Interim Decision #2688 

MATTER OF LUCERO 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-21710727 

Decided by Board February 7, 1979 

(1) In a Dominican divorce action for cause, appearance and pronouncement occur simultaneously. Matter of Gonzalez, Interim Decision 2575 (BIA 1975), overruled in part. 

(2) In a, Dominican divorce action for cause, the plaintiff must appear at an office of the 

Civil Registry within two months of the divorce in order to have the divorce pronounced. Once this action is completed, the divorce is final under Dominican law. Matter 

of Valerio, Interim Decision 2489 (BIA 1976); Matter of Tagle, Interim Decision 2476 

(BIA 1976), reaffirmed. 

(2) In a Dominican divorce by mutual consent, neither personal appearance nor pronouncement within two months are necessary to finalize the divorce. 

(4) Where the record was unclear whether the Dominican divorce terminating the petitioner's prior marriage was for cause, or by mutual consent, and it was unclear whether 

the formalities had been complied with, the record was remanded for further proceedings. 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Dr. Alfred Raymond Rego 

Representative 

652 Hope Street 

Bristol, Rhode Island 02809 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Appleman, Maguire, and Farb, Board Members 

The United States citizen petitioner has applied for immediate relative status for the beneficiary as her husband under section 201(b) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b). In a decision dated 

April 27, 1978, the District Director denied the petition on the ground 

that the petitioner was not free to marry the beneficiary because she 

had previously entered into an undissolved marriage. The petitioner 

appeals from this decision. The record will be remanded. 

The petitioner is a 39-year-old native of the Dominican Republic and a 

naturalized citizen of the United States. The beneficiary is a 31-year-old 

native and citizen of Peru. The parties were married on March 13, 197B, 

at New York City. ' 

The District Director based his decision on several factors. He found 

that the petitioner had been divorced on February 6, 1967, in the 

-Dominican Republic, in a divorce action for cause. Ha also found that 

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the divorce had not been pronounced until May 10, 1968, approximately 

15 months afterward. Citing Matter of Valerie, Interim Decision 2489 

(BIA 1976), he concluded that the provisions of Article 17 of the Civil 

Code of the Dominican Republic had not been met. This article includes 

the requirement that in a divorce for cause, the plaintiff must appear at 

an office of the Civil Registry to have the divorce pronounced and 

judgment registered, and that all this must take place within two 

months of the date of the judgment. The District Director found that the 

petitioner's first husband did not register the divorce within two months 

and that this rendered the divorce invalid. The petitioner was consequently not free to marry the present beneficiary. 

Before we begin our discussion of the merits of this case, there are 

several issues that need to be clarified. In his decision, the District 

Director relied upon Matter of Valerie, id. What was not mentioned in 

his decision was the fact that in a later case this Board characterized 

Valerio and Matter of Tagle, Interim Decision 2476 (BIA 1976) as dicta 

on the issue of pronouncement of divorces. Matter of Gonzalez, Interim 

Decision 2575 (BIA 1977). We have concluded that this characterization 

of the holdings of both cases was inaccurate. We have also concluded 

that the interpretation of Dominican law set forth mValerio, supra, was 

correct, and that the appearance/pronouncement dichotomy established 

in Gonzalez, supra, was incorrect. We therefore recede from the holding in Gonzalez, id., to the extent that it concerns appearance and 

pronouncement of Dominican divorces involving divorce actions for 

cause, and reaffirm Valerio and Tagle, supra. 

Turning to the case at hand, it is clear therefore that the District 

Director applied the correct interpretation of law for divorces for cause. 

If there were a divorce for cause, then, we would have no quarrel with 

the end result. This, however, may not be a divorce for cause; it may be 

a divorce based upon mutual consent. The translation of the divorce 

document considered by the District Director is almost incomprehensible and the petitioner should_ have been required to provide a more 

intelligible translation at the outset. But this problem aside, it is possible that the terminology used in that translation was inaccurate. We 

have reached this conclusion after referring to the translation of the 

divorce offered on appeal. This translation is considerably more lucid; 

but more importantly, it indicates that the divorce may have been by 

mutual consent under the provisions of Law 1306-bis On Divorce, 

specifically Chapter 1V, Articles 26 through 32. This result is also 

apparently indicated by the terminology used in the pronouncement 

document. If this is the case, the requirements for a mutual consent 

divorce, not a divorce for cause, are at issue here. If they have been 

met, then the divorce was valid under Dominican law. 

In cases in which we have previously discussed this issue, we have 

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held that the two-month pronouncement requirement was not applicable to mutual consent divorces. Chapter /V, cited above, makes no 

provision for a penalty for failure to have a divorce pronounced in such 

cases. In fact, personal appearance for pronouncement is not necessary 

in mutual consent divorces. Matter of Tagle, supra; Matter of Guzman, 

Interim Decision 2484 (BIA 1976). We have thus accepted an interpretation which holds that in a mutual consent divorce, which has met the 

other statutory requirements of Dominican law, and which would be 

recognized in the marrage jurisdiction, failure to pronounce the divorce 

will not cause it to be considered invalid.' 

In this instance, therefore, because the District Director may not 

have had an adequate opportunity to consider the possibility that this 

was a mutual consent divorce, we will remand the record to hini, 

including the translation which was offered on appeal. After this new 

information is considered, a new decision should be entered in the case. 

ORDER: The record is remanded to the District Director for farther 

proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and the entry of a new 

decision. 

FURTHER ORDER: Should a decision be adverse to the petiti otter, 

an appropriate order shall be entered and the record shall be certified to 

us for review. 

' This interpretation coincides with the views expressed in Forscher, Haitian Dominican Laws On Divorce Evaluated, New York Law Journal, October 20, 1971, Volume 16 6 , 

and by the State Department's Visa Office in its Operations Memorandum, January 2 9 , 

1975, to the United States Embassy, Santo Domingo. 

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