U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

81–569PDF 2013

ELECTIONS IN IRAN:

THE REGIME CEMENTING ITS CONTROL

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 18, 2013

Serial No. 113–46

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Alireza Nader, senior international policy analyst, RAND Corporation ...... 8

Suzanne Maloney, Ph.D., senior fellow, The Saban Center for Middle East 

Policy, Brookings Institution ............................................................................... 19

Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ........................................................................ 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Alireza Nader: Prepared statement ................................................................ 10

Suzanne Maloney, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 21

Mr. Karim Sadjadpour: Prepared statement ......................................................... 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

(1)

ELECTIONS IN IRAN: THE REGIME 

CEMENTING ITS CONTROL 

TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Deutch, 

for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute each. We will 

then hear from our witnesses. Thank you to all of you for being 

here. And without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements 

will be made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days 

to insert statements and questions for the record subject to the 

length limitation of the rules. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

In our fervor to repudiate all things Ahmadinejad and force ourselves into believing things in Iran are set to change, the West has 

rushed to anoint Hassan Rouhani as the moderate hope who will 

ease tensions between Iran and the West. And in wanting this 

change so badly, we’ve quietly lulled ourselves into submission accepting that a Rouhani victory was the choice of the Iranian people 

who wanted change, unwilling to see that this was still just a victory for the Supreme Leader and the regime. 

The people never really had a choice. They were forced to choose 

from one of Khamenei’s candidates, and this is what Khamenei 

wanted. The whole thing was rigged from the start. 

Khamenei is once again playing games with the West. In 

Rouhani he now has the perfect opportunity to coax the United 

States and the international community to ease up on sanctions 

while using Rouhani as the fall guy should public opinion turn. 

The regime in Tehran will use his election as an opportunity to 

undermine support for sanctions and buy time to fight back the effects the sanctions have had on Iran, while marching forward with 

its nuclear program. And we must see this for what it is, and not 

get caught up in the enthusiasm that has accompanied nearly 

every Presidential election in Iran since the 1990s, because if history has shown us anything, it is that these elections tend to bring 

2

with them a false hope that the regime is cracking when, in fact, 

it is just cementing its control. 

These elections were anything but free and fair. It is not fair 

when half of the population is disqualified from running because 

they are of the wrong gender, or they are a religious minority, and 

they aren’t free when the candidates are handpicked by the regime, 

assuring that no matter who wins the regime has their man in office. 

And that is what unfolded in Iran last Friday. The people didn’t 

have a free choice, and they got stuck with Rouhani, the consummate regime insider. 

I would urge caution to those so desperate to label Hassan 

Rouhani as a reformist or moderate. He is a man who has been in 

the core of the inner circle of the regime since the beginning having 

been close with the Founding Clerics of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, including the Grand Ayatollah Khameini. And how quickly 

those who need Rouhani to be something that he will never be, 

whitewash his past so that his election fits this reformist narrative. 

They seem to have forgotten that in 1999, Rouhani serving the 

regime led a relentless and violent crackdown on a student uprising. During a pro-regime rally in response o the students, Rouhani 

reportedly declared,

‘‘From today our people shall witness how in the arena our law 

enforcement force shall deal with these opportunists and rightist elements if they simply dare to show their faces.’’

This speech was reportedly followed by an IRGC force storming 

through university campuses, arresting, torturing, and murdering 

those who sought reform. And now this is what we have pinned our 

hopes to as a reformer in Iran. 

I urge all of us to remember that, ultimately, the power in Iran 

rests with Khamenei, the IRGC, and the regime. I fear that we will 

be too eager to lift the pressure on the regime under the false narrative of reform and moderation. 

The U.S. position must be clear: No concessions, no rewards, no 

easing of sanctions. The U.S. must not give up any ground unless 

the regime takes verifiable steps to halt its enrichment and dismantle its nuclear program. 

Let us not forget that he was part of the regime that concealed 

its nuclear program from the world for 20 years before becoming 

the face of that program as Iran’s top nuclear negotiator. And while 

many point to the halting of enrichment in 2004 under his watch 

as positive signs, I’d advise you to use caution with this rationale. 

This was a delay tactic that the regime, and even Rouhani himself 

had admitted to using in order to push the nuclear program forward. 

During the campaign, Rouhani reportedly bragged that under his 

watch Iran didn’t suspend the program. No, indeed, they had completed it. 

And with that, I’m pleased to yield to the ranking member, my 

friend, Ted Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this important hearing today. 

3

Last Friday, the Iranian people participated in what was expected to be an uninteresting election with a predetermined result 

to replace the pugnacious and repugnant Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 

Instead, the Iranian people rallied around the token moderate, 

Hassan Rouhani, proving their desire to chart a different course for 

their future and improve Iran’s relations with the international 

community. And while I commend the Iranian people for their inspiring civic participation, this election should not be viewed as the 

birth of Jeffersonian democracy in Iran. 

Before even one ballot was cast, the Supreme Leader went to 

great lengths to insure that one of his own proxies would be elected 

by disqualifying hundreds of qualified candidates. Even regime 

stalwart Rafsanjani was disqualified, thus signifying that political 

space in Iran had contracted to the point where it appeared that 

Iranian elections were little more than Ayatollah Khameini’s personal selection. 

Furthermore, this election occurred in a staggeringly repressive 

environment. In the weeks leading up to the election, the regime 

harassed pro-reform activists, throttled the internet, blocked foreign Persian language television stations, shut down university 

campuses, denied permissions to poll workers and conducted cyber 

attacks against numerous Iranian opposition sites. 

Yet, in spite of brutal repression, we saw the Iranian people 

again find a small opportunity to have their voices heard and advocate for change in Iran. 

Of course, you can’t think of Iran’s victory without remember 

those who demanded their voices be heard in 2009, when we witnessed massive rallies against the status quo that were brutally 

suppressed by the government. 

However, as we learned this weekend, the Green Movement and 

the people’s desire for change endures. Presented with a small 

opening, the people delivered a powerful message that the Iranian 

people want to shape their own future. 

Now, Rouhani campaigned on a platform of reforming the economy and improving relations with the international community, 

and freeing political prisoners, all of which challenges the status 

quo. 

At a rally of nearly 9,000 supporters days before the election he 

told the crowd,

‘‘If you want Iranian officials to stop presenting inaccurate economic data, if you want the rial to regain its value, if you want 

the Iranian passport to be respected again, come to the ballot 

boxes.’’

This seemingly go for broke strategy created a last minute surge 

in massive public support that persuaded a security-conscious regime to concede a Rouhani win. And as impressive as this civic activism is, Iran will be judged on its actions. 

We know that Rouhani is only a moderate candidate on the Iranian continuum, and that he has made hostile comments about the 

United States, and about Israel. We know that despite the attempts to paint him as a reformer, he still is a regime insider, intensely loyal to the Supreme Leader. He has not disavowed Iran’s 

4

nuclear ambitions, far from it. And we know that the reformist 

agenda have been stymied by the regime in the past. 

We know that a different President won’t change the fact that 

the Supreme Leader will continue to have veto power over the 

issues of foremost concern to the United States, and to our allies. 

The U.S. has worked hard to create an unprecedented international community united against Iran’s illicit nuclear weapons 

program. And it remains to be seen how a new President will affect 

that dynamic. But one thing is clear, being deferential to the Supreme Leader or being silent about human rights abuses will not 

compel Iran to moderate its nuclear policies. 

I hope the Iranian regime will heed the will of the Iranian people 

and make choices that create a better future for all Iranians. It’s 

time for this regime to engage with the U.S. Government and our 

allies in a substantial way on the nuclear issue. It’s time for Iran 

to end its support of terrorism, end its support of Assad’s murderous regime, and respect the basic rights of its people. 

Coming into this election, we all expected the Supreme Leader 

would promote a yes man like nuclear negotiator Jalili, but as we 

witnessed, the status quo is no longer sustainable. Many analysts 

have said that Iran’s number one priority is to ensure regime survival. 

Well, if this brutal regime wants to survive while ruling over a 

young population frustrated with everyday life, then it must fundamentally alter its behavior. Otherwise, the election of this seemingly moderate candidate won’t yield the last results that the Iranian people so powerfully advocated for at the polls. 

Thank you, and I look forward to discussing this further with our 

distinguished panel. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

I will now recognize members for any 1-minute statements they 

like to make. We will start with Mr. Health, Mr. Kinzinger from 

Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you 

for holding this hearing, and thank you to the witnesses for coming. It’s going to be a very interesting thing. 

I think if we were 10 years ago right now and this had happened, 

I think we’d be in a much different position. We could say hey, let’s 

see how this kind of plays out. Let’s see if this guy really is a moderate. Let’s see if Iran ends up engaging with the West. 

I think our big concern, as you’ve heard from everybody that’s 

spoken so far is Iran is on the edge of attaining a nuclear weapon, 

and being a major game changer in the region. So, while I really 

want to celebrate a potentially positive move here, I remain very, 

very concerned that this is either a stall tactic, or that the train 

has already left the station and we’re going to see Iran attain a nuclear weapon. 

So, I only have a minute to speak, but I just want to add myself 

to the voice of what I think you’ll hear on a lot of folks on the 

panel, which is we cannot allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon. We 

cannot allow this to be an impetus for saying well, we’re going to 

soften our stance, we’re going to back off a little bit, we’re going 

to re-engage diplomatically because they really want to make a difference. And with that, I yield back. 

5

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cicilline, America’s mayor. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, ranking 

member Deutch for holding today’s hearing on this important issue. 

The continuing threat that Iran poses to international peace and 

stability remains a paramount concern of the United States and 

the entire world, and addressing that threat must be a top U.S. foreign policy priority. 

Over the weekend, the people of Iran elected former chief nuclear 

negotiator, Hassan Rouhani as the nation’s next President. Although he’s considered much more moderate and reform-minded 

than his predecessor, with Rouhani’s support Iran continues its 

pursuit of nuclear weapons in defiance of international sanctions. 

And while he has been hailed by some as a champion of reform, 

Rouhani was, nevertheless, selected with the final approval of the 

Supreme Leader who remains in full control of Iran’s nuclear program and military. 

As my colleagues have described this morning, to describe the 

Presidential election as full and fair elections would be a gross 

overstatement; but, nonetheless, understanding the impact of 

Iran’s elections on the Iranian people as well as the rest of the 

world is critical, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of our 

witnesses this morning. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Cotton of Arizona is—Arkansas, sorry, is recognized. 

Mr. COTTON. I’m sure Arizona is a wonderful state but not quite 

as great as Arkansas. 

The Iranian elections were not free and fair. They were a sham 

election and Iran is a sham democracy. Iran remains a totalitarian 

theocracy. All candidates were screened by the mullahs who also 

censored and suppressed the media during the so-called campaign. 

Mr. Rouhani is not a moderate. He was part of the 1979 ruling 

clique, and a devoted follower of Ayatollah Khameini. He led the 

crackdown of the 1999 student uprising, and is a nuclear negotiator 

for Iran’s regime. He often deceived and dissembled with the West. 

If Iran wants to rejoin the civilized world, it’s very clear what 

they should do, not have sham elections. They should denuclearize 

in an objective, verifiable way subject to international inspections. 

They should withdraw all support for Bashar Assad, including the 

4,000 troops they’ve sent to Syria to support him. They should stop 

funding and arming Hezbollah. They should quit exporting terrorism around the world, including against our troops in Afghanistan. They should recognize Israel’s right to exist. They should respect the civil, political, and religious liberties of their own people, 

and they should hold a genuine election, not a sham election. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the witnesses. 

The election of Hassan Rouhani begins a new chapter for the Iranian people. Receiving over 50 percent of the votes in a six-man 

race establishes a mandate to govern for Rouhani. As we look forward to the possibility of a more open and free society with Iran, 

6

we must also recognize the reality that Presidential power within 

Iran is only a small portion of the true power structure which continues to be led by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini. 

Rouhani has been described as a reformer who ran on a platform 

of restoring pride for the Iranian people, and their government, and 

economy. Previous to his election, however, Rouhani served as the 

lead negotiator for Iran from 2003 to 2005. He was seen as diplomatic, but his concessions to the West in proposing a suspension 

of Iran’s nuclear program ultimately got him removed by then 

President Ahmadinejad. 

This lesson was well ingrained in President Rouhani, and with 

a weakened ability to bring substantive change to Iran’s ongoing 

nuclear activities in his election, while preferable for the Iranian 

people will not likely yield a productive shift from past Iranian policy. 

I look forward to hearing from the panel with their thoughts and 

insights for what, if any, potentially transformative policies might 

be voted for in President Rouhani’s election. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Meadows of North Carolina. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I’m happy to 

have the opportunity to hear more about recent elections. Thank 

you for being here, what it means to the people of Iran, and to the 

Middle East as a whole. 

I wish I could say that I was optimistic, that we’re going to see 

real change, but from what I’ve seen so far this is not going to be 

the case. You know, the Supreme Leader is still in place. He’s still 

hostile to the U.S. interests, and specifically to the continued existence of Israel. And as long as the ruling regime remains with no 

checks on their power it’s going to be hard to be optimistic about 

Iran. 

This has been true for years, but it’s even more relevant as 

they’re currently fighting a proxy war to uphold the Assad regime 

in Syria, so we need to really re-evaluate this. I look forward to 

your testimony, and I’m looking forward to a future with a stable 

and a truly democratic Iran. 

Thank you and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and ranking member, and distinguished witnesses for holding this hearing 

on such a timely topic. As we know, the election in Iran last Friday 

resulted in a Presidential victory for Hassan Rouhani who has been 

deemed by a moderate voice among the fundamentalist cleric who 

served the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini. 

As we temper our expectations with the realities of the rigged 

electoral process in Iran, there remains many questions moving forward. We must steadfastly maintain our strategic goal of preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Will this former 

head nuclear negotiator provide a space for an international deal, 

or will he continue to be a party to the delay and deceit tactics you 

have seen throughout the years? 

7

As the Obama administration moves to arms the rebels in Syria, 

will Iran continue to bolster the Assad regime and use its proxy for 

international terrorism. Finally, our greatest friend and ally in the 

region, Israel, has expressed skepticism about any potential change 

of course, and has rightly stated that Iran will be judged by the 

actions, and we will judge them by their actions. Thank you very 

much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Congresswoman Meng from New York. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, 

and our witnesses for being here today. 

We were all surprised by the nature and result of the recent election in Iran. The President-elect Hassan Rouhani is the most moderate of the candidates selected by the Guardian Council, but is in 

every way, and in every respect a regime insider. The Iranian 

threat is as grave as it was last week, and the centrifuges are still 

spinning. 

But the question here is not so much who Mr. Rouhani is, or 

where he has been, but rather it is where he is going. As we saw 

with the strike 30 years ago, a tinge of freedom, a tinge of moderation can yield far more when coupled with popular will. I look forward to exploring this possibility today and I yield back my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Congressman Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome to the 

panel. I think all of us, obviously, are interested this morning in 

who is the new cleric President of Iran, Rouhani. 

Given his pedigree, he’s been referred to as a moderate, but he 

certainly has impeccable credentials from the revolutionary point of 

view, and from the theocratic state point of view. So, just how 

much change can we really expect? And how much of a risk is it 

for us to fall into the trap of buying more time for the nuclear development because a moderate has been elected to the Presidency 

once again? So, I think all of us are interested in hearing your 

views about that and engaging with you as the United States tries 

to think through its policy in this post-election period. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Thank you for excellent opening statements from all of our members. And now I’m so pleased to introduce our witnesses. 

First, we welcome Mr. Ali Nader, a senior international policy 

analyst at the RAND Corporation and the author of ‘‘Iran’s 2013 

President Election, It’s Meaning and Implications.’’ Pretty timely. 

He has published numerous titles on Iran’s internal politics, and 

prior to joining RAND, Mr. Nader served as a research analyst at 

the Center for Naval Analysis. Thank you, sir. 

Next we welcome Dr. Suzanne Maloney, a senior fellow at the 

Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 

where her research focuses on Iran and Persian Gulf energy. Prior 

to joining Brookings Institution, Dr. Maloney served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff and directed the 2004 Council 

on Foreign Relations Task Force on U.S. Policy toward Iran. 

Next we welcome Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, and because your name 

is a little difficult for me, my staff made sure that your name is 

8

mentioned in every sentence of your introduction. He’s a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Prior to this, Mr. Sadjadpour 

was the chief Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group. In 

2007, Mr. Sadjadpour was named a Young Global Leader by Royal 

Economic Forum in Davos. Mr. Sadjadpour is board member of the 

Banu Foundation, an organization dedicated to empowering women 

worldwide. 

Thank you to our panelists. Without objection, as I said, your full 

prepared statements will be made a part of the record, and we will 

ask you to please summarize it in 5 minutes. Mr. Nader, we will 

start with you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALIREZA NADER, SENIOR 

INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. NADER. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, ranking member Deutch, and members of the subcommittee. Thank for allowing 

me to appear before you today to speak about the Iranian Presidential election, and policy options for the United States going forward. 

I would like to make three points before offering U.S. policy recommendations. First, Hassan Rouhani’s election as President demonstrates the Iranian people’s frustrations and deep opposition to 

their leader’s decisions. This election is a refusal of the policy of socalled resistance on the nuclear program pursued by Supreme 

Leader Ayatollah Khameini and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 

which has led to Iran’s growing isolation and its economic devastation. 

Second, the election also showed that U.S. pressure against Iran 

is beginning to pay off. Iran’s economic crisis played a significant 

role in Rouhani’s election. Iran’s continued progress with the nuclear program has been very hostile. According to Iran’s Oil Minister, energy exports have declined by 40 percent. The Iranian Government has reported an inflation rate of 30 percent, although 

some economists claim it is much higher. Iran’s currency, the rial, 

lost 80 percent of its value in 2012 alone. The livelihood of many 

Iranians, including the middle class, is in grave jeopardy. 

Khamenei and Ahmadinejad’s policies, especially in the nuclear 

program, threaten to unravel the Islamic Republic. Khamenei could 

be seeking a way out of the crisis and he could be working through 

Rouhani. 

Third, Rouhani’s presidency may provide a better opportunity to 

solve the nuclear crisis through diplomacy. His past experience as 

a capable nuclear negotiator and a moderate on foreign policy is 

encouraging, but not all of Iran’s policies may change. For example, 

Iran is unlikely to abandon the support for the Syrian regime. 

Rouhani will, nevertheless, have an opportunity to reshape Iran’s 

position on the nuclear program, as he will appoint Iran’s nuclear 

negotiator and other key figures. 

There’s still enough time and space for the U.S. policy of sanctions and diplomacy to succeed, but negotiations between the P5+1, 

which is composed of the permanent members of the U.N. Security 

Council in Germany and Iran, could fail if the Iranian regime perceives sanctions as being geared toward regime implosion and overthrow, rather than a way to achieve a diplomatic solution. 

9

U.S. policy has to be balanced to include not only pressures but 

a dignified way for the regime to compromise. This means a cap on 

Iranian enrichment, intrusive inspections, limits on the Army nuclear facilities, and a limited stockpile of enriched uranium. In return, the P5+1 would accept Iran’s declared right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and would lift the most onerous sanctions. 

Any future sanctions should be specifically designed to impact 

the regime’s nuclear calculus. In addition, they should be reversible 

in the event of a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1. This 

means that this should not be defined by issues related to human 

rights or Iran’s regional behavior. Moreover, the United States 

should have the freedom to issue waivers when necessary for thirdparty countries regarding their compliance with sanctions. This allows Washington to maintain the impressive International Coalition which has isolated the Iranian regime. 

It is important that future sanctions target the regime as much 

as possible. Sanctions have so far hurt the regime but they have 

also caused suffering among the Iranian people. The United States 

should seek more creative ways in targeting the regime. Recent 

U.S. Treasury sanctions against Khamenei’s business empire are to 

be commended in this regard. Furthermore, the United States must 

ensure that sanctions do not lead to a shortage of food and medicine in Iran. This would be used as a propaganda tool by the regime and could erode Iran’s goodwill toward the United States. 

While sanctions should not be tied to human rights, the United 

States and its allies must be more vigorous in highlighting Iran’s 

human rights abuses while opening better channels of communication with the Iranian people. 

This election has demonstrated that the Islamic Republic, although authoritarian, is responsive to pressure. Washington should 

engage Rouhani before it pursues additional sanctions. If the regime does not respond, then it will be met with a great deal of 

pressure. 

The future of Iran is impossible to predict but time is on the side 

of the United States and the Iranian people. The United States still 

has the opportunity to resolve the nuclear impasse diplomatically 

while it helps the Iranian people realize a better future for their 

country. 

Again, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for allowing me to speak 

to you about this important issue. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nader follows:]

10


81569a-1.eps

Testimony 

Rouhani's Election 

Regime Retrenchment in the Face of Pressure 

Alireza Nader 

RAND Office of External Affairs 

CT-394 

June 2013 

Testimony submitted before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa on June 18, 

2013 

This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates 

to federal, s1ate, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight 

bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address 

the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 

its research clients and sponsors. RAN D@: is a registered trademark. 
11


81569a-2.eps

Published 2013 by the RAND Corporation 

1776 Main Street, P ,0, Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 

4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 

RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ 

To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact 

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; 

Email: order@rand.org 
12


81569a-3.eps

Alireza Nader' 

The RAND Corporation 

Rouhani's Election: Regime Retrenchment in the Face of Pressure 2 

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

House of Representatives 

June 18, 2013 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members ofthe Subcommittee, thank you 

for allowing me to appear before you today to speak about the Iranian presidential election and 

policy options for the United States going forward. 

Hassan Rouhani's election as president demonstrates the Iranian people's frustrations and deep 

opposition to their leaders' decisions. His election is repudiation of the policy of "resistance" on 

the nuclear program pursued by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which has led to Iran's growing isolation and its economic devastation. 

The election may also show that U.S. pressure against Iran is beginning to payoff. Iran's 

economic crisis played a significant role in Rouhani's election. Iran's continued progress on the 

nuclear program has been very costly; it has resulted in a sharp deterioration ofthe economy due 

to sanctions and a marked decline in the average Iranian's standard of living. The Iranian 

population has borne the brunt of sanctions, but the regime has also come under tremendous 

pressure. Its over-dependence on energy revenues has made it vulnerable to U.S. and 

international sanctions that have reduced oil and natural gas exports. 

Rouhani's presidency may provide a better opportunity to solve the nuclear crisis through 

diplomacy. His past experience as a capable nuclear negotiator and a moderate on foreign policy 

is encouraging. Iran's foreign policy may be ultimately controlled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah 

Khamenei, and it will not change dramatically. For example, Iran is unlikely to abandon its support 

for the Syrian regime. But Rouhani will nevertheless have an opportunity to reshape Iran's 

position on the nuclear program, as he will appoint Iran's nuclear negotiator and other key figures. 

1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be 

interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the 

RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to 

federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commiSSions and panels; and private 

review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective 

analysIs and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the 

world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 

2 This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT394.html. 
13


81569a-4.eps

There is still enough time and space for the U.S. policy of sanctions and diplomacy to succeed. 

But negotiations between the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, 

China, and Germany) and Iran could fail if the Iranian regime perceives sanctions as being 

geared toward regime implosion and overthrow, rather than a way to achieve a diplomatic 

solution. 

U.S. policy has to be balanced to include not only pressures, but a dignified way for the regime to 

compromise. Washington and its allies should be prepared to offer Iran a deal that includes the 

recognition of Iran's declared right to enrich uranium and a lifting of the harshest sanctions in 

return for verifiable limitations on the nuclear program. 

In addition, the United States and its allies must be more vigorous in highlighting Iran's human 

rights abuses while opening better channels of communication with the Iranian people. 

Washington should engage Rouhani before it pursues additional sanctions. If the regime does not 

respond, then it will be met with greater pressure. 

The Regime's Electoral Strategy 

Before the election, the Iranian regime's primary goal was to prevent a replay of the 

disputed 2009 election and the ensuing mass protests that were met with brutal force. 

The Iranian regime, especially the Revolutionary Guards, described the 2013 election as 

an "engineered election" meant to produce a president loyal to the system. Khamenei's 

main goal was to produce a stable and undisputed election that maintained an aura of 

legitimacy. 

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009 widened cleavages within the 

Iranian political elite and led to the biggest demonstrations since the 1979 revolution. 

The subsequent birth of the Green Movement shook the pillars of the Islamic Republic. 

However, the Green Movement soon petered out due to a lack of strong leadership and 

identifiable and realistic goals. Since 2009, the regime has succeeded in creating a 

climate of fear and repression, which has included executions, rape, torture, jailing, and 

exile for Iran's pro-democracy activists. Thus, Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards 

sought to suppress popular dissent while producing a list of acceptable and safe 

candidates. The regime's strategy entailed a violent crackdown on Iranian media and 

2 
14


81569a-5.eps

civil society. Scores of journalists and activists, especially those associated with the 

reformists and Green Movement, were harassed and arrested. 

In addition, it appeared that Khamenei looked for a president who would not challenge him on 

major issues. Khamenei has faced persistent challenges from the three presidents under him. Ali 

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) often overshadowed him; Mohammad Khatami (1997-

2005) wanted to refomn the political system, and in the process diminish Khamenei's authority; 

and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) espoused populist and nationalist themes that tested 

the clergy's authority. In order to buttress his authority, Khamenei has empowered the 

Revolutionary Guards to sideline Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad. Today, the Guards are 

one of the most powerful economic, political, and military actors in Iran. Commanded by 

Khamenei, they are a key stakeholder within Iran's political system. 

Moreover, Khamenei has used the Guardian Council, a constitutional body, to ensure the 

selection of candidates who will not challenge the system. Out of a pool of nearly forty relatively 

prominent candidates, only eight met the approval of the Guardian Council. The disqualification of 

Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, President Ahmadinejad's in-law and preferred successor, was of no 

major surprise. Since his re-election in 2009, Ahmadinejad has consistently and very publicly 

opposed Khamenei, his former patron. Khamenei's supporters have turned decisively against 

Ahmadinejad, and described him and Mashaei as a "deviant current" that seeks to upturn the 

Islamic Republic. But the disqualification of former President Rafsanjani, a founder and pillar of 

the Islamic Republic, took many Iranians by surprise. 

Rafsanjani was responsible for Khamenei's ascension to the position of Supreme Leader in 1989. 

He has served the Islamic Republic as president (1989-1997), chairman of the Assembly of 

Experts (responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader), and head of the Expediency Council (a 

body that resolves disputes between government branches). Rafsanjani, although perceived as 

enormously wealthy and corrupt, was nevertheless considered to be an altemative to the current 

status quo. He has spoken of reducing tensions with the international community and even 

engaging the United States. 

The eight candidates that remained were all loyal to Khamenei, but some, such as Rouhani, 

demonstrated an independent streak. Four of them hailed from Iran's conservative establishment 

and are beholden to Khamenei: Saeed Jalili, Iran's hard-line nuclear negotiator; Ali Akbar 

Velayati, former foreign minister and current Khamenei advisor; Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, 

Tehran's mayor; and Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, former speaker of parliament and Khamenei's inlaw. 

3 
15


81569a-6.eps

Out of the other four candidates, only Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Reza Aref could be 

considered as true moderates. Rouhani, in particular, was viewed as an opponent of Iran's status 

quo. A former nuclear negotiator during Mohammad Khatami's presidency, Rouhani has called 

for a more pragmatic approach toward the nuclear program and foreign policy in general. In his 

campaign appearances, he criticized Iran's "securitized atmosphere" and said that Iranians 

deserve a "better and freer life." Aref dropped out of the race in order to strengthen Rouhani's 

candidacy. Rouhani's chances of victory were viewed as being small, including by Rouhani's 

campaign staff. 

From the ruling conservatives' standpoint, he was too closely associated with Rafsanjani and 

Khatami. He also had significant support from the repressed Green Movement, which made the 

regime nervous. 

However, the conservative candidates did not work together; they all stayed in the race instead of 

dropping out and supporting only one conservative candidate. And Iranians voted in 

overwhelming numbers. 

As we have seen, Khamenei accepted Rouhani's victory. He could not afford to falsify the vote 

count in the face of Iranians' frustrations. Rouhani may not have been one of his favored 

candidates, but he is loyal to the system and will probably not seek a fundamental reform of the 

Islamic Republic. He could, however, lessen Iran's isolation by making concessions forthe 

regime while allowing Khamenei to save face. 

Economic Pressures and Regime Flexibility 

Rouhani's election is a reaction to internal and external pressures, including sanctions. According 

to Iran's oil minister, energy exports have declined by 40%. The Iranian government has reported 

an inftation rate of 30%, although some economists claim it is much higher. Iran's currency, the 

rial, lost 80% of its value in 2012 alone. The livelihood of many Iranians, including the middle 

class, is in grave jeopardy. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's policies, especially on the nuclear 

program, threatened to unravel the Islamic Republic. 

There are indications that the regime was open to compromise even before Rouhani's election. 

During the third televised presidential debates, several of the candidates, including Velayati, 

strongly criticized Jalili's negotiation strategy. In particular, they faulted Jalili for gaining Iran 

nothing but increased sanctions and diplomatic isolation. This demonstrates an active level of 

4 
16


81569a-7.eps

debate on the nuclear policy within the highest echelon of the regime. Jalili defended himself by 

stating that Khamenei had approved of Iran's nuclear position. Thus, Velayati's criticism can 

perhaps be seen as an implicit criticism of Khamenei's policies. 

The regime's leadership has spoken of possible nuclear flexibility if the United States pursues a 

"logical" position. This is often interpreted within Iran as the P5+1 's acknowledgement of Iran's 

declared right to enrich uranium. Thus, P5+1 flexibility could beget Iranian concessions on the 

nuclear program. The P5+1 should not offer Iran an acknowledgement of its right to enrich 

uranium upfront. Iran should be expected to undertake measures to build confidence by freezing 

or slowing down aspects of its program. The P5+1 should also keep its demand that Iran accept 

more intrusive inspections of its facilities. A path forward will not be easy. But the debates within 

Iran, and Rouhani's election, are an indication that sanctions are making the regime reconsider its 

costly policies. 

It would be wrong to place too much hope on Rouhani, however. He is a consummate insider 

who helped build the regime and has served in some of the country's highest positions. He 

served as national security advisor from 1989-2005, during which he conducted nuclear 

negotiations with the EU Three (United Kingdom, France, and Germany). Before his election, he 

served as Khamenei's representative to the National Security Council. 

And many Iranians may be realistic enough to realize that Rouhani may not be a transformative 

figure. They voted for Rouhani not because they love him, but because they are desperate to 

change their country. Rouhani was the least dogmatic and hard-line of the eight candidates, and 

offered the best chance of an even slightly better future. 

It is also not clear how much flexibility Rouhani will have given Khamenei's suspicion of all 

challengers. Iran's unelected institutions --the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, and 

ultra-conservative pressure groups-- may try to constrain Rouhani's presidency. We will have to 

wait and see if Rouhani will have any real authority. 

U.S. Policy Recommendations 

Pressuring the Iranian regime works. However, the United States should be cautious not to let 

sanctions become its sole strategy. The imposition of sanction afler sanction without a clear 

diplomatic approach may convince the Iranian regime that Washington seeks regime implosion 

and overthrow, rather than a solution to the nuclear crisis. The United States may indeed have 

the power to implode the regime economically; but this may not guarantee an end to Iran's 

5 
17


81569a-8.eps

nuclear ambitions. Sanctions without diplomacy could lead a much weakened regime that is still 

close to a nuclear weapons capability. 

The United States must propose a nuclear package to Iran that not only stops it from reaching a 

nuclear weapons capability, but also allows the regime a dignified exit from the crisis. 

This means a cap on Iranian enrichment, intrusive inspections, limits on Iranian nuclear facilities, 

and a limited stockpile of enriched uranium. In return, the P5+1 would accept Iran's declared right 

to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and would lift the most onerous sanctions. 

Any future sanctions should specifically be designed to impact the regime's nuclear calculus. In 

addition, they should be reversible in the event of a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1. This 

means that they should not be defined by issues related to human rights, democratization, or 

Iran's regional behavior. Moreover, the United States should have the freedom to issue waivers, 

when necessary, for third-party countries regarding their compliance with sanctions. This allows 

Washington to maintain the impressive international coalition which has isolated the Iranian 

regime. 

At the same time, the United States cannot forget issues essential to a successful long-term U.S. 

policy toward Iran. The Iranian nuclear program is, rightly, of great national security concern. 

However, the United States should actively prepare for a post-Khamenei Iran. The presidential 

election is not as important as the succession to the Supreme Leader. Iran is likely to experience 

great change and turmoil after Khamenei's passing. But the end of Khamenei's leadership will 

also be an opportunity for Iran's pro-democracy advocates to shape their country's future 

direction. 

That said, it is important that future sanctions target the regime as much as possible. Sanctions 

have so far hurt the regime, but they have also caused suffering among the Iranian people. The 

United States should seek more creative ways in targeting the regime; recent U.S. Treasury 

sanctions against Khamenei's business empire are to be commended in this regard. Furthermore, 

the United States must ensure that sanctions do not lead to a shortage of food and medicine. 

This would be used as a propaganda tool by the regime, and could erode Iranians' good-will 

toward the United States. 

Finally, the United States should not let nuclear negotiations inhibit a greater focus on the 

regime's gross human rights abuses. Some American analysts argue that a strong U.S. policy on 

human rights may convince the regime that the U.S. is not serious about negotiations. But 

6 
18


81569a-9.eps

Khamenei and his supporters will always be suspicious of U.S. intentions. They correctly 

recognize that the regime, which has attempted to portray itself as an Islamic "democracy," is 

vulnerable on human rights abuses. 

American officials should name and shame Iran's officials as much as possible. It is also 

important that U.S. allies and important Iranian commercial partners such as India also pressure 

Tehran on human rights issues. 

The 2013 presidential election has demonstrated that the Islamic Republic, although 

authoritarian, is responsive to pressure. 

Rouhani's election will not dramatically change Iranian policy. The regime is likely to maintain 

support for Bashar ai-Assad in Syria. And it will not abandon its nuclear pursuits overnight. But 

the United States has been presented an important opportunity. The United States should hold off 

on sanctions until it has seriously engaged the new Rouhani administration. 

The future of Iran is impossible to predict, but time is on the side of the United States and the 

Iranian people. The United States still has the opportunity to resolve the nuclear impasse 

diplomatically while it helps the Iranian people realize a better future fortheir country. 

Again, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for allowing me to speak to you today about this important issue. I look forward to your 

questions. 

7 
19

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Dr. Maloney. 

STATEMENT OF SUZANNE MALONEY, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Ms. MALONEY. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and members of the subcommittee, I’m very grateful for 

the opportunity to appear today to discuss the recently concluded 

Iranian Presidential election with you. 

Obviously, Iran is at the forefront of all of our security interests. 

This election does not change any of those interests or any of our 

concerns about Iranian behavior, but it does offer the possibility of 

new momentum in addressing them. 

In my testimony, I will highlight the importance of election to 

the office of the presidency, speak for a few moments about why 

it is we think Rouhani won, and why it is he was allowed to win. 

And then conclude with a few remarks about U.S. policy moving 

forward. 

Many even in this room have dismissed the irrelevance of Iranian electoral processes and institutions. I fully understand why, 

and yet I respectfully disagree. In fact, it’s a misreading of Iran’s 

complicated domestic dynamics to dismiss its elections or its representative institutions as mere window dressing. 

Elections, even ones that are highly orchestrated as the ones in 

the Islamic Republic are, represent critical junctures in the life 

cycle of political systems. In Iran, they have repeatedly sent the 

revolutionary system careening in new directions. 

The election that just concluded in Iran reinforced the subversive 

utility of semi-democratic institutions even in authoritarian systems. Iran’s elections matter because they provide openings for 

candidates to challenge the official narrative, as we heard time and 

time again in this campaign on the nuclear issue. 

They matter because they enable journalists and crowds of people to come and speak about issues that have been off limits for 

public debate for many years, including the arrest and detention of 

the two candidates from the 2009 election. 

Elections release genies from bottles, as one of the foremost Iranian dissents has said. We also know that the presidency matters. 

If nothing else, we have learned from the past 8 years about 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is that Iran’s presidency is important to 

the way its policy is conducted. The President controls budgets and 

institutions. More importantly, he controls the context for Iran’s internal domestic politics, but also for its relationships with the 

word. We would not have the sanctions regime that we have today 

were it not for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 

Let me just say a few words about why it is I think Rouhani 

won. First, he ran a very smart campaign. He appealed to Iranian 

young people. He pushed the bounds on the nuclear issue in a way 

that no one really anticipated, and he created the opportunity for, 

in fact, conservatives to pile on to this particular issue in an amazing televised public debate that was on state television for 41⁄2

hours in which all of the candidates effectively said what we’re 

20

doing now is not working. We need a deal. We have never, in fact, 

heard anything like this from the Islamic Republic before. 

Rouhani, in fact, managed to do what the reformists have been 

trying to do in Iran for more than a decade, which is to create a 

coalition that can actually advance their interest. They did this by 

banding together with centrists, with pragmatists, with conservatives. Really, Rouhani is not a reformist by any stretch of the 

imagination. He’s very much a pragmatic conservative, and his 

election represents a new alliance, a new political force in Iran. 

He also benefitted from conservative disarray. None of this really 

explains, however, why it is that Khamenei let him win. I think 

many people, and certainly the prevailing narrative in the press is 

that this was just an explosion, and Iranians once again told their 

leaders something they didn’t want to hear. 

I think that’s quite possible, and certainly the role of the Iranian 

people and their unhappiness about their horrendous economic conditions is very important, but I think there’s also an argument to 

be made, and I can sketch it out in greater depth during the discussion period that, in fact, the regime is looking for a way out of 

the box that it’s in. And, in fact, what they’ve done is what they 

did toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War which is to try to empower 

a fixer, someone who can get them out of a very dire situation. 

For the U.S., this is an opportunity, but also one that offers no 

easy path forward. We see confirmation, as Ali has just said, that 

the U.S. strategy is working to a point. The point of a dual track 

policy that we’ve had in place for many years now has been to create the political will for a deal on the nuclear issue, and we know 

that that exists. That’s huge, and it’s a tremendous opportunity. 

Of course, Rouhani’s election will inevitably lead to sanctions erosion and other challenges for U.S. policy. We have to be prepared 

that the United States will negotiate seriously, that we can offer 

tangible rewards in exchange for confirmed overtures from the Iranians, and specific concessions on the nuclear program. 

Congress’ role in this moment of opportunity is extremely important. For Washington to greet the empowerment of the first serious 

moderate, someone who has an apparent mandate to make a deal 

on the nuclear issue with a new raft of sanctions would be a disaster. 

U.S. policy makers should appreciate that Rouhani will experience real constraints. He doesn’t have an easy path forward, but 

this is someone who’s been dubbed the sheik of diplomacy. He may 

just be the right man to do the deal we’ve been waiting for. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I 

look forward to the discussion. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Maloney follows:]

21


81569b-1.eps

Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

"Elections in Iran: The Regime Cementing Its Control" 

Suzanne Maloney 

Seniur F elluw, Saban Center jor Middle East Pulicy at the Bruukings Institutiun 

June 18,2013 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch and Members of the Subcommittee, I'm very 

grateful for the opportunity to discuss the recently-concluded presidential election in the Islamic 

Republic of Iran. Tehran's nuclear ambitions, support for terrorism, and repression of its own 

citizens has long ranked it at the forefront of U.S security interests in the Middle East and across 

the world. The election ofa new president does not alter any of those concerns or priorities, but 

the campaign and the outcome does offer the pussibility of new momentum in addressing them. 

And it highlights the apparent success of the strategy pursued by the Obama Administration in 

generating, as well as the need for thoughtful diplomacy to make the most of whatever 

opportunity lies before the world now that the 

In my testimony today, I will address the significance of elections and the role of the presidency 

in the Islamic Republic, the political ramifications of the campaign and the victory of Hassan 

Rouhani for Iran, and the implications for the interests and policies of the United States. 

Why Iranian Elections Matter 

Many, including Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, have dismissed the relevance of the electoral processes 

and institutions in Iran's Islamic Republic. I respectfully disagree. My interpretation is not based 

upon the outcome of this election - indeed, I articulated these positions well before the 

election's outcome, back when the smart money was only a tightly controlled election and an 

outcome that offered absolute lock-step continuity on the nuclear issue. Rather, I base my 

contention that Iran's elections and institutions matter upon my experience doing research on and 

in the Islamic Republic for many years as an academic, a government official, and now as a 

scholar at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. 

I fully understand the rationale for the argument that the elections are pure farce. Iran is, after all, 

an Islamic theocracy, a state in which the supreme leader is the ultimate decision-maker and 

elections are heavily stage-managed from start to finish. The president's powers are explicitly 

limited, and whatever sense of electoral unpredictability that characterized Iran in the past- for 

example, in 1997, when a reformist cleric upset the heavily-favored tront-runner- appeared to 

have ended with the contested 2009 reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Millions of Iranians 

outraged by the unusual speed and dubious margin of Ahmadinejad's ostensible victory took to 
22


81569b-2.eps

the streets chanting "where is my voteT This violence that greeted this appeal, and the show 

trials and other Stalinist tactics that followed in its wake, seemed to suggest that Iran's quirky 

system had devolved to a more banal authoritarianism, where polls serve as mere pageants and 

institutions are unabashedly manipulated. 

However, as confirmed by the unexpectedly dynamic debate during the campaign and the 

outcome that contravened the conventional wisdom, it is a misreading of Iran's complicated 

domestic dynamics to dismiss its elections or its representative institutions as mere windowdressing. And it was a mistake to disregard the brewing antagonisms within Iran's political 

establishment as irrelevant. Don't get me wrong- I don't mean to suggest that the election was 

a truly democratic enterprise; even in the best of times, the Islamic Republic fell far short of 

meeting international standards for free and fair elections. 

However, elections- even ones that are heavily rigged- represent critical junctures in the 

lifecycle of political systems, and in Iran they have repeatedly sent the revolutionary system 

careening in new directions. At times, these changes in course were deliberate, as in 1989 when 

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani ran virtually unopposed in order to spearhead the country's postwar reconstruction. At other times, the shifts have been largely unanticipated, such as the advent 

of the reform movement or even Ahmadinejad himself, whose mid-term transformation from the 

Supreme Leader's acolyte to his whipping boy has given the Iranian political establishment 

whiplash 

Iran's revolution was the product ofa deeply divided coalition that agreed on little beyond their 

opposition to the Shah, and throughout its history, the Islamic Republic has experienced an 

intense, evolving competition for influence. That contest remains as dynamic as ever, and the 

election will offer an opportunity for external observers to gauge the state of play. For those 

within the system, the campaign provides endless openings for ambitious contenders and rival 

factions to position themselves for future influence and reframe Iran's political climate, just as 

Khatami and Ahmadinejad did 

The election that just concluded in Iran reinforced the subversive utility of semi-democratic 

institutions in authoritarian states. Iran's elections matter because they provide openings for 

candidates to challenge the official narrative on thorny issues - as they did during this 

campaign on the nuclear issue - for journalists to push the envelope of state censorship, and for 

large gatherings of voters to demand the release of political prisoners, including the very 

candidates detained after the last rigged ballot Elections - even explicitly orchestrated ones that 

offer only a highly imperfect array of options - release the genies from the bottles, to 

paraphrase a statement by Akbar Ganji, one of Iran's foremost dissidents 

And because the legacy of the revolution and Iran's century-old struggle for representative rule 

has made popular participation incumbent even upon its theocracy, its elections mobilize 

millions of Iranians in ways that often prove difficult to control, even with a well-orchestrated 

repression. We saw this play out in dramatic fashion in 2009, when millions of Iranians came to 

the street to demand their votes be counted, because even though they appreciated the constraints 

of the system in which they live, Iran's citizens refuse to be cut out of the prospect The fact that 

74 percent of the Iranian electorate bothered to engage in Friday's ballot, often waiting in long 
23


81569b-3.eps

lines and certainly braving the fear and frustration that is the legacy of the 2009 upheaval 

demonstrates that Iranians themselves believe their electoral processes and institutions matter. 

Neither their sacrifices nor their celebrations at the outcome should be dismissed. 

If the past eight years of antics by Iran's current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have taught 

us nothing else, they have demonstrated over and over again that Iran's presidency matters. 

Despite its electoral illegitimacy, its institutional constraints, and the assiduous efforts of a 

system built around a di vine mandate, the otlice of the presidency has emerged as one with real 

power to shape the context for domestic and foreign policy. The post exerts considerable 

authority over the Iranian budget, the tramework for internal political acti vities, the social and 

cultural atmosphere, and even the most sensitive aspects of Iran's security policies. When 

Hassan Rouhani assumes the otlice in August, he will find himself near the apex of power, at a 

time of unprecedented external pressure and at the cusp of generational change within the Iranian 

regime. 

To appreciate the significance of the much-maligned Iranian presidency, simply consider the 

track records of its most recent occupants. During his two tenns in otlice (1997-2005), reformist 

president Mohammad Khatami managed to curb some of the worst abuses of Iran's own citizens 

and establish new avenues for political participation and speech. His tenure attracted foreign 

investment to Iran, unified its exchange rate, and established an oil stabilization fund to promote 

responsible economic stewardship. He repaired Iran's relationships with much of the world, and 

even helped push through a multi -year suspension of the most worrisome aspects of its nuclear 

program. 

It was not an unadulterated success by any stretch of the imagination; Khatami's ambitions for 

change were inherently limited by his steadfast loyalty to the theocratic system and many of its 

most problematic policies, and even his mild reforms were thwarted at every turn by hardliners' 

opposition. Still, compare those years to the two terms of his successor, who oversaw a 

crackdown against technocrats and the media, squandered an epic boom in oil revenues, and 

indulged in hate speech that helped alienate the world and isolate his country. It's clear that 

Iranians as well as the international community were better served by Khatami' s halting 

moderation than by Ahmadinejad's impetuous antagonisms. 

Repercussions of The Election Outcome and Expectations for Rouhani Presidency 

The question we are confronted with now is whether Iranians and the world will be better off 

under the administration of Hassan Rouhani, the cleric who the election with a narrow plurality 

but a decisive lead over his conservative rivals. The early signs are certainly auspicious, but 

Iran's tortuous system and the sway of hard-liners, particularly those in the security 

establishment who revile Rouhani 's past diplomatic approach to the nuclear issue, offer no 

certainties about the outcome. 

However, the purpose of this hearing to analyze the election, and I want to take a few moments 

to highlight the factors that facilitated an outcome that gainsays much of the pre-election 

analysis. Going into the election, a Rouhani victory seemed unlikely. The conservatives' favored 

candidate was said to be Saeed Jaliti, a pious and prim bureaucrat who was appointed as lead 
24


81569b-4.eps

nuclear negotiator six years ago. Jalili's chief qualifications forthe post were his status as a 

"living martyr" (he lost a leg in the war with Iraq), his discolored forehead (from dutiful prayer), 

and his cultivation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei over the past ten years. It is easy to understand 

why Jalili was seen as leading the pack; he is basically an improved version of Ahmadinejad, a 

younger generation hard-liner who boasts total commitment to the ideals of the revolution but 

who, given his limited national profile, would be perfectly subservient to Khamenei. 

By contrast, Rouhani initially drummed up minimal excitement within Iran and even less 

attention outside the country, despite the implicit imprimatur of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 

Iran's foremost power broker. Because the clergy is so unpopular in Iran at the moment, and 

because the hard-liners disparaged Rouhani' s track record on the nuclear issue almost non-stop, 

his prospects seemed dim. Further, in the unlikely event that his campaign did gain steam, it 

seemed, hard-liners would have no qualms about doing whatever it took to neutralize a potential 

threat. 

Despite these disadvantages, several important factors that enabled Rouhani to prevail. First, he 

ran a very savvy campaign that managed to build confidence among an influential swath of the 

political establishment at the same time that he lured Iran's young, disaffected voters to give him 

a second look. Rouhani had spent eight years disparaging Ahmadinejad's policies, and in his 

focus on the nuclear issue, he repeatedly highlighted the costs to Iran's economy and by 

extension, its political stability. That clearly resonated with traditionalists, who were already 

uneasy with Jalili or the other heavyweight conservative candidate, Tehran mayor Mohammad 

Baqr Qalibaf, for a variety of reasons including doubts about their reliability and capacity to 

manage the state. 

In reaching out beyond the conservatives who came up through the system with him, however, 

Rouhani needed to persuade refonnists as well as Iran's disaffected youth that he could and 

would take up the mantle of their causes. He pushed against the regime's red lines, for example, 

by promising to release political prisoners. And, in a clear reference to Mir Hossein Mousavi and 

Mehdi Karroubi, two refonnist candidates who were detained after the 2009 vote, he said that he 

would free all those who remain under house arrest as well. He bypassed state media by 

releasing a compelling video around his campaign theme of leading Iran out of the winter of its 

discontent. The video also highlighted his experience during the war with Iraq and on nuclear 

negotiations. His aggressive campaign caught the attention of a disaffected Iranian population, 

who eventually began to throng his rallies. 

The final element of his campaign strategy was to push the boundaries on the nuclear issue. 

Rouhani sparred heatedly with Jalili's campaign chiet: who was also the deputy negotiator, 

around the relative merits of their respective strategies, and with an interviewer on state 

television. In this respect, he was responsible for the most surprising and dramatic turn in the 

campaign- the emergence of a fierce and unvarnished critique of the current approach to the 

nuclear issue. The critique exploded onto the scene during one ofthe three televised debates 

among the eight approved candidates. During the course of a four-and-a-half-hour discussion 

broadcast live on state television, an exchange about general foreign policy issues morphed 

unexpectedly into a mutiny on the nuclear issue. One candidate, Ali Akbar Velayati, a scion of 

the regime's conservative base, attacked Jalili for failing to strike a nuclear deal and for 

pennitting U. S. -backed sanctions on Iran to increase. 
25


81569b-5.eps

The amazingly candid discussion that followed Velayati's charge betrayed the Iranian 

establishment's awareness of the regime's increasing vulnerability. It could only be understood as 

an intervention -one initiated by the regime's most stalwart supporters and intended to rescue 

the system by acknowledging its precarious straits and appealing for pragmatism (rather than 

Jalili's dogmatism). The discussion was also an acknowledgement that the sanctions-induced 

miseries of the Iranian public can no longer be soothed with nuclear pageantry or even appeals to 

religious nationalism. This worked to Rouhani's advantage, since his moderation on this issue 

appears to have greater resonance with the broad base of the population than the defiance and 

resistance preached by Jalili and Khamenei. 

In addition to running a shrewd campaign, Rouhani also benetitted trom an unprecedented 

alliance between Iran's embattled reform movement and the center-right faction to which 

Rouhani, as well as Rafsanjani, are generally understood to belong. The division between the 

two factions dates back to the earliest years of the revolution. It became more entrenched after 

the reformists gained power in 1997, when Mohammad Khatami, the reformist standard-bearer, 

was elected president in a major upset. By aligning with the center-right in this campaign, the 

reformists got a path out of the political desert in which they have lanb'llished since the end of 

Khatami's presidency. By joining with the reformists, Rouhani got a powerful get-out-the-vote 

etfort and the withdrawal from the race of Mohammad Reza Aret: the sole approved reformist 

candidate. By contrast, the conservative camp remained divided, never coalescing around a 

single candidate, despite increasingly shrill and desperate appeals trom some of its ideolOb'lleS 

Had the conservatives managed to field a single candidate rather than splinter their vote among 

four individuals, they could have at least forced the election into a run-off, and may well have 

dampened Rouhani's momentum sufficiently to prevent his election. 

Of course, Rouhani's most powerful advantage was the bitter unhappiness of the Iranian people, 

who have witnessed the implosion of their currency, the return of austerity measures not seen 

since the Iran-Iraq War, and the erosion of their basic rights and freedoms over the past eight 

years. The fact that they were willing to hope again, even after the crushing disappointment of 

2009 election, underscores a remarkable commitment to peaceful change and to democratic 

institutions. They did so in some substantial measure as a means of preventing a worse outcome, 

the election ofnuc1ear negotiator Saeed Jalili, whose slogans of resistance seemed to promise 

more of the same of what Iranians have endured over the past eight years. 

All this might explain the massi ve turnout on election day and Rouhani' s overwhelming popular 

victory. It does not explain, though, why Khamenei avoided the chicanery that plagued the 2009 

vote and why he let the result stand. Here, I think we must continue to analyze the campaign, its 

precedents and the establishment of the next administration. 

One explanation is that Khamenei simply miscalculated and found himselt: once again, 

overtaken by events when Rouhani's candidacy surged with little forewarning. After all, the 

conservatives have held all the cards in Iran since 2005; they dominate its institutions and dictate 

the terms of the debate. With the leading reformists imprisoned or in exile, no one expected that 

the forces of change could be revived so powertully. It is certainly possible that Khamenei began 

to appreciate that the campaign was shifting unexpectedly in a less tolerable direction, but 

wanted to avoid new stresses to the system by intervening to obstruct it as they had in 2009 
26


81569b-6.eps

There is another possibility, however, and one that better explains Khamenei 's strangely 

pennissive attitude toward the thousands who chanted for the release of political prisoners at 

Rouhani rallies and the candidates who defied his dictates on the nuclear issue while on live 

television. Khamenei even made a last-minute appeal for every Iranian -even those who don't 

support the Islamic Republic -to vote, an unprecedented gesture given the regime's ideological 

strictures. In this analysis, it is therefore possible to interpret that Khamenei 's unexpected 

munificence as a deliberate effort to steer the election in a different direction than many 

expected. Instead of viewing Rouhani's election as a replay of the shocking political upset that 

Khatami pulled offin 1997, it may in fact be an echo of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei's sudden 

shift in 1988 and 1989, when he charged Rafsanjani, a pragmatist, with ending the war with Iraq, 

and then helped Rafsanjani win the presidency so that he could spearhead the post-war 

reconstruction program. Now, as then, Iran's leadership is not bent on infinite sacrifice. Perhaps 

allowing Rouhani's victory is Khamenei's way of empowering a conciliator to repair Iran's 

frayed relations with the world and find some resolution to the nuclear dispute that enables the 

country to revive oil exports and resume normal trade. 

That does not mean, of course, that Rouhani has an easy road ahead He must wrangle the 

support of the hard-liners and lock in at least continued tacit backing from Khamenei. In doing 

so, he will have to overcome a decade of resentment. During his stint leading nuclear talks, 

Rouhani made the sole serious concession that the Islamic Republic has ever offered on its 

nuclear ambitions: a multi-year suspension of its enrichment activities that was ended just before 

Ahmadinej ad took office. 

The move won Rouhani the unending fury of the hard-liners, including Khamenei, who approved 

the deal but has publicly inveighed against Rouhani' s nuclear diplomacy as recently as last 

summer. Today, however, many Iranians -including, apparently, many within the establishment 

-find his ability to craft a viable deal with the world on the nuclear issue appealing. His election 

thus suggests that a historic shift in Iran's approach to the world and to the nuclear standoff 

could be in the offing. Still, to overcome old antipathies among the conservatives and to advance 

his agenda for change within Iran's Machiavellian political culture, Rouhani will need the clear 

and unwavering support of Khamenei, something that the Supreme Leader has only accorded to 

one president during his 25-year tenure: Ahmadinejad, in his first term 

For Iran's Islamic Republic, Rouhani's victory represents a significant turning point, albeit one 

whose proportions and precise vector remain uncertain. Rouhani is in many ways an accidental 

instrument of change in Iran. His past political affiliations lie closer to Iran's traditional 

conservatives rather than the leftists who spearheaded the refonn movement 15 years ago. 

Rouhani is a blunt pragmatist with plenty of experience maneuvering within Iran's theocratic 

system. He is far too sensible to indulge in a power grab it la Ahmadinejad. And, as a cleric, he 

assuages the fears of the Islamic Republic's religious class. He embraced refonnist rhetoric 

during the campaign, but will not deviate too far from the system's principles, the foremost of 

which is the primacy of the Supreme Leader. Meanwhile, Rouhani's focus on the economic costs 

of Ahmadinejad's mismanagement resonates with the regime's traditionalists as well as with a 

population battered by a decade of intensifying hardship and repression. All in all, the new 

president might benefit from a broader base of support than any in Iran's post-revolutionary 

history, which will be an important asset as he seeks to navigate the country out of isolation and 

economic crisis. 
27


81569b-7.eps

Implications for U.S. Interests and Policy 

The ultimate conclusion from Rouhani's victory is that neither Khamenei nor Iran's military 

commanders harbor any illusions about the depth of the existential crisis confronting the regime. 

Whether they can demonstrate similarly pragmatic flexibility in seeking to resolve the causes of 

that crisis- the standoff with the international community over the nuclear issue- remains the 

next great conundrum of Iran's always unpredictable political narrative. 

For Washington, this is a moment of tremendous opportunity, but no easy answers. Signs of 

domestic moderation in Iran may only encourage the erosion of the heretofore robust 

international coalition on sanctions implementation. And whoever takes the helm in Iran in 

August will still contend with a thomy factional landscape on the nuclear issue as well as on all 

the other areas of concern for Washington, particularly Syria and the regime's treatment of its 

own citizens. Still, whatever happens in the ensuing hours and days, we must appreciate that 

the arc of Iranian politics has shifted in ways that contravened the conventional wisdom. That 

alone is an auspicious sign. 

During the campaign, reports emerged that Iran's foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, 

has persuaded the country's Supreme Leader to authorize a wide-ranging new initiative toward 

Washington. Tehran quickly disavowed that disclosure, but the report reinforces a surprising 

sense of possibility that has come through in the course of the just-concluded campaign for Iran's 

presidency surrounding the nuclear issue and the long, bitter estrangement between the Islamic 

Republic and the United States 

This news, like the just-concluded presidential election campaign, underscores how much the 

ground has shifted within Tran on dealing with Washington, even at a time when conservatives 

control the narrative within Iran. Today, it is almost easy to forget that for most of the Islamic 

Republic's history, advocating dialogue with Washington was the political equivalent of the kiss 

of death. Even a decade ago, the kind offree-wheeling debate on how to negotiate with the 'Great 

Satan' that took place last week on state television and throughout the course of this presidential 

campaign would have been unthinkable; even then it was still rare, and risky, for Iranian otlicials 

to publicly discuss whether Iran should talk with Washington at all. 

The opponents of dialogue are not insignificant, and foremost among them is Supreme Leader 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His persistently hard-line views reflect a deeply engrained mistrust of 

American intentions that has endured at least three decades and is probably beyond 

propitiation. Without his buy-in, nothing is possible in Iran's Islamic Republic 

For Washington, all these developments ofTer welcome confIrmation that the U.S. strategy is 

working, at least to a point. The outcome confinned that political will for a nuclear deal exists 

within the Islamic Republic. Even with a more moderate president at the helm, however, the 

nuclear issue will not be readily resolved, and Iran's divided political sphere is as ditlicult as 

ever. 
28


81569b-8.eps

The unexpected twist in the initial election narrative, from what was presumed to a tepid 

cakewalk for a hand-picked protege of the Supreme Leader to a knock-down, drag-out public 

brawl over Iranian foreign policy and a late-game revival of the street excitement that preceded 

the 2009 vote, Washington's dilemmas today even more acute. So far, the tone and the message 

appear to be just right- steady reminders of the opportunities for resolving the nuclear crisis and 

combined with dispassion on the presidential contest. 

To overcome the deep-seated (and not entirely unjustified) paranoia of its ultimate decisionmaker, the United States will need to utilize creativity and some additional patience. First and 

foremost, U. S. policy-makers must appreciate that Rouhani will need to demonstrate to Iranians 

that he can produce tangible rewards for diplomatic overtures. That means that Washington 

should be prepared to otTer signitlcant sanctions relief in exchange for any concessions on the 

nuclear issue. Congress' role in this moment of opportunity is extremely important; for 

Washington to greet the empowennent of a serious moderate with real credentials and an 

apparent mandate to make progress on the nuclear issue with a new raft of sanctions would be an 

ill-advised response to the first good news emerging from Iran in years. 

u.s. policymakers should also appreciate that Rouhani may face real constraints in seeking to 

solve the nuclear dispute without exacerbating the mistrust of the hard-liners. In other words, the 

path out of isolation and economic crisis is perilous, but Iran's new president, who has 

sometimes been dubbed "the sheikh of diplomacy," may just be the right man at the right 

moment to walk it 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to answering any 

questions you might have. 
29

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Maloney. 

Mr. Sadjadpour. 

STATEMENT OF MR. KARIM SADJADPOUR, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and members of the subcommittee. 

I think the election of Hassan Rouhani was another important 

and humble reminder that there are no experts on Iranian politics, 

only students of Iranian politics. And it was another reminder that 

Presidential elections in Iran tend to be unfree, unfair, and unpredictable, as Representative Deutch can attest by my briefing before 

the election. 

I think what was most surprising about Hassan Rouhani’s victory wasn’t that he received the most votes. He was the lone 

‘‘moderate’’candidate on a ballot which was amongst five hardline 

representatives of the government. But what was most surprising, 

as Suzanne mentioned, was that he was allowed to win. And I 

think, as many of you have said here today, Rouhani’s victory I 

think can be better interpreted as a reflection of the tremendous 

popular discontent in Iran rather than a deep-seated affection for 

the candidate of Hassan Rouhani himself. 

We did see after the election that Iranians reacted jubilantly, 

and I would describe this as the equivalent of a population experiencing a light rain after 8 years of drought. When you do live in 

Iran, it makes a difference who your President is. During the era 

of Mohammad Khatami, it was a country which was more politically and socially tolerant. There was a much better economy than 

under Ahmadinejad, so from the vantage point of Iranian citizens 

it does make a difference who their President is. But as everyone 

has said here today, Hassan Rouhani is no Nelson Mandela. He’s 

not even Mohammad Khatami. He’s someone who’s not committed 

to reforming the system. He is a consonant regime insider who is 

committed to the preservation of the Islamic Republic, but I think 

there is an important caveat here, which is that Rouhani comes 

from the tradition in Iran of the pragmatic conservatives who, 

again, are deeply committed to the revolution, to the maintenance 

of the Islamic Republic, but they believe that in order to preserve 

the regime, Iran needs to privilege economic expediency over revolutionary ideology. And I think this will probably put him in contrast to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, who has long 

believed that compromising on revolutionary principles would actually—could possibly unravel the system rather than strengthen it. 

Let me move to a couple of thoughts on U.S. policy. I think the 

discussion on U.S. policy toward Iran is nicely framed by two 

quotes from Henry Kissinger, who said, ‘‘There are few nations in 

the world with whom the United States has more common interests 

and less reason to quarrel than Iran, but Iran has to decide whether it’s a nation or a cause.’’ And I think under a Rouhani presidency, as much as there is a popular desire for change in Iran, 

when it comes to the strategic principles of the Islamic Republic, 

namely, resistance toward the United States and toward Israel, 

Rouhani’s will or ability to change those principles is very unclear. 

30

But I will say one thing about Iran, and that is that Iran is one 

of the very few, if only, countries in the Middle East in which 

America’s strategic interest and its democratic values align rather 

than clash. If you look at a lot of the other countries in the Middle 

East, particularly in the Arab world, more representative systems 

in those countries actually produce less tolerant governments, and 

governments which are less sympathetic to the United States. And 

I think that is the exception in Iran, and for that reason I think 

it’s imperative for us to think more creatively about ways to facilitate political change in Iran beyond just sanctions. 

And I would argue that the single most important thing the 

United States can do to facilitate genuine political change in Iran 

is to inhibit the Iranian regime’s ability to control information and 

communication. And in this context, I think one thing which is absolutely critical, which we haven’t fully taken advantage of is our 

Voice of America Persian News Network. This is something which 

has the potential to reach 25–30 million Iranians, but it’s woefully 

underperforming. It doesn’t have nearly the popularity or the professionalism as the BBC Persian Television Service which played 

an integral role in these elections. So, I think that if there’s one 

thing Congress can do, it’s to spearhead the reform and the privatization of Voice of America’s Persian News Network. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadjadpour follows:]

31


81569c-1.eps

fJ 

CARNEGIE 

ENDOWMENT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

TIH GIO~Al THINK TANK 

"ELECTIONS IN IRAN: 

THE REGIME CEMENTING 

ITS CONTROL" 

Testimony by Karim Sadjadpour 

Senior ,\ssociate, Middle East Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

IIouse Foreign Affairs Committee 

Middle East and N mth A frica Subcommittee 

June 18, 2013 

SEiliNG BEIRUT BKUS5f.lS MOSCOW WASHINGTON 
32


81569c-2.eps

Overview 

~ladam ChairmtUl tUld distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify before you today. 

Hrtssan Rouhani's unexpected June 14,2013 victory in Ir,m's president1dl ntce \vas another humbling 

reminder that there are no experts on Iranian politics, only students of Iranian politics. \\'hat \vas 

surori:sini!WaS not that Rouhani received the highest number of votes: As the lone moderate 

candidate on ballot in a nat10n suffocating under tremendous internal and external political ~md 

economic pressure, Rouhani's late-hour surge was a ret1ect.ion of deep discontent \\,ith the status-quo 

rather than a deep-seated affinity for the candidate himself. 

\\:lut \),/as more surprising, however, \\',lS that Rouh~Uli W,lS permitted to W111 by an unelected 

consenati\ e establishment-namely Supreme Leader Ayatollah ~,\li Kh,unenei-who over the last 

decade have systematically purged moderates and refonnists from the corndors of power using force 

and int1tnidahon. Paradoxlcally, the deliberate process of counting the 37 million ballots in 2013 made 

it clear to many Iramans that that the ballots were not counted in President Alahmoud _1.hmadinejad's 

abruptly announced, and highly contested fe-election in 2009. 

\\,11ile the Iranian public reacted jubilantly to Rouhani's Ylctory-the equivalent of a light rain after 

e1ght years of drought----expectations about his will and ab1lity to affect metUlingful change in both 

Iran's internal ~Uld external behavior should be tempered. }Jthough Rouhani was endorsed by ke: 

reformtst including Fonner President \fohammed Khat,lmi, he is less a refonner than a 

insider "who is committed to the preseryation oFthc IslamiC Republic. Indeed, if 

he \vas anything he yvould not haye been permitted to run. TTis campaign focused not on 

pursuing democracy, or altering the Islamic Republic's strategic prinClples, but rather moderatmg its 

style more than its substance. 

Rouhani's yictory is unhkely to alter Iran's foreign policy principles, and hence is not likely to create 

the conditions needed for a r(lpprochement be1\veen the 1\1,10 countries. If \Vaslungton's goal is 

detente \\'ith Tehr,m, howeyer, Rouhdni's victory \vas likely the best possible outcome of A deeply 

tla\ved and unfree electoral process. 

Domestic Implications of a Rouhani Presidency 

The position of president in the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither authoritative nor ceremonial. The 

,Tast malorinT of the country's constihltional authontv rests \vith the Supreme r .eader, who \vill Iikclv 

continue to "haye effecti\Te ~ontrol O\Ter Iran's key in~tihltions of pmver, including its mihtary, medi;, 

and ludici(lry. ~onetheless, If',UliMl presidents play an important role in helping to m(uLlge the 

country's economy ,tS well as its internAl political and social atmosphere. 

Rouh"(mi \vll1 haye the opporhmity to bring in different personnel to mamlge the country's 

bureaucracies. In contrast to ~bhm()ud _-\hmadinejad, who valued political loyalty ,md ideological 

fealty oyer competence, Rouhani \villlikel-y (tttempt to bring back experienced mmugers ,md 

technocrats to the government. During the enl of reformist president \,[ohammad Khatami (1997-

2005) the political and social atmosphere-for ).JGO, newspapers, universit}, shldents, and simply 

young people \vanting to 11ye frecly-\vas palpably more tolerant than it has been during the eightyear tenure of ~'Iahmoud -.:\.hmadinejad (200.'1-2013). 
33


81569c-3.eps

Rouh,uli's victory raises important questions (lbout the Islamic Republic's internal power d:namics, 

particuLtrly the pO\,\Tr of Supreme LeAder Khtunenei ,md the Reyolutionary (iuards (IR(iC). 

Rouh,mi's victory has been commonly interpreted as a defeat for l";:'hmnenei. This may well prove to 

be true, but it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. \\'11ile \oters clearly repudiated Khamenei's 

policies-giyen the poor sho,\ying of Khamenei's t\\'O closest acolytes, nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili 

and former foreign minister ~\li ~-\kbar Velayati-m allowing them to do so l<Jumenei likely helped 

rehabilitate his deeply tattered image. Indeed, l<Jumenei's appro\'al rating toda) is likely much higher 

tlun it was Just prior to the election. 

The medlUm and long~tenn impact of Rouham's "\ym on Khamenei's authonty is less clear. At the 

moment Iran's most powerful institutions-namely the Revolutionary Guards, bassij pal,an·lilia.tary, 

Cuardian Council, Expediency CoullClI, parliament, judiClary, intelligence mlllistry, ,me, "C,BU" 

religious foundations ~lonyads), to name a few-are led by individuals who have been either 

handpicked by Khamenei or publicly deferential to him. To the best of my knmvledge, there is not a 

single example m which Khamenei has been eyen mildly, dlrectly cntici7ed by one of these 

mstltutlOns. 

\,,'ill these forces remain deferenttal to Kh-amenei, or do they sense that the Supreme Leader's political 

has peaked? \,,'iil forces aligned "\v1th fonner presidents TTashemi Rafsanjani and I\Tohammed 

both of whom beheve the constituhonal authority of the Supreme Leader must be curtailed, 

be emboldened b) Rouluni's win? \Vill Rouham himself, similar to his three predecessors, over tlme 

begin to challenge Khamenei's authonty? 

OYer the last seyeral years, there has been a prevailmg narrative that the instihltion of the 

Re\' olutlOnary Guards has eclipsed the institution of the clergy m terms of their intenlal politiCal (md 

economiC intluence and their management of the nuc1e,lr program and sensitl-n' foreign policy files 

like Syri'l. \\.11ile T believe this narrative to be broadly tme, it is interesbng to note that Rouhani 

handily defeated t\vo men-l\'fohammed Bagher Ghaltbaf and i\'fohsen Re7ai-"\vho '\vere fonner 

semor IRGC corrunanders. This -arguably ret1ects concerns, from erther society or l<Jlcunenei or both, 

about the gro\ving role of the militAry 111 Iranian politics. 

Popular expectations of Rouhani arc unduly high. Llbcrals who voted for him "\vith the hopes that he 

"\yi1l attempt to alter the constihltlOn of the Tslamic Republic, or aggressiycly champion human nghts, 

\yilllikely be disappointed. \"hile Rouh,Uli has vo\ved to pursue a ndtiOlul reconcili,ttion, it rem,tins to 

be seen \vhether it \"\;111 be a priority for him to pursue the release of 2009 opposition presidenbal 

candidates \,fir Hossein \TOUS,I\;1 and i\khdi Karoubi, both of '\vhom han' been under draconian 

house arrest for three years. 

Foreign Policy Implications of a Rouhani Presidency 

The Tranian president is the country's public face to the world ,md plays an important role in shapmg 

its international image. This is especially true given that Khamenei has not left Iran since 19H9. 

\\,'here,ls reformist president .i\loh;m1med I-..~:..hatdmi is best remembered inten1rttion{tlly for his slog(tn 

cdlling for a "Dialogue of ClviI17ations," '\hmadinej'ld \vill be remembered for his HoloGlllSt 

rlTisionism and demagoguery. Tt is not coincidental th(lt under Kh,ltami Tran aVOlded lTN Secunty 

CounCl] censure, "\vhile under A.hmadinejad the Tslamic Republic \vas sanctioned SiX times by the UN. 

(iiYen that the Supreme Leader"\",illlikely ret din yeto Rouh,Uli should not be expected to 

significantly "Iter the deeply entrenched str:ltqpcprinciplcs of the Tslamic Republic's foreign policy, 
34


81569c-4.eps

namely opposition to U.S. hegemony, the rejection of Israel's existence, and support for "resistrlnce" 

,Jlies such ,tS Hezbolldh, P,Jestinian IsL-tmic Jihdu, ,md the .L\ssAd regime in Syria. Indeed there remain 

deeply entrenched forces 1tl Iran-including, 1 would argue, Supreme Leader l,,-hamenei-who see 

resist;Ulce ;lgainst ~~_merica, and the rejection of ISLlel's existence, as inextricable elements of Iran's 

revolutionary ideology, tUld among the few remaining symbolic pillars of the IsLllllic Republic. 

In his first press conference as president~elect, Rouhani repeated l<Jumenei's frequent assertion that a 

pre~requisite for improved l.S.~Iran relations will require \Vashington to refrain from interfering in 

Iran's domestic ;lffairs. 1 continue to believe that Kh;unenei's opposition to the l.S. is clo;lked in 

ideology, but driven self~preser\'ation. I-(hamenei has risen to the top, ,llld preserved his power, in a 

closed en\;ronment. opening \vith the United States could bring about unpredictable changes that 

could dilute, rather than entrench, his gnp on power. In the words of Alachiavelh, "There is nothing 

more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, tlun to t;--lli.e 

the lead in the introduction of a ne\\ order of things." 

Rouh-ani's immediate focus is likely to be the nuclear ~lle, an issue \vlth \vhiCh he's intimately familiar 

hewing previously been IrtUl's chief nude-ar negotiator. In contrast to Saeed Jalili, the ideolo~cally rigid 

current nuclear negotiator. Rouhani's nuclear negotiating team---diplomats J,n-ad L.arif, 

TTossein i\Tousanan, and Cyrus L~ . .s.-educated, came from merchant backgrounds, 

and favored improved ties \vith \X:ashington. 

Like R1fs;mjmli, Rouhani belong to a camp in 'l'ehnn-sometimes referred to as "pragmat1c 

consen~at1\Ts"-\vho ,lre deeply committed to the Tslamic Republic but EI\~or prinkging economic 

expediency over revolutionary ideology. "T t is good to haYl~ centrifuges running," Rouhani smd in one 

of the presidential debates, "Provided people's lives and livelihoods are also mnning." This is in 

contrast to l<Jlcunenei, \vho has -argued that compromising on the reyolut1On's principles could lead to 

the system's unraveling, just as Perestroika, he belle,res, expedited the Soviet Union's collapsc. 

Apart from philosophical differences regarding hO\v to best susta111 the Tsbmic Republic, Rouhani's 

room for diplomatic maneU\ er could likely be constrained by l..J.lamene1's longstandmg belief that 

compromising undcr prcssure proJccts \veakncss And invites more prcssure. 

Implications for the United States 

Iran continues to luye sizeable int1uence over several key C.S. foreign policy challenges, including 

Syri'l, ,\fghanistan, Traq, the Tsradi-Palestinian conflict, terrorism, and, perhaps most 

urgently, nuclear proliferation. \,11ilc on some of thesc issues-such as and terrorism, 

particularly muhIaI fears of Sunni radicalism-there are overlapping 111terests between the two sides, 

on others-namely Israel's existence and ..:\ssad rule oyer Syria-Irtlll and the U.S. are embroiled in a 

fierce, zcro-sum g,tme thAt is unlikely to change in A Rouhani presidency. 

Fxen in this context, howe\Tr, it makes both strategic and tactical sense for the Obatna administration 

to nuke a sincere attempt to commence a process of dialogue and confidence-building with 'l'ehran. 

If skeptics, like myself, (tre incorrect, ,mu Kh,unenei is genuinely interested in finding ct nucle(tr 

accommodation WIth the P5+ 1-,,,,hich \vclUld entail making meaningful nucle,lr compromIses in 

exch<ltlge for meaningful sanctions relief-this ,vould be beneficial for C.S. national security mterests. 

If, hem-ever, the Ob,lllla administration makes another concerted effort to engage Iran tUld is 

rebuffed, \ye "vill continue to expose the flCt that Tehr(tn, not YCtshington, is the intransigent actor. 
35


81569c-5.eps

Ohama's unprecedented hut unreciprocated overtures to Tehnn (lChieved a much more di\erse and 

robust international cOellition against Irdn than the Bush eldministr,ltion ever m'l11Agcd to achicvc. 

It is important for \Yashington to think more creatively, beyond just economic sanctions, about hov .. 

to facilitate political ch,mge in 'l'ehran. Iran is one of the fe\\' countries in the 1\liddle East where 

..:\..meric(t's st[;ttegic interests ,l11d its commitment to democr(ttic values align, [;tther tlun clash. 

\V11ereas representative governments in the _\Tab world, for example, have the potential to bring 

about political systems that eU'e even less tolerant, and less sympathetic to U.S. interests, them the 

status quo, in Iran a more representative government \\'ould likely augur both greater political tlnd 

socitll tolertlnce :tnd tl more cooperative working relationship with \'('ashington. 

In this context, an importtmt pnority for \Vashington should be to pursue policies that expedite, 

rather than potentitllly hinder. Irtl11's trtlnsltion to truly representative gc)\ernment, one in which:-lil its 

citizens-including religious minorities, the non-religious, ,md women-ctln potentially be president. 

The best "\vay to accomphsh this goal is to inhiblt the Iranian government's ability to control news, 

infonnatlOn, and communication. 

In this context, Congress cm phy tl very inlportant role. Both empiric:-li studies tlnd anecdotal 

eYldence sUgJjest that the vast majority· of TranJans get thcir nc,vs from tele\~ision more than any other 

source. Satellite n;r is by far the most important tool for Tranlans seeking to access independent ne,vs 

cover(lge or information beyond the gO\'ernment's censorship and control. 

Unfortunately, the \,T01Ce of ,\menca's Persian 1"'('\VS "\Jetvlork (P~1"--l is "\voefully underperfonning 111 

this respect. \Xllilc in just a fc,v short years of existcnce nne Persian TY has managed to become 

arguably the most tnlsted news source for Iranians-playing an indispensable role 111 infonning 

people in both the 2009 (md 2013 presidential elections-Pt--,l.'., has 1tl contrast been plagued by 

perenl11al mismanagement, unprofesslOna]ism, and substandard productions. 

I,ike the Islamic Republic, PN"\J's problems ,vlll not be resoh-ed "\vith merely a change in a fe,v top 

personnel, but Will reell.ure a fundamental overhaul. ::-"early everyone who has closely mOflltored P.:\IN 

has reached the similAr concluslOn that it is simply not possible to attmct top-tier journalistic talent 

and produce modem, creative, Pcrsian-Ianguage television wlth111 the confines of the C.S. 

governtnent . 

..:\..s such, I belieye tl1rtt it is critical for PNK to be taken outside the confines of Yo ice of .;\..merict and 

rendercd a pubhc-prn-,lte partnership, much hke the BBC, \vhlch is supported by thc L~.S. government 

but managed by mcdi(l professionals rather than gO\Tmment bureaucrats. This will not requirc 

additional funding, beyond PN"\J's current budget. For less than the cost of one F-15 fighter jet, ,ve 

c:tn ph: a signiticant role in helping to inform the thinking of tens of millions of people in Ir,Ul who 

arc desperate for their country to emcrge from internation,J isolation. 
36

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, excellent testimony by 

all of you. 

It is my pleasure before I begin my questioning to recognize the 

Delegation of Women Parliamentarians that we have to our right. 

They’re from Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Kenya, and Mongolia. They are 

here to learn of our democracy and they’re touring Capitol Hill 

today to observe several hearings. I had the pleasure of speaking 

to them yesterday afternoon, and they asked very interesting questions about our democratic process, such as it is. So, thank you so 

much. Let’s give them all a welcome. Thank you, ladies. 

I want to touch on the role of the President and the office’s relationship with the Supreme Leader. The power of the Supreme 

Leader greatly outweighs that of the Office of the President. The 

Supreme Leader controls the military, the media, and the judicial 

branch. Over time, the Supreme Leader has exerted even more influence and control over the most powerful institutions in Iran by 

directly appointing their leaders to institutions like the Guardian 

Council, the Revolutionary Guards, and it is the Supreme Leader 

who has the final say in virtually every decision that impacts Iran’s 

nuclear program, Iran’s involvement in Syria, any other important 

foreign policy decision. So, when we look at the election of Rouhani, 

I see a man who was selected by an entity controlled by Khamenei, 

and I see a man who has been part of the Islamic regime in Iran 

since its beginning. 

So, I ask knowing what we know about the power structure in 

Iran, and Rouhani’s background as a regime loyalist who was 

handpicked to run by the regime, what should we expect from him 

to be able to implement democratic reforms, let’s say, or bring an 

end to human rights abuses, discrimination against women, 

against ethnic and religious minorities, and does he view the U.S.-

Israel relationship with the same contempt as Khamenei, and will 

he continue to spread terror across the region through Hezbollah? 

And to revisit the hope and optimism theme, for decades now 

every time there’s an election in Iran we heard that Iran is on the 

cusp of change, that reforms are on their way, but hope fades and 

we see a resurgent regime further cemented into power. Can we expect that this time it will be different? 

And then, lastly, where’s Ahmadinejad? What role will he play? 

Is he an outcast? Will he have a role to play even if, or is it an 

empty office? Mr. Nader. 

Mr. NADER. I think that’s the key question, how much power will 

Rouhani have, how much leeway will Khamenei give him. It’s true 

that Rouhani is not a reformer. We can’t expect major changes in 

Iran under his presidency. We can expect an improvement in 

human rights, necessarily, or an improvement really in social freedoms, maybe slightly. However, his goal is not to really change 

Iran domestically as much as it is to alleviate Iran’s external pressure. 

Ayatollah Khameini, of course, is the Supreme Leader, the Supreme Authority in Iran. The Revolutionary Guards are very powerful. Both institutions are largely unelected, and largely unaccountable, but I think it’s interesting that Rouhani was allowed to 

win. He is a regime insider. He is a Supreme Leader’s representative on the National Security Council, but Rouhani provides an opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:56 Sep 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061813\81569 HFA PsN: SHIRL
37

portunity for Khamenei to exit the crisis that Iran is facing currently. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me just interrupt you to give the others 

a chance. Dr. Maloney, and Mr. Sadjadpour. 

Ms. MALONEY. Very quickly, I think Rouhani has been elected to 

run the National Unity Government. His priority will be very much 

on the economy, which effectively means getting a nuclear deal. It’s 

ironic because this is the one issue on which he’s been vilified by 

hardliners for a decade, and yet I think this is his mandate. It 

means he will be very cautious about touching other issues, like 

Syria, certainly, like anything to do with Iran’s support for terrorism. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So, he will concentrate on the nuclear program because that’s been looked upon as his weak part. 

Ms. MALONEY. He will concentrate on it because it’s the only way 

he can solve the economic problems of the country. He will also 

have, I think, an onus on him to do something in terms of his 

promises to release political prisoners, and specific to that Mousavi 

and Karroubi, the two candidates from 2009. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. Thank you. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. One interesting tidbit about Rouhani is when 

you look at his nuclear team when he was Chief Nuclear Negotiator, there was three men, Javad Zarif, Hossein Mousavian, and 

a guy called Cyrus Nasseri. All of them were US-educated. They 

all came from merchant backgrounds, not ideological backgrounds, 

so these folks when you speak to them privately, they’re not death 

to America rigid ideologues. I think they’re interested in Iran, 

which again pursues economic interests and ideological interests always, but they’re certainly not interested in genuine democracy 

and opening up the system because I think they understand that 

that would be a threat to their interest. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And Ahmadinejad, where will he 

be relegated to? 

Mr. NADER. Hopefully, he will have no role in Iran in the future. 

Ahmadinejad made a lot of enemies, so he has to be very careful 

what he does from now on. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Good. Dr. Maloney? 

Ms. MALONEY. He’s already been called before the court, and will 

have probably a difficult time either staying out of prison, or finding some new post in the Islamic Republic. He’s persona non grata. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Wonderful. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I also want to thank the witnesses for really enlightening testimony. And I extend my welcome to the visiting delegation, as well. 

It’s wonderful to have you here. 

Less than a week ago it seemed that most Iran analysts believed 

the Supreme Leader would cement his control over the system by 

rigging the election to ensure that a compliant conservative like 

Jalili would become the President. Yet, days before the election he 

gave a speech encouraging even those who do not support the Islamic system to vote in the election. And it now appears that the 

Supreme Leader made the calculated decision to acquiesce to the 

will of the Iranian people. 

38

Dr. Maloney, you talked about empowering a fixer. That may be 

the case and, if so, I’d ask why he did this? But just to go on, I’m 

not sure if it’s a reaction to not wanting to further upset a young 

and volatile electorate like he did in 2009, or—and I’d like all of 

you to chime in on this, is the Supreme Leader—is there a possibility that the Supreme Leader is not empowering a President who 

can come in and do a deal, but the Supreme Leader, instead, seeks 

to undermine the United International Coalition against Iran’s nuclear program that currently exists. 

For instance, Mr. Nader spoke about putting a—what a deal 

would look like with a cap on enrichment, and a limited stockpile 

of enriched uranium, and intrusive inspections, but now that we 

have a moderate President no longer spewing bellicose statements 

like Ahmadinejad did, will countries like Russia and China, for example, be willing to accept a deal under Rouhani that we wouldn’t 

accept under Ahmadinejad? 

So, what if they offer less, but it comes without the venom that 

came with Ahmadinejad? What if they offer to minimize their 

stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, but they don’t have the 

rigorous inspections, and the safeguards that would stop their longterm nuclear weapons development? Would a deal like that potentially split the P5+1 unity due to negotiations fatigue and this 

sense of relief that we have that no one has to deal with 

Ahmadinejad any longer? 

Let’s start with that. Dr. Maloney, I’ll start with you. 

Ms. MALONEY. I think we should have no illusions about 

Rouhani’s level of flexibility, or his degree of authority on this 

issue. But I think it’s notable that he published a memoir which 

created a sensation within Iran and a number of people in this 

town and others have read it, in which he revealed an enormous 

amount of information and self-criticism about Iran’s approach to 

the nuclear issue. 

So, for that reason, I don’t think he’s there as a patsy or a dupe, 

but I also think he will not drive any easy bargain. I’ve spoken to 

the Europeans who dealt with him when he was in charge of this 

brief, and they found him quite frustrating. They didn’t enjoy the 

experience of negotiating across the table from him. 

But I think Iran today is in a very different set of circumstances 

than it was in 2003 when the leadership was watching U.S. moves 

in Iraq. The economy, as Ali and Karim have both indicated has 

suffered grievously as a result of the sanctions. And I think it’s 

quite clear that they are looking for some mechanism that won’t 

just erode the compliance with sanctions, because that’s insufficient. What they really need is the relaxation and specific removal 

of sanctions. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. But, Mr. Sadjadpour, is there a possibility 

that they could get that by giving up less given who the spokesperson is now with a negotiating partner? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. That’s certainly plausible in that at the moment, I’ve noticed just in the last few days there have already been 

statements from Russian, Chinese, and European officials, 

former—current European Foreign Ministers saying we now need 

to engage Iran. So, the role Ahmadinejad played in uniting the 

39

international community against Iran, Rouhani is now creating potential fissures. 

That said, I think that it’s going to be difficult for the P5+1 to 

offer meaningful concessions, and for the U.S. and Europeans to 

offer meaningful concessions if Iran isn’t going to make meaningful 

nuclear compromises. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Nader, you laid out what you think a deal 

might look like. Do you think that the Russians and Chinese, for 

example, might take less given the new President? 

Mr. NADER. I don’t think they’ll necessarily take less. We have 

to remember when Hassan Rouhani was National Security Advisor, 

Iran stopped uranium enrichment. And when Ahmadinejad became 

President in 2005, that was reversed. Now, Rouhani in his press 

conference yesterday said that those days are gone. We’re not going 

to stop uranium enrichment, but I think there’s potential to cap the 

Iranian enrichment program so they don’t go up to 20 percent, they 

don’t amass their stockpile. And I think this is something that is 

acceptable to the P5+1. And sanctions are going to continue no 

matter what, even if the Chinese and the Russians think Rouhani 

is more moderate. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. Madam Chairman. 

I would—I’d just close by referring back to what Mr. Nader said 

at the beginning, that U.S. pressure is really just beginning to pay 

off, and we shouldn’t be willing to let up on the pressure because 

there is someone who is less belligerent, saying being less bellicose. 

I think it’s an important thing for all of us to remember. I thank 

the witnesses, and thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to also 

thank Mr. Deutch for those comments. I think they were good. And 

I kind of want to pick up on that, but first I want to say to the 

visiting delegation, I also add a thanks. I’ve been to Georgia many 

times, and I was stationed in Kyrgyzstan with the military at 

Manas Air Base, so thank you for being hear and for your hospitality. And to the other two nations represented, hopefully we can 

come and visit you also some day, so thank you. And continue to 

press forward on your march toward freedom, we encourage you. 

In terms of the actual specific issue of Iran, Mr. Nader, I’m not 

sure I’m saying it right, I want to make sure I fully understood 

what you were saying. So, you’re advocating for, and I’m not arguing with you. I’m curious because you’re advocating for basically allowing Iran to go nuclear, but capping the level of enrichment to 

allow them to have a peaceful nuclear process. 

Now, let’s say, and I’m not a technical nuclear guy, but let’s say 

we cap them at 20 percent, or whatever, how quickly could that be 

reversed? So, if they agree to inspections, they agree to the cap, 

how quickly at the point our relationship falls apart again, or 

whatever, can they either secretly or openly get to highly enriched 

uranium where they can marry it with a bomb? Let me just ask 

you that question. 

Mr. NADER. I don’t advocate they go nuclear. We should make all 

efforts to stop Iran’s development of a nuclear weapons capability. 

But the Supreme Leader has supposedly issued a religious ruling 

40

or fatwa stating that Iran does not want nuclear weapons, so let’s 

let Iran operationalize that. Let’s just have them limit uranium enrichment to 5 percent, because they have to go to 20 percent and 

then higher to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. KINZINGER. But then how long does that—and you may not 

be a technical nuclear guy. How long does the 5–20 percent take? 

Mr. NADER. Well, Iran is under IAEA inspection, so anything 

they do is going to be monitored. And the goal is to make inspections even more intrusive, to have Iran open up some of the suspected nuclear sites to inspection. 

And Hassan Rouhani has said that he wants to be more transparent on the nuclear program. Let’s give him a chance. If Iran 

does not want to be more transparent, then we impose additional 

sanctions and increase pressures on Iran. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I know where you’re coming from. My only concern is, again, and as I mentioned in my opening statement, if this 

was 10 years ago, I think we’d have the pleasure of time to be able 

to say well, we can give it a couple of years and see if he’s legitimate. But I really, personally, from all I’ve heard, we actually are 

up against Iran becoming a nuclear state. So, unfortunately, and 

I wish we did; unfortunately, I don’t know if we have the luxury 

of being able to see how this develops, and how this kind of rounds 

out. 

A concern I have, too, and again I want to encourage, I don’t 

want the feeling to be from this committee, and I don’t think this 

committee has given it yet, but I don’t want the feeling to be hey, 

to the people of Iran we don’t trust you, we don’t believe that you 

really did what you went out to do, which is elect a moderate. But, 

obviously, you can understand our concern because of the wall that 

we’re up against, and what I saw in 2009. 

Now, I don’t want to make this an attack on the administration 

today, but I will say I do believe that America lost a really big opportunity in 2009 for a serious uprising, and I’m afraid I don’t want 

to do that here, as well. 

But let me ask another question. If we do find ourselves in this 

position of we are now facing a nuclear Iran, you know, let’s say 

it comes to be, whatever the fall is, or something like that, and this 

guy is in power. And I want to ask all three of you, what is preferable, to let this guy—to trust him enough to let him take Iran 

to a position where he wants to negotiate with the West, or to press 

forward on i.e., military strikes to ensure that Iran does not become nuclear? So, you’re kind of faced with we’ve got this guy in 

power, but on the other hand we believe that they’re going to go 

nuclear. We’ll start with Mr. Sadjadpour. I hope I said that right. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I will just say that what I would argue Iran 

is doing with the nuclear program is just taking a very incremental 

approach. They’re simultaneously putting their foot on the gas and 

on the brakes, meaning they’re expanding the number of centrifuges, they’re expanding the sophistication of the centrifuges, but 

they’re at the same time taking that stockpile of low enriched uranium and converting it to fuel rods which has been allaying some 

of the concerns of the Israelis. 

And I would simply argue that trying to dialogue and engage 

with this new Rouhani government, in my opinion is a win-win. If 

41

we’re able to make forward progress, we reach some type of detente, that’s a win. If we don’t, we expose them as the problem. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Dr. Maloney. 

Ms. MALONEY. I don’t think Rouhani changes the position of any 

of us, or anyone in this town that we do not want Iran to have access to a nuclear weapon. What he does do is potentially provide 

the opportunity for a deal that is mutually tolerable. 

We believe it will exist for that within the Iranian political establishment today. I know that it exists within the administration, 

and within this building. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you. And my time is expired, but I 

just want to say look, I hope this works out to be something, trust 

me. It would be nice to have this situation off the world’s table. 

A military strike, as an example, against Iran would be terrible, 

but a nuclear Iran would be even worse. So, these are—hopefully, 

this is maybe a miracle in the Middle East, but we’ll see. I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you to the 

witnesses for your testimony. 

If, in fact, it’s the case that Rouhani was allowed to win in part 

because the Iranian people would not have reacted well to a more 

conservative candidate, that the outpouring would have been so 

strong, it seems to me we have two possible narratives. One is, the 

Supreme Leader is actually trying to get Iran out of this box. And 

one has to ask well, if that were the case, couldn’t the Supreme 

Leader have done that directly, which would have been consistent 

with what Iranian people want, which would seem to be a really 

good path? 

So, instead, is it more likely that what the Supreme Leader is 

attempting to do by allowing Rouhani to win is provide this safety 

valve so the people sort of are calmed down, and then to my friend, 

Congressman Deutch’s point, to create an opportunity to really destabilize the international coalition that has really very strongly 

held together in the face of Iran’s nuclear program. And doesn’t 

that, in fact, put us in a very difficult position in terms of balancing both this opportunity, but at the same time safeguarding 

against this sort of opportunity that the Supreme Leader now has 

to dissipate some of the strength of the international coalition, and 

to continue full speed ahead with the nuclear program? 

If that analysis is reasonable, what is the best way for us to respond? What are the best ways to sort of understand what the true 

motivation is? I invite all of you. 

Mr. NADER. I think Khamenei wants to save face, and he couldn’t 

compromise as long as Ahmadinejad was President, because in 

2009 he strongly supported Ahmadinejad, and he’s been saying for 

the last 8 years, Ahmadinejad’s policies are correct. Ahmadinejad 

turned out to be disastrous for him, and this was embarrassing for 

him. 

So, this provides an opportunity to make some of these key decisions with Rouhani as President. If the Rouhani experiment fails, 

Khamenei can say well, it wasn’t me, it was Rouhani. 

42

In terms of the P5+1, I just don’t think a Rouhani presidency will 

weaken the coalition, because the sanctions right now are not going 

to be reversed until Iran makes a move to build confidence among 

the international community. Even the Russians and Chinese, I 

think, are aware of this. 

Ms. MALONEY. I think that your analysis is absolutely reasonable, but I do think that Khamenei took a big risk, if that’s what 

he did, because the safety valve of Rouhani risked putting people 

out in the streets in a way that they were in 2009, which is something that clearly Khamenei and the hardliners deeply, deeply fear. 

These young people shouting with joy, dancing around a particular 

color even was something that played into his own paranoia about 

a soft revolution sponsored from the outside. 

But I think you’re absolutely right to sort of believe that any possibilities are accurate right now in terms of the interpretation. And 

in terms of how it is we avoid getting sucked into an Iranian ploy, 

I think as actually both fellow panelists have suggested, the best 

way to do that is to ensure that we continue to approach the negotiations with full seriousness, that we are prepared to meet the Iranians, any concessions from the Iranians with meaningful incentives for continuing and confirming those concessions. 

And as Karim says if, in fact, this is not serious, then we’ll surely 

know that, and we will strengthen the coalition. If it is, then we 

may find a way to at least turn down some of the urgency with respect to the nuclear concerns. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Well, the word ‘‘cementing’’ is in the title of the 

panel today, and I think cemented is a good adjective for the sanctions. It’s going to be very tough to remove U.S. Congressional 

sanctions, even the European oil embargo, so I think we shouldn’t 

be too worried that the entire sanctions regime is going to suddenly 

fall apart just with Hassan Rouhani. 

With regards to the Supreme Leader’s calculations, I sometimes 

think we confer on them too much strategic planning and Machiavellian brilliance than oftentimes is the case. I would say in this 

case it was simply a lot of ad-hocery, and he probably didn’t know 

that morning who was going to be President. 

But I would argue this, is that I actually think that Khamenei’s 

image, his tattered image has been rehabilitated in a way that 

many of us didn’t anticipate; meaning, I think he’s far more popular now with the Iranian people than he was on June 13th, 2013. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I think it just makes the point that the sanctions 

that we’ve imposed are—or the international community has imposed with us are working, and we should just remain very cognizant of that as we move forward. 

Again, thank you for the testimony. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. Meadows is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Nader, I notice that you kind of gave the back and forth 

when you said his tattered reputation was perhaps reinvigorated, 

so I’d like you to go ahead and make your comments in a verbal 

manner, so I can follow-up on that. 

Mr. NADER. With all due respect to Karim, who I think is a great 

analyst and is a friend, I think the Islamic Republic does not have 

43

a good reputation in Iran. I think the days of the Islamic Republic 

are numbered. I think that as long as Khamenei is alive we won’t 

see major change in Iran, but when he passes away there’ll be an 

opportunity to have a better Iran, a more democratic Iran. And we 

have to keep in mind that Rouhani was not elected because Iranians love him, as Karim said, but because they’re desperate, because the regime——

Mr. MEADOWS. And they’re desperate because of the economic 

conditions. Right? 

Mr. NADER. Because of the economy, because of inflation, because 

of unemployment, because of lack of social freedom, prostitution, 

drug use. I mean, this regime is destroying Iran and its people realize it, and they seek a way out. And that was the only option 

available to them, to vote for Rouhani. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Dr. Maloney? 

Ms. MALONEY. I can’t gauge the current popularity of Ayatollah 

Khameini. I never found him to be all that well liked when I had 

the opportunity to visit Iran. 

I do think that this is a boost for the regime and, obviously, that 

makes our strategy now more complicated. But, clearly, Iranians 

want a way out that does not involve disruptive change. They’re 

not prepared to risk their lives on the street today for good reason. 

They know that they will be shot, thrown in jail, forced to leave 

the country and leave all their possessions and family behind. They 

want to find a moderate way, a sort of way to get out of this terrible set of circumstances that they’re in through gradual change. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, a peaceful coup. Is that what you’re suggesting? 

Ms. MALONEY. I think that would be the best possible outcome 

to what we’ve seen. I don’t think it is the inevitable outcome to 

what we’ve seen. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. But in your opening testimony, you were 

very positive, or at least more optimistic than most of the opening 

statements up here, so what would you say are the two bright 

spots that you see in this election that we can celebrate with the 

Iranian people? 

Ms. MALONEY. The most important part of this election actually 

wasn’t the election itself, it was the debate that took place a week 

before the ballot in which conservatives from across the board 

pounced on the nuclear negotiator and attacked the current strategy, and the failure to have gotten a deal from the international 

community in the series of negotiations that have taken place. 

That, to me, was the most important. The other most important 

element is the fact that Iranians had the opportunity to carry 

through the messages they’ve been trying to get out since 2009, 

and have been too repressed to do, which is to go to the street, demand the freedom of political prisoners, demand opportunities to 

engage with the world, and actually celebrate the possibility of 

some optimism going forward. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, what—and this final question is to each one 

of you. So, what benchmarks do we put in place where we say 

okay, well, these benchmarks have been met, so sanctions can be 

lessened or weakened, acknowledge progress here, and this is—

what would be those benchmarks? 

44

Mr. NADER. If I can go first, that Iran has an entirely peaceful 

nuclear program, uranium enrichment is capped, that Iran is——

Mr. MEADOWS. That’s verifiable? 

Mr. NADER [continuing]. Subject to vigorous inspections and it’s 

verifiable, and Iran cannot move toward a nuclear weapons capability. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Dr. Maloney? 

Ms. MALONEY. I would characterize it very similarly. I think 

there’s a deal to be had that involves all of those elements, that 

provides greater transparency and reliability, that our ability to 

foresee Iran’s efforts to jump toward a nuclear weapon, but I think 

that we also have to be gauging what’s happening within the country, as well. I don’t think we can simply disregard the political and 

social circumstances within the country. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I just want to make clear that I’m not trying 

to paint Ayatollah Khameini as a positive, as a popular guy. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I understand. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. And I think the fact that the candidates 

aligned with him showed so poorly in the election is a reflection of 

that. But I’m simply arguing he’s more popular now than he was 

before. 

With regards to prospects for political change in Iran, I simply 

say that in 1979, Iranians experienced a revolution without democracy, and I think today they aspire for democracy without a revolution. There’s not the same stomach to do what the Syrians are 

doing. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, do any of you see realistically their withdrawal of supporting Hezbollah in Syria? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would say no, as long as Ayatollah Khameini 

remains Supreme Leader, the rejection of Israel’s existence, support for groups like Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad and resistance 

against the United States, I would argue aren’t going to change. 

Mr. NADER. If I can just add, I agree. I think the Islamic Republic will always oppose Israel, but I think Rouhani is going to be less 

ideological than Ahmadinejad. In his press conference he referred 

to Israel as ‘‘Israel’’ instead of the ‘‘Zionist entity.’’ It’s a very small 

gesture but it’s something. Does it show he’s a true moderate? No, 

you know, a true moderate would acknowledge Israel, but when 

you compare him to the rest, he’s a tad better, and I think that’s 

just a little room for cautious optimism. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I appreciate the patience of the chair. I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent question. Thanks, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And let me just take 

this initial moment to welcome the Women Parliamentarians. It is 

an honor to have you here. We are glad you’re here. 

Witnesses, thank you for your testimony. We are clearly at a moment of uncertainty as we watch the dust settle. 

Dr. Maloney, you mentioned the relevance of elections, and the 

importance of even a semi-democratic process in an authoritarian 

context. I wonder if you could touch on a little bit any of whatever 

meaning there was in the turnout for the election, and the fact that 

Mr. Rouhani was able to win on the first ballot? 

45

Ms. MALONEY. I think this was huge. If I were an Iranian and 

I had been through what they had been through in 2009 when the 

vote was blatantly rigged, and when the protestors who came out 

and demanded to know where their vote was were brutally repressed, I don’t think I would have had the stomach to go to the 

polls; particularly after much of the hype surrounding the rejection 

of the candidacy of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was seen 

as the primary moderate. So, I think it is a tremendous testament 

to the faith of the Iranian people, their willingness to invest in 

highly imperfect institutions, and their willingness to continue to 

hope even in a situation that doesn’t provide a lot of hope. 

The fact that Rouhani won on the first ballot was also a big surprise. It’s always hard to tell where the political winds are going 

within Iran. And, of course, the social media buzz in the run up 

to the ballot was very much favorable toward Rouhani. But, of 

course, that was the case back in 2009, and we didn’t see the same 

outcome. So, part of this goes to the disarray among the conservatives, their inability to unite behind a single candidate. And there 

I think we should remember that nearly—at least 49 percent of the 

Iranian people voted for someone who was moderately to expressly 

hardline. And that should be a reminder of some of the constraints 

that we face. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. And that’s a good lead into my next 

question. Is there any reason to think that the change in President 

should affect our calculus, as we said earlier, change in benchmarks of our decisions, when to strengthen sanctions or conversely 

looking for changes where we might lessen or pull back on sanctions? 

Ms. MALONEY. I’ll say just briefly, I think that, you know, the 

next step should be at the negotiating table. It should not be in 

this building, because I think if there’s intensification of sanctions, 

Iranians themselves will read it as directed against their own action, and they, I will tell you, do not appreciate the sanctions. 

But, in fact, our benchmarks shouldn’t change, but we can expect 

and hope, I think, to see a more serious set of negotiators, as 

Karim described, the people who were with Rouhani when he was 

handling the file 10 years ago. And I think we should be prepared 

to do more than offer the sort of spare parts for aircrafts that has 

been kicking around now for a couple of decades. We should be prepared to give meaningful sanctions relief in exchange for meaningful concessions on the nuclear issue. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Sadjadpour? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would agree with that, and I would simply 

say that for the Supreme Leader, I would argue rapprochement or 

better relationship with the United States is inimical to his interests, so when we actually make efforts to try to engage Iran and 

he rebuffs us, I think it makes him look very bad in the eyes of 

his people who desperately do want to emerge from isolation, and 

the rest of the international community. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And yet, Mr. Nader, you mentioned his press 

conference yesterday. In his press conference in referring to the nuclear enrichment program, and I’ll quote him, he said, ‘‘All should 

know that the next government will not be budged from our inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:56 Sep 05, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\061813\81569 HFA PsN: SHIRL
46

alienable rights.’’ Does that lead us to have any hope that there is 

room for negotiation? 

Mr. NADER. Yes, because I think there is a middle ground where 

we could recognize their right to enrich uranium as long as it’s 

peaceful, especially if it’s capped. And, you know, the Iranian elite 

always talk about the U.S. pursuing a logical position on the nuclear program, and that’s often interpreted in Iran as meaning having a program but also saving face. I mean, this is very important 

for them to show that sanctions and pressure have not worked on 

their decision making; although, I argue they have. 

So, let’s give them an off-ramp on this crisis. Let’s give them an 

exit and allow them to exit the nuclear crisis, because we’ve built 

a lot of leverage against Iran and it’s time to use the leverage. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I think that’s an important point. 

With my last few seconds, Mr. Sadjadpour? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would just say that I would argue that the 

Obama administration’s unprecedented but unreciprocated overtures to Iran actually made this sanctions regime happen. We 

should take that into account. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that’s a good point, as well. The last few 

seconds, Iran is increasingly engaged in Latin America, South and 

Central America. Do you see Mr. Rouhani’s election as having an 

impact on their involvement, good or bad, within the Western 

Hemisphere? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Having lived in Latin America, Mexico, I’m 

confident that Iranian Shiite soft power isn’t going to go a long 

ways in that part of the world. And they do have certain assets in 

line with Hezbollah, but after the death of Hugo Chavez, I think 

they’ve lost their chief ally in Latin America. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. All right, thank you. I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this incredible 

hearing in a timely manner with the elections in Iran. And I appreciate hearing from you guys, the experts, about this election and 

the dynamic in Iran. 

Additionally, I’m interested in knowing how this election will affect Iran’s stance with both Syria and Israel. I think this is something I hear from you guys that we should tread cautiously about 

Mr. Rouhani as a so-called moderate in lieu of what I’ve read here 

that back in a newspaper in 1999, there was a student demonstration, and he took a real tough stance at clearing that. Those arrested for sabotage and destroying state property would face the 

death penalty if found guilty. That’s a pretty tough stance. 

Then a former student was talking about how the guards broke 

into their dorm rooms and murdered students in front of them. And 

as recently as January, Rouhani stated that Syria has constantly 

been on the front line of fighting Zionism, and this resistance must 

not be weakened. 

You were saying how we should continue forward to engage him. 

How would you recommend we engage him with that kind of a 

stance? I’ve heard some overtones here, and I’d like to hear more 

specifically. We’ll start with you, Mr. Nader. 

47

Mr. NADER. On the question of Syria, I see Iran’s Revolutionary 

Guards and the Supreme Leader as determining Iran’s position, 

and I don’t feel like they’re likely to budge on that issue. But it’s 

also important to note that Rouhani has stated he wants to fix 

Iran’s relations with key allies, such as Saudi Arabia. During his 

press conference he said the Saudis are our brothers. I signed the 

first security agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. So, if 

Iran’s relations with the Saudis and some of the other Arab countries improve we could see a change. 

In terms of how we should engage, I believe in bilateral negotiations with Iran. U.S. diplomats should be able to talk to the Iranians. Talking to the Iranians does not mean that we accept their 

regime. It’s just a foreign policy tool at our disposal. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Dr. Maloney? 

Ms. MALONEY. I would echo everything that Ali has just said. I 

think that Rouhani will be able to dig up quite a bit of very vociferous rhetoric for Rouhani on Syria, as well as a number of other 

issues. But he did speak during the campaign about the need for 

engaging in diplomacy, about the need for talks between the Assad 

government, the Assad regime and the opposition, as he described 

them. That’s more moderate rhetoric within the Iranian political 

discourse than the rest of the candidates certainly articulated. 

I think to the extent that he will have any influence on Syria, 

it will only be if he can make the argument that it is harming 

Iran’s ability to repair its relationships with the world, and that 

comes back to the economy and his need to fix it. 

His ability to create confidence within the Gulf is going to be 

critical. He certainly, I think, assuages a lot of fears there about 

what direction Iran is going, and whether or not he’s able to open 

up a channel of communication with Riyadh on this particular 

issue I think would be enormously important. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Sadjadpour? 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I see very little likelihood that Iran will change 

its position toward Israel. I think rejection of Israel’s existence is 

one of the three remaining symbolic pillars left of the revolution 

and the Islamic Republic. 

With regards to Syria, as someone once wrote, Syria is not America’s Vietnam, it’s Iran’s Vietnam. Iran is bleeding very heavily in 

Syria. They’ve spent billions of dollars to keep Assad afloat, and 

Rouhani being, as I said, someone who sees economic expediency 

oftentimes trumping revolutionary ideology, if he has a role, I 

would argue that he would probably argue for a different approach. 

But it is going to be the Revolutionary Guards who continue to 

carry out Iranian policy in Syria, not the presidency. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. We keep hearing about the continual creep toward developing a nuclear weapon, and their nuclear program continuing. Do you see the day that they’ll develop a weapon? If so, 

when? And if they do, what do we do? 

Mr. NADER. Well, the U.S. intelligence community has assessed 

that Iranian leadership has not made the decision to weaponize the 

program, that Ayatollah Khameini has not made that decision. And 

this is a regime that bases its decisions on cost-benefit calculations. 

The costs for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability are going 

up, and they could be reacting to the pressure. So, as long as those 

48

costs exist, there’s a good chance that they will not weaponize, especially if we maintain the pressure, and make sure Iran is more 

transparent on its nuclear program, as Mr. Rouhani has claimed he 

would like to do, to have more transparency. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Dr. Maloney? 

Ms. MALONEY. I think the only confidence that we’ll ever have 

about an Iranian nuclear capability is when there’s a different government in place within Iran. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Ms. MALONEY. It’s not within our capability to achieve that today 

or tomorrow, but I think that, ultimately, what we have to be focusing on constantly is putting as much distance between this regime and nuclear weapons capability as possible. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I would just echo Suzanne’s comments. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. I appreciate your time, and I yield back, 

Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I’d 

also like to welcome the Women Parliamentarians and note that we 

have a woman chairwoman here, of course. And we’re very proud 

of her on both sides of the aisle. We are. 

You know, I think we all look at this through different lenses. 

I look at it a little bit differently maybe than most that have spoken so far. I see two differences between Ahmadinejad and now 

Rouhani, and that is that this guy is a cleric, the other guy wasn’t. 

The other guy was somewhat of a ruffian. This guy is a sophisticate. This guy speaks five different Western languages. He speaks 

English, he was educated in Scotland, he speaks French, he speaks 

German, he speaks Russian. 

I think that it’s going to be very interesting the dynamic between 

the Supreme Leader and him, because they have a relationship on 

a different level that you don’t have I think when you’re not a cleric. I could see very easily that the Supreme Leader would say hey, 

you know, I trust you. You’re a cleric. Go out there and get me 

some time. You know, you’re a sophisticated guy. Go out there and 

talk to the West in a way that this other guy couldn’t. Gain us 

some time, because you can see that these sanctions are really 

hurting us. They’ll trust you, as they don’t trust him. Now, go out 

there and be soft, look soft. 

You know, I have to say, I’m very skeptical because I could see 

that happening, and then United States saying hey, wait a minute, 

you know, we’ve got a little thing going here with this guy. Let’s 

back up, let’s ratchet back, let’s throttle back, when we should be 

doing the opposite maybe in tightening the sanctions down, because the sanctions do seem to be working. 

What do you think about that? I mean, again, we all look at it 

through different eyes. I’m a former Jesuit so I look at it through 

the eyes of the cleric. I mean, here’s a guy, these two people can 

trust each other at a level that normally you don’t have. Anybody? 

Mr. NADER. I can just go first, briefly. The issue with 

Ahmadinejad was that in Persian culture you’re supposed to respect your elders even if you don’t like them, and Ahmadinejad did 

not do that. It is more likely than not that Rouhani will maintain 

49

respect for the Supreme Leader, and work within the parameters 

set for him by the Supreme Leader. Yes, he is charming, he’s a 

mellow, calm guy. He’s pragmatic, but I don’t think he’s going to 

be able to smile his way out of Iran’s crisis. 

Again, we have to ensure that Iran is held accountable no matter 

how popular and how much opposite he is of Ahmadinejad. I think 

the fact that the international community is more positive toward 

him shouldn’t mislead us into thinking that all of a sudden pressures on Iran are going to stop, because everybody realizes what 

the Islamic Republic is about, even if Rouhani is the President. 

Mr. VARGAS. Doctor? 

Ms. MALONEY. Very quickly, Rouhani and Khamenei have a relationship that dates back decades. And, obviously, that’s going to 

help. It also helps explain how it is that he’s gotten to where it is, 

but it’s also important to realize that Khamenei has spent the past 

decade disparaging Rouhani’s role, specifically in public with 

Rouhani sitting in the audience. It’s really remarkable, you don’t 

often see that in the Islamic Republic. So, you know, he made—he 

was forced to back down, he was forced to take someone whose position on the nuclear issue, which is obviously of critical importance 

to the regime, was not one that he has been articulating himself, 

that he has been defending and advancing himself for the past 10 

years. So, I think that it’s important that we see that there is this 

opportunity without in any way changing any of our own positions 

on the nuclear issue. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. I think after 8 years of seeing the Iranian cup 

80 percent empty, maybe it’s time to look at it 20 percent full just 

for once to say okay, this is a guy who is actually, as you mentioned, he studied abroad. His advisors were all US-educated. I 

think in his heart of hearts he would probably prefer a better relationship with the United States. And I’m not concerned that he’s 

going to be able to smooth-talk his way out of sanctions without 

them making any meaningful concessions. I don’t think that’s a 

concern we should have. 

Mr. VARGAS. Well, he seems like he’s already smooth-talked us 

a little bit. I mean, just saying he’s moderate and all these other 

things. I have great skepticism. I think Reagan said, ‘‘Trust but 

verify.’’ Here I think it’s verify and verify. Again, thank you very 

much, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good, thank you. 

Congresswoman Meng. 

Ms. MENG. I, too, want to extend a welcome to our women dignitaries here today. As our chairwoman and I are members of a 

body less than 19 percent female, it’s very encouraging to see you 

all here today. 

On one hand, we want to speak directly to the Iranian people, 

its women, and its youth. On the other hand, we want to build up 

trust with the regime if we’re going to negotiate successfully. 

What’s the best way to manage these dual objectives? 

Mr. NADER. Ultimately, I think regime change is up to the Iranian people. It is not up to the United States to change the regime 

in Iran. There are ways we can help, opening up communication, 

reforming Voice of America, like Karim said. But, ultimately, the 

Iranian people will determine their own destiny. 

50

I think for now we have to make sure that Iran stops its nuclear 

pursuits, and that we can verify it. And over time, especially once 

the Supreme Leader passes away, Iran will have an opportunity to 

seek a new future, possibly without the Islamic Republic. 

Ms. MALONEY. I think we’ve already got some good programs in 

place that have been in many ways put on hold because of the atmosphere that Ahmadinejad and this recent political context within 

Iran helped to create where it was dangerous for Iranians to participate in some of the international visitor programs, and the 

other opportunities to come here. That’s of some importance to 

many Iranians. But the highest priority for Iranians is economic 

opportunity. Economic opportunity can only come through restructuring of their economy, dealing with some of the longstanding mismanagement, but also in the removal of sanctions. 

What we can do best to serve the Iranian people is to respond 

to serious offers of concessions from its government on the nuclear 

issue with meaningful sanctions reform. 

Mr. SADJADPOUR. Not to belabor the point, but I think that we 

oftentimes underestimate the role that satellite television played in 

the uprisings in the Arab world, the role of Al Jazeera, and AlArabiya, and this model doesn’t really exist. Upwards of 90 percent 

of Iranians rely on television as the primary news source, and it’s 

basically either state television for their news, or BBC Persian. 

We have a huge opportunity here with Voice of America which 

we’re totally squandering. It’s an unprofessional service. The quality of programming is terrible, and with this one thing which costs 

less than an F–15 fighter jet, we can reach over 30 million Iranians. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Meng. 

Don’t have anyone from our side, and don’t have anybody here. 

Okay. 

Well, thank you very much for excellent testimony. It’ll be interesting to see what the future holds with this new leader. And I 

hope that with his soft demeanor he doesn’t lull us into thinking 

that he’s wearing the white hat, because reforms are difficult to 

come by, as long as the Supreme Leader is calling the shots. 

And with that, the subcommittee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

52

f


81569n.eps

SlJBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

W ASHTNGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

I1eaua Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

June 12,2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of 

the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

'c"0Y IV .!:9L<ig!l;jJf?ir§.ho_~,,~): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, June 18,2013 

10:30 a.m. 

Elections in Tran: The Regime Cementing its Control 

Mr. Alireza Nader 

Senior International Policy Analyst 

RAND Corporation 

Suzanne Maloney, Ph.D. 

Senior Fellow 

The Saban Center for Middle East Policy 

Brookings Institution 

Mr. Karim Sadjadpour 

Senior Associate 

Middle East Program 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

By Directiou of the Chairmau 
53


81569m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE OJ\' ______ '_he Middle Eastalld Norl" AFr_k_," _____ HEARING 

Day_~T'-'u"'e"'s"'da"'v"-. Date, ___ "'06"'1-'-11l"'.!-'.';:..3 ___ Room ___ "'21""7c;'JC-. __ 

Starting Time ~. 31 a m Ending Time 11:54 a.m. 

Recesses ~_. L-to __ ) L-to __ ) <---In --l <---to __ ) <---to __ ) L-to __ ) 

Presiding ,~lember(s) 

Grairmall f(n.t-l.ehtillell (R-Ff) 

Check all of the following tltat apply: 

Open Session 0 ExerntiYe (closed) Session 0 Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recorded (taped) 0 

Stenographic Record 0 

Elections in Iran: The Regime Cementing its Control 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRRSF.NT: 

(See uttendullce sheet) 

NON·SVBCOMMITTEE MEMllERS PRESENT: (lvlarkwith an * t{they are not members aflull commiEtee) 

HKARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes []] No 0 

(If "flO ", please list below and include title, agem:y, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any starements submftted for rhe record.) 

Nune ~ubmitted 

TIME SCUEDULE-D TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURt"lED 11:54 a.1Il. 
54

Æ


81569m-2.eps

Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Title: Elections in Iran: The Regime Cementing its Control 

Date: 06/18/13 

Noncommillee Memhers 

Member Present Member 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (F L ) X Deutch, Ted (FL) 

Chabot, Steve (OR) X Connolly, Gerald (VA) 

Wilson, Joe (SC) Higgins, Brian (NY) 

Kinzinger, Adam (IL) X 

Cicilline, David (RI) 

Cotton, Tom (AR) X 

Grayson, Alan (FL) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) 

Weber, Randy (TX) 

Schneider, Bradley (lL) 

Desantis, Ron (FL) Kennedy, Joseph (MA) 

Radel, Trey (FL) X Meng, Grace (NY) 

Collins, Doug (GA) Frankel, Lois (FL) 

Meadows, Mark (NC) X 

Yoho, Ted (FL) X 

Messer, Luke (IN) 

Present 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X