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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3235 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>

                                                       Calendar No. 374
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3235

 To require a strategy to counter the role of the People's Republic of 
China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect 
                    to Iran, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            November 7, 2023

 Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Moran, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Scott of 
   Florida, Mr. Hagerty, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Budd, Mr. 
Cassidy, Mrs. Britt, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Braun, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Hoeven, 
 and Mr. Ricketts) introduced the following bill; which was read twice 
           and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

                              May 7, 2024

               Reported by Mr. Cardin, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require a strategy to counter the role of the People's Republic of 
China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect 
                    to Iran, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``End Iranian Terrorism Act 
of 2023''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Islamic Republic of Iran has long provided 
        hundreds of millions of dollars in material support to Hamas 
        and other terrorist groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
        that directly threaten Israel;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Iran poses a threat to regional and global 
        security and has earned approximately $80,000,000,000 in oil 
        revenues since 2021;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the People's Republic of China, seeking to 
        secure reliable sources of Middle Eastern energy, has purchased 
        roughly $47,000,000,000 in Iranian petroleum products since 
        2021 and is undercutting the enforcement of sanctions imposed 
        by the United States with respect to Iran;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) illicit purchases of Iranian petroleum 
        products by the People's Republic of China and other countries 
        fund the Iranian regime's suppression of human rights in Iran, 
        provide valuable resources for Iran's terrorist proxies, and 
        provide additional resources for support by Iran for the 
        Russian Federation in its unprovoked war in Ukraine, contrary 
        to United States policy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) lack of sanctions and sanctions enforcement 
        directly undercuts United States policy objectives in the Indo-
        Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) increasing encroachment by the People's 
        Republic of China in the Middle East and North Africa, include 
        involvement of the People's Republic of China in illicit oil 
        trade, runs counter to the national security interests of the 
        United States; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) the United States should immediately enforce 
        existing sanctions, including sanctions provided for in 
        Executive Order 13846 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
        reimposing certain sanctions with respect to Iran), and expand 
        sanctions designations to include persons that store Iranian 
        oil, ship-to-ship oil transfer operators, ports and port 
        operators, refineries and refinery operators, and other 
        individuals and entities, particularly in the People's Republic 
        of China, dealing in Iranian-origin oil and 
        petrochemicals.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
              DEFINED.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional 
committees'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
              CHINA IN EVASION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
              IRAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to 
those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's 
Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States 
with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an 
assessment of options--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to strengthen the enforcement of such 
        sanctions; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to expand sanctions designations targeting the 
        involvement of the People's Republic of China in the 
        production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of 
        Iranian-origin petroleum products.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) 
shall include--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a description of the use of sanctions in 
        effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target 
        individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that 
        are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of 
        Iranian-origin petroleum products;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) an assessment of--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the People's Republic of China's 
                petroleum refining capabilities;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) which of the People's Republic of 
                China's refineries are at high risk of processing 
                Iranian-origin petroleum products and why;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) Iranian-owned entities operating in 
                the People's Republic of China and involved in 
                petroleum refining supply chains;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the People's Republic of China's role 
                in global petroleum refining supply chains;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) how the People's Republic of China 
                leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to 
                achieve political objectives;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) the People's Republic of China's 
                petroleum importing and exporting partners;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) what percent of the People's Republic 
                of China's energy consumption is linked to illegally 
                imported Iranian-origin petroleum products;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) the amount of money the People's 
                Republic of China saves by illegally importing 
                discounted Iranian-origin petroleum products rather 
                than paying market price;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (I) what level of influence the Chinese 
                Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent 
                ``teapot'' refineries; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (J) the challenges limiting the ability of 
                the United States to impose or enforce sanctions with 
                respect to such refineries, including--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) Lawen Namu Petroleum Trading 
                        Company;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) Qihang Energy; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) Shangang Guomao;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) a detailed plan for--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) monitoring the maritime domain for 
                smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products in 
                violation of sanctions imposed by the United States, 
                including through--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) automatic identification 
                        system monitoring;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) satellite imagery;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) vessel comparison and tanker 
                        classification;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) receiving tips from 
                        operators; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (v) creating a database of 
                        reported potential sanctions 
                        violations;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) identifying the individuals, entities, 
                and vessels responsible for such smuggling, including--
                </DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) vessels--</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (I) operated by the 
                                National Iranian Tanker Company or any 
                                other Chinese or Iranian entity subject 
                                to sanctions imposed by the United 
                                States;</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (II) transporting 
                                petrochemicals subject to 
                                sanctions;</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (III) conducting ship-to-
                                ship transfers of such 
                                petrochemicals;</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (IV) with deactivated 
                                automatic identification systems; 
                                or</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (V) that engage in ``flag 
                                hopping'' by changing national 
                                registries;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) individuals or entities--
                        </DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (I) storing petrochemicals 
                                subject to sanctions; or</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (II) refining or otherwise 
                                processing such petrochemicals; 
                                and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) through the use of port 
                        entry and docking permission of vessels subject 
                        to sanctions;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) assessing the viability of seizing 
                targets identified as belonging to entities smuggling 
                Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of 
                sanctions imposed by the United States, including--
                </DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) location;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) origin and 
                        destination;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) seaworthiness; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) asset value;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) seizing, prosecuting, and, if 
                appropriate, liquidating viable targets identified as 
                belonging to entities involved in such 
                smuggling;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) deterring individuals and entities 
                from violating sanctions by educating and engaging--
                </DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) insurance providers;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) parent companies; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) vessel operators;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) collaborating with allies and partners 
                of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, 
                including through standing or new maritime task forces, 
                to build sanctions enforcement capacity through 
                assistance and training to defense and law enforcement 
                services; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) using public communications and global 
                diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of 
                petroleum product smuggling in supporting Iran's human 
                rights abuses and destabilizing terrorism activities; 
                and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) an assessment of--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the total number of vessels smuggling 
                Iranian-origin petroleum products;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the total number of vessels smuggling 
                such petroleum products destined for the People's 
                Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the number of vessels smuggling such 
                petroleum products specifically from the Islamic 
                Revolutionary Guard Corps;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the most strategic locations for 
                intercepting smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products 
                destined for the People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) interference from the People's 
                Republic of China in attempts by the United States to 
                investigate or enforce sanctions on Iranian petroleum 
                product exports;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) the effectiveness of the use of 
                sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own 
                or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin 
                petroleum products;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) the distinction between the total 
                number of suspected violations of sanctions related to 
                smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products and the 
                number of vessels legally viable to seize and prosecute 
                in litigation, if any, and an accompanying explanation 
                for each;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) the personnel and resources needed to 
                enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin 
                petroleum products; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (I) the impact of smuggled Iranian-origin 
                petroleum products on global energy markets.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
index.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) identify each foreign entity, including any 
        member of the Chinese Communist Party or an entity organized 
        under the laws of the People's Republic of China or otherwise 
        subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, 
        that the President determines meets the criteria for the 
        imposition of sanctions under--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public 
                Law 104-172;50 U.S.C. 1701 note);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
                Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
                8501 et seq.);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) section 1245 of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
                8513a);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
                Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et 
                seq.);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) the Iran Freedom and Counter-
                Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et 
                seq.);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) title I of the Countering America's 
                Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et 
                seq.);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) any Executive order imposing sanctions 
                with respect to Iran issued under the authority 
                provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers 
                Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) any other provision of law imposing 
                sanctions with respect to Iran; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) impose sanctions applicable under existing law 
        with respect to each such entity.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 30 days after the 
imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign 
entity, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the sanctions imposed.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``End Iranian Terrorism Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Islamic Republic of Iran has long provided hundreds 
        of millions of dollars in material support to Hamas and other 
        terrorist groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that 
        directly threaten Israel;
            (2) Iran poses a threat to regional and global security and 
        has earned approximately $80,000,000,000 in oil revenues since 
        2021;
            (3) the People's Republic of China, seeking to secure 
        reliable sources of Middle Eastern energy, has purchased 
        roughly $47,000,000,000 in Iranian petroleum products since 
        2021 and is undercutting the enforcement of sanctions imposed 
        by the United States with respect to Iran;
            (4) illicit purchases of Iranian petroleum products by the 
        People's Republic of China and other countries fund the Iranian 
        regime's suppression of human rights in Iran, provide valuable 
        resources for Iran's terrorist proxies, and provide additional 
        resources for support by Iran for the Russian Federation in its 
        unprovoked war in Ukraine, contrary to United States policy;
            (5) lack of sanctions and sanctions enforcement directly 
        undercuts United States policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond;
            (6) increasing encroachment by the People's Republic of 
        China in the Middle East and North Africa, including 
        involvement of the People's Republic of China in illicit oil 
        trade, runs counter to the national security interests of the 
        United States; and
            (7) the United States should immediately enforce existing 
        sanctions, including sanctions provided for in Executive Order 
        13846 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to reimposing certain 
        sanctions with respect to Iran), and expand sanctions 
        designations to include persons that store Iranian oil, ship-
        to-ship oil transfer operators, ports and port operators, 
        refineries and refinery operators, and other individuals and 
        entities, particularly in the People's Republic of China, 
        dealing in Iranian-origin oil and petrochemicals.

SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 
              EVASION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to 
those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's 
Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States 
with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an 
assessment of options--
            (1) to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and
            (2) to expand sanctions designations targeting the 
        involvement of the People's Republic of China in the 
        production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of 
        Iranian-origin petroleum products.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
include--
            (1) a description and assessment of the use of sanctions in 
        effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target 
        individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that 
        are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of 
        Iranian-origin petroleum products;
            (2) an assessment of--
                    (A) Iranian-owned entities operating in the 
                People's Republic of China and involved in petroleum 
                refining supply chains;
                    (B) the People's Republic of China's role in global 
                petroleum refining supply chains;
                    (C) how the People's Republic of China leverages 
                its role in global petroleum supply chains to achieve 
                political objectives;
                    (D) the People's Republic of China's petroleum 
                importing and exporting partners;
                    (E) what percent of the People's Republic of 
                China's energy consumption is linked to illegally 
                imported Iranian-origin petroleum products; and
                    (F) what level of influence the Chinese Communist 
                Party holds over non-state, semi-independent ``teapot'' 
                refineries;
            (3) a detailed plan for--
                    (A) monitoring the maritime domain for sanctionable 
                activity related to smuggling of Iranian-origin 
                petroleum products;
                    (B) identifying the individuals, entities, and 
                vessels engaging in sanctionable activity related to 
                Iranian-origin petroleum products, including--
                            (i) vessels--
                                    (I) transporting petrochemicals 
                                subject to sanctions;
                                    (II) conducting ship-to-ship 
                                transfers of such petrochemicals;
                                    (III) with deactivated automatic 
                                identification systems; or
                                    (IV) that engage in ``flag 
                                hopping'' by changing national 
                                registries;
                            (ii) individuals or entities--
                                    (I) storing petrochemicals subject 
                                to sanctions; or
                                    (II) refining or otherwise 
                                processing such petrochemicals; and
                            (iii) through the use of port entry and 
                        docking permission of vessels subject to 
                        sanctions;
                    (C) deterring individuals and entities from 
                violating sanctions by educating and engaging--
                            (i) insurance providers;
                            (ii) parent companies; and
                            (iii) vessel operators;
                    (D) collaborating with allies and partners of the 
                United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, 
                including through standing or new maritime task forces, 
                to build sanctions enforcement capacity through 
                assistance and training to defense and law enforcement 
                services; and
                    (E) using public communications and global 
                diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of illicit 
                petroleum product smuggling in bolstering Iran's 
                support for terrorism and its nuclear program; and
            (4) an assessment of--
                    (A) the total number of vessels smuggling Iranian-
                origin petroleum products;
                    (B) the total number of vessels smuggling such 
                petroleum products destined for the People's Republic 
                of China;
                    (C) the number of vessels smuggling such petroleum 
                products specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary 
                Guard Corps;
                    (D) interference by the People's Republic of China 
                with attempts by the United States to investigate or 
                enforce sanctions on illicit Iranian petroleum product 
                exports;
                    (E) the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with 
                respect to insurers of entities that own or operate 
                vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum 
                products;
                    (F) the personnel and resources needed to enforce 
                sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum 
                products; and
                    (G) the impact of smuggled illicit Iranian-origin 
                petroleum products on global energy markets.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index.

SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall--
            (1) identify each foreign entity, including any member of 
        the Chinese Communist Party or any entity organized under the 
        laws of the People's Republic of China or otherwise subject to 
        the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, that the 
        President determines meets the criteria for the imposition of 
        sanctions under--
                    (A) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
                172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
                    (B) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
                Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
                8501 et seq.);
                    (C) section 1245 of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
                8513a);
                    (D) the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
                Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.);
                    (E) the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act 
                of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.);
                    (F) title I of the Countering America's Adversaries 
                Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.);
                    (G) any Executive order imposing sanctions with 
                respect to Iran issued under the authority provided by 
                the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
                U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or
                    (H) any other provision of law imposing sanctions 
                with respect to Iran; and
            (2) impose sanctions applicable under existing law with 
        respect to each such entity.
    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 30 days after the imposition 
of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign entity, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on the sanctions imposed.
    (c) Waiver.--
            (1) In general.--The President may waive the application of 
        sanctions under this section for renewable periods not to 
        exceed 180 days if the President--
                    (A) determines that such a waiver is in the 
                national security interests of the United States; and
                    (B) not less than 15 days before the granting of 
                the waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a notice of and justification for the 
                waiver.
            (2) Form.--A notice described in paragraph (1)(B) may be 
        submitted in classified form.

SEC. 6. REPORT ON IMPACTS ON THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN OF SANCTIONS 
              IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury and drawing on subject-matter experts 
including economists and statisticians from the Department of State and 
the Department of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the impacts on the Islamic 
Republic of Iran of sanctions imposed by the United States.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
an assessment of the following:
            (1) The impact of sanctions imposed by the United States on 
        the following:
                    (A) Problematic activities and policies of the 
                Islamic Republic of Iran, including ballistic missile 
                development, proliferation of Iranian drones and 
                missiles to state and non-state actors, uranium 
                enrichment, and funding of terrorist groups in the 
                ``Axis of Resistance'', and how sanctions have 
                meaningfully impacted the ability of such groups to 
                operate.
                    (B) Key officials of the Iranian regime, including 
                their access to alternative financial markets, their 
                standard of living, and impacts to their personal 
                wealth.
                    (C) The operations of independent civil society 
                organizations in Iran, including the ability of such 
                organizations to access products that would allow them 
                to document and share human rights abuses, promote 
                democratic norms, and engage in political dissent.
                    (D) The efficacy of licensing actions aimed at 
                ensuring the people of Iran have access to 
                circumvention technologies around Iranian regime 
                firewalls and censors to promote internet freedom, 
                including General License D-2 of the Department of the 
                Treasury.
                    (E) The standard of living of the people of Iran, 
                including--
                            (i) the impact on the purchasing power of 
                        the people of Iran and their ability to afford 
                        and acquire food and medicine; and
                            (ii) changes in the size of the working and 
                        middle classes in Iran, including impacts to 
                        the poverty rate in Iran.
                    (F) The growth of unofficial economies controlled 
                by officials of the Iranian regime and members of the 
                Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
            (2) What industries in Iran remain unaffected by such 
        sanctions.

SEC. 7. EXCEPTIONS.

    (a) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.--
            (1) In general.--A requirement to block and prohibit all 
        transactions in all property and interests in property under 
        this Act shall not include the authority or a requirement to 
        impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
            (2) Good.--In this subsection, the term ``good'' means any 
        article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or 
        manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, 
        and excluding technical data.
    (b) Exception to Comply With United Nations Headquarters Agreement 
and Law Enforcement Activities.--Sanctions under this Act shall not 
apply with respect to the admission of an alien to the United States if 
admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary--
            (1) to permit the United States to comply with the 
        Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 
        signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 
        November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United 
        States, or other applicable international obligations of the 
        United States; or
            (2) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement 
        activity in the United States.
    (c) Exception to Comply With Intelligence Activities.--Sanctions 
under this Act shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting 
requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the 
United States.
    (d) Humanitarian Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--Sanctions under this Act shall not apply 
        to--
                    (A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction 
                for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, 
                medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or 
                for humanitarian purposes; or
                    (B) transactions that are necessary for or related 
                to the activities described in subparagraph (A).
            (2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                    (A) Agricultural commodity.--The term 
                ``agricultural commodity'' has the meaning given that 
                term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 
                1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
                    (B) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' 
                has the meaning given the term ``device'' in section 
                201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
                U.S.C. 321).
                    (C) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the 
                meaning given the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the 
                Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
    (e) Report on Exceptions.--Not later than one year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
describes each activity that would be subject to sanctions under this 
Act if not excepted pursuant to subsection (b) or (c).
                                                       Calendar No. 374

118th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 3235

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To require a strategy to counter the role of the People's Republic of 
China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect 
                    to Iran, and for other purposes.

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                              May 7, 2024

                       Reported with an amendment
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