UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

KERN, YOB, and ALDYKIEWICZ 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 CHRISTOPHER B. WILLIAMS 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20110265 

U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School 

Thomas Berg, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Randolph Swansiger, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Major Richard E. Gorini, JA; Captain Richard M. Gallagher, JA. 

For Appellee: Pursuant to A.C.C.A Rule 15.2, no response filed. 

30 November 2011 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

 A military judge, sitting as a special court-martial, convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of absence without leave [hereinafter 

AWOL], one specification of failure to go to his appointed place of duty, one 

specification of going from his appointed place of duty, two specifications of 

violation of a lawful general order, five specifications of making a false official 

statement, and one specification of wrongful use of cocaine, in violation of Articles 

86, 92, 107, and 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 892, 907 

and 912a [hereinafter UCMJ]. Appellant was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for four months, and reduction in rank to Private E1. This case is 

before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

Specification 2 of Charge II alleges a false official statement to Ms. KM, a 

civilian nurse at Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC), to wit: “I did not seek 

treatment earlier because I had been mugged and kidnapped and they just let me go 

today,” or words to that effect. Specification 3 of Charge II alleges a false official 
WILLIAMS—ARMY 20110265 

2

statement to Detective NMD, a San Antonio police detective, to wit: “I was 

kidnapped,” or words to that effect. During the providence inquiry, appellant 

acknowledged the official nature of the statements. Applying the factors articulated 

in United States v. Teffeau, 58 M.J. 62, 68-69 (C.A.A.F. 2003) and United States v. 

Day, 66 M.J. 172, 174-75 (C.A.A.F. 2008) to the facts elicited during appellant’s 

colloquy with the military judge and to the stipulated facts in Prosecution Exhibit 1, 

both statements qualify as official statements. Notwithstanding the fact that these 

statements were made to civilians and did not address a matter within appellant’s 

line of duty, both statements qualify as “official.” 

Regarding Specification 2 of Charge II, the following factors support finding 

an “official statement”: the statement was made when appellant was not yet 

suspected of any criminal activity (i.e., he was the alleged victim of a kidnapping 

vice an AWOL returnee); the statement was made on-post in a military hospital; the 

statement was made to a nurse employed by the Army; the question asked by the 

nurse triggering appellant’s response related to the nurse’s official on-post duties; 

the question about prior treatment or lack thereof is consistent with a line of duty 

determination notwithstanding the lack of any ongoing line of duty investigation; 

Ms. KM, at the time of the questioning, was in the performance of her official Army 

duties; present during the questioning was SSG G, appellant’s noncommissioned 

officer (NCO) escort; Ms. KM was aware of appellant’s military status; the 

statement related to an alleged crime that occurred on-post and committed by two 

suspected civilians, an offense of interest to both civilian and military authorities; 

and appellant’s statement could have and did subject him to criminal liability in the 

military justice system for various offenses in addition to his false official statement 

(i.e., the statement established his absence from his unit subjecting him to 

prosecution under Article 86 in addition to Article 107). Additionally, shortly after 

the making of the false statement to Ms. KM, appellant knew or should have known 

there would be parallel criminal investigations based on his statement, because he 

was interviewed by a civilian detective as the victim of an alleged on-post 

kidnapping by two civilians. 

Regarding Specification 3 of Charge II, the following factors support finding 

an “official statement”: at the time appellant was interviewed, he was not a suspect 

of any offense, but was the apparent “victim” of a kidnapping by two unidentified 

civilians committed on Fort Sam Houston, an active Army installation; present 

during the questioning was SSG G, appellant’s NCO escort; Detective NMD was 

aware of appellant’s military status; the statement related to an alleged crime that 

occurred on post and committed by two suspected civilians, an offense of interest to 

both civilian and military authorities; appellant’s statement could have and did 

subject him to criminal liability in the military justice system for various offenses in 

addition to his false official statement (i.e., the statement established his absence 

from his unit subjecting him to prosecution under Article 86 in addition to Article 

107); at the time of the questioning appellant either knew or should have known that 

there would be parallel criminal investigations based on his statement, because he 
WILLIAMS—ARMY 20110265 

3

was interviewed by a civilian detective as the victim of an alleged on-post 

kidnapping by two civilians. 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record, we hold the findings of guilty and the 

sentence as approved by the convening authority are correct in law and fact. 

Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 JOANNE P. TETREAULT E 

 f C 

JOANNE P. TETREAULT ELDRIDGE 

Deputy Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: