IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–0374

Filed April 17, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

TINA LYNN THACKER,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, James D. 

Birkenholz, District Associate Judge.

The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 

affirming her conviction and sentence of second-degree harassment

following a guilty plea. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED;

DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant 

Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Kevin J. Bell, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we must decide two questions related to the 

sentencing of the defendant. The first question is whether the district 

court complied with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) in 

sentencing the defendant after she pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain 

when the sentencing order does not contain the provisions of the plea 

bargain. The second question is whether the district court improperly 

accepted the guilty plea without first determining that the defendant’s 

plea was made voluntarily and intelligently and had a factual basis as 

required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b). For the reasons 

expressed below, we conclude the district court’s sentencing order does 

not comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d), and as a 

result, we vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the district 

court for resentencing. With respect to the defendant’s claim that her

plea was not voluntary, we conclude the issue cannot be resolved in this 

direct appeal and therefore reserve this claim for a postconviction-relief

action.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

The minutes of testimony in this case state that on October 4, 

2013, a supervisor at the Des Moines Area Regional Transit facility 

notified police regarding a customer, Tina Thacker, who was screaming 

profanities at customer service. As the supervisor tried to calm her

down, Thacker saw a bus driver, Donald Robuck, which caused her to 

renew her screaming. Among other things, she screamed she was going 

to find out where Robuck lived. The minutes state Robuck had been the

driver of a bus boarded by Thacker. When Thacker asked Robuck to 

turn on the air conditioner, the system blew out hot air. Thacker then 

became incensed, used obscenities, and threatened to kill Robuck.
3

Thacker was charged by trial information with harassment in the 

first degree, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code 

section 708.7(2) (2013). The charge was apparently resolved by a plea 

agreement. 

The plea agreement, however, is not part of the record. What is 

part of the record is a form entitled “Petition to Plead Guilty to Serious 

Misdemeanor.” The form contains an entry stating “the plea agreement 

is:” but nothing was entered on the lines provided. The terms of the plea 

agreement were left blank. There is nothing in the record to indicate 

whether this was an intentional or unintentional omission. The 

defendant waived her right to have the proceedings recorded. 

On the same day the Petition to Plead Guilty to Serious 

Misdemeanor was filed, the district court, also using a form, accepted the 

plea agreement and imposed a sentence. The form contained the 

following boilerplate language: “The following sentence is based on all of 

the available SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS set out in Iowa Code 

Section 907.5.” The district court checked the box “The Plea Agreement” 

as being the factor that was “the most significant in determining [the]

particular sentence.” 

The district court ordered Thacker to serve one year in jail but 

suspended the sentence. The district court placed Thacker on probation 

for a period of one year with the Iowa Department of Correctional 

Services. The district court imposed conditions of probation which 

required Thacker to (1) complete any recommended substance abuse 

treatment, (2) cooperate and complete a VORP (Victim-Offender 

Reconciliation Program) session with each victim who so desires, (3) 

complete an assaultive behavior class, (4) participate in substance abuse 

monitoring by urine analysis during the term of probation, and (5) 
4

complete a psychological evaluation and follow through with any 

recommended treatment. The district court further dismissed a related 

simple misdemeanor charge and ordered Thacker not to have contact 

with the victim for a period of five years. Additionally, the district court 

ordered Thacker to pay a fine of $315, the statutory surcharges, 

restitution, court costs, and attorney fees. Thacker appealed. We 

transferred the case to the court of appeals.

On appeal, Thacker raised two issues. First, she claimed the 

district court erred by not stating adequate reasons on the record for the 

exercise of the district court’s sentencing discretion as required by Iowa 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d). Second, she claimed she received 

ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not knowingly and 

voluntarily enter into her plea agreement. 

A divided court of appeals rejected Thacker’s arguments. With 

respect to the claim that the district court failed to give adequate reasons

for her sentence, the court of appeals held that the district court was 

merely giving effect to the parties’ agreement and that no further 

statement of reasons was required. On the question of whether she 

received ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not intelligently 

and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement, the court of appeals held 

that Thacker failed to show prejudice. A dissent asserted the district 

court abused its discretion in citing a plea agreement as its reason for 

the sentence, when no plea agreement was apparent in the record. The 

dissent further took the position that the record was inadequate to 

resolve the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 

We granted further review. For the reasons expressed below, we 

now vacate Thacker’s sentence and remand the case to the district court 

for further proceedings. We also conclude the record is inadequate to 
5

resolve the ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal and reserve that 

claim for a postconviction-relief action.

II. Standard of Review.

A. Review of District Court Sentencing Order. When “the 

sentence imposed is within the statutory maximum, we will only interfere 

if an abuse of discretion is shown.” State v. Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d 7, 8 

(Iowa 1979). In exercising discretion, the district court must “weigh all 

pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature 

of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, 

character, and propensities or chances for reform.” State v. Johnson, 

476 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa 1991). Errors in sentencing, including 

contentions the trial court failed to articulate adequate reasons for a 

particular sentence, “may be challenged on direct appeal even in the 

absence of an objection in the district court.” State v. Lathrop, 781 

N.W.2d 288, 292–93 (Iowa 2010). 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. “We review ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims de novo.” State v. Williams, 574 N.W.2d 

293, 300 (Iowa 1998). When a defendant seeks to have an ineffectiveassistance claim resolved on direct appeal, the defendant must establish 

that the record is adequate to allow the appellate court to determine the 

issue. See State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010). If the 

record is inadequate on appeal, the issue must be addressed in an action 

for postconviction relief. Id. 

III. Discussion of On-the-Record Disclosure of Reasons for 

Sentencing.

A. Background to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d). 

Unlike most European countries in which judicial sentences are 

reviewable as a matter of law, appellate courts in the United States have 
6

historically adopted a hands-off approach to criminal sentencing. See

Ronald M. Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the Judicial 

Doorstep, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 122, 122 (1977) [hereinafter 

Labbe]. In the 1960s and 1970s, considerable attention in professional 

and academic communities was devoted to considering the relatively 

uncontrolled nature of criminal sentencing in our courts.1 Judge Simon 

E. Sobeloff of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 

stimulated the debate through his academic writings and public 

remarks. See Remarks of Judge Sobeloff, Appellate Review of Sentences: 

A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249, 264–75 (1962); Simon 

Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences,

21 Brook. L. Rev. 2 (1955); Simon E. Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: 

Should There Be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A. J. 13 (1955).

In the early 1970s, the torch of reform was carried by Judge 

Marvin Frankel who, in a seminal law review article, canvassed what he 

called “lawlessness in sentencing.” Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in 

Sentencing, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1972). Among other things, Judge 

Frankel emphasized the advantages of giving reasons for discretionary 

sentencing. Frankel noted “the giving of reasons helps the decisionmaker himself in the effort to be fair and rational, and makes it possible 

for others to judge whether he has succeeded.” Id. at 9. Similar 

observations were made by Judge Irving Kaufman, who noted that 

explanations of sentences “would exert a beneficial influence to 

1The Iowa Law Review published one major article participating in the 

commentary. See Michael C. Berkowitz, The Constitutional Requirement for a Written 

Statement of Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentencing Decision: A Due Process 

Proposal, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 205 (1974) [hereinafter Berkowitz]. 

 
7

rationalize the procedure which now is too easily characterized as 

capricious,” Irving R. Kaufman, Foreword: The Sentencing Process and 

Judicial Inscrutability, 49 St. John’s L. Rev. 215, 222 (1975), and would 

give some reassurance to the criminal “that his liberty is not being 

revoked in a wholly arbitrary fashion,” id. at 221. 

The notion that judges should state their reasons for sentencing on 

the record gained professional support. As early as 1968, the American 

Bar Association proposed that sentencing judges be required to state 

their reasons for selection of a sentence on the record so that a court 

could exercise its power of judicial review. See ABA Project on Standards 

for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences

§ 2.3(c) & cmt. e, at 42, 47 (1968) (noting that “a statement of reasons 

will be invaluable as an aid to the reviewing court [as] it is difficult to see 

how meaningful review can occur . . . where the appellate court is left 

completely in the dark as to why the sentence under review was 

imposed”). The adoption of the ABA Standards led to a reconsideration 

of the approach to sentencing in a number of states. See Labbe, 68 J. 

Crim. L. & Criminology at 123 (canvassing trends).

In the 1970s, we considered whether to adopt an ABA-type rule. 

In State v. Horton, 231 N.W.2d 36, 40–42 (Iowa 1975) (McCormick, J., 

concurring specially), Justice McCormick wrote a special concurrence in 

which he advocated adoption of a requirement that district court judges 

express reasons for sentencing on the record. Justice McCormick 

emphasized the anomaly that, with respect to sentencing, “the exercise of

this power, among the greatest that one person may exercise over the life 

of another, is virtually unreviewable.” Id. at 40. He noted four basic 

reasons for the adoption of the requirement that the reasons for 

sentencing be placed on the record: (1) increasing the rationality of 
8

sentencing, (2) the therapeutic value of sentencing on the defendant,2 (3) 

ensuring meaningful appellate review of the sentence, and (4) informing 

correctional authorities of the reasoning behind a sentence. Id. at 41. 

He further noted that a requirement that a district court state reasons 

for sentencing on the record could promote consistency and assist in the 

rational development of uniform sentencing. Id.3

Nonetheless, in the 5–4 decision in State v. Peckenschneider, 236 

N.W.2d 344, 348 (Iowa 1975) (en banc), we declined to adopt the ABA 

approach and require district courts to express reasons for sentencing on 

the record. Justice McCormick wrote the dissenting opinion, reprising 

the reasoning of his Horton special concurrence. Compare id. at 348–56 

(McCormick, J., dissenting), with Horton, 231 N.W.2d at 40–42. In State 

v. Harvey, 236 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa 1975) (McCormick, J., specially 

concurring), an opinion released on the same day as Peckenschneider, 

Justice McCormick again wrote a concurring opinion, stating that our 

refusal to accept ABA standards as mandatory criteria to be applied in 

sentencing “permits perpetuation of the inequities, disparities, and 

2See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 199 

(1985) (emphasizing that some sort of explanation for a decision remains necessary if 

we are to conceive genuinely of the individual as an “autonomous moral agent entitled 

to self-respect”). 

3Recent scholarship has emphasized the role of sentence explanation in limiting 

the appearance of bias and lessening the risk of cognitive bias, including racial bias. 

See Berkowitz, 60 Iowa L. Rev. at 208–09, 233–34 (noting role of written explanation in 

addressing perception and reality of racial bias); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & 

Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 

1, 36–38 (2007) (suggesting that requiring explanations should induce deliberation and 

reduce intuitive or impressionistic reactions that may be biased); Michael M. O’Hear, 

Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the Wisconsin and Federal 

Experiences, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 751, 759–60 (2009) (noting that requiring judges to 

explain the basis for their decisions tends to increase perception of neutrality, mitigate 

against cognitive bias, and lead to better consideration of the full range of information). 

 
9

unfairness which have led to substantial justified criticism of sentencing 

practices.” 

While Justice McCormick’s views did not prevail in our court, the 

legislature took action. In 1977, the legislature enacted a statutory 

provision, which provided that “[t]he court shall state on the record its 

reason for selecting the particular sentence.” 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 153, 

§ 66 (currently found in Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d)).

B. Caselaw Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d). 

We have been called upon to interpret and apply Iowa Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 2.23(3)(d) in a number of cases. Many have noted that by

requiring reasons for a particular sentence to be on the record, a 

reviewing court will be able to assess whether there has been an abuse of 

discretion in sentencing. See State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 

(Iowa 2014); State v. Uthe, 542 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1996). We have 

noted that without such a record “we could [not] discern [whether there 

had been] any abuse of sentencing discretion.” Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d at 

8. It is apparent from the cases that one of the important reasons for the 

rule is to preserve the appellant’s right to challenge the exercise of 

discretion by the sentencing judge. See id. We have also recognized the 

value of particularized statements in ensuring criminal defendants are 

aware of the consequences of their criminal actions. See Thompson, 856 

N.W.2d at 919; State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Iowa 2001) (en 

banc).

While the rule requires a statement of reasons on the record, a 

“terse and succinct” statement may be sufficient, “so long as the brevity 

of the court’s statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the 

trial court’s sentencing discretion.” State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 

343 (Iowa 1989). A terse and succinct statement is sufficient, however, 
10

only when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of 

the statement and the record before the court. See, e.g., State v. Victor, 

310 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Iowa 1981) (noting it was “clear from the trial 

court’s statement exactly what motivated and prompted the sentence”

(emphasis added)). When the reasons for a particular sentence have not 

been stated on the record, however, we have vacated the sentence and 

remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. See, e.g., State 

v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 388–90 (Iowa 1979); State v. Thompson, 

275 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1979). 

We have rejected a boilerplate-language approach that does not 

show why a particular sentence was imposed in a particular case. In

Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304, we considered boilerplate language in a 

written order that provided, “The court has determined that this sentence 

will provide reasonable protection of the public. Probation is denied 

because it is unwarranted.” We concluded such language, standing 

alone, did not satisfy the requirement that the district court make an onthe-record statement of reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id.

at 304–05.4

In a somewhat similar vein, the court of appeals in State v. Cooper, 

403 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987), considered the statement:

“[t]he Court has reviewed the circumstances of the offense, and the 

4A leading federal appellate decision relating to such boilerplate language is 

United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005). In Cunningham, Judge 

Posner rejected the position that a judge could employ a stamp which declared that he 

or she had considered the statutory factors required in sentencing. Id. at 676. Such a 

position, according to Judge Posner, was inconsistent with appellate review of 

sentences. Id. at 679. The decision in Cunningham has been undermined, however, by 

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357–59, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203, 

218–19 (2007), in which the Supreme Court found that implicit explanation of 

sentences may be sufficient to affirm the reasonableness of a sentence under federal 

law. 

 
11

defendant’s prior background.” The court of appeals held that such 

vague and generalized comments were inadequate under the rule. Id. 

The Cooper court emphasized that “appellate courts should not be forced 

to rely on post hoc attempts at divining the district court’s motivation 

from the entirety of the record in order to determine if the district court 

abused its discretion.” Id. 

We have also considered what the rule requires in the context of a 

plea bargain. In State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983), the 

defendant entered a plea bargain with the state. There was no claim the 

state or the court departed from the terms of the plea bargain. See id. 

We held that a statement of reasons for the sentence was not required 

because “[t]he sentence of imprisonment was . . . not the product of the 

exercise of trial court discretion but of the process of giving effect to the 

parties’ agreement.” Id. Similarly, in State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755,

756–57 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam), we again considered the impact of a 

plea bargain on the district court’s obligation to state on the record the 

reasons for a particular sentence. We held that a sentencing court does 

not abuse its discretion for failing to state sufficient reasons for imposing 

a sentence if it “was merely giving effect to the parties’ agreement.” Id.

In contrast to Snyder and Cason, in Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 

917–18, we considered a case in which the district court elected not to 

follow the sentence agreed to by the parties in a plea bargain. In this 

setting, we held the district court was required to state on the record his

or her reasons for exercising his or her discretion in imposing a sentence 

different from that agreed to by the parties. Id. at 920–21.

The failure of the district court to adequately cite its reasons for a 

sentence on the record is ordinarily reversible error. See, e.g., Lumadue, 

622 N.W.2d at 304–05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used 
12

boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state 

reasons related to “this” defendant and “this” offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d 

at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its 

imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 

(vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding 

sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 541 

A.2d 332, 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting failure to provide adequate 

“statement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error 

requiring resentencing”). One of the main purposes of requiring specific 

reasons is to provide a record sufficient to allow meaningful appellate 

review, see, e.g., Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816; Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d at 8, 

which is afforded as a matter of right to most criminal defendants, see

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(e) (detailing notification of right to appeal 

regarding indictable offenses); id. r. 2.73(1) (noting the appropriate 

procedures regarding a right to appeal in a simple misdemeanor case).

There have, however, been unusual circumstances when we have 

applied a harmless error approach to cases in which the district court 

failed to state its reasons on the record. In State v. Matlock, 304 N.W.2d 

226, 228 (Iowa 1981), we held a district court that failed to state its 

reasons on the record did not commit reversible error when it sentenced 

the defendant to the least severe sentence authorized by law. A remand 

for resentencing in Matlock could not possibly have benefited the 

defendant under these narrow circumstances. 

In one other case, State v. Alloway, 707 N.W.2d 582, 587 (Iowa 

2006), overruled by Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 921, we rejected an appeal 

involving a claim the trial court did not adequately state reasons on the 

record for a sentence for lack of prejudice. The defendant’s claim in 

Alloway, however, was presented as a claim of ineffective assistance of 
13

counsel in which a showing of prejudice is ordinarily required. Id. In 

Alloway, we applied the rule that a defendant who waives the making of 

a record of sentencing must take steps to create an alternate record 

through a bill of exceptions or a supplemental statement. Id. at 586. In 

Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 921, however, we reversed the caselaw upon 

which Alloway was based. The Alloway approach requiring a showing of 

prejudice thus has no continued vitality.

C. Application of Principles. The State suggests Thacker failed 

to preserve error in this case by failing to address the lack of record by 

either requesting a bill of exceptions or expanding the record pursuant to 

the rules of appellate procedure. We took such an approach in Alloway 

based on prior precedent. During the pendency of this case, however, we 

overruled the Alloway approach in Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 921. In 

Thompson, we declared that the responsibility to develop the record 

rested with the court, not one of the parties. Id. As a result, the State’s

argument on this point is without merit.

We next turn to language in the sentencing order form. The 

district court order is on a form that states in boilerplate fashion that the 

district court considered all the relevant factors required by law in 

imposing the sentence. It is clear under our precedents, however, that 

such boilerplate language, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy Iowa 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d). See Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 

304–05. The boilerplate form is identical for all cases and tells us 

nothing about how the district court arrived at a particular sentence in a 

particular case. See id.; Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802.

Here, the district court checked the box for “The Plea Bargain” as 

the most significant factor in its sentencing decision. The question 

arises, then, whether this case falls within the Snyder-Cason principle 
14

that when a district court simply imposes a sentence agreed to by the 

parties it does not exercise discretion in a fashion that requires a 

statement of reasons on the record.

The problem with this theory, however, is that we do not know 

from the record whether the particulars of the district court’s sentence 

were agreed to by the parties. Although we know there is a plea 

agreement of some kind, the Petition to Plead Guilty to Serious 

Misdemeanor is silent on the terms of the plea agreement. What we 

simply do not know is whether the plea bargain had an agreed upon 

recommendation for the sentence or whether the parties only agreed that 

the State would drop the more serious harassment charge if the 

defendant pled guilty to a lesser offense. While the district court 

considered the plea agreement in its sentence, apparently, the 

consideration given could have been that the more serious charge had 

been dismissed and the only crime for which the defendant should be 

sentenced was now a serious misdemeanor. Further, even if there was 

an agreed upon recommendation for sentencing, we do not know from 

the record whether the district court followed it in every particular or 

deviated from it in some respects. We are left to speculate on these 

questions. 

As a result, we cannot conclude the district court has adequately 

stated reasons for its sentence on the record as required under Iowa Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d). While terse reasoning can be adequate 

when we know the statement in the context of the record demonstrates 

what motivated the district court to enter a particular sentence, see

Johnson, 445 N.W.2d at 343, we cannot guess or simply calculate the 

rough probabilities. Looking on the record, we do not know whether the 

district court exercised its discretion, simply accepted the parties 
15

agreement, or did a little of both. We therefore vacate the sentence and 

remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings. 

On remand, if the district court determines it merely gave effect to 

the parties’ agreement and exercised no discretion in sentencing other 

than to accept the plea agreement as advanced by the parties, it should 

make the particulars of the plea agreement with respect to the sentence a 

part of the record. See Matlock, 304 N.W.2d at 228 (“If the court has no 

discretion in sentencing, it should so state.”). If, on the other hand, the 

parties did not come to an agreement with respect to the particulars of 

the sentence or the district court departed from any agreement the 

parties may have had, then the district court exercised discretion and, as 

a result, must make a statement on the record as to why it exercised its 

discretion in the way it did. On remand, there is no requirement the 

district court arrive at a different sentence, but only that it satisfy the 

requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d). 

IV. Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea. 

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) requires the district court 

to determine “that the [defendant’s] plea is made voluntarily and 

intelligently and has a factual basis.” Thacker contends she did not 

knowingly and voluntarily enter into the written plea bargain in this 

case. 

This case involves a serious misdemeanor. In State v. Meron, 675 

N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2004), we held the district court, with the 

defendant’s consent, may waive the in-court colloquy otherwise required 

by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b). Nonetheless, we 

emphasized that allowing written waivers does not diminish the 

importance and necessity of the court’s role to ensure each plea is 

voluntary, intelligent, and supported by the facts. Id. 
16

The record before us, however, simply does not allow us to 

determine whether Thacker entered into the plea voluntarily and 

intelligently. We also cannot determine on the record whether she was 

prejudiced. As a result, we decline to address the ineffective-assistanceof-counsel issue on direct appeal. A determination of the ineffectiveness 

claim must be made in an action for postconviction relief to “allow a 

record to be developed concerning the actual terms of the plea agreement 

and [Thacker’s] understanding of the terms of the plea agreement.” State 

v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481, 489 (Iowa 2005). 

V. Conclusion.

For the above reasons, the sentence in this case is vacated and the 

matter remanded to the district court for resentencing.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS.

All justices concur except Mansfield, J., Cady, C.J., and 

Waterman, J., who dissent.
17

#14–0374, State v. Thacker

MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent and would affirm Thacker’s sentence.

According to the minutes of testimony, this incident began when 

Thacker was picked up at a bus route along Ingersoll Road in 

Des Moines on October 4, 2013. Thacker told the bus driver, Donald 

Robuck, that someone who owed her money had been chasing her. She 

asked Robuck to turn on the air conditioning, but when he did so, the 

system blew hot air. This incensed Thacker, who began calling Robuck a 

“fat m***** f*****” and threatened to kill him.

On arrival at the bus depot in downtown Des Moines, Thacker 

went to customer service and caused a disruption by screaming 

profanities. Efforts to calm her down were unsuccessful. Thacker 

attempted to follow Robuck and a supervisor outside, but got stuck in a 

revolving door. She started kicking the door until it began to move. 

When Thacker saw Robuck leaving for his next route, she screamed at 

him that she was going to find out where he lived.

Thacker was charged with first-degree harassment, an aggravated 

misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, a simple misdemeanor. See Iowa 

Code § 708.7(2) (2013); id. § 723.4(2). On February 7, 2014, the charges 

were disposed of when Thacker pled guilty to the lesser included offense 

of second-degree harassment, a serious misdemeanor, and received a 

one-year suspended sentence and probation. See id. § 708.7(3). The 

record includes Thacker’s petition to plead guilty to a serious 

misdemeanor (which includes a written waiver of rights signed by her) 

and the district court’s written sentencing order, which lists the plea 

agreement as the only reason for the sentence imposed. The sentencing 
18

order also indicates that Thacker waived reporting and record of the 

sentencing hearing.

The district court is required to state the reason or reasons for a 

particular sentence on the record. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d) (“The 

court shall state on the record its reason for selecting the particular 

sentence.”). “The district court can satisfy this requirement by orally 

stating the reasons on the record or placing the reasons in the written 

sentencing order.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 2014). 

However, as the majority acknowledges, when the defendant’s sentence 

is based upon a plea agreement, the court provides a sufficient reason or 

reasons when it cites the plea agreement as the reason for the sentence. 

See State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam). The 

district court did so here.

In Thompson, we overruled prior precedent and held that even 

when a defendant waives reporting of the sentencing hearing, the 

defendant does not thereby waive the requirement that the district court 

provide the reason or reasons for the sentence on the record. See 

Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 920–21. The present case is not a Thompson

case. Unlike the sentencing order in Thompson, see id. at 918, the 

sentencing order here states the reason for the sentence, namely, the 

plea agreement, and that reason is a legally sufficient one.

Thacker, thus, wants to take Thompson a step further. She wants 

to establish a rule that when the sentence is based on a plea agreement, 

either the written plea agreement or the hearing transcript setting forth 

the terms of the plea agreement must be included in the record. This is 

intended to be a check so the appellate court can verify that the district 

court did, indeed, follow the plea agreement in its sentencing order.
19

Whatever the potential merits of this rule in the abstract, I think it 

makes no sense to apply it unless the defendant is asserting the 

sentence did not comply with the plea agreement. Thacker makes no 

such assertion. In fact, Thacker does not challenge her underlying 

sentence at all, for example, by claiming it is too harsh or restrictive. All 

we have here is her appellate attorney’s contention that one cannot tell 

from the record whether the sentence imposed is actually consistent with 

the plea agreement. Presumably, appellate counsel has asked Thacker, 

or Thacker’s trial counsel, whether the sentence is consistent with the 

plea agreement. The briefing should disclose the answer to this 

question. Since sentencing proceedings come with a presumption of 

regularity, see, e.g., State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Iowa 2001); State 

v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Iowa 1998), it seems unfair to assume—

in the absence of any claim by the defendant—that an irregularity might 

have occurred.

The court’s approach appears to elevate form over substance. That 

is, it remands the case for expansion of the record even when the 

defendant is not complaining about the result. The effect of the court’s 

approach will be to require another layer of documentation in 

misdemeanor cases. I think the limited resources of our criminal justice 

system can best be deployed elsewhere.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

Cady, C.J., and Waterman, J., join this dissent.