IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

ROBERT E. CHAMBERS, II, )

Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. 08-352

)

vs. )

) Magistrate Judge Baxter

JUDGE RITA HATHAWAY, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter.

On December 16, 2008, Plaintiff Robert E. Chambers, II, an inmate incarcerated at the

State Correctional Institution at Albion, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as Defendants are: Judge Rita Hathaway (“Judge

Hathaway”); Officer Gary Schubert (“Schubert”); Officer Wagner (“Wagner”); and Sergeant

LaPorte (“LaPorte”).

In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that, on August 28, 2007, Defendant Judge Hathaway

“violated [his] due process by putting a stay out of New Ken., Arnold, and Lower Burrell order

on [his] sentencing paperwork.... ” (Complaint at Section IV.C). Plaintiff claims further that, on

July 3, 2006, Defendants Schubert, Wagner, and LaPorte violated his Fourth Amendment rights

by allegedly conducting an illegal search and seizure, which led to the discovery of “two pieces

of paper towel containing drugs that had four individually wrapped plastic baggies containing a

controlled substance that didn’t have [his] fingerprints or DNA on them.” (Id.). As relief for his

claims, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief and “immediate relief or re-sentencing based on

evidence.” (Complaint at Section VI). 

On September 28, 2009, Defendant Judge Hathaway filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint citing, inter alia, absolute judicial immunity. [Document # 32]. Defendant Schubert,

Wagner, and LaPorte subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that

Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

[Document # 36]. Despite being given ample time to do so, Plaintiff has failed to file a response

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to either motion. Instead, Plaintiff has filed his own motion for summary judgment, which

attempts to raise additional factual and legal issues regarding his conviction that have little

relevance to the issue at hand. [Document # 38]. The parties have consented to having a United

States Magistrate Judge exercise jurisdiction over this matter. [Document ## 2, 25, 26]. This

matter is now ripe for consideration.

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). A

complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)(rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (May 18, 2009)

(specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act). 

The Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the

facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp.,

394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906

(3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. Although the United States Supreme Court does “not require heightened fact

pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is “required to make a ‘showing’

rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief.” Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469,

at *1 (D.Del. February 22, 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d

Cir. 2008). “This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead

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simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence

of’ the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3. 

Recently, the Third Circuit expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal/Phillips line of cases:

To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out “sufficient

factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then

“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the alleged misconduct.”

* * *

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

district court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a district

court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint

are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has “a plausible claim for

relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the

plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an

entitlement with its facts. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal,

“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than

the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has

not ‘show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This “plausibility”

requirement will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009)(emphasis added)(citations

omitted).

In addition, pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-521(1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the

litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of

legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with pleading

requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v.

Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969)(petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn

and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949

F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all

allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d

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Cir.1997)(overruled on other grounds). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.

1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906

F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will

consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.

Discussion

1. Defendant Judge Hathaway

a. Absolute Judicial Immunity

Defendant Judge Hathaway asserts that she is immune from Plaintiff’s claim for monetary

damages under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. The Court agrees. It is well-settled

that judicial officers are immune from damage suits arising out of their official duties. Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). “Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from an

ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “A judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of authority....” Sparkman 435 U.S. at 356. 

Judicial immunity may be overcome only when: (i) the challenged actions were not taken

in the judge’s judicial capacity; or (ii) the challenged actions, “though judicial in nature, were

taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. In this case, it is

beyond question that Defendant Judge Hathaway was acting in her judicial capacity and within

her jurisdiction when she issued the challenged sentencing order. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for

monetary damages against Defendant Judge Hathaway is barred by the doctrine of absolute

judicial immunity and will be dismissed.

b. Injunctive Relief 

To the extent Plaintiff seeks an order requiring “re-sentencing based on evidence,”

Defendant Judge Hathaway argues that Plaintiff is attempting to make a “thinly veiled collateral

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attack on his conviction,” which is barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). However, the Defendant’s reliance on Heck to bar Plaintiff’s

request for re-sentencing is misplaced, as Heck only bars actions for monetary damages. See, id.

at 487 (“when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence”)(emphasis added).

In the alternative, Defendant Judge Hathaway argues that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks

habeas corpus relief, his claim fails for lack of exhaustion under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 490 (1973). However, Plaintiff’s request for re-sentencing is not in the nature of habeas

corpus relief because he is not seeking immediate or speedier release from incarceration. See, id.

at 488-490 (habeas corpus is exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or

duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release). Instead he is merely

challenging the probationary portion of his sentence, in which he is ordered to stay out of New

Kensington, Arnold and Lower Burrell upon his release. Thus, Preiser is inapplicable to the

present case.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, because the federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction,

the Court must determine whether it lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts “from 1

exercising ‘subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state’s highest court or to

evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision] in

a judicial proceeding.’” Ernst v. Child and Youth Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 491

(3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S.Ct. 139 (1997)(quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny

County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996))(internal quotations omitted). 

1

This doctrine arises out of the decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923) and

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983). Although Defendant

Judge Hathaway has failed to raise this issue, the Court is compelled to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction

over the subject matter, as the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

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A constitutional claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the particular state court decision if

granting the plaintiff’s requested relief would “effectively reverse [the] state court’s decision or

void its ruling.” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. The bar imposed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

applies if, in order to grant the relief Plaintiff requests, the Court must either “determine that the

state court judgment was erroneously entered” or “take action that would render that judgment

ineffectual.” Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150 (1923). 

Here, Plaintiff claims that the probationary portion of Defendant Judge Hathaway’s

sentence, ordering him to stay out of New Kensington, Arnold and Lower Burrell, Pennsylvania,

upon his release from incarceration, violates his constitutional rights. As relief, Plaintiff is

essentially asking this Court to conduct a de novo review of the sentencing order to determine

whether it is unconstitutional and, if so, to order a “re-sentencing based on evidence.”

(Complaint at Section VI). However, both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court have already upheld Defendant Judge Hathaway’s sentence in the

face of the same constitutional challenge presented here. Thus, granting the requested relief here

would render ineffectual both Defendant’s sentencing order and the subsequent state court

decisions upholding the sentence. Plaintiff cannot seek review of Defendant’s sentencing order

in this Court under the guise of a civil rights claim when his state court requests seeking the same

relief have already been denied. Such review is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

2. Defendants Schubert, Wagner, and LaPorte

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Schubert, Wagner, and LaPorte each conducted an illegal

search and seizure of his person on July 3, 2006, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 

(Complaint at Section IV.C). These Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed

because, among other things, it is based on circumstances that are alleged to have occurred well

beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The Court agrees.

The federal civil rights laws do not contain a specific statute of limitations for § 1983

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actions. However, it is well established that the federal courts must look to the relevant state

statute of limitations for personal injury claims to determine the applicable limitations period. 

Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 1998). In this regard,

federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania have adopted Pennsylvania’s two year personal injury

statute of limitations set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, in determining that a § 1983 claim must be

filed no later than two years from the date the cause of action accrued. See Lake v. Arnold, 232

F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451 (3d Cir.

1996).

Here, the alleged misconduct of Defendants Schubert, Wagner and LaPorte occurred on

July 3, 2006. As a result, Plaintiff was required to bring an action against these Defendants on or

before July 3, 2008. Instead the Complaint in this matter was not received by the Court until

December 16, 2008, well beyond the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. As a

result, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Schubert, Wagner, and LaPorte are time-barred and

will be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss

filed by Defendant Judge Rita Hathaway [Document # 32] is GRANTED, and the Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants Schubert, Wagner, and LaPorte [Document # 36]

is GRANTED.

The Clerk is directed to mark this case closed.

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: July 14, 2010

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