me. to Those Who Served 

Foreword

The campaign described in the present volume was important to the

Army as an experience in amphibious warfare and combined operations

against a formidable and still resourceful enemy. It was also of critical

importance in the evolution of American strategy in the Pacific. CARTWHEEL

began as an uphill fight with means that seemed inadequate to the ends

proposed, even though these were limited. But it swiftly brought our forces

to a crest from which we were able to launch the two powerful drives,

through the Southwest and Central Pacific, that crushed Japan before we

redeployed the forces directed against Germany. The campaign put to the

test the principle of unity of command, and also the capacity for co-operation between two theaters, one under Army, the other under Navy command, and both under forceful and dominant commanders. By ingenious

and aggressive use of the ground, sea, and air forces at their disposal they

made these suffice to achieve more than had been foreseen as possible, and

opened up a new vista of strategy. They took a heavy toll of the enemy's

resources, established the technique of bypassing his strongholds, including finally Rabaul itself, and threw him on the defensive. This book will

be of interest not only to professional officers, but also to a wide variety of

other readers and students.

Washington, D. C.

30 May 1958

R. W. STEPHENS

Maj. Gen., U. S. A. Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

Born in Scotland and a U.S. citizen since 1928, John Miller, jr., was

awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History by the State University of Iowa in 1942. In World War II he saw service overseas with the

U.S. Marine Corps in New Zealand and in the Solomon Islands, where he

participated in the Bougainville operations described in this volume. A

member of the historical staff of the Department of the Army since 1945,

Dr. Miller is the author of Guadalcanal: The First Offensive in the present

series, coauthor of Korea: 1951-1953, and contributor of several chapters

to the 1956 edition of ROTC Manual 145-20, American Military History,

1607-1953. He has written articles and reviews for historical and military

journals, and has taught history at the University of Omaha, the State

University of Iowa, the Graduate School of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and The American University in Washington, D.C.

viii
Preface

The reduction of Rabaul was accomplished by a gigantic double envelopment which required closely co-ordinated land, sea, and air operations by the armed forces of the United States and her Pacific allies. This

volume, like the others in the series, attempts to explain in detail the part

played by the U.S. Army ground forces and to make clear, by summary,

the contributions of all forces and nations.

The CARTWHEEL battles differed from those of the two earlier campaigns, Guadalcanal and Papua, that were directed toward the reduction

of Rabaul. In Guadalcanal and Papua the antagonists, more evenly matched

than in later campaigns, strained themselves to bring relatively small

ground forces to bear on narrow fronts, so that great issues hinged on the

outcome of regimental and battalion actions. A study of those campaigns,

therefore, quite properly focuses on tactics. During the period covered by

this book the Allied commanders could employ superior forces over a vast

area while the Japanese had no recourse but to entrench themselves in an

effort to hold out and inflict as many casualties as possible. This volume

attempts to analyze the techniques by which the Allies employed their

strength to bypass fortified positions and seize weakly defended but strategically important areas, or, in the apt baseball parlance used by General

MacArthur, to "hit 'em where they ain't." It is, therefore, a study in strategy

and high command as well as in tactics.

The willing, able counsel and assistance I have received in preparing

this book have greatly eased my task. Dr. Louis Morton, Chief of the Pacific

Section of the Office of Military History during the period of research and

writing, and my other friends and colleagues in this Office have aided

unstintingly. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Army,

has been a constant source of wise and kindly help. The successive Chiefs

of Military History—Maj. Gens. Orlando Ward, Albert C. Smith, John H.

Stokes, and Richard W. Stephens—and Cols. Thomas J. Sands, George G.

O'Connor, Ridgway P. Smith, Jr., and Seneca W. Foote have appreciated

the nature and worth of history and provided encouragement and powerful

support.

For locating and furnishing to me, without restriction, all the necessary records I wish to make public my gratitude to the efficient records

ix
staff of this Office and of the Military Records Branch, Federal Records

Center, of the U.S. General Services Administration; the Historical Branch,

G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Naval History Division

of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I also owe thanks to Messrs.

Stanley L. Falk and Thomas G. Wilds for performing research and translation in Japanese records, to Mrs. Marguerite Bartz for typing the manuscript, and to the participants named on pp. 386-87 who generously read all

or parts of the manuscript and sent in helpful comments and additional

information.

Final editing was the responsibility of Mrs. Gay Morenus Hammerman,

who also prepared the index. Mrs. Nancy Easterling Payne was copy editor.

Maps were prepared under the supervision of Maj. James F. Holly and

Mr. Elliot Dunay. Miss Margaret E. Tackley selected the photographs and

wrote the captions. To these capable and friendly colleagues who contributed so much—many thanks.

Responsibility for any deficiencies in this book is mine alone.

Washington, D. C.

30 May 1958

JOHN MILLER, JR.

x
Contents

Chapter Page

I. THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND ........ . 1

Early Pacific Strategy .............. . 1

The Casablanca Conference ........... . 6

II. SELECTING OBJECTIVES ............ . 9

Preliminary Theater Planning .......... . 9

The Pacific Military Conference .......... . 11

Preparation of the Directive of 28 March 1943 ..... . 15

III. ELKTON III: THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL .... . 20

The Southwest Pacific Area ............ . 20

The Plan of Maneuver ............. . 25

IV. THE JAPANESE ................ . 32

Japanese Command and Strategy .......... . 32

Japanese Offensives, January-June 1943 ....... . 36

Japanese Strength and Dispositions, 30 June 1943 .... . 45

V. CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC . . 49

CHRONICLE ................ . 4 9

Nassau Bay .................. . 59

VI. TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA ... 67

South Pacific Organization ............ . 67

Preparations and Plans ............. . 70

Secondary Landings .............. . 78

Rendova ................... . 8 5

The Move to Zanana .............. . 92

Rice Anchorage ................ . 94

VII. THE OFFENSIVE STALLS ............ . 97

Japanese Plans ................ . 97

Operations of the Northern Landing Group ...... . 99

Operations of the Southern Landing Group ...... . 106

Casualties .................. . 12 0

Command and Reinforcements .......... . 122

xi
Chapter Page

VIII. GRISWOLD TAKES OVER ............ . 127

The Attack on Bairoko ............. . 127

Pressure on the Japanese ............. . 132

Preparations for the Corps Offensive ........ . 137

IX. XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE ............. . 143

Plans .................... . 14 3

Ilangana and Shimizu Hill: The 43d Division ..... . 146

The Attack Against the Ridges: The 37th Division ... . 149

Capture of the Airfield ............. . 158

X. AFTER MUNDA ................ . 16 5

T h e Airfield ................. . 16 5

Reinforcements ................ . 16 7

Th e Cleanup ................. . 16 9

Vella Lavella: The Bypass ............ . 171

Final Operations ................ . 18 4

XI. THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 189

Plans .................... . 18 9

Allied Air and Naval Preparations ......... . 195

Lae: The Seaborne Invasion ........... . 202

Nadzab: The Airborne Invasion .......... . 207

Strategic Reconsiderations ............ . 21 2

Advance Through the Ramu Valley ......... . 216

The Coastal Advance .............. . 217

XII. THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE ....... . 222

The Decision To Bypass Rabaul .......... . 222

The General Plan ............... . 225

Air Operations in October ............ . 229

Forces and Tactical Plans ............ . 234

Preliminary Landings .............. . 23 9

Seizure of Empress Augusta Bay .......... . 241

XIII. EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD ......... . 251

Air and Surface Action, 1-11 November ....... . 251

Operations Ashore ............... . 25 5

December Attacks Against Rabaul ......... . 269

XIV. CROSSING THE STRAITS ............ . 272

Plans and Preparations ............. . 272

Arawe ................... . 28 2

Cape Gloucester ................ . 28 9

Saidor ................... . 29 5

xii
Chapter Page

XV. EXPANDING INTO THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO . . 306

General Plans ................. . 306

Reducing Rabaul and Kavieng .......... . 309

Seizure of the Green Islands ............ . 312

XVI. ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES ........ . 316

T h e Decision ................. . 31 6

The Reconnaissance in Force ........... . 321

To the Shores of Seeadler Harbour ......... . 332

Lorengau .................. . 33 9

XVII. BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK ....... . 351

Preparations ................. . 35 1

Hill 70 0 ................... . 35 8

Hill 26 0 ................... . 36 4

Action by the Creeks .............. . 371

XVIII. FINALE: EMIRAU ............... . 379

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ............... . 38 3

GLOSSARY ..................... . 39 0

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ............ . 395

INDEX ....................... . 39 9

Tables

No. Page

1. Comparison of Allied Intelligence Estimates With Japanese Strength

and Dispositions, Southeast Area, 30 June 1943 ...... . 47

2. American Casualties on New Georgia .......... . 187

Charts

1. Organization of Forces for CARTWHEEL .......... . 21

2. Estimated Timing and Sequence of CARTWHEEL Operations ... . 28

3. Organization of Japanese Forces, Southeast Area, June 1943 ... 33

4. Southwest Pacific Organization for Woodlark-Kiriwina .... . 52

5. Organization of Principal South Pacific Forces, June 1943 ... . 68

xiii
No. Page

6. Organization of South Pacific Forces for TOENAILS ...... . 74

7. Organization of Attack Force, D Day .......... . 77

8. Western Force on D Day ............... . 79

9. Eastern Force on D Day ............... . 80

10. South Pacific Organization for Vella Lavella Invasion ..... . 176

11. Organization of Northern Force [TF 31], Vella Lavella .... . 177

Maps

1. Pacific Ocean (National Geographic Society Map) . . Inside Back Cover

2. The Pacific Areas, as of 1 August 1942 .......... . 3

3. The CARTWHEEL Area ................ . 23

4. The Wau Area .................. . 37

5. Operation CHRONICLE Area, 30 June 1943 ......... . 50

6. Southern Approaches to Salamaua ............ . 62

7. Landings in New Georgia, 21 June-5 July 1943 ....... . 69

8. Approach to Bairoko, 5-20 July 1943 ........... . 100

9. Drive Towards Munda Point, 2-14 July 1943 ........ . 107

10. Capture of Munda Point, 22 July-4 August 1943 ....... . 145

11. The Cleanup, 5-27 August 1943 ............ . 166

12. The Huon Peninsula and the Straits ........... . 189

13. Opening the Markham Valley, 4-16 September 1943 ..... . 204

14. Capture of Finschhafen, 22 September-20 October 1943 . . . . . 217

15. Bougainville Landings, 27 October-1 November 1943 ..... . 225

16. Situation on Bougainville, 15 December 1943 ........ . 258

17. Arawe Landings, 15 December 1943 ........... . 283

18. Cape Gloucester Landings, 26-29 December 1943 ...... . 292

19. Seeadler Harbour Area ................ . 318

20. Los Negros Assault, 29 February-9 March 1944 ....... . 324

21. Lugos Mission to Lorengau, 15-18 March 1944 ....... . 341

22. Japanese Counterattack on Bougainville, 9-17 March 1944 ... . 353

Illustrations

General Douglas MacArthur ............... . 4

Some Pacific Planners in Conference ............ . 17

Vice Adm. Jinichi Kusaka ................ . 35

General Hitoshi Imamura ................ . 35

Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi ................. . 36

xiv
Page

Lt. Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake .............. . 38

Japanese Troop Transport Under Attack ........... . 40

Brig. Gen. Nathan F. Twining .............. . 51

Troops Disembarking From LCI .............. . 57

Natives Carrying Luggage ................ . 58

Jeep and Trailer Leaving an LST ............. . 59

Clearing Airfield Site With Hand Tools ........... . 60

Airfield at Segi Point .................. . 82

Men of 152d Field Artillery Battalion ............ . 84

Ships Moving Toward Rendova .............. . 86

Aboard the Transport McCawley .............. . 87

Men of 43d Signal Company Wading Ashore ......... . 89

Truck Towing a 155-mm. Howitzer Over Muddy Trail ...... . 93

Maj. Gen. Noboru Sasaki ................ . 98

Troops of the 172d Infantry Wading Across a Creek ....... . 111

Evacuating Casualties, 12 July 1943 ............ . 113

Jeep Trail From Zanana ................. . 115

Infantry Loading on LCP (R)'s .............. . 116

LCM's Approaching Laiana, New Georgia .......... . 117

Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson ............. . 125

Japanese Prisoners Captured Near Laiana Beach ........ . 128

Pillbox Made of Coconut Logs and Coral ........... . 133

Soldiers of the 161st Infantry ............... . 138

Bombing of Munda Airfield, Early Morning ......... . 141

Munda Airfield .................... . 16 0

Reducing an Enemy Pillbox With a Flame Thrower ....... . 162

Light Tanks M3 of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion ...... . 164

Munda Airfield in Operation ............... . 168

4-Ton Truck Stuck in the Mud .............. . 170

37th Division Troops Carrying Weapons and Ammunition . . . . . 171

Warship Firing at Japanese Destroyers ........... . 182

14th New Zealand Brigade Group ............. . 185

Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins ............... . 188

B-24 Over Salamaua .................. . 197

Enemy Aircraft Destroyed on the Ground .......... . 198

B-25 Medium Bombers ................. . 199

Salamaua ...................... . 20 2

Crossing Rain-Swollen Francisco River ............ . 203

Australian Troops Debarking From LST's .......... . 206

C-47 Transport Planes Loaded With Parachute Troops ..... . 208

Airdrop at Nadzab, Morning of 5 September 1943 ....... . 209

Bombing Rabaul ................... . 23 1

B-25's Leaving Bougainville ............... . 233

L t. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift ............. . 23 7

xv
Page

Maj. Gen. Allen H. Turnage ............... . 243

Mount Bagana .................... . 24 5

3d Marines Landing on Cape Torokina ........... . 247

LCVP's on the Beach at Empress Augusta Bay ......... . 249

Aircrewman Wounded in Strike on Rabaul .......... . 254

Amphibian Tractors LVT (1) ............... . 256

Tractor and Trailer in Mud ............... . 257

Soldiers of the 148th Regimental Combat Team ........ . 259

Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. .............. . 262

37th Division Troops .................. . 263

Results of Japanese Bombing of Puruata Island ........ . 264

105-mm. Howitzer ................... . 26 6

4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar ................ . 267

Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon ............... . 268

C-47 Air-Dropping Supplies ............... . 270

B-25's Over Wewak .................. . 281

Alligator Returning to Beach on Arawe ........... . 289

Early Morning Bombardment ............... . 29 1

7th Marines Landing on Narrow Beach ........... . 293

Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey ............... . 297

M10 Motor Carriage Mounting 3-Inch Gun .......... . 301

Japanese Ships Burning at Rabaul ............. . 310

Aboard the Cruiser Phoenix ............... . 325

First Wave of Landing Craft Unloading ........... . 327

2d Lt. Marvin J. Henshaw ................ . 328

Digging a Foxhole Through Coral Rock ........... . 329

Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger ................ . 337

LST's Loaded With Troops and Equipment ......... . 339

Men of the 8th Cavalry ................. . 346

Crossing the Lorengau River ............... . 348

Troop G, 8th Cavalry, Near Number 1 Road ......... . 349

60-mm. Mortar Emplacement ............... . 354

155-mm. Guns of the 3d Marine Defense Battalion ....... . 357

37th Division Men Carrying 5-Gallon Cans of Water ....... . 360

Two Light Tanks M3 of the 754th Tank Battalion ....... . 363

"OP Tree" on Hill 260 ................. . 365

South Knob, Hill 260 .................. . 370

North Knob, Hill 260 .................. . 371

Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler ............... . 376

Tank-Infantry Attack .................. . 37 7

Japanese Pillbox on Fire ................. . 378

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

xvi
CHAPTER I

The Strategic Background

The great Japanese bastion at Rabaul

on New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago posed a double threat to the Allies

from 1942 through the early months of

1944. Bristling with warships and airplanes, it menaced the line of communications from the United States to Australia, and it blocked any Allied advance

along the north coast of New Guinea to

the Philippines. Reduction of Rabaul

was therefore the primary mission, during this period, of the Allied forces of

the South and Southwest Pacific Areas.

In executing this mission these forces

fought a long series of ground, air, and

naval battles spaced across a vast region.

Early Pacific Strategy

Before the Allies could move effectively against Rabaul itself, they had to

clear the way by seizing Guadalcanal

and driving the Japanese out of the Papuan Peninsula. With the successful conclusion of these two campaigns in early

1943, the South and Southwest Pacific

forces completed the first phase of a series

of offensive operations against Rabaul

that had been ordered by the U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff in July 1942. The strategic

purpose of this series was defensive, the

scale limited. The immediate aim of the

Joint Chiefs was, not to defeat the Japanese nation, but to protect Australia and

New Zealand by halting the Japanese

southward advance from Rabaul toward

the air and sea lines of communication

that joined the United States and

Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand.

These orders stemmed from earlier,

more fundamental decisions by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and the U.S.-

British Combined Chiefs of Staff, who

from the very outset had agreed to defeat Germany first and then to concentrate against Japan. Pending Germany's

defeat, the Allies decided on a defensive

attitude in the Pacific. But within this

framework they firmly resolved that Australia, New Zealand, the Hawaiian Islands, and Midway were not to be allowed to fall into Japanese hands.1

Throughout the early months of 1942

the Japanese threat to the Allied line

of communications had mounted stead1

 For complete discussions on the development

of this strategy see Maurice Matloff and Edwin

M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953), Chs. I-VIII;

Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953), Chs. II-IV, IX; and Mark Skinner

Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, 1950), pp. 367-521. All are in

the series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II. See also Louis Morton's volumes on

strategy, command, and logistics in the Pacific, now

in preparation for the same series.
2 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ily. The enemy's capture of Rabaul in

January placed him in an excellent position to move south. Well situated in

relation to Truk and the Palau Islands,

Rabaul possessed a magnificent harbor

as well as sites for several airfields. Only

440 nautical miles southwest of Rabaul

lies the New Guinea coast, while Guadalcanal is but 565 nautical miles to the

southeast. Thus the Japanese could advance southward covered all the way by

land-based bombers. And since none of

the islands in the Bismarck ArchipelagoNew Guinea-Solomons area lay beyond

fighter-plane range of its neighbors, the

Japanese could also cover their advance

with fighters by building airstrips as they

moved along. By May 1942 they had

completed the occupation of the Bismarck Archipelago. They pushed south

to establish bases at Lae and Salamaua

on the northeast coast of New Guinea,

and built airfields in the northern Solomons.

With the Japanese seemingly able to

advance at will, the Joint Chiefs had

been making all possible efforts to protect Hawaii, Midway, New Zealand, and

Australia by holding the lines of communication. Troops to reinforce existing

Allied bases and to establish new bases

were rushed overseas in early 1942. The

32d and 41st Divisions went to Australia.

The 37th Division was dispatched to the

Fijis, the Americal Division to New

Caledonia, and the 147th Infantry to

Tongatabu. Troops of the Americal Division, plus Navy and Marine units, occupied posts in the New Hebrides beginning in March. A Navy and Marine force

held Samoa.

At this time the Japanese planned to

cut the line of communications arid isolate Australia by seizing the Fijis, Samoa,

New Caledonia, and Port Moresby in

New Guinea. But even before they were

turned back from Port Moresby by the

Allies during May, in the naval battle of

the Coral Sea, the Japanese had postponed the attacks against the Fijis, New

Caledonia, and Samoa and had planned

instead the June attempt against Midway. Although they managed to seize a

foothold in the Aleutians, they failed

disastrously at Midway. With four aircraft carriers sunk and hundreds of

planes and pilots lost, the Japanese could

no longer continue their offensives. The

Allies were thus able to take the initiative in the Pacific.

To conduct operations, the Joint

Chiefs organized the Pacific theater along

lines which prevailed for the rest of the

period of active hostilities. By agreement

in March 1942 among the Allied nations

concerned, they set up two huge commands, the Southwest Pacific Area and

the Pacific Ocean Area.2 (Map 2) The

Southwest Pacific included Australia and

adjacent waters, all the Netherlands

Indies except Sumatra, and the Philippine Islands.

The vast Pacific Ocean Areas embraced nearly all the remainder of the

Pacific Ocean. Unlike the Southwest

Pacific, which was one unit, the Pacific

Ocean Areas were divided into three

parts—the South, Central, and North Pacific Areas. The North Pacific included

the ocean reaches north of latitude 42°

2

 The plural is customarily employed for the

Pacific Ocean Areas, although the JCS directive

establishing the command used "Area." See CCS

57/1, Memo, JCS for President, 30 Mar 42, title:

Dirs to CINCPOA and to the Supreme Comdr

SWPA, with Incls.
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 3

MAP 2

north; the Central Pacific lay between

42° north and the Equator.

The South Pacific Area, which lay

south of the Equator, east of longitude

159° east, and west of longitude 110°

west, was an enormous stretch of water

and islands that included but one modern sovereign nation, the Dominion of

New Zealand. Among the islands, many

of them well known to readers of romantic fiction, were the French colony

of New Caledonia, the British-French

Condominium of the New Hebrides,

and the Santa Cruz, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga,

Cook, Society, and Marquesas Islands.

The boundary separating the South and

Southwest Pacific Areas (longitude 159°

east) split the Solomon Islands.

General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme

Commander or, as he came to be called,

Commander in Chief of the Southwest

Pacific Area, with headquarters at Brisbane, Australia, in early 1943, commanded all land, air, and sea forces
4 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, Commander in Chief of the Southwest Pacific

Area, with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific

Ocean Areas. Photograph taken in Brisbane, Australia, March 1944.

assigned by the several Allied governments.3

 This famous and controversial

general was enjoined from directly commanding any national force. In contrast

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who was

concurrently Commander in Chief of

the Pacific Ocean Areas, with authority

over all Allied forces assigned, was also

Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

He exercised direct control over the

North and Central Pacific Areas but in

accordance with the Joint Chiefs' instructions appointed a subordinate as

commander of the South Pacific Area

with headquarters first at Auckland,

New Zealand, and later at Noumea, New

Caledonia. Like MacArthur, this officer

was ineligible to command any national

force directly. Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., the incumbent at the close of

the Guadalcanal Campaign, replaced the

original commander, Vice Adm. Robert

L. Ghormley, on 18 October while the

campaign was reaching its climax.

At the time of the Coral Sea engagement in May, a small Japanese force had

garrisoned Tulagi in the Solomons, and

shortly afterward the Japanese began

3

 "Supreme Commander" was the title used by

CCS 57/1, 30 Mar 42. MacArthur seems to have

preferred "Commander in Chief" and "Supreme

Commander" fell into disuse.
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 5

building an airfield at nearby Lunga

Point on Guadalcanal. Just before they

learned of the Japanese airfield under

construction on Guadalcanal, the Joint

Chiefs capitalized on the Midway victory by ordering the South and Southwest Pacific Areas to begin the advance

against Rabaul. The operations, as set

forth in the Joint Chiefs' orders of 2

July 1942, were divided into three

phases. The first, or "Task One," was

the seizure of Tulagi and Guadalcanal

in the Solomons, and of the Santa Cruz

Islands. Since possession of the Santa

Cruz Islands did not prove necessary,

they were never taken. Task Two included the capture of the remainder of

the Japanese-held Solomons and of Lae,

Salamaua, and other points on the northeast coast of New Guinea in the Southwest Pacific Area. Task Three was the

seizure and occupation of Rabaul itself,

and of adjacent positions.4

Command during Task One, which

would be executed in the South Pacific

Area, was entrusted to the South Pacific

commander. Tasks Two and Three, to

be carried out by South and Southwest

Pacific Area forces entirely within the

Southwest Pacific Area, were to be conducted under MacArthur's command.

When they received the Joint Chiefs'

directive, the commanders of the South

and Southwest Pacific Areas met in Melbourne, Australia, to discuss the three

tasks. They agreed that the advance

should be governed by two basic concepts: the progressive forward movement

of air forces and the isolation of Rabaul

before the final assault. After the initial

lunge into Guadalcanal, there would follow a series of advances to seize air and

naval bases in New Guinea, New Britain,

and the northern Solomons. With these

bases Allied fighter planes and bombers

would be in position to cover the entire Bismarck Archipelago-eastern New

Guinea-Solomons area and isolate Rabaul from the east, west, north, and south

before troops were put ashore to capture

the great base.5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the

reinforced 1st Marine Division as the

landing force for Task One. That unit,

landing on Guadalcanal and Tulagi on

7 August 1942, quickly captured its

major objectives. The Japanese reaction

to the invasion was so violent and resolute, and Allied control over the air and

sea routes so tenuous, that the campaign

did not end then but dragged on for six

months. It was not until February 1943

—after two Army divisions and one more

Marine division had been committed to

the battle and six major naval engagements fought—that Guadalcanal was

completely wrested from the enemy.6

4

 Jt Dir for Offen Opns in SWPA Agreed on by

U.S. CsofS, 2 Jul 42, OPD 381, Sec 2, Case 83.

Unlike other JCS directives, this paper bore no

JCS number. It is also reproduced in JCS 112,

21 Sep 42, title: Mil Sit in the Pac.

5

 Dispatch, CINCSWPA and COMSOPAC to CofS

USA, COMINCH, and CINCPAC, 8 Jul 42, CCR

82s, ABC 370.26 (7-8-42), Sec 1. 6

 For the history of the Guadalcanal Campaign

see John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (Washington, 1949); Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World

War II, Vol. IV, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine

Actions (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1949), and Vol. V, The Struggle for Guadalcanal

(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949); Maj.

John L. Zimmerman, USMCR, The Guadalcanal

Campaign (Washington, 1949); and Wesley Frank

Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air

Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan—August 1942 to July 1944

(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950).
6 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

With the Guadalcanal victory, the Allies

seized the initiative from the Japanese

and halted their southward advance. The

Japanese never attempted the assaults

against the Fijis, Samoa, and New Caledonia.

Just as the Guadalcanal Campaign was

opening, a Japanese force landed at

Buna, on the northeast coast of New

Guinea's Papuan peninsula, and attempted to capture the vital Allied base

at Port Moresby by crossing the towering Owen Stanley Range. But the offensive stalled, and MacArthur was able to

move the 32d U.S. Division, the 7th

Australian Division, and several additional American regimental combat

teams and Australian infantry brigades

against the Japanese beachheads at Buna,

Gona, and Sanananda on the Papuan

peninsula, as well as to establish bases at

Milne Bay at Papua's tip and on Goodenough Island in the D'Entrecasteaux

group.7

At the beginning of 1943, with both

the Guadalcanal and Papuan campaigns

drawing to a successful close, the Allies

could look forward to using Guadalcanal

and Papua as bases for continuing the

advance against Rabaul. In the Central

Pacific, Admiral Nimitz could not undertake any offensive westward from Pearl

Harbor and Midway until the line of

communications to Australia was absolutely secure. At this time both Halsey

and MacArthur were preparing plans for

their campaigns against Rabaul, but had

not yet submitted them to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

The Casablanca Conference

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

not yet received detailed plans for Rabaul, they were well aware of the importance of the operations in the South

and Southwest Pacific Areas. These operations naturally had to be considered

in the light of global strategy and reviewed by the U.S.-British Combined

Chiefs of Staff.8

By the end of 1942, the Joint Chiefs

were concluding their study of Allied

objectives for the year 1943. President

Roosevelt and the service chiefs were

then preparing to meet at Casablanca

in French Morocco with Prime Minister

Churchill and the British Chiefs in order

to explore the problem fully and determine Allied objectives for the year. No

final plan for the defeat of Japan had

been prepared but the subject was being

studied in Washington.9 Also under discussion were the question of advancing

against Japan through the North Pacific

7

 For a detailed discussion of the war in the

Southwest Pacific, 1942-43, see Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957).

8

 See Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive,

pp. 172-73; Min, JCS mtg, 22 Dec 42; Min, JPS

mtg, 16 Sep 42; JCS 112/1, 14 Oct 42; title: Mil Sit

in the Pac. For a more detailed discussion see Ray

S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 215-19,

and Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins:

An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers,

1948), Ch. XXVII. See also John Miller, jr., "The

Casablanca Conference and Pacific strategy," Military Affairs, XIII (Winter 1949), 4.

Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based

on the proceedings and papers of the Casablanca

Conference which are filed in regular sequence

with the CCS and JCS minutes and papers. They

were also printed and bound, along with the proceedings of the meetings attended by the President

and Prime Minister, in a useful separate volume—

Casablanca Conference: Papers and Minutes of

Meetings. 9

 JPS 67/2, 4 Jan 43, title: Proposed Dir for a

Campaign Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 7

and the possibility of conducting operations in Burma to reopen the road to

China.10

Pacific operations, and the emphasis

and support that the advance on Rabaul

would receive, were significantly affected

by decisions made at Casablanca. During

the ten-day conference that began on 14

January the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff

carefully weighed their strategic ends,

apportioned the limited means available

to accomplish them, and so determined

Allied courses of action for 1943.

The Americans and British who met

at Casablanca agreed on general objectives, but their plans differed in several

important respects. The Americans

wished the Allies to conduct a strategic

offensive directly against Germany and

to aid the Soviet Union, but they also

favored strong action in the Pacific and

Far East. It was imperative, in their view,

to guarantee the security of Allied lines

of communication there and to break the

enemy hold on positions that threatened

them. Convinced that China had to be

kept in the war, they recommended that

the British, with the aid of American

ships and landing craft, recapture Burma

so that the Burma Road could be reopened and the Allies could send more

supplies to bolster Generalissimo Chiang

Kai-shek's armies. They wished to keep

the initiative in the Southwest and South

Pacific, to inflict heavy losses on the Japanese, and eventually to use Rabaul and

nearby positions as bases for further

advances. Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief

of Naval Operations, expressed the hope

that 30 percent of Allied military power

could be deployed against the Japanese

instead of the 15 percent which he estimated was then being used.

The British understandably shied

away from enlarging the scope of Allied

action in the Pacific. With the Germans

right across the Channel from England,

the British stressed the importance of

concentrating against Germany first.

While admitting the necessity for retaking Burma, they strongly emphasized the

importance of aiding the Soviet Union.

They promised to deploy their entire

strength against Japan after the defeat

of Germany, and suggested that the Japanese should meanwhile be contained by

limited offensives. At the same time the

British desired to extend the scope of

Allied operations in the Mediterranean.

General George C. Marshall, Chief of

Staff, and Admiral King opposed what

Marshall called "interminable operations in the Mediterranean." They advocated maintaining constant, unremitting pressure against the Japanese to prevent them from digging in and consolidating their gains. Warning that the

American people would not stand for another Bataan, Marshall argued that sufficient resources must be kept in the

Pacific; otherwise "a situation might

arise in the Pacific at any time that would

necessitate the United States regretfully

withdrawing from the commitments in

the European Theatre."

 11

 Admiral King,

pointing out the strategic importance of

an advance across the Central Pacific to

the Philippines, raised the question of

where to go after Rabaul was captured.

The British did not wish to make spe- 10

 Min, JPS mtgs, 2 and 9 Dec 42; Min, JCS

mtgs, 25 Aug, 15 Sep, and 15 Dec 42, and 5 Jan 43;

Min, CCS mtg, 6 Nov 42. 11

 Min, CCS mtg, 17 Jan 43.
8 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

cific commitments for operations beyond

Rabaul but suggested a meeting after its

capture to decide the question.

By 23 January Americans and British

had reconciled their differences over strategic objectives for 1943. They agreed to

secure the sea communications in the

Atlantic, to move supplies to the Soviet

Union, to take Sicily, to continue their

build-up of forces in Britain for the invasion of northern France, and—a decision that was to have a marked effect

on Pacific operations—to bomb Germany

heavily in the Combined Bomber Offensive that was to be launched by midsummer 1943. To make sure that none

of these undertakings would be jeopardized by the need for diverting strength

to prevent disaster in the Pacific, adequate forces would be maintained in the

Pacific and Far East. What was considered "adequate" was not defined.

The Combined Chiefs agreed in principle that Burma was to be recaptured

by the British and that they would meet

later in the year to make final decisions.

In the Pacific the Allies were to maintain constant pressure on Japan with the

purpose of retaining the initiative and

getting into position for a full-scale offensive once Germany had surrendered.

Specifically, the Allies intended to capture Rabaul, make secure the Aleutians,

and advance west through the Gilberts

and Marshalls in the Central Pacific

toward Truk and the Marianas. The

Central Pacific advances were supposed

to follow the capture of Rabaul.
CHAPTER II

Selecting Objectives

With Allied strategic objectives for

1943 determined at Casablanca, the next

task facing the Army and Navy commanders in Washington and in the Pacific was the selection of exact tactical

objectives. Two considerations would be

paramount in making a choice: the military value of the objectives, and the resources that would be available. The

process of selection was not completed

until a full-dress conference involving

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff

Planners, and representatives of all the

Pacific commands had met in Washington.1

 Such a conference was made necessary by the large disparity between the

size of the forces General MacArthur

asked for to take his objectives and the

size of the forces that were actually available.

Preliminary Theater Planning

General MacArthur's Plans

In the Southwest Pacific, General MacArthur had begun planning for the offensive against Rabaul at an early date.

His plans for Tasks Two and Three—

mutually supporting advances along two

axes, culminating in a converging attack

against Rabaul—were the same in early

January 1943 as those outlined in July

of the previous year. But his forces could

not start Task Two until the Allies had

successfully completed the Guadalcanal

and Papuan campaigns in the first two

months of 1943. There were not enough

ground troops to undertake any offensive

moves immediately, MacArthur reported, and there were far from enough

air forces to conduct the campaigns.2

In order to advance against Rabaul in

one continuous movement, MacArthur

wished to assemble all the necessary

forces before starting the offensive, and

substantial reinforcements would be required. In both South and Southwest

Pacific Areas there were troops equivalent to fifteen and two-thirds American,

New Zealand, and Australian divisions,

but not all were trained and equipped

for offensive action. Of the six trained

Southwest Pacific divisions, five would be

resting and reorganizing for some time

to come, after fighting in Guadalcanal,

Papua, and the Middle East. There were

seven trained divisions—six American

and one New Zealand—as well as some

separate infantry and cavalry regiments

in the South Pacific. Three of the divisions and one regiment had seen service on Guadalcanal and were enjoying

1

 See below, pp. 11-15.

2

 Rad to MacArthur, 7 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2273;

Rad to MacArthur, 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2833; Rad

from MacArthur, 10 Jan 43, CM-IN 4574.
10 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

a well-deserved rest. The equivalent

therefore of only five divisions plus several separate regiments could be counted

as ready for immediate use.

In naval strength, MacArthur was limited to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. He had no carriers, no battleships,

and few cargo ships, transports, and

landing craft. The greater part of the

Pacific Fleet, including aircraft carriers,

battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, was

operating in the South Pacific Area.

Both areas boasted a total air strength

of about 1,850 land-based planes of all

types—bombers, fighters, and cargo

planes. These planes came from the U.S.

Army Air Forces, the U.S. Navy, the

U.S. Marine Corps, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force.3

At this time General MacArthur was

looking forward to targets well beyond

Rabaul; he had set his sights on the

Philippine Islands. In February 1943

he and his staff concluded that the completion of the campaign against Rabaul

could secure for the Allies "important,

but not decisive advantages." These advantages would certainly aid future operations but, except for the destruction of

precious shipping, would do little damage to Japan's main economic structure.

Since the Netherlands Indies contained

the great economic wealth, especially oil,

taken by Japan in 1941 and 1942, a

decisive blow could be struck, MacArthur reasoned, by cutting the lines of

communication between Japan and the

Indies. As the Philippine Islands lay

squarely athwart all sea and air routes

between Japan and the Indies, the Allies

could cut them by establishing air and

naval bases in the Philippines. General

MacArthur concluded that he should

move to the Philippines by advancing

westward along New Guinea's north

coast, then swinging northwest through

the intermediate islands into the Philippines. The advance along the New

Guinea coast might be started about the

time that the siege of Rabaul began, but

could not safely start until Rabaul was

neutralized lest ships and planes based

there harry or obstruct the advance.4

This plan for advancing to the Philippines, called RENO, had not yet been

transmitted to Washington. It looked far

into the future. There were not enough

forces to inaugurate the Rabaul plan,

ELKTON. Certainly not enough were

available to begin RENO.

Admiral Halsey's Plan

In the South Pacific, Admiral Halsey

looked on Munda Point in New Georgia

as the most likely first objective for his

forces under Task Two.5 The Japanese

had started an airfield at the Australian

Methodist Mission on Munda in November 1942 when their attempts to recapture Henderson Field on Guadalcanal

had faltered. The new field was intended

to serve as an advanced air base in an3

 Information on strength and plans at this time

is drawn from GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan for the

Seizure and Occupation of the New Britain—New

Guinea-New Ireland Area, 12 and 28 Feb 43, and

from U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command (Washington, 1947), p. 18. The latter is an

almost verbatim copy of a series of monographs prepared during and immediately after the war by the

Historical Section, G-3, GHQ, SWPA.

4

 GHQ SWPA, Estimate of the Situation and

Rough Draft, RENO Plan, 25 Feb 43, OCMH. 5

 The name "Munda" is apparently a phonetic

rendition of a native term rather than a reflection

of Caesar's glory.
SELECTING OBJECTIVES 11

other attempt to retake Henderson Field

in 1943.

The Japanese exhibited skill and cunning in concealing their activities at

Munda. Even though the Allies had long

known that Munda Point was being used

as a staging area, they were not sure that

an airfield was under construction until

3 December. The Japanese had rigged

cables to the tops of the palm trees, then

cut the trunks away and left the cables

holding up the treetops. Thus hidden

from aerial observation, they built their

runway and then cut down the camouflage. The day they completed the runway, 15 December 1942, the Japanese

decided to build a second airfield at Vila

on nearby Kolombangara.6 The airfields

at Munda and Vila, only 180 nautical

miles from Henderson Field, presented

a serious threat to the Allied positions in

the Solomons and New Hebrides.

In Allied hands, Munda would be

invaluable for continuing the advance

against Rabaul, and Admiral Halsey's

forces pressed on. They capped their

success on Guadalcanal with the bloodless seizure of the Russell Islands on 21

February 1943. This shortened the airline distance to Munda by sixty-five

miles and provided torpedo boat and

landing craft bases to assist in the capture

of all New Georgia, an operation then

being planned by Halsey and his subordinates.

Munda Point was, physically, one of

the best sites for an air base in the Solomon Islands. Strategically, it was well

situated to support an advance to Bougainville, which would be necessary if

South Pacific aircraft were to strike

Rabaul effectively.7 South Pacific forces

would have to use aircraft carriers to

advance directly from Henderson Field

to Bougainville, but possession of Munda

Point would enable them to advance

progressively under cover of land-based

fighter planes and bombers and obviate

the need to use precious carriers close

to islands that were studded with enemy

airfields.8

The Pacific Military Conference

Neither MacArthur nor Halsey could

start his offensive yet. They had not yet

agreed on a co-ordinated plan, and they

lacked enough forces to begin. Allotment of forces would depend on decisions by the Joint and Combined Chiefs

of Staff, who at Casablanca had decided

on the program for 1943 without knowing how many troops, planes, and ships

would be needed for Rabaul.

Shortly before leaving Washington for

Casablanca, the Joint Chiefs had instructed MacArthur to submit detailed

plans for carrying out their directive of

2 July 1942 and authorized him to exchange views with Nimitz and Halsey.

They suggested personal meetings by the

6

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, I, Japanese

Monogr No. 48 (OCMH) in the series Japanese

Studies in World War II, 47, 52; ONI USN, Combat

Narratives: Solomon Islands Campaign, X, Operations in the New Georgia Area, 21 June-5 August

1943 [Washington, 1944], 1-2.

7

 From Henderson Field to the Shortland Islands

is 285 nautical miles, to Kahili, 300 miles, to Buka

Passage, 363 miles. From Munda, which is within

fighter range of Henderson and the Russells, to the

Shortlands is 100 nautical miles, to Kahili, 125

miles, to Buka Passage, 234 miles, and to Rabaul,

394 miles. 8

 Adm William F. Halsey, Jr., Narrative Account

of the South Pacific Campaign, 3 Sep 44, OCMH;

Lt Gen Millard F. Harmon, The Army in the South

Pacific, 6 Jun 44, p. 7, OCMH; Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey and Lt Comdr J. Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York: Whittlesey House,

1947), p. 154.
12 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

commanders or by their staffs to prepare

a broad plan that would enable the Joint

Chiefs to give careful consideration to

such matters as timing, reinforcement,

supply, and the transfer of command

over Tasks Two and Three to MacArthur.9

 Maintaining that it was inconvenient for high commanders to undertake long journeys away from their headquarters, MacArthur radioed his ideas

for Tasks Two and Three to Nimitz and

Halsey. On 11 February Halsey sent his

deputy commander, Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson, to Brisbane to begin

a co-ordinated plan.10

Shortly thereafter MacArthur asked

the Joint Chiefs for permission to send

his chief of staff and several other officers

to Washington to explain his plans. The

Joint Chiefs approved, but stipulated

that representatives from Halsey's and

Nimitz' areas should also come for a general discussion of Pacific problems.11

 The

delegates reached Washington on 10

March and two days later met with Admiral King and various officers from the

Army and Navy planning and logistical

staffs.12

Thus began the series of meetings,

generally known as the Pacific Military

Conference, which were to produce a

new directive for operations. This conference constituted an excellent example

of the detailed and undramatic, but absolutely essential, spadework that had

to precede major decisions affecting the

course of the war in the Pacific.

The ELKTON Plan

After Admiral King opened the first

session on 12 March with a strategic

review of the world situation, Maj. Gen.

Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's

chief of staff, presented the ELKTON plan

9

 Rad to MacArthur, 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2833;

Rad to Maj Gen Rush B. Lincoln, New Caledonia

(to be passed to Halsey), 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2834;

Rad to Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, Hawaii (to be

passed to Nimitz), 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2835; Rad

to MacArthur, 11 Jan 43, CM-OUT 3664. 10

 Rad from MacArthur, 27 Jan 43, CM-IN 12553;

Rad from MacArthur, 11 Feb 43, CM-IN 5610;

Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific

Force, War Diary: 1 January 1943-30 June 1944

(hereafter cited as COMSOPAC War Diary), 11-

12, 14-15 Feb 43 entries. 11

 Rad from MacArthur, 15 Feb 43, CM-IN 7418;

Rads to MacArthur, 16 Feb 43, CM-OUT 5656 and

CM-OUT 5660; Rads to Harmon (for Halsey), 16

Feb 43, CM-OUT 5658 and CM-OUT 5661; Rads

to Emmons (for Nimitz), 16 Feb 43, CM-OUT 5657

and CM-OUT 5659. The Pacific representatives

timed their trip to accompany Brig. Gen. Albert C.

Wedemeyer to Washington. Wedemeyer, a member

of the Operations Division of the War Department

General Staff and of the Joint and Combined Staff

Planners, visited the Southwest Pacific to explain

the Casablanca decisions to MacArthur and to become better acquainted with the area.

12

 To represent him, Halsey had selected General

Harmon, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces

in the South Pacific Area; Maj. Gen. Nathan F.

Twining, commanding the Thirteenth Air Force;

and two staff officers, Brig. Gen. Dewitt Peck,

USMC, his war plans officer, and Capt. Miles R.

Browning, USN, his chief of staff. MacArthur sent

Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, his chief of staff;

Brig. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, his operations

officer; and Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, Commander, Allied Air Forces, SWPA. Representing

Nimitz were his deputy and chief of staff, Vice Adm.

Raymond A. Spruance, General Emmons, and Capt.

Forrest P. Sherman. Present at the first meeting,

besides King and the Pacific delegates, were Lt.

Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff

of the Army; Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, of the

Joint Strategic Survey Committee; Maj. Gen. George

E. Stratemeyer, Chief of the Air Staff; Maj. Gen.

Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; Maj.

Gens. LeRoy Lutes and Lucius D. Clay, of Headquarters, Army Service Forces; Vice Adm. Russell

Willson, of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee;

Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.; and Wedemeyer.
SELECTING OBJECTIVES 13

to the conference.13 This plan, bearing

the date 28 February 1943, was a revision of the first ELKTON plan, which

was dated 12 February, and prescribed

the same general scheme of maneuver

as MacArthur's earlier plans for the reduction of Rabaul. MacArthur had prepared it on the assumption that he would

control both the Southwest and South

Pacific forces for Tasks Two and Three,

for the Joint Chiefs' directive had stated

explicitly that these would be conducted

under his command. Halsey, according

to MacArthur, had already assented to

ELKTON.

ELKTON'S intelligence estimate pointed

out that the Japanese generally controlled the north coast of New Guinea

northwest of Buna, as well as New Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons

northwest of Guadalcanal. Japanese defenses were concentrated, as were Allied

holdings in the region, in the vicinity of

airfields. Except for the perimeters

around the airfields and naval bases, the

land areas were pretty well unoccupied.

Between 79,000 and 94,000 Japanese

troops were thought to be stationed in

the New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago-Solomons area. Enemy air strength

was estimated at 383 land-based planes,

while 4 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers,

14 cruisers, 11 seaplane tenders, about

40 destroyers, numerous auxiliaries, and

about 50 merchant ships of 3,000 tons or

over were on hand for operations. It

was expected that the Japanese, if attacked, could be immediately reinforced

by 10,000 to 12,000 troops and about 250

planes as well as major portions of the

Combined Fleet from the Netherlands

Indies, Japanese home waters, and the

Philippines Islands. In six months, 615

more aircraft could be committed, and

10 or 15 divisions might be dispatched if

shipping was available.

Having described the forbidding nature of the enemy stronghold, General

Sutherland proceeded, in his presentation of the ELKTON plan, to outline the

contemplated Allied moves. The execution of Tasks Two and Three would require mutually supporting, co-ordinated

advances along two lines: one, by Southwest Pacific forces in the west, from New

Guinea to New Britain; the other, by

South Pacific forces in the east, through

the Solomons. ELKTON broke Tasks Two

and Three into five operations:

1. Seizure of airdromes on the Huon

Peninsula of New Guinea to provide air

support for operations against New

Britain;

2. Seizure of Munda Point as well as

other airdromes on New Georgia to

cover operations against New Ireland

in the Bismarck Archipelago and the

remainder of the Solomons;

3. Seizure of airdromes on New Britain and Bougainville to support operations against Rabaul and Kavieng in

New Ireland;

4. Capture of Kavieng and the isolation of Rabaul, although it was considered possible that Kavieng might be

taken after Rabaul;

5. Capture of Rabaul.

The timing of these missions was not

rigidly fixed, nor was there an estimate

of the time required to carry them out.

13

 Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar 43, 1st mtg, 12

Mar 43. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (New

York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), devotes one

chapter (VIII) to this conference.
14 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Large forces, assembled in advance,

were required to execute the five operations of ELKTON—and there was the rub

from the point of view of the Washington planners faced with global responsibilities. They listened as Sutherland read

a detailed accounting of forces on hand

and forces requested. The plan, in brief,

called for five additional divisions, fortyfive additional air groups, or about twice

the 1,850 land-based planes then on

hand, and an unspecified number of warships, transports, cargo ships, and landing craft sufficient to mount and support

all the operations.14

The official records do not disclose

with what emotions the officers from the

various Washington agencies received

the information about the necessary reinforcements, but it is not difficult to

imagine that some were surprised. At

Casablanca the Americans had assumed

the capture of Rabaul in 1943 as a matter of course, and had confidently discussed the possibility of advancing beyond Rabaul.

The Pacific delegates learned immediately that there was virtually no chance

for them to get all the reinforcements

that they wanted.15 It was possible to

effect some increases in the number of

aircraft, but to give General MacArthur

everything he asked would have cut too

deeply into the bomber offensive against

Germany. There were several trained

divisions available in the United States,

but there were not enough transports

to ship them overseas in time, or to supply them after their arrival. Everyone at

the conference was convinced of the

necessity for offensive operations, but it

was recognized that the operations would

be limited by the available means. Admiral Halsey's representatives, Lt. Gen.

Millard F. Harmon of the Army, Brig.

Gen. Dewitt Peck of the Marine Corps,

and Capt. Miles R. Browning of the

Navy, endorsed the ELKTON plan, but

some of the Navy planners in Washington were dubious of its value. They

believed it would tie up too many ships

and too many troops for too long a time,

and would not achieve decisive results.

The Washington planners informed the

Pacific representatives that only two or

three more divisions and a few more

planes could be sent overseas.16

The solution therefore was to replace

the ambitious directive of 2 July 1942

with something more realistic. Before

deciding on a new directive, the Joint

Chiefs instructed the Pacific delegates to

decide what offensive operations they

thought could be undertaken in 1943

with the allotted forces. It was understood that the Pacific commanders would

not be committed by their subordinates'

recommendations.17

The Pacific delegates answered

promptly. They stated that the South

and Southwest Pacific forces would be

able to advance as far as the southeast

part of Bougainville, seize eastern New

Guinea up to Madang, extend to Woodlark and Kiriwina in the Trobriand

Islands, and advance to Cape Gloucester

14

 GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan ... . 28 Feb 43. 15

 Rad, Sutherland to MacArthur, 12 Mar 43,

CM-OUT 1930.

16

 For the detailed record of debate and discussion at the various meetings of the Pacific Military

Conference, see Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar

43, with Inclosures and Annexes. See below, Bibliographical Note. 17

 Min, JCS mtg, 19 Mar 43.
SELECTING OBJECTIVES 15

in western New Britain. These operations were essentially the second task of

the directive of 2 July 1942.18 With this

statement, the Pacific Military Conference as such came to a close, although

the Pacific representatives remained in

Washington a few days longer at the

request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Preparation of the Directive of

28 March 1943

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having approved the additional Pacific reinforcements and heard the opinions of the

Pacific delegates, immediately accepted

the proposal that South and Southwest

Pacific operations in 1943 be limited

to Task Two, and turned to consideration of new orders for Halsey and MacArthur.19

Neither the limitation of operations

to Task Two nor the inclusion of Woodlark and Kiriwina was an entirely new

idea. The Joint U.S. Strategic Committee, commissioned by the Joint Staff

Planners to prepare a plan for the defeat

of Japan, in February had considered

the means for, and limiting factors affecting, the operations planned at Casablanca, and recommended that only

Task Two be carried out in 1943. The

committee felt that the capture of Rabaul, which could not be undertaken

until fairly late in 1943, might interfere

with the recapture of Burma, an operation which was considered to be on a

priority with the advance through the

Central Pacific and the support of

China. The Strategic Committee had

also recommended capture of Woodlark

and Kiriwina.20

Seizure of these islands would bring

Rabaul and the northern Solomons

within range of fighters and medium

bombers, and would thus compensate

for the absence of enough heavy

bombers. The islands, which lie outside

the bad weather belt that frequently

blankets the southeast tip of New

Guinea, would also serve as staging bases

for the rapid switching of air units

between the South and Southwest Pacific. In December of the previous year,

Admiral Halsey had suggested to MacArthur the establishment of an air base

at Woodlark or Kiriwina, and offered

to furnish some of the necessary troops.

This project had the approval of Marshall and King.21

 The seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina was included as part

of Plan ELKTON of 12 February, but had

18

 Memo by Reps of the Pac Areas, in JCS 238/2,

21 Mar 43. 19 Min, JCS mtg, 21 Mar 43.

20

 Memo, Secretariat JUSSC for Secretariat JPS,

13 Feb 43, sub: Opns in S and SW Pac Areas During

1943 and Their Relation to the Concept of Mil

Strategy for 1943 as Set Forth in the Anfa Papers,

with Incls A and B, attached to JPS 67/2, 4 Jan 43,

title: Proposed Dir for a Campaign Plan for the

Defeat of Japan, ABC 381 Japan (8-27-42), Sec 1.

This paper is also filed as JPS 67/3, 15 Feb 43,

title: Opns in S and SW Pac in 1943. The Casablanca Conference was held at Anfa and is often

referred to as the Anfa Conference, although its

code name was SYMBOL. The Joint U.S. Strategic

Committee was renamed the Joint War Plans Committee in March 1943, and should not be confused

with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which

was composed of senior officers who advised on

broad strategic matters. 2 1

 See COMSOPA C to COMSOWESPA C

[CINCSWPA] , 17 Dec 42; COMINC H to

COMSOPAC, 18 Dec 42; Memo, King for Marshall,

20 Feb 43, sub: Instal of Airstrips on Kiriwina

Island or Woodlark Island; Memo, Marshall for

King, 22 Feb 43, same sub. All in CNO File A 16-3

(4) No. 1, Warfare Opns, SWPA, 1943, and made

available by Lt. Grace P. Hays, USN, of the Hist

Sec, JCS. See also Halsey and Bryan, Admiral

Halsey's Story, p. 154.
16 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

been omitted from the version of ELKTON which Sutherland brought to Washington.

Timing

Although the Joint Chiefs had accepted the delegates' proposals in principle, they were concerned about the

timing of operations. They brought the

Pacific representatives and some of the

Joint Planners into their meeting on

Sunday morning, 21 March, to help settle matters.

The Southwest Pacific delegates argued that lack of adequate forces would

keep the South Pacific from beginning

operations against New Georgia and

southern Bougainville until after the

Southwest Pacific had seized the Huon

Peninsula in New Guinea, an operation

that would take place about August.

This sequence was approximately that

set forth in the ELKTON plan. The South

Pacific delegates, especially Harmon, felt

that it would be better to move against

New Georgia before the capture of the

Huon Peninsula. A reasonable margin

of safety would require that enough

strength be mustered for a drive right

through to Bougainville after Munda's

capture.

The views of the Southwest Pacific

delegates on New Georgia are somewhat

curious. At an early meeting of the conference, Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke,

Jr., of Admiral King's staff, had asked

Sutherland for MacArthur's opinion on

the operation against Munda for which

the South Pacific was then preparing.

Sutherland replied that his chief would

be unable to make recommendations

until he had been "apprised" of the

operations, the forces involved, and the

amount of assistance he would be expected to contribute.22

Admiral King was disturbed by the

idea of postponing action in the Solomons, for the Japanese fleet was no

longer pinned down by the Guadalcanal Campaign. If the Solomon operations were to be postponed, he suggested,

the American fleet units assigned to the

South Pacific might be more profitably

employed elsewhere, perhaps in the Central Pacific. The Joint Chiefs directed

the Joint Planners to draft a plan, but

did not immediately attempt to decide

on the timing of operations.23 In the

message the Joint Chiefs sent to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Halsey about the

additional reinforcements, they stated

that "prevailing opinion" in Washington favored launching the invasion of

Munda after the establishment of an air

base at Woodlark and possibly after the

conclusion of the planned advance in

New Guinea.

MacArthur replied at once to express

his vigorous opposition to what he, Sutherland, and Kenney called "divergent

action," that is, concurrent operations

22

 Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar 43, 3d mtg, 13

Mar 43. It is difficult to comprehend Sutherland's

statement as reported in the official record.

MacArthur's message regarding Wilkinson's visit to

Brisbane indicated that an exchange of views had

taken place. According to the COMSOPAC War

Diary, 4 March 1943 entry, MacArthur was informed on 4 March that South Pacific headquarters

hoped to seize New Georgia about 10 April. Halsey

discussed the action with Sutherland and Kenney

at his headquarters in Noumea, New Caledonia,

and made it clear that MacArthur would not be

asked for any assistance except for limited air action against the Shortland Islands. Finally, the 28

February ELKTON, which Sutherland read to the

conference, specifically called for an invasion of

New Georgia and made an estimate of the forces

that would be needed. 23

 Min, JCS mtg, 21 Mar 43.
SELECTING OBJECTIVES 17

SOME PACIFIC PLANNERS IN CONFERENCE. From left, Capt. Cato D. Glover, Jr.,

Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, Lt. Gen. Richard K.

Sutherland, Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, and Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin. Photograph taken in Brisbane, Australia, March 1944.

against New Georgia and New Guinea

by the South and Southwest Pacific

Areas. Neither area, he asserted, would

be strong enough for independent action. The South Pacific would need

strong air support from its neighbor

in the New Georgia action, and there

simply were not enough planes. He

therefore recommended that the New

Georgia invasion be postponed at least

until the seizure of the Lae-Madang

area guaranteed control of the Vitiaz

Strait between the Huon Peninsula and

western New Britain, prevented the

Japanese from moving reinforcements

to Rabaul from the west, and enabled

the Southwest Pacific to support and

protect its neighbor by bombing Rabaul

heavily. Then New Georgia could be

taken, and the South and Southwest

Pacific Areas, now mutually supporting,

could begin the reduction of Rabaul.24

The question of timing was never

finally determined by the Joint Chiefs.

Speaking at their meeting on 28 March

when the Joint Planners' draft of a new

directive for Halsey and MacArthur was

considered, King again emphasized the

dangers of allowing the South Pacific to

stand idly by while waiting for the

northeast New Guinea coast to be

24

 Rad from MacArthur, 25 Mar 43, CM-IN

13461; Comments by Gen Kenney on draft MS of

this volume, attached to Ltr, Gen Kenney to Maj

Gen Albert C. Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 11 Nov

53, no sub, OCMH.
18 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

cleared. Marshall, whose talents included

great skill at reconciling divergent

points of view, offered the opinion that

both MacArthur and Halsey would take

every advantage to press forward whenever Japanese resistance was weak. The

Japanese would find themselves in a difficult position. If they strengthened the

Solomons at the expense of New Guinea

MacArthur could move forward, and

Halsey could take advantage of any shifts

of troops to New Guinea. Halsey himself, although willing to postpone the

advance against New Georgia until after

Woodlark and Kiriwina were taken, had

stated that he would not remain idle.

He intended to hit the Japanese with

land-based aircraft and to be prepared

to move into New Georgia and southern

Bougainville if the Japanese weakened

their defenses to such an extent that he

could advance without precipitating a

major engagement. King withdrew his

objections, subject to the proviso that

MacArthur submit detailed plans showing timing and sequence of operations

and the composition of task forces.25

Command

One final question, command, remained to be decided before the Joint

Chiefs could issue a new directive. This

question was settled fairly quickly.26 The

directive of 2 July 1942 had provided

that Tasks Two and Three would be

under MacArthur's direction. This principle continued to be accepted by the

Joint Chiefs without serious challenge.

Both the Army and the Navy had been

arguing somewhat heatedly over the

question of a unified command for the

entire Pacific, but the warmth of their

debate did not seriously interfere with

the preparation of the new directive.

The possibility of mutual co-operation

by Halsey and MacArthur was rejected.

Some naval officers, including King, suggested that since Halsey would be operating west of the line of demarcation

(longitude 159° east), it should be moved

westward again, but did not press the

point.27 It was agreed that MacArthur

would command the operations by the

Southwest Pacific forces, and that Halsey's operations with South Pacific forces

in the Solomons would be under MacArthur's "general directives."

One particularly important aspect of

the command question related to the

Pacific Fleet units that would take part

in the operations. Admiral King always

opposed any tendency to break up the

Pacific Fleet by permanently assigning

its units to any particular area, for then

the fleet would lose part of its striking

power as well as strategic and tactical

mobility. For these reasons King had

previously proposed that Nimitz' authority be extended to include the waters

of the Southwest Pacific Area, but had

apparently never insisted on this as a

solution. The Joint Chiefs settled the

matter on 28 March by agreeing that all

units of the Pacific Ocean Areas other

than those assigned by the Joint Chiefs

to task forces engaged in the operations

would remain under Nimitz' general

control. This meant that MacArthur

25

 Min, JCS mtg, 28 Mar 43; COMSOPAC War

Diary, 28 Mar 43 entry. 26

 But see Rad, Sutherland to MacArthur, 25 Mar

43, CM-OUT 9499.

27

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 213, indicates that discussions of this point in and out of

the conference room were heated. The minutes do

not yield much information about the emotions of

the protagonists.
SELECTING OBJECTIVES 19

would exercise strategic direction only

over Halsey's forces that were engaged

in the Solomons west of longitude 159°

east, and that Halsey's other forces, as

well as Pacific Fleet units not assigned

by the Joint Chiefs, would remain under

Nimitz.28 With the question of command

settled and the problem of timing left

largely to the commanders' discretion,

the Joint Chiefs on 28 March approved

a directive providing for offensive operations by MacArthur and Halsey in

1943.29

The 28 March Directive

Brief crisp orders were dispatched to

Halsey, Nimitz, and MacArthur on 28

March. The Joint Chiefs canceled their

directive of 2 July 1942. They ordered

MacArthur and Halsey to establish airfields on Woodlark and Kiriwina, to

seize the Lae-Salamaua-FinschhafenMadang area of New Guinea and occupy

western New Britain, and to seize and

occupy the Solomon Islands as far as

southern Bougainville. The operations

were intended to inflict losses on the

Japanese, to deny the target areas to

the enemy, to contain Japanese forces

in the Pacific by retaining the initiative,

and to prepare for the ultimate seizure

of the Bismarck Archipelago. As previously indicated, operations would be

conducted under MacArthur's command. The advances in the Solomons

were to be under the direct command

of Halsey, who would operate under

MacArthur's strategic direction. Except

for those units assigned by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to task forces engaged in

these campaigns, all elements of the Pacific Ocean Areas would remain under

Nimitz. MacArthur was directed to submit detailed plans including the composition of task forces and sequence and

timing of operations.30

With this directive, the Joint Chiefs

set the program for 1943 in the South

and Southwest Pacific. There can be no

doubt that they were disappointed by

their inability to approach the goals set

so freely at Casablanca, but the 28 March

directive possessed the virtue of being

based on assumptions that were realistic,

even pessimistic. The defined objectives

were believed to be surely attainable.

28

 The command question is treated in the following documents: Ltr, COMINCH-CNO [King]

to CofS USA [Marshall], 6 Jan 43, no sub, included in JCS 112/1, 14 Oct 42, title: Mil Sit in

the Pac, ABC 370.26 (7-8-42), Sec 1; Memo, Gen

Handy for Capt Connolly, Naval War Plans Div,

29 Dec 42, no sub, OPD 384 PTO (12-29-42), Sec

2, Case 43; Memo, Marshall for COMINCH, 8 Jan

43, sub: Strategic Dir of Opns in the SW Pac, same

file; Memo, COMINCH for CofS USA, 18 Feb 43,

sub: Opns in SOPAC-SWPA, OPD Exec Off File

No. 10, Item 67c; Memo, CofS USA for CNO, 19

Feb 43, same sub, same file; JCS 238/3, 21 Mar 43,

title: Plan of Opns for Seizure of Solomon IslandsNew Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area; JCS

238/4, 27 Mar 43, title: Plan of Opns for Seizure

of Solomon Islands-New Guinea-New Britain-New

Ireland Area-Offen Opns in the S and SW Pac

During 1943; JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar 43, title: Dir—

Plan of Opns for Seizure of Solomon Islands-New

Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area; and Min

JCS mtg, 28 Mar 43. 29

 Min, JCS mtg, 28 Mar 43. 30 JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar 43.
CHAPTER III

ELKTON III: The Plan for CARTWHEEL

The Southwest Pacific Area

Command Structure

Most of the commands of the Southwest and South Pacific Areas which

would execute the Joint Chiefs' orders

were already in existence.1 General MacArthur, as Allied Commander in Chief,

had organized his General Headquarters (GHQ), Southwest Pacific Area, on

U.S. Army lines. Directly under Sutherland, the Chief of Staff,2

 were the four

standard general staff and three special

staff sections. Each section was headed

by an American Army officer. Officers

from the American Navy and from the

Australian, Netherlands, and Netherlands Indies armed forces served in the

most important staff sections, but in

comparatively junior positions.3 On the

surface GHQ was a U.S. Army headquarters, but its responsibilities and authority were joint and Allied in nature.

It was an operational headquarters.

Under GHQ in Australia were three

other tactical headquarters—Allied Land

Forces, Allied Naval Forces, and Allied

Air Forces, whose names indicate their

functions. (Chart 1) Allied Land Forces

was commanded by an Australian, General Sir Thomas Blarney, and was theoretically responsible for the tactical direction of all Allied ground troops, less

certain antiaircraft units which were

controlled by Allied Air Forces. Under

Allied Land Forces was the U.S. Sixth

Army, established in the area in February 1943 under command of Lt. Gen.

Walter Krueger. Included in Sixth

Army were Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger's I Corps, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, and the 503d Parachute

Infantry Regiment. The 1st Marine Division was under Krueger's operational

control.4 The First and Second Australian Armies, many of whose units

were still in training, were part of Allied

Land Forces. The main tactical headquarters which operated under Blarney

1

 For details see Louis Morton's forthcoming

volumes on strategy, command, and logistics in the

Pacific, and Milner, Victory in Papua. For South

Pacific organization, see below, pp. 67-70. 2

 Sutherland, a lean, spare, dedicated man, and

an exacting taskmaster, was somewhat less than

popular with some of the officers who commanded

forces directly under GHQ, apparently because they

felt that he, personally, tried to take over part of

their authority. But his worst enemies have never

questioned his professional competence. 3

 G-3, for example, contained a substantial number of U.S. Navy and Allied officers, and such subordinate sections of G-2 as the Allied Intelligence

Bureau, the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, and the Allied Geographical Section had large

numbers of Allied officers.

4

 GHQ SWPA GO 17, 16 Feb 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 16 Feb 43. The antiaircraft units, two

antiaircraft coast artillery brigades that were controlled by Allied Air Forces, were assigned to Sixth

Army.

CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

during early 1943 was New Guinea

Force, a largely Australian headquarters

responsible for the conduct of operations in New Guinea. GHQ usually

established a temporary advanced echelon at Port Moresby, New Guinea,

shortly before the beginning of each

operation.

Allied Naval Forces was commanded

by Vice Adm. Arthur S. Carpender (inevitably called "Chips") of the U.S.

Navy, and included the U.S. Seventh

Fleet (concurrently commanded by Carpender) and large parts of the Australian

and Netherlands Navies. The most important component of Carpender's command was the VII Amphibious Force,

organized under Rear Adm. Daniel E.

Barbey in early 1943.

Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, an American airman, led the Allied Air Forces

which consisted of the U.S. Fifth Air

Force and the Royal Australian Air

Force Command, Allied Air Forces,

under Air Vice Marshal William D.

Bostock. Kenney also commanded the

Fifth Air Force but for tactical purposes

it was run by the Deputy Commander,

Brig. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead who led

the Advanced Echelon at Port Moresby,

New Guinea.5

All national forces serving under these

tactical headquarters were administered

and usually supplied by their own service elements. U.S. Army Forces, Far

East, commanded by MacArthur, was

responsible for administration of the

Sixth Army, the Fifth Air Force, and

U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area. This last, under Maj.

Gen. Richard J. Marshall, had the responsibility for logistical support of

American ground forces.6 Australian

Line of Communications units in Allied

Land Forces supplied the Australian

troops. Soldiers fighting in New Guinea

under New Guinea Force were supplied

by a U.S.-Australian organization known

as the Combined Operational Service

Command which had been created during the Papuan campaign.

Most echelons subordinate to GHQ

had functioned during the Papuan campaign and by mid-1943 were operating

with an efficiency born of this experience.

Geography

The forthcoming campaigns would be

fought in New Guinea, the Solomon

Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago.

Many places in these islands bear the

names of outstanding figures in the history of exploration: Torres Strait, Dampier Strait, Bougainville, and D'Entrecasteaux Islands. Other names like New

Britain and New Ireland are of more

pedestrian origin, and the Bismarck and

Solomon Seas were named during World

War II.7 Despite the familiarity of many

place names, the area was one of the

least known and least developed in all

the world. Further, although there is

perhaps no ideal place to fight a war,

the New Guinea-Bismarcks-Solomons

5

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 99.

6

 GHQ SWPA Stf Memo 3, 19 Feb 43; USAFFE

GO 1, 26 Feb 43, adv copy. Both in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 19 Feb 43. 7

 Nothing is named for Meneses, who first visited

New Guinea in 1526, nor for Mendaña who discovered the Solomons in 1568. But the whole group,

the islands of Guadalcanal, San Cristobal, Santa

Isabel, and Florida, and Point Cruz on Guadalcanal

and Estrella Bay at Santa Isabel retain the names

given by Mendaña.
ELKTON III: THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL 23

area was one of the worst possible places. (Map 3)

All the islands have much in common,

and much that is common is unpleasant. All have hot, wet, tropical climates.

Ali are mountainous. All are heavily

jungled. All are pest-ridden and full of

tropical diseases, especially malaria.

None has motor roads longer than a few

miles. There are almost no ports with

piers and quays to accommodate large

ships.

The native inhabitants are Melanesians, most of them barely beyond the

Stone Age. Cannibalism and headhunting were suppressed only recently in

areas where British, German, Dutch,

and Australian governments exerted

their authority. During World War II

there were rumors that some of the New

Guinea natives, freed by the Japanese

conquests from the white man's restraining influence, had reverted to their ancient practices.

New Guinea, the largest island in the

area and after Greenland the largest

island in the world, is about 1,600 statute miles long, 500 miles from north

to south at its widest point, and has

an area estimated at about 312,000

square miles. Its most distinctive geographic feature, aside from the jungle,

is the great cordillera that runs the

length of the island. This cordillera

consists of a number of parallel eastwest mountain ranges which narrow into

the Owen Stanley Range in the Papuan

peninsula. The highest peaks reach over

sixteen thousand feet into the sky. The

mountain valleys that are cut by such

rivers as the Sepik, Ramu, Markham,

and Bulolo are several thousand feet

above sea level, and the climate is pleasant and relatively healthful. There are

no really large rivers in New Guinea,

but the Markham, which flows into

Huon Gulf, and the Sepik and Ramu

are several hundred miles long. The 600-

mile Sepik, flowing between the Victor

Emmanuel Range and the Torricelli

Mountains, is navigable by steam launch

for 300 miles above its mouth. Between

the mountains and the sea are swampy

lowlands and vast stretches of tropical

rain forest so thick that the sun never

penetrates the treetops to dry the ground

and no underbrush ever grows.

At the outset of the war there were

no motor roads of any significant length.

There were short roads in and around

the main ports and gold fields and innumerable native footpaths, or "tracks."

As both Allied and Japanese forces had

demonstrated during the Papuan campaign, overland travel was fantastically

difficult. The best ways to travel were

by water and by air. However, both the

Australians and Japanese were, in the

first part of 1943, engaged in ambitious

transmontane road-building projects.

Before the war the Australians had

exploited air travel to the utmost in

developing the gold fields of the Bulolo

Valley in the mountains southwest of

Salamaua. They had avoided the difficulties of overland travel by cutting airstrips in the flatlands of the valley, then

flying in gold-mining machinery, building materials, and, to add to the amenities of life in the attractive uplands,

even race horses.

Across Vitiaz and Dampier Straits

from New Guinea's Huon Peninsula

lies Cape Gloucester, the western tip

of New Britain, which curves northeasterly to culminate in Gazelle Peninsula

24 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

and Rabaul. New Ireland, long and narrow, parallels the long axis of the Papuan peninsula so that it, the Admiralty

Islands, part of New Guinea, and New

Britain enclose the Bismarck Sea. New

Britain, New Ireland, the Admiralties,

and other islands form the Bismarck

Archipelago.

Southeast of Rabaul, and northeast

of the Papuan peninsula and the Louisiade Archipelago, lie the Solomon

Islands. This 600-mile-long doublechained archipelago was found by Mendaña in 1568, but his calculations of

longitude were so far wrong that two

hundred years went by before white men

found it again. Carteret, Bougainville,

Surville, Shortland, and D'Entrecasteaux sighted or visited the archipelago

between 1767 and 1793, and French

geographers eventually concluded that

these were the islands Mendaña had

found.

The area was divided politically. That

part of New Guinea west of longitude

141° east belonged to the Netherlands.

Papua was an Australian possession with

the status of Territory. Northeast New

Guinea, the Admiralties, New Britain,

New Ireland, Bougainville, and Buka

made up the Australian Mandated Territory of New Guinea; Australia took

them from Germany in World War I

and was awarded a League of Nations

mandate over them.8 The Solomons

southeast of Bougainville are, politically,

the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, established by Great Britain in 1893

to suppress blackbirding.

A crude comparison may give a general idea of the size of the area. If a

map of the New Guinea-Bismarck

Archipelago-Solomon Islands area is

superimposed on a map of the United

States, with the western tip of New

Guinea's Vogelkop Peninsula at Seattle,

Washington, Milne Bay at southeastern

New Guinea lies in Colorado, and the

Solomon Islands lie in the Missouri and

Mississippi Valleys.

Coastwatching

In early 1943 the key points of this

huge area, except for Port Moresby,

Milne Bay, Goodenough Island in the

D'Entrecasteaux; group, and the Guadalcanal-Russells-Florida area of the Solomons were in Japanese hands, but Allied intelligence agencies were able to

keep a fairly close check on enemy troop,

ship, and plane movements by means of

radioed reports from observers operating behind the enemy lines. These observers were the coastwatchers, members

of an organization, the Coastwatching

Service, established before the war as

part of the Directorate of Intelligence,

Royal Australian Navy. Their territory

originally embraced New Guinea, the

Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomons, but later islands of the Netherlands Indies were added to the network.

Initially the coastwatchers were all British, Australian, or New Zealand civil

servants or planters, commissioned in

the Australian armed forces, but as the

war progressed qualified men from the

American forces were also assigned. The

coastwatchers were part of the Allied

Intelligence Bureau of the G-2 Section

of GHQ. Those in the Solomons re8

 In 1947 the Mandated Territory and Papua

were consolidated as a United Nations trusteeship.
ELKTON III: THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL 25

ported their observations directly to

South Pacific agencies.9

These intrepid men were greatly

aided in their work by the devotion

and help of the natives. The Melanesians in general remained loyal to the

Allied cause, and throughout the war

rescued shot-down airmen and stranded

sailors, worked as guides, bearers, and

laborers, and a select few stayed with the

various coastwatchers.

As the interior of the New GuineaBismarcks-Solomons area was little

known and practically unmapped, the

coastwatchers proved an invaluable

source of information on terrain. In

addition, their hideouts served as bases

for the patrols that thrust behind the

Japanese lines in advance of nearly every

Allied operation.

The Plan of Maneuver

On receiving the instructions from

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur and his subordinates turned to

the job of preparing plans and issuing

orders to carry out the directive of 28

March. The task was not difficult. All

that was needed was a revamping of the

two previous ELKTON plans.

MacArthur's headquarters issued its

plan for South and Southwest Pacific

Area operations for 1943 on 26 April,

and followed it the next month with

warning orders and operations instructions. The warning: orders covered the

whole ELKTON plan; the operations instructions dealt specifically with the

opening phases. The 26 April plan,

designated ELKTON III, was issued after

a personal conference in Brisbane between Admiral Halsey and General

MacArthur.

This was the first meeting of the wellknown admiral and the even more famous general. Halsey was deeply impressed by MacArthur; speaking of their

wartime conferences, he wrote:

I have seldom seen a man who makes a

quicker, stronger, more favorable impres- sion. . . . On the few occasions when I

disagreed with him, I told him so, and we

discussed the issue until one of us changed

his mind. My mental picture poses him

against the background of these discussions;

he is pacing his office, almost wearing a

groove between his large, bare desk and

the portrait of George Washington that

faced it; his corncob pipe is in his hand (I

rarely saw him smoke it); and he is mak- ing his points in a diction I have never

heard surpassed.10

At this meeting, timing and co-ordination of the advance in New Guinea

with the invasion of New Georgia were

discussed.11 Halsey carried some of his

points with MacArthur; they agreed that

the initial invasion of New Georgia

would take place at the same time as

the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina

instead of after the establishment of

Southwest Pacific forces on the Huon

Peninsula, as the Southwest Pacific leaders had been advocating. ELKTON III

specified that the New Georgia and

Woodlark-Kiriwina operations would 9

 See Comdr. Eric A. Feldt, RAN, The Coastwatchers (Melbourne and New York: Oxford University Press, 1946); MIS GHQ FEC, The Intelligence Series, IV, Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA. The Royal New

Zealand Navy also operated a coastwatching system

east of the Solomons.

10 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

155. 11

 COMSOPAC War Diary, 25 Apr 43 entry; Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp. 154-55.
26 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

be simultaneous, but that major forces

were not to be committed.12

The CARTWHEEL Operations

The plan of maneuver decided on

by MacArthur was the same as that set

forth in previous plans—mutually supporting advances along two axes, converging finally on Rabaul. The general

concept underlying these operations

characterized most Allied operations in

both South and Southwest Pacific Areas.

Despite its stiff brand of English, the

warning instruction that expressed this

concept is worth noting:

The general scheme of maneuver is to

advance our bomber line towards Rabaul;

first by improvement of presently occupied

forward bases; secondly, by the occupation

and implementation of air bases which can

be secured without committing large forces;

and then, by the seizure and implementa- tion of successive hostile airdromes. By destructive air attack soften up and

gain air superiority over each attack objec- tive along the two axes of advance. Neu- tralize with appropriate aviation support- ing hostile air bases and destroy hostile

naval forces and shipping within range. Prevent reinforcement or supply of objec- tives under attack. Move land forces for- ward, covered by air and naval forces, to

seize and consolidate each successive objec- tive. Displace aviation forward onto cap- tured airdromes. Repeat this process to suc- cessive objectives, neutralizing by air ac- tion, or by air, land, and sea action, intermediate hostile installations which are

not objectives of immediate attack. The

entire movement will be covered by air

attack on Japanese air and sea bases along

the general perimeter BUKA-RABAULKAVIENG-WEWAK, with the object of

denying supply and reinforcement of ob- jectives under attack.13

The operations planned for ELKTON

III were lumped under the code name

CARTWHEEL, and were arranged according to a complicated but flexible schedule that provided for about thirteen invasions or captures in eight months, and

also provided for maximum mutual support by South and Southwest Pacific

Areas.

CARTWHEEL would start with amphibious movements by the Southwest Pacific into Woodlark and Kiriwina. Simultaneously the South Pacific, using

"diversionary" and "aggressive" infiltration, would move into New Georgia

"and/or" Santa Isabel without committing major forces to action.14

Woodlark and Kiriwina were not held

by either belligerent. Kiriwina is 270

nautical miles from Rabaul, and southern Bougainville is 300 miles away.

Thus Allied fighters and medium bombers would be brought within range of

these enemy areas, and Allied control

over the Solomon and Bismarck Seas

would be intensified. During the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina (designated Operation I in ELKTON III), heavy

bombers would strike southern Bougainville, Buka, and Rabaul. The South

Pacific would support the move by its

ground operations in the Solomons (Operation A) in addition to providing strategic naval support and pinning down

Japanese aircraft in the Solomons. In

12

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

155; GHQ SWPA, ELKTON III, Plan for the Seizure

of the Lae-Salamaua-New Britain-Solomons Areas,

26 Apr 43.

13

 GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 2, 6 May 43, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 6 May 43. 14

 GHQ SWPA, ELKTON III . . . , 26 Apr. 43.
ELKTON III: THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL 27

accordance with Halsey's original suggestion, the South Pacific would furnish

the occupation force and an air squadron for Woodlark. The timetable included in ELKTON III allotted two

months for Operations I and A. (Chart 2)

When Operation A ended, South Pacific forces would not undertake any

large-scale movements, but would continue air and sea operations to support

the Southwest Pacific. This area would

execute Operation II, the seizure of

Lae (IIa), Salamaua and Finschhafen

(IIb), and Madang (IIc). Lae was to be

seized two months after the initiation of

the CARTWHEEL operations, Salamaua

and Finschhafen six weeks after Lae, and

Madang two weeks after Salamaua. The

Madang operation, including the consolidation phase, would probably require

two months. During Operation II aircraft from both areas would keep striking the Japanese in the Solomons, New

Ireland, New Britain, and New Guinea.

Airfields at Lae and in the Markham

Valley behind Lae would support the

advance against Madang as well as the

South Pacific's thrust against southern

Bougainville.

Five and one-half months after the

start of CARTWHEEL, and one month after

the move against Lae, the South Pacific

would complete the seizure of New Georgia, and move forward to capture the

Japanese bases at Faisi in the Shortland

Islands and Buin in southern Bougainville (Operation B).15

 Allied aircraft

from Woodlark, Kiriwina, and the Huon

Peninsula would support and cover

these movements. It was expected that

Operation B would require six weeks.

The next two sets of operations by the

Southwest and South Pacific Areas would

be practically concurrent. At the beginning of the seventh month, the South

Pacific was to seize Kieta, a Japanese base

on the east coast of Bougainville, and

begin neutralizing the airfields on and

near Buka (Operation C). In the middle

of the sixth month, the Southwest Pacific would cross Vitiaz Strait to take

Cape Gloucester and Arawe (Operation

IIIa), then occupy Gasmata and neutralize Talasea (Operation IIIb). With the

New Guinea and New Britain bases in

Allied hands, Wewak could be neutralized, and the operations against western

New Britain could be supported. Finally,

with the execution of Operations III and

C, light bombers and fighters could easily attack Rabaul and Kavieng, and the

South and Southwest Pacific Areas could

begin to neutralize them in advance of

an amphibious assault on Rabaul. This

entire set of operations, it was estimated,

would last for eight months. For planning purposes, ELKTON III assumed that

the CARTWHEEL operations would begin

about the first of June.

The arrangements for mutual support of the two areas during these operations were more detailed and exact than

those for the Guadalcanal and Papua

Campaigns. ELKTON III and subsequent

orders, besides specifying the time and

place of the CARTWHEEL operations, also

provided for direct communication between South and Southwest Pacific Areas.

Starting on 15 May, daily operational

15

 This feature of ELKTON III was not closely followed by Halsey. References to the New Georgia

operations in ELKTON III are rather vague. They

probably were included after the Halsey-MacArthur

conference.

ELKTON III: THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL 29

and intelligence summaries would be exchanged. Instructions stressed particularly the necessity for a common radio

frequency for fighter planes and a radio

circuit connecting all major Allied air

headquarters and bases. Beginning with

Operations I and A, Southwest Pacific

planes would conduct regular defensive

reconnaissance over the Solomon and

Bismarck Seas and the land areas west

of longitude 155° east and southwest of

the line Buka Passage-New Ireland.

South Pacific aircraft would be responsible for defensive reconnaissance to the

east and northeast of 155° east and the

Buka Passage-New Ireland line, with a

one-degree overlap granted to both areas.

Offensive reconnaissance would be conducted without regard to any boundaries.

MacArthur was to be notified well in advance of any movements by air or sea,

and all further arrangements for co-ordination and mutual support would be

made by him.16

Forces and Missions

MacArthur mainly used the existing

headquarters in his area, but set up one

new task force, primarily American, directly under GHQ. This organization,

known at first as New Britain Force but

from July on as ALAMO Force, was commanded by General Krueger, who retained his command of Sixth Army.17

ALAMO Force headquarters was virtually

the same as Sixth Army headquarters,

and placing ALAMO Force directly under

GHQ had the effect of removing most

American troops engaged in tactical operations from General Blarney's control.

The plans called for New Guinea Force,

with General Blarney in command, also

to operate directly under GHQ. Roughly speaking, New Guinea Force would

conduct the operations in New Guinea

while ALAMO Force ran those in Woodlark, Kiriwina, and New Britain.18

 All

operations would be supported and protected by Allied Air Forces and Allied

Naval Forces.

Logistical responsibilities would be divided between American and Australian

supply services. General Marshall's U.S.

Army Services of Supply was assigned responsibility for the immediate movement

of supplies for American ground forces

by water (excluding naval movements)

from rear bases in Australia to the intermediate bases at Port Moresby and Milne

Bay, the advanced base at Oro Bay near

Buna, and other bases when established.

Marshall's command was to enlarge,

stock, and operate ports and bases for the

ALAMO Force, and would be responsible

for completing airdromes then under

construction on New Guinea and Goodenough Island. Australian Line of Communications units were to move supplies

from rear bases to Cape York Peninsula,

Port Moresby, and Milne Bay.

In amphibious assaults Allied Naval

Forces would carry supplies forward

from intermediate and advanced bases

to the combat areas. When those areas

were secured the regular American and

Australian supply agencies would take

over. In addition, Admiral Carpender's 16

 GHQ SWPA, ELKTON III . . . , 26 Apr 43;

GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 2, 6 May 43, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 6 May 43. 17

 ALAMO was the code name in clear; the secret

code name was ESCALATOR Force.

18

 GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 2, 6 May 43, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 6 May 43.
30 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

command would assist in the movement

of supplies forward from Australia.

After some postponements caused by

delays in assembling the troops for Kiriwina, D Day for Woodlark, Kiriwina,

Nassau Bay in New Guinea, and New

Georgia in the Solomons was set for 30

June.

The Intelligence Estimate

ELKTON Ill's estimate of Japanese

strength in the Bismarck Archipelago,

Solomons, and New Guinea reflected the

recent changes in Japanese strength and

like the 28 February estimate was fairly

accurate. With the Japanese in control of

all sea and air routes leading from their

rearward island fortresses to Rabaul,

MacArthur and his staff clearly recognized that the enemy might quickly

strengthen his forces. They expected that

strong naval units from Truk, including

6 battleships, 2 carriers, 3 auxiliary carriers, 8 seaplane tenders, 15 cruisers,

about 40 destroyers, and 27 submarines

as well as about 50 merchant vessels of

over 3,000 tons displacement might be

made available at once. Within thirty

days, about four divisions could arrive,

as well as 277 airplanes and fleet units

from the Netherlands Indies and the

Philippines. By the end of six months,

the Japanese in the Bismarck Archipelago-Solomons-New Guinea area might

be able to muster ten to fifteen divisions

and 755 aircraft, but not much more in

the way of fleet strength.

Just as on the Allied side, the crux of

the matter would be shipping. The availability of troopships would govern the

size of the ground combat forces that

could be sent to and maintained in the

area. About 300,000 gross tons of shipping, half consisting of ships over 3,000

tons, was immediately available, and to

that 100,000 to 125,000 gross tons might

be added.

No mention was made of possible Japanese offensives against positions held by

the Allies. Enemy capabilities were considered to be entirely defensive. The Japanese were believed able to attempt the

following: defense of Lae and Salamaua

while reinforcing western New Britain

and north New Guinea; air attacks

against the Allied communication lines

as well as in tactical support of ground

defenses; naval interception of Allied

amphibious movements; and diversions

against northwest Australia and southeastern Papua.

Specifically, it was anticipated that the

Japanese would attempt to hold LaeSalamau while rushing about 25,000 reinforcements to Madang and Finschhafen by sea. Once the Allied offensives got

under way, reasoned MacArthur's planners, the Japanese would probably be

unable to reinforce Lae or Salamaua.

Enemy soldiers might be sent overland

from Wewak through the Markham Valley to Lae, but would hardly be fit to

fight on arrival. At the same time the

Japanese could be expected to increase

their garrisons at Cape Gloucester, Gasmata, and Arawe in western New Britain.

The enemy was expected to mount a

maximum air effort in an attempt to

defeat or delay the advancing Allies.

Both daylight sorties and harassing night

attacks would probably be used. If the

Japanese could keep half their planes in

serviceable condition, they could send

out at least a hundred fighters and eightyfive bombers in the initial attacks. By
ELKTON III: THE PLAN FOR CARTWHEEL 31

draining the Solomons, they could attack

on the second day with at least twentyfour fighters and ten bombers in addition

to whatever aircraft were left from the

first day, and by then more planes would

be arriving from outside the area. The

naval surface units at Rabaul could get

to Lae in not more than eighteen hours,

and strong forces could steam from Truk

to Lae in a few days' time.19

19

 G-2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Reinforcement Rate in the New Guinea-Bismarcks Area,

Annex A to ELKTON III. A map showing enemy dispositions is appended to Annex A, and differs in

certain minor respects from the order of battle

data in the text of the annex.
CHAPTER IV

The Japanese

Just as the Allies were determined to

advance against Rabaul, the Japanese

were determined to hold it, and, indeed,

to continue the advance that had been

checked at Guadalcanal and Buna. The

importance imparted to Rabaul by its

airfield sites and harbor, as well as by its

strategic location, had long been recognized by the Japanese. Imperial General

Headquarters' instructions of November

1941 directed the capture of Rabaul at

the earliest opportunity after the fall of

Guam.1 Rabaul supported the offensives

against the Allied lines of communication, and defensively was a bastion which

would help defend the Caroline Islands,

the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines against attack from the south. It

was one of the most important bases in

the semicircular string of island fortresses

that stretched from Burma through the

Indies and the Bismarck Archipelago to

the Marshall Islands, thence north and

northwest to the Kuriles.2

Japanese Command and Strategy

By late 1942 Rabaul had been developed into the major air and naval base

in the Japanese Southeast Area, and was

the site of the highest headquarters in

that area. Although smaller than most

Allied areas in the Pacific, the Southeast

Area was huge. Its western boundary, as

set on 2 April 1943, was longitude 140°

east.3 The northern boundary ran from

140° east just north of the Equator to a

line drawn between Kapingamarangi in

the Greenwich Islands to Nauru, thence

southeast between the Fijis and Samoa.

It thus embraced parts of both the South

and Southwest Pacific Areas.

Unlike the Allied areas, the Southeast

Area did not possess a unified command.

The highest Army and Navy headquar1

 Unless otherwise indicated all data on the

Japanese in this chapter are derived from the following monographs in the series Japanese Studies

in World War II: 17th Army Operations, Vol. II,

Monogr No. 40 (OCMH); 18th Army Operations,

Vols. I, II, Monogrs No. 41, 42 (OCMH); Southeast

Area Naval Operations, Vols. I-III, Monogrs No.

48-50 (OCMH); History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-45, Monogr No.

72 (OCMH); Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air

Operations, November 1942-June 1943, Pt. III,

Monogr No. 107 (OCMH); and 8th Area Army

Operations, Monogr No. no (OCMH). Monograph

No. no is a greatly improved revision of History

of the 8th Area Army, 1942-44, Monograph No. 37

(OCMH).

2

 For early Japanese planning see Morton, The

Fall of the Philippines, pp. 51-61; Milner, Victory

in Papua; Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive,

pp. 4-7. 3

 From 7 January to 2 April 1943, the western

boundary was the border of Dutch and Australian

New Guinea—longitude 141° east. In addition to

Japanese sources cited see U.S. Strategic Bombing

Survey, The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul

(Washington, 1946), pp. 10, 83.

34 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ters co-operated closely with one another,

but were responsible to different higher

authorities. (Chart 3) In charge of Army

operations in eastern New Guinea, the

Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomons

was General Hitoshi Imamura, commanding the 8th Area Army with headquarters at Rabaul. Imamura was responsible to the Army Section of Imperial

General Headquarters. The naval command was the Southeast Area Fleet or the

Southeastern Fleet led by Vice Adm.

Jinichi Kusaka. His immediate superior

was the Commander in Chief of the

Combined Fleet but on several occasions

he seems to have dealt directly with

Tokyo.

By the time the Guadalcanal and Papuan campaigns ended, the 8th Area

Army included two field armies and one

air division. The 17th Army operated in

the Solomons; the 18th Army was to be

responsible for the campaigns in eastern

New Guinea. The 6th Air Division, with

headquarters at Rabaul, generally operated in New Guinea under the tactical

direction of the 18th Army.

Under the Southeastern Fleet were the

land-based 11th Air Fleet, which operated principally in the Solomons, and the

8th Fleet with bases at Rabaul and in

the Shortlands-Buin area. The 8th Fleet,

whose strength and composition varied

considerably, usually included cruisers,

destroyers, submarines, transports, and

naval base forces. An administrative

rather than a battle fleet, its primary

duties were patrol and escort. Largescale combat operations were the mission

of either the 3d or the Combined Fleet,

both then at Truk.4

Both the 8th Area Army and the

Southeastern Fleet had been set up in

late 1942 when the Japanese, making

their major offensive effort in the Solomons and still planning to drive the

Americans from Guadalcanal, realized

that they had to commit large forces to

attain success. But Imperial General

Headquarters then revised its strategy

and decided to abandon Guadalcanal,

evacuate the survivors, and withdraw to

strong positions in front of Rabaul.

Under the revised strategy, Imperial

Headquarters decided to shift its emphasis from the Solomons to New Guinea.

A policy of "active defense" would be

pursued in the Solomons in order to

reinforce New Guinea and pursue an

"aggressive offensive" there.5 Lae, Salamaua, Wewak, and Madang on New

Guinea's north coast were specifically

mentioned as bases to be held. Imamura

therefore ordered Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi, commander of the 18th Army, to

strengthen Lae, Salamaua, Wewak, and

Madang. These points were valuable as

harbors, airfield sites, or both. Lae and

Salamaua were of great importance as

their possessor could dominate Dampier

and Vitiaz Straits and thus block any

attempt to advance along the New

Guinea coast to the Philippines or any

other place in the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere. The Japanese were

determined not to yield "an operational

route for the proclaimed enemy Philippines invasion."

 6 These bases would also

be necessary to the Japanese if they were

4

 USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul,

pp. 11, 43-44.

5

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, I, Japanese

Monogr No. 48 (OCMH), 55. 6

 18th Army Operations, I, Japanese Monogr No.

41 (OCMH), 55-56.
THE JAPANESE 35

VICE ADM. JINICHI KUSAKA GENERAL HITOSHI IMAMURA

to realize their hopes of capturing Port

Moresby.

Thus the Japanese survivors of Buna

were ordered to Salamaua, and on Imamura's orders Adachi directed more elements of his army to move from Rabaul

to the New Guinea bases. The 20th Division began moving to Wewak; the 41st

sent elements to Madang, and part of the

51st Division was sent to Lae and Salamaua. The fixing of the west boundary

of the Southeast Area on 7 January at

the Dutch border apparently gladdened

Adachi's heart. After being limited to

the Buna region, "having suddenly obtained freedom of the operational area,

it gave them [the 18th Army] bright and

desirous hopes. . . ."

 7

At the same time, detachments of Field

Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi's

Netherlands Indies-based Southern Army

were occupying areas along New

Guinea's north coast from the Vogelkop

Peninsula to Hollandia.

Imperial Headquarters' orders for the

Solomons required the 8th Area Army, in

co-operation with the Southeastern Fleet,

to hold the central and northern Solomons. Army and Navy authorities at

Rabaul disagreed over exactly where the

forward defense lines should be located.

The Army favored the Bougainville

area, holding that it would be too difficult to supply the islands farther south.

The Navy insisted on New Georgia and

Santa Isabel as outposts for Bougainville.

Each service went its own way. The

Army assumed responsibility for the defense of the northern Solomons. The

Navy took over land defense of the central Solomons. Imamura gave to Lt. Gen. 7

 Ibid., p. 110.
36 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

LT. GEN. HATAZO ADACHI

Haruyoshi Hyakutake's 17th Army, then

consisting chiefly of the 6th Division,

responsibility for Bougainville and adjacent islands.8

Having insisted on the necessity for

holding New Georgia and Santa Isabel,

naval authorities then complained that

this responsibility placed an excessive

demand on naval strength, and asked

Imamura for some Army ground troops

for New Georgia in addition to the few

who were already there. The general,

still invoking the difficulty of supply, was

at first reluctant. In March the Southeastern Fleet sent the 8th Combined

Special Naval Landing Force to New

Georgia, and another, the 7th, to Santa

Isabel.9 After a good deal of negotiation,

and perhaps on orders from Imperial

Headquarters, Imamura acceded to Kusaka's requests and sent more Army

troops to New Georgia under their own

headquarters, the Southeastern Detachment, and some additional units to Santa

Isabel. Both the 8th Combined Special

Naval Landing Force and the Southeastern Detachment, as well as the Santa Isabel force, were under the tactical control

of the 8th Fleet.

Thus in early 1943 the Japanese were

holding a network of mutually supporting air and naval bases arranged in

depth, running in two converging arcs

through New Guinea and the Solomons

to Rabaul. From the defensive point of

view, these positions would serve to protect Rabaul, the Netherlands Indies, and

the Philippines. Offensively, these bases

could support advances southward, and

although the Japanese had decided on

delaying action in the Solomons, they

were determined to take the offensive in

New Guinea.

Japanese Offensives, January-June 1943

The Attack Against Wau

The first offensive effort under the revised strategy was directed against Wau

in the Bulolo Valley goldfields southeast

of New Guinea's Huon Peninsula. Wau,

the site of a prewar airfield, lies 145 air

miles north by west of Port Moresby,

and 25 air miles southwest of Salamaua.

(Map 4) Since May 1942 Wau had been

held by a small body of Australians,

known as the KANGA Force, who operated 8

 Of the 17th Army units which served on Guadalcanal, the 35th Brigade (Kawaguchi Force or Detachment) went to Burma; the 2d Division, to the

Philippines; the 38th Division, to New Britain

under direct control of the 8th Area Army.

9

 Composed of the Kure 6th and the Yokosuka

7th Special Naval Landing Forces, the 8th Combined

had been activated in Japan for service on Guadalcanal but did not get there before the evacuation.
THE JAPANESE 37

MAP 4

under control of the New Guinea Force.

As the Bulolo Valley could be reached

overland from other Allied bases only

over mountainous, jungled, and swampy

routes, the KANGA Force was supplied

largely by air. It had been ordered to

keep watch over Lae and Salamaua and

to hold the Bulolo Valley as a base for

harrying the enemy until he could be

driven out of the area.10 If the Japanese

had been able to establish themselves

at Wau, they could have reaped great

gains. They could have staged aircraft

from Madang and Wewak through Wau,

thus bringing Port Moresby within effective range of their fighters.11

 The

18th Army entertained ambitious plans

for capturing Wau and crossing the Owen

Stanley Range to seize Port Moresby. It

is not clear, however, whether Adachi

intended to proceed from Wau over the

rough trail that led from Wau to Bulldog on the Lakekamu River, or to move

against Port Moresby via Kokoda. Either

route would have outflanked the Allied

Gona-Sanananda-Buna-Dobodura-Oro

Bay positions that had been won in the

arduous Papuan campaign.

When 18th Army troops moved to

New Guinea in early 1943, some went to

Lae and Salamaua to strengthen naval

forces already there.12 The reinforced

102d Infantry Regiment was sent in a

convoy from Rabaul to Lae during the

first week in January. But the Allies,

warned by the fact that the Japanese had

given up their efforts to send troops to

Buna, had anticipated that the Japanese

might try to strengthen Lae and Salamaua and were therefore attempting to

isolate that area by air action. Allied

planes found the convoy, bombed it, and

sank two transports. About three fourths

of the 102d went ashore at Lae, but half

its supplies were lost.

Once at Lae, the 102d was ordered by

Adachi to seize Wau. This Allied enclave

was connected to the north coast by several trails that could be traversed on

foot. The Japanese commander at Lae,

Maj. Gen. Toru Okabe, decided to begin

his drive against Wau from Salamaua.

10

 Milner, Victory in Papua, Chs. I, III; ALF, Rpt

on New Guinea Opns: 23 Sep 42-22 Jan 44. 11 AAF Int Summary 74, 3 Feb 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 2 Feb 43. 12

 Interrogation of Lt Gen Hatazo Adachi, Lt Gen

Rimpei Kato (former CofS, 8th Area Army), Lt Col

Shoji Ota (former stf off, 8th Area Army), and Capt

Sadamu Sanagi (former Senior Stf Off, Southeastern

Fleet), by members of the Mil Hist Sec, Australian

Army Hq, at Rabaul, no date, OCMH.
38 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

LT. GEN. HARUYOSHI HYAKUTAKE

By 16 January he had gathered his attacking force there.

The Allies, determined to prevent the

Japanese from capturing Wau and

threatening Port Moresby, had meanwhile acted promptly. Headquarters,

New Guinea Force, decided to reinforce

Wau, and in mid-January advance elements of the 17th Australian Infantry

Brigade were flown from Milne Bay to

Wau.13

After assembling at Salamaua, Okabe

and the 102d Infantry made their way

laboriously upward to the Bulolo Valley.

They struck at Wau in a dusk attack on

28 January and pushed through to the

edge of the airfield. But there they were

stopped. For the next three days Australian soldiers of the 17th Brigade, plus

ammunition, supplies, and two 25-

pounder guns, were flown in by air. In

three days troop carriers of the Allied

Air Forces flew in 194 planeloads, or one

million pounds. So critical was the situation on the 29th that the first load of

troops practically leaped from the planes

firing their small arms. The Japanese

pressed hard, but by 30 January acknowledged failure and began to withdraw.14

Having broken the enemy's attack, the

Australians kept pressing him back

toward Salamaua. In April the 3d Australian Division took over direction of

operations and the KANGA Force was dissolved. The Australians then halted

short of Salamaua to wait until other

Allied troops could be made ready for a

large-scale attack against the entire

Finschhafen-Lae-Salamaua complex.15

The Australians' gallant defense of

Wau thus frustrated the last Japanese

attempt to attack Port Moresby overland,

and kept for the Allies an advantageous

13

 ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns: 23 Sep 42-22

Jan 44; NGF OI 60, 13 Jan 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 14 Jan 43. 14

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 136-37; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 186-87; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns:

23 Sep 42-22 Jan 44. 15

 USSBS, Employment of Forces, p. 17; GHQ

SWPA G-3 Opns Rpt 380, 21-22 Apr 43, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr 43.
THE JAPANESE 39

position which would help support later

offensives against the Huon Peninsula.

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea

The Australian defense of Wau had a

third consequence that was more farreaching than even the most ebullient

Bulolo Valley veteran (if anyone was

ebullient after fighting in the mud,

mountains, and heat) realized at the

time. It helped lead to the destruction

of an entire Japanese convoy and the

subsequent weakening of Lae.16

Okabe's attacks against Wau had so

depleted his meager force that the Japanese at Rabaul, who were determined to

hold Lae and Salamaua at all costs, became worried. The 20th and 41st Divisions could not be spared from Wewak

and Madang. Thus Imamura, Adachi,

and the naval commanders decided to

send the rest of the 51st Division in convoy to Lae. They planned very carefully.

They were well aware of the havoc

that airplanes could wreak on troop

transports. Guadalcanal had demonstrated that point, and if final proof was

needed, Adachi had had it in the destruction of part of Okabe's shipment in January. Had it been possible for the convoy to sail from Rabaul to Madang and

land the troops there to march to Lae,

the ships could have stayed out of effective range of Allied fighters and medium bombers; heavy bombers, thus far

relatively ineffective against ships, were

not greatly feared. But there was no overland or coastal route capable of getting

large bodies of troops from Madang to

Lae. It was therefore necessary to sail

directly to Lae and thus come within

range of fighters and medium bombers.

The Japanese, employing almost two

hundred planes based at Rabaul, Madang. Wewak, Cape Gloucester, Gasmata, and Kavieng, hoped to beat Allied

planes down out of the air and to provide

direct cover to the ships.

But the Allies had deduced Japanese

intentions. Ship movements around New

Britain in late February, though not part

of the effort to reinforce Lae, were noted

by Allied reconnaissance planes. As a

result air search was intensified and air

striking forces were alerted. On 25 February General Kenney and his subordinates came to the conclusion that the

Japanese would probably try to put more

troops ashore at Lae or Madang.17

Not only were the Allies warned; they

were also ready. By the end of February

airfields in Papua, with those at Dobodura near Buna carrying the biggest load,

based 207 bombers and 129 fighters. The

Southwest Pacific had no aircraft carriers

and few if any carrier-type planes that

were specifically designed for attacks

against ships. But Kenney and his subordinates had redesigned the nose of the

B-25 medium bomber and installed forward-firing .50-caliber machine guns so

that the bomber could strafe the deck of

a ship and thus neutralize all her exposed

antiaircraft guns. Further, they had practiced the skip-bombing technique that

proved particularly effective in sinking

16

 Unless otherwise indicated, this brief account is

based on the Japanese monographs and on definitive accounts in Craven and Cate, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 141-51, and Samuel

Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval

Operations in World War II, Vol. VI, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier: 22 July 1942-1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), Ch. V.

17

 See Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 197.

See also GHQ SWPA G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 343, 28

Feb-1 Mar 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 1 Mar 43.
40 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

JAPANESE TROOP TRANSPORT UNDER ATTACK by B-25's, Battle of the Bismarck Sea.

ships.18 Once warned, the Allied airmen

prepared detailed plans for striking the

convoy and executed a full-scale rehearsal off Port Moresby.

At Rabaul, 6,912 Japanese soldiers

boarded eight ships. The ships weighed

anchor about midnight of 28 February

1943 and, with eight destroyers as escort,

sailed out of Rabaul and westward

through the Bismarck Sea at seven knots.

At first bad weather—winds, mist, and

rain—hid them from the air, but soon the

weather began to break and Allied patrol

planes sighted the convoy first on 1

March and again the next morning off

Cape Gloucester. As it was still beyond

the reach of medium bombers, heavy

bombers from Port Moresby attacked it

in the Bismarck Sea. They sank one

transport and damaged two others, a

good score for heavy bombers. Survivors

of the sunken ship, about 950 in number, were picked up by two of the destroyers which made a quick run to Lae

to land the men after dark. The destroyers returned to the convoy on the morning of 3 March. During the night the

convoy had sailed through Vitiaz Strait

and into the Solomon Sea, tracked all the

while by an Australian Catalina.

But now the ships entered the Huon

Gulf in clear daylight, and were within

range of medium bombers. The Allied

planes that had organized and rehearsed

18

 For details see Craven and Cate, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 140-41; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 21-22, 105, 144, 154-55,

162, 164. Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold had observed

the RAF practicing skip-bombing in 1941 and introduced it to the AAF.
THE JAPANESE 41

for the attack assembled over Cape Ward

Hunt at 0930 and set forth for the kill.

The Japanese had failed to destroy Allied air power in advance, and the convoy's air cover was ineffective. Starting

about 1000 and continuing until nightfall. American and Australian airmen in

P-38's, P-39's, P-40's, Beaufighters,

A-20's, A-29's, Beaufort bombers, B-17's,

B-24's and B-25's pounded the luckless

Japanese from medium, low, and wavetop altitudes with resounding success.

All remaining transports, along with

four destroyers, sank on 3 and 4 March.

After night fell motor torpedo boats

from Buna and Tufi swept in to finish

off crippled ships and shoot up survivors

in the water.

Of the 6,912 troops on board, 3,664

were lost. Including those taken by destroyer to Lae, 3,248 were rescued by the

Japanese. The sinking of eight transports

and four destroyers in "the most devastating air attack on ships" since Pearl

Harbor was a tremendous victory, and

it was won at a cost of thirteen killed,

twelve wounded, and four Allied planes

shot down.19

The Japanese quickly changed their

plans for future shipments. They decided to send no more convoys to Lae.

Large slow ships would be sent only to

Hansa Bay and Wewak; high-speed ships

and small craft would run to Finschhafen

and Tuluvu on the north coast of New

Britain. Small coastal craft would take

men and supplies to Lae from Finschhafen and Cape Gloucester, and some

men and supplies would be sent overland from Finschhafen to Lae. In emergencies supplies that were absolutely required at Lae would be sent in by highspeed ships or submarines. The main

body of ground forces eventually intended for Lae would be sent overland after

completion of a road, already under construction, from Wewak through Madang

to Lae.

Road Building

Construction of the road had been

started in January. This most ambitious

project involved building a truck highway from Madang to Bogadjim, thence

over the Finisterre Range and through

the Ramu and Markham River Valleys

to Lae. The 20th Division was given this

work.

In early February the Allies, having

received reports from natives, were

aware of enemy activity in the Ramu

Valley. Allied intelligence deduced that

the Japanese were interested in an inland

route to Lae. Intelligence also minimized the danger of a serious threat, for

it seemed unlikely that the road could

19

 Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 59.

Allied casualty figures are from Kenney, General

Kenney Reports, p. 206. Official communiques at

the time, based on pilots' reports, claimed twentytwo ships and fifteen thousand men, and Kenney,

in his book and in his comments on the draft manuscript of this volume, claimed six destroyers or light

cruisers sunk, two destroyers or light cruisers damaged, and from eleven to fourteen merchant vessels

in the convoy sunk; he also included, in his total

for the Bismarck Sea, two small merchant ships

that were sunk at Lae and Wide Bay. According to

Kenney a second enemy convoy joined the first,

which explains the disparity. However, Craven and

Cate, in The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp.

147-50, and Morison, in Breaking the Bismarcks

Barrier, after surveying all available enemy records,

maintained that the convoy consisted of eight transports and an equal number of destroyers, that

there was no second convoy, and that eight transports and four destroyers were sunk. 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. no (OCMH)

supports them.
42 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

be completed in time to be of much

use.20

Allied intelligence was correct. The

road-building projects were next to impossible for the Japanese to accomplish.

Their maps were poor. The routes they

selected, especially the inland route for

the Madang-Lae road, led them through

disease-ridden jungles and swamps, over

towering mountains, and up and across

canyons and gorges. They never had

enough machinery and what they had

was ineffective. Their trucks, for example, were not sufficiently powerful to

climb steep slopes. Their horses fared

poorly on jungle grasses. Bridges kept

washing away on the Madang-Hansa

Bay road. Combat troops were unhappy

as laborers. Dense forests hid the road

builders from air observation, but in the

open stretches of the Finisterre Range

they were constantly subject to air attack.

By the end of June the Madang-Lae

road had been pushed only through the

Finisterre Range.

Lae therefore never did receive substantial reinforcements or supplies, despite the Japanese determination to hold

it and dominate Dampier and Vitiaz

Straits.

The I Operation

While Japanese Army troops were

busy building roads in New Guinea,

the Japanese Navy had also taken a hand

in an effort to beat the Allies. Galled by

the admittedly crushing defeat in the

Bismarck Sea, fully aware of the threat

that Allied air activity in the South Pacific presented to their shipments of

troops and supplies to New Georgia and

Santa Isabel, and concerned over their

declining air strength, the Japanese decided to gather more planes, smash Allied air power, and attack Allied shipping in the Southeast Area.

Japanese air strength was somewhat

less than substantial at this time. In

March 1943 there were only about three

hundred planes—one hundred Army and

two hundred Navy—in the Southeast

Area. Rabaul frequently complained that

Tokyo never sent enough replacements

to replace losses. Toward the end of

March General Imamura asked Imperial

Headquarters for more. Headquarters

did send more, but not enough to satisfy

Imamura, and some planes that were dispatched never arrived. For example, the

68th Air Regiment navigated so badly

while flying from Truk to Rabaul that

many of its planes failed to find Rabaul

and were lost at sea.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet,

decided to take a hand in the attempt to

beat the Allies out of the air. For this

effort, given the code name I Operation,

he sent the planes from the 3d Fleet carriers at Truk to join with 11th Air Fleet

planes at Rabaul, Kavieng, Buin, Buka,

and Ballale. He took headquarters of

both the Combined and 3d Fleets from

Truk to Rabaul to direct the I Operation, which involved more than three

hundred aircraft.

Japanese aircraft had concentrated

against the Allied New Guinea bases in

March, and the month had been a quiet

one on Guadalcanal. But that the Japanese had renewed their interest in the

20

 See GHQ G-2 Daily Summary of Enemy Int

and G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 317, 2-3 Feb 43, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 3 Feb 43. See also Australian Mil

Forces Weekly Int Review 28, 5-12 Feb 43, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 5 Feb 43.
THE JAPANESE 43

Solomons was demonstrated to the Allies

on 1 April when bombers and fighters

struck at the Russells. Air combats raged

for three hours as Allied fighters beat off

the attackers, losing six of their number

in the process.21

Six days later, 7 April, came the main

phase of I Operation in the Solomons.

It was a splendid opportunity for the

Japanese, for there were many targets

around Guadalcanal. A naval task force,

having fueled at Tulagi, was steaming

northwest en route to shell Vila and

Munda that night. Including cargo ships,

transports, and the task force, there were

present about forty ships of corvette size

or larger, and a larger number of smaller

vessels. In addition much ammunition,

fuel, and equipment were being stored

on Guadalcanal in preparation for the

invasion of New Georgia.

To attack these lucrative targets, Yamamoto dispatched 117 fighters and

71 bombers. Coastwatchers on New

Georgia, counting more than 160 planes

overhead, flashed warnings southward.

Halsey canceled the scheduled bombardment; the task force rounded Florida

and sped down Indispensable Strait.

Other ships and craft started getting

under way and most had reached open

water when the Japanese arrived about

1500.

While Allied bombers flew to the

southeast to avoid the Japanese, all available Allied fighters, seventy-six in number, took the air to intercept. P-38's

(Lightnings) flew on top, and beneath

them, at various altitudes, were F4U's

(Corsairs), F6F's (Hellcats), and P-39's

(Airacobras). As the Japanese planes

broke up into separate flights, a general

melee ensued. The skies above the Russells, Tulagi, and the waters between

Guadalcanal and Florida saw violent

combat. According to the Japanese, "resistance offered by the ten or so enemy

Grummans [F6F's] and P-38's was beaten

down and the attack on shipping was

carried out." They reported seriously

damaging most of the Allied ships, a

claim that is as inaccurate as their statement that only ten Allied fighters tried

to intercept.22 They sank the New Zealand corvette Moa, the U.S. oiler Kanawha, and the U.S. destroyer Aaron

Ward, and damaged one other oiler.

They apparently never sighted the task

force. Seven Allied fighters and one pilot

were lost, but the Japanese lost many

more.23

Yamamoto, apparently satisfied with

the performance over Guadalcanal, then

turned against the Allies in New Guinea.

On 11 April 22 bombers and 72 fighters

struck at Oro Bay. They sank one merchant ship, damaged another so badly

that it had to be beached, and hit an

Australian minesweeper. Next day 131

fighters and 43 bombers flew over the

Owen Stanleys to hit Port Moresby.

There were few Allied fighters on hand

to oppose them. As he himself points out,

General Kenney had expected the attack to hit Milne Bay and had sent most

21

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 212.

22

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH), 13. 23

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 212-13; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 120-24. Allied airmen claimed

thirty-nine Japanese planes downed in air combat,

while surface ships claimed twenty-five. There were

undoubtedly many duplications. The Japanese admit losing twenty-one.
44 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

of his fighter strength there.24 Fortunately the damage was very light. Two

days later the Japanese fulfilled Kenney's

expectations by attacking Milne Bay, but

they did little damage. One Dutch merchant ship was a total loss, and a British

motorship and another Dutch ship were

damaged. Yamamoto then concluded the

I Operation, which he regarded as highly

successful, and returned the carrier

planes to their parent units at Truk. The

Japanese, apparently misled by optimistic pilots' reports, boast of destroying 1

cruiser, 2 destroyers, 25 transports, and

134 planes, while losing 42 planes themselves. But actual Allied losses in the

Solomons and New Guinea were 1 destroyer, 1 tanker, 1 corvette, 2 Dutch

merchant ships, and about 25 planes.

Ambush Over Kahili

Yamamoto then decided to pay a

morale-building visit to the Buin area.

He, his chief of staff, and other officers

left Rabaul on 18 April in two twin-engine bombers escorted by fighters. When

the party reached a point thirty-five miles

northwest of Kahili, the airdrome near

Buin, they were jumped by eighteen

P-38's from the South Pacific's Thirteenth Air Force, which had been sent

there for that very purpose.

When Admiral Halsey returned to

Noumea after conferring with MacArthur in Brisbane, he learned that

American intelligence officers had discovered the exact time on 18 April Yamamoto was due to reach the Buin area

from Rabaul. Admiral Nimitz and his

staff agreed that disposing of Yamamoto

would advance the Allied cause, so the

Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, was

told to shoot him down. The eighteen

P-38's, manned by picked pilots and led

by Maj. John W. Mitchell, were sent on

the mission. Taking off from Henderson

Field on Guadalcanal, they flew low over

the waves for 435 miles by a circuitous

route to the interception point northwest of Kahili. Yamamoto's flight hove

in sight just as its fighter escort was leaving. Mitchell's attack section, led by

Capt. Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., bored in

and Lanphier made the kill. Yamamoto's

plane crashed in the Bougainville jungle.

He died. The other plane fell in the sea,

but the chief of staff, whom it was carrying, survived. One American pilot was

lost. This Lucifer-like descent of the aggressive, skillful Yamamoto, perhaps the

brightest star in the Japanese military

firmament, was a severe blow to the morale of the Japanese armed forces.25

The Big Raid

By early June, the Allies in the Solomons realized that the Japanese were

again determined to accomplish what

the I Operation had failed to do—cut

the lines of communication to Guadalcanal by air action. Yamamoto fell from

the skies believing that I had succeeded,

but by June the enemy leaders at Rabaul

knew that the Allies were freely building

up supplies on Guadalcanal. On 7 June

the Japanese inaugurated another series of fighter-escorted bombing attacks

against Guadalcanal. Planes from the

24

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 225, 228-

29.

25

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 213-14; Halsey and Bryan, Admiral

Halsey's Story, pp. 155-57; Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 128-29. There are some differences in these accounts, chiefly regarding Yamamoto's destination and time of arrival. Halsey and

Bryan, and Craven and Cate say he was to arrive at

Ballale at 0945. Morison says he was due at Kahili

at 1145.
THE JAPANESE 45

Russells made the first interception that

day. According to Allied accounts, the

Japanese lost twenty-three fighters, four

of them to P-40's of the No. 15 Royal

New Zealand Air Force Fighter Squadron in its Solomons debut. Nine Allied

planes were shot down but all pilots were

recovered. In a second attack five days

later, the Japanese are reported to have

lost thirty-one planes, the Allies, six.

By mid-June Allied reconnaissance

planes were reporting 245 planes at Rabaul, with the forward fields in the northern Solomons filled to capacity. What

some Allied veterans of this period call

"the big raid" on Guadalcanal came on

16 June when a large force of enemy

bombers and fighters, numbering over

100 planes, flew down to attack Guadalcanal.26

 The coastwatchers again had sent

their timely warnings, and 104 Allied

fighters were ready. As in April, they intercepted promptly, the Japanese formations broke up into smaller flights, and

air combats raged. Whenever possible

ship- and shore-based antiaircraft took

the enemy under fire. The Japanese hit

three Allied ships, two of which had to

be beached, and did some damage to

shore installations before they were

driven off. Six Allied fighters were shot

down. The number of enemy planes

destroyed was large, although the exact

total cannot be determined. The Allies

claimed 98. One Japanese account admits the loss of about 30 planes.27

Neither the I Operation nor "the big

raid" achieved substantial results. The

Japanese failed, partly because their efforts were brief and sporadic rather than

long and sustained, and partly because

Allied resistance had been vigorous and

generally skillful.

Japanese Strength and Dispositions,

30 June 1943

In June Japanese strategy was still

substantially what it had been in January.28

 Late in March Lt. Gen. Rimpei

Kato, the 8th Area Army's chief of staff,

and other officers had gone to Imperial

Headquarters, apparently to explain

things after the Bismarck Sea debacle.

The result of the visit was an ArmyNavy "Central Agreement" which was

really a reaffirmation of the policies laid

down earlier. The Japanese still planned

to defend the Solomons while strengthening the bases in New Guinea and the

Bismarck Archipelago in preparation for

future offensives, especially against Port

Moresby. Ambitious plans for air supremacy were prepared, including one

for maintaining 641 planes (284 Army

and 357 Navy) in the Southeast Area,

but, as has been shown above, these were

destined to fail.

In April Imamura summoned his

army commanders to Rabaul and gave

them orders based on the Central Agreement. Instructions to Adachi emphasized

holding Lae and Salamaua, building the

Madang-Lae highway, and establishing

coastal barge lines from western New

Britain to Lae and Salamaua. In fulfillment of the policy of using naval air in

26

 USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul,

p. 46, says 150-60 planes attacked on 6 June, but

16 June is apparently intended. 27

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 218-19; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey,

The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against

Japan (Washington, 1946); Southeast Area Naval

Operations, III, Japanese Monogr No. 50 (OCMH),

53.

28

 The basic research for this section was performed by Messrs. Stanley L. Falk and Burke C.

Peterson.
46 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

the Solomons and Army air in New

Guinea, the entire 6th Air Division was

told to move to New Guinea.

In June Imamura issued more orders,

which restated the importance of Lae

and Salamaua. The 18th Army was told

to strengthen them as well as Wewak,

Madang, and Finschhafen. Adachi was

to regroup his forces at Lae and Salamaua and prepare to capture the Allied

outposts and patrol bases at Wau, Bena

Bena, and Mount Hagen, and to infiltrate up the Ramu and Sepik River Valleys.

In anticipation of the operations

against Bena Bena and Hagen, Imperial

Headquarters transferred the 7th Air

Division from the Netherlands Indies to

the 8th Area Army about July, and

shortly afterward placed Headquarters,

4th Air Army under Imamura to coordinate operations of the two air divisions.

Imamura also developed an ambitious

airfield construction program which involved building new fields or enlarging

old ones. By June, too, all divisions of

the 18th Army—the 20th, 41st, and 51st—

were concentrated in New Guinea. The

17th Army, still consisting chiefly of the

6th Division, was in Bougainville. The

Southeastern Detachment and the 8th

Combined Special Naval Landing Force

were dug in deeply in New Georgia, and

the 7th Combined Special Naval Landing Force and Army elements still held

Rekata Bay at Santa Isabel.

It is not possible, on the basis of

existing information, to state positively

just how many troops Imamura had under his command at this time. These

figures, and those in the table of strength

and dispositions, are guesses based on

available enemy data: for the Solomons,

25,000; for the New Guinea coast east

of the Dutch border, 55,000; for the

Bismarck Archipelago, perhaps 43,000

ground troops, for a total of 123,000.29

In aircraft, the Japanese possessed a

total of something over 500 planes in

June, though some of them were usually

29

 Strength tables and reports do not seem to

have survived the war, and available wartime and

postwar documents and accounts are inexact, contradictory, or both. The most detailed figures on

Japanese Army strength in the Southeast Area for

June 1943 are contained in Southeast Area Naval

Operations, Vol. II, Japanese Monograph No. 49

(OCMH), pp. 22-23, but this account gives no hint

of the source of the figures that are not supported

by the few strength figures in Army records. For

example, the naval account states that there were

55,000 men holding Lae, Salamaua, Finschhafen,

Madang, and Wewak—the 18th Army's area of responsibility—in June 1943, but an 18th Army statistical table indicates that the 18th Army then

contained 80,000 men. The office of Official War

History, Department of the Interior, of the Commonwealth of Australia, believes that the figure of

80,000 for the 18th Army is correct. Ltr, Mr. Gavin

Long to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Chief Historian, OCMH), 7 Dec 55, OCMH. Japanese documents give no data on ground-troop strength in

the Bismarck Archipelago for June 1943. The nearest date for which there are anything like valid

figures is November 1943, and those figures are

given in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey's The

Allied Campaign Against Rabaul. Its text asserts

that in November 1943 there were 97,870 (76,300

Army and the remainder Navy) in the Bismarck

Archipelago, but this statement does not seem to

be solidly supported by the interrogations upon

which the text is based. General Imamura is

quoted on pages 10, 11, and 82, as stating that of

90,000 troops in the Rabaul area in November, 55,-

000 belonged to his army. From whatever November

figure is selected, the strength of the 17th Division,

which arrived in New Britain in September and

October of 1943, must be subtracted. Unfortunately,

there are no figures on that division's strength. The

figure 43,000, given in the text above, for the Bismarcks was obtained by the arbitrary method of

subtracting 12,000, a reasonable estimate of the

strength of the 17th Division, from Imamura's

November figure of 55,000. There are fewer problems for the Solomons, which seem to have contained about 25,000 Japanese ground troops.
THE JAPANESE 47

TABLE 1—COMPARISON OF ALLIED INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WITH JAPANESE

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS, SOUTHEAST AREA, 30 JUNE 1943

Source: Allied estimates are from GHQ SWPA G-2 Int Bulletin, Summary Enemy Dispositions, 30 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun 43; and CTF 31 Opn Plan A8-43, 4 Jun 43, Int Annex, Off of Naval Rcds and Library. Approximate strengths of Japanese units are from Japanese Monographs Nos. 37, 40-42, 48-50, 72, HO, and 107

(OCMH). The Australian Official War historians regard the postwar estimates as too low. See Ltr, Long to Green- field, 7 Dec 55. They are, however, admittedly conservative, and based on the best Japanese data available in Washington.

out of action. For example, of the 300

planes assigned to the 11th Air Fleet on

30 June, only 225 were ready for combat

operations. Of 240 belonging to the 6th

Air Division, 50 needed minor attention

and 25 required major repairs.

Planes were given a high degree of

tactical mobility by the large number

of conveniently spaced air bases in the

area. Kavieng had one field. Rabaul

boasted four—Lakunai, Vunakanau, Rapopo, and Keravat (which never

amounted to much)—with one more under construction at nearby Tobera. In

addition, the 8th Area Army was improving fields, or building new ones, at Wewak, Hansa Bay, Alexishafen, Madang,

Lae-Salamaua, Tuluvu, and Talasea.

The same situation prevailed in the Solomons. Besides the New Georgia fields

and the seaplane bases at Rekata Bay and

Shortland-Faisi, there were fields at Ka-
48 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

hili and Ballale in the Buin-Shortlands

area, and another, Kara, soon to be built. There was one at Buka, with another, Bonis, under construction just across

Buka Passage. On the east coast of Bou- gainville the Tenekau and Kieta strips

were being built, apparently under orders of the 8th Area Army.30

The 8th Fleet, in June, had one

cruiser, eight destroyers, and eight sub- marines. The potential of this fleet had

been cut somewhat by Admiral Mineichi

Koga, who had succeeded to command

of the Combined Fleet. Because the re- capture of Attu in May was regarded as

a direct threat to the Japanese homeland, he diverted 20 percent of the forces (ap- parently including aircraft) "in the

course of being assigned or available for

assignment" in the Southeast Area to the

Aleutians and to Saipan.31

Table 1 compares Allied estimates of

enemy strength, and dispositions of that

strength, with an approximation of en- emy strength and dispositions based on

available enemy records. It will be noted

that Allied estimates for Japanese

strength and dispositions throughout the

Southeast Area were quite accurate. In June 1943 the Japanese still cher- ished ambitions toward future offensives. It is clear in retrospect that their re- sources made them capable of defensive

action only. But, as at Guadalcanal and

Buna, the Japanese were so skillful in

defensive operations that Allied troops

were faced with a long series of hard

battles. 30

 In addition to the Japanese monographs cited

above, see USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against

Rabaul, pp. 11-12, 46; USAFISPA Photo Int Unit

Periodic Rpt, Airdromes and Seaplane Anchorages,

Jul 43.

31

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH), 18.
CHAPTER V

CARTWHEEL Begins:

The Southwest Pacific

On 30 June 1943—D Day for CARTWHEEL—Allied air, sea, and ground forces

facing the Japanese from New Guinea to

the Solomons were ready to attack. The

Japanese were expecting the offensive

but did not know just when or where it

would come. And the Allies had determined to compound their uncertainty

by launching not one, but three invasions—in New Georgia, at Woodlark and

Kiriwina, and at Nassau Bay in New

Guinea in preparation for the Markham

Valley-Lae-Salamaua operations.

CHRONICLE

Plans and Preparations

Planning for the seizure of Woodlark

and Kiriwina (designated Operation

CHRONICLE) had started at General Krueger's Sixth Army headquarters near Brisbane in early May. General MacArthur

had directed Allied Air and Naval Forces

to support ALAMO Force and had made

Krueger responsible for the co-ordination of ground, air, and naval planning.1

Krueger, Kenney, Carpender, Barbey,

and staff and liaison officers participated.

Krueger's authority to co-ordinate planning gave him a pre-eminent position;

he was first among equals.

Planning had not proceeded far before a hitch developed. When Admiral

Halsey suggested the seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina he offered to provide

part of the invasion force, an offer that

had been cheerfully accepted. Thus in

midmonth Generals Harmon and Twining and Vice Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch,

who commanded all South Pacific aircraft, flew to Brisbane to discuss details

of the transfer of forces to the Southwest Pacific. On the way over from

Noumea Harmon and Twining made

an air reconnaissance of Woodlark, and

on arriving at Brisbane offered their

opinion that Woodlark would be of little

use in providing air support for the

South Pacific's invasion of southern Bougainville. But Kenney, Carpender, Brig.

Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, G-3 of

GHQ, and Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Casey,

the chief engineer of GHQ, explained

how difficult it would be for Kenney's

aircraft to support that invasion without

the additional airfield that Woodlark

would provide. The South Pacific repre1

 GHQ SWPA OI 33, 7 May 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 8 May 43; CG Sixth Army, Hist of

CHRONICLE Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Aug

43.
50 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MAP 5

sentatives then agreed to go on with the

operation, and the details whereby

ground force units, a fighter squadron,

naval construction units, and six motor

torpedo boats would be transferred, and

destroyer-transports (APD's) and tank

landing ships (LST's) would be lent to

the Southwest Pacific, were arranged.2

The invasion of the two islands was

the first real amphibious movement undertaken in MacArthur's area. Planning

was so thorough and comprehensive that

the plans for movement of troops, supplies, and equipment in amphibious

shipping became standing operating procedure for future invasions.

Kiriwina, a narrow, north-south island twenty-five miles long, lies within

fighter and medium bomber range of

Rabaul, Buin in southern Bougainville,

and Lae, and 60 miles from the nearest

Allied base at Goodenough Island in the

D'Entrecasteaux group. From Rabaul to

44-mile-long Woodlark is 300 nautical

miles, from Buin 225, from Lae 380, and

from Goodenough 160. Neither island

was occupied by the Japanese. (Map 5)

MacArthur had ordered Allied Naval

Forces to support the ALAMO Force by

carrying troops and supplies, destroying

Japanese forces, and protecting the lines

2

 Rad [apparently from Twining] to Comdr AdVon 5AF, 16 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16

May 43; Notes of Conf Between Reps of SOPAC

and SWPA, Brisbane, 17 May 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 17 May 43.
CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 51

BRIG. GEN. NATHAN F. TWINING, left, Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, and Col.

Glen C. Jamison examining a map of the South Pacific area. Photograph taken

October 1942.

of communication. To carry out these

orders Admiral Carpender organized several task forces of which the most important were Task Forces 74 and 76. (Chart

4) The first, commanded by Rear Adm.

V. A. C. Crutchley, RN, and consisting

of Australian and American cruisers and

destroyers, was to destroy enemy ships

in the Coral and Arafura Seas and be

prepared to co-operate with South Pacific forces in the event of a major Japanese naval offensive. Task Force 76 was

the Amphibious Force which had been

organized in January 1943 under Admiral Barbey. Barbey's ships—4 APD's,

4 APC's, 12 LST's, 18 LCI's, and 18

LCT's with 10 destroyers, 8 subchasers,

4 minesweepers and 1 tug as escort—

would transport and land the attacking

troops. As ships at Kiriwina would be

vulnerable to submarine attack, Barbey

assigned 4 destroyers to cover Kiriwina

until all defenses were in, and ordered

PT boats to patrol at each island.3

Kenney's orders directed Air Vice

Marshal Bostock's Royal Australian Air

3

 ANF Opn Plan 4-43, 19 May 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 21 May 43; CTF 76 Opn Plan 1-43, 14

Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16 June 43; CTF

74 Opn Order 2-43, 18 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 24 Jun 43; Ltr, CTF 76 to COMINCH, 1 Oct

43, sub: Rpt on Opn CHRONICLE, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 43.

CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 53

Force Command to protect the lines of

communication along the east coast of

Australia and to support the defense

of forward bases, but assigned the support of the Woodlark-Kiriwina operation to the Fifth Air Force as a primary

mission. The V Bomber Command, under Col. Roger M. Ramey, was to attempt

the destruction of Japanese air power at

Rabaul, using one heavy bomb group

nightly from 25 through 30 June,

weather permitting, and to attack Japanese ships, continue its reconnaissance

missions, provide antisubmarine patrols

during daylight within two hundred

miles of the Allied bases in New Guinea,

and render close support to the ground

troops as needed. Since there were no

Japanese on the islands support bombardment was not necessary. To Brig.

Gen. Paul B. Wurtsmith's V Fighter

Command went the main burden of providing fighter escort and cover for convoys and landing operations from the

airfields at Dobodura, Port Moresby, and

Goodenough Island. Wurtsmith was also

directed to be prepared to station fighters on Woodlark and Kiriwina once the

airstrips were ready.

The 1st Air Task Force and No. 9

Operational Group of the RAAF, respectively commanded by Col. Frederic

H. Smith and Air Commodore J. E.

Hewitt, were ordered to destroy Japanese ships and aircraft threatening the

operation, and to provide antisubmarine

escort and reconnaissance. No fighter

umbrella was provided for the convoys,

a lack which the naval commanders protested vigorously but unsuccessfully.

Fighter squadrons were maintained on

ground alert at Dobodura, Milne Bay,

and Goodenough Island, ready to fly if

hostile aircraft attacked the shipping.4

The 112th Cavalry Regiment, Col.

Julian W. Cunningham commanding,

and the 158th Infantry, a separate regiment led by Col. J. Prugh Herndon, plus

substantial supporting arms and services,

had been allotted to the ALAMO Force.

Krueger organized the troops that had

come from the South Pacific—the 112th

Cavalry (a dismounted two-squadron

unit serving as infantry), the 134th Field

Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers),

the 12th Marine Defense Battalion, plus

quartermaster, port, ordnance, medical,

and engineer units, a naval base unit and

a construction battalion—into the Woodlark Task Force and ordered it to seize

and defend Woodlark and build an airfield.5

 The Kiriwina Task Force, under

Herndon's command, consisted of the

158th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion),

4

 AAF SWPA OI 36, 14 May 43, and Fifth AF OI

3, 15 May 43. Both in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 15

May 43. AdVon 5AF FO 83, 27 Jun 43; Ltr, CofS V

Fighter Comd to CG ESCALATOR, 22 Jun 43,

sub: Protection of Shipg; Rad, CTF 76 to Comdr

Seventh Flt, 23 Jun 43; Rad, CG AdVon 5 to CG

ESCALATOR, 24 Jun 43; Rad, CG ESCALATOR to CTF

76, 26 Jun 43. Last five in Sixth Army G-3 Jnl and

File No. 4, 23 Jun-1 Jul 43. CG Sixth Army, Hist

of CHRONICLE Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Aug

43; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 164-65.

The 1st Air Task Force consisted of a headquarters based at Dobodura which had operational

control of units temporarily assigned by General

Whitehead. The additional headquarters was considered necessary because the towering Owen Stanleys rendered radio communication between Port

Moresby and Dobodura somewhat temperamental.

The Fifth Air Force thus had three headquarters

as well as those of the bomber and fighter commands. See Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 164-65. 5

 A Marine Corps defense battalion consisted of

antiaircraft batteries (90-mm., 40-mm., and 20-mm.

antiaircraft guns, and searchlights) and coast artillery (155-mm. guns). A few defense battalions also

included tank platoons.
54 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

the 148th Field Artillery Battalion (105-

mm. howitzers), plus additional 155-mm.

gun units and engineer, ordnance, medical, antiaircraft, and quartermaster

troops. It was to capture and hold Kiriwina and construct an airdrome. The

first echelon of the Woodlark Force

would be carried on 6 APD's, 6 LCI's,

and 6 LST's, that of the Kiriwina Force

on 2 APD's and 12 LCI's.6

Doctrine regarding unity of command

and the passage of command from ground

to naval officers on embarkation, and

back to ground officers on landing, was

not clearly set forth in the plans. For the

relationship between naval and ground

commanders, the principle of unity of

command rather than co-operation seems

to have been followed, but it would have

been sounder to have prescribed the

exact command relationships in the

orders.

In contrast with the practice of the

South Pacific Area, where naval doctrine

prevailed, no air units were placed under

naval or ground commanders. The ultimate authority common to air, naval,

and ground units was GHQ itself. Air

liaison and support parties, however,

were set up at ALAMO Force headquarters and at Dobodura.

Krueger from the first had planned

to establish ALAMO headquarters at

Milne Bay. When reconnaissance showed

that development of the bay into a satisfactory base would constitute a sizable

operation, he and his staff pitched in to

do the job.

Assembly of the invasion force was

complicated by the fact that the Kiriwina Force was scattered from Port

Moresby to Australia. (The Woodlark

Force had come virtually intact from

the South Pacific, and was, except for

naval and air elements, concentrated at

Townsville). Movement schedules were

carefully worked out, and the first elements of the Kiriwina Force reached

their staging area at Milne Bay in early

June. It was soon apparent that assembly

of the forces could not be completed

before the third week in June. For this

reason D Day for CHRONICLE, which

would also be D Day for Nassau Bay

and New Georgia, had been set for 30

June.7

On 20 June Krueger's ALAMO headquarters opened at Milne Bay, and MacArthur and Barbey arrived shortly afterward. Within a few days all elements of

Herndon's Kiriwina Force reached the

bay. Final training of this regimental

combat team in loading and unloading

landing craft and in beach organization

was inhibited by the necessity for unloading ships and developing the base.

On the other hand the 112th Cavalrymen at Townsville were able to make

good use of the opportunity to train

uninterruptedly. Barbey's amphibious

force, Task Force 76, was also able to

train effectively, an activity that had

begun in early May.8

At Townsville and Milne Bay, soldiers

and sailors marked "loading slots" or

6

 ESCALATOR FO's 1 and 2, 2 Jun 43, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 12 and 10 Jun 43. Like Task Force

76's plans these orders included so much detail as

to constitute standing operating procedure.

7

 Rpt of Com Appointed by Gen Krueger, 25 May

43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 27 May 43; GHQ SWPA

OI 33/10, 17 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 8

May 43. 8

 CG Sixth Army, Hist of CHRONICLE Opn, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Aug 43; BYPRODUCT [Kiriwina]

TF Jnl and Hist of Kiriwina TF; CTF 76 Rpt on

CHRONICLE.
CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 55

deck-plan layouts of LST's and LCT's

on the beaches with tape, then assembled

loads in the slots to test the cargo space

allotted against the cargo assigned. All

units agreed the technique worked very

well.

During the last days of June bad

weather prevented the planned air attacks against Rabaul, but B-25's and A20's made about seventy sorties against

Lae and Salamaua. On 30 June the

weather cleared and eight B-17's and

three B-24's attacked Vunakanau airstrip at Rabaul. Bombing on this small

scale, which was all the resources in the

area would permit, continued for the

next few days while the ground troops

consolidated themselves at Woodlark

and Kiriwina.9

The Advance Parties

In early May two small engineer reconnaissance parties headed by the Sixth

Army's deputy engineer had slipped

ashore on Woodlark and Kiriwina to

gather data on airfield sites, beach conditions, and defense positions.10

 Their

reports, coupled with the fact that there

were no Japanese troops present, indicated that it would be advisable and possible to send in parties to prepare beaches

and roads in advance of the main landings. Thus CHRONICLE was unusual

among amphibious operations, for the

shore party landed ahead of the assault

troops.

At 0400, 21 June, the APD's Brooks

and Humphreys left Townsville carrying almost two hundred men of the 112th

Cavalry. They stopped at Milne Bay to

pick up more men the next day, and at

1600 left Milne Bay at high speed to

make the night run to Woodlark. The

trip was timed to keep the ships within

range of fighter cover until dusk on the

outgoing trip, and after dawn on the

return voyage. The APD's reached

Woodlark without incident, and at 0032

of 23 June the advance party, under

Maj. D. M. McMains, started landing at

Guasopa Harbor in six LCP(R)'s. Rough

seas and high winds slowed the landings,

which were not completed until 0400,

when the APD's shoved off for Milne

Bay.

The Australian coastwatcher had not

been informed before the landing. When

told that troops were coming ashore

he formed his native guerrillas in skirmish line and got ready to fight. Fortunately before anything tragic happened

he heard the invaders speaking the American variety of English and joined them.

The Brooks and Humphreys reached

Milne Bay during daylight of 23 June

and took aboard the 158th Regimental

Combat Team's shore party, a part of

the 59th Combat Engineer Company and

the 158th Infantry's communication platoon, under command of Lt. Col. Floyd

G. Powell. Departing Milne Bay at 1810,

9

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 166. 10

 This and the next two subsections are based on

Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, Ch. IX;

Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters

Army Forces Pacific [GHQ AFPAC] Engineers of

the Southwest Pacific: 1941-1945, I, Engineers in

Theater Operations (Washington, 1947), 100-102;

CG Sixth Army, Hist of CHRONICLE Opn, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Aug 43; Ltr, CTG 76.1 to CTF

76, 24 Jun 43, sub: Adv Landing LEATHERBACK.

[Woodlark], in Sixth Army G-3 Jnl and File No.

4, 23 Jun-1 Jul 43; Ltr, Col Cunningham to CG

ESCALATOR, 3 Jul 42, sub: Current Opns LEATHERBACK TF, in Sixth Army G-3 Jnl and File No. 4, 2

Jul-10 Jul 43; CTF 76 Rpt on CHRONICLE; Sixth

Army G-3 Jnl and File for the period covered;

Woodlark TF [112th Cav RCT] Opns Diary; BYPRODUCT TF Jnl and Hist of Kiriwina TF.
56 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

four hours behind schedule, they reached

Kiriwina at midnight.11 The island is

almost entirely surrounded by a coral

reef, with a five-mile-long channel winding through the reef to a 200-yard-wide

beach at Losuia on the south coast of

the main part of the island. Unloading

of the APD's went very slowly as the LCP

(R)'s threaded their way through the

channel. The tide was low, and the landing craft ran aground several times in

the darkness. Admiral Barbey also

blamed the 158th's inadequate training

for part of the delay. Daylight came before the ships were emptied; they departed with part of their loads still on

board. Three nights later they returned

to unload heavy communication and engineer equipment that had been left in

their holds. This led Barbey to recommend that APD's carry no item of equipment that could not readily be carried by

one man.

At Woodlark the advance party reconnoitered, established outposts and beach

defenses, dug wells, blasted coral obstructions out of the channels, cleared

trails and dispersal and bivouac areas,

prepared six beaching points for LST's,

and installed signs, markers, and lights

to mark channels and beaches for the

main body, which would be landing in

darkness to avoid Japanese air attacks.

Similar efforts by the Kiriwina party

were not as successful, partly because of

the delay in landing engineer equipment. A good deal of effort was expended

in building a coral causeway, 7 feet high

and 300 yards long, across the reef on

the north coast to permit a landing there.

Natives aided in this work by lugging

basketloads of coral.

The Japanese were unaware of, or

indifferent to, the advance parties; they

launched neither surface nor air attacks

against them.

The Landings

About half the Woodlark Force—units

of the 112th Cavalry, the 134th Field

Artillery Battalion, and the 12th Marine

Defense Battalion—left Townsville on

25 June aboard six LST's, with one subchaser and two destroyers as escort. The

voyage to the target was uneventful.

Landing of the 2,600 troops began at

2100 of 30 June. Unloading of the LST's

at their beaching points was rapid. Cunningham's force had borrowed extra

trucks at Townsville to permit every

item of equipment to be put aboard a

truck which was driven aboard an LST

at Townsville, then driven off at Woodlark. Emptied of their loads, the slowmoving LST's cleared Woodlark before

daylight.

Two APD's, carrying part of the

Woodlark Force from Milne Bay, arrived shortly before 0100, 1 July, but

encountered trouble in navigating the

channel with the result that landing

craft were not put into the water until

0230. The landing craft coxswains had

trouble finding the right beach, but by

0600 the APD's were emptied and ready

to leave. Some confusion had existed on

the beach, but not enough to prevent its

being cleared by the same time.

Additional echelons arrived in LCI's

and LST's on 1 July, and all these were

unloaded quickly and easily. The LST's

took 310 instead of the 317 trucks, Cun11

 Col Herndon's comments on draft MS of this

volume, attached to his 1st Ind, 16 Nov 53, to Ltr,

Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, to Col Herndon, 6

Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.
CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 57

TROOPS DISEMBARKING FROM LCI at

Kiriwina Island wade ashore, 30 June

1943.

ningham explained, because one LST

raised its bow ramp and closed its doors

before all its trucks could be driven

aboard.

On shore, defense positions were set

up. Antiaircraft and coast artillery pieces

of the 12th Defense Battalion were installed, and machine gun and 37-mm.

beach positions were established. Cargo

was moved inland, and work on the airfield began on 2 July.

Meanwhile Colonel Herndon's Kiriwina Force had been landing, but without the smoothness that characterized

operations at Woodlark. Shortly after

dawn on 30 June, twelve LCI's, which

with six escorting destroyers had sailed

from Milne Bay the previous noon, began landing their 2,250 troops. Trouble

accompanied the landing from the start.

The LCI's had great difficulty getting

through the narrow, reef-filled channel

to Red Beach near Losuia. And the

water shallowed near shore so much that

they grounded 200-300 yards from the

shoreline. The landing went slowly.12

Sunset of 30 June saw the arrival of

twelve LCT's and seven LCM's which

had left Milne Bay on 29 June and

stopped overnight at Goodenough Island. Again there were problems. Heavy

rains were falling. The tide was out.

Only one LCT was able to cross a sandbar which blocked the approach to the

jetty at Losuia. Other LCT's hung up

on the bar and were forced to wait for

the tide to float them off. The remainder

made for Red Beach but grounded

offshore with the result that much of the

gear on board had to be hand-carried

ashore. Some of the vehicles were driven

ashore, but several drowned out in the

salt water.

LCT's in subsequent echelons avoided

some of the difficulties by landing on the

north shore of Kiriwina where the coral

causeway had been built. Here trucks

could back right up onto the bow ramps

of the LCT's, but several were damaged

by sliding off the causeway.

In the absence of enemy interference

Admiral Barbey approved a change in

the original plan to move part of the

supplies to Goodenough aboard LST's,

then transship them to LCT's for the

trip to Kiriwina. After 12 July LST's

12

 Colonel Herndon stated on 16 November 1953

that part of the trouble arose from a navigational

error that caused the ships to sail past Kiriwina and

made them late. He also stated that, originally, the

main body was to land on the north coast, but that

for some reason the plan was changed and Red

Beach and Losuia Jetty were used.
58 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

NATIVES CARRYING LUGGAGE which had been deposited on the coral causeway,

north shore of Kiriwina Island, 1 July 1943.

sailed directly from Milne Bay to the

north shore of Kiriwina.

Unloading on the north shore, while

easier than at Losuia, complicated matters further for the troops ashore. Heavy

equipment was landed some distance

from the proposed airfield near Losuia.

Building the necessary roads was slowed

by heavy rains and lack of enough heavy

engineer equipment.

Base Development

Meanwhile the construction program

at Woodlark went forward. By 14 July

the airfield was near enough completion

to accommodate C-47's. One week later

5,200 feet of runway were surfaced with

coral, and on 23 July the air garrison—

the 67th Fighter Squadron which had

served on Guadalcanal in the grim days

of 1942—arrived for duty.

On Kiriwina heavy rains continued

and added to the engineers' troubles in

building and maintaining roads. All construction equipment was used on the

roads until about 10 July; during that

time the airfield site was partly cleared

with hand tools. General Krueger visited

the island on 11 July and expressed his

dissatisfaction with the progress of road

and airfield construction. Three days

later he placed Col. John T. Murray,

formerly of the 41st Division, in command of the Kiriwina Task Force and

returned Colonel Herndon to command

of the 158th Infantry. Herndon had

asked for more engineers and machinery.

These arrived after Murray took com-
CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 59

JEEP AND TRAILER LEAVING AN LST anchored off north shore of Kiriwina Island,

July 1943.

mand and thereafter the work went

faster. By D plus 20 the first airstrip,

1,500 feet long, was cleared, roughly

graded, and ready for surfacing. By the

month's end the strip was 5,000 feet long

and ready for coral. No. 79 Squadron of

the RAAF flew in and began operations

on 18 August.

Except for reconnaissance and two

small bombing attacks against Woodlark, the enemy did not react to the invasions, so that Barbey was able to transport twenty echelons to Kiriwina and

seven to Woodlark without losing a ship

or a man. By mid-August transport of

supplies and men to the two islands was

no longer a tactical mission. U.S. Army

Services of Supply was ready to relieve

Barbey of logistical responsibility.

Thus the Southwest Pacific Area, using

small forces, was able to secure two more

airfields to further the Allies' control

over the Solomon Sea.

Nassau Bay

Plans and Preparations

The invasion of Nassau Bay was designed to ease the problem of supplying

the troops that were to attack Salamaua

and Lae. They could not be wholly supplied by ship, by landing craft, by airplane, or by land. The threat of Japanese

air attacks in the restricted waters of

Huon Gulf and Vitiaz Strait, coupled

with the prevailing shortage of troop

and cargo ships, rendered the use of large

ships impractical if not impossible. The
60 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

CLEARING AIRFIELD SITE WITH HAND TOOLS, Kiriwina Island, July 1943.

shortage of landing craft and the distance limited the extent of any shore-toshore operations. The Australian troops

operating out of Wau against Salamaua

were still being supplied by air, and this

placed a heavy burden on Southwest

Pacific air transport and limited the number of ground troops that could be employed. In order to supplement air transport the Australians had begun their

road from Edie Creek at the south end

of the Bulolo Valley to the headwaters

of the Lakekamu River on the southwest coast of the Papuan peninsula, but

the tremendous difficulties inherent in

pushing roads through New Guinea

mountains slowed the Australians as

they had the Japanese. It was clear that

the opening of the Markham ValleyHuon Peninsula campaign would be delayed beyond August if it had to await

completion of the mountain highway.13

The seizure of Nassau Bay offered a

possibility of at least partially solving

these problems, a possibility which fitted

neatly into the pattern of plans already

being prepared. Nassau Bay lies less than

sixty miles from Lae, or within range

of the landing craft of the 2d Engineer

Special Brigade which GHQ expected

to employ, and it is just a short distance

down the Papuan coast from Salamaua.

Troops of the 3d Australian Division

were operating inland from Nassau Bay

at this time. Seizure of the bay by a

shore-to-shore movement from Morobe,

then held by the U.S. 162d Infantry

13

 USSBS, Employment of Forces, pp. 21-22; ALF,

Rpt on New Guinea Opns: Wau-Salamaua, 22 Jan13 Sep 43; Memo, Comdr ALF for GHQ SWPA, 5

May 43, sub: Warning Instns, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 6 May 43.
CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 61

of the 41st Division, would provide a

means by which the Australians getting

ready to attack Salamaua could be supplied by water to supplement the air

drops, and would also provide a staging

point for the shore-to-shore movement

of an entire Australian division to a

point east of Lae. Therefore GHQ and

New Guinea Force headquarters decided

to seize Nassau Bay on the same day that

Woodlark, Kiriwina, and New Georgia

were invaded. The troops seizing Nassau

Bay would then join forces with 3d

Australian Division and press against

Salamaua in order to keep the Japanese

from deducing that the Allies were planning a major assault against Lae.14

General Blarney was supposed to assume personal command of the New

Guinea Force for the Markham ValleyHuon Peninsula operations but the pressure of his duties kept him in Australia

until August. Pending his arrival in New

Guinea Lt. Gen. E. F. Herring of the

Australian Army retained command of

the New Guinea Force and operated

under Blamey's headquarters instead of

GHQ as originally planned. Maj. Gen.

Stanley G. Savige, General Officer Commanding the 3d Australian Division, had

tactical command of the operations

against Salamaua. Troops of the U.S.

162d Regimental Combat Team, which

was assigned to Nassau Bay and subsequent operations against Salamaua,

would come under General Savige's control once they were ashore.

When the Australians had defeated

the Japanese attempt to capture Wau,

they pursued the retreating enemy out

of the Bulolo Valley and down through

the mountains to a point inland from

Nassau Bay. In preparation for Nassau

Bay and the attack on Salamaua, Savige

ordered his division to push against Salamaua from the west and south. He directed the MacKechnie Force, essentially

a battalion combat team of the 162d Infantry, to make the initial landing at

Nassau Bay and operate on the right

(east) flank of his 17th Brigade. At the

same time the 24th Australian Infantry

Battalion would create a diversion by

operating against the Japanese detachments in the Markham Valley and establishing an ambush on the Huon Gulf at

the mouth of the Buang River, halfway

between Lae and Salamaua. (Map 6}

From 20 through 23 June the Japanese

counterattacked the 17th Brigade's positions in the vicinity of Mubo and Lababia Ridge, a 3,000-foot eminence that is

surrounded by the Bitoi and Buyawim

Rivers and has a commanding view of

Nassau Bay to the southeast, Bitoi Ridge

to the north, and the Komiatum Track

which served as the line of communications from Salamaua to the Japanese

facing the Australians. The Japanese

fought hard but failed to budge the 17th

Brigade. Starting on 23 June they retired

a short distance to the north. On 30 June

Savige's 15th Brigade was attacking Bobdubi and the 17th Brigade, facing north,

was holding Mubo and Lababia Ridge.15

14

 GHQ SWPA OI 33, 7 May 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 8 May 43; Ltr, Land Hq [ALF] to Gen

Off Commanding NGF, 17 May 43, sub: POSTERNSeizure Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang Area,

in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 7 Jun 43; GHQ SWPA OI

34, 13 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 14 Jun 43.

15

 ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns: Wau-Salamaua, 22 Jan-13 Sep 43; Incl 1, Tactical Sit to 1630,

30 Jun 43, to GHQ SWPA G-2 Daily Summary of

Enemy Int and G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 465, 30 Jun1 Jul 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 1 Jul 43.
62 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MAP 6

The MacKechnie Force, designated to

land at Nassau Bay on 30 June, consisted

of the reinforced 1st Battalion, 162d

Infantry. In command was Col. Archibald R. MacKechnie, commander of the

162d. This regiment had arrived in New

Guinea from Australia in February 1943.

Organized in March, the MacKechnie

Force moved by land marches and seaborne movements in landing craft and

trawlers from the Buna-Sanananda area

to Morobe, where it set up defensive

positions to protect an advanced PT boat

base. For Nassau Bay the force was augmented by American and Australian

units.16

By late June the 3d Battalion, 162d,

had relieved the MacKechnie Force of

the mission of defending Morobe. Thirty

days' supply and ten units of fire had

been assembled. The troops trained for

the landing by boarding PT boats, then

transferring at sea to LCVP's, and debarking on beaches from the landing

craft. On the night of 28 June the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon,

162d, outposted the islands lying offshore between Nassau Bay and Mageri

Point about ten miles north-northwest

of Morobe, where the invasion was to

be mounted, in order to install lights

to guide the invasion flotilla. Colonel

MacKechnie flew to the Bulolo Valley

for a conference with General Savige,

and at his request Savige dispatched one

of his companies from Lababia Ridge

to the mouth of the Bitoi River to divert

Japanese attention from Nassau Bay. As

16

 162d Inf Rpt of Opns, 29 Jun-12 Sep 43, in

Morobe-Nassau-Bitoi Ridge-Mt. Tambu-Tambu

Bay-Salamaua Area of New Guinea; William F. McCartney, The Jungleers: A History of the 41st Infantry Division (Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1948), p. 51; Ltr, Col MacKechnie to Gen

Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 20 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.

The augmented MacKechnie Force consisted of

Lt. Col. Harold R. Taylor's 1st Battalion, 162d;

one platoon of the regimental Antitank Company;

part of the regimental Service Company; one company of the 116th Engineer Battalion; elements of

the 116th Medical Battalion and a portable surgical

hospital; the 218th Field Artillery Battalion (75-

mm. pack howitzers), less A Battery; detachments

from the 41st Division signal, quartermaster, and

ordnance companies; detachments of the Combined

Operational Service Command and the Australian

New Guinea Administrative Unit, a military organization in charge of native affairs; a detachment

of C Battery, 209th Coast Artillery Battalion (Antiaircraft); A Company, Papuan Infantry Battalion

(native enlisted men and Australian officers); and

A and D Companies of the 532d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment, 2d Engineer Special Brigade.
CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 63

the landing was to be made in darkness,

one platoon of this company was sent to

the landing beach to set up lights to

guide the landing craft. Company A,

Papuan Infantry Battalion, of the MacKechnie Force, reconnoitered to Cape

Dinga just south of Nassau Bay, and one

of its scouts even sneaked into the enemy

camp at Cape Dinga and spent the night

with the Japanese. On the basis of the

Papuan Infantry Battalion's reports it

was estimated 300-400 Japanese were

in the vicinity of Nassau Bay, and about

75 more near the south arm of the Bitoi

River.17

The Enemy

This estimate was somewhat exaggerated. Present at Cape Dinga were about

a hundred men of the 102d Infantry, 51st

Division, and about fifty sailors of a naval

guard unit.18 The Japanese were expecting an Allied landing to come in Huon

Gulf rather than at Nassau Bay, and

had made their dispositions accordingly.

General Adachi, commanding the 18th

Army from his headquarters at Madang,

had been carrying out the 8th Area Army

commander's orders to strengthen Wewak, Madang, Finschhafen, and especially Lae and Salamaua to protect Vitiaz

Strait while preparing to attack Wau,

Bena Bena, and Mount Hagen and infiltrate the Ramu and Sepik River Valleys.

(See below, Map 12.) The Madang-Lae

Highway was still under construction

but had been pushed only to the Finisterre Range which parallels the north

coast of the Huon Peninsula. The Japanese correctly estimated that the Allies

planned to use the air base sites in the

mountain valleys to support their advances along the coast. Therefore they

planned the moves against Wau and

against Bena Bena and Mount Hagen,

two outposts that had been used since

1942. The 6th Air Division, based in the

Wewak area, was ordered to attack these

points daily.

In command at Lae was Maj. Gen.

Ryoichi Shoge, infantry group commander of the 41st Division. His command at this time was largely transient,

as the 18th Army was sending troops

through Lae to strengthen Salamaua.

Since the March disaster in the Bismarck

Sea, some troops had been landed at Lae

from submarines, forty men per boat;

others came in barges and destroyers to

Cape Gloucester from Rabaul, thence to

Finschhafen by barge and overland or

by barge to Lae. In April and May the

66th Infantry (less the 3d Battalion),

51st Division, had been transferred to

Salamaua from Lae, and elements of the

115th Infantry, the 14th Artillery Regiment, and the 51st Engineer Regiment,

all of the 51st Division, staged through

Lae for Salamaua. At Salamaua Lt. Gen.

Hidemitsu Nakano, commander of the

51st Division, was directing operations.

The third infantry regiment of Nakano's division, the 102d, had made the

January attack against Wau and had

been almost continuously in action since

that time.

17

 162d Inf Rpt of Opns; McCartney, The Jungleers, p. 52. 18

 This subsection is based on 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. no (OCMH),

pp. 43-45; 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 1-22; 18th Army Operations, Annex B (Maps), Japanese Monogr No. 47

(OCMH); Hist Div MIS GHQ FEC, Statements of

Japanese Officials on World War II (English Translations), IV, 119-20, OCMH; Interrogation of

Adachi et al., by Mil Hist Sec, Australian Army

Hq, OCMH.
64 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

By the end of June Nakano had six

thousand men under his command. The

Japanese defensive positions included the

high ground inland from the shore—

Mount Tambu, Komiatum, and Bobdubi.

Landing of the MacKechnie Force

As dusk fell at Morobe on 29 June

three PT boats of the Seventh Fleet took

aboard 210 men of the MacKechnie

Force. A fourth PT, without passengers,

escorted.19 At the same time twenty-nine

LCVP's, two Japanese barges, and one

LCM of the 532d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment took the other 770 men

of the MacKechnie Force on board at

Mageri Point. The landing craft were

organized in three waves which departed

Mageri at twenty-minute intervals. The

night was dark, the sea heavy; rain was

falling.

The first two waves rendezvoused with

the two PT boats from Morobe which

were to guide them to the target but the

third missed and proceeded on the fortymile run to Nassau Bay without a guide.

Thus far things had gone fairly well

but the remainder of the night was full

of troubles. The rain obscured the guide

lights on the offshore islands. The escorting PT lost the convoy. The lead PT

overshot Nassau Bay. Some of the landing craft of the first wave followed it,

then lost time turning around and finding the convoy again.

The landing began, in rainy darkness,

shortly after midnight. The Australian

platoon on shore had lost its way and

arrived at Nassau Bay, in time to install

only two instead of three lights. Thus

the first two waves of landing craft intermingled and landed together on the

same stretch of beach. And a ten- to

twelve-foot surf, a rare occurrence at Nassau Bay, was pounding. It rammed the

landing craft so far up on the beach that

seventeen of them could not back off but

promptly broached and filled with water,

almost complete wrecks. The LCM, after

unloading a bulldozer, was able to retract; it proceeded out to sea and got

the troops off the lead PT boat, and then

returned to the beach where it swamped.

There was no enemy opposition, nor

any casualties. Japanese in an outpost at

the beach had fled into the jungle, believing, prisoners reported later, that

the bulldozer was a tank. Except for the

landing craft, there were no serious losses

of equipment, but most of the radios

were damaged by salt water.

Seven hundred and seventy men were

landed that night.20 The leader of the

third wave, which arrived hours after

the first two, realized that his craft were

the only ones immediately available for

resupply and decided not to land until

the surf abated. He took the barge and

the rest of the LCVP's, with B Company

19

 This subsection is based on McCartney, The

Jungleers, pp. 52-55; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 136-37; Office of the Chief Engineer, GHQ AFPAC, Engineers of the Southwest

Pacific: 1941-1945, VIII, Critique (Washington,

1951), 84-85; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns:

Wau-Salamaua, 22 Jan-13 Sep 43; Ltr, Brig Gen

William F. Heavey, CO 2d ESB, to Chief Engr

SWPA, 13 Jul 43, sub: Rpt on Nassau Bay Opns,

in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 19 Jul 43; GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl for period covered; 41st Div G-3 Jnl and

File for period covered; 162d Inf Rpt of Opns, and

Jnl and Files for period covered; Ltr, Gen Heavey

to CofEngrs USA, 30 Jun 44, sub: Rpt of Combat

Opns, DRB AGO; MacKechnie, Notes on Nassau

Bay-Mubo-Tambu Bay-Salamaua Opns, 29 Jun-12

Sep 43, no date, DRB AGO.

20

 The first report gave 740 but was soon corrected. See msgs in 41st Div G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun 43.
CARTWHEEL BEGINS: THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 65

on board, to shelter in a cove down the

coast. When the storm subsided they returned to Nassau Bay but failed to make

contact with the troops, who were beating off a Japanese attack. The wave returned to Mageri Point, then went back

to Nassau Bay and landed on the afternoon of 2 July.

Once on shore A and C Companies,

162d Infantry, established defense lines

three hundred yards north and south,

respectively, of the landing beach. The

Australian platoon defended the west (inland) flank. There was no contact with

the enemy that night. By daybreak of

30 June the beach was cleared of all

ammunition, equipment, and supplies.

Beach defenses, employing machine guns

salvaged from the wrecked landing craft,

were set up. Communication with higher

headquarters was a problem. Most of the

water-soaked radios would not work, and

during the first few days Colonel MacKechnie was out of contact with New

Guinea Force, 41st Division headquarters, and Morobe at one time or another.

Nothing was heard from the Papuan Infantry Battalion elements on the other

side of Cape Dinga for several days. All

the SCR's 511 and 536, the small hand

radios used for tactical communication

within infantry battalions, had been

soaked and were never usable during

the subsequent operations against Salamaua.

After daylight of 30 June C Company

marched south to the Tabali River just

west of Cape Dinga. Company A started

north from its night positions to clear

the area as far as the south arm of the

Bitoi River but soon ran into enemy

mortar and machine gun fire (its first

such experience) and halted. Patrols went

out and reported the enemy as present

in some strength. Then A Company, reinforced by a platoon of D Company,

2/6th Australian Infantry Battalion of

the 17th Brigade, which had flashed the

landing lights, attempted to strike the

Japanese right (west) flank but was

stopped. When the Australian platoon

ran out of ammunition it was relieved by

a detachment of engineers from the crews

of the wrecked landing craft. Two of the

C Company platoons came up from the

south to join A Company. At 1500 the

force started forward and by 1650 had

brushed away scattered Japanese opposition to reach the south arm of the Bitoi

River.

When General Adachi received word

of the invasion his first thought was to

destroy the MacKechnie Force before it

had a chance to consolidate. But General

Nakano persuaded him that it would be

better to "delay the enemy advance in

NASSAU from a distance" and to concentrate on the Australian threat at Bobdubi.21

 So no more enemy troops were

sent against MacKechnie. Meanwhile the

Papuan Infantry Battalion troops began

pressing against the rear of the Japanese

detachment at Cape Dinga. This detachment began moving toward the American beachhead.

About 1630 the C Company platoon

defending the left (south) flank reported

that Japanese troops were crossing the

Tabali River just south of its position,

whereupon it was ordered to withdraw

to the south flank of the landing beach

proper to hold a line between the beach

and a swamp which began a short dis21

 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr

No. 42 (OCMH), 14.
66 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

tance inland. Before the platoon could

move, Japanese troops attacked its rear

and flank. The platoon fought its way

north, losing its commander and four

enlisted men killed on the way.

While the platoon was withdrawing,

Capt. Paul A. Cawlfield, MacKechnie

Force S-3, organized a defense line at the

beach using engineers, part of D Company, and men from force headquarters.

At dusk the harassed platoon reached

this line, and then the enemy struck in a

series of attacks that lasted all night.

Machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire and

grenades hit the American positions, and

small parties attempted to infiltrate. But

the American units, in action for the

first time, beat off the attackers who,

except for scattered riflemen that were

hunted down and killed, pulled out just

before sunrise. The MacKechnie Force

estimated that it had killed fifty Japanese. Its own casualties were eighteen

killed, twenty-seven wounded. Colonel

MacKechnie later asserted that in his

opinion several of the American casualties were caused by American troops firing at each other in the excitement of

the night action.

By 2 July, with the landing of B Company and other elements of the third

wave, the Nassau Bay beachhead was

considered secure. On that date the

Americans made contact with the 17th

Brigade, and the MacKechnie Force

made ready to execute its missions in

the northward drive against Salamaua.

Thus with the landings at Woodlark,

Kiriwina, and Nassau Bay, General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area inaugurated CARTWHEEL. Compared with the

massive strokes of 1944 and 1945, the

operations were small, but they gave invaluable amphibious experience to soldiers and sailors and they began a forward movement that was not halted until

final victory.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the

Solomon Sea, Admiral Halsey's South

Pacific forces had executed their first

CARTWHEEL missions by invading New

Georgia.
CHAPTER VI

TOENAILS: The Landings in New Georgia

The South Pacific's tactical and logistical planning for the invasion of New

Georgia (TOENAILS, or Operation A) involved all the major echelons of the

complex command that was Admiral

Halsey's. Halsey's position was somewhat

unusual. As he phrased it, the Joint

Chiefs' orders of 28 March "had the curious effect of giving me two 'hats' in the

same echelon."

 1 His immediate superior

in the chain of command was Admiral

Nimitz, who was responsible, subject to

decisions by the Joint Chiefs, for supplying him with the means of war. For the

strategic direction of the war in the Solomons MacArthur was Halsey's superior.

South Pacific Organization

Whereas MacArthur's headquarters

followed U.S. Army organization, Halsey's followed that of the Navy.2

 There

were many more subordinates, such as

island commanders, reporting directly

to Halsey than reporting to MacArthur,

and the South Pacific was never organized as simply as the Southwest Pacific.

Halsey, by the device of not appointing

a single tactical commander of all naval

forces, retained personal control of them.

There was a single commander of landbased aircraft, but there was never a

single ground force commander with

complete tactical authority. (Chart 5)

Naval forces, designated the Third

Fleet in March 1943, came generally from

the U.S. Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy. Except for New Zealand

ships, no warships were ever permanently assigned; as need arose Nimitz

dispatched warships to the South Pacific.

The South Pacific Amphibious Force

(Task Force 32), on the other hand, was

a permanent organization to which landing forces were attached for amphibious

operations. In command was Rear Adm.

Richmond K. Turner who had led the

Amphibious Force in the invasion of

Guadalcanal the year before.

Land-based air units from all Allied

services in the South Pacific were under

the operational control of the Commander, Aircraft, South Pacific, Admiral

Fitch. Fitch's command, Task Force 33,

was made up of Royal New Zealand and

U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps air

units. Principal administrative organizations within Task Force 33 were General

Twining's Thirteenth Air Force and the

1

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

154. 2

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based

on The History of the United States Army Forces

in the South Pacific Area [USAFISPA] During

World War II: 30 March 1942-1 August 1944, MS,

Pt. II, Chs. I-II, IV, and Pt. III, Vol. I, Ch. I,

OCMH.

TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 69

1st and 2d Marine Air Wings. The most

important tactical organization in Fitch's

force was the interservice, international

outfit known as Air Command, Solomons, that had grown out of the exigencies of the Guadalcanal Campaign.3

 Fitch

issued general directives which were

executed under the tactical direction of

the Commander, Aircraft, Solomons,

who until 25 July 1943 was Rear Adm.

Marc A. Mitscher.

There were two principal ground force

commanders in early 1943. The first,

General Harmon, an experienced airman who had served as Chief of Air

Staff in Washington, was the commanding general of U.S. Army Forces in the

South Pacific Area; his command embraced air as well as ground troops. His

authority was largely administrative and

logistical, but he also advised the area

commander on tactical matters and Halsey throughout the period of active operations relied heavily on him. Under Harmon, in early 1943, were four infantry

divisions, the Americal, 25th, 37th, and

43d, as well as the Thirteenth Air Force.

The Americal and 25th Divisions had

fought in the Guadalcanal Campaign.

The 43d Division had seen no fighting

but had received valuable experience

when elements of the division took part

in the invasion of the Russells. The 37th,

which had gone out the year before to

garrison the Fijis, was as yet untried. In

addition to these divisions, which usually

fought under the tactical command of

the XIV Corps, there were, in Harmon's

command, the Army garrison troops in

the island bases and a growing number,

but never enough to satisfy the local

commanders, of service units. By mid1943 Harmon's command embraced

about 275,000 men.

The Marine Corps counterpart to

Harmon's command, as far as ground

forces were concerned, was the I Marine

Amphibious Corps. This organization,

under Maj. Gen. Clayton B. Vogel,

USMC, had administrative responsibility

over all Marine Corps units, except ships'

detachments and certain air units, in the

South Pacific—two Marine divisions, one

raider regiment, six defense battalions,

one parachute regiment, and service

troops. The 1st Marine Division in the

Southwest Pacific was nominally administered by the I Marine Amphibious

Corps but drew its supplies from Southwest Pacific agencies.

The highest logistic agency, the Service Squadron, South Pacific Force, operated directly under Halsey. It controlled

all ships, distributed all supplies locally

procured, assigned shipping space, designated ports, and handled all naval procurement. An equally important logistic

agency was the Army's Services of Supply,

South Pacific Area. In early 1943 under

Maj. Gen. Robert G. Breene it was an

expanding organization which was playing an important part in South Pacific

affairs.

The organization of the South Pacific,

as set forth on paper, seems complicated

and unwieldy. Perhaps it could have

functioned awkwardly, but the personalities and abilities of the senior commanders were such that they made it work.

There is ample testimony in various reports to attest to the high regard in which

the aggressive, forceful Halsey and his

subordinates held one another, and

3

 During the Guadalcanal Campaign the senior

naval aviator on the island commanded all aircraft

there, with the informal title of COMAIR CACTUS.

70 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

events showed that the South Pacific was

able to plan and conduct offensive operations involving units from all Allied

armed services with skill and success.

Preparations and Plans

Admiral Halsey and his officers had

begun planning and preparing for New

Georgia in January 1943, before the end

of the Guadalcanal Campaign. This process, which involved air and naval bombardments, the assembly of supplies, and

reconnaissance of the target area, as well

as the preparation and issuance of operation plans and field orders, continued

right up to D Day, 30 June.

The Target

In climate, topography, and development, the Solomons are much like New

Guinea and the Bismarcks. Their interiors were virtually unexplored. They

are hot, jungled, wet, swampy, mountainous, and unhealthful.4

New Georgia is the name for a large

group in the central Solomons which

includes Vella Lavella, Gizo, Kolombangara, New Georgia (the main island

of the group), Rendova, and Vangunu,

Simbo, Ganonnga, Wana Wana, Arundel, Bangga, Mbulo, Gatukai, Tetipari

(or Montgomery), and a host of islets and

reefs. (Map 7) From Vella Lavella to

Gatukai, the cluster is 125 nautical miles

in length. Several of the islands have symmetrical volcanic cones rising over 3,000

feet above sea level.

In addition to the multitude of small

channels, narrows, and passages, navigable only by small craft, there are several large bodies of water in the group.

The Slot, the channel sailed so frequently

by the Japanese during the Guadalcanal

Campaign, lies between New Georgia

on one side and Choiseul and Santa Isabel on the other. Marovo Lagoon on New

Georgia's northeast side is one of the

largest in the world. Vella Gulf separates

Vella Lavella from Kolombangara, which

is set off from New Georgia by Kula Gulf.

Blanche Channel divides New Georgia

from Rendova and Tetipari.

The island of New Georgia proper,

the sixth largest in the Solomons, is about

forty-five statute miles long on its northwest-southeast axis, and about thirty

miles from southwest to northeast. It is

mountainous in the interior, low but

very rough in the vicinity of Munda

Point.

New Georgia proper was difficult to

get to by sea except in a few places. Reefs

and a chain of barrier islands blocked

much of the coast line, which in any event

was frequently covered by mangrove

swamps with tough aerial prop roots.

The best deepwater approach was the

Kula Gulf which boasted a few inlets,

but Japanese warships and seacoast guns

defended much of the shore line of the

gulf. There were protected anchorages

in the southeast part of the island at

Wickham Anchorage, Viru Harbor, and

Segi Point. Munda Point, the airfield

site, was inaccessible to large vessels.

East and west of the point visible islets

and reefs, and also invisible ones, barred

Roviana and Wana Wana lagoons to

large ships. Rounding the lagoons like a

crude fence on the seaward side is a

tangled string of islands, rocks, and coral

reefs—Roviana, Sasavele, Baraulu, and

4

 Data for this subsection are taken from U.S.

Navy hydrographic charts; military maps; MIS

WDGS, Survey of the Solomon Islands; a terrain

study in 37th Div records.
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 71

others, some with names, some without.

These all have cliffs facing the sea (south)

and slope down to sea level on the lagoon

side. The channels between the barrier

islands were too shallow for ships. Nor

could ships reach Munda Point from

Kula Gulf and Hathorn Sound. Diamond

Narrows, running from Kula Gulf to

the lagoons, was deep but too narrow

for large vessels.

Across Blanche Channel from Munda

and her guardian islands lies mountainous Rendova, which could be reached

from the Solomon Sea. Rendova Harbor,

though by no means a port, offered an

anchorage to ocean-going ships.

During the first months of 1943 coastwatchers covered the Solomons thoroughly. Buka Passage, between Bougainville and Buka, and Buin on southern

Bougainville had been the sites of coastwatching stations for several months, and

in October 1942 flying boats and submarines took watchers to Vella Lavella,

Choiseul, and Santa Isabel.5

At Segi Point on New Georgia was

Donald G. Kennedy, a New Zealander

who was District Officer in the Protectorate Government. Like Resident Commissioner William S. Marchant, the Anglican Bishop of Melanesia, and various

other officials and members of religious

orders, Kennedy remained in the Solomons when the Japanese came.6

 At Segi

Point Kennedy organized a network of

white and Melanesian watchers covering Kolombangara, Rendova, Vangunu,

Santa Isabel, and Roviana. A Euronesian

medical practitioner was posted on Santa

Isabel. On Roviana Sgt. Harry Wickham

of the British Solomon Islands Defense

Force organized the natives to keep watch

over Munda Point.

Kennedy raised a guerrilla band to

protect his hideout at Segi Point, for

the Japanese occasionally sent out punitive expeditions to hunt him down. The

primary mission of the coastwatchers

was watching, not fighting, but Kennedy

and his band were strong enough to

wipe out several patrols that came too

close. On one occasion Kennedy and his

men, aboard the ten-ton schooner Dadavata, saw a Japanese whaleboat systematically reconnoitering the islets in Marovo

Lagoon. They attacked with rifles,

rammed the whaleboat, sank it, and

killed or drowned its company.7

In addition to gaining information

from terrain studies, interrogation of

former residents, and coastwatchers' reports, South Pacific headquarters was

able to augment its knowledge of New

Georgia by a series of ground patrols.

The first such expedition was directed

by General Vogel. Four officers and eight

enlisted men from each of the four battalions of the 1st Marine Raider Regiment assembled on Guadalcanal on 17

March, then sailed to Florida to board

amphibian patrol planes (PBY's) which

took them to Segi Point. After Kennedy

furnished them with native scouts and

bearers, patrols went out to reconnoiter

Kolombangara, Viru Harbor, Munda

Point, and other areas. Traveling overland and by canoe, they carefully exam5

 By July, unfortunately, the Japanese were hunting the Bougainville coastwatchers so resolutely

that the stations there had to be abandoned. See

Feldt, The Coastwatchers, Ch. XI. 6

 [British] Central Office of Information, Among

Those Present: The Official Story of the Pacific

Islands at War (London: His Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1946), pp. 11, 43. 7

 Ibid., p. 52.
72 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ined caves, anchorages, and passages.

Their mission completed, all parties reassembled at Segi Point on 9 April.

The raiders' reports indicated that

troops in small craft could be taken

through Onaiavisi Entrance to a 200-

yard-long beach at Zanana, east of the

Barike River. From there they could

strike westward toward Munda.8 Before

D Day, additional patrols from the invading forces went to New Georgia and

stayed.

From November 1942 until D Day,

Munda and Vila airfields were continuously subjected to air and naval bombardments. Vila, located in a swampy

region, was practically never used by

the enemy. From January until D Day,

Allied cruisers and destroyers shelled

Munda four times at night, Vila three

times. The net result of the continuous

air bombardment and the sporadic naval

shelling was that the Japanese could not

base planes permanently at Munda. It

was used, and only occasionally, as a forward staging field.9

Logistic Preparations

On Halsey's orders South Pacific agencies had begun assembling supplies and

developing bases and anchorages for the

invasion of New Georgia as early as January 1943. Admiral Turner, remembering his experiences in the Guadalcanal

Campaign, suggested that supplies for

the invasion be stockpiled on Guadalcanal, and in February movement of

supplies to Guadalcanal (under the appropriate code name DRYGOODS) began.

In spite of the fact that the port of Noumea, New Caledonia, was jammed with

ships waiting to be unloaded, in spite of

the fact that port facilities at Guadalcanal were so poor, and in spite of a

bad storm at Guadalcanal in May that

destroyed all the floating quays, washed

out bridges, and created general havoc,

enough supplies for the invasion were

ready on Guadalcanal by June. This

was accomplished by Herculean labor at

Noumea, by routing some ships directly

to Guadalcanal, and by selective discharge of cargo from other ships. The

effects of the storm at Guadalcanal were

alleviated by using the ungainly-looking 21⁄2-ton, six-wheel amphibian truck

(DUKW) to haul supplies from ships to

inland dumps over open beaches. By

June 54,274 tons of supplies, exclusive

of organization equipment, maintenance

supplies, and petroleum products discharged from tankers, had been put

ashore. In addition many loaded vehicles,

13,085 tons of assorted gear, and 23,775

drums of fuel and lubricants were moved

from Guadalcanal to the Russells in

June. Bulk gasoline storage tanks with

a capacity of nearly 80,000 barrels were

available on Guadalcanal.10 Although

8

 I Mar Amphib Corps, Report on New Georgia

Ground Reconnaissance: 21 March-9 April 43, 18

Apr 43. 9

 Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp.

322-47; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier,

pp. 106-10; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Washington, 1946),

I, 142, 192; USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against

Rabaul, p. 43; USSBS, The Thirteenth Air Force in

the War Against Japan, p. 6; Southeast Area Naval

Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 49 (OCMH),

19; Southeast Area Air Operations, 1942-44, Japanese Monogr No. 38 (OCMH), pp. 7-11.

10

 COMSOPAC War Diary, 1 Jan 43 entry; Extract of recommendations submitted by COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC, Incl F to memo, Gen Peck for

Gen Breene et al., 16 Jan 43, sub: Notes on Mtg

Held in War Plans See COMSOPAC, 14 Jan 43, in

USAFISPA File No. 381, Preliminary Plng COMSOPAC and COMGENSOPAC, Jan-June 43, KCRC;
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 73

Noumea and Espiritu Santo in the New

Hebrides were still the main South Pacific bases, Guadalcanal was ready to play

an important role. The South Pacific

commanders had insured that haphazard

supply methods would not characterize

TOENAILS.

Tactical Plans

Final plans and orders for TOENAILS

were ready in June.11 Halsey had hoped

to invade New Georgia in April, but

could not move before the Southwest

Pacific was ready to move into the Trobriands and Nassau Bay. The general

concept of the operation was worked out

by Admiral Halsey, a planning committee, and members of Halsey's staff. The

committee consisted of General Harmon,

the Army commander; Admiral Fitch,

the land-based air commander; Admiral

Turner, the amphibious commander;

and General Vogel of the I Marine Amphibious Corps. The principal staff officers concerned were Admiral Wilkinson;

Captain Browning, Halsey's chief of staff;

and General Peck, Halsey's war plans

officer. By May agreement was reached

on the general plan. It called for the

simultaneous seizure of Rendova, Viru

Harbor, Wickham Anchorage, and Segi

Point. A fighter field would be built at

Segi Point. After the initial landings

small craft from Guadalcanal and the

Russells would stage through Wickham

Anchorage and Viru Harbor to build

up Rendova's garrison. Munda's field

would be harassed and neutralized by

155-mm. guns and 105-mm. howitzers

emplaced on Rendova and the nearer

barrier islands. These moves were preparatory to the full-scale assaults against

Munda and Vila, and later against southern Bougainville.

Assigned to the operation were South

Pacific aircraft, warships, the South Pacific Amphibious Force, and the heavily

reinforced 43d Division with its commander, Maj. Gen. John H. Hester, in

command of the landing forces. The 37th

Division, less elements, was in area reserve to be committed only on Halsey's

orders.

Final plans and tactical organization

were complicated, as TOENAILS called for

four separate simultaneous invasions

(Rendova, Wickham Anchorage, Segi

Point, and Viru Harbor) with the Rendova landing to be followed by two more

on the same island.

Admiral Halsey's basic plan, issued on

3 June, organized the task forces, prescribed their general missions, and directed Admiral Turner to co-ordinate the

planning of the participating forces. Four

task forces were assigned to the operation: Task Force 33, the Aircraft, South

Pacific, under Admiral Fitch; Task Force

72, a group of Seventh Fleet submarines

Ltr, COMSOPAC to COMGENSOPAC et al., 24

Feb 43, sub: Assembly of Sups for Future Opns, in

USAFISPA G-2 Hist Sec File, Plng for New

Georgia Opn, OCMH; The History of USAFISPA,

Pt. I, Vol. I, p. 178, and Pt. III, pp. 649-51, 661, 669,

673-74, OCMH; ONI USN, Operations in the New

Georgia Area, p. 3. 11

 Two files previously cited, USAFISPA G-2 Hist

Sec File, Plng for New Georgia Opn, and USAFISPA File No. 381, Preliminary Plng COMSOPAC

and COMGENSOPAC, contain valuable material for

the student interested in the genesis and development of tactical plans. This subsection is based on

these two files and on Hq NGOF FO 1, 16 Jun 43,

and Addendum 1, 24 Jun 43; 43d Div FO 1, 17

Jun 43; COMSOPAC Opn Plan 14-43, 3 Jun 43,

with annexes; CTF 31 Opn Plan A8-43, 4 Jun 43,

with annexes; CTG 31.3 Opn Order AL 10-43, 21

Jun 43; CTG 31.1 Loading Order 1-43, 13 Jun 43;

CTG 31.3 Loading Order 1-43, 16 Jun 43. Last five

in Off of Naval Rcds and Library.
74 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

CHART 6—ORGANIZATION OF SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES FOR TOENAILS

commanded by Capt. James F. Fife and

now under Halsey's operational control;

Task Force 36, the naval covering force

commanded, in effect, by Halsey himself;

and Task Force 31, the attack force.

(Chart 6)

Task Force 33, to which Halsey temporarily assigned planes from Carrier

Division 22 (three escort carriers), was

to provide defensive reconnaissance for

New Georgia operations and the Southwest Pacific's seizure of Woodlark and

Kiriwina, and to cover the area northeast of the Solomons (Southwest Pacific

planes were responsible for the Bismarcks). It was to destroy enemy units

which threatened South and Southwest

Pacific forces, especially Japanese planes

operating from New Georgia and southern Bougainville. Fitch's planes were also

to provide fighter cover, direct air support, and liaison and spotting planes for

the attack force. Starting D minus 5, Task

Force 33 would attempt to isolate the

battlefield by attacking the Japanese air

bases at Munda, Ballale, Kahili, Kieta,

and Vila, and by striking at surface vessels in the Bougainville and Munda

areas. During daylight, fighters would

cover ships and ground troops, and antisubmarine patrols would be maintained

for convoys. Black Cats (PBY's) would

cover all night movements. Striking

forces at all times were to be prepared
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 75

to hit enemy surface ships. Beginning

on D Day, eighteen dive bombers would

remain on stand-by alert in the Russells.

Medium bombers were to be prepared

to support the ground troops. Finally,

arrangements were made for air dropping supplies and equipment to the

ground troops in New Georgia.

One innovation in the command of

supporting planes had apparently arisen

from Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift's recommendations based on his

experiences in invading Guadalcanal.12

Halsey directed that on take-off from

Guadalcanal and Russells fields planes

assigned to missions in the immediate

area of operations would come under

control of the local air commander (the

Commander, New Georgia Air Force).

Direction of fighters over Task Force 31

was to be conducted by a group aboard

a destroyer until direction could be conducted ashore on Rendova. Similarly,

bomber direction for direct air support

would be handled aboard Turner's flagship McCawley until bomber director

groups could establish themselves ashore.

In early June, Fitch issued orders concentrating most of his strength in the

Guadalcanal area under Admiral Mitscher.13

 Totals for aircraft involved were

fairly impressive. On 30 June Fitch had

on hand for the operation 533 planes, of

which 213 fighters, 170 light bombers,

and 72 heavy bombers were ready to

fly.14

Task Force 36 included part of the

37th Division on Guadalcanal in area

reserve, besides all Halsey's naval

strength except that assigned to the attack force. Naval units, including aircraft carriers (two CV's and three

CVE's), battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, would operate out of Noumea,

New Caledonia, and the New Hebrides

into the Coral and Solomon Seas to intercept and destroy any Japanese forces

which ventured out. The reserve 37th

Division forces were to be committed,

on five days' notice, on orders from

Halsey.

Captain Fife's submarines would at

first conduct offensive reconnaissance

from about latitude one degree north

southward to the prevailing equatorial

weather front. Once the Japanese were

aware of the invasions, Fife's boats were

either to concentrate on locating enemy

vessels or to withdraw south to cover

Bougainville Strait and the waters between New Ireland and Buka. This reconnaissance would be in addition to

patrols by Central Pacific submarines,

which would keep watch over any Japanese surface forces approaching the

South from the Central Pacific.

Admiral Turner's attack force (Task

Force 31) consisted of ships and landing

craft from the South Pacific or III Amphibious Force (Task Force 32), plus

the ground troops. These troops, designated the New Georgia Occupation

Force, initially included the following

units:

12

 See Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S.

Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its

Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1951), p. 172, and Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, p. 71. 13

 Ltr, COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC, 4 Jun

43, sub: Availability of Aircraft at MAINYARD

[Guadalcanal] for TOENAILS Opn, in USAFISPA

G-2 Hist Sec File, Plng for New Georgia Opn,

OCMH.

14

 ONI USN, Operations in the New Georgia Area,

p. 62.
76 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

43d Division

9th Marine Defense Battalion

1st Marine Raider Regiment (less two

battalions)

136th Field Artillery Battalion (155-

mm. howitzers), 37th Division

Elements of the 70th Coast Artillery

Battalion (Antiaircraft)

One and one-half naval construction

battalions

Elements of the 1st Commando, Fiji

Guerrillas15

Radar units

Naval base detachments

A boat pool

Creating the New Georgia Occupation Force, and attaching all ground

troops to it (instead of attaching the supporting units to the 43d Division), made

another headquarters necessary, and

threw a heavy burden on 43d Division

headquarters. General Hester commanded both force and division, and the

43d Division staff was, in effect, split into

two staffs. The 43d Division's staff section chiefs (the Assistant Chiefs of Staff,

G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4), as well as officers from Harmon's headquarters, served

on the Occupation Force staff sections,

and their assistants directed the division's

staff sections. Brig. Gen. Harold R. Barker, 43d Division artillery commander,

commanded all Occupation Force artillery—field, seacoast, and antiaircraft.

From the start General Harmon was

dubious about the effectiveness of this

arrangement. He was "somewhat concerned that Hester did not have enough

command and staff to properly conduct

his operation in its augmented concept."

 16

 On 10 June, with Halsey's concurrence, he therefore told Maj. Gen.

Oscar W. Griswold, commanding the

XIV Corps and the Guadalcanal Island

Base, to keep himself informed regarding Hester's plans in order to be prepared to take over if need be.17

The general plan of maneuver called

for assault troops from Guadalcanal and

the Russells to move to Rendova, Segi

Point, Wickham Anchorage, and Viru

Harbor on APD's, transports, cargo ships,

minesweepers, and minelayers. Segi,

Wickham, and Viru would be taken by

small forces to secure the line of communications to Rendova while the main

body of ground forces captured Rendova.

Artillery on Rendova and the barrier

islands was to bombard Munda, an activity in which ships' gunfire would also

be employed. On several days following

D Day, slow vessels such as LST's and

LCT's would bring in more troops and

supplies. They would travel at night and

in daylight hours hide away, protected

from Japanese planes by shore-based antiaircraft, in Wickham Anchorage and

Viru Harbor. About D plus 4, when

enough men and supplies would be on

hand, landing craft were to ferry assault

troops from Rendova across Roviana Lagoon to New Georgia to begin the march 15

 This unit included besides the Fijians some

Tongans and a few Solomon Islanders. See [British]

Central Office of Information, Among Those Present, pp. 53-56. American documents list this unit

variously as "1st South Seas Scout Company," "South

Pacific Scouts," "native troops," and erroneously, as

"1st Company, 1st Fiji Infantry," which was a different unit serving at Port Purvis on Florida.

16

 Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, quoted in

part in Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia

Material, OCMH. 17

 Rad, COMGENSOPAC to COMGEN MAINYARD,

10 Jun 43, Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New

Georgia Material, OCMH.
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA

CHART 7—ORGANIZATION OF ATTACK FORCE, D DAY 1

77

1

 This chart shows D-Day organization only. Second and third echelons were organized along similar lines. 2

 To assume control of all assigned land, sea, and air forces in New Georgia on orders from Admiral Halsey.

against Munda. Coupled with this advance would be the amphibious seizure

of Enogai Inlet in the Kula Gulf to cut

the Japanese reinforcement, supply, and

evacuation trail between Munda and

Enogai, and thus prevent the Japanese

on Kolombangara from strengthening

their compatriots on New Georgia. Once

Munda and Enogai were secured, it was

planned, Vila on Kolombangara would

be seized and further advances up the

Solomons chain would follow.

Turner organized his force into five

groups. (Chart 7) The Western Force

(Task Group 31.1), which Turner commanded in person, would seize Rendova

and make subsequent assaults against

Munda, Enogai, and Kolombangara. The

Eastern Force, under Rear Adm. George

H. Fort, was to take Segi, Viru, and

Wickham. Task Group 31.2, consisting

of eight destroyers, would cover the transports. No ships' gunfire support was

planned in advance, but all ships, including transports, were ordered to be

ready to deliver supporting and counterbattery fire if necessary.

The New Georgia Occupation Force,

under General Hester, included the

Western Landing Force (under Hester),
78 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

which during the amphibious phase

would function as part of Turner's Western Force; the Eastern Landing Force

(under Col. Daniel H. Hundley), which

during the amphibious phase would be

part of Fort's Eastern Force; naval base

forces for all points to be captured; the

reserve under Col. Harry B. Liversedge,

USMC; and two more whose designations are not self-explanatory—the New

Georgia Air Force and the Assault Flotillas. (Charts 8 and 9)

The New Georgia Air Force, led by

Brig. Gen. Francis P. Mulcahy, USMC,

consisted initially of Headquarters, 2d

Marine Air Wing. In contrast with the

system in the Southwest Pacific, this air

headquarters was under the landing force

commander. Mulcahy was to take over

control of New Georgia air operations

during the amphibious phase once that

control was relinquished by Turner; he

would take command of the planes from

Guadalcanal and the Russells that would

be supporting the attack, once they were

airborne. He was eventually to command

the air squadrons to be based at Munda

and Segi Point. The Assault Flotillas

consisted of landing craft to be used to

ferry the assault troops from Rendova

to New Georgia proper when the attack

against Munda was ready to begin.

Two ground force units which Turner

retained temporarily under his direct

control were small forces designated to

make covering landings. The Onaiavisi

Occupation Unit, composed of A and

B Companies, 169th Infantry, was to

land from two APD's and one minesweeper on Sasavele and Baraulu Islands

on either side of Onaiavisi Entrance to

hold it until the day of the assault against

the mainland through the entrance. The

landing of the occupation unit was scheduled for 0330, 30 June. The Rendova

Advance Unit, C and G Companies (each

less one rifle platoon), was to land from

two APD's on Rendova at 0540 to cover

the landing of the main body of the

Western Landing Force. The latter,

about 6,300 strong, was to start landing

on Rendova at 0640, 30 June.

Command over all air, sea, and ground

forces in New Georgia would pass from

Turner to Hester on orders from Halsey.

The presence of the DRYGOODS stockpiles on Guadalcanal greatly simplified

logistical problems. Three Army units of

fire and thirty days' supplies were to be

put ashore at Rendova, and five units of

fire and thirty days' supplies at Viru,

Segi, and Wickham. Supply levels were

to be built to a sixty-day level out of the

DRYGOODS stocks. General Griswold was

told to make the necessary quantities

available to Turner. Turner was responsible for the actual movement of supplies

to New Georgia.

Directions for unloading during the

assault phase were simple and clear.

Turner instructed all vessels to be ready

for quick unloading. All ships were to

square away before reaching the transport areas offshore, and if possible to

work all hatches from both sides. Unloading parties included 150 men for

each cargo ship and transport, 150 men

per LST, 50 men per LCT, and 25 men

per LCI. The shore party totaled 300

men. Once ashore, cargo was to be moved

off the beaches and into inland dumps as

fast as possible.

Secondary Landings

With tactical plans for TOENAILS

largely ready by mid-June, the invasion


TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 81

forces spent the rest of the month making final preparations—checking weapons and supplies, conducting rehearsals

in the New Hebrides, and studying orders, maps, and photographs. South Pacific aircraft pounded Vila, Munda, and

the Shortlands-Bougainville bases while

Southwest Pacific planes continued their

long-range strikes against Rabaul.

Segi Point

In the midst of these preparations, Admiral Turner received disquieting news

about Segi Point, which was scheduled

to furnish the Allies with an airfield.

Coastwatcher Donald Kennedy reported

on 20 June that the Japanese were moving against his hideout and that he was

heading for the hills. He requested

help.18

Kennedy's report was correct. In early

June a small Japanese force had gone to

the southeast part of Vangunu to deal

summarily with disaffected natives, and

on 17 June half the 1st Battalion, 229th

Infantry, under a Major Nagahara or

Hara had moved from Viru Harbor

southeast toward Segi Point.

As loss of Segi Point prior to D Day

would deprive the Allies of a potential

air base, Turner, a man of fiery energy

and quick decision, abruptly changed

his plans. He had originally intended to

land the heavily reinforced 1st Battalion,

103d Infantry, at Segi on 30 June to

build the fighter field and establish a

small naval base. But on receipt of Kennedy's call for aid, he hurriedly dispatched the handiest force available, the

4th Marine Raider Battalion (less N and

Q Companies), from Guadalcanal in the

fast destroyer-transports Dent and Waters

to seize Segi and hold it. Ships and marines wasted no time. By 2030 of the

same day—20 June—the ships were loaded

and under way. Before dawn next morning they had safely worked their way

through Panga Bay, though both vessels scraped bottom in the reef- and rockfilled waters. Kennedy, still safe, had lit

bonfires on the beach and when the marines started ashore at 0550 he was there

to meet them. There were no Japanese.

The major and his men were still in the

vicinity of Lambeti Village.

Next morning the APD's Schley and

Crosby brought A and D Companies of

the 103d Infantry and an airfield survey

section to Segi Point. Though alerted

several times against enemy attack, the

Segi garrison was undisturbed until 30

June, when a series of Japanese air attacks made things lively. Construction

of the airfield began on 30 June. Using

bulldozers and power shovels, and working under floodlights at night, the Seabees of the 20th Naval Construction

Battalion had the strip ready for limited

18

 The remainder of this chapter is based on

Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp. 158-

61; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 221-29; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 138-60; ONI USN, Operations

in the New Georgia Area, pp. 9-23; History of the

New Georgia Campaign, MS, 13 Aug 45, prepared

by Hist Sec, G-2 SOPACBACOM, Vol. I, Chs. II-III,

V, OCMH; after action rpts, jnls, int rpts, and

hists of USAFISPA, NGOF, COMAIR New Georgia

(2d Mar Air Wing), XIV Corps, I Mar Amphib

Corps, 43d and 37th Divs, and subordinate units,

and 1st Mar Raider Regt; COMSOPAC, TF 31, and

TF 33 War Diaries; 17th Army Operations, Vol. II,

Japanese Monogr No. 40 (OCMH); 17th Army

Operations, Map Supplement, Japanese Monogr No.

40A (OCMH); Southeast Area Naval Operations,

Vol. II, Japanese Monogr No. 49 (OCMH); Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air Operations, Pt.

IV, Japanese Monogr No. 108 (OCMH).
82 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

AIRFIELD AT SEGI POINT, New Georgia.

operations as a fighter staging field by

11 July.19

Wickham Anchorage

The force selected for the seizure of

Wickham Anchorage by Vangunu Island was ready to sail from the Russells

on 29 June. Commanded by Lt. Col.

Lester E. Brown, the force included Colonel Brown's 2d Battalion, 103d Infantry, reinforced, and N and P Companies,

plus a headquarters detachment, of the

4th Marine Raider Battalion. Under

Admiral Fort aboard the Trever, the

convoy consisted of the destroyer-transports Schley and McKean, carrying marines, and seven LCI's which bore soldiers. The ships cast off shortly after 1800

and set course for Oleana Bay, about two

and one-half miles west by south from

Vura village.

Allied scouting parties had reported

that the main Japanese concentration at

Wickham Anchorage—one platoon of

the 229th Infantry and a company of the

Kure 6th Special Naval Landing Force—

was near Vura, and had also reported

that on the east shore of Oleana Bay a

500-yard-long strip of solid sand offered

a good landing beach. It had therefore

been decided to land the troops at Oleana

Bay and then march overland and outflank the enemy positions from the west.

There were two trails from Oleana Bay

to Wickham Anchorage. One, which followed the shore line, was believed used

by the Japanese, but a shorter one had

been cut farther inland in April by Ken19

 "The lighting of the airstrip at night was a

carefully figured risk. We calculated we could get

sufficient warning from our radar to turn off the

lights before the attackers arrived." Ltr, Col Hundley to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 19 Oct 53, no

sub, OCMH.
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 83

nedy's men in order to get scouts into

the Vura area. This trail was thought to

be unknown to the Japanese, and troops

following native guides could be expected to cover it in five or six hours.

Visibility was practically nonexistent

for the Wickham-bound convoy on the

night of 29-30 June. Rain, lashed by a

stiff wind, fell throughout the night,

and continued as the vessels threaded

their cautious way through the shoals

and reefs into Oleana Bay. At 0335, 30

June, the ships hove to. Shortly afterward the first wave of marines began to

debark from the destroyer-transports

into LCVP's, a task complicated by darkness, rain, high wind, and heavy seas.

Two LCVP's were almost loaded when

the APD commanders discovered they

were lying off the west rather than the

east shore of the bay. The marines reboarded the destroyer-transports which

then moved a thousand yards eastward.

Again the marines loaded into LCVP's

and started for the beach, which was

obscured by rain and mist. Beach flares

which had been set by members of the

scouting party were invisible. Only the

noise of the breakers indicated the direction of the shore. But things got worse.

As the first wave of LCVP's blindly made

their way shoreward, the LCI's broke

into the formation and scattered it. Unable to re-form, or even to see anything,

the LCVP coxswains proceeded on their

own. The result was exactly what might

be expected from a night landing in bad

weather. The assault wave of marines

landed in impressive disorganization.

Six LCVP's smashed up in the heavy surf

that boiled over coral reefs. Fortunately,

the Japanese were not present to oppose

the landing. There were no casualties.

The LCI's, landing in daylight, found

the proper beach, and by 0720 the Army

troops were ashore. More marines had

begun landing at 0630 at the correct

beach. With all landing operations concluded by 1000, the ships departed.

Three officers of the reconnaissance

party had met the landing force and informed Colonel Brown that the Japanese

main strength was at Kaeruka rather than

Vura. Once the scattered troops had been

collected, the overland advance began

with a small column moving toward Vura

along the coastal trail while the main

column marched against Kaeruka over

Kennedy's trail. The marines and soldiers first met the enemy in early afternoon. Then ensued four days of fighting

in the sodden jungles, with the Americans receiving support from dive bombers and warships, from their own heavy

weapons, and from the 105-mm. howitzers of the 152d Field Artillery Battalion

on the beach at Oleana Bay. By the end

of 3 July the Americans, having blasted

the Japanese out of their entrenchments,

were in complete possession of Wickham

Anchorage. Many of the Japanese garrison had been killed; some escaped by

barge, canoe, or on foot. In the seizure

of this future staging point for landing

craft, the marines lost twelve killed,

twenty-one wounded. Army casualties

are not listed.

Viru Harbor

When the Viru Occupation Force, the

reinforced B Company, 103d Infantry,

on board three destroyer-transports,

sailed into Viru Harbor before daylight

on 30 June, lookouts vainly scanned the

shore line for a white parachute flare.

This was to have signaled that the ma-
84 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MEN OF 152D FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION firing a 105-mm. howitzer in support

of Colonel Brown's 2d Battalion, 103d Infantry.

rine raider companies that landed at Segi

Point had moved against Viru from inland and seized positions flanking the

harbor, for it had been agreed that attempting to land the infantry in frontal

assault against the high cliffs surrounding

the harbor would be too risky. But Lt.

Col. Michael S. Currin, commanding the

4th Marine Raider Battalion, had warned

that his overland march was going slowly

and that he might not arrive and take

the harbor by 30 June. Thus the destroyer-transports waited just outside the

harbor, beyond range of a Japanese shore

battery (Major Hara had left part of

his battalion at Viru) and at noon went

to Segi Point where with Turner's approval the troops went ashore. The attack force commander agreed that in

view of the delay B Company should

follow the marine raiders in their overland march.

Currin's men had begun the first leg

of their twelve-mile advance from Segi

Point to Viru Harbor in rubber boats

on 27 June. They landed near Lambeti

Plantation that night, and the next morning set out on their overland march.

Skirmishes with the Japanese, coupled

with the difficulty of walking through the

jungle, slowed them down. They forded

streams, knee-deep in mud and shoulderhigh in water. The leading elements of

the column churned the trail into slippery ooze, so that the rear elements

floundered and stumbled along. Thus
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 85

it was evening of 30 June before the

marines reached Viru Harbor, which

they took handily the next day by a

double envelopment supported by dive

bombers that knocked out the Japanese

shore battery.20 On 4 July B Company,

103d, which had come up from Segi

Point, took over the defenses of Viru

Harbor from the marines.

Thus were the operations of the Eastern Force conducted, separately from

each other and separately from those of

the Western Force, but under Admiral

Turner's general supervision in his capacity of attack force commander. They

had provided one airfield and two staging bases. While important, they were

undertaken only to support the seizure

of Rendova by a substantial force, which

was then to assault Munda and Vila.

Rendova

Admiral Turner's ships that were assigned to Rendova arrived off Guadalcanal in the morning of 29 June.21

 They

had come up from Efate bearing the

assault troops of the Western Landing

Force's first echelon. They weighed anchor late that afternoon and made an

uneventful journey through the mist and

rain to Blanche Channel between Rendova and New Georgia.

No enemy warships were there to oppose them. Their absence had been ensured by a group of cruisers, destroyers,

and minelayers from Halsey's Task Force

36 under Rear Adm. Aaron Stanton Merrill. Merrill's ships, on the night of 29-30

June, had bombarded Munda and Vila,

then ventured northwest to the Shortlands to shell enemy bases and lay mines.

This action inflicted damage to the Japanese while placing a surface force in

position to cover Turner's landings. The

bad weather canceled the air strikes

against the Bougainville-Shortland bases,

but Allied planes—dive and torpedo

bombers—were able to hit Munda and

Vila on 30 June.

The night of 29-30 June was short

for the six-thousand-odd troops aboard

Turner's ships. Reveille sounded at

0200, more than four hours before the

ships hove to off Renard Entrance, the

channel leading to Rendova Harbor.

First landings were made by the Onaiavisi Occupation Unit—A and B Companies, 169th Infantry. These had come

from the Russells in the destroyer-transport Ralph Talbot and the minesweeper

Zane to land on Sasavele and Baraulu

Islands before daylight in order to hold

Onaiavisi Entrance against the day that

the New Georgia Occupation Force made

its water-borne movement against the

mainland. Later in the morning B Company's 2d Platoon outposted Roviana

Island and the next day wiped out a

Japanese lookout station. These landings

were not opposed. The Japanese had

maintained observation posts on the barrier islands but had not fortified them.

The only mishap in this phase of TOENAILS occurred early in the morning of

30 June, when the Zane ran on a reef

while maneuvering in the badly charted

waters in the rain. She was pulled free

by the tug Rail in the afternoon.

The landing of the 172d Infantry on

20

 According to Colonel Hundley, some naval vessels, apparently unaware of the postponement,

sailed into Viru Harbor just as the bombing began.

The Japanese manned the shore defenses, which

were promptly knocked out, and were completely

surprised by the marine attack. Ibid. 21

 There were six transports, two destroyer-transports, and eight destroyers.
86 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

SHIPS MOVING TOWARD RENDOVA, late afternoon, 29 June 1943.

Rendova was somewhat disorderly. C

and G Companies, guided by Maj. Martin Clemens and Lt. F. A. Rhoades,

RAN, of the coastwatchers, and by native

pilots, were to have landed from the destroyer-transports Dent and Waters on

East and West Beaches of Rendova Harbor at 0540 to cover the main body of

the 172d Infantry when it came ashore.22

But again the weather played the Allies

foul. The mist and rain obscured the

Renard Entrance markers and the white

signal light on Bau Island that the reconnaissance party, present on Rendova

since 16 June, had set up. As a result the

APD's first landed C and G Companies

several miles away, then had to re-embark them and go to the proper place.

Meanwhile, the six transports took

their stations north of Renard Entrance

as the destroyers took screening positions to the east and west. By now the

clouds had begun to clear away, and visibility improved. The troops gathered

on the transport decks, and the first wave

climbed into the landing craft at the

rails, carrying their barracks bags with

them. The order "All boats away, all

troops away" was given aboard Turner's

flagship, the transport McCawley, as the

sun rose at 0642. Four minutes later

22

 C and G Companies, 172d Infantry, and A Company, 169th Infantry, had received special physical

conditioning and training in jungle fighting and

small boat handling. They were given the somewhat romantic title of "Barracudas." Clemens, a

former district officer in the government of the

British Solomon Islands Protectorate, was a major

in the British Solomon Islands Defense Force, and

had been a great help during the Guadalcanal

Campaign. Rhoades had been a plantation manager

before the war.
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 87

ABOARD THE TRANSPORT MCCAWLEY, Admiral Turner's flagship, 29 June

From left, Brig. Gen. Leonard F. Wing, Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson, Rear

Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, and Maj. Gen. John H. Hester.

Turner warned the first boats as they

headed for shore, some three thousand

yards to the south: "You are the first

to land, you are the first to land—expect

opposition."

 23

As the landing craft moved shoreward

the waves became disorganized. When

the craft reached Renard Entrance between Bau and Kokorana Islands, there

was confusion and milling about until

they began going through the entrance

two abreast toward the narrow East

and West Beaches that fronted Lever

Brothers' 584-acre plantation.

As the first landing craft touched down

about 0700, the troops sprang out and

ran across the beaches into the cover of

the jungle. C and G Companies reached

Rendova Harbor about ten minutes after

the troops from the transports, and they

joined with the main body and moved

inland toward the Japanese.24

23

 CTF 31 War Diary, 30 Jun 43 entry.

24

 43d Division documents give no data on the

planned composition and timing of assault waves.

They are at variance regarding the time of landing. The 43d Division and New Georgia Occupation Force reports (which are virtually identical)

state that C and G Companies landed at 0630 and

that the main body began landing at 0745. These

assertions are undoubtedly incorrect. The 172d report states that C and G Companies went astray

but landed along with the main body about 0700.

And the 43d Division's time of 0745 is contradicted

by that division's G-3 Journal which states that

the division command post opened on Rendova at

0730. CTF 31 War Diary states that the first troops

hit the beach at 0656.
88 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The Japanese Rendova detachment—

about 120 troops from the 229th Infantry

and the Kure 6th Special Naval Landing

Force—had been alerted early during the

morning of 30 June. The alert proved

to be a false alarm and they went back

to sleep. The next alert—their first realization that they were being attacked—

came when the American assault craft

hit the beach. As it was too late for the

Japanese to man their beach defense

positions, they posted themselves in the

coconut plantation about one hundred

yards behind East Beach. Radiomen tried

to warn Munda but could not get the

message through. A lookout at Banieta

Point fired four blue flares and signaled

headquarters by blinker.

The Japanese could not hope to do

more than harass the Americans. The

special naval landing force commander,

hit in the face by a burst from a BAR,

was an early casualty. When about a

dozen men were dead, the disorganized

Japanese fell back into the jungle. They

are reported to have lost some fifty or

sixty men, while killing four Americans

and wounding five, including Col. David

M. N. Ross, the 172d's commander. By

the end of the day the Americans had

pushed inland one thousand yards. The

105-mm. howitzers of the 103d Field

Artillery Battalion were in position to

cover Renard Entrance, the north coast

of Rendova, and the barrier islands.

All troops except working parties on

board ship were ashore within thirty

minutes after the landing of the first

wave. This number included General

Harmon who went along to observe

operations. In the absence of strong enemy resistance on Rendova, the chief

problem that confronted the invaders

was unloading supplies, getting them

ashore, and moving them inland. Less

than half an hour after they had been

lowered into the water, the first landing

craft returned to the ships for cargo. No

landing waves were formed; each craft

moved cargo ashore as soon as it was

loaded by its mother ship.

The first real delay in unloading was

caused by shallow water. Many tank

lighters (LCM's) grounded on reefs in

the harbor and lost time refloating and

finding passages through deeper water.

Many lighters, grounding about fifty feet

offshore, had to lower their ramps in

water while the troops waded ashore with

cargo in their hands or on their shoulders. In consequence, disorderly stacks

of gear began piling up near the shore

line. The beachmaster attempted, with

only partial success, to prevent this.

During most of the morning the Japanese did little. The Rendova garrison

had not amounted to much; after the

war the Japanese explained that the

Munda and Rabaul commanders had not

expected the Americans to land on the

offshore islands. "Therefore," a postwar report states, "the landing on RENDOVA Island completely baffled our

forces."

 25

 When it became clear that the

Americans were indeed landing on Rendova, 120-mm. and 140-mm. naval coast

defense batteries at Munda and Baanga

Island opened up on the ships, and they

immediately replied with 5-inch fire.

The destroyer Gwin was soon hit. She

was the only casualty in the exchange of

fire between ships and shore batteries

that continued all day. But Turner and

General Hester were operating very close

25

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH), 36.
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 89

MEN OF 43D SIGNAL COMPANY WADING ASHORE from LCM's with signal

equipment, 30 June 1943.

to the Japanese air bases in southern

Bougainville and the Shortlands, and

these presented the greatest danger. Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese

were not prepared to counterattack at

once.

The commanders at New Georgia were

not the only Japanese surprised by the

invasion. Those at Rabaul were taken

equally unaware. They had, of course,

known that some form of Allied activity

was impending in late June. The move

to help Kennedy, the increasing tempo

of Allied air and naval action, and intercepted Allied radio traffic told them as

much. So Admiral Kusaka gathered air

attack forces together and sent them to

the airfields around Buin. But after 26

June, when Allied movements seemed

to slow down (Turner's task force was

then rehearsing in the New Hebrides),

the Japanese command concluded that

the Allies had been simply reinforcing

Guadalcanal on a grand scale. Kusaka

pulled his air units back to Rabaul. Thus

it was that although a submarine had

sighted Turner's ships south of New

Georgia about midnight, Kusaka, with

sixty-six bombers, eighty-three fighters,

and twenty reconnaissance seaplanes at

his disposal, could do nothing about the

invasion for several hours.

Turner, whose plans called for unloading to be completed by 1130, was first

interrupted by a false air raid alarm at

0856. The ships stopped unloading and

steamed around in Blanche Channel

while the thirty-two fighter planes cover-
90 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ing the landing got ready to intercept.

The reported enemy planes failed to appear, and unloading was resumed.

The first real enemy air attack, a sweep

by twenty-seven fighters, came just after

1100. The Allied fighter cover shot most

of them down before they could do any

damage, but Turner's schedule was further delayed by the necessity for going

to general quarters and getting under

way.

By about 1500 all but about fifty tons

of gear had been unloaded. Turner ordered the transports and screening destroyers back to Guadalcanal and they

speedily took their departure. Shortly

afterward twenty-five Japanese bombers,

escorted by twenty-four fighters, came

down from Rabaul. The majority of the

bombers were shot down, but one managed to put a torpedo into the flagship

McCawley. At 1715 eight more bombers

struck at the retiring task force but

failed to score. That evening overeager

American PT boats, mistaking the crippled McCawley for an enemy, put two

more torpedoes into her sides and she

sank in Blanche Channel, fortunately

without loss of life.

Meanwhile the landing and handling

of supplies on Rendova had been less

than satisfactory. The invading forces

had hoped to use Rendova Plantation

to store supplies, although the preinvasion patrols had not been able to investigate it thoroughly because the Japanese were there. As the rain continued,

the streams flooded, and the red clay of

the plantation turned into mud. The

mile-long prewar road that linked East

and West Beaches served well early in

the day, but soon heavy truck traffic

ground it into a muddy mess. Seabee

drivers of the 24th Naval Construction

Battalion had to hook their truck cables

to trees and winch their 21⁄2-ton, 6x6

trucks along in order to haul supplies

from the heaped beaches to the cover

and safety of high ground farther inland.

They cut hundreds of coconut logs into

twelve-foot lengths and tried to corduroy

the roadbed, but the mud seemed to be

bottomless. One bulldozer sank almost

out of sight. To add to the supply difficulties, many containers were inadequately marked and medical supplies became mixed among rations, fuel, and

ammunition. The Rendova naval base

force could not find all its radios, and

little was known regarding the progress

of operations at Wickham and Viru. The

clutter and confusion caused by bogged

trucks on the muddy roads and trails

finally became so bad that the next day

General Hester requested Turner to stop

further shipments of trucks until the

beachhead could be better organized.

Despite the confusion ashore and the

loss of the McCawley, operations on 30

June were largely successful. Six thousand men of the 43d Division, the 24th

Naval Construction Battalion and other

naval units, and the 9th Marine Defense

Battalion had come ashore with weapons,

rations, fuel, ammunition, construction

equipment, and personal baggage. The

Japanese had lost Rendova and several

planes, and although they enthusiastically reported inflicting heavy damage

to Turner's ships, they admitted that,

"due to tenacious interference by enemy

fighter planes, a decisive blow could not

be struck against the enemy landing

convoy." "The speedy disembarkation of
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 91

the enemy," they felt, "was absolutely

miraculous."

 26

With the capture of the beachhead,

General Hester dissolved the 172d. Regimental Combat Team and returned the

field artillery, engineers, and medical

and communications men to divisional

control. The build-up of troops and supplies for the attack against Munda and

Vila was ready to begin.

The second echelon of the Western

Force came in on LST's the next day.

This echelon included the 155-mm. howitzers of the 192d Field Artillery Battalion and the 155-mm. guns of A Battery, 9th Marine Defense Battalion. Succeeding reinforcements continued to arrive at Rendova, Segi Point, Viru, and

Wickham through 5 July until virtually

the entire New Georgia Occupation

Force as then constituted was present in

New Georgia, with the main body at

Rendova.

The Japanese were unable to do anything to prevent these movements, and

did little damage to the beachhead. Only

Japanese aircraft made anything like a

sustained effort. Storms and poor visibility continued to prevent Allied planes

from striking at the Shortlands-Bougainville fields, although they were able to

hit the Munda and Vila airfields as well

as Bairoko. The Japanese reinforced

their air strength at Rabaul and sent

planes forward to southern Bougainville

and the Shortlands. On 2 July Admiral

Kusaka had under his command 11 fighters and 13 dive bombers from the carrier

Ryuho, 11 land-based twin-engine bombers, 20 fighters, 2 reconnaissance planes,

and a number of Army bombers that

were temporarily assigned. The same day

foul weather began closing in the rearward Allied bases. About noon the Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, from his

post on Guadalcanal, ordered all Allied

planes back. This left New Georgia without air cover. To make matters worse,

the 9th Marine Defense Battalion's SCR

602 (a search radar designed for immediate use on beachheads) broke down

that morning, and the SCR 270 (a longrange radar designed for relatively permanent emplacement) was not yet set

up.

Kusaka sent all his planes to New

Georgia. They reached the Rendova area

in the afternoon, circled behind the

clouded 3,448-foot twin peaks of Rendova Peak, then pounced to the attack.

Many soldiers saw the planes but thought

they were American until fragmentation

clusters dropped by the bombers began

exploding among them. The Rendova

beachhead, with its dense concentrations of men and matériel, was an excellent target. At least thirty men were

killed and over two hundred were

wounded. Many bombs struck the fuel

dumps, the resulting fires caused fuel

drums to explode, and these started more

fires. Three 155-mm. guns of the 9th

Marine Defense Battalion were damaged.

Much of the equipment of the 125-bed

clearing station set up by the 118th Medical Battalion was destroyed; for a time

only emergency medical treatment could

be rendered. The wounded had to wait

at least twenty-four hours before they

could receive full treatment at Guadalcanal.

That night nine Japanese destroyers

and one light cruiser shelled Rendova

but hit nothing except jungle. The Jap- 26

 Ibid., pp. 29, 37.
92 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

anese, it was clear, did not intend to land

troops on Rendova, but they did not intend to allow the Americans to remain

there unmolested. The air attacks, while

serious, did not disrupt preparations for

the next phase of TOENAILS.

The Move to Zanana

After the occupation of Rendova, the

next tasks facing the invaders were the

movement to the New Georgia mainland

and the assault against Munda airfield.

On 2 July Admiral Halsey, doubtless encouraged by the lack of effective Japanese opposition, directed Turner to proceed with plans for the move against

Munda. To carry out these plans, Turner on 28 June had reorganized the

Western Force into five units: the transport unit consisting of destroyer-transports and high-speed minesweepers; a

destroyer screen; a fire support group,

eventually consisting of three light cruisers and four destroyers; two tugs; and

the Munda-Bairoko Occupation Force

under General Hester.

The Munda-Bairoko Occupation Force

was further divided into five components. The Northern Landing Group,

under Colonel Liversedge, was to operate against Bairoko. The Southern Landing Group (the 43d Division less the

1st Battalion of the 103d Infantry, the

136th Field Artillery Battalion, the 9th

Marine Defense Battalion less elements,

and the South Pacific Scouts) under

Brig. Gen. Leonard F. Wing, assistant

commander of the 43d Division, was to

attack Munda. The New Georgia Air

Force, the Assault Flotillas (twelve LCI's,

four LCT's, and native canoes), and a

naval base group comprised the remaining three components. The Southern

Landing Group was to land at Zanana

Beach about five air-line miles east of

Munda and attack westward to capture

Munda while the Northern Group landed at Rice Anchorage in the Kula Gulf

and advanced southward to capture or

destroy the enemy in the Bairoko-Enogai

area, block all trails from there to Munda, and cut off the Japanese route of

reinforcement, supply, and escape.27

The troops on Rendova had been making ready since 30 June, but some of their

efforts were marked by less than complete success. Hester had ordered aggressive reconnaissance of the entire area

east and north of Munda. Starting on the

night of 30 June-1 July, patrols from

the 172d Infantry were to pass through

Onaiavisi Entrance and Roviana Lagoon,

land at Zanana, and begin reconnoitering, while Marine patrols pushed south

from Rice Anchorage. The 43d Division

patrols were to operate from a base camp

west of Zanana established on the afternoon of 30 June by Capt. E. C. D. Sherrer, assistant intelligence officer of the

New Georgia Occupation Force.

At 2330, 30 June, despite a false rumor

that Onaiavisi Entrance was impassable

for small boats, patrols left Rendova on

the eight-mile run to the mainland. The

next morning regimental headquarters

discovered that the patrols, unable to

find the entrance in the dark, had landed

on one of the barrier islands. The next

evening the 1st Battalion, accompanied

by Colonel Ross, shoved off for the mainland but could not find its way. Thus

it was concluded that the move should

27

 Rice Anchorage lies about fifteen statute miles

north by east of Munda Point. The other beach

near Munda, Laiana Beach, lay within range of

the Japanese artillery at Munda and would have

been a risky place to land.
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 93

TRUCK TOWING A 155-MM. HOWITZER OVER MUDDY TRAIL, Rendova, 7 July 1943.

be made in daylight. Accordingly A

Company, 169th Infantry, and the 1st

Battalion, 172d Infantry, moved out for

Zanana on the afternoon of 2 July. Native guides in canoes marked the channel. Everything went well except that

about 150 men returned to Rendova at

2330. Questioned about their startling

reversal of course, they are reported to

have stated that the coxswain of the leading craft had received a note dropped

by a B-24 which ordered them to turn

back.28 By the next morning, however,

the entire 1st Battalion was on the mainland.

The build-up of supplies on Rendova

continued to be difficult; the rain and

mud partially thwarted the efforts of the

118th Engineer and the 24th Naval Construction Battalions to drain the flat

areas. East Beach was finally abandoned.

The Occupation Force supply officers,

after examining the solid coral subsurfaces under the sandy loam of the barrier

islands, began using the islands as staging points for supplies eventually intended for the mainland.

On the other hand, the artillery picture was bright. General Barker, the

artillery commander, had never planned

to make extensive use of Rendova for

artillery positions, as the range from

Rendova to Munda was too great for

all weapons except 155-mm. guns. Such

barrier islands as Bau, Kokorana, Sasavele, and Baraulu could well support artillery, and these islands, open on their

28

 There seem to be no further available data regarding this interesting but absurd excuse.
94 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

north shores, possessed natural fields of

fire. The field artillery could cover the

entire area from Zanana to Munda, and

initially would be firing at right angles

to the axis of infantry advance and parallel to the infantry front. This would

enable the artillery to deliver extremely

accurate supporting fire, since the dispersion in artillery fire is greater in

range than in deflection. On the other

hand, it would increase the difficulty of

co-ordination between artillery and infantry, for each artillery unit would require exact information regarding not

only the front line of the unit it was

supporting, but also the front line of the

unit's neighbors. Three battalions of artillery were in place in time to cover the

move of the 1st Battalion, 172d Infantry, to Zanana, and by 6 July two battalions of 105-mm. howitzers (the 103d

and 169th), two battalions of 155-mm.

howitzers (the 136th and 192d), and two

batteries of 155-mm. guns (9th Marine

Defense Battalion) were in place, registered, and ready to fire in support of the

infantry.

Antiaircraft managed to make a tremendous improvement over its performance of 2 July, and celebrated Independence Day in signal fashion when a close

formation of sixteen unescorted enemy

bombers flew over Rendova. This time

radars were working, the warning had

been given, and fire control men and

gunners of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion's 90-mm. and 40-mm. batteries

were ready. The Japanese flew into a

concentration of fire from these weapons,

and twelve immediately plunged earthward in return for the expenditure of

eighty-eight rounds. The fighter cover

from the Russells knocked down the remaining four.

Meanwhile, at Zanana, the 1st Battalion, 172d Infantry, established a perimeter of 400 yards' radius, wired in and

protected by machine guns, 37-mm. antitank guns, and antiaircraft guns. Here

General Wing set up the 43d Division

command post, and to this perimeter

came the remaining troops of the 172d

and 169th Infantry Regiments in echelons until 6 July when both regiments

had been completely assembled. Ground

reconnaissance by 43d Division soldiers,

marines, and coastwatchers, aided after

3 July by the 1st Company, South Pacific

Scouts, under Capt. Charles W. H. Tripp

of the New Zealand Army, was still

being carried on. The advance westward

was ready to begin.

Rice Anchorage

While 43d Division troops were establishing themselves at Zanana, Colonel

Liversedge's Northern Landing Group

was boarding ships at Guadalcanal and

making ready to cut the Japanese communications north of Munda. The

Northern Landing Group was originally

to have landed on 4 July, but the delays

in getting a foothold at Zanana forced

Turner to postpone the landing, and all

other operations, for twenty-four hours.

Because the Bairoko-Enogai area, the

New Georgia terminus of the Japanese

seaborne line of communications, was

strongly held, and because preinvasion

patrols had reported the Wharton River

to be unfordable from the coast to a point

about six thousand yards inland, Turner

and Liversedge had decided to land at

Rice Anchorage on the south bank of

the river about six hundred yards in-
TOENAILS: THE LANDINGS IN NEW GEORGIA 95

land.29 Supervised by Capt. Clay A. Boyd,

USMC, and Flight Officer J. A. Corrigan of the RAAF and the coastwatchers,

native New Georgians cleared the landing beach and bivouac areas inland, and

began hacking two trails from Rice Anchorage to Enogai to supplement the one

track already in existence.

The organization of Liversedge's

Northern Landing Group was somewhat

odd; the group consisted of three battalions from three different regiments.

The 3d Battalions of the 145th and 148th

Infantry Regiments of the 37th Division

and the 1st Raider Battalion, 1st Marine

Raider Regiment, made up the force.30

And the force was lightly equipped. In

order to permit rapid movement through

the thick jungles and swamps of the area

north of Munda, the troops took no artillery of any kind. Machine guns and

mortars were their heaviest organic supporting weapons.

The battalions boarded the APD's,

destroyers, and minesweepers at Guadalcanal on the afternoon of 4 July. The

troops carried one unit of fire and rations for three days; five days' rations

and one unit of fire were stowed as cargo.

Escorted by Rear Adm. Walden L. Ainsworth's three light cruisers and nine destroyers, the speedy convoy started up

the Slot at dusk. Shortly before midnight

of a dark, rainy night, the ships rounded

Visuvisu Point and entered Kula Gulf.

Ainsworth bombarded Vila and then

Bairoko Harbour with 6-inch and 5-inch

shells, while the transport group headed

for Rice Anchorage.

As the cruisers and destroyers were

concluding their bombardment, the destroyer Ralph Talbot's radar picked up

two surface targets as they were leaving

the gulf. These were two of three Japanese destroyers which had brought the

first echelon of four thousand Japanese

Army reinforcements down from the

Shortland Islands.31 The Japanese ships

had entered Kula at the same time as

Ainsworth; warned by his bombardment,

they were clearing out, but fired torpedoes at long range. One scored a fatal

hit on the destroyer Strong. As two other

destroyers were taking off her crew, four

140-mm. Japanese seacoast guns at Enogai opened fire, joined soon by the Bairoko batteries, but did no damage.32

Liversedge's landing started about

0130, just after Ainsworth's bombardment ceased. The APD's unloaded first,

then destroyers, finally minesweepers.

Each LCP (R) towed one ten-man rubber boat to shore. The way was marked

by native canoes and shore beacons. The

Japanese batteries harassed the troops but

did not hit anything. There were no

Japanese on the landing beach.

Nonetheless the landing was attended

by troubles. A shallow bar obstructed

the mouth of the Wharton River so effectively that many boats were grounded

and later craft got over the bar only by

coming in with lighter loads. The landing beach was too small to accommo- 29

 The patrols had left Segi on 14 June by boat.

Turner had also considered landing the force at

Roviana Lagoon and having it march overland to

Bairoko but decided against it because the terrain

was too rugged. 30

 Turner had originally planned to use the 4th

Raider Battalion but when it was delayed at Viru

Harbor the 3d Battalion, 145th, was substituted.

31

 See below, p. 98. 32

 Ainsworth had first wanted to bombard Enogai

but did not because air reconnaissance showed no

evidence of shore batteries there.
96 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

date more than four boats at once, and

the river mouth was thus continually

jammed with loaded boats waiting their

turns at the beach. Also, about two hundred men of the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry, were landed at Kobukobu Inlet,

several hundred yards north of Rice

Anchorage, a mishap which may have

occurred because of the darkness of the

night. Some days elapsed before the two

hundred men made their way through

the jungle to catch up with their battalion.

As dawn of 5 July was breaking, the

volume of fire from the Enogai batteries

against the ships was increasing, and it

seemed unwise to risk this fire in daylight as well as to invite air attack. All

but seventy-two troops and 2 percent of

the cargo had been put ashore. Therefore, the convoy commander withdrew.

Liversedge, with nearly all his three battalions ashore and under his control,

made ready to move south.

Thus by 5 July TOENAILS was over.

Throughout the complicated series of

operations certain characteristics stood

out. The weather had been consistently

foul. The Japanese had not been able

to resist effectively. The American performance, in spite of several instances of

confusion, was very good, in that six

landings in all had been carried out according to a complicated schedule that

called for the most careful co-ordination

of all forces. Clearly, Admiral Turner's

reputation as an amphibious commander

was well founded.

The Americans had now established

themselves in New Georgia. Viru Harbor and Wickham Anchorage were secure points on the line of communications. The airfield at Segi Point was

nearing completion. And at Rice Anchorage and Zanana General Hester's

Munda-Bairoko Occupation Force was

making ready to strike against Munda

airfield.
CHAPTER VII

The Offensive Stalls

Although enemy resistance had been

ineffective, and casualties in TOENAILS

were relatively few, the Japanese were

not finished. They planned to hold New

Georgia. The New Georgia Occupation

Force had had difficulties, but greater

troubles were in store for it.

Japanese Plans

On 2 July, with the Americans in possession of Rendova, Segi Point, and Viru

Harbor, the Japanese altered their command on New Georgia.1

 By mutual

agreement Maj. Gen. Noboru Sasaki,

commander of the Southeastern Detachment, took over direction of all Army

and Navy forces in New Georgia. This

action brought Rear Adm. Minoru Ota's

8th Combined Special Naval Landing

Force under Sasaki, who was under the

tactical control of the 8th Fleet. Except

for small detachments on Vella Lavella,

Gizo, and other islands, the 10,500 men

in Sasaki's joint force were about evenly

divided between Kolombangara and

Munda. At Kolombangara, under Col.

Satoshi Tomonari, were two battalions

of the 13th Infantry, most of the 3d Battalion, 229th Infantry, the Yokosuka 7th

Special Naval Landing Force (less elements), and artillery and engineer units.

Guarding Munda, where Sasaki and Ota

maintained their headquarters, were Col.

Genjiro Hirata's 229th Infantry (less

two battalions) and artillery, engineer,

communication, and medical units. The

main body of the Kure 6th Special Naval

Landing Force was concentrated at Bairoko.

Sasaki was well aware that the Americans would attack Munda. He could

see the troops moving from Rendova to

the mainland. Munda field was receiving

shellfire from the American 155's. If further proof was needed, Japanese patrols

had brushed with the Allies near Zanana

on 3 July, and the next day the 229th

Infantry reported a clash with about five

1

 Unless otherwise indicated this chapter is based

on SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia

Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. III, OCMH; the jnls, diaries,

and after action rpts of COMSOPAC, CTF 31,

NGOF, XIV Corps, 43d Div, 43d Div Arty, 1st Mar

Raider Regt, 145th Inf, 148th Inf, 169th Inf, and

172d Inf; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese

Monogr No. no (OCMH); 17th Army Operations,

Vol. II, Japanese Monogr No. 40 (OCMH); Southeast Area Naval Operations, Vol. II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH); Outline of Southeast

Area Naval Air Operations, Pt. IV, Japanese

Monogr No. 108 (OCMH); Operations of the 1st

Battalion, 169th Infantry (43d Infantry Division)

in the New Georgia Campaign: 30 June-18 July

1943 (Northern Solomons Campaign), a monograph

relating the personal experience of a battalion intelligence officer, prepared by Maj. Jack Swaim; Ltr,

Lt Col Marvin D. Girardeau to Chief of Military

History, sub: Comments Re Hist Monogr, Marines

in Central Solomons, 6 Feb 57, with inclosures,

OCMH.
98 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MAJ. GEN. NOBORU SASAKI

hundred Americans in the same place.

Immediately after the invasion of Rendova Sasaki had instructed Tomonari to

alert his units for possible transfer to

Munda and directed that two 140-mm.

naval guns and two mountain guns be

moved from the Bairoko area to Munda.

After receiving the 229th's report he

brought the 3d Battalion, 229th Infantry, from Kolombangara through Bairoko to Munda to rejoin the regiment

on 4 July.

On the same day, Sasaki proposed a

counterlanding against Rendova. As their

artillery pieces lacked the range to hit

Rendova, the Japanese on Munda could

not retaliate when shells from American

155's crashed on Munda field. Sasaki

therefore suggested that the main body

of the Munda garrison board landing

craft, avoid recognition by mingling with

American craft, and assault Rendova

amid the resulting confusion. This interesting plan might have succeeded and

caused a disaster to the Allies. More

probably, by removing the Munda troops

from their strong defense positions, it

would have saved the Americans a lot

of fighting. 8th Fleet Headquarters apparently vetoed the proposal.

Also on Independence Day General

Imamura and Admiral Kusaka, who

wished to hold New Georgia at all costs

as a key outpost for Bougainville, considered the problem of holding the

island in relation to the general defense

of the Southeast Area. They decided to

strengthen New Georgia and to hold

New Guinea with the troops already

there. Imamura agreed to give four thousand more 17th Army troops to Sasaki.

These, including additional units from

the 13th and 229th Infantry Regiments

plus artillerymen, engineers, and medical men, were to be shipped in echelons

from Erventa in the Shortlands to Kolombangara. Warships would transport

them. It was the first echelon of these

troops that Admiral Ainsworth's task

force kept from landing on the night of

4-5 July. On 5 July the Japanese naval officers' worries regarding New Georgia

were increased by Hester's build-up at

Zanana and Liversedge's landing at Rice

Anchorage. The Japanese assigned ten

destroyers to transport the second echelon, which was to be put ashore at Vila

in the early morning hours of 6 July.

Informed that Japanese warships were

getting ready to sail from the Shortlands,

Halsey ordered Ainsworth's task group

to intercept, reinforced by two destroy-
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 99

ers to replace the Strong and the damaged destroyer Chevalier. Ainsworth, retiring from the Kula Gulf, was in Indispensable Strait when Halsey's orders

reached him. He reversed course and

entered Kula Gulf about midnight, a

few minutes behind the Japanese destroyers. In the ensuing Battle of Kula

Gulf, the veteran cruiser Helena was

sunk. The Japanese lost the destroyers

Niizuki and Nagatsuki, but put 850

soldiers ashore at Vila.2 This addition of

850 men enabled Sasaki to send part of

another battalion from Kolombangara to

Munda that same day.

Admiral Kusaka, who moved his headquarters from Rabaul to Buin "to alter

the grave situation and raise the morale

of all the forces," wanted still more

troops for New Georgia.3 On 7 July he

asked Imamura for 11,000 more soldiers.

The general, who had just approved

sending 4,000 men to New Georgia, now

stated that he doubted that even Bougainville could be made secure. Although willing to consider sending another division to Bougainville, he refused to provide 11,000 more troops for

New Georgia.

It was well for the Americans that

Imamura refused the 11,000 men. Blasting the existing garrisons out of Munda

and Bairoko was to prove sufficiently

difficult and bloody.

Operations of the Northern Landing

Group

The March to Dragons Peninsula

At 0600 of 5 July, with nearly all his

Northern Landing Group ashore and in

hand, Colonel Liversedge ordered his

troops to move out. The 1st Marine

Raider Battalion, the 3d Battalion, 148th

Infantry, and K and L Companies of the

145th Infantry were to advance southward toward Dragons Peninsula, the

piece of land lying between Enogai Inlet

and Bairoko Harbour. (Map 8) Once

they had reached the head of Enogai

Inlet, the Raiders and K and I Companies, 145th, were to swing right to

take the west shore of Enogai Inlet prior

to assaulting Bairoko, while the 3d Battalion, 148th, advanced southwest to

block the Munda-Bairoko trail. M, L,

and Headquarters Companies of the 3d

Battalion, 145th Infantry, were ordered

to stay and defend Rice Anchorage under Lt. Col. George C. Freer, the battalion commander.

The preinvasion reconnaissance parties, after examining the ground between

Rice Anchorage and Dragons Peninsula

to determine whether an overland attack would be practicable, had reported

the country generally level with sparse

undergrowth. There were no swamps.

Enogai Inlet, with a good anchorage, had

a mangrove-covered shore line except at

its head where firm ground rose steeply

to an elevation of about five hundred

feet. Dragons Peninsula itself was hilly,

swampy, and jungled, but on the inland

shore of Leland Lagoon a ridge ran from

Enogai to Bairoko village. Bairoko Harbour was deep, and was backed by

swamplands.

The advance to Dragons Peninsula began immediately after Liversedge issued

his orders. Guided by natives, the troops

moved along the three parallel trails—

the original track and the two cut by

2

 For a full account see Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 160-75. 3

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH), 32.

THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 101

Corrigan's natives. The 1st Marine Raider Battalion, Lt. Col. Samuel B. Griffith, III, commanding, led the way, followed in order by K and L Companies,

145th, under Maj. Marvin D. Girardeau,

and Lt. Col. Delbert E. Schultz's 3d

Battalion, 148th Infantry. The patrols'

reports had implied that the going would

be easy, but the march proved difficult.

The rough trails, winding over hills and

ridges, were obstructed by branches,

roots, and coral outcroppings. Rain wet

the troops all day. The Raiders, whose

heaviest weapon was the 60-mm. mortar, made fairly steady progress, but the

soldiers of M Company, 148th Infantry,

fell behind as they floundered through

the mud with their heavy machine guns,

81-mm. mortars, and ammunition.

At 1300 part of D Company of the

Raiders, the advance guard, was sent on

ahead to secure a bridgehead on the far

bank of the Giza Giza river.4 Three

hours later the Raiders' main body and

the companies of the 145th Infantry arrived at the river and bivouacked there

overnight. They had covered five and

one-half miles in the day's march without meeting a single Japanese. Colonel

Schultz's battalion camped for the night

about one and one-half miles to the

north.

Next morning, 6 July, the Raiders led

out again, and D Company pushed ahead

to secure a crossing over the Tamakau

River. The rains had flooded the river;

it was now nine feet deep. Without tools

or time to build a proper bridge, the

Raiders threw a log over the stream, and

improvised rafts from poles and ponchos

to ferry over their heavy equipment.

After several rafts had capsized, they gave

up and carried everything over on the

log. Several men slipped off the log and

fell into the swollen river; a few had to

be rescued from drowning. The crossing

had started before noon, but not until

dusk did the last man cross the river.

Schultz's battalion, also delayed by high

water, caught up with the Raiders and

bivouacked near them for the night.

On the morning of 7 July the Raiders

and Girardeau's companies set out for

Enogai, while Schultz's battalion pushed

south toward the Munda-Bairoko trail.

The country was rough, the going hard

for both forces. The Raiders took five

hours to cover the 2,500 yards between

their bivouac and the east end of Enogai

Inlet.

The 3d Battalion, 148th, reached the

trail at 1700. In the afternoon the two

hundred men who had been landed

astray on 5 July caught up with the main

body. There had been no opposition

from the Japanese; a patrol was observed but kept its distance.

Capture of Enogai Inlet

When the Marine Raiders and Girardeau's two companies reached Enogai

Inlet, one platoon, again from D Company, pushed forward to secure the deserted village called Maranusa. From

there a patrol marched toward Triri,

another village which was hardly more

than a clearing. Up to now the marines

had not seen any Japanese, but as the

patrol approached Triri its point detected five Japanese ahead. The marines

ambushed the party and killed two of its

members. They belonged to the Kure

6th Special Naval Landing Force. The

4

 At this time the lettered companies of the 1st

Raider Battalion were all rifle companies; there was

no heavy weapons company.
102 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

other three fled. When Liversedge heard

about this action, which made it obvious

that his force had been discovered, he

ordered Griffith to secure Triri at once

in order to prepare to repel a counterattack. Griffith dispatched the demolition platoon from battalion Headquarters Company with orders to pass through

D Company and seize Triri. On the way

up, the platoon ran into a strong enemy

patrol which opened fire. The marines

retired to a defensive position on the

bank of a stream and kept the enemy

in place with fire. At this point D Company appeared on the scene, swung to

the left, struck the Japanese on their

inland (right) flank, and drove them off.

Three marines and ten Japanese were

killed in this skirmish. One of the dead

Japanese had on his person a defense

plan which showed the exact location of

the heavy guns at Enogai. By 1600 all

elements of the Enogai attacking force

were installed at Triri.

At dawn the following morning—8

July, the day on which Schultz's battalion completed its block on the

Munda-Bairoko trail—two Raider combat patrols went out of Triri. B Company sent one out to ambush a trail

which led northwesterly to Enogai, and

a D Company patrol advanced south

along a cross-country track leading to

Bairoko to lay another ambush. This patrol had advanced a short distance by

0700, when it ran into an enemy force

of about company strength. A fire fight

broke out, and at 1000 Griffith sent C

Company to drive the enemy back a

short distance.

In the meantime, the patrol which had

advanced toward Enogai reported no

contact with the enemy. In order to assemble all companies of the 1st Raider

Battalion for the attack against Enogai,

Griffith sent K and L Companies of the

145th south to take over from C Company. C Company then disengaged,

moved back to Triri, and in the early

afternoon the 1st Raider Battalion

marched northwest toward Enogai. But

the trail led the marines into an impassable mangrove swamp. The battalion therefore retired to Triri, while

scouts hunted for a better route to use

the next day.

In the south sector, the fight between

the Japanese and K and L Companies

had continued. The Japanese in repeated assaults struck hard at K Company

which was on the right (west). Capt.

Donald W. Fouse, commanding K Company, was wounded early in the action

but stayed with his company until the

fight was over. When the Raider battalion retired to Triri, the Demolition

Platoon was committed to the line, and

when K Company was hard hit a platoon

from B Company of the Raiders swung

wide around the Japanese left flank and

struck them in the rear. This maneuver

succeeded. The enemy scattered.5

The 1st Raider Battalion resumed its

advance against Enogai the next morning, using a good trail, apparently unknown to the Japanese, that led over

high ground west of the swamp. K and

L Companies remained to hold Triri,

the site of Liversedge's command post.

Griffith's battalion, meeting no opposition, made good time. By 1100 the marines were in sight of Leland Lagoon.

They swung slightly to the right toward

5

 K Company reported killing a hundred Japanese; the marine platoon is reported to have killed

twenty.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 103

Enogai Point and at 1500 ran into two

Japanese light machine guns which

opened fire and halted the advance. Griffith deployed, with A Company on the

left, C in the center, B on the right, and

D in reserve. The companies then assaulted, but the Japanese defended so

resolutely that no further progress was

made that day.

Patrols reconnoitered vigorously so

that by 0700, 10 July, Griffith had been

informed that the Japanese were strongest in front of his center and left, and

that there were no Japanese directly in

front of B Company. The battalion resumed the attack at 0700. C and A

Companies advanced slowly against rifle

and machine gun fire. Supported by 60-

mm. mortars, B Company drove forward

rapidly, cleared the village of Baekineru,

and captured two machine guns. Then

A Company, strengthened by one platoon from battalion reserve, pushed over

Enogai Point to the sea. By 1500 all

organized resistance had ended except

for a pocket in front of A Company.

When D Company started establishing

beach defenses, it was troubled by three

machine guns from another enemy

pocket. Mopping up these two groups

of Japanese took until 11 July.

The Raiders had run out of food and

water by midafternoon of 10 July, but

were succored by L Company, 145th,

which brought rations and water up

from Triri. These had been dropped, at

Liversedge's urgent request, by C-47's

from Guadalcanal.

By 12 July Enogai was organized for

defense against land or seaborne attacks.

Estimates of Japanese casualties ranged

from 150 to 350. Postwar Japanese accounts assert that Enogai was defended

by one platoon of soldiers and 81 men

of the Kure 6th Special Naval Landing

Force. The marines lost 47 killed, 4 missing, and 74 wounded. They captured 3

.50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, 4

heavy and 14 light machine guns, a

searchlight, rifles, mortars, ammunition,

2 tractors, some stores and documents,

and the 4 140-mm. coastal guns that had

harassed the landing at Rice Anchorage.

The guns were intact except that their

breechblocks had been removed. Luckily, a marine digging a foxhole uncovered one, and a hasty search of the area

turned up the other three. The marines

used these guns to help guard the seaward approaches to the newly won position.6

Roadblock North of Munda

While the Raiders were thus engaged,

the soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 148th

Infantry, were deep in the jungle holding

their block. The block, completed on 8

July, was set up on a well-used trail

some two miles southeast of Enogai Inlet

and eight miles north of Munda. I Company, with one M Company platoon attached, faced toward Bairoko; K Company faced Munda. L Company covered

the flanks of I and K, and extended its

lines back to protect the battalion command post. M Company, with the Antitank Platoon attached, was in a supporting position to the rear. Each rifle

company held one platoon in reserve

under battalion control. All positions

were camouflaged. Colonel Schultz ordered his men to fire at enemy groups

larger than four men; smaller parties

were to be killed with bayonets.

6

 Sasaki apparently had ordered two of these guns

to Munda.
104 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The battalion held the block from 8

through 17 July. Patrols went out regularly. General Hester had ordered patrols

to push far enough to the south to make

contact with the 43d Division's right

flank as it advanced westward against

Munda, but this was never done.

Schultz was strengthened on 11 July

by the addition of I Company, 145th Infantry, after a group of Japanese had

overrun part of L Company's positions

in a series of attacks starting 10 July.

Except for this, the Japanese made no

effort to dislodge Schultz's men, whose

greatest enemy proved to be hunger. The

troops had left Rice Anchorage carrying

rations for three days on the assumption

that Enogai Inlet would be taken in two

days and that American vessels could

then land stores there. These could be

delivered to the troops after a relatively

short overland haul. But Enogai was not

secured until 11 July. The 120 native

carriers thus had to carry food all the

way from Rice Anchorage. Although, according to Colonel Liversedge, the natives "accomplished an almost superhuman task," they could not carry supplies

fast enough to keep the troops fed.7

By 9 July the food shortage was serious. Only 2,200 D rations had been

delivered. Late that evening, with food

for the next day reduced to one ninth

of a D and one ninth of a K ration per

man, Schultz radioed to Liversedge an

urgent request that food be brought in

by carrier. He also hoped the natives

could carry out two badly wounded men

who were being cared for in the battalion

aid station. But as there were not enough

natives, C-47's dropped food, as well as

ammunition, to the battalion the next

afternoon. Much of the food fell far beyond the 3d Battalion's lines, and some

of the ammunition was defective. Schultz

was forced to cut the food allowance for

the next twenty-four hours to one twelfth

of a K ration. Fortunately Enogai had

now fallen, and on 13 July Flight Officer

Corrigan's natives carried in three hundred pounds of rice which the men

cooked in their helmets, using salt tablets for seasoning. The next day, though,

was another hungry one; one D and one

K ration was the allowance for each

eighteen men. Thereafter, until the block

was abandoned, carrying parties and air

drops kept food stocks high enough.

During the nine days it held the block,

the 3d Battalion lost 11 men killed and

29 wounded; it estimated it had killed

250 Japanese.

At the time it was believed that the

blockers had cut off Munda from reinforcement via Bairoko, and that they

held the Japanese Bairoko force in place,

prevented Enogai from being reinforced

from either Munda or Bairoko, and protected Griffith's right flank and rear.8

Knowledge gained after the event indicates that none of these beliefs was

warranted.

That Munda was not isolated is demonstrated by the fact that the Japanese

reinforcement of Munda was in full

swing, and all the reinforcements seem

to have reached Munda without much

trouble. The enemy obviously stopped

using the blocked trail after 8 July and

shifted to another one farther west.

Meanwhile, reinforcement by water

7

 1st Mar Raider Regt [NLG], Combat Rpt and

War Diary, 4 Jul-29 Aug 43 entries.

8

 NGOF, Report of Operations on New Georgia;

1st Mar Raider Regt, Special Action Rpt, New

Georgia, 6 Oct 43.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 105

continued. On 9 July, when 1,200 Japanese from the Shortlands landed on Kolombangara, 1,300 of the 13th Infantry

transferred by barge to Bairoko. Three

days later, on 12 July, a Japanese tenship force left Rabaul to carry 1,200

more soldiers to Kolombangara, and Halsey sent Ainsworth's task force to intercept again. The two forces collided early

on 13 July northeast of Kolombangara

in a battle named for that island. The

Allies lost the destroyer Gwin; the New

Zealand light cruiser Leander and the

American light cruisers St. Louis and

Honolulu suffered damage. The Japanese flagship, the light cruiser Jintsu, was

sunk, but 1,200 enemy soldiers were

landed on the west coast of Kolombangara.9

At Bairoko, during this period, the

13th Infantry made ready to go to Munda. It was part of this regiment which

attacked the trail block on 10 July.10 On

13 July, when the Bairoko garrison was

strengthened by the 2d Battalion, 45th

Infantry, and a battery of artillery, the

13th Infantry marched south to the

Munda front.

As far as pinning down the Bairoko

troops was concerned, the block lay more

than two miles from Bairoko, and thus

could not have affected the Bairoko garrison very much. And surely, had the

Japanese desired to reinforce Enogai

from Bairoko, they would have used the

direct trail along the shore of Leland

Lagoon rather than going over the more

roundabout route which was blocked.

In view of the American strength at

Rendova and Zanana, the thesis that the

Japanese might have sent troops from

Munda to Enogai is equally untenable,

even if it were not known that the Japanese were reinforcing Munda, not Enogai. Finally, Schultz's battalion was too

far from Griffith's to render much flank

protection in that dense, dark jungle.11

It is clear that the trail block failed to

achieve results proportionate to the effort expended. So far, the principal effect of the entire Rice Anchorage-Enogai-Bairoko operation had been to employ troops that could have been better

used at Munda.

By 11 July, with Enogai secured, Liversedge was five days behind schedule.

Casualties, illness, and physical exhaustion had reduced the 1st Raider Battalion to one-half its effective strength.

Considering that two fresh battalions

could reduce Bairoko in three days, he

asked Admiral Turner, with Hester's approval, for additional troops. There were

not two more battalions to be had, Turner replied, but he promised to land the

4th Raider Battalion at Enogai by 18

July, and authorized a delay in the assault against Bairoko until then. Thus

short one battalion, Liversedge directed

Schultz to abandon his block and march

to Triri on 17 July. The 3d Battalion,

148th, was to join the Raiders and part

of the 3d Battalion, 145th, in the Bairoko attack.

The Northern Landing Group had accomplished the first phase of its mission

by capturing Enogai, but was behind

schedule. On the Munda front, General 9

 For a full account of the battle see Morison,

Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 180-91. 10

 An enemy account claims that the Americans

were "annihilated." See 17th Army Operations, Vol.

II, Japanese Monogr No. 40 (OCMH).

11

 On 10 July General Hester explicitly directed

Colonel Liversedge to keep his battalions within

supporting distance of one another.
106 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Wing's Southern Landing Group was also

behind schedule.

Operations of the Southern Landing

Group

From Zanana to the Barike River

Once the 169th and 172d Regiments

had landed at Zanana, General Hester

had originally planned, the two regiments were to march overland about two

and one-half to three miles to a line of

departure lying generally along the Barike River, then deploy and attack west

to capture Munda airfield. (Map 9) The

regiments were directed to reach the line

of departure and attack by 7 July, but

by the time the two regiments had

reached Zanana all operations were postponed one day.

The overland approach to Munda involved a march through the rough, jungled, swampy ground typical of New

Georgia. The terrain between Zanana

and Munda was rugged, tangled, and patternless. Rocky hills thrust upward from

two to three hundred feet above sea level,

with valleys, draws, and stream beds in

between. The hills and ridges sprawled

and bent in all directions. The map

used for the operation was a photomap

based on air photography. It showed the

coast line and Munda airfield clearly,

but did not give any accurate indication

of ground contour. About all the troops

could tell by looking at it was that the

ground was covered by jungle.

The difficulty of travel in this rough

country was greatly increased by heat,

mud, undergrowth, and hills. Visibility

was limited to a few yards. There were

no roads, but a short distance north of

Zanana lay Munda Trail, a narrow foot

track that hit the coast at Lambeti Plantation. Engineers were making ready to

build a road from Zanana to Munda

Trail, and to improve the latter so that

it could carry motor traffic.

Having made their way from Zanana

to the line of departure on the Barike,

the two regiments would, according to

Hester's orders, deliver a co-ordinated

attack against Munda airfield, which lay

about two and one-half miles westward.

The 172d Infantry on the left (south)

would be responsible for a front extending inland from the coast. The 169th

Infantry's zone of action lay north of the

172d's; its right flank would be in the

air except for protection given it by

South Pacific Scout patrols operating to

the north. The attack would be supported by General Barker's artillery and by

air and naval bombardments.

Two days after the beginning of the

two-regiment attack, a heavy naval bombardment would prepare the way for an

assault landing by the 3d Battalion, 103d

Infantry, and the 9th Marine Defense

Battalion's Tank Platoon at 0420, 9

July, at the west tip of Munda Point.

Hester and Wing did not expect to

meet any serious opposition between

Zanana and the Barike River, and their

expectations must have been confirmed

by the experience of the 1st Battalion,

172d. On 3 July Colonel Ross had ordered this battalion to remain at Zanana,

making every effort at concealment. The

message was apparently not received, for

on 4 July the battalion, accompanied by

A Company, 169th Infantry, easily

marched to the Barike River, meeting

only small Japanese patrols on the way.

It was this premature move that helped

to alert Sasaki.

Next morning Captain Sherrer of the

108 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

G-2 Section led a patrol of six New Zealanders, twelve Americans, and eighteen

Fijians from his base camp toward the

upper reaches of the Barike River. They

intended to set up a patrol base on high

ground suitable for good radio transmission and reception. Normally they

would have avoided detection by moving off the trails and striking out through

the wilderness, but, laden with radio

gear, they followed Munda Trail. As

they approached a small rise that lay

about two miles from Zanana, and about

eleven hundred yards east of the line of

departure, they met enemy machine gun

fire. They replied with small arms, and

the fire fight lasted until dusk when

Sherrer's group disengaged and went

south to the bivouac of the 1st Battalion,

172d, near the mouth of the Barike. B

Company, 172d, went out to investigate

the situation the next morning and

found the Japanese still occupying the

high ground, astride the trail. Attacks

by B Company and by A Company,

169th, failed to dislodge the Japanese.

By afternoon of 6 July, however, the

three battalions of the 172d Infantry

were safely in place on the Barike, the

1st and 3d on the left and right, the 2d

in regimental reserve.

But the 169th Infantry, commanded

by Col. John D. Eason, was not so fortunate. That regiment's 3d Battalion,

under Lt. Col. William A. Stebbins, set

out along the trail from Zanana to the

line of departure on the morning of 6

July. Natives guided the battalion as it

moved in column of companies, each

company in column of platoons, along

the narrow trail. The men hacked vines

and undergrowth to make their way

more easily. Shortly after noon, General

Wing ordered Stebbins' battalion to destroy the point of Japanese resistance

that Sherrer had run into.

It was estimated, correctly, that about

one platoon was trying to block the trail.

General Sasaki, aware of the Allied activity east of him, had ordered part of

the 11th Company, 229th Infantry, to

reconnoiter the Barike area, clear fire

lanes, and establish this trail block with

felled trees and barbed wire.

The 3d Battalion, 169th, apparently

did not run into the block on 6 July. It

dug in for the night somewhere east of

the block, but does not seem to have established the sort of perimeter defense

that was necessary in fighting the Japanese in the jungle. Foxholes were more

than six feet apart. The battalion laid no

barbed wire or trip wire with hanging

tin cans that rattled when struck by a

man's foot or leg and warned of the approach of the enemy. Thus, when darkness fell and the Japanese began their

night harassing tactics—moving around,

shouting, and occasionally firing—the

imaginations of the tired and inexperienced American soldiers began to work.

They thought the Japanese were all

around them, infiltrating their perimeter

with ease. One soldier reported that Japanese troops approached I Company,

calling, in English, the code names of

the companies of the 3d Battalion, such

stereotypes as "come out and fight," and

references to the Louisiana maneuvers.12

The men of the battalion, which had

landed in the Russells the previous

March, must have been familiar with the

sights and sounds of a jungle night, but

affected by weariness and the presence

of the enemy, they apparently forgot. In

12

 169th Inf Hist, 20 Jun-30 Sep 43, p. 5.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 109

their minds, the phosphorescence of

rotten logs became Japanese signals. The

smell of the jungle became poison gas;

some men reported that the Japanese

were using a gas which when inhaled

caused men to jump up in their foxholes.

The slithering of the many land crabs

was interpreted as the sound of approaching Japanese. Men of the 169th are

reported to have told each other that

Japanese nocturnal raiders wore long

black robes, and that some came with

hooks and ropes to drag Americans from

their foxholes. In consequence the men

of the battalion spent their nights nervously and sleeplessly, and apparently

violated orders by shooting indiscriminately at imaginary targets.

Next day, the shaken 3d Battalion advanced with I Company leading followed

by L, M, Battalion Headquarters, and K

Companies. It ran into machine gun fire

from the Japanese trail block at 1055. I

Company deployed astride Munda Trail,

L Company maneuvered to the left, K

was initially in reserve. M Company

brought up its 81-mm. mortars and heavy

machine guns but could not use them

profitably at first as banyan trees and

undergrowth blocked shells and bullets.

The mortar platoon then began clearing fields of fire by cutting down trees.

B Company of the 172d also attacked the

block from the south.

I Company launched a series of frontal

assaults but was beaten back by machine

gun fire. Three platoon leaders were

wounded in these attacks. K Company

came out of reserve to deliver a frontal

assault; its commander was soon killed.

Neither it nor any of the other companies made progress. The Japanese were

well dug in and camouflaged. Riflemen

covered the automatic weapons. Fire

lanes had been cut. The enemy weapons

had little if any muzzle blast, and the

Americans had trouble seeing targets.

Some tried to grenade the enemy but

were driven back before they could get

close enough to throw accurately. At

length the 81-mm. mortars got into

action; observers operating thirty yards

from the Japanese position brought

down fire on it. Some Japanese are reported to have evacuated "Bloody Hill,"

as the Americans called it, that afternoon. At 1550 the 3d Battalion withdrew to dig in for the night.13

 After

dark the Japanese harassed the 3d Battalion again. According to the 169th Infantry, "a sleepless night was spent by all

under continued harassing from enemy

patrols speaking English, making horror

noises, firing weapons, throwing hand

grenades, swinging machetes and jumping into foxholes with knives."

 14

On 8 July, the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry, which had been behind the 3d

within supporting distance, was ordered

to bypass the 3d and move to the Barike

while the 3d Battalion reduced the

block. On 7 July General Wing had

ordered Colonel Ross to use part of the

172d against the block, but apparently

by the afternoon of 8 July no elements

of the 172d except B Company had gone

into action against it. On 8 July the 3d

Battalion, 169th, and B Company, 172d,

struck the block after a mortar preparation and overran it. The 3d Battalion

13

 The 169th Infantry History (p. 4) claims that

the block was destroyed on 7 July, and that a day

was lost when the 1st Battalion, 169th, moved ahead

of the 3d on 8 July. But messages in the 43d Division G-3 Journal indicate that the block was still

active on 8 July. 14

 169th Inf Hist, p. 4.
110 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

lost six men killed and thirty wounded,

and suffered one case diagnosed as war

neurosis, in reducing the block. The

trail from Zanana to the Barike was open

again, but the attack against Munda had

been delayed by another full day.

By late afternoon of 8 July, the 1st

Battalion, 169th, had reached the Barike

River and made contact on its left with

the 3d Battalion, 172d; A Company,

169th, had been returned to its parent

regiment; the 3d Battalion, 169th, was

behind and to the right of the 1st Battalion. With the two regiments on the

line of departure, Hester and Wing were

ready to start the attack toward Munda

early on 9 July. Hester told Wing: "I

wish you success."

 15

The Approach to the Main Defenses

By 7 July General Hester, after conferences with General Wing and Colonels Ross and Eason, had abandoned

the idea of the amphibious assault

against Munda by the 3d Battalion, 103d

Infantry, and the 9th Marine Defense

Battalion's tank platoon. He was probably influenced in his decision by the

strength of the Munda shore defenses.

The plan for the attack on 9 July called

for the 169th and 172d Regiments to advance from the Barike, seize the high

ground southwest of the river, and capture the airfield. On the high ground—

a complex of ridges that ran from Ilangana on the beach inland in a northwesterly direction for about three thousand yards—were the main Japanese defenses. The 172d Infantry was to move

out astride the Munda Trail with the

1st and 3d Battalions abreast. Each battalion zone would be three hundred

yards wide. Battalions would advance in

column of companies; each rifle company

would put two platoons in line. The

169th Infantry, maintaining contact on

its left with the 3d Battalion, 172d,

would advance echeloned to the right

rear to protect the divisional right flank.

The 1st Battalion was to advance abreast

of the 172d; the 3d Battalion would

move to the right and rear of the 1st.

The regimental commanders planned

to advance by 200-yard bounds. After

each bound, they intended to halt for

five minutes, establish contact, and move

out again. They hoped to gain from one

to two thousand yards before 1600.

The division reserve consisted of the

2d Battalion, 169th, which was to advance behind the assault units. Antitank

companies from the two regiments, plus

Marine antiaircraft artillerymen, were

defending the Zanana beachhead. In Occupation Force reserve, under Hester,

was the 3d Battalion, 103d Infantry, on

Rendova. H Hour for the attack was set

for 0630.

General Barker's artillery on the offshore islands inaugurated the first major

attack against Munda at 0500 of 9 July

with a preparation directed against rear

areas, lines of communication, and suspected bivouac areas and command

posts. After thirty minutes, fire was

shifted to suspected centers of resistance

near the line of departure. In one hour

the 105-mm. howitzers of the 103d and

169th Field Artillery Battalions, the

155-mm. howitzers of the 136th Field

Artillery Battalion, and the 155-mm.

guns of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion fired over 5,800 rounds of high

explosive. Starting at 0512, four destroy- 15

 43d Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Jul 43.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 111

TROOPS OF THE 172D INFANTRY WADING ACROSS A CREEK on the Munda Trail.

ers from Admiral Merrill's task force,

standing offshore in the Solomon Sea,

opened fire at the area in the immediate

vicinity of the airfield in accordance with

plans prepared in consultation with General Barker. Naval authorities had originally wanted to fire at targets close to

the line of departure as well, but the

43d Division, fearing that the direction

of fire (northeast to east) might bring

shells down on its own troops, rejected

the proposal.16 Between 0512 and 0608,

the destroyers fired 2,344 5-inch rounds.

At 0608, four minutes before the bombardment was scheduled to end, some

Japanese planes dropped bombs and

strafed one ship; the destroyers retired.

Then Allied planes from Guadalcanal

and the Russells took over. Fifty-two

torpedo bombers and thirty-six dive

bombers dropped seventy tons of high

explosive bombs and fragmentation clusters on Munda. Now it was the infantry's turn.

H Hour, 0630, came and went, but

not a great deal happened. The 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported that it

was ready to move but could not understand why the 172d Infantry had not advanced. At 0930, General Wing was informed that no unit had yet crossed the

line of departure. Several factors seem

to have caused the delay. Movement as

usual was an ordeal. The Barike was

flooded. Soldiers, weighted with weapons, ammunition, and packs, had to wade

through waist-to-shoulder-deep water.

16

 Merrill thought the 43d Division was generally

too cautious. See Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks

Barrier, p. 179.
112 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The river, which had several tributaries,

wound and twisted to the sea. It crossed

the Munda Trail three times; the spaces

between were swampy. The men, sweating in the humid heat, struggled to keep

their footing, and pulled their way along

by grabbing at roots and undergrowth.

Leading platoons had to cut the wristthick rattan vines.

Although patrols of New Georgians,

Fijians, Tongans, New Zealanders, and

Americans had reconnoitered the area,

their information could not always be

put to good use. There was no accurate

map on which to record data, nor were

there any known landmarks.

In the jungle, orthodox skirmish lines

proved impractical. As men dispersed

they could not be seen and their leaders

lost control. At any rate, movement off

the trails was so difficult that most units

moved in columns of files, the whole

unit bound to one trail. Thus one or

two Japanese, by firing on the leading

elements, could halt an entire battalion.

The Occupation Force intelligence

officer had estimated that the main Japanese defenses lay 1,600 yards from the

Barike, anchored on Roviana Lagoon

and extending inland to the northwest.

This was correct, except that the defense

line on the ridges was actually about

2,500 yards from the Barike's mouth.

Beyond the main defenses, the Japanese

outposts, using rifles, machine guns, and

sometimes mortars and grenade dischargers, were well able to delay the

advance.

At 1030 General Barker returned to

the 43d Division command post from a

tour of the front and reported that at

1000 the 172d Infantry was a hundred

yards beyond the Barike, but that the

169th was still east of the river. The

only opposition had come from the outpost riflemen that the Americans usually

called "snipers." At the time these were

believed, probably erroneously, to be

operating in the treetops.17

Japanese fighter aircraft appeared over

New Georgia during the day; the Allied

air power prevented any from getting

close enough to strafe the attacking

troops.

By 1630, when it dug in for the night,

the 172d had gained some eleven hundred yards.18

 The 169th had made no

progress to speak of. The 1st Battalion

got one hundred yards west of the

Barike; the other two apparently remained east of the river.

The 169th was facing about the same

obstacles as the 172d, but it is possible

that the 169th was a badly shaken regiment before the attack began.19

 The

night before the attack, 8-9 July, the 3d

Battalion was bivouacked near Bloody

Hill, and the other two lay to the west.

When the Japanese made their presence

known to the three battalions, or when

the Americans thought there were Japanese within their bivouacs, there was a

great deal of confusion, shooting, and

17

 Whereas the Japanese, like the Allies, used trees

whenever possible for observation posts, it is doubtful that "snipers" used many trees in the jungle.

See Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, p.

318. Anyone who has ever climbed a tree in the

jungle can testify to the difficulties a man with a

rifle would encounter—lack of visibility, tree limbs

in the way, and the innumerable little red ants

whose bite is like the prick of needles. 18

 From 1100, 8 July, to 1300, 9 July, this regiment was commanded by Lt. Col. Charles W. Capron. Colonel Ross, wounded on 30 June, had apparently been ordered to Rendova for medical

treatment. 19

 The 172d was either not subjected to night

harassing or was not sufficiently bothered by it to

report it.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 113

EVACUATING CASUALTIES, 12 JULY 1943. Jeep, converted into an ambulance, could

carry three litters and one sitting patient.

stabbing. Some men knifed each other.

Men threw grenades blindly in the dark.

Some of the grenades hit trees, bounced

back, and exploded among the Americans. Some soldiers fired round after

round to little avail. In the morning no

trace remained of Japanese dead or

wounded. But there were American

casualties; some had been stabbed to

death, some wounded by knives. Many

suffered grenade fragment wounds, and

50 percent of these were caused by fragments from American grenades. These

were the men who had been harassed by

Japanese nocturnal tactics on the two

preceding nights, and there now appeared the first large number of cases

diagnosed as neuroses. The regiment was

to suffer seven hundred by 31 July.

The 43d Division resumed the attack

on 10 July. The 172d Infantry, reporting only light opposition, advanced a

considerable distance. The 169th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion in the lead

and the 2d Battalion to its right rear, advanced successfully until it reached the

point where the Munda Trail was intersected by a trail which ran southeast to

the beach, then circled to the southwest

to the native villages of Laiana and Ilangana. Reaching this junction about 1330

after crossing a small creek on two felled

tree trunks, the leading battalion was

halted by machine gun fire. This fire
114 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

came from rising ground dominating

the trail junction, where Capt. Bunzo

Kojima, commanding the 9th Company,

229th Infantry, had established a camouflaged trail block. He employed one rifle

platoon, reinforced by a machine gun

section, some 90-mm. mortars, and elements of a 75-mm. mountain artillery

battalion. When the 1st Battalion was

stopped, Colonel Eason decided to blast

the strong point. While the infantry

pulled back a hundred yards, the 169th's

mortars and the Occupation Force artillery opened fire. Barker's guns fired over

four thousand rounds of 105-mm. and

155-mm. high explosive, shattering trees,

stripping the vegetation, and digging

craters.20 Coincident with this bombardment, eighty-six Allied bombers (SBD's

and TBF's) unloaded sixty-seven tons of

bombs on Lambeti Plantation and

Munda. During the artillery bombardment Kojima's men lay quiet but when

the fire ceased they immediately stood

to their guns and halted the American

infantrymen when they attacked. At the

day's end, the Japanese were still on the

high ground; the 169th Infantry, after

advancing about fifteen hundred yards,

was forced to bivouac in a low swampy

area. The American commanders concluded that they were nearing a main

defensive line. They were right. The

high ground to their front contained the

main Japanese defenses that were to resist them for weeks.

Laiana Beachhead

By 11 July the advancing regiments

were still in trouble. Progress had been

slowed by the enemy, and also by the

supply problems arising from the fact

that the troops had landed five miles

east of their objective and thus committed themselves to a long march

through heavy jungle. Now the regiments, in spite of their slow advance, had

outdistanced their overextended supply

line.

The 118th Engineer Battalion had

made good progress in building a jeep

trail from Zanana to the Barike River.

Using data obtained from native scouts,

the engineers had built their trail over

high, dry ground, averaging one half to

three quarters of a mile per day. There

was little need for corduroying with logs,

a time-consuming process. When they

ran into trees too big to knock down

with their light D-3 bulldozers, the engineers blasted them with dynamite.

Lacking heavy road-graders, the 118th

could not make a two-lane, amply

ditched road, but it managed to clear a

one-lane track widened at regular intervals to permit two-way traffic. Near a

five-foot-deep, fast-running stream east of

the Barike the engineers hit soft mud.

To get to ground firm enough to permit

construction of footbridges and two

thirty-foot trestle bridges, they were

forced to swing the road northward parallel to the river for two and one-half

miles to get to a firm crossing. The advancing regiments crossed the Barike on

9 July, but several days were to elapse

before the bridges were completed.

Thus there was a gap between the end

of the road and the front. To bridge the

gap, nearly half the combat troops were

required to carry forward ammunition,

food, water, and other supplies, and to

evacuate casualties. Allied cargo planes

20

 One fortunate concomitant of artillery fire was

better visibility as the heavy shellings tore the

jungle apart.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 115

JEEP TRAIL FROM ZANANA, built

through heavy jungle by 118th Engineer Battalion, 13 July 1943.

were used to parachute supplies to the

infantry, but there were never enough

planes to keep the troops properly supplied.

With fighting strength reduced by the

necessity for hand carry, with his right

flank virtually exposed, and his extended

supply line open to harassment by the

enemy, Hester decided, on 10 July, to

change his plan of attack in order to

shorten the supply line. If a new beachhead could be established at Laiana (a

native village about two miles east by

south from Munda airfield), some five

thousand yards would be cut off the supply line. Patrols, operating overland and

in canoes, examined Laiana beach at

night and reported that it was narrow

but suitable, with a coral base under the

sand. Unfavorable aspects included a

mangrove swamp back of the beach and

the fact that the Japanese main defenses

appeared to start at Ilangana, only five

hundred yards southwest of Laiana, and

arch northwest toward the Munda Trail.

But the advantages outweighed the

disadvantages. Hester ordered the 172d

Infantry to swing southward to Laiana,

seize and hold a beachhead from the

land side, then advance on Munda. The

169th Infantry was to continue its attempt to drive along the Munda Trail.

Hester ordered the reinforced 3d Battalion, 103d Infantry, at Rendova, to be

prepared to land at Laiana after the

172d had arrived.

At 1000, 11 July, the 172d Infantry

disengaged from the attack, turned

south, and started moving toward shore

through knee-deep mud. The regiment

tried to keep its move a secret, but Japanese patrols quickly observed it, and

mortar fire soon began hitting it. The

wounded were carried along with the

regiment. The advance was halted about

midafternoon after a gain of some 450

yards. Both 1st and 3d Battalions (the

2d had remained behind to block the

trail and thus cover the rear until the

169th could come up) reported running

into pillboxes. Aside from the mortar

shelling and some infiltration by patrols

between the 172d and the 169th, the

Japanese appeared to have stayed fairly

still.

The march was resumed on 12 July

with the hope of reaching Laiana before dark, for the regiment had not re-
116 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

INFANTRYMEN LOADING ON LCP (R)'s for the trip to Laiana, New Georgia, 14 July

1943. Men are from the 3d Battalion of the 103d Infantry, 43d Division.

ceived any supplies for two days. Colonel

Ross reported that the carrying parties

equaled the strength of three and onehalf rifle companies. Despite this fact,

and although food and water were exhausted, the regiment kept moving until

late afternoon when leading elements

were within five hundred yards of

Laiana. There machine gun and mortar

fire halted the advance. At this time

scouts confirmed the existence of pillboxes, connected by trenches, extending

northwest from Ilangana. The pillboxes,

which the Americans feared might be

made of concrete, housed heavy machine

guns, and were supported by light machine guns and mortars.

That night (12-13 July) Japanese

mortars registered on the 172d's bivouac,

and the troops could hear the Japanese

felling trees, presumably to clear fields

of fire.

His hungry, thirsty regiment was without a line of communications, and Colonel Ross, concerned over the Japanese

patrols in his rear, had to get to Laiana

on 13 July. With the artillery putting

fire ahead, the 172d started out through

mangrove swamp on the last five hundred yards to Laiana. The enemy fire

continued. The advance was slow, but

late afternoon found the 172d in possession of Laiana. It organized the area for

defense while patrols sought out the
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 117

LCM's APPROACHING LAIANA, NEW GEORGIA, under Japanese artillery fire, 14

July 1943. The Tank Platoon of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion is aboard

these landing craft.

Japanese line to the west. That night

twelve landing craft left Rendova to

carry food and water to Laiana and

evacuate the wounded. For some reason

the 172d failed to display any signals.

The landing craft, unable to find the

right beach, returned to Rendova.

When the 172d was nearing Laiana

on 13 July, General Hester ordered the

3d Battalion, 103d Infantry, 43d Division, to be prepared to land at 0900 the

following morning. The Tank Platoon

of the 9th Marine Defense Battalion was

attached; to help the tanks and to aid in

the reduction of fixed positions, engineers (bridge builders, demolitions

men, flame thrower operators, and mine

detector men) were also attached.

The reinforced battalion, loaded in

LCP(R)'s and LCM's, rendezvoused at

daybreak of 14 July in Blanche Channel.

When the daily fighter cover arrived

from the Russells, the landing craft

started for Laiana. With the 172d already

holding the beachhead, the first wave

landed peacefully at 0900. Reefs forced

some craft to ground in waist-deep water,

but the hungry soldiers of the 172d

helped unload them. As the LCM's

neared shore Japanese artillery shells began falling on the water route and on

the landing beach. To blind the Japa-
118 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

nese observers, the field artillery fired

more than five hundred white phosphorous rounds as well as high explosive

at suspected Japanese gun positions and

observation posts on Munda Point and

on the high ground (Bibilo Hill) northeast of Munda field. The Japanese artillery did no damage.

General Sasaki reported that he had

repulsed the landing, and that the Americans had lost, of seventy landing craft,

thirteen sunk and twenty damaged.

Nevertheless, 8th Area Army headquarters appears to have learned that the

landing had succeeded.

Once ashore, 43d Division engineers

began building a jeep trail from Laiana

north to the 169th Infantry. Supplies

came in for the 172d, and its wounded

men were evacuated. Telephone crews

laid an underwater cable between

Zanana, Laiana, and General Barker's

artillery fire direction center.

The 3d Battalion, 103d, was still in

division reserve, but Colonel Ross was

authorized to use it in case of dire need.

He committed L Company to fill a gap

between the 2d and 3d Battalions of the

172d on the morning of 15 July when

the 172d was making an unsuccessful

attack toward Ilangana. Soldiers of the

Antitank Platoon of the 3d Battalion,

103d, disassembled a 37-mm. gun, carried it forward, reassembled it on the

front line, and destroyed three pillboxes

with direct fire. This was the only success; the day's end found the 172d still

facing the main enemy defense line.

The Seizure of Reincke Ridge

While the 172d had been driving to

Laiana and getting ready to attack westward, the 169th Infantry was pushing

against the high ground to the north. On

10 July, the day before the 172d turned

southward, the 169th had been halted.

It faced Japanese positions on the high

ground which dominated the MundaLambeti trail junction. The Munda

Trail at this point led up to a draw,

with hills to the north (right) and south

(left). The Japanese held the draw and

the hills.

The regiment renewed the attack on

11 July just before General Hester replaced Colonel Eason with Col. Temple

G. Holland, but made no gains. When

Holland took over the regiment, he

ordered the advance postponed until the

next morning. The exact nature of the

Japanese defenses was not yet completely

clear, but it was evident that the Japanese had built mutually supporting pillboxes on the hills.

Holland's plan for 12 July called for

the 1st Battalion to deliver the attack

from its present position while the 2d

Battalion enveloped the Japanese left

(north) flank.21 The 3d Battalion, temporarily in division reserve, would be released to the regiment when the trail

junction was secure. The 169th attacked

as ordered but bogged down at once,

partly because it became intermingled

with elements of the 172d, which was

starting for Laiana. When the units were

disentangled the two battalions attacked

again. The 1st Battalion ran head on into

Japanese opposition but reported a gain

of three hundred yards. The 2d Battalion

received enfilading fire from the northernmost ridge but kept its position. A

21

 Ltr, Col Holland to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil

Hist, 12 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 119

second attack, supported by a rolling

barrage, was attempted in the afternoon.

The infantry, unable to keep pace with

the barrage which moved forward at the

rate of ten yards a minute, fell behind

and halted. At the day's end, Holland,

who reported to Hester that his regiment was badly disorganized, asked General Mulcahy for air support the following day.

Next morning, 13 July, after thirty

minutes of artillery fire and a twelveplane dive-bombing attack against the

south ridge, the 169th attacked again.

All three battalions were committed.

The 2d Battalion, in the center, was to

assault frontally up the draw while the

1st Battalion, on the right, and the 3d

Battalion on the left, moved against the

north and south ridges with orders to

envelop the Japanese.

The 3d Battalion, with I and L Companies in line and M in support, struggled forward for four hours.22

 It pushed

four hundred to five hundred yards into

the Japanese lines and managed to secure

its objective, the south ridge, which it

named Reincke Ridge for Lt. Col.

Frederick D. Reincke, who had replaced

Stebbins in command on 8 July.

The other two battalions were not as

successful. The 2d Battalion, with E and

F Companies in line and G in support,

met machine gun fire in the draw,

halted, was hit by what it believed to be

American artillery fire, and pulled back.

The 1st Battalion, attacking the north

ridge, found it obstructed by fallen

limbs from blasted trees and by shell

and bomb craters. The Japanese who

had survived the bombardments opened

fire from their pillboxes and halted

the assaulting companies. The battalion,

now operating without artillery or mortar support, tried to assault with rifle

and bayonet. Some men started to climb

to the ridge crest but were killed or

wounded by machine gun fire. B Company lost three of its four officers in the

attempt. Japanese artillery and mortar

fire cut communication to the rear. The

battalion returned to its original position.

The 1st and 2d Battalions took positions on the flanks and rear of the 3d

Battalion, which held Reincke Ridge.

The Japanese held the north ridge and

the draw. To the west they held the

higher ground called Horseshoe Hill. To

the south was the gap left by the 172d

when it turned south. In spite of the 3d

Battalion's exposed situation Holland

and Reincke decided to hold the hardwon position which was the only high

ground the 169th possessed. Its possession was obviously vital to the success

of an attack against the main enemy defenses.

All that night and all the next day (14

July) the Japanese tried to push the 3d

Battalion from Reincke Ridge. I Company was hit hard but held its ground

with the loss of two men killed and nineteen wounded. Artillery and mortar

shells kept exploding on the ridge top,

while Japanese machine guns covered

the supply route to the rear. During its

first twenty-four hours on the ridge,

Reincke's battalion suffered 101 casualties; L Company consisted of just fiftyone enlisted men by the end of 14 July.

22

 K Company had been detached to guard the

regimental command post.
120 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

During part of the time no medical

officer was present, but the battalion

medical section under S/Sgt. Louis Gullitti carried on its duties of first aid and

evacuation.

On the same day Holland reorganized

the other two battalions. The regimental

Antitank Company had landed at Zanana

on 13 July and been assigned the task

of carrying supplies forward from the

trail's end. This task had eased, because

the engineers finished bridging the

Barike on 12 July and by 14 July had

extended the trail to within five hundred yards of the 169th's front lines.

Rations, water, and ammunition were

parachuted to the regiment on 14 July.

Colonel Holland relieved part of the

Antitank Company of its supply duties

and assigned sixty of its men to the 2d

Battalion, twenty to the 1st. He also sent

patrols south to cover the gap to his left.

Late in the afternoon he reported to

Hester that morale in his regiment had

improved.

Next day the 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry, landed at Zanana and was immediately attached to the 43d Division

with orders to advance west and relieve

part of the 169th on the line. The battalion reached the regiment at 1700.

Colonel Holland put it in regimental

reserve pending the completion of the

operations against the hills in front of

him.

Operations against Munda airfield

had gone very slowly but by 15 July had

achieved some success. Liversedge had

captured Enogai and while waiting for

another battalion was getting ready to

attack Bairoko. The 169th Infantry had

some high ground and was in contact

with the main enemy defense line. The

172d Infantry was also in contact with

the main Japanese defenses, and the new

beachhead at Laiana would soon shorten

the supply line.

Casualties

While Hester's men had been attaining limited tactical successes, unusual

medical problems had appeared within

his division.

Enemy resistance was not great at

first. Some 90 men of the 43d Division

were killed up to 17 July; 636 were

wounded. Other men had been injured

by vehicle collisions, falling trees, accidental explosions, and the like. Disease

had put over 1,000 men out of action.23

Diarrhea and dysentery, ailments

helped along by improper field sanitation, were prevalent in early July. They

put men on the sick list for several days.

Skin fungus infected about one quarter

of the men. And there was always malaria. Although malaria control measures

seem to have been carried out so conscientiously that few new cases broke out

in the Occupation Force, all the troops

had been in the Solomons for some time

and there were always recurrent cases.

An especially large number of casualties was caused not by wounds or infectious disease but by mental disturbance.

Between fifty and a hundred men were

leaving the line every day with troubles

which were diagnosed as "war neuroses."

Col. Franklin T. Hallam, surgeon of the

XIV Corps, arrived in New Georgia on

14 July when mental troubles were at

their height. In Hallam's opinion, "war

neurosis" was a "misnomer in most instances," because men suffering simply

23

 XIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 17 Jul 43.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 121

from physical exhaustion "were erroneously directed or gravitated through

medical channels along with the true

psychoneurotics and those suffering with

a temporary mental disturbance currently termed 'WAR NEUROSIS.' " 24

These unfortunate men "who had not

changed clothes or had two continuous

hours of sleep all had the same expression. Their hair was matted and muddy,

and beards were 1⁄2 inch in length, eyes

were sunk in, dark, and had a strained

expression. Gait was plodding and

methodical, no spring or bounce. When

they stopped walking they fell in their

tracks, until it was time to proceed

again."

 25

 Colonel Hallam's description

is even more graphic:

At least 50% of these individuals requir- ing medical attention or entering medical

installations were the picture of utter exhaustion, face expressionless, knees sagging,

body bent forward, arms slightly flexed and

hanging loosely, hands with palms slightly

cupped, marked coarse tremor of fingers . . ., feet dragging, and an over-all appearance of apathy and physical exhaustion.

About 20% of the total group were/highly

excited, crying, wringing their hands, mumbling incoherently, an expression of utter

fright or fear, trembling all over, startled at

the least sound or unusual commotion, having the appearance of trying to escape

impending disaster. Another 15% showed

manifestations of the various types of true

psychoneurotic complexes. The remaining

15% included the anxiety states, and those

with various bizarre somatic disturbances. These were the individuals whose symptoms

were of insidious onset, starting with insomnia, vague digestive symptoms, bad

dreams, frequency of urination, irritability,

diminished ability to concentrate, and a

generally reduced efficiency in the performance of assigned duties.26

Of about 2,500 men in the New

Georgia Occupation Force whose troubles were diagnosed as "war neuroses"

between 30 June and 30 September,

the 43d Division contributed 62 percent during the period 30 June-31 July.

About 1,500 cases came from the three

infantry regiments of the 43d Division:

700 from the 169th Infantry, 450 from

the 172d Infantry, and 350 from the

103d Infantry.27

Attempting to explain this mental

trouble, Hallam divided the causes into

two groups he termed "basic causative

factors" and "precipitating causative factors." Basic causes involved leadership,

orientation, discipline, and physical fitness. Units with poor leaders were more

apt to have trouble than those in which

the standard of leadership was high. In

some units there was a direct correlation

between the incidence of mental troubles among the leaders and among the

led. When soldiers were not adequately

oriented—not told what was going on,

what their objectives were, and what they

were expected to do—they were more

apt to become excited by loose talk and

24

 Ltr, Col Hallam to The Surgeon, USAFISPA,

31 Oct 43, sub: Med Service, New Georgia Campaign, p. 31. 25

 This description comes from a personal account, "Medic on Munda," by Capt. Joseph Risman

(Medical Corps), 169th Infantry, and is quoted in

SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia Campaign, Vol. I, Ch III, p. 26, OCMH.

26

 Ltr, Hallam to The Surgeon, USAFISPA, 31

Oct 43, sub: Med Service, New Georgia Campaign,

pp. 36-37. 27

 Ibid., p. 32. Of the 2,500 cases occurring from

30 June to 30 September, the 43d Division had

about 1,950 or 79 percent; the 37th Division, 200

or 8 percent; the 25th Division, 150 or 6 percent;

Navy and Marine Corps units, 200 or 8 percent. In

July, the New Georgia Occupation Force had 1,750

cases or 70 percent, in August, 650 or 26 percent,

and in September, 100 or 4 percent.
122 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

wild rumors. The significance of lack of

proper discipline and physical fitness in

any military organization, but especially

in one engaged in battle, is perfectly obvious. Interestingly enough, however,

Hallam noted that men "with borderline

physical defects, consisting principally of

eye, teeth, joint, weight, and feet defects, did not break, but did some of the

best fighting."

 28

 Remarkably few men

wounded in action became neurosis

cases, perhaps because their knowledge

that they would be evacuated eased their

mental strain.

The basic causes, of course, were present in some units when they came to

New Georgia. It was Hallam's opinion

that men affected by any of the basic

causes were triggered into mental disturbance by the precipitating factors,

which were combat fatigue, enemy action, noise, and mass hysteria. Combat

fatigue, the almost unutterable physical

and mental weariness that comes from

long stress and strain in battle, probably

accounted for half the diagnoses of war

neuroses. The most effective enemy action was the kind which so seriously disturbed the 169th Infantry—the real, and

occasionally the wholly imaginary, nocturnal harassing tactics of the Japanese.

Although aerial bombardment was also

effective, the noises to which Hallam referred were not the sounds of guns firing and shells bursting, but the natural

sounds of a jungle night, the breezes,

branches, birds, and land crabs. These

caused great anxiety among men to

whom they were unfamiliar. On occasion mass hysteria took over; mental

breaks spread like infection among

troops.

Most of the mental cases, and especially those caused by fatigue, Hallam

believed, could have been cured by a

few days in a rest camp in the combat

area. Sedatives, sleep, clean clothes,

baths, shaves, good food, relief from

duties, and recreation would soon have

enabled the men to return to their units.

But up to mid-July there were no rest

camps, nor even any real hospital facilities, in New Georgia. The 43d Division, about 30-35 percent understrength in medical officers and enlisted

men, had only a 125-bred clearing station

to care for casualties.29 Men requiring

more than twenty-four hours of medical

treatment were being evacuated, usually

by water, to Guadalcanal, with the result that casualties frequently did not

reach hospitals until three days after

they had been taken out of the line.

These medical problems, coupled with

the slow progress of ground operations

up to mid-July, caused serious concern

to all the responsible higher commanders.

Command and Reinforcements

As early as 10 July, Generals Hester

and Wing were far from pleased with the

performance of all units and commanders. On 10 July Wing, who had visited

the command post of the 3d Battalion,

169th Infantry, on 8 July, directly

ordered the regimental commander to

relieve the 3d Battalion's commander

and put Colonel Reincke in his place.

Three days prior to this relief, the

145th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d

Battalion, serving under Liversedge) of

the 37th Division, which had been stand28

 Ibid., p. 35.

29

 The 17th Field Hospital came up from Guadalcanal and opened on New Georgia on 28 July.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 123

ing by on Guadalcanal in area reserve,

had been dispatched to Rendova. The

first echelon sailed on 7 July, the second

two days later. The regimental commander, Colonel Holland, had hardly

arrived on Rendova when Hester relieved the commander of the 169th Infantry and ordered Colonel Holland to

take over the regiment temporarily. Also

relieved were the executive, intelligence,

and operations officers of the 169th.

Leaving Lt. Col. Theodore L. Parker in

command of his old regiment, Holland

took his own executive, intelligence, and

operations officers and eighteen enlisted

men from the 145th to headquarters of

the 169th.

Meanwhile problems of higher command for New Georgia had not ceased

to concern Admirals Halsey and Turner

and especially General Harmon. On 5

July Harmon was on Guadalcanal, as

were Turner and General Griswold.

After informing Turner and Griswold

of his views, he radioed to Halsey a recommendation that the forward echelon

of the XIV Corps staff be sent to New

Georgia about 8 July to prepare, under

Hester, to take over supply, administration, and planning. Once Munda airfield

fell, Harmon urged, Griswold should

become commander of the New Georgia

Occupation Force. This would free

Hester to reorganize his main striking

force and directly command the attack

against Vila in Kolombangara. Such a

change was necessary, Harmon explained, because Hester's small staff was

not capable of bearing the responsibilities that would soon be thrust on it.30

Admiral Turner was not a man given to

avoiding responsibility or yielding authority. Harmon wrote later, in explaining his reasons for urging a change in

command, that Turner was "inclined

more and more to take active control of

land operations."

 31

 In his message to

Halsey, he did not make this point. The

South Pacific commander replied to Harmon the next day, telling him to augment Hester's 43d Division staff as he

saw fit. Halsey wished to discuss with

Harmon the recommendations on superseding Hester before reaching a decision.

On the same day Halsey directed Turner

to prepare plans for Kolombangara in

consultation with Hester.32

The next day the irascible Turner

presented his views to Halsey in very

mild terms. Expressing regret over the

necessity for disagreeing with Harmon,

he strongly urged that Hester retain

command of the New Georgia Occupation Force. Griswold and his staff were

excellent, Turner agreed, but Hester

was conducting operations "in a manner

much to be admired." Superseding him

would hamper the operation "by inducing a severe blow to morale."

 33

At this point Harmon, a peppery, wiry

man, grew impatient. He boarded his

B-17 and flew to Halsey in Noumea.

". . . before nightfall," he later related,

30

 Rad, Harmon to COMSOPAC, 5 Jul 43, Hq

SOPACBACOM File. Suppl New Georgia Material,

OCMH.

31

 Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, quoted in

part in Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New

Georgia Material, OCMH. 32

 Rad, COMSOPAC to Harmon, 6 Jul 43, Hq

SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material,

OCMH; COMSOPAC War Diary, 6 Jul 43. 33

 Rad, CTF 31 to COMSOPAC, 7 Jul 43, Hq

SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material,

OCMH.
124 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

"Admiral Halsey approved the course of

procedure I had recommended."

 34

Griswold received instructions on 10

July to take six officers from his staff and

fly to New Georgia on 11 July in an

amphibian plane. The remainder of the

XIV Corps staff would follow by water

on 12 July. On orders from Halsey,

which the admiral expected to issue after

the capture of Munda airfield, Griswold

would assume command of the New

Georgia Occupation Force. Turner's authority over the Occupation Force would

cease, but he was to continue to support

the operation. Halsey repeated to Turner

his instructions regarding plans for

taking Kolombangara, and told him

that, if Griswold approved the idea,

Hester would command the ground

forces in the attack.35

Griswold arrived at Rendova on 11

July just as Hester and Wing were

changing their plan of attack against

Munda and sending the 172d Infantry

to seize the Laiana beachhead. The XIV

Corps commander was not long in reaching a judgment regarding operations to

date.

General Harmon, at his headquarters

in Noumea, wrote an optimistic letter

to Washington on the morning of 13

July. He reported that operations in

New Georgia seemed to be progressing

favorably. He did not send the letter, for

later in the morning he received a radiogram from General Griswold, who said,

"From an observer point of view things

are going badly." Griswold urged that

the 25th Division and the remainder of

the 37th Division be sent into the battle

at once. Although he reported, "Enemy

resistance to date not great," he did not

think the 43d Division would ever take

Munda. It was, he declared, "about to

fold up."

 36

This message had an immediate effect.

Halsey met with Harmon and informally

appointed him as his deputy. He ordered

Harmon to "assume full charge of and

responsibility for ground operations in

New Georgia," and "to take whatever

steps were deemed necessary to facilitate

the capture of the airfield."

 37

Before leaving for Koli Point on

Guadalcanal to be nearer the scene of

action, Harmon ordered Griswold to

hasten his preparations for assuming

command on New Georgia. All ground

forces assigned for the operation, he told

Griswold, would be available by the

time he assumed command. Harmon

promised to alert one regimental combat team of the veteran 25th Division

for movement, but it would be dispatched to New Georgia only if he

specifically approved.

Of the assigned 37th Division forces,

the 145th Infantry, like the 136th Field

Artillery Battalion, was already on hand

in New Georgia, the 1st and 2d Battalions at Rendova and the 3d Battalion under Liversedge along with 3d Battalion,

148th Infantry. Admiral Turner at once 34

 Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, quoted in

part in Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New

Georgia Material, OCMH; COMSOPAC War Diary,

9 Jul 43. 35

 Rad, COMSOPAC to CTF 31, 9 Jul 43; and

Rad, COMGENSOPAC to CG XIV Corps, 10 Jul

43, in Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia

Material, OCMH; XIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 10-11 Jul

43.

36

 Rad, Griswold to Harmon, 13 Jul 43, quoted

in SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia

Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. III, p. 39, OCMH. 37

 Harmon, The Army in the South Pacific, p. 8;

Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific

Campaign, p. 7. Both in OCMH.
THE OFFENSIVE STALLS 125

REAR ADM. THEODORE S. WILKINSON (left) and Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon in

the chart room of the transport McCawley.

ordered Col. Stuart A. Baxter, commanding the 148th Infantry in the Russell Islands, to alert Headquarters, the

1st and 2d Battalions, and the Antitank

Company of his regiment for immediate

movement to New Georgia. These movements would put two full infantry regiments of the 37th Division in New

Georgia.

On the 16th, Griswold proposed that

the 37th Division units operate under

control of their division commander,

Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler, and that

Beightler and his senior staff officers fly

to New Georgia for conferences and personal reconnaissance. Harmon agreed,

and Beightler left for New Georgia in a

PBY on 19 July.

On arriving at Guadalcanal, Harmon

ordered Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins,

commanding the 25th Division, to get

one regimental combat team ready for

transfer to New Georgia. Collins, who

on Griswold's departure had become

island commander and as such responsible for Guadalcanal's defense, decided

that the 161st Regimental Combat Team

could most easily be spared from its de-
126 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

fense missions. On 14 July he directed

Col. James L. Dalton, II, regimental and

combat team commander, to be ready to

move on twelve hours' notice.38

The next day Admiral Turner was relieved of his posts of Commander, South

Pacific Amphibious Force (III Amphibious Force and Task Force 32), and Commander, New Georgia Attack Force

(Task Force 31). This relief apparently

had nothing to do with recent events on

New Georgia. Admiral Nimitz, then preparing for the great Central Pacific drive

that was to start with the invasion of the

Gilberts in November 1943, had directed

Halsey to send Turner to Hawaii.

Turner departed on the 15th, and during the next two years commanded the

V Amphibious Force in the invasions of

the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas,

Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. His posts in

the South Pacific were taken over by Admiral Wilkinson, until then Halsey's

deputy commander.

On the day Turner left, Harmon

ordered Griswold to assume command

of the New Georgia Occupation Force

at midnight of 15-16 July, and to seize

Munda and join forces with Liversedge

as soon as possible. Griswold took over

command as ordered. Hester reverted to

command of the 43d Division.

Thus by mid-July Turner and Hester,

the two officers most responsible for the

execution of the New Georgia tactical

plans, had been replaced. With the offensive stalling, General Griswold was facing his first experience in commanding

a corps in combat. His problems were

formidable, although some progress had

been made. Liversedge's three battalions

were behind schedule but had taken

Enogai and were preparing to attack

Bairoko. On the Munda front the 169th

and 172d Infantry Regiments, also behind their schedule, had laboriously

made their way from Zanana across the

Barike to Laiana and the vicinity of

Reincke Ridge and were in contact with

the main Japanese defenses. These forces

were obviously not adequate to break

through and capture the airfield, but additional regiments were on their way.

Aside from the difficulties presented by

the enemy and the terrain, Griswold was

confronted by an abnormally high rate

of mental illness, and by the need to improve the Occupation Force supply system so that the regiments would be

taken care of in the normal manner instead of by emergency air drop. Obviously, it was a case calling for generalship of a high order.

38

 The regimental combat team consisted of the

161st Infantry; the 89th Field Artillery Battalion;

A Company, 65th Engineer Battalion; and A Company, 25th Medical Battalion.
CHAPTER VIII

Griswold Takes Over

General Griswold at once concluded

that he could not mount a large-scale

offensive against Munda until he had

received reinforcements and reorganized

the Occupation Force. Estimating that

four battalions of "Munda moles well

dug in" faced him, he planned to keep

"pressure on slant-eye," and to gain more

advantageous ground for an offensive,

by using the 43d Division in a series of

local attacks. At the same time he would

be getting ready for a full corps offensive

to "crack Munda nut and allow speedy

junction with Liversedge."

 1 In the rear

areas, Griswold and his staff set to work

to improve the system of supply and

medical treatment.

The Attack on Bairoko

Meanwhile Colonel Liversedge, after

taking Enogai and abandoning the trail

block, was making ready to assault Bairoko. (See Map 8.) Liversedge's operations against Bairoko were not closely

co-ordinated with action on the Munda

front. Upon assuming command Griswold directed Liversedge to submit daily

reports, but radio communication between Liversedge and Occupation Force

headquarters on Rendova had been poor.

Curiously enough Liversedge's signals

from his Navy TBX radio could barely

be picked up at Rendova, although the

radio at Segi Point was able to receive

them without much difficulty. As a result

Liversedge had to send many messages

through Segi Point to headquarters of

Task Force 31 at Guadalcanal, from

there to be relayed to Rendova, a slow

process at best.

In the days following the fall of Enogai, Liversedge sent patrols out to cover

Dragons Peninsula. They made contact

with the Japanese only once between 12

and 17 July. Little information was obtained. "Ground reconnaissance," wrote

Liversedge, ". . . was by no means all

it should have been." Most patrols, he

felt, were not aggressive enough, had

not been adequately instructed by unit

commanders, and were not properly conducted. ". . . some patrols were sent

out in which the individual riflemen had

no idea of where they were going and

what they were setting out to find."

1

 Rad, Griswold to Harmon, 16 Jul 43, in XIV

Corps G-3 Jnl, 16 Jul 43. Unless otherwise indicated

this chapter is based on SOPACBACOM, History

of the New Georgia Campaign, Vol. I, OCMH; the

orders, action rpts, jnls and jnl files of NGOF, XIV

Corps, 43d Div, 37th Div, 25th Div, NLG, and their

component units; USAFISPA's Daily Int Summaries

and Periodic Int Rpts; 17th Army Operations, Vol.

II, Japanese Monogr No. 40 (OCMH); Southeast

Area Naval Operations, Vol. II, Japanese Monogr

No. 49 (OCMH); the published naval and air histories previously cited.
128 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

JAPANESE PRISONERS CAPTURED NEAR LAIANA BEACH are escorted to division

headquarters for interrogation.

There was always the problem of "goldbricking on the part of patrols who are

inclined to keep their activity fairly close

to their camp area. . . ." Patrols made

"grave errors in distance and direction"

and frequently were unobservant. Many

returned from their missions unable to

tell in what direction the streams flowed,

whether there were fresh enemy tracks

around a given stream, and the approximate dimensions of swamps they had

passed through.2

Prisoners might have supplied a good

deal of information, but only two had

been captured. Air photography, too,

might have furnished Liversedge with

data on strongpoints, gun emplacements,

stores, and bivouac areas, but he complained that he had received practically

no photos. One group of obliques received just before the landing at Rice

Anchorage turned out to be pictures of

marines landing at Segi Point. Thus, except for the map captured on 7 July,

Liversedge had no sound information

on the installations at Bairoko. He was

aware only that the Japanese were digging in and preparing to resist. The

Americans could only guess at Japanese

strength at Bairoko, whither the survivors of the Japanese garrison at Enogai 2

 NLG War Diary and Combat Rpt, pp. 9-10.
GRISWOLD TAKES OVER 129

had gone. Harmon's headquarters estimated that one Army infantry battalion

plus two companies, some artillerymen,

and part of the Kure 6th Special Naval

Landing Force were defending Bairoko.

The actual strength of the garrison is

not clear. It consisted, however, of the

2d Battalion, 45th Infantry, the 8th Battery, 6th Field Artillery (both of the 6th

Division), and elements of the Kure 6th

Special Naval Landing Force.3

Liversedge had few more than three

thousand men to use in the attack. The

move of Colonel Schultz's 3d Battalion,

148th Infantry, to Triri and the 18 July

landing of the 4th Marine Raider Battalion at Enogai gave him a force almost

four battalions strong, although casualties and disease had reduced the three

battalions that made the initial landing.

M Company and the Antitank Platoon

of the 3d Battalion, 145th Infantry, were

holding Rice Anchorage. The 1st and 4th

Raider Battalions and L Company,

145th, were at Enogai. Schultz's battalion

and the remainder of the 3d Battalion,

145th, were at Triri.

Liversedge called his battalion commanders together at 1500, 19 July, and

issued oral orders for the Bairoko attack,

which was to take place early next morning. The Raider battalions, advancing

some three thousand yards southwest

from Enogai along the Enogai-Bairoko

trail, would make the main effort. One

platoon of B Company, 1st Raider Battalion, was to create a diversion by advancing down the fifty-yard-wide sandspit forming the west shore of Leland

Lagoon. The 3d Battalion, 148th, was

to make a separate enveloping movement. Advancing southwest from Triri

to the trail junction southeast of Bairoko, it was to swing north against the

Japanese right flank. A and C Companies, 1st Marine Raider Battalion, and

elements of the 3d Battalion, 145th,

formed the reserve at Enogai.

Late in the day the B Company platoon took landing craft from Enogai to

the tip of the sandspit, went ashore, and

moved into position for the next morning's attack. The remainder of the attacking force stayed in bivouac. From

2000, 19 July, to 0500, 20 July, Japanese

aircraft bombed and strafed Enogai,

which as yet had no antiaircraft guns.

No one was killed, but the troops had

little rest.

The two Raider battalions started out

of Enogai at 0800, 20 July, and within

thirty minutes all units had cleared the

village and were marching down the

trail toward Bairoko. The 1st Raider

Battalion (less two companies) led, followed by the 4th Battalion and regimental Headquarters. At 0730 Schultz's

battalion had left Triri on its enveloping

march.

The Northern Landing Group was attacking a fortified position. A force delivering such an attack normally makes

full use of all supporting services, arms,

and weapons, but Liversedge's men had

little to support them. No one seems to

have asked for naval gunfire. Liversedge,

who had been receiving fairly heavy air

support in the form of bombardments

of Bairoko, is reported to have requested

a heavy air strike to support his assault.

His message reached the Guadalcanal

headquarters of Admiral Mitscher, the

3

 Japanese sources give no strength figures for

these units. SOPACBACOM, History of the New

Georgia Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. V, gives approximately two thousand, a figure which may be high.
130 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, too

late on the 19th for action next day.4

The marines definitely expected air

support. The 4th Raider Battalion noted

at 0900: "Heavy air strike failed to

materialize."

 5 Artillery support was precluded by the fact that there was no

artillery. Hindsight indicates that the six

81-mm. mortars of the 3d Battalion,

145th Infantry, might have been used

in general support of the attack, but

these weapons remained with their parent battalion.

The Raiders advanced without meeting an enemy until 0955 when the 1st

Battalion's point sighted four Japanese.

When the first shot was fired at 1015,

B and D Companies, 1st Raider Battalion, deployed and moved forward.

Heavy firing broke out at 1045. By noon

the battalion had penetrated the enemy

outpost line of resistance and was in the

outskirts of Bairoko. When D Company,

on the left, was halted by machine gun

fire, Liversedge began committing the

4th Raider Battalion to the left of the

1st. Then D Company started moving

again. Driving slowly but steadily against

machine gun fire, it advanced with its

flanks in the air beyond B Company

until by 1430 it had seized a ridge about

three hundred yards short of the shore

of Bairoko Harbour. Liversedge ordered

more units forward to cover D Company's flank. These advances were made

with rifle, grenade, and bayonet against

Japanese pillboxes constructed of logs

and coral, housing machine guns. The

jungle overhead was so heavy that the

Raiders' 60-mm. mortars were not used.

The platoon on the sandspit, meanwhile,

was held up by a number of machine

guns and was unable to reach the mainland to make contact with the main

body.

So far the marines, by attacking resolutely, had made good progress in spite

of the absence of proper support, but

now 90-mm. mortar fire from Japanese

positions on the opposite (west) shore

of Bairoko Harbour began bursting

around the battalion command posts

and on D Company's ridge. With casualties mounting, D Company was forced

off the ridge. By 1500 practically the

entire force that Liversedge had led out

of Enogai was committed and engaged

in the fire fight, but was unable to move

farther under the 90-mm. mortar fire.

Colonel Griffith, commanding the 1st

Raider Battalion, regretted the absence

of heavy mortars in the Marine battalions. Liversedge, at 1315, sent another

urgent request for an air strike against

the positions on the west shore of Bairoko Harbour, but, as Griswold told

him, there could be no air strikes by

Guadalcanal-based planes on such short

notice. With all marine units in action,

the attack stalled, and casualties increasing, Liversedge telephoned Schultz to

ask if his battalion could make contact

with the marines before dark.6 Other4

 Maj. John N. Rentz, USMCR, Marines in the

Central Solomons (Washington, 1952), p. 111. The

XIV Corps G-3 Journal for 19 July contains a message from Liversedge, sent at 2235, 18 July, requesting a twelve-plane strike on 19 July, and a "large

strike to stand by for July 20 A M and SBD's to

stand by for immediate call remainder of day."

XIV Corps headquarters replied that a "large strike

stand by" for 20 July was "impracticable." 5

 4th Mar Raider Bn Special Action Rpt, Bairoko

Harbor, New Georgia Opn, p. 3.

6

 All men of Headquarters Company, 4th Raider

Battalion, were engaged in carrying litter cases to

the rear.
GRISWOLD TAKES OVER 131

wise, he warned, the attack on Bairoko

would fail.

Schultz's battalion had marched out

of Triri that morning in column of companies. Except for two small swamps,

the trail was easy. By 1330 the battalion

had traveled about 3,000 yards, passing

some Japanese corpses and abandoned

positions on the way, and reached the

point where the Triri trail joined one

of the Munda-Bairoko tracks. Here,

about 2,500 yards south of Bairoko, the

battalion swung north and had moved a

short distance when the advance guard

ran into an enemy position on high

ground. Patrols went out to try to determine the location and strength of the

Japanese; by 1530 Schultz was ready to

attack. M Company's 81-mm. mortars

opened fire, but the rifle companies, attempting to move against machine guns,

were not able to advance. One officer

and one enlisted man of K Company

were killed; two men were wounded.

This was the situation at 1600 when

Schultz received Liversedge's call.

Schultz immediately told Liversedge

that he could not reach the main body

before dark. A few minutes later, the

1st Marine Raider Regiment's executive

officer, having been dispatched to Schultz

to tell him to push harder, arrived at the

battalion command post. According to

the 3d Battalion's report, the executive

agreed that contact could not be made

before dark and he so informed Liversedge.

The group commander concluded that

he had but one choice: to withdraw. He

issued the order, and the marine battalions began retiring at 1700. Starting

from the left of the line, they pulled

back company by company. Machine

gun and mortar fire still hit them, but

the withdrawal was orderly. All uninjured men helped carry the wounded.

The battalion retired about five hundred yards and set up a perimeter defense on the shore of Leland Lagoon.

When L Company of the 145th came up

from Enogai carrying water, ammunition, and blood plasma, it was committed to the perimeter. Construction of

the defenses was impeded by darkness,

but the task was completed and the hasty

defenses were adequate to withstand

some harassing Japanese that night.

Some of the walking wounded had

been sent to Enogai in the late afternoon of the 20th, and at 0615 of the 21st

more were dispatched. Evacuation of

litter cases began at 0830, and an hour

later a group of Corrigan's natives came

from Enogai to help. Carrying the

stricken men in litters over the primitive

trail in the heat was hard on the men

and on the litter bearers. Liversedge

therefore ordered that landing craft

from Enogai come up Leland Lagoon

and take the wounded back from a point

about midway between Bairoko and Enogai. This evacuation was carried out,

and by late afternoon, the withdrawal,

which was covered by Allied air attacks

against Bairoko, had been completed.

All the marines were at Enogai, where

they were joined by Schultz's battalion,

which had retired to Triri and come to

Enogai by boat. The Raider battalions

lost 46 men killed, 161 wounded. They

reported counting 33 enemy corpses, but

estimated that the total number of enemy dead was much higher.

Once again at Enogai, the Northern

Landing Group resumed daily patrols

over Dragons Peninsula.
132 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Pressure on the Japanese

On the Munda front, meanwhile, the

169th and 172d Regiments were engaged

in their limited offensive to hold the

Japanese in position and secure more

high ground from which to launch the

corps offensive that was to start on 25

July. (See below, Map 10.)

The 172d Infantry

From 16 through 24 July the 172d

Infantry expanded the Laiana beachhead. It moved west about six hundred

yards and established a front line that

ran for about fifteen hundred yards inland from the beach near Ilangana. During this period it had the support of

tanks for the first time. Reconnaissance

had revealed some trails in front of the

172d that the tanks could use. Therefore

three M3 light tanks of the 9th Marine

Defense Battalion were assigned to each

of the 172d's battalions, and six riflemen

were ordered to advance with and cover

each tank.

In the zone of the 2d Battalion, 172d,

on the beach, the tanks made good progress along a jeep trail on 16 July. But

when they reached the trail's end, their

rate of advance slowed to about one mile

an hour as logs, stumps, and trees caused

constant backing, towing, and rerouting. About seventy-five yards beyond the

2d Battalion's front lines, in an area

where artillery fire had partly cleared

the vegetation, the tanks sighted Japanese pillboxes. They deployed into a

wedge formation, then fired 37-mm. high

explosive shells. As this fire cut down

the underbrush other pillboxes became

visible. Japanese machine gunners manning positions in grass shacks opened

fire, but were immediately blasted by

canister from the tanks. Such heavy

fire then struck the tanks that they were

forced to close their turret hatches, but

they found the source of much of the

fire—a machine gun position at the base

of a banyan tree. The marines shot at

this position for some time, but as they

killed one gunner, his replacement

would bound forward from the rear,

man the gun, and keep shooting until

he was killed. At length the tanks destroyed the gun, drove the surviving

crew members into a nearby pillbox,

pulled up close, and demolished three

pillboxes with short-range fire. Troops

of the 2d Battalion then moved forward

to grenade the wreckage.

The three tanks operating with the

3d Battalion, to the right of the 2d, had

less success, as the ridges in that zone

were so steep that the tanks could not

elevate or depress their guns enough to

hit the enemy positions.

The destruction of the pillboxes near

the shore gave the troops an opportunity

to inspect the type of defenses they would

have to overcome before they could

take Munda. The pillboxes were not

concrete, as had been feared, but were

made of coconut logs and coral. From

ten to twelve feet square, they had three

or four layers of logs banked with six

to eight feet of weathered coral. About

ten feet from floor to ceiling, they were

dug into the earth so that only two or

three feet of pillbox projected above

the ground. Each had several firing slits

for riflemen as well as a firing platform

for a heavy machine gun. Outside were

foxholes among banyan and mahogany

trees. Trenches connected all positions,

which were well camouflaged. Besides

employing terrain contours for concealment, the Japanese used earth, grass,
GRISWOLD TAKES OVER 133

PILLBOX MADE OF COCONUT LOGS AND CORAL near Munda Airfield.

vines, palm fronds, and leaves to such

good effect that the American soldiers

might receive fire from a pillbox and

still not be able to see it. Soldiers of the

43d Division remarked that the Japanese

positions were easier to smell than see.

As usual, the Americans reported the

presence of many snipers in trees, but

these reports had little basis in fact. No

one ever seems to have actually seen one.

The tanks attacked again on the 17th,

but lack of tank-infantry co-ordination

hampered their efforts. The Marine tanks

and the Army infantry had not trained

together. Foot soldiers had no sure means

of communicating with the tanks when

they were closed up for action. Tank

crews, with hatches closed, could see

very little in the jungle. The tankers uttered the classic complaint that the riflemen did not give them proper support

and protection, while the infantrymen

claimed that the tanks did not always

press forward to support them. Doubtless both accusations were based on

truth.

Japanese antitank tactics, practically

nonexistent at first, improved each day,

for staff officers had hurried down

from Rabaul to instruct Sasaki's men in

methods of dealing with tanks. The

Japanese used mines, flame throwers,

Molotov cocktails, and fuzed charges

of TNT against the tanks, but apparently had no antitank guns. After two

tanks were permanently disabled on 17-
134 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

18 July, General Griswold withdrew

the other tanks from the front to permit

repairs. He ordered the 9th Marine Defense Battalion tank commander to reconnoiter for terrain suitable for tank

action, and at the same time requested

that the Tank Platoon of the 10th Marine Defense Battalion, then in the Russells, be sent to New Georgia.

Kelley Hill

In the 169th Infantry's zone farther

north, the 3d Battalion's seizure of

Reincke Ridge was being exploited. The

2d Battalion was able to capture the hill

immediately north of Reincke Ridge,

and on 15 July Maj. Joseph E. Zimmer,

commanding the 1st Battalion, reconnoitered the high ground (Kelley Hill)

four hundred yards southwest of Reincke Ridge in preparation for an attack.

At 0830 the next day, 16 July, the

155-mm. howitzers of the 136th Field

Artillery Battalion and the 3d Battalion's

mortars put fire on the objective. At

the same time the 1st Battalion, fortified

by hot coffee and doughnuts, passed

through the 3d Battalion's lines and advanced to the attack. One platoon from

C Company, carrying .30-caliber light

machine guns, struck out down the west

slope of Reincke Ridge and up the east

slope of Kelley Hill, seized the crest, and

set up machine guns to cover the advance of the battalion's main body,

which was to envelop Kelley Hill from

the south. The whole effort was bloodless. The battalion's advance elements

climbed the hill without meeting any

opposition. They found only empty

pillboxes and abandoned foxholes. By

1530 the entire battalion was on the

ridge top. The men found they could

look west and see the waters south of

Munda Point, although the airfield was

hidden from view. Because natives had

formerly dug yam gardens on the ridge,

there was an open area about 75 by 150

yards. Zimmer's men, using Japanese

positions when possible, started building

an all-round defense in the clearing.

Automatic rifles, machine guns, and

M1903 and M1 rifles were posted on the

line, with mortars in supporting positions in rear.

There was a brush with a Japanese

patrol at 1650, and before dark, when

the emplacements were still incomplete,

Japanese artillery and mortar fire struck

the battalion. Fourteen men died, including 1st Lt. John R. Kelley, in whose

memory the hill was named. Just fifteen

minutes after midnight part of the 3d

Battalion, 229th Infantry, now commanded by Captain Kojima, assaulted

the hill from positions on Horseshoe

Hill. Beaten off, Kojima tried twice

more against the right (north) and rear

(east) but failed to dislodge Zimmer's

battalion.

The 1st Battalion held to the ridge,

but as day broke on 17 July the troops

realized that their situation was not enviable. That the Japanese were still

active was indicated by their resistance

to an attempt by the 2d Battalion to

drive into the draw between Reincke

Ridge and Kelley Hill. This attempt

was beaten back. The 1st Battalion's

rations and ammunition were running

low; the battalion surgeon had no medical supplies. And when Japanese machine guns fired on a party carrying

twenty wounded men to the rear and

forced it to return west to Kelley Hill,

the men of the battalion knew that they
GRISWOLD TAKES OVER 135

were virtually isolated. Fortunately the

telephone line to the regimental command post was still operating, and Major

Zimmer was able to keep Colonel Holland informed on his situation. As the

hot day wore on, the supply of water

dwindled. Some men left their positions

to drink from puddles in shell holes.

Eight of those who thus exposed themselves were wounded by Japanese riflemen. In midafternoon succor came. A

party of South Pacific Scouts, accompanied by Capt. Dudley H. Burr, the

regimental chaplain, escorted a supply

party through to Kelley Hill. The party

brought ammunition, rations, water,

blood plasma, litters, and orders from

Holland to hold the hill. The wounded

were carried out. The unwounded on

Kelley Hill, securely dug in, made ready

to meet the Japanese night attack which

they had reason to expect.

The Enemy Counterattacks

Up to now, Japanese ground troops

had harried the Americans at night with

local attacks, but had not attempted

any large co-ordinated offensives. They

had manned their defensive positions,

fired at the American infantry, and had

received bombs, shells, and infantry assaults without retaliating very actively.

This quiescence, so different from enemy reactions during the Guadalcanal

Campaign, puzzled the American commanders. General Sasaki was well aware

that only offensive action would destroy

the Allied forces on New Georgia, and

he had brought the 13th Infantry to

Munda from Kolombangara for that

purpose.

Sasaki ordered the 13th, acting in concert with as much of the 229th Infantry

as he could spare from the defenses east

of Munda, to assemble on the upper

reaches of the Barike, fall upon the Allied flank and rear, and destroy the

whole force.7 The 13th Infantry, having

completed its march from Bairoko, assembled on the upper Barike on 15 July.

It claims to have attacked the 43d Division's right flank on that date, a claim

that is not supported by the 43d Division

records. Two days later the 13th made

ready to attack from the upper Barike.

In the afternoon of the 17th American

patrols operating on the practically open

right flank reported that an enemy column, 250-300 men strong, was moving

eastward. A platoon from the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop went out to

ambush the column but failed to intercept it. It was obvious that the Japanese

had some sort of offensive action in

mind.

It was equally obvious that the Allied

forces in front of Munda were in a vulnerable position. Their right flank was

in the air; the front line positions were

exposed to envelopment from the north.

The Japanese reinforcement route from

Bairoko was still open, and 43d Division

rear installations, strung out from Zanana to the front, were unguarded except for local security detachments.

Movement was slow along the Munda

Trail; the track north from Laiana was

not yet completed. It would thus be

difficult to send speedy reinforcement to

any beleaguered unit. A resolute, skillful attack by the 13th Infantry, such as

Sasaki had planned, could destroy the

43d Division's rear installations, cut

the line of communications from Zanana

to the front, and if co-ordinated with the

7

 This order probably accounts for the withdrawal of part of the 229th from Kelley Hill.
136 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

efforts of the 229th Infantry might surround the American regiments on the

front lines.

Captain Kojima was ready to do his

part. He had prepared another attack

against Kelley Hill. At 0015, 18 July,

Japanese machine guns north of Kelley

opened fire. They covered the advance

of riflemen who were attempting an

assault against the west slope of Kelley

Hill. The 1st Battalion fired at the Japanese infantry with all weapons that

would bear, including two captured Japanese machine guns. Tracers from Kojima's machine guns revealed their location, and 3d and 1st Battalion mortar

crews put their fire on the Japanese

positions to the north. Kojima's first attack failed. His men pulled back, regrouped, and tried again, this time from

the north. They succeeded in seriously

threatening the line. The broken ground

on the north slope of Kelley Hill provided some cover from the fire of one

of the machine guns that was supposed

to sweep the area. The Japanese, taking

advantage of the dead space, crawled

within grenade-throwing range of the

northern line of the 1st Battalion. But

mortar fire killed some of them and

forced the others to withdraw. The 1st

Battalion reported counting 102 Japanese bodies on the slopes of Kelley Hill

after daybreak.

A predawn attack by the 2d Battalion,

229th Infantry, against the beach positions of the 3d Battalion, 103d Infantry,

in the 172d's sector, was readily repulsed.8

Elsewhere on the night of 17-18

July the Japanese caused alarms and uproar. They launched simultaneous raids

against the engineer and medical bivouacs and the 43d Division command

post at Zanana. Near one of the Barike

bridges they ambushed a party taking

wounded of the 169th to the rear, then

attacked the hasty perimeter set up by

the party and killed several of the

wounded.

The attacks against the engineer and

medical bivouacs were easily beaten off,

but at the command post the raiders'

first onslaught carried them through the

security detachment's perimeter and into

the communication center where they

ripped up telephone wires and damaged

the switchboard before being chased off.

The division artillery liaison officer,

Capt. James Ruhlen, called for supporting fire from the 136th Field Artillery

Battalion. Adjusting by sound, he put

fire on a nearby hill where the Japanese

were thought to be emplacing mortars

and laid a tight box barrage around the

command post. This fire was continued

throughout the night. During the action

Lt. Col. Elmer S. Watson, 43d Division

G-3, was wounded. Maj. Sidney P. Marland, Jr., his assistant, took his place.

Shortly after receiving word of the attack, General Griswold ordered a battery of artillerymen from Kokorana to

Zanana to protect the command post,

and on his orders Colonel Baxter selected the 1st Battalion of his 148th Infantry to move from Rendova to Zanana at daybreak.

The 13th Infantry then withdrew to

the north. It had caused a few casualties

but accomplished very little, certainly

not enough to justify its trip from Kolombangara. As might be expected, Gen8

 The 3d Battalion, 103d, was attached to the

172d Infantry.
GRISWOLD TAKES OVER 137

eral Sasaki was disappointed.9 Reincke

Ridge, Kelley Hill, and Laiana beachhead remained in American hands.

Preparations for the Corps Offensive

Commitment of the 37th Division

General Griswold, preparing for his

corps offensive, needed fresh troops at

the front. On 18 July he ordered Colonel Baxter to advance west with the 2d

Battalion of his 148th Infantry and relieve the 169th Infantry as soon as possible. Baxter, whose 1st and 2d Battalions had arrived at Zanana that morning,

effected the relief by 21 July after being

delayed by Japanese detachments at the

Barike.

After the 169th's relief, regimental

command changed again. Colonel Holland took over his old regiment, the

145th, while Lt. Col. Bernard J. Lindauer succeeded to command of the 169th.

Lindauer's regiment returned to Rendova for rest and reorganization. Its 3d

Battalion, after receiving 212 replacements, was sent into reserve at Laiana

on 24 July.

By 23 July the major part of the 37th

Division had arrived at New Georgia

and was either in action or ready to be

committed. Present were Division and

Division Artillery Headquarters; the

145th and 148th Infantry Regiments less

their 3d Battalions, which were under

Liversedge; the 135th and 136th Field

Artillery Battalions; the 37th Cavalry

Reconnaissance Troop; and the signal,

quartermaster, ordnance, engineer, and

medical units (except B Company,

117th Engineer Battalion, and B Company, 112th Medical Battalion).

General Griswold, on 22 July, directed

General Beightler to resume command

at noon of all his units then on New

Georgia except the 136th Field Artillery

Battalion. To the 37th Griswold attached the 161st Regimental Combat

Team less its artillery, and the 169th

and 192d Field Artillery Battalions of

the 43d Division. The 136th Field Artillery Battalion was serving as part of

corps artillery. The other three organic

and attached artillery battalions were

under the 37th Division for direct fire

support missions only; for all others they

would be controlled by corps artillery,

now commanded by General Barker.

Griswold, reshuffling units for the

offensive, set the boundary between divisions along an east-by-south-west-bynorth line approximately thirteen hundred yards north of Ilangana. The 43d

Division was on the left (south), with

the 103d and 172d Regiments in line

from south to north.10 The 172d moved

right to establish contact with the 37th

Division's left.

The 37th Division, assigned an indefinite frontage north of the 43d Division,

gave the 145th Infantry a narrow front

of 300 yards on the left, because only the

2d Battalion, 145th, which had been

covering the gap north of the 172d Infantry, was immediately available. The

9

 Japanese records do not indicate just what the

main body of the 13th actually did during the

period 17-19 July. The various raids could not

have been the work of the entire unit. The main

body apparently never got into action at all. The

170 hungry survivors of Major Hara's Viru garrison

may have caused some of the trouble to the Americans, for on 18 or 19 July they reached Munda after

marching overland from Viru and infiltrating the

American lines from the rear.

10

 The 2d Battalion, 103d, having been relieved

by the 1st Battalion, had come up from Wickham

Anchorage.
SOLDIERS OF THE 161ST INFANTRY debarking from an LCI, New Georgia, 22 July 1943.
GRISWOLD TAKES OVER 139

1st Battalion was still holding the high

ground taken over from the 169th Infantry. The 161st Infantry was given a

500-yard front in the center. One of its

battalions constituted the corps reserve.

The 148th Infantry was put on the right,

with no definite frontage, and assigned

the responsibility for protecting the

corps' right flank and rear.

All units had moved into position by

24 July. The 161st Infantry, whose transfer had been approved by General Harmon, had arrived at Baraulu Island on

21 July, moved to New Georgia the next

day, and suffered its first casualties of

the campaign when two captains of the

regimental staff were killed on reconnaissance. On 23 July the regiment

moved to assembly areas in preparation

for the offensive. Most of the 161st's zone

of action lay north of the high ground

taken by the 169th Infantry.

The corps line of departure ran northwest from a point near Ilangana. In the

161st's zone, it lay about three hundred

yards west of the assembly areas, and

ran over Horseshoe Hill. Colonel Dalton, who had taken over command of the

regiment in the closing days of the

Guadalcanal Campaign, sent out patrols

to reconnoiter for the line of departure.

These patrols were stopped short of the

line by Japanese on a ridge that formed

part of the northeast slope of Horseshoe

Hill, and returned to report to Dalton

that there were two pillboxes on the

ridge. A reinforced platoon went out to

deal with the enemy. This platoon came

back and claimed the destruction of two

positions but reported the presence of

several more. Because Beightler did not

want to commit the regiment to general

action before 25 July, he ordered Dalton

to use one rifle company to clear the

ridge on 24 July. I Company, supported

by M Company's 81-mm. mortars, attacked and reported knocking out two

more pillboxes, apparently by killing

the occupants. But I Company also reported the presence of a dozen more pillboxes. Before nightfall, patrols reported

that the Japanese had reoccupied the

two positions I Company had attacked.

Thus just before D Day the 161st Infantry was aware that a strong enemy position lay camouflaged between it and the

line of departure.

Reorganization

In the days following his assumption

of command, General Griswold and his

staff were deeply occupied with administrative as well as tactical matters. Reinforcements from the 25th and 37th

Divisions had to be received and assigned. The supply system was overhauled; medical services were improved.

General Griswold immediately designated Barabuni Island as supply dump

for the 43d Division, Kokorana for the

37th. Ships from Guadalcanal would

land equipment and supplies in these

islands, whence landing craft would

transport them through the barrier islands to Laiana or to other positions on

the barrier islands.

Hester's move to Laiana was paying dividends. Although low, swampy

ground had at first slowed construction

of the trail from Laiana north to the

Munda Trail, six hundred yards had

been built by 17 July, and on 20 July the

whole trail was opened to motor traffic.

As a result, Hester reported, his regiments would no longer need to be supplied from the air. The 43d Division
140 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

command post moved from Zanana to

Laiana on 21 July. At the same time

most of the 43d Division's service installations moved to Laiana. Two-lane roads

were built within the dump areas, and

additional trails out of Laiana, plus more

trails to the various regiments, were also

built. Bulldozer operators working inland received fire from enemy riflemen on occasion. After one driver was

wounded, the engineers fashioned shields

for the bulldozers with steel salvaged

from wrecked enemy landing craft. A

D-4 and a much heavier D-7 bulldozer

that came in with A Company, 65th Engineer Battalion, on 23 July, speeded

construction of a trail to the 161st Infantry and of lateral trails in the 37th

Division's area. With the roads built it

was possible to assemble supplies close

behind the infantry regiments and to

plan their systematic delivery in the

future.

The XIV Corps and its assigned units

also undertook the improvement of medical care. Several hours after he assumed

command Griswold asked Harmon to

send the 250-bed 17th Field Hospital

from Guadalcanal to Rendova at once.

Harmon approved. Because of physical

frailty some medical officers had become

casualties themselves, and the resulting

shortage prevented careful supervision

and handling of casualties. Griswold

asked Harmon for fifteen medical officers

physically able to stand the rigors of field

service. To make sure that casualties

being evacuated from New Georgia received proper medical attention during

the trip to Guadalcanal, the corps surgeon arranged with naval authorities

for a naval medical officer to travel on

each LST carrying patients.

Finally, all units benefited by the 43d

Division's experience in dealing with

war neurosis. Rest camps, providing hot

food, baths, clean clothes, and cots, were

established on the barrier islands, and

Colonel Hallam tried to see to it that

more accurate diagnoses were made so

that men suffering from combat fatigue

were separated from true neurotics and

sent to the camps.

Air Support

Air support of the New Georgia operation had been generally good, and the

scale of bombing was increasing. Completion of the Segi Point field on 10

July and full employment of the Russells fields made it possible for fighters

to escort all bombing missions. These

missions could therefore be executed in

daylight with resulting increases in accuracy. South Pacific air units were able

to put more planes in the air at one time

than ever before. Regular strikes against

the Shortlands and southern Bougainville were intensified.

Allied fighters providing the 0700 to

1630 cover for the New Georgia Occupation Force also escorted the almost

daily bombing attacks against Munda,

Bairoko, and Vila. Fighter operations

were proving especially effective in protecting the beachheads and shipping.

On 15 July some seventy-five Japanese

bombers and fighters were intercepted

by thirty-one Allied fighters, who reported knocking down forty-five enemy

craft at a cost of three American planes.

Thereafter Japanese aircraft virtually

abandoned daylight attacks against Rendova and New Georgia and confined

their efforts to nocturnal harassment.

Bombing and strafing missions in sup-
GRISWOLD TAKES OVER 141

BOMBING OF MUNDA AIRFIELD, EARLY MORNING, 12 July 1943. Photograph taken

from Kokorana Island.

port of the ground troops were numerous

and heavy, considering the number of

aircraft in the South Pacific. On 16 July

37 torpedo bombers and an equal number of dive bombers struck at Lambeti

with thirty-six 1,000-pound, eighteen

2,000-pound, and eighty-eight 500-pound

bombs at 0905. The strike was followed

by another against Munda by 36 SBD's

and TBF's. These dropped twelve 1,000-

pound and twelve 2,000-pound bombs

at 1555. On 19 July 20 TBF's and 18

SBD's hit at positions north of Munda,

and the next day 36 SBD's dropped

1,000-pound bombs at suspected gun

positions north of Lambeti. Two days

later 36 SBD's and 18 TBF's again

bombed the Munda gun positions, which

were struck once more by 16 SBD's on

23 July. On 24 July, the day before the

corps offensive began, 37 TBF's and 36

SBD's with a screen of 48 fighters

dropped thirty-seven 2,000-pound and

thirty-six 1,000-pound bombs on Bairoko in the morning. In late afternoon

18 SBD's and 16 TBF's hit Munda and

Bibilo Hill.

Most of the aircraft flying these missions were piloted by marines. It will be

noted that this air support was, according to then current Army doctrine, direct air support. Most of these missions

were flown as part of "a combined effort

of the air and ground forces, in the battle area, to gain objectives on the immediate front of the ground forces."

 11

 But

11

 See FM 100-20, Command and Employment of

Air Power (1943), p. 16. See also TM 20-205,

Dictionary of United States Army Terms (1944), p.

90.
142 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

as most of the targets were several thousand yards from the front lines, this

was not close air support, which was

defined after the war as "attack by aircraft on hostile ground or naval targets

which are so close to friendly forces as

to require detailed integration of each

air mission with the fire and movement

of these forces."

 12

 South Pacific commanders, including General Harmon,

had hoped to make extensive use of close

air support on New Georgia, and a few

close air support missions such as that

requested by Colonel Holland had been

executed, but they were difficult for the

air forces to execute and dangerous to

the ground troops. There was, at that

time, no systematized target marking

system nor any good means of radio communication between the front lines and

the aircraft. The Thirteenth Air Force

had no tactical air communications

squadron. The dense jungle and rolling

terrain where the troops were operating

had so few landmarks that pilots could

not easily orient themselves. Nor could

the ground troops orient themselves any

more easily. Panels marking the front

lines could scarcely be seen from the air.

Enemy positions could rarely be identified by spotters in observation planes or

by air liaison parties on the ground. Because maps were inexact, and the troops

had difficulty in locating themselves precisely, bombing missions executed close

to the front lines resulted in casualties

to American troops. Three soldiers of

the 172d Infantry were killed in that

way on 16 July. For these reasons close

air support was seldom used in any of

the CARTWHEEL operations. The direct

air support on New Georgia was, however, of great value, and General Griswold had every intention of following

Harmon's order that the New Georgia

operation employ air support to the

maximum degree.

Griswold, in the nine days following

his assumption of command, had improved supply and evacuation on New

Georgia. In spite of the failure at Bairoko, the tactical position, too, had improved. The tired 169th had been relieved, and fresh 25th and 37th Division

regiments were ready to enter the fight.

The troops had repulsed a counterattack, improved their position by seizing

high ground, and now held a southeastnorthwest line about three thousand

yards from the east end of Munda field.

The XIV Corps could look forward

to receiving the same resolute, effective

air and naval support that had aided the

43d Division. With the logistic and tactical situations of his troops thus improved, and sure of ample air and naval

support, Griswold was ready to attack

Munda.

12

 SR 320-5-1, Dictionary of United States Army

Terms, (Aug 50), p. 48.
CHAPTER IX

XIV Corps Offensive

The plan for the XIV Corps' drive

against Munda was completed shortly

after Griswold took over.1 Col. Eugene

W. Ridings, Griswold's assistant chief of

staff, G-3, flew to Koli Point to confer

with General Harmon and Admiral Wilkinson on naval gunfire and air support.

Ridings also asked for, and obtained, a

better radio (SCR 193) for Liversedge,

to improve communications between

him and Griswold. Harmon stressed the

importance of submitting a precise plan

for air support to Admiral Mitscher.

Dive bombers would naturally be the

best for close work, while mediums and

heavies should be used for area bombing,

he asserted. Harmon agreed to send in

more tanks at Griswold's request.2

Plans

The American Plan

Naval support plans called for a sevendestroyer bombardment of Lambeti

Plantation shortly before the infantry's

advance. Comdr. Arleigh A. Burke, the

destroyer division commander, came to

Rendova on 23 July to view Roviana Lagoon and select visual check points. Air

support for the offensive would include,

besides the normal fighter cover, pattern

bombing by multiengine planes in front

of the 43d Division about halfway between Ilangana and Lambeti Plantation.

Single-engine planes would strike at positions north and northeast of Munda

field. Artillery spotting planes and liaison planes would be on station continuously.

Artillery support would be provided

by Barker's artillery from its island positions. Plans called for fairly standard

employment of the field artillery, providing for direct and general support of

the attack, massing of fires in each infantry's zone of advance, counterbattery

fire, and the defense of Rendova against

seaborne and air attack. One 105-mm.

howitzer battalion was assigned to direct

support of each regiment, one 155-mm.

howitzer battalion to general support of

each division. Except for specific direct

and general support missions, all artillery would operate as the corps artillery

under Barker. The XIV Corps had

neither organic artillery nor an artillery

commander.3

Griswold's field order, issued on 22 1 Unless otherwise indicated this chapter is based

on the same sources as Chapter VIII. 2

 It was at this conference that he approved the

transfer of the 161st Regimental Combat Team to

New Georgia.

3

 See Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive,

pp. 218-19.
144 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

July, directed his corps to attack vigorously to seize Munda airfield and Bibilo

Hill from its present positions which

ran from Ilangana northwest for about

three thousand yards. (Map 10) The 37th

Division was to make the corps' main

effort. Beightler's division was to attack

to its front, envelop the enemy's left

(north) flank, seize Bibilo Hill, and

drive the enemy into the sea. At the

same time it would protect the corps'

right flank and rear. The 43d Division

was ordered to make its main effort on

the right. Its objectives were Lambeti

Plantation and the airfield. Liversedge's

force, depleted by the abortive attack

on Bairoko, was to continue patrolling

and give timely information regarding

any Japanese move to send overland reinforcements to Munda. The 9th Defense Battalion's Tank Platoon would

assemble at Laiana under corps control.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 169th Infantry, at Rendova, constituted the corps

reserve.4

All units were ordered to exert unceasing pressure on the enemy. Isolated

points of resistance were not to be allowed to halt the advance, but were to

be bypassed, contained, and reduced

later. Griswold ordered maximum use of

infantry heavy weapons to supplement

artillery. Roads would be pushed forward with all possible speed.

D Day was set for 25 July. The thirtyminute naval bombardment was to start

at 0610, the air bombing at 0635. The

line of departure, running northwest

from Ilangana, was practically identical

with the American front lines except in

the zone of the 161st Infantry where the

existence of the Japanese strongpoint

east of the line had been determined

on 24 July.

The XIV Corps was thus attempting

a frontal assault on a two-division front,

with the hope of effecting an evelopment on the north. In the initial attack

it would employ two three-battalion regiments (the 161st and the 172d) and three

two-battalion regiments (the 103d, the

145th, and the 148th).

Enemy Positions and Plans

On 22 July the Japanese front line

ran inland in a northwesterly direction

for some 3,200 yards. This line was

manned by the entire 229th Infantry,

and at the month's end the 2d Battalion,

230th Infantry, was also assigned to it.

In support were various mountain artillery, antitank, antiaircraft, and automatic weapons units.5

 The positions

were the same complex of camouflaged

and mutually supporting pillboxes,

trenches, and foxholes that had halted

Hester in midmonth. The pillboxes

started near the beach at Ilangana and

ran over the hills in front of the

103d, 172d, 145th, and 161st Regiments.

4

 Griswold issued his attack order as NGOF FO 1,

22 July 43, although Hester had issued NGOF FO

1 in June.

The 37th Division was less the 129th Regimental

Combat Team and the 3d Battalions, 145th and

148th Infantry Regiments, and was reinforced by

the 161st Regimental Combat Team (less its artillery) and a detachment of South Pacific Scouts.

The 43d Division was less nearly all its headquarters, whose officers were filling most of the posts

in Occupation Force headquarters, and less two battalions of the 169th Infantry and the 1st Battalion,

103d Infantry.

5

 These included the Antitank Battalion, 38th

Division; 2d Independent Antitank Battalion; a detachment of the 2d Battalion, 90th Independent

Mountain Artillery Regiment; thirteen 7.7-mm.

machine guns, and two 75-mm. antiaircraft units.

146 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

A particularly strong series lay on a

tangled set of jungled hills: Shimizu

Hill in front of the 172d Infantry, and

Horseshoe Hill (so named from its configuration) in front of the 145th and

161st Regiments. Horseshoe Hill lay

northwest of Kelley Hill and west of

Reincke Ridge. East of Horseshoe Hill

lay the Japanese pocket discovered by the

161st. The pocket lay on a north-south

ridge that was joined to Horseshoe Hill

by a rough saddle. The pillbox line terminated at about the northern boundary

of the 161st Infantry. When the 2d Battalion, 230th Infantry, was committed it

did not occupy carefully prepared positions. From the end of the pillboxes the

line ran west to the beach, and this north

flank does not seem to have been strongly

held.

XIV Corps headquarters still estimated that four enemy battalions faced

it; three at Munda and one at Bairoko.

This was a fairly accurate estimate of

strength on the enemy line, but Sasaki

had an ace up his sleeve—the 13th Infantry. This regiment, which was not in

full strength, was stationed on the American right flank about 4,900 yards west

by north from Ilangana. Sasaki's plans

to use his ace were similar to his earlier

plans. On the same day that Griswold

issued his field order, Sasaki directed

Colonel Tomonari to attack the American right flank in the vicinity of Horseshoe Hill on 23 July, then drive east

along the Munda Trail. But the Americans struck before Tomonari made his

move.

Ilangana and Shimizu Hill:

The 43d Division

In the 43d Division's zone, the offensive began as scheduled on the morning

of 25 July. For once the weather was

favorable. D Day dawned fair and clear,

with visibility as good as could be expected in the jungle.

Naval gunfire, air, and artillery preparations went off as scheduled. Commander Burke's seven destroyers had

sailed up from Tulagi. At 0609 the two

screening destroyers fired the first of

four thousand 5-inch shells at Lambeti

Plantation; these were followed by the

main group at 0614. Visibility to seaward was good, but the morning haze

still hung over Lambeti Plantation. Fifteen minutes later visibility had improved but now the target area was

partly obscured by smoke and dust raised

by the bombardment.6 Firing ceased at

0644.

From 0630 to 0700, 254 aircraft unloaded 500,800 pounds of fragmentation

and high explosive bombs on their target area, a 1,500-by-250-yard strip beginning about 500 yards west of the 103d

Infantry's front lines. No corps artillery

concentrations were fired on 25 July,

but the 43d Division's supporting artillery began before 0700 the first of more

than 100 preparations that were fired

6

 When the infantrymen later reached Lambeti

Plantation they found that although the bombardment had done extensive damage many positions,

which could have been destroyed only by direct

hits, remained intact. The theoretical density of

this shelling was 70 rounds per 100 square yards.

Admiral Wilkinson, who thought the target area

was too far west of the front lines, later observed

that 200 rounds per 100 square yards would be required to achieve complete destruction. Because of

the difficulty in distinguishing targets in morning

haze, Commander Burke recommended that shore

bombardments should not start earlier than twenty

minutes before sunrise. See CTF 31 (Com III

AMPHFOR) Action Rpt for Morning 25 Jul 43,

The Bombardment of Munda, 3 Sep 43, in Off of

Naval Rcds and Library; and ONI USN, Operations

in the New Georgia Area, pp. 53-54.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 147

that day. The 103d and 152d Field Artillery Battalions fired more than 2,150

105-mm. howitzer shells; the 155-mm.

howitzers of the 136th Field Artillery

Battalion threw 1,182 rounds at the

enemy.

With the din subsiding as the artillery

shifted its fire to positions farther west,

the infantrymen of the 43d Division

moved to the attack at 0700. In the 172d

Infantry's zone the 2d and 3d Battalions

on the left and right attacked westward

against Shimizu Hill. But by 1000 they

had run into the enemy pillbox line

and halted. Colonel Ross then requested

tanks, got some from the corps reserve,

and attacked again. By 1430 three tanks

were disabled, and the attack stalled. A

little ground had been gained on the

regimental left.

The 103d Infantry, now commanded

by Colonel Brown, attacked alongside

the 172d with little more success.7 The

3d Battalion, on the left, pushed forward against machine gun and mortar

fire, but immediately hit the Japanese

line and stopped. The battalion attempted to move around the pillboxes

but found that this maneuver took its

men into other machine gun fire lanes.

The 2d Battalion, 103d, in the center

of the 43d's zone, did better. It moved

forward two or three hundred yards

against light opposition. By 1040 E Company's leading elements had advanced

five hundred yards. The company kept

moving until noon, when it had reached

the beach near Terere. Here it set up a

hasty defense position. But the companies on either flank had not been able

to keep up, and the Japanese moved in

behind E Company to cut the telephone

line to battalion headquarters.

To exploit E Company's breakthrough, General Hester took the 3d Battalion, 169th Infantry, out of division

reserve and ordered it to push through

the same hole E Company had found.

But the Japanese had obviously become

aware of the gap, and as the 3d Battalion

marched to the line of departure it was

enfiladed by fire from the south part of

Shimizu Hill and from the pillboxes to

the south. It halted. Five Marine tanks

were then ordered to push over Shimizu

Hill but could not get up the steep

slopes. When three of them developed

vapor lock all were pulled back to Laiana. In late afternoon the E Company

commander decided to abandon his exposed, solitary position, and E Company

came safely back through the Japanese

line to the 2d Battalion.

North of the 43d Division the 37th

Division had made scant progress.8 Thus

the first day of General Griswold's offensive found the XIV Corps held for

little gain except in the center of the 43d

Division's line.

The 43d Division was weakened by almost a month's combat, and its reduced

strength was spread over a long, irregular, slanting front. It was obvious that

combat efficiency would be increased

by narrowing the front, and this could

be done by advancing the left and

straightening the line. Consequently

Hester's plan for 26 July called for the

172d to stay in place while the 103d In7 fantry attempted to advance the eight Colonel Brown, formerly commander of the 2d

Battalion, took over regimental command when

Colonel Hundley replaced the 43d Division chief of

staff on 22 July. 8

 See below, pp. 149-52.
148 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

hundred yards from Ilangana to Terere.

Strong combat patrols went out in the

morning of 26 July to fix the location

of the Japanese pillboxes as accurately

as possible. After their return, the artillery began firing at 1115, one hour before the infantry was to attack. At 1145

the 103d's front was covered with smoke

and under its cover the front-line companies withdrew a hundred yards. At

noon the artillery put its fire on the Japanese positions directly in front. As the

tanks were not quite ready at H Hour,

1215, the artillery kept firing for ten

more minutes. It lifted fire one hundred

yards at 1225, and the 103d started forward. The tanks led the advance in the

center; behind them was the infantry.

Attached to the 103d for the attack

were 2d Lt. James F. Olds, Jr., the acting corps chemical officer, and six volunteers from the 118th Engineer Battalion.

Each carried a flame thrower, a weapon

which the 43d Division had brought to

New Georgia but had not used up to

now.9 Griswold, whose headquarters had

conducted flame thrower schools on

Guadalcanal, was aware of the weapon's

possibilities. That morning the six engineers had received one hour of training in the use of the M1A1 flame

thrower.

The flame throwers went forward with

the infantry, which halted about twenty

yards in front of the pillbox line and

covered it with small arms fire. Under

cover of this fire the flame thrower operators, their faces camouflaged with dirt,

crawled forward. Operating in teams of

two and three, they sprayed flame over

three barely visible pillboxes in front of

the center of the 103d's line. Vegetation

was instantly burned off. In sixty seconds

the three pillboxes were knocked out

and their four occupants were dead.10

Operations of the infantry, tanks,

flame throwers, and supporting heavy

weapons and artillery met with almost

complete success. The 103d Infantry encountered seventy-four pillboxes on a

600-yard front, but by midafternoon,

spurred on by pressure from General

Wing, it had reduced enemy resistance

at Ilangana. From there it continued its

advance through underbrush and vines

and gained almost 800 yards. By 1700

the left flank rested on the coastal village

of Kia. The 43d Division's line, formerly

1,700 yards long, was now much

straighter by 300 yards.

From 28 through 31 July, the 43d

Division inched slowly forward, a few

yards on the right flank and about five

hundred yards along the coast. This was

accomplished by "aggressive action and

small unit maneuver, combined with

constant artillery and mortar action

[which] gradually forced the enemy back

from his high ground defenses."

 11

 The

172d ground its way over Shimizu Hill,

the last real ridge between it and Munda

airfield, and in doing so it helped unhinge the main Japanese defense system in its zone, just as the 103d's drive

9

 On 19 July Griswold radioed Guadalcanal to

state his urgent need for more M1A1 flame throwers.

10

 Capt. James F. Olds, Jr., "Flamethrowers Front

and Center," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, Vol. 30,

No. 3 (June-July 1944), pp. 5-9. This account,

while valuable, seems to have telescoped two situations and actions into one, for Olds asserts that

the 103d was at Lambeti Plantation on 26 July.

From the fact that three pillboxes had only four

occupants, it would seem that this part of the

Japanese line was lightly manned. 11

 43d Div Rpt of Opns, Munda Campaign, p. 13.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 149

through Ilangana had broken the enemy

line on the left.12

Major Zimmer's 1st Battalion, 169th

Infantry, was brought over from Rendova on 29 July; the 3d Battalion, now

commanded by Maj. Ignatius M. Ramsey, was taken out of division reserve

and the 169th (less the 2d Battalion) was

assigned a zone between the 172d and

the 103d.13 As the month ended the

169th (less its 2d Battalion in corps reserve) was in the process of extending

to the northwest to pinch out the 172d.

Command of the 43d Division changed

hands on 29 July when Maj. Gen. John

R. Hodge, the tough, blunt commander

of the Americal Division, came up from

the Fijis to take over from Hester. This

change was ordered by General Harmon

who felt that Hester had exhausted himself. General Hodge had served as assistant commander of the 25th Division during the Guadalcanal Campaign, and

thus had had more experience in jungle

warfare than any other general then in

New Georgia. Hodge, Harmon wrote,

was the "best Div Comdr I have in area

for this particular job."

 14

The 43d Division, having cracked

through the Shimizu Hill-Ilangana positions, was in a favorable position to drive

against Munda under its new commander, while the 37th Division on its

right fought its way through the enemy

positions in its hilly, jungled zone.

The Attack Against the Ridges:

The 37th Division

The dawn of D Day, 25 July, found

the 43d Division committed to a general

attack, but the 37th Division was forced

to postpone its advance. General Beightler had issued a field order on 23 July

calling for a general attack by his three

regiments, to start at 0700, 25 July. The

145th, 161st, and 148th Infantry Regiments were to attack due west, toward

Bibilo Hill, on the division's left, center,

and right, with the 145th maintaining

contact with the 172d Infantry on its

left and the 148th Infantry covering the

corps' right flank and rear. But the discovery of the strong Japanese position

east of the 161st Infantry's line of departure altered the plans.

On 24 July Beightler ordered Colonel

Holland not to advance his 145th Infantry, but to stay in place. He told

Colonel Baxter to move the 148th Infantry only up to the line of departure.

The two regiments would hold while

part of the 161st contained the Japanese

position and the rest of the regiment

bypassed it and came up on a line with

the 145th and 148th.

After Baxter received the commanding

general's orders, he suggested that his

regiment could perhaps help the 161st

reduce the pocket by making a limited

advance. Baxter hoped to establish an

observation post on high ground from

which both Munda airfield and the

pocket in front of the 161st could be

12

 Unfortunately the records are too scanty to provide details showing just how the 172d took this

position. During the attack 1st Lt. Robert S. Scott

almost singlehandedly halted a Japanese counterattack and for his gallantry was awarded the Medal

of Honor. WD GO 81, 14 Oct 44. 13

 Colonel Reincke was now regimental executive

officer. 14

 See Ltr, Harmon to Griswold, quoted in

SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia Campaign, I, 25, OCMH. See also Halsey and Bryan,

Admiral Halsey's Story, p. 161; Rad 2027, COMGENSOPAC to CofS USA, 10 Aug 43, in Marshall's

IN Log.
150 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

seen. Beightler assented to this request

at 0910, 25 July. Patrols went out, and

on their return the direct support artillery battalion laid a ten-minute preparation 400 yards in front of the line of

departure while mortars covered the

400-yard gap. The 2d Battalion, 148th,

commanded by Lt. Col. Herbert Radcliffe, started forward, met no Japanese,

and gained 500-600 yards.15 The 1st

Battalion, Lt. Col. Vernor E. Hydaker

commanding, moved up to the 2d Battalion's old positions.

Bartley Ridge and Horseshoe Hill

When I Company, 161st Infantry, had

been unable to reduce the Japanese

strongpoint on Bartley Ridge on 24 July,

Colonel Dalton issued orders for its

seizure on D Day.16 I Company was to

contain the Japanese pocket by attacking to its front while the 1st Battalion

and the rest of the 3d Battalion executed a double envelopment.17

 The 1st

Battalion was to move around the Japanese left (north) flank while the 3d Battalion went around the right, after which

the two battalions would drive southward and northward for two hundred

yards. Fifteen minutes of mortar fire

would precede these moves. Beightler

arranged for the 145th and 148th Regiments to support the 161st with heavy

weapons fire. He also asked corps headquarters for tanks to help the 161st, but

the 43d Division had been given the

tanks for the D-Day attack.

From positions near the Laiana Trail

eight 81-mm. mortars opened fire at

0745, 25 July, in support of Dalton's attack. Heavy weapons of the adjoining

regiments attempted to deliver their supporting fires, but the denseness of the

jungle prevented forward observers' controlling the fire. The unobserved fire

began obstructing rather than helping

the 161st, and that part of the plan was

abandoned.

The 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt.

Col. David H. Buchanan, was unable to

gain. Shortly after 0800, when the attack

began, I Company reported that its attack against the ridge strongpoint had

stalled. A knob projecting east from Bartley Ridge and the heavy undergrowth

provided enough cover and concealment

to let the infantrymen reach the base of

the ridge, but uphill from the knob,

where the growth was thinner, all movement was halted by fire from the crest.

The 161st Infantry had made plans to

use flame throwers, and an operator

carrying his sixty-five pounds of equipment made two laborious climbs and

silenced an enemy machine gun, but

many other Japanese positions remained

in action. The main body of the 3d

Battalion, attempting to get around the

south end of Bartley Ridge, was also

halted.

The 1st Battalion was more successful.

At 1035 its commander, Lt. Col. Slaftcho Katsarsky, radioed Dalton that he

had found the north flank of the Japanese position on Bartley Ridge, and

15

 Because of the inaccurate maps and densely

jungled, rough ground, all units had difficulty in

determining distances and exact locations. Nearly

all reports warn that distances and locations are

only estimates, and all give widely varying figures. 16

 Bartley Ridge was named in memory of 2d Lt.

Martin E. Bartley, an I Company platoon leader

killed on 25 July. 17

 The 2d Battalion was in division reserve along

with the 37th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 151

that he was moving his battalion around

it. Shortly afterward Beightler, Dalton,

and staff officers conferred and decided

that the 3d Battalion should contain

the strongpoint while the 1st Battalion

pushed westward with orders to develop

enemy positions but not to engage in

full-scale combat. The 37th Division

could not advance westward in force

until Bartley Ridge had been cleared.

The 3d Battalion established itself in

containing positions north, east, and

south of Bartley Ridge. E Company was

released from reserve and sent into line

on high ground just north of Bartley to

secure the right flank in the 161st's zone.

The 1st Battalion advanced to a point

about four hundred yards west of Bartley and halted on a small rise northeast

of Horseshoe Hill. Tanks of the newly

arrived 10th Marine Defense Battalion

were to be committed to support the

37th Division the next day, and in the

afternoon the tank commander made a

personal reconnaissance of Colonel Buchanan's zone in preparation for the

attack.

Six light Marine tanks were to lead

out in the attack at 0900, 26 July, after

preparatory fire by machine guns and

81-mm. mortars. L and K Companies, in

column, would move behind the tanks,

which were supported by infantrymen

armed with .30-caliber M1 rifles, .30-

caliber Browning Automatic Rifles

(BAR's), and two flame throwers. Tankinfantry communication was indirect.

The tank radios formed a net within

the Tank Platoon, and a 161st radio

car maintained radio contact between

the Tank Platoon commander and Colonel Buchanan.

When the tanks, with their hatches

closed, got off the approach trail that

had been bulldozed by members of the

65th Engineer Battalion, Colonel Buchanan directed the infantrymen to lead

them forward. It was 0925 before the attack got started. In two lines of three

vehicles each, the tanks lumbered over

the littered undergrowth, steep slopes,

and felled logs toward the southeast

slope of Bartley Ridge. The Japanese

quickly responded with fire from antitank and 70-mm. battalion guns, machine guns, and mortars.

The attack went well at first. About

a dozen pillboxes were reported knocked

out by 1110, and Buchanan ordered his

men to occupy them to keep the Japanese from moving in again at night.

Unfortunately, the tanks had encountered exactly the sort of difficulties that

might be expected in tangled terrain

with communications uncertain. In their

lurches and frequent changes of direction they injured some of the accompanying foot troops. Poor visibility

caused them to get into untenable positions from which they had to be extricated with consequent delays to the attack. During the morning a Japanese

soldier stole out of the tangled brush

and planted a magnetic mine that disabled one tank. A second tank was halted

by a ruptured fuel line. The remaining

four withdrew at 1110 to reorganize.

The flame thrower operators, carrying their bulky, heavy fuel tanks on their

backs, were not properly protected by

the riflemen and were soon killed.

In the course of the day's fighting some

fourteen pillboxes and a number of machine gun positions were knocked out,

and the 3d Battalion advanced about
152 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

two hundred yards up Bartley Ridge.18

But it met such heavy fire from Bartley

and Horseshoe Hill that its position

clearly could not be held. Attempts to

pull out the disabled tanks were unsuccessful. The battalion withdrew to its

previous positions. The attack had disclosed the existence of so many more

positions that Dalton received Beightler's permission to make a thorough reconnaissance before attacking again.

While the 161st was attacking Bartley

Ridge on 25 and 26 July, Colonel Holland's 145th Infantry stayed in its forward positions on Reincke Ridge and

Kelley Hill. During this period it sent

out patrols to the north and west to try

to find the source of the 90-mm. mortar

fire that had been hitting the regiment

since 22 July. It received no artillery

support at this time because its front

line was considered too close to enemy

targets for the artillery to fire without

hitting American infantry. By the end

of 26 July the 1st Battalion, 161st, had

fought its way forward to come up on

line north of the 145th, but near the

regimental boundary the line sagged

eastward in the shape of a great U. Colonel Parker's 2d Battalion, 145th, was

occupying positions in rear of the 1st

Battalion, 145th, commanded by Lt. Col.

Richard D. Crooks.

General Beightler ordered Holland to

commit his 2d Battalion, in order to

reduce the Japanese positions on Horseshoe Hill that had fired on the 3d Battalion, 161st, during its 26 July attack

against Bartley Ridge. Doubtless because

troops of the 161st had not been able

to get past the south end of Bartley,

Colonel Parker's battalion was to march

northward right around the 3d Battalion, 161st, push west around the north

of the enemy positions on Bartley Ridge,

then attack to the southwest. This maneuver would entail a march of about

one and one-half miles to the assembly

area.

Parker's battalion moved out in the

early morning of 27 July. It reached its

assembly area on the north flank of

Bartley Ridge without incident. After

a preparation of one hundred rounds by

the division artillery, which cleared some

of the foliage, the battalion advanced to

the attack in column of companies.

"Having to fight every foot of the way,"

it gained about three hundred yards

before 1300, when E Company in the

lead moved south off slopes of a ridge

and started up a small knob projecting

from Horseshoe Hill.19 As the company

ascended the hill it was struck by fire

from pillboxes. Among the first men

killed was Capt. Gardner B. Wing, E

Company's commander, in whose honor

the 145th christened the knob.

On the same day, while American

mortars fired intermittently at Bartley

Ridge, patrols from the 3d Battalion,

161st Infantry, examined the Japanese

lines to procure data for a preparation

by the corps artillery. In the course of

the reconnaissance Colonels Dalton and

Buchanan observed enemy pillboxes on

the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 145th

18

 In the course of the day's action Capt. Paul K.

Mellichamp, battalion executive officer, picked up

a radio from a wounded operator and directed

mortar fire. He was wounded, but continued to

direct the fire until he collapsed. He died shortly

afterward, and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 19

 37th Div G-3 Jnl, 27 Jul 43.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 153

Infantry, and recommended that the attack be delayed until 29 July.20

 General

Beightler gave his assent. Dalton and

Buchanan also decided to attack from

the northwest instead of the southeast.

Reconnaissance and pressure were to

continue on the 28th.

On the morning of the 28th a tenman patrol from I Company, led by Lt.

Walter Tymniak, set out in a southerly

direction toward the top of Bartley

Ridge. To their surprise and satisfaction, the Americans met no fire, got

safely to the top, and found several

abandoned pillboxes. They occupied

them, and I Company followed to the

crest and began infiltrating the pillboxes.

Not all were vacant, but the task of the

attackers was eased as each pillbox was

taken, for its fire could then no longer

be used with that of its neighbors to

make crossfire or interlocking bands of

fire. Because the Japanese appeared to

be evacuating and the American front

was intermingled with the enemy front,

the artillery preparation was called off.

The 3d Battalion continued its infiltration on 29 July. At the end of the day

it was relieved by Maj. Francis P. Carberry's 2d Battalion and went into division reserve.

The 145th Infantry's zone was shifted

farther north on 30 July as part of a

general shift in boundaries that General

Griswold was making in order to widen

the 43d Division's front. This move

placed the southern half of Bartley Ridge

within the 145th's zone. Colonel Parker's 2d Battalion, 145th, had just completed its move around the 161st's north

flank, thence southwest against Horseshoe Hill. On 30 July it was attached

to the 161st for the completion of the

reduction of Bartley Ridge and Horseshoe Hill.

Carberry's and Parker's battalions

pushed their attacks on 30 July. In contrast with Carberry's battalion, which

met little resistance, Parker's men engaged in sharp fighting in the west. The

Japanese who had evacuated the position

facing Carberry had apparently moved

into positions facing Parker. With grenade, rifle, machine gun, mortar, and

flame thrower the two battalions fought

all day and part of the next, until by

midafternoon of 31 July the Japanese

rear guards on Bartley Ridge were either

dead or in flight, and the 2d Battalion,

161st, had advanced west and was on a

line with the 1st. Bartley Ridge had contained forty-six log and coral pillboxes

and thirty-two other lighter positions.

First attacked by a company, it fell only

after seven days' fighting by two battalions.

On Horseshoe Hill the Japanese resisted from their pillboxes and foxholes

with equal skill and enthusiasm. The

Americans used small arms, grenades,

automatic weapons, mortars, flame

throwers, and field artillery as they systematically reduced the enemy positions,

almost pillbox by pillbox.21 On 1 August

Parker's battalion received orders to attack in late afternoon, obeyed, and took

Horseshoe Hill without firing a shot or

losing a man. The Japanese had gone.

20

 It is not clear whether these pillboxes were on

Horseshoe Hill or were on the saddle connecting

Bartley Ridge with Horseshoe Hill.

21

 During these operations Pfc. Frank J. Petrarca,

a medical aid man, so distinguished himself by

gallant, selfless devotion to duty that he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. WD GO

86, 23 Dec 43.
154 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Advance and Withdrawal

of the 148th Infantry

On 1 August, the day on which the

Americans completely occupied the

ridge positions, the 148th Infantry returned eastward to the 37th Division's

lines after an advance which had taken

it almost to Bibilo Hill. The 148th Infantry was the only regiment not confronted by prepared enemy positions,

and it had made comparatively rapid

progress from the first. When Colonel

Baxter moved his regiment forward on

25 July, it went around the north flank

of the Japanese defense line and met no

resistance. However, none of the Americans then knew that the major part of

the enemy 13th Infantry lay to the north

of Baxter's right flank. Patrols, accompanied by Fiji scouts, went out and

reported the presence of a few Japanese

to the west, none to the south. Generals

Griswold and Beightler had emphasized

the importance of maintaining lateral

contact and Beightler had expressly directed that the 148th was to maintain

contact with the 161st, and that all units

were to inform their neighbors and the

next higher unit of their locations. The

148th, however, was not able to make

contact on its left with the 161st Infantry.

Baxter's two-battalion regiment advanced regularly for the next three days.

Colonel Radcliffe's 2d Battalion led on

26 and 27 July; on 28 July Colonel Hydaker's 1st Battalion bypassed the 2d

and led the advance to a point somewhere east of Bibilo Hill.22

 Patrols went

out regularly and at no time reported

the presence of a sizable body of the

enemy. On 27 July Baxter reported that

he had established "contact with Whiskers." Colonel Dalton, the "guest artist"

regimental commander of the attached

161st Infantry, sported a beard and was

dubbed "Whiskers" and "Goatbeard"

in the 37th Division's telephone code.

But the 148th's front was almost a thousand yards west of Whiskers' 1st Battalion, and the contact must have been

tenuous. Next day G Company was

ordered to move to the left to close a gap

between the two regiments, but the gap

stayed open.

During the move troops of the 117th

Engineer Battalion labored to push a

supply trail behind the advancing battalions. The rate of march was in part

geared to the construction of the supply

trail. As Baxter told Radcliffe over the

telephone on 27 July, "I am advancing

behind you as fast as bulldozer goes."

 23

Next day, however, there occurred a

disturbing event. A platoon from A

Company, 117th Engineer Battalion,

was using a bulldozer to build the trail

somewhere north of Horseshoe Hill

when it was ambushed by the enemy.

Three engineers were killed and two

were wounded before elements of the

Antitank Company and of the 1st Battalion rescued the platoon and extricated

the bulldozer.

Japanese movements during this period are obscure, but this and subsequent attacks were made by the 13th Infantry coming south at last in accordance

with Sasaki's orders.

The situation became more serious on

28 July, the day on which Baxter's ag22 The total of daily yardage reported in the

journals, if correct, would have placed the 148th

west of Bibilo Hill on 28 July, but the 148th

soldiers, like almost everyone else in the jungle,

overestimated the distances they had traveled. 23

 148th Inf Jnl, 27 Jul 43.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 155

gressive movement took him almost to

Bibilo Hill. At this time the regiment

was spread thinly about fifteen hundred

yards beyond the 161st; its front lay some

twelve hundred yards west of the regimental ration dump and eighteen hundred yards from the point on the supply

line "which could be said to be adequately secured by other division

units."

 24

 There was still no contact with

the 161st, and in the afternoon a group

of the 13th Infantry fell upon the ration

dump. From high ground commanding

it the enemy fired with machine guns,

rifles, and grenade discharges at men of

the regimental Service Company. The

Service Company soldiers took cover

among ration and ammunition boxes

and returned the fire. The dump, under

command of Maj. Frank Hipp, 148th

S-4, held out until relieved by two

squads of the Antitank Company and

one platoon from F Company. East of

the dump, troops of the 13th Infantry

also forced the 148th's supply trucks

to turn back. Baxter, stating "I now find

my CP in the front line," asked Beightler to use divisional units to guard the

trail up to the dump.25

All the 148th's troubles with the

Japanese were in the rear areas. The

westward push, which took the leading

battalion as far as one of the MundaBairoko trails, had been practically unopposed. But early on the morning of

29 July General Beightler, unaware of

the 13th's position, telephoned Baxter to

say that as the Japanese seemed to be

moving from the southwest through the

gap between the 148th and 161st Regiments, and around the 148th's right,

Baxter was to close up his battalions and

consolidate his positions. At 0710 Beightler told Baxter to withdraw his battalions to the east, to establish contact with

the 161st, and to protect his supply route.

Baxter, who had sent patrols out in all

directions early in the morning, at 0800

ordered one company of the 2d Battalion to clear out the supply trail to the

east. At 0941, with Japanese machine

guns still dominating the supply trail,

Beightler sent Baxter more orders similar to those of 0710, and also ordered

forward a detachment of the 37th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop to help clear

the east end of the supply trail. The

telephone, so busy with conversations

between Beightler and Baxter on 29

July, was then quiet for an hour.

Meanwhile Beightler had been conferring with Dalton, Holland, and members of the divisional general staff. As a

result he had decided that the 161st

should continue reducing Bartley Ridge,

that the 145th should stay in place, and

that the 148th would have to withdraw.

So at 1055 Baxter ordered his regiment

to turn around and pull back to the east.

The 2d Battalion, 148th, was to use at

least one company to establish contact

with the 161st while the rest of the battalion withdrew toward the ration dump.

The 1st Battalion would move back to

the 2d Battalion's positions. At 1150

Baxter reported the 2d Battalion in contact with the 161st, and shortly afterward Beightler ordered Baxter to move

the 1st Battalion farther east, putting

it in position to deliver an attack the

next morning against the rear of the

Japanese holding up Dalton's regiment.

The division commander again empha24

 37th Div Opn Rpt, p. 6. 25

 37th Div G-3 Jnl, 28 Jul 43.
156 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

sized the necessity for maintaining firm

contact with the 161st.26 At 1305, with

the 148th moving east, Colonel Katsarsky reported that his 1st Battalion, 161st,

had as yet no contact with the 148th.

Beightler at once told Baxter that, as

Japanese machine gunners were operating between the two regiments, the

gap must be closed before dark. An hour

later Baxter called Beightler to say that

he was too far west to close with the

161st before dark. When Beightler ordered him to close up anyway, Baxter

demurred. Asking his general to reconsider the order, he stated that he could

almost, but not quite, close the gap.

Beightler thereupon told Baxter to comply with his orders as far as was physically possible.

The 2d Battalion had meanwhile been

pushing east, except for F Company's

main body, which was advancing west

toward the ration dump. Both bodies

were encountering enemy resistance,

and the day ended before the Japanese

were cleared out. The Reconnaissance

Troop cleared some Japanese from the

eastern part of the supply trail, but at

1758 Baxter reported that the trail had

been closed by raiding Japanese.

The 148th Infantry, in examining the

personal effects of some of the dead

Japanese, found that the men belonged

to the 13th Infantry. Some of them had

been carrying booty taken in the raids

east of the Barike several days earlier.

Colonel Baxter later estimated that the

enemy harrying his regiment numbered

no more than 250, operating "in multiple small light machine gun and mortar

detachments and . . . [moving] from

position to position utilizing the jungle

to its maximum advantage. You can well

imagine what we could do with our

M-1's, BAR's and Machine Guns if all

we had to do was dig in and wait for

the Jap to come at us."

 27

General Beightler, a National Guardsman most of his life, was an affable man,

but he was far from satisfied with the

outcome of the day's action.28 At 1832

he radioed Baxter that General Griswold had ordered the 148th to establish

contact with the 161st early the next

morning and to protect the supply route.

"Use an entire battalion to accomplish

latter if necessary. At no time have you

been in contact on your left although

you have repeatedly assured me that

this was accomplished . . . Confirmation of thorough understanding of this

order desired." Baxter thereupon telephoned division headquarters and put

his case before a staff officer. General

Beightler's criticism, he felt, was not

justified. "Please attempt to explain to

the General that I have had patrols

in contact with the 161 and have documentary evidence to substantiate this.

I have not, however, been able to

maintain contact and close the gap

by actual physical contact due to the

fact that the 161st had been echeloned

600 to 800 yards to my left rear. I have

been trying and will continue tomorrow

26

 As the Americans still did not know the 13th

Infantry's location, they thought the attack had

originated from the southwest rather than from

the north.

27

 Opns of the 148th Inf in New Georgia, 18 Jul5 Aug 43, p. 21. 28

 General Beightler's record as a division commander was somewhat unusual in that he was in

command of the 37th at the outbreak of war, led

it overseas in 1942, and retained command of it

through the Solomons and Philippines campaigns

until the end of the war.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 157

morning to establish this contact. It is

a difficult problem as I have had Japs between my left flank and the 161st."

 29

Rain and mud added to Baxter's troubles on 30 July. Still harried by enemy

machine guns and mortars, the 2d Battalion pushed east and south toward the

161st as the 1st Battalion covered the left

(north) flank. Elements of the 37th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, C Company,

117th Engineer Battalion, and the 3d

Battalion, 161st Infantry, pushed north

to give additional protection to the division's right (north) flank and to protect the east end of Baxter's supply route.

Baxter attempted to cut a new trail directly into the 161st's lines, but Japanese

rifle fire forced the bulldozer back. Some

of the 148th's advance elements sideslipped to the south and got through

to the 161st that day, but the main

body was still cut off.30 Some of the Japanese who were following the 148th attacked the 1st Battalion, 161st, but

were halted. This action then settled

down into a nocturnal fire fight.

The plight of the rest of the regiment

was still serious. Water was running

low. Part of the Reconnaissance Troop

tried to take water forward to the 148th

on 30 July. It was stopped by Japanese

fire. But rain fell throughout the night

of 30-31 July and the thirsty men were

able to catch it in helmets and fill their

canteens.

On 31 July Beightler suggested that

Baxter destroy heavy equipment and

break his regiment into small groups to

slip northward through the jungle

around the enemy. The 148th blew up

all the supplies it could not carry but

it had to fight its way along the trail. It

had over a hundred wounded men and

could not infiltrate through the jungle

without abandoning them.

Toward the end of the day B Company, which had been trying to clear

the Japanese north of the supply trail,

was ordered to disengage and withdraw

slightly for the night. One of B Company's platoons, however, had come under fire from a Japanese machine gun

about seventy-five yards to its front and

found that it could not safely move.

Pvt. Rodger Young, who had been

wounded in the shoulder at the first

attempt to withdraw, told his platoon

leader that he could see the enemy gun

and started forward. Although a burst

from the gun wounded him again and

damaged his rifle, he kept crawling forward until he was within a few yards

of the enemy weapon. As a grenade

left his hand he was killed by a burst

that struck him in the head. But he had

gotten his grenade away, and it killed

the Japanese gun crew. His platoon was

able to withdraw in safety. For his gallantry and self-sacrifice Young was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.31

Colonel Baxter's radio fairly crackled

the next morning, 1 August, with orders

from General Beightler: "Time is precious, you must move." "Get going." 29

 The version of the radiogram quoted is taken

from the 37th Div G-3 Jnl File, 29 Jul 43; the telephone message is from the 37th Div G-3 Jnl, 29

Jul 43. 30

 F and H Companies, part of E Company, and

the 2d Battalion Headquarters Company were the

elements that got through to the 161st.

31

 Stanley A. Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division

in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1948), p. 101; WD GO 3, 6 Jan 44. Mr. Frank

Loesser commemorated this exploit in a popular

song, "Rodger Young," copyright 1945.
158 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

"Haste essential."

 32

 Thus urged on,

Baxter ordered an assault by every man

who could carry a rifle. He formed all

his command—A, E, B, and G Companies—in a skirmish line with bayonets

fixed, and assaulted by fire and movement at 0850. The attack succeeded. By

0930 the leading elements, ragged,

weary, and muddy, reached Katsarsky's

area. The 148th was given fresh water

and hot food, then passed into division

reserve. As the men struggled in after

their ordeal, all available ambulances,

trucks, and jeeps were rushed up to

transport the 128 wounded men to the

37th Division's clearing station at

Laiana.

Capture of the Airfield

The first day of August had broken

bright and clear after a night of intermittent showers. It is likely that the spirits

of the top commanders were also bright,

for things were looking better. With

Ilangana and Shimizu Hill reduced, the

43d Division was in possession of the

last piece of high ground between it and

Munda airfield. Bartley Ridge had

fallen; Horseshoe Hill was about to fall,

and the 148th was completing its retirement.

General Griswold had issued no special orders for the day; the field order

that had started the corps offensive was

still in effect. In the 37th Division's zone

the most significant development was

the return of Baxter's men. The 145th

Infantry was patrolling; the 161st was

mopping up. In the 43d Division's area

of responsibility, General Hodge had

ordered an advance designed to bring

his division up on line with the 145th

Infantry.

The 103d Infantry began its attack

at 1100. E, G, and F Companies advanced in line behind patrols. Meeting

practically no opposition, they gained

ground rapidly and by 1500 were nearing

Lambeti Plantation. The 2d Battalion,

169th Infantry, then in process of pinching out the 172d, attacked northwest

across the front of the 172d and established contact with the 145th Infantry.

The 172d completed a limited advance

before going into division reserve. The

3d Battalion, 169th, on the left of the 2d,

attacked in its zone and at 1500 was still

advancing. For the first time since it had

landed on New Georgia, the 43d Division

could announce that the going was easy.

The day before, Generals Hodge and

Wing, accompanied by Colonel Ross,

had visited the command and observation posts of the 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry, from where they could see part

of Munda airfield. They detected evidence of a Japanese withdrawal, which

seemed to be covered by fire from the

enemy still on Horseshoe Hill.

Thus at 1500, 1 August, with the 43d

Division still moving forward, General

Griswold ordered all units to send out

patrols immediately to discover whether

the Japanese were withdrawing. "Smack

Japs wherever found, even if late."

 33

 If

the patrols found little resistance, a general advance would be undertaken in

late afternoon. Colonel Ridings telephoned the orders to 37th Division

headquarters, and within minutes patrols went out. They found no enemy.

At 1624 Ridings called Beightler's head32

 37th Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 43. 33 XIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 43.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 159

quarters again with orders to advance

aggressively until solid resistance was

met, in which case its location, strength,

and composition were to be developed.

The 148th Infantry was to have been

placed in corps reserve with orders to

protect the right flank, patrol vigorously

to the north, northeast, and northwest,

and cut the Munda-Bairoko trail if possible. Since the 27th Infantry of the 25th

Division was arriving and moving into

position on the 37th Division's right

flank, Beightler persuaded corps headquarters to let him use the 148th Infantry.34

 Ridings required, however, that

the 148th be given the mission of protecting the right flank because the 27th

Infantry would not have enough strength

for a day or two.

All went well for the rest of the day.

The 103d Infantry reached the outer

taxiways of Munda airfield; the 169th

pulled up just short of Bibilo Hill. The

37th Division's regiments plunged forward past Horseshoe Hill, which was

free of Japanese, and gained almost

seven hundred yards.

The Japanese Withdrawal

The Japanese positions facing the XIV

Corps had been formidable, and the

Americans had been held in place for

long periods. But the Americans had

wrought more destruction than they

knew. The cumulative effect of continuous air and artillery bombardment and

constant infantry action had done tremendous damage to Japanese installations and caused large numbers of casualties. By late July most of the Japanese

emplacements near Munda were in

shambles. The front lines were crumbling. Rifle companies, 160-170 men

strong at the outset, were starkly reduced. Some had only 20 men left at

the end of July. The 229th Infantry numbered only 1,245 effectives. Major Hara,

Captain Kojima, and many staff officers

of the 229th had been killed by artillery

fire. Hospitals were not adequate to care

for the wounded and sick. The constant

shelling and bombing prevented men

from sleeping and caused many nervous

disorders.

To compensate for the diminution of

his regiment's strength, Colonel Hirata

ordered the soldiers of his 229th Infantry to kill ten Americans for each Japanese killed, and to fight until death.

Higher headquarters, however, took

a less romantic view of the situation. On

29 July a staff officer from the 8th Fleet

visited Sasaki's headquarters and ordered him to withdraw to a line extending from Munda Point northeast about

3,800 yards inland. The positions facing

the XIV Corps, and Munda airfield itself, were to be abandoned. Sasaki and

his subordinates thought that it would

be better to withdraw even farther, but

the views of the 8th Fleet prevailed over

those of the responsible men on the spot.

The withdrawal, which was deduced by

XIV Corps headquarters on 1 August,

was accomplished promptly, and except

for detachments at Munda and in the

hills the main body of Sasaki's troops

was in its new position by the first day

of August.

Jungle Techniques and Problems

The Americans did not yet know it,

but the worst was over. All regiments

began making steady progress each day 34

 See below, pp. 167-69.
160 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MUNDA AIRFIELD

against light, though determined and

skillful, opposition.35

By now all regiments, though depleted

by battle casualties and disease, had become veterans. Pockets that once would

have halted an entire battalion or even

a regiment were now usually reduced

with speed and skill. The flame thrower,

receiving its most extensive use in the

Pacific up to this time, was coming into

its own as an offensive weapon. All regiments employed it against enemy positions, both in assault and in mopping

up. The flame thrower did have several

important disadvantages. The equipment was large and heavy, and required

the operator to get very close to enemy

positions, then expose his head and body

in order to use his weapon. He needed

to be protected by several riflemen. But

even with its disadvantages, it was useful

in destroying enemy positions.

Tanks, too, were of great value. General Griswold felt that, despite the difficulties inherent in operations over hilly

jungle, the actions of the Tank Platoons

35

 Unless otherwise indicated all lessons-learned

data are from CG XIV Corps, Informal Report on

Combat Operations in the New Georgia Campaign.

This document is not a narrative report. It contains

data on tactics, weapons, logistics, and special jungle

problems as compiled by the corps, division, and

special headquarters participating in the operation.
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 161

of the 9th and 10th Marine Defense Battalions had been successful. On 29 July,

looking forward to fighting over easier

terrain around Munda airfield, he asked

General Harmon for more tanks. Corps

headquarters, he also announced, was

preparing to mount flame throwers on

tanks.36 The operation ended before

flame throwing tanks could be used, but

the idea was successfully carried out in

later campaigns.

The technique of reducing a pillbox,

whether isolated or part of a defensive

system, was now mastered. The official

records unfortunately do not give much

exact information on the reduction of

specific pillboxes, but after the battle

the 37th Division gave a valuable general

description of the methods employed.

The first essential was a complete reconnaissance to develop the position, intention, and strength of the enemy. This

was quite difficult in the jungle. "To

one unskilled in jungle fighting, it is inconceivable that well trained reconnaissance patrols in sufficient numbers cannot develop the situation in front of the

advancing forces."

 37

 Because they could

not see far enough, because they could

not always get close enough, and because

Japanese fire discipline was sometimes

so good that a given position would not

fire until actually attacked, reconnaissance patrols could not always develop

positions. The next step was a reconnaissance in force by a reinforced platoon. This often uncovered a portion

of the enemy position but not all of it.

Usually the complete extent of a center

of resistance was determined only by

the attack.

The attack itself consisted of three

parts: artillery preparation, 81-mm. mortar fire, and assault.

The artillery preparation had a threefold effect. It improved visibility by

clearing away brush and foliage. It destroyed or damaged enemy positions.

And it killed, wounded, and demoralized

enemy soldiers.

The 81-mm. mortars, using heavy shell

that had a delay fuze, fired on observed

positions and usually covered the area

between the American infantry and the

artillery's targets. They frequently drove

the Japanese soldiers out of their pillboxes into the open where they became

targets for rifle and machine gun fire.

The 60-mm. mortars, though more mobile than the 81-mm.'s, threw too light

a shell to be very effective in these attacks. Their shells usually burst in the

trees, but the 81-mm. heavy shells penetrated the treetops and often the tops of

the pillboxes themselves before exploding.

The assault consisted of a holding attack by a company or platoon delivering

assault fire to cover a close-in single or

double envelopment. BAR's, M1's, and

grenades were used extensively, and

flame throwers were employed whenever

possible. Units of the 25th Division,

which later drove northward from

Munda to Zieta, encountered pillbox

positions that were too shallow, and in

country too dense, for artillery and mortars to be used without endangering the

36

 Rad, Griswold to Harmon, 29 Jul 43, in XIV

Corps G-3 Jnl, 30 Jul 43. Part of the 754th Army

Tank Battalion was alerted at Noumea for transfer

to Guadalcanal to be equipped with flame throwers

for employment in New Georgia but Munda airfield

had fallen before it was moved.

The Tank Platoon of the 11th Marine Defense

Battalion arrived in early August. 37

 37th Div Rpt, G-3 Narrative, Jungle Tactics

and Opns, p. 3.
162 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

REDUCING AN ENEMY PILLBOX WITH A FLAME THROWER. Pillbox is along the

beach near Munda Airfield.

attacking infantry. Men of this division

therefore advocated flame throwers, infantry cannon, and tanks for pillbox

reduction.

These techniques, which simply represented the application of established tactical principles, were being applied well

in early August, but several problems

remained. Because the infantry units did

not advance at the same rate, the front

line became irregular and the supporting

artillery was thus unable to capitalize

on the advantages of firing at right angles

to the axis of advance. All unit commanders were eager to employ artillery

and mortar support to the utmost, but

they frequently complained that neighboring units' supporting artillery and

mortar fires were falling in their areas

and endangering their troops. They had

a tendency to forget that the enemy also

used artillery and mortars and, when

receiving American artillery fire, frequently lobbed 90-mm. mortar shells

into the American front lines to convince

the American infantrymen that they

were being fired on by their own artillery. In most cases the complaints were

probably caused by Japanese rather than

American fire.

Because maps were inaccurate and reconnaissance was inhibited by poor visibility, it was extremely difficult to determine the exact location of friendly

units. In the 37th Division's zone several

artillery preparations were called off be-
XIV CORPS OFFENSIVE 163

cause of uncertainty about the position

of the 148th Infantry. Flares and smoke

pots, and sometimes flame throwers, were

used to mark flanks, but usually could

not be seen by anyone not in the immediate vicinity. Griswold had ordered the

front line battalions to mark their flanks

daily with white panels twenty-five feet

long by six feet wide. These were to be

photographed from the air. Reconnaissance planes made daily photographic

flights, but there were no clearings in

the New Georgia jungle large enough

to permit the panels to be spread out,

and this effort failed. By plotting close-in

defensive artillery fires, forward observers were able to provide some reliable

information on the location of front

lines. When the 37th Division rolled

forward after 1 August, it estimated positions and distances on the basis of

speedometer readings from locations that

had been plotted by air photography

and interpolated on maps.

The difficulties of scouting and patrolling naturally affected nearly every aspect of the operation. Because enemy

positions could not be fixed in advance,

the troops often attacked terrain rather

than the enemy. This procedure resulted

in slow advances and in a high expenditure of mortar ammunition on areas

actually free of the enemy. And mortar

ammunition supply was laborious; shells

had to be hand-carried from trail-end to

the mortar positions. Poor scouting

caused battalions to advance on narrow

fronts and thus be halted by small enemy positions. One regimental operations officer asserted that inadequate reconnaissance was due in part to the fact

that "higher commanders" did not issue

orders until the late afternoon preceding an attack. Thus battalions did not

have time for full reconnaissance:

"Many times, units were committed

in an area which had not been reconnoitered. This fact resulted in commanders having to make decisions concerning

a zone of advance in which he knew little

or nothing about the enemy positions.

Enemy strong points encountered in this

fashion often times resulted in hasty

withdrawals which were costly both in

men and weapons."

 38

"Munda is yours"

The XIV Corps maintained the momentum of its advance against the enemy delaying forces. On 2, 3, 4, and 5

August the advance continued all across

the corps' front. The 103d and 169th

Infantry Regiments, which had gained

the outer taxiways of the airfield on 1

August, kept going. The 3d Battalion,

172d, was committed on the 169th's

right on 4 August. In the more open

terrain around the airstrip the troops

were able to use 60-mm. mortars effectively, and their advance was consequently speeded. Kokengolo Hill, the

rise in the center of the airfield where

a Methodist mission had once stood,

held up the advance temporarily. Bibilo

Hill, whose fortifications included six

75-mm. antiaircraft guns that the Japanese had been using as dual-purpose

weapons, was reduced in three days of

action by elements of the 169th, 172d,

145th, and 161st Regiments, supported

by Marine tanks. The 148th Infantry,

on the north flank, established blocks

and ambushes on a north-south track

38

 Rpt, Maj Carl H. Coleman, S-3 145th Inf, to

G-3 37th Div, 1 Sep 43, sub: Informal Rpt on New

Georgia Campaign.
164 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

LIGHT TANKS M3 OF THE 9TH MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION supporting infantry

action near the base of Bibilo Hill.

that was presumed to be the MundaBairoko trail.

On 5 August, with Bibilo Hill cleared,

the units of the 37th Division crossed

the narrow strip of land between the

hill and the water. This tactical success

had one effect of great personal importance to the soldiers: many had their

first bath in weeks.

In the 43d Division's zone on 5 August, the infantry, with tank and mortar

support, killed or drove the last Japanese from the tunnels, bunkers, and

pillboxes of Kokengolo Hill. Here were

found caves stocked with rice, bales of

clothing and blankets, and occupation

currency. Crossing the western part of

the runway, with its craters, grass, and

wrecked Japanese planes, the infantrymen secured it in early afternoon. General Wing telephoned General Hodge

from Bibilo Hill: "Munda is yours at

1410 today."

 39

 Griswold radioed the

good news to Admiral Halsey: ". . . Our

ground forces today wrested Munda

from the Japs and present it to you . . .

as the sole owner. . . ." Halsey responded

with "a custody receipt for Munda . . . .

Keep 'em dying."

 40

The major objective was in Allied"

hands. The hardest part of the long New

Georgia battle was over.

39

 43d Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 43. 40

 Rad, CG NGOF to COMSOPAC, 5 Aug 43, in

XIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 43; Rad, COMSOPAC

to CG NGOF, 6 Aug 43, in XIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 7

Aug 43.
CHAPTER X

After Munda

The hardest slugging was over, at least

on New Georgia. But several tasks faced

the troops. The airfield had to be put

into shape at once and the remaining

Japanese had to be cleaned out of New

Georgia and several of the offshore islands. (Map 11)

The Airfield

Repair and enlargement of the battered airstrip began immediately after

its capture.1 ". . . Munda airfield looked

like a slash of white coral in a Doré

drawing of hell. It lay like a dead thing,

between the torn, coffee-colored hills

of Bibilo and Kokengolo."

 2 Seabees of

the 73d and 24th Naval Construction

Battalions began the work of widening,

resurfacing, and regrading the field. On

9 August additional naval construction

battalions added their tools and men

to the task. Power shovels dug coral out

of Kokengolo Hill, and bulldozers, earthmovers, graders, and rollers spread and

flattened it. Good coral was plentiful,

as were men and tools, and the work

moved rapidly forward. By 7 August

the field, although rough, was suitable

for emergency wheels-up landings.

Advance parties from General Mulcahy's air headquarters moved from Rendova to Munda during the second week

of August. On the 14th, the day after

the first Allied plane landed, General

Mulcahy flew from Rendova to Munda

in his amphibian plane and opened

Headquarters, Air Command, New

Georgia, in a Japanese-dug tunnel in

Kokengolo Hill.

Two Marine fighter squadrons (VMF

123 and VMF 124), with twelve Corsairs (F4U's) each, arrived on the 14th

and began operations at once. Together

with the fighters based at Segi Point,

1

 Unless otherwise indicated this chapter is based

on Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 237-44; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 225-39; ONI USN, Combat

Narratives: Solomon Islands Campaign, XI, Kolombangara and Vella Lavella, 6 August-7 October

1943 [Washington, 1944]; SOPACBACOM, History

of the New Georgia Campaign, Vol. I, Chs. VIIVIII; the rpts, jnls, and jnl files of NGOF, COMAIR

New Georgia, XIV Corps, 25th Div, 43d Div,

northern landing force, and component units; History of the 8th Area Army, 1942-44, Japanese

Monogr No. 37 (OCMH); 17th Army Operations,

Vol. II, Japanese Monogr No. 40 (OCMH); South- east Area Naval Operations, Vol. II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH); outline of Southeast Area

Naval Air Operations, August 1942-October 1942,

Pt. II, Japanese Monogr No. 106 (OCMH). This

section is also based on Building the Navy's Bases

in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards

and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-

1946, II (Washington, 1947), 265-66.

2

 John A. DeChant, Devilbirds: The Story of

United States Marine Corps Aviation in World War

II (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 109.

AFTER MUNDA 167

which were also under Mulcahy, they

and other Allied squadrons covered the

Allied landing at Vella Lavella on 15

August.3 There were some difficulties at

first. Maintenance crews were inexperienced, there were not enough spare

parts, the field was not complete, and

taxiways and dispersal areas were small

and in poor condition. Japanese naval

guns, promptly nicknamed "Pistol Pete,"

shelled the airfield from the nearby islet of Baanga intermittently from 16

through 19 August. But conditions

quickly improved, and Pistol Pete, which

had not done much damage, was captured by elements of the 43d Division

on 19 August.

As the field was enlarged, more planes

and units continued to arrive. Operations intensified, and as the Japanese

were cleared from the central Solomons

Mulcahy's planes began to strike targets

in the northern Solomons. For this reason his command was removed from the

New Georgia Occupation Force on 23

September and assigned as part of the

Air Command, Solomons. Mulcahy's

fighters escorted bombers to the Bougainville bases, and Munda-based bombers soon began dropping loads there too.

Munda airfield, which by mid-October

had a 6,000-foot coral-covered runway

and thus was suitable for bombers, became the best and most-used airfield in

the Solomons. The rotation of Navy,

Marine Corps, and Army Air Forces

commanders that was standard in the

South Pacific had brought about the

relief of Admiral Mitscher as Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, by General

Twining, the Thirteenth Air Force commander. General Twining moved his

headquarters on 20 October from Guadalcanal to Munda and made the most

intensive possible use of the new base.

Reinforcements

Airfield development, though of primary importance, could be of only minor

interest to the ground troops who had

the dreary task of slogging northward

from Bibilo Hill in an attempt to trap

the retreating Japanese. The job had

been assigned to the 27th and 161st Infantry Regiments, both operating under

their parent command, the 25th Division.

Addition of the 27th Infantry to the

New Georgia Occupation Force had

come about because of General Griswold's urgent requests for more men.

During July the Western Force of Task

Force 31 had carried fully 26,748 men

to Rendova,4 but by the month's end

not that many men were available for

combat. Many of the arrivals were service troops. Further, casualties and disease had weakened the infantry regiments. The three infantry regiments in

the 37th Division (less the two battalions

with Liversedge) had an authorized total

strength of about 7,000 men. But the

161st Infantry, which entered the campaign below strength, was short 1,350

men. The two-battalion regiments were

short too, so that the 37th Division's

rifle regiments had only 5,200 men. And

the 43d Division was in worse shape.

With an authorized strength of 8,000

men, its three rifle regiments had but

3

 See below, pp. 179-80.

4

 CTF 31 War Diary, 31 Jul 43 entry. Also transported were: 4,800 tons of rations; 17,431 drums of

fuel, or 3,486 tons; 2,281 vehicles weighing 6,895

tons; 9,961 tons of ammunition; and 5,323 tons of

other freight.
168 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MUNDA AIRFIELD IN OPERATION. C-47 transport taking off is evacuating wounded men.

4,536 men. Griswold had asked Liversedge if he could release two infantry

battalions for the Munda drive but

Liversedge replied that that would be

possible only if Enogai and Rice Anchorage were abandoned. His raider battalions were then only 60 percent effective.5

On 28 July Griswold asked Harmon

for replacements or for a regimental

combat team less artillery. This request

posed a grave problem for Harmon and

Admiral Halsey. The injunction against

committing major forces to New Georgia

was still in effect; at least it was theoretically in effect, for in small island warfare, especially in 1943, 26,000 men constituted a major force. The only immediately available division was the 25th,

and one of its regiments, the 161st, had

been sent in fairly early. Further, Halsey

and Harmon had planned to use the

25th for the invasion of the Buin-Faisi

area of Bougainville.

Yet as long as the high command retained confidence in Griswold, there

could be but one answer. As Harmon

wrote to his chief of staff, Brig. Gen.

Allison J. Barnett, ". . . we have to

make this Munda-Bairoko business go—

and as quickly as possible. It is the job

'in hand' and whatever we use we have

to get it done before we go on to the

next step." One of the major difficulties,

5

 See XIV Corps G-3 Jnl File, 28-29, 31 Jul 43.

By 14 August sickness and casualties had rendered

the 4th Marine Raider Battalion practically unfit

for fighting. The battalion surgeon, Lt. J. C. Lockhart, USNR, reported that out of 453 men present

only 137 were fit for duty. Memo, 4th Mar Raider

Bn Surgeon for CO 4th Mar Raider Bn, 14 Aug 43,

sub: Health of Personnel of 4th Raider Bn, in

XIV Corps G-3 Jnl File, 23 Aug 43.
AFTER MUNDA 169

according to Harmon, was the fact that

the Americans had underestimated the

job in hand. "Munda is a tough nut—

much tougher in terrain, organization

of the ground and determination of

the Jap than we had thought. . . . In

both Guadalcanal and New Georgia we

greatly underestimated the force require to do the job."

 6 Thus Harmon

alerted the 27th Infantry of the 25th

Division for transfer to New Georgia

and recommended to Halsey that the

25th Division be taken off the list for

Bougainville.7 As soon as he received

Halsey's approval Harmon ordered up

the 27th Infantry. On 29 July Col.

Thomas D. Roberts of Harmon's staff

arrived at Griswold's headquarters to

announce the imminent arrival of the

27th Infantry and some replacements.

At this time the Japanese were still

holding the Ilangana-Shimizu HillHorseshoe Hill-Bartley Ridge defense

line, and no one was anticipating the

rapid advances that characterized the first

days of August. Thus on 30 July with

Colonel Roberts' concurrence Griswold

asked for more 25th Division troops and

Harmon promptly promised the 35th Infantry.

Advance elements of the 27th Infantry, and Headquarters, 25th Division,

landed on the barrier island of Sasavele

on 1 August, and in the next few days

the regiment was moved to the right

(north) flank of the Munda front to protect the XIV Corps' right flank and rear.

The Cleanup

North to Bairoko

The Japanese withdrawal from Munda

released a sizable body of American

troops to attempt the cleanup of the

Japanese between Munda and Dragons

Peninsula. After the rapid advances began on 1 August the 27th Infantry, temporarily commanded by Lt. Col. George

E. Bush, sent out patrols to the north

before advancing to clear out the Japanese and make contact with Liversedge.8

Meanwhile General Griswold decided

that mopping-up operations would have

to include a drive from Bibilo Hill

northwest to Zieta, a village on the west

coast about four crow's-flight miles

northwest of Bibilo, to cut off the retreating Japanese. On 2 August the 37th

Division had reported that Fijian patrols had cut the Munda-Bairoko trail

but found no evidence of any Japanese

traffic. Lt. Col. Demas L. Sears, Assistant

Chief of Staff, G-2, 37th Division, offered the opinion that if the Japanese

were evacuating New Georgia they were

moving along the coast to Zieta rather

than to Bairoko. This opinion was buttressed by reports from Colonel Griffith

of the Raiders who radioed on 2 August

that there had been no traffic in or out

of Bairoko.

Next day, on orders from Griswold,

the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry, left

Enogai on a cross-country trek toward

Zieta, a trek that was halted short of

there on 5 August by additional orders

6

 Ltr, Harmon to Barnett, 28 Jul 43, quoted in

SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. IV, p. 35, OCMH. 7

 He suggested substituting the 2d Marine Division or the 3d New Zealand Division.

8

 Col. Douglas Sugg had commanded the regiment until a few days before the move to New

Georgia. He fell ill and was hospitalized, and his

place was taken by Colonel Bush, the executive.

Sugg resumed command of his regiment on 12

August.
170 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

4-TON TRUCK STUCK IN THE MUD on a jeep trail, New Georgia.

from Griswold. He had decided to use

the two 25th Division regiments under

General Collins, the commander who

had led the division on Guadalcanal, to

drive to Zieta and Bairoko.

From then until 25 August, the 25th

Division units slogged painfully along

the swampy jungle trails in pursuit of

the elusive enemy. The Japanese occasionally established roadblocks, ambushes, and defenses in depth to delay

the Americans, but the worst enemy was

the jungle. The terrain was, if anything,

worse than that encountered on the

Munda front. The maps were incorrect,

inexact, or both. For example, Mount

Tirokiamba, a 1,500-foot eminence reported to lie about 9,000 yards northwest of Bibilo Hill, was found to be

4,500 yards south by west of its reported

position. Mount Bao, thought to be

6,000 yards east-northeast of Bibilo Hill,

was actually 2,500 yards farther on.

As the regiments advanced, bulldozers

of the 65th Engineer Battalion attempted to build jeep trails behind

them. But the rain fell regularly and

the trails became morasses so deep that

even the bulldozers foundered. General

Collins ordered the trail building

stopped in mid-August. Now supplies

were carried by hand and on men's

backs to the front, and when these methods failed to provide enough food and

ammunition the regiments were supplied from the air.
AFTER MUNDA 171

37TH DIVISION TROOPS CARRYING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION forward, 5 August 1943.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry,

trekked north on the Munda-Bairoko

trail and made contact on 9 August with

Liversedge. The 2d and 3d Battalions,

27th Infantry, after some sharp fighting

took Zieta on 15 August, then pushed

northwest to Piru Plantation. The plantation lay about seven and one-half airline miles northwest of Bibilo Hill, but

the regiment's advance on the ground

required a 22-mile march. The 161st

Infantry, following the 1st Battalion,

27th, moved up the trail and after midAugust began patrolling to the west

short of Bairoko Harbour. On 25 August, after Griffith had reported two

nights of busy enemy barge activity in

and out of Bairoko Harbour, the Americans bloodlessly occupied its shores.

The Japanese Evacuation

But the main body of Japanese survivors had slipped out of Zieta and Bairoko. Traveling light, they had evaded

the slower-moving, more heavily encumbered Americans. On 5 August General

Sasaki had decided that he could defend New Georgia no longer. He therefore sent the 13th Infantry and most of

the Bairoko-based special naval landing

force units to Kolombangara, the 229th

Infantry, the 3d Battalion, 230th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, to Baanga, a long narrow island
172 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

which lay across Lulu Channel from

Zieta. These units, plus two 120-mm.

naval guns, were ordered to defend

Baanga, and the naval guns were to shell

Munda airfield.

Sasaki's headquarters, having moved

out of Munda, was established on Baanga until 7 August, and the next day

he moved to Kolombangara.

Baanga

The islet of Baanga, 6,500 yards long

and some 4,000 yards west of Kindu

Point on New Georgia, was captured to

extend Allied control over Diamond

Narrows and to stop the shelling of

Munda by the two 120-mm. guns nicknamed "Pistol Pete" by the American

troops.

Seizure of Baanga was entrusted to

the 43d Division, briefly commanded by

General Barker after 10 August, when

General Hodge returned to the Americal Division.9

 Patrolling started on 11

August, but the Japanese on Baanga

fought back hard, and the 169th Infantry, which Barker initially assigned to

Baanga, gave a "shaky performance."

 10

The 172d Infantry (less one battalion)

joined in, and the southern part of the

island was secured by 21 August. The

43d Division lost 52 men killed, no

wounded, and 486 nonbattle casualties

in this operation.

The Japanese, meanwhile, had decided to get off Baanga. General Sasaki

had evolved a plan to use the 13th Infantry, then on Kolombangara, to attack

New Georgia, and dispatched his naval

liaison officer to 8th Fleet headquarters

to arrange for air and fleet support. But

he was to get none. Moreover, no more

ground reinforcements were to be sent

to New Georgia. The last attempted

shipment consisted of two mixed battalions from the 6th and 38th Divisions, to

be carried to Kolombangara on destroyers.11

 But Comdr. Frederick Moosbrugger with six destroyers surprised the Japanese force in Vella Gulf on the night

of 6-7 August and quickly sank three

Japanese destroyers. The fourth enemy

ship, which carried no troops, escaped.

Moosbrugger's force got off virtually

scot free, while the Japanese lost over

fifteen hundred soldiers and sailors as

well as the ships. About three hundred

survivors reached Vella Lavella.12 When

Sasaki's request reached the 8th Fleet,

Vice Adm. Gunichi Mikawa, basing his

decision on instructions from Imperial

General Headquarters, ordered Sasaki to

cancel his plan for attacking New Georgia and to concentrate the Baanga troops

on Arundel to forestall further Allied

advances. So the Japanese left on barges

for Arundel, completing the movement

by 22 August.

Vella Lavella: The Bypass

Meanwhile an Allied force had made

a landing at Barakoma on Vella Lavella,

which lay about thirty-five nautical miles

northwest of Munda. This landing represented a major and completely successful departure from the original TOENAILS plan. The plan had called for the

attack against Munda to be followed by 9

 Barker was replaced several days later, on orders

from the War Department, by General Wing, who

was senior to him. 10

 See Ltr, Griswold to Harmon, 24 Aug 43,

quoted in SOPACBACOM, History of the New

Georgia Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. VII, p. 7, OCMH.

11

 Each battalion consisted of four rifle companies,

a machine gun platoon, and a small artillery unit. 12

 For a complete account see Morison, Breaking

the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 212-22.
AFTER MUNDA 173

the seizure of Vila airfield on Kolombangara, but the Japanese were now

correctly believed to be established on

Kolombangara in considerable strength.

Some estimates placed the enemy garrison at ten thousand, a little under the

actual total. And Admiral Halsey did not

want a repetition of the Munda campaign. As he later put it, "The undue

length of the Munda operation and our

heavy casualties made me wary of another slugging match, but I didn't know

how to avoid it."

 13

There was a way to avoid a slugging

match, and that way was to bypass Kolombangara completely and land instead

on Vella Lavella. The advantages were

obvious: the airfield at Vila was poorly

drained and thus no good while Vella

Lavella looked more promising. Also,

Vella Lavella was correctly reported to

contain few Japanese. Vella Lavella,

northwesternmost island in the New

Georgia group, lay less than a hundred

miles from the Japanese bases in the

Shortlands and southern Bougainville,

but a landing there could be protected

by American fighter planes based at

Munda and Segi Point.

The technique of bypassing, which

General MacArthur has characterized as

"as old as warfare itself," was well understood in the U.S. Army and Navy long

before Vella Lavella, but successful bypassing requires a preponderance of

strength that Allied forces had not hitherto possessed.14

 The first instance of an

amphibious bypass in the Pacific occurred in May 1943 when the Allied capture of Attu caused the Japanese to evacuate Kiska.

When members of Halsey's staff proposed that South Pacific forces bypass

Kolombangara and jump to Vella Lavella of the more euphonious name, the

admiral was enthusiastic.15 On 11 July

he radioed the proposal to Admirals

Turner and Fitch. "Our natural route of

approach from Munda to Bougainville,"

he asserted, "lies south of Gizo and Vella

Lavella Islands." He asked them to consider whether it would be practicable

to emplace artillery in the MundaEnogai and Arundel areas to interdict

Vila; cut the supply lines to Vila by

artillery and surface craft, particularly

PT boats; "by-pass Vila area and allow

it to die on the vine"; and seize Vella

Lavella and build a fighter field there.

The decision on this plan would depend on the possibility of building a

fighter field on Vella Lavella to give close

fighter support for the invasion of Bougainville.16

 Both Turner and Fitch liked

the idea.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance was necessary first.

13

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

170.

14

 Ltr, MacArthur to Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 5

Mar 53, no sub, OCMH.

In ground operations field orders usually specify

that isolated pockets of resistance are to be bypassed, contained, and reduced later, so that the

advance will not be held up.

15

 Ltrs, Adm Halsey to Maj Gen Orlando Ward,

Chief of Mil Hist, 27 May and 27 Aug 52, no subs,

OCMH. The second letter contains as inclosures

letters from Admiral Robert B. Carney, formerly

Chief of Staff, South Pacific Area, and Lt. Gen.

William E. Riley, USMC (Ret.), formerly Halsey's

war plans officer, to Admiral Halsey. Other former

staff officers credit Wilkinson and Comdr. William

F. Riggs, Jr., with the idea. See Ltr, Vice Adm D. B.

Duncan to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 10 Nov

53, no sub, OCMH. 16

 Rad, COMSOPAC to CTF 31 and COMAIRSOPAC, 11 Jul 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 12 Jul

43.
174 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Allied knowledge of Vella Lavella was

limited. Coastwatchers, plantation managers, and such members of the clergy

as the Rev. A. W. E. Silvester, the New

Zealand Methodist missionary bishop

whose see included New Georgia and

Vella Lavella, provided some information but not enough to form the basis

for the selection of an airfield site or an

invasion beach. Col. Frank L. Beadle,

Harmon's engineer, therefore took command of a reconnaissance party consisting of six Army, Navy, and Marine officers. Beadle was ordered to concentrate

his reconnaissance in the coastal plain

region of Barakoma and Biloa Mission

on the southeast tip of Vella Lavella because it was closest to Munda, the natives were friendly, coastwatcher Lt.

Henry Josselyn of the Australian Navy

and Bishop Silvester were there, and the

terrain seemed favorable. The Japanese

had already surveyed the Barakoma area

for a fighter strip.

Beadle's party boarded a torpedo boat

at Rendova on the night of 21-22 July

and slipped through the darkness to

land at Barakoma. Silvester, Josselyn,

and two natives were on hand to meet

the American officers. For six days

Beadle's party, the bishop, the coastwatcher, and several natives explored the

southeast part of the island, and ventured

up the west coast to Nyanga Plantation,

about twelve crow's-flight miles northwest of Barakoma. Returning to Rendova on 28 July, Beadle reported that

the vicinity of Barakoma met all requirements, and that there were no Japanese

on the southeast coast of the island.

Beadle recommended that the landing

be made on beaches extending some 750

yards south from the mouth of the Barakoma River, and suggested that an advance detachment be sent to Barakoma

to mark beaches. These recommendations were accepted.

Admiral Wilkinson, Turner's successor, chose an advance party of fourteen

officers and enlisted men from the various units in the Vella Lavella invasion

force and placed it under Capt. G. C.

Kriner, USN, who was to command the

Vella Lavella naval base. This group

proceeded from Guadalcanal to Rendova, then prepared to change to PT

boats for the run through the night of

12-13 August toward Barakoma. The

work of the advance party was of a

highly secret nature. If the Japanese became aware of its presence, they could

kill or capture the men and certainly

would deduce that an Allied invasion

was imminent.

On 11 August coastwatcher Josselyn

radioed Guadalcanal to report the presence of forty Japanese. (Japanese survivors of the Battle of Vella Gulf, 6-7

August, had landed on Vella Lavella.)

His message indicated that pro-Allied

natives had taken them prisoner. From

Koli Point General Harmon radioed

General Griswold to ask for more men

to accompany the advance party and take

the prisoners into custody. Accordingly

one officer and twenty-five enlisted men

from E and G Companies, 103d Infantry, were detailed to go along.

The whole party left Rendova at 1730

on 12 August. En route Japanese planes

bombed and strafed the four torpedo

boats for two hours. One was hit and

four men were wounded but the other

three made it safely. During the hours

of darkness they hove to off Barakoma.

Rubber boats had been provided to get
AFTER MUNDA 175

the party from the torpedo boats to

shore, but no one was able to inflate the

rubber boats from the carbon dioxide

containers that were provided. So natives

paddled out in canoes and took the

Americans ashore.

Meanwhile Josselyn had radioed Wilkinson again to the effect that there were

140 Japanese in the area; 40 at Biloa and

100 about five miles north of Barakoma.

They were, he declared, under surveillance but were not prisoners. Once

ashore Captain Kriner discovered there

were many starving, ragged, poorly

armed stragglers but no prisoners. He requested reinforcements, and in the early

morning hours of 14 August seventy-two

officers and enlisted men of F Company,

103d Infantry, sailed for Barakoma in

four torpedo boats. This time the rubber

boats inflated properly and the men

paddled ashore from three hundred

yards off the beach.

The advance party with the secret

mission of marking beaches and the combat party with the prisoner-catching mission set about their respective jobs.

Beach marking proceeded in a satisfactory manner although the infantrymen in that party were not completely

happy about the presence of the 103d

troops. They felt that the two missions

were mutually exclusive and that the

prisoner-catching mission destroyed all

hope of secrecy. Only seven Japanese

were captured.17 F Company, 103d, held

the beachhead at Barakoma against the

arrival of the main invasion force.

Plans

Once Colonel Beadle had made his

recommendations the various South

Pacific headquarters began laying their

plans. This task was fairly simple, for

Admiral Halsey and his subordinates

were now old hands at planning invasions. Actual launching of the invasion would have to await the capture

and development of Munda airfield.

It was on 11 August that Halsey issued

his orders. He organized his forces much

as he had for the invasion of New Georgia. (Chart 10) The Northern Force

(Task Force 31) under Admiral Wilkinson was to capture Vella Lavella, build

an airfield, and establish a small naval

base. Griswold's New Georgia Occupation Force would meanwhile move into

position on Arundel and shell Vila airfield on bypassed Kolombangara. New

Georgia-based planes would cover and

support the invasion. South Pacific Aircraft (Task Force 33) was to provide air

support by striking at the ShortlandsBougainville fields. As strikes against

these areas were being carried out

regularly, the intensified air operations

would not necessarily alert the enemy.

Three naval task forces of aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and the submarines of Task Force

72, would be in position to protect and

support Wilkinson. On Wilkinson's recommendation, Halsey set 15 August as D

Day.18

Admiral Wilkinson also issued his

orders on 11 August. The Northern

Force was organized into three invasion

echelons (the main body and the second 17

 SOPACBACOM's History of the New Georgia

Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. VIII, pp. 20-21, OCMH, contains some fanciful data concerning the sinking of

one PT boat and the killing of about fifty Japanese.

18

 COMSOPAC Opn Plan 14A-43, 11 Aug 43, in

Off of Naval Rcds and Library.
176 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

CHART 10—SOUTH PACIFIC ORGANIZATION FOR VELLA LAVELLA INVASION

and third echelons) and the motor torpedo boat flotillas. (Chart 11) Under

Wilkinson's direct command, the main

body consisted of three transport groups,

the destroyer screen, and the northern

landing force. Each transport group,

screened by destroyers, was to move independently from Guadalcanal to Vella

Lavella; departure from Guadalcanal

would be so timed that each group would

arrive off Barakoma just before it was

scheduled to begin unloading. Three

slow LST's, each towing an LCM, would

leave at 0300, 14 August, six LCI's at

0800, and seven fast APD's at 1600. The

motor torpedo boat flotilla would cover

the movement of the main body on D

minus 1 by patrolling the waters east

and west of Rendova, but would retire

to Rendova early on D Day to be out of

the way. Preliminary naval bombardment would in all probability not be

necessary, but Wilkinson told off two

destroyers to be prepared to support the

landing if need be. Two fighter-director

groups were put aboard two destroyers.

Once unloaded, each transport group

would steam for Guadalcanal. The second echelon, composed of three LST's

and three of the destroyers that would

escort the main body, was to arrive at

Barakoma on D plus 2, beach overnight,

and return to Guadalcanal. The third

echelon consisted of three destroyers and

three LST's from the main body. Wilkinson ordered it to arrive on D plus 5,

beach throughout the night, and depart

for Guadalcanal the next morning.19

The northern landing force, 5,888

men in all, consisted of the 35th Regimental Combat Team of the 25th Di19

 CTF 31 Opn Plan A12-43, 11 Aug 43, in Off of

Naval Rcds and Library.

178 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

vision; the 4th Marine Defense Battalion; the 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Troop; the 58th Naval Construction

Battalion; and a naval base group.20

Command of the landing force was entrusted to Brig. Gen. Robert B. McClure, assistant commander of the 25th

Division, who as a colonel had commanded the 35th Infantry during the

Guadalcanal Campaign. General McClure would be under Wilkinson's control until he was well established ashore.

He would then come under General

Griswold.

The Japanese on Vella Lavella (no

garrison at all but only a group of

stragglers) were estimated to total about

250, with 100 more on nearby Ganongga

and 250 at Gizo. Wilkinson warned that

enemy air strength in southern Bougainville, less than a hundred miles away,

and at Rabaul was considerable, and that

naval surface forces were based at both

places.

To carry off such a stroke almost

literally under the enemy's aircraft

would require, besides fighter cover,

considerable speed in unloading. Wilkinson planned to unload the main body

in twelve hours. Troops debarking from

APD's were to go ashore in LCVP's,

forty to a boat. At the beach ten of each

forty would unload the boat while the

thirty pushed inland. Once emptied,

LCVP's were to return to their mother

ships for the rest of the men and supplies. Sixty minutes were allotted for unloading the APD's and clearing the

beach. The LCI's would then come in

to the beach and drop their ramps. Passenger troops would debark via both

ramps, ground their equipment, then reboard by the starboard ramps, pick up

gear, and go ashore down the port ramps.

One hour was allotted for the LCI's.

Then the LST's, bearing artillery,

trucks, and bulldozers, would ground.

Trucks were to be loaded in advance to

help insure the prompt unloading of the

LST's.

The 35th Infantry, commanded by

Col. Everett E. Brown, had been making ready for several days. It had

been alerted for movement to Munda

on 1 August, and on 9 August had received orders from Harmon's headquarters to prepare for an invasion. The 1st

and 2d Battalions on Guadalcanal and

the 3d Battalion and the 64th Field Artillery Battalion in the Russells then began

rehearsing landings. In the week preceding the invasion South Pacific Aircraft

struck regularly at Kolombangara, Buin,

Kahili, and Rekata Bay.

By 14 August the landing force and

its supplies were stowed aboard ship,

and all transport groups of the main

body shoved off for Barakoma on schedule. Once on board, the men were informed of their destination. Japanese

planes were reported over Guadalcanal,

the Russells, and New Georgia, but Wilkinson's ships had an uneventful voyage up the Slot and through Blanche

Channel and Gizo Strait. The sea was

calm, and a bright moon shone in the

20

 The 35th Regimental Combat Team consisted

of the 35th Infantry; the 64th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzer); C Company, 65th Engineer Battalion; Collecting Company B, 25th Medical Battalion, and detachments from other divisional services. Harmon, who had promised the

35th Infantry for New Georgia on 1 August, later

considered using the 145th Infantry, but concluded

that it could not be pulled out of New Georgia and

brought back to Guadalcanal in time. Rads, Harmon

to Griswold, 1 Aug and 6 Aug 43, in XIV Corps

G-3 Jnl.
AFTER MUNDA 179

clear night sky. Northwest of Rendova

the LCI's overhauled the LST's while

the APD's passed both slower groups.

Seizure of Barakoma

As first light gave way to daylight in

the morning of 15 August, the APD's

carrying the 1st and 2d Battalions of the

35th Infantry arrived off Barakoma and

hove to. General Mulcahy's combat air

patrol from Munda and Segi Point

turned up on schedule at 0605. With

part of the 103d Infantry and the secret

advance party already on shore and in

possession of the landing beach, there

was no need for support bombardment.

The APD's swung landing craft into the

water, troops of the 2d Battalion climbed

down the cargo nets and into the boats,

and the first wave, with rifle companies

abreast, departed. The 2d Battalion hit

the beach at 0624 and at once pushed

south toward the coconut plantation

around Biloa Mission, about four thousand yards from the beach. The 1st Battalion, having left the APD's at 0615,

landed with companies abreast at 0630

and pushed northward across the waistdeep Barakoma River. Thus quickly unloaded, the APD's cleared the area and

with four escorting destroyers proceeded

toward Guadalcanal.

The twelve LCI's arrived on schedule

and sailed in to the beach, but quickly

found there was room for but eight at

one time. Coral reefs a few yards from

shore rendered the northern portion of

the beach unusable. The remaining four

LCI's had to stand by offshore awaiting

their turn. The 3d Battalion started unloading but had barely gotten started

when enemy aircraft pounced at the invasion force.

This time the Japanese were not

caught so completely asleep as they had

been on 30 June. In early August Japanese radio intelligence reported a good

deal of Allied radio traffic, and the

commanders at Rabaul were aware that

ships were again concentrating around

Guadalcanal. They concluded that a new

invasion was impending but failed to

guess the target. At 0300 of the 15th a

land-based bomber spotted part of Wilkinson's force off Gatukai. Six dive

bombers and forty-eight fighters were

sent out on armed reconnaissance, and

these found the Americans shortly before 0800. Mulcahy's planes and ships'

antiaircraft guns promptly engaged

them. The Japanese planes that broke

through went for the destroyers, which

steamed on evasive courses and escaped

harm. The Japanese caused some casualties ashore by strafing, but did not attack

the LST's and LCI's. They ebulliently

reported repulsing fifty Allied planes.

This attack, together with the limitations of the beach, delayed the unloading

of the LCI's, which did not pull out until 0915.21

 The three LST's then beached

and began discharging men and heavy

cargo. Unloading continued all day.

The Japanese struck again at 1227;

eleven bombers and forty-eight fighters

came down from the north. Some attacked the LST's but these "Large, Slow

Targets" had mounted extra antiaircraft

guns and brought down several Japanese planes.

At 1724, some thirty-six minutes before the LST's departed, the enemy came

again. Forty-five fighters and eight bomb21

 The 35th Infantry later reported the existence

of a longer beach eight hundred yards north of

Barakoma.
180 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ers attacked without success. The Japanese pilots who flew against the Northern

Force on that August day showed a

talent for making unwarranted claims.

A postwar account soberly admits the

loss of seventeen planes, but claims the

sinking of four large transports, one

cruiser, and one destroyer. It states that

twenty-nine Allied planes were shot

down and that four large transports were

damaged.22 The ships retiring from Vella

Lavella were harried from the air almost

all the way, fortunately without suffering

damage.

D Day, a resounding success, had proceeded with the efficiency that characterized all Admiral Wilkinson's operations. Landed were 4,600 troops (700 of

whom were naval personnel) and 2,300

tons of gear including eight 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, fifteen days' supplies, and

three units of fire for all weapons except

antiaircraft guns, for which one unit was

landed. The 35th Regimental Combat

Team established a perimeter defense.

Field artillery was in position by 1700,

and by 1530 the 4th Marine Defense Battalion had sixteen .50-caliber, eight 20-

mm., and eight 40-mm. antiaircraft guns

and two searchlights in place. The guns

engaged the last flight of enemy planes.

There were some problems, of course.

The LST's had been unloaded slowly,

but supplies came ashore faster than the

shore party could clear them off the

beach. Boxes of equipment, ammunition, and rations were scattered about.

The troops had brought their barracks

bags and these lay rain-soaked in the

mud. Unused field stoves stood in the

way for several days.

The bypass to Vella Lavella was easier

and cheaper than an assault on Kolombangara. Twelve men were killed and

forty wounded by air bombing and strafing, but D Day saw no fighting on the

ground.

There was never any real ground combat on Vella Lavella, because Japanese

stragglers were mainly interested in escape rather than fighting. When it became known that Wilkinson was landing

on Vella Lavella officers of the 8th Fleet

and the 17th Army went into conference.

They estimated, with an accuracy unusual for Japanese Intelligence, that the

landing force was about a brigade in

strength. With blithe sanguinity someone proposed sending a battalion to

effect a counterlanding. General Imamura's headquarters took a calmer view

and pointed out that sending one battalion against a brigade would be "pouring water on a hot stone."

 23

 The 8th

Area Army stated that two brigades

would be needed to achieve success, but

that not enough transports were available. In view of the general Japanese

strategy of slow retreat in the central

Solomons in order to build up the defenses of Bougainville and hold Rabaul,

it was decided to send two rifle companies and one naval platoon to Horaniu

at Kokolope Bay on the northeast corner

of Vella Lavella to establish a barge staging base between the Shortlands and

Kolombangara.

The real struggle for Vella Lavella

took place in the air and on the sea.

Japanese naval aircraft made a resolute

effort to destroy the American ships

bearing supplies and equipment to Vella.

22

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH), 47-48. 23 Ibid., p. 48.
AFTER MUNDA 181

Fighters and bombers delivered daylight

attacks and seaplanes delivered a series

of nocturnal harassing attacks that were

all too familiar to Allied troops who

served in the Solomons in 1942, 1943,

and early 1944.

The combat air patrol from Mulcahy's

command made valiant efforts to keep

the Japanese away during daylight, but

as radar-equipped night-fighters did not

reach the New Georgia area until late

September shore- and ship-based antiaircraft provided the defense at night.24

 For

daylight cover Mulcahy had planned to

maintain a 32-plane umbrella over Barakoma, but the limited operational facilities at Munda made this impossible

at first. On 17 August only eight fighters

could be sent up at once to guard Barakoma. To add to the difficulties, the

weather over New Georgia was bad for

a week, the fighter-director teams on

Vella Lavella were new to their task, and

one of the 4th Defense Battalion's radars

was hit by a bomb on 17 August.

The Northern Force's second echelon,

under Capt. William R. Cooke, having

departed Guadalcanal on 16 August,

beached at Barakoma at 1626 the next

day. The fighter cover soon left for

Munda and at 1850, and again at 1910,

Japanese planes came over to bomb and

strafe. General McClure ordered Cooke

not to stay beached overnight but to put

to sea. Escorted by three destroyers, the

LST's went down Gizo Strait where they

received an air attack of two hours and

seventeen minutes' duration. The convoy sailed toward Rendova until 0143,

then reversed and headed for Barakoma.

One LST caught fire, probably as a result of a gasoline vapor explosion, and

was abandoned without loss of life. The

other two reached Barakoma, suffered

another air attack, unloaded, and returned safely to Guadalcanal.

Capt. Grayson B. Carter led the third

echelon to Vella Lavella. It was attacked

by enemy planes in Gizo Strait at 0540

on 21 August; one destroyer was slightly

damaged and two men were killed.

Planes struck off and on all day at the

beached LST's, but men of the 58th

Naval Construction Battalion showed

such zeal in unloading that the LST's

were emptied by 1600. The next convoys, on 26 and 31 August, had less exciting trips. The weather had cleared

and the air cover was more effective.

During the first month they were there,

the Americans on Vella Lavella received 108 enemy air attacks, but none

caused much damage. In the period between 15 August and 3 September, the

day on which Wilkinson relinquished

control of the forces ashore, Task Force

31 carried 6,505 men and 8,626 tons of

supplies and vehicles to Vella Lavella.

During that period General McClure's

troops had strengthened the defenses

of Barakoma, established outposts and

radar stations, and patrolled northward

on both coasts. On 28 August a thirtyman patrol from the 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop that had accompanied radar specialists of the 4th Marine

Defense Battalion in search of a new

radar site reported considerable enemy

activity at Kokolope Bay.

Capture of Horaniu

Having decided to establish the barge

base at Horaniu, the Japanese sent the

24

 Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Washington: Combat

Forces Press, 1952), p. 163.
182 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

WARSHIP FIRING AT JAPANESE DESTROYERS near the coast of Vella Lavella, early

morning, 18 August.

two Army companies and the naval platoon, 390 men in all, out of Erventa on

17 August. Four torpedo boats, 13 troopcarrying daihatsu barges,25

 2 armored

barges, 2 submarine chasers, 1 armored

boat, 4 destroyers, and 1 naval air group

from the Shortlands were involved. The

destroyers were intercepted north of

Vella Lavella in the early morning hours

of 18 August. The daihatsus dispersed.

The Americans sank the 2 submarine

chasers, 2 motor torpedo boats, and 1

barge. The Japanese destroyers, two of

which received light damage, broke off

the action and headed for Rabaul.26

Harried by Allied planes, the daihatsus

hunted for and found Horaniu, and the

troops were ashore by nightfall on 19

August. About the same time, General

Sasaki took alarm at the seizure of Barakoma and sent the 2d Battalion, 45th

Infantry, and one battery of the 6th

Field Artillery Regiment from Kolombangara to defend Gizo.

When General McClure received the

25

 Daihatsu is an abbreviation for Ogata Hatsudokitei which means a large landing barge. The

daihatsu was 41-44 feet long; it could carry 100-

120 men for short distances, 40-50 on long trips.

The sides were usually armored, and it carried

machine guns.

26

 For a complete account see Morison, Breaking

the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 234-37.
AFTER MUNDA 183

report from the reconnaissance troop

patrol on 28 August, he ordered Maj.

Delbert Munson's 1st Battalion to advance up the east coast and take the

shore of Kokolope Bay for a radar site.

To take the 1st Battalion's place in the

perimeter defense, McClure asked Griswold for a battalion from New Georgia.

The 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry, was

selected.

On the morning of 30 August Major

Munson dispatched A Company up the

east coast ahead of his battalion, and

next day, after the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry, the main body of

the 1st Battalion, 35th, started north.

Josselyn and Bishop Silvester had provided native guides and the bishop gave

Munson a letter instructing the natives

to help the American soldiers haul supplies. C Company, 65th Engineer Battalion, was to build a supply road behind

Munson.

By afternoon of 1 September A Company had reached the vicinity of Orete

Cove, about fourteen miles northeast of

Barakoma. The main body of the battalion was at Narowai, a village about

seven thousand yards southwest of Orete

Cove. The coastal track, which had been

fairly good at first, narrowed to a trail

that required the battalion to march in

single file. Inland were the jungled

mountains of the interior. Supply by

hand-carry was impossible, and McClure and Colonel Brown, who had been

informed that higher headquarters expected the Japanese to evacuate, decided

to use landing craft to take supplies to

Munson. On 2 September supplies arrived at Orete Cove along with seventeen Fiji scouts under Tripp, who had

recently been promoted to major.

From that day until 14 September

Munson's battalion, supported by the 3d

Battalion, 35th, and C Battery, 64th Field

Artillery Battalion, moved forward in a

series of patrol actions and skirmishes.

Horaniu fell on 14 September. The

Japanese did not seriously contest the

advance. Instead they withdrew steadily,

then moved overland to the northwest

corner of the island.

Up to now troops of the United States

had borne the brunt of ground combat

in the Solomons, but Admiral Halsey had

decided to give the 3d New Zealand Division a chance to show its mettle. He

had earlier moved the division from New

Caledonia to Guadalcanal. On 18 September Maj. Gen. H. E. Barrowclough,

general officer commanding the division,

took over command of Vella Lavella

from General McClure. On the same day

the 14th New Zealand Brigade Group

under Brigadier Leslie Potter landed

and began the task of pursuing the retreating enemy.27

 Battalion combat teams

advanced up the east and west coasts,

moving by land and by water in an attempt to pocket the enemy. But the Japanese eluded them and got safely off the

island.

The Seabees had gone to work on the

airfield at once. As at Munda, good coral

was abundant. By the end of August they

had surveyed and cleared a strip four

thousand feet long by two hundred feet

wide. They then began work on a control

tower, operations shack, and fuel tanks.

27

 A brigade group was similar in strength and

composition to a U.S. regimental combat team. For

details of Potter's operations see Oliver A. Gillespie,

The Pacific, "The Official History of New Zealand

in the Second World War, 1939-1945" (Wellington,

New Zealand, 1952), pp. 125-42.
184 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The first plane to use the field landed

on 24 September, and within two months

after the invasion the field could accommodate almost a hundred aircraft.

The decision to bypass Kolombangara

yielded this airfield in return for a low

casualty rate. Of the Americans in the

northern landing force, 19 men were

killed by bombs, 7 died from enemy gunfire, and 108 were wounded. Thirty-two

New Zealanders died, and 32 were

wounded.

Final Operations

Arundel

About the time that Vella Lavella was

being secured, General Griswold's forces

on New Georgia were carrying out their

part of Admiral Halsey's plan by seizing

Arundel and by shelling Kolombangara

to seal it off. The attack on Arundel,

which is separated from the west coast of

New Georgia by Hathorn Sound and

Diamond Narrows, proved again that it

was all too easy to underestimate the

Japanese capacity for resolute defense.

The 172d Infantry invaded it on 27

August, but the Japanese fought so

fiercely that the 27th Infantry, two battalions of the 169th Infantry, one company of the 103d Infantry, B Company

of the 82d Chemical Battalion (4.2-inch

mortars, in their South Pacific debut),

the 43d Reconnaissance Troop, and six

Marine tanks had to be committed to

keep the offensive going.

Resistance proved more intense than

expected in part because the indefatigable Sasaki had not yet abandoned his

hope of launching an offensive that

would recapture Munda. On 8 September he sent the 3d Battalion, 13th Infantry, from Kolombangara to strengthen

his forces on Arundel, and five days later,

when Allied air and naval forces had

practically cut the supply lines between

Bougainville and Kolombangara and his

troops faced starvation, he decided to attack Munda or Bairoko via Arundel and

seize the Americans' food. He therefore

dispatched Colonel Tomonari (who was

slain in the ensuing fight) and the rest of

the 13th Infantry to Arundel on 14 September.

Thus the battle for Arundel lasted until 21 September, and ended then, with

the Americans in control, only because

Sasaki ordered all his Arundel troops to

withdraw to Kolombangara.

The Japanese Evacuation

Sasaki had ordered the evacuation of

Arundel because Imperial General Headquarters had decided to abandon the

New Georgia Islands completely. While

the Americans were seizing Munda airfield, the Japanese naval authorities in

the Southeast Area realized that their

hold on the central Solomons was tenuous. But they resolved to maintain the

line of communications to Kolombangara, so that Sasaki's troops could hold

out as long as possible. If Sasaki could

not hold out, the next best thing would

be a slow, fighting withdrawal to buy

time to build up defenses for a final stand

on Bougainville.

Such events in early August as the fall

of Munda and the Japanese defeat in

Vella Gulf on 6-7 August precipitated

another argument between Japanese

Army and Navy officers over the relative

strategic merits of New Guinea and the

Solomons. This argument was resolved

in Tokyo by the Imperial General Headquarters which decided to give equal
AFTER MUNDA 185

14TH NEW ZEALAND BRIGADE GROUP landing on Vella Lavella, 18 September 1943.

priority to both areas. Tokyo sent orders

to Rabaul on 13 August directing that

the central Solomons hold out while Bougainville was strengthened, and that the

central Solomons were to be abandoned

in late September and early October. The

decision to abandon New Georgia was

not made known at once to General

Sasaki.

Sasaki, with about twelve thousand

men concentrated on Kolombangara,

prepared elaborate defenses along the

southern beaches and, as shown above,

prepared plans for counterattacks.

Finally on 15 September, after Sasaki

had sent the 13th Infantry to Arundel,

an 8th Fleet staff officer passed the word

to get his troops out.

Southeastern Fleet, 8th Fleet, and

Sasaki's headquarters prepared the plans

for the evacuation. A total of 12,435 men

were to be moved. Eighteen torpedo

boats, thirty-eight large landing craft,

and seventy or eighty Army barges

(daihatsus) were to be used.28 Destroyers

were to screen the movement, aircraft

would cover it, and cruisers at Rabaul

would stand by in support.

The decision to use the daihatsus was

logical, considering the destroyer losses

in Vella Gulf and the success the nocturnal daihatsus had enjoyed. American

28

 17th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No.

40 (OCMH), 54, says 138 "large motor boats" were

to be used; Southeast Area Naval Operations, II,

Japanese Monogr No. 49 (OCMH), 52, lists 18 torpedo boats, 38 large landing barges, and about 70

Army craft.
186 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

PT boat squadrons, four in all, had been

operating nightly against the enemy

barges in New Georgian waters since late

July, and had sunk several, but only a

small percentage of the total. Destroyers

and planes had also operated against

them without complete success. The

Japanese put heavier armor and weapons

on their barges for defense against torpedo boats, which in turn replaced their

torpedoes—useless against the shallowdraft barges—with 37-mm. antitank and

40-mm. antiaircraft guns. The barges

were too evasive to be suitable targets

for the destroyers' 5-inch guns. Planes of

all types, even heavy bombers, hunted

them at sea, but the barges hid out in the

daytime in carefully selected staging

points. Those traveling by day covered

themselves with palm trees and foliage

so that from the air they resembled islets.

Sasaki ordered his troops off Gizo and

Arundel; those on Arundel completed

movement to Kolombangara by 21 September. The seaplane base at Rekata Bay

on Santa Isabel and the outpost on Ganongga Island were also abandoned at

this time. The evacuation of Kolombangara was carried out on the nights of

28-29 September, 1-2 October, and 2-3

October. Admiral Wilkinson had anticipated that the enemy might try to escape

during this period, the dark of the moon.

Starting 22 September American cruisers

and destroyers made nightly reconnaissance of the Slot north of Vella Lavella,

but when Japanese submarines became

active the cruisers were withdrawn. The

destroyers attempted to break up the

evacuation but failed because enemy

planes and destroyers interfered. The

Japanese managed to get some 9,400 men,

or some 3,600 less than they had evacuated from Guadalcanal in February,

safely off the island. Most of them were

sent to southern Bougainville. Twentynine landing craft and torpedo boats

were sunk, one destroyer was damaged,

and sixty-six men were killed.29

The final action in the New Georgia

area was the Battle of Vella Lavella on

the night of 6-7 October, when ten Japanese destroyers and twelve destroyertransports and smaller craft came down

to Vella Lavella to rescue the six hundred stranded men there. Facing odds of

three to one, American destroyers engaged the Japanese warships northwest

of Vella Lavella. One Japanese destroyer

was sunk; one American destroyer was

badly damaged and sank, and two more

suffered damage. During the engagement

the transports slipped in to Marquana

Bay on northwest Vella Lavella and got

the troops out safely.30 The last organized

bodies of Japanese had left the New

Georgia area.

When the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, landed at Ringi Cove on southern

Kolombangara on the morning of 6

October, it found only forty-nine abandoned artillery pieces and some scattered

Japanese who had been left behind.31

The long campaign—more than four

months had elapsed since the Marines

landed at Segi Point—was over.

29

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 49 (OCMH), 54-55. At the time the

Americans greatly overestimated their success against

barges. See for example Halsey and Bryan, Admiral

Halsey's Story, p. 172. 30

 See Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier,

pp. 243-52, for a more complete account. 31

 ACofS G-2 XIV Corps to CG XIV Corps, 29 Oct

43, sub: Photo Int Rpt, Kolombangara, with incls,

Exhibit 6, List of Guns Abandoned by Enemy in

the Vila Area.
AFTER MUNDA 187

TABLE 2—AMERICAN CASUALTIES ON NEW GEORGIA

Source: NGOF, Narrative Account of the Campaigns in the New Georgia Group, p. 29.

Conclusion

New Georgia had been lengthy and

costly. Planned as a one-division affair,

it had used up elements of four divisions. It would be months before the

25th and 43d Divisions were ready to

fight again. American casualties totaled

1,094 dead, 3,873 wounded. (Table 2)

These figures do not tell the complete

story, for they count only men killed or

wounded by enemy fire. They do not include casualties resulting from disease or

from combat fatigue or war neuroses. For

example the 172d Infantry reported

1,550 men wounded or sick; the 169th

Infantry, up to 5 August, suffered 958

nonbattle casualties. The 103d Infantry

had 364 "shelled-shocked" and 83 nonbattle casualties.32

Japanese casualties are not known, but

XIV Corps headquarters reported a

count of enemy dead, exclusive of Vella

Lavella, of 2,483.

The Allied soldiers, airmen, marines,

and sailors who suffered death, wounds,

or illness, and those who fought in the

campaign without injury, had served

their cause well. New Georgia was a success. The bypassing of Kolombangara,

though overshadowed by later bypasses

and clouded by the fact that the bypassed

troops escaped, was a satisfactory demonstration of the technique; the seizure of

Vella Lavella provided Halsey's forces

with a good airfield for a much lower

price in blood than an assault on Kolombangara. The Allies swiftly built another

airfield at Ondonga Peninsula on New

Georgia. This gave them four—Munda,

Barakoma, Ondonga, and Segi. The first

three, the most used, brought all Bougainville within range of Allied fighters.

When South Pacific forces invaded the

island, they could pick an undefended

place and frustrate the Japanese efforts

to build up Bougainville's defenses and

delay the Allies in New Georgia.

The New Georgia operation is also

significant as a truly joint operation, and

it clearly illustrates the interdependence

of air, sea, and ground forces in oceanic

warfare. Victory was made possible only

by the close co-ordination of air, sea, and

ground operations. Air and sea forces

fought hard and finally successfully to cut

the enemy lines of communication while

the ground troops clawed their way forward to seize objectives intended for use

by the air and sea forces in the next advance. Unity of command, established

32

 172d Inf Rpt of Opns, New Georgia; 169th Inf

Jnl, 5 Aug 43; 103d Inf Rpt of Opns, New Georgia.
188 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MAJ. GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS talking to Maj, Charles W. Davis, Commanding

Officer, 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry (left), New Georgia, August 1943.

from the very start, was continued

throughout with obvious wholeheartedness by all responsible commanders.

No account of the operation should

be brought to a close without praising

the skill, tenacity, and valor of the

heavily outnumbered Japanese who

stood off nearly four Allied divisions in

the course of the action, and then successfully evacuated 9,400 men to fight

again. The obstinate General Sasaki, who

disappears from these pages at this point,

deserved his country's gratitude for his

gallant and able conduct of the defense.
CHAPTER XI

The Markham Valley and the

Huon Peninsula

While South Pacific troops had been

so heavily engaged in New Georgia, General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific forces

were executing Operation II of the

ELKTON plan—the seizure of the Markham Valley and the Huon Peninsula of

New Guinea—aimed at increasing the

Southwest Pacific Area's degree of control over Vitiaz and Dampier Straits.

(Map 12) This operation had actually

started in January 1943 with the Australian defense of Wau in the Bulolo

Valley, and was furthered by the Australian advance from the Bulolo Valley

toward Salamaua and the go June landing of the MacKechnie Force at Nassau

Bay.

Plans

The Allies

The ground forces in Operation II (or

POSTERN) were under command of the

New Guinea Force.1 General Blarney arrived at Port Moresby and assumed command of the New Guinea Force on 20

August 1943, and General Herring went

to Dobodura, where as general officer

commanding the I Australian Corps he

exercised control over tactical operations.

General Blarney was responsible for coordination of ground, air, and naval

planning. In the actual conduct of

ground, air, and naval operations, the

principle of co-operation rather than

unity of command appears to have been

followed.

1

 The subsection is based on ALF, Rpt on New

Guinea Opns: 4 Sep 43-26 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA

Warning Instns 2, 6 May 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 6 May 43; GHQ SWPA OI 34, 13 Jun 43, and

subsequent amendments, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl,

14 Jun 43; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 183-86; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 273-87; Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, Ch. XIV; Memo, ACofS G-3

GHQ SWPA for CofS GHQ SWPA, 14 Jul 43, no

sub, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 14 Jul 43; Ltr, Adv

Hq ALF to GHQ SWPA, 16 Jul 43, sub: Opns

CARTWHEEL, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16 Jul 43;

Ltr, Brig Gen Donald Wilson, CofS AAF SWPA,

to CINCSWPA, 20 Jul 43, sub: Supporting Plan,

GHQ OI 34, same file; LHQ [ALF] OI 54, 30 Jul

43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 31 Jul 43; NGF OI 95,

25 Aug 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 25 Aug 43;

Memo, Gen Chamberlin, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA,

for CofS GHQ SWPA, 25 May 43, sub: Control of

Opns of 2d ESB, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 25 May

43; ANF Opn Plan 5-43, 19 Jul 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 20 Jul 43; AAF SWPA OI 37, 18 Jun 43,

in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 19 Jun 43; Ltr, Comdr

ANF to CINCSWPA, 16 Aug 43, sub: Air Support

for Troop and Sup Overwater Movements During

POSTERN Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16 Aug 43;

Memo, Gen Kenney for Gen Chamberlin, 25 Aug

43, sub: Opn Plan, Adv Ech 5th AF, POSTERN Opn,

same file; G-2 Est POSTERN, 20 Aug 43, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 20 Aug 43.

190 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The operations involved in the seizure

of the Huon Peninsula and the Markham Valley were complex. The Southwest Pacific lacked enough ships for a

completely amphibious assault, and had

too few aircraft for a completely airborne attack; there were enough ground

troops, but New Guinea terrain precluded large-scale overland movements.

To bring sufficient power to bear General

MacArthur and his subordinates and

staff therefore employed all available

means—amphibious assault, an assault

by parachute troops, an airlift of an

entire division, and the shore-to-shore

operation already executed at Nassau

Bay.

MacArthur, in operations instructions

issued before the invasions of Woodlark,

Kiriwina, and Nassau Bay, and followed

by a series of amendments, ordered the

New Guinea Force to seize the LaeMarkham Valley area by co-ordinated

airborne and overland operations

through the Markham Valley and amphibious operations (including Nassau

Bay) along the north coast of New

Guinea. The Markham Valley operations

were to be based on Port Moresby; the

north coast operations on Buna and

Milne Bay. MacArthur directed the

seizure of the coastal areas of the Huon

Gulf, including Salamaua and Finschhafen, and initially ordered the New

Guinea Force to be prepared for airborne-overland and shore-to-shore operations along the north coast of New

Guinea as far as Madang on Astrolabe

Bay. The immediate objectives were Lae

and the Markham and Ramu Valleys.

The two river valleys form a tremendous trough between the Finisterre and

Kratke Ranges. Starting at the mouth of

the Markham River at Lae and running

northwesterly for 380 miles to the mouth

of the Ramu, the trough varies from 5

to 25 miles in width. The rivers flow in

opposite directions from a plain in the

level uplands of the trough some 80 miles

northwest of Lae. Both valleys contain

extensive flats of grass-covered sand and

gravel, and thus there were many excellent sites for air bases. Already in existence were several emergency strips that

had been used by Australian civil aviation before the war.

Lae, a prewar sea terminal for air service to the Bulolo Valley, had a developed

harbor and airfield, and was the key to

successful employment of airfields in the

valleys. Once it was captured, ships could

carry supplies to Lae, and roads could

be pushed up the Markham Valley to

carry supplies to the airfields. The New

Guinea Force was ordered to construct

airfields in the Lae-Markham Valley area

as specified by General Kenney. They

were eventually to include facilities for

two fighter groups, some night fighters,

two medium and two light bombardment

groups, one observation squadron, one

photo-reconnaissance squadron, and four

transport squadrons. MacArthur wanted

Madang taken in order to protect the

Southwest Pacific's left flank during the

subsequent landings on New Britain.

Salamaua was not an important objective, but MacArthur and Blarney ordered

the 3d Australian Division with the MacKechnie Force attached to press against

it for purposes of deception. They

wanted the Japanese to believe that Salamaua and not Lae was the real objective,

and so to strengthen Salamaua at Lae's

expense.

The commander in chief ordered Ken-
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 191

ney and Carpender to support the New

Guinea Force with their Allied Air and

Allied Naval Forces. Allied Land Forces

could make the necessary troops available.

U.S. Army Services of Supply and Line

of Communications units of Allied Land

Forces would provide logistical support.

From thirty to ninety days of various

classes of supply was to be stocked at intermediate and advance bases. General

Marshall's U.S. Army Services of Supply

would be responsible for supply of American forces in the Huon Peninsula and

Markham Valley, and would provide all

items to the Army and Navy. MacArthur

ordered Marshall's command to aid

Allied Naval Forces in transporting the

2d Engineer Special Brigade to the combat zone, and to prepare to relieve Allied

Naval Forces of the responsibility for

transporting supplies to Lae and to

Woodlark and Kiriwina.

Some of the plan's outstanding features were the ways it proposed to use

air power. The impending assault by

parachute would be the first tactical employment of parachute troops as such by

Allied forces in the Pacific.2 The combination of airlifted troops and parachute troops in co-ordination with amphibious assault had also not been used

hitherto by the Allies in the Pacific. The

year before, General Whitehead had

"sold the Aussies on the scheme of an

airborne show at Nadzab to take Lae out

from the back," and General MacArthur

had liked the idea too, but there were

not enough transport planes in the area

to carry it out at that time.3 Generals

MacArthur and Blarney had planned to

operate overland from the Lakekamu

River to the Bulolo Valley and thence to

the Markham Valley in conjunction with

a parachute assault by one battalion. Delays in building the mountain road from

the Lakekamu to the Bulolo Valley made

necessary a decision to land an entire

parachute regiment at Nadzab, a superb

airfield site in the Markham Valley where

a prewar Australian airstrip already

existed, and to fly an entire division

from Port Moresby to Nadzab immediately afterward.

The third unusual feature of the POSTERN air operations was made possible by

General Kenney's enthusiastic willingness to try any experiment that offered

a hope of success and by the fact that

both Allied and Japanese forces were

concentrated in small enclaves on the

New Guinea coast, with the highlands

and hinterland available to whichever

force could maintain patrols there. On

General Kenney's recommendation, MacArthur ordered the development of two

grass strips, one in the Watut Valley west

of Salamaua and the other in the grassy

plateau south of Madang where the

Markham and Ramu Rivers rise. These

strips could serve as staging bases that

would enable Kenney to send fighters

from Port Moresby and Dobodura as far

as the expanding enemy base at Wewak

or over the western part of New Britain,

and to give fighter cover to Allied

bombers in the vicinity of Lae. Thus the

Allied Air Forces would be using inland

airfields to support and protect a seaborne invasion of a coastal area. 2

 The 1st Marine Parachute Battalion fought well

at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in 1942, but it fought

on foot as an infantry battalion. It made no tactical

jumps. 3

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 128.
192 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

D Day was set for planning purposes

as 1 August, but was postponed to 27

August and finally to 4 September to

permit the assembly of enough C-47's,

more training for the 7th Australian Division, and the relief of the VII Amphibious Force of its responsibilities for

Woodlark and Kiriwina. The precise

date was picked by General Kenney on

the basis of weather forecasts. He wanted

fog over western New Britain and Vitiaz

and Dampier Straits that would keep

Japanese aircraft away while bright clear

weather over New Guinea—a fairly common condition—permitted the flight to

and jump into the Markham Valley. The

fourth of September promised to be such

a date and was selected.4

The final tactical plans were prepared

by New Guinea Force and by the various

higher headquarters in the Allied Air

and Allied Naval Forces under the supervision of General MacArthur, General

Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff,

and such subordinates as General Chamberlin, the G-3 of GHQ.5

Final plans, issued in August, called

for the employment of two veteran Australian divisions, the 7th and the 9th,

the U.S. 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, and elements of the U.S. 2d Engineer Special Brigade, as well as the

American and Australian troops already

pressing against Salamaua in their deception maneuver. The 9th Australian

Division was to be carried by the VII

Amphibious Force, with elements of the

2d Engineer Special Brigade, attached,

from Milne Bay to beaches far enough

east of Lae to be beyond range of enemy

artillery.

Early plans had called for the 2d Engineer Special Brigade to carry the 9th

Australian Division to Lae and support

it thereafter. But closer study showed

that an engineer special brigade could

carry and support but one brigade in reduced strength—about 3,000 men, or not

nearly enough to attack Lae. Therefore

the VII Amphibious Force was ordered

to carry the 9th Division, and the 2d Engineer Special Brigade was attached to

Barbey's command for the initial phases.

Two brigade groups, totaling 7,800 men,

plus elements of the amphibian engineers, were to land starting at 0630, 4

September.6 That evening 2,400 more

Australians would land, and on the night

of 5-6 September the VII Amphibious

Force, having retired to Buna after unloading on 4 September, was to bring in

the 3,800 men of the reserve brigade

group. The time for H Hour, 0630, was

selected because it came thirty minutes

past sunrise, by which time the light

would be suitable for the preliminary

naval bombardment.

4

 In his book Kenney tells how the American and

Australian weather teams kept altering their forecasts and disagreeing with one another. Finally the

American team picked 5 September; the Australians

decided on 3 September. General Kenney "decided

that neither one of them knew anything about

weather, split the difference between the two forecasts, and told General MacArthur we would be

ready to go on the morning of the 4th for the

amphibious movement. . . ." General Kenney Reports, p. 288. 5

 GHQ supervised the preparation of the plans

for Operation II more closely than, for example,

those for Woodlark-Kiriwina. The staff at GHQ

felt that New Guinea Force and subordinate headquarters were slow in preparing plans, tended to

prepare plans for initiating operations rather than

for carrying them through completely, failed to provide for co-ordination of forces, and did not

thoroughly appreciate logistics. See Memo, Chamberlin for CofS GHQ SWPA, 28 Aug 43, no sub, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16 Jul 43.

6

 A brigade group was similar in strength and

composition to a U.S. regimental combat team.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 193

Admiral Carpender organized his Allied Naval Forces into almost the same

task forces that he had set up for Woodlark and Kiriwina and assigned them

similar missions. Admiral Barbey organized his VII Amphibious Force into a

transport group of 2 destroyers, 4 APD's,

13 LST's, 20 LCI's, 14 LCT's and 1 AP;

a cover group of 4 destroyers; an escort

group of 2 destroyers; an APC group of

13 APC's, 9 LST's, and 2 subchasers; and

a service group of 1 tender, 3 LST's, 10

subchasers, 5 minesweepers, 1 oiler, and

1 tug. The attached engineer special brigade elements possessed 10 LCM's and 40

LCVP's.

Allied Air Forces' plans for support of

the invasion called for General Whitehead to provide close support to ground

troops, to provide escort and cover for

the amphibious movements, to establish

an air blockade over Huon Peninsula,

to specify to General Blarney the air facilities to be constructed in the target

areas, and to prepare to move forward

to the new bases.

But again there was an argument over

the method by which the air forces would

cover the VII Amphibious Force. Admirals Carpender and Barbey had no aircraft carriers and thus were completely

dependent upon the Allied Air Forces

for air support. They pointed out that

the amphibious movement to Lae would

involve over forty ships, 7,800 soldiers

and 3,260 sailors. This represented all

suitable vessels available, with none retained in reserve. Losses to Japanese air

attacks would seriously jeopardize the

success of future operations, and therefore they argued that only a fighter umbrella providing continuous cover for

the VII Amphibious Force would be

adequate. The airmen, who were planning to use over three hundred planes

in the Markham Valley parachute jump,

were willing to provide air cover for

Barbey's ships over Lae itself on D Day,

but argued that the movement of the

convoys would be amply protected by

maintaining fighter squadrons on ground

alert at Dobodura and the staging airfield in the Watut Valley. The argument,

a heated one, went up the chain of command to General MacArthur himself,

and was finally settled by Kenney's agreement to use a total of thirty-two planes

to give as much cover as possible over

the VII Amphibious Force during daylight and to maintain fighter squadrons

on ground alert.

There remained the problem of fighter

control. One fighter control unit was

stationed at Dobodura, and another at

the staging field in the Watut Valley, but

radar coverage over the area was far from

complete. Japanese aircraft from Wewak

or Madang could fly south of the mountains to Lae, or from New Britain across

Dampier and Vitiaz Straits, and radar

would not pick them up until they were

almost over Lae. And as Brig. Gen.

Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's

G-2, pointed out, Allied experience at

New Georgia showed that the Japanese

air reaction might be violent. An Australian airman suggested that the difficulty be alleviated by posting a radarequipped destroyer between Lae and

Finschhafen. This was accepted, and the

U.S. destroyer Reid, which was part of

Barbey's antisubmarine screen, was selected as picket with orders to steam in

Vitiaz Strait some forty-five miles southeast of Finschhafen.

Markham Valley plans called for the
194 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, flying from Port Moresby in C-47's, to

jump onto Nadzab airstrip on the north

bank of the Markham River on 5 September, the day after the amphibious assault. Nadzab was not believed to be

occupied by the Japanese, but this seizure

would block the valley and prevent the

enemy's sending troops overland from

Wewak. Once captured, Nadzab airstrip

was to be quickly readied for airplanes

by the 503d and by a force of Australian

engineers and pioneers. The Australians

were to paddle in boats from the staging

airfield in the Watut Valley down the

Watut River to Nadzab—a distance of

about thirty-two air miles, but actually

twice that far for anything but crows and

airplanes. Then one brigade of the 7th

Australian Division, plus engineers and

antiaircraft units, having been flown to

the Watut Valley previously, would fly

in. The next brigade would come in directly by air from Port Moresby. Once

adequate strength had been assembled,

the 7th Australian Division would march

eastward down the Markham River

against Lae, and at the same time the 9th

Australian Division would drive westward from the landing beaches.

Seizure of Nadzab would have a threefold effect: it would provide Allied forces

with one more air base with which to

increase their control over the Huon

Peninsula, the straits, and western New

Britain; it would provide a base for the

7th Division's eastward march against

Lae; and an Allied force at Nadzab

could forestall any attempt by the Japanese to reinforce Lae from Wewak by

marching through the Ramu and Markham Valleys.

The Enemy

Japanese strategic intentions were not

changed by the invasion of the Trobriands or of Nassau Bay. In August 1943

Generals Imamura and Adachi were still

resolved to hold Lae and Salamaua as

parts of the outer defenses of Wewak

and Madang, and were still planning to

move into Bena Bena south of the Ramu

Valley.7 There were about ten thousand

men in the Lae-Salamaua area, with

somewhat more than half of these defending Salamaua. Many of the ten thousand, reported the Japanese after the

war, were sick. Some estimates run as

high as 50 percent. At Lae, General

Shoge, temporarily detached from his

post as infantry group commander of the

41st Division, led a force consisting of a

naval guard unit, elements of the 21st,

102d, and 115th Infantry Regiments,

and artillerymen and engineers. In addition to defending Lae, Shoge was responsible for patrolling up the Markham

River and for protecting the southern

approaches to Finschhafen on the east

coast of the Huon Peninsula.

In the months following the Bismarck

Sea disaster the supply systems for Lae

and Salamaua had almost broken down.

The Allied aerial blockade of the Huon

Peninsula prevented the use of large

ships to carry supplies forward to Lae.

Until June, six submarines helped carry

supplies, but then the number was cut

to three and the bulk of supplies had to

be carried on barges. Supply of the ten

7

 This subsection is based upon 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. no (OCMH),

pp. 22-34, 36-85; 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 27-54; USSBS, Allied

Campaign Against Rabaul, p. 84.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 195

thousand men for the five months preceding September would have required

150 bargeloads per month, while 200

more barges were needed for transport

of reinforcements and ammunition. But

there were far too few barges. Only 40,

for example, were making the run to

Lae from the staging base at Tuluvu on

the north shore of Cape Gloucester. The

sea and the tides in Dampier Strait damaged many, and several fell victim to

Allied aircraft and to nocturnal PT's

which, like their sister boats in the

Solomons, prowled the barge lanes.

Imperial General Headquarters, meanwhile, had paid heed to Imamura's request for more planes. On 27 July Imperial Headquarters ordered the 4th Air

Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Kumaichi Teramoto, from the Netherlands

Indies to the Southeast Area. Teramoto's

army would include the 7th Air Division,

the 14th Air Brigade, some miscellaneous squadrons, and the 6th Air Division,

which was already based at Wewak.

The 4th Air Army headquarters arrived at Rabaul on 6 August, whereupon

Imamura ordered Teramoto and his

planes to proceed to Wewak with the

mission of escorting convoys, destroying

Allied planes and ships, and co-operating with the 18th Army. The move was

made at once; the Allies were well aware

that the Japanese were building up

strength on the four Wewak airfields.

Allied Air and Naval Preparations

Increases in Air Strength

The increases in Allied strength that

had been promised to the Southwest

Pacific Area at the Pacific Military Conference in March had been coming

through practically on schedule.8 P-47's

of the 348th Fighter Group began arriving in Australia in June, and before the

end of July the whole group had been

deployed to New Guinea. The 475th

Fighter Group, flying P-38's, was ready

for combat by the middle of the next

month.

Bomber strength, too, was increasing.

Newly arrived B-24's of the 380th Heavy

Bombardment Group went into action

from Darwin, Australia, in mid-July.

One of the 380th's first large-scale operations was a spectacular raid on the oil

center at Balikpapan, Borneo, on 13

August, a feat that required a 1,200-mile

round trip. Port Moresby saw the arrival

of new B-25's of the 345th Medium

Bombardment Group in July. And the

C-47's were also increasing in number.

By September the 54th Troop Carrier

Wing could boast fourteen full squadrons of transport planes.

By the end of August the Southwest

Pacific Area had on hand nearly all its

authorized plane strength—197 heavy

bombers and 598 fighters. Keeping this

number in flying condition, however,

was next to impossible. Many of the

planes were old, and with the air forces

constantly in action there were always

battle casualties. Kenney was always

short of manpower; he could never obtain enough replacement pilots to keep

all his new and veteran squadrons up

to strength, a condition that was probably duplicated in every active theater.

Operations

The first important action of Kenney's

8

 This section is based on Craven and Cate, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 168-86; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 257-61;

Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 251-79.
196 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Allied Air Forces in preparation for the

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operation was the development of the staging

fields in the Watut Valley and in the

Ramu-Markham trough. Ever since the

Buna campaign Kenney had been anxious for a good fighter field near Lae to

use in covering the invasion. He hoped

to fly troops into an existing emergency

strip and seize it, as he had done during

the Buna campaign. Kokoda and Wau

had been surveyed but found unsuitable.

Then in May an aviation engineer officer, with orders to find a field farther

forward than Wau, trekked from the

Bulolo Valley almost to Salamaua, found

nothing suitable, and thereupon backtracked and went down the Watut River

where he found and recommended an

emergency landing strip at Marilinan.

But Marilinan was not perfect; it was

feared the September rains would render

its clay too muddy to be usable. At this

point General Wurtsmith of the V

Fighter Command took a hand. Looking over the ground himself, he picked

a site at Tsili Tsili four miles down the

Watut River from Marilinan. Kenney

and Whitehead agreed with his choice.

Meanwhile Kenney and Herring arranged to build the second staging field,

using a few Australian troops and native

labor, at Bena Bena south of the Ramu

Valley. This emergency strip had long

served as a New Guinea Force patrol

base, and the Japanese at this time were

hoping to capture it eventually. The

Allies decided to build a grass strip suitable for fighters at Bena Bena (C-47's

carrying supplies to the Australian patrols had been using Bena Bena for

some time), and to burn off the grass in

fashion so obvious as to distract the

enemy's attention from Tsili Tsili.

In June and July, C-47's flew Australian troops and the U.S. 871st Airborne Engineer Battalion to Marilinan.

The troops moved down the river to

Tsili Tsili, cleared the strips, and C-47's

flew in specially designed bulldozers and

other earth-moving equipment. Some

gear, including trucks sawed in half so

they could be loaded into C-47's, was

also flown to Tsili Tsili, where the trucks

were welded together. Two strips at

Tsili Tsili were soon ready, and by midAugust three thousand troops, including

a fighter squadron, were based there.

Japanese aircraft failed to molest the

Allies until the fields were all built; they

raided Tsili Tsili on 15 and 16 August

without doing much damage and thereafter left it alone.

While General Kenney had liked the

prospects of Tsili Tsili from a technical

point of view, he had felt that Tsili

Tsili had an unfortunate sound. He

therefore officially directed that the base

be given the more attractive name of

Marilinan.9

During this period the Fifth Air Force

had been supporting the Allied diversionary attacks against Salamaua. Nearly

every day of July saw some form of air

attack against the Lae-Salamaua area.

Sorties during the month totaled 400 by

B-25's, 100 by B-24's, 45 by RAAF Bostons, 35 by A-20's, 30 by B-17's, and 7

by B-26's. The Japanese supply point at

Madang was also raided during the

period 20-23 July by B-25's and heavy

bombers.

But these raids were secondary to

Kenney's main air effort, which was di9

 Craven and Cate in The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, however, use the name Tsili Tsili.
B-24 OVER SALAMAUA, 13 August 1943. Note smoke from bomb bursts.
198 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON THE GROUND by Allied planes near Lae.

rected against Wewak. Aware of the increase in Japanese air strength at Wewak,

and lacking enough strength to hit both

Wewak and Rabaul, Kenney had decided

to concentrate against Wewak rather

than Rabaul up to the day of the landing at Lae, and to rely in part on the

weather for protection against Rabaulbased planes. There were too many Japanese fighter planes at Wewak, however,

for Kenney to risk sending unescorted

bombers there. Raids against Wewak had

to await completion of the Marilinan

staging field, which would extend the

range of Allied fighters as far as Wewak.

Meanwhile Kenney ordered his bombers

not to go as far as Wewak, thus leading

the Japanese to believe that Wewak lay

beyond bomber range and to send planes

there with a false sense of security.

On 13 August photographs taken by

Allied reconnaissance planes showed a

total of 199 Japanese airplanes on the

four fields at Wewak. The 4th Air Army

was now due for a surprise. Marilinan

was ready by midmonth and so was the

Fifth Air Force. General Whitehead had

four bombardment groups with enough

range to hit Wewak from Port Moresby

—two heavy groups with 64 planes in

commission and two medium groups

totaling 58 B-25's. With Marilinan in

commission the bombers would have

fighter protection all the way.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 199

B-25 MEDIUM BOMBERS leaving installations aflame in the Wewak area.

Heavy and medium bombers and

fighters struck the four Wewak fields on

17 August and achieved excellent results.

Taking the Japanese by surprise, they

caught most of the enemy planes on the

ground. Next day they were back in

strength, and the Wewak offensive continued throughout the rest of August.

The planes struck at Hansa Bay and

Alexishafen during the same period.

Damage inflicted by these raids was

heavy, though less than estimated at the

time. Kenney's headquarters claimed

over 200 Japanese aircraft destroyed on

the ground, a claim that Army Air

Forces headquarters scaled down to 175.

Postwar Japanese reports, however, give

losses as about half what the Allies

initially claimed.10 But despite the efforts

of Imamura and Teramoto, strength of

the 4th Air Army thereafter averaged

but 100 planes, and "the prospect of the

New Guinea operation [was] much

gloomier."

 11

The Allied Naval Forces, which had

not played a decisive part in the Buna

campaign because it lacked enough ships

10

 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr

No. no (OCMH), p. 83, states that one hundred

planes were lost; 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 29, asserts that sixty

to seventy were destroyed. 11

 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr

No. 110 (OCMH), p. 84.
200 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

and because hydrographic information

on the waters of New Guinea's north

coast was almost nonexistent, was also

taking a hand. PT boats based at Morobe

were stalking the enemy barge routes at

night and making the transport of men

and munitions to Lae increasingly difficult. The Fifth Air Force's successful

strike against Wewak encouraged Admiral Carpender to send warships as far

up the coast as Finschhafen. Thus on 22

August four destroyers under Capt. Jesse

H. Carter left Milne Bay, stopped at

Buna to discuss air cover and obtain

target information, and sailed for Finschhafen. Starting at 0121, 23 August,

Carter's ships bombarded Finschhafen

with 540 rounds of 5-inch shells and returned safely to Milne Bay. This operation was small in itself, but it was significant because this was the first time

Allied warships had ventured so far up

the New Guinea coast.

During the first three days of September Allied planes executed preparatory

bombardments in support of the Lae invasion. They launched heavy attacks

against airfields, supply points, and shipping lanes on 1 September, the same day

on which medium and heavy bombers

raided Alexishafen and Madang. Next

day B-25's and P-38's delivered a lowlevel attack against Wewak. Gasmata and

Borgen Bay on New Britain, and Lae itself, were struck on 3 September, and

eleven nocturnal RAAF Catalinas raided

Rabaul.

The Salamaua Attack,

1 July-12 September 1943

During July and August, while the

various headquarters of the Southwest

Pacific Area were preparing plans and

assembling troops and supplies for the

Lae-Markham Valley invasions, and

while the air and naval forces were attacking Japanese aircraft, bases, and lines

of communication, the troops in front of

Salamaua were carrying out their part

of the plan by the diversionary attack

against that port.12 Starting from the

arc-shaped positions they held in early

July, the 3d Australian Division and the

MacKechnie Force, soon joined by the

remainder of the 162d Infantry, fought

their way forward until by the end of

August they were closing in on the town

and airfield of Salamaua. (See Map 6.)

At first the reinforced 1st Battalion,

162d Infantry, fighting on the right of

the 3d Australian Division, was the only

American unit present, but this force

was enlarged in July, after the capture of

Bitoi Ridge, when other elements of the

41st Division were attached to the 3d

Australian Division. This attachment

came about because more U.S. infantrymen and artillerymen were needed to

secure the Tambu Bay-Dot Inlet area

northwest of Nassau Bay, and because a

supply base for Australians and Americans in the combat area was required.

Consequently the Coane Force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Coane

who was also 41st Division artillery commander, was organized during the second

12

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based

on McCartney, The Jungleers, Ch. VII; ALF, Rpt

on New Guinea Opns: 1 Mar-13 Sep 43; 162d Inf

Rpt of Opns, and Jnl; 41st Div Arty, Hist of

Salamaua Campaign, 23 Apr-4 Oct 43; Combined

Operational Int Center GHQ SWPA, Resume of

Allied Mil Opns and Int Leading to the Capture

of Lae and Salamaua From the Enemy: Jun-Sep 43,

20 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA Jnl, 20 Sep 43.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 201

week in July.13 The MacKechnie Force,

then fighting forward from Bitoi Ridge,

was not a part of the Coane Force. Some

units assigned to the Coane Force were

already in the Nassau Bay area; others

soon came up from Morobe.14

Both Coane and MacKechnie Forces

fought under command of General

Savige, commanding the 3d Australian

Division, and after Savige's headquarters

was relieved on 24 August by Headquarters, 5th Australian Division, under

command of Maj. Gen. E. J. Milford, the

Americans served under Milford. At the

same time Col. William D. Jackson, 41st

Division artillery executive officer, was

appointed as Commander, Royal Artillery, of the 3d and then the 5th Australian Divisions. Jackson, using a composite Australian and American staff,

served as artillery commander until the

end of hostilities in that area.

On 17 July the Coane Force moved

forward from Nassau Bay, and by the

end of the next day had secured the

southern headland of Tambu Bay, where

a supply base was set up. Starting on 20

July, the Americans launched a series of

attacks with strong artillery support

which resulted on 13 August in the capture of the high ground—Roosevelt

Ridge, Scout Ridge, and Mount Tambu

—overlooking Tambu Bay and Dot Inlet.

On 12 August the Coane Force was dissolved and the entire 162d Infantry reverted to Colonel MacKechnie's control.

At the same time the Australians

pressed forward so that by the first week

in September they had reached the Francisco River, which flows in an west-east

direction just south of the Salamaua airfield. All advances were made up and

down precipitous ridges varying from

eight hundred to three thousand feet in

height. With characteristic skill the Japanese had established strong defensive

positions on the ridges; there were many

automatic weapons emplacements, with

earth-and-log pillboxes predominating,

that gave each other mutual support with

interlocking bands of fire. Trenches and

tunnels connected the emplacements.

Early September saw Japanese resistance slackening. On 11 September the

Australians and the 162d Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon crossed the rainswollen Francisco River and by the end

of 12 September the airfield, the town,

and the entire isthmus, which had been

held by the Japanese for eighteen

months, was back in Allied hands.

The cost was not cheap. On 29 June

13

 It consisted at first of the 2d and 3d Battalions,

162d Infantry; the 162d Infantry Cannon Company;

3d Platoon, Antitank Company, 162d Infantry; C

Battery, 209th Coast Artillery Battalion; A Battery,

218th Field Artillery Battalion; A Company, 116th

Medical Battalion; A and D Companies, 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 2d Engineer

Special Brigade; A Company, Papuan Infantry Battalion; a Combined Operational Service Command

detachment; Troop D, 2/6th Royal Australian

Artillery Regiment; and signal and quartermaster

troops. 14

 Problems involving command over the mixed

Australian-American units appear to have been additional factors in the decision to create the Coane

Force rather than to turn all American troops over

to Colonel MacKechnie. The MacKechnie Force was

attached to the 3d Australian Division, but Maj.

Gen. Horace H. Fuller, commanding the 41st U.S.

Division, retained control over the American troops

at the actual beachhead. Thus, as he put it later,

Colonel MacKechnie was "placed in the unenviable

position of trying to obey two masters" who kept

giving him conflicting orders. The impossibility of

obeying them both finally led MacKechnie to request relief as commanding officer of the 162d. He

was reassigned as Coane Force S-3, and later as

liaison officer with the 3d Australian Division, but

returned to command the 162d on the dissolution

of the Coane Force. See Ltr, Col MacKechnie to

Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 2 Nov 53, no sub,

OCMH.
202 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

SALAMAUA, objective of the attack.

there were 2,554 men in the 162d Infantry. By 12 September battle casualties

and disease had reduced the regiment to

1,763 men. One hundred and two had

been killed, 447 wounded. The 162d

estimated it had killed 1,272 Japanese

and reported the capture of 6 prisoners.

The Japanese had lost Salamaua after

a stiff fight and the very strength of their

defense had played into Allied hands,

for of the ten thousand enemy soldiers

in the Lae-Salamaua area, the majority

had been moved to Salamaua. The Allied

ruse had succeeded.

Lae: The Seaborne Invasion

The Landing

The unit slated to invade Lae, Maj.

Gen. G. F. Wootten's 9th Australian Division, embarked on the ships of Admiral Barbey's Task Force 76 at Milne
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 203

CROSSING RAIN-SWOLLEN FRANCISCO RIVER

Bay on 1 September.15 Next day Barbey's

ships sailed to Buna and to Morobe,

where they were joined by fifty-seven

landing craft of the 2d Engineer Special

Brigade that had assembled there in the

latter part of August. On the night of

3-4 September the armada set out for

Lae, eighty miles distant; it arrived at

the landing beaches east of Lae at sunrise of 4 September. (Map 13)

At 0618, eighteen minutes after the

sun rose, five destroyers fired a tenminute bombardment on the beaches.

Then sixteen landing craft from the

APD's started for the beaches carrying

15

 This section is based on Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, Ch. XIV; Off of Chief Engr,

GHQ AFPAC, Engineers in Theater Operations, p.

106, and Critique, p. 97; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea

Opns: 4 Sep 43-26 Apr 44; Combined Operational

Int Center GHQ SWPA, Resume . . . Lae and

Salamaua, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 20 Sep 43; 2d

ESB Rpt.
204 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MAP 13

the assault waves. At 0631 the 20th Australian Infantry Brigade began going

ashore at Red Beach, near Bulu Plantation and some eighteen miles east of Lae.

This landing was unopposed. Two

minutes later troops of the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade landed at

Yellow Beach, eighteen miles east of

Lae, east of the Bulu River. A small

group of Japanese on Yellow Beach ran

away at the approach of the Australians.

Scouts of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade landed with the Australian infantry.

Fifteen minutes after the assault waves

beached, LCI's pushed their bows onto

the beaches and put more riflemen

ashore. They were followed by LCT's

and LST's. All assault troops had landed

by 0830, and by 1030 fifteen hundred

tons of supplies had been landed. By

the end of the day the beachheads were

secure, 2,400 more Australians had

landed, and the 26th Brigade and the

2/17th Australian Infantry Battalion had

crossed the Buso and begun the advance

westward against Lae.

There was no resistance on the
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 205

ground, but Japanese aircraft attempted

to break up the invasion. About 0700,

before fighter cover had arrived, a few

two-engine bombers with fighter escort

attacked Task Force 76 and damaged two

LCI's. Imamura dispatched eighty planes

from Rabaul to attack Barbey but these

were delayed by the fog over New

Britain that Kenney's weathermen had

predicted. The picket destroyer Reid's

radar located them over Gasmata in the

afternoon just as Task Force 76 was

making ready to sail for Milne Bay. The

Reid vectored out forty P-38's and

twenty P-47's which intercepted the

flight and broke it up. Some planes got

through, however, and attacked a group

of six LST's off Cape Ward Hunt. They

damaged two and killed over a hundred

Australian soldiers and American sailors.

The Japanese did not attack the jammed

landing beaches at this time, but returned in the evening to blow up an ammunition dump, damage two beached

LCI's, and kill two men.16

16

 They claimed to have sunk 14 transports, 2

barges, 1 PT boat, 3 destroyers, and to have shot

down 38 planes.
206 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

AUSTRALIAN TROOPS DEBARKING FROM LST's for the occupation of Lae.

The Advance Westward

Once the assault troops had landed

control of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade elements—thirteen hundred men of

a reinforced boat company, a boat control section, a shore battalion, a medical

detachment, scouts, and a headquarters

detachment—passed from Admiral Barbey to General Wootten. A salvage boat,

ten LCVP's, and two additional LCVP's

mounting machine guns for support of

landings remained at Red Beach. Eventually, twenty-one LCM's and twentyone LCVP's were sent to Red Beach.

Because of breakdowns, these replacements were necessary if ten craft of each

type were to be kept in operation. All

these craft were used to support the 9th

Division's march against Lae.

The 2/13th Australian Infantry Battalion, once landed, pushed east from

Bulu Plantation and secured the east

flank by seizing Hopoi. The reserve 24th

Infantry Brigade landed on schedule on

the night of 5-6 September, and at daylight started west behind the 26th Brigade. On 6 September, after a ten-mile

march, the 26th Brigade met its first opposition at the Bunga River.

The 24th Brigade advanced along the

coast while the 26th Brigade moved some

distance inland in an effort to get behind Lae and cut off the enemy garrison.

The 24th's advance was rendered difficult, not so much by the enemy as by

the terrain. The heavy September rains

flooded the creeks and turned the trails

into deep mud that was virtually impassable for vehicles. Fortunately the

boats of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 207

were available to ferry supplies by water

to coastal dumps and enable the advance

to continue. The leading Australian battalions reached the Busu (not to be confused with the Buso farther east) on the

morning of 8 September. This swollen

river, five feet deep and sixty feet wide

at the mouth, and flowing at twelve

knots, was a severe obstacle in itself, and

the west bank was held by the Japanese.

Patrols attempted to force a crossing

on the morning of 9 September but the

combination of Japanese bullets and the

swift current forced them back. In the

late afternoon elements of four rifle companies got across in rubber boats and by

wading and swimming. Several men

were drowned and many weapons lost in

this act of gallantry, but the four companies seized a bridgehead on the west

bank and held it against enemy counterattacks.

Meanwhile the troops on the east

bank loaded men, weapons, and ammunition onto the 2d Engineer Special

Brigade's landing craft and sent them to

the west bank. For the next sixty hours,

the landing craft plied back and forth

until the entire 24th Brigade had been

transferred to the west bank. Rain, mist,

and darkness helped hide the boats from

the Japanese, who tried to hit them with

artillery, machine guns, and rifles. During the same period a box girder bridge

was moved in pieces by landing craft

from Bulu Plantation to the mouth of

the Burep River, then laboriously hauled

inland to the 26th Brigade's zone over a

jeep track built by the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. The bridge was installed

over the Busu under enemy fire on the

morning of the 14th. The 26th Brigade

crossed over that night. Both brigades

were then on the west bank of the Busu

and were ready to resume the advance

against Lae and effect a junction with

the troops of the 7th Australian Division

that were advancing east out of Nadzab.

Nadzab: The Airborne Invasion

The Jump

Capture of Nadzab had been spectacularly effected on 5 September. This mission, assigned to Col. Kenneth H. Kinsler's 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment,

was coupled with the additional mission

of preparing the airstrip for C-47's carrying Maj. Gen. George A. Vasey's 7th

Australian Division from Marilinan and

Port Moresby.17

Reveille for the men of the 503d

sounded early at Port Moresby on the

morning of 5 September. The weather

promised to be fair, although bad flying

weather over the Owen Stanleys delayed

take off until 0825. New Guinea Force

had prepared its plans flexibly so that

the seaborne invasion on 4 September

would not be slowed or altered if any

threat of bad weather on 5 September delayed the parachute jump, but Kenney's

weathermen had forecast accurately.

The paratroopers and a detachment of

17

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based

on Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan; pp. 184-86; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp, 266-69; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 292-96; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea

Opns: 4 Sep 43-26 Apr 44; Combined Operational

Int Center GHQ SWPA, Resume . . . Lae and

Salamaua, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 20 Sep 43; 503d

Parachute Inf Rpt of Opns, Markham Valley, 5-19

Sep 43; Japanese Operations in the Southwest

Pacific Area, MS (Vol. II of the MacArthur hist),

Ch. VII, OCMH; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. no (OCMH), pp. 81-85; 18th

Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 42

(OCMH), 18-80; Interrogation of Adachi et al., by

Mil Hist Sec, Australian Army Hq, OCMH.
208 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

C-47 TRANSPORT PLANES LOADED WITH PARACHUTE TROOPS for the drop at

Nadzab. Two men at left are General Kenney and General MacArthur.

2/4th Australian Field Regiment which

was to jump with its 25-pounder guns

reached the airfield two hours before

take off.18 There they put on parachutes

and equipment. The 54th Troop Carrier

Wing had ninety-six C-47's ready, and

the troops boarded these fifteen minutes

before take-off time.

The first C-47 roared down the runway at 0825; by 0840 all transports were

aloft. They crossed the Owen Stanleys,

then organized into three battalion

flights abreast, with each flight in sixplane elements in step-up right echelon.

An hour later bombers, fighters, and

weather planes joined the formation over

Marilinan, on time to the minute. All

together 302 aircraft from eight different

fields were involved. The air armada

then flew down the Watut Valley, swung

to the right over the Markham River,

and headed for Nadzab. The C-47's

dropped from 3,000 feet to 400-500 feet.

The parachutists had stood in their

planes and checked their equipment over

Marilinan, and twelve minutes later they

formed by the plane doors ready to

jump.

In the lead six squadrons of B-25

strafers with eight .50-caliber machine

guns in their noses and six parachute

fragmentation bombs in their bays

worked over the Nadzab field. Six A-20's

laid smoke after the last bomb had exploded. Then came the C-47's, closely

covered by fighters.

The paratroopers began jumping from

the three columns of C-47's onto separate

jump areas about 1020. Eighty-one

C-47's carrying the 503d were emptied 18

 The 503d had trained this detachment.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 209

AIRDROP AT NADZAB, MORNING OF 5 SEPTEMBER 1943. The paratroopers began

jumping from C-47's onto separate jump areas about 1020.

in four and one-half minutes. All men

of the 503d but one, who fainted while

getting ready, left the planes. Two men

were killed instantly when their chutes

failed to open, and a third landed in a

tree, fell sixty feet to the ground, and

died. Thirty-three men were injured.

There was no opposition from the

enemy, either on the ground or in the

air. Once they reached the ground, the

503d battalions laboriously moved

through high kunai grass from landing

grounds to assembly areas.

Five B-17's carrying supply parachutes

stayed over Nadzab all day. They

dropped a total of fifteen tons of supplies on ground panel signals laid by the

503d. The Australian artillerymen and

their guns parachuted down in the afternoon. The whole splendid sight was witnessed by Generals MacArthur and Kenney from what Kenney called a "brasshat" flight of three B-17's high above.

MacArthur was in one, Kenney in another, and the third B-17 was there to

provide added fire power in case the

Japanese turned up.

The 503d's 1st Battalion seized the

Nadzab airstrip and began to prepare it

to receive C-47's. The 2d and 3d Battalions blocked the approaches from the

north and east. As soon as the parachutists had begun landing, the Australian units that had come down the

Watut River—the 2/2d Pioneer Battalion, the 2/6th Field Company, and

one company of the Papuan Infantry

Battalion—began landing on the north

bank of the Markham. They made contact with the 503d in late afternoon and

worked through the night in preparing

the airstrip.
210 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The next morning the first C-47 arrived. It brought in advance elements of

the U.S. 871st Airborne Engineer Battalion.

Twenty-four hours later C-47's

brought in General Vasey's 7th Division

headquarters and part of the 25th Australian Infantry Brigade Group from

Marilinan, where they had staged from

Port Moresby. Thereafter the transports

flew the Australian infantry and the

American engineers directly from Port

Moresby. By 10 September the welltimed, smoothly run operation had proceeded fast enough that 7th Division

troops at Nadzab were able to relieve

the 503d of its defensive missions.

Enough American engineers had arrived

to take over construction of new airstrips.

The 503d's only contact with the

enemy came in mid-September when

the 3d Battalion ran into a Japanese

column at Yalu, east of Nadzab. The

parachute regiment was withdrawn on

17 September. It had lost 3 men killed

jumping, 8 men killed by enemy action,

33 injured jumping, 12 wounded by the

enemy, and 26 sick.19

This was, comparatively, small cost

for the seizure of a major airbase with a

parachute jump. Nadzab paid rich dividends. Within two weeks the engineers

had completed two parallel airstrips six

thousand feet long and had started six

others.

The Advance Against Lae

The 25th Australian Infantry Brigade

Group moved eastward out of Nadzab

toward Lae on 10 September while General Wootten's 9th Division troops were

forcing a crossing over the Busu River

east of Lae. The Markham Valley narrows near Lae, with the Atzera Range

on the northeast and the wide river on

the southwest. A prewar road in the

Atzera foothills connected Nadzab with

Lae, and a rough trail on the other side

of the Atzeras paralleled this road from

Lae to Yalu, where it intersected the

road. Thus while some troops blocked

the trail at Yalu, and the 2/33d Australian Infantry Battalion guarded the

line of communications, the 2/25th Australian Infantry Battalion advanced

down the road and part of the 2/2d

Australian Pioneer Battalion moved

down the north bank of the river.

When a small group of Japanese offered resistance to the advance at Jensen's Plantation, toward the lower end

of the valley, the 2/25th Battalion drove

it back and on 14 September captured

Heath's Plantation farther on. The

2/33d Australian Infantry Battalion

then took over and pushed on toward

Lae. By now the Australians had come

within range of Japanese 75-mm. guns

and found the going harder. But an assault the next day cleared Edward's

Plantation and enemy resistance ended.

The advance elements of the 25th Brigade entered Lae from the west the next

morning, 16 September. In the afternoon the 24th Brigade, which had advanced from the east and captured Malahang Airdrome on 15 September, pushed

into Lae and made contact with the

25th Brigade. Lae had fallen easily and

speedily. The Japanese had vanished.

19

 These figures are taken from a table of casualties

attached to the 503d's report and differ slightly

from casualty figures in the body of the report.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 211

The Japanese Evacuation

Throughout July and August the Salamaua Japanese were reinforced at Lae's

expense, but were continually forced

back. On 24 August General Nakano,

reflecting the importance which his superior had attached to Salamaua, addressed his troops thus: "Holding Salamaua is the Division's responsibility.

This position is our last defense line,

and we will withdraw no further. If we

are unable to hold, we will die fighting.

I will burn our Divisional flag and even

the patients will rise to fight in close

combat. No one will be taken a prisoner."

 20

Imperial Headquarters, however, did

not order a suicidal last stand. Nakano

was ordered to hold out as long as possible, but to withdraw if he could not

hold Salamaua. The Australian landing

between Lae and Finschhafen and the

503d's seizure of Nadzab, coupled with

Allied air and PT boat activity in the

Huon Gulf and the straits, caused General Adachi on 8 September to order

Nakano to abandon Salamaua and pull

back to Lae. Nakano's hospital patients

and artillery had already been sent to

Lae, and on 11 September withdrawal

of the main body began.

Meanwhile, after considerable discussion Imperial Headquarters, Imamura,

and Adachi abandoned their plans to

take Bena Bena and Mount Hagen.

Adachi saw that the Allied operations at

Salamaua, Nadzab, and Lae threatened

to cut off the 51st Division. He now decided that he would have to withdraw

from Lae, but determined to hold the

Finisterre Range, the Ramu Valley, and

Finschhafen. Therefore he ordered

Nakano and Shoge to withdraw overland

from Lae to the north coast of the Huon

Peninsula, and directed the 20th Division to move from Madang to Finschhafen and to dispatch a regiment to the

Ramu Valley to assist the 51st.

Thus the Allied troops pushing toward both Lae and Salamaua in early

September met only delaying forces. The

Salamaua garrison had assembled at Lae

by the 14th, two days after the first

echelon of the Lae garrison had started

north. Another echelon left that day, and

the last slipped out on the 15th. The day

before, General Vasey had learned from

a captured document and from interrogation of a prisoner that the Japanese

were leaving Lae. He dispatched troops

northward to reinforce the 2/4th Australian Independent Company, which

was operating in the wilds north of Lae,

but the Japanese eluded their pursuers.

It was a band of retreating enemy that

the 3d Battalion, 503d, encountered at

Yalu, and when Australian forces rushed

there the Japanese hastily altered their

route to avoid interception.

Once out of Lae, the 51st Division and

the Lae naval garrison executed one of

the difficult overland marches that were

to characterize so many future Japanese

operations in New Guinea. There was

little fighting, but Australian patrols

harried the retreat. The Japanese moved

north out of Lae and avoided Nadzab

and the obvious Markham-Ramu trough

that Adachi had originally planned to

use for the withdrawal. They moved in

a generally north-northeasterly direction, crossed the Busu River by means

of a rough-hewn bridge on 20-22 September, and skirted the west ends of

20

 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 37.
212 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

the Rawlinson Range and Cromwell

Mountains in the vicinity of Mount Salawaket about 25 September.

They had started with food for ten

days, but this was exhausted by the time

they reached Salawaket. Thereafter they

lived by looting native gardens and by

eating roots and grasses. Dysentery and

malaria made their appearance, but as

there were plenty of suppressive drugs

the malaria rate was low.

The 51st Division had already abandoned most of its heavy equipment before the retreat. Along the way mountain

artillerymen, unable to drag their guns

over the precipitous slopes, were forced

to abandon them. Many soldiers threw

away their rifles. This was in strong contrast to the behavior of the 1st Battalion,

20th Division, which had reinforced the

51st Division at Salamaua. The commander, a Major Shintani, had threatened death to any soldier who abandoned

his arms. Shintani died on the road, but

his battalion rigorously adhered to his

orders. Each soldier who completed the

march carried his rifle and his helmet.

By mid-October the troops reached the

north coast of the Huon Peninsula. The

Army troops went to Kiari, naval personnel to nearby Sio. Slightly over 9,000

men had left Lae; 600 were march

casualties. Nearly 5,000 soldiers arrived

at Kiari, and some 1,500 sailors went to

Lio. Many others were taken to the hospital at Madang. The defense of LaeSalamaua and the subsequent retreat

cost almost 2,600 lives.

Strategic Reconsiderations

The Japanese Pull Back

The fall of Lae and Salamaua, coming

hard on the heels of defeat in the central

Solomons, had a profound effect upon

Japanese strategic plans, an effect that

went far beyond the immediate importance of Lae and Salamaua. Although

the twin losses of Guadalcanal and Buna

were severe, Imperial General Headquarters had not regarded these as irretrievable. It had continued to prepare

plans for offensives in the Southeast

Area.21 Now the war leaders in Tokyo

reassessed the situation and determined

on a drastic retrenchment.

The fall of the central Solomons and

of Lae-Salamaua closely followed the

loss of Attu and the evacuation of Kiska

in the Aleutians, and came at a time

when Imperial Headquarters entertained well-justified fears about the

opening of an Allied offensive through

the Central Pacific.22 The Japanese in

September decided that they were overextended. They determined to withdraw

their perimeter in order to set up a defense line that would hold back the

Allies while they themselves marshaled

their strength for decisive battle. This

perimeter would be strongly manned

and fortified. It was hoped that the defensive preparations behind it would be

completed by the early part of 1944.

So Imperial Headquarters drew its

main perimeter line from western New

Guinea through the Carolines to the

Marianas. This was "the absolute national defense line to be held by all

21

 This subsection is based upon: 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH),

pp. 80-87; and 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 19-22, 48-53, 58-64, 84-

86, 151-54. 22

 The offensive began in November 1943. See

Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, The Seizure

of the Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955).
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 213

means."

 23

 The Southeast Area, including Rabaul, once the focus of such great

but elusive hopes for victory, was now

on the outpost line.

But the war was far from over for

MacArthur's and Halsey's troops. General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka were

no longer counted on to win decisively,

but they were ordered to hold out as

long as possible, and so delay the Allied

advance. To strengthen the Southeast

Area, Imperial Headquarters in September ordered the 17th Division from

Shanghai to Rabaul "to reinforce the

troops manning the forward wall."

 24

Imamura and Kusaka determined to

hold Bougainville, whose defenses they

had been trying to build up during the

long fight on New Georgia, to develop

and strengthen Madang and Wewak, to

develop the transport system connecting

the main bases of the Southeast Area, and

to hold Dampier and Vitiaz Straits. Control of these straits had been essential to

nearly all Japanese movements to New

Guinea and, as before, the Japanese were

resolved to hold them in order to block

any Allied westward advance. (See Map

12.)To this end Imamura, who kept the

38th Division under his control to defend Rabaul, had previously dispatched

the reinforced 65th Brigade to Tuluvu

on the north coast of Cape Gloucester

with orders to develop a shipping point

there and to maintain the airfield. On 5

September he sent Maj. Gen. Iwao Matsuda to Tuluvu to take command of the

65th Brigade, some elements of the 51st

Division, and the 4th Shipping Group.

To Matsuda's responsibility for handling shipping he added that of defending the coasts of western New Britain.

On the New Guinea side of the straits,

the Japanese regarded Finschhafen as the

key defensive position. Possessed of two

good harbors—Finschhafen itself and

Langemak Bay—and a small airfield, it

had long been used as a barge staging

point. In early August Adachi had been

concerned about a possible attack against

Finschhafen, but he did not have enough

troops to strengthen its small garrison

substantially while the 41st Division was

defending Wewak, the 51st Division was

defending the Lae-Salamaua area, and

the 20th Division was working on the

Madang-Lae road. He did, however,

send the 80th Infantry and one battalion

of the 21st Field Artillery Regiment of

the 20th Division from Madang to

Finschhafen. By the end of August Maj.

Gen. Eizo Yamada, commanding the 1st

Shipping Group and the combat troops

at Finschhafen, had about one thousand

men.

When the 9th Australian Division

landed east of Lae on 5 September,

Adachi foresaw the danger, to Finschhafen. He suspended construction of the

Madang-Lae road, which was now a

twenty-foot-wide all-weather road running along the coast from Madang to

Bogadjim, thence over the Finisterre

Range at a defile named Kankirei and

into the Ramu Valley to a point ten

miles north of Dumpu. This decision

freed the 20th Division for combat duty.

Adachi ordered a small force of the 20th

23

 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr

No. 110 (OCMH), p. 87. 24

 Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific

Area (Vol. II of MacArthur hist), Ch. VII, p. 26,

OCMH.
214 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Division, under Maj. Gen. Masutaro

Nakai, the divisional infantry commander, to advance to Kaiapit, which is

on the uplands near the sources of the

Markham and Ramu Rivers. The move

was intended to keep the Allies from advancing through the Ramu Valley, over

Kankirei to the coast, and on against

Madang and Wewak, and was also to

help cover the retreat of the 51st Division from Lae up the trough to Madang. When Adachi decided not to use

the Markham and Ramu Valleys for the

retreat he ordered Nakai north to hold

the Kankirei defile.

Adachi ordered the main body of the

20th Division, commanded by Lt. Gen.

Shigeru Kitagiri, to march to Finschhafen. The division departed Bogadjim

on 10 September on its march of nearly

two hundred miles, but was still far from

its destination when the Allies struck the

next blow.

Allied Decisions

General MacArthur's ELKTON III

called for the capture of Finschhafen as

a step toward gaining control of Vitiaz

and Dampier Straits. The plan had set

the tentative date for the move against

Finschhafen at six weeks after the invasion of Lae. At least two factors, however, impelled a speed-up in the timetable. The first was the quick fall of Lae

and Salamaua after the landing on 4

September. The second was the 20th Division's move toward Finschhafen. But

before orders could be sent out for the

capture of Finschhafen, it was necessary

to consider this operation in relation to

the larger problems involved in capturing Madang, an operation considered

necessary to protect the left flank during

the seizure of Cape Gloucester. Seizure

of Finschhafen, Madang, and Cape

Gloucester would of course give physical

control of both sides of the straits to the

Allies.25

Capture of Madang was bound to be

a large operation. Allied intelligence

estimated that in late August a total of

55,000 Japanese held the regions between Lae and Wewak. At this time

General Blarney, in a letter to MacArthur, held that the Japanese would

exert every effort to defend the Markham and Ramu Valleys, Bogadjim (near

the defile into the Ramu), Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhafen. Capture of

Madang, which had been assigned to his

New Guinea Force, would require as

preliminary conditions complete air and

naval superiority, support by the VII

Amphibious Force, physical possession of

Lae, the Markham Valley, Salamaua, and

Finschhafen, and the neutralization of

the Japanese in western New Britain.

Blarney set forth three steps to be

followed after the capture of Lae. The

first was the capture of Finschhafen by

a seaborne assault. Blarney recommended

as the second step seizure of an intermediate objective between Finschhafen

and Bogadjim, because 256 miles of

water separated Lae from Bogadjim,

25

 See above pp. 27, 190 and Chart 2. This subsection is based on ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns: 4

Sep 43-26 Apr 44; Ltr, Blamey to MacArthur, 31 Aug

43, no sub, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 31 Aug 43;

Memo, Chamberlin for CofS GHQ SWPA, 3 Sep

43, sub: Comment on Ltr From Cmdr ALF, 31 Aug

43, Opns for Capture of Madang, same file; Chamberlin's Memo for File, 3 Sep 43, same file; and

GHQ SWPA OI 34/12, 15 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 14 Jul 43; GHQ SWPA OI 34/14, 17 Sep

43, same file.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 215

178 separated Finschhafen and Bogadjim, and these were long distances to

travel with a flank exposed. The third

and final step would be the capture of

Madang by a combination of airborne

invasion and amphibious assault coupled

with pressure from troops advancing

northwestward out of the Ramu Valley.

To avoid exposing the right flank, he

strongly urged capturing Cape Gloucester (which had been assigned to the

ALAMO Force) before taking Madang.

This would be feasible, he argued, because Madang was so much farther from

Finschhafen than was Cape Gloucester.

These proposals received close study

at the advanced echelon of GHQ, which

had moved to Port Moresby during the

planning for Lae and the Markham

Valley. General Chamberlin looked on

them as generally sound. Regarding

Blamey's concern over control of Cape

Gloucester as well as the coasts of the

Huon Peninsula, however, he pointed

out to General Sutherland that "G-3 believes that a physical occupation of areas

has little bearing on the control of Vitiaz

Strait but considers that airfields strategically placed which cover the water

areas north of Vitiaz Strait are the controlling considerations."

 26

As to the intermediate objective between Finschhafen and Bogadjim, which

Chamberlin placed at Saidor (with a

harbor and prewar airfield) on the north

coast of the Huon Peninsula, he felt that

little would be gained by seizing it as

well as Madang. On the other hand it

appeared that Saidor might prove a

satisfactory substitute for Madang.

Timing of operations would be

tricky, largely because the VII Amphibious Force lacked enough ships to

conduct two operations at once. It would

be committed to operations on the Huon

Peninsula until mid-November. Therefore the Cape Gloucester invasion could

not take place until about 1 December,

but the attack against the north coast of

the Huon Peninsula would also have to

be launched about the same time if the

New Britain offensive was to be protected effectively. For these reasons

Chamberlin recommended deferring the

decision on whether to move to New

Britain before or after invading the

north coast of the Huon Peninsula. For

this latter operation, he proposed two

alternatives: seizure of a prewar airfield

at Dumpu in the Ramu Valley without

operating on the coast at all, or seizure

of the Saidor airfield without operating

in the Ramu Valley.

The questions were threshed out at a

conference at Port Moresby on 3 September. MacArthur, Sutherland, Chamberlin, Kenney, Whitehead, Blamey,

Carpender, and others attended. Blarney

spoke strongly in favor of his recommendations. Kenney urged a deep penetration of the Ramu Valley all the way

to Hansa Bay, which lies between Madang and Wewak. After Hansa Bay, he

recommended, the advance could turn

southward in co-ordination with the

Cape Gloucester attack. Admiral Carpender wanted an operation somewhere

26

 Memo, Chamberlin for CofS GHQ SWPA, 3

Sep 43, sub: Comment on Ltr From Comdr ALF,

31 Aug 43, Opns for Capture of Madang, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 31 Aug 43. Japanese sources often

use "Dampier Strait" to mean both Vitiaz and

Dampier Straits; Allied sources often use "Vitiaz

Strait" for both.
216 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

between Madang and Saidor to precede

Cape Gloucester. He received some support in his view from MacArthur, who

asserted the necessity for seizing an area

between Finschhafen and Madang before capturing Cape Gloucester, so as to

assure the safe movement of supplies to

support the latter operation. After a

good deal of discussion, opinion crystallized in favor of covering the move to

Gloucester by seizing the line DumpuSaidor. Dumpu would be seized at once

by airborne and overland advances, and

would then be used to cover simultaneous moves against Saidor and Gloucester.

These moves, Chamberlin estimated on

3 September, would take place about 1

November at the earliest, but 1 December was more probable.

Thus it was that on 15 September

MacArthur ordered Blamey's New

Guinea Force, supported by Kenney's

forces, to seize Kaiapit at the head of

the Markham Valley and Dumpu about

thirty miles south of Bogadjim. Two

days later he ordered the New Guinea

Force, with naval support, to capture

Finschhafen. It would serve as an advanced air base, and Allied Naval Forces,

basing light naval craft there, would use

it to cut off the Japanese from Cape

Gloucester and Saidor. The attack on

Madang was postponed.

Advance Through the Ramu Valley

With his forces converging on Lae

from east and west General Blarney completed plans for Kaiapit and Dumpu.

Tactically the initial phases of the task

appeared fairly simple; patrols had reported the area between Nadzab and

the Leron River, a tributary of the

Markham, to be free of the enemy.27

Logistics would present the greatest difficulty. No overland line of communications existed, and until roads were built

all supplies for the advancing troops

would have to be flown in. This fact

limited the attacking force to one division (the 7th) of but two brigade

groups.

The 2/6th Australian Independent

Company began the drive in September

when Kenney's transport planes landed

it on a prewar airstrip in the Markham

Valley some thirty miles northwest of

Nadzab near the Leron River. The 2/6th

then made its way eight miles up the

river to Kaiapit, after a sharp encounter

on 19 September, captured the village

from a small group of Japanese, and

held it against their repeated counterattacks. Two days later the Kaiapit strip

saw the arrival, after a flight up from

Nadzab, of the 21st and 25th Brigade

Groups of General Vasey's 7th Australian Division.

At the month's end the 21st Brigade,

followed by the 25th, left Kaiapit and

entered the Ramu Valley. By 6 October

the 21st was in possession of Dumpu,

where 7th Division headquarters was

established. The great Markham-Ramu

trough had fallen with an ease that the

Allies had not expected, an ease brought

about by the hasty Japanese decision not

to retreat through the trough.

Behind the lines engineers set to work

building a truck highway from Lae to

Nadzab along the prewar road, but rain

fell during forty-six of the final sixty

27

 This section is based on ALF, Rpt on New

Guinea Opns: 4 Sep 43-26 Apr 44; Craven and

Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 190-

93.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 217

MAP 14

days of the project and it was December

before the task was finally finished and

large amounts of supplies could be sent

to Nadzab. Nadzab and the other sites in

the Markham and Ramu Valleys received all their supplies and equipment

by airlift during the period the road was

under construction.

By the end of December Allied Air

Forces possessed three first-class air bases

in full-scale operation in the Markham

and Ramu Valleys: one at Nadzab, one

at Lae, and one at the juncture of the

Gusap and Ramu Rivers. The last site

was selected in preference to Kaiapit,

which proved too swampy and malarious

for extensive development. Dumpu

served as a staging field for fighter planes.

After establishing strong positions at

Dumpu, the 7th Australian Division

continued its part in seizing the Huon

Peninsula. Marching north-northwest

from Dumpu, it attacked Nakai's positions in the defiles of the Finisterres. The

defiles were secured in February after

almost three months of the most arduous

kind of fighting. Nakai retreated toward

Madang while Vasey's division broke out

to the coast east of Madang.

The Coastal Advance

Finschhafen

Vasey's operations through the Ramu

Valley were co-ordinated with those of

Wootten's 9th Australian Division,

which was operating on the coasts of the

Huon Peninsula in a series of operations

that began with Finschhafen. Before

leaving Milne Bay for Lae, Wootten had

been alerted to the possibility that he

might have to send a brigade to Finschhafen. (Map 14) Thus GHQ's decision

on 17 September to invade Finschhafen
218 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

at once was no surprise to the veteran

Australian commander.28

 Admiral Barbey had just time enough, and no more,

to assemble 8 LST's, 16 LCI's, 10 destroyers, and 4 APD's for the invasion on

22 September, but "Uncle Dan" was now

an old amphibious hand and he met the

deadline. The LST's loaded at Buna, and

the whole task group assembled in the

harbor at Lae on 21 September. General

Wootten meanwhile had selected the

20th Infantry Brigade Group of his division to make the landing, and had

ordered the 22d Infantry Battalion to

advance east along the coast to threaten

Langemak Bay, just south of Finschhafen. Elements of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade had been attached to Wootten, and these units also made ready. No

close air support was planned for the invasion, but in the days preceding 22

September B-24's and B-25's bombed

the Gasmata airfield on the south coast

of New Britain. Daytime A-20's and

B-25's struck at Japanese lines of communication to Finschhafen, and PT's

took over the work at night.

Troops of the 20th Brigade boarded

their convoy on the afternoon of 21 September. The force included, besides the

Australians and Barbey's American

sailors, one boat company, half the shore

battalion of the 532d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment, and medical and signal

troops, or 575 men, 10 LCM's, and 15

LCVP's. The 22d Battalion marched out

of Lae en route to Langemak Bay on the

21st, and the same day the amphibious

force sailed for Finschhafen, eighty-two

miles distant.

The beach selected for the landing,

designated Scarlet, lay six miles north

of Finschhafen at the mouth of the Song

River. It was nine hundred yards long

(north to south), thirty feet wide, and

was marked by coral headlands to the

north and south.

Destroyers bombarded Scarlet Beach

on the morning of 22 September, and

during darkness, at 0445, the first Australian assault wave touched down.

Coxswains had difficulty finding the right

beach in the dark with the result that

most landing craft carrying the first two

waves lost direction and landed in a

small cove south of Scarlet Beach. First

light aided the LCI's carrying the third

wave; they landed at the right place. The

waves that landed at the cove met some

scattered but ineffective fire from enemy

posts in the fringe of the jungle. The

third wave met better organized opposition from log-and-earth pillboxes, but

by 0930 all resistance had been overcome, all troops and supplies were

ashore, and the landing craft retracted.

The Japanese survivors retired to rising

ground about a half mile inland and

some sharp fighting ensued before the

2/17th Battalion was in complete possession of the beachhead. The 2/13 Battalion meanwhile swung left (south) toward the village of Heldsbach, which was

just north of the Finschhafen airstrip.

28

 This section is based on Craven and Cate, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 187-89; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 269-74;

Off of Chief Engr, GHQ AFPAC, Engineers in

Theater Operations, p. 112, and Critique, pp. 106-

09; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns: 4 Sep 43-26

Apr 44; 2d ESB Rpt; GHQ SWPA Check Sheet,

Chief Engr SWPA to CINC, CofS, and G-3 SWPA,

23 Oct 43 [a rpt of 2d ESB action], in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 23 Oct 43; Japanese Operations in the

Southwest Pacific Area (Vol. II of MacArthur hist),

Ch. VII, OCMH; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. no (OCMH), pp. 82-83; 18th

Army Operations, III, Japanese Monogr No. 43

(OCMH), 84-117.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 219

General Yamada had posted only a

small part of his force at Scarlet Beach.

He was keeping the rest of his 4,000-man

command at Hanisch Harbor on the

south coast of the peninsula and on

Satelberg, a 3,240-foot peak which was

about six miles west of Scarlet Beach,

dominated the entire coastal region, and

overlooked both Finschhafen and Langemak Bay. When General Adachi received news of the Allied landing he

ordered Yamada to concentrate his force

at Satelberg and attack at once. This attack was designed to hold or destroy the

Australians pending the arrival of General Kitagiri's 20th Division. By 21 September the 20th Division, advancing

overland and hauling its heavy matériel

on barges, had reached Gali, one hundred miles from Finschhafen; it expected

to arrive at Finschhafen on 10 October.

Adachi ordered Kitagiri to hurry.

Admiral Barbey's retiring ships offered

a tempting target to Japanese airmen,

but the 7th Air Division, under orders

to cover a Wewak-bound convoy, hesitated to leave it unprotected. The 4th

Air Army headquarters ended this indecision by ordering the 7th out against

Barbey, but bad weather over central

New Guinea kept the Army planes on

the ground. Those of the naval 11th Air

Fleet at Rabaul went up and fiercely attacked the amphibious force on 22 and

24 September. But the vigilant destroyer

Reid had given warning and Allied fighters, the ships' own antiaircraft, and "good

luck in addition to good ship maneuvering" kept the ships from harm.29

At the beachhead the American engineers built roads and dumps and unloaded naval craft. The larger engineer

craft carried additional supplies from

Lae to Scarlet Beach, while the LCVP's

hauled supplies at night from Scarlet

Beach to the Australians who were pushing south toward Finschhafen.

The 20th Brigade continued its move

toward Finschhafen on the 23d. It captured Heldsbach, the airfield, and part

of the shore of the harbor before meeting

stiff resistance at the Bumi River, where

three hundred enemy sailors and one

company of the 2d Battalion, 238th Infantry, defended the south bank. Two

companies of the 2/15th Battalion moved

inland (right) to outflank the enemy,

and the next morning the Australians

forced their way over the river in the

face of stalwart resistance. The brigade

commander, who was becoming increasingly aware of the Japanese concentration at Satelberg, asked Wootten for one

more battalion with which to hold Scarlet Beach while he concentrated his brigade against Finschhafen. Wootten assented. The 2/43d Battalion landed at

Scarlet Beach on the night of 29-30 September to relieve the 2/17th, and the

latter moved out at once for Finschhafen. Following air and artillery bombardment, the three Australian battalions—the 2/13th, 2/15th, and 2/17th—

attacked on 1 October, fought all day,

and overwhelmed the defenders. The

next morning they occupied the village

and harbor of Finschhafen and made

contact south of Langemak Bay with

patrols of the 22d Battalion, which had

advanced overland from Lae.

The Counterattack

To gain complete control of the New

Guinea side of Vitiaz Strait, Generals

29

 Ltr, Adm Barbey to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil

Hist, 20 Nov 53, no sub, OCMH.
220 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MacArthur and Blarney had ordered

that the capture of Finschhafen be followed by an advance along the coast to

Sio, fifty land miles distant. But the advance could not be undertaken until

the Japanese were driven from their

dominating positions at Satelberg and

on Wareo spur, a lower spur which lay

north of the Song River from Satelberg.

On 26 September Yamada had

launched an unsuccessful attack with the

80th Infantry against the Australian

beachhead. After Finschhafen fell on 2

October, the 20th Brigade moved back

to Scarlet Beach in preparation for an

assault against Satelberg. Two battalions

attacked but met stout resistance.

When General Wootten's headquarters and the 24th Brigade arrived, Wootten decided that all signs indicated the

Japanese would counterattack immediately, before he could complete his

preparations for advancing to Sio. He

decided to go on the defensive for the

time being.

Meanwhile the 20th Division was on

its way; advance elements totaling 2,354

men had reached Sio by 30 September.

General Kitagiri decided to advance by

an inland route rather than use the

coastal track to Satelberg. Like so many

other Japanese generals in similar circumstances during World War II, he

decided not to concentrate all his forces

before attacking but ordered his units

to attack the Australians upon arriving.

Japanese tactical doctrine warns of the

dangers of such piecemeal commitment

but Japanese generals frequently aided

the Allied cause by putting aside their

doctrine in favor of pell-mell, piecemeal

attack.

For his main attack against Scarlet

Beach Kitagiri decided to drive eastward from Satelberg with most of his

forces while a small detachment aboard

four landing craft attempted an amphibious assault. But his division was

no better at safeguarding important

documents than was any other Japanese

unit. On 15 October General Wootten

received a captured Japanese order which

warned him to expect a two-regiment attack from Satelberg, coupled with a seaborne assault. The Australians made

ready.

Next day the 9th Division, though suffering some local reverses, repulsed the

20th's attack from Satelberg. At 0300, 17

October, Japanese planes bombed the

Allies, whereupon 155 men of the 10th

Company, 79th Infantry, attempted to

land from their four craft. Two barges

were sunk, one departed in haste, and

the other reached shore in the vicinity

of a .50-caliber machine gun position

manned by Pvt. Nathan Van Noy, Jr., of

the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, and one other American engineer.

As the enemy soldiers disembarked they

hurled grenades, one of which wounded

Van Noy before he opened fire. But Van

Noy held his fire until the Japanese were

visible, then opened up and killed about

thirty of them. He died of his wounds,

and for his gallant devotion was awarded

the Medal of Honor.30 Though the Japanese claim that the few men who

reached the shore wrought great damage, in actuality they were all quickly

killed.

Later in the morning came another

major attack from Satelberg. Wootten,

30

 See The Medal of Honor of the United States

Army (Washington, 1948), pp. 283-84. Van Noy's

loader, who was wounded, received the Silver Star.
THE MARKHAM VALLEY AND THE HUON PENINSULA 221

who had no reserve brigade, asked for

the 26th and Barbey's ships transported

it to Scarlet Beach on 20 October. The

Japanese attacks continued through 25

October, but all failed. As his food supplies were exhausted, Kitagiri suspended

the attacks and regrouped for another

try. The Australians, losing 49 dead in

these actions, reported killing 679 of

the enemy.

General Adachi, who had often been

in and out of Salamaua during the fighting there, traveled from Madang via

Kiari and Sio to Satelberg. He arrived

on 31 October, and stayed for four days.

During this period Kitagiri made some

hopeful estimates on the success of

future, more gradual offensives.

Satelberg to Sio

But Wootten was now ready to assume the offensive. By 17 November one

more brigade, the 4th, had arrived to

hold the beachhead while the three infantry brigades of the 9th Division attacked. Meanwhile work on the airstrip

and advanced naval base at Finschhafen

had gone forward so quickly that PT

boats from Finschhafen were now harrying enemy sea communications at night

in consort with PBY's ("Black Cats").

With the support of tanks and artillery,

and rocket-equipped LCVP's lying offshore, the 9th Division fought a major

action starting on 17 November. By 8

December it had captured Satelberg and

Wareo spur and was ready to push up

the coast to Sio, whence the 20th Division was retreating on orders from

General Imamura himself.

Wootten's men advanced slowly but

steadily against the retreating enemy,

supported all the while by the 2d Engineer Special Brigade craft.31

 The Australians found many sick, wounded, and

dead Japanese who had fallen by the

way as the weakened 20th Division,

which numbered 12,526 men on 10 September and only 6,949 men by December, laboriously marched along. On 15

January 1944 the 9th Division entered

Sio, on the north coast of the Huon

Peninsula.

Fighting on the peninsula was not yet

over, but the main strategic objectives—

the airfield sites and the coast of Vitiaz

Strait—were now in Allied hands. When

the Lae-Nadzab road and the airfields

were completed, the Allies could control

the air over the straits and bring a

heavier weight of metal to bear on Japanese bases to the north and to the west.

31

 In the Nassau Bay-Lae-Finschhafen operation

the 2d Engineer Special Brigade lost twenty-one

dead, ninety-four wounded, and sixty evacuated

sick. On the pursuit to Sio four LCVP's were lost

to enemy action, four more to surf and reefs.
CHAPTER XII

The Invasion of Bougainville

While MacArthur's and Halsey's

troops were gaining the Trobriands, the

Markham Valley, the Huon Peninsula,

and the New Georgia group for the

Allied cause, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and their subordinate committees in

Washington had been making a series

of decisions affecting the course of the

war in the Pacific. These decisions related not so much to CARTWHEEL itself

as to General MacArthur's desire to

make the main effort in the Pacific along

the north coast of New Guinea into the

Philippines. But, since they called for

troops to support the offensives in Admiral Nimitz' Central Pacific Area, they

had an immediate impact upon CARTWHEEL, especially on the Bougainville

invasion (Operation B of ELKTON III)

and on MacArthur's plans to seize

Rabaul and Kavieng after CARTWHEEL.

The Decision To Bypass Rabaul

Once the Combined Chiefs at Casablanca had approved an advance through

the Central Pacific, the Joint Chiefs put

their subordinates to work preparing a

general strategic plan for the defeat of

Japan. An outline plan was submitted at

the meeting of the Combined Chiefs in

Washington, 12-15 May 1943. The Combined Chiefs approved the plan as a basis

for further study.1

The plan, which governed in a general

way the operations of Nimitz' and MacArthur's forces until the end of the war,

aimed at securing the unconditional surrender of Japan by air and naval blockade of the Japanese homeland, by air

bombardment, and, if necessary, by invasion. The American leaders agreed

that naval control of the western Pacific

might bring about surrender without

invasion, and even without air bombardment. But if air bombardment, invasion,

or both proved necessary, air and naval

bases in the western Pacific would be required. Therefore, the United States

forces were to fight their way westward

across the Pacific along two axes of advance: a main effort through the Central Pacific and a subsidiary effort

through the South and Southwest Pacific

Areas.2

The Washington commanders and

1

 Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 219-22. 2

 In point of fact the terms "main effort" and

"subsidiary effort," though used constantly, bore so

little relation to the number of troops, aircraft, and

ships engaged as to be almost without meaning. In

general, the Central Pacific had the preponderance

of fleet (included carrier-based air) strength; MacArthur had the greater number of divisions and

land-based aircraft.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 223

planners preferred the Central Pacific

route for the main effort because it was

shorter and more healthful than the

South-Southwest Pacific route; it would

require fewer ships, troops, and supplies;

success would cut off Japan from her

overseas empire; destruction of the Japanese fleet, which would probably come

out fighting to oppose the advance, would

enable naval forces to strike directly at

Japan; and it would outflank and cut off

the Japanese in the Southeast Area. The

main effort should not be made through

the South and Southwest Pacific Areas,

it was argued, because a drive from New

Guinea to the Philippines would be a

frontal assault against large islands with

positions closely arranged in depth for

mutual support. The Central Pacific

route, in contrast, permitted the continuously expanding U.S. Pacific Fleet

to strike at small, vulnerable positions

too widely separated for mutual support.

The Joint Chiefs decided on the two

axes, rather than the Central Pacific

alone, because the Japanese conquests

in the first phase of the war had compelled the establishment of comparatively large Allied forces in the South and

Southwest Pacific Areas; to shift all these

to the Central Pacific would take too

much time and too many ships, and

would probably intensify the already

strong and almost open disagreement between MacArthur and King over Pacific

strategy. Further, the Joint Chiefs hoped

to use the oilfields on the Vogelkop

Peninsula.3 Twin drives, co-ordinated

and timed for mutual support, would

give the U.S. forces great strategic advantages, for the Japanese would never

know where the next blow would fall.4

At Washington in May the Combined

Chiefs, as they had at Casablanca, approved plans for seizure of the Gilbert

and Marshall Islands as the opening

phase of the Central Pacific advance.

They also approved the existing plans

for CARTWHEEL, which the Joint Chiefs

estimated would be ended by April 1944.

Next month, the Joint Chiefs, concerned with the problem of co-ordinating

Nimitz' and MacArthur's operations,

asked MacArthur for specific information on organization of forces and dates

for future operations and informed him

that they were planning to start the Central Pacific drive in mid-November. They

planned to use the 1st and 2d Marine

Divisions, then in the Southwest and

South Pacific Areas, respectively, all the

South Pacific's assault transports and

cargo ships (APA's and AKA's), and the

major portion of naval forces from

Halsey's area.5

Faced with the possibility of a rival

offensive, using divisions and ships that

he had planned to employ, General MacArthur hurled back a vigorous reply.

Arguing against the Central Pacific (he

3

 This hope came to nothing. Robert Ross Smith,

The Approach to the Philippines, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 425-28.

4

 See JSSC 40/2, 3 Apr 43; JPS 67/4, 28 Apr 43;

JCS 287, 7 May 43; JCS 287/1, 8 May 43; CCS 220,

14 May 43. All these papers are entitled "Strategic

Plan for Defeat of Japan" or something very

similar. See also Crowl and Love, The Seizure of

the Gilberts and Marshalls, Ch. I; Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, Ch. I; Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XVII; relevant chapters

in Morton's forthcoming volumes on strategy, command, and logistics in the Pacific, and in Maurice

Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare:

1943-1944, also in preparation for the series

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 5

 Min, JCS mtg, 15 Jun 43; Rad, JCS to MacArthur, 15 Jun 43, CM-OUT 6093.
224 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

called the prospective invasion of the

Marshalls a "diversionary attack"), he set

forth the virtues of advancing through

New Guinea to the Philippines. Withdrawal of the two Marine divisions, he

maintained, would prevent the ultimate

assault against Rabaul. He concluded his

message with the information on target

dates and forces that the Joint Chiefs

had requested.6 Two days later, 22 June,

Admiral Halsey protested the proposed

removal of the 2d Marine Division and

most of his ships.7

Although General MacArthur may not

have known it at the time, his argument

that transfer of the two divisions would

jeopardize the Rabaul invasion was being

vitiated. In 1942 there had been general

agreement that Rabaul should be captured, but in June 1943 members of

Washington planning committees held

that a considerable economy of force

would result if Rabaul was neutralized

rather than captured.8 The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, in expressing

itself in favor of giving the Central

Pacific offensive priority over CARTWHEEL, also argued that the Allied drive

northward against Rabaul was merely a

reversal of the Japanese strategy of the

year before and held "small promise of

reasonable success in the near future."9

On the other hand Admiral William

D. Leahy, chief of staff to the President

and senior member of the Joint Chiefs,

was always a strong supporter of MacArthur's views.10

 He argued strongly

against any curtailment of CARTWHEEL.

Admiral King, however, was far from

pleased (in June 1943) with the rate

of "inch by inch" progress in the South

and Southwest Pacific. He wanted to see

Rabaul "cleaned up" so the Allies could

"shoot for Luzon," and seemed to imply

that if CARTWHEEL did not move faster

he would favor a curtailment.11

The immediate question on the transfer of the Marine divisions was compromised. The 1st Marine Division

would remain in the Southwest Pacific.

The 2d Marine Division, heretofore

slated for the invasion of Rabaul, was

transferred from New Zealand to the

Central Pacific, where it made its bloody,

valorous assault on Tarawa in November 1943. Assured by King that the Central Pacific offensive would assist rather

than curtail CARTWHEEL, Leahy withdrew his objections.12

By 21 July the arguments against capturing Rabaul had so impressed General

Marshall that he radioed MacArthur to

suggest that CARTWHEEL be followed by

the seizure of Kavieng on New Ireland

and Manus in the Admiralties, with the

6

 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN

13149. 7

 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Jun 43, CM-IN

13605. Halsey sent his views to MacArthur who

relayed them. 8

 Incl B, Jt War Plans Com 58/D, 24 Jun 43,

title: Memo for RAINBOW Team, in OPD 384 Marshall Islands (10 Jun 43) Sec 1. 9

 JSSC 386, 28 Jun 43, title: Strategy of the Pac.

10

 See Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was

There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), passim. 11

 Min, JCS mtg, 29 Jun 43. At this time King

wanted to go to Luzon by way of the Marianas,

which he always regarded as the key to the Pacific

because he believed that an attack there would

smoke out the Japanese fleet. 12

 Min, JCS mtg, 20 Jul 43; JCS 386/1, 19 Jul 43,

Strategy in the Pac; JPS 205/3, 10 Jul 43, title:

Opns Against Marshall Islands; Draft Memo, JPS

for JCS, 12 Jul 43, sub: Strategy in the Pac, OPD

381 Security 195; OPD Draft Memo, 14 Jul 43, no

sub, same file; JPS draft paper, 19 Jul 43, title:

Strategy in the Pac, and attached papers, with JPS

219/D in ABC 384 Pac (28 Jun 43); OPD Brief,

Notes on JWPC 58/2, in OPD 384 Marshall Islands

(10 Jun 43) Sec 1.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 225

purpose of isolating Rabaul, and by the

capture of Wewak. But MacArthur saw

it otherwise. Marshall's plan, he stated,

involved too many hazards. Wewak, too

strong for direct assault, should be

isolated by seizing a base farther west.

Rabaul would have to be captured

rather than just neutralized, he insisted,

because its strategic location and excellent harbor made it an ideal naval base

with which to support an advance westward along New Guinea's north coast.13

Marshall and King were not convinced. Thus the Combined Chiefs,

meeting with President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Churchill in Quebec

during August, received and approved

the Joint Chiefs' recommendation that

Rabaul be neutralized, not captured.

They further agreed that after CARTWHEEL MacArthur and Halsey should

neutralize New Guinea as far west as

Wewak, and should capture Manus and

Kavieng to use as naval bases for supporting additional advances westward.

Once these operations were concluded,

MacArthur was to move west along the

north coast of New Guinea to the Vogelkop Peninsula. Subsequently MacArthur

was informed that his cherished ambition to return to the Philippines would

be realized; Marshall radioed him that

once the Vogelkop was reached, the

Southwest Pacific's next logical objective would be Mindanao.14

Papers containing the Combined

Chiefs decisions were delivered to General MacArthur by Col. William L.

Ritchie of the Operations Division, War

Department General Staff, who reached

GHQ on 17 September.15

From then on MacArthur did not raise

the question of Rabaul with the Joint

Chiefs; his radiograms dealt instead with

broader questions relating to the Philippines and the relative importance of the

Central and Southwest Pacific offensives.16

 Although the evidence is not

conclusive, the general course of events

and certain opinions MacArthur gave

during the planning for Bougainville

seem to indicate that he knew of the

decision to neutralize rather than capture Rabaul, or else had reached the

same decision independently, some time

before Colonel Ritchie reached the

Southwest Pacific.

The General Plan

If ever a series of offensives was conducted according to plan, it was the extremely systematic Allied moves in the

Pacific that started in 1943. At the time

that Allied forces were fighting in New

Guinea and New Georgia, the Joint

Chiefs were considering the wisdom of

neutralizing Rabaul, and General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey were preparing for the invasion of Bougainville.

ELKTON III had initially provided that

the southern Bougainville area (Buin

and Faisi) was to be invaded during the 13

 Rad 8604, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Jul 43,

in Marshall's OUT Log; Rad 16419, MacArthur to

Marshall, 23 Jul 43, in Marshall's IN Log. 14

 See Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 225;

CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to the

President and Prime Minister; CCS 301/3, 27 Aug

43, title: Specific Opns in Pac and Far East, 1943-

44; Rad 8679, Marshal to MacArthur, 2 Oct 43, in

Marshall's OUT Log. See also Smith, The Approach

to the Philippines, Ch. I.

15

 Rad, Ritchie to Handy, 18 Sep 43, CM-IN

13521. 16

 MacArthur's subsequent plans called for the

neutralization of Rabaul, followed by its possible

capture. See GHQ SWPA, RENO III, 20 Oct 43, in

ABC 384 Pac, Sec 3-A.
226 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

fifth month after the beginning of CARTWHEEL, simultaneously with the conquest of New Georgia, and one month

before the invasion of Cape Gloucester.

(See Chart 2.) Admiral Halsey had altered the plan by managing to start his

invasion of New Georgia on 30 June. In

June General MacArthur, in ordering

the Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula

attack, directed Admiral Halsey to be

ready to take southern Bougainville on

orders from GHQ.17 At this time Admiral Halsey, planning in accordance

with ELKTON III, intended to use the 3d

Marine Division and the 25th Division

against southern Bougainville, the 2d

Marine and 3d New Zealand Divisions

against Rabaul.18 Before long, however,

the 25th Division, sent into New Georgia, was too worn for further combat

and the 2d Marine Division was ordered

to invade the Gilberts instead of Rabaul.19

Tactical planning for Bougainville began in the South Pacific in July when

Halsey assigned the Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps, to

command the ground forces. (Map 15)

His mission was the seizure of Buin,

Kahili, and Tonolei Harbor on southern Bougainville and of the nearby islands in Bougainville Strait—the Shortlands, Faisi, and Ballale, where there

were then an estimated twenty thousand

Japanese soldiers and sailors.

Near the end of July Admiral Halsey

suggested a change in plan to General

MacArthur. It was based on two assumptions: first, that the objectives of the

operation were denying the use of airfields and anchorage to the Japanese

and securing airfields and anchorages

for the Allies, as a step toward the capture of Rabaul; and second, that because

terrain, strategic position, and Japanese

dispositions indicated that southern Bougainville was extremely important to

the Japanese, the operation would be

a major one. With the difficulties of the

then bogged-down New Georgia invasion and the success of the artillery on

the offshore islands against Munda both

obviously in mind, he suggested that

he could save men, matériel, and time

by avoiding the Bougainville mainland

completely. He proposed to seize the

Shortlands and Ballale, to emplace artillery on the former with the mission of

interdicting Kahili, to build one or more

airfields in the Shortlands, and to use

the anchorages there that the Japanese

8th Fleet then employed regularly. MacArthur heartily approved the scheme.20

By early September, however, Admiral

Halsey had decided on a further change

17

 GHQ SWPA OI 34, 13 Jun 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 14 Jun 43. This section is based in part on

Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 245-51; Halsey and Bryan, Admiral

Halsey's Story, pp. 173-74; Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 279-84; Maj. John N. Rentz,

USMCR, Bougainville and the Northern Solomons

(Washington, 1948), Ch. I; The Bougainville Campaign, MS, prepared by Hist Sec G-2, SOPACBACOM, Vol. I, Ch. I, OCMH. None of these, however, is entirely satisfactory for they do not employ

Southwest Pacific Area sources. 18

 Rad, Comdr Third Flt to CINCSWPA, 21 Jun

43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 23 Jun 43. 19

 The 25th Division stayed on Guadalcanal after

the conclusion of the campaign there. It had little

opportunity for rest and reorganization before

moving to New Georgia.

20

 Ltr, COMSOPAC to CINCSWPA, 26 Jul 43,

sub: Bougainville Opn, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl,

31 Jul 43; Rad, CINCSWPA to Comdr Third Flt,

4 Aug 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 43;

COMSOPAC War Diary, 26 Jul and 4 Aug 43

entries.

THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 227

in plan. Several factors influenced his

decision. The impressive and inexpensive success on Vella Lavella had demonstrated once more the validity of the old

principle of striking soft spots, when

possible, in preference to headlong assault against fixed positions. Further,

reconnaissance had indicated that airdrome sites on the Shortlands were not

very good. Landing in the Shortlands,

which the Japanese were believed to

be reinforcing, would entail heavy losses;

poor beaches would impede the landing

of heavy construction equipment and

artillery for the neutralization of Kahili.

It was also estimated that assaulting the

Shortlands-Ballale-Faisi area would require two divisions, while two more

would be needed to operate on southern

Bougainville proper. As the South Pacific had but four divisions—the 37th

and Americal Divisions of the U.S.

Army, the 3d Marine Division, and the

3d New Zealand Division—that were

considered fit to fight, no more advances

would be possible for months.21

Looking for a method of neutralizing

the southern Bougainville-Shortlands

area without capturing it, a method that

would retain enough troops for a major

forward move later, Halsey acted on the

advice of his principal subordinate commanders. He decided in favor of increased air effort from the New Georgia

fields against southern Bougainville and

Buka. Starting about 1 November, he

proposed to capture the Treasury Islands

and Choiseul Bay as airfield, radar, and

PT base sites from which to "contain

and strangle" southern Bougainville and

the Shortlands. He proposed that after

the mainland of Bougainville had been

reconnoitered he and MacArthur could

decide whether to advance from Choiseul to Kieta on the east coast or from

the Treasuries to Empress Augusta Bay

on the west if post-CARTWHEEL plans

required the establishment of positions

on the mainland of Bougainville.22

This plan was consistent with ELKTON

III, and varied only slightly from the

July schemes approved by MacArthur.

But by now, MacArthur, perhaps aware

of the decision to neutralize rather than

capture Rabaul, and obviously anxious

to hurry up CARTWHEEL and get started

on the drive toward the Philippines,

had changed his mind about the scope

and nature of the operation. Thus when

Halsey's chief of staff, Rear Adm. Robert B. Carney, and his new war plans

officer, Col. William E. Riley, USMC,

presented the Treasuries-Choiseul plan

to MacArthur at GHQ on 10 September,

MacArthur was against it. With the successful airborne move to Nabzab in

mind, he expressed his agreement with

the principle of the bypass, but maintained that Halsey's plan would make it

impossible for South Pacific aircraft to

hit at Rabaul effectively before 1 March

21

 The 2d Marine Division was due to leave; the

25th and 43d Divisions were due for rest and rehabilitation.

22

 Ltr, Halsey to CINCSWPA, 9 Sep 43, sub:

ELKTON III–S Bougainville Objectives, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 10 Sep 43; Memo, Adm Fitch, Gen

Harmon, Maj Gen Charles D. Barrett [CG I Mar

Amphib Corps], and Adm Wilkinson for COMSOPAC, 7 Sep 43, no sub, ABC 384 (1-17-43) Sec

2; Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific

Campaign, p. 8, OCMH; Harmon, The Army in the

South Pacific, p. 9, OCMH. Some advocated bypassing Bougainville completely in favor of a jump

to Emirau in the Saint Matthias group northwest

of Kavieng.
228 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

1944. He wanted Halsey's aircraft established within fighter range of Rabaul in

time to assist with the neutralization of

Rabaul that would cover the Southwest

Pacific's invasion of Cape Gloucester.

This would be necessary, MacArthur

held, because Southwest Pacific air forces

could not attack all the objectives (including Madang and Wewak) that would

have to be neutralized in order to protect the invasions of Cape Gloucester

and of Saidor, on the north coast of the

Huon Peninsula. Southwest Pacific

headquarters hoped to start Operation

III (chiefly Cape Gloucester) shortly

after 1 December; Cape Gloucester itself would probably be invaded between

25 December 1943 and 1 January 1944.

Therefore it would be necessary for

South Pacific forces to establish themselves on the mainland of Bougainville

about 1 November. So important was

the operation that MacArthur tacitly

approved commitment of the major part

of South Pacific ground forces.

Specifically, he proposed the following

outline plan:

1. 15 October-1 November, Southwest Pacific air forces would make heavy

attacks against Japanese aircraft, air installations, and shipping at Rabaul;

2. 20-25 October, South Pacific forces

would occupy the Treasuries and positions on northern Choiseul in order to

establish radar positions and PT boat

bases;

3. 1 November, South Pacific forces

would occupy Empress Augusta Bay on

the west coast of Bougainville in order

to establish airfields within fighter range

of Rabaul;

4. 1-6 November, the Southwest Pacific would continue air attacks on Rabaul and would assist in the neutralization of Buka;

5. 25 December 1943-1 January 1944,

Southwest Pacific forces would seize

Cape Gloucester and Saidor in order to

gain control of Vitiaz and Dampier

Straits and to secure airdromes for the

neutralization of Kavieng. During this

period South Pacific forces would neutralize Rabaul.23

General MacArthur stressed the importance of a landing on the mainland

at another meeting on 17 September

attended by General Harmon and Colonel Riley. Asked if he preferred a landing on the east or the west coast of Bougainville, he put the decision entirely

in Admiral Halsey's hands.

And so on 22 September, Halsey issued warning orders which canceled all

his earlier plans and assigned the units

to constitute the invasion force. Admiral Wilkinson would lead it. The

landing forces, under Wilkinson, were

still to be under the commanding general of the I Marine Amphibious Corps.

Halsey instructed Wilkinson and his

units to be ready to carry out one of

two plans: either they were to seize and

hold the Treasury Islands and the airfield sites in the Empress Augusta Bay

region on the west coast of Bougainville;

or they were to seize the Treasuries and

Choiseul Bay, build airfields, PT boat

bases, and landing craft staging points,

and in late December seize the Japanese

23

 Ltr, MacArthur to Halsey, 11 Sep 43, no sub,

and Notes for Memo on Conf Between Reps of

SWPA and SOPAC, GHQ SWPA, 10 Sep 43. Both

in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 11 Sep 43.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 229

airfield at Tenekau on the east coast of

Bougainville.24

Submarines took patrols to the east

coast and to Empress Augusta Bay to

gather data, and South Pacific intelligence officers interviewed missionaries,

traders, planters, coastwatchers, and

fliers who had been shot down over

Bougainville. The east coast patrol, carried by the submarine Gato, delivered

an unfavorable report. The west coast

patrol, composed of marines, debarked

from the submarine Guardfish about ten

miles northwest of Cape Torokina in

Empress Augusta Bay. The marines were

unable to examine Cape Torokina because it was occupied by the Japanese,

but they took samples of soil similar to

that at Torokina. When tested, it showed

that Cape Torokina was suitable for

airfields.

Between the sea and the mountains

at Cape Torokina, which lay within

fighter range of Munda, was a coastal

plain of about seven square miles. It

was lightly defended; Halsey estimated

that there were about one thousand Japanese in the area. So forbidding were

the surrounding mountains that the area

was almost isolated from the strong Japanese garrisons in southern Bougainville.

Halsey and his planners estimated that

if Allied forces seized Torokina the

Japanese would require three or four

months to bring enough heavy equipment over the mountains to launch an

effective counterattack. But there were

disadvantages. The heavy surf in Empress Augusta Bay, which had no protected anchorages, would make landing

operations difficult. No more than 65

miles separated the cape from all the

Japanese air bases on Bougainville, and

Rabaul was only 215 miles to the northwest.

Admiral Halsey calculated the chances

and decided on Torokina. In his words:

"The conception was bold and the probability of provoking a violent air-landsurface action was accepted and welcomed on the premise that the by-products of enemy destruction would, in

themselves, greatly further the over-all

Pacific plan. Enthusiasm for the plan

was far from unanimous, even in the

South Pacific, but, the decision having

been made, all hands were told to 'Get

going.'"25

Halsey informed MacArthur of his

decision on 1 October. Expressing his

complete agreement, MacArthur promised maximum air support from the

Southwest Pacific. The invasion would

be launched on 1 November.26

Air Operations in October

The Fifth Air Force

By October the Fifth Air Force in

the Southwest Pacific Area was well situ24

 Ltr, COMSOPAC to CG 1 Mar Amphib Corps,

CTF 31, and CTF 33, 22 Sep 43, sub: Warning

Order, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 24 Sep 43. During

this period Admiral Halsey received communications from Admiral King's office which seemed to

require him to seize southern Bougainville and then

Kieta and Buka. This confused the issue until Admiral Nimitz assured Halsey that the messages from

King were estimates and not directives, and that

Halsey was to operate under the provisions of the 28 March 1943 directive.

25

 Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific Campaign, p. 8, OCMH. 26

 Rad, Halsey to MacArthur, 1 Oct 43, and Rad,

MacArthur to Halsey, 1 Oct 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 1 Oct 43.
230 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ated to carry the fight against Rabaul.27

Nearly all its warplanes had been displaced to forward bases. Port Moresby,

an outpost in 1942, was now a rear base.

Dobodura was the main staging base

for heavy bombers, and Nadzab was

being readied as the main base for future operations. P-38's from New

Guinea could stage through Kiriwina

and escort the bombers all the way to

Rabaul.

Rabaul was ripe for air attack. Transports, cargo ships, and smaller craft, together with some warships, crowded

Simpson Harbor. Supply depots were

fully stocked. Four all-weather airfields

—Lakunai, Vunakanau, Rapopo, and

Tobera—were in operation in and near

Rabaul.28

Southwest Pacific aircraft had been

harrying Rabaul with small raids since

January 1942, but now the Allies were

ready to attack this bastion on a large

scale. General Kenney was ready for

the first big attack on 12 October. All

together, 349 planes took part: 87 heavy

bombers, 114 B-25's, 12 Beaufighters,

and 125 P-38's, plus some weather and

photo reconnaissance planes—or, as he

put it, "Everything that I owned that

was in commission, and could fly that

far."29 B-25's and Beaufighters made

sweeps over Vunakanau, Rapopo, and

Tobera while the heavy bombers struck

at shipping. The Allies lost four planes

and estimated a great deal of damage to

Japanese aircraft and ships. Their estimates were somewhat exaggerated, especially those on shipping damage, but

some Japanese planes were destroyed.

The Japanese, taken by surprise and

unable to send up fighters to intercept,

later reported that this and later raids

in October were "a great obstacle to the

execution of operations."30

Bad weather over New Guinea halted

Kenney's operations against Rabaul for

the next few days. The Japanese used

the respite to send out attacks against

Oro Bay on 15 and 17 October, and

Finschhafen on 17 and 19 October. The

Allied planes did not sit idle while Rabaul was inaccessible, but struck at Wewak on the 16th and again the next day.

Kenney planned and sent out another

big raid against Rabaul on 18 October,

but when the air armada was over the

Solomon Sea the weather closed in.

Fifty-four B-25's went on to Rabaul

anyway. Kenney followed this attack

with three successive daylight raids on

23, 24, and 25 October before the

weather again imposed a delay, this time

until the 29th, when B-24's and P-38's

bombed Vunakanau.

The weather intervened again, so that

it was not until 2 November, the day

after South Pacific forces landed at Em27

 This section is based on Craven and Cate, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 251-55, 317-26;

Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 313-20; Morison,

Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 275-88, 271-92;

Thomas C. Wilds, "The Admiral Who Lost His

Fleet," United States Naval Institute Proceedings,

Vol. 77, No. 11 (November 1951); CTF 33 War

Diary, Oct 43 entries; Southeast Area Naval Operations, Vol. III, Japanese Monogr No. 50 (OCMH),

pp. 5-11; Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air

Operations, Pt. IV, Japanese Monogr No. 108

(OCMH), pp. 42-44. 28

 Lakunai had a sand and volcanic ash surface;

the other three were concrete. Keravat field on the

west coast of Gazelle Peninsula had never been

used.

29

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 313. 30

 Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air Operations, Pt. IV, Japanese Monogr No. 108 (OCMH),

p. 44.
BOMBING RABAUL. Top left and right: Japanese corvette off the coast of New

Britain near Rabaul suffers a direct hit from a B-25. Bottom: Vunakanau airfield

is attacked by low-flying bombers dropping parachute bombs.
232 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

press Augusta Bay, that Southwest Pacific

aircraft again struck at Rabaul. On that

day seventy-five B-25's escorted by P-38's

attacked and ran into the fiercest opposition the Fifth Air Force encountered

during World War II. A large number

of carrier planes and pilots from the

Combined Fleet at Truk had just been

transferred to Rabaul, and they put up

a stiff fight.

Although it is clear that these raids

failed to wreak as much havoc at Rabaul

as Kenney's fliers claimed, it is also clear

that they caused a good deal of damage

to aircraft and prevented the Japanese

planes at Rabaul from undertaking any

purely offensive missions. In short, the

Southwest Pacific's air support for the

Bougainville invasion, though not as

devastating as was thought at the time,

was effective.

Certainly American pilots, like the

Japanese, and like soldiers and sailors on

the ground and in ships, tended to exaggerate the damage they inflicted. But

there were two important differences

between American and Japanese claims.

First, Japanese claims were wildly exaggerated whereas American claims were

merely exaggerated. Second, Japanese

commanders apparently took the claims

seriously, so that nonexistent victories

often served as the bases for decision. On

the other hand American commanders,

taking human frailty into account, evaluated and usually scaled down claims so

that decisions were normally based on

more realistic estimates of damage.

Air Command, Solomons

General Twining's composite force,

Air Command, Solomons, had been striking hard at the northern Solomons bases

during the same period and for the

same purpose—to knock out the Bougainville bases so that Wilkinson's convoys could sail past in safety. Twining's

available air strength had been displaced

forward to bases within range of south

Bougainville targets. At the start of operations in October, Twining had 614

Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Royal

New Zealand Air Force planes. Of these,

264 fighters and 223 medium, dive, torpedo, and patrol bombers were at New

Georgia and the Russells, and 127 heavy

bombers and patrol planes were at Guadalcanal.

Ever since 1942 South Pacific planes

had been battering at the Japanese bases

at Kahili, the Shortlands, Ballale, Kieta,

and Buka, and now the process was intensified in an effort to put them out of

commission.31 Starting on 18 October,

Twining—whose high professional qualifications were matched by a physical appearance so striking that he looked like

Hollywood's idea of a diplomat—drove

his interservice, international force hard

in a continuous series of high-level, lowlevel, dive, glide, and torpedo bombing

attacks and fighter sweeps, all made with

escorting fighters from the four air services in the command. The primary mission was accomplished. The hard-hit

enemy showed skill and determination

in keeping his airfields in repair, but

these qualities were not enough. By 1

November all his Bougainville airfields

had been knocked out of commission,

and the continuous attacks kept them

that way.

31

 Kenney offered to include Buka in his attacks,

but Halsey asked him to concentrate on Rabaul and

leave Buka to Twining.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 233

B-25's LEAVING BOUGAINVILLE after an attack on airfields and supply areas.

The Japanese

Of Admiral Kusaka's 11th Air Fleet, a

substantial portion was based at Rabaul

in early October, the remainder in southern Bougainville. When Air Command,

Solomons, intensified its operations, Kusaka withdrew his planes to Rabaul, and

to avoid being completely destroyed by

Kenney's heavy raids he frequently

pulled his planes back to Kavieng in New

Ireland. Despite these attacks Kusaka was

usually able to maintain about two hundred planes in operating condition at

Rabaul throughout October.

Now Admiral Koga, like the late Yamamato, decided to use his carrier planes

jointly with the land-based planes of

Kusaka's air fleet in an effort to improve

the situation in the Southeast Area. As

a result of the September decision to

withdraw the main defensive perimeter,

Koga developed a plan to cut the Allied

lines of communication in the Southeast

Area and so delay the Allies and buy

time for the Japanese to build up the

defenses along the main perimeter. This

plan, called Operation RO, was to be

executed by the operational carrier air

groups of the Combined Fleet, transferred from Truk to Rabaul, and by the

11th Air Fleet. Vice Adm. Tokusaburo

Ozawa, commander of the 3d Fleet, and

Kusaka would conduct the operation

jointly from Rabaul. Koga decided on

this course of action fully aware that his

surface strength would be immobilized
234 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

while his carrier planes were at Rabaul.

He had planned to transfer the planes

in mid-October, but delayed the move

because he received a false report that

the U.S. Pacific Fleet was out against

the Marshalls. On 20 October, now aware

that Nimitz' forces were not moving

against the Marshalls, Koga ordered the

carrier planes dispatched. By the beginning of November, 173 carrier planes—

82 fighters, 45 dive bombers, 40 torpedo

bombers, and 6 patrol planes—had

reached Rabaul to team with Kusaka's

200. It was Ozawa's carrier pilots who

gave Kenney's men such a hard fight on

2 November. Koga had first planned to

deliver his main stroke against New

Guinea but the increased tempo of Allied activity in the Solomons made him

decide to strike in the Solomons.

Koga's decision to execute Operation

RO was to have far-reaching results, results that were the precise opposite of

what he expected. The transfer of the

carrier planes coincided with the South

Pacific's invasion of Bougainville.

Forces and Tactical Plans

The Allies

Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon Islands, is 125 miles long on its

northwest-to-southeast axis, and 30 to 48

miles wide.32 Its mountainous spine comprises two ranges, the Emperor and the

Crown Prince. Two active volcanoes,

10,000-foot Mount Balbi and 8,000-foot

Mount Bagana, send continual clouds

of steam and smoke into the skies. Mount

Bagana, a stark and symmetrical cone,

overlooks Empress Augusta Bay and is

the most outstanding feature of the region's dramatic beauty.

The mountain range ends toward the

southern part of the island, and there,

on the coastal plain near Buin, the Japanese had built the airfields of Kahili

and Kara. On the western coast the

mountains slope down through rugged

foothills and flatten out into a narrow

and swampy coastal plain that is cut

by many small rivers. These silt-laden

streams constantly build bars across their

own mouths and thus frequently change

their courses.

Good harbors in varying stages of

development were to be found at Buka,

Numa Numa, Tenekau, Tonolei, and

in the islands off the south coast. Empress Augusta Bay, exposed as it was to

the open sea, was a poor anchorage. The

Japanese had airfields at Buka and Bonis

on either side of Buka Passage, at Tenekau, Kieta, Kara, and Kahili on the

mainland, and at Ballale near the Shortlands, and had seaplane anchorages and

naval bases in the Shortlands. As on all

the other islands, there were no real

motor roads, only native trails near the

coasts plus a few that led through the

mountains.

The native population consisted of

over forty thousand nominally Christian

Melanesians, who were slightly darker

in color than their fellows in the southern Solomons. Before the war about a

hundred white missionaries, planters,

32

 This section is based on Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 279-89; Halsey and Bryan,

Admiral Halsey's Story, pp. 173-76; SOPACBACOM,

The Bougainville Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. I, OCMH;

Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area

(Vol. II of MacArthur hist), Ch. IX, p. 216, OCMH;

Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 7-8; 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH)

pp. 85-103; 17th Army Operations, II, Japanese

Monogr No. 40 (OCMH), 95-99; COMSOPAC Opn

Plan 16-43, 12 Oct 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 17

Oct 43.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 235

traders, and government officials had

lived on the island. Some of the natives,

it was known, were pro-Japanese and

had aided the enemy in rooting out the

coastwatchers earlier in the year.

Allied intelligence agencies estimated

enemy strength at about 37,500 soldiers

and 20,000 sailors, and correctly reported

that the Army troops belonged to the

17th Army, commanded by General

Hyakutake, who had been responsible

for the direction of the Guadalcanal

Campaign.33 Over 25,000 of Hyakutake's

men were thought to be in the BuinShortlands area, with an additional

5,000 on the east coast of Bougainville,

5,000 more at Buka and Bonis, and light

forces at Empress Augusta Bay. Air reconnaissance enabled the Allies to keep

a fairly accurate count of Japanese warships and planes in the New GuineaBismarcks-Solomons area.

Admiral Halsey, in preparing his attack, was not embarrassed by too many

ships. Admiral Nimitz was getting ready

to launch his great Central Pacific advance in November and had removed

many of Halsey's ships, leaving him but

eight transports and four cargo ships, or

enough shipping to carry one reinforced

division in the assault. Because South

Pacific commanders expected the Japanese to oppose the invasion with vigorous air attacks, they decided not to use

the slow LST's for the assault. The

South Pacific had one carrier force, Task

Force 38 under Rear Adm. Frederick C.

Sherman, consisting of the 910-foot aircraft carrier Saratoga, the light carrier

Princeton, two antiaircraft cruisers, and

ten destroyers. Nimitz, in response to

Halsey's requests for additional cruiserdestroyer and carrier task forces, assured Halsey that Central Pacific forces

would be within reach to assist if necessary, and agreed to send Halsey another

carrier task force on or about 7 November.34

Halsey issued the basic orders for the

operation on 12 October. He organized

five task forces similar to those that had

made up the New Georgia attack forces.

They were: Task Force 31 (the attack

force), under Admiral Wilkinson; Task

Force 33 (South Pacific land-based aircraft), under Admiral Fitch; Sherman's

Task Force 38; the cruisers and destroyers of Admiral Merrill's Task Force 39;

and Captain Fife's submarines in Task

Force 72.

The submarines were to carry out offensive reconnaissance in the waters of

the Bismarck Archipelago, and would be

supplemented in their work by Central

Pacific submarines operating out of Pearl

Harbor. Merrill's ships would support

the invasion by operating against enemy

surface ships and by bombarding Buka

and the Shortlands. Halsey also planned

to employ Sherman's Task Force 38 in

a raid against Buka and Bonis, which

lay beyond effective fighter range of the

New Georgia airfields. Task Force 33

was ordered to carry out its usual missions of reconnaissance, destruction of

enemy ships and aircraft, and air cover

and support of the invasion force. Air

33

 "Harukichi," listed in Miller, Guadalcanal: The

First Offensive as Hyakutake's given name, is a mistranslation.

34

 Ltr, Adm Duncan to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil

Hist, 16 Nov 53, no sub, OCMH.
236 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Command, Solomons, which was part

of Task Force 33, was making its intensive effort during October against the

Japanese airfields in southern Bougainville and the outlying islands, so that

these areas could safely be bypassed. Arrangements for local air support were

the same as for New Georgia. The local

air commander with the invasion force

was designated, as a subordinate of

Twining's, Commander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons, and would take command

of all support aircraft as they took off

from their bases.

Admiral Wilkinson's invasion force,

Task Force 31, consisted of eight transports, four cargo ships, two destroyer

squadrons, mine craft, almost all the

South Pacific's PT squadrons, and a

large force of ground troops under the

Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps (IMAC).

The ground commander was General

Vandegrift, USMC, an apple-cheeked,

deceptively soft-spoken Virginia gentleman, who had won distinction by his

conduct of operations on Guadalcanal

from 7 August 1942 until December of

that year. Vandegrift was at this time

slated to become commandant of the

Marine Corps in Washington, but was

given the Bougainville command temporarily because Maj. Gen. Charles D.

Barrett, who had replaced Vogel in command of the I Marine Amphibious

Corps, had met accidental death in Noumea. Halsey's choice for the corps command fell upon Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger,

USMC, another hero of Guadalcanal,

who was then in Washington as Director

of Marine Corps Aviation. Vandegrift

was to exercise the command until

Geiger could arrive.

Ground forces assigned to the attack

included the following: I Marine Amphibious Corps headquarters and corps

troops; 3d Marine Division; 37th Division; 8th Brigade Group, 3d New Zealand Division; 3d Marine Defense Battalion; 198th Coast Artillery Regiment

(Antiaircraft); 2d Provisional Marine

Raider Battalion; 1st Marine Parachute

Battalion; naval construction and communications units, and a boat pool.

In area reserve, to be committed on

orders from Admiral Halsey, were the

Americal Division in the Fijis; the 2d

Battalion, 54th Coast Artillery (Harbor

Defense) Regiment at Espiritu Santo;

and the 251st Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) Regiment in the Fijis.

Naming D Day as 1 November, the

date for the invasion of Empress Augusta

Bay, Halsey ordered Task Force 31 to

seize and hold the Treasury Islands on

D minus 5 (27 October) and establish

radar positions and a small naval base.

Wilkinson's main attack would be the

seizure of Empress Augusta Bay on 1

November, which would be followed by

the speedy construction of two airfields

on sites to be determined by ground reconnaissance after the troops had landed.

Task Force 31 was initially ordered to

be ready to establish a PT base on northern Choiseul. This part of the plan was

changed on the recommendation of

Vandegrift, who argued that the Treasury landings might reveal to the Japanese the intention to invade Empress

Augusta Bay. Halsey, Wilkinson, and

Vandegrift decided instead to use the

2d Marine Parachute Battalion in a

twelve-day raid on Choiseul which they

hoped would mislead the enemy into
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 237

LT. GEN. ALEXANDER A. VANDEGRIFT

believing that the real objective lay on

Bougainville's east coast.35

Halsey made Wilkinson, whose headquarters was then at Guadalcanal, responsible for co-ordination of all amphibious plans. Wilkinson was to command all elements of Task Force 31

until, at a time agreed upon by him and

the ground commander, direction of all

air, ground, and naval forces at Empress

Augusta Bay would be transferred to the

latter.

Wilkinson divided Task Force 31 into

a northern force, which he commanded

himself, for the main attack and a southern force, led by Admiral Fort, for the

Choiseul raid and the seizure of the

Treasuries. The assault echelon of the

northern force, scheduled to land at Empress Augusta Bay on D Day, included

destroyers, the transports and cargo ships,

and Maj. Gen. Allen H. Turnage's 3d

Marine Division, less one regimental

combat team and plus supporting units.

The Treasuries echelon of the southern

force was made up of 8 APD's, 2 LST's,

8 LCI's, 4 LCT's, 2 APC's, the 8th Brigade Group of the 3d New Zealand Division, the 198th Coast Artillery, A Company of the 87th Naval Construction Battalion, and communications and naval

base detachments. The parachute battalion would be transported by four

APD's escorted by destroyers. The 37th

Division, in corps reserve, would be

picked up at Guadalcanal by the northern force transports and would start arriving at Bougainville soon after D Day

to help hold the beachhead.

Guadalcanal and the Russells were to

serve as the main staging and supply

bases. However, the shortage of shipping

led the I Marine Amphibious Corps to

shorten the lines by establishing a supply

base at Vella Lavella. Plans called for

35

 General Geiger described the plan of maneuver

as "a series of short right jabs designed to throw

the enemy off balance and conceal the real power

of the left hook to his midriff at Empress Augusta

Bay." He must have boxed left-handed.
238 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

the Vella depot to be stocked with a

thirty-day supply of rations and petroleum products, but so strained was South

Pacific shipping that only a ten-day supply had been stocked at Vella Lavella

by 1 November.

During the last half of October the

ground units completed their training

and conducted final rehearsals. The 3d

Marine Division, part of which had

served in Samoa in 1942 before joining

the main body in New Zealand, had recently transferred from New Zealand to

Guadalcanal. It completed its amphibious and jungle training there and rehearsed for Empress Augusta Bay in the

New Hebrides from 16 to 20 October.

The 37th Division, returned from New

Georgia to Guadalcanal in September,

likewise conducted amphibious and jungle training at Guadalcanal. The 3d Marine Defense Battalion, which after serving in the Guadalcanal Campaign had

been sent to New Zealand and from

there back to Guadalcanal, rehearsed

there. The 8th Brigade practiced landings at Efate en route to Guadalcanal

from New Caledonia, and from 14 to 17

October rehearsed at Florida.

The Japanese

The Japanese fully expected Halsey to

attack Bougainville and were busy preparing to meet the invasion. Imperial

Headquarters' orders in September had

stressed the importance of Bougainville

as an outpost for Rabaul, and General

Imamura had instructed General Hyakutake to make ready. This the 17th

Army commander did, acting in conjunction with the commander of the

8th Fleet. The Japanese planned to use

air and surface strength to smash any

Allied attempt at invasion before the

assault troops could get off their transports. But if troops did succeed in getting ashore, the Japanese hoped to attack and destroy their beachheads.

Hyakutake's army consisted mainly of

the 6th Division, Lt. Gen. Masatane

Kanda commanding. (This division had

acquired an unsavory reputation for indiscipline by its sack of Nanking, China,

in 1937). Also assigned were the 4th

South Seas Garrison Unit (three infantry battalions and one field artillery battery), and field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and service units. Imamura was

sending four rifle battalions and one

artillery battalion of the 17th Division

from New Britain to northern Bougainville; these were due in November.36

Hyakutake, whose headquarters was

on tiny Erventa Island near Tonolei

Harbor, had disposed most of his strength

to cover the Shortlands, Buin, and Tonolei Harbor, the rest to protect Kieta

and Buka. Some 26,800 men—20,000 of

the 17th Army and 6,800 of 8th Fleet

headquarters and naval base forces—and

an impressive number of guns ranging

from machine guns to 140-mm. naval

rifles were stationed in southern Bougainville and the islands. Over 4,000

men were at Kieta, and the arrival of

the 17th Division units would bring the

Buka Passage garrison to 6,000.37

36

 The units attached to the Southeastern Detachment had been returned to their parent organizations. The Detachment was inactivated in December. 37

 These figures are taken from Southeast Area

Naval Operations, III, Japanese Monogr No. 50

(OCMH), 7-8. Army accounts do not give strength

figures.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 239

The unpromising nature of the terrain on the west coast of Bougainville

had convinced Hyakutake that the Allies would not attempt to land there.

Consequently only a small detachment

was stationed at Empress Augusta Bay.

Hyakutake was aware that he would be

outnumbered and outgunned in any

battle, but like most of his fellow Japanese generals he placed great faith in

the superior morale he believed his

troops possessed.

"The battle plan is to resist the enemy's material strength with perseverance, while at the same time displaying

our spiritual strength and conducting

raids and furious attacks against the

enemy flanks and rear. On this basis we

will secure the key to victory within

the dead spaces produced in enemy

strength, and, losing no opportunities,

we will exploit successes and annihilate

the enemy."38 Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before

a fall.

Preliminary Landings

The Treasuries

The assault echelon of Admiral Fort's

southern force consisted of five transport

groups: the advance transport group

with 8 APD's and 3 escorting destroyers;

the second with 8 LCI(L)'s, 2 LCI(G)'s,39

and 6 destroyers; the third with 2 LST's,

2 destroyers, and 2 minesweepers; the

fourth with 1 APC, 3 LCT's, and 2 PT

boats; the fifth with 1 APC, 6 LCM's,

and a rescue boat.40 These ships loaded

troops and supplies at Guadalcanal, Rendova, and Vella Lavella and departed

for the Treasuries on 26 October. Their

departures were timed for the five groups

to arrive in Blanche Harbor, which is

between Mono and Stirling Islands, between 0520 and 0830, 27 October.41

 All

possible measures were taken to avoid

detection, because the small forces had

to get established in the Treasuries before the Japanese were able to send in

reinforcements from their ample reserves in the nearby Shortlands. But

detection was almost inevitable in an

operation so close to enemy bases, and

at 0420, 27 October, a reconnaissance

seaplane sighted the ships near the

Treasuries and reported their presence.

Admiral Merrill's task force, covering

the operation some distance westward,

was also discovered.

Heavy rain fell as the leading APD's

arrived off the western entrance to

Blanche Harbor. Low-hanging clouds

obscured the jungled hills of Mono Island. As Blanche Harbor was too nar38

 17th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No.

40 (OCMH), 95. 39

 The LCI (G) was a gunboat designed to give

close fire support in landings. Two 20-mm., three

40-mm., and five .50-caliber machine guns were installed on an LCI (L).

40

 This section is based on Gillespie, The Pacific,

pp. 142-59; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 293-96; Rentz, Bougainville and the

Northern Solomons, pp. 92-114; ONI USN, Combat

Narratives: Solomon Islands Campaign, XII, The

Bougainville Landing and the Battle of Empress

Augusta Bay, 27 October-2 November 1943 [Washington, 1945], 11-23; SOPACBACOM, The Bougainville Campaign, Ch. II, OCMH; 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), p.

102; 17th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr

No. 40 (OCMH), 100-103; Outline of Southeast

Area Naval Air Operations, Pt. IV, Japanese Monogr

No. 108 (OCMH), p. 44. 41

 In Samuel Eliot Morison's words, "The historian wishes that the exploring captains of H.M.S.

Blanche, Renard, and Gazelle had not been so

fond of their ships as to name several harbors,

channels, and sounds after each one." Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, p. 293, n. 1.
240 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

row to permit ships to maneuver safely,

the fire support destroyers and seven

APD's remained west of the harbor.

While the troops boarded the landing

craft, destroyers opened fire on the landing beaches on Mono's south shore, and

the minesweepers checked Blanche Harbor. At the same time the APD McKean

put a radar party ashore on Mono's

north coast.

Covered by the destroyers' gunfire

and accompanied by the LCI gunboats,

the first wave of LCP(R)'s, carrying elements of two battalions of the 8th Brigade, moved through the channel in

the wet, misty half-light. There were

only a handful of Japanese on Mono,

some 225 men of the special naval landing forces. The naval bombardment

drove most of the defenders out of their

beach positions, and as the New Zealand

infantry went ashore they drove out or

killed the Japanese in the vicinity of the

beach. However, enemy mortars and machine guns from hidden positions in the

jungle fired on the landing beaches and

on the LST's of the fourth transport

group, which beached at 0735. This fire

caused some casualties, damaged some

weapons and equipment, and delayed

the unloading. But before noon the 8th

Brigade troops captured two 75-mm.

guns and one 90-mm. mortar and resistance to the landing ceased.

Stirling Island, which was not occupied by the enemy, was secured by a

battalion during the morning. A total of

2,500 men—252 Americans of the 198th

Coast Artillery and several detachments

from other units, the rest New Zealanders—had been landed on the south shore

of Mono. The radar detachment and accompanying combat troops that had

landed on the north coast of Mono numbered 200.

Meanwhile the American destroyers

were busy. In addition to providing fire

support for the landings they escorted

the unloaded transport groups back to

Guadalcanal. Two picket destroyers with

fighter director teams aboard were stationed east and west of the Treasuries

to warn against enemy air attacks.

General Hyakutake had decided that

the Treasury landings were a preliminary to a systematic operation, and that

the Allies would build an airfield on the

Treasuries, take Choiseul, and after

intensified air and surface operations,

would land three divisions on southern

Bougainville in late November. He felt

that they might possibly invade Buka.

Warning that the recent decline in Japanese naval strength might cause the

Allies to move faster, he stressed the

importance of building up the south

Bougainville defenses. In short, he believed just what the Allies hoped he

would.

When Admiral Kusaka at Rabaul was

notified of the Allied landing, he

brought some planes forward from Kavieng and sent fighters and dive bombers

against the Allies. Most of these were

headed off by the New Georgia-based

P-38's and P-40's that formed the southern force's air cover, but some got

through to damage the picket destroyer

Cony and harass the retiring LST's. The

Japanese pilots reported that they had

sunk two transports and two cruisers.

On shore, Brigadier R. A. Row of the

New Zealand Army, the landing force

commander, set up beach defenses. By

12 November his troops had killed or

captured the enemy garrison which had
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 241

fled into the hills of Mono. Two hundred

and five Japanese corpses were counted;

40 New Zealanders and 12 Americans

had been killed, 145 New Zealanders

and 29 Americans wounded.

Succeeding transport echelons, thirteen in all, brought in more troops and

equipment from 1 November 1943

through 15 January 1944. During this

period the boat pool, an advanced naval

base, and radars were established; these

supported the main operation at Empress Augusta Bay. Seabees of the U.S.

Navy built a 5,600-foot-long airstrip on

Stirling that was ready to receive fighter

planes on Christmas Day.

The Choiseul Raid

Four of the APD's that had carried

Brigadier Row's troops to the Treasuries sailed to Vella Lavella on 27 October and there took aboard 725 men of

Lt. Col. Victor H. Krulak's 2d Marine

Parachute Battalion, plus fourteen days'

rations and two units of fire. Escorted by

the destroyer Conway, the APD's steamed

for the village of Voza on Choiseul, and

that night landed the parachutists and

their gear.

General Vandegrift had ordered Krulak so to conduct operations that the

Japanese would believe a large force

was present. Krulak therefore raided

a barge staging point at Sagigai, some

eight miles from Voza, and then sent

strong combat patrols to the western

part of Choiseul. But by 2 November

the Japanese appeared to be concentrating at Sagigai with the obvious intention

of destroying the 2d Parachute Battalion. From eight hundred to one thousand enemy were reported to have moved

into Sagigai from positions farther east,

with more on the way. By now the Empress Augusta Bay landing had been

safely executed, and Vandegrift ordered

Krulak to withdraw. The battalion embarked on three LCI's in the early morning hours of 4 November. The raid cost

11 Marines dead, 14 wounded; 143 Japanese were estimated to have been slain.

Japanese sources do not indicate

what estimates Imamura and Hyakutake

placed on the operation. However, since

Hyakutake expected that Choiseul

would be invaded after the Treasuries

and before southern Bougainville, it is

not unlikely that Krulak's diversion confirmed his belief that southern Bougainville was the main Allied objective.

Seizure of Empress Augusta Bay

Supporting Operations

In invading Empress Augusta Bay,

Halsey's forces were bypassing formidable enemy positions in southern Bougainville and the Shortlands, and placing themselves within close range of all

the other Bougainville bases, as well as

within fighter range of Rabaul—thus the

strong air attacks by the Fifth Air Force

and the Air Command, Solomons. In

addition, Halsey had planned to make

sure that the Japanese bases on Bougainville were in no condition to launch

air attacks during the main landings on

1 November.42 Forces assigned to this

42

 This subsection is based on Halsey and Bryan,

Admiral Halsey's Story, pp. 177-79; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 292-93; Admiral

Frederick C. Sherman, Combat Command: The

American Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific War (New

York: E. P. Button & Co., Inc., 1950), pp. 199-200;

ONI USN, The Bougainville Landing and the

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, pp. 25-37.
242 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

mission were the 2 carriers, 2 antiaircraft light cruisers, and 10 destroyers of

Admiral Sherman's Task Force 38 and

the 4 light cruisers and 8 destroyers of

Admiral Merrill's Task Force 39.

Task Force 38 sortied from Espiritu

Santo on 29 October, Task Force 39

from Purvis Bay on Florida Island on 31

October. Both were bound initially for

Buka.

Merrill, sailing well south of the Russells and west of the Treasuries on his

537-mile voyage in pursuance of Halsey's tight schedule, got there first. He

arrived off Buka Passage at 0021, 1 November, and fired 300 6-inch and 2,400

5-inch shells at Buka and Bonis fields.

Shore batteries replied but without effect. Merrill then retired at thirty knots

toward the Shortland Islands. Enemy

planes harassed the task force but the

only damage they did was to the admiral's typewriter. One fire started by

the bombardment was visible from sixty

miles away.

About four hours after the beginning

of Merrill's bombardment Task Force

38 reached a launching position some

sixty-five miles southeast of Buka. This

was the first time since the outbreak

of the war in the Pacific that an Allied

aircraft carrier had ventured within

fighter range of Rabaul, and the first

tactical employment of an Allied carrier

in the South Pacific since the desperate

battles of the Guadalcanal Campaign.

In Admiral Sherman's words:

"We on the carriers had begun to

think we would never get any action. All

the previous assignments had gone to

the shore-based air. Admiral Halsey had

told me that he had to hold us for use

against the Japanese fleet in case it came

down from Truk. . . ."

 43

The weather was bad for carrier operations as the planes detailed for the

first strike, a force made up of eighteen

fighters, fifteen dive bombers, and eleven

torpedo bombers, prepared to take off in

the darkness. The sea was glassy and

calm; occasional rain squalls fell. There

was no breeze blowing over the flight

decks, and the planes had to be catapulted into the air, a slow process that,

coupled with the planes' difficulties in

forming up in the dark, delayed their arrival over Buka until daylight. Two torpedo bombers and one dive bomber hit

the water upon take-off, doubtless because of the calm air. The rest of the

planes dropped three 1,000-pound bombs

on Buka's runway and seventy-two 100-

pound bombs on supply dumps and dispersal areas.

The next strike—fourteen fighters,

twenty-one dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers—was launched at 0930

without casualties. These planes struck

Buka again and bombed several small

ships offshore. At dawn the next morning, 2 November, forty-four planes attacked Bonis, and at 1036 forty-one more

repeated the attack. Then Sherman,

under orders from Halsey, headed for

the vicinity of Rennell, due south of

Guadalcanal, to refuel. In two days of

action Task Force 38, operating within

sixty-five miles of Buka, estimated that

it had destroyed about thirty Japanese

planes and hit several small ships. More

important, it had guaranteed that the

Buka and Bonis runways could not be

used for air attacks against Admiral Wil43

 Sherman, Combat Command, p. 200.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 243

MAJ. GEN. ALLEN H. TURNAGE (right) and Commodore Laurence F. Reifsnider

aboard a transport before the landings on Bougainville.

kinson's ships. The Americans lost seven

men and eleven planes in combat and

operational crashes.

Meanwhile Merrill's ships had sped

from Buka to the Shortlands in the early

morning hours of 1 November to bombard Poporang, Ballale, Faisi, and

smaller islands. Merrill had bombarded

these before, on the night of 29-30 June,

but in stormy darkness. Now the bombardment was in broad daylight; it

started at 0631, seventeen minutes after

sunrise. Japanese shore batteries replied

with inaccurate fire. Only the destroyer

Dyson was hit, and its casualties and

damage were minor. His mission completed, Merrill headed south.

Approach to the Target

The last days of October found Wilkinson's ships busy loading and rehearsing at Guadalcanal and the New Hebrides.44

 Wilkinson had organized his eight

44

 The rest of this chapter is based on Morison,

Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 296-305; Rentz,

Bougainville and the Northern Solomons, pp. 21-

39; ONI USN, The Bougainville Landing and the

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, pp. 37-49; SOPACBACOM, The Bougainville Campaign, Ch. III,

OCMH; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese

Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), pp. 103-05; Southeast
244 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

transport and four cargo ships of Task

Force 31's northern force into three

transport divisions of four ships each. A

reinforced regiment of marines was to be

carried in each of two of the divisions,

the reinforced 3d Marine Defense Battalion in the third. The four transports

of Division A, carrying 6,421 men of the

3d Marines, reinforced, departed Espiritu Santo on 29 October and steamed

for Koli Point on Guadalcanal. There

Admiral Wilkinson and General Vandegrift boarded the George Clymer. General Turnage, 3d Marine Division commander, and Commodore Laurence F.

Reifsnider, the transport group commander, had come up from the New

Hebrides rehearsal in the Hunter Liggett. Transport Division B, after the rehearsal, took the 6,103 men of the reinforced 9th Marines from the New Hebrides and in the late afternoon of 30 October joined with the four cargo ships

of Transport Division C south of San

Cristobal. Division C carried the reinforced 3d Marine Defense Battalion,

1,400 men, and a good deal of heavy

equipment.

All transport divisions, plus 11 destroyers, 4 destroyer-minesweepers, 4 small

minesweepers, 7 minelayers, and 2 tugs,

rendezvoused in the Solomon Sea west

of Guadalcanal at 0740, 31 October.

They sailed northwestward until 1800,

then feinted toward the Shortlands, and

after dark changed course again toward

the northwest. During the night run to

Empress Augusta Bay PB4Y4's (Navy

Liberators), PV-1's (Vega Ventura night

fighters), and PBY's (Black Cats) covered

the ships. Enemy planes were out that

night and made contact with the covering planes but apparently did not spot

the ships, for none was attacked and Japanese higher headquarters received no

warnings.

Empress Augusta Bay was imperfectly

charted and the presence of several uncharted shoals was rightly suspected.

Consequently Wilkinson delayed arrival

at the transport area until daylight so

that masthead navigation could be used

to avoid the shoals.

The Landings

At 0432 of 1 November, Wilkinson's

ships changed course from northwest to

northeast and approached Cape Torokina in Empress Augusta Bay. Speed was

reduced from fifteen to twelve knots.

The minesweepers went out ahead to

check the area. General quarters sounded

on all ships at 0500, and forty-five

minutes later the ships reached the transport area. The transport Crescent City

struck a reef but suffered no damage.

Sunrise did not come until 0614, but

the morning was bright and clear enough

for the warships to begin a slow, deliberate bombardment of Cape Torokina at

0547. As each transport passed the cape

it too fired with its 3-inch and antiaircraft guns. Wilkinson set H Hour for

the landing at 0730. At 0645 the eight

transports anchored in a line pointing

north-northwest about three thousand

yards from shore; the cargo ships formed

a similar line about five hundred yards

to seaward of the transports.

Wilkinson, sure that the Japanese

would launch heavy air attacks, had come

Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese Monogr No.

50 (OCMH), 11-13; Outline of Southeast Area

Naval Air Operations, Pt. IV, Japanese Monogr No.

108 (OCMH), p. 46; observations of the author,

who participated as a member of D Battery, 3d

Marine Defense Battalion.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 245

MOUNT BAGANA

so lightly loaded that four to five hours

of unloading time would find his ships

emptied. Vandegrift and Turnage, anticipating little opposition at the beach,

had planned to speed unloading by sending more than seven thousand men

ashore in the assault wave. They would

land along beaches (eleven on the mainland and one on Puruata Island off Cape

Torokina) with a total length of eight

thousand yards.

The assault wave boarded landing

craft at the ships' rails. The winchmen

quickly lowered the craft into the water;

and the first wave formed rapidly and

started for shore.

The scene was one to be remembered,

with torpedo bombers roaring overhead,

trim gray destroyers firing at the beaches,

the two lines of transports and cargo

ships swinging on their anchors, and

the landing craft full of marines churning toward the enemy. This scene was

laid against a natural backdrop of awesome beauty. The early morning tropical

sun shone in a bright blue sky. A

moderately heavy sea was running, so

that at the shore a white line showed

where the surf pounded on the black and

gray beaches, which were fringed for

most of their length by the forbidding

green of the jungle. Behind were the

rugged hills, and Mount Bagana, towering skyward, emitting perpetual clouds

of smoke and steam, dominated the entire scene.
246 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The destroyers continued firing until

0731, when thirty-one torpedo bombers

from New Georgia bombed and strafed

the shore line for five minutes. The first

troops reached the beach at 0726, and in

the next few minutes all the assault wave

came ashore. There was no opposition

except at Puruata Island and at Cape

Torokina and its immediate vicinity.

There the Japanese, though few in numbers, fought with skill and ferocity.

Cape Torokina was held by 270 Japanese soldiers of the 2d Company, 1st

Battalion, and of the Regimental Gun

Company, 23d Infantry. One platoon

held Puruata. On Cape Torokina the

enemy had built about eighteen log-andsandbag pillboxes, each with two machine guns, mutually supporting, camouflaged, and arranged in depth. He had

also emplaced a 75-mm. gun in an openended log-and-sand bunker to fire on

landing craft nearing the beach.

Neither air bombardment nor naval

gunfire had had any appreciable effect

on these positions. Because air reconnaissance had shown that the enemy had

built defense positions on Cape Torokina (a low, flat, sandy area covered with

palm trees), it had been a target for

naval bombardment. Two destroyers had

fired at the cape from the south, but

had done no damage. Exploding shells

and bombs sent up smoke and dust that

made observation difficult; some shells

had burst prematurely in the palm trees.

Poor gunnery was also a factor, for many

shells were seen to hit the water.45

Thus when landing craft bearing the

3d Marines neared the cape the 75-mm.

gun and the machine guns opened fire.

The men were forced to disembark

under fire and to start fighting the moment they put foot to the ground. Casualties were lighter than might have been

expected—78 men were killed and 104

wounded in the day's action—but only

after fierce fighting and much valor were

the men of the 3d Marines able to establish themselves ashore. The pillboxes

were reduced by three-man fire teams:

one BAR man and two riflemen with

M1's, all three using grenades whenever

possible. The gun position was taken by

Sgt. Robert A. Owens of A Company,

3d Marines, who rushed the position

under cover of fire from four riflemen.

He killed part of the Japanese crew and

drove off the rest before he died of

wounds received in his assault.46

By 1100 Cape Torokina was cleared.

Most of its defenders were dead; the

survivors retreated inland. Puruata Island was secured at about the same time,

although some Japanese remained alive

until the next day. Elsewhere the landing waves, though not opposed by the

enemy, pushed inland slowly through

dense jungle and a knee-deep swamp

that ran two miles inland and backed

most of the beach north and east of

Cape Torokina. The swamp's existence

had not previously been suspected.

Air Attacks and Unloading

The Allied air forces of the South and

Southwest Pacific Areas had performed

mightily in their effort to neutralize

the Japanese air bases at Rabaul, Bougainville, and the Shortlands, but they

45

 See Rentz, Bougainville and the Northern

Solomons, p. 34; Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines

and Amphibious War, p. 180.

46

 Sergeant Owens received the Medal of Honor

posthumously.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 247

3D MARINES LANDING ON CAPE TOROKINA

had not been able to neutralize Rabaul

completely. In planning the invasion of

Empress Augusta Bay, the South Pacific

commanders were aware that the Japanese would probably counterattack

from the air. General Twining had arranged for thirty-two New Georgia-based

fighter planes of all types then in use

in the South Pacific—Army Air Forces

P-38's, New Zealand P-40's, and Marine

F4U's—to be overhead in the vicinity

all day. These planes were vectored by

a fighter director team aboard the destroyer Conway. Turning in an outstanding performance, they destroyed or

drove off most of the planes that the

Japanese sent against Wilkinson. But

they could not keep them all away.

At 0718, as the last boats of the assault

wave were leaving their transports, the

destroyers' radars picked up a flight of

approaching enemy planes then fifty

miles distant. The covering fighters kept

most of the planes away, but a few, perhaps twelve, dive bombers broke through

to attack the ships.

These bombers had come from Rabaul, where the enemy commanders were

making haste to organize counterattacks.

On 30 October Vice Adm. Sentaro

Omori, commanding a heavy cruiser division, had brought a convoy into Simpson Harbor at Rabaul. Next morning a

search plane reported an Allied convoy

of three cruisers, ten destroyers, and

thirty transports near Gatukai in the
248 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

New Georgia group. This was probably

Merrill's task force; it could not have

been Wilkinson's. On receiving this report Admiral Kusaka ordered the planes

of his 11th Air Fleet to start attacks, and

he and Koga, over the protests of the

8th Fleet commander, who warned of the

dangers of sending surface ships south

of New Britain, directed Omori to take

his force and all the 8th Fleet ships out

to attack. This Omori did, but he missed

Merrill and returned to Rabaul on the

morning of 1 November.

Then came the news of the landing at

Empress Augusta Bay. General Hyakutake was still sure that the main Allied

attack would be delivered against southern Bougainville, but General Imamura

ordered him to destroy the forces that

had landed. Imamura also arranged with

Kusaka for a counterattacking force from

the 17th Division, made up of the 2d

Battalion, 54th Infantry, and the 6th

Company, 2d Battalion, 53d Infantry, to

be transported to Empress Augusta

Bay.47 It would be carried on 6 destroyertransports and escorted by 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 6 destroyers, all

under Omori.

Admirals Koga and Kusaka, just completing their preparations for Operation

RO, also ordered out their planes. The

weather had come to their assistance by

halting the heavy raid General Kenney

had planned for 1 November. Koga alerted the 12th Air Fleet for transfer from

Japan to Rabaul. Kusaka sent out planes

of his 11th Air Fleet. The carrier planes

apparently did not take part on 1 November.

According to enemy accounts, Japanese planes delivered three separate attacks against Wilkinson on 1 November.

The Japanese used a total of 16 dive

bombers and 104 fighters, of which 19

were lost and 10 were damaged.48

When Wilkinson's ships received

warning at 0718, the transports and cargo

ships weighed anchor and steamed for

the open sea. They escaped harm, and

the dive bombers were able to inflict

only light damage to the destroyers. Two

sailors were killed. The transports returned and resumed unloading at 0930,

having lost two hours.

Another enemy attack at 1248 succeeded in breaking through the fighter

cover. Warned again by radar, the transports, with the exception of the American Legion, which stuck on an uncharted shoal, fled. The Japanese attacked the

moving ships instead of the Legion. No

damage was done, but the ships lost two

more hours of unloading time.49

The halts in unloading caused by air

attacks, coupled with beach and terrain

conditions that Admiral Halsey described as "worse than any we had previously encountered," slowed the movement of supplies and equipment.50

 Fully

one third of the landing force—5,700

men in all—had been assigned to the

shore party, but nature and the Japanese

47

 This force had been standing by awaiting orders

to move to western New Britain. It was separate

from the 17th Division units scheduled for Bougainville mentioned above, p. 238.

48

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), p. 46; p. 13 states that

twenty-two planes were lost. 49

 As usual the Japanese claims, like those of

American pilots, were exaggerated. They said they

sank two transports and a cruiser. 50

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

179.
THE INVASION OF BOUGAINVILLE 249

LCVP's ON THE BEACH AT EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY damaged by the rough, driving surf.

aircraft thwarted efforts to unload all

the ships on D Day.

Even on quiet days the surf at Empress Augusta Bay was rough, and on 1

November a stiff breeze whipped it higher. The northernmost beaches were steep

and narrow. The surf, and possibly the

inexperience of some of the crews, took

a heavy toll of landing craft. No less

than sixty-four LCVP's and twenty-two

LCM's broached on shore and were

swamped by the driving surf. As surf

conditions got worse, several beaches became completely unusable. Five ships

were shifted to beaches farther south,

with more delay and congestion at the

southern beaches. It was during this

move that the American Legion ran

aground.

By 1730 the eight transports were

empty and Wilkinson took them back to

Guadalcanal. But the four cargo ships,

which carried heavy guns and equipment, were still practically full. Vandegrift, who had had ample experience at

Guadalcanal in being left stranded on a

hostile shore while much of his equipment remained in the holds of departing ships, persuaded Wilkinson to allow

the cargo ships to put out to sea for the

night and return the next morning to

unload.51 Most of the troops aboard went

ashore in LCVP's before Commodore

Reifsnider led the cargo ships out to sea.

D Battery of the 3d Defense Battalion,

for example, its 90-mm. antiaircraft

51

 Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp.

79-81.
250 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

guns, fire control equipment, and radars

deep in the holds of the Alchiba, which

had lost all its LCM's in the raging surf,

went ashore as infantry and occupied a

support position in the sector of the 9th

Marines.

Except for the full holds of the cargo

ships, D Day had been thoroughly successful. All the landing force, including

General Turnage, Brig. Gen. Alfred H.

Noble, corps deputy commander, Col.

Gerald C. Thomas, the corps chief of

staff, and several other officers, were

ashore. General Vandegrift returned to

Guadalcanal on the George Clymer, leaving Turnage in command at Cape Torokina. By the day's end the division held

a shallow beachhead from Torokina

northward for about four thousand

yards. Aside from unloading the cargo

ships (a task that was expeditiously accomplished the next day), the main missions facing the amphibious and ground

commanders and the troops were threefold: to bring in reinforcements; to organize a perimeter defense capable of

beating off the inevitable Japanese counterattack; and to build the airfields that

would put South Pacific fighter planes

over Rabaul.
CHAPTER XIII

Exploiting the Beachhead

The ground troops at Cape Torokina

could be expected to carry out their missions efficiently only if they were unhampered by Japanese aircraft and warships.

Therefore the real battle for the beachhead was fought in the air and on the

sea. The primary mission of South Pacific aircraft and warships during the

first days of November was protection

of the newly won beachhead. In this

mission they fought hard and with excellent results.

Air and Surface Action, 1-11 November

When Admiral Omori led his task

force out of Rabaul in late afternoon of

1 November, he had orders to escort

Imamura's troops and to attack Wilkinson's transports in Empress Augusta

Bay. But after joining with the troopcarrying destroyers in Saint George's

Channel between New Britain and New

Ireland, Omori was sighted by a U.S.

submarine. Further, an unidentified

plane dropped a bomb near the light

cruiser Sendai. The Japanese, sure that

their intentions had been deduced, postponed the troop movement, but Omori

was allowed to take his task force of

two heavy and two light cruisers and

six destroyers to Empress Augusta Bay

with the intention of destroying the

American transports and cargo ships

which he thought would still be there.1

Meanwhile, Admiral Merrill's Task

Force 39 had sailed to the vicinity of

Vella Lavella after the two bombardments on 1 November. Four of his

eight destroyers were refueling in the

late afternoon of 1 November when

General Twining's reconnaissance planes

spotted Omori and flashed a warning.

Halsey ordered Merrill out to intercept

Omori. Receiving continuous, accurate

plots of Omori's course and speed, Merrill set his course and speed so that his

four light cruisers and eight destroyers

would intercept west of Empress Augusta Bay.

At 0229, 2 November, a few miles

from Cape Torokina, Task Force 39

made contact with Omori and attacked

at once. In this engagement, the Battle

of Empress Augusta Bay, Merrill sank

one light cruiser and one destroyer; except for the destroyer Foote, which lost

her stern to a Japanese torpedo, the

1

 This section is based on Craven and Cate, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 257-61, 325-28;

Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp. 180-

85; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp.

305-37; Sherman, Combat Command, 201-08; CTF

33 War Diary; Southeast Area Naval Operations,

III, Japanese Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 14-29; Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air Operations, Pt.

IV, Japanese Monogr No. 108 (OCMH), pp. 48-68.
252 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

American ships received light damage.

The flashes from gunfire and explosions

were visible to Commodore Reifsnider's

four cargo ships, which had put out to

sea, and to the marines ashore. The engagement lasted until dawn, when

Omori, tacitly acknowledging failure,

took his surviving ships back to Rabaul.

Near as he was to Rabaul, Merrill expected to suffer air attack at dawn, and

he was not wrong. When a Japanese

patrol plane sighted him 18 dive bombers and 80 fighters promptly took off

from Rabaul to the attack. Bad weather

on the morning of 2 November had kept

most of the Allied fighters on the New

Georgia fields, but 8 F6F's, 1 F4U, 3

P-38's, and 4 New Zealand P-40's, vectored by a destroyer still in Empress

Augusta Bay, hurled themselves at part

of the Japanese formation and shot down

several planes.

The remaining enemy planes came

upon Task Force 39 shortly before 0800

and promptly attacked. The task force

maneuvered rapidly, sailing clockwise in

a great circle and shooting 5-inch, 40-

mm., 20-mm., and even 6-inch guns at

the diving Japanese with considerable

success. The light cruiser Montpelier

suffered two bomb hits which wounded

several men, but the other ships went

unscathed. The Japanese broke off the

action, but on the way home lost more

planes to Allied fighters. More planes

from Rabaul would doubtless have come

out after Merrill that day but for the

Fifth Air Force's raid on the airfields,

which the Japanese carrier pilots contested so hotly.

Merrill's ships, after two busy days

that included two shore bombardments,

the night action of Empress Augusta

Bay, and the morning air attack, now

escorted Reifsnider's retiring cargo ships

as far as Rendova, then steamed for

Florida and concluded their eventful,

successful cruise. On the other hand, the

Japanese had lost two ships and numerous aircraft, and had not inflicted anything like equivalent damage to the

Americans. But Admiral Koga had not

given up. When he was informed of the

landings at Empress Augusta Bay, he

ordered Vice Adm. Takeo Kurita to take

seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser,

four destroyers, and a fleet train from

Truk to Rabaul. Kurita arrived safely

on 4 November, although later ships

were hit by Twining's B-24's.

This force of heavy cruisers at Rabaul

posed a serious threat to the new beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay, and created, wrote Admiral Halsey, "the most

desperate emergency that confronted me

in my entire term as COMSOPAC."2

He knew that he had to stop them, but

he had only two naval task forces—

Merrill's, which was exhausted after its

performance of 1-2 November, and

Sherman's carriers. Up to now carriers

had been employed against land bases

only in the most gingerly fashion. The

South Pacific staff calculated that Sherman, from his refueling position near

Rennell, could strike Kurita before

Kurita would strike Empress Augusta

Bay. So Halsey ordered Sherman to hit

Rabaul. When he gave these orders the

South Pacific commander expected the

carrier air groups to be "cut to pieces"

and the carriers "stricken."3

"I fully expected that they [Sherman's

2

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp.

180-81. 3

 Ibid., p. 181.
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 253

carriers] would be lost."4 ". . . but we

could not let the men at Torokina be

wiped out while we stood by and wrung

our hands."5 Halsey was never a man

to stand idly by and wring his hands, or

to allow anyone else that emotional

luxury.

Halsey directed South Pacific landbased air (Task Force 33) to provide

cover for Sherman during his daylight

approach and retirement. This job was

done by Navy fighters from New Georgia, which of course were capable of

landing on carrier decks. Thus Sherman

was able to send all his aircraft against

Rabaul instead of keeping some of them

overhead for protection.

Task Force 38 reached its launching

point in the Solomon Sea 57 miles southwest of Torokina and 230 miles southeast of Rabaul at 0900, 5 November. The

weather was fine for carrier operations;

a steady breeze was blowing, and there

were frequent rain squalls where the

ships could hide in case of air attack.

The two carriers sent out 97 planes: 23

torpedo bombers, 22 dive bombers, and

52 fighters. They arrived over Rabaul

and dived through a hole in the clouds

to take the Japanese by surprise. Though

faced by intense antiaircraft fire they

bored in with resounding success. They

did not sink any ships, but damaged

three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,

and two destroyers so severely that

months passed before any of them were

fit to fight again. This was done at a

cost of fifteen men killed or missing, ten

planes lost. Halsey's gloomy expectations

were not fulfilled.

Twenty-seven B-24's and fifty-eight

P-38's from the Fifth Air Force reached

Rabaul in the afternoon. As practically

all the Japanese planes were out after

Task Force 38, Kenney's men bombed

the wharves. The Japanese failed to find

Sherman, but they attacked an LCI, an

LCT, and a PT boat near the southern

arm of Empress Augusta Bay, and

claimed a tremendous but nonexistent

victory.6

Sherman's victory, on the other hand,

was real. Next day Koga decided to pull

his heavy cruisers back to Truk, and the

threat to Cape Torokina was ended.

Thereafter no more heavy Japanese ships

went to Rabaul.

Meanwhile Kusaka's 11th Air Fleet

and the carrier planes, besides attacking

Merrill and Sherman, had been striking

day and night against Cape Torokina,

hammering at reinforcement convoys,

and fighting almost constantly with Allied fighter planes. They damaged three

ships and sank one, but kept losing

planes to ship- and shore-based antiaircraft guns and to Twining's fighters.

Air Command, Solomons, made a maximum effort to keep the enemy's Bougainville bases out of action and to keep

the Rabaul-based planes away from Cape

Torokina and the reinforcement convoys. For example, on 10 November

there were 712 take-offs and landings

at Munda airfield alone.

Rabaul was still a primary target for

General Kenney. The weather prevented

an attack on 6 November, but 10 No4 vember saw a heavy attack, and next day Halsey's preface to Sherman's Combat Command, p. 8. 5

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

181.

6

 For details see Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks

Barrier, p. 329.
254 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

AIRCREWMAN WOUNDED IN STRIKE ON RABAUL is helped out of his plane on flight

deck of aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, 5 November 1943.

RAAF Beauforts and Fifth Air Force

planes struck in the morning before

heavy clouds piled up over Rabaul.

The additional carrier task group of

the Fifth Fleet that Admiral Nimitz

had promised to Halsey reached the

South Pacific on 7 November. Commanded by Rear Adm. Alfred L. Montgomery, it consisted of the carriers Essex,

Bunker Hill, and Independence. Halsey

planned to use Montgomery's ships as

well as Task Force 38 in a double carrier

strike against Rabaul on 11 November.

Sherman sailed to a point in the Pacific Ocean near Green Island, northnorthwest of Bougainville, and launched

planes. They reached Rabaul in bad

weather about 0830, struck at ships, and

returned to the carriers, which retired

southward without being detected.

Montgomery launched his strike from

a point in the Solomon Sea about 160

miles southeast of Rabaul. His planes

hit at ships too, then returned to their

mother carriers. The Japanese found

Montgomery and delivered a series of

furious though unsuccessful air attacks

which inflicted only slight damage. They

lost thirty-five planes to ships' antiaircraft guns and to Allied fighters from

New Georgia.

In eleven days of the RO operations

against the Allied lines of communication and the Torokina beachhead, the
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 255

Japanese pilots had reported enormous

damage to Allied ships and planes,

whereas in reality they had accomplished

very little and had suffered the real damage themselves.7

 Koga had sent 173

planes and 192 men down from Truk,

and by the end of 11 November 121

planes had been destroyed and 86 of the

men were dead. The 11th Air Fleet had

lost about 70 planes. These losses

".. . had put the carrier air force in a

position where further combat would

rob it of even a skeleton force around

which to rebuild. . . ."8 Koga may have

believed his pilots' claims, but he also

recognized the significance of his own

losses. On 12 November he withdrew

the carrier planes to Truk. The withdrawal, first of the cruisers and then of

the planes, ended Rabaul's offensive

threat. Thereafter it was a formidable

defense position only, and after Armistice Day Southwest Pacific planes were

able to cease their attacks against it and

concentrate against enemy bases to the

west.

The damage that Sherman's pilots inflicted on the heavy cruisers and Koga's

losses in carrier planes had repercussions

that were felt far beyond Empress Augusta Bay. Koga had planned to use the

Combined Fleet to seek out and destroy

the U.S. Pacific Fleet if the Americans

invaded the Gilberts or Marshalls, but

when Admiral Nimitz' forces moved into

the Gilberts on 21 November 1943, Koga

did not stir out of Truk; the cruiser

damage and aircraft losses had completely immobilized the Combined

Fleet.9 This series of events, wherein the

Japanese shifted forces back and forth

to meet Allied threats from different

parts of the Pacific, and lost as a result,

was an advantage the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had in mind when they ordered

two advances rather than one. The series

illustrates also the strategic importance

of Rabaul, and the advantages that their

interior lines gave to the Japanese.

Operations Ashore

Now landed and completely protected

from Japanese surface attack, although

subject to frequent air raids by day and

by night, the 3d Marine Division was

hampered as much by terrain as by the

enemy. The swamps and dense forest

slowed the movement of supplies and the

building of roads and airfields. During

their first five days on shore the marines

patrolled, established antiaircraft and

beach defenses, and extended the perimeter two thousand yards inland. (Map

16) Seventy-eight marines were killed or

missing, 104 wounded.10

More Troops

The first reinforcements, one battalion

of the 21st Marine Regiment, arrived on

7

 The Japanese reported sinking 5 battleships, 10

aircraft carriers, 19 cruisers, 7 destroyers, and 9

transports between 27 October and 10 December. 8

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 25-26.

9

 See Wilds, "The Admiral Who Lost His Fleet,"

United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 77,

No. 11 (November 1951); Crowl and Love, The

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, Ch. IV. 10

 This section is based on Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 337-69; Rentz, Bougainville

and the Northern Solomons, pp. 39-80; [British]

Central Office of Information, Among Those Present, pp. 64-73; SOPACBACOM, The Bougainville

Campaign, Chs. III-IV, V, OCMH; Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific Campaign,

OCMH; Harmon, The Army in the South Pacific,

OCMH; I Mar Amphib Corps, Bougainville Beachhead; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr

No. no (OCMH), pp. 103-06; 17th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 40 (OCMH), 104;

the author's observations.
256 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

AMPHIBIAN TRACTORS LVT(1), carrying supplies and ammunition, move inland

over a muddy trail.

eight LST's and eight APD's on 6 November. Escorted by six destroyers and

covered by Task Force 39, these ships

had sailed from Purvis Bay two days

before. Japanese aircraft harried them

during the night of 5-6 November but

did no damage.

For speedy unloading, the LST cargoes had been packed on trailers at Purvis Bay. But Cape Torokina did not

boast very many beaches suitable for the

LST's (which in the South Pacific almost

never carried tanks). One beach at Puruata Island had room for three LST's,

but using this meant unloading gear at

Puruata and then transshipping it to the

mainland. At the beaches east of Cape

Torokina the LST's grounded offshore.

Seabees improvised coconut log runways,

which failed to stand up under the

strain. The eventual answer to the problem lay in steel pontons.

On 8 November substantial reinforcements came in, some aboard six of the

ships that had made the initial invasion

and then returned to Guadalcanal to

pick up the 148th Regimental Combat

Team of the 37th Division. Japanese

aircraft made the day exciting as the soldiers unloaded and went ashore. Over

a hundred planes attacked at noon.

Twenty-eight Allied fighters from New

Georgia kept many of them off, but some

got through and damaged the President

Jackson. Once ashore, the 148th relieved

the 3d Marines on the left flank, and
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 257

TRACTOR AND TRAILER IN MUD. Marines are perched on load of artillery

ammunition.

the marine regiment was assigned a position in the middle of the inland side

of the perimeter defense.

General Geiger, having flown out from

Washington and relieved General Vandegrift as corps commander, arrived at

Bougainville on the 9th. On 13 November Admiral Wilkinson relinquished his

control and Geiger became directly responsible to Halsey. The amphibious

commander retained responsibility for

the transport of troops and supplies to

the beachhead.

Other reinforcements from the 37th

and 3d Marine Divisions came in

promptly. The 129th Regimental Combat Team landed on 13 November, and

was followed six days later by the 145th.

Except for miscellaneous units and detachments, this completed the movement

of General Beightler's veteran division

to the beachhead. The remaining units

of the 21st Marines arrived on 11 and 17

November. During the latter shipment

the APD McKean was fatally torpedoed

by a Japanese plane. Thus by the end

of the third week in November there

were two full divisions at Empress

Augusta Bay, plus substantial bodies of

corps troops, naval construction battalions, and naval base forces. The I Marine

Amphibious Corps held a perimeter

about sixteen thousand yards in circumference, including seven thousand yards

along the beach. The 37th Division held

the left, the 3d Marine Division the

EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 259

SOLDIERS OF THE 148TH REGIMENTAL

COMBAT TEAM boarding the transport

President Jackson for the run to

Bougainville, 5 November 1943.

right. This perimeter was not attained

without fighting, but the 37th Division

was fortunate in that, except for patrol

clashes, all the fighting occurred in the

3d Marine Division's zone.

Expansion of the Perimeter

Even after 1 November Japanese

Army commanders continued to cherish

the delusion that the main effort was yet

to come, and that southern Bougainville

or Buka was the real target. However,

on orders from Imamura to destroy the

wide, shallow Allied beachhead at Cape

Torokina, Hyakutake dispatched the two

battalions of the 23d Infantry from the

Buin area to the cape. Under command

of Maj. Gen. Shun Iwasa, infantry group

commander of the 6th Division, the 23d

was to operate in conjunction with the

17th Division troops whose transfer from

Rabaul, first planned for 1 November,

had been postponed. Aboard four destroyers, 475 men of this group finally

got under way for Torokina on 6 November; 700 others sailed for Buka. The

17th Division troops were to cover the

movement of the 23d Infantry by landing north of the cape near the Americans' left and creating a diversion. They

would then move inland and join with

the 23d. Iwasa was to advance down a

trail with the combined force and attack

the beachhead.

The troop-carrying destroyers hove to

off the beach between the Laruma and

Koromokina Rivers in the predawn

darkness on the morning of 7 November.

Between 0400 and 0600, the 475 soldiers

slipped ashore in twenty-one landing

craft under the very noses of the American defenders. Patrolling PT boats

missed the destroyers, and an antitank
260 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

platoon on shore saw the landing craft

but thought they were American. The

enemy soldiers landed so close to the

American lines that they actually cut off

several marines in an outpost, who were

later rescued by two LCM's.

The Japanese attacked at once in the

vicinity of a lagoon about fourteen hundred yards west of the Koromokina

River. The sector was defended by troops

of the 3d Marines who had just exchanged positions with the 9th Marines.

General Turnage had ordered the transfer because the 3d had seen all the fighting on D Day, the 9th (which landed on

the left) none, and there seemed to be

no immediate prospect of fighting on the

left. The enemy made some small local

gains by infiltrating. The fighting, with

rifles, machine guns, mortars, and grenades, was close work, but the marine

lines held.

Next morning five field artillery batteries, plus mortars, antitank guns, and

machine guns, fired a twenty-minute

preparation into the Japanese position.

Then the newly arrived 1st Battalion,

21st Marines, supported by light tanks,

assaulted. It met only light opposition;

the artillery preparation had come close

to achieving perfection. Instead of engaging in a fierce fight, the 1st Battalion

walked, cautiously but steadily, through

the jungle. It found, in the small area

where the Japanese had packed themselves, about three hundred men killed

almost instantaneously, their dead bodies

lying beside their smashed weapons. In

this action at Koromokina Lagoon the

marines suffered sixteen men killed,

thirty wounded.

Meanwhile the 23d Infantry had

moved into position inland and had already begun attacking the trail blocks

the marines had set up. Control of the

trail system inland was of great importance to the security of the beachhead. It was clear that unless the Japanese had enough strength to deliver a

major attack from the sea (and Admiral

Sherman had settled that question on 5

November) any Counteroffensives would

be delivered along the axes of the trails.

There were two important tracks at

Cape Torokina, East-West Trail and the

Numa Numa Trail. The latter ran from

the shore near the mouth of the Piva

River northward through the mountains

to Numa Numa on the east coast. EastWest Trail intersected the Numa Numa

Trail about five thousand yards inland

(north) of the Piva's mouth. It led eastward, then north through the mountains

to Roravana Bay and intersected the

several trails leading to Buin. A local

track, Mission Trail, ran from a point

about two thousand yards north of the

Piva mouth southwestward to the Roman

Catholic mission station at Buretoni just

northwest of Torokina.

On 5 November the 23d Infantry attacked a block on Mission Trail that was

held by the 3d Raider Battalion. After

the raider battalion beat off the 23d; it

and later the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,

counterattacked up Mission Trail and by

Armistice Day had advanced to the junction of Mission and Numa Numa Trails.

Losing 19 killed and 32 wounded, the

marines estimated that they had accounted for 550 of the enemy.

Two days later the 21st Marines continued the fight, this time not only to

keep control of the trails but also to se-
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 261

cure an airfield site. Since landing the I

Marine Amphibious Corps had also been

hard at work pushing supply routes

through the swamps, an extremely difficult and time-consuming task. At the

same time patrols had found a good airfield site in a coconut grove by the right

(west) bank of the Piva River near the

junction of the Numa Numa and EastWest Trails. This was some distance

from the 3d Division's front, and the difficulties of pushing supplies so far prevented an immediate forward displacement of the 3d Division to include the

site. Generals Geiger and Turnage therefore decided to establish a self-sustaining

outpost at the trail junction in order to

hold the airfield site. On 13 and 14 November troops of the 21st Marines, fighting hard against Japanese in prepared

positions, made their way through the

coconut grove and by 1600 of 14 November had seized the trail junction.

Because the building of roads and

trails inside the beachhead eased the

logistical situation, Geiger decided to

move his whole front forward in the

latter part of November. The 3d Division would advance on the east (right),

the 37th Division on the west. Five

artillery battalions, operating under the

37th Division artillery commander, Brig.

Gen. Leo N. Kreber, would provide support, as would the Aircraft, Northern

Solomons, under Brig. Gen. Field Harris,

USMC. The 37th Division met no fighting in its advance but the 3d Marine

Division continued to meet opposition

from the 23d Infantry along the trails,

especially on the Numa Numa Trail

north of the airfield site and in the region

northeast of that site where the EastWest Trail crossed several tributary

forks of the Piva River. Here, between

20 and 24 November, the Japanese resisted vigorously but vainly. By 26 November the 3d Marine Division, maintaining contact on the left with the 37th

Division, had extended its lines as far

north as the south shore of Lake Kathleen, about 7,500 yards north of the

Piva's mouth. In the fighting in the Piva

forks the 3d Marines took the first high

ground in the beachhead. Along the

shore line the I Corps held the beach

from a point 6,000 yards northwest of

Cape Torokina to a point 3,500 east of

the cape. The inland lines of the perimeter were about 19,500 yards long.

During November the Japanese Army

commanders still refused to believe that

Halsey had made his main effort at Empress Augusta Bay and therefore undertook no counterattacks on a scale large

enough to be effective. But Rabaul-based

aircraft continued to raid the beachhead.

Both division command posts were hit,

as were several fuel and ammunition

dumps, which blew skyward in impressive and expensive displays. On a few

occasions the enemy planes swooped

down suddenly over the mountains during daylight and caught the beachhead

by surprise (the mountains blocked the

radar beams), but most of the bombings

were nocturnal, and the Japanese simplified the radar operators' problems by

attacking from seaward where they were

easy to locate in time for warning to be

given and the antiaircraft guns to go

into action. Puruata Island, with phosphorescent water outlining it clearly,

was a favorite and profitable target, since

it was nearly always packed with supplies
ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY, JR., center, with Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, left,

and Brig. Gen. Leo N. Kreber, Bougainville, 13 November 1943.
37 T H

 DIVISION TROOPS moving inland from the beach over a slimy mud trail,

8 November 1943. These men are from the 148th Regimental Combat Team.
RESULTS OF JAPANESE BOMBING OF PURUATA ISLAND, 20 November 1943. Top left,

view from Bougainville. Note wrecked landing craft, foreground. Top right,

damaged 90-mm. gun of F Battery, 3d Defense Battalion. Bottom, fuel dump

on fire.
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 265

awaiting transshipment to the mainland.11

These attacks did not jeopardize the

security of the beachhead but they were

a costly nuisance. Of ninety air alerts in

November, twenty-two resulted in bombings and strafings that killed twenty-four

men and wounded ninety-six. In addition to the antiaircraft guns a few PV-1

night fighters from New Georgia defended against Kusaka's fliers. Though

their losses were lighter than in daylight

attacks, the Japanese lost several planes

to the night fighters and the antiaircraft

batteries.

So sure were the Japanese that Buka

was an ultimate target that they continued to send reinforcements there.

Late in November 920 soldiers on board

three destroyers with two more escorting attempted to get to Buka. They were

intercepted in the Solomon Sea during

the night of 25 November by Captain

Burke's destroyer squadron, which

chased them from near Buka almost to

Cape Saint George, the southern tip of

New Ireland. Burke's ships sank three

destroyers without receiving as much as

one hit themselves. This action, the

Battle of Cape Saint George, was the last

of the night surface engagements which

had characterized the Solomons campaigns since the one off Savo Island on

8 August 1942.12

In November and December at Empress Augusta Bay the indefatigable Japanese had begun to emplace artillery of

calibers as high as 150-mm. on the high

ground around the beachhead, especially

in a group of hills that lay east of the

Numa Numa-East-West Trails' junction

and paralleled the west bank of the

Torokina River. With these guns they

shelled the beachhead, especially the airstrips and the supply dumps. The 3d

Marine Division reacted by extending

its lines to include the hills in a series

of operations that lasted from 9 December through 27 December. One eminence, Hellzapoppin Ridge, was a natural fortress three hundred feet long,

with sharp slopes and a narrow crest. It

overlooked much of the beachhead and

was an excellent site for artillery. Here

the Japanese had constructed extensive

positions on the reverse slopes using natural and artificial camouflage. The 21st

Marines attacked Hellzapoppin Ridge

but were driven off on 18 December.

Several air strikes missed the narrow

ridge completely. Finally, co-ordinated

air (TBF's dropped 100-pound bombs

with delay fuzes), artillery, and infantry

attacks resulted in the capture of Hellzapoppin on Christmas Day. In the air

strikes success was finally attained by

marking the American front lines with

colored smoke and designating the enemy

targets with white phosphorus.

By 15 December the Americans held

their final defensive line, a perimeter

defense that extended on its inland side

for about 22,500 yards. Over 44,000 men

were present. Construction of the defense perimeter had begun in some sectors on 25 November, and by 15 December the work was complete. The line

consisted of two-man foxholes, trenches,

emplacements for automatic weapons,

11

 In the early hours of 20 November a Japanese

plane scored a direct hit on one of the 90-mm. guns

of F Battery, 3d Defense Battalion, on Puruata

that killed five and wounded eight of the crew as

well as knocking the gun out of commission and

blowing up a fuel dump. 12

 For details see Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks

Barrier, pp. 352-59.
266 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

105-MM. HOWITZER of the 135th Field

Artillery Battalion in action.

mortars, antitank guns, and artillery,

with alternate positions for all weapons.

Fields of fire were cleared for 100 yards

in front of the lines but all possible

foliage was left in place overhead. The

field artillery, grouped under command

of General Kreber, was sited to fire in

support of any threatened sector, and all

weapons were registered and adjusted for

every possible avenue of approach. All

trails were blocked, and the approaches

to the swamps were mined. Whenever

possible machine guns were posted in

commanding positions on high ground.

The 4.2-inch chemical mortars were so

sited and adjusted that they could place

their fire directly in front of the infantry.

The whole front was wired in behind

two rows of either double-apron or concertina barbed wire, and the wire was

full of trip wires and of cans hung up

to rattle when an enemy approached the

wire. Several antiaircraft searchlights

were set up to illuminate the front at

night, either directly or by throwing up

widely spread beams that would be reflected down from the clouds. The defenses were formidable, and it would be

some time before the Japanese got

around to testing them thoroughly.

Meanwhile life inside the perimeter

promised to be relatively agreeable.

The XIV Corps Takes Over

The 3d Marine Division had borne

the brunt of operations thus far, but it

was not to be allowed to settle down in

comfort behind its defenses. Admiral

Halsey had other plans. The Americal

and 40th Divisions had at first been

scheduled for the projected assault

against Kavieng, but Halsey now wanted

the I Marine Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 3d Marine Division and

the 40th Infantry Division, to conduct

the operation. He proposed sending

General Griswold's XIV Corps headquarters to Bougainville to relieve General Geiger's headquarters, and transferring the Americal Division from the

Fijis to relieve the 3d Marine Division.13

When Halsey first announced his plan

on 2 November General Harmon opposed it, but Halsey overrode his objections.

Thus on 15 December General Griswold relieved General Geiger of command of all Allied air, surface, and

ground forces based at Empress Augusta

Bay and in the Treasuries. Admiral Halsey also made Harmon his informal

13

 The 40th was then in Hawaii due for shipment

to the South Pacific.
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 267

4.2-lNCH CHEMICAL MORTAR firing in

support of infantry troops.

deputy for supervising operations of the

XIV Corps. On Christmas Day came

the first troops of the Americal Division,

the 164th Regimental Combat Team.

Bidden farewell by one of the area's frequent earthquakes, the battle-weary 3d

Marines departed on the ships that had

carried the 164th. On 28 December General Hodge arrived and took over command of the eastern sector from Turnage, and the 182d Regimental Combat

Team prepared to take over from the

21st Marines. The 132d Regimental

Combat Team took over its part of the

line on 9 February, and five days later

the Americal's field artillery battalions,

the 221st, 245th, 246th, and 247th, began

relieving the 3d Division's artillery regiment, the 12th Marines.14

 The 3d Defense Battalion and several Marine air

squadrons remained at Empress Augusta

Bay.

With the Japanese quiescent in December except for intermittent air attacks at night, the immediate problems

facing Griswold were logistical rather

than tactical. The road net had to be

finished; a good road net would not

only improve the supply situation but

would give Griswold all the benefits of

interior lines if and when the Japanese

attacked in strength. The inland airfields had to be completed, beach congestion ended, more dumps and depots

established. General Griswold stated the

problem thus:

Puruata Island was so heavily loaded

down it was about to sink. All beaches were

congested. No long range supply road system had been planned. Long hand carry

was the rule, particularly in the Marine Di- vision sector (later the Americal) for the

front line troops. Forward ration dumps,

ammunition and bomb dumps, gasoline

dumps, hospital areas and bomb shelters for

the same, beach developments, interior supply roads, the Service Command area itself,

a central cemetery, refrigeration, sawmills,

drainage ditches, and a myriad of other

14

 Total casualties for the I Marine Amphibious

Corps to 15 December were:

1. Empress Augusta Bay, 293 killed, 1,071 wounded, 95 missing, and 1,161 sick and evacuated. (The

relatively large figure for missing was due to the

McKean's sinking and the loss of many of her

passengers.)

2. Treasuries, 53 killed, 174 wounded, and 1

missing.

3. Choiseul, 7 killed, 14 wounded, 4 missing. In

addition I Marine Amphibious Corps lost several

men at the base depot in Vella Lavella to aerial

bombardment. Of the total casualties, the 3d Marine

Division lost the most—186 killed, 624 wounded.

The 37th Division suffered 10 wounded during the

period. All these figures are taken from a casualty

report in I Marine Amphibious Corps' report, Phase

III. The 3d Marine Division reported that it had

counted 2,100 dead Japanese.
268 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

LT. GEN. MILLARD F. HARMON, center, and Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, second

from left, are briefed by a Marine officer.

things were non-existent, and not even

visualized. Space for all these things had to

be carved out of the virgin jungle.15

Griswold, characterized by Halsey as

"a farsighted and capable planner," set

to work with his staff.16 Harmon's headquarters contributed greatly to the solution of the logistical problems by activating, in New Caledonia on 15 December,

a Provisional Service Command for Bougainville. This organization, specifically

tailored for the particular mission of

supporting the XIV Corps, began its

operations on Bougainville on 6 January

1944. By 31 January its strength was

slightly more than two thousand men.

Logistical development under Griswold was extensive and orderly. By now

the swamp had been drained. Malaria

was kept rigidly under control. The

volcanic ash of the region made adequate

roads, but the heavy rainstorms that fell

almost daily tended to wash them away.

Road maintenance was therefore one of

the most difficult logistic problems. By

1 March forty-three miles of two-way

and thirty-six miles of one-way roads had

been built. The troops also cleared

several acres for gardens. The hot sun

and frequent rains gave them fair returns, and fresh vegetables, normally a

rarity in that part of the world, improved

the otherwise almost unvarying diet of

C and K rations and dehydrated foods.

15

 Ltr, Griswold to Barnett, CofS USAFISPA, 15

Feb 44, quoted in SOPACBACOM, The Bougainville Campaign, Ch. 5, p. 239, OCMH. 16

 Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific

Campaign, p. 11, OCMH.
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 269

Green vegetables grew fairly well, but

tomatoes and corn did not.17 There were

frequent distributions of books, movies,

performances by motion picture and

radio personalities, sports, and occasionally beer and soft drinks. Empress

Augusta Bay was about as pleasant a

beachhead as one could hope for.

During the first two and a half months

following Griswold's assumption of command there was no heavy fighting. There

were not enough troops to hold all the

high ground inland, but combat and

reconnaissance patrols went out to the

east, the north, and the west to keep tab

on all the possible routes of Japanese

approach. Airplanes also reconnoitered

trails, and PT boats, water routes.

One of the outstanding patrols was

conducted by the 1st Battalion of the

Fiji Infantry Regiment, which arrived in

late December. This battalion, composed

of 34 officers (some white, some Fijian)

and 777 enlisted Fijians, was at first commanded by Lt. Col. J. B. K. Taylor of

New Zealand. But Taylor was wounded

his first night ashore and was replaced

by Maj. Geoffrey T. Upton, also of New

Zealand.18 A detachment of the Fiji battalion left the beachhead on 28 December and walked through the mountains

over the Numa Numa Trail to the village of Ibu, east of the mountains, where

they set up an outpost on 30 December.

From Ibu these natural jungle fighters

kept watch over enemy movements on

the east coast so that no Japanese could

advance unsuspected along the Numa

Numa Trail. They reported to corps

headquarters by radio and were supplied

by air drops from C-47's. They also

hacked an airstrip suitable for L-4 planes

(Piper Cubs) on the 1,700-foot-high shelf

that Ibu rests on.

But during December 1943 all ground

operations were of minor importance

when compared with the air operations

against Rabaul that were conducted by

South Pacific aircraft.

December Attacks Against Rabaul

Eight Seabee battalions and one New

Zealand engineer brigade had begun

work on a fighter strip at Cape Torokina

promptly after D Day. Because the area

was one of the few relatively dry patches

of ground at Empress Augusta Bay, there

was some competition among other units

to occupy it, but the squatters were

evicted and the builders were able to

work unimpeded.19 The strip was ready

for operations on 9 December, and the

next day seventeen F4U's of Marine

Fighting Squadron 216 (I Marine Aircraft Wing) flew in and set up at their

new base.

Starting in mid-November B-24's of

the Thirteenth Air Force had begun

bombing Rabaul every few days, but

17

 Ltr, Hon. Hugh M. Milton, II (former CofS,

XIV Corps), to author, 13 Jul 56, OCMH. Exceptions to the unvarying diet were: turkey for

Thanksgiving and Christmas, steak early in 1944,

and fresh (cold storage) eggs on Easter Sunday. 18

 The Fijians added more color to the beachhead than did any other unit. Immaculate in appearance, they were nearly all men of extraordinary

physical stature. They obviously liked soldiering

and their marching was impressive in its precision.

They sang well and often, their repertoire ranging

from their native songs through "Onward Christian

Soldiers" to "Pistol Packin' Mama" in Fijian.

19

 This section is based on Craven and Cate, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 350-52; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 392-98;

USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul,

passim. See also Sherrod, History of Marine Corps

Aviation in World War II, pp. 193-97.
270 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

C-47 AIR-DROPPING SUPPLIES on a partially completed airstrip.

now, with its new forward fighter fields

at Torokina and in the Treasuries, Air

Command, Solomons, was ready to start

an intensive series of operations with

the purpose of completely neutralizing

Rabaul.

The Solomons air command now had

a new commander. Maj. Gen. Ralph J.

Mitchell of the Marine Corps relieved

General Twining on 20 November.

Twining returned to the United States,

then went to Italy where he commanded

the Fifteenth Air Force.20 The strength

of General Mitchell's command was

formidable, even after the intensive

operations of October and November.

He had, in operating condition on 17

December, 199 fighters, 200 light and

medium bombers, and 99 heavy bombers, or about twice what the Japanese

had in the entire Southeast Area.21

The first time the Torokina field was

used against Rabaul was 17 December,

when fighters from New Georgia staged

through it on a 76-plane sweep. From

then on it was almost continuously in

use. For the rest of December, except

when the weather was too bad for flying,

Mitchell continued the attacks, varying

fighter sweeps with fighter-escorted raids

by B-24's.22

But Mitchell's heavy bomber pilots,

20

 In the closing days of the war, Twining led the

Twentieth Air Force.

21

 Total strength of Mitchell's command, including nonoperational planes, was 268 fighters, 252

light and medium bombers, and 111 heavy bombers. 22

 On Christmas Day Halsey sent a carrier raid

against Kavieng. He ordered a surface bombardment of Buka in order to lure out enemy aircraft,

whereupon Admiral Sherman's two carriers (Bunker

Hill and Monterey) struck Kavieng soon after sunrise. But Sherman's pilots found few targets.
EXPLOITING THE BEACHHEAD 271

like Kenney's, were unable to knock out

Rabaul, and toward the end of the year

the Japanese sent in more planes. Medium, dive, and torpedo bombers

would have to be used, and their employment would have to await completion of the strips near the Piva River.

The first of these, termed Piva U or Piva

Uncle, was started on 29 November and

completed on 30 December. The second,

Piva Yoke, was ready on 9 January

1944.23

It was clear that the reduction of

Rabaul would not occur until 1944.

Kenney's and Mitchell's attacks in 1943,

however, were quite effective, if not completely successful. They caused enough

damage to make the Japanese garrison

start wholesale excavation in November

in an effort to put everything possible

under ground and so escape complete

destruction.

Meanwhile, under partial cover of the

invasion of Bougainville and Mitchell's

attacks on Rabaul, General MacArthur's

forces had crossed Vitiaz and Dampier

Straits to invade New Britain.

23

 These dates are taken from Building the Navy's

Bases in World War II, pp. 270-72.
CHAPTER XIV

Crossing the Straits

Plans and Preparations

By November 1943 CARTWHEEL was

rolling along rapidly and smoothly. In

just over five months Nassau Bay, Woodlark, Kiriwina, New Georgia, Vella Lavella, Salamaua, Nadzab, Lae, the Markham Valley, Finschhafen, the Treasuries,

and Empress Augusta Bay had fallen to

the Allies. At the newly won bases airfields were either in operation or under

construction. Allied planes dominated

the skies all the way to Rabaul, and

Allied ships sailed the Solomon Sea and

the Huon Gulf in comparative safety.

The capture of Finschhafen in Operation II was a step toward control of the

straits between New Guinea and New

Britain, a control that would help make

possible the drive toward the Vogelkop

Peninsula and the Philippines in 1944

and would be essential to any amphibious advance against Rabaul. The Southwest Pacific's next move (Operation III

of ELKTON III) was first planned by

GHQ on the assumption that Rabaul

would be captured. Looking eastward

rather than westward from the Huon

Peninsula, it aimed at the establishment

of air forces at Cape Gloucester on

western New Britain and of PT boat

bases on the south coast of New Britain.

(See Map 12.) These were to increase

Allied control over Rabaul and over

Kavieng and Manus in the Admiralties,

and to provide bases on the north side of

the straits to insure the safe passage of

convoys.

Selecting Targets

GHQ's orders for the operation, given

the code name DEXTERITY, were published on 22 September.1

 They directed

General Krueger's ALAMO Force, formerly the New Britain Force, supported

by Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces,

and by U.S. Army Services of Supply,

Southwest Pacific, to seize Cape Gloucester by airborne and amphibious invasions and to neutralize the forward

Japanese base at Gasmata on southern

New Britain, to gain control over

western New Britain as far east as the

line Gasmata-Talasea, and to capture

Vitu and Long Islands beyond the straits.

General Blamey's New Guinea Force

would meanwhile continue its operations in the Huon Peninsula and the

valleys. Gasmata was to be neutralized

by troops who would land at nearby

Lindenhafen Plantation, establish an

emergency airfield, and advance on Gasmata in a shore-to-shore movement. The

1

 GHQ SWPA OI 38, 22 Sep 43, and amendments,

in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 22 Sep 43.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 273

plan directed Krueger to prepare to participate with South Pacific forces in the

capture of Rabaul but this order was

canceled on 10 November.2 Saidor was

not specifically mentioned, although

both MacArthur and Chamberlin had

suggested it as a target earlier in the

month.

D Day for the invasion of Cape

Gloucester was initially set for 20 November but was postponed twice. The

final date was 26 December.

This plan provoked a good deal of

disagreement. The first to protest was

General Kenney. With the decision to

bypass Rabaul obviously in mind, he

presented his objections to General MacArthur on 10 October. The original concept, he argued, called for an encircling

ring of air bases, including Cape Gloucester, to be established around Rabaul

in order to lay siege to it. But now that

"faster action is contemplated" it would

take too long to develop Gloucester into

a useful air base. It would not be necessary to take either Gloucester or Lindenhafen, he told MacArthur: bases at Dobodura, Nadzab, and Kiriwina, plus the

one at Finschhafen and perhaps a new

one at Saidor, could provide support

for invasions as far away as Kavieng.3 In

speaking of faster action, Kenney apparently was referring to the long-range

plan RENO III, which was then being

prepared. It called for completion of the

CARTWHEEL operations and then the

move toward the Philippines, according

to the following schedule: Hansa Bay, 1

February 1944; Kavieng (by the South

Pacific), 1 March 1944; Admiralties, 1

March 1944; neutralization of Rabaul

and perhaps, later, its occupation; Humboldt Bay and Arafura Sea, 1 June 1944;

Geelvink Bay-Vogelkop Peninsula, 15

August-1 October, 1944; Halmahera,

Amboina, the Palaus, 1 December 1944;

Mindanao, 1 February 1945.

General Chamberlin, MacArthur's

G-3, observed that the air general's plan

differed from MacArthur's present

plans.4 There would be time, he asserted,

to complete airdromes at Gloucester before undertaking the next operations.

While he did not state that the Kavieng

invasion could not be supported without

Gloucester, he pointed out several advantages to be derived from the move to

New Britain:

1. The Allies could better control

Vitiaz Strait. (Here he reversed himself

on the position he had taken on the

point the month before.) Control from

one side would be possible but it would

be dangerous to leave the other side in

Japanese hands.

2. Cape Gloucester would provide

better support for the Kavieng and Admiralties attacks provided for in RENO

III.

3. Cape Gloucester would provide

better cover for convoys moving through

Vitiaz Strait against the Admiralties.

Even assuming the bypassing of Rabaul,

Chamberlin concluded, a point on the

south coast of New Britain would be

needed to control Vitiaz Strait, neutralize

2

 GHQ SWPA OI 38/12, 10 Nov 43. Apparently

there was a strategic lag at GHQ so that the impact

of the Joint Chiefs' order to bypass Rabaul was not

fully reflected at once in orders prepared by the

GHQ staff. 3

 Ltr, Kenney to CINCSWPA, 10 Oct 43, sub:

GHQ OI 38, 22 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 11

Oct 43; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 326-

27; General Kenney's comments on draft MS of

this volume, OCMH.

4

 Chamberlin must also have been referring to

RENO III.
274 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Gasmata, and provide an emergency airfield for planes attacking Rabaul.5

Admirals Carpender and Barbey also

seem to have favored holding both sides

of the straits, as did General Krueger.

The admirals did not favor the seizure

of Gasmata, because they felt it would

mean a reckless exposure of ships to

Rabaul-based aircraft.6

Kenney was informed that MacArthur's plans, which encompassed the

bypassing of Rabaul, required Cape

Gloucester and Lindenhafen.7 But Kenney's argument, coupled with the admirals' and added to the facts that Gasmata was swampy and that the Japanese

were known to be sending more troops

there, did have some effect. One month

later MacArthur canceled Gasmata

operations and directed the ALAMO

Force to seize Cape Gloucester and to

establish control over adjacent islands

and "minimum portions" of western

New Britain with the purpose of protecting Cape Gloucester.8

The matter did not end there. It was

finally settled by a conference at GHQ

in Brisbane on 21 November attended by

Kenney, Carpender, and Barbey. The

naval commanders opposed Gasmata and

are reported to have wanted a PT boat

base elsewhere on New Britain's south

coast. Therefore Arawe, the name of a

peninsula, a harbor, and an island west

of Gasmata which had been listed as an

objective in ELKTON III, was substituted

for Gasmata with the intention of using

it as a PT base and in the hope of diverting the enemy's attention from Cape

Gloucester. Arawe had a fair anchorage

and there were only a few Japanese in

the area. General Kenney assured his

fellow commanders that he could give

better air cover to Arawe than to Gasmata. Cape Gloucester remained the

main objective.9 As the same ships had

to be used for both invasions, the dates

were staggered.

Setting Dates

The first dates selected, 14 November

for Lindenhafen and 20 November for

Cape Gloucester, proved impossible to

meet and had to be postponed. The

process of postponement and selection of

new dates clearly illustrates some of the

controlling factors in Southwest Pacific

amphibious operations.

By 26 October Kenney, Sutherland,

and Chamberlin realized that enough

air cover would not be available to meet

the first target dates. The Finschhafen

airstrip would not be completed until

about 5 December. Construction of the

Lae-Nadzab road had fallen behind

5

 Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for CofS GHQ

SWPA, 11 Oct 43, sub: Comments on Ltr From

Comdr AAF, 10 Oct 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl,

11 Oct 43; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 330-31. 6

 Ltr, Adm Barbey to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil

Hist, 20 Nov 53, no sub, OCMH. 7

 Ltr, GHQ SWPA to Comdr AAF, 16 Oct 43,

sub: GHQ OI 38, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16 Oct

43.

8

 GHQ SWPA OI 38/12, 10 Nov 43. General

Whitehead also disliked both Gasmata and Cape

Gloucester. See his letter to Kenney, 11 November

1943, quoted in Craven and Cate, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 329-30.

9

 Memo, SJC [Chamberlin] for MacArthur, 21

Nov 43, sub: Practicality of Establishing PT Base

S Coast Western New Britain, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 21 Nov 43; GHQ OI 38/15, 22 Nov 43; Ltr,

Gen Krueger to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 31

Oct 53, no sub, OCMH. For conflicting accounts

see Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 326-27,

and Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p.

372. After the war Barbey expressed the view that

the PT base was never an important factor.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 275

schedule and it could not take heavy

vehicles and machinery before 1 December; consequently the three airstrips in

the lower Markham Valley would not be

in shape to maintain air operations before 15 December. The VII Amphibious

Force, which would carry the assault

troops in DEXTERITY, could not be released from its responsibilities for supplying Lae and Finschhafen for some

time. It was estimated that from 135,000

to 150,000 more tons of supplies would

have to be sent to Lae, 60,000 to 70,000

more to Finschhafen, in order to support air operations. Shipments to Nadzab were slowed by the lack of enough

men and docks at Lae, and movement

of supplies to Finschhafen was slowed

by the fact that until the airfield was

finished the naval commanders would

not risk sending heavy ships there.

Southwest Pacific invasions usually

took place during the dark of the moon

to help hide ships from nocturnal raiding planes. The last-quarter moon would

come on 19 November, the first-quarter

moon on 4 December. If the attack could

not be mounted before 4 December it

would have to be put off until after 19

December, the date of the next lastquarter moon. But this was the period

of the northwest monsoon, and the

longer the Southwest Pacific waited for

ideal moon conditions the rougher

would be the surf at Cape Gloucester.

Chamberlin therefore recommended

that DEXTERITY be put off until the

earliest possible date in December, that

the VII Amphibious Force keep on supplying Lae and Finschhafen a while

longer, and that two engineer aviation

battalions that were scheduled for Cape

Gloucester be set to work at Lae and

Finschhafen for the time being.10 MacArthur, accepting these recommendations, announced that he would delay

the attack about fifteen days, and that

the VII Amphibious Force would supply Lae and Finschhafen until about 20

November.11

This decision provoked the quiet, undramatic General Krueger to protest that

the resulting schedule would be too

tight. MacArthur's order meant that

Gloucester would have to be invaded on

4 December. The subsidiary operation

would have to be accomplished on 28

November. Since there was no reserve

shipping, any losses on 28 November

would hamper the main landing.

Further, the VII Amphibious Force,

once relieved at Lae and Finschhafen,

could not be expected to get to Milne

Bay until 26 or 27 November. Thus

there would hardly be time for rehearsals. Krueger, asking for more ships

or for more time, suggested that the first

operation take place on 2 December,

Gloucester on the 26th.12 MacArthur

agreed to another postponement and

eventually set Z Day for Arawe at 15

December, D Day for Gloucester at 26

December.13

ALAMO Force Plans

Originally assigned to ALAMO Force

for DEXTERITY were the 1st Marine Division; the 32d Division; the 632d Tank

10

 Memo, Chamberlin for CofS GHQ SWPA, 26

Oct 43, sub: Data of Attack on New Britain, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 26 Oct 43. 11

 Rad, MacArthur to Comdrs NGF, ALAMO, et

al., 28 Oct 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 28 Oct 43. 12

 Ltr, Krueger to MacArthur, 12 Nov 43, no sub,

in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 14 Nov 43. 13

 GHQ SWPA OI 38/17, 3 Dec 43; GHQ SWPA

OI 38/18, 16 Dec 43.
276 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Destroyer Battalion; the 503d Parachute

Infantry Regiment, for Cape Gloucester

only; and a number of quartermaster,

medical, signal, engineer, and antiaircraft units. The 1st Cavalry and 24th

Infantry Divisions, then in Australia but

soon to move to New Guinea, and the

503d Parachute Infantry (which would

be committed at Cape Gloucester) constituted GHQ's reserve. The 1st Marine

and 32d Divisions moved from Australia

to the forward area shortly before the

invasions.14

As usual, MacArthur gave Krueger

responsibility for co-ordinating the plans

of supporting air and naval forces with

those of the ALAMO Force. In contrast

with the system of unity of command

over all elements of an invasion force

that prevailed in the South Pacific, the

commander in chief specifically directed

that Allied Air and Naval Forces would

operate under GHQ through their respective commanders and exempted

them from control by ALAMO or New

Guinea Forces. However, if the Japanese

attacked in any area the senior local commander was to control all Southwest

Pacific forces in the threatened area.

General Krueger and the ALAMO

Force staff had been planning for DEXTERITY since August.15

 In the beginning

ALAMO headquarters was at Milne Bay,

where it had been established at the

opening of the CARTWHEEL offensives.

On 21 October Krueger moved it to

Goodenough Island.16

During the planning period for DEXTERITY the Japanese were strengthening

their garrisons in western New Britain

in accordance with the orders issued by

Imamura in September. Thus Allied

estimates of Japanese strength in the

area rose from 500 before September to

2,500 on the 26th. In December Krueger

placed enemy strength at between 5,668

and 9,344, with the strongest concentration at Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marine

Division, apparently deriving its information from the same sources as ALAMO

Force, arrived at a higher figure—between 8,400 and 12,076.17

Little was known about the terrain of

western New Britain, and Krueger

ordered ground reconnaissance in addition to the extensive air photography

that was undertaken by Allied Air

Forces. Because PT boats were not allowed to operate off New Britain's north

coast no patrols were able to examine

Borgen Bay, where the main Cape

Gloucester landings were to take place.

Marine patrols landed from PT boats

and reconnoitered the area south of Cape

Gloucester from 24 September through

14

 The 32d Division went to Milne Bay and Goodenough, the 1st Division to Milne Bay, Oro Bay,

and Goodenough. 15

 ELKTON III had provided for the invasion of

Cape Gloucester, Arawe, and Gasmata, and in

August and September GHQ had prepared general

plans and specific orders that were superseded by

RENO III and OI 38. See GHQ's MARFA Plans in

ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 1.

16

 Sixth Army headquarters remained at Camp

Columbia near Brisbane until 2 February 1944

when it moved to Cape Cretin on the southeast

corner of the Huon Peninsula. ALAMO headquarters

had moved from Goodenough to the cape on 24

December to be near the scene of operations. The

advance echelon of GHQ remained at Port Moresby. 17

 ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn, 15 Dec 43-

10 Feb 44, and Incls, 17 May 44; ALAMO G-2

Periodic Rpt 18, 9 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl

DEXTERITY No. 6; 1st Mar Div Order of Battle and

Strength Est, New Britain, 13 Dec 43, in ALAMO

Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 7. The order of battle

lists were nearly correct except that the Allies did

not know that the 17th Division was moving from

Rabaul to western New Britain.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 277

21 December in a series of patrols. A

group of ALAMO Scouts, an informal reconnaissance organization operating directly under General Krueger, reconnoitered Gasmata from 6 through 27

October. On the night of 9-10 December

one American officer and five natives

disembarked from a PT boat east of

Arawe, scouted the area, and concluded

there were only a few Japanese present.18

More information was obtained from

aerial photography. Missions were flown

almost daily so that ALAMO and subordinate headquarters could be kept informed of gun positions, beach defenses,

bridges, and trails. The VII Amphibious

Force used air photos as the basis for its

hydrographic charts, and the 1st Marine

Division used them to pick the landing

beaches.19

Krueger's first tactical plans, prepared

in accordance with GHQ's orders, had

called for the heavily reinforced 126th

Regimental Combat Team, under Brig.

Gen. Clarence A. Martin, of the 32d Division, to take Gasmata. Cape Gloucester

was to have been captured by the BACKHANDER Task Force under Maj. Gen.

William H. Rupertus, commander of the

1st Marine Division. The assault force

was to have consisted of one regimental

combat and one battalion landing team

of Rupertus' division, the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 12th

Marine Defense Battalion. The marines

were to have delivered an amphibious

assault, coupled with a parachute jump

by the 503d.20 But this whole plan was

drastically revised.

When on 22 November General MacArthur substituted Arawe for Gasmata,

Krueger decided to use a smaller force

than the 126th. He correctly believed

Arawe to be weakly defended. For Arawe

he formed the DIRECTOR Task Force

under Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, who as a colonel had led the invasion of Woodlark. Its assault units included Col. Alexander M. Miller's twosquadron 112th Cavalry; the 148th Field

Artillery Battalion; the 59th Engineer

Company; Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 236th Antiaircraft Artillery

(Searchlight) Battalion; and C and D

Batteries, 470th Antiaircraft Artillery

(Automatic Weapons) Battalion. In reserve was the 2d Battalion, 158th Infantry. Supporting garrison units, to be

moved to Arawe after 15 December (Z

Day), consisted of several engineer, medical, ordnance, and other service detachments. All these units had been attached

to the ALAMO Force for the invasion of

the Trobriands in June, and were still

occupying the islands.

The concept of the Cape Gloucester

invasion was changed also; the parachute

jump was canceled and the 503d removed from the troop list. Several factors contributed to this change. General

Krueger's headquarters had never liked

the idea. General Rupertus, too, had op18

 The patrols on western New Britain included

Maj. John V. Mather, Australian Army; Sub-Lt.

Andrew Kirkwell-Smith, a coastwatcher in the Australian Navy; and Sub-Lt. William G. Wiedeman,

also of the Australian Navy but before the war a

Church of England missionary at Sag Sag on

western New Britain. 19

 ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; Craven and

Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 332.

20

 In reserve was Maj. Gen. William H. Gill's 32d

Division less the 126th Regimental Combat Team.

General Chamberlin doubted the wisdom of using

the 503d as no suitable drop zone was to be found.

ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; ALAMO Plan of

Opn, DEXTERITY, 28 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 28 Sep 43; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for

CofS GHQ SWPA, 10 Oct 43, sub: Plan of Opns

DEXTERITY Submitted by ALAMO Force, same file.
278 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

posed the parachute jump from the start.

He pointed out that bad weather, which

had prevented several air attacks against

Rabaul, might interfere with the parachute jump and thus deprive him of a

substantial part of his assault force.21

General Kenney's headquarters, in December, added its opposition. First, although ALAMO Force orders did not

specify exactly how the jump was to be

accomplished, it was understood at

Allied Air Forces headquarters that a

piecemeal and therefore dangerous drop

was planned. Second, it seemed that the

jump would be under way about the

time that Japanese planes might be expected to turn up. Asking if the jump

was necessary, Kenney's operations officer

stated emphatically that the air commander wanted "no part" of it.22

General Rupertus' headquarters had

disliked the whole scheme of maneuver

as prescribed by ALAMO headquarters,

as well as the parachute jump. ALAMO'S

first plans called for simultaneous, separated landings by two small forces, which

were to converge on the airfield at Cape

Gloucester in conjunction with the

503d's jump. But the 1st Marine Division, which had had ample experience

with jungle warfare on Guadalcanal,

felt that this plan was unsound because

the rough and scarcely known terrain

could easily delay either or both of the

marching forces. Also, the Japanese

could be expected to outnumber any one

of the three landing forces. When Generals MacArthur and Krueger visited 1st

Marine Division headquarters at Goodenough on 14 December, Col. Edwin A.

Pollock, divisional operations officer,

frankly expressed the marines' objections

to the parachute jump and the scheme of

maneuver.

Krueger had included the parachute

jump because MacArthur's headquarters

had assigned the 503d Parachute Infantry to the operation, and he considered himself under orders to make

his plans fit the forces assigned.23 MacArthur, Krueger, and Kenney now discussed the matter further. It developed

that Dobodura would not support the

mounting of the 503d as well as all the

planned bomber operations. To use the

503d would require moving one heavy

bomber group from Dobodura to Port

Moresby, and bad weather over the Owen

Stanleys might keep the bomber group

out of action. The jump was canceled.

ALAMO Force further revised its tactical plans for taking Cape Gloucester

to meet the 1st Marine Division's objections. Final plans called for one regimental combat team to land on two

beaches on the north coast of New

Britain between Silimati Point in Borgen Bay and the airfield at Cape Gloucester, while a second (less a battalion

landing team) landed immediately behind, passed through the first, and attacked toward Cape Gloucester to the

airfields. One battalion landing team was

to land near Tauali on the west coast of

New Britain to block the coastal trail

21

 Memo, CG BACKHANDER TF for CG ALAMO, 3

Nov 43, no sub, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY

No. 3. 22

 Check Sheet, Dir Opns AAF for G-3 GHQ

SWPA, 8 Dec 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 43.

23

 Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, and Maj.

John A. Crown, USMCR, The Campaign on New

Britain (Washington, 1952), p. 19; Gen Krueger's

comments on the draft MS of this volume, attached

to his ltr to Maj Gen A. C. Smith, Chief Mil Hist,

31 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 279

and prevent reinforcement of the airdrome area from the south or retreat of

the airdrome garrison to the south.

The assault units of Rupertus' BACKHANDER Task Force were two regimental

combat teams of the 1st Marine Division; the 12th Marine Defense Battalion less its 155-mm. gun group; detachments, including LCM's and LCVP's,

of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade; and

the 913th Engineer Aviation Battalion.

The reserve, supporting, and garrison

units included the remainder of the 1st

Marine Division, the 155-mm. gun group

of the 12th Defense Battalion, and a large

number of engineer, medical, quartermaster, and malaria control units, chiefly

of the Army.

The Arawe (DIRECTOR) forces were

to mount the invasion at Goodenough,

the Gloucester (BACKHANDER) forces

through Oro Bay, Goodenough, and

Milne Bay. In ALAMO reserve was the

32d Division.24

Logistical plans called for the U.S.

Army Services of Supply, Southwest

Pacific Area, now commanded by Maj.

Gen. James L. Frink, to establish and

maintain at New Guinea bases sixty

days' supply of all types except chemical

and Air Force.25 Thirty days' of the last

two classes were to be maintained.

Frink's command was to make building

materials for ports and air bases available

to the ALAMO Force by Z plus 5 and D

plus 5, and was to furnish naval forces

with supplies common to the Army and

Navy pending establishment of the naval

supply system, or in emergencies. The

VII Amphibious Force would of course

transport supplies to the beachheads until they were secured and Frink was

ready to take over. Allied Air Forces

was to transport supplies to the ground

troops in emergencies.

All units in the task forces were to be

stripped of equipment not needed for

their combat missions. They would carry

to Arawe and Cape Gloucester in the

assault echelons thirty days' supply and

three units of fire, which would be built

up by succeeding shipments to sixty

days' supply and six units of fire (ten

for antiaircraft). Oro Bay was the main

supply base, Milne Bay the secondary.26

Cape Cretin, near Finschhafen on the

southeast corner of the Huon Peninsula,

which the ALAMO Force was preparing

as a supply point and staging base, was

to serve for resupply.

Krueger, on receiving data on Allied

Air Forces' requirements, directed the

BACKHANDER Task Force to build a small

strip at Cape Gloucester for air supply

at once, a 100-by-5,000-foot runway by

D plus 10; a second 100-by-5,000-foot

runway, capable of expansion to 6,000

feet, by D plus 30; and also overruns,

parallel taxiways, roads, and airdrome facilities.27 24

 See ALAMO Force, Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; ALAMO

FO 5, and annexes, 30 Nov 43, in ALAMO Force G-3

Jnl DEXTERITY No. 5; Amendment 1 to ALAMO

FO 5, 15 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 7; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 331; Hough and Crown, The

Campaign on New Britain, p. 19. See also ACofS

G-3 ALAMO, Revised G-3 Study, Gloucester, 2 Dec

43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 5. 25

 General Marshall was Deputy Chief of Staff,

GHQ.

26

 GHQ SWPA OI 38, 22 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 22 Sep 43; ALAMO Administrative Order 4,

30 Nov 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY

No. 5. 27

 Appendix 4, Annex 4, Engr, to ALAMO FO 5,

17 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY

No. 8.
280 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The Enemy

When the Allies landed on Cape

Gloucester General Imamura could not

have been surprised. He had anticipated

such a move some time before. In October the 8th Area Army staff had concluded that two lines of action were

open to the Allies: capture of the New

Britain side of the straits, invasion of

Bougainville, and a direct assault upon

Rabaul in February or March 1944; or

the slower process of isolating Rabaul

by seizing the Admiralties and Kavieng.28

Considering the first course the more

likely, he decided to send more troops

to western New Britain in addition to

those he had sent under General Matsuda in September. He would have

liked to reinforce the Admiralties and

Kavieng but felt he could not spare any

more troops from the defenses of Rabaul.

Imamura therefore ordered the 17th

Division., less the battalions dispatched

to Bougainville, to western New Britain.

Reaching Rabaul from China between 4

October and 12 November, the 17th

went by echelons to its new posts by

naval vessel and small boat. The movement began in October but was still

under way in mid-December.

The 17th Division commander was

given operational control of the units

already there, chiefly General Matsuda's

65th Brigade and 4th Shipping Group

at Cape Gloucester and 2d Battalion,

228th Infantry, and two naval guard

companies at Gasmata.29 Final plans organized the entire force into three commands. The first and largest, under Matsuda, consisted of the 65th Brigade

(principally the 141st Infantry), the 4th

Shipping Group, and a large number of

field artillery, antiaircraft, automatic

weapons, engineer, and communications

units. Matsuda was charged with defense

of the area from the emergency airstrip

and barge staging point near Tuluvu

around the coast to Cape Busching on

the south. Under Matsuda Maj. Masamitsu Komori, with most of the 1st Battalion, 81st Infantry, one company of

the 54th Infantry, and engineers plus

detachments, was assigned responsibility

for defense of Arawe. Col. Shuhei Hirashima, commanding the 54th Infantry,

less the 2d Battalion, the 2d Battalion,

228th Infantry, the 2d Battalion, 23d

Field Artillery Regiment, and the naval

guard companies, was to hold the airfield at Gasmata.30

 The 17th Division

established its command post at Gavuvu,

east of the Willaumez Peninsula and a

long distance from the scene of operations.

The air strength available to the Japanese for the forthcoming fight had

been reduced, not only by the Allied air

attacks against Rabaul, but also by orders

from Tokyo. The 2d Area Army was

established in the Netherlands Indies on

1 December 1943, and the boundary between it and Imamura's 8th Area Army

was set at longitude 140° east. But the

28

 This subsection is based on 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. no (OCMH),

pp. 85-119; Southeast Area Air Operations, 1942-

44, Japanese Monogr No. 38 (OCMH), pp. 25-29;

Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), pp. 36-39; 17th Division

Operations in Western New Britain, Japanese

Monogr No. 111 (OCMH), pp. 1-7.

29

 The 65th Brigade had played an important

part in the fighting on Luzon in the first Philippines campaign. See Morton, The Fall of the

Philippines. 30

 A false report from natives in October that the

Allies had landed east of Gasmata had caused the

dispatch of the naval companies to Gasmata.
B-25's OVER WEWAK. Three damaged enemy planes are visible on the ground.
282 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

7th Air Division was transferred out of

the 4th Air Army and assigned to the

2d Area Army.

31 This transfer seriously

reduced Imamura's forces, but so far the

7th Air Division had not operated effectively. Its most outstanding exploit had

been the loss of planes on the ground

at Wewak.

Air Operations

With the new fields in the Markham

Valley and at Finschhafen in operation,

Allied Air Forces' aerial preparations for

DEXTERITY were the most extensive yet

seen in the Southwest Pacific.32 They included, besides daily P-38 photographic

missions, long-range search missions by

PBY's of the Seventh Fleet's Patrol

Wing 10, RAAF Catalinas, and Fifth

Air Force B-24's, and bombing and

strafing.

Air attacks, which had been under

way against New Britain since October,

began on a large scale in late November.

Cape Gloucester and Gasmata were the

main targets. Arawe was avoided until

14 December in order to keep from

warning the Japanese. During December

Kenney's planes attacked Gasmata or

Gloucester, or both, nearly every day

and sometimes twice a day. As General

Whitehead said, Cape Gloucester was

"tailor made" for air operations. The

target area lay along the beach and was

long and narrow.33 During December

Kenney's planes flew 1,845 sorties over

Gloucester, dropped 3,926 tons of bombs,

and fired 2,095,488 rounds of machine

gun ammunition. The chief targets were

Tuluvu airfield, antiaircraft guns, supply dumps, and the barge staging points.

The airfield was knocked out of action

early in the operation and stayed that

way.

Arawe

Preliminaries

The 112th Cavalry, shipped aboard

LST's, reached Goodenough Island from

Woodlark on 1 and 2 December.34 There

General Cunningham gave Colonel

Miller detailed orders for the landing

of his regiment at Arawe on 15 December.

Arawe, which before the war had been

a regular port of call for vessels of the

31

 Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, Ch.

IV.

32

 This subsection is based on Craven and Cate,

The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 332-38. 33

 Memo, Lt Col Paul Weyrauch, Asst Arty Off

ALAMO, and Lt Col Carl A. Fields, Air Off ALAMO,

for CofS ALAMO, 10 Nov 43, no sub, in ALAMO Force

G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 3.

34

 This section is based on Ltr, Comdr VII Amphib

Force to COMINCH, 10 Jan 44, sub: Arawe Opn,

and incls, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 10 Jan 44;

ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn, and Incl 1,

Lessons Learned; DIRECTOR TF, Hist Rpt, Arawe

[in form of ltr, Gen Cunningham to CG Sixth

Army, 6 June 44]; 112th Cav, Hist Rpt [Arawe],

24 Nov 43-10 Feb 44; 8th Area Army Operations,

Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), pp. 119-22;

17th Division Operations in Western New Britain,

Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), pp. 8-14;

Southeast Area Air Operations, Japanese Monogr

No. 38 (OCMH), pp. 29-30; Memo, Capt Joseph

H. Baker for CO 592d Engr Boat and Shore Regt,

18 Dec 43, no sub, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 9; ALAMO Fragmentary FO's 1 and 2,

27 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No.

11; Capt T. H. Baker, USMC, Rpt Amphib Tractor

Opn Arawe, 27 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl

DEXTERITY No. 12; Ltr, Gen Cunningham to CG

ALAMO, 6 Jan 44, sub: Opns DIRECTOR TF, in

ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 15; Ltr, CG

2d ESB to CTF 76, 16 Dec 43, sub: Rpt Arawe

Landing, and Log of Events as Seen From SC 742,

both in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 8;

CTF 76 Opn Plan A3-43, 10 Dec 43, and Memo,

JWC [Cunningham] for Gen Krueger, 18 Dec 43,

no sub, and 2d ESB FO 1, 11 Dec 43, all in ALAMO

Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 7; G-2 ALAMO Ter-
CROSSING THE STRAITS 283

MAP 17

Burns-Philp South Seas Company, had

a harbor suitable for large vessels. There

were several beaches that landing craft

could use, of which the two best were

House Fireman on the west coast of the

boot-shaped Arawe peninsula and the

village of Umtingalu on the mainland,

seventeen hundred yards east of the

peninsula's base. The rest of the coast

line consisted of stone cliffs about two

hundred feet high, interspersed with low

ground that was covered by mangrove

swamp. Reefs fringed all the beaches,

and it was clear that LCVP's could not

get to the shore until detailed reconnaissance for passages was made. (Map 17)

Therefore General Krueger arranged

with Rupertus for one company of the

1st Marine Amphibian Tractor Battalion to be attached to the DIRECTOR Task

Force to take the assault waves ashore.

Krueger also attached part of the 592d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 2d

Engineer Special Brigade, with 17

LCVP's, 9 LCM's, 2 rocket-firing

rain Rpt, Arawe, 26 Nov 43, and Ltr, Hq ALAMO

to CG BACKHANDER TF, 30 Nov 43, no sub, and

DIRECTOR TF FO 1, 4 Dec 43, and Memo, DAA

[Maj D. A. Alberti, ALAMO G-3 Sec] for G-3

ALAMO, 8 Dec 43, sub: Observation DIRECTOR Exercise, all in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 5;

Off of Chief Engr, GHQ AFPAC, Critique, pp.

109-17; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, p. 335; Hough and Crown, The

Campaign on New Britain, pp. 140-52; Isely and

Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, pp.

186-88; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier,

pp. 373-77.
284 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

DUKW's, and 1 repair and salvage boat,

to Task Force 76 for the landings.35

The 112th Cavalry stayed on Goodenough for ten days. During this period

the troops received additional practice

and training with all their weapons, including two new ones—the flame thrower

and the 2.36-inch rocket launcher (bazooka). Before shoving off all men were

informed of the general plan of attack

and given aerial photographs and maps

to study. The training period was topped

by two landings. The first was intended

to familiarize the troops with loading

and unloading landing craft. The second

was conducted under assumed combat

conditions and involved the co-ordinated

landing of all elements at proper intervals and their tactical deployment

ashore. General Cunningham forcefully

pointed out several major deficiencies.

Units were not always under control of

their commanders, intervals between

landing waves were too long, and not all

junior officers and noncommissioned officers knew their duties.

With Generals MacArthur and Krueger looking on, the DIRECTOR Task

Force boarded the LSD Carter Hall,

HMAS Westralia, and the APD's Sands

and Humphreys on the afternoon of 13

December.36 At midnight the ships departed for Buna, where General Cunningham left the Carter Hall and joined

Admiral Barbey aboard the destroyer

Conyngham, the flagship. The voyage to

the target, which included a feint toward Finschhafen, was uneventful except for seas rough enough to cause

the passenger troops some discomfort.

Admiral Crutchley's cruisers and destroyers covered the move to the east

while PT boats patrolled the straits to

the westward.

The Landings

Barbey's convoy sighted the south

coast of New Britain shortly after 0300,

15 December, and the troop ships soon

hove to in the transport area about five

miles east of Arawe.37 By 0450 the Carter

Hall had launched thirty-nine loaded

amphibian tractors bearing the assault

waves and the two rocket DUKW's out

of her well deck.

Dawn was still one hour away when

150 men of A Troop, 112th, who had

been aboard the APD Sands, started for

the beach at Umtingalu in fifteen rubber boats. They had been ordered to

make a surprise landing in darkness at

H minus 1 hour and block the coastal

trail that was the Japanese escape and

reinforcement route to the east. About

0525, when the boats were nearing shore

and in the moonlight were probably visible from the shore, they came under

fire from machine guns, rifles, and a 25-

mm. dual purpose gun, which promptly sank all but three of the rubber boats.

35

 The rocket DUKW, with 4-5-inch rockets, was

an experimental craft that the engineer special

brigades of the Southwest Pacific Area had developed in an effort to provide fire support for

landings after naval gunfire had ceased or lifted.

These DUKW's attempted, without much success,

to carry out the function performed by the LCI

gunboat in the South Pacific. 36

 The Westralia is listed variously as an APA

and an LSI. TF 76, for Arawe, including supporting echelons, consisted of the ships listed above,

ten escort and bombardment destroyers, an escort

and mine group of patrol craft and subchasers,

several LCT flotillas, and a service group of LST's

plus landing craft attached from the 1st Marine

Division and the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. 37

 All times are approximate. All sources employed

give differing times for the same events.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 285

The fire continued while the troops

floundered in the water divesting themselves of their light combat packs and

outer clothing. The destroyer Shaw then

opened fire and quickly silenced the

enemy.38 Small boats picked up the survivors of A Troop, who later landed

without arms and almost naked at

House Fireman Beach. Twelve men

were killed, four missing, and seventeen

wounded in this repulse.

B Troop fared better. Ordered to land

at H minus 1 hour on the islet of

Pilelo, across Pilelo passage from the

peninsula, its men were to take the

Japanese by surprise and silence a radio

station that was reported at the village

of Paligmete. They left the APD Humphreys on fifteen rubber boats at the

same time that A Troop left the Sands.

B Troop had planned to surprise the

enemy by landing at Paligmete village,

but when the Japanese started firing

on A Troop it was obvious that surprise

was lost. B Troop landed at Wabmete,

on the west of Pilelo, instead. Once

ashore the cavalrymen started on foot

for Winguru.

The leading platoon reached Winguru at 0615 and met fire from Japanese

in two caves on the rising ground south

of the village. Leaving one squad to contain these Japanese, B Troop pushed

on to Paligmete, found neither Japanese

nor radio, and returned to Winguru to

mop up. Bazooka fire closed one cave

but the other was faced with logs which

proved impervious to rockets and machine guns. Finally a flame thrower

team, covered by machine gun fire,

edged to within fifteen yards of the cave

and let loose a blast of flame. B Troop

then moved in, tossed grenades, and

the action was over. One American soldier had been killed. Seven dead enemy

were found. The action ended about

1130.

Meanwhile the main landing at

House Fireman Beach had been accomplished successfully if not flawlessly. The

assault waves came from Lt. Col. Clyde

E. Grant's 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry,

organized into five landing waves: ten

LVT (A) (2)'s (Buffaloes), carrying E

and F Troops, in the first; eight LVT

(1)'s (Alligators) each in the second,

third, and fourth waves; and five Alligators in the fifth. The waves were

scheduled to land at five-minute intervals. H Hour was set for 0630, after

the conclusion of the air and naval bombardments. One and a half hours were

allowed for the amphibian tractors to

proceed from the ships to the beach, a

move which would take place in poor

light. Since dawn came at 0624 and sunrise at 0646, the landing itself would

take place in daylight.

But someone along the line had become confused. Once boated, the first

wave started directly for the shore in the

dark. Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey,

commanding the 2d Engineer Special

Brigade, who had come along as an observer aboard the landing wave control

craft, SC 742, saw the boats dimly about

0500. When radio communication with

the flagship unaccountably failed, the

38

 General Cunningham was wroth at the Shaw's

delay in opening fire, but Admiral Barbey and

Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey [Commanding General, 2d Engineer Special Brigade], who observed

the operation from the deck of SC 742, reported

that the Shaw held her fire because she could not

immediately locate any targets. The boats and the

shore, viewed from the sea, blended into a dark

blur. General Cunningham had tried the predawn

landing against Admiral Barbey's advice.
286 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

subchaser's captain and Heavey headed

off the errant amphibian tractors. There

was much confusion and milling about

in the darkness, and it was 0600 or later

before the tractors regained their formation.

Destroyers bombarded House Fireman Beach with 1,800 5-inch rounds

from 0610 to 0625, whereupon B-25's

took over. Three squadrons had been

assigned to air alert over Arawe under

control of an air liaison party aboard

the Conyngham, and the first of these

bombed and strafed the peninsula and

the beach. Under ideal conditions the

interval between the cessation or lifting

of support bombardment and the landing of troops is only long enough to

prevent the troops from being hit by

their own support fire, but the lead wave

of tractors had been slowed by the confusion and by a stiff current in Pilelo

passage. It did not land until after 0700.

On the way in, the wave met machine

gun fire that was quickly silenced by

4.5-inch rockets from the control craft

and the two rocket DUKW's on the

flanks. Otherwise there was no opposition.

This was fortunate, because the succeeding waves in the Alligators, which

were slower craft than the Buffaloes, had

not been able to keep up. Twenty-five

minutes elapsed before the second wave

landed, ample time for a resolute defending force to have inflicted heavy

casualties on the first wave. When another fifteen minutes had passed the last

three waves came ashore practically together.39

The 2d Squadron, once landed, reorganized, sent patrols to the toe of

the peninsula, and pushed northwestward toward the base against slight opposition from scattered riflemen and

rear guards. E Troop located twenty or

more Japanese in caves in the cliff on

the east side of the peninsula, killed

several, and passed on. When others

came out of their caves to snipe and

harass, the 112th Cavalry Headquarters

Troop sent out a patrol which disposed

of them.

Only two companies of Japanese soldiers had been in the area, and when

the 2d Squadron came ashore they retreated eastward. Major Komori and his

force had not yet reached Arawe.

Meanwhile passages through the reefs

had been found. The reserve 1st Squadron, under Maj. Harry E. Werner, had

debarked from the Westralia while the

Carter Hall was launching the tractors.

Werner's squadron came ashore about

0800 in the 2d Engineer Special Brigade's 2 LCM's and 17 LCVP's. An hour

later Barbey's second echelon, 5 LCT's

carrying 150 tons of gear and 50 men

per LCT, and 7 LCM's carrying 25 tons

of gear per LCM, arrived from Cape

Cretin and began unloading.

Operations at the beach were not

smooth. The detachments forming the

shore party had never worked together

before, and although the beach was a

good one it soon became congested.

There was room for but two LCT's at

one time; so unloading of beaching craft

continued all day.

For DEXTERITY the admirals had won

the air cover argument, and planes were

assigned as combat air patrol over the

39

 After the event all units and observers reporting on the subject declared it a mistake to use

vehicles with differing speeds in the assault waves.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 287

ships instead of standing by on ground

alert. The first fighter cover, in the form

of 8 P-38's, took station overhead at

0715. This cover was subsequently increased and was maintained all day but

it was not able to prevent an air attack

at 0900. The 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul

had just received more planes and now

totaled 50 bombers and 100 fighters.

Both Kusaka's fleet and the 6th Air Division sent out planes against Arawe. One

flight of these, reported as consisting

of 20 or 30 planes, eluded the P-38's

and delivered the attack at 0900. The

Westralia and Carter Hall, unloaded before dawn, had departed at 0500 to

avoid air attack. The rest of Task Force

76, with the exception of craft actually

at the beach and the flagship Conyngham, which remained to direct operations, sought the cover of clouds and

rain squalls. The Japanese bombed and

strafed the beached LCT's, the Conyngham, and the troops for about five minutes, scored no hits, and left with P-38's

in pursuit.

By midafternoon the DIRECTOR Task

Force controlled the entire peninsula.

The 2d Squadron had reached the base,

and now began establishing a main line

of resistance there. Over sixteen hundred men, five hundred from the attached units and the rest from the two

squadrons of the 112th Cavalry, were

ashore.

Operations,, 16 December 1943-

10 February 1944

During the next few days LCT's from

Cape Cretin and APD's from Goodenough brought in heavy weapons, supplies, and more troops. There was no

ground contact with the Japanese at

Arawe, but in the air the enemy reacted

with violence. Between 15 and 27 December naval planes delivered seven attacks against Arawe and against the 1st

Marine Division at Cape Gloucester,

and in about the same period the 6th

Air Division attacked four times. LCT's

at Arawe on 16 December suffered almost continuous air attack. Resupply

convoys lost one coastal transport sunk

and another damaged, plus one minesweeper and six LST's damaged. Although General Cunningham's force had

no 90-mm. antiaircraft guns to keep

bombing planes away, damage ashore

was fortunately light. Cunningham expressed his urgent need for the 90-mm.'s,

but none was available for Arawe. By

late December, however, the 11th Air

Fleet and the 6th Air Division had lost

so many planes to Allied fighters over

New Britain, to Southwest Pacific attacks against Wewak, and to the South

Pacific's raids on Rabaul that they were

forced to stop daylight bombardment

and confine their activities to the defense

of Rabaul and Wewak. When Imamura

asked Tokyo for more planes Imperial

Headquarters responded by sending the

8th Air Brigade to Hollandia under the

2d Area Army.

The Japanese had not yet given up

at Arawe. When the 17th Division commander received word of Cunningham's

landing he ordered Major Komori, who

was then proceeding by boat and overland march to Arawe from Rabaul, to

make haste. He also ordered the 1st

Battalion, 141st Infantry, to move from

Cape Busching to Arawe and come under Komori's command. Komori was
288 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

then to destroy the DIRECTOR Task

Force.

The Americans soon became aware of

the approaching Japanese. On 18 December two Japanese armed barges attacked a 112th Cavalry patrol on board

two of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade's

LCVP's (which had remained under

Cunningham at Arawe). The Japanese

scored hits; the patrol abandoned the

LCVP's and made its way east to Arawe

on foot. Komori's force reached the

Pulie River east of Arawe on 20 December, advanced west, and on Christmas

Day forced the 112th to abandon its

observation posts and outposts east of

Arawe.

Cunningham, correctly concluding

that the Japanese were converging

against him from two directions but erroneously concluding that Komori's

command was but the advance guard of

a stronger force from Gasmata, asked

Krueger for reinforcements. The ALAMO

commander hastily dispatched G Company, 158th Infantry, by PT boat.

Komori, with the 1st Battalion, 81st

Infantry, reached the area northwest of

the main line of resistance on 26 December. Like the Americans, he had difficulty in getting any exact information on positions in the featureless, jungled terrain at the peninsula's base. Several of his night probing attacks were

repulsed by mortar fire, as were daytime

attacks on 28 and 29 December. The second of these took the lives of most of

his men, but the 1st Battalion, 141st

Infantry, arrived in the late afternoon

of 29 December. Several small attacks in

early January 1944 by the 112th were

beaten off, but the cavalrymen established the fact that the Japanese were

digging in about six hundred yards beyond their own perimeter. Komori had

resolved to defend the prewar airstrip

on the mainland east of the peninsula,

which in any case the Allies did not

want.40

On 6 January Cunningham reported

to Krueger the existence of the Japanese

positions. Cunningham's forces now totaled almost 4,750 men and his short

front line—seven hundred yards—was a

strong position with fields of fire cut,

barbed wire emplaced, and artillery and

mortar data computed.41 The enemy positions he faced consisted largely of shallow trenches and foxholes and were

practically invisible in the dense underbrush. There were only about 100 Japanese and half-a-dozen machine guns

there, but lack of visibility and the fact

that the Japanese moved their guns frequently made them almost impossible

for artillery and mortars to hit. An assault would be further complicated by

the fact that in the area there were no

clearly defined terrain features which

could serve to guide an attack and help it

maintain its direction. Cunningham

asked for tanks and more troops, and

repeated his request for 90-mm. antiaircraft guns.

Krueger agreed that attacks by riflemen alone against Komori would result

in a waste of lives and agreed to send

40

 For an amusing incident about this airstrip and

the embarrassment caused by overenthusiasm on

the part of public information officers, see Hough

and Crown, The Campaign on New Britain, pp.

144-49. 41

 By 10 January Task Force 76 had carried 4,750

men and 8,165 tons of supplies to Arawe.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 289

ALLIGATOR RETURNING TO BEACH ON

ARAWE for more supplies, 18 December 1943.

tanks as well as more troops. F Company, 158th Infantry, and B Company,

1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division,

reached Arawe from Cape Cretin on 10

and 12 January.

On the morning of 16 January attack

and medium bombers struck at the Japanese positions, artillery and mortars

shelled them, and the Marine light

tanks, two companies of the 158th Infantry, and C Troop of the 112th Cavalry

attacked. The tanks led, with infantrymen and cavalrymen following each

tank. Direct communication between

tanks and foot troops was successfully

attained by a device which the tank

company improvised; it installed an

EE8 field telephone at the rear of each

machine. The attack went well and carried forward for fifteen hundred yards.

Next day B Troop and one tank platoon mopped up remaining pockets of

resistance.

Thereafter Arawe was quiet. Casualties for all units in the DIRECTOR Task

Force totaled 118 dead, 352 wounded,

and 4 missing. Komori had actually

withdrawn to defend the airstrip, and

remained there until ordered to retreat

to the east in February.

Ironically enough, no PT base was

ever built at Arawe. Actually the final

plans had never included any provision

for one. Lt. Comdr. Morton C. Mumma,

commanding Southwest Pacific PT's,

successfully insisted that he did not want

and did not need a PT base there to

patrol the straits or to attack Japanese

barges, which seldom used the south

coast anyway. Arawe never became an

air base either. The only airstrip ever

used was one for artillery liaison planes

that engineers hastily cleared on 13 January.

Cape Gloucester

Meanwhile the main event at Cape

Gloucester had gotten under way. Elements of the 1st Marine Division scheduled for the main assault landings east

of Cape Gloucester conducted final rehearsals at Cape Sudest on 21 Decem-
290 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ber.42 The heavily reinforced 7th Marines boarded ship at Oro Bay three days

later and departed at 0600 on Christmas

morning. En route ships carrying the reinforced 1st Marines (less one battalion

landing team) from Cape Cretin joined

up. The convoy then made its way peacefully through Vitiaz Strait, sailed between Rooke and Sakar Islands, and approached Cape Gloucester. The 2d Battalion Landing Team, 1st Marines, embarked at Cape Cretin and steamed

through Dampier Strait for Tauali.43 Admiral Crutchley's Task Force 74—the

American cruisers Phoenix and Nashville, HMAS Australia and HMAS

Shropshire, and eight destroyers—escorted Task Force 76 while PT boats

patrolled the northern and western entrances to the straits.

The Landings

In the dim light of 0600 on 26 December Crutchley's ships opened their

supporting bombardment on the landing

beaches east of Cape Gloucester, a bombardment that continued for ninety

minutes. Two new LCI's equipped with

4.5-inch rockets took station on the flanks

as guide and fire support craft. After

threading their way through a difficult

channel, APD's, in the lead, lowered

landing craft full of troops while behind

them LCI's and LST's awaited their

turns at the beaches. (Map 18)

The 1st Air Task Force of the Fifth

Air Force had prepared extensive plans

for all-day air cover and support that

involved a total of five fighter squadrons

and fourteen attack, medium, and heavy

bomber squadrons. The first support

bombers arrived from Dobodura about

0700 and B-24's, B-25's, and A-20's

bombed and strafed the beaches and the

airdrome. B-25's dropped smoke bombs

on Target Hill, the 450-foot ridge just

west of Silimati Point that gave clear observation of the beaches and airfields.

A-20's strafed the landing beaches until

the leading wave of landing craft was

five hundred yards from shore. At that

time the naval gunfire was moved inland

and to the flanks.

An errant breeze blew so much smoke

from Target Hill that some of the leading waves of landing craft carrying the

7th Marines could not easily identify the

beaches. There was no opposition at the

proper beaches, where most of two battalions of the 7th landed, but a detachment which wandered three hundred

yards too far west had a brisk fire fight

on shore.

The 7th Marines found that the landing beaches were good but very shallow.

And as the assault waves crossed the

beaches they were brought up sharply

by jungle so dense they had to start hacking to get inland. Immediately behind

the beach was a narrow shelf of relatively

42

 This section is based on Craven and Cate, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 337-45; Hough

and Crown, The Campaign on New Britain; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 378-89;

Office of the Chief Engineer, GHQ AFPAC, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific: 1941-1945, VI,

Airfield and Base Development (Washington, 1951),

192-95; ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; 8th

Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110

(OCMH), pp. 119-22; 17th Division Operations in

Western New Britain, Japanese Monogr No. 111

(OCMH), pp. 14-21. 43

 For Cape Gloucester Task Force 76 consisted of

the flagship Conyngham, 10 APD's, 16 LCI's, 12

destroyers, 3 minesweepers, and 24 LST's; 14 LCM's,

12 LCT's, and 2 rocket DUKW's went to Tauali.

In reserve were the Westralia and Carter Hall. Detachments of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade—181

men, 33 landing craft, and 2 rocket DUKW's—were

attached to the 1st Marine Division.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 291

EARLY MORNING BOMBARDMENT of landing beaches east of Cape Gloucester,

26 December 1943.

dry ground. Behind the shelf was a

swamp which made anything like rapid

movement or maneuver completely impossible. Men floundered through the

mud, slipping into sinkholes up to their

waists and even their armpits. And in the

swamp giant trees, rotted by water and

weakened by bombs and shells, toppled

over easily. The first marine fatality on

Cape Gloucester was caused by a falling

tree.

The narrow beach and the swampy

jungle behind it caused a good deal of

congestion, especially when the LST's

began discharging their cargo. As expected, Japanese planes from Rabaul attacked the ships and the beach during

the day, although their first attacks were

directed against Arawe in the belief that

the convoy had been intended as reinforcement for Cunningham. They sank

one destroyer, seriously damaged two

more, and scored hits on two others, as

well as on two LST's.

By the day's end the 7th Marines held

the beachhead area. The artillery battalions of the 11th Marines had landed and

emplaced their howitzers. The 1st Marines had come ashore, passed through

the 7th, and begun the advance west

toward the airdrome. The regiment first

attempted to advance with battalions

echeloned to the left rear, but the swamp

forced movement in a long column with

a narrow front along the coastal trail.

Also on 26 December the reinforced
292 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MAP 18

2d Battalion, 1st Marines, landed successfully at Tauali and D Company, 592d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 2d

Engineer Special Brigade, landed on

Long Island to prepare a radar station

there.

The first night ashore at Gloucester

was miserable, and it was the first of

many more that were just as bad.

Drenching rains characteristic of the

northwest monsoon poured down in torrents; more trees fell. The Japanese in

the airdrome area, estimating that only

2,500 men had come ashore, counterattacked the 7th Marines, but they

failed, as did a heterogeneous group that

later struck at the Tauali positions.

Capture of the Airfield

The 1st Marines started westward

along the coastal trail toward the cape

and the airfield at 0730, 27 December.

The swamp still forced the regiment to

advance in column of battalions, with

the rear battalion echeloned as much as

possible to the left rear. Each battalion

marched in column of companies and

sent small patrols into the swamp to protect its flanks. General Sherman tanks of

A Company, 1st Tank Battalion, supported. By 1615, when it dug in for the

night, the regiment had gained three

miles, and had become aware of the

existence of a large Japanese block about

a thousand yards east of the airfield.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 293

7TH MARINES LANDING ON NARROW BEACH, Cape Gloucester, 26 December 1943.

Next day the 1st made deliberate

preparations before attacking the block.

The absence of Japanese resistance the

day before had led to the conclusion that

the enemy was concentrating his forces

inside the block. The 1st Marines waited

during the morning for more tanks to

make their way up the trail, which by

now was a veritable morass, and for artillery and aircraft to shell and bomb the

block. The infantry and the tanks moved

to the attack about noon and shortly ran

into the block. This position was a strong

point which originally had faced the sea

for defense of the beach but which served

alternately as a trail block. It consisted

of camouflaged bunkers with many antitank and 75-mm. weapons. There was

scarcely room for tanks and infantry to

maneuver, but by the end of the afternoon the 1st Marines had reduced the

block.

General Rupertus had been asking for

his reserve, the reinforced 5th Marines,

which had remained under Krueger's

control, and on the 28th Krueger released the regiment. Rupertus then decided to hold up the advance on the airfield until the 5th arrived. It came on 29

December, but confusion over orders

caused part of the 5th to land just behind

the 1st, the rest at the D-Day beaches.

When the 5th had been reassembled the

drive began again. The 1st Marines continued the coastal advance and, because

the swampland on the left had given way

to jungle, the 5th was able to make a

wide southwesterly sweep. There was almost no resistance. By the day's end most

of the airdrome was in Allied hands and
294 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

the major objective of the campaign had

been achieved.

The Japanese Withdrawal

This phase of the operation had gone

rapidly and at the cost of comparatively

few casualties. But the absence of Japanese opposition made it clear that a large

body of the enemy must be elsewhere in

the vicinity. Thus in the first two weeks

of 1944 the 7th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, under Brig. Gen.

Lemuel C. Shepherd, the assistant division commander, attacked southward

to clear Borgen Bay. Here waged the bitterest fighting of the campaign as the

141st Infantry struggled to keep possession of the high ground.

Thereafter there was little combat.

The marines patroled extensively in

search of the enemy, who proved to be

elusive. B Company, 1st Marines, landed

on Rooke Island on 12 February but

found it had been evacuated. Eventually

elements of Rupertus' division advanced

by shore-to-shore movements as far east

as Talasea without encountering any

large numbers of Japanese.44

The enemy garrison at Cape Gloucester, especially Matsuda's command, had

been in poor physical condition before the invasion. The incessant air attacks against barge supply routes had

forced it onto short rations, and malaria,

dysentery, and fungus infections were

rife.

The 17th Division commander, Lt.

Gen. Yasushi Sakai, seems to have had

little heart for a resolute defense, for he

urged General Imamura to approve a retreat to the Willaumez Peninsula. Imamura at first refused, then assented in

January. On 23 February he ordered

Sakai's entire command—17th Division,

65th Brigade, 4th Shipping Group, and

all attached units—to retreat all the way

back to Rabaul and help defend it.

Base Development

Repair of the wrecked airdrome began

in early January with the arrival of the

913th Engineer Aviation Battalion. The

work was complicated and slowed by

jungle, rain, and swampy ground, and by

nocturnal air raids that prevented night

work for nearly two weeks. GHQ and the

Fifth Air Force revised their requirements and directed construction of a

5,000-foot strip and a second, parallel

strip 6,000 feet long. The 864th and

141st Engineer Aviation Battalions arrived later in January and turned to on

the strips and on roads and airdrome installations. By the end of the month 4,200

feet of the first airstrip had been covered

with pierced steel matting, but it was 18

March before the strip was completed.

By then Rabaul, Kavieng, and the Admiralties had been neutralized or captured and GHQ was planning the first

giant step of its advance to the Philippines, a step which took it far beyond

range of fighter planes based at Cape

Gloucester.45 The parallel 6,000-foot

strip proved impossible to build and was

never completed.

Cape Gloucester never became an important air base. It is clear that the

Arawe and Cape Gloucester invasions

were of less strategic importance than the

other CARTWHEEL operations, and in the 44

 In April the 40th Division relieved the 1st

Marine Division and the 112th Cavalry on New

Britain.

45

 See Smith, The Approach to the Philippines,

Ch. II.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 295

light of hindsight were probably not essential to the reduction of Rabaul or the

approach to the Philippines. Yet they

were neither completely fruitless nor excessively high in casualties. The 1st

Marine Division scored a striking tactical

success at the cost of 310 killed, 1,083

wounded. And the Allied forces of the

Southwest Pacific Area had, by means of

these operations, broken out through the

narrow straits.

Saidor

The first two DEXTERITY operations

faced toward Rabaul, and as events later

showed had much less effect on the

course of the war than the other CARTWHEEL operations. But in December

1943 General MacArthur reversed his

field and decided to exploit the tactical

successes at Arawe and Cape Gloucester

by moving west to seize Saidor, on the

north coast of the Huon Peninsula. (See

Map 12.) General Chamberlin had suggested Saidor in September, but it was

11 December before an outline plan was

prepared.46

Saidor lay slightly northeast of Mounts

Gladstone and Disraeli, which glower at

each other from their 11,000-foot eminences. It had a prewar airstrip, and had

been used as a barge staging point by the

Japanese. Lying no nautical miles from

Finschhafen, 52 from Madang, and 414

from Rabaul, it was well situated to support the advance westward toward the

Vogelkop and the move northward

against the Admiralties. In addition

Allied seizure would cut the 18th Army

in two, for that army's main concentrations were at Madang-Wewak to the

west, and at Sio-Gali to the east.

Preparations and Plans

The invasion of Saidor was not actually decided on until 17 December,

two days after the invasion of Arawe and

nine days before the invasion of Cape

Gloucester. On that date General MacArthur ordered Krueger to prepare plans

at once for an operation from Goodenough Island to seize Saidor and construct an advanced air and naval base

there. Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces

would support, and again MacArthur

made Krueger responsible for co-ordination of planning by the ground forces

and the commanders of close support air

and naval forces. The New Guinea

Force, whose troops were now advancing

against Sio and patrolling in the Ramu

Valley beyond Dumpu, would support by

continuing the move against Sio and by

vigorous demonstrations in the Ramu

46

 This section is based on Craven and Cate, The

Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 345-49; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 389-91;

Off of Chief Engr, GHQ AFPAC, Engineers in

Theater Operations, pp. 118-19, and Critique, pp.

112-32; Smith, The Approach to the Philippines,

pp. 90-93; ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn;

ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl, MICHAELMAS Opn, DEXTERITY; MICHAELMAS TF [126th RCT, reinforced],

Rpt of MICHAELMAS Opn, 16 Dec 43-10 Feb 44;

MICHAELMAS TF Opn Diary; CTF 76 Opn Plan

4-43, 29 Dec 43; CTF Rpt of Saidor Opn, 3 Feb 44;

GHQ SWPA Outline Plan Saidor, 10 Dec 43, in

ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 8; Memo,

CAW [Gen Willoughby] for CofS GHQ SWPA, 21

Dec 43, no sub, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Dec 43;

GHQ Ltr of Instns to Comdrs ALAMO Force, ANF,

AAF, NGF, and USASOS, 17 Dec 43, sub: MICHAELMAS Opn, and GHQ SWPA OI 38/19, 31 Dec 43,

both in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec 43; ALF, Rpt

on New Guinea Opns: 4 Sep 43-26 Apr 44; 8th

Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110

(OCMH), pp. 86-91; 18th Army Operations, II,

Japanese Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 125-80.
296 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Valley. U.S. Army Services of Supply

was to haul supplies for the operation

forward to Cape Cretin, where Krueger

was to establish a temporary staging area

and supply point pending the time that

the U.S. Army Services of Supply base at

Finschhafen began operating. Ground

combat forces would come from the

ALAMO reserve for Cape Gloucester, the

U.S. 32d Division which had fought in

the Papuan campaign. In addition MacArthur assigned two engineer aviation

battalions, an amphibian truck company,

and an engineer boat and shore regiment.

Assignment of the mission to ALAMO

Force instead of New Guinea Force

represented a departure from the principle that New Guinea Force would command all operations in New Guinea. The

change was probably made because

nearly all trained Australian divisions

were either committed to action or withdrawn for rest, and because it seemed

clear that all the ALAMO reserve would

not have to be committed to Arawe or

Gloucester.

MacArthur gave Krueger and his air

and naval colleagues little time to get

ready. Actual initiation of the Saidor offensive, he announced, would depend on

the progress of operations on Cape

Gloucester, because landing craft for the

former would have to come from the

latter. It was expected, however, that D

Day would be 2 January 1944, or shortly

thereafter. Two days' notice would be

given.

GHQ's first outline plan had envisaged

a parachute assault to take Saidor, but

that was decided against because there

still were not enough forward airfields

to support current bombing operations

and a parachute assault at the same time.

The attack would have to be made by

ground troops.

For the attack Krueger organized the

MICHAELMAS [Saidor] Task Force under

command of General Martin, assistant

commander of the 32d Division, who had

just reached Goodenough Island. Most

combat troops of the task force came out

of the force Krueger had originally organized for Gasmata. The rest were those

assigned by General MacArthur. Martin's force was built around the 126th

Regimental Combat Team of the 32d

Division, which included the 120th Field

Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzers).47

At the time of assignment the 32d Division units of the task force had just

moved to Goodenough Island from

Milne Bay. The rest of the force was

scattered at such diverse points as Milne

Bay, Kiriwina, and Lae.

Although time for planning and preparing was short, and the pressure of

Admiral Barbey's duties prevented him

from conferring frequently with Krueger

in person, the reports of the participating

units bear witness to the fact that the

experience and state of training of the

commanders and troops were so high

that things went smoothly.

General Martin hastily organized a

headquarters for his task force, taking as

the nucleus Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 126th Infantry. To

47

 Other units were the 121st Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm. pack howitzers); Headquarters and

Headquarters Battery, 191st Field Artillery Group;

B and D Batteries, 209th Coast Artillery Battalion

(AA, AW); A and D Batteries, 743d Coast Artillery

Gun Battalion (AA); the Shore Battalion of the

542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 2d Engineer Special Brigade; the 808th and 863d Engineer Aviation Battalions; and a variety of service

units.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 297

REAR ADM. DANIEL E. BARBEY, left, and Brig. Gen. Clarence A. Martin, center,

observing landing operations at Saidor, 2 January 1944.

this were added some officers from 32d

Division headquarters. Col. Charles D.

Blanchard, task force G-3, came from

ALAMO Force as did a complete engineer section. Col. J. Sladen Bradley,

commander of the 126th, also served as

deputy commander and chief of staff of

the MICHAELMAS Task Force.

Plans began to take shape on 20 December at a conference in ALAMO headquarters at Goodenough Island. Present

were Admiral Barbey; Maj. Gen.

William H. Gill of the 32d Division;

General Heavey of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade; Brig. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, ALAMO Force chief of staff; Col.

Clyde D. Eddleman, G-3 of ALAMO

Force; General Whitehead; General

Martin; and Colonel Blanchard. Whitehead, Patrick, and Eddleman presented

their ideas, as did Barbey, who was just

about to leave for Cape Gloucester. Both

Barbey and Martin felt that, as Saidor

was known to be lightly held by the

enemy, preliminary air bombardment on

the beaches on D Day would be of less

value than a surprise landing at an early

hour in the day. This conference was

followed by two other brief ones during

the next ten days.

As there was neither time nor opportunity for ground reconnaissance of

Saidor, the landing beaches were chosen

from aerial photographs. Three beaches,
298 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

designated Red, White, and Blue from

left (south) to right on the west shore of

Dekays Bay just east of Saidor were selected. They were rough and stony but

were chosen because they were close to

the objective, because the beach gradient

was steep enough to enable the troops to

make a dry landing, because there was

solid ground behind them, and because

Dekays Bay could be expected to offer

protection from the northwest monsoons

prevailing at that time of year.

Formal orders were published in late

December.48 Admiral Barbey organized

his force generally as follows:

These ships would carry the assault

troops from Goodenough and land them

at Saidor on D Day. Six more LST's

would land additional troops and equipment on D plus 1, and LST shipments

would continue to bring in troops and

supplies from Goodenough and Cape

Cretin for some time thereafter.

The assault waves of troops would land

from the APD's in thirty-six LCP(R)'s as

follows: The 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, was to land on Red Beach at H

Hour with two companies abreast, while

the 2d Battalion, 126th, put one company on White Beach and one company

on Blue; the 1st Battalion, 126th, would

land from LCI's on White Beach at H

plus 30 minutes. All units would push

inland and reconnoiter. Field and antiaircraft artillery were to land soon after

the assault infantry. Forming the shore

party would be A Company, 114th Engineer Battalion; the Antitank Company

and part of the Cannon Company, 126th

Infantry; and the Shore Battalion, 542d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. In

all, seven thousand men and three thousand tons of gear were to be put ashore

on D Day.

Plans for naval gunfire called for two

destroyers to put 575 5-inch rounds of

deep supporting fire at inland targets between H minus 20 minutes and H Hour.

Four destroyers would fire 1,150 rounds

at the beach from H minus 20 to H

minus 3 minutes when the lead wave of

landing craft would be nine hundred

yards from shore. Fire from rocketequipped LCI's would cover the landing

craft during the last nine hundred yards.

In accordance with Martin's and Barbey's desire for surprise, the air plans did

not provide for a preliminary bombardment on D Day. Provisions were made,

however, for bombers to strike at inland

targets after H Hour, and for strafers and

fighters to execute supporting missions

on call.

H Hour was set for 0650, fifteen minutes before sunrise—the earliest possible

minute that would allow adequate light

for the earlier naval bombardment.

48

 See ALAMO [ESCALATOR] FO 7, 22 Dec 43, and

MICHAELMAS TF FO 1, 29 Dec 43, both in ALAMO

Force G-3 Jnl File, MICHAELMAS; CTF 76 Opn Plan

4-43, 29 Dec 43.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 299

Weather could be expected to be either

squally with rough surf or pleasant with

smooth surf, and subject to sudden

change from one extreme to the other.

Troops of General Martin's task force,

aside from the 32d Division units, were

arriving at Goodenough while the plans

were being prepared. Some units arrived

short of clothing and equipment, and

these were supplied as well as possible.

Meanwhile General Krueger, concerned over the difficulties of supplying

Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and Saidor

simultaneously, argued in favor of postponing Saidor. But General MacArthur,

Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, and

others, promising to make sure that

enough supplies arrived at Saidor, and

unwilling to lose momentum, agreed

that the operation would be valueless if

postponed. Preparations went forward.49

Admiral Kinkaid, a cool, soft-spoken,

bushy-eyebrowed product of many years

in the U.S. Navy, had relieved Admiral

Carpender as commander of Allied

Naval Forces and of the Seventh Fleet in

November. A classmate of Admiral

Turner at the Naval Academy, he had

already had ample experience in the

Pacific, having commanded carrier task

forces during the Guadalcanal Campaign

and led the invasion of the Aleutians.

On 28 December General Patrick

notified Martin that the Cape Gloucester

operation was proceeding successfully,

and that his task force would probably

invade Saidor on 2 January, the estimated date. As the LST's would have to

sail from Goodenough on 31 December

in order to reach Saidor on D Day, Martin concluded that loading would have

to start on 30 December, for the task

force assembly area on Goodenough lay

eighteen miles from the embarkation

point. He ordered his force to move to

the embarkation point at once. Movement and loading continued night and

day, usually in rain which turned the

roads into mud. On 30 December Martin

received word officially that D Day

would definitely be 2 January.

APD's and LCI's took aboard only

troops, individual equipment, and individual or squad weapons. Heavy equipment, vehicles, motor-drawn weapons,

bulk supplies, and some troops went

aboard the LST's. Martin was forced to

make a last-minute change in embarkation plans on 30 December when he

found there would be nine APD's instead of the ten he had expected. The

surplus infantrymen were ordered aboard

an LCI, but since the units involved

were then moving to the embarkation

point some did not receive word of the

change until they had reached the beach.

The difficulties were all overborne,

and by 0830, 31 December, the six LST's

had departed Goodenough. Their slots

at the beach were promptly taken by the

six that were to bring heavy equipment

to Saidor on D plus 1. The LCI's left

Goodenough in midafternoon, and the

fast APD's completed loading at 1700.

There had not been opportunity for a

dress rehearsal, but the LCP(R)'s of the

APD's practiced landing formations at

Goodenough Bay.50

49

 Ltr, Krueger to CINCSWPA, 28 Dec 43, sub:

Deferment of MICHAELMAS, and Rad, Gen R. J.

Marshall to Gen Chamberlin, 28 Dec 43, both in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 29 Dec 43.

50

 The 126th Regimental Combat Team had received six weeks of amphibious training in Australia and three weeks training in LST's, LCI's, and

APD's at Milne Bay.
300 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

For the soldiers and sailors aboard the

APD's New Year's Eve passed quietly.

Martin, the APD captains, Colonel Bradley, and the battalion commanders conferred aboard the destroyer Stringham

and made minor last-minutes changes in

landing plans. Some of the ships showed

moving pictures. At 0600 on New Year's

Day, 1944, the APD's sailed. They put in

at Oro Bay en route, where they were

joined by Admiral Barbey in his flagship, the destroyer Conyngham, to which

General Martin transferred his command

post afloat. During the ships' approach to

Saidor on 1 January, sixty B-24's and

forty-eight B-25's hit the Japanese installations with 218 tons of demolition

bombs.

Barbey's final run through the straits

to Saidor was unexciting. The early part

of the night of 1-2 January was clear,

with a quarter moon shining on the

ships. After midnight the sky became

overcast and rain fell.

Seizing Saidor

When the ships and landing craft hove

to in Dekays Bay before sunrise of 2

January, heavy overcast and rain obscured the shore. Admiral Barbey postponed H Hour from 0650 to 0705 to

provide more light for naval gunfire,

loading and assembly of boats, and

identification of beaches. There followed another delay of twenty minutes

while LCP(R)'s formed up. The destroyers and rocket LCI's fired the scheduled

1,725 5-inch shells and 624 4.5-inch

rockets at the beaches and inland areas.

Troops aboard ship, one thousand yards

offshore, felt the concussion of the explosives.

The assault waves meanwhile had

boated and assembled, and were churning toward Red, White, and Blue

Beaches. First craft touched down at

0725, and during the next seventeen

minutes the four waves of thirty-six

LCP(R)'s landed 1,440 troops. There was

no opposition from the enemy. The sixteen LCI's, organized in three waves,

grounded and put ashore more than

3,000 troops.

Each LST had towed an LCM of the

2d Engineer Special Brigade. The LST's

cast loose their tows on arrival offshore,

and three LCM's sailed to the beaches

with the last wave of small craft. Thirty

minutes before the LST's were scheduled to beach, an angledozer clanked out

of each LCM and at once set to work

grading landing points and beach exits

to use in unloading the LST's. When the

six LST's beached at about 0800, landing

points and beach exits made of gravel

and wire mesh were ready. This performance, plus the efficiency of the shore

party, which Admiral Barbey praised

highly, enabled cargo to come ashore in

record time. Each LST rapidly unloaded

three hundred tons of bulk supplies and

two hundred tons of vehicles and equipment. By 1140 all LST's had unloaded

and retracted. The bad weather delayed

the scheduled air bombing, but later in

the morning B-24's, B-25's, and A-20's

bombed the Saidor, airstrip and the high

ground inland.51

51

 There was one hitch in the air plans. Martin

did not receive the 1st Air Task Force's support

plan until after he had left Goodenough and was

aboard ship. There he discovered that one alternate

target lay on the American side of the bomb safety

line. As the ships were under radio silence he could

not notify air headquarters. The air liaison party,

after landing, radioed the necessary information directly to the bombers before any American casualties were incurred.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 301

M10 MOTOR CARRIAGE MOUNTING 3-lNCH GUN on a rough and stony beach near

Saidor, 2 January 1944.

When they reached shore the rifle battalions began to push inland while the

artillery established itself and the shore

party moved supplies off the beach. Japanese resistance was limited to a few rifle

shots. General Martin reported that only

15 enemy soldiers had been near the

beaches at the time of the landing, and

11 of these were killed by the bombardments and by soldiers of the 126th.

Saidor had a normal garrison of about

50, and on 2 January some 120-150

transients were present. All these

promptly took to the hills. American

casualties on D Day numbered 1 soldier

killed and 5 wounded and 2 sailors

drowned at Blue Beach. Forces ashore

numbered 6,779:52 6,602 Army ground

troops, 129 from Army Air Forces units,

and 48 sailors.

Admiral Crutchley's task force had

performed its usual mission of covering

the invasion against Japanese warships

from Rabaul, but none appeared.

Thirty-nine fighters and twenty-four

bombers of the 4th Air Army were based

at Wewak but were unable to launch an

attack until 1600. By then Barbey's ships

were well out to sea, Martin's soldiers

had dispersed their supplies, and little

damage was done.

So ended the first day at Saidor. The

speedy efficiency of Saidor operations,

when compared, for example, with the

Kiriwina invasion of the previous year,

bears witness to the Southwest Pacific's

improvement in amphibious technique.

Yet the fact that there are flaws in even

52

 This figure comes from the MICHAELMAS Task

Force report. CTF 76's report gives 7,200.
302 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

the best-executed operations was demonstrated the next morning. The MICHAELMAS Task Force expected six LST's (each

towing an engineer LCM) carrying the

121st Field Artillery Battalion and A and

D Batteries, 743d Coast Artillery Gun

Battalion (Antiaircraft), to arrive at

0700, 3 January, which would be after

daylight. When three vessels came dimly

in view about a hundred yards from the

north shore at 0510 and failed to identify

themselves, the shore defenses opened

fire. The vessels withdrew. After daylight

they returned and were correctly identified as three of the six expected LST's.

Thereafter shipments of troops and

supplies on the LST's were uneventful.

The 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion

arrived on 6 January; the larger part of

the 128th Regimental Combat Team

came in on 16 and 19 January in response

to General Martin's request for more

troops; the 863d Engineer Aviation Battalion was landed on 29 January. By 10

February, when General Krueger declared DEXTERITY over, and GHQ announced that U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific, would take over

supplying Saidor, Arawe, and Gloucester

on 1 March, the Saidor garrison numbered 14,979 in addition to a small naval

detachment. Forty men had been killed,

111 wounded; 16 were missing.

Base Development

Construction missions assigned to the

engineers included building or installing

an airfield, roads, fuel storage tanks,

docks, jetties, a PT boat base, and a hospital. Work on the airfield started

promptly and in itself was not difficult,

since the prewar field was in fair condition. The amphibian engineers unloaded

ships and built roads, but continuous

rainfall hindered their work and General

Martin occasionally diverted the aviation

engineers to assist the amphibians in

their work. The Americans were assisted

in all phases of construction work by

native labor. A detachment of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit

consisting of one officer, several enlisted

men, and eleven native policemen had

landed on 2 January to supervise the employment of New Guinea natives. Seven

days later 100 native workers came up

from Lae, and by 10 February there were

13 policemen, 200 Lae natives, and 406

local workers at Saidor. C-47's landed on

the airfield on D plus 9, and by 10 February it was almost ready to receive warplanes.

Junction With the Australians

In the days immediately following D

Day General Martin disposed one battalion in defensive positions on each flank,

with the third patrolling in the mountains between the flanks. There were

some fourteen miles of coast line between the flanks which were held by the

coast artillery, supported by other units.

The MICHAELMAS Task Force was

hardly ashore when General Krueger

warned that, as the Japanese troops in

the vicinity of Sio were preparing to

move west to Madang, an attack against

Saidor was to be expected. These warnings were repeated on 7 and 9 January.

General Martin asked for more troops

on 10 January and General Krueger sent

him the 1st and 3d Battalion Combat

Teams of the 128th Regimental Combat

Team.

Meanwhile patrols went to the east,

west, and south. There were occasional
CROSSING THE STRAITS 303

brushes with scattered Japanese patrols,

but no pitched battles. January ended

without an attack. The Japanese were

known to be advancing west, but they

had not yet touched Saidor.

Almost from the very outset General

Martin had urged an advance to the east

to hem in the Japanese between his

forces and the advancing Australians,

but, partly because it apparently did not

wish to commit additional troops, and

partly because of garbles in the transmission of messages, ALAMO headquarters

did not at once accede to Martin's desires.53

Doubts regarding Japanese intentions

were dispelled on 6 February when from

a newly established observation post in

the Finisterres American soldiers saw

large numbers of Japanese troops marching along an inland trail that ran south

of Saidor through the mountains and

foothills. It was concluded that the Japanese were bypassing Saidor.

The conclusion was correct. In late

December General Adachi, concerned

over the state of things to the east, had

flown from Madang to 51st Division

headquarters at Kiari. He received word

of the American landing at Saidor just

before he went overland to the 20th Division at Sio. Opinion at General Imamura's Rabaul headquarters was divided

over the best course of action. Some staff

officers argued that the 20th and 51st Divisions should attack Saidor. Others

counseled that they slip peacefully past

Saidor over an inland route and proceed

to Madang to join with the remainder of

the 18th Army to defend Wewak. Abandoning the attempt to hold the shores of

the straits, Imamura decided in favor of

bypassing Saidor. He sent orders to that

effect to Adachi at Sio.

Adachi placed General Nakano of the

51st Division in charge of the retreat and

directed the 41st Division to move from

Wewak to defend Madang. Adachi left

Sio by submarine "in a troubled state of

mind because he would again have to

force the two divisions to go through difficulties."54

 He later ordered General

Nakai to send eight companies out of

the Ramu Valley to Bogadjim. They

were to advance down to the coast to

harass Saidor while Nakano's force retreated.

Nakano, who first directed the 20th

Division to retreat along the coast while

the 51st Division and naval units moved

inland, eventually decided to avoid

enemy opposition by sending the whole

force through the Finisterres.

The retreat began promptly. Sio was

abandoned to the 9th Australian Division and the Japanese moved up the

coast, then headed inland east of Saidor.

The retreat to Madang, almost two hundred miles away by the coastal route, was

another of the terrible Japanese marches

in New Guinea. The troops struggled

through jungles, across rivers, and over

the awesome cliffs and mountains of the

Finisterres. Fatigue, straggling, disease,

and starvation characterized the retreat.

"The men were no longer able to care

for themselves and walked step after step

looking ahead only a meter to see where 53

 Gen Martin, 1st Ind, 2 Nov 53, to Ltr, Gen

Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, to Gen Martin, 6 Oct 53,

no sub, OCMH. General Martin kindly attached to

his indorsement several letters and papers and took

the trouble to prepare an excellent narrative which

clarified many obscure points.

54

 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No.

42 (OCMH), 132.
304 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

they were going."55 The two divisions

had totaled twenty thousand in December 1943; only ten thousand wearily

entered Madang in mid-February.

Yet that the ten thousand made such

a trip and that the Japanese could make

such marches in retreat and in the advance are tribute and testimony to the

patient fortitude and iron resolution of

the Japanese soldier. They clearly illustrate that despite his baggy uniforms and

bombastic phrases he was a formidable

opponent.

After the fall of Sio the 5th Australian Division relieved the 9th and advanced up the coast. Its advance patrols

made contact with those of the MICHAELMAS Task Force on the Yaut River about

fourteen miles southeast of Saidor on 10

February 1944.

Because permission to move east was

received too late, Martin could not block

the Japanese in that direction. And the

escape route to the south ran up and

down such steep ravines and slopes that

no heavy weapons could be carried there,

and the Americans could not block that

route either. General Martin decided to

attack to the west. The move, executed

by elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions,

126th Infantry, began at once.

General Gill and his staff reached

Saidor on 18 February to assume command, and continued the westward

move. By 24 February patrols of the 3d

Battalion, 126th, had reached Biliau at

Cape Iris, about twelve land miles from

Saidor. On 5 March the 126th Infantry

(less the 2d Battalion), the 121st Field

Artillery Battalion, and B Battery, 120th

Field Artillery Battalion, disembarked

from engineer landing craft at Yalau

Plantation, twenty miles farther on. By

now the 7th Australian Division had

broken out of the Ramu Valley and General Nakai was retreating toward Madang. Patrols of the 32d U.S. and the 7th

Australian Divisions made contact at Kul

between the Sa and Kambara Rivers,

about eight miles beyond Yalau Plantation, on 21 March. The Australians went

on to take Bogadjim on 13 April.

Meanwhile Imperial General Headquarters had transferred the 18th Army

and the 4th Air Army out of the 8th Area

Army and assigned them to control of the

2d Area Army to pull Adachi's troops out

of Madang and west to Wewak, Aitape,

and Hollandia. Adachi's troops started

west again, evacuating Madang just before the Australians entered from the

east on 24 April.56 So the large-scale attack on Madang envisaged in ELKTON

III never came off. Saidor proved to be

an effective and economical substitute.

Securing of the major objectives of

Operation II of CARTWHEEL was completed by the seizure of Saidor, and subsequent operations on the Huon Peninsula were anticlimactic strategically,

however bitter and tragic they were for

those who fought and died in them. The

Saidor landing completed the seizure of

the Markham-Ramu trough and the

Huon Peninsula for the Allies and obtained one more airfield to support operations against the Admiralties and enemy

bases to the west.

55

 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No.

42 (OCMH), 180.

56

 For the 18th Army's operations subsequent to

the period embraced by this volume, see Smith,

The Approach to the Philippines, Chs. V-VIII. The

new boundary between the 8th Area and the 2d

Area Armies was set at longitude 147° east.
CROSSING THE STRAITS 305

Strictly speaking, Saidor was the last

invasion of the CARTWHEEL operations.

With it General MacArthur fulfilled the

provisions of the Joint Chiefs' orders of

28 March 1943. But he and Admiral

Halsey were not yet finished with the

Japanese in the Southeast Area. By the

end of 1943 Rabaul had not yet been

completely neutralized, and before the

approach to the Philippines could begin

there remained a set of subsidiary,

transitional operations to be accomplished. These, which the Joint Chiefs

and MacArthur had discussed earlier in

1943, would complete the encirclement

of Rabaul and would provide a naval

base to substitute for Rabaul in the drive

to the Philippines.
CHAPTER XV

Expanding Into the Bismarck

Archipelago

General Plans

Further operations in the Bismarck

Archipelago had been contemplated for

nearly two years. The Joint Chiefs' directive which launched the campaigns

against Rabaul in 1942 had authorized

operations to follow Arawe and Cape

Gloucester, and MacArthur's early plans

called for the capture of Kavieng on

northern New Ireland and of Manus in

the Admiralty Islands as well as of

Rabaul.1 Further, when the Joint Chiefs

were deciding to bypass Rabaul, General Marshall suggested that CARTWHEEL

be extended to include seizure of Kavieng, Manus, and Wewak. MacArthur

was less than enthusiastic about Wewak,

which was a major enemy base. His plan

for the drive to the Philippines, RENO

III, called for the invasion of Hansa Bay

on 1 February 1944, of Kavieng by the

South Pacific on 1 March 1944, and of

the Admiralties on 1 March 1944.2

Responsibility for base construction at

Kavieng and at Seeadler Harbour at

Manus was to be Admiral Halsey's, and

he began planning these bases in November 1943. Kavieng was supposed to

become a minor fleet base, a PT base,

and a major air base with six airfields.

Manus would serve as an air base (two

airfields and a seaplane base) while

Seeadler Harbour would be developed

into a major fleet base whose complete

repair facilities would include drydocks,

and a main naval supply base. It would

serve Admiral Nimitz' naval forces as

well as the Seventh Fleet.3

Halsey, who conferred with MacArthur in Brisbane in late 1943 before

departing on a trip to Hawaii and the

continental United States, opposed the

seizure of Kavieng. He wished to apply

the bypass technique and seize Emirau in

the Saint Matthias Islands, about ninety

miles northwest of Kavieng, for this

group had never been taken by the Japanese. Kavieng, on the other hand, was a

major air and naval base and was reported to be strongly defended. In December MacArthur told members of

Halsey's staff that an attack against Emi- 1

 See above, pp. 5, 13. 2

 See also GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 3, 23 Nov

43. in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl 1, 23 Nov 43-12 Feb

44.

3

 File on Manus-Kavieng base development in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 43.
EXPANDING INTO THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 307

rau or Kavieng would serve equally well

in the isolation of Rabaul.4

Halsey spent four days with Nimitz at

Pearl Harbor and then, in early January,

flew to San Francisco where he and

Nimitz conferred with Admiral King.

Here, and later in Washington, the South

Pacific commander made known his

views on Kavieng and Emirau.5

Halsey was not able to carry his point

at this time. He did however discuss timing and the question of naval support

for Manus and Kavieng. These were important because by now the Central

Pacific offensives were well under way.

Nimitz' forces, having invaded the Gilberts in November 1943, were planning

their initial move into the Marshalls

(Kwajalein and Roi-Namur) in late

January. Kavieng, almost four hundred

miles from Cape Torokina, lay beyond

fighter-plane range of Halsey's most advanced air base. Thus aircraft carriers

would have to provide cover for the invasion forces, and Admiral Nimitz

agreed to furnish them. General MacArthur wanted carriers to cover the invasion of Manus as well, in case bad

weather kept the Fifth Air Force planes

grounded in New Guinea and at Cape

Gloucester. Nimitz pointed out, however, that such weather could also affect

carrier operations.6

Admiral Carney, Halsey's chief of staff,

had visited Pearl Harbor in December

and reported that the ships for Kavieng

would not be available until 1 May.7

This would also put off the Admiralties

operation.8 But Admiral Nimitz then

suggested that by delaying his second

Marshalls invasion (Eniwetok) until 1

May he could provide support for Manus

and Kavieng about 1 April. MacArthur

was ready and willing to invade Manus

and Kavieng in March before moving to

Hansa Bay, but the Joint Chiefs ordered

Nimitz to deliver a strong carrier strike

against Truk during March. No direct

naval supporting forces could be available for Manus and Kavieng until April.9

Nimitz proposed that representatives of

all the Pacific areas meet in Pearl Harbor to settle details of co-ordination and

timing.10

The command question came up again

in January when Marshall asked MacArthur's opinion on a draft directive for

the next operations. The draft, Marshall

told him, had received the approval of

General Kenney, who was also in Washington. Except for Kavieng it did not

specify any particular localities to be attacked but authorized advances into the

Bismarck Archipelago preparatory to the

drive to the Philippines. South Pacific

forces attacking Kavieng were to be

placed under MacArthur's "general di4

 Memo, SJC [Chamberlin] for Jnl, 21 Dec 43,

sub: Conf at GHQ, 20 Dec 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 21 Dec 43. 5

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp.

186-87; Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill,

Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York:

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 533-34. 6

 Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, CNO, and

COMSOPAC, 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330.

7

 Memo, Carney for Halsey, 12 Dec 43, sub:

CINCPOA-SOPAC Stf Conf, 9-12 Dec 43, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Dec 43. 8

 Memo, B F [Brig Gen Bonner Fellers, G-3 Sec

GHQ SWPA], no addressee, 22 Dec 43, sub: Conf

G-3 Plng Sec, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec 43. 9

 Rad, CINCPAC to COMINCH, 22 Dec 43, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 24 Dec 43; Rad, Halsey to

MacArthur, 5 Jan 44, and Rad, MacArthur to Marshall and Halsey, 6 Jan 44, and Rad, COMSOPAC

to COMSOPAC Administration, 9 Jan 44, all in

Marshall's IN Log. 10

 Rad, CINCPAC to CINCSWPA, CNO, and

COMSOPAC, 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330.
308 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

rection," and Nimitz was ordered to provide fleet support and more assault shipping for Manus and Kavieng after the

approaching conference at Pearl Harbor.11

MacArthur objected strenuously. After

reviewing the course of CARTWHEEL

operations, which took place along two

axes and for which, therefore, "loose coordination" sufficed, he argued that in

the Bismarck Archipelago the South and

Southwest Pacific forces would be converging in a fairly restricted area. South

Pacific forces alone could not capture

Kavieng, and elements of the forces

might have to be mingled. Constant,

complete co-ordination of air and surface

units would be required. Unity of command, vested in himself, should be applied, urged-MacArthur, with the South

Pacific forces under Halsey's direct command. And, finally, the Joint Chiefs

rather than Nimitz should determine the

extent of fleet support and additional

assault shipping.12

In their orders for the extension into

the Bismarck Archipelago, dated 23 and

24 January, the Joint Chiefs acceded to

MacArthur's suggestions on fleet support

in a left-handed way. They directed

Nimitz to provide fleet support and cover

for the Manus-Kavieng invasions under

his direct command, and to attach more

warships and assault shipping to MacArthur's and Halsey's forces. The exact

amounts were to be determined at the

forthcoming Pearl Harbor conference,

which would then forward recommendations to Washington for approval.

Control over South Pacific forces remained the same as for CARTWHEEL.

Halsey was in direct command under

MacArthur's direction.13

The conference at Pearl Harbor convened on 27 January. Halsey, flying out

from Washington, had been grounded by

bad weather in Fort Worth, Texas, and

again in San Francisco, and so was not

present. Carney, whom he had authorized to make preliminary arrangements with MacArthur, represented him,

as did General Harmon. Representing

MacArthur were Sutherland, Kenney,

and Kinkaid. Nimitz, Rear Adm. Forrest

P. Sherman, and others spoke for the

Central Pacific.

Sutherland made it quite clear that

MacArthur now definitely wanted the

South Pacific to capture Kavieng for use

as an air base, not Emirau. Halsey's proposal was shelved for the time being.

Besides discussing operations in the

Bismarck Archipelago, the conference

covered a wide range of topics—the value

of the Marianas, B-29's, the possibility of

bypassing Truk, and the comparative

merits of the Central and Southwest

Pacific routes to the Philippines. All

agreed that whether Truk was bypassed

or not, Seeadler Harbour was essential

as a fleet base for the approach to the

Philippines.

Nimitz proposed to give long-range

support to the Manus-Kavieng invasions

with a two-day strike against Truk by

the main body of the Pacific Fleet starting about 26 March. In addition he

agreed to send two divisions of fast car11

 Rad 3097, Marshall to MacArthur, 17 Jan 44,

in Marshall's OUT Log. 12

 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 19 Jan 44, in

Marshall's IN Log.

13

 JCS 679, 24 Jan 44, title: Dirs for Seizure of

Control of Bismarck Archipelago; Rads, JCS to

CINCPAC and CINCSWPA, 23 Jan 44, with JCS

679.
EXPANDING INTO THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 309

riers to operate under Halsey's command

during the Manus-Kavieng invasions,

while other carrier divisions and fast

battleships operated in covering positions.14

These were large forces indeed. As

originally planned the Bismarck operations would have been extensive. In addition to the naval forces, Halsey

planned to use all his land-based aircraft and two divisions in assault, with

one in reserve. However, not one of the

operations approved by the Joint Chiefs

and MacArthur was carried out according to the original plan.

Reducing Rabaul and Kavieng

All during the invasions of Arawe,

Cape Gloucester, and Saidor, and during

the discussions over the Bismarck Archipelago operations, the Solomons air command had been putting forth a maximum effort to reduce Rabaul. Completion of the Torokina fighter strip at

Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, was

a major step forward, for now New

Georgia- and Guadalcanal-based bombers could have fighter escort in their

attacks. But by the end of 1943 it was

clear that high-level bombing would not

suffice to neutralize Rabaul. Obviously,

success depended on completion of the

bomber strips by the Piva River (Piva

Uncle and Piva Yoke).15

Piva Uncle, eight thousand feet by

three hundred feet, was ready as a staging field on 30 December 1943. On 5

January 1944 SBD's and TBF's from

Munda staged through to attack Rabaul,

but by noon, when the bombers arrived

over the target, Rabaul was as usual

blanketed by heavy clouds. A similar attack two days later met the same difficulties, but on 9 January Piva Yoke was

ready and from then on bombers could

be permanently based at the Bougainville fields and could reach Rabaul in the

morning, before it was covered by clouds.

Thereafter during January TBF's,

SBD's, B-25's, and B-24's struck regularly at Rabaul. The Japanese lost many

planes but occasionally received reinforcements from Truk, and continued to

resist with fighter interception and antiaircraft fire. ". . . the skies overhead

14

 These forces were to include 3 aircraft carriers,

3 light carriers, 7 cruisers, and 18 destroyers. In

addition 4 old battleships, 7 cruisers, 4 escort carriers, 48 destroyers, 30 destroyer-escorts, 1 command

ship (AGC), 19 transports, 3 LSD's, 5 minesweepers,

36 LST's, and 36 LCI's would be assigned to

Halsey's Third Fleet for Kavieng, while for Manus

the Seventh Fleet was to receive 3 light cruisers, 4

escort carriers, 35 destroyers, 8 patrol frigates, 1

AGC, 1 transport, 1 cargo ship, 2 minesweepers, 1

LSD, 13 APD's, 30 LST's, 30 LCI's, 70 LCT's, and

30 submarines. Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's

Story, p. 188; Craven and Cate, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 551-52; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 346; Smith, The Approach

to the Philippines, pp. 7-8; Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific Campaign, OCMH; Rad,

CINCPAC to COMINCH-CNO, 29 Jan 44, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Jan 44; Ltr, CINCPOA to

COMINCH, 30 Jan 44, sub: Assignment Naval

Forces and Assault Shipg to Third and Seventh

Fits for Opns Against Bismarck Archipelago, ABC

384 Pac (17 Jan 43) Sec 3-A.

15

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based

on Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, pp. 350-56; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 337-66, 392-410; Samuel Eliot

Morison, History of United States Naval Operations

in World War II, VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls: June 1942-April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown

and Company, 1951), 330; Building the Navy's

Bases in World War II, II, 268-74; USSBS, The

Allied Campaign Against Rabaul; 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), p.

123; Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 6, 58-63.
310 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

JAPANESE SHIPS BURNING AT RABAUL

were the scene of continuous annihilation battles. . . ."16

By the end of January heavy bombers

had flown 263 sorties over Rabaul;

B-25's, 180 sorties; SBD's, 368; TBF's,

227; fighters, 1,850. Losses totaled 8

B-24's, 14 B-25's, 8 SBD's, 5 TBF's, 19

P-38's, 37 F4U's, 5 F6F's, and 6 New

Zealand P-40's.

Damage to Japanese equipment and

weapons on the ground was relatively

light, for in late November the enemy

had begun the prodigious task of digging

every possible item underground in Rabaul's volcanic rock, a task that was well

along by January. But all buildings were

knocked flat. Ships and grounded planes

were especially vulnerable to low-level

bombing and dive-bombing. By February 1944 the Allies had won a signal victory; Japanese surface ships stopped

using the harbor.

During the same period Kavieng received increased attention from both

Allies and Japanese. Halsey, expecting

to assault the base eventually, wanted to

reduce Kavieng to help cut the Japanese

lines of communication from rear bases

to Rabaul. The Japanese, well aware of

the threat to Rabaul, decided to

strengthen Kavieng and the Admiralties

to help protect Rabaul.

In October Imamura had sent the

230th Infantry of the 38th Division from

Rabaul to New Ireland. Next month he

sent an emissary to Tokyo to ask for one

16

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 58.
EXPANDING INTO THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 311

more division. Imperial Headquarters

responded by sending the 1st Independent Mixed Regiment to New Ireland. It

reached its destination in late 1943 and

early 1944. Imamura placed it, together

with the 230th Infantry, under Maj.

Gen. Takeo Ito, infantry group commander of the 38th Division. Ito's

soldiers and the 14th Naval Base Force

were responsible for defense of New

Ireland.

In December Halsey set a trap and

ordered Buka bombarded to lure Japanese planes and ships away from Kavieng. Admiral Sherman, lying east of

Kavieng with the carriers Bunker Hill

and Monterey plus escorts, was then to

strike at Kavieng in the hope of catching troopships and warships in the harbor. Before dawn on Christmas morning

Sherman launched eighty-six planes,

which bombed Kavieng at 0745 and were

back aboard their carriers by 1015. But

the results were disappointing as there

were almost no ships in the harbor.

On New Year's day Sherman delivered

another strike from 220 miles east of

Kavieng. Outside the harbor his planes

caught some of the ships that had just

unloaded part of the 1st Independent

Mixed Regiment but the Japanese air

cover of forty-two planes prevented the

ships from suffering damage. Sherman

struck Kavieng again three days later,

again without doing much damage; no

ships were present and the Japanese

planes were out against Cape Gloucester.

In February the Fifth Air Force, using

Finschhafen as a fighter base and Cape

Gloucester as an emergency field, began

to attack Kavieng with the aim of softening it before the projected invasion, cutting the line of communications to Rabaul, and supporting the South Pacific's

invasio 11th forty-eigh n of thet B-24' Greesn wit Islands h P-3. O8 escort n thes

caught Kavieng's planes on the ground,

and the next two days saw similar attacks.

During the first two weeks of February Rabaul's defenses grew obviously

weaker as the Air Command, Solomons,

maintained the intensity of its attack.17

There were few attempts to intercept until 19 February. On that date twentyeight SBD's, twenty-three TBF's, and

sixty-eight fighters, finding no ships in

the harbor, put bombs and rockets on

Lakunai airfield. Twenty B-24's with

thirty-five escorting fighters bombed

from high altitudes. About fifty Japanese fighters attempted to break up the

attack without success. This was the last

attempted interception. Thereafter attacking Rabaul became a milk run.

Allied pilots encountered antiaircraft

fire but no planes. Rabaul no longer

could threaten any Allied advance except

one directed against itself.

Rabaul's impotence was of course

largely brought about by the South and

Southwest Pacific air and naval campaigns that had been under way for so

long, but it was partly brought about by

Admiral Nimitz' naval forces. The Central Pacific had invaded Kwajalein and

Roi-Namur on 31 January and seized

them so rapidly that the reserve and garrison forces did not have to be committed. When the Joint Chiefs told

Nimitz that they were willing to delay

the Manus-Kavieng invasions in order to

proceed directly to Eniwetok, using the

uncommitted troops, Nimitz decided to

17

 From 1 through 19 February fighters flew 1,579

sorties; B-24's, 256; B-25's, 263; TBF's, 244, and

SBD's 573.
312 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

go there as quickly as possible. Accordingly he invaded Eniwetok on 17 February. In support of this move the main

body of the Pacific Fleet, commanded by

Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, attacked Truk on 16 and 17 February,

over one month ahead of schedule. Spruance's strike was an outstanding success.

The Combined Fleet had already escaped toward home waters, but Spruance's pilots destroyed or damaged 250-

275 planes as well as thousands of tons

of shipping. Admiral Koga, thus almost

bereft of planes, ordered all naval planes

out of the Southeast Area at once. ". . .

Rabaul, compelled to face the enemy

with ground resources alone and completely isolated, was abandoned."18

The Allies dropped 20,584 tons of

bombs on Rabaul throughout the war,

and fired 383 tons of naval shells after

Rabaul was reduced to the indignity of

suffering destroyer and nocturnal PBY

bombardment in March. Thirty naval

vessels were sunk, 23 damaged. In addition 154 large cargo vessels and 517

barges were sunk; 70 small cargo vessels

suffered damage.19 ". . . The [Japanese]

Navy lost the pick of its flight personnel

at Rabaul, a fact which told heavily upon

subsequent efforts to rebuild our air

forces."20

Rabaul was abandoned only in the

strategic sense, and it was impotent only

for offensive action. It could have defended itself with bloody efficiency had

the Allies attacked. The garrison of New

Britain numbered almost 98,000 men

(76,300 in the 8th Area Army and 21,570

in the naval forces). The rugged country

of Gazelle Peninsula was well suited for

defense. By the war's end some 350 miles

of tunnels and caves had been excavated.

At peak strength Rabaul had 367 antiaircraft guns (of which 73 were destroyed

by air bombing), ranging in type and

caliber from 13.2-mm. to 120.7-mm. dual

purpose. There were 43 coast defense

guns (1 destroyed) of calibers up to and

including 150-mm. Of the 475 artillery

guns and howitzers (37-mm. to 150-mm.),

none was destroyed by bombing, nor

were any of the 1,762 machine guns. Imamura's men also had tanks, mines,

ditches, caves, bunkers, and concrete pillboxes, as well as rifles, grenades, bayonets, and ample ammunition.

Rabaul would not have been as valuable to the Allies as it was to the Japanese in their southward advance. It

would have been useful to the Allies

only in a northward move against Truk

and the Marianas. Because the Joint

Chiefs had decided to advance westward,

and because Seeadler Harbour in the Admiralties was better than Rabaul's, the

Japanese fortress was not worth the price

the Japanese surely would have exacted.

Seizure of the Green Islands

Plans and Preparations

In December 1943 Admiral Halsey's

planes were bombing Rabaul, his ships

were patrolling the Solomon Sea, and his

ground troops in Bougainville were

either fighting the enemy or consolidating positions in anticipation of a fight.

18

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 6. 19

 These and subsequent statistics come from

USSBS, The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul, pp.

11-36. 20

 Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air Operations,

November 1942-June 1943, Pt. III, Japanese

Monogr No. 107 (OCMH), p. 59.
EXPANDING INTO THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 313

But this was not enough to satisfy him.

When he learned that Nimitz' plans, as

they stood in December, would not permit the invasion of Manus and Kavieng

for several months, he decided to seize an

air base site within fighter range of Kavieng in the meantime.21

 At a conference

in Port Moresby on 20 December attended by MacArthur, Kinkaid, Carney, Chamberlin, and others, the South

Pacific representatives proposed that the

Southwest Pacific attack Manus directly

while South Pacific forces captured the

Green Islands, some 37 miles northwest

of Buka, and established there an airfield

and PT boat base. Situated 117 miles

east of Rabaul and 220 miles southeast

of Kavieng, this circular coral atoll was

not strongly held. The Japanese used it

only as a barge staging base between

Rabaul and Buka. Allied seizure of the

atoll would put South Pacific fighter

planes within range of Kavieng, extend

the range of PT boat patrols as far as

New Ireland, and cut the Japanese seaborne supply route to Buka.

MacArthur, deciding for the time

being against a move to Manus in advance of the projected invasion of Hansa

Bay, approved simultaneous attacks

against Manus and Kavieng and told the

South Pacific to go ahead with the plan

to attack the Green Islands about 1 February.22

The island group consists of four flat,

thickly wooded coral atolls which encircle a lagoon. The group is about nine

miles long from north to south, five miles

from east to west. Horseshoe-shaped

Nissan, the main island, provided good

landing beaches on its west shore inside

the lagoon, but it was not known

whether the passage between Barahun

and Nissan would accommodate landing

craft. Therefore Halsey sent four PT

boats from Cape Torokina to examine

the passage on the night of 10-11 January. They found seventeen feet of water

there, or enough to float an LST.23

Admiral Halsey, who returned to

Noumea on 3 February, placed control

of the operation and responsibility for

the co-ordination of amphibious planning in Admiral Wilkinson's hands on 5

February.24 This action confirmed warning orders which had been issued in early

January.

Only destroyer-transports and landing

craft were assigned to the attack force.

Command of the landing force was given

to General Barrowclough of the 3d New

Zealand Division. Barrowclough's division (less the 8th Brigade Group), the

976th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion of the U.S. Army, a PT base unit,

communications units, a boat pool, and

a large naval base unit including an en- 21

 Unless otherwise indicated this section is based

on Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 355; Gillespie, The Pacific, pp. 168-95;

Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p. 188;

Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 412-

19; Rentz, Bougainville and the Northern Solomons,

pp. 114-17; Building the Navy's Bases in World

War II, II, 274-76; Halsey, Narrative Account of

the South Pacific Campaign; Southeast Area Naval

Operations, III, Japanese Monogr No. 50 (OCMH),

60-62.

22

 Memo, SJC [Chamberlin] for Jnl, 21 Dec 43,

sub: Conf at GHQ, 20 Dec 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 21 Dec 43. 23

 A fully loaded LST draws 14 feet 114 inches of

water astern, 9 feet 914 inches when loaded for

landing operations. 24

 Rad, Comdr Third Flt to CINCSWPA, CINCPAC, and all TF's SOPAC, 5 Feb 44, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 7 Feb 44.
314 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

tire construction regiment, constituted

the landing force. Halsey ordered the

Solomons air command and Ainsworth's

and Merrill's cruiser task forces to support and cover the invasion, and arranged with MacArthur for Kenney's air

forces to deliver the attacks on Kavieng

during the first fifteen days of February.25

As South Pacific headquarters estimated that Rabaul and Kavieng would

be virtually neutralized by mid-February, D Day was set for the 15th. General

Barrowclough, who had been island commander at Vella Lavella, moved his headquarters to Guadalcanal in January to be

near Wilkinson during the planning.

They decided to send a large reconnaissance party to Green in order to determine the strength of the enemy garrison

and to examine possible airfield sites,

beaches, and naval base sites, and the

lagoon tides. The party was to spend

twenty-four hours ashore.

Three hundred and twenty-two

soldiers of the 30th New Zealand Battalion and twenty-seven American and

eleven New Zealand hydrographic, air,

small boat, communications, and intelligence specialists boarded three APD's

on 29 January. The destroyer-transports

hove to west of Barahun about midnight

and launched landing craft. Two of the

torpedo boats that had checked the passage led the landing craft through to the

beach. Once ashore the reconnaissance

party waited for daylight while the

APD's hauled clear. Guarded by the New

Zealand soldiers, the specialists set to

work and gathered their data. They

found a good airfield site, and estimated

that the enemy garrison numbered about

a hundred. The twelve hundred native

inhabitants proved so friendly and cooperative that preliminary naval bombardment to support the main landing

was omitted. The specialists were not

molested, but the enemy fired on one

landing craft that went to the south part

of the island where there was an abandoned Roman Catholic mission and

killed three New Zealanders and one

American. When Rabaul heard of the

landing Kusaka sent six bomb-carrying

fighters to Green. They attacked the

landing boats but did no damage.

The APD's reclaimed the New Zealanders and Americans on 31 January

and returned safely to Guadalcanal. On

the way back two of the escorting destroyers sank a Japanese submarine near

Buka Passage.

The Japanese Green Islands garrison

reported it had suffered heavy losses,

asked for reinforcements, and fled northwest in three landing craft to the Feni

Islands. Kusaka put 123 men aboard a

submarine on 1 February and sent them

to Nissan. The submarine hove to off the

northeast coast about midnight in a sea

so rough that after 77 men had gone

ashore, the submarine commander called

off the operation and returned to Rabaul

with 46 men still on board. The return

of the original garrison to Nissan on 5

February brought total enemy strength

to 102.

25

 Rad, Comdr Third Flt to CINCSWPA, 22 Jan

44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 23 Jan 44; Rad, MacArthur to Comdrs AAF, ANF, ALAMO, et al., 27

Jan 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 27 Jan 44. Rear

Adm. John F. Shafroth, Halsey's deputy commander, issued the warning orders on 3 January.

Ltr, COMSOPAC to COMAIRSOPAC, COMGENSOPAC, et al., 3 Jan 44, sub: Warning Orders, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 6 Jan 44.
EXPANDING INTO THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 315

The Landings

In the meantime the South Pacific's

APD's returned from service in the Cape

Gloucester operation. Shortly before 12

February the APD's, LST's, LCI's

LCT's, LCM's, and patrol boats and

coastal transports of the amphibious

force took aboard the 5,806-man New

Zealand-American landing force at Tulagi, Guadalcanal, the Russells, New

Georgia, and Vella Lavella.26 The ships,

timing their departures so as to meet off

Bougainville on 14 February, sailed from

their various ports on the 12th and 13th.

A Japanese reconnaissance plane

spotted them west of Bougainville on 14

February, reported their presence to Rabaul, and kept contact. Admiral Kusaka

sent thirty-two planes against the ships

throughout the moonlit night of 14-15

February. They did no damage to Wilkinson's ships but managed to hit the

cruiser Saint Louis in Admiral Ainsworth's task force, which was operating

south of Saint George's Channel. Twelve

Japanese planes were lost.

The APD's arrived in the transport

area west of Barahun shortly after 0600

on 15 February and promptly dispatched

LCVP's toward the passage. Thirty-two

fighters of the Solomons air command

were on station overhead. But Kusaka

did not yield easily. He sent out seventeen bombers and about fifteen of these

attacked the landing craft. They scored

no hits. At the same time Kenney's airmen, with four A-20 and seven B-25

squadrons, delivered a strong blow

against Kavieng which kept that base

from attacking the invaders at Green.

Within two hours all men of the New

Zealand combat units went ashore on

Nissan. During the day all ships and

boats were completely unloaded and

with the exception of the LCT's, all left

for the south once they were emptied.

The LCT's remained as part of the naval

advanced base.

Between 15 and 20 February the New

Zealand infantrymen hunted down and

killed the Japanese garrison. Ten New

Zealanders and 3 Americans were killed;

21 New Zealanders and 3 Americans were

wounded.

By 17 March 16,448 men and 43,088

tons of supplies had been sent to the

Green Islands. The 22d Naval Construction Regiment had begun work at once.

Within two days of the landings a PT

boat base opened. This extended the

range of torpedo boat patrols to New

Ireland and along the entire northeast

coast of Bougainville. By 4 March a

5,000-foot fighter field was ready; in late

March a 6,000-foot bomber field was

opened. Kavieng now lay within range

of fighters and light bombers as well as

heavy bombers from Bougainville. But,

stripped of its naval planes when Admiral Koga ordered their withdrawal in

February, it had already ceased to

menace the Allies.

26

 Eleven destroyers escorted; two aircraft rescue

boats and two tugs were also in the amphibious

force. There were 4,242 New Zealanders and 1,564

Americans in the landing force.
CHAPTER XVI

Action in the Admiralties

The Decision

First Plans

By the time Halsey's forces invaded

the Green Islands, the Southwest Pacific's

plans for moves to the Admiralties and

Hansa Bay, which had been started in

November 1943, were well developed.1

On 13 February General MacArthur

issued operations instructions to the

South and Southwest Pacific Areas which

called for these commands to gain control of the Bismarck Archipelago and to

isolate Rabaul by seizing Manus and

Kavieng about 1 April.2 To General

Krueger's ALAMO Force, supported by

Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces, he

assigned responsibility for the seizure of

Seeadler Harbour and Manus, as well as

Hansa Bay. Using naval construction battalions and Army service units furnished

by Admiral Halsey, Krueger was to start

building a major naval base at Seeadler

Harbour and to develop the Japanese

airfields at Lorengau on Manus and

Momote Plantation on Los Negros. MacArthur also warned Krueger to make

ready for the drive west along the New

Guinea coast.

As in past and future operations,

Krueger was responsible for the coordination of plans. But in these orders

General MacArthur departed from the

previous practice in his area and adopted

principles similar to those prevailing in

the South and Central Pacific areas. He

specified that the amphibious (naval)

commander would be in command of all

assault forces, ships and troops but not

aircraft, until the landing force was established ashore. Then the amphibious

commander would pass the command to

the landing force commander, who

would become again responsible to

his normal military superior—General

Krueger in the case of units assigned to

the ALAMO Force.3

The operations, as planned, differed

from previous ones in another important

respect. In one general area three separate naval forces would be operating:

Halsey's, Kinkaid's, and the additional

forces from Nimitz. Chamberlin therefore suggested that in the event of a

major naval action command of these

1

 GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 3, 23 Nov 43, in

ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl 1, 23 Nov 43-12 Feb 44. 2

 GHQ SWPA OI 44, 13 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 13 Feb 44. Unless otherwise indicated this

chapter is based on [Maj. William C. Frierson]

The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division (29 February—18 May 1944), AMERICAN

FORCES IN ACTION (Washington, 1946).

3

 This change was suggested by Chamberlin who

felt that previous orders had, in this respect, been

unsound. Note, SJC to CINC, 12 Feb 44, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 13 Feb 44.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 317

forces be vested in Halsey, who would

be the senior admiral present.4 This suggestion was accepted, although for some

reason it was not followed in similar

situations at Hollandia and Leyte.

Forces assigned to General Krueger

for the Admiralties totaled 45,110 men.

They included:

These were to be concentrated at Oro

Bay and Cape Cretin. The 6th Division

was designated as GHQ reserve.

Hansa Bay was supposed to be invaded on 26 April by the 24th and 32d

Divisions. There an air and light naval

base would assist in the isolation of Rabaul and the Madang-Alexishafen area

and would support operations westward.5

The Target: Enemy Dispositions

The Admiralties, lying 200 miles

northeast of New Guinea, 260 miles west

of Kavieng, and 200 miles northeast of

Wewak, were admirably situated to assist in isolating Rabaul and in supporting the approach to the Philippines.

They contained two airfields as well as a

superb harbor. The Japanese had built

and used the airfields but, possessing

Rabaul, had never made extensive use of

Seeadler. This harbor, formed by the

horseshoe-shaped curvature of the two

major islands, had a surveyed area 6 miles

wide, 20 miles long, and 120 feet deep,

ample for the fleets of World War II.

Guarding the harbor entrance is a line

of islets—Koruniat, Ndrilo, Hauwei,

Pityilu, and others—which parallel

Manus' north coast.6 (Map 19)

Manus, the largest in the group, is

separated from Los Negros by a narrow

strait, Loniu Passage. Forty-nine miles

from east to west and sixteen miles

across, Manus is a heavily wooded island

of volcanic origin. Mangrove swamps

cover much of the shore line. A range

of mountains, two thousand to three

thousand feet in height, extends the eastwest length. Many of the streams were

navigable for small boats, and nearly all

could be forded except when in spate.

Principal overland routes consisted of

four native tracks: three ran from the

north coast over the high country; the

fourth extended from Lorengau to the

west part of Manus.

Los Negros, much smaller than

Manus, is irregularly shaped and cut by

several inlets. Papitalai Harbour, an extension of Seeadler Harbour, is separated from Hyane Harbour by a low spit

only fifty yards across. Natives had built

a skidway over the spit to drag their

canoes from one harbor to the other.

4

 Ibid.

5

 Memo, Chamberlin for CINC, 9 Feb 44, sub:

Outline Plan—Hansa Bay, and Memo, Chamberlin

for Comdrs, 9 Feb 44, sub: Hansa Bay—SW Pac

Forces, both in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 9 Feb 44.

6

 Data in this subsection are derived from [Frierson] The Admiralties; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 436-37; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. no (OCMH), p. 133;

Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 35-36.

ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 319

The center part of Los Negros, in the

vicinity of Momote, is flat and fertile.

The swampy region north of the skidway had some coconut plantations. West

of Momote are three jungled hill masses

about two hundred feet high.

The thirteen thousand natives (Melanesian with some Micronesian admixture) lived largely in Los Negros and

eastern Manus. Coconut was the standard commercial crop. The natives, who

sailed their large canoes with skill, also

dived for trochus shell and pearls. The

climate—hot and wet—is about the same

as that of the rest of the region.

Japanese troops had landed at Lorengau in April 1942 and developed an airfield there. The next year they built a

5,000-foot strip at Momote and improved

the Lorengau field. Toward the end of

the year, as the Allies advanced to the

Markham Valley, the Huon Peninsula,

and Cape Gloucester, the Japanese began using the Admiralties' fields as staging points for aircraft flying between Rabaul and Wewak and Hollandia.

Up to now the garrison had consisted

of the 51st Transport Regiment, but

when the Japanese decided to strengthen

Kavieng they also decided to reinforce

the Admiralties. Elements of the 14th

Naval Base Force, the main body of

which was stationed in New Ireland,

were sent to Los Negros and Manus. On

9 December General Imamura directed

Adachi to send one infantry regiment

and an artillery battalion from New

Guinea to be rehabilitated in the Palaus,

from where they were to proceed to the

Admiralties.7 The 66th Infantry reached

the Palaus safely, but replacements and

reinforcing units en route from Japan

were lost to a U.S. submarine. Then Imamura organized an infantry and an artillery battalion in the Palaus out of other

replacements. These set out for the Admiralties in January, but their ships were

so harried by submarines that they

turned back. Imamura therefore arranged with Kusaka for destroyers to

carry the 2d Battalion of the 1st Independent Mixed Regiment from Kavieng

to the Admiralties. This movement was

accomplished on 23-25 January, and at

the month's end the 1st Battalion, 229th

Infantry, was dispatched. Though it suffered air attack on the way, it arrived

safely.

By 2 February the Japanese garrison

consisted of the two infantry battalions,

the 51st Transport Regiment, and

several naval detachments. In command

was Col. Yoshio Ezaki, who also led the

51st Transport Regiment. He disposed

his main strength on Los Negros to defend Seeadler Harbour and Momote airfield against attack from the north. An

Allied attack through Hyane Harbour

was not expected because it was small,

with so narrow an entrance that landing

craft would come under fire as they

passed through.

"Prepare for Immediate

Reconnaissance in Force"

General Kenney's Allied Air Forces

had prepared elaborate plans for supporting the Admiralties invasion from

Dobodura and Nadzab. During January

and the first two weeks of February his

planes bombed the Admiralties and Kavieng, and also continued their attacks

against the Wewak airfields so as to keep

them out of action and destroy the 4th

7

 The Admiralties remained under Imamura's

control after the reorganization in March 1944.
320 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Air Army's planes. By 6 February Momote and Lorengau airfields were unserviceable, and no planes were present.

Antiaircraft fire had stopped completely,

not because the guns were destroyed but

because Colonel Ezaki, to conceal his

positions from the Allies, had ordered

his troops neither to fire nor to move

about in daylight.

At this time Kenney and Whitehead

were eagerly seeking methods by which

the whole advance could be made to

move more rapidly. Whitehead wanted

to get the Admiralties out of the way

soon, so that he would have time to concentrate against Wewak and Hollandia

in the westward advance. Kenney, who

had experience in New Guinea with

quick seizures of airfields by light forces,

had a scheme in mind for another such

operation. Some time before 23 February he told Whitehead to hit Los Negros

hard but not to crater the runway. Hoping to force the Japanese to evacuate Los

Negros and retire to Manus, he ordered

frequent low-altitude photo-reconnaissance missions.8

The Allies were not yet fully aware

that Japanese air resistance in the Southeast Area was almost a thing of the past,

and that they had won. They knew, however, that the enemy was weakening. The

runways at Rabaul were usually cratered.

On 21 February Allied intelligence reasoned that Japanese aircraft were "absconding" from Rabaul, probably to

Truk and other bases in the Carolines.9

Further, five Seventh Fleet destroyers

sank a Japanese transport about one hundred miles east of Lorengau during a

sweep on 22-23 February. Survivors

testified that they were part of a 400-man

detachment of air force ground crews

that was being transferred to bases

farther north. Three of the destroyers

then sank a Japanese destroyer and a

cargo ship south of New Hanover,

skirted the southwest coast of New Ireland, and steamed safely past Rabaul

through Saint George's Channel, which

lies between New Britain and New Ireland, on the way back to base. The other

two bombarded Kavieng. No Japanese

aircraft opposed either group although

these waters had formerly been dominated by Japanese air and surface forces.

On 23 February—shortly after the

great Truk raid and the withdrawal of

Japanese naval aircraft from the Southeast Area—Whitehead forwarded to Kenney a reconnaissance report from three

B-25's that had just flown over Los

Negros and Lorengau for ninety minutes. Although they flew as low as twenty

feet, they were not fired on, saw no Japanese, no trucks, and no laundry hung

out to dry. The airfields were pitted and

overgrown with grass. The whole area

looked "completely washed out." Whitehead recommended that a ground reconnaissance party go in at once to check.10

When Kenney received this message

he was at his headquarters in Brisbane.

Concluding, with Whitehead, that "Los

Negros was ripe for the plucking," he

hurried to MacArthur's office and proposed to MacArthur, Kinkaid, and part

of MacArthur's staff that a few hundred

troops carried on APD's seize Los Negros

8

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 358; Craven

and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, p.

559. 9

 GHQ SWPA G-2 Daily Summary of Enemy Int,

and GHQ SWPA G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 700, 20-21

Feb 44, both in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Feb 44.

10

 Rad, Comdr AdVon Fifth AF to Comdr AAF,

23 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 23 Feb 44.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 321

and repair Momote airfield at once,

rather than capture Seeadler Harbour,

so that they could be reinforced and supplied by air if need be. This should be

a reconnaissance in force. If resistance

proved too strong the invaders could

withdraw. A quick seizure of the Admiralties, Kenney argued, might make

possible the bypassing of Kavieng and

Hansa Bay.11

General Willoughby, in contrast with

the airmen, was convinced that the Japanese garrison was fairly strong. His estimate for 25 February placed enemy

strength at 4,050.12

MacArthur quickly decided in favor

of the reconnaissance in force. Next day

he radioed orders to Krueger, Whitehead, and Barbey to "prepare for immediate reconnaissance in force." He directed Krueger and Barbey to send eight

hundred men of the 1st Cavalry Division

and other units aboard two APD's and

one destroyer division from Oro Bay to

Momote not later than 29 February. If

successful the cavalrymen were to prepare the airfield for transport aircraft

and hold their positions pending arrival

of reinforcements.13

The Reconnaissance in Force

Preparations

With but five days between MacArthur's radiogram and D Day there was

little time to make ready. But in accordance with GHQ's earlier orders, planning had begun in January when

Krueger directed the 1st Cavalry Division to prepare terrain, logistical, and

intelligence studies. Krueger, Whitehead, and Barbey had begun a series of

planning conferences on 19 February.

Kinkaid's and Barbey's plans, issued

on 26 February, provided for transporting and landing the reconnaissance force,

then reinforcing it or withdrawing it if

necessary. With the cruisers Nashville

and Phoenix and four destroyers Rear

Adm. Russell S. Berkey was to provide

cover during the approach to the Admiralties and to deliver supporting gunfire against Los Negros, Lorengau, and

Seeadler Harbour during the landings.

The attack group, which Barbey placed

under command of Rear Adm. William

M. Fechteler, his deputy, consisted of

eight destroyers and three APD's.14

The cruisers were added to the force

because General MacArthur elected to

accompany the expedition, and to invite

Admiral Kinkaid to go with him, to

judge from firsthand observation whether

to evacuate or hold after the reconnaissance. The first plans had called for just

one destroyer division and three APD's,

but when Kinkaid learned of MacArthur's decision he added two cruisers

and four destroyers. This was necessary

because a destroyer had neither accommodations nor communications equipment suitable for a man of MacArthur's

age and rank. A cruiser would serve

better, but a single cruiser could not go

to the Admiralties. Kinkaid's policy for11

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 359. 12

 Note, G-2 to G-3, 25 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA

G-3 Jnl, 25 Feb 44. GHQ SWPA G-3 Monthly

Summary of Enemy Dispositions, 29 Feb 44, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 29 Feb 44, gives the same figures. 13

 Rad, MacArthur to Comdr ALAMO, CG AdVon

Fifth AF, and Comdr VII Amphib Force, 24 Feb 44,

in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 24 Feb 44.

14

 Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp.

435-36; Rad, Comdr Seventh Flt to CTF's 76 and

74, and CTG 74.2, 26 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3

Jnl, 28 Feb 44.
322 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

bade sending only one ship of any type

on a tactical mission. Therefore he sent

two cruisers, and the two cruisers required four additional destroyers as escorts.15

The air plans prescribed the usual missions but necessarily compressed them

into a few days. Bad weather limited the

air effort on 26 February, but next day

four B-25 squadrons attacked Momote

and Lorengau while seven squadrons of

B-24's attacked the Wewak fields and

B-25's struck at Hansa Bay. Heavy attacks against the Admiralties and Hansa

Bay followed on 28 February, and that

night seven B-24's attacked Hollandia,

far to the west.16

Krueger had originally planned to

send a preinvasion reconnaissance party

to the western tip of Manus, from where

it was to patrol eastward for several

weeks and radio reports to his headquarters. But the new orders caused him

to cancel this plan in favor of a reconnaissance on Los Negros. More data on

Hyane Harbour and Japanese dispositions there and at Momote would have

been useful, for there was still no agreement on enemy strength in that region.

Willoughby's estimate of 4,050 conflicted

sharply with that offered by Whitehead,

who stated on 26 February that there

were not more than 300 Japanese, mostly

line of communications troops, on Los

Negros and Manus.17 And the 1st Cavalry

Division's estimate placed Japanese

strength at 4,900, despite an assertion

in its field order that "Recent air reconnaissance . . . results in no enemy action and no signs of enemy occupation."18

Because Krueger did not wish to risk

betraying Allied plans by sending a

patrol to Hyane Harbour and Momote;

he decided to send one to examine the

region about one mile south of the harbor. Accordingly, at 0645, 27 February,

a PBY delivered a six-man party of

ALAMO Scouts to a point five hundred

yards off Los Negros' southeast shore

under cover of air bombardment. The

scouts took a rubber boat ashore, found

a large bivouac area on southeastern Los

Negros, and reported by radio that the

area between the coast and Momote was

"lousy with Japs." But when this report

reached GHQ Kenney discounted it. He

pointed out, with reason, that twenty-five

enemy "in the woods at night" might

give that impression and that the patrol

had examined not the airdrome but only

a part of the south end of Los Negros.19

This patrol did provide more data on

which to base plans for naval gunfire

support. Kinkaid and Barbey decided

that one cruiser and two destroyers

should fire on the bivouac area while the

other cruiser and two more destroyers

fired at Lorengau and Seeadler Harbour

and other destroyers supported the landing itself.

The 1st Cavalry Division, which was

15

 Oral statement of Adm Kinkaid to the author

et al., 16 Nov 53. 16

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 563. 17

 Rad, Comdr AdVon Fifth AF to Comdr AAF,

26 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 26 Feb 44.

18

 Cf par. la (2) of BREWER TF FO 2, 25 Feb 44,

with Annex 1, Int, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl 3, 24-

26 Feb 44. The reconnaissance forces estimated

1,500 on Los Negros, altogether 4,350 in the Admiralties. ALAMO FO 9 and BREWER TF FO 1 are

orders prepared for the one-division invasion of

the Admiralties scheduled for 1 April. 19

 Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 361.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 323

to provide the landing force, was unique

in the U.S. Army in World War II. Dismounted and serving as infantry, it was

a square division of two brigades plus

division artillery. Each brigade consisted

of two cavalry regiments of about two

thousand men each. Each regiment was

composed of headquarters, service, and

weapons troops, and two squadrons. The

squadrons contained a headquarters

troop, three rifle troops, and a weapons

troop. The weapons troop, using the organization of the infantry heavy weapons

company, had been added in 1943.20 Division artillery had a headquarters battery, two 75-mm. pack howitzer battalions, and two 105-mm. howitzer battalions.

MacArthur's orders of 24 February

specified that the landing force should

number eight hundred men, including

five hundred men of one squadron with

additional artillery and service troops,

but the next day he recommended that a

slightly stronger force be used.21

On 26 February Krueger established

the occupation force for the Admiralties

as the BREWER Task Force. He placed it

under Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, and

assigned to it the ground force units previously allotted by GHQ.

For the D-Day landing Krueger and

Swift organized the BREWER reconnaissance force under Brig. Gen. William

C. Chase, commander of the 1st Cavalry

Brigade. It consisted of detachments

from 1st Cavalry Brigade Headquarters

and Headquarters Troop; the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry; two 75-mm. howitzers

of B Battery, 99th Field Artillery Battalion; the 673d Antiaircraft Artillery

Battery (.50-caliber machine guns); the

1st Platoon, B Troop, 1st Medical Squadron; the 30th Portable Surgical Hospital; air and naval liaison officers and

a shore fire control party; and a detachment of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit—or about a thousand

men.

If the landing succeeded and the reconnaissance force stayed, the BREWER

support force, under Col. Hugh T. Hoffman, was to land on D plus 2. Hoffman's

command embraced the remainder of

the 5th Cavalry and the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, in addition to C Battery

(90-mm.), 168th Antiaircraft Artillery

Battalion; A Battery (multiple .50-

caliber mount), 211th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion; medical, engineer, and

signal units from the 1st Cavalry Division; and E Company, Shore Battalion,

592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. The 40th Naval Construction Battalion and detachments from other elements of the 4th Construction Brigade,

all from the South Pacific, were to accompany the Support Force.

The remainder of the BREWER Task

Force, including the rest of the 1st

Cavalry Brigade and the 2d Cavalry Brigade, was to follow if needed as soon as

shipping became available. To shorten

sailing time, Cape Cretin was to be used

as a staging area for reinforcements.

Hyane Harbour, scene of the initial

20

 The 1st Cavalry Division, a Regular Army unit

with a high percentage of Regular officers and enlisted men, was not organized until 1921, but its

regiments had long and distinguished histories. The

5th Cavalry (originally the 2d Cavalry), organized

in 1855, was commanded by Robert E. Lee, and

the 7th Cavalry was George A. Custer's old

regiment. 21

 Rad, MacArthur to Comdr ALAMO, CG AdVon

Fifth AF, and Comdr VII Amphib Force, 25 Feb

44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 25 Feb 44.

ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 325

ABOARD THE CRUISER PHOENIX, 28 February 1944. Left, gunfire directed at

Japanese heavy guns; right, Admiral Kinkaid and General MacArthur viewing

the bombardment.

landing, was indeed an unlikely place.

Two small points of land about 750

yards apart flanked the entrance; from

them the enemy could put cross fire

against landing craft sailing through the

narrow gap in the barrier reef. Much of

the shore line inside the harbor was

covered by mangroves, but on the south,

150 yards behind Momote airfield, a

1,200-yard sandy beach with three jetties

offered passage to troops and vehicles.

(Map 20)

With H Hour set for 0815 to give

bombers time to deliver heavy strikes in

support of the landing, the APD's were

to anchor five thousand yards off Hyane

Harbour. The destroyers carrying troops

would enter the transport area to unload

their passengers, then return to their fire

support stations. Twelve LCP(R)'s were

to carry the reconnaissance force ashore.

The first three waves of four craft each

would go in at five-minute intervals, unload, return forty minutes later, and depart again in three waves five minutes

apart until the troops were ashore.

To join the expedition, MacArthur

and Kinkaid flew to Milne Bay and

boarded the cruiser Phoenix in the afternoon of 27 February. The same afternoon

at Oro Bay, where the 1st Cavalry Division had been unloading ships and receiving amphibious training, the BREWER

reconnaissance force boarded Admiral

Fechteler's ships, 170 men per APD and

about 57 men per destroyer. The ships

departed Oro Bay in late afternoon and

early evening of 28 February, rendezvoused with Berkey's cruisers and destroyers early next morning just south of
326 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Cape Cretin, and followed eleven miles

behind Berkey through Vitiaz Strait and

the Bismarck Sea. No enemy ship or

plane made an appearance. The sea was

calm, the sky heavily overcast, as the

ships neared Hyane Harbour.

The Landings

Fechteler ordered his ships to deploy

at 0723, 29 February. Cruisers and destroyers took their support stations and

commenced firing at 0740. APD's in the

transport area lowered landing craft

which proceeded toward their line of departure 3,700 yards from the beach.

The heavy overcast and generally bad

flying weather prevented all but a handful of Allied B-24's from reaching the

Admiralties before H Hour. P-38's,

B-25's, and smoke-laying reconnaissance

planes arrived later, but before they

could attack the overcast closed in so

tightly that they could do nothing. "The

Fifth Air Force had made its chief contribution in pointing out the opportunity."22

The first sign of the Japanese came at

H minus 20 minutes when the first wave

of landing craft reached the line of departure. As it passed through the entrance, enemy 20-mm. machine guns on

either side opened fire while heavier

guns directed their fire against the

Phoenix and the destroyers. The cruiser

and the destroyer Mahan promptly silenced a gun on Southeast Point, and

other vessels silenced the machine guns.

According to Admiral Kinkaid this performance so thoroughly converted General MacArthur into a naval gunfire enthusiast that he became more royalist

than the king, and thereafter Kinkaid

frequently had to point out the limitations of naval gunfire to the general.23

Support plans called for naval gunfire

to stop at 0755 (H minus 20 minutes)

so that B-25's could bomb and strafe at

low altitudes, but at 0755 no B-25's

could be seen nor could any be reached

by radio. The ships fired, therefore, until

0810, and then fired star shells as a signal

that strafers could attack in safety. Soon

afterward three B-25's bombed the gun

positions at the entrance to the harbor.24

Thus supported by air and naval bombardment, the leading wave of landing

craft, carrying G Troop, 2d Squadron,

5th Cavalry, met little fire as it passed

through the entrance and turned left

(south) toward the beach. It touched

down at 0817, whereupon an enemy machine gun crew on the beach scrambled

back for cover. The first man ashore, 2d

Lt. Marvin J. Henshaw, led his platoon

across the narrow beach to take a semicircular position on the edge of a coconut plantation. There were no American

casualties, but several Japanese were

killed as they hastily made off in the

direction of the airstrip.

The Japanese resumed their positions

at the harbor entrance when the naval

shelling ceased and fired at the LCP(R)'s

as they returned to the APD's. The

Mahan steamed to within a mile of shore

and fired 20-mm. and 40-mm. guns at the

southern point. She could not put fire on

the point opposite because the LCP(R)'s

22

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 564.

23

 Oral statement of Adm Kinkaid to the author

et al., 16 Nov 53. 24

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 564.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 327

FIRST WAVE OF LANDING CRAFT UNLOADING men of G Troop, 2d Squadron, 5th

Cavalry, 29 February 1944.

were in the way. As the second wave

started through the entrance so much

enemy fire came from the skidway and

from the northern point that it turned

back. The destroyers Flusser and Drayton then put their fire on the north point

while the Mahan pounded the southern.

When the enemy fire ceased, the landing

craft re-formed, went through the passage, fired their machine guns at the

skidway, and landed 150 men of the

second wave at H plus 8 minutes.

The second wave then passed through

the first about a hundred yards inland.

The third wave, which with the fourth

received enemy fire on the way in, landed

at H plus 30 minutes, pushed southwest,

and established a line just short of the

airstrip that included most of the eastern

revetment area. So far, except for firing

at the boats, the Japanese had not fought.

At 0900 General Chase radioed Krueger

that a line had been established three

hundred yards inland, and "enemy situation undetermined."25

 By 0950 the

squadron, commanded by Lt. Col.

William E. Lobit, had overrun Momote

airfield. The troopers found it covered

with weeds, littered with rusty fuselages,

and pitted with water-filled bomb

craters.

While the beachhead was relatively

peaceful, the landing craft continued to

receive fire on the way in and out. The

destroyers continued intermittent bom25

 Serial 7, 0900, 1st Cav Brigade Unit Jnl, 29 Feb

44, Vol. III of 1st Cav Brigade Hist Rpt Admiralty

Islands Campaign.
328 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

2D LT. MARVIN J. HENSHAW receiving the congratulations of General

MacArthur, who awarded him the

Distinguished Service Cross, 29 February 1944.

bardment of the harbor entrance for

about six hours. By the time the

LCP(R)'s of the third wave had returned

to the APD's, four of the total twelve had

been damaged by the enemy gunfire. Because the landing force probably could

not be evacuated without the LCP(R)'s

(although emergency plans called for an

APD to penetrate the harbor and evacuate the 2d Squadron), the landing craft

abandoned their schedule and entered

the harbor only when the destroyers had

forced the enemy to cease fire. A heavy

rainstorm, which prevented the few

Allied planes over the target from bombing, soon reduced visibility so much that

the Japanese fire became ineffective.

The entire reconnaissance force was

unloaded by 1250 (H plus 4 hours, 35

minutes). Caliber .50 antiaircraft guns

and the two 75-mm. pack howitzers had

been manhandled ashore. Two cavalrymen had been killed, three wounded.

Five Japanese were reported slain. Two

sailors of the landing craft crews were

dead, three wounded.

"Remain Here"

By afternoon Lobit's squadron had advanced over the entire airfield including

the western dispersal area, an advance of

thirteen hundred yards on the longest

axis, without encountering any more

Japanese. Patrols moved across the island

to Porlaka and north to the skidway

without seeing an enemy. But it was

clear that the Japanese had not evacuated. Other patrols advancing to the

south had found signs of recent occupancy, such as three kitchens and a

warehouse full of rations, and a captured

document indicated that some two hundred antiaircraft artillerymen were

camped nearby.

General MacArthur and Admiral Kinkaid came ashore about 1600. MacArthur awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Henshaw, inspected the lines, received reports, and

made his decision. He directed General

Chase "to remain here and hold the airstrip at any cost."26

 Having "ignored

sniper fire . . . wet, cold, and dirty

26

 Quoted in 1st Cav Brigade Hist Rpt Admiralty

Islands Campaign, I, 3. There are other versions of

MacArthur's statement in existence.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 329

DIGGING A FOXHOLE THROUGH CORAL

ROCK near the airstrip, 29 February

1944.

with mud up to the ears," he and Kinkaid returned to the Phoenix, whence

MacArthur radioed orders to send more

troops, equipment, and supplies to the

Admiralties at the earliest possible moment.27

 The cruisers and most of the destroyers departed for New Guinea at

1729, leaving behind the destroyers Bush

and Stockton to support the cavalrymen.

Chase and Lobit had obviously concluded that the larger estimate of enemy

strength, rather than the airmen's, was

the right one. If all the Japanese they

estimated to be on Los Negros should

counterattack, the one thousand men of

the reconnaissance force would find it

very difficult to hold both the airfield

and the dispersal area. An inland defense

line, about three thousand yards long exclusive of the shore, would have been required to defend them. Because such a

line could not safely be held by one

thousand men, Chase decided to pull

back east of the airstrip. He set up a line

about fifteen hundred yards long which

ran from the beach southward for about

nine hundred yards, then swung sharply

east to the sea. The troops did not occupy

Jamandilai Point in their rear, but

blocked its base that night and cleared

it the next morning. The position selected on the edge of the strip provided

a ready-made field of fire to the west.

In late afternoon the troopers organized their defenses. The beachhead

was too small to permit the 75-mm. pack

howitzers to cover the area immediately

in front of the lines. Consequently the

field artillerymen were turned into riflemen. The .50-caliber antiaircraft guns

were set up on the front line. Outposts

were established in the dispersal area on

the other side of the airstrip. The

soldiers found digging foxholes even

more arduous than usual, for the soil

was full of coral rock. The Americans'

defenses suffered from two weaknesses:

the impossibility of field artillery support

immediately in front of the line, and the

lack of barbed wire.

To remedy the latter, Chase urgently

requested Krueger to arrange for an airdrop of barbed wire and stakes, as well

as mortar and small arms ammunition,

on the north end of Momote drome as

soon as possible.28

27

 Comment by Lt Col Julio Chiaramonte, attached to Ltr, Gen Chase to Gen Smith, Chief of

Mil Hist, 6 Nov 53, no sub, OCMH; Rad, CINCSWPA to CTF 76, and CG's ALAMO and Fifth AF,

29 Feb 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 1 Mar 44. 28

 Item 25, 1st Cav Brigade Unit Jnl, 29 Feb 44.
330 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Careful preparations for defense were

more than justified, because except for

the air force ground crews the Japanese

had not been evacuating either Los

Negros or the island group. The larger

intelligence estimates had been correct.

And the Japanese, warned by American

submarines that sent "frequently lengthy

operational messages" from south of the

Admiralties in late February, had been

on the alert for an attack.29 Most of the

Admiralty garrison was stationed on Los

Negros, with the 1st Battalion, 229th

Infantry responsible for the defense of

the airfield and Hyane Harbour. One

battalion defended Lorengau. The Japanese, expecting attack through Seeadler

Harbour, had let the Americans slip in

through the back door, but now they

planned to take action. When General

Imamura found out about the invasion,

he ordered Colonel Ezaki to attack with

his entire strength.30 Ezaki did not immediately use the 2d Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment, but left it

at Salami Plantation north of the skidway. He directed the 1st Battalion,

229th, commanded by a Captain Baba,

to attack that night and "annihilate the

enemy who have landed. This is not a

delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice

your life for the Emperor and commit

suicide in case capture is imminent."31

As dusk fell Japanese riflemen and the

American outposts began a fire fight,

whereupon the outposts were recalled.

Shortly afterward small groups of enemy

began moving up against the 2d Squadron's line in a series of un-co-ordinated

attacks. Relying chiefly on grenades, the

enemy groups attacked in darkness. Some

managed to infiltrate through the line

and cut nearly all the telephone wires.

Baba's battalion delivered its heaviest

attack against the southern part of the

perimeter. Some Japanese, using life

preservers, swam in behind the American lines and landed. Another group

broke through along the shore at the

point of contact of the left (east) flank

of E Troop and the right (south) flank of

the field artillery unit, which was holding the beach. The Americans defended

by staying in their foxholes and firing

at every visible target and at everything

that moved.

Two Japanese soldiers moved through

the darkness and penetrated to the vicinity of General Chase's command post.

Before they could do any damage Maj.

Julio Chiaramonte, force S-2, killed one

and wounded the other with a submachine gun.

By daylight of 1 March most of the

enemy attackers had withdrawn. During

the morning the infiltrators who had

hidden themselves were hunted down

and killed. Seven Americans were dead,

fifteen wounded, as compared with sixtysix enemy corpses within the perimeter.

So far the reconnaissance force had

held its own. But because the support

force would not arrive until the next day

patrols pushed westward and northward

to determine just what Japanese opposition was to be expected. After moving

an average distance of four hundred

yards they encountered the enemy in

some strength. Clearly, another attack

was probable.

29

 Southeast Area Naval Operations, III, Japanese

Monogr No. 50 (OCMH), 66. 30

 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr

No. 110 (OCMH), p. 135. 31

 This order, a copy of which was captured, is

quoted in part in [Frierson] The Admiralties, p.

33.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 331

Chase's situation was improved during

1 March by the arrival of more ammunition. As the weather had cleared, three

B-25's dropped supplies at 0830. Later

in the day a B-17 of the 39th Troop

Carrier Squadron made two supply runs,

and four B-17's of the 375th Troop Carrier Group each dropped three tons of

blood plasma, ammunition, mines, and

grenades. The reconnaissance force received no barbed wire.32

Captured documents had indicated

the location of many enemy defensive

positions, and the patrols that went out

in the morning brought back more data.

By now the Americans knew that Los

Negros' south coast possessed prepared

positions, and that the western dispersal

area, Porlaka, and the coast of Hyane

Harbour from the 2d Squadron's perimeter north to the skidway were fortified.

In consequence the two supporting destroyers and the 75-mm. pack howitzers

bombarded these areas. Starting at 1600

Fifth Air Force planes bombed the dispersal area, and at 1715, when antiaircraft guns near the south end of the airstrip fired on the planes, the Bush and

Stockton pulled to within a thousand

yards of the shore and shelled them.

Several 4th Air Army fighter planes from

Wewak appeared but failed in their effort to drive off the American planes.

The air bombardment flushed a body of

Japanese, estimated one hundred strong,

from cover in the dispersal area. When

these men rushed east across the strip in

an effort to escape the bombs, most were

cut down by the cavalrymen's fire.

Otherwise enemy ground forces remained quiescent during most of the

afternoon except for a seventeen-man

patrol of officers and sergeants, led by

Captain Baba, which had apparently infiltrated the lines on the previous night.

Baba's patrol came through heavy underbrush to within thirty-five yards of General Chase's command post. When the

Americans sighted the patrol, Chase and

his executive officer, Col. Earl F. Thompson, directed the movements of Major

Chiaramonte and four enlisted men who

moved out to the attack. After Chiaramonte's party had killed several Japanese, the others committed suicide with

grenades and swords.

The Japanese varied their pattern by

striking at the perimeter at 1700 instead of after dark in an attack that was

weaker than the one of the night before.

Daylight simplified the defenders' task

in repelling the attack, which ceased at

2000. Thereafter throughout the night

small groups harried and infiltrated the

lines. About fifty Japanese used life belts

to cross the harbor entrance and attack

the position at the base of Jamandilai.

In the course of the action the field artillerymen fired three hundred 75-mm.

rounds at the enemy and also killed 47

Japanese within the artillery positions

with small arms fire. All together, 147

Japanese were killed within the perimeter during the two night battles.

Actually, the Japanese, though possessing numerical superiority, had never

used their full strength and had not

seriously threatened Chase's force, which

still held its lines intact on the morning

of 2 March. Recklessness, coupled with

the skill and tenacity of the cavalrymen,

had cost the Japanese their best chance.

32

 Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to

Saipan, p. 565, state that barbed wire was dropped,

but several days later Chase was still protesting that

he had not received any.
332 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

To the Shores of Seeadler Harbour

Seizure of Momote Airfield

Meanwhile, at Oro Bay and Cape Cretin Colonel Hoffman's support force,

numbering about 1,500 ground combat

troops and 428 Seabees, had loaded

aboard six LST's and an equal number

of 2d Engineer Special Brigade LCM's

that were towed by the LST's. These vessels, escorted by Australian and American destroyers and two minesweepers

under Capt. E. F. V. Dechaineux of the

Australian Navy, made a quiet voyage

and stood into Hyane Harbour shortly

after 0900 on 2 March.

The two minesweepers and one destroyer steamed to the north of Los

Negros in an attempt to force the 1,500-

yard-wide entrance to Seeadler Harbour.

They encountered such heavy fire from

Japanese coastal guns on the guardian

islands of Hauwei and Ndrilo that

they retired. Captain Dechaineux then

brought three more destroyers, which

fired at the Japanese while the first three

ships again unsuccessfully attempted to

force the passage. Minesweeping would

obviously have to await ships with

heavier guns than those of destroyers

and minesweepers.

The LST's and LCM's made their way

through the entrance to Hyane Harbour

and beached, whereupon Japanese mortars and machine guns north of the skidway opened up. The landing craft replied with their machine guns, and at

the same time B-25's attacked the Japanese positions.

In the midst of the din the combat

troops walked ashore. Then bulldozers

left the LST's and began building ramps

to get the other vehicles ashore. Unloading was finished by 1700, and the LST's

departed; the LCM's remained in Hyane

Harbour.

Before the LST's left for New Guinea

Chase requested that the destroyers put

fire in the northern point of land at

Hyane Harbour. Four ships each fired

fifty 5-inch rounds from close range, but

when the LST's started out of the harbor

they met machine gun fire. They replied

and made the open sea in safety. One destroyer and the two minesweepers took

the LST's to New Guinea while four

destroyers stayed in the vicinity of the

Admiralties to intercept any Japanese

seaborne attacks.

Since Momote airfield was not yet in

American hands, Chase assigned part of

the 40th Construction Battalion to a defensive sector on the right (north) flank

of the beachhead. The Seabees, meeting

some rifle fire while moving into position, used their ditch-digger to scoop out

a 300-yard-long trench.

As men, weapons, ammunition, supplies, and equipment came ashore during

the day the beachhead became crowded.

Chase decided to attack and enlarge his

perimeter to include all the airfield, dispersal area, and revetments, and the

roads immediately around the airfield.

When Hoffman came ashore in the

morning he was met by Colonel Thompson, who took him to Chase's headquarters where the three officers completed

plans for an attack by the 5th Cavalry

that afternoon.

At 1415, B-25's, P-38's, and P-47's

began bombing and strafing the west half

of the airfield, the dispersal area, the

skidway, and the northern part of Los

Negros. This attack lasted until 1530.

The 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 5th
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 333

Cavalry, on the left (south) and right

respectively, had attacked at 1500. There

was no opposition from the enemy;

within the hour Hoffman's regiment was

in possession of the entire airfield and

had begun to dig in along the line of

the western and southern dispersal bays.

The day's sole casualties, two men killed

and four wounded, were caused by three

American bombs that fell on positions

held by E Troop and antiaircraft artillerymen.

It was clear to the Americans that the

Japanese garrison had not yet made its

maximum effort, for papers found in the

advance over the airfield indicated that

Baba's battalion was still south and west

of the airfield. And earlier estimates had

placed two thousand troops in the west

half of Los Negros and Lorengau. Major

Chiaramonte therefore warned the invasion force to expect attacks from the

south, from Porlaka in the west, and

southward from the skidway.33

The invading Americans carefully prepared their defense positions. The front

lines, still without barbed wire, included

nearly all the dispersal area. Two antiaircraft batteries and E Company, 592d

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

were assigned to beach defense. Seabees

established an inner defense line west

and northwest of Chase's command post.

The three 75-mm. batteries of the 99th

Field Artillery Battalion set up in revetments some five hundred yards behind

the front in a semicircle with overlapping

sectors of fire. Because it was next to impossible to prevent the Japanese from

infiltrating the front lines, all units inside the perimeter prepared all-round

local defenses.34

Ezaki Attacks Again

Colonel Ezaki now was preparing for

a larger effort. He planned a co-ordinated

attack, with the 2d Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment, driving south

from Salami across the skidway, while

one company, having moved from

western Los Negros to Porlaka, struck

eastward. Meanwhile, other detachments

from the outlying islands and from inland regions of Manus were to concentrate at Lorengau. His forces were slow

in concentrating, and Ezaki postponed

the attack until the night of 3-4 March.

As a result the 5th Cavalry was merely

harassed in its new positions on the night

of 2-3 March.

The Americans used the daylight

hours to strengthen their defenses.35

Bulldozers cleared fields of fire in front

of the cavalry squadrons' lines. To keep

infiltration to a minimum, each cavalry

troop posted three rifle platoons in line

with troop heavy weapons attached to

each platoon. Japanese revetments were

used as much as possible. Riflemen dug

foxholes on the reverse slopes of the

mounds, mines were laid in front, and

the approaches to all positions were

rigged with empty C-ration cans that

33

 BREWER Rcn TF S-2 Periodic Rpts 1-3, 1, 2,

and 3 Mar 44, in Vol. II, 1st Cav Brigade Hist Rpt,

27 Feb-18 May 44.

34

 General Chase again requested barbed wire by

air but reported that he never received it. 35

 [Frierson] The Admiralties, pp. 43-44, asserts

that when a group of Japanese officers attempted

to land on the beachhead from a boat on the morning of 3 March they were all killed, and that a

document carried by one of them warned the

Americans to expect attack that night. No contemporary evidence to support this statement has been

found.
334 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

contained lumps of coral and were hung

close to the ground so they would rattle

when struck by a shoe. The 60-mm. mortars were situated to deliver close support fire directly in front of the cavalry

squadrons, while the 81's were massed

near the center of the perimeter in front

of the field artillery to deliver deeper

supporting fire. Most of the antiaircraft

.50-caliber machine guns were returned

to their normal missions, but since the

main attacks were expected from the

north and west the guns posted on the

north end of Momote field facing the

skidway remained at the front.

While the riflemen made ready, the

artillery and the offshore destroyers fired

at every evidence of the Japanese. They

put concentrations on enemy groups

north of the skidway. At 1600 field and

antiaircraft artillery shot up several

enemy barges that were observed behind

overhanging vegetation on the north

shore of Hyane Harbour.

After dusk Japanese patrols began

probing the lines, and at 2100 a lone

plane dropped eight bombs which cut the

telephone wires between the 1st Squadron and the 5th Cavalry command post.

When the plane departed, flares and

tracers heralded an attack by the remnants of the late Baba's battalion against

the southwest portion of the perimeter,

held by the 1st Squadron under Lt. Col.

Charles E. Brady. Mortar and machine

gun fire supported the attack, but it was

weak. American mortars and machine

guns beat off the attackers, although

some infiltrated the lines, concealed

themselves, and had to be flushed out

and killed after daylight.

The 2d Battalion, 1st Independent

Mixed Regiment, delivered the main assault from the skidway, which was

coupled with a drive east from Porlaka

by other detachments. F Troop, which

held the north-south portion of the line

in the western dispersal area, and G

Troop, defending the line from F

Troop's right flank to the beach, received

the brunt of the attacks. E Troop suffered only harassing attacks and infiltration. By now the 2d Squadron, having

landed on 29 February, had had more

than enough experience in repelling

night attacks, but this one differed from

earlier ones in which the enemy had

moved quietly and concealed himself as

much as possible. On this night the Japanese advanced in the open in frontal assault with a good deal of talking, shouting, and even singing. Artillery and mortars opened fire at once.

As they approached F and G Troops,

the leading enemy waves hurled grenades, but they fell short of the cavalry

lines. The Japanese pushed through the

mine fields, taking casualties but not

stopping, and drove into the interlocking bands of fire from the machine guns,

which promptly cut them down. More

kept coming; the cavalry lines held, but

some Japanese managed to infiltrate and

cut telephone lines. G Troop's three platoons stayed down in their positions and

fired or hurled grenades at all possible

targets. Just before dawn some Japanese

soldiers penetrated G Troop's positions

and Capt. Frank G. Mayfield organized

a quick counterattack and drove them

out. A few minutes later the Japanese

assaulted again. This time, as two of

Mayfield's platoons had exhausted their

machine gun ammunition, the Japanese
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 335

nearly succeeded in breaking through.

But the Japanese were killed or driven

off by a platoon of H Troop heavy machine guns under S/Sgt. Edwin C. Terry.

During these attacks Sgt. Troy A. McGill, of G Troop, was holding a revetment with his squad of eight men. When

all but McGill and one other man had

been killed or wounded, McGill ordered

the other survivor to retire, fired his rifle

until it jammed, then fought in front of

his position with clubbed rifle until he

was slain. McGill's gallantry won him the

Medal of Honor.36

The attacks had been delivered with

frequency and resolution throughout the

night, but there was little evidence of

skill or co-ordination. For example,

about an hour before daylight a column

of soldiers advanced down the road from

Porlaka, singing, the cavalrymen later

reported, "Deep in the Heart of

Texas."

 37

 Mines, machine guns, rifles,

and grenades killed nearly all of them.

Reports of the night's action also relate instances of Japanese shouting false

commands in English and tapping telephone lines. One H Troop mortar section thought it heard an order to retreat

and abandoned its position with the result that the 2d Squadron lost its 81-mm.

mortar support.

During the night the 99th Field Artillery Battalion fired almost continuously,

as did all mortars except those that were

abandoned. This fire was delivered in

spite of harassing attacks from Japanese

who had slipped through the front lines.

Three field artillerymen were killed by

infiltrators, and one antiaircraft crew

abandoned its gun under pressure from

the Japanese. Five Japanese, one with a

grenade discharger, actually posted

themselves on the roof of the dugout

containing Colonel Lobit's command

post, but Capt. Bruce Merritt killed

them from his nearby foxhole. The Seabees, in their secondary line behind G

Troop, passed ammunition to the hardpressed cavalrymen and toward dawn

some moved up to help G Troop hold

its line. Other Seabees met a group of

Japanese attacking two antiaircraft gun

positions and killed them.

By daylight of 4 March the Japanese

had pulled back and the close fighting

was over, but enemy mortars and field

pieces hit the American positions until

about 0730. The intensity of the night's

action is indicated by the fact that two

of the machine guns in G Troop's sector

had fired a total of 8,770 rounds, and 168

enemy corpses lay directly to the troop's

front. There were no prisoners. Sixtyone Americans were killed, 244

wounded, of whom 9 dead and 38

wounded were Seabees. Ezaki had made

his greatest offensive effort and failed.

With more Americans due soon, the

shattered Japanese units would be capable of defensive action only.

The Advance

On 1 March, meanwhile, at ALAMO

headquarters on Cape Cretin General

Krueger had completed plans for reinforcement of Chase's men and for seiz36

 WD GO 35, 9 May 45. 37

 The Japanese may have been singing, but it

seems improbable that they sang this song, which

was a favorite of the 1st Cavalry Division. The 2d

Squadron had been on Los Negros for four days,

and this was its third night in close combat. One

may guess that nerves were strained, imaginations

overactive.
336 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ure of the entire Admiralties group.38

Krueger ordered Swift to strengthen the

reconnaissance force, seize Seeadler Harbour, extend control over the entire Admiralties, and start building airdromes

and a naval base.39 On the 2d, the day

Hoffman's support force landed, Krueger

received an urgent request from Chase,

who asked for his other regiment, the

12th Cavalry. Krueger, Swift, and Barbey then arranged to speed up the movement to the Admiralties and land the

12th Cavalry and other units on 6

March, the 2d Cavalry Brigade on 9

March instead of on 9 and 16 March, as

they had originally planned.40 They also

arranged to rush the 2d Squadron and

the Weapons Troop, 7th Cavalry, and

the 82d Field Artillery Battalion on

three APD's, to arrive on the morning of

4 March.41

General Krueger desired that Seeadler

Harbour be opened up. Two factors,

besides the obvious one that Allied forces

were eventually to use the harbor as a

major naval base, motivated him. Hyane

Harbour and the initial beachhead were

becoming too congested to receive the

2d Brigade, but Salami Plantation on

the west shore of the northwest peninsula of Los Negros offered a good landing place. Clearing the harbor would

also make possible a shore-to-shore movement from Los Negros against Manus.

Therefore air and naval bombardments

of enemy positions on the northwest tip

of Los Negros, and on the guardian

islands of Koruniat, Ndrilo, and Hauwei were arranged.42

 Krueger, on 3

March, ordered Swift to proceed to Los

Negros at once, to survey the situation,

and to take command ashore.

On the morning of 4 March, shortly

after Ezaki's attack subsided and after

supporting Allied destroyers had shelled

the skidway and the region to the north,

the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, and the

82d Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm.

pack howitzers) landed at Hyane Harbour. Chase decided to wait for more

troops before attacking, and put the 2d

Squadron, 7th, under Lt. Col. Robert

P. Kirk, in the line to replace the weary

men of the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry.

Except for minor harassing attacks, infiltrations, and a one-plane bombing attack, the night of 4-5 March was quiet.

General Swift, accompanied by the

1st Cavalry Division's chief of staff, Col.

Charles A. Sheldon, and the intelligence

and operations officers, reached Hyane

Harbour aboard the destroyer Bush on

the morning of 5 March. He assumed

command of the troops ashore at 1100,

but since the Bush was busy executing

fire support missions he stayed aboard

38

 The total forces involved included the rest of

the 1st Cavalry Division; Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Group;

C Battery, 237th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(Searchlight); the 211th Coast Artillery Battalion

(Antiaircraft); the 2d Battalion, 50th Coast Artillery Regiment; the Shore Battalion and A Company, Boat Battalion, 592d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment; and a large array of signal, medical, quartermaster, and engineer units. 39

 ALAMO FO 11, 1 Mar 44, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE

Jnl 7, 1-3 Mar 44. 40

 Rad, CG ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, 1 Mar 44, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 1 Mar 44. 41

 [Frierson] The Admiralties, p. 43; Rad, Chase

to CG ALAMO, 2 Mar 44, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl

7; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, 2 Mar 44, and Rad,

CTF 76 to Comdr Seventh Flt, 2 Mar 44, both in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 2 Mar 44. Barbey proposed

using LST's for the 4 March reinforcements, but

Krueger persuaded him to send them on APD's.

42

 ALAMO Force Rpt, BREWER Opns, p. 11; Rad,

CG ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, 4 Mar 44, in GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 4 Mar 44.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 337

LT. GEN. WALTER KRUEGER (front seat) with Brig. Gen. William C. Chase and

Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift on an inspection tour, Los Negros Island.

until 1600 so as not to interrupt the

firing.

Swift directed Chase's reconnaissance

force to clear the major part of Los

Negros from Momote to the north and

west, and to be prepared to extend over

the entire island. He instructed the 2d

Cavalry Brigade, due to arrive on 9

March, to land at Salami Plantation, to

be prepared to move to a point on

Manus west of Lorengau, and to attack

eastward against that airfield and secure

the eastern half of Manus.43

To carry out the instructions for seizing all of Los Negros, the 2d Squadron,

7th Cavalry, was ordered to attack north

across the skidway on the afternoon of

the 5th. Accordingly the 2d Squadron,

5th, began relieving Colonel Kirk's

squadron in the perimeter late in the

morning. At 1120, while the relief was

being effected, the Japanese began a

series of harassing attacks, followed after

noon by a resolute attack from Porlaka

and the skidway. The enemy soldiers

who broke into the front lines were all

killed while field artillery and mortars

broke up the attacks. Twenty-five dead

Japanese bodies were counted, but

twelve cavalrymen were wounded and

it was 1630 before the 2d Squadron, 7th,

was reorganized and ready to attack.

Once it had moved beyond the perim43

 BREWER TF FO 3, 5 Mar 44, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl 8, 4-6 Mar 44.
338 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

eter, Kirk's squadron found that the Japanese had mined the approaches to the

skidway. The mines caused some casualties at first but thereafter were successfully detected and removed. The squadron advanced slowly past enemy corpses

that littered the road, but by darkness

had reached the skidway, where it halted

for the night.

Kirk resumed his advance early on 6

March. Later in the morning the 12th

Cavalry Regimental Combat Team,

commanded by Col. John H. Stadler,

Jr., came ashore. Transported to Hyane

Harbour aboard four LST's, the combat

team, 2,837 men strong, consisted of the

12th Cavalry; the 271st Field Artillery

Battalion (105-mm. howitzers); three

light tanks of the 603d Tank Company;

five LVT's of A Company, 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment; and

engineer, medical, and signal troops.44

When it reached shore, the 12th Cavalry, accompanied by the tanks, began

moving north across the skidway to join

Kirk in the advance, while the 271st

Field Artillery Battalion moved into position near the airstrip. The Japanese,

obviously in retreat, offered only minor

resistance. The advance was slowed

chiefly by mud and trees they had felled

across the roads and trails to Salami.

Near the beach at Salami some Japanese

in bunkers and buildings offered fight

but were blasted out by tanks and 75-

mm. howitzers. By 1630 all three cavalry squadrons were established at Salami. The surviving Japanese had escaped by boat and canoe to the west.

Thus by the day's end the 1st Cavalry

Brigade held the beachhead where the

2d Brigade was to land.

Meanwhile air and naval surface

forces had been at work on the Japanese

positions guarding the entrance to

Seeadler Harbour. Two days after the

minesweepers were driven off, cruisers

and destroyers of Admiral Crutchley's

Task Force 74 bombarded suspected

enemy gun positions on orders from

Admiral Kinkaid, and on 5 March they

fired eighty 8-inch, three hundred 6-

inch, and one hundred 5-inch rounds

without meeting any return fire.45 Next

morning, the lone destroyer Nicholson

approached the harbor entrance to draw

enemy fire. The Japanese opened up at

850 yards range, whereupon Task Force

74 and Allied bombers struck at the

enemy positions thus disclosed. They

were bombed again on 7 March by

seven B-24's, and on 8 March by seventeen B-24's and eleven B-25's. Thereafter LCM's, destroyers, and other craft

entered the harbor freely without encountering enemy fire.

From 6 through 8 March the 5th Cavalry extended its holdings around the

airstrip. The 2d Squadron took Porlaka

on 6 March, then crossed Lemondrol

Creek in canvas and rubber boats and

amphibian tractors to seize Papitalai village on 7 March.

American control over Seeadler Harbour was furthered on 7 and 8 March

by the seizure of two promontories

northwest of Papitalai. The 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, using amphibian

tractors, shuttled from Salami to Papitalai Mission and captured it against

44

 12th Cav, Hist of 12th Cav During the Admiralty Islands Campaign, 27 May 44, p. 3.

45

 Rad, Comdr Seventh Flt to CTF 74, 4 Mar 44,

and Rad, CTF 76 to CG ALAMO, 5 Mar 44, both in

ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl 8, 4-6 Mar 44.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 339

LST's LOADED WITH TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT landing at Salami Plantation.

sharp opposition. The 2d Squadron, 7th,

using LCM's, took Lombrum Plantation.

The 12th Cavalry and the tanks patrolled to the northwest tip of Los Negros to cover the 2d Brigade's landing,

releasing, in the process, sixty-nine Sikh

soldiers that the Japanese had been using as laborers.

On the morning of 9 March destroyers

shelled Lorengau and minesweepers

checked Seeadler Harbour. Then six

LST's and one cargo ship entered the

harbor to land Brig. Gen. Verne D.

Mudge's 2d Cavalry Brigade and attached units at Salami Plantation.46

Los Negros was now firmly in Allied

hands. The next task facing the combat

troops was the seizure of Lorengau.

Lorengau

Plans and Preparations

General Swift had assigned responsibility for capturing Manus to the 2d

Cavalry Brigade. General Mudge accordingly had his plans ready the day after

his brigade landed at Salami Plantation.47

 Not much was known about Jap46

 This force consisted of: the 2d Cavalry Brigade

(less the 2d Squadron and Weapons Troop, 7th

Cavalry); the 61st Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm.

howitzers); various divisional and nondivisional engineer, medical, quartermaster, and ordnance units;

B Battery, 168th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(Gun); B Battery, 211th Coast Artillery Battalion;

F Company, 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment; an Australian New Guinea Administrative

Unit detachment; and a detachment of No. 62

Works Wing, RAAF. 47

 2d Cav Brigade FO 2, 10 Mar 44, in Hist of Hq

Troop, 2d Cav Brigade, Admiralty Islands Campaign, 9 Mar-18 May 44 (actually the 2d Brigade's

report); 8th Cav FO 2, 13 Mar 44, in 8th Cav Hist

Rpt, Admiralty Campaign, 6 Mar-20 May 44, Sec 11.
340 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

anese strength on Manus, but reconnaissance had shown that Lorengau airdrome and Lorengau village east of it

were fortified. As Lugos Mission was

practically undefended, Mudge decided

to land there—about 3,000 yards west of

the airdrome. (Map 21) The beaches

selected, Yellow 1 and Yellow 2, lay

west and east of the Liei River. Yellow

1, of coral sand, was 700 yards long, 14

to 26 yards wide, with swamps immediately behind it. Yellow 2, 100 yards

long, gave access to Number 3 Road

which led along the coast to Lorengau.

Mudge assigned the assault to the 8th

Cavalry, commanded by Col. William

J. Bradley. It was to land in column

of squadrons, the 1st Squadron in the

lead. Troop A was to land in LVT's on

Yellow 2 east of the Liei, C Troop from

LCV's on Yellow 1 to the west. The

7th Cavalry, less the 2d Squadron, would

follow the 8th ashore. The 2d Squadron, 7th, would constitute the brigade

reserve. C Troop, 8th Engineer Squadron, was to land on Yellow 1, improve

the beaches, and bridge the Liei to

connect the beaches. Once ashore the

8th Cavalry was to send the 1st Squadron east along Number 3 Road against

Lorengau airfield while the other moved

inland to Number 1 Road, and then

moved east against Lorengau village to

keep the Japanese from escaping inland

to the jungled mountains where they

would have a great defensive advantage.48

The cavalry generals arranged with

naval officers and with Capt. George F.

Frederick of the 12th Air Liaison Party

for ample air and fleet support of the

landing, in addition to support by field

artillery. The islets north of Los Negros

would provide positions from which field

artillery could support the 2d Brigade's

advance east by firing across its front at

right angles to the axis of advance, as

had been done in New Georgia during

the advance on Munda airfield. Therefore plans were prepared for sending

patrols to Hauwei, the Butjo Luo group,

and Bear Point on Manus, just west of

Loniu Passage, to determine enemy

strength and look for artillery positions.

D Day for Manus was first set for 13

March.

The island patrols, consisting of detachments from the 302d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop plus artillery officers, left Salami on 11 March. Bear

Point, though not occupied by the enemy, had so poor a beach that artillery

could not be landed. Butjo Mokau, the

most northern of the Butjo Luo group,

offered good artillery positions and bore

no signs of enemy occupation. In late

afternoon F Troop, 7th Cavalry, occupied both islands of the group.

The Hauwei patrol, a platoon strong,

left Salami aboard an LCV and a PT

boat and landed on the western part of

Hauwei.49 After the patrol had moved

a short distance inland, machine gun,

mortar, and rifle fire struck it from the

48

 The landing force consisted of: the 2d Cavalry

Brigade; C Troop, 8th Engineer Squadron; a detachment of the Shore Battalion, 592d Engineer

Boat and Shore Regiment; detachments of the 1st

Medical Squadron and the 1st Signal Troop; two

medium and three light tanks.

49

 Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons 18 and 21 had

arrived in Seeadler Harbour with their tender

Oyster Bay. They served as a "sneak and peak" and

general utility organization. Morison, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, p. 446.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 341

MAP 21

front and both sides. The patrol made

a fighting withdrawal to the beach, supported by fire from the PT boat and

the LCV. But by the time the cavalrymen made the beach, the PT, whose

skipper had been wounded, had returned to its tender. Five men boarded

the LCV, but the remainder were still

embroiled with the enemy. Mortar shells

and machine gun bullets wounded most

of the men aboard the LCV, which

struck a submerged coral reef two hundred yards from shore and sank, leaving

the survivors floating in the water. When

about six Japanese started to set up a

machine gun on the beach, the cavalrymen still on shore shot them with

submachine guns, then took to the water

and joined the survivors from the LCV.

After three hours in the water, the eighteen men, suffering from exposure to the

sun and water, were picked up by a PT

boat while a destroyer shelled Hauwei.

An LCM later picked up one more man.
342 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Six men of the reconnaissance troop and

two artillerymen had been killed, three

were missing, and every survivor was

wounded as well as burned.50

A larger force was obviously needed

for Hauwei, and the landing on Manus

would have to be delayed if the artillery

was to get into position in time to support the landing. Further, naval officers

had already counseled delay in order to

provide more time to clear the sea lanes

to Lugos Mission.

Accordingly the 2d Squadron (less F

Troop), 7th Cavalry, was selected to

seize Hauwei. Supporting its attack

would be destroyers, rockets, 105-mm.

fire from the 61st Field Artillery Battalion at Mokerang Plantation north of

Salami, and P-40's of No. 77 Fighter

Squadron, RAAF, which had reached

Momote on 9 March. The squadron

boarded LCM's at noon, 12 March, set

out for Hauwei, and landed under cover

of the supporting bombardment at 1400.

The squadron later reported that "the

covering fire was not accurate and most

missiles fell short in the sea."51

E Troop landed on the west shore

under small arms fire while G Troop,

debarking on the south, met machine

gun fire. The Japanese had rigged trip

wires to activate mines, but the soldiers

detected and avoided them. Kirk's squadron then drove inland against rifle fire

and by 1500 held a north-south line

across Hauwei about three hundred

yards from the western tip and one thousand yards from the eastern end. By now

the whole squadron was ashore, and H

Troop's 81-mm. mortars were ready to

fire. E Troop continued its advance but

G stayed in place. As contact broke

between the two troops, Colonel Kirk

pulled E Troop back and dug in for

the night.

General Mudge arrived at 1600 and

after receiving Kirk's report ordered C

Troop from Salami to Hauwei, and alerted one medium tank to move to Hauwei

next day. C Troop arrived by LCM at

1800 and took up a support position.

During the night Japanese on Pityilu

fired 20-mm. guns at the 2d Squadron

but hit no one. The 61st Field Artillery

Battalion put one thousand rounds of

harassing fire on the enemy's section of

Hauwei.

Next morning, at 0900, the tank arrived and Kirk assigned his reconnaissance platoon as close support. The attack began at 1000 with C, E, and G

Troops abreast from left (north) to right.

On the right a bunker, manned by eight

Japanese with two 7.7-mm. machine

guns, grenade discharges, and rifles,

withstood four direct mortar bursts and

four 75-mm. shells before it crumbled.

In the center E Troop enveloped a short

trench equipped with machine guns,

grenade dischargers, and rifles. With

these positions reduced the troops moved

rapidly. By noon the 2d Squadron had

covered the whole island. Eight Americans had been killed, forty-six were

wounded. Forty-three dead Japanese, all

sailors, were counted. Captured booty

included two 5-inch naval guns and a

range-finder. One gun had been hit by

the earlier bombardments; the other was

in firing condition.

50

 Maj. B. C. Wright, The 1st Cavalry Division in

World War II (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Company,

1947), p. 27. 51

 7th Cav, Hist Rpt 7th Cav, 2 Mar-18 May 44,

Pt. B, p. 5.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 343

That afternoon the 61st Field Artillery Battalion unloaded its 105-mm.

howitzers from LCM's and next day set

them up on the southwest side while

the 271st Field Artillery Battalion emplaced its 105-mm. howitzers on the west.

The 99th Field Artillery Battalion,

meanwhile, had emplaced twelve 75-

mm. pack howitzers and six 37-mm. antitank guns on Butjo Mokau on 13 March.

The Landing at Lugos

With the artillery now in position,

embarkation of the 2d Cavalry Brigade

aboard twelve LCM's, seven LCV's, and

one LST began shortly after 0400 on

15 March. The LST and the smaller

craft proceeded separately to the rendezvous area off Lugos Mission and assembled about 0800.

The three supporting artillery battalions had begun firing intermittently

at Lorengau village at 2100 the previous

evening, and at 0830 they shifted their

fire to Lugos Mission. Four destroyers

lying offshore fired at the shore line

between the Tingau River, west of Lugos, and Lorengau until 0900. At 0900

eighteen B-25's from Nadzab arrived

overhead and from 0907 to 0925 put

eighty-one 500-pound bombs and fired

more than 44,000 machine gun bullets

on the beaches. At 0925, when the bombers cleared the area, three engineer

rocket boats covered the first wave's

landing.

The LST had previously disgorged

seven LVT's, and six of them (the seventh was a rocket boat) bore A Troop

toward Beach Yellow 2 while LCV's

carried C Troop toward Yellow 1. When

the craft were close to shore, a machine

gun east of the beaches opened fire.

LVT's, and engineer support craft, and

two PT boats replied and the gun fell

silent. LVT's and LCV's landed their

troops without casualties, and almost exactly on schedule.52

The soldiers of A Troop left the

LVT's and drove through Lugos Mission toward Number 3 Road. The few

Japanese in the area, mostly sailors, did

not offer determined resistance and were

killed by A Troop and by later mop-up

squads. C Troop, to the west, met no

opposition as it advanced to a ridge some

eight hundred yards inland where it established defenses to cover the landing

of the 2d Brigade.

Colonel Bradley had ordered the bulk

of the 8th Cavalry to land at Yellow 2

if it proved suitable for LCM's and

LST's, and succeeding waves landed so

quickly that Yellow 2 quickly became

congested. The LST, which carried

troops, weapons, and vehicles but no

bulk cargo, was unloaded in forty-five

minutes. It retracted to return to Salami

for the 7th Cavalry.53 This regiment,

commanded by Col. Glenn S. Finley,

landed from the LST and LCM's in the

afternoon and took over defense of the

beachhead.

Meanwhile the 8th Cavalry had begun

its two-squadron advance against Lorengau airdrome and Lorengau village over

Roads 1 and 3.

52

 General Swift, who observed the landing from

the deck of a PT boat, is reported to have noted

that timing was off by one and one-half minutes

because a heavy sea slowed the landing craft.

Wright, The 1st Cavalry Division in World War

II, p. 28. 53

 8th Cav Hist Rpt, Admiralty Campaign, Narrative of Events, p. 6.
344 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The Advance East:

The Airfield and the Village

During the day the 2d Squadron, 8th,

under Maj. Haskett L. Connor, made its

way southward along a native track

toward Number 1 Road. Tractors borrowed from the artillery towed supplies

and ammunition. Japanese riflemen harassed the soldiers as they toiled slowly

upward over a continuous succession of

ridges. It was 1500 before F Troop, in

the lead, reached Number 1 Road, where

it ran into fire from three Japanese positions which covered the track's junction

with the road. Enemy mortars to the

south added their fire, and Connor decided to dig in for the night. At his request the 61st Field Artillery Battalion

silenced the enemy temporarily while

the squadron established night defenses

about six hundred yards from the road.

The next morning, 16 March, General Mudge and Colonel Bradley visited

the squadron and observed its attack

which, supported by one light and two

medium tanks, overran the positions and

enabled Connor's squadron to move east

along Number 1 Road. The tanks had

been hauled through the jungle with

the aid of a D-7 bulldozer which cut

down grades, cleared undergrowth, and

towed the tanks when they stuck. One

tank and the bulldozer remained attached to the 2d Squadron on its advance along the road. By late afternoon

it had reached a position on the road

about a thousand yards west-northwest

of Lorengau village and eight hundred

yards south of the airstrip.

The chief obstacle to the 2d Squadron's advance was terrain. The 1st

Squadron (less C Troop) had had to fight

its way along the coast on Number 3

Road. After landing on the morning of

15 March, the 1st, under Maj. Moyers

S. Shore, had started east along the road

behind A Troop. The road led through

heavy rain forest interspersed with mangrove swamp on low ground. "The recent rains had softened the red clay until

it assumed a glue-like consistence which

made the footing difficult and slowed

. . . leading elements."

 54

About one mile out of Lugos A Troop

was halted by three pillboxes.55 With the

beach on one side and mangrove swamp

on the other, there was no space for

maneuver. Without orders from the

troop commander one squad attempted

an unsupported frontal assault which

failed. Major Shore then alerted B

Troop to pass through A and assault

upon completion of an artillery preparation. From Hauwei 105's of the 271st

Field Artillery Battalion swept the enemy area with shells that burst as close

as a hundred yards from the cavalrymen. B Troop attacked but was quickly

halted.

Shore then asked for a tank, more artillery fire, and a strike by RAAF P-40's

(armed with 500-pound bombs), which

had been on station since before H

Hour, and arranged for 81-mm. mortar

support. "The combination of fire and

bombs" turned the trick. They "plowed

the position into a mass of craters," and

B Troop advanced past "the blasted

54

 Ibid., p. 6. 55

 1st Cavalry Division reports and journals use

the word "bunker" for almost every enemy position

encountered. Japanese positions along the road

and at Lorengau appear to have been, according

to World War II terminology, earth-and-log pillboxes.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 345

remains of the pillboxes and scattered

parts of their tenacious occupants. . . ."56

The three pillboxes had apparently

constituted the airstrip's western defenses, for when they crumbled the 1st

Squadron moved freely down the road.

By 1700 it had advanced out of the

jungle and held a ridge among the palms

overlooking the southwest corner of the

airstrip. Two of the squadron had been

killed, eleven wounded, in the course of

the action. Forty Japanese were reported

killed. During the night of 15-16 March

Shore's squadron, which C Troop rejoined at 1800 after its relief at the

beachhead by the 7th Cavalry, received

rifle fire from Japanese in a palm grove

between the airfield and the sea.

Next morning, 16 March, Shore decided to hold up his attack while an A

Troop platoon went north of the strip

to clear out the enemy riflemen and C

Troop moved along the south edge of

the airdrome to reconnoiter enemy positions there. It was noon before the A

Troop platoon accomplished its mission

and the 1st Squadron could move.

Meanwhile C Troop, after advancing

200 yards over a series of rolling coconutstudded ridges which lay at right angles

to the axis of advance, was halted by

machine gun fire from a ridge about 150

yards to its front. The troop commander,

Capt. Winthrop B. Avery, emplaced the

heavy machine guns and 81-mm. mortars which had been attached from the

Weapons Troop and attempted a coordinated attack. One platoon was to

make a frontal assault while a second

platoon worked around the south flank.

The frontal attack failed, but the flanking platoon, commanded by S/Sgt. Ervin

M. Gauthreaux. literally gained the top

of the enemy positions, threw grenades

into two pillboxes, and flushed several

Japanese.57

But at this point things went wrong.

With the enemy threat removed from

his left (north) flank, and aware that C

Troop was held up, Shore decided to

leave C Troop in place to hold the

enemy while the remainder of A Troop

followed its other platoon through the

palms and squadron Headquarters

Troop, B Troop, and elements of D

Troop drove down the airdrome on

C's left. As B Troop advanced in the

open it was struck by fire from the very

positions that Gauthreaux' platoon was

straddling, whereupon it halted, withdrew, and as it carried its casualties back

to safety returned the enemy's fire. But

the fire hit Gauthreaux's platoon, and

Avery was forced to order him off the

Japanese positions.58

After four hundred 105-mm. rounds

had pounded the enemy position, C

Troop attacked frontally while B Troop

completed its retirement. But the Japanese still remained in their positions

on the ridge and broke up C Troop's

attack. By now all elements of the squadron had been committed and the Americans had advanced to about the center

of the airstrip.

General Mudge arrived on the scene,

inspected the squadron, reconnoitered

the front, and decided to relieve the 1st

Squadron, 8th, with the 7th Cavalry.

During the relief, which was effected

56

 8th Cav Hist Rpt, Admiralty Campaign, Narrative of Events, p. 7.

57

 Gauthreaux received the Silver Star and a commission as 2d lieutenant. 58

 Tanks had advanced along the north side of

the strip but did not fire on the C Troop platoon.
346 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MEN OF THE 8TH CAVALRY moving a 37-mm. antitank gun to a firing position near

Lorengau Village, 18 March 1944.

about 1600, the 7th Cavalry lost five

men killed and fifteen wounded.

With the previous day's experience

as a guide, General Mudge and Colonel

Finley planned a co-ordinated attack for

17 March. The 7th Cavalry and the 2d

Squadron, 8th, were to take the remainder of the airstrip and push on over

the Lorengau River to the village. The

1st Squadron, 7th, with squads from the

8th Engineer Squadron attached, was to

seize the eastern end of the airdrome

while the 2d Squadron, 7th, moved south

of the strip to make contact with the 2d

Squadron, 8th, and advance to the river

on Number 1 Road.

During the night of 16-17 March destroyers and field artillery battalions

shelled the Japanese positions, and in

the early morning twenty-four 81-mm.

mortars, two light tanks, and two 37-mm.

antitank guns put their fire on the pillboxes. An 81-mm. mortar of D Troop,

8th, attached to the 7th Cavalry, demolished one pillbox and its .50-caliber

and .30-caliber machine guns and crew

of fifteen men with a direct hit. When

the mortars ceased fire automatic weapons opened up, and the 1st Squadron,

7th, assaulted. "At 1033 when our troops

came out of their fox-holes there were

numerous cries of 'Garry Owen' as the

1st Squadron went into its first action

against the Japanese."59

There was little resistance, since the

59

 7th Cav, Hist Rpt 7th Cav, 2 Mar-18 May 44,

Pt. B, p. 11. "Garry Owen" is the 7th's regimental

song.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 347

supporting fires had "practically wiped

out all enemy resistance except for necessary mopping up of a few bunkers still

remaining intact."60 The 1st Squadron,

under Maj. James A. Godwin, quickly

seized the ridge that had held up Shore's

squadron the day before, then encountered another ridge position slightly to

the east. After artillery and mortars had

pounded it, cavalrymen moved in and

occupied it. Flame throwers destroyed

the pillboxes that remained in action.

Meanwhile noon found the two inland squadrons in contact with each

other. By 1300 all three squadrons were

in contact and had resumed the eastward advance. Only a few scattered Japanese opposed the move from the airstrip to the river, but emplaced mines

caused some casualties and slowed the

advance, so that it was 1500 before the

three squadrons pulled up on a ridge

on the west bank that overlooked the

village. It was too late in the day to attack Lorengau, which the Americans had

reason to believe was strongly defended.

The 7th Cavalry's reconnaissance platoon had immediately crossed the river

over the sandbar at its mouth, met fire

from Japanese positions west of Lorengau, and withdrawn. Landing craft

bringing in supplies received fire from

the hills above the village. And, on the

person of a Japanese officer who died

defending the airdrome, the Americans

had discovered maps of the defenses of

Manus which showed that Lorengau and

the road leading overland through the

villages of Old Rossum and Rossum

were fortified.

Lorengau lies in a cup-shaped valley

surrounded by 400-foot-high hills. Most

of the Japanese defenses faced seaward,

although positions also covered the roads

leading east, west, and south. As the

Lorengau River was about sixty feet

wide and ten to twenty feet deep in

most places, the 2d Brigade's best approach route led over the alluvial sandbar at the mouth. The enemy had planted mines, controlled by a master switch

in a pillbox on the hillside, on the

stretch of beach between the sandbar

and the hills. They had put foxholes and

machine gun emplacements about a hundred yards inland from the shore, and

had built about twelve pillboxes in the

hills. The attackers would have to cross

the river and the beach in full view of

the enemy positions, but two factors favored an assault: repeated bombings and

shellings had uncovered several Japanese

positions so that they were visible, and

the ridge taken in the 17 March attack

provided good observation over Lorengau.

The 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, was

designated to make the attack with mortar and artillery support. At 1000, 18

March, the reconnaissance platoon led

out in single file followed by E, F, and

G Troops. The move was unexpectedly

easy; only scattered machine gun fire

was directed at the reconnaissance platoon, which quickly cleared the beach

and the rifle pits. It cut the master cable

leading to the mines. Later a dead Japanese was found in a small pillbox with

the detonator switch clutched in his

hand.

The rifle troops received fire and some

casualties while crossing the river, but

got over rapidly. On the east shore they

60

 7th Cav, Hist Rpt 7th Cav, 2 Mar-18 May 44,

Pt. B, p. 11.
348 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

CROSSING THE LORENGAU RIVER over the sandbar at the mouth of the river,

18 March 1944.

deployed and prepared to attack. E

Troop was to assault the enemy center

in Lorengau with F Troop echeloned

to the right rear; G Troop was to take

the hills beside the river. Artillery and

81-mm. mortars hit the enemy once

more, and when their fire ceased 60-

mm.'s and machine guns opened up,

whereupon the cavalry troops assaulted

the bunkers with grenade, submachine

gun, rifle, and flame thrower. Again, it

was unexpectedly easy, for the Japanese

apparently retreated inland over Number 2 Road.61

 Eighty-seven Japanese

were killed defending Lorengau, while

the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, captured

it at a cost of seven wounded.

Fighting in the Admiralties was not

yet over; it was 18 May before General

Krueger officially terminated the operation. Los Negros was not cleared of the

enemy until the end of March, and it

took two squadrons, several tanks, P-40

strikes, and a good deal of artillery fire

before the 2d Brigade cleared Number

2 Road to Rossum on 25 March. But

the capture of Lorengau airfield, following the seizure of Momote, placed in

Allied hands the main strategic objectives of the operation. During the entire operation (including the seizure of

more outlying islands in April) the 1st

Cavalry Division lost 326 men killed,

1,189 wounded, and 4 missing. It reported burying 3,280 and capturing 75

61

 Little is known about Japanese decisions and

movements, as no Japanese survived to report to

Rabaul. 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese

Monogr No. no (OCMH), p. 134.
ACTION IN THE ADMIRALTIES 349

TROOP G, 8TH CAVALRY, NEAR NUMBER 1 ROAD on the west side of the Lorengau

River, 18 March 1944.

of the enemy, and General Krueger estimated that the Japanese had disposed

of 1,100 more bodies.62

Base Development

Meanwhile several battalions of Seabees, plus Army engineer units, were

building airfields and a naval base. MacArthur, Nimitz, and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had intended that the naval base

be used by all Allied fleets serving in

the Pacific. In February Nimitz proposed

to Admiral King that Admiral Halsey,

who furnished most of the service troops,

be given responsibility, under Nimitz,

for developing and controlling the

base.63 Nimitz' proposal was rejected by

the Joint Chiefs but not before MacArthur became so irate that he ordered

work on the Admiralties "restricted to

facilities for ships under his direct command—the Seventh Fleet and British

units."64 Halsey, whom MacArthur

vainly requested as his commander of

Allied Naval Forces, made a hurried

trip to Brisbane in early March and

found that MacArthur "lumped me,

Nimitz, King, and the whole Navy in a

vicious conspiracy to pare away his authority."65

 Halsey was in a difficult position. MacArthur was very angry; he was

Halsey's superior, and was vastly senior

62

 ALAMO Force Rpt, BREWER Opns, p. 26. 63

 Rad, CINCPAC to COMINCH, 23 Feb 44, CMIN 16947.

64

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

189; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 9 Mar 44, CMOUT 3710. 65

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

189; Suppl Min, JCS mtg, 8 Feb 44; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1443.
350 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

to him.66 And it is probably gratuitous

to say MacArthur was formidable in argument. The scene, as Halsey records it,

was lively, with MacArthur expressing

himself strongly. "Unlike myself," the

Admiral wrote, "strong emotion did not

make him profane. He did not need to

be; profanity would have merely discolored his eloquence." But the ram-jawed

Halsey could also be formidable. Supported by Kinkaid and Carney, he asked

the General to rescind his order:

". . . 'if you stick to this order of yours,

you'll be hampering the war effort!' "

Halsey went on to say that "the command of Manus didn't matter a whit to

me. What did matter was the quick construction of the base. Kenney or an Australian or an enlisted cavalryman could

boss it for all I cared, as long as it was

ready to handle the fleet when we moved

up New Guinea and on toward the

Philippines." After long argument, General MacArthur agreed to cancel his order and the work went forward under

Admiral Kinkaid's direction.67

Momote airfield, first used in March,

was seven thousand feet long by 18 May.

When the Lorengau airstrip proved unsuitable, Seabees and the 836th Engineer

Aviation Battalion, working under pressure, finished one at Mokerang Plantation by 21 April, then put in a parallel

runway. Seabees installed two runways

for carrier aircraft on the outlying

islands, and also developed Seeadler Harbour into one of the largest naval bases

in the Pacific, with repair facilities for

all types of warships and transports.68 As

planned, the naval base serviced the

Third, Fifth, and Seventh Fleets in later

operations, and the airfields supported

the drives along the New Guinea coast

and through the Central Pacific. The

gallant action of the 1st Cavalry Division

in execution of MacArthur's bold decision thus paid rich dividends.

66

 During World War I MacArthur had commanded a brigade and then a division while Halsey

commanded a destroyer. 67

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, pp.

189-90; Oral statement of Adm Kinkaid to the

author et al., 16 Nov 53. General Kenney, in his

comments, remarked that Halsey's statement sounds

as though "he didn't like me, the Australians, or

enlisted cavalrymen." Actually Halsey was probably

only listing people unlikely to be directing construction of a naval base. 68

 Building the Navy's Bases in World War II, II,

295-302; Off of Chief Engr, GHQ AFPAC, Airfield

and Base Development, pp. 208-22, and Critique,

pp. 145-53.
CHAPTER XVII

Bougainville Counterattack

By March 1944 the Japanese were

clearly beaten in the Southeast Area.

With air and naval strength gone, the

ground troops were stranded, immobilized, incapable of affecting the course of

the war. Only at Rabaul were the Japanese strong, and that strength could not

be employed unless the Allies chose to

attack. But among the characteristics

that made the Japanese a formidable opponent was his refusal to accept defeat

even in a hopeless situation. If beaten,

he knew it not. Thus it was that Generals Imamura and Hyakutake designed

the destruction, in March, of the XIV

Corps at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville.1

Preparations

The Approach

When in late 1943 the Japanese commanders had finally concluded that the

invasion of Empress Augusta Bay was

actually the Allied main effort at Bougainville, they began making plans for

their counterattack. Unfortunately for

him, Hyakutake's intelligence estimate

was as inaccurate as most other Japanese

estimates during World War II. He

placed Allied strength at Empress

Augusta Bay at about 30,000 of whom

10,000 were supposed to be aircraft

ground crews. His figure for General

Griswold's total strength was too low by

half. Against the XIV Corps he planned

to use the main strength of the 17th

Army, which consisted principally of

General Kanda's 6th Division and several

battalions of the 17th Division that Imamura had sent down in November. Total

Japanese strength involved is variously

reported as 15,000 to 19,000 men.2

1

 This chapter is based on SOPACBACOM, The

Bougainville Campaign, Chs. IV-IX, supplemented

by rpts, jnls, and jnl files of XIV Corps, Americal

Div, 37th Div, and the principal component units

which participated; Maj Gen Oscar W. Griswold,

Bougainville: An Experience in Jungle Warfare

(typescript); ACofS G-2 XIV Corps, History of the

"TA" Operation, Bougainville, March 1944 [21

Apr 44]; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese

Monogr No. no (OCMH), pp. 106-22; 17th Army

Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 40 (OCMH),

105-29; Capt. Francis D. Cronin, Under the Southern Cross: The Saga of the Americal Division

(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1951), pp. 143-

68; Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in World

War II, pp. 141-70; Answers (27 Jul 49) of Gen

Kanda [former CG, 6th Div] to questions by Hist

Sec G-2 FEC, in Hist Div MIS GHQ FEC, Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II (English Translations), II, 19-31, OCMH.

2

 ACofS G-2 XIV Corps, History of the "TA"

Operation, a careful, conservative study written after

the counteroffensive from prisoner-of-war interrogations, captured documents, and G-2 periodic reports and summaries, gives 15,400 men as the total.

In 1949 General Kanda, speaking from memory,

said there were 19,000 men involved plus about

2,000 sailors. He may have included all troops in

rear areas in his figure.
352 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

During the early part of 1944 Japanese engineers built or improved roads,

trails, and bridges so that the 17th Army

could move from north and south Bougainville to assembly areas in the hills

inland from the XIV Corps' perimeter.

By mid-February the enemy soldiers

were all on their way, and Hyakutake

left Erventa to supervise the action himself.

The Japanese had hoped to launch an

amphibious assault against the Americans, coupled with an attack from inland.

A shortage of landing craft made the

amphibious assault impossible, but

barges, operating on moonless nights to

avoid Allied aircraft and PT boats, transported heavy equipment, including artillery, to a point east of Cape Torokina

from where it was laboriously hauled inland to the hills. Packhorses and trucks

carried supplies part of the way on the

overland routes.

The infantry regiments of the 6th Division advanced along both coasts, the

13th and 23d Infantry Regiments on the

west, the 45th Infantry up the east coast

to Numa Numa, thence southwest by the

Numa Numa Trail. The 17th Division

battalions also marched along both coasts

from their positions in the north.

Such a move could hardly go unnoticed. Coastwatchers, radio intercepts,

long- and short-range ground patrols, interrogation of prisoners and even of a

few deserters, Japanese activity near the

Fiji outpost at Ibu, interpretation of

aerial photographs, and air and naval

searches told General Griswold that the

Japanese were on the move all over the

island, and that attack was imminent.

Allied planes regularly bombed all suspected troop movements, bridges, and

assembly areas. When the Japanese

launched strong attacks at Ibu in midFebruary, the corps commander ordered

the Fijians back to the perimeter. Four

hundred and fifty Fiji soldiers and two

hundred Bougainville natives made their

way to Cape Torokina. Two Fijians

were slightly wounded during the withdrawal.

Patrol clashes and fire fights in the

hills north and northeast of the XIV

Corps' perimeter indicated that the Japanese were concentrating there. Further,

Japanese carelessness in safeguarding important documents played into General

Griswold's hands. Papers taken from

enemy corpses gave him a precise idea

of Hyakutake's plan of attack, told him

exactly which Japanese units were about

to attack him, and gave him the general

location of the enemy artillery units. Information about the attack was posted

on the American units' bulletin boards.

XIV Corps' Defenses

At the beginning of March the XIV

Corps' perimeter was somewhat larger

than it had been when Griswold took

over. It included, in a horseshoe-shaped

line on the inland side, some 23,000

yards of low hills and jungle. The beach

frontage totaled 11,000 yards. Depth of

the position was about 8,000 yards. (Map

22) The main ground combat elements

of the corps were the Americal and 37th

Divisions, which numbered about 27,000

men. All together, 62,000 men, including

naval units, were attached or assigned to

the XIV Corps.

All the infantry regiments were placed

on the front lines. A total of twelve rifle

354 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

60-MM. MORTAR EMPLACEMENT on Hill 700 held by 145th Infantry, 15 February

1944.

battalions held frontages varying from

2,000 to 2,400 yards. Usually each regiment held one battalion in reserve. The

37th Division defended the left (northwest) sector from a point on the beach

5,500 yards northwest of Cape Torokina

to the area of Hill 700, about 2,000 yards

east of Lake Kathleen. The 148th Infantry, on the division left, and the 129th

Infantry, in the center, held low ground.

The 145th Infantry, on the right, held

Hill 700, the highest ground possessed

by the Americans. The Americal Division's line ran from just east of Hill

700, where the 164th Infantry's left flank

tied in with the 145th's right, over Hills

608, 309, and 270, then along the west

bank of the Torokina River. Near its

mouth the line crossed over to the east

bank.3 The 182d Infantry, in the division's center, held Hills 309 and 270

on the main perimeter line. The 132d

Infantry on the right held low ground.

In addition a detachment of the 182d Infantry, plus artillery and mortar observers, maintained an outpost on Hill

260, an eminence which was some distance east of the main line of resistance

and overlooked the Torokina River.

Griswold had ordered this hill held so

that it could be used as an American

artillery and mortar observation post,

and so that the enemy could not use it

to observe American positions.

3

 The 132d Infantry, Americal Division, had seized

this area in an action in January wherein S/Sgt.

Jessie R. Drowley fought so valiantly that he was

awarded the Medal of Honor. WD GO 73, 6 Sep 44.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 355

All units had been developing and

strengthening positions on the main line

of resistance, which now consisted of rifle

pits and earth, log, and sandbag pillboxes, wired in behind double-apron or

concertina barbed wire. In front of the

wire were minefields. Various devices

were employed to give illumination at

night: searchlights, either shining directly or reflecting a spread beam off

clouds; flares tied in trees and set off by

pull wires; flashlights; thermite grenades; and cans full of sand and gasoline.

Grenades, with wires attached, were set

up as booby traps along obvious approach routes. Oil drums, each with

scrap metal packed around a bangalore

torpedo, were wired for electrical detonation. Fields of fire fifty yards or more

deep, deep enough to prevent the enemy

from throwing hand grenades at the

American positions from cover and concealment, had been cleared. Almost all

the infantry regiments possessed extra

machine guns, and had issued two BAR's

to each rifle squad. All regiments had

constructed reserve positions. The naval

construction battalions, the 3d Marine

Defense Battalion, Army engineer units,

and others maintained provisional infantry units as part of the corps reserve,

which also included the 82d Chemical

Battalion, the 754th Tank Battalion, and

the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry.4

Artillery support for the perimeter,

though below American standards, was

stronger than the enemy's supporting

artillery. The XIV Corps still had

neither organic artillery nor an artillery

commander. Serving as corps artillery

commander was General Kreber, artillery commander of the 37th Division.

Under General Kreber's command were

the eight (six 105-mm. and two 155-mm.)

howitzer battalions organic to the two

divisions, plus the provisional corps

artillery. This consisted of two 155-mm.

gun batteries of the 3d Marine Defense

Battalion; four 90-mm. antiaircraft batteries of the 251st Antiaircraft Artillery

Regiment; and four 90-mm. antiaircraft

batteries of the 3d Marine Defense Battalion, of which one, D Battery, 70th

Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) Battalion,

was attached from the Army. Gun power

of the XIV Corps units was augmented

on 3 March when six cannon companies,

with 75-mm. pack howitzers, reached

Bougainville and joined the infantry

regiments.

The XIV Corps' positions were

strong, and since he possessed interior

lines General Griswold could easily

switch his reserve units back and forth.

But the positions were not ideal. The

corps lacked enough men, by American

standards, to hold all the high ground

in the vicinity. Beyond the coastal plain

the ground rises abruptly from ridge to

ridge, each higher than the preceding

one, up to the summits of the Crown

Prince Range. Thus the Americans on

Hills 608 and 700 held positions that

were dominated by the higher ground

in Japanese hands—Blue Ridge, three

thousand yards north of Hill 700, and

Hills 1000 and 1111, just southeast of

Blue Ridge. These hills gave the enemy

an excellent view over all the perimeter

except the reverse slopes of the American-held hills. By 1 March, however,

4

 This unit had served on Bougainville since 30

January, chiefly as a labor battalion. See Ulysses G.

Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, a volume in

preparation for the series UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
356 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

General Griswold was sure that "the

perimeter was as well organized as the

personnel and the terrain would permit."5

The Japanese Plan of Attack

General Hyakutake organized most of

his infantry into three forces, each

named for its commander. The Iwasa

Unit, under General Iwasa, consisted of

the 2d Battalion, 13th Infantry; the 23d

Infantry; and two batteries of field artillery, some mortars, and engineers and

other supporting troops. The Magata

Unit, led by Col. Isaoshi Magata of the

45th Infantry, whom Kanda considered

to be a crack regimental commander, included nearly all the 45th Infantry plus

mortars, field artillery, and engineers.

The third unit, under Col. Toyoharei

Muda, who had succeeded the late

Tomonari in command of the 13th Infantry, consisted of the remainder of the

13th plus engineers. Supporting the attacks of the three infantry units was an

artillery group commanded by a Colonel Saito. This consisted of four 150-mm.

howitzers, two 105-mm. howitzers, and a

number of smaller pieces.6 Artillery ammunition supply totaled three hundred

rounds per piece, of which one fifth was

to be used for direct support of the infantry, the rest for interdicting the airfields.

Also present were elements of the 1st

and 3d Battalions, 53d Infantry, and

part of the 81st Infantry, all from the

17th Division. At first these were either

placed in 17th Army reserve or were assigned diversionary missions against the

northwest part of the XIV Corps' beachhead.

The Iwasa Unit assembled behind

Hill 1111, the Magata Unit behind

Mount Nampei, a shoulder-shaped ridge

extending outward from the Crown

Prince Range just northwest of Blue

Ridge. The Muda Unit assembled at

Peko, a village on the East-West Trail

about 5,400 yards east-northeast of Hill

260. The artillery group emplaced in the

vicinity of Hill 600.

The plan of maneuver involved two

thrusts from the north coupled with an

attack from the northeast, all on a complicated schedule. Briefly, the Iwasa Unit

was to attack and secure Hill 700 on Y

Day (set, after some delays in moving

into position, for 8 March), reorganize

on 9 and 10 March, and advance to the

Piva airfields. During this period the

Muda Unit was to capture Hills 260 and

309, whereupon it and one battalion of

the Iwasa Unit were supposed to attack

Hill 608 from the southeast and northwest on 12 March. All these attacks were

preliminary to an effort which was to

be delivered, starting 11 March, by the

Magata Unit against the 129th Infantry

in its low ground west of Hill 700.

Magata's men, after cracking the 129th's

line, were to advance against the Piva

airstrips in conjunction with Iwasa's advance. Then all units were to drive

southward on a broad front to capture

the Torokina fighter strip by 17 March.

Haste was essential, since the 17th Army

had brought with it but two weeks'

rations.

Hindsight indicates that the Japanese

plan was unsound. Even had Hyaku5

 Griswold, Bougainville, p. 46. 6

 General Kanda specified 18 70-mm. battalion

guns; ACofS G-2 XIV Corps, History of the "TA"

Operation lists 168 75-mm. mountain guns. The

Japanese 105 is often called a 10-cm. piece.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 357

155-MM. GUNS OF THE 3D MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION firing on enemy positions,

6 March 1944.

take's estimate of American strength

been correct, he still lacked enough

strength in manpower and in artillery

(he had no air support whatever) to attack prepared positions, and under the

actual circumstances he was hopelessly

outnumbered and outgunned. If his object had been to inflict maximum damage regardless of his own losses, he might

have achieved a larger degree of success

by concentrating his forces from the first

in order to overwhelm a narrow portion

of Griswold's front, break through, and

spread destruction throughout the rear

areas until Griswold could redeploy his

infantry regiments. Of course, Hyakutake might have achieved more success

had the American soldiers elected to turn

and run instead of standing their

ground, but that was an imponderable

that he could not count on. The Americal and 37th Divisions were veteran

units.7

By 8 March almost everything was

ready. The rhetorical manifestoes by

which Japanese officers exhorted their

troops were issued. General Hyakutake

expressed himself along these lines:

The time has come to manifest our

knighthood with the pure brilliance of the

sword. It is our duty to erase the mortifica7

 Hyakutake, in 1942, had delivered a similar, unsuccessful, counterattack against Vandegrift's positions on Guadalcanal. See Miller, Guadalcanal: The

First Offensive, Ch. VI.
358 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

don of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack!

Assault! Destroy everything! Cut, slash, and

mow them down. May the color of the red

emblem of our arms be deepened with the

blood of the American rascals. Our cry of

victory at Torokina Bay will be shouted re- soundingly to our native land.

We are invincible! Always attack. Security

is the greatest enemy. Always be alert. Execute silently.8

Not to be outdone, General Kanda had

this to say:

We must fight to the end to avenge the

shame of our country's humiliation on

GUADALCANAL. . . . There can be no

rest until our bastard foes are battered, and

bowed in shame—till their . . . blood adds

lustre ... to the badge of the Sixth Division. Our battle cry will be heard

afar. . . .9

Again, the most apt comment is in

Proverbs XVI: 18.

Hill 700

At 0545, shortly after daybreak of 8

March, Hyakutake's artillery heralded

the opening of his counteroffensive by

firing on all parts of the beachhead, with

especial attention to the Piva airfields.

American observers on the ground, in

artillery liaison planes, and on board destroyers, aided by information gained

from documents, quickly determined the

general location of the Japanese artillery,

and counterbattery fire by the corps artillery and the organic division artillery

battalions began at once. The Americal

Division artillery put its fire on hills to

the east and east-northeast, the 37th on

those to the northeast. Smoke shells were

fired at suspected enemy observation

posts to blind the enemy. In the 37th's

sector the 6th Field Artillery Battalion,

supporting the 129th Infantry, and the

lagth Infantry Cannon Company were

so situated that they could shoot directly

at enemy gun flashes. The other battalions fired by forward observer.10

At 1045 twenty-four SBD's and twelve

TBF's of the 1st Marine Air Wing

dropped fourteen tons of bombs on Hills

250 and 600. A strike against Hill 1111

was planned for the late morning but

was postponed when a sudden cloud

screen obscured the hilltop. Finally, at

1600, fifty-six SBD's and thirty-six TBF's,

guided by artillery smoke shells, dropped

100- and 1,000-pound bombs on Hill

1111 and environs.

In the course of the day's firing the

Japanese destroyed one B-24 and three

fighters, and damaged nineteen planes

on Piva strips. Before nightfall all

bombers except six TBF's which remained for local support left for New

Georgia to escape destruction. The

enemy also damaged one 155-mm. gun

and several tanks. Early next morning,

the 9th, the enemy guns turned their

attention to the Torokina fighter strip

and forced its planes to take to the air

for safety. Almost no shells fell on the

front lines except in the 145th Infantry's area, where shellfire and mortars caused several casualties.

The sector of the 145th, now commanded by Col. Cecil B. Whitcomb, extended from low ground in the vicinity

8 of the Numa Numa Trail eastward past Quoted in Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division

in World War II, pp. 142-43. The "red emblem"

referred to was probably the shoulder patch of the

6th Division.

9

 Quoted in Griswold, Bougainville, p. 81.

10

 Throughout the operation U.S. destroyers also

fired counterbattery fire and against suspected

enemy assembly areas and approach routes.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 359

the south shore of Lake Kathleen and up

along the military crest of Hill 700, a

frontage of about 3,500 yards. The 3d

Battalion, on the left (west), held the

low ground just south of Lake Kathleen

and Cannon Hill, an eminence slightly

lower and to the west of Hill 700. On

the right the 2d Battalion held Hill 700

with two rifle companies (E and G) and

machine gun sections of H Company in

line, F Company in reserve, and H Company's 81-mm. mortars grouped on the

reverse (south) slope.

Hill 700, which commanded the entire beachhead, was steep, with slopes of

65 to 75 percent in all directions. American intelligence estimates, though not

ruling out an enemy attack here, had

tended to discount its probability. The

steepness that increased the difficulty of

attack also complicated the defense, for

the forward (north) slope fell away too

sharply to permit it to be completely

covered with grazing fire. Thus the 2d

Battalion had an extra allotment of machine guns. Its pillboxes housed 37-mm.

antitank guns, light and heavy machine

guns, BAR's, and rifles. The front was

wired in, with some mines in front. In

direct support were the 105-mm. howitzers of the 135th Field Artillery Battalion and, starting on 8 March, the 4.2-

inch mortars of D Company, 82d Chemical Battalion.11

That the 145th Infantry was in danger

of attack had become obvious on 6 March

when patrols reported the presence of

large numbers of Japanese about fourteen hundred yards north of Hill 700.

Additional ammunition was made available to the troops, and two days' C

rations, ammunition, and a five-gallon

can of water were stocked in each pillbox against a breakdown in supply. For

nocturnal illumination each machine

gun section was issued four incendiary

grenades and a gallon can of flame

thrower fuel.

On 7 March Japanese wire-cutting

parties started work in front of the 145th.

Next day patrols in front of Hill 700,

Cannon Hill, and along Lake Kathleen's

shores kept running into enemy troops.

At the same time 129th Infantry patrols

reported many enemy contacts, and

Americal Division patrols also observed

enemy troops east of the Torokina River,

along the East-West Trail, and around

Hills 250 and 600. In front of the 145th

fire fights and skirmishes went on all day.

When patrols reported that the enemy

was massing, the 37th Division artillery,

the 145th's Cannon Company, and the

4.2-inch mortars fired a counterpreparation twelve hundred yards wide and two

thousand yards deep in front of the 2d

Battalion. Japanese orders had called for

an attack on 8 March, but none developed. The 23d Infantry had spent the

day moving into position in front of the

145th; the 2d Battalion reconnoitered

Cannon Hill, the 3d, 700, but for some

reason the regiment did not assault.12

Rain fell throughout the night of 8-9

March. Shortly after midnight, concealed

by darkness, rain, and mists, about two

companies of the 23d Infantry attacked

up the north slope of Hill 700 against

the 1st Platoon, G Company, 145th,

11

 This company also supported the 129th Infantry.

12

 In 1949 General Kanda said that as the 23d's

attack had not succeeded, and as the 13th had taken

Hill 260 on 8 March, he ordered the attack continued on the 9th. Either his recollection was faulty

or his subordinate commanders deceived him.
37TH

 DIVISION TROOPS CARRYING 5-GALLON CANS OF WATER up the steep slope

of Hill 700. Foreground, from left: Pfc. Howard K. Stoneburner, Sgt. Brant A.

Johnson, and Pfc. Thomas J. Householder. Background, from left: Pfc. Gerald

C. Menken, Pfc. Taylor Maggard, and S/Sgt. Robert G. Dove.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 361

which held a level saddle between the

topmost eminence of the hill and a rise

to the left (west) dubbed Pat's Nose.

Other elements of the 23d put pressure

on E Company, 145th, on the highest

point of 700. This attack was repulsed.

About 0230, 9 March, the 23d Infantry attacked G Company's 1st Platoon again, this time in column of battalions. The 2d Battalion, in the lead,

blew up the barbed wire, knocked out a

pillbox, and through the gap its forward

elements moved onto the saddle and set

up machine guns. American mortars and

artillery opened up and appear to have

severely punished the 3d Battalion,

which was following the 2d.

When day broke the Americans were

not sure of the extent of the enemy

penetration, as mists and enemy fire

hampered reconnaissance. Some local

counterattacks, largely un-co-ordinated,

were attempted but all failed. Soldiers

of the 145th tried to attack northward

up the south slopes of Hill 700, but the

Japanese drove them back by rolling

down grenades.

By noon the situation was clarified.

The Japanese had made but a minor

penetration; about one company held a

salient on the saddle about one hundred

yards from east to west and fifty yards

deep. It had captured seven pillboxes,

plus observation posts, in the 1st Platoon's line and had set up light and

heavy machine guns.

General Beightler released the 1st Battalion, 145th, from division reserve to

Colonel Whitcomb, who attached it to

the 2d Battalion, and elements of the

117th Engineer Battalion took up positions in the 145th's regimental reserve

lines south of Hill 700.

About noon C Company, 145th,

started northward up Hill 700 toward

the saddle in frontal assault while two F

Company platoons attacked the saddle

from the east and west. By 1530 the platoon attacking from the east had recovered some of the lost ground but C

Company had been halted about two

thirds of the way to its objective.

Two light tanks of the 754th Tank

Battalion, released out of corps reserve

by General Griswold, tried to support

an attack later in the afternoon, but the

hill proved too steep for them. The F

Company platoons pressed their attack

anyway and by 1735 had retaken five pillboxes. By nightfall a solid line had been

established in front of the Japanese. It

ran along Hill 700 south of the crest in

the region of the penetration and joined

its flanks with the original main line of

resistance. B and C Companies and one

platoon of D Company held the new

line.

During the day the Japanese used

their point of vantage on the saddle to

put mortar and machine gun fire on McClelland Road, a lateral supply route

south of the crests of the hills, roughly

parallel to the main line of resistance.

This fire halted the 3⁄4-ton trucks and

half-tracks that were used to bring up

ammunition and required the use of

hand-carrying parties, which hauled ammunition forward and took out the

wounded under Japanese fire.

Neither Japanese nor Americans made

any aggressive moves on the night of

9-10 March, but it was a noisy night.

The Japanese laid mortar and small arms

fire on the American lines, while the 37th

Division artillery and mortars put close-
362 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

in and deep supporting fires in front of

the 2d Battalion, 145th.

At 0645 the next day, 10 March, while

the Muda Unit began its attack against

the Americal Division troops on Hill

260, the 23d Infantry troops on the saddle renewed their attack and other elements of the Iwasa Unit attempted to

get through the curtain of American

artillery and mortar fire to reinforce the

saddle. The Americans on Hill 700 responded with fire and local counterattacks. There was no change in the location of the front lines.

During the morning Griswold released the Provisional Infantry Battalion,

251st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment,

from corps reserve; it proceeded to the

145th's regimental reserve line. Elements

of the 117th Engineer Battalion thereupon made ready to destroy the Japanese

positions with bangalore torpedoes and

pole charges of TNT. But this came to

naught when four engineers, trying to

snake a torpedo into a pillbox, were

killed outright by the torpedo, which

either exploded prematurely or was

detonated by a Japanese shell. A Japanese-speaking American soldier brought

a loud-speaker up close to the enemy and

urged immediate capitulation; the Japanese responded with a mortar shell

which knocked the loud-speaker out of

action.

By afternoon of this day of patternless

and ineffective action (which also featured enemy fire on McClelland Road

and a 36-plane strike against Japanese

positions), the American units in contact

with the enemy had become intermingled. Sorting and reorganizing them

consumed much of the afternoon, so that

it was 1700 before elements of the 1st

and 2d Battalions, 145th, after a tenminute mortar preparation, delivered a

co-ordinated attack. The Americans used

bangalore torpedoes, rocket launchers,

and pole charges in the face of artillery,

mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. The

fighting was close work; several pillboxes

were recaptured and then lost. As darkness fell, however, the Americans had

achieved some success. The Japanese

penetration was now reduced by more

than half. By 1930, G, F, A, C, B, and E

Companies held the line; the 37th Reconnaissance Troop, which General

Beightler attached to the 145th at 1815,

was in reserve.

During the night, as Colonel Magata

prepared to deliver his attack against

the 129th Infantry, General Iwasa sent

the rest of his command against the

145th's front from Cannon Hill to the

crest of 700. The Japanese came in

closely packed waves, shouting, the 37th

Division reported, imprecations in Japanese. The fields of fire at Cannon Hill

and Pat's Nose were better than at 700,

and the 145th, heavily supported by

artillery and mortars, handily repulsed

Iwasa everywhere except on the saddle,

where the Japanese captured one more

pillbox.

As dawn broke on 11 March, a day on

which Muda was active at Hill 260 and

the Magata Unit began its attack against

the 129th Infantry, General Beightler

was obviously concerned over the 145th's

failure to reduce the enemy salient. The

night before he had ordered the 2d Battalion, 148th Infantry, to move from its

regimental reserve positions to the

145th's sector. To replace it General

Griswold placed the 1st Battalion, 24th

Infantry, at Beightler's disposal. Beight-
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 363

Two LIGHT TANKS M3 OF THE 754TH TANK BATTALION heading up Hill 700

during the afternoon of 9 March.

ler also dispatched his assistant division

commander, Brig. Gen. Charles F. Craig,

to the 145th's sector to observe operations and keep him informed. The regimental commander was suffering, Craig

reported later, from extreme battle

fatigue and was relieved. Colonel Freer,

who had been serving as executive of

the 145th, took his place.13

In the meantime the Japanese made

valorous efforts to put more troops onto

the saddle. The Americans resisted with

vigor and with all the fire power at their

disposal. Charging, literally, over the

piled heaps of their dead comrades, the

enemy soldiers fought hard but vainly,

and failed either to budge the Americans

or to strengthen the saddle.

The 2d Battalion, 148th, reached its

assembly area behind the 145th at 1115.

Colonel Radcliffe, its commander, reconnoitered in preparation for an afternoon attack.

Three 105-mm. howitzer battalions,

the 145th Infantry Cannon Company,

4.2-inch chemical mortars, the 81-mm.

mortars of D, H, and M Companies of

the 145th, and the 60-mm. mortars of all

the rifle companies of the 2d Battalion,

148th, fired a preparation from 1320 to

1330. Then elements of the 148th attacked. Two platoons from E Company

13

 Ltr, Gen Craig to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil

Hist, 30 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.
364 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

moved east from Pat's Nose in an effort

to envelop the saddle from north and

south while a third platoon delivered a

holding attack westward from the crest

of Hill 700. The whole target was

blanketed by artillery smoke shells. The

145th supported the attack with overhead fire. The platoon making the envelopment from the north gained the

crest, losing eight dead, whereupon the

platoon leader and four enlisted men

seized a communication trench, then a

pillbox. But the Japanese killed the five

men and the attack halted about 1900.

The troops dug in on the ground they

had gained. During the night the Japanese harried the Americans but failed to

penetrate the line.

The attack on 12 March followed the

previous day's pattern. While intense

local battles raged in the 199th Infantry

sector and on Hill 260, E Company continued its attack and F Company attacked northwestward from the top of

700. Using grenades, rifles, flame throwers, and rocket launchers, the 148th

soldiers methodically reduced the pillboxes one by one. When nearly all the

officers in both companies were wounded, sergeants took over command. By

1300 the Japanese held but one pillbox;

by 1317 they had lost it, and by 1530

mopping up was completed, all the Japanese save two wounded prisoners were

dead, the 145th's line was restored. Three

hundred and nine enemy corpses were

counted in the immediate area. During

the next day the Iwasa Unit, which had

suffered heavily in its unsuccessful attack, withdrew behind a screen of combat patrols and fire.

During the period 8-13 March the

37th Division lost five officers and seventy-three enlisted men killed.14

 The artillery expended a considerable amount

of ammunition in defense of Hill 700:

20,802 105-mm. rounds; about 10,000 75-

mm. rounds; 13,000 81-mm. and 811 4.2-

inch mortar shells.15

Hill 260

While General Iwasa was meeting defeat at Hill 700, Colonel Muda was attacking the American outpost on Hill

260 in preparation for operations against

Hills 309 and 608 in the Americal Division's sector. The Muda Unit—principally one battalion and two companies

of the 13th Infantry—completed its assembly at Peko and moved forward. On

the night of 9-10 March small enemy

forces infiltrated between Hill 260 and

the main line of resistance, while an assault force assembled east of 260 and

made ready to attack.16

Some 800 yards east of the main perimeter line and 7,500 yards north of the

Torokina's mouth, Hill 260 is shaped

like an hourglass. Its long axis runs from

northwest to southeast. The two ends

of the hourglass are rises called North

Knob and South Knob. Each knob is

about half the size of a football field.

The handle between them is slightly

14

 Memo, G-1 37th Div for G-2 and G-3, 14 Mar

44, no sub, in 37th Div G-3 Jnl File, Vol. 13, Serials

4601-5400. 15

 On 14 March General Kreber ordered 90-mm.

antiaircraft guns to supplement certain 40-mm.

guns already in use on the front lines. Thereafter

these flat-trajectory weapons sniped at enemy guns

emplaced on the forward slopes of the hills to the

north and northeast. 16

 In addition to sources cited above, this account

of the Hill 260 action is based on comments of Col. William D. Long on draft MS of this volume, attached to his Ltr to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist,

21 Mar 54, no sub, OCMH.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 365

"OP TREE" ON HILL 260

lower and so narrow that there was room

for only a trail. North and South Knobs

lie so close together—less than 150 yards

apart—that to hit one knob with artillery

or mortar fire inevitably showered the

other with fragments. The slopes to the

east and west are very steep.

The East-West Trail crossed the Torokina just east of 260 and, bending south

of South Knob, entered the main perimeter line between Hills 309 and 608. A

small north-south stream, called the

Eagle River by the Americans, flowed

between 260 and the main perimeter

before running into the Torokina River.

In the early part of March only one trail

led from the main line to South Knob.

The last hundred yards to the top consisted of a steep stairway revetted into

the southwest slope. A small vehicular

bridge had been built over the Eagle.

The entire area, including the east and

west slopes of 260, was heavily jungled.

From a platform on a 150-foot-high

tree ("OP Tree") on South Knob, American mortar and artillery forward observers could view the banks of the Torokina below, the East-West Trail, and

Hills 250 and 600 to the northeast. Conversely, in Japanese hands Hill 260

would have provided good observation

of Hills 608 and 309 and of the corps'

rear area between them. On 10 March

the American garrison on 260 consisted

of about eighty men including forward

observers and a reinforced platoon from

G Company, 182d Infantry, which regiment held the main perimeter west of

260. It was "a sore thumb stuck out into

the poison ivy."17 Defenses, all on

South Knob, consisted of pillboxes and

bunkers inside barbed wire and defensive warning devices arranged in a triangle around OP Tree. Fire lanes faced

northeast, east, and southeast.

The Americans had been maintaining

ambushes on the northeast and southeast approaches to South Knob but on

9 March withdrew them to put harassing

and interdictory fires over the whole

area from 1830 to 2330, 9 March, and

again from 0415 to 0500, 10 March. A

few minutes after 0600 on 10 March,

during the 182d's normal stand to for

the two hours before daylight, fire from 17 Ibid. Japanese mortars, machine guns, and
366 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

rifles began striking the American positions on 260. At 0638 an officer of the

246th Field Artillery Battalion, Americal Division, reported from his post in

OP Tree that the Japanese had attacked

and were all around the base of his tree.

He was not heard from again. The attack, which the Americans estimated was

made by one company, was actually delivered by all or part of the 3d Battalion,

13th Infantry. It overran most of the

American positions, captured OP Tree,

and drove the survivors of the American

garrison to North Knob. One six-man

group from the mortar and artillery observation teams took refuge in two pillboxes and put up such stout-hearted resistance that they held their positions in

spite of the fact that the Japanese had

surrounded them.18

When the enemy attack was reported

to General Griswold, he ordered General

Hodge, the Americal Division's commander, to hold 260 at all costs. This

order came as a surprise to the Americal's

officers, who had not expected to be required to hold 260 in the face of a strong

enemy attack.19 Col. William D. Long,

commanding the 182d, promptly released two companies—E and F—of his

2d Battalion from regimental reserve

and placed Lt. Col. Dexter Lowry, commander of the 2d Battalion, in charge of

operations.20 F Company left the perimeter, crossed the Eagle River and pushed

northward through virgin jungle to

North Knob, made contact with the G

Company soldiers who had made their

way there, and established a perimeter

defense. At 0845 E Company was ordered

to advance east over the trail to attack

the South Knob from the southwest in

conjunction with a southward move by

one platoon of F Company.

By 1045, when E Company reached

the base of Hill 260's southwest slope,

the troops on North Knob had become

aware that some Americans on South

Knob were still alive.21 The attack began immediately after E Company's arrival. One E Company platoon started

up the steep slope as the F Company

platoon attempted to move south, but

after a gain of about thirty-five yards

both platoons, now coming into the

cleared areas, halted under enemy fire.

Shortly after 1300 Long authorized

Lowry to contain the Japanese at the

base of OP Tree until he could send

flame throwers forward.

Lowry therefore held up the attack,

received the flame throwers, and by 1420

was ready to go again. This time he

planned a double envelopment from

260's southwest spur. One platoon of E

Company was to move left (north) to

make contact with the F Company platoon advancing south while a second

E Company platoon moved right to attack from the south and southeast. The

platoons moved out and began their at18

 For a stirring, well-told account by one of the

observers, see Griswold, Bougainville, pp. 103-09, or

SOPACBACOM, The Bougainville Campaign, Ch.

VIII, pp. 368-75, OCMH. Colonel Long, in his

comments on the draft MS of this volume, expressed

his admiration for the skill of the Japanese who

delivered the attack "from the most difficult direction with complete surprise." 19

 Comments on draft MS of this volume by Lt

Col Carl D. McFerren, formerly ACofS, G-2,

Americal Div, on Bougainville, in OCMH.

20

 Long had sewed as ACofS, G-2, Americal Division, during the Guadalcanal Campaign. 21

 They apparently based this conclusion on fire

fights between the Japanese and the trapped ob- servers.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 367

tack at 1445. The Japanese quickly

halted the northern attack. The southern platoon started up South Knob, met

grazing fire, retired, moved to the right,

and assaulted again. This time, using

flame throwers and grenades, the platoon drove up onto a shelf on the southern edge of South Knob that protected

it from small arms fire. It was within

earshot of the trapped Americans. Colonel Lowry, now estimating that at least

two enemy companies held South Knob,

reported that his and the enemy's forces

were too close for him to use 60-mm.

mortars safely. The attack was renewed

at 1800, but by then battle casualties

and exhaustion had reduced E Company's strength by one half. Lowry and

Colonel Long, who had arrived at South

Knob at 1715, decided to hold their

present positions. The six Americans

in the pillboxes thought E Company had

secured the hill, and stayed where they

were. Active operations for the day were

concluded by an enemy bayonet assault

which F Company repulsed by fire.

Early next morning the Japanese, apparently strengthened during the night,

struck at E Company in a quick attack.

The company turned back the attackers,

but of its 7 officers and 143 enlisted men

who had left the perimeter the day before, only 1 wounded officer and 24 enlisted men remained at the front. Colonel Long therefore ordered G Company (less its original outpost platoon)

out of the main perimeter to relieve E.

As G Company advanced up the west

slope of South Knob it ran into enemy

troops attacking from the east, southeast, and south. Colonel Lowry reported

his troops in distress as the enemy threatened to encircle his position on South

Knob and began driving E Company off.

But there was almost no way to

strengthen him. General Hodge was required to hold one battalion available

for service in corps reserve, and there

were few other troops that could be committed without weakening the main line

of resistance, which was now under attack on Hill 700 and in the 129th's sector. With the foothold on South Knob

practically lost, and because South Knob

could be neutralized from North Knob,

Hodge and Long decided to pull E and

G Companies off South Knob and send

them to North Knob, and to send B

Company forward to assist them in

breaking contact.22 The Japanese, failing to follow up their advantage, did

not pursue E and G Companies as they

retired toward the Eagle River, where

they were joined by B Company. All

companies proceeded to North Knob.

B Company, cutting a trail from the old

trail northward parallel to the northsouth axis of 260, led the way. When a

larger perimeter on North Knob was

completed, G Company went back to

the main line of resistance.

In midafternoon, Brig. Gen. William

A. McCulloch, the Americal's assistant

commander, arrived at the 182d Infantry command post and assumed command of operations at Hill 260.23

 In late

afternoon B and F Companies, reinforced by a provisional flame thrower

platoon from the 132d Infantry, attacked again. F Company pushed front22

 B Company's sector was taken over first by B

Company, 57th Engineer Battalion, and then by

G Company, 164th Infantry. 23

 McCulloch, then a colonel, had commanded

the 27th Infantry of the 25th Division during the

Guadalcanal Campaign.
368 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

ally while B Company attempted a flanking movement around OP Tree. This

time flame throwers burned out two

Japanese positions, and B Company

managed to drive onto South Knob.

The six trapped Americans successfully

sprang for safety, but at 1915 both companies withdrew to North Knob. B Company established a trail block on EastWest Trail, but unlike Magata and

Iwasa in the 37th Division's sector, Muda

attempted neither night attacks nor harassing infiltration.

The next day, 12 March, was subsequently referred to by the 182d Infantry as "Bloody Sunday." By now all combat elements of the Muda Unit were

emplaced on South Knob. Operations

on Bloody Sunday opened about 0700

when the Japanese put artillery and

mortar fire on the Americal's main perimeter and the rear areas. Before 12

March the presence of American troops

on both knobs had inhibited the employment of American artillery and mortars, but now that the Americans were

off South Knob the supporting weapons

could shoot with a little more freedom.

The Americal Division, using OP Tree

as a registration point, replied therefore

to the Japanese with artillery and mortar fire on targets of opportunity, especially on South Knob and the approaches

to Hill 260. This fire, like all similar

fire, forced the Americans on North

Knob to move back to avoid being hit

by fragments from the shells landing on

South Knob.

Meanwhile supplies on North Knob

were running low, and getting more

food, ammunition, and water to the

companies there was proving difficult.

The only supply route was the trail B

Company had cut northward from the

old trail, and it was a footpath too narrow for vehicles. Carrying parties on the

north leg of the trip encountered so

much fire from the Japanese on South

Knob and on the west slopes that they

made the trip by running in spurts while

covered by riflemen. This, to phrase it

mildly, was tiring. But by noon these

methods had succeeded in amassing

enough ammunition to mount an attack,

and the American commanders decided

to deliver one and so capitalize on the

advantages they presumed the morning

bombardment had given them.24

The plan of attack called for F Company, 182d, to provide a base of fire

from the perimeter on North Knob

while B Company, with six flame throwers attached, moved south and west to

attack South Knob from the west and

northwest.25

In column of platoons, B Company

started off North Knob at 1300. The 2d

Platoon, in the lead, tried to storm the

crest of South Knob from the northwest,

but as it moved across a small gully two

new Japanese pillboxes on the west slope

opened fire and it halted. The enemy

had revealed his positions, and 81-mm.

mortars and machine guns opened up on

the pillboxes. Under cover of this fire,

and freely using flame throwers, the

next platoon in column (the 3d) crossed

the gully and moved as far as the top

24

 Later, when more troops became available, a

trail wide enough for jeeps was built from the

perimeter directly to North Knob. 25

 Colonel Lowry, lightly wounded and weary, had

by this time been temporarily replaced in command

of the 2d Battalion by Lt. Col. William Mahoney,

until then the regimental executive officer.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 369

of South Knob without losing a man.

It had reached a point southwest of OP

Tree when fire from Japanese positions

on the east slope struck and the soldiers

hit the ground. Every attempt to maneuver brought down enemy fire, but

when American mortars struck the Japanese positions the 3d Platoon renewed

the assault with grenades and flame

throwers, with the latter protected by

BAR men who blazed away almost continuously at the enemy. The fearsome

sight of the flame is reported to have

caused some Japanese soldiers to throw

down their arms and flee.

At this point, when victory seemed

almost won, the 3d Platoon was struck

by machine gun fire from the east of OP

Tree and from a machine gun at the

base of the tree itself. The day was nearly

gone; it was 1620, and the attackers'

ammunition was running low. No fresh

troops were immediately available on

Hill 260. The 1st Battalion (less C and

D companies), 132d, had been attached

to the 182d and A Company was alerted

for movement at 1515, but it was 1600

before A Company reached the 182d's

main line of resistance. Hoping to hold

the ground gained, McCulloch and Long

decided to send A Company, 132d, along

the old trail to attack the South Knob

from the southwest, make physical contact with B Company, 182d, and establish a defensive position on the crest of

South Knob. Time was running out.

Another hour went by before A Company began its move, and as it neared

Hill 260 it received enemy gunfire which

killed the company commander. There

was confusion and further delay until

order was restored. By now it was obvious that A Company would not reach

B before dark. Thus, because there were

not enough men to hold the ground B

Company had gained, the American

commanders reluctantly made the "painful decision" to order B Company to return to North Knob, A Company to

the main perimeter.26

The fight for Hill 260 had gone on

for three days. Continued bombardments and attacks had failed to dislodge

the Japanese. No reinforcements were

available. The supply line to Hill 260

was tenuous, and it seemed that a resolute attack from the north might cut

off the two-company garrison. In view

of these factors, and perhaps because

the cost of holding a small hill a halfmile in front of the main perimeter

seemed disproportionately high, the

Americal Division asked permission to

pull off the hill. Corps headquarters

refused.27

The 13th of March was largely a repetition of the previous day's action, except that different companies were involved. To improve the supply situation and prevent the Japanese from severing the old trail by attacks from South

Knob, a more direct trail from the main

perimeter was cut to North Knob. At

1000 A Company, 132d, relieved E Company, 182d, on North Knob. Additional

flame throwers, this time a provisional

platoon from the 164th Infantry, were

attached to the 182d. During the morning about one thousand 105-mm. and

26

 Americal Div Rpt of Bougainville Opns, p. 4. 27

 It is not clear where the request originated. On

11 March there was talk of withdrawal, but Colonel

Long forbade it as authority to withdraw could

come only from headquarters higher than his.
370 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

SOUTH KNOB, HILL 260, 19 March 1944.

another thousand 4.2-inch mortar rounds

hit the enemy on South Knob.28

At 1400, B Company, 132d, having

moved out from the main perimeter, attacked up the southwest slope toward

OP Tree after an artillery and mortar

preparation. On North Knob A Company, 132d, provided a base of fire; B

Company, 182d, was in reserve. The uphill attack succeeded in getting two

platoons abreast on the southwest and

west slopes of South Knob but halted

in the face of grenades and rifle fire. The

Japanese then retaliated with a counterattack against the left flank of B Company. A Company pushed one platoon

toward OP Tree to relieve the pressure

on B but it too was quickly stopped. B

Company's reserve platoon drove off

the attacking Japanese, whereupon the

American units withdrew.

Next day the American commanders

considered using tanks against the Japanese but decided against it because

the vehicles could not ford the Eagle

28

 As Colonel Long put it in his comments, "Artillery with its dispersion and range had to be used

on South Knob carefully. Artillerymen were strong

for an impact fuse which gave a treetop burst of

help to the observer in adjusting fire. I wanted the

artillery to dig after the Japanese with delayed

action fuses. I think we finally compromised on

50-50." And "you can work up a healthy argument on the type of fuse to be employed in any

Officers' Club throughout the world. The Artillery

like to get it in the air where their FO's can see it,

and the Infantry likes to get it down into the

ground where the enemy can feel it."
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 371

NORTH KNOB, HILL 260. Note effects of artillery and mortar fire.

River over the new trail and the hill

was too steep for them to climb. After

one more unsuccessful effort to capture

OP Tree, the American commanders

changed their plans. Patrols to the northeast of 260 had failed to find any large

bodies of the enemy. Since the Japanese

apparently had no more reserves to

commit in that sector, and were obviously incapable of driving beyond Hill

260 against the main perimeter, the

Americans decided to reduce their casualties by halting general attacks against

South Knob, but to harry the enemy and

reduce his strength by raids and combat

patrols, by sapping forward from North

Knob, and by extensive artillery and

mortar fire.

Ironically enough, on 15 March, after

the Americans had made their decision,

the Japanese commanders made a similar

one. As Colonel Magata's main attack

against the 129th Infantry had gone

badly, Hyakutake and Kanda decided

to send Muda's main strength to reinforce Magata, leaving only a screening

force on South Knob.

From then until 18 March, when General McCulloch launched a series of coordinated attacks, the Americans shelled

South Knob heavily and made several

ingenious attempts to burn out the Japanese with gasoline. They threw gallon

cans of gas by hand and tried to ignite

them with white phosphorous grenades.

They jury-rigged a 60-mm. mortar for
372 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

throwing cans. Finally they took two

hundred feet of flexible pipe and snaked

it to within nine feet of an enemy emplacement; with oxygen pressure they

pumped gasoline from a drum through

the pipe and over the enemy, and ignited it with a white phosphorous grenade. All the while mortars and artillery hammered away, the artillery firing

at the reverse slopes while the mortars

covered the hilltop. The 182d Infantry's Cannon Company emplaced its

75-mm. pack howitzers on Hill 309 for

direct fire and did its best to knock down

OP Tree. By 14 March South Knob,

jungled no longer, was a bare, blasted

slope. At 1900, 17 March, OP Tree fell

to the ground. During the action more

then ten thousand 105-mm. rounds

struck South Knob. When all was over,

the Americans reported counting 560

enemy dead. American casualties totaled

98 killed, 24 missing, and 581 wounded.29

Action by the Creeks

The sector of the 37th Division's 129th

Infantry, where Colonel Magata delivered his attack, was generally flat and

low. In contrast with the Iwasa Unit,

which assaulted up very steep slopes,

Magata's soldiers possessed easy routes

of approach along Numa Numa Trail

and various streams. The 129th, in the

center of the 37th Division's line, held

about 3,900 yards of curving front from

a point slightly east of the Numa Numa

Trail west and southwest to the right

flank of the 148th Infantry. Several small

streams, all tributaries of the Koromokina River, flowed through the area in

a generally southerly direction. Taylor

Creek cut through the 129th's lines less

than 1,000 yards west of Numa Numa

Trail. Cox Creek entered the line about

750 yards southwest of Taylor Creek's

penetration. The Logging Trail, cut

and used extensively by XIV Corps engineers in the relatively peaceful days

before March, entered the main perimeter just west of Taylor Creek.

The 129th Infantry, commanded by

Col. John D. Frederick, held its front

with two battalions in line. The 2d Battalion, on the right, faced north, its left

(west) flank joined to the right of the 3d

Battalion between Cox Creek and another branch of the Koromokina River.

In general, the 129th's positions were

stronger than the 145th's, since the terrain permitted grazing fire except in

the numerous ravines and gullies that

were scattered throughout the area.

Earth-and-log-pillboxes, mutually supporting and arranged in depth, formed

the backbone of the main line of resistance, which was wired in behind single

barbed wire and double-apron barbed

wire fences. Antipersonnel mines had

been laid in front of the wire. The entire

front was covered by interlocking bands

of machine gun fire. Additional rows of

double-apron barbed wire extended diagonally from the main line of resistance

to channel Japanese attacks into the machine gun fire lanes. In addition to division artillery, mortars, and the 75-mm.

pack howitzers of the 129th's Cannon

Company, the front was supported by

37-mm. antitank guns (firing canister)

and 40-mm. antiaircraft guns.

29

 These figures come from Griswold, Bougainville, p. 120. The 182d Infantry's report gives

figures which differ slightly from these. Colonel

Long later wrote, in his comments, that the

wounded-in-action figure was somewhat inflated because fatigue cases had been diagnosed with "unreasonable freedom" and counted among the

wounded.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 373

The 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Preston J. Hundley, had in line three rifle

companies, F, G, and E from left to right.

Cox Creek lay in F Company's sector, the

Logging Trail and Taylor Creek in G's,

and the Numa Numa Trail in E's.

During the early days of the 17th

Army's attack the 129th Infantry received mortar and artillery fire, engaged

in fire fights and patrol clashes, and

strengthened its positions, but was not

heavily engaged in battle. But on 11

March Colonel Magata moved forward

from his assembly area behind Mount

Nampei to begin the attack that was designed to pierce the 129th Infantry and

capture the Piva airfields not far away.

Outposts and patrols reported increasing

numbers of Japanese troops in front of

the 129th, and the artillery fired on them

off and on all day. When an antipersonnel mine in front of E Company was

exploded about 1600, Colonel Frederick

ordered in the outposts. Shortly afterward Japanese troops were reported advancing down the Logging Trail toward

the perimeter. Starting at 1800, when all

outposts and patrols had come in, division artillery and mortars laid a ten-minute concentration to the front of Colonel

Hundley's battalion. A patrol from G

Company went out to examine the impact area, now cleared of underbrush

and foliage, but came under Japanese

fire and returned to the perimeter to report that it had located no less than

fourteen enemy machine guns.

In the gathering dusk Magata's troops

—the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry, on the

left (east) and the 3d Battalion on the

right—opened up on the 2d Battalion,

129th, with machine guns and rifles. The

Americans replied with rifles, mortars,

machine guns, and a 40-mm. antiaircraft

gun, which along with a .50-caliber machine gun put searching fire up the Logging Trail. Machine guns in the frontline pillboxes abstained from firing so

as not to reveal their locations to the

enemy. This fire fight continued until

1920, then died down to flare up sporadically throughout the night.

General Beightler, at 2100, ordered his

regimental commanders to keep their

troops alert, for documents captured that

day (apparently on Hill 700) indicated

that the Japanese planned to attack in

strength the next day. At the same time,

as Japanese soldiers began working their

way through the American wire, C Company, 82d Chemical Battalion, was attached to the 129th Infantry, and at 0420

the next morning its 2d Platoon moved

its 4.2-inch mortars into position behind

the Antitank Company, 129th, which

was supporting the rifle companies.

By dawn of 12 March, though the

Japanese had made earnest efforts to get

through the lines, they found they had

been held for very small gains. As the

coming of daylight clarified the situation, the 2d Battalion, 129th, found that

the Japanese had succeeded in cutting

through G Company's wire and effecting two minor penetrations. In the 2d

Platoon sector, where Taylor Creek and

the Logging Trail entered the perimeter, the Japanese had captured two pillboxes (one an alternate, unoccupied position), and to the right (east) they had

seized five pillboxes.

The Japanese tried to exploit their

penetrations and break out to the south

but were held back by American artillery, mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire.

Then the 129th prepared to counterat-
374 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

tack and restore the line. Colonel Frederick ordered C Company out of regimental reserve and forward to support G

Company at 0723. By 0810, when C

Company moved into position behind

the 2d Platoon of G Company, one platoon of the Antitank Company had attacked the western penetration and retaken one pillbox. During the rest of

the morning another Antitank Company

platoon moved in behind E Company;

81-mm. mortars of D Company, 129th,

took up positions to support the 2d

Battalion; and B Company moved forward behind C.

At 1255, after a mortar concentration,

three rifle platoons (two from C and one

from G), plus two flame throwers, attacked the western penetration and by

1405 had retaken the second pillbox.

The Japanese retaliated with a counterattack that was promptly repulsed. By

the end of the day the Japanese still

held the five pillboxes, which the Americans had not attacked, in the 3d Platoon's sector. Two Americans had been

killed, twenty-two wounded in the day's

action as compared with one killed and

six wounded the day before.

American artillery and mortars shelled

the enemy during the night. Searchlights

tried to illuminate him with direct

beams, but failed as he took refuge in

the ravines and draws. The searchlights

then achieved more success by raising

their beams so that they were reflected

from the clouds.

The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 45th

Infantry struck again at G Company

about 0400 of 13 March and gained one

more pillbox before they were stopped.

To eliminate this penetration, Colonel

Frederick requested tanks.30 Corps headquarters, at 0815, released the 1st Platoon of C Company, 754th Tank Battalion, to the 129th. General Griswold

released the tanks with the express proviso that they could not be used as stationary defenses, but must be employed

in an attack to recapture the lost pillboxes. At 0812 General Beightler ordered the 129th not to deliver any piecemeal infantry attacks but to wait for the

tanks and organize a co-ordinated tankinfantry assault. He issued this order just

fifteen minutes after C Company, 129th,

made a local counterattack which regained one pillbox.

Four tanks and elements of B, C, and

G Companies attacked at 1000 after a

ten-minute artillery preparation. Although the ground was generally level,

the tanks had difficulty in bringing their

guns to bear because the Japanese were

down in ravines with steep slopes. After

two pillboxes had fallen, the tanks withdrew. The attack was renewed at 1315.

After another hour the tanks had almost

exhausted their fuel and ammunition,

and the attack was suspended while the

2d Platoon, C Company, 754th Tank Battalion, came up to replace them.31

 The

new tanks and the same infantry units

attacked at 1730. This time the tanks

and infantry managed to demolish all

the Japanese-held pillboxes. By 1930, at

a cost of eighteen wounded, the original

line was almost restored. Colonel Magata withdrew his battalions to rest, re30

 His request for tanks on 12 March had been

turned down. 31

 During the afternoon XIV Corps headquarters

assigned one battalion of the 131st Engineer Regiment to buttress the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry,

on the 129th regimental reserve line. A Company of

the 131st had been assigned the day before.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 375

organize, reconnoiter, and make ready

for another attack.

On the 14th, a day that was quiet

except for small arms fire and occasional

shelling, the 2d Battalion repaired its

positions, strung new wire, planted

mines in the ravines that provided covered routes of approach, and fired its

mortars. Patrols went out and reported

the presence of strong bodies of the enemy not far from the perimeter. Thus

the Americans were sure that the Japanese withdrawal was only temporary.

Temporary it was, for at 0400 of 15

March the 1st and 3d Battalions of the

45th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 81st

Infantry, renewed the assault. They

again achieved a small local success in

the Cox Creek sector held by the 2d

Platoon of F Company. By dawn they

had seized one pillbox and penetrated

to a depth of about one hundred yards.

F Company, supported by one platoon

of C Company and aided by a 36-plane

air strike in front of the battalion line,

counterattacked with flame throwers and

bazookas to recapture the pillbox by

1153. But the enemy, still holding a

salient in the line, was digging positions

in the roots of banyan trees and appeared to be pushing in reinforcements

and more weapons.

General Craig, arriving in the sector to

observe and inform General Beightler, as

he had on Hill 700, asked for tanks. General Griswold sent a platoon. A tank-infantry attack, delivered at 1500 with artillery and mortar support, made small

gains. A second, at 1635, killed or drove

off all the enemy at a cost of seven killed,

fifty-six wounded, and one tank damaged. One hundred and ninety Japanese

corpses lay within the American lines,

and four enemy soldiers were captured.

The Japanese suspended their assaults on

16 March but renewed them on the 17th

and effected a small penetration in F

Company's sector which tanks and infantry promptly eliminated.

This was the last attack for several

days, for the Japanese overhauled their

plans. They had decided to abandon the

attacks on Hills 260 and 700 in favor of

a massed attack by the depleted regiments of the 17th Army against the 129th

Infantry. While the survivors of the

Muda and Iwasa Units, except for the

screening forces on Hill 260, moved

through the jungles to Magata's position,

the front lines remained static. Artillery

and mortar fire, patrol skirmishes, and

fire fights continued, especially in the sector of the 2d Battalion, 129th Infantry.

By 23 March the 13th and 23d Regiments had joined Magata and the attack

was ready. But captured documents and

reconnaissance enabled the Americans to

divine Japanese intentions, so that in late

afternoon of the 23d Beightler warned

his troops to expect a general attack at

dusk.

After dark the Japanese shelled the

American positions. As before, sporadic

fire fights went on all night and, concealed by the darkness, nearly all Hyakutake's remaining units attacked through

the ravines.32

The 37th Division artillery and the

various mortars promptly opened fire

and largely broke up the Japanese assault before it got started. But the enemy

32

 In 1949 Kanda asserted that on his recommendation Hyakutake had called off this attack,

but the validity of his assertion is belied by American experience and by contemporary Japanese documents.
376 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT S. BEIGHTLER, Commanding General, 37th Division, directing

tank-infantry attack, 16 March 1944.

succeeded in again piercing the 1st Platoon of F Company in the Cox Creek

area, this time a little to the west of the

earlier penetration.33 About one hundred

Japanese soldiers captured four pillboxes

and pushed to a low ridge about twentyfive yards from the battalion command

post. When dawn broke a fire fight was

raging throughout the entire area as the

Japanese unsuccessfully attempted to enlarge their holdings.

The American commanders responded promptly. Two platoons of the Antitank Company and one platoon of K

Company, 129th, assembled near the 2d

Battalion command post, and General

Beightler dispatched two companies of

the 148th Infantry to positions behind

Colonel Hundley's battalion. The Antitank and K Company platoons, plus the

3d Platoon, A Company, 754th Tank

Battalion, attacked northwest from the

command post at 0725 and within twenty

minutes had gained possession of the

ridge. At 0930 the attackers reorganized

and drove in again, supported this time

by 37th Division artillery, three battalions of the Americal Division artillery,

the 129th Infantry Cannon Company,

and twenty-four 4.2-inch mortars, which

fired into the ravines.34 The Americans

burned, dug, and blasted the Japanese

33

 Also defending this sector, in supporting positions, were platoons of B and C Companies.

34

 The fire was repeated twice during the afternoon.
BOUGAINVILLE COUNTERATTACK 377

TANK-INFANTRY ATTACK, 16 March 1944. Men following the medium M4 tank

are from the 129th Infantry.

out of their ravines, trenches, foxholes,

and pillboxes while the seven artillery

battalions, their fire directed by General

Kreber and augmented by the heavy

mortars, shelled the concentrated enemy

troops in front of the American lines.

By 1400 General Griswold had dispatched more reserves to the area but

they were not needed. The Japanese

were dead or dispersed, the line restored. Hyakutake's counteroffensive

was over.

His troops withdrew from the 129th's

front pursued by the Fijians and two

American battalions from the corps reserve, and on the same day he told Imamura that further attacks would be

fruitless. Imamura left the. next move to

Hyakutake but ordered him to resort to

guerrilla warfare and raise as much of

his own food as possible. Hyakutake,

though not abandoning his desire to

counterattack, elected to withdraw to the

posts whence he had come. The 6th

Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 4th South

Seas Garrison Unit, came north to cover

the retreat which began on 27 March.

South Knob of Hill 260 was evacuated;

the Americans reoccupied it on 28

March. The withdrawal was an orderly

affair, although wounded men and heavy

equipment were abandoned along the

way.

In the attack the Japanese had lost

over 5,000 men killed, more than 3,000

wounded. The XIV Corps lost 263 dead
378 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

JAPANESE PILLBOX ON FIRE

in its successful defense.35 The 17th

Army, in spite of its serious losses, was

still an effective fighting force; late

March and early April saw several sharp

fights when the XIV Corps fanned out

to pursue the enemy and enlarge the

perimeter.36

So ended the last Japanese offensive

effort in the Solomons. Had it succeeded,

it would have seriously affected the

course of the war in the Solomons by

requiring the commitment of more men,

ships, and planes to recapture Empress

Augusta Bay. But it is unlikely that it

would have had any real effect on the

final outcome of the war. 35 Griswold, Bougainville, p. 139; 8th Area Army

Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), p.

in. By 29 April twenty-eight 75-mm., one 105-mm.,

and four 150-mm. field pieces had fallen into Allied

hands. 36

 This was done to gain commanding ground, to

establish trail blocks, and, at the behest of the War

Department, to give combat experience to the 1st

Battalion, 24th Infantry, and the 25th Regimental

Combat Team of the 93d Division, which arrived in

late March.
CHAPTER XVIII

Finale: Emirau

March was a busy month in the Admiralties and at Empress Augusta Bay,

where battles raged almost simultaneously. It was also a month of important

decisions that culminated in the last Allied offensive move directed against Rabaul and Kavieng.

General MacArthur and his staff for

some time had been convinced that the

invasion of Hansa Bay in New Guinea

was not a worthwhile move. On 3 March,

just after the reconnaissance force landed

in the Admiralties, General Chamberlin

suggested to other members of the staff

that since Rabaul and Kavieng were

now so much weaker than when operations were planned it might be possible,

if carrier-based aviation was provided, to

bypass Hansa Bay and advance beyond

Wewak in a long leap forward.1 Two

days later, by radio, MacArthur took up

the question with the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Explaining that complete occupation of the Admiralties would soon follow, he argued that the success of the

reconnaissance party presented an excellent opportunity to move west along

the north coast of New Guinea. He suggested that his forces seize Kavieng at

once, bypass Hansa Bay, and advance all

the way to Hollandia in Netherlands

New Guinea, if Admiral Nimitz could

provide the carriers for a short time.

Carriers would be required for fighter

cover, for Hollandia lay beyond effective

fighter-plane range of the most westerly

Southwest Pacific bases. Such a move, he

pointed out, would bypass the main

strength of Adachi's 18th Army (then at

Madang and Wewak) and speed the

advance to the Vogelkop by several

months.2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were undoubtedly influenced by Halsey's arguments against Kavieng and in favor of

Emirau, and by Nimitz' opposition to

Kavieng, as well as by MacArthur's proposals. They ordered that the Kavieng

plan be canceled, that Emirau be seized

instead, and that Kavieng and Rabaul

be isolated with minimum forces. They

authorized the bypassing of Hansa Bay

in favor of the invasion of Hollandia.

The Hollandia invasion would be the

1

 See Min of Conf, 1700, 3 Mar 44, at GHQ

SWPA, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 3 Mar 44. See also

Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, p. 9.

2

 Rad, MacArthur to CofS for JCS, 5 Mar 44, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 5 Mar 44. On the same day

MacArthur told Krueger of the proposals he had

made and ordered him to prepare plans for both

Hollandia and Hansa Bay so as to be ready for any

contingency. Rad, MacArthur to Comdr ALAMO, 5

Mar 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 5 Mar 44.
380 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

first direct move in MacArthur's advance

to the Philippines.3

MacArthur forwarded the relevant

provisions of the orders to Halsey, directing him to revoke plans for Kavieng and

to seize, occupy, and defend Emirau with

minimum forces at the earliest possible

moment. At Emirau a light air and naval

base was to be established from which

to blockade the Bismarck Archipelago

and neutralize Truk. Meanwhile operations to neutralize Rabaul and Kavieng

would continue.4

Admiral Halsey has written that when

he received these orders at Noumea he

was surprised, but that no special problems were raised. "This entailed no more

than dusting off our original plan, picking the landing force, and notifying Ping

Wilkinson and Roy Geiger to load them

in."5

Commodore Reifsnider was given

command of the amphibious force. The

landing force Halsey selected was a new

regiment, the 4th Marines, which had

been created out of the recently disbanded raider battalions.6

 Landing force

command was entrusted to General

Noble of the Marine Corps. Carried

aboard nine APD's and one APA and

escorted by nine destroyers and two

tugs, the landing force sailed from Guadalcanal on 18 March and made a peaceful voyage past the Solomons and New

Ireland to Emirau. On 20 March, while

four old battleships fired 1,079 14-inch

and 12,281 5-inch shells at Kavieng, the

Marines went peacefully ashore. There

were no Japanese; air bombardments

and naval gunfire were unnecessary. This

operation, wrote Admiral Halsey, established "a record of six days between

'Stand by to shove off!' and 'Well

done!' " 7

Within a month 18,000 men and 44,-

000 tons of supplies had been ferried to

Emirau. The first airstrip was opened in

May.8 From here Allied planes and torpedo boats patrolled New Ireland, and

when bomber strips were ready longrange bombers from Emirau and Nissan

could reach Truk.

And so, peacefully and almost anticlimactically, the Emirau operation was

concluded, and with it the long, hardfought series of operations against Rabaul which had begun with the invasion

of Guadalcanal almost two years before.

Whereas the first of the operations,

Guadalcanal and Papua, were agonizingly slow, the CARTWHEEL and Bismarck

Archipelago campaigns had clicked off

with speed and precision. In less than

one year MacArthur's and Halsey's

forces fought their way from Guadalcanal and Buna through Woodlark, Kiriwina, Nassau Bay, New Georgia, Lae,

Salamaua, Nadzab, the Markham and

Ramu Valleys, Finschhafen, the Treasuries, Empress Augusta Bay, Arawe, Cape

Gloucester, Saidor, the Green Islands,

3

 JCS 713/4, 12 Mar 44, title: Future Opns in Pac; Rad, JCS to MacArthur, 12 Mar 44, in Marshall's OUT Log. For Hollandia and subsequent

operations see Smith, The Approach to the Philippines. 4

 Rad, MacArthur to COMSOPAC, 13 Mar 44, in

GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 13 Mar 44. 5

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

190.

6

 It was numbered the 4th to commemorate the

4th Marine Regiment that was taken prisoner on Corregidor.

7

 Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p.

191.

8

 See Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier,

pp. 423-24; Rentz, Bougainville and the Northern

Solomons, pp. 117-19.
FINALE: EMIRAU 381

Emirau, and the Admiralties. They

gained control of all the seas and straits,

as well as the air, in the whole vast region of the Japanese Southeast Area.

Using carrier aircraft and planes based

on airfields captured by ground forces

that had been transported and protected

by air and naval surface forces, they

reduced Rabaul to impotence. They destroyed hundreds of Japanese planes,

seriously diminished the dwindling force

of trained pilots, sank or damaged precious warships, chewed up three Japanese divisions and several brigades, and

safely bypassed some 100,000 Japanese

who, for practical purposes, were now

out of the war. Together with Admiral

Nimitz' forces, they forced Japanese air

and naval surface forces to evacuate the

Southeast Area. In taking these strides,

the Allied forces of the South and Southwest Pacific Areas accomplished their assigned mission of defending the U.S.-

Australian line of communications. They

also placed MacArthur's forces in position to start the drive along the New

Guinea coast to the Philippines.

This great advance from Guadalcanal

and Buna employed elements of the

armed forces of three nations and called

for the most careful co-ordination and

timing of a complex variety of operations. With the exception of large armored battles, true close air support, and

struggles between aircraft carrier task

forces, CARTWHEEL and the Bismarck

operations boasted about every important type of action, singly and in combination, that, characterized World War

II. There were bitter struggles for a few

yards of swampy jungles; land marches;

assaults against fortified positions; gallant defenses; parachute jumps and airlifts; amphibious invasions, both ship-toshore and shore-to-shore; air and naval

support bombardments; fighter sweeps;

large bombing raids; strikes by landand carrier-based planes against ships;

and gun and torpedo actions between

surface warships. Throughout the series

of battles an improvement in technique,

especially in amphibious operations, is

apparent.

All the invasions shared a dominant

feature; in each case the range of the

fighter plane was a vital factor in determining the objective, setting the timetable, and fixing the limits of the advance. Aircraft carriers might have made

longer advances possible, but during

much of the time they were not available and doctrines then current warned

against using carriers to support the

invasion of air and naval bases.

Planning and executing these forward

moves were military accomplishments of

a high order, and the credit must be

shared by all participants from the area

commanders to the men in the ranks.

But stamped upon the whole series of

operations is the imprint of the higher

commanders. Although many of the staff

officers and subordinate commanders

stood out prominently and later won

greater fame and rose to higher posts—

Krueger, Collins, Harmon, Twining,

Carney, Turner, Kenney, Kinkaid, Barbey, Sutherland, Fechteler, Chamberlin,

Swift, Vandegrift, Geiger, Griswold,

Hodge, Wilkinson, Beightler, and Turnage, to name a representative few—it is

clear that General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey dominated and controlled

the campaigns.

They were different men, and they

worked differently: MacArthur, austere
382 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

and aloof, insisting that his staff and

subordinate commanders reach agreement on details; Halsey, with a salty

façade of bluff humor and informality,

working more closely with his generals

and admirals. But both possessed and

exhibited exceptional leadership and

judgment. And they worked well together. With an easy, cordial relationship, they co-operated and assisted each

other to further the Allied cause. They

shuttled ships back and forth from area

to area to bolster each other's forces, and

they timed operations in such a way

that, as General Marshall predicted, forward moves in each area supported the

other, thwarted the enemy strategy, and

gained a significant victory. This victory

was won at the cost of fewer casualties

than the Japanese sustained in defeat.

Both MacArthur and Halsey were obviously deeply conscious of their responsibility for conserving the lives of the

men entrusted to their leadership, and

considered each objective, not only in

terms of its strategic value, but also in

terms of human life.

In opposing the Allies, the Japanese

had fought with characteristic resolution

and often with great skill, but to little

avail. Except for their delaying tactics

in New Georgia, which slowed the campaign and required the commitment of

far more Allied troops than had been

planned, they were uniformly unsucessful. General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka were, as far as the evidence indicates, experienced and skillful. Close

analysis fails to show many overt errors

in their strategy or in its execution. The

flaw in their conduct of operations was

fundamental, and was imposed on them

by Imperial General Headquarters; they

had to try too much with too little. Attempting to hold almost the entire

Southeast Area with inferior numbers of

men, ships, planes, and guns, they lost

it all except the parts the Allies neither

needed nor wanted. They had possessed,

strategically speaking, interior lines

which enabled them to switch reserves

back and forth and to reinforce their

forward units as long as they controlled

the air and the sea. But they were so

badly outnumbered that the advantages

of interior lines were vitiated from the

start, and when they lost control of the

air and the sea the interior lines became

valueless. Having lost the initiative, they

never knew exactly where and when the

next blow would fall and were never

able to dispose their forces properly to

meet it.

The Allied forces operated, strategically, on exterior lines—which as has

often been pointed out present to the

attacker greater difficulties but also

greater promise of decisive results. Because of their superior strength the Allies could select targets so as to avoid

strong points and seize lightly held, strategically valuable areas. In short, the

Allies were able to use the bypass technique with its concomitant savings in

lives and time.

So it was that March 1944 saw the Allies as far forward as Emirau, the Admiralties, and Saidor, with the Southwest Pacific forces making ready to drive

toward the Philippines.
Bibliographical Note

This volume is based upon three general types of sources of information: official records, chiefly of the U.S. Army;

manuscript histories or first narratives

prepared during the war by Army historians in the field and now in the custody of the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH); and published

works, especially the air and naval histories cited so frequently.

Official Records

Papers of the Combined

and Joint Chiefs of Staff

These papers, which are basic to an

understanding of strategy, were, when

consulted, under the control of the

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Operations, General Staff, U.S. Army.

Principal files consulted were: Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), Joint Chiefs

of Staff (JCS), and Joint Staff Planners

(JPS) minutes of meetings, including

the bound volumes containing the minutes and papers of the various international conferences, from mid-1942

through March 1944; all CCS, JCS, and

JPS papers dealing with Pacific strategy

and command for the same period; and

the Notes on Pacific Conference Held

in March 1943.

Army Records

The bulk of the research for this volume was performed in Army records.

They are voluminous in quantity, inconsistent in quality. Unless otherwise indicated, when consulted they were in the

custody of the Army Records Section,

Departmental Records Branch, Office of

The Adjutant General (DRB AGO),

now designated as the Military Records

Branch, Federal Records Center, Region 3.

General George C. Marshall's Log for

the period covered contains radiograms

exchanged by Marshall and the theater

and subordinate Army commanders in

Marshall's capacities as Chief of Staff

and as an Executive Officer for the JCS.

It is filed in the Staff Communications

Office, Secretary of the General Staff,

U.S. Army.

The most useful body of records from

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific

Area (GHQ SWPA), and successor commands, is the G-3 Journal and Journal

File. It is an absolutely essential source

for the period and region covered by this

volume. It contains all the important

planning papers, memoranda, letters,

radiograms, orders, estimates, periodic

operations and intelligence reports from

immediately subordinate headquarters,

and many action reports. Other useful

papers from GHQ are: The ELKTON

Plans of 12 February 1943 and 26 April,

photostats of which are in OCMH files;

Military Intelligence Section, General

Headquarters, Far East Command, The

Intelligence Series, Vol. III, Operations
384 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

of the Military Intelligence Section,

GHQ SWPA/FEC/SCAP (in six parts),

Tokyo, 1950, and Vol. IV, Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau,

GHQ SWPA, Tokyo, 1948 (both edited

by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby,

copies of OCMH files). Copies of the

three volumes of the history prepared

for General Douglas MacArthur by his

historical section in Tokyo were received by the OCMH shortly before

completion of the research and writing

of this book. These volumes are works of

some merit, but the first two, which deal

with the war, do not add to the information that was already available in other

sources. Volume I, tentatively entitled

Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, contains little on Allied plans

and operations that is not already available in published works; Volume II,

tentatively entitled Japanese Operations

in the Southwest Pacific Area, is largely

based on the Japanese monographs discussed below but is not as detailed.

Since Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces

in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA),

was not a tactical headquarters, its most

valuable records are those dealing with

planning. USAFISPA File No. 381, Preliminary Planning COMSOPAC and

COMGENSOPAC (in the Kansas City

Records Center, Office of the Adjutant

General, Kansas City, Missouri), is a good

source as are three files from the Historical Section, G-2, South Pacific Base Command (which succeeded USAFISPA):

SOPAC Notes, a documented narrative

on the preliminaries to Munda; Planning for New Georgia Operation, which

contains 105 pages of copies of radios,

letters, memoranda, and plans; and Supplementary New Georgia Material. The

last three are in the custody of the

OCMH.

Records of the various tactical headquarters which conducted the invasions

or battles described in this volume are,

on the average, good.

For Woodlark and Kiriwina, the Sixth

Army [ALAMO Force] prepared an excellent report. The operations reports and

journals of the 112th Cavalry and the

158th Infantry are good.

Documents on New Georgia are uneven. The report of the New Georgia

Occupation Force provides only a sketchy

outline, but the G-2 and G-3 Journals

and Files of the XIV Corps are satisfyingly complete. The XIV Corps and its

principal subordinate headquarters also

prepared the Informal Report on Combat Operations in the New Georgia Campaign. A report on lessons learned rather

than an operations narrative, it is very

valuable. The 43d Division's report is

about the same as the Occupation Force

report, and its journals and files are not

always complete. Those of its regiments

vary. The 37th Division, whose journals

and files are complete, prepared a fine,

crisp, day-by-day action report. The report of the 25th Division, which includes regimental and battalion reports,

is a model of brevity, honesty, and

clarity.

Pending publication of the Australian

Army's official histories, Australian records must be studied for the complete

story of the Nassau Bay-Lae-SalamauaNadzab-Finschhafen-Markham ValleyRamu Valley operations. The following

American records relate to U.S. Army

participation: 41st Division Artillery,

History of the Salamaua Campaign, 23

April-4 October 1943; 2d Engineer Spe-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 385

cial Brigade, Report of Combat Operations, 30 June 1943-30 June 1944; the

162d Infantry reports and journals,

which are very full; the 503d Parachute

Infantry Report of Operations, Markham Valley, 5-19 September 1943; and

several of the published works listed

below.

U.S. Army operations on Bougainville

are excellently covered by the reports,

journals, and files of the XIV Corps, 37th

Division, Americal Division, and component units, all of which are good and

complete. In addition Maj. Gen. Oscar

W. Griswold's typewritten Bougainville:

An Experience in Jungle Warfare, and

the History of the "TA" Operation by

the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, XIV

Corps, are useful.

The Army side of the Arawe-Cape

Gloucester-Saidor invasions is well covered by: the ALAMO Force reports, journals, and files which, like all papers from

Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger's headquarters,

are first-rate; the DIRECTOR Task Force

and 112th Cavalry reports and journals;

and the MICHAELMAS Task Force's reports and war diary. In addition a number of reports from observers at Arawe

are in the GHQ SWPA and ALAMO

Force G-3 Journals.

Similarly, the ALAMO Force records

for the Admiralties are excellent, as are

those of the 1st Cavalry Division which

include reports and journals of the division, the two brigades, and all principal

subordinate units.

Navy Records

The publication of Samuel Eliot Morison's excellent Breaking the Bismarcks

Barrier in 1950 made extensive research

in Navy records quite unnecessary. However the following, all filed in the Classified Operations Records Branch, Division of Naval History, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Administration (formerly the Office of

Naval Records and Library), were consulted: Commander, South Pacific Area

and South Pacific Force, War Diary: 1

January 1943-30 June 1944; Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force (Task Force 31), War Diary:

1-31 July 1943; Commander, Aircraft,

South Pacific Force (Task Force 33),

War Diary: 1 April 1943-31 March 1944.

In addition several orders and reports

from the Seventh Fleet and the VII Amphibious Force are also to be found in

the Operations Reports Collection

(GHQ, SWPA) of The Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army.

At the time of this writing, this collection was in the custody of the Military

Records Branch, Region 3, GSA.

Marine Corps Records

The existence of very good published

works obviated the necessity for extensive research. Marine Corps documents,

filed in the Historical Branch, G-3,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, that

were consulted include: I Marine Amphibious Corps, Bougainville Beachhead; Headquarters, New Georgia Air

Force [Forward Echelon, 2d Marine Air

Wing], Special Action Reports, 1st

Phase, New Georgia, 29 June-13 August

1943, and 2d Phase, New Georgia, 14

August-20 October 1943, with annexes;

and 1st Marine Raider Regiment, Special Action Report, New Georgia, and

its War Diary, 15 March-30 September

1943.
386 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Japanese Records

The best sources of enemy information, besides the innumerable documents

captured in the field during World War

II and employed extensively in the preparation of the first narratives, are contained in the series of monographs entitled Japanese Studies in World War

II. These were prepared in Tokyo, after

the conclusion of hostilities, by former

Japanese Army and Navy officers and

under the supervision of the Historical

Section, G-2, GHQ Far East Command,

and translated by the Allied Translator

and Interpreter Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Copies of

the original Japanese and the translated

versions are filed in OCMH, where dubious passages in the English versions

were retranslated by Messers. Stanley L.

Falk, Brewster Hurwitz, Burke C. Peterson, Thomas G. Wilds, and Robert J. C.

Butow.

Miscellaneous

Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.'s brief

but explicit report, Narrative Account

of the South Pacific Campaign, 29 April

1942-15 June 1944, is useful, as is Lt.

Gen. Millard F. Harmon's similar The

Army in the South Pacific. Australian

activities are covered by Allied Land

Forces' Report on New Guinea Operations, 23 September 1942-22 January

1944, a copy of which the Australian

Army generously furnished to the

OCMH. For geography and terrain the

War Department's secret Survey of the

Solomon Islands, and the Terrain Studies and Terrain Handbooks prepared by

the Allied Geographical Section, GHQ

SWPA, are best.

Prior to publication of this volume

draft copies of the manuscript were sent

to over fifty surviving senior commanders

and staff officers in an effort to elicit

helpful criticisms, corrections, suggestions, and, particularly, additional information. The following officers responded most generously with letters,

notes, and marked manuscript pages,

which are filed in the OCMH: Vice

Adm. Daniel E. Barbey (Ret.); Maj.

Gen. Allison J. Barnett (Ret.); Maj.

Gen. Robert S. Beightler (Ret.); Brig.

Gen. William J. Bradley (Ret.); Rear

Adm. Miles R. Browning (Ret.); Admiral Arthur S. Carpender (Ret.); Maj.

Gen. William C. Chase (Ret.); Lt. Col.

Julio Chiaramonte; Maj. Gen. Kenneth

Cooper; Brig. Gen. Charles F. Craig

(Ret.); Admiral D. B. Duncan (Ret.)

(who answered for Admiral Robert B.

Carney (Ret.), Vice Adm. Harry R.

Thurber (Ret.), and Vice Adm. Ralph

E. Wilson [Ret.]); Lt. Gen. Clyde D.

Eddleman; Col. Glenn S. Finlay (Ret.);

Maj. Gen. William H. Gill (Ret.); Lt.

Gen. Oscar W. Griswold (Ret.); Col. J.

Prugh Herndon (Ret.); Maj. Gen. John

H. Hester (Ret.); General John R.

Hodge (Ret.); Col. Temple G. Holland

(Ret.); the late Lt. Col. Frank O.

Hough; Col. Daniel H. Hundley (Ret.);

General George C. Kenney (Ret.); the

late Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King; General Walter Krueger (Ret.); Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy; Col. William

D. Long (Ret.); Col. Archibald R. MacKechnie (Ret.); Maj. Gen. Robert B.

McClure (Ret.); Brig. Gen. William A.

McCulloch (Ret.); Maj. Gen. Clarence

A. Martin (Ret.); Col. Alexander M.

Miller, III (Ret.); Hon. Hugh M. Milton, II; the late Maj. Gen. Verne D.

Mudge; Maj. Gen. Dewitt Peck, USMC
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 387

(Ret.); Lt. Col. David M. N. Ross (Ret.);

Col. Douglas Sugg (Ret.); General Gerald C. Thomas (Ret.); General Allen H.

Turnage, USMC (Ret.); General Nathan

F. Twining.

Manuscript Histories

For all operations in the South Pacific

Area, The History of the United States

Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

During World War II, 30 March 1942-

1 August 1944, contains essential background information. It was prepared by,

and under the supervision of, Maj.

Frederick P. Todd, USAFISPA Historical Section, and Capt. Louis Morton,

G-2 Historical Section, South Pacific

Base Command.

The G-2 Historical Section of the

South Pacific Base Command also prepared the History of the New Georgia

Campaign and The Bougainville Campaign. The first consists of text, colored

maps showing movements and dispositions, and photographs. Of nine chapters

of text, which cover the New Georgia

operation in great detail, the first was

written by Todd, the other eight by

WOJG Joseph J. Rubin. The Bougainville Campaign, which was written by

Lt. Col. Edwin Cates, Cpl. Stanley L.

Jones, and T/4 Francis A. Saunders, Jr.,

is a methodical, detailed discussion of

the operation. It contains no maps except a dimly photostated version of a

Marine Corps Hasty Terrain Map. No

positions or movements are shown.

General MacArthur's headquarters

wrote no similar campaign histories, but

the Historical Section, G-3, GHQ

SWPA, prepared a series called Studies

in the History of the Southwest Pacific

Area, of which Volume II, New Guinea

and Bismarcks Campaign, 22 January

1943-20 October 1944, summarizes the

planning and operations described in

this volume. It was used extensively in

preparing Allied Operations in the

Southwest Pacific Area.

Published Works

The number of books relating to the

subject matter of this volume grows

with the years. Some of the volumes

listed below bear directly on the CARTWHEEL operations. Others, not necessarily cited in this book, provide essential background information.

[Frierson, Maj. William C.] The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division (29 February-18 May

1944), AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION. This pamphlet is the definitive

account.

Arnold, Henry H. Global Mission, New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

DeChant, John A. Devilbirds: The Story

of United States Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

Cline, Ray S. Washington Command

Post: The Operations Division,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1951.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea

Cate (eds.). The Army Air Forces in

World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan—August 1942

to July 1944. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950. This fine

book obviated the need for research

in Army Air Forces records.

Feldt, Comdr. Eric A., RAN. The Coastwatchers. Melbourne, Australia, and

New York: Oxford University Press,
388 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

1946. The American edition is shorter

than the Australian.

Frankel, Stanley A. The 37th Infantry

Division in World War II. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.

Gillespie, Oliver A. The Pacific. "The

Official History of New Zealand in the

Second World War, 1939-1945." War

History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs. Wellington, New Zealand,

1952.

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., and

Lt. Comdr. J. Bryan, III. Admiral Halsey's Story. New York: Whittlesey

House, 1947.

Heavey, Brig. Gen. William F. Down

Ramp! The Story of the Army Amphibian Engineers. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947.

Hough, Lt. Col. Frank O., USMCR, and

Maj. John A. Crown, USMCR. The

Campaign on New Britain. Historical

Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps. Washington: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1952.

Karolevitz, Capt. Robert F. (ed.). The

25th Division and World War II.

Baton Rouge, La.: Army and Navy

Publishing Company, 1946.

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. New York: Duell, Sloan and

Pearce, 1949.

King, Admiral Ernest J. Our Navy at

War: A Report to the Secretary of the

Navy Covering Our Peacetime Navy

and Our Wartime Navy and Including

Combat Operations up to March 1,

1944. Washington: U.S. News, 1944.

King, Ernest J., and Walter Muir Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King: A Naval

Record. New York: W. W. Norton &

Company, Inc., 1952.

Krueger, General Walter. From Down

Under to Nippon: The Story of the

Sixth Army in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953.

Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D. I Was

There: The Personal Story of the

Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt

and Truman Based on His Notes and

Diaries Made at the Time. New York:

Whittlesey House, 1950.

McCartney, William F. The Jungleers:

A History of the 41st Infantry Division. Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1948.

Marshall, General of the Army George

C. Biennial Report of the Chief of

Staff of the United States Army, July

1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945.

Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell,

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1953.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of

United States Naval Operations in

World War II, Vol. VI, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier: 22 July 1942-1

May 1944. Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1950.

Office of the Chief Engineer, General

Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific.

Engineers of the Southwest Pacific:

1941-1945. Vol. I, Engineers in

Theater Operations. Vol. VI, Airfield

and Base Development. Vol. VIII,

Critique. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1947, 1951, 1951-

Rentz, Maj. John N., USMCR. Bougainville and the Northern Solomons. His-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 389

torical Section, Division of Public

Information, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948.

———. Marines in the Central Solomons.

Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S.

Marine Corps. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.

Robson, R. W. (ed.). The Pacific Islands

Handbook, 1944 (North American

ed.). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

Sherrod, Robert. History of Marine

Corps Aviation in World War II.

Washington: Combat Forces Press,

1952. Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1948.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

The Thirteenth Air Force in the War

Against Japan. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

———. The Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command.

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947. This is a slightly rearranged version of the Studies in the

History of the Southwest Pacific Area.

———. Interrogations of Japanese Officials. 2 Vols. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

———. The Allied Campaign Against

Rabaul. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

Wright, Maj. B. C. The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II. Tokyo, Japan:

Toppan Printing Company, 1947.

Zimmer, Col. Joseph E. The History of

the 43d Infantry Division, 1941-1945.

Baton Rouge, La.: Army and Navy

Publishing Company, n.d.
Glossary

AA

AAF

ACofS

AdVon

AF

AFPAC

AGC

AGO

AKA

ALF

ANF

AP

APA

APC

APD

ATIS SCAP

AW

BAR

Bazooka

BB

BYPRODUCT

CA

CCS

CG

CHRONICLE

CINCPAC

CINCPOA

CINCSWPA

CM-IN

CM-OUT

CNO

CO

C (s)ofS

Com

Antiaircraft

Army Air Forces

Assistant Chief of Staff

Advance Echelon

Air Force

Army Forces, Pacific

Combined operations communications headquarters ship.

In Pacific most frequently used as flagships of amphibious

force or group commanders.

Office of The Adjutant General

Cargo ship, attack

Allied Land Forces

Allied Naval Forces

Transport

Transport, attack

Coastal transport

High-speed destroyer-transport

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

Automatic weapons

Browning automatic rifle

Rocket launcher, hand-carried

Battleship

Code name for Trobriand Islands (Kiriwina)

Coast Artillery

Combined Chiefs of Staff

Commanding General

Code name for plan for seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area

[Commander in Chief] Supreme Commander, Southwest

Pacific Area

Classified Message, In

Classified Message, Out

Chief of Naval Operations

Commanding Officer

Chief (s) of Staff

Committee
GLOSSARY 391

COMAIRSOPAC

COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC

Comd

Comdr

COMGEN

COMGENSOPAC

COMINCH

COMSOPAC

COMSOWESPAC

Cons

CRU

CTF

CTG

CV

CVE

DD

DEXTERITY

DMS

DRYGOODS

DUKW

ELKTON

ESB

FA

FEC

FM

FO

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

GHQ

GO

Incl (s)

Ind

Instal

JCS

Jnl (s)

JPS

Commander [land-based], Aircraft, South Pacific Force

Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force

Command

Commander

Commanding General

Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the South

Pacific Area

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force

Commander, Southwest Pacific (also CINCSWPA)

Construction

Cruiser

Commander, Task Force

Commander, Task Group

Aircraft carrier

Aircraft carrier, escort

Destroyer

Code name for western New Britain—Saidor operation

Destroyer-minesweeper

Code name for assembly of supplies at Guadalcanal-Tulagi

area for offensive in New Georgia, February 1943

21⁄2-ton, 6x6 amphibious truck

Code name for MacArthur's plan for recapture of Rabaul

Engineer special brigade

Field Artillery

Far East Command

Field Manual

Field Orders

Personnel officer or section of a general staff, down through

divisional level

Intelligence officer or section of general staff, down through

divisional level

Operations officer or section of a general staff, down through

divisional level

Supply officer or section of a general staff, down through

divisional level

General headquarters

General Orders

Inclosure (s)

Indorsement

Installation

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Journal (s)

Joint Staff Planners
392 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Jt

JUSSC

KCRC

LCI

LCM

LCP (R)

LCT

LCV

LCVP

LEATHERBACK

LHQ

LST

MAC

MAINYARD

Min

MIS

MTB

NCB

NGF

NGOF

NLG

OCMH

OI

ONI

OPD

PB4Y4

PBY

Plng

POA

POSTERN

PT

PTO

PV-1

RAAF

RAAFCAAF

RAF

RAN

Rcn

RCT

RENO

RN

Joint

Joint U.S. Strategic Committee

Kansas City Records Center, Office of the Adjutant General, Kansas City, Missouri

Landing craft, infantry

Landing craft, mechanized

Landing craft, personnel (ramp)

Landing craft, tank

Landing craft, vehicle

Landing craft, vehicle, personnel

Code name for Woodlark Island

Land Headquarters (also ALF)

Landing ship, tank

Marine Amphibious Corps

Code name for Guadalcanal Island

Minutes

Military Intelligence Section

Motor torpedo boat

Naval construction battalion

New Guinea Force

New Georgia Occupation Force

Northern landing group

Office of the Chief of Military History

Operations Instructions

Office of Naval Intelligence

Operations Division, War Department General Staff

Naval designation of B-24

Twin-engine U.S. Navy patrol bomber (Black Cat)

Planning

Pacific Ocean Area

Code name for Lae-Finschhafen-Madang operations

Motor torpedo boat

Pacific Theater of Operations

Twin-engined Navy patrol plane, also used as a night fighter

Royal Australian Air Force

Royal Australian Air Force Comand, Allied Air Forces

Royal Air Force

Royal Australian Navy

Reconnaissance

Regimental combat team

Code name for MacArthur's plan for advancing along north

coast of New Guinea and thence to Mindano

Royal Navy
GLOSSARY 393

S-3

SBD

SC

SCR

SL

SNLF

SOPAC

SOPACBACOM

SR

SWPA

SYMBOL

TBF

TF

TM

TOENAILS

TU

USA

USAFFE

USAFISPA

USASOS SWPA

USMC (R)

USN

USSBS

WD

WDGS

YMS

Operations officer or section of a regimental or battalion

headquarters

Scout bomber (Douglas)—a Navy dive-bomber

Submarine chaser

Signal Corps radio

Searchlight

Special naval landing force (Japanese)

South Pacific Area, South Pacific Force

South Pacific Base Command

Special Regulations

Southwest Pacific Area

Code name for Casablanca Conference 14-23 January 1943

Single-engine U.S. Navy torpedo bomber

Task Force

Technical Manual

Code name for New Georgia operation

Task Unit

U.S. Army

U.S. Army Forces in the Far East

U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area

U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve)

U.S. Navy

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

War Department

War Department General Staff

Motor minesweeper

Basic Military Map Symbols*

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armored Command

Army Air Forces

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service

Coast Artillery

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corps

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corps

Veterinary Corps

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing

symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry

*For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, see

FM 21-30, dated October 1943, from which these are taken.
396 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force

Wing

Division or Command of an Air Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry

8th Field Artillery Battalion

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division.

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry

Weapons

Machine gun

Gun

Gun battery

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gun
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The multivolume series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,

consists of a number of subseries which are tentatively planned as follows: The

War Department, The Army Air Forces, The Army Ground Forces, The Army

Service Forces, Defense of the Western Hemisphere, The War in the Pacific,

European Theater of Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, The

Middle East Theater, The China-Burma-India Theater, The Technical Services,

Special Studies, and Pictorial Record.

The following volumes have been published or are in press: *

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparation

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

Defense of the Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

The War in the Pacific

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

The Approach to the Philippines

The Fall of the Philippines

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

European Theater of Operations

The Lorraine Campaign

Cross-Channel Attack

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Supreme Command

Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

* The volumes on the Army Air Forces, published by the University of Chicago Press, are not

included in this list.
398 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

Special Studies

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Rearming the French

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

A-20's. See Aircraft, Allied.

A-29's. See Aircraft, Allied.

Aaron Ward: 43

Adachi, Lt. Gen. Hatazo: 34-35, 37, 39, 45, 63, 65,

211, 213-14, 219, 221, 303, 319

Admiralty Islands

geography: 317-18

plans for taking: 273, 307, 316-21

"reconnaissance in force": 321-31

seizure of objectives: 332-50, 379

Ainsworth, Rear Adm. Walden L.: 95, 98-99, 105,

314

Air Command, New Georgia: 165

Air Command, Solomons: 69, 167, 232, 235-36, 253,

270, 309-12

Air Liaison Party, 12th: 340

Air operations, Allied: 55, 140, 167, 178, 196, 227,

228, 229-32, 338. See also Airborne operations;

Fighter operations, Allied.

Admiralties: 319-20, 324-26, 328, 332, 338, 342,

343, 344

air-ground co-ordination: 142. See also Fighter

operations, Allied, fighter control,

attacks on enemy shipping: 37, 39-41, 74

bombardment of airfields: 72, 74, 86, 198-99, 232

Bougainville: 232, 245, 246, 253, 256, 265, 358, 363

carrier-based air strikes: 242, 252-53, 254, 27on,

311

close air support lacking: 142

DEXTERITY (western New Britain-Saidor): 274-75,

286, 289, 290, 293, 297, 298, 300, 3oon

"direct air support": 141-42

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula: 193, 195, 199,

218

New Georgia: 75, 83, 85, 111, 114, 119, 129-30,

130n, 131, 140-42, 143, 146, 159

in preparation for amphibious invasions: 51-53,

193, 199, 218, 232, 245, 246, 282, 319-20

Rabaul attacked: 53, 269-71, 309

skip bombing: 39, 4on

strategic bombing: 195

support of amphibious landings: 181, 253, 256,

274-75, 286, 290, 297, 298, 300, 300n, 315, 325-

26, 328, 332, 342, 343

support of infantry advances: 83, 85, 111, 114,

119, 129-30, 130n, 131, 140-42, 143, 146, 159,

293, 331, 332, 344, 375

support of infantry defense: 358, 362

in theater strategy: 26

Air operations, Japanese: 230

against Allied beachheads: 89-90, 91, 129, 261-65

against amphibious forces and landings: 205, 246-

49, 252-56, 287, 291, 315. See also Amphibious

Air operations, Japanese—Continued

operations, Allied, enemy response to landings.

attacks on naval vessels: 42-44, 174, 219, 248

"big raid" on Guadalcanal: 44-45

carrier-based air strikes: 42-44, 233, 253-55

cover for convoys: 39-40

fighter interception: 232, 311

1 Operation: 42-44

RO Operation: 233-34, 248, 253-55

Air reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance, Allied;

Reconnaissance, Japanese.

Air strengths, Allied

Air Command, Solomons: 270, 27on

for Bougainville: 232

for New Georgia: 75

South Pacific Area: 10, 75, 232

Southwest Pacific Area: 10, 195

Air strengths, Japanese: 13, 30, 46-47, 91, 280-82

Air supply: 37-38, 60, 75, 103, 104, 114-15, 120, 170,

209, 216, 217, 269, 331

Air Task Force, 1st: 53, 53n 290, 300n

Air units

Commands

V Bomber: 53

V Fighter: 53, 196

Groups

345th Medium Bombardment: 195

348th Fighter: 195

38oth Heavy Bombardment: 195

475th Fighter: 195

Squadrons

39th Troop Carrier: 331

67th Fighter: 58

375th Troop Carrier: 331

Wing, 54th Troop Carrier: 195, 208

Airborne operations: 190, 191, 193-94, 207-09, 277-

78, 277n

Aircraft, Allied

A-20's: 41, 55, 196, 218, 290, 300

A-29's: 41

B-17's: 41, 55, 196, 209, 331

B-24's: 41, 55, 195, 196, 218, 230, 252, 253, 269,

270, 282, 290, 300, 309, 310, 311, 322, 326, 338

B-25's: 41, 55, 195, 196, 208, 218, 230, 232, 286,

290, 300, 309, 310, 322, 326, 331, 332, 338, 343

B-26's: 196

B-29's: 308

Beaufighters: 41, 230

Beaufort bombers: 41, 254

Boston bombers: 196

C-47's: 194, 195, 196, 207, 208-10, 269, 302

Catalinas: 200, 282. See also Aircraft, Allied, PBY's.
400 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Aircraft, Allied—Continued

F4U's (Corsairs): 43, 165, 252, 269, 310

F6F's (Hellcats): 43, 252, 310

L-4's (Piper Cubs): 269

P-38's (Lightnings): 41, 43, 44, 195, 205, 230, 232,

252, 253, 282, 287, 310, 311, 326, 332

P-39's (Airacobras): 41, 43

P-40's: 41, 45, 252, 310, 342, 344

P-47's: 195, 205, 332

PB4Y4's (Navy Liberators): 244

PBY's (Black Cats): 71, 74, 221, 244, 282, 322

PV-1's (Vega Ventura night fighters): 244, 265

SBD's: 141, 143, 271, 309, 310, 311, 358

TBF's: 141, 246, 271, 309, 310, 311, 358

Aircraft, Northern Solomons: 261

Aircraft, South Pacific: 73

Aircraft carriers. See Warships, Allied.

Aircraft losses, Japanese

in RO Operation: 255

at Truk: 312

at Wewak: 198

Airfield and airstrip construction, Allied

Admiralties: 349-50

Bougainville: 269, 271

Green Islands: 315

New Britain: 279, 294

New Georgia: 81-82, 82n, 165-67, 183-84

New Guinea: 191, 196, 209-10, 302

Woodlark: 58-59

Airfield construction, Japanese: 46

Airfields

Allied reconnaissance for sites: 196, 261

in Allied theater strategy: 26, 187, 190, 191, 221,

250, 309, 313

Japanese: 47-48

strategic importance in Pacific: 13, 23, 59

AKA's: 223

ALAMO Force: 29, 49, 50, 53, 54, 215, 272, 274, 275-

79, 296-302, 316, 335. See also Krueger, Lt.

Gen. Walter.

ALAMO Scouts: 277, 322

Alchiba: 250

Allied Air Forces, SWPA: 20-22, 29, 38, 49, 191, 193,

217, 272, 276, 278, 279, 295, 316, 319-20. See

also Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.

Allied Land Forces, SWPA: 20-22, 191. See also

Blarney, General Sir Thomas.

Allied Naval Forces, SWPA: 20-22, 29, 49, 50, 191,

198, 272, 276, 295, 299, 316, 349. See also Carpender, Vice Adm. Arthur S., and Kinkaid,

Vice Adm. Thomas C.

American Legion: 248, 249

Amphibious Force, VII: 22, 192-93, 214, 215, 275,

277, 279. See also Barbey, Rear Adm. Daniel

E.

Amphibious operations, Allied

air support. See Air operations, Allied, in prepAmphibious operations, Allied—Continued

aration for amphibious invasions; Air operations, Allied, support of amphibious landings.

beachmaster: 88

clearing the beaches: 65, 90, 180, 267-68, 286, 332

communications problems: 65, 90, 285-86

enemy response to landings: 88-91, 179-81, 204-

05, 218-19, 240, 246-49, 284-85, 287-88, 291,

301, 315, 343

landings: 55, 56, 57-58, 57n, 64-65, 83, 86-91,

95-96, 116, 179-80, 202-05, 218, 239-40, 244-46,

284-87, 290-92, 300-302, 315, 325-28, 340

marking beaches: 55, 56, 62, 64, 95, 174-75

naval support. See Naval operations, Allied, support of amphibious landings.

organization of forces. See Command structure,

organization of forces for amphibious operations

planning: 50-54, 106, 175-79, 192-93, 207, 217-

18, 235-38, 275-79, 295-99, 313-14, 321-24

preinvasion parties: 55-56, 82-83, 86, 174, 229,

314, 322

preparations: 54-55, 62-63, 70, 78-81, 92, 283-84

setting invasion dates: 192, 273, 274-75

shore parties: 298, 300

shore-to-shore movement: 60-61, 64, 336, 342

training: 54, 56, 62, 86n, 238, 284, 299, 299n

unloading: 56, 57, 72, 88, 89-90, 178, 179, 181,

244-45, 248-50, 256, 300, 332

Amphibious operations, Japanese: 220, 259-60

Antiaircraft artillery units. See also Coast Artillery

units.

Battalions

168th: 323

211th: 323

236th (Searchlight): 277

470th (Automatic Weapons): 277

976th Gun: 313

Battery, 673d: 323

Regiment, 251st: 355, 362

Antiaircraft guns and fire, Allied: 180, 181

40-mm.: 94, 372

.50-caliber: 328, 329

90-mm.: 94, 287, 288, 364n

as field gun: 329, 364n, 373

naval vessels: 252, 254

Antiaircraft guns and fire, Japanese: 163, 253

Antitank guns, Allied: 117, 343, 359

Antitank weapons, Japanese: 133, 151

AP's: 193

APA's: 223, 380

APC's: 193, 237, 239

APD's (destroyer-transports): 55, 56, 76, 78, 81, 82,

83, 86, 92, 95, 176, 178, 179, 193, 203, 218,

237, 239, 240, 241, 256, 284, 287, 290, 298, 299,

300, 313, 314, 315, 320, 321, 325, 328, 380

Arawe: 274, 280

description: 282-83
INDEX 401

Arawe—Continued

plans for taking: 27, 274, 277

seizure: 282-89

strategic importance: 294-95

Artillery, Allied. See also Antiaircraft guns and

fire, Allied; Coast artillery units, Field artillery

battalions.

conditions prevent using: 152, 161-62

co-ordination with infantry units: 94, 117-19

counterbattery fire: 358

counterpreparation fire: 359

defensive fire: 373, 375

direct fire: 358, 372

emplacement: 93-94, 180, 334

fields of fire: 94, 109, 266, 329, 333, 355, 362

firing parallel to infantry front: 94, 340, 344

grazing fire: 372

harassing fire: 365

interdicting fire: 365

observation: 354, 358, 365-66, 37on

in perimeter defense: 265, 355

phosphorous shells: 118

planning for use: 143

preparation fire: 94, 110, 114, 116, 134, 146-47,

148, 150, 159, 161-62, 260, 265, 289, 293, 344,

346-48, 363-64, 369-70, 37on, 372, 376-77

registration points: 368

rolling barrage: 117

support of amphibious landings: 342, 343

supporting fire: 136, 361-62

types of fuses: 37on

75-mm. pack howitzers: 328, 329, 331, 333, 343,

370

105-mm. howitzers: 73, 83, 94, 110, 143, 147, 343,

359, 363

155-mm. guns: 73, 91, 93, 94, 98, 110

155-mm. howitzers: 91, 94, 98, 110, 134, 143, 147

Artillery, Japanese

fields of fire: 116

mountain guns: 98, 114

naval guns: 167, 170, 171, 238

preparation fire: 368

shells beachhead: 265

shells landing operations: 117

supports infantry counteroffensive: 356-57, 358

75-mm. guns: 114, 210, 245, 246

120-mm. naval guns: 170, 171

140-mm. naval guns: 98, 238

Arundel Island: 172, 175, 184-86

Assault Flotillas: 78, 92

Australia, HMAS: 290

Australian Navy: 22

Australian officers in GHQ, SWPA: 20

Australian units. See also KANGA Force; Line of

Communications units; New Guinea Administrative Unit; Royal Australian Air Force.

Australian units—Continued

Armies

First: 20

Second: 20

Battalion, 2/2d Pioneer: 209, 210

Brigade groups, infantry

20th: 218-21

21st: 216

25th: 210, 216

Brigades, infantry

4th: 221

15th: 61

17th: 38, 61, 65, 66

24th: 206-07, 220

26th: 204, 206, 207, 221

Companies

2/4th Independent: 211

2/6th Independent: 216

2/6th Field: 209

Corps, I: 189

Divisions, infantry

3d: 38, 60, 61, 200-201, 201n

5th: 201, 304

7th: 6, 192, 194, 207, 210, 216-17, 304

9th: 192, 194, 202-07, 210, 213, 217-21, 303,

304

Regiments

2/6th Artillery: 210n

2/4 Field: 208

Avery, Capt. Winthrop B.: 345

B-17's. See Aircraft, Allied.

B-24's. See Aircraft, Allied.

B-25's. See Aircraft, Allied.

B-26's. See Aircraft, Allied.

B-29's. See Aircraft, Allied.

Baanga: 172

Baba, Captain: 330, 331

BACKHANDER Task Force: 277, 279

Bairoko: 92, 94, 99, 105, 127-31, 169, 171

Ballale: 226-27, 232, 234, 243

BAR's: 161, 246, 369

Barakoma: 174, 179-81

Barbed wire: 108, 266, 329, 331, 331n, 333, 333n,

355, 372

Barbey, Rear Adm. Daniel E.: 22, 381

and Admiralties operations: 321, 322, 336

and CHRONICLE (Woodlark-Kiriwina) operations:

49. 51, 54. 56, 57, 59 and Finschhafen invasion: 218, 219

and Lae invasion: 192, 193, 202-03, 206

and Saidor invasion: 296-98

and theater strategy: 274, 274n

and western New Britain operations: 274, 274n,

284, 285n

Barge lanes, Japanese: 45, 195, 200

Barges, Japanese: 182, 194-95, 220

daihatsu: 182, 182n, 185-86
402 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Barker, Brig. Gen. Harold R.: 76, 93, 106, 111, 112,

118, 137, 143, 172, 172n

Barnett, Brig. Gen. Allison J.: 168

"Barracudas": 86n

Barrett, Maj. Gen. Charles D.: 236

Barrowclough, Maj. Gen. H. E.: 183, 313, 314

Bartley, 2d Lt. Martin E.: 150n

Bartley Ridge: 150-53

Battleships. See Warships, Allied.

Baxter, Col. Stuart A.: 125, 137, 149-50, 154-58

Bayonets, U.S.: 103, 158

Bayonets, Japanese: 367

Bazookas: 285, 375

Beach defenses, Allied: 103

Beadle, Col. Frank L.: 174

Beaufighters. See Aircraft, Allied.

Beaufort bombers. See Aircraft, Allied.

Beightler, Maj. Gen. Robert S.: 125, 381. See also

Infantry divisions, 37th.

and Bougainville counteroffensive: 361, 362, 363,

373, 374, 375, 376 and Munda offensive: 137, 139, 144, 149-50, 152,

153, 154-58, 156n, 159

Bena Bena: 196

Berkey, Rear Adm. Russell S.: 321

Bibilo Hill: 118, 144, 149, 154-55, 163-64

"Big raid": 44-45

Bishop of Melanesia (Anglican): 71

Bismarck Archipelago: 306-15, 316, 380-81. See

also Admiralty Islands; Arawe; Cape Gloucester.

Bismarck Sea, Battle of the: 39-41

Blarney, General Sir Thomas

command: 20-22, 29, 61

and Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations: 189, 214-16, 272

and theater strategy: 214-16

Blanchard, Col. Charles D.: 297

"Bloody Hill": 109

"Bloody Sunday": 368

Blue Ridge: 355

Bogadjim: 214-15

Bombers, dive, Allied: 141, 143, 271. See also Aircraft, Allied, SBD's.

Bombers, dive, Japanese: 247

Bombers, heavy: 143, 230, 270-71, 310. See also

Aircraft, Allied, B-17's; Aircraft, Allied, B24's.

Bombers, land-based, in Japanese operations: 2

Bombers, medium: 143, 271. See also Aircraft, Allied, B-25's; Aircraft, Allied, B-26's.

Bombers, torpedo: 141, 245, 271. See also Aircraft,

Allied, TBF's.

Bonis: 234, 235, 242

Bostock, Air Vice Marshal William D.: 22, 51. See

also Royal Australian Air Force Command,

Allied Air Forces.

Boston bombers: 196

Bougainville: 71, 73, 187, 222

casualties. See Casualties, Allied, Bougainville;

Casualties, Japanese, Bougainville.

developing and protecting the beachhead: 251-71

geography: 234

invasion: 241-50

Japanese counteroffensive: 251-78

in Japanese strategy: 213

picked as Allied objective: 14, 19

planning for invasion: 225-29, 234-39

preliminary landings: 239-41

Boyd, Capt. Clay A.: 95

Bradley, Col. J. Sladen: 297, 300

Bradley, Col. William J.: 340, 343, 344

Brady, Lt. Col. Charles E.: 334

Breene, Maj. Gen. Robert G.: 69

BREWER reconnaissance force: 323

BREWER Task Force: 323. See also Cavalry Division,

1st; Swift, Maj. Gen. Innis P.

Bridges. See River crossings.

Brooks: 55

Brown, Col. Everett E.: 178

Brown, Lt. Col. Lester E.: 82, 147-49, 147n

Browning, Capt. Miles R.: 12n, 14, 73

Buchanan, Col. David H.: 150, 151, 152-53

Buin: 27, 226, 235, 238

Buka: 27, 232, 234, 235, 238, 242, 259, 265, 270n, 311

Bulldozers: 90, 140, 154, 170, 196, 300, 332, 333, 344

Bulolo Valley. See Wau.

Bunker Hill: 254, 311

Burke, Capt. Arleigh A.: 143, 146, 265

Burr, Capt. Dudley H.: 135

Bush, Lt. Col. George E.: 169, 169n

Bush: 329, 331, 336

Bypasses

in Allied strategy: 381, 382

considered for Bougainville: 226-28

considered for Kavieng: 321

Hansa Bay: 321, 379

Kolombangara: 171-73, 187

Rabaul: 222-25, 273-74

C-47's. See Aircraft, Allied.

Camouflage, Japanese: 11, 132-33, 186, 265

Cannon, infantry: 162

Cannon Hill: 359, 362

Cape Cretin: 279, 323

Cape Gloucester: 287, 311

picked as Allied objective: 14-15

plans and preparations for taking: 27, 228, 272-

79, 282

seizure: 289-95

strategic importance: 214-16, 294-95

Cape Saint George, Battle of: 265

Cape Torokino: 229, 244-59, 260, 261, 269-70

Capron, Lt. Col. Charles W.: 112n

Carberry, Maj. Francis P.: 153
INDEX 403

Cargo ships: 76, 78, 236, 237, 244, 248, 249-50.

See also AKA's.

Carney, Rear Adm. Robert B.: 227, 307, 308, 313,

350, 381

Carpender, Vice Adm. Arthur S.: 22, 29-30, 49, 51,

191, 193, 200, 215-16, 274, 299. See also Allied

Naval Forces. SWPA.

Carrier Division 22: 74

Carriers, aircraft. See Warships, Allied.

Carter, Capt. Grayson B.: 181

Carter, Capt. Jesse H.: 200

Carter Hall: 284, 286, 287

CARTWHEEL: 272, 305. See also Bougainville;

CHRONICLE; DEXTERITY; Intertheater co-ordination; Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations; Munda; Nassau Bay; New Georgia; TOENAILS.

forces and missions: 29-30

logistics: 29-30

plans to extend: 306

plans revised: 222-29

summary of operations: 380-82

timing of operations: 26-29, 30, 49, 381

Casablanca Conference: 6-8

Casey, Brig. Gen. Hugh J.: 49

Casualties, Allied

Admiralties: 348

Bougainville counteroffensive: 377-78

Bougainville invasion: 241, 246, 255, 267n

DEXTERITY (western New Britain-Saidor) operations: 289, 295, 302

Green Islands: 315

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations:

202, 210, 221, 221n

New Georgia: 120-22, 172, 187

Casualties, Japanese

Admiralties: 348-49

Bougainville, Allied invasion: 241, 267n

Bougainville counteroffensive: 377

New Georgia: 187

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations:

202, 212, 221

Catalinas. See Aircraft, Allied.

Cavalry brigades

1st: 323. See also Chase, Brig. Gen. William C.

2d: 323, 336, 337, 338, 339-48

Cavalry Division, 1st: 276, 317, 321, 322-50, 323n

Cavalry reconnaissance troops

25th: 178, 181

37th: 137, 150n, 155-57, 363

43d: 135, 184

302d: 340

Cavalry regiments

5th: 323n, 323-39

7th: 323n, 336-40, 342-43, 345-47

8th: 340-48

12th: 336, 338-39. See also Regimental combat

teams, 12th Cavalry.

Cavalry regiments—Continued

112th

Arawe: 277, 282, 284-89

Woodlark: 53, 54, 55, 56

Caves, Japanese use of: 285, 286

Cawlfield, Capt. Paul A.: 66

"Central Agreement" on Japanese strategy: 45

Central Pacific Area: 2-4, 222-24, 307

Chamberlin, Brig. Gen. Stephen J.: 12n, 49, 192,

215-16, 273, 273n, 274, 277n, 295, 313, 316-17,

379, 381

Chase, Brig. Gen. William C.: 323, 327, 328, 329,

331, 331n, 332, 335-36

Chemical Battalion, 82d: 184, 355, 359, 359n, 373

Chevalier: 99

Chiaramonte, Maj. Julio: 330, 331, 333

Choiseul: 227, 228, 236, 241

CHRONICLE: 49-59

Churchill, Winston S.: 1, 6-7, 225

Claims, exaggerated, Japanese: 205n, 232, 253, 255,

255n Claims, exaggerated, U.S.: 232

Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D.: 12n

Clemens, Maj. Martin: 86, 86n

Coane, Brig. Gen. Ralph W.: 200

Coane Force: 200-201, 201n

Coast Artillery units

Battalions

70th (Antiaircraft): 76, 355

209th (Antiaircraft): 62n, 201n

743d Gun (Antiaircraft): 302

Regiments

54th (Harbor Defense): 236

198th (Antiaircraft): 236, 237, 240

251st (Antiaircraft): 236

Coast artillery, Japanese: 95, 96

Coast defenses, Allied. See Beach defenses, Allied.

Coast defenses, Japanese: 88, 110

Coastwatchers: 24-25, 25n, 43, 45, 55, 71, 81, 86,

174, 229

Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton: 125, 170, 381. See

also Infantry divisions, 25th.

Combat fatigue. See Medical problems, Allied.

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 1, 6-8, 222, 223, 225

Combined Fleet: 34, 42, 48, 232, 233, 255, 312

Combined Operational Service Command: 22, 62n,

201n

Command structure, Allied

for Admiralties base development: 349-50

for advance on Rabaul (CARTWHEEL): 18-19

air: 75, 78

for Bismarck Archipelago: 307-08

for Bougainville invasion: 235-36, 237

for CHRONICLE (Woodlark-Kiriwina): 49, 54

for Emirau: 380

for New Britain operations: 276

for New Georgia operations: 75-78, 122-26, 137,

175-78
404 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Command structure, Allied—Continued

organization of forces for amphibious operations:

95, 175, 235-37, 279, 313-14, 317, 321, 323

for Saidor: 295-96

South Pacific Area: 67-70

South and Southwest Pacific Areas contrasted: 54,

67, 78, 276, 316-17

Southwest Pacific Area: 20-22

Command structure, Japanese: 32-34, 97, 280

Communications, telephone: 116-17, 135, 330, 334

Communications problems: 127, 143. See also Amphibious operations, communications problems.

Congressional Medal of Honor: 149n, 153n, 157, 220,

246n, 335, 354n Connor, Maj. Haskett L.: 344

Conway: 241, 247

Cony: 240

Conyngham: 284, 286, 287, 300

Cooke, Rear Adm. Charles M., Jr.: 12n, 16

Cooke, Capt. William R.: 181

Corps

I: 20

XIV. See also Griswold, Maj. Gen. Oscar W.

Bougainville: 266-69, 351-56, 369

New Georgia: 69, 123-24, 137-42, 143-64

Corrigan, Flight Officer J. A.: 95, 101, 104, 131

Counterattacks, Allied: 260, 373-74, 376-77

Counterattacks, Japanese

Admiralties: 330, 331, 333-35, 337

Arawe: 287-89

Bougainville: 259-60. See also Counteroffensive

on Bougainville, Japanese.

Cape Gloucester: 292

Finschhafen: 219-21

New Georgia: 15-37

Counteroffensive on Bougainville, Japanese: 351-78

Cox Creek: 372, 375

Craig, Brig. Gen. Charles F.: 363, 375

Crescent City: 244

Crooks, Lt. Col. Richard D.: 152

Crosby: 81

Cruisers. See Warships, Allied; Warships, Japanese.

Crutchley, Rear Adm. V.A.C.: 51, 284, 290, 301, 338

Cunningham, Brig. Gen. Julian W.

Arawe: 277, 282, 284, 287, 288

Woodlark: 53, 56-57

Currin, Lt. Col. Michael S.: 84

Dalton, Col. James L., II: 126, 139, 150-53, 154,

155

Dampier Strait: 189, 213, 214. See also DEXTERITY.

Dechaineux, Capt. E. F. V.: 332

Dent: 81, 86

Destroyers. See Warships, Allied; Warships, Japanese.

Destroyer-transports, Allied. See APD's (destroyertransports).

Destroyer-transports, Japanese: 186

DEXTERITY: 272-305. See also Arawe; Cape Gloucester; Saidor.

Directive of 2 July 1942, JCS: 5, 11, 14. See also

Task One, Rabaul operations; Task Three,

Rabaul operations; Task Two, Rabaul operations.

Directive of 28 March 1943, JCS: 15-19

DIRECTOR Task Force: 277, 279, 283

Discipline, importance of: 121-22

Distinguished Service Cross: 152n, 328

Dive bombers. See Aircraft, Allied, SBD's; Bombers, dive, Japanese.

Diversions. See Tactics, Allied; Tactics, Japanese.

Dobodura: 230, 273, 278

Dragons Peninsula: 99-103. See also Bairoko; Enogai.

Drayton: 327

Drowley, S/Sgt. Jessie R.: 354n

DRYGOODS: 72, 78

DUKW's (amphibian trucks): 72, 284, 284n, 286

Dumpu: 215-17

Dyson: 243

Eason, Col. John D.: 108, 110, 114, 118

Eastern Landing Force (TOENAILS): 78

Eddleman, Col. Clyde D.: 297

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L.: 20

ELKTON: 10, 12-15, 16. See also ELKTON III; Rabaul, plans for advance on.

ELKTON III: 25-31, 214, 225-26, 227, 276n. See also

Rabaul, plans for advance on.

Embick, Lt. Gen. Stanley D.: 12n

Emirau: 227n, 306-07, 308, 379-80

Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C.: 12n

Empress Augusta Bay: 234, 309, 351

base development: 266-69

Japanese attacks on beachhead: 251-55, 261-65.

See also Counteroffensive on Bougainville, Japanese.

Japanese forces (preinvasion): 235, 239

landings: 241-50

plans for landings: 227, 228, 236

preinvasion reconnaissance: 229

protecting and reinforcing the beachhead: 251-59

Empress Augusta Bay, Battle of: 251-52

Engineer units

Battalions

65th: 178n, 183

114th: 298

116th: 62n

117th: 137, 154, 157, 361, 362

118th: 93, 114, 148

141st Aviation: 294

808th Aviation: 302

836th Aviation: 350

863d Aviation: 302

864th Aviation: 294
INDEX 405

Engineer units—Continued

Battalions—Continued

871st Airborne: 196

913th Aviation: 279, 294

Engineer Special Brigade, 2d: 20

Admiralties: 332

casualties: 221

DEXTERITY (western New Britain-Saidor) operations: 279, 283, 285, 286, 288, 292,

300

Nassau Bay-Lae-Finschhafen: 60, 62n, 191,

192, 201n, 203, 204, 206-07, 218, 221

Engineer Company, 59th Combat: 55, 277

Regiments

532d Boat and Shore: 62n, 64, 201n, 218, 221

542d Boat and Shore: 298

592d Boat and Shore: 283, 292, 317, 323, 333,

338

Engineer Squadron, 8th: 340, 346

Engineers, Allied: 116, 120, 194, 269, 349, 355.

See also individual engineer units.

Enogai: 77, 92, 94, 96, 99-103

ESCALATOR Force: 29n. See also ALAMO Force.

Essex: 254

Evacuation of wounded: 120, 131, 134-35, 157-58,

361

Exterior lines, advantages and difficulties: 382

Ezaki, Col. Yoshio: 319, 320, 330, 333, 335

F4U's (Corsairs). See Aircraft, Allied.

F6F's (Hellcats). See Aircraft, Allied.

Faisi: 27, 226, 243

Fechteler, Rear Adm. William M.: 321, 326, 381

Field Artillery battalions

6th: 358

61st: 342-43, 343, 344

64th: 178, 178n

82d: 336

99th: 323, 333, 335, 343

103d: 88, 94, 110, 147

120th: 296, 304

121st: 302, 304

134th: 53,56

135th: 137, 359

136th: 76, 92, 94, 124, 134, 136, 137, 147

148th: 54, 277

152d: 83, 147

169th: 94, 110, 137

192d: 91, 94, 137

218th: 62n, 201n

221st: 267

245th: 267

246th: 267, 366

247th: 267

271st: 338, 343, 344

Field fortifications, Allied: 359, 365, 372. See also

Perimeter defenses, Allied.

Field fortifications, Japanese

Admiralties: 342, 345-47

Bougainville: 246, 265

effects of Allied bombardment: 159

New Britain: 285, 293

New Georgia: 110, 111, 114, 115-16, 117, 132-33,

144-46, 153

New Guinea: 201

technique of reducing: 161-62

Fife, Capt. James F.: 74, 75, 235

Fifth Air Force: 22

Admiralties: 326, 331

attacks on Kavieng: 311

attacks on Rabaul: 229-32, 252, 253, 254

CHRONICLE (Woodlark-Kiriwina): 53, 53n

DEXTERITY (western New Britain-Saidor): 282,

290

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula: 196-97

Fifth Fleet: 254, 350

Fighter operations, Allied

fighter control: 176, 181, 193, 247

fighter cover for amphibious landings: 181, 193,

247, 286-87, 290

fighter cover for carriers: 253

fighter cover for convoys: 53, 55, 193, 244

fighter escort for bombers: 11, 140, 167, 191, 230,

309

fighter interception: 43, 45, 90, 94, 140

fighter staging strips: 81-82, 191, 195-96

strategic importance of fighter planes: 381

Fighter planes. See the following subentries under

Aircraft, Allied: F4U's (Corsairs); F6F's (Hellcats); P-38's (Lightnings); P-39's (Airacobras);

P-40's; P-47's; PV-1's (Vega Ventura night

fighters).

Fiji Guerrillas, 1st Commando: 76

Fiji Infantry Regiment: 269, 269n, 352, 377

Fijians. See Fiji Guerrillas, 1st Commando; Fiji

Infantry Regiment; Natives.

Finley, Col. Glenn S.: 343, 346

Finschhafen

Allied fighter base: 311

in Allied strategy: 214-16, 272

Japanese air attack: 230

in Japanese strategy: 211, 213

picked as Allied objective: 19

plans for taking: 27, 217-18

seizure: 217-21

Fitch, Vice Adm. Aubrey W.: 49, 67, 73, 74, 75, 173,

235

Flame throwers: 148, 148n, 150, 151, 160, 161, 161n,

162, 284, 285, 347, 366, 367-68, 369, 374, 375

Flusser: 327

Food shortages, Allied. See Logistics, Allied, supply problems, isolated units under fire.

Food shortages, Japanese: 212, 221, 356

Foote: 251

Fort, Rear Adm. George H.: 77, 78, 82, 237, 239
406 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Fouse, Capt. Donald W.: 102

Frederick, Capt. George F.: 340

Frederick, Col. John D.: 373, 374

Freer, Lt. Col. George C.: 99, 363

Frink, Maj. Gen. James L.: 279

Fuller, Maj. Gen. Horace H.: 201n

G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA: 20n

G-3 Section, GHQ, SWPA: 20n

Gasmata: 27, 272, 274, 277, 280, 282

Gasoline, as weapon: 371

Gato: 229

Gauthreaux, S/Sgt. Ervin M.: 345, 345n

Geiger, Maj. Gen. Roy S.: 236, 237n, 257, 261, 266,

380, 381

Geography. See also individual islands.

CARTWHEEL area: 22-24, 22n

George Clymer: 244, 250

Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert L.: 4

Gill, Maj. Gen. William H.: 277n, 297, 304

Girardeau, Maj. Marvin D.: 101

Godwin, Maj. James A.: 347

Goodenough Island: 276, 279, 297

Grant, Lt. Col. Clyde E.: 285

Green Islands: 311, 312-15

Grenades, Allied: 161, 246, 285, 355, 369

Grenades, Japanese: 220, 330, 334

Griffith, Lt. Col. Samuel B., III: 101-03, 130, 169,

171

Griswold, Maj. Gen. Oscar W.: 381

Bougainville base development: 266-69

Bougainville counteroffensive: 351-56, 357, 361,

362, 366, 372n, 374, 377

New Georgia, Munda offensive: 137-40, 142, 143-

44, 148, 148n, 153, 154, 156, 158, 160-61, 163,

164, 167

New Georgia, operations after Munda: 169-70,

175, 183

New Georgia, takes command: 76, 78, 123-27,

130, 134, 136

Grumman fighters. See Aircraft, Allied, F6F's

(Hellcats).

Guadalcanal

"big raid" on: 44-45

as supply base: 72-73

Guardfish: 229

Guerrilla action. See Coastwatchers; Fiji Guerrillas, 1st Commando.

Gullitti, S/Sgt. Louis: 120

Gwin: 88, 105

Hallam, Col. Franklin T.: 120, 140

Halsey, Admiral William F., Jr.: 43, 49, 224, 35on,

380

and Bougainville operations: 235-37, 241-42, 248,

251, 252-53, 257, 266, 349-50

command: 4, 18-19, 67, 308, 316-17

and Green Islands: 312-14

Halsey, Admiral William E., Jr.—Continued

on Griswold: 268

influence on CARTWHEEL operations summarized:

381-82

and Kavieng: 27on, 306-09, 310-11

and MacArthur: 25, 349-50, 381-82

and New Georgia operations: 73-74, 75, 76, 92,

98-99, 123-24, 168-69, 173, 175, 183

and theater strategy: 10-12, 13, 16-18, 16n, 25-

26, 27, 225, 226-29, 306-09, 310

Hand-carry of supplies: 104, 115, 116, 170, 183, 267,

361, 368

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T.: 12n

Hansa Bay: 215, 273, 306, 316, 317, 322, 379

Hara (or Nagahara), Major: 81, 84, 159

Harassing tactics, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese,

night harassment.

Harmon, Lt. Gen. Millard F.: 228, 308, 381

appoints Griswold to command New Georgia Occupation Force: 123-24, 126

and Bougainville: 266, 268

and CHRONICLE (Woodlark-Kiriwina) operations:

49 command and force: 69

on Munda operations: 168-69

and New Georgia operations: 73, 76, 123-26, 139,

140, 142, 143, 168-69, 178n

at Pacific Military Conference: 12n, 14, 16

Harris, Brig. Gen. Field: 261

Hauwei: 340-43

Heavey, Brig. Gen. William F.: 285-86, 285n, 297

Heavy bombers. See Aircraft, Allied, B-17's; Aircraft, Allied, B-24's; Bombers, heavy.

Heavy weapons. See Machine guns, Allied; Mortars, Allied.

Helena: 99

Hellzapoppin Ridge: 265

Henshaw, 2d Lt. Marvin J.: 326, 328

Herndon, Col. J. Prugh: 53, 57n, 58

Herring, Lt. Gen. E. F.: 61, 189, 196

Hester, Maj. Gen. John H. See also Infantry divisions, 43d.

command and force: 73, 76, 77

and XIV Corps Munda offensive: 147, 149

landings at Rendova and Zanana: 88, 90, 91, 92

operations on New Georgia Island: 98, 104, 105,

110, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120

relief as commander of New Georgia Occupation

Force: 76, 122-24, 126

Hewitt, Air Commodore J. E.: 53

Hill 250: 359, 365

Hill 260: 354, 356, 364-71

Hill 270: 354

Hill 309: 354, 356, 364, 365, 372

Hill 600: 356, 359, 365

Hill 608: 354, 355, 356, 364, 365

Hill 700: 354, 355, 356, 358-64

Hill 1000: 355
INDEX 407

Hill 1111: 355, 357, 358

Hipp, Maj. Frank: 155

Hirashima, Col. Shuhei: 280

Hirata, Col. Genjiro: 97, 159

Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.: 149, 158, 164, 172, 267,

366, 367, 381. See also Infantry divisions, 43d.

Hoffman, Col. Hugh T.: 323, 332-33

Holland, Col. Temple G.: 118, 119, 120, 123, 135,

137, 142, 149, 152, 155

Hollandia: 304, 379-80

Honolulu: 105

Horaniu: 180, 181-83

Horseshoe Hill: 119, 134, 139, 146, 150, 152, 153,

158, 159

Hospitals

17th Field: 122n, 140

30th Portable Surgical: 323

House Fireman Beach (Arawe): 283, 285-86

Humphreys: 55, 284, 285

Hundley, Col. Daniel H.: 78, 147n

Hundley, Lt. Col. Preston J.: 373

Hunter Liggett: 244

Huon Peninsula: 13, 215. See also Finschhafen;

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations;

Saidor.

Hyakutake, Lt. Gen. Haruyoshi: 35-36, 235-235n,

238, 240, 248, 259, 351-52, 356-58, 357n, 371,

375, 375n. See also Japanese Army units, Armies, 17th.

Hyane Harbour: 319, 331, 323-24, 330, 332

Hydaker, Lt. Col. Vernor E.: 150, 154

I Operation: 42-44

Ilangana: 146-49

Illumination, night: 355, 359, 374

Imamura, General Hitoshi: 34-36, 39, 42, 45-46,

98-99, 180, 194-95, 199, 205, 211, 213, 221, 238,

248, 276, 280-82, 287, 294, 303, 310-11, 319, 330,

351, 377. See also Japanese Army units, Area

armies, 8th.

Imperial General Headquarters: 32, 34-35, 36, 42,

45, 46, 172, 184, 195, 211, 212-13, 238, 287, 304, 311, 382

Independence: 254

Infantry divisions

Americal: 2, 69, 149, 227, 236, 266-67

and Bougainville counteroffensive: 352-54,

357- 358, 359, 364-71

casualties (Hill 260): 371

24th: 276, 317

25th: 69, 124, 149, 159, 226, 227n

casualties: 121n, 187

New Georgia operations after Munda: 161-

62, 167-70, 176-78

32d: 2, 6, 317

Arawe: 275-76, 276n, 277, 277n, 279

Saidor: 296-302

Infantry divisions—Continued

37th: 2. See also Beightler, Maj. Gen. Robert S.

and Bougainville counteroffensive: 352-54,

357, 358-64, 372-77

in Bougainville invasion: 227, 236, 237, 238,

256-59, 261, 267

casualties: 121n, 187, 364

New Georgia operations: 69, 75, 76, 95, 124-

25, 137-38, 144, 144n. 149-58, 158-59, 161, 164, 167, 169

40th: 266, 266n

41st: 2, 58, 61, 62n, 200-201

43d: 227n. See also Hester, Maj. Gen. John H.;

Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.; Infantry regiments,

103d; Infantry regiments, 169th; Infantry regiments, 172d.

casualties: 121, 121n, 167-68, 187

command: 69, 76, 124, 126, 149

early New Georgia operations: 111, 111n, 112,

118, 135, 136

in XIV Corps offensive: 137, 140, 144, 144n,

146-49, 158, 164, 167

"war neurosis" among troops: 121, 121n

93d: 378n

Infantry regiments. See also Regimental combat

teams.

24th: 355, 355n, 363, 378n

27th: 159, 167, 169-70, 184, 186

35th: 169, 178, 178n, 183

103d: 81, 82, 106, 110, 115, 116-18, 121, 136, 136n,

137, 137n, 144, 144n, 147-49, 158, 159, 163, 174-

75, 184

126th: 296, 298, 301, 304

129th: 354, 356, 358, 359, 372-77

132d: 354, 354n, 367, 369-70

145th: 95, 99-103, 122-23, 124, 129, 131, 137-38.

144-46, 144n, 149, 150, 152-53, 155, 158, 163,

178n, 183, 354, 358-64

147th: 2

148th: 95, 96, 99-102, 103, 124-25, 129, 130-31,

136, 137-38, 144. 144n. 149. 150, 154-58, 159. 163-64, 169, 354, 363, 376

158th: 53, 55, 56, 58, 277, 288, 289

161st: 144-46, 144n, 149-52, 154-57, 158, 163,

167-68

162d: 60, 61, 62, 65, 200-202, 201n

164th: 354, 369

169th: 78, 85, 93, 94, 106-15, 118-20, 121, 122-23,

132, 134-35, 136, 137, 144, 144n, 147, 149, 158,

159, 163, 172, 184

172d: 85, 86n, 87, 93, 94, 106, 109-18, 120, 121,

132-34. 137, 144-46, 147, 149n, 158, 162, 172, 184

182d: 354, 365-72

503d Parachute: 20, 192, 194, 207-10, 211, 276,

277-78
408 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Intelligence, Allied. See also Coastwatchers; Reconnaissance, Allied,

on Bougainville counteroffensive: 352

estimates for Admiralties: 320-21, 322, 330, 333

estimates for Bougainville: 235

estimates for CARTWHEEL: 13, 30-31, 47, 48

estimates for New Georgia: 112, 129, 146, 178

estimates for northeast New Guinea: 214

estimates for western New Britain: 276

on Madang-Lae road: 41-42

for Nassau Bay: 63

for Yamamoto attack: 44

Intelligence, Japanese: 259, 261, 330, 351

Inter-Allied co-ordination: 20, 201n

Interior lines: 255, 382

Interservice co-ordination: 20, 187-88, 189, 276. See

also Unity of command.

Interservice co-ordination, Japanese: 32-34, 35

Intertheater co-ordination, and mutual support:

18-19, 26, 27-29, 49-50

Ito, Maj. Gen. Takeo: 311

Iwasa, Maj. Gen. Shun: 259, 356, 362

Iwasa Unit. See Japanese Army units.

Jackson, Col. William D.: 201

Japanese Army air units

Army, 4th Air: 46, 195, 198, 219, 282, 301, 304,

319, 331

Brigades

8th Air: 287

14th Air: 195

Divisions

6th Air: 34, 46, 63, 195, 287

7th Air: 46, 195, 219, 282

Regiment, 68th Air: 42

Japanese Army units. See also Southeastern Detachment.

Area armies

2d: 280-82, 287, 304

8th: 34, 35, 36n, 46, 47, 63, 118, 180, 280, 304,

312

Armies

17th: 34, 36, 36n, 46, 98, 180, 235, 238, 351-52,

357, 358-78

18th: 34, 35, 37, 46, 63, 295, 304, 379

Battalion, 2d Independent Antitank: 144n

Brigades

35th: 36n

65th: 213, 280, 280n, 294

Divisions

2d: 36n

6th: 36, 46, 129, 172, 238, 259, 351, 358

17th: 213, 238, 248, 248n, 259, 280, 287, 294,

351, 356 20th: 35, 39, 46, 211, 212, 213-14, 219, 220-21,

303-04

38th: 36n, 144n, 172, 213, 310

Japanese Army units—Continued

Divisions—Continued

41st: 35, 39, 46, 63, 194, 213, 303

51st: 35, 39, 46, 63, 211-12, 213, 214, 303-04

Garrison Unit, 4th South Seas: 238, 377

Iwasa Unit: 356, 357, 359-64, 375

Kawaguchi Force. See Japanese Army units, Brigades, 35th.

Magata Unit: 356, 357, 372-77

Muda Unit: 356, 364-71, 375

Regiments

1st Independent Mixed: 311, 319, 330, 333,

334-35

6th Cavalry: 377

6th Field Artillery: 129, 182

13th Infantry: 97, 98, 105, 135-37, 146, 154-

58, 171, 172, 184, 185, 352, 356, 359n, 364-

71, 375

14th Artillery: 63

21st Field Artillery: 213

21st Infantry: 194

23d Field Artillery: 280

23d Infantry: 171-72, 246, 259, 261, 352, 356,

359-62, 359n- 375

45th Infantry: 105, 129, 182, 352, 356, 373-77

51st Engineer: 63

51st Transport: 319

53d Infantry: 248, 356

54th Infantry: 248, 280

66th Infantry: 63, 319

79th Infantry: 220

80th Infantry: 213, 220

81st Infantry: 280, 288, 356, 375

90th Independent Mountain Artillery: 1440

102d Infantry: 38, 63, 194

115th Infantry: 63, 194

141st Infantry: 280, 287, 288, 294

228th Infantry: 280

229th Infantry: 81, 82, 88, 97, 98, 108, 114,

134, 135-36, 135n, 144, 159, 171-72, 319,

330

230th Infantry: 144-46, 171-72, 310, 311

238th Infantry: 219

Shipping groups

1st: 213

4th: 213, 280, 294

Japanese naval air units

Fleets

11th Air: 34, 42, 219, 233, 248, 253, 255, 287

12th Air: 248

Japanese naval units. See also Southeastern Fleet.

Fleets

3d: 34, 233

8th: 34, 97, 98, 159, 172, 180, 185, 226, 238, 248

Landing forces

7th Combined Special Naval: 36, 46

8th Combined Special Naval: 36, 36n, 46, 97
INDEX 409

Japanese naval units—Continued

landing forces—Continued

Kure 6th Special Naval: 36n, 82, 88, 97, 101,

103, 129

Yokosuka 7th Special Naval: 36n, 97

Naval Base Force, 14th: 311, 319

Jintsu: 105

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1-8, 11-12, 222-25, 305, 307,

308, 309, 349, 379. See also Directive of 2 July

1942, JCS; Directive of 28 March 1943, JCS.

Joint Staff Planners: 15, 16

Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 15, 15n, 224

Joint War Plans Committee: 15n

Josselyn, Lt. Henry: 174-75, 183

Jungle. See Jungle fighting; Terrain; Weather.

Jungle fighting: 159-63. See also Tactics, Allied;

Tactics, Japanese; Terrain,

advance in columns necessary: 112, 291, 292

close air support problems: 142

co-ordinated attack problems: 278

importance of good perimeter defenses: 108, 329-

30. See also Field fortifications, Allied; Perimeter defenses.

lateral contact problems: 112, 154-57, 161-63

psychological problems: 108-09, 112-13. See also

"Snipers," Japanese; Tactics, Japanese, night

harassment.

reconnaissance problems: 161, 163

supply problems: 163. See also Air supply;

Hand-carry of supplies; Logistics, Allied, supply problems.

Kaeruka: 83

Kahili: 226-27, 232, 234

Kaiapit: 216-17

Kanawha: 43

Kanda, Lt. Gen. Masatane: 238, 351, 351n, 356, 356n,

358, 359n, 371, 375n KANGA Force: 36-38

Kato, Lt. Gen. Rimpei: 45

Katsarsky, Lt. Col. Slaftcho: 150, 156

Kavieng

air attacks on: 27on, 310-11

in Allied strategy: 13, 27, 224-25, 228, 272, 306

bypassed: 306, 379

in Japanese strategy: 310-11

plans for taking: 13, 27, 224-25, 273, 306-09, 316

Kelley, 1st Lt. John R.: 134

Kelley Hill: 136

Kennedy, Donald G.: 71, 81, 82-83, 89

Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.: 209, 350, 350n, 381

Admiralties air operations: 319-21, 322

air attacks on Kavieng: 314

air attacks on Rabaul: 230-32, 232n, 253-54, 271

and Bismarck Sea, Battle of the: 39-41

and CHRONICLE (Woodlark-Kiriwina): 49

command: 22

Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.—Continued

New Guinea air operations: 43-44, 190-91, 192,

195, 208, 215, 216

at Pacific Military Conference: 12n, 18n

and theater strategy: 16n, 273-74, 307, 308

western New Britain air operations: 278, 282

Kieta: 27, 227, 232, 234, 238

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 7, 12, 16, 18, 224-25, 224n,

307, 349

Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C.: 299, 308, 313, 316,

320, 321-22, 325-26, 328-29, 338, 350, 381

Kinsler, Col. Kenneth H.: 207

Kiriwina Force. See Kiriwina Task Force.

Kiriwini Island. See also Operation I, ELKTON

III.

in Allied strategy: 273

geography: 50

picked as Allied objective: 14-16, 19

plans for taking: 26

seizure: 49-59

strategic importance: 15

Kiriwina Task Force: 53, 54, 57

Kirk, Lt. Col. Robert P.: 336, 342

Kirkwell-Smith, Sub-Lt. Andrew: 277n

Kitagiri, Lt. Gen. Shigeru: 214, 219, 220-21

Koga, Admiral Mineichi: 48, 233-34, 248, 252-53,

255, 312

Kojima, Capt. Bunzo: 114, 134, 136, 159

Kokengolo Hill: 163-64

Kolombangara: 97-99, 105, 173, 184, 187. See also

Vila.

Kolombangara, Battle of: 105

Komori, Maj. Masamitsu: 280, 286, 287-88

Kreber, Brig. Gen. Leo N.: 261, 266, 355, 364n, 377

Kriner, Capt. G. C.: 174

Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter: 20, 29, 379n, 381

and Admiralties operations: 316, 317, 321-23, 327,

335-36, 348, 349 and CHRONICLE (Woodlark-Kiriwina) operations:

49, 53, 54, 58 and DEXTERITY (western New Britain-Saidor) operations: 272, 274, 275, 276-79, 283-84, 288-89,

293, 295-96, 299, 302

Krulak, Lt. Col. Victor H.: 241

Kula Gulf, Battle of: 98-99

Kurita, Vice Adm. Takeo: 252

Kusaka, Vice Adm. Jinichi: 34, 89, 91, 98-99, 213,

233, 240, 248, 253, 314, 315

L-4's. See Aircraft, Allied.

Lae. See also Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula

operations; Operation II, ELKTON III.

in Allied strategy: 190, 214

in Japanese strategy: 2, 34-35, 41-42, 46

picked as Allied objectives: 19

plans for taking: 27, 190-94

seizure: 202-07, 210-12

Laiana: 114-17, 132
410 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Lakunai: 230, 230n, 311

Lambeti Plantation: 146, 158

Landing craft, Allied: 286n, 313. See also Rubber

boats.

Barges, Japanese: 64

LCI's: 56, 57, 78, 82, 83, 92, 176, 178, 179, 193, 204,

205, 218, 237, 241, 298, 299, 300, 315

LCI's, with rockets: 290, 298, 300

LCI (G)'s: 239, 239n, 240

LCI (L)'s: 239, 239n

LCM's: 57, 64, 88, 117, 176, 193, 206, 218, 239, 249,

250, 260, 279, 283, 286, 300, 315, 332, 338, 339,

342, 343

LCP (R)'s: 55, 56, 95, 117, 240, 299, 300, 325,

326-28

LCT's: 57, 76, 78, 92, 193, 204, 237, 239, 286, 287,

315

LCV's: 339, 340-41, 343

LCVP's: 64, 83, 178, 193, 206, 218, 219, 221, 221n,

249, 279, 283, 286, 288, 315

LSD's: 284

LST's: 56, 76, 78, 91, 176, 178, 179-80, 181, 193,

204, 205, 218, 235, 237, 239, 240, 256, 282, 284n,

290, 291, 298, 299, 300, 302, 313, 315, 332, 338,

343, 339

LVT (1)'s (Alligators): 285, 286

LVT (A) (2)'s (Buffaloes): 285, 286

Landing craft, Japanese: 185

Lanphier, Capt. Thomas G.: 44

Leahy, Admiral William D.: 224

Leander, HMNZS: 105

Lindauer, Lt. Col. Bernard J.: 137

Line of Communications units: 22, 29, 191

Lines of communications

Japanese: 10, 94

United States to Australia: 1-2, 6, 381

Liversedge, Col. Harry B.: 78, 92, 94-96, 98, 99, 102,

104, 105, 126, 127-31, 143, 144, 168, 171

Loads, effect of weight on troops: 101, 111, 171.

See also Flame throwers.

Lobit, Lt. Col. William E.: 327, 328, 329, 335

Lockhart, Lt. J. C.: 168n

Logistics, Allied. See also Air supply; Amphibious

operations, Allied, clearing the beaches; Amphibious operations, Allied, unloading; Handcarry of supplies,

base development: 267-69, 302, 349-50. See also

Airfield and airstrip construction, Allied,

plans for Bougainville: 237-38

plans for CARTWHEEL: 29-30

plans for Markham Valley operations: 191

plans for western New Britain: 279

preparations for New Georgia invasion: 72-73

staging points for supplying beachhead: 93

stockpiling of supplies: 72, 78, 359

supply lines, tactical: 154-57, 261, 368, 369

Logistics, Allied—Continued

supply problems: 59-60, 90, 93, 114-16, 194-95,

216, 275, 299

supply problems, isolated units under fire: 104,

134-35, 157, 359, 368

supply systems: 139-40, 209

Logistics, Japanese: 352. See also Food shortages,

Japanese.

Long, Col. William D.: 364n, 366-67, 366n, 369,

369n, 370n, 372n

Lorengau: 316, 319, 321, 322, 330, 339-48

Los Negros: 317-18, 320, 321, 348

Lowry, Lt. Col. Dexter: 366-67, 368n

Lugos Mission: 339, 343

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 12n

M1 rifle: 161, 246

MacArthur, General Douglas: 6, 49, 54, 67, 305,

350n, 379-80 and Admiralties operations: 316, 320-21, 323, 325-

26, 328-29, 349-50, 350n

command: 3-4, 5, 18-19, 20-22, 29

and DEXTERITY (western New Britain-Saidor) operations: 273-75, 276, 277, 278, 284, 295-96, 299,

305 and Halsey: 25-26, 349-50, 381-82

influence on CARTWHEEL operations summarized:

381-82

and Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations: 190-91, 192, 193, 209, 214-16

and theater strategy: 9-10, 11-13, 16-18, 16n, 25-

26, 214-16, 223-29, 273-75, 306-09, 313. See

also RENO.

Machine guns, Allied: 134, 151, 220, 266, 332, 334,

335, 359, 373

Machine guns, Japanese: 103, 113-14, 116, 130, 131,

132, 147, 157, 238, 240, 245, 324, 332

MacKechnie, Col. Archibald R.: 62, 65, 201, 201n

MacKechnie Force: 61, 62, 64-66, 200-201, 201n

Madang

in Allied strategy: 190, 214, 216, 317

in Japanese strategy: 34-35, 213

Japanese withdrawal: 303, 304

picked as Allied objective: 14, 19

plans for taking: 27

Magata, Col. Isaoshi: 356, 373, 374-75

Magata Unit. See Japanese Army units.

Mahan: 326-27

Mahoney, Lt. Col. William: 368

Manus Island: 224, 225, 272, 306, 307, 308-09, 313,

316

description: 317

seizure: 336, 339-48

Maps: 106, 150n, 162, 170

Marchant, William S.: 71

Marches, Japanese: 211-12, 303-04
INDEX 411

Marilinan: 196, 208

Marine air units: 141

Air wings

1st: 69, 269, 358

2d: 69, 78

fighter squadrons

VMF 123: 165

VMF 124: 165

VMF 216: 269

Marine units. See also Marine air units.

Battalions: 53n

1st Amphibian Tractor: 283, 317

1st Parachute: 236

1st Raider: 99-103, 129-31, 168

1st Tank: 289

2d Parachute: 236, 241

2d Provisional Raider: 236

3d Defense: 238, 243, 249-50, 267, 355

3d Raider: 260

4th Defense: 178, 180, 181

4th Raider: 81, 82-83, 84, 95n, 105, 129-31,

130n, 168

9th Defense: 76, 90, 91, 92, 94, 106, 110, 117,

132, 134, 144, 161

10th Defense: 151, 161

12th Defense: 53, 56, 57, 277, 279

Corps, I Amphibious: 69, 226, 228, 236, 257, 261,

266, 267n. See also Geiger, Maj. Gen. Roy S.;

Vandegrift, Maj. Gen. Alexander A.; Vogel,

Maj. Gen. Clayton B.

Divisions

1st: 5, 20, 69, 223-24, 275-76, 278, 279, 287,

289-95, 290

2d: 169n, 223-24, 226, 227n

3d: 226, 227, 236, 237, 238, 255, 257-59, 261,

265, 266-67, 267n

Regiments

1st: 291-94

1st Raider: 71, 76, 95

3d: 244, 246, 256-57, 260

4th: 380, 38on

5th: 293-94

7th: 290-92, 294

9th: 244, 260

11th: 291

12th: 267

21st: 255-56, 257, 260, 265

Markham Valley: 190. See also Markham ValleyHuon Peninsula operations.

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations: 49,

60, 61, 189-221. See also Operation II, ELKTON III.

Finschhafen: 217-21

Japanese counterattack: 219-21

Japanese withdrawal: 212-14

Lae operations: 202-07, 209-12

Nadzab parachute jump: 207-09

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations—Continued

plans and preparations: 189-99, 214-16

Ramu Valley advance: 216-17

Salamaua attack: 199-202

Marland, Maj. Sidney P., Jr.: 13

Marshall, General George C.: 7, 18, 224-25, 306,

307, 382

Marshall, Maj. Gen. Richard J.: 22, 29, 191. See

also U.S. Army Services of Supply, SWPA.

Martin, Brig. Gen. Clarence A.: 277, 298, 296-303,

300n, 303n, 304

Mather, Maj. John V.: 277n

Matsuda, Maj. Gen. Iwao: 213, 280, 294

Mayfield, Capt. Frank G.: 334

McCawley: 75, 86, 90

McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert B.: 178, 181, 182-83

McCulloch, Brig. Gen. William A.: 367, 367n, 369,

371

McGill, Sgt. Troy A.: 335

McKean: 82, 240, 257, 267n

McMains, Maj. D. M.: 55

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.: 12n

Medical battalions

25th: 178n

112th: 137

116th: 62n, 201n

Medical problems, Allied: 120-22

malaria: 120, 268

mental disturbances: 113, 120-22, 140. See also

Jungle fighting, psychological problems.

Medical problems, Japanese: 159, 212, 294

Medical treatment: 120, 122, 122n, 140. See also

Evacuation of wounded.

Medium bombers. See Aircraft, Allied, B-25's; Aircraft, Allied, B-26's; Bombers, medium.

Melanesians: 23, 25, 234-35, 319. See also Natives.

Mellichamp, Capt. Paul K.: 152n

Merrill, Rear Adm. Aaron Stanton: 85, 111, 235,

242, 248, 251-52, 314

Merritt, Capt. Bruce: 335

MICHAELMAS Task Force: 296-302, 304

Mikawa, Vice Adm. Gunichi: 172

Milford, Maj. Gen. E. J.: 201

Miller, Col. Alexander M.: 277, 282

Milne Bay: 54, 279, 325

Mines, land, Japanese: 338, 342, 247

Mitchell, Maj. John W.: 44

Mitchell, Maj. Gen. Ralph J.: 270-71

Mitscher, Rear Adm. Marc A.: 69, 75, 129-30, 143

Moa, HMAS: 43

Momote Plantation airfield: 316, 319, 321, 322, 327,

332-33, 348, 350

Mono Island: 239-41

Monterey: 311

Montgomery, Rear Adm. Alfred L.: 254

Montpelier: 252

Moosbrugger, Comdr. Frederick: 172
412 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Morale, Allied: 112-13, 120. See also Jungle fighting, psychological problems.

Morale and soldierly qualities, Japanese: 212, 239,

304, 351, 382

Mortars, Allied

conditions prevent use: 161-62

defensive fire: 136, 368

fire into ravines: 376

jury-rigged for throwing gasoline cans: 371

preparation fire: 103, 130, 134, 150, 342, 344, 369,

374

4.2-inch chemical: 184, 266, 359, 363

60-mm.: 101, 103, 161, 334, 363, 367, 370

81-mm.: 109, 131, 151, 161, 334, 344, 363

Mortars, Japanese: 114, 115-16, 130, 152, 240, 361-

62

Muda, Col. Toyoharei: 356, 364

Muda Unit. See Japanese Army units.

Mudge, Brig. Gen. Verne D.: 339, 340, 342, 344,

345-46

Mulcahy, Brig. Gen. Francis P.: 78, 119, 165-67, 181

Mumma, Lt. Comdr. Morton C.: 289

Munda

capture of airfield: 158-59, 163-64

description: 10-11, 70, 71, 72

offensive against: 97-158, 169

plans for taking: 13, 16, 73, 76-77, 92

repair and enlargement of airfield: 165-67

strategic importance: 11

Munda-Bairoko Occupation Force: 92

Munson, Maj. Delbert: 183

Murray, Col. John T.: 58

Nadzab

Allied bomber staging base: 230, 343

in Allied strategy: 273

description: 191

development: 203-09, 216-17

seizure: 207-11

strategic importance: 194, 211

Nagahara, Major. See Hara (or Nagahara), Major.

Nagatsuki: 99

Nakai, Maj. Gen. Masutaro: 214, 217, 303, 304

Nakano, Lt. Gen. Hidemitsu: 63, 65, 211, 303

Nashville: 290, 321

Nassau Bay: 49, 59-66

Natives: 23, 25, 41, 71, 81, 95, 234-35, 314, 319. See

also Fiji Guerrillas, 1st Commando; Fiji Infantry Regiment; Papuan Infantry Battalion.

as carriers: 104, 131

in construction work: 302

as guides: 93, 99-101, 108, 183

as pilots: 86

reconnaissance by: 112, 169, 174

Naval bases, Allied: 306, 316, 349-50. See also PT

boat bases.

Naval construction units. See also Seabees.

Battalions: 76

20th: 81

24th: 90, 93, 165

40th: 323, 332

58th: 178, 181

73d: 165

87th: 237

Brigade, 4th: 323

Regiment, 22d: 315

Naval operations, Allied

Battle of the Bismarck Sea: 39-41

Battle of Cape Saint George: 265

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay: 251-52

Battle of Kolombangara: 105

Battle of Kula Gulf: 98-99

Battle of Vella Gulf: 171, 174, 185

Battle of Vella Lavella: 186

bombardment of airfields: 72

carrier-based air strikes. See Air operations,

Allied, carrier-based air strikes.

counterbattery fire: 77, 88, 358n

preparation fire for infantry advance: 110-11, 143,

146, 146n

shore bombardment: 198-200, 312

support of amphibious landings

Admiralties: 321-22, 325-27, 332, 338, 342,

343

Bougainville: 235-36, 241-43, 244, 245, 246,

251-53

CHRONICLE (Woodlark-Kiriwina): 51

DEXTERITY (western New Britain-Saidor):

286, 290, 298, 300

New Georgia: 77, 86

New Guinea: 203, 218

support of infantry defense: 358n

Naval operations, Japanese: 91, 251

Battle of the Bismarck Sea: 39-41

Battle of Cape Saint George: 265

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay: 251-52

Battle of Kolombangara: 105

Battle of Kula Gulf: 98-99

Battle of Vella Gulf: 172, 174, 185

Battle of Vella Lavella: 186

Naval strength, Allied (SWPA): 10

Naval strength, Japanese: 13, 30, 47, 48

Naval task organizations

Eastern Force (TOENAILS): 77, 78, 85

Northern Force (Task Force 31) (Vella Lavella):

179-84

Task Force 31

Bougainville: 235, 236, 237, 244

TOENAILS: 74, 75, 126, 167

Vella Lavella: 179-84

Task Force 32 (South Pacific Amphibious Force)

(TOENAILS): 67, 73, 75, 126
INDEX 413

Naval task organizations—Continued

Task Force 33 (South Pacific Aircraft)

Bougainville: 235-36, 253

TOENAILS: 67, 73-75

Vella Lavella: 175, 178

Task Force 36 (TOENAILS): 74, 75, 85

Task Force 38 (Bougainville): 235, 242, 252-53,

254

Task Force 39 (Bougainville): 235, 242, 251-52,

256

Task Force 72

Bougainville: 235

TOENAILS: 73

Vella Lavella: 175

Task Force 74

Admiralties: 338

Cape Gloucester: 290

TOENAILS: 51

Task Force 76

Arawe: 284, 287, 288n

Cape Gloucester: 290, 290n

Lae: 202-03, 205

TOENAILS: 51, 54

Western Force (Task Group 31.1) (TOENAILS):

77, 78, 91, 92, 167

Task Group 31.2 (TOENAILS): 77

Netherlands forces: 20

Netherlands Navy: 22

New Britain: 273-74, 280. See also Arawe; DEXTERITY; Cape Gloucester; Rabaul.

New Britain Force. See ALAMO Force.

New Georgia. See also Operation A, ELKTON III.

bypassing of Kolombangara: 171-84

controversy over timing of operations: 16-18

geography: 70-71

drive for Munda: 97-164

first phase of operations. See TOENAILS.

in Japanese strategy: 98

summary of operations: 187

New Georgia Air Force: 78, 92

New Georgia Attack Force. See Naval task organizations, Task Force 31, TOENAILS.

New Georgia Occupation Force: 75-76, 77, 85, 87n,

91, 121, 121n, 123, 126, 175. See also Hester,

Maj. Gen. John H.; Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.

New Guinea. See also Markham Valley-Huon

Peninsula operations; Nassau Bay; Saidor,

geography: 23

New Guinea Administrative Unit: 62n, 302, 323

New Guinea Force: 22, 29, 38, 296

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations: 61,

189-91, 192n, 207, 214, 216, 272, 295-96

New Ireland. See Kavieng.

New Zealand units: 67, 183n

Brigade, 8th: 238, 240-41

Brigade groups

8th: 236, 237

14th: 183

New Zealand units—Continued

Division, 3d: 169n, 183, 226, 227, 236, 237, 313-15

Fighter Squadron, No. 15 RNZAF: 45

Nicholson: 338

Night attacks, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese,

night attacks.

Niizuki: 99

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.: 381

and Central Pacific offensive: 126, 235, 311-12

command: 4, 18-19, 67

and Kavieng: 307-09, 316, 379

and plans for Admiralties operations: 307-09, 316

reinforcements for Halsey: 235, 254

and Seeadler Harbour: 306, 349

and theater strategy: 11-12, 307-09

and Yamamoto attack: 44

Nissan Island: 313, 314

Noble, Brig. Gen. Alfred H.: 250, 380

Nonbattle casualties: 187. See also Medical problems, Allied, mental disturbances.

North Knob, Hill 260: 364-71

North Pacific Area: 2-4

Northern Landing Group: 94-96, 99-106, 127-31.

See also Liversedge, Col. Harry B.

Nouméa: 72-73

Okabe, Maj. Gen. Toru: 37, 38, 39

Olds, 2d Lt. James F., Jr.: 148, 148n

Omori, Vice Adm. Sentaro: 247, 248, 251-52

Onaiavisi Occupation Unit: 78, 85

OP Tree, Hill 260: 365-71

Operation I, ELKTON III: 26-27

Operation II, ELKTON III: 27, 189, 272, 304. See

also POSTERN.

Operation III, ELKTON III: 27, 228, 272

Operation A, ELKTON III: 26-27. See also TOENAILS.

Operation B, ELKTON III: 27, 222

Operation C, ELKTON III: 27

Opposition, Japanese. See also Amphibious operations, enemy response to landings; Counterattacks, Japanese; Counteroffensive on Bougainville, Japanese,

air: 232, 320. See also Amphibious operations,

enemy response to landings.

Bougainville: 261

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula operations:

218-19

New Georgia: 96, 101, 111-12, 120, 188

Orientation of troops, importance of: 121-22

Oro Bay: 230, 279, 325

Ota, Rear Adm. Minoru: 97-98

Owens, Sgt. Robert A.: 246

Ozawa, Vice Adm. Tokusaburo: 233-34

P-38's. See Aircraft, Allied.

P-39's. See Aircraft, Allied.

P-40's. See Aircraft, Allied.
414 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

P-47's. See Aircraft, Allied.

Pacific Fleet: 18-19, 255

Pacific Military Conference: 11-15, 195

Pacific Ocean Areas: 2-4

Papuan Infantry Battalion: 62n, 63, 65, 201n, 208

Paratroops. See Airborne operations; Infantry regiments, 503d Parachute.

Parker, Lt. Col. Theodore L.: 123, 152, 153

Patrick, Brig. Gen. Edwin D.: 297, 299

Patrol activity, Allied. See also Reconnaissance,

Allied.

Admiralties: 340-41

Bougainville: 269

New Georgia: 92-93, 101-02, 104, 108, 135, 153,

154

New Guinea: 302-03

Patrol activity, Japanese: 115, 331

Patrol Wing 10: 282

Pat's Nose: 361, 362, 364

PB4Y4's (Navy Liberators). See Aircraft, Allied.

PBY's (Black Cats): See Aircraft, Allied.

Pearl Harbor conference, January 1944: 307, 308-09

Peck, Brig. Gen. Dewitt: 12n, 14, 73

Perimeter defenses: 94, 108, 131, 134, 180, 250, 260,

265-66, 288, 329, 333-34, 352-56. See also Field

fortifications, Allied.

Petrarca, Pfc. Frank J.: 153n

Philippines, in Allied strategy: 272, 273, 305, 307,

308, 380, 381

Phoenix: 290, 321, 325, 326, 329

Physical fitness of troops, importance: 121-22

Pillboxes, Allied: 355, 359

Pillboxes, Japanese. See Field fortifications, Japanese.

"Pistol Pete": 167, 172

Piva airstrips: 271, 309, 356, 358, 373

Plans, Allied. See Amphibious operations, planning; Strategy, Allied; Tactical plans, Allied;

Theater strategy, Allied.

Plans, Japanese. See Strategy, Japanese; Tactical

plans, Japanese.

Pollock, Col. Edwin A.: 278

POSTERN: 189. See also Markham Valley-Huon

Peninsula operations; Operation II, ELKTON

III.

Potter, Brigadier Leslie: 183

Powell, Lt. Col. Floyd G.: 55

President Jackson: 256

Princeton: 235

Prisoners of war as laborers for Japanese: 339

Provisional Service Command (Bougainville): 268

PT boat bases: 272, 274, 274n, 289, 302, 306, 313,

315

PT boats: 90, 176, 211

in Bougainville invasion: 236, 239

against enemy lines of communications: 186, 195,

198, 210, 218, 221

PT boats—Continued

patrol: 259, 276, 284, 290

transport troops: 64, 174, 288, 340-41

Puruata Island: 256, 261, 267

PV-1's (Vega Ventura night fighters). See Aircraft, Allied.

Rabaul: 305

air attacks on: 230-32, 252-53, 254, 269, 309-12

decision to bypass and neutralize: 222-25

forces available for advance on: 9-10, 11

forces needed for advance on: 14, 17

Japanese estimate of Allied intentions: 280

operations against. See Bismarck Archipelago;

CARTWHEEL.

plans for advance on: 5, 10. See also Directive

of 2 July 1942, JCS; ELKTON; ELKTON III.

plans for neutralization: 227-28, 272, 273, 317

strategic importance: 1, 2, 32, 255, 312

strength of Japanese defenses: 312, 351

Radar: 91, 94, 95, 181, 193, 205, 240, 241, 248, 261,

292.

Radcliffe, Lt. Col. Herbert: 150, 154, 363

Radios: 65, 143, 151. See also Amphibious operations, communications problems; Communications problems.

Rail: 85

Ralph Talbot: 85, 95

Ramey, Col. Roger M.: 53

Ramsey, Maj. Ignatius M.: 149

Ramu Valley: 190, 214-17, 295-96

Rapopo: 230, 230n

Rations: 268-69, 269n. See also Logistics, Allied,

supply problems, isolated units under fire.

Reconnaissance, Allied. See also Airfields, Allied

reconnaissance for sites; Amphibious operations,

preinvasion parties; Patrol activity, Allied.

Admiralties, in force: 319-32

air: 39, 49, 235, 251, 282, 320, 322

air photo reconnaissance: 128, 163, 198, 276-77,

282, 297, 320

Bougainville: 375

in force, for Admiralties: 319-32

Green Islands: 313, 314

Nassau Bay: 63

New Georgia: 71-72, 94, 95n, 99, 101, 103, 112,

115, 127-28, 132, 138, 148, 152-53, 158-59, 161,

163

New Georgia (Vella Lavella): 173-75, 181

submarine: 75, 235

western New Britain: 276-77

Woodlark-Kiriwina: 49, 55

Reconnaissance, Japanese: 108, 239

Regimental combat teams

12th Cavalry: 338

25th: 378n

35th: 176, 178n, 180

126th: 277, 296, 299n
INDEX 415

Regimental combat teams—Continued

128th: 302

129th: 144, 257

132d: 267

145th: 257

148th: 256

158th: 55

161st: 125-26, 137-38

162d: 61

164th: 267

172d: 91

182d: 267

Reid: 193, 205, 219

Reifsnider, Commodore Laurence F.: 244, 249, 380

Reincke: Lt. Col. Frederick D.: 119, 122

Reincke Ridge: 118-20, 134

Reinforcements, Allied

Admiralties: 329, 335-36

air, for SWPA: 195

Bougainville: 250, 255-59

New Georgia: 105, 124-26, 137-38, 167-69

Reinforcements, Japanese

Admiralties: 319

air, for New Guinea: 195

Bougainville: 265

New Georgia: 99, 104-05

Rendova: 71, 73, 76-77, 78, 85-92, 98

Rendova Advance Unit: 78

RENO: 10. See also MacArthur, General Douglas,

and theater strategy; RENO III.

RENO III: 273, 273n, 306. See also MacArthur,

General Douglas, and theater strategy; RENO.

Rhoades, Lt. F. A.: 86, 86n

Rice Anchorage: 92, 92n, 94-96, 99

Ridings, Col. Eugene W.: 143, 158-59

Rifles, M1: 161, 246

Riley, Col. William E.: 227, 228

Ritchie, Col. William L.: 225

River crossings: 101, 207

RO Operation: 233-34, 248, 253-55

Road building, Allied

Bougainville: 261, 267-68

Kiriwina: 58

New Georgia: 106, 114, 116, 139, 170

New Guinea: 23, 60, 216-17, 274-75

Road building, Japanese

Bougainville: 352

New Guinea (Madang-Lae): 41-42, 45, 63

Roadblocks and trail blocks, Allied: 103-05, 260

Roadblocks and trail blocks, Japanese: 108, 114

Roads. See also Road building, Allied; Road

building, Japanese.

Bougainville: 234

CARTWHEEL area: 23

New Georgia: 90

New Guinea: 23, 221

Roberts, Col. Thomas D.: 169

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 1, 6-7, 225

Ross, Col. David M. N.: 88, 92, 106, 109, 110, 112n,

116-18, 147, 158

Row, Brigadier R. A.: 240

Royal Australian Air Force

Group, No. 9 Operational: 53

Squadrons

No. 77 Fighter: 342

No. 79: 59

Wing, No. 73: 317

Royal Australian Air Force Command, Allied Air

Forces: 22, 51-53

Rubber boats: 174-75, 284, 285

Ruhlen, Capt. James: 136

Rupertus, Maj. Gen. William H.: 277-79, 283, 293

Ryuho: 91

Saidor: 215-16, 273, 295-305

Saint Matthias Islands. See Emirau.

Saito, Colonel: 356

Sakai, Lt. Gen. Yasushi: 294

Salamaua: 2. See also Markham Valley-Huon

Peninsula operations; Operation II, ELKTON

III.

in Allied strategy: 190, 214

in Japanese strategy: 34-35, 46, 211

picked as Allied objective: 19

plans for taking: 27

seizure: 200-202

Salami Plantation: 336, 337, 338, 339

Sands: 284

Saratoga: 235

Sasaki, Maj. Gen. Noboru: 97-99, 106, 108, 118, 135,

137, 146, 159, 171-72, 182, 184-86, 188

Satelberg: 219-21

Savige, Maj. Gen. Stanley G.: 61, 62, 201

SBD's. See Aircraft, Allied.

SC 742: 285, 285n

Schley: 81, 82

Schultz, Lt. Col. Delbert E.: 101, 103-04, 105, 129,

130-31

Scott, 1st Lt. Robert S.: 149n

Scouting. See Reconnaissance, Allied.

SCR's

193: 143

270: 91

511: 65

536: 65

602: 91

Seabees: 183, 241, 256, 269, 332-33, 335, 349, 350.

See also Naval construction units.

Sears, Lt. Col. Demas L.: 10

Seeadler Harbour

in Admiralties operations: 321, 330, 332. See

also Seeadler Harbour, seizure.

base development: 306, 349-50

description: 317

plans for taking: 316
416 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Seeadler Harbour—Continued

seizure: 336-39

strategic importance: 308, 312

Segi Point: 71, 73, 76, 78, 81-82, 84-85, 91, 140

Sendai: 251

Service Squadron, South Pacific Force: 69

Services of Supply. See Combined Operational

Service Command; U.S. Army Services of Supply, South Pacific Area; U.S. Army Services of

Supply, SWPA.

Seventh Fleet, U.S.: 22, 64, 73, 282, 299, 306, 349,

350

Shaw: 285, 285n

Sheldon, Col. Charles A.: 336

Shepherd, Brig. Gen. Lemuel C.: 294

Sherman, Rear Adm. Forrest P.: 12n, 306, 311

Sherman, Rear Adm. Frederick C.: 235, 242, 252-53,

254, 260

Sherrer, Capt. E. C. D.: 92, 106-08

Shimizu Hill: 146-49

Shintani, Major: 212

Shipping shortages, Allied: 59-60

Shipping shortages and losses, Japanese: 30, 39-41

Shoge, Maj. Gen. Ryoichi: 63, 194, 211

Shore, Maj. Moyers S.: 344-45

Shortland Islands: 226-27, 232, 234, 235, 238

Shropshire, HMAS: 290

Silvester, the Rev. A. W. E.: 174, 183

Sio: 220-21, 303

Sixth Army: 20, 22, 29, 276n. See also Krueger, Lt.

Gen. Walter.

Skirmish line: 158

Smith, Col. Frederick H.: 53

"Snipers," Japanese: 112, 112n, 133.

Solomon Islands. See also Bougainville; Buka;

Choiseul; Green Islands; Guadalcanal; New

Georgia; Rendova; Russell Islands,

geography: 24

South Knob, Hill 260: 364-71

South Pacific Aircraft. See Naval task organizations, Task Force 33.

South Pacific Amphibious Force. See Naval task

organizations, Task Force 32.

South Pacific Area: 2-4, 5, 222-24, 228

command structure: 67

South Pacific Scouts: 92, 94, 106, 135, 144n

Southeast Area (Japanese): 32-34, 32n, 35, 213, 381

Southeast Area Fleet. See Southeastern Fleet.

Southeastern Detachment: 36, 46, 97, 238n

Southeastern Fleet: 34, 36, 185

Southern Landing Group (Munda-Bairoko): 92,

106-20

Southwest Pacific Area: 2, 5, 9-10, 222-24, 228

command structure: 20-22

GHQ and Markham Valley operations: 192, 192n,

215

GHQ and New Georgia operations: 16-18

GHQ plans DEXTERITY operations: 272-75

Spruance, Vice Adm. Raymond A.: 12n, 312

St. Louis: 105, 315

Stadler, Col. John H., Jr.: 338

Stebbins, Lt. Col. William A.: 108, 119

Stockton: 329, 331

Strategy, Allied: 1-8. See also Pacific Military

Conference; Theater strategy, Allied.

Strategy, Japanese: 2, 32-36, 45-46, 48, 185, 212-14,

382

Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. George E.: 12n

Stringham: 300

Strong: 95, 99

Submarines, Allied: 73-74, 75, 175, 186, 229, 235

Sugg, Col. Douglas: 169n

Supply. See Logistics, Allied; Logistics, Japanese.

Supply lines, Japanese: 184. See also Barge lanes,

Japanese; Lines of communications, Japanese.

Sutherland, Maj. Gen. Richard K.: 20, 20n, 381

at Pacific Military Conference: 12-14, 12n, 16,

16n

at Pearl Harbor conference, January 1944: 308

and planning of operations: 192, 215, 274

Swift, Maj. Gen. Innis P.: 323, 336-37, 381

TA Operation: 351n. See also Counteroffensive on

Bougainville, Japanese.

Tactical plans, Allied

Admiralties: 339-40

Bougainville: 228-29, 235-38

Cape Gloucester: 272-79

Green Islands: 312-14

Markham Valley-Huon Peninsula: 189-94

New Georgia: 73-78, 81, 92, 99, 106, 110, 118, 129,

143-44, 150

Woodlark-Kiriwina: 49-54

Tactical plans, Japanese

Bougainville counteroffensive: 356-58, 375

Lae-Salamaua: 194-95

New Britain: 280

New Georgia: 97-98

Tactics, Allied

ambushes: 61, 101, 102, 365

attacks on fortified positions: 118-19, 129-31, 148,

153, 161-62, 246, 285, 293, 342, 344-45, 362, 363, 364, 368-69, 376-77

bypass: 144, 172-73. See also Bypasses.

co-ordinated attacks: 345, 346

diversions: 61, 62, 129, 190, 200-202, 241

double envelopments: 85, 150, 366-67

envelopments: 102, 117-18, 129, 144, 161, 363-64

flank attacks: 102. See also Tactics, Allied, coordinated attacks.

frontal assaults: 109, 118-19, 144, 158, 344

Tactics, Japanese. See also Marches, Japanese.

ambushes: 136, 154

antitank: 133

diversions: 259

frontal assaults: 334
INDEX 417

Tactics, Japanese—Continued

infiltration: 330, 331, 334, 335, 364

lack of co-ordination in attacks: 335

night attacks: 66, 136, 330, 334

night harassment: 108, 109, 112, 112n, 122, 131,

331, 335

piecemeal commitment of forces: 220

Talasea: 27, 272

Tank Battalion, 754th: 355, 361, 374, 376

Tank Destroyer Battalion, 632d: 275-76

Tank-infantry co-ordination: 133, 151, 289

Tanks, Allied: 143, 147, 184, 260, 288-89, 342, 344,

375

against field fortifications: 132-34, 148, 162, 163,

374

General Sherman: 292

hampered by terrain: 132-34, 151, 361, 370

in jungle fighting, evaluation: 160-61

M3 light: 132

Task One, Rabaul operations: 5

Task Three, Rabaul operations: 5, 9, 12, 13, 18

Task Two, Rabaul operations: 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18

Taylor, Lt. Col. Harold R.: 62

Taylor, Lt. Col. J. B. K.: 269

Taylor Creek (Bougainville): 372, 373

TBF's. See Aircraft, Allied.

Teramoto, Lt. Gen. Kumaichi: 195, 199

Terauchi, Field Marshal Count Hisaichi: 35

Terrain. See also Geography, CARTWHEEL area.

Admiralties: 317-18, 344

Bougainville: 234, 246, 248-49, 255

New Britain: 278, 290-91, 292

New Georgia: 70-71, 84, 101, 102, 105, 106, 109,

111, 150n, 151, 170

New Guinea: 23, 201, 206-07, 303

Terry, S/Sgt. Edwin C.: 335

Theater strategy, Allied: 9-10, 214-16, 225-29, 273,

306-09, 379-80, 382. See also ELKTON; ELKTON

III; Halsey, Admiral William F., Jr., and theater strategy; MacArthur, General Douglas, and

theater strategy; Pacific Military Conference;

RENO.

decision to bypass Rabaul: 222-25

two-pronged advance on Japan: 222-24, 255

two-pronged advance on Rabaul: 16-18, 25-26

Third Fleet: 67, 350

Thirteenth Air Force: 44, 67, 69, 142, 269. See also

Twining, Maj. Gen. Nathan F.

Thomas, Col. Gerald C.: 250

Thompson, Col. Earl F.: 331, 332

TOENAILS: 67-96, 172

Tomonari, Col. Satoshi: 97, 146, 184

Tonolei Harbor: 226, 234, 238

Torokino. See Cape Torokino.

Torpedo boats, Allied. See PT boats.

Torpedo boats, Japanese: 182, 185

Torpedo bombers. See Aircraft, Allied, TBF's.

Tractors: 344

Trail blocks. See Roadblocks and trail blocks,

Allied; Roadblocks and trail blocks, Japanese.

Trails

Bougainville: 234, 260

Manus Island: 317

New Georgia: 95, 99-101, 102, 103-04, 106, 114,

132

New Georgia (Vella Lavella): 183

New Georgia (Viru Harbor): 84-85

New Georgia (Wickham Anchorage): 82-83

Transports, Allied: 76, 78, 86, 236, 237, 243, 248

Treasury Islands: 227, 228, 236, 239-41

Trever: 82

Tripp, Capt. Charles W. H.: 94

Trobriand Islands. See Kiriwina Island.

Troop disposition, Japanese

Admiralties: 319

Bougainville: 238-39

CARTWHEEL area: 47

New Georgia: 97-98

Troop strength, Allied

Admiralties: 317

Bougainville: 265, 352

Green Islands: 315n

Markham Valley: 192

New Georgia: 129, 167-68

South and Southwest Pacific Areas: 9-10

Troop strength, Japanese. See also estimates under

Intelligence, Allied.

Admiralties: 319

Bougainville: 238, 351, 351n

CARTWHEEL area: 46, 46n, 47

Green Islands: 314

Lae-Salamaua: 194

Nassau Bay: 63

New Britain: 312

New Georgia: 97-98, 129, 129n, 173

Troop transport, Japanese: 39-41. See also Barges,

Japanese.

Truk: 307, 308, 309, 312

Tsili Tsili. See Marilinan.

Turnage, Maj. Gen. Allen H.: 237, 244, 245, 250,

260, 261, 267, 381

Turner, Rear Adm. Richmond K.: 96, 299, 381

and Kolombangara bypass: 173

and operations against Munda: 92, 94, 95n, 105

and planning for TOENAILS: 67, 73, 75, 77, 78

and relief of Hester: 123-24

and Rendova landings: 85-87, 88, 89-90

and Segi Point: 81, 84

and supply planning for New Georgia: 72

transfer to Central Pacific: 126

Twining, Maj. Gen. Nathan F.: 12n, 49, 167, 232,

232n, 247, 251, 270, 27on, 381. See also Thirteenth Air Force.

Tymniak, Lt. Walter: 153
418 CARTWHEEL: THE REDUCTION OF RABAUL

Unity of command: 54, 187-88, 308

U.S. Army Forces, Far East: 22

U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area: 69.

See also Harmon, Lt. Gen. Millard F.

U.S. Army Services of Supply, South Pacific Area:

69

U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific

Area: 22, 29, 59, 191, 272, 279, 296, 302

Upton, Maj. Geoffrey T.: 269

Vandegrift, Maj. Gen. Alexander A.: 75, 236, 241,

244, 245, 249, 250, 257, 381

Van Noy, Pvt. Nathan, Jr.: 220

Vasey, Maj. Gen. George A.: 207, 210, 211, 216

Vella Gulf, Battle of: 171-72, 174, 184

Vella Lavella: 172-84, 187

Vella Lavella, Battle of: 186

Vila: 11, 73, 77, 98-99, 123, 173, 175. See also

Kolombangara.

Viru Harbor: 70, 73, 76, 83-85, 91

Vitiaz Strait: 189, 221

in Allied strategy: 214, 273

in Japanese strategy: 63, 213

Vogel, Maj. Gen. Clayton B.: 69, 71, 73, 236

Vogelkop Peninsula: 223, 225, 272, 379

"War neurosis." See Medical problems, mental disturbances.

Warships, Allied.

battleships: 75, 175, 309

carriers, aircraft: 75, 175, 235, 242, 252-53, 254,

307, 308-09

in theater strategy: 379, 381

cruisers: 75, 85, 92, 95, 175, 186, 242, 284, 290, 314,

321

destroyers

Admiralties: 321, 324, 327-28, 329, 332, 338

Bougainville: 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 242, 243,

244, 245, 246, 248, 256, 265

DEXTERITY: 284, 284n, 286, 290, 298, 300

Emirau: 380

Markham Valley: 193, 200, 203, 218

New Georgia: 75, 77, 85, 92, 95, 98-99, 110,

146, 172, 175-76, 186

Warships, Japanese

cruisers: 248, 251, 252

destroyers: 95, 98, 172, 182, 185, 248, 251, 252, 259,

265

Waters: 81, 86

Watson, Lt. Col. Elmer S.: 136

Wau: 36-39, 61

Weather

affects air operations: 86, 91, 230, 300, 328

affects landing operations: 64, 83, 86

and airborne operations: 278

favorable: 146, 253

hampers handling of supplies: 90

hampers infantry operations: 101, 157

Weather—Continued

hampers Japanese: 328

hampers road building: 216-17

and Markham Valley operations: 192, 192n, 205,

207

New Britain monsoon: 292

and New Georgia operations: 96

for Saidor landing: 299, 300

Wedemeyer, Brig. Gen. Albert C.: 12n

Werner, Maj. Harry E.: 286

Western Landing Force: 77-78, 85

Westralia, HMAS: 284, 286, 287

Wewak: 27, 225, 303, 304, 306, 322, 379

Allied air attacks: 198, 230

in Japanese strategy: 34-35, 213

Whitcomb, Col. Cecil B.: 358, 361

Whitehead, Brig. Gen. Ennis C.: 22, 53n, 191, 193,

196, 215, 274n, 282, 297, 320-21

Wickham, Sgt. Harry: 71

Wickham Anchorage: 70, 73, 76, 82-83, 91

Wiedeman, Sub-Lt. William G.: 277n

Wilkinson, Rear Adm. Theodore S.: 381

and Bougainville invasion: 228, 235, 236-37, 243-

44, 248, 249, 257

and Emirau: 380

and Green Islands: 313, 314

as Halsey's deputy: 12, 73

and Munda offensive: 143, 146n

replaces Turner as amphibious commander: 126

and Vella Lavella: 174, 175-78, 180, 186

Willoughby, Brig. Gen. Charles A.: 193, 321

Willson, Vice Adm. Russell: 12n

Wing, Capt. Gardner B.: 152

Wing, Brig. Gen. Leonard F.: 92, 94, 109, 110, 111,

122, 148, 158, 164

Withdrawals, Allied: 65-66, 131, 147, 155-58, 352,

369, 369n

Withdrawals, Japanese: 38, 88, 159, 170, 184-86,

211-12, 294, 303-04, 377

Woodlark Force. See Woodlark Task Force.

Woodlark Island. See also CHRONICLE; Operation

I, ELKTON III.

geography: 50

picked as Allied objective: 14-16, 19

plans for taking: 26-27

seizure: 56-57. See also CHRONICLE.

strategic importance: 15, 49

Woodlark Task Force: 53. See also Cunningham,

Brig. Gen. Julian W.

Wootten, Maj. Gen. G. F.: 202, 206, 210, 217-21

Wurtsmith, Brig. Gen. Paul B.: 53, 196

Yamada, Maj. Gen. Eizo: 213, 219, 220

Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku: 42, 44

Young, Pvt. Rodger: 157

Zane: 85

Zimmer, Maj. Joseph E.: 134-35, 149

U.S. GOVERNMEN T PRINTIN G OFFICE : 1959 O—470507