not the Soviet. launch a space

vehicle in such a way that it would. escape detection

I I It wastegarded as extremely

unlikely that the U.S.S.a. would be able to launch

space vehicles without detection.

Why, if the../Soviets could follow their

probes from the U.S.S.a.,/ did the U.S. need Stonehousel t It was pointed out that all

Soviet probes would not be visible from the U.S.S.a.

at all times, and that the U.S.S.a. had requested

·permission to install additional collection sites in

South America, Australia, and possibly Africa. The

alternative was to depend on a "dump method" of

returning data to the U.S.S.a. when the probes were

within view from the U.S.S.a.

t61- NSA was asked by the DDR&E if the

proposed NSA space collection center was to be in a

separate building, if it was to be a contract operation,

and why additional equipment was needed? The

SSSPB reply was that existing processing and computing equipment was already fully committed to other

high-priority problems which could not be dropped;

that additional equipment would be needed but was to

be installed in the existing NSA building; that substantial savings would result from the use of some of

the same models of equipment already owned by NSA,

and, that a minimum number of new people would be

required since existing people and resources would be

used>in de'Velop~g and operating" the SSS program

center;

-+et-. Could existing systems be used for the

space/collection \program? The SSSPB explained at

someilen.gth why no.other available system would meet

the/space-eollection requirements, even if a reasonable

Dumber of modifications were ttl:ade. However, the

board pointed out /that specific components of the

other systems, where\suitable, were to.be incorporated

into the new system.

(~ Dr.\ Fubini was assured. that there

were no plans to diBcardithe "1962 moder'i'-- _

systems and that no funds were being requested to

replace any major items in these systems. The two

secondary tracking stations/.received from ARPA were

being modified under a $3.5 million contract to provide

coverage of both the VHF and UHF frequency ranges

rather than a single frequency range, and to provide

improved tracking, mOllitClring, search, and magnetic

tape recording. 7

(U) Some of the same or similar questions

were also raised by DDR&E/regarding the Air Force's

Space Detection and Tracking System (Spadats).

At the end of July 1961, NSA forwarded to DDR&E two alternative/plans. Plan A was

considered to be a "normal R&D approach" to meet

the established space sutveillanceSigint objectives,

and Plan B was "an enlarged and expedited program

developed by SSSPB." The\NSASABteviewed Plan B

and concluded that the NORA!> requirements on

which Plan B was based were not \complete enough for

assessment. DmNSA decided to sUbmit\.both plans to

DDR&E, since it was believed that "tbe urgency of

the NORAD requirements IIlust be evaluated before

an intelligent decision can be\made."B

J81 NSA reported\that a "critical examination of national space surveillance requirements had

been conducted. Plan A was consistent witb\existing

FY62 RDT&E resources, and would "concentrate on

the programmed resources of I I

passive Sigint collection system, to satisfy immediate

needs for Sigint space surveillance and. proce88ing."

The e88ential elements of the Plan A proposal were as

follows:

1. Addition of minimum analytic carability\ ·.·...\t... o

I Iby FY63 to

enable these sites (a) to make a "fair" validity

estimate of the nature and purpose of an indeterminate.

percentage of radiating Soviet space vehicles within.

few hours after detection and (b) to collect data.

II

SECRET 11
DOCID:

~~CnHT

(b) (1)

4~(5)912 (b)(1 )

(b)(3)-50 usc 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

2. Completion by 1966~7, essentially on a norJllal

budget .yde, of two addRina:y:rio/' ait.., a

simplified collection system i ·nd one Stonehouse, deep-space collectio in Asmara,

Ethiopia.

3. Studies to be continued, both locally and under

contract for improvements in our RF and analytic

capability, including simultaneous coverage of multiple

targets and an alternate means of implementing the

Stonehouse deep-space collection plan (preferably as

a joint venture with United States military space

programs).

+6t- Following completion of the studies, a

detailed program (five years) was to be developed for

an increased Sigint space surveillance capability. The

results of the studies would permit reasonably accurate

cost estimates of total resources necessary to carry out

the program. FY62 RDT&E costs should not exceed

$1.2 million, which could be made available within the

NSA budget.

-tS+- Plan B represented a much enlarged

systems concept as NSA's contribution to the national

space surveillance program. Phase I of the expedited

project establishedI

'" The estimated total cost of this program is approximately

$90 million for the period FY62 through FY64 and an annual

operating cost of approximately $20 million. . ..Recognized

inadequacies of Plan A compared to Plan B were:

a. Identification of the nature and purpose of fewer foreign

space vehicles on their zero orbits.

b. Lower validity identification.

c. Reduction of intercept coverage of the U.S.S.R (both

geographical and in terms of percentage of vehicle passes

detected).

d. Only partial coverage of deep-space probes.

e. Less reliable intersite tip-off.

f. Completion three to four years later.

6. If the NORAD requirements and timetable are considered to

be of such an urgency that an expedited, enlarged program for

space surveillance is warranted, the FY62 funds required to

carry on Plan B must be made available in the first part of

FY62.

7. It is requested that a determination be made 88 to which of

the alternatives should serve 88 NSA's primary guidance in

fulfillment of Sigint space surveillance responsibilities. 9

It appears that Dr. Fubini doubted

that either the Secretary of Defense or the President

would approve NORAD's full program for space surveillance. If they did, approval of NSA's $110 million

12 SHCRHT

plan would be almost automatic. If, on the other hand,

NORAD's request/were disapproved, NSA would still

stand a good ch811ce of having a less expensive SSS

program, one without the part directed at "near-realtime reporting/ on hostile vehicles," approved. He

pointed out, /however, that a third possibilityendorsing NORAD's estimate of the nature of the

space threat but directing a much cheaper system to

meet it-was likely. In this event, NSA's role and

funding requests would be reexamined on their merits.

1'€T Dr. Fubini suggested that NSA prepare atevised Plan A. Some of the SSSPB members

concluded that NSA's SSS plans would soon be competing with NORAD's for the DOD space-surveillance

dollar, and that the high cost of Spadats was causing

reconsideration of alternatives, one of which involved

retiance on Sigint, "to perform a not inconsiderable

ftaction of the total space-surveillance task. ,,10

-f€i- NSA representatives, Dr. Solomon

Kullback and Mr. Howard C. Barlow, met with Dr.

Fubini on 13 September 1961 and were advised that

DDR&E had recommended approval of NSA's Plan A;

that NORAD's Spadats plan would be reduced to

about 25 percent of the $1. 7 billion originally estimated, and that the NSA and NORAD plans should

be kept separate but must be closely related. 1

I

(U) When the SSSPB was established on

31 March 1961, it was expected that its work would

be completed and the group dissolved by 1 June 1961.

However, the NSASAB recommended changes in the

SSSPB's proposed plans for the SSS program, and

this, combined with the critical reception of the plan

by OSD, DDR&E, caused DIRNSA to' request the

preparation of alternative proposals. The SSSPB continued to function through the summer and fall of

1961, reporting to D/DIRNSA. 12

NSA complied with Dr. Fubini's request that it propose alternative programs for Space

Surveillance Sigint, and transmitted three plans to

DDR&E early in November with a recommendation

that Plan Two be approved. This plan was believed to

provide the growth potential needed to meet the full

national requirements. 13

tet- One point made by NSA was that

The SSS problem differs from normal Sigint problems in that

it involves moving targets emitting an unpredictable variety of

wide bandwidth signals. It requires a general solution approach

now, since we would lack the necessary lead time to develop

equipments if we were to wait for each signal to be observed.

Such a solution involves considerable initial expense for site

construction and equipment irrespective of the numbers of space

vehicles launched, but is far more economical in the long run

than a multiplicity of 'crash' ad hoc attempts 88 new vehicles

and signals appear. I.
~iCKiT 13

$ 6.2

8.1

6.3

$20.6'7

8BCRHT

$67,946,000

56,663,000

35, 176,0001t·

-o~

-().l

4.£ ----....

$ 4.5

ARMY AIR TOTAL

FORCE

-0-

-0-

1.8

$ 1.8

(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

NSA

RDT&E $ 6.2

Procurement 8. 1

Military Construction -:Q:..

Grand Totals $14.3

(U) Plan Two w~ accepted by DDR&E in

December 1961 with certain modifications-limit the

number of sites which would be provided a search

capability, specify that existmg receivers from commercial sources or resulting from earlier government

development programs would be used, and ordered a

detailed technical development. plan be prepared and

reviewed by DDR&E before any system development

money was committed. It was. informally indicated

that approximately $20.6 million would be made available as the FY63 funding level,and that these funds

would be distributed as follows: .

(ti) In mid-December 1961, OffiNSA, Vice

Admiral L.H. Frost, USN, announced the establishment of a new "Spacol Management Office" for the

purpose of "directing the implementation of the approved DOD program for the research, design, development, construction, installation, and initial service

test of the Spacol system. R3 will develop Spacol plans

in collaboration with D31.,,18

(U) The Spacol Management Office was to

be the "principal NSA element responsible for the

allocation or expenditure of Spacol resources, and for

conducting liaison with organizations external to NSA

on Spacol or subjects directly related t6 Spacol."

(U)..LEO' 'Gt- I IChief of the

Office of Analytic Equipment Development, (Kl), was

designated Spacol project manager and chief of the

new office. The latter was to be staffed with personnel

"from all appropriate Agency elements in order to

achieve an optimum group of personnel who are

specialists in all the functional areas involved in

Spacol. "

(U) The Office of Spacol Management (R6)

was subsequently designated the "Office of Special

Program Management." It was organized to work as a

team within which there would be functional specialization to permit engineering personnel to concentrate

on engineering while nonengineering personnel would

years, rather than three years." Total estimated cosu

for the three plans were:

Plan One

Plan Two

Plan Three

/](b)(1 )

!i(b)(3)-50 USC 403

\{b) (3) !i(b)(3)-P.L.86-36 40359b7l2-)

9~ _,

)1\ was explained that PIa: One o~d/ the greatest probahility of meeti,ngSigint requirep;.ent.

by 1965, parti~ul~rly early·····identification ol' spade

vehicles before they\coyld~ake a first pass 9~er UiS.

territory or U.S. \fQr~e~ abroad. Plan One diji'~red f~bm

the Plan B su~miited\in May 1961 in tha!(the original

target dat~-8et by NOR-AD was slipped ~6 1 July 1965.

It w~/aI8o assum~ th~t theI tjit~ • .,

Dwould be collo¢ated ~tb an existi.Jlg Sigmt s~atlOn,.

that. a full U.S. site ml Jas not po~it.icallYi att~~able, and thrt the Aitefb,CIVe was a mmlmum

faclhty manned bYl lAs a result of recomT

mendations by NSASAB and DDR&E, the ability to

search for other targets while collecting /from on.e

target, and the ability to cope with foreigIl communication satellites had been added; probable additional

communications costs were identified.. I

of€1 Plan Two took into con~ideration the

guidance given NORAD-that the space 8urveillance

operational target date should be chlinged to m~d1965, that DDR&E would support dt!velopment lind

deployment of one full-eapability Spadats facility in

addition to the NORAD control center, but ~hat

additional facilities would have to .~ait. It therefore

proposed that only I Isite have the ifull

computer-equipped configuration. Plan Two would 'provide a reduced interim capability but allc::::::::Jsites

were to be constructed and eventually be able to meet

stated intelligence requirements. IS

(U) Savings would result from elimination

of the proposed 2400-bit-per-second communications

and switching centers to link the computers, and from

elimination of a separate NSA SSS computer, together

with relaxation of the "crash" aspect of the construction program, training, etc. The savings would be

reflected in slower reporting, a lower confidence factor

in reporting, and increased vulnerability to communication difficulties.

Plan Three assumed that the DOD

would not confirm the "near-real-time" reporting requirements expressed in the DOD-NASA Agreement,

sought by NORAD and other operational commands,

and approved by JCS. Quick-reaction capability was

to be limited to intersite tip-off and efficient operational control of collection resources. Computer analysis and high-speed data communications were dropped,

and premium construction costs to meet a 1965 operational date were avoided. It was noted, however, that

while the reduced system comtemplated in Plan Three

would not meet the operational commander's stated

requirements, it would represent a great improvement

over existing collection facilities. The total cost of

Plan Three was to be spread over four and one-half

DOCIO:
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handle other major responsibilities necessary for system development without duplicating theskills\ and

effort of other organizations. The office <RP) consisted

of a chief, administrative and clerical statrt and. four

branches. R61 was a program controls and support

organization charged to prepare and monitor control

procedures, and to support the other organizations. It

was to perform the following functions:

1 Conceptual Phase: Prepare tiBcal andimplementation plans, participate in site surveys. and technical support requirements for Technical Development Plans;

2 Preprocurement Phase: Prepare management and

fiscal provisions for purchase descriptions, .•. review

purchase descriptions, prepare and proc~ss precontractual documentation, and participate in analysis

of contract proposals;

3 Development Installation Phase: Provide administrative services on contracts, perform fiscal and

schedule analysis, report on all active. contracts,

provide technical representatives for contracting

officers on active contracts, plan for and direct

movement of systems to operational sites, originate

installation planning, participate in Category ill

testing, and coordinate requirements and plans in

NSA and with the SCAs.

R62 was to provide ro"ect mana ement and en

ing services for

for

Developing the Final Technical

Development Plan (U)

(U) The Spacol program was given an

FY63 funding level of about $20 million, and its

assumed total cost was set at about $40 million. The

Secretary of Defense approved implementation of the

"more austere" version of the plans submitted by

NSA. NSA was told that the final Spacoldevelopment

plan would be "tied to maximum utilization of existing

capabilities in this critical signal collection area"; and

was directed to minimize "the necessity for continual

ad hoc responses to events" and to "provide a balance

for an austere but vigorous and technically adequate

growth of capability. "19

fS1 DDR&E requested that NSA prepare

a detailed development plan within the stated funding

assumptions, and specified important issues to be kept

in mind in preparing the plan. They included:

1. Achievement of a significant capability by

1965 is required in both th~ Iand Stonehouse collection sites.

14 SECRET

2. Early capability in at least one Stonehouse

site in 1964 is highly desirable to obtain the earliest

useful collection capability against both very high

altitude satellites, and also on manned or unmanned

lunar vehicles and other deep-space probes.

3. The ... plan ... should identify the equipments proposed in enough detail so that the equipment lists formulated can be subjected to early

decisions as to their applicability and availability.

4. Particular attention must be paid to the

potentials inherent in building on existing and nearfuture signal collection installations and capabilities. The engineering plan should list existing capabilities, pointing out their shortcomings and

weaknesses and should identify which ones cannot

be employed in Spacol; the plan should also indicate

the\degree to which existing capabilities will be

complemented by the new proposed capabilities, as

deem~ desirable or necessary because of the future

growth\of collection requirements.

5. The NORAD requirement is obscure because

it\ appears tied to a threat that is neither defined

nor clearly met by passive devices of the Spacol

type. In view of this, the development plan should

inclUde statements regarding the reliability, usefulness,\ and cost effectiveness of extremely rapid

reporting as compared to more deliberate reporting

with higher assurance and reliability.

6. The plan should discuss the traffic handling

ability which can be incorporated in the Spacol

system within the funding confines mentioned

earlier ..\...

7. The \plan should specify the variety of precision tracking capabilities which need to be incorpora"t~ in\\ b.oth the I land Stonehouse

recelVlDg statIOns.... 1...- _

8. Careful\attention should be given to the data

processing and communications systems associated

with SpacoI. In particular, it should be possible on

the basis of the development plan to specify those

items of information which can be developed by

relatively simpleequipments at the field sites; those

which would require a rather extensive data processing facility of at least one site; and those cases

in which it would. be most efficient to do the

processing at NSA a.ftercommunicating the data to

NSA headquarters. "\ ..

9. In general, the\development plan must describe, in detail, the. way in which the Spacol

system grows as a function of time ....

10. The operational planning which shows how the

Stonehouse system can make use of initial information received from thel Isites should be
DOCI D: 4 a.$Wo2JSC 403

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•

cult to answer and to bureaucratic friction between

the various org.aniz8,tio:ll8 involved. 21

4'rl R6representatives visited NORAD

headquarters early in February 1962 and briefed

NORAD representatives on the status of the SSS

program and plans. NORADhad heard that the

program was ~ing cut in the ·~real-time reaction"

area and was concerned tlU,it its requirements would

not be met. NORAD representatives indicated their

concern regarding the matter\.of survivability in the

event olan enemy attack in which NSA was destroyed,

and they were considering setting up a small NSAtype operationin\their under ou d Combat 0 ratioDs Center (COC).

specified-in partl~l1tllr.howthese two sites complement one.anothe.r.\in .. the very high altitude

satellite and space-probe work, and how the handover is to be accompliShecl.\Detai1s are required as

to how the overall nunjber\of Stone.house stations

is related to overall perform8,:Ilce,.onthe basis·of

anticipated Soviet trajectories.

11. The plan ..• should include\..a\.discussion.of the

relative merits of mobile and.\.6xed. installations at

certain of the sites, including\the time phasing of

such alternative sites and theust!8 to which the

mobile equipments could be put \If they are sub.sequently replaced by fixed equipm~ts-e.g. ,use of

the mobile equipment as gap fillersj

12. NSA has recently been asked to begin\some

investigations on how the presently conceived Spacol

effort could be com lemented if a

would be desirable that the development plan for

Spacol specify to what extent this capability would

complement the conventional Spacol capability in

the event that the I Icollection platform

should prove to be technically feasible at an early

enough time. 20

The NSA representatives reported

that NORAD's approach failed to appreciate that

even though they let imm~iate reporting ... to build up the.

required amount of information for an inference on vehicle

purpose,

(U) DDR&E noted that some of this planning was under way, and added that the development

plan had been discussed with Dr·1 1

of the NSA Scientific Advisory Board. He had suggested that the appropriate NSASAB panel meet

about the middle of January 1962 to advise NSA on

submission of the engineering development plan.

DDR&E concurred in the latter'$ advice and suggested

that an initial review of the proposed development

plan be held in March 1962. NSA was also encouraged

to seek the cooperation and assistance of any other

organization "capable of making substantive contributions to the NSA preparation of its development

plan. "

(D) The new Spac(>l Management Office

had difficulty in finding satisfactory answers to some

of the questions raised by DDR&E regarding the SSS

program, and in obtaining the information needed to

develop an adequate technical development plan.

These difficulties appear to have been due both to the

fact that some of the questions were inherently diffiThe R6 representatives made a number of recommenda.tiona for NSA action including:

1. Prepare a draft NSA position on the desirability and feasibility of providing a small SIGINT

processing element for NORAD underground COC

(425L). In the absence of any official NORAD

proposal, this position should not.be forwarded, but

some advance consideration is recommended ....

2. Infor.m NORAD of results ofl 1site

survey as soon as p088ible ....

3. Provide NORAD an explanation of present

NSA capabilities for alternate routings of communications froml ~r other field Sigint sites

to NORAD in the event of outage or destruction of

the NSA Center ....

4. Make a current reappraisal of the desirability

of having a permanent NSA Liaison Officer at

NORAD, as suggested by JCS on 5 Dec 1960; ...

5. Pursue the NSA-NORAD mutual agreement

requested by NORAD in June 1961 and recommended by ADP in his report of 27-28 July 1961

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 SECRET 15
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(p)(3)-P.L.86-36 (b)(3)-P. L. 86-36

TDY to NORAD so that detailed~greements on

such matters as Spacol support can be keyed to an

overall understanding ....

6. NSA should ask USIB to pronounce on the

validity and relative importance of the near-realtime reporting aspect of space surveilhmce requirements compiled by NORAD and accepted by JCS

on 19 June 1961 (JCSM-415~ 1 and.\ JCS 2283/

137), in view of the effect subsequent DDR&E

challenges to this concept are having on.\NSA's own

planning ....

7. Ask NSA field activities (and SDSLO-L),

which have not already done so to brief their

respective unified or specified commander$on NSA's

SSS plans and to ascertain any specialreql)irements

for space surveillance Sigint. (Their overall space

surveillance requirements were expressed to NORAD 24-25 January 1961 and are included in t:Qe

Spadats requirements study) .... 22

The first NSA report on th¢"Status

of Space Surveillance Sigint Planning" and "SPACOL

Status Report-1 April 1962" was forwarded toDDR&E

early in April 1962. In part, it reported that:

Our principal efforts during the quarter just endec\ have

concentrated on five areaa: establishing a managem~nt approach,

reviewing systems requirements, firming up site selection, collecting background information, and establishing Ilystemdesign

criteria.

Progress and achievement in this phaae can be lD.eaaured not

in terms of hardware, nor by the volume of pllUJJling papers

during the quarter. but rather by the greater .•• meaaure of

confidence achieved in the extent and limits of our knowledge in

each area .... 23

i'S+- Planning for the SSS prOgram •.. and

discussion of requirements had been confined to (:(>nsideration of requirements for intelligence •• on Soviet

space operations, but in May 1962 Production Group

B also stated requirements as follows:

2. Consequently it is suggested that the mission of I I

and Stonehouse facilities aa outlined in para. 2.a-.-o~l!"""":trh~e""

referenced A4 DfF be amended as follows:

..•...

(U) Dr. Fubini wrote DffiNSA early in

May 1962 acknowledging receipt of the first SPACOL

Status Report which he considered

very informative in giving a broad generAl treatment of the

subject, but It is not detailed enougb in treating the specific

problems aa presented in DDR&E guidance letter, ... in sufficient breadth or depth to allow us to go ahead with confidence

on appropriation or obligation. Although the contracliB and

studies in-being mentioned in the report may cover all of the

unanswered issues, their content is not embodied even summarily

in this report and, therefore, we will need more information.

This information must address itself to and be presented in the

same format as the detailed DDR&E guidance, ...

We Ihould like to emphaaize the concern of this office with the

statements made in the report which assume that Spacol ij going

to (0 ahead on the baais of the present knowledge. FY63 funds

will be made available only upon presentation to DDR&E of an

acceptable development plan; therefore, any commitment that

may have implied the availability of these funds could bring

about undesirable consequences. In this connection, it •. is requested that NSA provide us with written confirmation that all

contracts issued to date on Spacol can be completed within the

present (FY62) funds. Incremental funding is not considered to

be a satiafactory answer to this question. The comptroller is

being advised of our concern about these funds by a copy of this

letter. The NSA report ... does not provide mcal details that in

any way recognize expenditure limitations that were placed upon

Spacol by DDR&E. Our enmination of the program indicates

that discrepancies might easily exceed $1 ()() million.

... it ia requested that NSA prepare an additional report on

Spacol. This report should be a technical development plan

prepared in accordance with the specific guidance from ODDR&E

dated 20 December 1961, and Ihould be submitted to ODPR&E

on or before 10 June 1962 in order that we can determme our

position on FY63 funding of Spacol.

It is further requested that your report indicate the NSA

manpower used to date, and that required to prepare the above

report. 2S

(U) WQUO) A note of 11 M? 1962 from Dr. Louis

Tordella, D/DffiNSA, to Mr. L I commented regarding the above, " ... I can readily see

why Fubini got upset. Let's put more conditionals in

our statements of what we plan to do." A memorandum

was forwarded to DDR&E on 5 June 1962 assuring

him that the apparent assumption in the first report

that Spacol was in fact going ahead was made merely

for planning purposes; that no contracts had been let

specifically supporting Spacol; that a study contract

under negotiation would be financed entirely from

FY62 funds already available to NSA, and that no

commitments extending into FY63 would be made

until approved by DDR&E. The remaining material

requested was to be forwarded separately by 10 June

1962, as requested, but that deadline was extended. 26

The proposed technical development plan was forwarded to DDR&E on 19 June 1962. When all or part

of the plan had been approved, a secret, edited version

was to be prepared for use by the participants in the

program. 27

(0 eeO) After reviewing this plan, DDR&E

wrote DffiNSA on 14 August 1962 that:

16 8GCR~T IIAfU)LE ViA e6Mt:foff ettAfUiELS 6ftiLY
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(b)(:3)"l? L:$6~3Q SECRET

•

1.... The contents of the document are a good, broad and

comprehensive treatment of the subject matter, with sufficient

detail to analyze in depth the features of the proposed program.

In this analysis, it appeared to us that several of the technical

iuues were not completely resolved, as was to be expected in

view of the preliminary nature of the TOP. On./the.whole,

however, the report is satisfactory, and furnishes/a mOllt appropriate basis for further guidance regarding the/techn.ital issues

which we consider to require additional clarification ina modified

TOP ....

... 3. Specifically the modified TOP .should include some or

all of the following provisions for furth.er definition of the Spacol

system characteristics, while preserving a well-balanced system

capability:

a. Based on an anlysis of .£OIIt versus effectiveness, consider

deletin~ Ifrom the lIystem, since, while they

fulfill 16 percent of the system requirements, they also incur 25

percent of the COIIt.

b. Sincelr--------Iupgrading is a COIIt estimate

only representing 25 percent of the system COllts with no clearly

defined system improvement value, consider deferring this item

until that time when value versus COllt determination indicate

that such action is necessary to maintain an adequate system

capability.

c. Because missile-<lriented capabilities are currently being

used for space collection, consider planning for continuing

utilization of that missile-oriented capability, and identify in

detail that unique and nonoverlapping capability which will be

furnished by tbe specifically provided equipment of the Spacol

system.

d. Since user requirements can be fulfilled by combinations

of various amounts and types of data, consider simpler, less

COIItly alternatives for fulfilling NORAD requirements, specifically including procedural changes required to provide Spadats

with Comint generated data.

4. . .. I am also concerned about the COIIt estimates for the

Spacol system as described in the June report. It is noted there

that the proposed program has asaociated with it a current COIIt

estimate very clOlle to the budgeted funding. In view of the

historical fact that the initial planning estimates of COIIt are

often considerably below final program COIIta, and to insure that

the maximum funding of $40 million at Spacol system completion

not be eIceeded, it would be prudent to plan for a present base

cost estimate substantially under the $40 million level.

It is not the intent of this constraint to set arbitrary funding

limitation on the program; however, the impact of the revisions

of the TOP you will make in consonance with paragragh 3 will

undoubtedly have the automatic effect of substantially reducing

the present cost estimate to a base planning figure of perhaps

$25 million. In any case, program planning and the associated

management and contractual arrangement must be undertaken

so as to avoid final expeditures in eIcess of budgeted amounts. 21

(U) It was also anticipated that NSA

would be able to complete its revisions of the TDP in

line with the above guidance not later than 7 September 1962, and that following receipt of the modified

TDP, release of additional funds could be authorized.

(U) NSA forwarded its proposed changes

in the "sss Technical Development Plan" to DDR&E

about two weeks ahead of the indicated deadline. The

proposed modifications, int:!ffect~di'(ided the program

into two phases:

1..Phase I inclld;~o~~~~:edzn~~~ims fod

lllstaUatlODs, anA/the NSA Processing Center.

These\\ items were to.be undertaken immediately

and their estimated totl,ll cost WaS $21,405,000.

2. Phase U included upgrading~ I I \ \ / =::::J and was to

be defetred until FY65 when accurate cost data on

Pbase I would be available.

(U) This approach provided a mechanism

for funds control while maintaining &.balanced system

capability. \. It was pointed out "that 'cost' of the

modification is a two~year delay in thel I

installation \and one additional year of less productive

operation ofl I" No funds were to be

obligated for Phase II without DDR&E approval, and

NSA would furnish DDR&E a detailed funding summary covering Phase I and recommendations for Phase

II by 1 June 1964. Further discussion of certain points

requested by DDR&E was atEio enclosed. 29

(U) On 18 September 1962, DDR&E approved FY63 RDT&E funds for Spacol, raising the

total of funds approved from $37,343,400 to a total of

$43,559,400, and releasing $6,216,000 for the Spacol

project based on the technical development plan as

modified on 23 August 1962. 30

(U)~ NSA discovered, however, that the

redUctions in Phase I included FY63 MCA (Military

C01struction Army) funds amounting to $1,285,000

for Iand $1,553,000 for I I

construction which could not be deferred from FY63

to FY65. Therefore, it requested that the authorization

for Phase I be adjusted by adding these amounts to

make the total for Phase I $24,183,000, with a

corresponding reduction in Phase II. It pointed out

that these adjustments could be made without exceeding the $25 million planning limitation imposed by

DDR&E. 31

(8) The complete "NSA Space Surveillance Sigint, Technical Development Plan, September

1962" was approved on 20 September 1962. The

changes approved by DDR&E had been incorporated.

Primary Sigint objectives of the SSS program were

stated as follows:

... To meet the aspects of space surveillaDce which Sigint is

best able to fulfill. .. Space Surveillance Sigint objectives, to be

met by monitoring signals from the space vehicles themselves,

are:

Near-Real Time Reporting:

1. Time and estimated place of launch.

2. Nature, location, and probable purpose of vehicle.

SECRET 17
Continued Reporting (sampling or other basis):

1. To confirm or deny reported nature, pUrpCllle, and

of the vehicle.

It was/expected that a major improvement in the speed with which intelligence

eQuId he derjved f:m I.. lin..terceptedby I J could be secul - ite

processing and [ IA d,L.e-ve""T""o-p-m-e-n"'t"'a"'l-m-od-"'e"'l-o-+-a~f=-a-c"!"lil~it-y"""'fo.,..r......

pr~:cj~g t z:::::::Jwas to be installed

atL Ishortly after installation

of t e asic coHection system (iuring the winter,

(C) The technical devel!opIDent plan

analyzed existing missile and space-collectioll sites

and installations in terms of their potentials and

limitations in relation to knoWDspace-collection

requirements. Proposed ,SSS facilities were $imilarly

evaluated./The results,. so far as the SSSprogram

was concerned, were s.ummarizedin a table showing

"Estimated Relative/Value/ of Proposed SSS Facilities. "/(see Figure 10 Phasing charts for the 1 .1

Dand Stonehouse I systems coveting the period •

~~~ :~:Cwere aISt~n~~X:;i~n~se=trmlte 2) I

I were completed,thenext major

improvements would occur about eil!hteen month.s

later, when the I / rsites would

become operational. I / I

/

SSS Management Program (U)

(U).Jf?r Planning and implementing the SSS

program were to be directed and coordinated by

NSA .•.. while specific responsibilities were divided

all;long NSA, the service cryptologic agencies, other

government agencies and private contractors, with

due regard for limitations on resources and the

special talents available and needed. It was expected that there would be one system contractor

for .'. thel ~ystem, and another for the

Stonehouse system. The service cryptologic agencies

were to participate in system procurement to the

and a similar facility addP.dtol learly in

1963 (Figure 4 issl Isystem diagram).

<U) The Stonehouse system was patterned after the NASA deep-space instrumentation

facility (DSIF) since the data to be collected was

similar (Figure 5 is a Stonehouse system diagram).

. b)(1)

b)(3),SOUSQ 403

(0)(3)-P.L.86-36

extent neceuary to allow them to conduct the training,

provillioning and construction activities for which they will be

responsible. 31

Detailed site selection, provision of adequate real estate,

structures, and support facilities will be accomplished by the

appropriate service cryptologic agency under the guidance of

NSA. ,.

Communications were to be provided by the Defense

Communications Agency, based on requirements submitted. by NSA.

(U) NSA was to provide each of the SCAs

with a statement of the number and type of operational

personnel required per shift, and the SCAs were to

apply appropriate manning factors and provide the

necessary personnel.{ Iand signal analysts

were to be furnished y NSA (see Figure 6.)33

(U) ..f.Fr It was pointed out that many of the

people would require extensive training in advance of

their assignment to one of the SSS sites. It was

expected that the service technical schools would

provide .hasic training courses for operators and maintenance personnel and that NSA would provide advanced Or supplementary training where required.

There wO\lld be on-the-job training (OJT)jnll

and earth-satellite tracking at estfi.l:>lished t~

stations in. the zone of the interior:1nitial assignees to

1 1and Stonehollsestations would be given

OJT by the system/contractor at his plant before

shipment 9fthe equipment overseas.

(U)~ Three classes of funds-Military Construction Appropriations Defense Agency (MCDA),

Procurement Appropriation Defense Agency (PDA),

(b)(1 )

(b)(3)

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1-
db (1

DOCI D: 4 a3~~~-2[)QSC4Q3 (b)($)-P.L 86'-3(3

and ReliJeafch,. DevelopDlent, Test and Evaluation

(RD.T..&E.).. -wer..e t..equiredf(}t ..t heBS.S. t>rramlsee IFi~e 7.). Technical difficulties in siting I .. adei it necessary to replace $1,675,000 of MCDA

funds requested for FY63 with ane.stimated. $5 million

in FY65 funds. PDA funds were needed for procurement of commercially available collection and process-

~iequipment, for I \\\ I

Ufor spares.for one year after installation, and for

handling charges, etc. RDT&E funds were\necessary

to cover the systems engineering and development

effort. Specialized training costs were met by internal

programming within OIM budgets. 34

PERT Adopted (U)

(U)-f'?r The PERT (program evaluation review

techniques) system was adopted for management control in the development of the SSS program. In

addition to time-oriented networks already prepared,

the system included: time-scaled networks for each I land Stonehouse site; monthly inputs of time

changes; and use of a computer to identify critical

paths and distribution of analysis information. 35

Space Sigint Requirements (U)

(~ In the spring of 1963 NASA wrote

NSA to confirm its hope that NSA might be able to

collect and exploit data transmissions from Soviet

lunar spacecraft before they could be obtained from

NASA's own lunar exploration program. The data

would be of great value in the Apollo manned lunar

landing program. A statement of NASA's data collection requirements was enclosed, and it was noted that

these would also be levied on the intelligence community through GMAIC (Guided Missile and Astronautics

Intelligence Committee).

... NSA bas primary responsibility for tbe collection of such

data transmisaione, it is desirable tbat you collllider tbis problem

area immediately. The NASA would appreciate receiving a

proposed ground instrumentation 8Upport plan for meeting tbese

requirements Crom NSA and your comments on tbe enclosed

requirements.

In connection witb tbe instrumentation 8Upport plan, tbe

NASA reviewed your 'Space Surveillance Sigint (C) Sl44037

Technical Development Plan,' dated September 1962. The plan

generally appears to be capable of meeting tbe NASA requirements except in respect to the timing of certain facilities. It is

evident that tbe proposed 85-Coot diameter antenna at Asman

is a key facility for obtaining proper support of tbe NASA

requirements. The availability of this installation at the earliest

~RCRET

pouiilledate would be highly desirahle, even if tbe facilitiM are

activatedon.sl1~yatembuis.

... 4. In summarytbetentative NASA views are:

... c. The use of eJ:isfin~ Ifacilities on an interim

buitJlDd tbe optimizing of tbe capabilities of the 4o-foot

antennuinl Ishould be examined in detail.

... d. The proposed NSA facility at Aamara Ihould be

accelerated. The NASA is willing to Ulitt the NSA in thit

regard, if desired by tbe NSA. J6

Representatives of CIA, DIA, and

NSA met on 24 July 1963 to discuss Sigint spacecollection plans and related intelligence requirements.

During this discussion an NSA representative pointed

out that, even when the Interim Deep-Space Facilities

Plan was fully implemented, it would provide primary

..........

....... lin the plan. Dr. ..................._ .......,.,....__.,..,......................._ ..........J

Wheelon, CIA, mentioned that there were other facilities which could possibly contribute to our collection

capability, and that in his discussion with Dr. Fubini

it appeared that DOD might not have realized the full

impact on the intelligence community caused bv deletion ofl Iand Stonehouse I Jfrom

the SSS program. Dr. Wheelon said that he would

recommend to the DCI that "the door be left open on

CIA's review of that portion of the Combines Cryptoloic Program dealing with space, pending the results

of further study of space intelligence requirements."

It was also decided that CIA and DIA representatives

would draft a proposed letter for NSA to send to usm

stating that NSA had not received space intelligence

requirements covering the period through 1970 and

requesting that usm prepare such requirements and

indicate their priority compared with other requirements previously submitted. 37

In the fall of 1963 representatives of

CIA, DIA, CCPC (Critical Collection Priorities Committee), GMAIC and NSA concluded that usm had

not defined intelligence requirements to be levied on

NSA well enough to allow it to develop a national plan

for space collection. They pointed out that, since the

cost of space collection was extremely high, NSA could

not obtain adequate funds and other support unless

usm's specific needs were spelled out in detail. NSA

requested, therefore, that usm develop such requirements and give them to NSA for use in determining

if existing plans were adequate. If plans were inadequate, NSA was to notify usm and submit to OSD

a proposal for augmenting resources. Two other studies

of missile and space intelligence were also then under

way: a DOD-wide review addressed primarily to the

efficiency and responsiveness of collection and analytic

SfiCRE'f 19

•
DOCID: 403591~

CuNt ilJr::N1 iAt iui i1 i

ibi i3i

«:b)(1 )

[(b){p)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P. L. 86-36

efforts, and a full-scale evaluation of the total eft'Qrt··

against the Sovie~ land ESV problems0J8

SSS Program Priorities and Funding (U)

(U) Early in November./1963, NSA .Imbmitted a I ppgradingFunding

Summary' to DDR&E at the latter's request. but

pointed out that the indicated priorities andline item

C08ts might change -by the time the .. SSS Phase n

Funding Plan" was submitted, as required by DDR&E,

prior to 1 June 1964. This material was for Use in

connection with the DOD FY65 budget review. Specific

projects were listed in priority order for FY65 and

FY66. NSA predicted that some of the lower priority

projects listed for FY66 would not be.completed as

part of the SSS program either because the need

proved to be insufficient or because. they could be

deferred. Also, although there would be benefits froIn

accomplishing some of the higher priority FY66 projects in FY65, it was believed that th.e scheduling. w~

reasonable and that funding forI. • •lin

FY65 should remain at the current level of

$2,995,492. 39

Program Review, April 1964 (U)

In April 1964', NSA forwarded to

DDR&E a review of the first eighteen months of the

..Space Surveillance Sigint Program (Phase I). ,j This

document attempted to update the ..SSS Technical

Development Plan" of September 1962 by identifying

the more significant neces$ary departures from the

plan, and the reallocation of funds within the approved

total of $40 million.

It was anticipated that some of the detail of the TD~ would

have to be changed to meet the impact !>f new conditions.

ProbleID8 created by changint requirementa, dollar limitatioDa,

gold flow reatrictions, the impact of foreign policieS tech- .

nological adju8tments in lIY8tem design have been met by

reaponsive and realistic ~~illtioIl8.40

(U) -If?} The SSS pr<>gram was progre$sing in

accordance with the approved plan; three major system

contracts had been awarded for Stonehouse,I... __---, ~:-::--~:-- __---:..,c:e.:!q=.u:!ip:.:m=en::.t::s::. .....::;Complete fabrication

of Stonehouse and equipment. was expected within sa months; the contract

had been awarded several weeks earlier and was

expected to be completed on schedule. Stonehouse

construction was expected to be about five months

late, because of local political complications, and

20 eONPlDHNTlAL

might be further delayed because of local land acquisition.problems. The only significant change in system

design reported was the addition of a 150-foot antenna 1 Ito Stonehouse. It was predicted that the

SSS program would be completed within the approved

$40 million ceiling.

(U)Hardware fabrication had been left

largely to commercial contractors while design of

advanced subsystems was assigned to the NSA RID

Organization.

(u>-fer The Stonehouse. contract was awarded

to Radiation, Incorporated, of Melbourne, Florida on

1 August \1963, as the low bidder of two firms. Five

companies were solicited on thei ~ontract.

and the contr.act was awarded to Ling-TeDfco-VQugbt

of Greenville~ Texas on 12 March 1964. The1 I

Dontract was awarded to Sylvania Electronic Systems-West, on 15 July 1963, on a sole-source basis

because it was \believed that the construction to be

acomplished under severe weather conditions at this

site did not alloW the time required for competitive

bidding.

(U) Each purchase description included a

"work package" approach by which all the work was

divided in accordance. with PERT C08t techniques into

units which readily could be compared, and which

made regular reporting and contract supervision easier

and more effective. Fixed-price incentive contracts

Were used, since only a small amount of development

work was involved in each\ contract.

(0) The original TOP concept of communications support was retained; it included duplex

links from the collection sites to the NSA Operations

Building and between sites. Technical data could be

exchanged and raw intelligence data could be forwarded to NSA at a rate of 100 words-per-minute.

Since there was no requirement for field computers to

have direct inp~ to an agency cODlPuter, there was no

ne~ for transmission of digitized\ data, although it

was expected that the communications system would

be .• able to provide such service. Since the Army

proVided some terminal equipment from its own resources, and some planned high-speed \.teletype equipment could not be procured for timelyjnstallation in

the I Icircuits, the coat of communications

support for the SSS program was only $302,000,

instead of the $540,000 programmed.

iG) The remote locations of thel~---:~o;--_ and Stonehouse sites, the size and weight of the

equipment components, the contractual requirements

for GBL (government bill of landing) delivery, and the

installation schedules specified in each individual contract, required that careful attention be given to the
Notes

'(U) Memorandum from 'Director, NSA for DDRl:E,

Serial: N 0920, "Space Surveillance Development/Planning," 15

Mar 1961.

2(U~ MlR froml I Chief, Aneq, to

Meulll. Barlow and Conley, "Diacuuion of Spexpro," 3 Mar 1961;

-ter M_age from DIRNSA to COMUSAFSS, HDNAVSECGRU,

CUSASA, SSSPB 1001/61, AGO 03100/31, 31 Mar 1961; (C) DIF

from Deputy Director to AG, "FAtabliahment of the Space Surveillance Sigint Planning Board (SSSPB)." 31 Mar 1961.

4et- D/F from SSSPB to Deputy Director. NSA,

"SSSPB Draft Funding Plan for Space Surveillance Silint," 'Zl

April 1961, and attached Draft, p. 2.

~b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (1)

(b) (3)

OGA

SECRET

'(V) MlR frbm Ito. AIde. K3 (Sind) for Howard

C. Barlow, Deputy ADRD, j'Valijl.jtyof ~uirementl of the SSSPB

Plan," 22 May 1961.

'(V) RDT&E TUk.lUport./"Benaon," Regulation

No. OIH)J, 3 Aug 1961'p. 4.

'(U~ Me .. / mo~ncNIll <t~l'D.mittjnf questions and proposed replies) from SSSPBL •• ••.. ... to Director, NSA,

"Fubini Questions," 15 June 1961, with. incloaur.e.

7(U~ Memorandum from SSSPB1r--------1

to Director, NSA, ."Fubini Qu~hpns:~ \15 i.June 1961; lU) MJR by

I tJr., and Melville J.Boueber, SSSPB. "Meeting

4 Augult 1961 with '" Dr. Fubini...," 7!-ug 1961.

'tel Memorandum from {)irector, NSA to DDR&E,

Serial: N 2006,"Space Surveillance SigintPr\:lgTam," 31 July 1961,

with two incloa\1rea and MlR by A. W. Roee, Z1 July 1961.

'(U) Ibid. TheMJR to the NSA memorandum to

DDRl:E Itates, ..3. '" The S$SPB members. are not completely in

accord with this memo, feeling that it Ih(lUld gi~e more IUpport to

Plan B." NSA took. a safe,. tactical poaiti()n Without committing

itself regarding the validity Ilr urgency of the. ~irementl Plan B

was intended to meet.

IO(U)...(ED.UG+- MIR by I IJr. (R SSSPB

mem~l' and Melville J. Boucher,,\41 SSSPB\member), "Meetinp.

4 August 1961 with ... Dr. Fubini.•.•" 7 Aug 1961.

II(U)...(E.0J.JG7- MJR by I IR022, "DiscU81ioD

with Dr. Fubini," 19 Sept 196r-;'........... .......

12(U)....(FO' '01- MJR l:Jyl IChairman, SSSPB

(unsigned and undated), but attacbed to dr.ct memorandum from

Director, NSA to M-6, "Continuation of SSSPB," 4 Aug 1961.

'ier MJRby I and M.J. Boucher,

SSSPB. "Space Surveillance Sigint [SSS) Meeting 1 Nov 1961... ,"

2 Nov 1961; IC) Memorandulll ftom Director, NSA to DDR&E.

Serial: N 2468, "Space Surveillance Sigint Program," 6 Nov 1961.

..(~ "Outline. of Proposed Programs for Space

Surveillance Sigint," 6 NQv 1961.

n(U) Ibid.

"(U) Ibid.

17(U)~ MlR by RoO. AIde, K3, "Preparation of

Detailed RID Plana for COllection Syatem of Spacol." 'n Nov 1961;

(U) MlR byl IJr.• K12, "StatuI of Sparol," 5 Dec

1961; (U) Memorandum from Director, NSA to ADN. ADP. ADRD.

ADC, ADMS, "Sparol Planning and Programming," 4 Dec 1961;

(U) DIF from ADN to ADP, ADRD. ADC, ADMS, "Sparol Planning

and Programming." 5 Dec 1961; (U) Memorandum from Harold

Brown. OSD, DDRl:E tQ Director, NSA, "Spacol," 20 Dec 1961.

"m) DjF from Director. NSA to ADN, ADP.

ADRD. ADMS, "FAtabliahment Sparol Management Office,"

15 Dec 1961; (V) Melllorandum from D/ADRD to ADN, ADP,

ADMS, and C/Group C....Reeponsibiliti. of the Sparol Manarement

Office (R3)," 19 Dec 1961. While tbe numerical d.ignator for the

new office was announced as R3,. thia was almoat immediately

changed to R6.

"(U) Memorandum from Harold Brown, OSD,

DDRl:E to Director, NSA, "Sparol," 20 Dec 1961.

2O(U) -'bid.

2/(V)-lfOUG) - D/F from R3 (later R6) to C12, "Spacol

BackgrouDd Qu.tiona," 13 Feb 1963; IU) D/F from C12 to R6.

"Spacol Background Qu.ti0D8," 8 •• Mar 1962; (U) Memorandum

from I I R6, to NS~AB Communications P8JMI,

"Spacol Development Plan," 21 Feb 1962.

22(U).(EOY€tt I land M.J. Boucher, "Report 011

TDY to NORAD, 6 Feb 1962," R6 to Chief R6, 12 Mar 1962.

'(b)(1)

(ib)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P. L. 86-36

rtation of each/system fromth~CONUS.Tbe

systems were transported by rail,

water an all to and under

then existing DOD policies, /no charges were made to

NSA for this service. Add-on equipment(for those sites

was airlifted.

-tSt- Thel fsystem was shipped

by water; provision was/made for this U1 the contr.l1ct

and paid for by NSA./Shipment ofl . I

ui ment had to be phased to avoid the winter

Initially, air transportation from

~ro="'ft"e~"""rI~a~v~a-~r~tation, close to the contractor's

plant at Mountain View, California was planned, but

shipment by water was found to be better,/ The ideal

appeared to be to use a small: ~hartered vessel directly

from the West Coast td _ Ie the system

check at the contractbr B p IIllt, tfie cu!tractual mstallation schedules, and the weather permitted, water

transport was to be used.

(U) The largest and most expensive transportation problem concerned the Stonehouse system,

especially the 150-foot and 85-foot dish antennas.

Moving all the equipment overland from the port of

Massawa to Kagnew Station posed unusual difficulties.

Costs were estimated at $187,500, which included

$250,000 for the ship charter, $425,000 for a cartage

contract to supplement Kagnew Station motor pool

facilities, haulage for the large antennas in the

CONUS, and shipment of vehicles for use between

Massawa and Asmara.

(U) Funds required for data processing

equipment for the SSS program center at the Operations Building, Fort Meade were rather drastically

reduced from an estimate of $2,540,000 in FY64 funds

to $579,000 in FY65, plus $302,000 in FY64. These

reductions were made because some of the equipment

was not needed and other equipment having wider

application was purchased from other funds. 41

DOCID: 4035912

SHCRE'f 21
DOCID: 4035912

SECRET

(b)(1 )

(b)(3)-50 usc 403

(b)(3)-P. L. 86-36

Memorandum from NSA to DDR&E, Serial:

N 05~, "StatuB of Space Surveillance Sigint Pl~ing," 3 April

1962 with incloaure, "Spacol StatuB Report-1 April 1962," with

TS-controlled supplement.

l!fet- Comment No.2 from GroupB to C1, "Role

of Spacol in Overall Elint Collection Scheme," 9 May 1962.

2S(U) Memorandum from D/DDft&,E to Director,

NSA, "Spacol," 4 May 1962.

26(U) Memorandum from NSA (AI)RE) to DDR&E,

Serial: N 0093, "Spaco!." 5 June 1962.

Ufet- Memorandum from NSA (ADRE) to DDR&E,

Serial: N 0962, "Space Surveillance SigiDt Technical Development

Plan," 19 June 1962.

n(U) Memorandum from DDR&Eto Director, NSA,

"Spacol Technical Development Plan (TOP)," 14 Aug 1962.

29(U) Memorandum from NSA to DDR&E, Serial:

N 1320, "Spacol," 23 Aug 1962.

lO(U) Memorandum from DDR&~ to Director, NSA,

..Approval of FY63 NSA RDT&:E Program for Spacol," 18 Sept

1962; (U) Memorandum from DDR&E to Director, NSA, "Spacol,"

8 Oct 1962.

'"te+- Memorandum from Director, NSA, to

DDR&E. Serial: N 1495. "SDacol-Revised MCA Funding Schedule

fori ~" 4 Oct 1962. The

term "SSS Program" w used to refer to the specific 1'0 million

program approved by DOD and means "Space Surveillance SigiDt

Program."

22 SHCRH!f

J2~ NSA, "Space Surveillance SigiDt, Technical

Development Plan," Sept 1962, pp. 115-16.

ll(U) Ibid., p. 116.

34(U) Ibid., p. 121. See 01.0 Appendices, pp. 125

if. including particularly: 1, National Objectives and Requirement.,

pp. 125-6; n, usm Requirement. for SSS, p. 127; IV, NSA Support

for NORAD Spadat., pp. 13840; V, Requirement. for Timelin_,

pp. 141-3; IX, Present Collection Sit", pp. 186-91, XV, Site

Selection, pp. 199.

"Space Surveillance SigiDt Quarterly Report,"

1. Oct 1962.

l6LS+- Letter from Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Auociate Adminiltrator, NASA, to Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake,

USAF, Director, NSA, 27 Mar 1963. [Ed. Note: Subject line not

known\.because correspondence could not be located.]

MlR by B.K Buffham, ..Space Collection

Dwcuuioll with CIA and DIA," 12 Aug 1963.

~. Memorandum from Director, NSA, for usm,

Serial: N 1523, "Space Intelligence Collection," 9 Oct 1963 with

MIR by B.K. Buffham, EADP, 8 Oct 1963.

"(U) ~.. Memorandum from NSA (ADRE) for DDR&:E,

Serial: N 1662,1 IUpgrading Funding Summary,"

7 Nov 1963.

"'(e;- Memorandum from NSA (ADRD) to DDR&:E,

Serial: N 0457, "Review of Space Surveillance SigiDt Program," 9

Apr 1964, with inclosure, "Space Surveillance SigiDt Review," 1

Apr 1964.

4I(U) Ibid.
DOCID: 4035912

8BCRE'f

I

Facility

(b)(1 )

(b)(a)c50 usc 403

(b)(3j'-P. L:8(3-36

Value

(% or Total)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

OGA

Ba8icReasoDs for Value

I \

I I ..............

Stonehouse I

......................................... (Asmara)

1000lo Space probe and high ESV coverage.

*This total for field sites is still only 80% of the task; NSA SMAC and gap-fillers supply the rest.

Figure 1

Estimated Relative Value of Proposed SSS Facilities.

(Figure is 8EeftZT=eeo.)

SBCRET 23
DOCID: 4035912

UNCLASSIFIED CO~JFIDE~JTIAL

(b)(1 )

(0)(3)-50 USC 403

(O)(3)-P. L. 86-36

INSTALLATIONS FY·62

PHASE I

FY·63 FY-64 FY-65

/ PHAS.E 11\

FY-66\\ \\FY-67

STONEHOUSE I I

CONST.

I

DESIGN PLAN

FABRICATION

SHIP

INSTAL.L & TEST

I I I I • I I

Figure 2

Planned I ~nd Stonehouse System Phasing (September 1962). L...-___ (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED.)

24 UNCLASSIFIED CO~JFIDENTIAL
TIP-OFF

TIP-OFF rNITIAL / TRACK 7 INITIAL

SIGN~ ~NA~YSI~ ACQUISITION SIGNALI --.ANALYSIS STONEHOUSE - SUPPORT & CONTROL SITE ~II !: ..

... ..

CIl

oS'/.G'~

-I C) 1-...>- %I » Z 1\~ 0 -I A)

::0: 01\

1-G'

, 1/// , Ir ,~ IF

I .. TRACK / TIP-OFF

OTHER .... SIGNALI I ANALYSIS - .. TRACK

I .. SUPPORT & CONTROL .. NSA SIGNALI I ANALYSIS

I ."I e., .... SIGINT REPORTING .. .... SUPPORT & CONTROL

-..

%I

m

"ll

0 v~ %I ~~ ::::! A.;

z

C)

. • r SIGINT REPORTING

TRACK .. ... REPORTING

....... ALL SOURCE REPORTING ... OTHER

NORAD ... CONSUMERS

SIGINT REPORTING ..

...

DOCID: 4035912

Figure 3

Control and Data-Flow Diagram.

(Figure is ~p;eftr;T eeo.)

Y(b)(1 )

(b)(3)-50 usc 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
•

I DqfID: 4035912

____Figure 4

_"""":":':::--.....,...ISystemDiagram.

(Figure is .cO~J.RBl3ffnAL.1 (b)(1 )

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
DOCID: 4035912

PRIMARY . SIGNAL DEMODULATORS QUICK LOOK

ANTENNA • ANALYSIS AND .. AND GRAPHIC

CONDITIONING DECHANNELING RECORDERS

t? PREAMPS MONITOR MULTICOUPLERS - RECEIVERS -.,

! . TRACK

RECEIVERS I ,

- DATA MAGNETIC

... CONVERTER TAPE

j~

RECORDERS

SERVO .... SYSTEM I- A

1. - ....

; IPROGRAMMERI CONTROL ...

- CONSOLE

.4

III

SERVO TIMING

SYSTEM SYSTEM

TRACK

RECEIVERS

... ,

PREAMPS ... MULTICOUPLERS MONITOR

- COMM

RECEIVERS FACILITY

Figure 5

Stonehouse System Diagram.

(Fi,ure it UNCLASSIFIED.)
DOCID: 4035912

UNCLAssn'IED CO~JF=IDENTIAL (b)(1 )

(b)(3.)-50 usc 403

(b)(3)~P.L. 86-36 _

INSTALLATIONS INTERIM

(FY64)

INTERMEDIATE

(FY65)

FINAL

(FY67)

............

2. Stonehouse I ASA 24

T-R 5

NSA 2

ASA 120

T-R___________ 3

NSA -__ 19

TOTALS 73 217 280

ASA 73 73 148

AFSS 15 23 37

T-R** 47 78 114

NSA

Grand Totals (Cumulative) 208 391 559

• Not included in personnel totals.

••Contact technical representatives and/or engineering perBOnDel.

Figure 6

Personnel Manning Table (September 1962).

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED.)

28 UNCLASSIFIED CO~JF=IDENTIAL
DOCID: 4035912

CO[\1 FlOEhlTI A L

i(b)(1 )

(b)(3)-50 usc 403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

UNCLASSIFIED

I

INSTALLATIONS IN TOTALS BY CUMULATIVE

PRIORITY ORDER MCDA* /PDA** RDT&E INSTALLATION TOTALS

(000 omitted)

I I

PHASE I 2. Stonehouse I 431 3,389 1,731 5,651 7,091

FY63-64

I I

Phase I Total 1,823 13,061 6,521

PHASE II I

FY65-67

'--------------:'------------------------------ Phase n Total 7,779 9,094 1,512

FUTURE··1 ........._......... ---,

Grand Totals 12,045 29,133 9,303

*Military Construction Appropriation Defense Agency.

"Procurement Apprppriation I>efense Agency.

***Itemsl Ishown for/future planning purposes only.

,

. Figure 7

and Stonehouse Funding Estimate (September 1962). "--__....J (Figure is UNCLASSIFIED.)

cor~FIDE~lTIAI UNCLASSIFIED 29
DOCID:

SHeRRT

4035912

(b) (1)

(b) (3)

OGA

~t(b)(1)

yj~b}(3)-50 USC 403

. (b)(3)-P. L. 86-36

CHAPTER111/

/i/!} I u" i i ,',' ,',' "

·Constructing andS/Equipplng//the Stations//(U)

3.

•

..J.f;+ Construction at thel Isite

I Iwas delayed/ by an order /t.o

suspend overseas defense constru.ction that wOUld increase the drain on U.S. monetary gold /I'esel'ves.

Operators for thellequipment were /trained

at HQUSAFSS, but the construction hQld-()l'der dee.

layed equipment familiarization at the contractor's

plant, and additional training was given to .till in/ the

delay. I

(U) -fGt Installation atl ~as planned

for the fourth quarter of FY63 and the station/became

operational in August 1963 (first quarter of FY64).

-

(U)...{Gtat I ~rogre88ed on schedule. Generators

installed for emergency power were/use<! as the primary

source until a frequency converter plant could be

completed in the spring of 1965. Requirements for a

signal~ I lposition/were prepared, but

the cnOice of a smau computer (Scientific Data System's [SDS] 910) for handling/tracking data had to

await completion of operational analysis studies for

tracking data handling and tracking .errol'8.

(.s+- 1/ Iwas scheduled for installation during the second quarter of FY63 and the

station became operational in February 1963 (third

quarter FY63). Thel / ~ite was suitable for

I

-<..)-- Interim add-on equipment fori

I Iwas a priority action in Phase IL.o"""f""'th"""'e---l

TDP. It was intended to provide additional target

30 8BCRB'f

acquisition ¢apabiUties, improved signals analysis, betterrecordiIig equi}jmeIlt, increased tracking data-processing capabilities, and to extend frequency coverage.

'TheimprQved equipment at ea.ch site inclUded:

1 Two ,Mosely x-y plbtters to iaid in acquisitions of

.•. the ESVs.

2. Mincom CM-114, ..•••. fourteen';'track recordete to

replace the old seven-track m()dels.

4. OSl lOn 0 al lD

n.ew signa 1 en 1 ca 10n. an proper operation of

ebllection and recording equipment, 4

(U)+r- I Ialso had iian SDS-910

tracking data processor which expanded or condensed

ant~nna-pointing mformat.ion and provided more efficiep,t and accurate transmission of tracking data over

teletype circuits. Bankhead n was to receive this

equipment during the summer of 1964.

NSA developed plans for further upgrading I .• las part of Phase U of the

SSS program for FY65 and FY66. The upgrading was

.

t... o...• t~ accomnliahed. simultaneously with the mo... ve of

the _ Ifrom vans to permanent Space in

the new operations area at each site. Womout and

obsolescent equipment was to be replaced as necessary.

Preliminary planning for Phase n improvements

included:

(1) Improved photo readout system.

:::IImproved analog decommutatioD. \1

(4) Replacement of obBOIesceDt pte4mpufiers and

multicouplers.

(5) Replacement of the low-band track receiver

with one which was less complex and could be

more easily maintained. Provide VHF search

receivers with an electronic scanning

capability.
I SECRET

·!oGA

lbl (11

ibl (31

-ret- I

I ~----"'Ir-(-s-ee---:F=i:""gu-re-l:-:0:-)-,-w"":h:""e-r-e

installation and testing of the system was to have been

completed during the\.third quarter of FY65. Slippage

in obtaining the preferred site and the decision to

expedite I Ierocurement delayed award of

the system contract fori I It was awarded

to Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., LTV Temco Aerosystems

Division, Greenville, Texas on 13 March 1964. It

provided for the following contract parameters: 10

/~(bIJLI

~j~t£lI«31 __ 5D USC 4 03

~\(""N. COC%

pel'8on~el<fQr/24-hoUl·oper~ti~~s.1 1was

authQriZed71 milital'y •operating, maintenance, and

support personll~l and 3 contractor maintenance personnel for 16-hour coverag~. Each station was also

authorized two NSN8J:lalyst8'1J:lc~eases in manning

requirements were expecteQ as a resl,llt of expanded

coverage, the increased capability of the I I

1/. ~dprovision of a full 24-hour analytic

capability.

(U)/fGr Preliminary training on the!

CJwas provided by the cOntractor (Col/ms RadlO)

at DaUas, Texas prior to titld installation of the

system. Subsequent traming requirements were satisfied by O.JT programs. on site. To train additional

military personnel, NSA establ1shed a training program in FY65 and FY66. It was expected that other

operating and maintenance training requirements

would be satisi{ed through the $ystem contract, at

aervice schools,a.. by DOrmal oJT training. 8

(U) -fGr Additional military construction was

.also needed at each. site to house the add-on equipment. Four extra Vans temporarily were used at

I PettnAnent bUildings fotl F;J

planned for Phase n of the SSS program.

E ui ment to aid\ in the readout of

Was under devel·

opment m 1 0 t e general RID program

suppotting theL-.Jand space programs. Specificatiana $d a purchase order were prepared to purchase.two.of these equipments (Tadds) for use as part

of thel \.. \.\ ~xploitation system.\NSAIRD also

surveyed\the current state of the art inl

I \\\Ireadout SysteDlS to determine'-=w...h""a.... t -:eq=U"'l':':p-. ...J

ments were best suited for an improved system. Other

efforts to\improve techniques and electronic equipments tOlllake signal handling and analysis more

automatic were also under way (see Figures B and 9.).9

4035912

(6)

(7)

(8)

Video demodulators and displaylf.

Servo system redesign.

Additional frequency CQveragelL...-__.......................J

only). •

(9) Additional display units. •

(10) Multiple target capabilitrl lonl~~. (11) High-band antenna replacement, if requiteg.

(12) Low-band antenna replacement, if reqUired;

(13 )r-D:::;,.:;.o~l=:er:.....:.:tr:.:a:.:::ck.in=·::;J:l.··..:SOL:s::.:t:.:re:lD=.·~. ...,

(14)

(15 )L.,..-p-ro-v-e-m-e-n~t-s-m--s...lgn....Lal"'i.-,s·......--!--..,...---...... equipment. L ..J-....._~

(16) Integration of the track data processor With

the existing data handling system, 1..... .....1

(17) IStandLd multiplex/system for use with the

CM-114 recorder.

(18) Field analog reproduction facility. 5

(U)JCY When the provisioning and logistic

support fo~ tbroke down, USASA and NSA

acted together to identify the underlying causes,

initiate immediate remedies, and review existing and

proposed procedures to ptevent a.recurrence Of t.he

breakdown. The two InajQr contributing factors identified were: (1) inadequate supply procedures, 8I\d (:2)

poor reporting from the site toUSASAINSA The

supply procedures were improved to eliminate unnecessary handling, provide expeditious proceasing of

priority requests and shorten procurement time by use

of an open--end support contract. The status repotting

problem was solved by establishment of a semi:lDonthly

report from each site to regional and command headquarters to/ NSA and to the other sites covering all

technical, maintenance, and supply problems. 6

(U).JCY NSA and the user agencies (USASA

and USAFSS) tried to prevent recurrence of the supply

problems at 9thet SSS sites by joint and periodic

reviews of all manuals, part$ documentation, @d

provisioning.NSA expected that these efforts, together

with proper.supply procedures, would permit normal

supply channels to support the SSS systeDlS. ASA and

AFSS were assuming full engineering support for the

I . t, but NSA continued to participate in

these support activities to insure the fullest utilization

of the interim capability and to insure proper feedback

of experience and know-how in the upgrading phase of

other SSS sites. 1

(U~ There was 8, serious RFI (radio fre.

19uenr interference) problexn at I I .and efforts were made to overcome this problem

by use of suitable filters.

(U)~ I !was authorized 73 military

operating personnel and 13 contractor maintenance

DOCID:

SECRET 31
DOCID: 4035912

SECRET

.. )(1)

(b)(3)-50USQ 403

. (b)($).P.L86-36

07\P)(1)

ij (b)(3) ... ; OGA

__----,.;..-I(U)

(U) -EGr ThL·/ / ~ite/wJ8 planned lor I :lbut/the fact /tl1at no e~ting military base could be used raised/the probable con-i

struction costs to about $5 milli9n/(total /CQllts were

.timated at $9 to 10 million). /That was/conside.red .

diaproportionately high for thei$iteis ~titiPated/prri

ductivity. It appeared to haVe .the I<twest potentiiI

intelligence return in rel$tionto investment. When

theL Istudy also .indicated/a/ higher (equip,;

ment cost per site for the S$Sprogram, itwas.<ieci<i'ed

to drop the I . /1 sY',tem in order to remain

within the $40 million Vrogram ce..ilin.. i

g est.. abliB.hed. b.y DOD. Th~ Jrequirementiwas subsequently

met by the equipment installed a~// ii •.. / • lin

May 1967 for thel ./ /lprojecr(.ee.Figur~ll ).1 i

Target cost

Target profit

Target price

Ceiling price

Spread

Sharing formula

GFE

Final system contract

Construction

$4,580,000

400,000

4,980,000

5,496,000

516,000.

85/15%

$/536,000

7,368,()Q()

2,036,000

$9,940;000

(U)#i.A/t<)ntraei;for a designpla~

awarded in April>1963,Mt~revaluation of theL-J

c::Jdesign/study,!! and/cQmpleted in June 1963. It

c.lled.for.a more.flexible·~ystemthan that envisioned

by the/TPP land iilldicated that.the cost of the

e~uipDient/w6uld be/.lightlyhigher than anticipated.

A revised purchase d~8cription, more in consonance

With the/TDP, /was/,prepared/and the equipment

contract/was awatded/on\20 July 1963. 13

,/ // /The/personnel authorization fo~ I

I i /Iwas limitedto 15. No expansion was planned

~x<ipt/for communicators and\administrative personlief to be hired in the fall of\1964 to/support the

.project after the/equipment had arrived.

/ (U)..{q- / Itwas originally planned that the VHF

'antenna .would / be housed in an I I

• (see Figure 12).

i / By .the/8pring/Of 196.3 itbecaQleapparent that the only feasible/ meth¢ of imeetiIlg/the

scheduI~ oper~.ti.onal date/i fori .. i Iwhere

lIinstallation/probl~ms threatened to cause a

~or eight-month,lippage, was to negotiate a

sole-source contract with: thel ~tudy /contractor. Since I Iwasto. be the IIonlyertensive

space surveillance Slgmt facility I f I Ithis ,etion to expedIte procurement was

considered justified. 12

I

[

32 SBeRBT

Stonehouse (U)

An alternate site to Aemara, Ethiopia

us was co ider n

L....----.... The U.S. Ambll88ador to Ethiopia advised

suspension of all activity on the Stonehouse program

prior to the visit of the Emperor of Ethiopia to the

United States in October 1963. He recommended that

no contracts be let, or construction started, or any

contacts made with Ethiopian personnel until after

the Emperor's visit. The contract for Stonehouse

equipment, however, was in the final phase of negotiation. The Corps of Engineers was ready to request

bids on the military construction and expected to

award the construction contract by the end of August,

or earlier. Negotiations were to continue on the equipment contract but the potential contractor was warned

to avoid direct or indirect contact with the Ethiopian

government until cleared by NSA. Funds for military

construction were withheld until approval WeB received
DOCID: 4035912

jj.p)( 1)

/Eb)(3)-50 USC 403

(p)(3)-P.L. 86-36

SBCRH'f

duct on-sitetec.hnical surveys of each interim system.

DIRNSA. the~ WroteUSASA and USAFSS defining

the /tequire!U\enb\.of the.survey and instructed each to

pr()vidE!cert~i4\te(:hnicalsupport.A plan of action was

prepared jomtfy\by.iNSA,.USASA, and USAFSS survey

partymembe~.\Th.eir work.\began on 14 September

and ended on2~ Oct.ober 1964,.when the last members

of the partyr~turned to CONUS. The letter from

OIRNSA Mted \that\DDR&E\felt that the propoeed

manning figures \in the\ plan required additional analysisand thatiniproved\ efficiency and a reduction in

personnel could be \achieved through "training, documentation, and a. more\ responsive\logistics system."

NSA had begun to\impiement the interim phase of

the "upgrade plan," \ including initiation of purchase

r~uests for •. the n~w\ travel.in -wave tube, hi h-band

pr~amplifiersand the and

high-band acquiBitiQn aid fo~ 1....- .....

(U).;:::+- At about the same time, an unsolicited

proposal was.reeeived from Sylvania EIectro~......l.Z.Il,;;"'"

tems-West (SES-W~st) to build copies of th

.... ---:-:""'''''='''::-'.in case of tertn.ination of the current

contract with Ling-Temco-Vought). It was concluded

that the last part of the proposal was not economically

sound, but that the proposal for1....-=--=-- _

would be considered in the context of the survey team

report. 19

(U) •.• The sUl'vey team concluded, with reference toCI Ithat the RF\ portions of the I -----n were "almost entirely\ unsuitable for

retention. The entire HF receiving system must be

replaced...... It was also recommended that the "servomechanical subsystem, including both antenna pedestals, should not be retained...... They recommended

retention of the antenna programmer, computer, and

externals analysis equipment of the datallubsystem,

the Dial-X intercom systetn, and emting I I

maintenance, test and support equipment. They also

proposed specific actions by\ NSA, HQUSASA, or by

HQUSAFSS. 20

(U)..f:i?r A so-c:alled ....ert concept," by which

full manning would be provided only during alert

periods. was considered. This proposal was opposed by

the I loperations offic..er on the grounds that

the heavy activity of the preceding three-month period

had demonstrated the need for.full 24-hour manning. 21

(U) JC+- With regard tol ~he survey group concluded that the high-band RF subsystem

should not be considered for use in the upgraded

system; that the limited dyna~ic range of the lowband RF subsystems was even more of a problem than

in the high-band subsystem. It reccanmended that the

(U) Maintenance personn~l for Stonehouse

were 888igned to the project ana given training courses

by the equipment contractorsland some of the specialized equipment suppliers, .While operating personnel

were generally to be trained at the site after installation of the equipment. It /was also planned to keep

an NSA engineer at the site for at least the first year

of operation (see Figure 13).

from Ambassador Korry to begin work on Stonehouse

in Asmara. 15

iSt The initial contract for Stonehouse

equipment with Radiation, Inc., of Melbourne, Florida

was modified-after competitive bidding-to include

a new 15(}-foot antenna. It was considered necessary

because the

an ecause an requirements con m

the need for it. The operations schedule for Stonehouse

was affected by a delay in the availability of the

station facilities. 16

(U) To fulfill the basic requirements of the

TDP, an 85-foot parabolic antenna with an J:-y mount

was selected and equipped with several interchangeable

cassegrain feeds and provision for mounting antenna

feeds at the apeJ: of the structure, in order to provide

the fleDbility in frequency coverage desired.

Requirements for the preamplifier

subsystem continued to be of primary importance/ to

the success and future development of the system.

However, more realistic estimates of the initial requirements of the station combined with reasonable

development of the required masers indic$te<J! that

maser coverage be provided only from 2 to 3/gc. in the

initial installation. Additional frequency coverage by

maser preamplifiers was planned as additional maser

units became available through normal RID

development.

(~ -

_______rUpgrading (u)

(U) ,,)P(" The NSA Phase n Upgrading Plan for

Iwas approved by DIRNSA and

L-~::-o-rw-a-rd-;-ed-;--to:--"'I'D::";D':1R&~E for review on 1 June 1964.

Following this review, DDR&E directed NSA to conBBCRE'f 33
DOCID: 4035912

SHCRHT

1)

$)cqO USC 403

)(91~p"L;"""86-36

"QGA

fbi (1 I

(bl (31

although\ Stonehouse was still

4,---'I"""":'"~;---""""""alsotracked and intercepted

signals and from\. the NASA satellite

Nimbus/llDdCanadian Alouette during testing. Signals

from other U. S. space vehicles were also intercepted

da.ily~./ Meetings Were held with USASA personnel in

and~ipation of theit.assuming maintenance and operatiOnal responsibility for Stonehollse\by mid-1965.

..N/SA...\a.l..fJO formed ..a. smallovetations\.statf to be ready when \ Stonehouse and 1 I became

operational. 24

(U) JRr The I ~urvey report

was d~tributed to obtain technical contributions from

field and headquarters personnel, to be used in preparing atechnic~l development plan for upgrading the

1\ \/1 installations.

~The. 0 erations buildin \and\.associated facilities at

completed, system.............u,...·.""T""w-a-r-e.......m-s..,.t......-e"T""",-t....-e-r-a..... ·· ome

erected, and operational checks begun. On-site acceptance tests were about. 90 percent completed by\the

end of 1964. Thel\\ Isystem was tutned over

to station personnel on 2tl\February 1965 \for full

operation and maintenance. NSA exercised operational

control, provided technical guidance and some operational supplies, and received the. collected data and

Ireports. I .~

officer-in-eharge requested that manning be increased

from 15 to 19 for the planned 65 hou.rs of operation

per week. During the first half of 1965.1

produced significant results: intercepts"i=··1====:::::;'

not obtainable from other sites. Its operational performance and success were considered to be

outstanding. 25

(U) When construction of the Stonehouse

operations building slipped, portions of the Stonehouse

equipment were temporuily installed in the feedstorage building to save time and allow subsystem

checkout to proceed. Maintenance and operating per34 SB€RH'f'

L_
1II ..

DOCID: 4035912 (b)(1 )

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1 )

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b)(3)-P. L. 86-36 SBCRET

I

(U) Teams of NSA observers visited the

Stonehouse installation from 17 to 26 November, on

30 November, and on9 December 1965 to participate

in Category m tests. Their observations were intended

to assist USASA in "establishing the system in a

steady state for optimum and maximized performance," and secondarily to identify any operational or

maintenance pl'obleIll$ on which NSA could take corrective action. regarding Stonehouse and any new

system developments.

fS+- The Stonehouse hardware appeared to

the NSA team to be versatile, to be operating according to design specifications, and to have a potential

exceeding the specifications. There had, however, been

problems with the phase-lock receiver and the computer peripheral gear, difficulties which caused degradation Qf I Iresults, and serious hydraulic

problems with the 85-foot antenna.

(U) There also appeared to be too little

coordination between operations and maintenance personnel; it was suggested that if an equipment status

board were prominently displayed in the operations

room, this situation would be improved. 28

(U) The Stonehouse facility was manned

largely by military personnel with a small number of

civilians (8 civilians of 51 tota1), including an NSA

senior electronics engineer who had been the project

engineer during the system development, a senior

electronics technician, and an RCA contract technician. USASA also employed, under a maintenance

sel'vices contract, five technical personnel from RadiatiQn, Inc., the system development contractor. The

NSA team concluded that the military personnel were

narely adequate to perform their assigned functions

and that there was. a serious problem of continuity

which appeared to be mostly a matter of training and

experience rather than numbers of people. ~er~ also

appeared to be a complete lack of clerical support;

specialized maintenance personnel were typing, driving, and performing escort duties despite the critical

character of system maintenance and the fact that

heavy emphasis should be put on maintenance training. The team recommended that a full-time training

officer be assigned to Stonehouse to organize a responsive training program, and that more effort be put

into OJT training, which for military personnel appeared to be very limited. 29

(U) The NSA team also recommended that

the OIC of the installation be a major, with two

captains-one for operations and the second, an electronics engineers (EE), for maintenance; that the OIC

should also be an EE or, more importantly, that he be

familiar with NSA operations and experienced with

considered to be hlgh-quahty intelligence product of

significant consumer interest. Category m testing was

suspended during the following quarter because of

high-priority operational tasking. Testing resumed at

the end of September, but with the stipulation that

it might be interrupted again if high-priority targets

appeared. 27 .

sonnel arrived at the site. NSA and USASA gave

careful attention to maintenance and $upply procedures and spare-parts requirements. A/memorandum

of understanding was prepared by NSA and USASA

defining responsibility for Category m testing. After

system acceptance, USASA was to take p088ession of

the installation and thereafter exercise all necessary

operating and maintenance functions. USASA would

be responsible for Category m testing. Documentation

and spares were to be furnished, lind they had to be

found acceptable before the Category m testing was

concluded and the system declared ready for operation.

Stonehouse was to be declared an operational facility

ready for unlimited tasking only after both NSA and

USASA had certified that the criteria of the Category

m test plan had been met. 26

(U) Three recognized categories of testing

were to be completed.

Category I-Tests conducted by the system contractor under government surveillance at the producing plant to determine if system performance

complied with contract /specifications.

Category IT-Tests conducted by the system contractor in accordance/ with directions of the technical representatives of the contracting officer.

After such tests successfully demonstrated that

system performance met contract requirements, the

system was accepted by the government.

Category m-Qn-site operational tests which also

included many other functions necessary for optimum system performance prior to operational tasking. They covered effective operation and maintenance by the using service, adequacy of construction

and utilities $ervices, communications, system documentation, /site organization and management,

logistics, training, test equipment and modification

procedures.

'\5 ce~ The Stonehouse installation was accepted from the contractor on 17 May 1965 and

complete Category m testing started immediately

thereafter, but urgent operational requirements forced

_______tsimultaneously to accept tasking while starting the first test phase. During the quarter, signals

I I

SBCRiT 35

HANDLE yu C0MW:I' C~:u;; g~y
DOCID: 4035912 .. Y....T"...... r"Ir"I ....,......,W""\r,. UL'\.iLi\.~~lr l.r.U

(b)(1 )

(op)(3)-P.L.86-36

Sigint; and that NSA sl:.ould furnish a qualified

civilian analyst. A programmer familiar with tracking

was also considered necessary.

(U) Thirty equipments at Stonehouse were

"deadlined" (out of order) on 24 November 1965~

Despite elaborate efforts to insure that adequate initial

spares would be provided with the equipment when it

was installed and that additional parts could be

promptly secured when needed, delays in obtaining

needed parts were often prolonged. Little use was

apparently being made by USASA of procedures approved by the U. S. Army Electronics Command

(USAECOM) for procuring repair parts for unique

items through the prime contractor or the

subcontractors. 30

(U) The most useful suggestion that the

NSA observers felt they could make to USASA was

that frequent visits be made to Stonehouse by workinglevel personnel engaged in resupply procedures. They

also concluded that" ...until all the documentation is

in, the pipelines filled, and usage data has been

developed, Stonehouse will require extraordinary attention and interest. With routine handling, the list

of deadlined equipment will increase, not diminish."

(U) Technical manuals were criticized by

site personnel as being written for people with a higher

level of education and experience than those actually

assigned to use them, and it was observed that

documents, even when available at the site, were not

used. It was also noted that valuable technical reports,

prepared by the senior technical representative at the

Stonehouse site, were seriously delayed by the lack of

typing services. 31

(U) The Stonehouse station management

had not been able to advance from a "day-to-day

crash approach to problem solving," and so much time

was needed to meet immediate operational and maintenance problems that little time was left to establish

normal procedures and practices for handling most

problems.

The same critical comment is made of the NSA organizations

at Fort Meade which receive operational data from the site and

are responsihle for providing a constant flow of technical feedhack. In the plainest of language, Stonehouse has not received

the level of competent management-from either NSA or ASAwhich it must have to consistently and expertly render its

mission."

(U) This condition was attributed to the

pressure of competing requirements, to a communitywide shortage of "broadly experienced talent," and to

the fact that Stonehouse was the first installation of

its kind. That it was the first made it particularly

36 UNCLASSIFIED

.-

important that its plOblems be carefully analyzed in

an effort to avoid "the same organizational pains"

with other large, space-eollection facilities in the

future. Unfortunately, there had been a tendency to

regard Stonehouse as "just another overseas facility,"

and NSA operational personnel had not been able to

give the project adequate attention. The same was

believed to be true of HQUSASA, which had assigned

a junior lieutenant as project officer and had also

given him other assignments wich prevented him from

being fully effective on the Stonehouse project.

(U)~ The NSA team's report stated:

...7. The site, given a relatively unskilled cadre of operators

and maintenance personnel, a new system, and an unresponsive

I\upply system never fully organized itself. Operational tukio;

by NSA, before the Category ill test period had even begun,

effectively forced the site to go to day-tlHlay measures. Training

neVer achieved its goal; contract and NSA maintenance personnel

were so busy keeping the system on the air they gave little

thought to making personnel sufficiently expert to assume very

much of the load...

8.\.10 spite of all these events, the system has been operational

and has been effective. But it could have been, and should be,

more effective....

9.\.. i...Operators generally did not appear to know how to set

up their equipment, comprehend the meaning of information

displays. or even understand the function of the equipment.

10. Opinion of NSA observers was not unanimous that the

present operators could be trained to do their jobs. One opinion

had it \thl\t only technical personnel could configure the equipment to. meet mission requirements. Considering the total system

Imowled~e required to patch around 'deadlined' equipment and

reconfigure the patch panels, this may be true....

., .15. ~commendations:

a. It is\recommended that a training program be conducted

a~ Ito include the following:

(1) Description of orbital elements (keplerian, spherical,

cartesian).

(2) Description of orbital data (az-el-range, az-el, doppler).

(3) Explanation of vocabulary of orbital mechanics.

(4) Description of how orbits are determined.

(5) Description of data being sent to Stonehouse (prognosticated launch times, look-angle generation

procedutes).

(6) Expl!lrat\on of graphic aids (x-y to az-el conversion

chart. plotting boards, Spadats bul1etin).

It is estimated\ that such a training program would require 10

hours, preferably\2 hours per day. It is suggested that NSA send

a qualified person tol I for a period of one week to

conduct the training....

b. It is recommended that the fol1owing additional hardware be installed a1 I· c. In order to fully utilize the above recommended hardware and to increase the site's capabilities, specific software are

[sic] recommended which would accomplish the fol1owing tasks:

(1) Increase the types of inputs to generate program

track data....

(2) Generate data matrices for the antenna

programmer....

(3) Accept antenna data....
I

I

SHCRHT

Program Status in the Second Half of

1966 and 1967 (U)

(U) By the autumn of 1966, USASA and

NSA were considering formal termination of Stone-

(U)~ A technical development plan was also

nrenared for uQpading space colle.ction facilities at I I(designated Projectl A purchase description was released to Sylvania Electronics

Systems-West on 11 February 1966 covering both the

I lequipment (scheduled for completion and installation in\.first quarter of FY68) and similar equipmentfor thel Iproject (see Figure 14).40

(U) +Gr Preliminary acceptance tests on the

I Iequipment were completed at the plant

of LTV\ElectrOBystems, Inc., on 29 January 1966. The

equipment was then dismantled and packed for shipment to I l and scheduled for delivery at the site

by 11 April 1966. Reinstallation, checkout, and final

acceptance tests were to be completed by 18 July

1966, to be followed by USASA Category ill tests. 41

possibility of op~~~j;ingl jwith

NSA civilian personnel in grades 11 through 13, and

to ascertaining the amount of backing which could be

e;z;pected from the DOD. It was intended to implement

the revised plans on a schedule which would make it

p088ibleto have both sites in operation by mid-1967.

ItflPpea18, however, that these proposals did not

receive final approval within NSA. 37

.--tet- II:----:===-::-=-----='~_~=----=--' caused deferral by DDR&E, on 30 November 1965, of

further efforts byNSA to proceed with a major upgrading ofl I(a project which had been

rede$ignated asl1 The interim facility was to

continue in use\for the pl'.esent. A joint study was

started by NSA and USAFSS,. however, to determine

altemateJDethods of improving 1 Ifacilities

within the.eDsting political limitations. This included

phased, routine replacement of the more critical

portions of the system and "optimum utilization of the

new operations!!p~ce without attracting undue attention." Political\conditions inl Ibecame less

favorable for retention of the U. S. intercept station

atl IProjectl rere

dropped from the SSS program in June 1966. Ji

(U)...fGt- NSA\.and USASA conducted a broad

eIamination of space-<:ollection requirements for the I I and measures\needed to upgrade spacecollection facilities at bothl

(U) It was also reported that SMAc.\(SJ>e~

cial Missile and Astronautics Center) personnel\uaed

last-minute telecons to pass instructions rega.rding

system configuration for particular missions. \They

often included equipment which was either not at\.the

site or was "deadlined." The NSA observers suggeated

that, as long as personnel at the site were capable\\of

reconfiguring available equip.ent, the way it w~s done

be left to them. If instructions must be givEln, ...•. the

telecons should take place at least eightboursbefore

mission activation.

(U) It was noted on the positive side that

experienced NCOs at the site appeared "knowledgeable, dedicated and capable of performing their duties.. "

Generally the Stonehouse system was producing intelligence data and meeting most tasking requirements

despite administrative, operational, and maintenance

problems. 34

(U) Completion of Category ill testing was

further delayed by priority tasking through the remainder of 1965 and the first half of 1966. 35

(U) ;q.. As further considerations was given to

the steps needed to improve the 1 1

systems, and to collection requirements and costs,

NSA officials became convinced that it would not be

advantageous to use existing equipment in the upgra:ding process. It was estimated that the maximum

amount which might be saved by retaining usable

equipment at both sites would not exceed $1 million

and that the advanuages of new equipment, thoroughly

integrated and tested in the United States before

shipment overseas,would in the long run outweigh the

temporary savingsp6

tst R6 proposed that a new system, to be

operated b USAFSS ersonnel be rocured to replace

the at and that a

L- ...I Consideration was also given to the

DOCI D: 4 035 912 ..)(1)

"'?)-50DSCAQ:3

t@).~P. L. 86-36

(4) Increll8e programmer functions... .f

d. It is recommended that the follofnng ftWl!l.te 'be

provided for normal housek.eeping functions: f •• <\ .....•.........

(1) Automatic system checkout. f. •.. ".. \'. ... . (2) Update operator display via Nixi~ tubes ilJrd\a thrte.

poeition switch for ll.-y, azoel, RAP ana ~\c:!:ata.

(3) Frequency bookkeeping. .... .••...\. \

e. It is recommended that computerJprocr8~ \be\.written

to give Stonehouse capabilities to: .. •• ....\.\.. \

(1) Input Spadats elements and 9utputa pr~!lmmer

tape, earth trace, lighting conditions, Ii£etiin~ Qf. a

satellite, and plotter tape." • .....\\ \

(2) Input track data and output a targeting .nd \!i&ta

statistics. ... •••. \.. \ \

(31 Input station locations and output global tf!lC~8' coverage. II ... .. . .. .

SHCR~T 37
DOCID: 4035912

-eOriPiDEI":TIAL

house (AN/FRR~5v) Category ill testing. Most of the

operational and maintenance probleIDB identified a

year earlier remained unsolved. They included the

inability of the military system to give prompt respOn:"

sive support, certain technical inadequacies of military

maintenance personnel, and a continuing lag intbe

updating of documentation. A manpower survey ~arly

in 1966 identified the need for additional maintenance

billets, and plans were made to fill this need through

the normal CCP cycle. At a meeting in September

1966 in Philadelphia, USAECOM representatives divulged that they had never attempted to fill a supply

pipeline to Stonehouse or any other SSS installation,

and that procurement never began until a reqUisition

was received, Two years after NSA began to urge the

necessary action, USAECOM was considering contracting for the resupply of systems parts. It was expected

that this approach, if followed, would at least start

the Stonehouse and other SSS programs on the road

to reliable operations. 42

(U) Stonehouse continued to be operational during the second half of 1967 and in 1968, and

only final contract settlement with Radiation, Inc.

remained to be completed as far as the $SS program

was concerned. 43

(U) Some Category ill testing was continued at thel Iduring

the last quarter of 1966. Category ill tests to determine system operational capability began on 15 September 1966 but were suspended on 12 November 1966

until the VHF antenna, which had separated from its

pedestal, had been repaired. Phase ill tests were

resumed on 5 December 1966 and completed on 31

December 1966; the test report was finished early in

February 1967. Reports on Phase I and II had already

been published. The arrival of two additional contractor technicians in January 1967 resulted in significant

improvement in the operational condition of the equipment. The system continued to operate satisfactorily

through the first and second quarters of FY68 and it

was concluded that LTV Electrosystems, Inc., the

developer, had essentially satisfied contractual requirements. Some technical discrepancies which were noted

at the time of final acceptance were still being

corrected by the contractor at the end of the third

quarter of FY68.

(U~ I--------.rsite was the most difficult of the SSS program sites to support directly. It

was in a short-tour area, a fact which aggravated the

problem of securing an adequate number of trained

maintenance and operations personnel. The electronic

installation was the largest in the SSS program

network; its electromechanical equipment was not

38 CONFIDENTIAL

--

!(5)(1)

(P)(3)-50 USC403

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

protected by radomes but exposed to'salt-air;1 I 1\\ Iwas also plagued by a greater number of

spare-parts supply problems than other SSS sites.

These were major factors responsible for this site's

uneven operational performance record, although the

sYstem was capable of "eminently satisfactory performance"when fully operational. 44

Notes

'4rl- "Space Surveillance Sigint Quarterly Report,"

1 Oct 1962.

2 (et "Space Surveillance Sigint Program Review,"

1 Apr 1964.

j'-CJ "Space Surveillance Sigint Quarterly Report,"

1 Oct 1962, pp. 3-4; (C) "Space Surveillance Sigint Program

Review," 1\ Apr 1964,.

• (U) Ibid., p. 24.

S (U) Ibid., pp. 27-28.

6 (U) Ibid., pp. 29-30.

7 (U) Ibid.

• (U) Ibid•., pp. 30-31.

9 (U) "SSS\Quarterly Report," 1 Jan 1963.

'0 J.,C+- "Spa~ Surveillance Sigint Program Review,"

1 Apr 196,(, pp, 3,(-35; (C) \"Space Surveillance Sigint Program,

Final Summary );{eport of Development Status," 1 Apr 1968.

II (U) Ibid., p.~; SSS "Final Summary Report of

Development Stat\18," 1 Apr 1968.

'l.+Gr Memorandum from NSA, ADRE to DDME,

Serial: N lM91, "Space Surveillance Sigint Program," 9 Apr 1963.

13~ "Space Surveillance Sigint Program Review,"

1 Apr 196,(, pp. 45-4fi.

,. (U) IbUl., p. 52.

IS (U) "sss Program Quarterly Report," 15 July

1963.

''"tet- ·'.space Surveillance Sigint Program Review,"

1 Apr 1964, p. 57.

17 (U) Ibid., pp. 65-67.

II (U)~ Le~ter from Director, NSA to USASA,

USAFSS, Serial: N 0896,1 ~pgrading Plan," 23

July 1964.

'9-f€r "Space Surveillance Sigint Quarterly Report," 1 Oct 1964.

2O~ "Space Surveillance Sigint!L..- ---'

1 ISurvey Report," 10 Nov 1964, pp. 19, 39-40.

2. (U) Ibid., p. 31.

22 (U) Ibid., pp. 47, 75-76.

2J (U) Ibid., pp. 60-61.

2. tet "Space Surveillance Sigint Quarterly Report," 1 Jan 1965.

2S tet Ibid.; "Space Surveillance Sigint Quarterly

Report," 1 Apr 1965 and 1 July 1965; "Space Surveillance Sigint

Program, Final Summary Report of Development Statu8," 1 Apr

1968.

26 (U) Ibid.; "Memorandum of Understanding between the National Security Agency and the U.S. Army Security

Agency for the Category ill Testing of the Stonehouse System," 6

Jan 1965; tet"Space Surveillance Sigint Quarterly Report," 1 Apr

1965.
Ibid.

"Sp.ce Surveillance Si(int Quarterly Report,"

DOCID: 4035912

17-4C+ "Sp.ce Surveillance Sigint Qu.rterly Report," 1 July 1965; t9') See also meuagee from Director, NSA to

Secret.ry of Defenae and DIA, re NASA l18e o~ I

I l16 Mar 1966; ferSp.ce Surveillance

Sigint Qu.rterly Report," 1 October 1965.

21 (U) "Report of. NSA Observers of the C.tegory

mTeetiDg of Stonehouse," p. 8.

29 (D) Ibid., pp. 8-....

JO (U) Ibid., pp. 16-18"

)1 (U) Ibid., pp. 18-20.

)2 (D) Ibid., p. 21.

]J (U) Ibid., pp. 24-25.

)4 (D) ibid., p. 216.

H;et- "Qu.rterly St.tll8 Report of Sp.ce Surveillance Sigint Progr.m," 1 July 1966.

l6 (D) ,J,R1' Memorandum from R6 to Director, NSA, I IDpgr.dinl P18D8," 18 June 1965, with ...."':"tta~ch':""m-en-ta~. ---

)7 (D) Ibid.

II c.er "Sp.ce Surveillance Sirint Qu.rterly Report," 1 Jan 1966 and 1 July 1966. )9 (D) Ibid.

40 "Sp.ce Surveillance Sigint Quarterly Report," 1 Apr 1966. 4. (D)

44Gt1 Oct 1966.

4) "Sp.ce Surveillance Sirint Qu.rterly Report," 1 Oct 1967 and 1 Jan 1968-

44.(.Q "Space Surveillance SigiDt Qu.rterly Report," 1 Jan 1967, 1 Apr 196'7, and 1 Jan 1968; "Space

Surveillance Sirint Program Final Summary Report of Development

Statue," 1 Apr 1968.

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Figure 8

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Figure 9

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Figure 11

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Figure 13

Stonehouse, Asmara, Ethiopia.

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED.)
i CO~1FIDD~TIAL

Figure 14

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CHAPTER IV

CompletioD\ and Certain Lessons of Experience (U)

Accomplishments t\ndCnlminatiob«U)

(U) primary and secondary systems I Isuccessfully completed Category I testing at Sylvania's plant on 26 May 1967.

Aircraft tracking test results for the I

Lessons Learned (U)

(U)~ The office of Special Program Management fR6) concluded from its experience with

system development under the SSS program that:

a. Its m08t.basic problem was that of educating and

counseling the\system contractors from the interpre:

tation of operational requirements through cl08e supervision of fabrication and testing.

b. Each of thec=Jsystems built under the SSS

program by three contractors was uniquely designed to

meet specific mission requirements, located in a completely different physical, electronic and operational

environment, and had to be completed within such a

short period, ranging from 16 to 28 months, that some

normal procurement and fabrication proce88es had to

be compre88ed or eliminated.

c. At the beginning of the program, a basic decision

was made that the systems would be assembled from

L...-__,..._-----------...J No significant

operational or maintenance problems were reported

during the remainder of 1967. 2

(U)~ NSA and USASA also jointly prepared

an integrated technical support purchase description

for application ofl IIt was agreed to

contract with SylvanIa (SES West) for resupply covering essential unique spare parts, engineering services, modifications control, and configuration man-

.agement. USASA provided the necessary funds but

the contract was handled through NSA, which negotiated a basic ordering agreement with SES-West, the

system developer. It was planned that, beginning with

FY69, USASA would take over completely. 3

(U~ Installati()n and Category II testing of I Iwas completed on r2~ovember 1967, and the

system was accepted by the government on 15 November 1967, one month ahead of scheduJe. Category ill

testing was then started by USASA.

ts1- During Category ill testing

(U) By 1968 Stonehouse had\.been tasked

with many missionsnotknoWD\. in 1962, a.nd neW

.equipment had been added \Qutside \the SSS ptogram:

to keep up with intelligencetequirements. Th.e system

had made substantial •• inteUigence\contributions,\despite the problems created hythe need to reconfigure

the system to cover new targets. The I..........----:~- .................._ .........----",.

was shipped on schedule from Sylvania's plant at

Mountain View, CalifOtnia tol\\\I

I I and the last of the cOInPonents \.artived by 23

May 1967. Installation was begun by the\ contractor in

May and was completed on 17 June 1967. The system

was accepted by the government on 15\ September

1967, following satisfactory Category II tests. Category

ill tests were then started by USASA, and\.. completed

on 15 January 1968. No major ~ngineering\or operational problems developed as the $ystem began full

operation, and met·. or exceeded performance

requirements.

I

-w-e-r-e-a"""l:"'"m-08---:'t"""":"1h:"'"r-e-e"""":""ti:"'"m-e-s-as-a-c-c-u-r-a':""te-as-t':"':h-e-c-o-n':""tr-a-c~t

specified. Sylvania thereby earned a:$50,000 performance incentive payment negotiated in \ the contract.

The equipment was then loaded aboard ship at Redwood City, California for shipmenttol I Ian~dT"'""ar-rl"'v-ea"T"""a""t:--

the site on schedule in July 1967.

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commercial off-the-shelf components in order to eliminate requirements for new research or development.

It proved nece88ary, however, to modify some of the

components and develop new interfaces between equipments. The &BBembly of such large electronic (and

electromechanical) systems by this procedure reduced

costs and saved time but, neverthele88, required

professional engineering judgment of the highest

quality.

d. While each of the system contractors had an

established quality control program, their effectiveneBB

varied from company to company. They also were not

completely effective in the case of printed. circuit

boards and contractor-developed equipment.

e. The mechanical, electromechanical, and hydraulic components of the systems proved le88 reliable

than the electronic components. There were unusually

severe dust, heat, and moisture problems where equipment that had to be located outside was not protected

by radomes.

f. Systems were usually installed on, or even ahead

of, schedule, but Category n tests were frequently

delayed by component failures. Operational requirements were met prior to system acceptance.

g. The experience with each contract was applied

to those which followed, as far as available time/ and

funds permitted, and resulted in improved operational

characteristics though all problems were not solved. 4

(U~ Regarding systems technical support

problems, policies, and procedures, R6 concluded that:

a. Neither NSA or USASA foresaw clearly the

impact of the SSS program on the conventional

resupply system, maintenance and maintenance training procedures, test equipment requirements, technical

manuals, system drawings, provisioning/ documentation, system spare parts requirement$, and other

elements of a successful maintenance program. Some

warning was given by spare parts and /documentation

shortages for I rbut there was

apparently not hme enough to benefit from this

experience before other system contracts were let.

b. It was aBBumed that the systems would require

only routine logistical support. "It was not realized

that the operation and maintenance of large systems

is entirely dependent upon a systems approach, and

that the key to systems availability begins with senior

engineering support, to be followed by highly trained

operator and maintenance personnel, who would have

documentation available written for system use, and

with the reliable and dependable backup of a responsive spare parts supply system."

c. Other early difficulties were attributed to the

fact that, at the start of the program, contract

specifications, data itema, and guidance were not

systems oriented; ...•.. that maintenance personnel were

trained So far ahead that they did not remember what

they had learned ..•. by the time the systems were

operational; that conventional provisioning methods

delaye<l. spare parts procurement; and that resupply

procedures failed to meet SSS program operational

requirements.

d./ Most of the abQve difficulties were overcome by

the/ time the last systems in the program became

operational. While nothing could be done to change

short-tour areas, experienced personnel from long-tour

installations were availlible and training methods were

improved. Technical documentation requirements were

streamlined and documents which maintenance personnel did not use were \.eliminated.

e. "Probably the most\ significant concept to emerge

from the SSS program had been mutual USASA/NSA

recognition that these systems definitely require special follow-on engineering and logistical supporting

programs. Beginning withI Ias they

entered the Category ill test phase, a tecbnicalsupport

contract was established, and internal USASA/NSA

procedures were agreed upon...."

f. The office of Special Program Management concluded that it probably had "gone far beyond its

original organizational charter in attempting to transfer knowledge gained during systems development to

tasking, operator, and maintainer organizations. This

effort includes all aspects of technical support (which

are defined to include engineering modifications, documentation, configuration management, training and

logistics). And this effort to transfer knowledge for the

purpose of aBBuring systems availability for operations

has been just as large an undertaking as the original

system development, and sometimes more difficult."

g. It also believed that "significant new approaches ... , have been developed by the office of

Special Program Management and will be implemented

in the future to derive the most'meaningful technical

support data, at the lowest cost and in phase with

hardware development, installation and acceptance.

The concept is predicated on the point that both

system performance and system availability must be

parallel technical efforts, from the start of design

planning...5

(U) The fiscal status of the SSS program

in April 1968 when it was completed is shown in Figure

15.

48 UNCLASSIFIED GO~JFIDE~JTIAL
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SSS PROGRAM FISCAL SUMMARY

(IN THOUSANDS)

UNCLASSIFIED

$2,000,000

1,200,000

220,000

252,000

807,000

$4,479,000

GOVERNMENT

SYSTEMS IN ORDER FURNISHED SYSTEM MILITARY

OF INSTALLATION ADD-ONS EQUIPMENT CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION TOTALS

............

STONEHOUSE - 401 8,354 1,185 19,940 (AN/FRR-65 (V» I

TOTALS $888 $2,727 $26.919 "'.987 $35.521* I • Although the SSS program was originally approved for $40 million, $35,521,000 is the current best

estimate of all costs, subject to the close-out of the fixed price, incentive fee contracts. The difference of

$4,479,000 is accounted for by the following:

July 1964 program funding reduced by DOD

Nov 1965 program funding reduced by DOD

Construction funds not made available

Construction funds held in reserve by BOB

Construction funds in excess

Figure 15

Fiscal Status of SSS Program. April 1968.

(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED.)

COf\IFIOE~jTI/\L

UNCLASSIFIED 49
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Notes

'fer "Space SurveillBDce Sigint Program, Final

Summary Report of Development Status," 1 Apr 1968.

"Space SurveillBDce Sigint Quarterly Report,"

J July 1967, 1 Oct 1967, BDd 1 JBD 1968.

50 CO~I'ID'ENTIAL

1t€t- "Space SurveillBDce Sigint Quarterly Report,"

1 Oct 1967 and 1 Jan 1968; (C/ "Space Surveillance Sigint Program,

Final Summary Report of Development Status," 1 Apr 1968.

"Space Surveillance Sigint Program, Final

Summary Report of Development Statu8," 1 Apr 1968.

s<U/ Ibid.
• .e

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

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Advanced Research Projects Agency (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

Ballistic Missile Early Waming System

Bureau of the Budget

Combined Cryptologic Program

Critical Collection Priorities Committee

Combat Operations Center (NORAD)

Deep-space instrumentation facility (NASA)

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

Institute for Defense Analysis

'":M"":":::C~A----------;-M;-:i':":'li':""ta-ry---:C:O:-o-n-s-:-tru-c-:-ti""o-n-Ar~m-y-----'

NSASAB National Security Agency Scientific Advisory Board

O/M Operation and maintenance

OSO/OSD Office of Special Operations/Office of the/Secretary of Defense

PERT Program evaluation review techniques

SCAs Service cryptologic agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force)

Spacol Space collection

Spadats Space Detection and Tracking System

ISSSPB Space Surveillance Sigint Planninf/Board

USAECOM U.S. Army Electronics Command

USIB United States Intelligence Board

ARPA

BMEWS

BOB

CCP

CCPC

COC

DSIF

GMIAC

GMIC

IIDA

:SECRET

T1-Feb 81-S3-1753 UNCLASSIFIED 51
.;4 .

II1\NBbB VIA 09M1N'f OIl~L8 ONL¥