No. 79-31 

IN THE SUPREMI3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

RICHARD SCHULTZ, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

VS. 

CARLA JEAN SCHULTZ, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Regnier and Lewis, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell, 

Montana 

Submitted on briefs: April 3, 1980 

Decided: JUb! 2 0 1-%@ 

Filed: JUN 2 0 1980 
Mr. Justice John Conway ~arrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This is the second appeal taken from a petition for a 

dissolution of marriage and the equitable apportionment of 

assets of a marital estate. The petition was originally 

filed in the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, in and for the County of Flathead, the Honorable 

Robert Sykes presiding. 

The facts of the case are fully developed in the first 

appeal, In re Marriage of Schultz (1979), - Mont. , 

597 P.2d 1174, 36 St.Rep. 1330, and need only be briefly 

discussed here. Appellant husband and respondent wife were 

first married in June 1967, divorced a year and a half 

later, and remarried in December 1969. A petition for the 

dissolution of the second marriage was filed on July 28, 

1977. At that time husband was 46 years old and employed as 

a railroad brakeman-conductor with net earnings of approximately $1,350 per month. Wife was 37 years old and unemployed, but had worked during the marriage as a bartender 

and waitress. The primary asset of the marital estate was a 

twenty-acre tract of land, known as the Haskill Creek property, 

located east of Whitefish, Montana, in Flathead County. A 

small log house was located on the property which served as 

the marital home of the parties during the marriages. 

Husband originally purchased the land for $11,000 prior to 

his marriages to wife, and approximately $5,000 of the 

purchase price was paid by husband during the marriages. 

On March 23, 1978, the District Court distributed the 

marital estate. The personal property was divided equally 

between the parties, and husband received the Haskill Creek 

property but was ordered to pay wife $6,000 as her interest 
therein. Husband was also ordered to assume all marital 

obligations and was given credit for his contributions 

toward the support of wife's children. The following chart 

indicates the court's apportionment: 

DESCRIPTION VALUE - TO HUSBAND -- TO WIFE 

(1) Real Estate $40,000 $34,000 $ 6,000 

(2) Less Contract 

Balance & 

Equity (6,000) (6,000) 

(3) Personal 

Property 7,170 3,585 

(4) Less Debts (4,280) (4,280) 

(5) Less Child Support Contributions (20,000) (20,000) 

NET 

Wife contested the above apportionment in the first 

appeal on the basis of issues unrelated to those raised 

here. We remanded the case to the District Court to enter 

certain findings with respect to the personal property of 

the parties and to distribute the marital estate without 

considering husband's contributions toward the support of 

wife's children. Following our instructions, the District 

Court re-apportioned the marital estate, this time dividing 

the estate equally between the parties with respect to both 

real and personal property. Husband again was ordered to 

assume all marital obligations, and the property was divided 

in the following manner: 

DESCRIPTION VALUE TO - HUSBAND -- TO WIFE 

(1) Real Estcte $40,000 $25,190 $14,810 

(2) Less Contract 

Balance & 

Equity (6,000) (6,000) 

(3) Personal 

Property 7,170 3,585 3, 585 

(4) Less Debts (4,280) (4,280) 

NET $18,495 $18,395 
An objection to this second apportionment is now raised 

by husband in the form of a second appeal. Husband argues 

that the District Court committed reversible error and 

abused its discretion by dividing the marital estate equally 

between the parties without considering the relative contributions of the parties. In particular, husband objects to 

the District Court's award to wife of a greater interest in 

the Haskill Creek property simply by reason of her living on 

the property during the marriage. 

In considering husband's arguments, we note, first of 

all, that a District Court has far-reaching discretion in 

resolving property division disputes in dissolution proceedings and that the District Court's judgment will not be 

disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. 

Zell v. Zell (1977), 174 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33, 35; In re 

Marriage of Aanenson (1979), - Mont. - , 598 P.2d 1120, 

1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525, 1528; Cook v. Cook (1972), 159 Mont. 

98, 103, 495 P.2d 591, 593-594; Schwartz v. Schwartz (1979), 

- Mont. , 602 P.2d 175, 176; 36 St.Rep. 1980, 1981. 

To prevail in this case, husband must show, therefore, that 

the District Court clearly abused its discretion. 

The primary focus of husband's arguments concerns the 

District Court's apportionment of the Haskill Creek property, 

which was acquired by husband prior to his marriages to 

wife. That property consisted of a twenty-acre tract of 

partially cleared and partially uncleared land. At the time 

of purchase, a small log house was located upon the property, 

and there was second growth timber of only marginal merchantable quality. Husband and his friends made several substantial improvements to the house while the parties lived there 

during the marriages. 
In disposing of property acquired prior to a marriage, 

a District Court is required by statute to consider: 

". . . those contributions of the other spouse to 

the marriage, including: (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker; (b) the extent to which 

such contributions have facilitated the maintenance 

of this property, and (c) whether or not the property disposition serves as an alternative to maintenance arrangements." Section 40-4-202, MCA. 

Husband here refers to certain conclusions made by the 

District Court for his argument that wife was not entitled 

to a greater interest in the property because of her lack of 

contributions. The District Court concluded in its conclusions of law that wife made no substantial improvements to 

the Haskill Creek property and that she dissipated the 

marital estate. The court found, however, that by reason of 

wife's iiving on the property during the marriage and the 

period in which improvements were made, she was entitled to 

equal interest in the property. 

In understanding the conclusions and the discretion of 

the District Court, it is important to consider the findings 

of fact entered by the court. These findings provide, in 

part, a basis for the court's conclusions. Husband would 

have us believe, from a rather selective examination of the 

court's conclusions, that wife made no contributions to the 

Haskill Creek property but simply lived on it, and further 

that wife was the sole cause and reason for the dissipation 

of the marital estate. The findings of fact indicate otlierwise. The court found factually that both parties were 

responsible to some extent for the dissipation of the marital 

estate and that wife made considerable sacrifices while 

living upon the property. Finding of Fact No. 19 stated: 

"Considerable strife, turmoil and controversy 

occurred throughout the two marriages of the 

parties. Drinking -- on the part of both parties 

has contributed -- to the problem. The respondent 
[wife] left the family home on several occasions; 

and the separation of the parties dissipated the 

assets and monies accumulated during the course 

of the marriage on the part of both parties." 

(Emphasis added.) 

Finding of Fact No. 21 stated: 

"Substantial improvements were made on the house 

during the marriages. The resulting living conditions were a problem in attempting to maintain 

reasonable conditions. The respondent [wife] 

contributed little physical effort in improving 

the house; but both parties neither expected nor 

required such effort on her part. The parties 

living on said property, where substantial improvements were being made, required considerable 

sacrifice of personal comfort." 

We find substantial evidence in the record to support 

such findings. Testimony was given at the apportionment 

hearing regarding the parties' several conflicts and their 

drinking problems. It is impossible to conclude from such 

testimony that the separation of the parties and the subsequent dissipation of the marital estate was caused entirely 

by the actions of one party. The transcript also indicates 

that, while husband and his friends engaged in most of the 

physical work with regard to the improvements made upon the 

property, wife nevertheless did such things as buy bedroom 

lights, bathroom lights and a hot water tank for the house, 

stain doors and casings, clean up messes during the construction, make trips into Whitefish for materials, ride the 

Caterpillar with husband in working the property and drive 

the truck during haying operations. 

With respect to the living conditions that both parties 

lived with during the construction, there is testimony to 

the effect that there were considerable sacrifices made. An 

entire bedroom and bathroom were added, and there were no 

kitchen cupboards or carpeting in the house. One friend of 

husband's, who provided considerable help during the con- 
struction, testified that the condition of the property 

before the start of the work was "pretty badw--"there 

wasn't any water, sewer, no liveable conditions--it was 

really rough." Because of these contributions and sacrifices, we find that the District Court did not err or abuse 

its discretion in awarding wife a greater interest on the 

second apportionment. 

In affirming the discretion and decision of the District Court, we wish to reiterate that, in dissolution 

proceedings, ea::h Jase must be considered by District Courts 

individually with an eye to its unique circumstances. Cook 

v. Cook, 159 Mont. at 104, 495 P.2d at 59. There is no 

fixed formula or rationale to be applied in each case, 

except that the court's exercise of discretion must be 

reasonable under the particular circumstances. Biegalke v. 

Biegalke (1977), 172 Mont. 311, 315, 564 P.2d 987, 989. 

Here, both parties contributed to the maintenance of the 

Haskill Creek property, and both were responsible for the 

separation, which caused a dissipation of the marital 

estate. 

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion, and the 

judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

We concur: 

/ 

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Qq4 P"P 7=3%%'& 

Xhief Justice