J-S02003-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L.L., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.J., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1714 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 7, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000004-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2024

R.J. (Mother) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, involuntarily terminating her parental rights with 

respect to her child, J.L.L. (Child) (born 5/18).1 Counsel has filed a petition 

to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 960 (Pa. 2018), does not apply in 

the instant case as the June 7, 2023 order does not change Child’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption, but rather scheduled a future 

goal change hearing. See Order, 6/7/23. Mother was not required to file two 

separate notices of appeal, however, she mistakenly did so. See 1713 EDA 

2023. Mother’s appeal with respect to the goal change was quashed by our 

Court on August 4, 2023. Order, 8/4/23. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 976 

(“Where . . . one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one 

docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeals 

must be filed.”); see also In re M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 981 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(applying Walker holding to children’s fast track appeals). 
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Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).2 After careful 

review, we deny counsel’s petition and direct counsel to file either a compliant 

Anders brief or an advocate’s brief, in conformance with our decision.

The trial court set forth the following relevant history leading to Child’s 

adjudication of dependency and placement into the custody of the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (DHS):

On September 24, 2018, DHS received a General Protective 

Services [(GPS)] report alleging that [Mother] presented herself 

to her primary care physician’s office and expressed that she

wanted help with housing, drug and alcohol treatment, and mental 

health treatment. Mother admitted to using phencyclidine [(PCP)]

while Child slept at night. The report stated that Mother disclosed 

that she was recently in an inpatient program at Gaudenzia[, a 

substance abuse and co-occurring disorders treatment provider,]

with Child, but she did not complete the program; that Mother was

attempting to get back into an inpatient program, but her 

insurance would not cover it; that Mother had a lot of insight into 

her addiction and was aware that she needed support with staying

sober; and that Mother was participating in an outpatient program 

at Drexel Medicine. The report alleged that Mother was supervised 

by an adult probation officer and was subject to random urine 

tests; that Mother was attempting to move out of the home of 

[D.L. (Father)3], Child’s [f]ather; that Mother was residing with a 

friend at the time of the report; that Mother wanted ongoing 

assistance with housing and[,] potentially, a dual diagnosis 

treatment program she could attend with Child. The report was 

substantiated. 

____________________________________________

2 See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders

briefing requirements to termination of parental rights appeals involving 

indigent parents represented by court-appointed counsel).

3 Father is not a party to the present appeal. At the time of the termination 

hearing, Mother and Father did not live together and Father testified that he 

barely sees Mother. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 71-72.
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On September 26, 2018, DHS met with Child, Mother, and Father 

at Father’s home and Child appeared happy, healthy, and with all

of his needs met. Mother stated that she attended [t]he Caring 

Together program at Drexel to address her history of substance 

abuse. Mother requested that DHS assist her with housing. 

Mother denied using drugs around Child. Mother further stated 

that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression.

Father denied knowing that Mother was using drugs again. Father 

was aware that Mother was attending therapy for substance abuse 

and that he provided care for Child while Mother attended her 

program. Father had a history of substance abuse and attended

Sobriety Through Out-Patient, Inc. to address his drug and alcohol 

concerns. DHS found the home to be appropriate. 

On November 7, 2018, DHS visited the family and Child appeared 

happy and was safe. Mother reported she had [neither] used 

drugs recently[,] nor thought about using drugs. Father stated 

that he supported Mother and ensured she attended her drug 

treatment program daily. Father stated that he was moving into 

a larger home and told Mother that she was welcome to reside 

there. DHS subsequently closed the case for Child. 

On December 27, 2018, DHS received a GPS report alleging that 

Mother had five children who resided with various family members 

and foster families; that on December 26, 2018, Mother left 

Interim House West[, a residential treatment program,] and 

returned under the influence of PCP, which she admitted using; 

that Mother had Child in her care the whole time she was away 

from Interim House West; and that the staff supervised Child until 

Mother seemed to be able to care for herself. The report stated 

that Child had bronchitis and [] had been taken to a hospital for 

medical care several times. The report[] further stated that 

Mother [had] mental health concerns and suffered from bipolar 

disorder, severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder 

[(PTSD)]. The report was substantiated. 

On December 28, 2018, DHS met with Mother and Child at Interim 

House West. DHS noted that Child appeared lethargic and had a 

runny nose. Mother admitted that she used PCP at a friend’s 

house while Child was in her care. Mother stated that she had 

learned that her former paramour was being released from prison, 

which caused her distress. Mother stated that she was fearful of 

her former paramour[,] with whom she experienced domestic 

violence. Mother stated that she did not want Child removed from 

her care and would remain drug free and follow the facility rules.
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DHS spoke to an Interim House West Administrator, who stated 

that Mother had been in the program for less than 30 days and 

had not complied with the rules of the program. The administrator 

stated that Mother had returned to the facility under the influence 

of drugs multiple times. DHS transported Mother and Child to a 

hospital. Child was later discharged to Father’s care. 

On May 17, 2019, DHS met with Child, Mother, and Father at the 

Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia [(CHOP)]. Child had an upper 

respiratory infection and needed to be monitored. CHOP staff 

further stated that Father appeared at CHOP agitated and was 

aggressive towards the staff. DHS interviewed Father, who denied 

having current substance abuse or mental health issues. Father 

stated that he last attended treatment at Wedge Recovery Centers 

and was not currently in treatment. Father stated that he was 

interested in caring for Child when Child was discharged from the 

hospital. 

DHS subsequently learned that Father is the perpetrator of an 

indicated Child Protective Services [(CPS)] report dated 

September 24, 2015[,] concerning Child’s half-sibling[.] Father

exposed [the then] three-year[-]old [c]hild to PCP[,] which 

resulted in [the child’s] hospitalization. DHS further learned that 

Mother was Father’s paramour at the time and was in the home 

during the incident. On May 17, 2019, DHS obtained an [o]rder 

for [p]rotective [c]ustody [] for Child and [Child] remained at 

CHOP. On May 19, 2019, Child was discharged from CHOP and 

transported to his foster care placement with Turning Points for 

Children, where he currently remains.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/23, at 1-4 (citations and footnote omitted); see 

also DHS Petition, 05/23/19, Ex. A ¶¶ f-q.

Pursuant to the court’s order, Mother was to have weekly supervised 

visits with Child, and Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) 

for immediate drug screening, monitoring, and three random drug screens 

prior to the next court date. See Order 5/28/19. In addition, Mother’s DHS 

case plan objectives included parenting classes, substance abuse treatment,

and securing employment and housing. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 
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6/7/23, at 42. Throughout the time Child has been in placement, Mother has 

attempted drug and alcohol treatment programs at least three times, but has 

not been consistent or successful in completing a program. Id. at 43-44. 

Makeda Hunter, case manager supervisor with Turning Points for Children, 

CUA-5,

4 also testified that Mother has been unable to secure safe and stable 

housing while Child has been in DHS’ care. Id. at 44. Regarding employment, 

Hunter testified that Mother does have a job for which she was able to provide 

pay stubs. Id. Mother has generally appeared for weekly visits with Child, 

but is often late. Id. at 44-45 (case manager testifying visitation records 

show several instances of Mother arriving at end of visit between January and

June of 2023). Over the lifetime of Child’s placement, Mother’s compliance 

with her case plan objectives was determined to be minimal.5 Id. 48-49.

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4 Philadelphia DHS works alongside neighborhood organizations, called 

Community Umbrella Agencies (CUAs), to ensure the provision of services 

within a neighborhood when possible. There are ten CUA regions within 

Philadelphia. See Department of Human Services Who’s involved in your 

case?, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, https://www.phila.gov/departments/departmentof-human-services/whos-involved-in-your-case/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2024).

5 We note that Mother’s case plan compliance was initially substantial or 

complete, but that her compliance appeared to decrease at the end of 2020

and was minimal by the fall of 2021. A review of the dependency record 

reveals the following findings during the lifetime of the case:

• August 8, 2019 permanency review order: visitation with Child’s mother 

to remain weekly and supervised by the Agency.

• November 1, 2019 permanency review: Mother has substantially 

complied with permanency plan.

• January 17, 2020 permanency review: Mother has been fully compliant

with permanency plan; Mother to have unsupervised weekly visits, the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Since May of 2019, Child has remained in the same foster placement, in 

kinship placement.

6

 Id. at 37-38. Child lives with foster parent, foster 

parent’s adopted niece, and Child’s older half-sister, who was adopted by 

foster parent. Id. at 38-39. Child is very bonded to foster parent, refers to 

____________________________________________

Agency to supervise one visit per month, pending Mother does not have 

positive drug test results.

• June 10, 2020 permanency review: Mother has substantially complied 

with permanency plan; visitations to be virtual due to Covid; Mother to 

have unsupervised overnight visits once Covid restrictions lifted and 

Mother has suitable housing.

• November 2, 2020 permanency review: Mother has moderately 

complied with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the 

Agency.

• March 22, 2021 permanency review: Mother has moderately complied 

with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.

• August 2, 2021 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not noted.

• October 25, 2021 permanency review: Mother has minimally complied 

with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.

• May 16, 2022 permanency review: Mother has minimally complied with 

permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.

• September 2, 2022 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not 

noted.

• November 28, 2022 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not 

noted.

• December 19, 2022 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not 

noted, however stated that Agency is unable to verify certain objectives, 

but that Mother is attending visits with Child; Mother’s visits to be 

supervised by the Agency.

• January 23, 2023 permanency review: Mother has minimally complied 

with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.

• April 12, 2023 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not noted.

6 Child was temporarily in respite care following allegations of abuse by foster 

parent’s spouse. CUA case manager Makeda Hunter testified that foster 

parent and spouse were separated and that foster parent was pursuing a 

divorce. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 40.

 
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her as “Mommy,” and the two appear to have an “affectionate relationship.” 

Id. at 40-41. 

On January 6, 2023, DHS filed petitions seeking to terminate Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights. On June 7, 2023, the trial court held a 

termination hearing7 at which Mother, Father, two CUA case workers, a CEU 

evaluator, and a social worker testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 

trial court held in abeyance its decision with respect to Father, but found clear 

and convincing evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights 

with respect to Child. On that same date, the trial court entered a decree 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act.

8

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. Thereafter, on November 29, 

2023, counsel filed a petition to withdraw, as well as an accompanying Anders

brief.9

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7 At the termination hearing, Harry Levin, Esquire, represented Child’s legal 

interests, and Jane Marie Morrissey, Esquire, guardian ad litem (GAL), 

represented Child’s best interests. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). 

8 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. 

9 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4):

If counsel intends to seek to withdraw in a criminal case pursuant 

to Anders/Santiago or if counsel intends to seek to withdraw in 

a post-conviction relief appeal pursuant to Turner/Finley, 

counsel shall file of record and serve on the judge a statement of 

intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a [Rule 1925(b)] Statement. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In In re V.E., supra, our Court stated: 

Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first 

appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental 

rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the 

record, petition this court for leave to withdraw representation if 

he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on which to base 

the appeal. Given the less stringent standard of proof required 

and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination proceeding in 

which a parent is not guaranteed the same procedural and 

evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, the court holds that 

appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must 

submit an Anders brief.

Id. at 1275. Moreover, we held that “any motion to withdraw representation, 

submitted by appointed counsel, must be accompanied by an advocate’s brief, 

and not the amicus curiae brief delineated in McClendon.” Id. (emphasis 

original); see also In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 602 (Pa. 1973) 

(“[T]he logic behind . . . an individual in a criminal case being entitled to 

representation by counsel at any proceeding that may lead to ‘the deprivation 

of substantial rights’ . . . is equally applicable to a case involving an indigent 

parent faced with the loss of her child.”).

When counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders and its progeny, 

this Court may not review the merits of the appeal without first addressing 

the request to withdraw. See In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217, 

____________________________________________

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (c)(4). See In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (where Anders procedure from criminal proceedings has been applied 

to parental termination cases, parent’s counsel acted appropriately by 

following Rule 1925(c)(4) in appeal from decision terminating parental rights 

to child).
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1219 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 

590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“We reiterate that [w]hen presented with an 

Anders brief, this [C]ourt may not review the merits of the underlying issues 

without first passing on the request to withdraw.”) (internal quotations 

omitted). To procedurally withdraw, counsel must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and (3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citations omitted); see also In re Adoption of V.G., 751 A.2d 1174 

(Pa. Super. 2000) (reiterating requirements counsel must satisfy before being 

permitted to withdraw in termination appeals). 

With respect to the third Anders requirement, that counsel inform the 

appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has 

held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy of 

the letter sent to [the] client advising him or her of their rights.” 

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; 

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal; 
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(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Finally, this 

Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there 

are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” 

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(footnote omitted). 

Instantly, counsel filed a petition to withdraw. See Application to 

Withdraw as Counsel, 11/29/23. Counsel also provided a copy of the letter 

sent to Mother, notifying her that counsel was requesting to withdraw, 

attaching a copy of the Anders brief, including the petition to withdraw, and 

informing Mother of her right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se and 

raise any issues worthy of consideration.

10

 See Anders Brief, 11/29/23, at

Ex. B. However, our review of counsel’s petition and Anders brief does not 

reflect the type of zealous review required. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355-

56 (“[C]ounsel must consistently serve the client’s interest to the best of his 

or her ability. Only after such an evaluation has led counsel to the conclusion 

that the appeal is ‘wholly frivolous’ is counsel justified in making a motion to 

withdraw.”). Further, we note that the petition to withdraw neither mentions 

____________________________________________

10 Mother has not responded to this communication.
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counsel’s “conscientious examination of the record,” see Cartrette, supra, 

nor is the Millisock letter attached to the petition as required. 

Moreover, rather than framing potential issues in the brief in support of 

Mother’s appeal, counsel solely advances arguments in support of the 

termination decree, and bookends those arguments with statements that she 

has made a conscientious review of the record and has concluded that the 

appeal would be wholly frivolous. See generally Anders Brief, 11/29/23, at 

18-29. This is in direct violation of Santiago, wherein our Supreme Court 

reiterated:

To repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are 

references to anything in the record that might arguably support 

the appeal. Indeed, we have recognized and emphasized the 

difference between an Anders brief, which offers an issue for 

a court’s consideration, but reflects counsel’s candid 

assessment of the complete lack of merit in his [or her]

client’s case, and a merits brief, which implies that an issue is 

worthy of review and has some chance of succeeding. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 359-60 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Specifically, counsel’s brief with respect to termination under section 

2511(b) practically mirrors the trial court’s section 2511(b) analysis found in 

its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Moreover, counsel’s brief includes no reference to 

the record in support of the appeal.

11

 Compare Anders Brief, 11/29/23, at 

26-28 with Santiago, 978 A.2d at 360. 

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11 The trial court referenced testimony that Child was “significantly bonded 

with [his foster] parent[,] who he has lived with for the past four years[;]” 

that Child calls the foster parent “mom” and wishes to be adopted by her; that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The determination of the best interests of the child is a separate 

consideration from a finding that a statutory ground for termination has been 

met under section 2511(a) and is “the paramount consideration in deciding 

whether to terminate parental rights.” In re S.D.T., Jr., 934 A.2d 703, 706

(Pa. Super. 2007). Essential to a court’s section 2511(b) analysis is discerning

“the nature and status of the parent-child bond, [by] paying close attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.” In re C.P., 901 

A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006). While expert testimony and a formal 

bonding analysis are not specifically required by statute, the moving party 

must at least produce sufficient evidence to prove that severing the bond 

between child and parent will not have negative effects on the child. Id. In 

addition, the proper way to evaluate the parent-child bond in termination 

cases is to focus strictly on the bond between the parent and child and the 

possible ramifications of severing this bond. Id. at 521. 

In this case, the only testimony as to the possible effect of severing any

bond between Mother and Child came from CUA case worker, Makeda Hunter, 

who stated that she did not believe it would “cause irreparable harm” to Child 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 

50. However, the record reveals Hunter was not qualified to provide testimony 

as to the relationship between Mother and Child. Because Hunter was not 

____________________________________________

Child’s primary bond is with the foster parent; and that Mother expressed a 

bond with Child, but failed to offer any evidence of such a bond. Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/26/23, at 16 (citing N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 38, 7-

8, 40-41, 93-94). Counsel’s only references to the record were the same.
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present at a single visit between Mother and Child, she could only comment 

from “reading the notes” that Mother and Child would frequently have a snack 

and watch a movie during Mother’s visits. Id. at 49, 51. In addition, Hunter 

was not asked the basis for her opinion as to severing the bond between 

Mother and Child, nor was she cross-examined on her statement. See 

generally id. at 49-64. Aaron Lloyd, a former CUA case worker who worked 

with the family from approximately November 2020 to May 2022, was not 

asked a single question about the interactions between Mother and Child 

during visits or any bond between the two. See generally id. at 26-35. Roya 

Paller, a social worker,12 testified regarding a visit with Child in respite care13

to assess Child’s understanding of adoption. Id. at 7. Paller testified that 

Child expressed his desire to be adopted by “Mommy,” his foster parent. Id.

at 8-9. However, Paller provided no testimony as to Child’s relationship with 

Mother, or whether she asked any questions with respect to any relationship 

or bond between Mother and Child.

14

 See generally id. at 7-9. Paller was 

not asked a single question on cross-examination by any party. Id. at 9. 

____________________________________________

12 No testimony was elicited as to Paller’s credentials; however, her report 

states she holds a Bachelor of Social Work and is employed by Forensic Social 

Work Services. Paller was called as a witness by Attorney Levin, representing 

Child’s legal interests.

13 See fn.6, supra.

14 We also note that a review of Paller’s report, admitted as CA-1, does not 

include any information about Child’s understanding of adoption or any 

information about Child’s relationship to Mother. Further, the report is 

undated, both in terms of when it was prepared and when Paller visited with 

Child.
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Finally, we find the questioning of Mother, or lack thereof, with respect 

to bonding to be particularly lackluster. See generally id. at 93-94. Mother’s 

counsel asked her a total of six questions regarding her relationship with Child, 

during which Mother expressed a close relationship with Child, stating that 

they are bonded like “a mother and a son.” Id. Mother’s counsel did not ask 

her to expand on any of her testimony, nor did representatives from DHS, the 

GAL, or the child advocate. See id. We, therefore, cannot conclude that

counsel may withdraw on appeal. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 360 (“Under 

Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by counsel’s examination and 

assessment of the record and counsel’s references to anything in the record 

that arguably supports the appeal.”). 

Accordingly, we deny counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw and 

remand the matter. Upon remand, counsel shall file either (1) an Anders

brief that conforms to the requirements set forth in Santiago, supra; or (2) 

an advocate’s brief on Mother’s behalf within 30 days from the date of this 

decision. If counsel files an advocate’s brief, Appellees shall have 30 days 

thereafter to file a responsive brief. 

Case remanded. Petition to withdraw denied with instructions. Panel 

jurisdiction retained. 
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Date: 2/12/2024