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i 

80–758 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–29] 

THE READINESS POSTURE 

OF THE U.S. ARMY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 16, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

RYAN CRUMPLER, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, April 16, 2013, The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Army .................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, April 16, 2013 .......................................................................................... 33 

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013 

THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Fountain, BG Walter E., USARNG, Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Army National Guard ......................................................................................................... 9 

Huggins, LTG James L., Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

U.S. Army ............................................................................................................. 4 

Mason, LTG Raymond V., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, U.S. 

Army ...................................................................................................................... 6 

Visot, MG Luis R., USAR, Deputy Commanding General for Operations, 

U.S. Army Reserve ............................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fountain, BG Walter E. ................................................................................... 54 

Huggins, LTG James L., Jr., joint with LTG Raymond V. Mason and 

MG Luis R. Visot .......................................................................................... 39 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Enyart ........................................................................................................ 77 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 77 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Barber ......................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 81 

(1) 

THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 16, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:26 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WITTMAN. I call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness of 

the House Armed Services Committee. 

I want to welcome this afternoon this panel to our hearing and 

I would like to thank all of you for taking the time to address us 

today concerning the readiness posture for the United States Army. 

And as you know over the past 12 years, the Army—Active, the 

Guard, and Reserve—has deployed more than 1.1 million soldiers 

to combat with more than 4,500 giving the last full measure of devotion to this country. 

More than 32,000 soldiers have been wounded, 9,000 requiring 

long-term care. In that time, soldiers have earned more than 

14,000 awards for valor to include 7 Medals of Honor and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses. 

The Army’s contribution to our Nation’s security have been numerous and continue around the world today. This hearing comes 

at a time of strategic inflection for the Army. 

After more than a decade, the protracted counterinsurgency operations and cyclic combat operations in the Middle East, the Army 

must find a way to return to full spectrum operations, reset and 

reconstitute the force, responsibly draw out an operation in Afghanistan, and fully develop its role under the new defense strategic guidance. 

The Army must also find a way to do all of this under a tightening budget and the compounding talent challenges of sequestration, continuing fiscal challenges in Afghanistan, and to do so with 

a smaller force. 

To discuss how the Army plans to meet the challenges of tomorrow in this austere budgetary environment, we have with us this 

afternoon Lieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., the Army’s 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; Lieutenant General Raymond 

V. Mason, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; Major 

General Luis Visot, the Deputy Commanding General for Operations of the U.S. Army Reserve; and Brigadier General Walter E. 
2 

Fountain, the Acting Deputy Director of the U.S. Army National 

Guard. 

Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here with us today 

and I appreciate your thoughtful statements as we head forward in 

your insights on today’s Army and the challenges that we have 

ahead. So with that, I am going to go to my Ranking Member, Ms. 

Bordallo, for her opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

General Huggins, Mason, Visot, and Fountain, I thank you all for 

your testimony and your service to our Nation, and I look forward 

to our dialogue this afternoon. 

This is the first in the series of hearings that will dive into some 

level of detail about the readiness issues for each of the Services. 

Moreover, this is also our first hearing subsequent to the President’s budget release as well as passage of the fiscal year 2013 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, so we can hopefully have a more 

thorough and data-driven discussion. 

The 2011 strategic guidance, the effects of sequestration and the 

planned withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Afghanistan place a 

significant pressure on all our military components, but particularly the Army. 

The Army has planned on reducing its end strength to 490,000 

soldiers over the next several years. Yet, still must equip and train 

each soldier according to its force generation model. 

The Army has been at the forefront of the wars over the last decade, but now has an opportunity to reset the force in a time of 

great financial strain. It is under this context that we must evaluate the readiness of our army for current missions in Afghanistan 

and potential contingencies in the coming years. 

So, I hope that our witnesses will be able to touch on the strategic risk and the lack of strategic depth because of the inability 

to train nondeploying forces as a result of sequestration and general budget constraints. 

I am particularly concerned about this risk and its impact on the 

National Guard and their ability to meet Title 32 or Homeland Defense requirements. We must all understand that all deploying 

forces to Afghanistan or elsewhere will be fully trained and 

equipped but subcommittee members have to understand the level 

of risk that we are embarking on with nondeployed forces. 

So in this vein, I hope our witnesses can also comment on the 

potential impact of shifting the current force generation model for 

Active Duty soldiers from a 36-month cycle to a 24-month cycle. 

What will be the impact on their quality of life and ability to train 

soldiers? 

And I am also curious to understand what further changes there 

might be to the force generation model as a result of the refocus 

on the Asia-Pacific region. The current force generation model fo-
3 

cuses primarily on meeting the requirements of the COIN [Counterinsurgency] strategy. 

So given the unique environments and wide-ranging environments that exist in the Asia-Pacific region, what is the Army doing 

to incorporate that into any force generation model as well as their 

trading scenarios? 

I am also concerned about the current budget situation’s potential impact on maintenance of Army equipment. As we retrograde 

from Afghanistan, we will need significant funds to get our equipment back to CONUS [Continental United States] and then reset. 

Given the immediate nature of the cuts imposed by sequestration, 

what is the short and medium term impact of sequestration to 

maintaining our current equipment? 

So I hope that our witnesses can touch on the cost growth over 

the next several years to maintaining and resetting our equipment 

as a result of this significant cut in the budget caused by sequestration. What gaps in maintenance will we have as a result of some 

of the immediate deferrals and does this have an impact on the 

training of soldiers? 

And finally, gentlemen, I hope our witnesses will comment on the 

current BCT [Brigade Combat Team], restationing and composition 

changes that are ongoing. I am particularly focused on how this assessment may impact the missions and requirements of the Army 

National Guard. 

The Army National Guard has a mixture of infantry and combat 

support elements. Do our witnesses see this changing substantial 

as a result of this BCT composition review or as a result of the 

2011 strategic guidance? 

So again, I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony, and Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. Thank you so much for 

your opening comments and for your leadership as our Ranking 

Member. I would like to—again gentlemen, thank you very much 

for being here and I look forward to your thoughtful statements 

and your insights into our Nation’s army. 

General Huggins, General Fountain, and General Visot, I understand that for each of you, this is your first time testifying before 

the subcommittee, and I want to welcome you, and General Mason 

I understand that this is a time again, back before us, so welcome 

back. 

As you know, last year, this subcommittee spent a great deal of 

time exploring our current state of readiness in discussing how we 

remain prepared to meet the challenges we are likely to face in the 

future. 

Time and time again, we heard of a force being described as 

being on the ragged edge. Today we again explore readiness, this 

time in the context of how the Army is reshaping itself to be ready 

for the future challenges and conflicts of the 21st century. 

The administration continues to argue that we can afford a 

smaller force with a smaller army—an army with less capacity so 

long as we have a more capable one. To enable a skilled superior 

army, one that can meet the Nation’s needs and respond to a wide 

range of threats, will require timely, thoughtful and targeted investments. 
4 

The Army must spend every dollar wisely as it seeks to remain 

ready, anything less will result in a far-reaching and long-lasting 

implication for the Army and for this Nation. Congress has a responsibility and a constitutional duty to train and equip our soldiers to ensure they are ready for the job we have asked them to 

do. 

I look forward to learning about what investments and readiness 

you are making and how the Army plans to meet its mission in 

these challenging times. And gentlemen, with that, we will go to 

your opening testimony. 

I want you to know that your full prepared remarks will be entered in for the record, so I know we have those. I would urge you 

to keep your opening comments to 3 minutes and that gives us the 

advantage of time here for members to ask questions. 

So if you will do that, I will assure you that the full text of your 

comments will be entered into the record and if you can abide by 

that then that helps us get right to questions which is where I 

think the members would like to focus their time. 

So, with that, General Huggins, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES L. HUGGINS, JR., USA, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY 

General HUGGINS. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 

Bordallo and distinguished members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today along with my colleagues to discuss the readiness of the United States Army and the 

way ahead. 

On behalf of Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John 

McHugh, and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, thank 

you for your service and your support and your commitment to our 

soldiers, civilians and their families. 

Today we are here and honored to represent the nearly 1.2 million talented, experienced, well-led, and professional soldiers, and 

testify on the critical issues of readiness for our total army force, 

Army Active, National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve. 

Upfront, the Army is facing severe fiscal challenges. It has serious implications on our ability to provide trained and ready forces 

for the Nation. Sequestration and shortfalls in overseas contingency operating funds pose substantial impacts to the readiness 

throughout the remainder of fiscal year 2014, but also even more 

grave is the outlook for fiscal year 2014 readiness given the cost 

we have deferred and pushed into fiscal year 2014 to make it 

through fiscal year 2013. 

This in effect compounds the risk in 2014. And after more than 

a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation and our 

army are in a period of transition—a turning point characterized 

by a fiscally constrained environment and a global and security environment that is more complex and uncertain than any time since 

the end of World War II, and as the tragic events yesterday in Boston unfolded, it might also indicate that the future is even more 

unstable. 
5 

And I would like to take just a moment and recognize the great 

work of our Army National Guard brothers there in that moment 

of great tragedy for our American brothers in Boston. 

This discussion on readiness is perfectly timed and the magnitude of the challenges ahead have serious implications on our 

ability to provide trained and ready forces for the Nation. If sequestration is implemented without significant changes from fiscal year 

2014 to fiscal year 2021, the readiness of our total force will be 

gravely impacted. 

The Army simply will not be able to meet—will not have the resources to meet the defense strategic guidance and we risk becoming a hollow force. Now, we have talked about ragged edge before, 

but the hollow force really is indicative of three critical areas there 

that must be balanced—end strength, readiness, and modernization. By staying balanced in those three areas is the only way we 

can make sure we have a force capable of completing a wide array 

of missions. 

As each of you know, the Army’s primary purpose is to fight and 

win our Nation’s wars and we are fully committed to that nonnegotiable obligation. As a total force, again Army Active, National 

Guard, and Army Reserve, we have led this effort performing missions again in Iraq and Afghanistan with great proficiency and professionalism. 

Our Army’s readiness is also a key deterrent as well as a hedge 

against strategic risk during unpredictable times. Your support has 

been critical to the successes we have had in the past but will be 

more so in the future. 

Continued investment in our readiness is a strategic necessity. 

However, to meet our sequestered targets, the Army will curtail approximately 80 percent of our ground forces for the rest—training 

for the rest of the fiscal year. This will create secondary shortfalls 

in critical specialty areas such as aviation, intelligence, and engineering. The latter will impact approximately 2,300 soldiers in 

their initial entry training. 

And then operating under numerous continuing resolutions has 

only compounded the effects of sequestration and is affecting the 

training for fiscal year 2014 as we look ahead and beyond. 

And finally, we will also be forced to look at cancelling all but 

two of the remaining decisive action brigade level training events 

at our combat maneuver centers unless additional funds can be 

made available. 

The Army understands the seriousness of our Nation’s fiscal situations, however we need legislative solution that averts sequestration and gives our leaders the flexibility to work with the resources 

you provide to shape the soldiers for the future. 

The magnitude of today’s fiscal constraints and uncertainty is 

not lost on the Army—senior military and civilian leaders understand Army must be good stewards of our resources and tax dollars 

that are provided to us. 

However, sequestration, fiscal constraints, shortfalls and overseas contingency operating funds have caused us to do what matters with less as opposed to doing more with less. However, doing 

what matters with less cannot come at the price of the overall 

readiness of our total army. 
6 

Our current readiness, the Army is committed to balancing the 

current global demands for security with a realistic strategy that 

maintains American land power, America’s dominance in land 

power remains unchallenged, and it is imperative that the Army’s 

total force remain ready and relevant in this persistent engagement era. 

Our priorities as we work through the challenges today are our 

Homeland Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and that is to 

the approximately 60,000 soldiers that are there as well as the 

next to deploy soldiers, and those others that are deployed in other 

contingency response missions around the world. 

We are also focusing on maintaining them in training as well as 

properly equipping them and having them prepare to execute other 

on-call missions. We must also provide for the readiness—high levels of readiness for our forces that are in Korea as well as our global response force which is our hedge to respond to no notice contingencies or crises. 

As the G–3/5/7 [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and 

Training], you have my commitment that I will ensure the leaders 

and soldiers are properly trained and ready for a full range of these 

missions. However, it will take a reprioritization of resources. 

At the end of the day, the Army must remain well-trained, 

equipped and ready. The Nation’s strategic land power maintains 

its credible advantage over the adversaries because of our capacity, 

our capabilities and modernization efforts, and our readiness. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to conclude my 

statement by telling you all that it is an honor to serve this great 

Nation as I have for the past 32 years, and it is a privilege to be 

here today with my colleagues, and thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Huggins, General 

Mason, and General Visot can be found in the Appendix on page 

39.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. General Huggins, thank you. 

General Mason. 

STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND V. MASON, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, U.S. ARMY 

General MASON. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordello and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. I want to just touch on a few 

areas of readiness that are on the top of my list and I imagine are 

on the top of your list as well and that would be equipment retrograde from Afghanistan, reset of that equipment, and the Army’s 

organic industrial base. 

Like my fellow witnesses, my top priority is to ensure our soldiers in harm’s way have what they need to succeed and those next 

to deploy are trained, equipped, and ready because they continue 

to have a challenging and dangerous mission ahead of them. 

In the next 20 months, our focus will be on closing bases and 

bringing out $20 billion worth of army equipment from Afghani-
7 

stan. The logisticians did a terrific job in retrograding the equipment from Iraq. 

But bringing home the equipment from Afghanistan is orders of 

magnitude harder. Moving equipment out through the northern 

distribution network and the Pakistan ground lines of communication, while improving, is still a slow and fragile process. So our primary method continues to be the more costly, multimodal air alternative. 

After a dozen years of war, it is important that we complete our 

mission right. Over the years, our citizens and the Congress have 

entrusted us with billions of dollars worth of modern equipment. 

We need to ensure, especially during these times of fiscal constraints, that the equipment we need for whatever the Nation asks 

for us next is reset and ready and back in the hands of our soldiers. 

To make sure that that equipment is ready, we need a fully funded 

reset program that continues for 3 years after the last piece of 

equipment comes back from Afghanistan. 

The reset program you have funded to date has enabled this 

army to maintain operational readiness rates in theater for our 

ground fleet at 90 percent or better, and for our aviation fleet at 

75 percent or better. However, that equipment has experienced significant wear and tear from operating from over a decade in the extreme temperatures and rugged mountains of Afghanistan. 

In fiscal year 2013, we expect to reset approximately 100,000 

items at our industrial facilities and 60,000 pieces of equipment on 

site where our units are stationed or what we call ‘‘field maintenance.’’ That includes over 400 aircraft. 

However, sequestration will cause us to defer some of these requirements to future fiscal years which I call compounding risk and 

it is going to have a negative impact on our combat readiness both 

in the near-, mid-, and long term. 

As I believe the members of the subcommittee are aware, this 

year we published our Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan to 

help us transition our depots to rationalize those and our arsenals 

from war to peace time operations. 

This plan gives us a framework to make informed, optimized decisions so that our army and the Nation will continue to have a 

modern, reliable, cost-effective, and highly responsive industrial 

base enterprise for years to come. 

Sequestration cuts, and I would add annual continuing resolutions, fall heavily on the Army’s operations and maintenance accounts. Deferring maintenance will cost production gaps in the industrial base and create breaks in the supply chain recovering— 

causing—requiring years to recover. 

These gaps greatly impact equipment readiness, industrial partnerships and sub-vendors supporting the supply chain, those second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers, and many of those are small 

businesses. It also takes a heavy toll on our highly skilled civilian 

workforce. 

So in closing, I very much appreciate working with you and your 

staffs as we continue to sustain a high-quality, all-volunteer army 

that remains the most decisive land force in the world, and I am 

also very honored to be here after 34 years in the service to be in 
8 

front of this committee. So thank you very much. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, General Mason. 

General Visot. 

STATEMENT OF MG LUIS R. VISOT, USAR, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY RESERVE 

General VISOT. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon and 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

On behalf of the more than 200,000 Army Reserve soldiers and 

12,000 civilians and military technicians and their families, I want 

to thank the subcommittee for its continued outstanding support of 

the Army Reserve. 

I am proud to report that America’s Army Reserve is a ready, 

trained, and accessible operational force. The days of Strategic 

Army Reserve are simply gone. 

We provide a great return on investment for the American taxpayer as we comprise almost 20 percent of the total army for just 

6 percent of the budget. As part of that total army, we provide lifesaving and life-sustaining capabilities to all Services and all components for both combat and contingency missions. 

The Operational Army Reserve currently has more than 12,000 

soldiers mobilized and deployed, serving in more than 28 countries 

with almost 5,000 soldiers today in Afghanistan, and we are deeply 

committed to the health and welfare of our dedicated men and 

women. 

We continue to promote Army Reserve soldier and family resiliency by ensuring all members of the Army Reserve family have 

awareness of and access to the training and resources available to 

support their personal and professional well-being and wellness. 

Never in our Nation’s history has the Army Reserve been more 

enduring and indispensible to America. The steady demand for the 

Army Reserve capabilities has introduced a new paradigm of reliance on the Army Reserve as a positive investment for America 

and an essential part of our national security architecture. 

While we are poised to continue to provide soldiers for planned 

and contingency missions, we are concerned with the additive impact of sequestration this year and in the future on training and 

readiness that may certainly have a negative effect on our capacity 

and ability to support missions abroad and respond to domestic disaster. 

In closing, we have the best Army Reserve in the U.S. history. 

Now is the time to build an investment that our Nation and this 

country has made in our Army Reserve. We understand the fiscal 

uncertainty we currently face as a nation, but that is exactly why 

it is critical to continue—invest in our Operational Reserve force. 

Keeping us ready, trained, and accessible is more critical in light 

of the budget impacts that will hit our army in the coming decades. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward 

to your questions. Twice the Citizen, Army Strong. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Visot. We appreciate that. 

General Fountain. 
9 

STATEMENT OF BG WALTER E. FOUNTAIN, USARNG, ACTING 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

General FOUNTAIN. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for this opportunity to speak with you today. 

It is my honor to represent the more than 356,000 citizen soldiers in the Army National Guard. 

The Army National Guard is the best-manned, best-led, besttrained, and best-equipped and most experienced in its 376-year 

history. This is do in no small part to the support of this committee, the daily support of our Guard families and employers, and 

the magnificent performance of our soldiers. 

This historic and essential level of readiness as an operational 

force is at risk due to budgetary uncertainty. If continued, it will 

erode current levels of readiness and potentially return the Army 

Guard to the Strategic Reserve. 

As we speak, there are more than 24,000 Guard soldiers mobilized across the world. Since September 11th, 2001, there have 

been more than 517,000 soldiers mobilized for Federal missions. 

The past year alone, Guard soldiers have provided over 447,000 

duty days in service to State and Nation, saving lives and property 

in the face of disasters and emergencies. 

Over the last 12 years of conflict, the Army National Guard has 

shown that it is accessible to the Nation and States, capable of performing any mission assigned to it and ready for service. 

The Army Guard has answered the call time and again without 

fail. As an operational force, continued employment in contingencies, exercise and training opportunities at home and aboard is 

vital to maintaining the Army Guard’s hard-won readiness and experience. 

Additional mobilization authorities enacted in the 2012 NDAA 

[National Defense Authorization Act] provides the Department of 

Defense with an important option to employ Reserve forces overseas outside of current contingencies. Through preplanned and 

prebudgeted requirements, Reserve forces can bring their expertise 

and experience to support the combatant commander. 

The Army Guard has demonstrated that its units are capable of 

performing every mission they have been given. Simultaneously, it 

responded with no notice to some of the worst natural disasters in 

our Nation’s history. 

This readiness for missions both at home and abroad is a function of resourcing. However, field and depot level maintenance in 

equipment is now being deferred, rotations to the Army’s premiers 

Combat Training Centers have been cancelled, and technicians who 

do most of the maintenance are in danger of being furloughed. 

All these measures began to undermine the Guard’s ability to respond rapidly to contingencies overseas and our no notice emergencies here at home. 

The Army Guard has recruited and retained a magnificent core 

of veteran soldiers who have demonstrated their eagerness to 

serve. All of them have either joined since September 2011 or have 

made a conscious decision to continue service since. 

They expect to be employed in conducting the Army and Nation’s 

business. Reductions in OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo] funding 
10 

less money for military schools and fewer opportunities to perform 

training overseas deployments have occurred. 

If there is one mission I could—message I could leave you with 

today, it is now is not a time to put the Army National Guard back 

on the shelf and allow us to return to the Strategic Reserve. The 

current budget situation, if continued over time, presents challenges to the ability to maintain our operational Army National 

Guard. 

Today’s Army National Guard is a low-cost, high-impact option 

for our Nation’s defense. With continued modest investment, the 

Army Guard, as part of the total army solution, the Nation can 

continue to benefit from a cost-effective force of over 350,000 welltrained, ready soldiers who are eager to take on any mission at 

home or abroad. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak today and look forward to 

your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Fountain can be found in the 

Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Fountain. 

We appreciate your opening comments and that gives us a good 

baseline by which to go forward and I will begin the questioning. 

I want to start off with the issue of sequester and you all had 

alluded to that as how it affects the different elements of what is 

going on with the Army. It is a $5.3 billion reduction in operation 

and maintenance funding through fiscal year 2013, $1 billion of 

that is in the Reserve Component for both operation maintenance 

accounts. 

And to absorb this, the Army has had to do some things that I 

think in the—both in the short term and long term prove to be 

pretty challenging. With a reduction in training for over 78 percent 

of our nondeployed BCTs, deferment of post combat maintenance 

on equipment, that is concerning, and also furlough of 251,000 

Army civilian personnel, all of those I think collectively get us on 

the track that creates some problems. 

But I want to—I want to look at the training component, and 

General Huggins, I want to go to you and ask, to what level of 

readiness are the units training right now, both the deploying and 

non-deploying units? And are they able to accomplish collective 

training? In other words, at what level are they able to train—at 

the brigade level, at the battalion level, at the company level? How 

are we trying to overcome as best you can the training deficiencies, 

not just for the deploying units? 

I understand the deploying units are going to be kept up at their 

readiness training levels, but the nondeploying units to me, we will 

see quickly a decay of readiness as that training component decays. 

So if you could give me a little bit of overview about how training 

is going forward there and then at what level, at what magnitude, 

can training be pursued? And are there opportunities to try to overcome that by strategically looking at the training component? 

General HUGGINS. Chairman Wittman, thank you very much. 

First and foremost, as you stated, the forces that we have deploying will maintain a high level of collective, and by that I mean I— 

I mean brigade level since that is typically what we deploy train-
11 

ing. Likewise, if it is a smaller element, a battalion or company or 

troop, we would work it at its highest level. 

That said, there is still a little bit of a difference than we would 

have done perhaps in the past. What we have done is we have tailored those units for their specific missions. As many of you have 

visited Afghanistan and Iraq, you know the strategy there has 

changed somewhat to security force assistance. 

So, what we have done with those, let’s say ‘‘standard brigade 

combat teams,’’ is that they are deploying for their security force 

assistance mission, we have tailored their readiness standards to 

meet that. We have focused our collective training to meet that. 

But that is not the measure of readiness that we use in the 

standards updates we provide quarterly to the members. I mean, 

that is the—that readiness standard is as the unit was designed. 

So if it was a brigade combat team infantry, it is designed to conduct basically decisive action, either combined arms maneuver or 

wide area security now, and to the most lethal end of the spectrum 

of combat. 

So, even those units we are sending in harm’s way but are not 

trained to that full level but they are trained to meet all of their 

combat requirements. I can absolutely guarantee you that portion. 

That is the easy part of the answer and that is our obligation as 

each of you has pointed out. 

For our non-deploying forces, they are tiered in the measure I 

spoke to. We are maintaining a high level of readiness for those in 

Korea, but even that is still somewhat less than our full measure 

of readiness. In our terms, C–1 [Readiness level] would be the 

highest; this one would drop back down again to an assigned level. 

But for the vast majority, almost 80 percent—78 percent, as you 

stated, Mr. Chairman, is we have curtailed their training. If you 

are not deploying or going to either Kuwait for some of those stability operations we are conducting in operation Spartan Shield 

there, you will train only at the squad level. 

What forces command has—our component has relayed is that it 

is what we define as A–4. That is the bare minimum. But we are 

struggling to reach anything above that and as I said, we have cancelled Combat Training Center rotations and the real impact on 

this is the ramp to regain readiness is long and not very steep because it takes time. 

And you can lose readiness very, very quickly. 

It is—and what we are trying to do to mitigate that is also focus 

on our professional and leader development portions. But even 

that, that is just a mitigation measure. So, that is why I said I believe that is the case for 2013 and our outlook is it will extend into 

2014. 

The real risk comes into global environment and that is those 

formations that could be allocated to respond to certain contingency 

plans around the world for the combatant commanders. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Huggins. 

I will not go to our Ranking Member, Representative Madeleine 

Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
12 

And I guess this question would be to any one of the witnesses 

here and it is a takeoff, I guess, further on what the Chairman has 

been discussing. 

How will you know that your forces are not ready? And if you 

could limit your answer since we are timed up here and I would 

like to get in as many questions as I could. Whoever would like to, 

the question is how will you know that your forces are not ready? 

What will be the triggers that will tell you your forces are not 

ready and how far away, in your opinion, are we in terms of degraded readiness? 

General HUGGINS. Madam Chair—Madam Congressperson, I will 

tell you—I will go quickly because I think it is important to each 

of us here on the panel to give you a quick answer on this one. 

We have established standards, obviously, for avoiding—I can 

tell you that we are all committed to maintain our readiness at 

those squad levels we talked about. Our brothers in the Army Reserve and National Guard are funded to a little bit more than that 

but I will let them explain that. 

But the real measure is because we have given guidance to limit 

that readiness because we can’t afford to buy more readiness other 

than at the squad level in about 80 percent of our formation, and 

that is so we can ensure we send the other forces in harm’s way, 

fully trained and properly equipped, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Next. 

General MASON. Madam Congresswoman, you know, I focus on 

my job on equipment readiness, and so each month we do the unit 

status reporting, the strategic readiness updates. So I am watching 

those very carefully, and we are beginning to see a downtick in the 

home station, nondeployed forces. 

My concern is that we have got to watch that very closely because it is one—readiness is one of those things that all of a sudden drops off the—off the cliff. It happened to us in the 1990s, so 

we are watching that very closely. That is unit readiness and that 

is happening down at our camps, posts and stations. 

And then there is a deeper strategic depot readiness that we are 

also watching very closely. And you won’t feel that today or even 

next month or perhaps 6 months from now. You will feel that in 

a year or 2 years. 

And so there is this balance between looking at near-term readiness of units through our USR [Unit Status Report] reporting and 

we are watching that very closely. I look at it almost every day and 

brief it to the Chief several times a week. So we are focused on that 

and watching that. 

But the deeper one is the one that concerns me perhaps a little 

bit more because that is the one you can’t get back. It will take you 

a long time to do that. So it is this balance between that. And so, 

that is where the sequestration, I think, will have the deeper, 

longer effect. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. Next. 

General VISOT. Ranking Member Bordallo, as far as the Army 

Reserve, we are continuing to be a provider of sustainment and 

support capabilities that we have within the Army Reserve. We 

provide at a readiness level for training—at a training too, and utilized the Army Force Generation model, and we don’t anticipate at 
13 

this point, as we speak today a significant reduction for us because 

we are in that 60-month period of time for us to provide that readiness. 

At the T–2 level, that is as we go into the available year, our 

focus is primarily that we provide company level proficiency, and 

at the same time, battalion level or staff, you know, battle proficiency. 

So we don’t anticipate at this point in time any significant impact upon our readiness in being able to provide the forces that our 

army requires and our army nation requires. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you, General. 

General Fountain. 

General FOUNTAIN. [Off mike.] —Ranking Member Bordallo, 

from an Army National Guard—Army Force Generation model— 

readiness model which has allowed us and at the individual level 

and we continue to increase the level of readiness as we progress 

to the 60-month model to a collective level or unit level. For our 

combat formations, our objective is to reach platoon level for our 

combat’s support—support in combat service, support company 

level as our brothers from the USAR [U.S. Army Reserve] do. 

To answer your question on how will we know when we reach 

degraded readiness levels, as I stated in my opening comments, we 

have already reached that point in the collective level with the cancellation of brigade combat team, CT—Combat Training Center rotations. 

The equipment levels will impact our readiness as well in regard 

to the availability of that equipment that is moving through depot 

and reset level maintenance. 

Finally, it should be known that for us to execute our domestic 

or home mission, that is based on our level of readiness to conduct 

our wartime mission as well so that we will have—be impacted— 

we will always respond domestically, the response could be slowed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I know there are other members and I hope they 

have an opportunity to ask some questions, but I think I would like 

to come back for—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will. 

Ms. BORDALLO [continuing]. More. 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN [continuing]. Have a second round of questions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will go now to Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all of you for being here and your service to our country. 

General Mason, I want to direct my question to you. As you may 

or may not know, I have the Anniston Army Depot in my congressional district and they have been a great asset as we prosecuted 

these two wars and many of them have gone over in the theater 

and just done everything that has been asked of them and more. 

But I have been bothered lately by the fact that this furlough 

talk has many of them concerned that they may be hit with furloughs and my understanding is that the defense working capital 
14 

fund is fully funded that pays for the projects that are at the depot 

through this fiscal year and well into next year—toward the end 

of next year. 

Do you believe that the depot workers at Anniston would be subject to a furlough if in fact it were issued by the DOD [Department 

of Defense] given that working capital fund is fully funded? 

General MASON. Yes, Mr. Congressman. I agree with you 100 

percent. What our organic industrial base has done in Anniston, 

specifically with combat vehicles, has been amazing. 

The investment in that has taken the health of our combat fleet 

and our wheel fleet significant high and we have reduced the age 

of our fleet. So our fleets are in really pretty good shape right now 

thanks to the great workers in Anniston and the other Red River 

and the other depots that are there. 

The answer to your question is, right now, a furlough decision 

has not been made. It is still being worked through with the leadership of the Department of Defense and—but if it does, if we do 

have a furlough right now, the workers at Anniston would be part 

of that furlough. And we will have to work our way through, what 

the numbers will be there. But yes, sir, that is the plan right—even 

though it is an army working capital fund—— 

Mr. ROGERS. And why is that since it is already fully funded? 

General MASON. It—the structure for the furloughs and working 

capital fund are a separate piece and while the working capital 

fund, as you know, is that revolving fund in there, the workers still 

fall in like all the other workers do and it is not separated by either structure or by policy or law. 

So, it is something to look at in the future discussions and I personally would like to have some discussions with—inside the Army 

and then with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] as to 

whether there is a possibility in the future, could we separate the 

working capital fund or reimbursable type work from the other 

type of work that is there. That would be a policy issue that we 

would have to go back to OSD on but I think it is something worth 

looking at. 

Mr. ROGERS. At present, it is not separated. 

So the working capital—you are saying at present it is not separated—— 

General MASON. The dollars are but not the workers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. And the dollars are subject to the cash flow 

problems that they are having? 

General MASON. They are. That is correct. 

And as workload comes down, you order less parts, the working 

capital fund then becomes at risk but there is cash in the working 

capital fund right now, that is correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. I have heard in recent press reports over the last 

few days that there is a discussion within your Department about 

the furlough potential exposure being closer to 7 days than 14 

days. I know it came down from 21 to 14. Is—are those press reports accurate? 

General MASON. I think all of those options are being looked at. 

You know, it was 21 days, potentially 14 and 7 is—what I understand in the meetings I am in is that that is an option. Seven days 

is a potential option. I don’t know where it will end up at. 
15 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Let me ask you, ultimately, how you feel 

this—if there are furloughs, would affect the readiness equipment 

that is already scheduled for maintenance. 

General MASON. It will end up pushing those works into 2014, 

and so we will compound the risk that we have got in 2013 and 

we will go into 2014 because we won’t have the work there—the 

workers to do all the work we need to do, and sequestration compounds that with the dollars that are going to be available to execute the work in the depots. 

So, as you know, we looked at cancelling. We have already began 

to cancel some third- and fourth-quarter work. 

Mr. ROGERS. You know, my understanding is those cancelations 

are not applicable to Anniston as an Army depot, is that accurate? 

General MASON. Sir, I will take that for record. 

Mr. ROGERS. Fine. 

General MASON. I think that there are—is work that will be cancelled, but I will take that for the record and come back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. 

And I would just say as a side note, burdening the structure even 

more, I just came back from Afghanistan a week before last, and 

as they are positioning that equipment to come back, that is also 

going to be piling up at these depots whether it is small arms, 

wheeled track vehicles, whatever. 

We got a very important industrial base that we got to maintain 

and I appreciate the work that you do in that effort and we need 

to be doing a better job on our side of the table to make sure you 

have what you need. So, thank you for your service. And I yield 

back, Mr. Chairman. 

General MASON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my question 

is either going to be answered by General Huggins or General 

Mason. 

One of the things that we know from sequestration is its impact 

on the civilian workforce, and civilian workforce, just so we are not 

confused, we have of course those that—what I would call the 

‘‘outsourced workforce.’’ And in—for example, I am from Hawaii, so 

Schofield Barracks depot is actually BAE so it is more of an 

outsourced kind of situation than people who are civilian—military 

civilian employees. 

Now having said that, it is also my understanding that the civilian, the military workforce, is under the operations and maintenance budget and that is why we are hearing all of these issues 

regarding furloughs. 

I also understand that all the Services are not ‘‘created equal’’ in 

terms of how those funds work. So, it is said that, for example, 

Navy and Marine Corps, probably have enough in their operations 

and maintenance budget or the amounts that they have to have 

zero furloughs. 

And I am wondering where you are because it is also said that 

you are not in the same position as Navy and there is a movement 
16 

to treat everyone equally which then may result with the 7 days 

or the 14 days from the 22 days, whichever it is. So would one of 

you like to take a stab at that first? 

General HUGGINS. We tag team pretty well, ma’am. So, we 

will—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. It is okay. 

General HUGGINS [continuing]. We will probably go back at it. I 

will try and frame the higher problem first. I understand the comments in terms of our Navy and our Marine brothers. Our challenge, it is an OMA [Operations and Maintenance, Army], operations maintenance fund issue, but it really stems for us from an 

overseas contingency operating fund shortfall to which we started 

out the year in and to which we continue to see increasing demands for everyday. 

So then that now has bled into out OMA account which then creates the shortfall in terms of our civilian pay. And obviously, that 

is a large percentage of it. So, that is the higher portion of the impact. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Before you tag off, let me ask you this, when we 

looked at the impacts of sequestration, and when the continued resolution and everything was identified, the sequestration component 

for OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] was I believe about 6 

billion. But what you are—are you speaking to something other 

than that immediate sequestration impact that was assessed to the 

OCO budget? 

General HUGGINS. No, what I am saying is that initially we had 

a $10 billion shortfall in what we had requested in overseas—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. I see. 

General HUGGINS [continuing]. Contingency funding. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Okay. I understand. 

General HUGGINS. That is right. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Okay. 

General MASON. Yes. Yes, ma’am. I think to add to that, we have 

got those—as I have mentioned earlier, we have got the near-term 

readiness of OPTEMPO which deals with repair parts and also 

fuel. And it deals also with the contractors who are supporting that 

equipment, and you don’t want to take a lot of risk there right now 

because we are focused on deployers and next deployers. Where we 

are taking some risk frankly in the deeper readiness which is in 

the depot maintenance, both in the base account, which we are taking ready—we are taking risk in there, and now some risk in the 

OCO reset account because we want to make sure that the down— 

the soldiers and equipment that is down range in Afghanistan is 

fully ready to conduct combat operations. 

So that is that balance we have got right now. And so that is 

as—we don’t then have the ability to move around that OMA dollars back here in the base and so that is impacting the furlough 

issue. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I know that has always been an issue of the 

flexibility that you may or may not need, but if you don’t have dollars in there, you can’t really be flexible. 

Now, one of the things that we will hear is that as we anticipate 

the—call them the ‘‘drawdown’’ from Afghanistan and everyone is 
17 

sort of saying, ‘‘Well, by then—by the year 2014 or 2015 fiscal year, 

we should be down to zero on OCO.’’ 

But what I am hearing you are saying you really can’t do that 

unless an additional account is boosted up because you can’t do the 

retrograde and the reset at that time. Am I—am I hearing you correctly? 

General MASON. Yes, ma’am, you are correct. Just because the 

last combat soldiers or that part of the mission might end in 2014, 

of course we are looking at an enduring force and that is—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. Right. 

General MASON [continuing]. Going to be determined what that 

number will be and of course that is going to require reset. But 

even as that equipment comes out in 2014, you got to transport it 

back, get it into the depot, a helicopter—a reset of a helicopter 

takes over a year. 

So even if that helicopter was to come back at the end of 2014, 

you at least need dollars to 2015 and you have got other helicopters 

that are sitting there. So, this equipment takes some time to get 

it back, get it through the depot, work the repair parts against it. 

So, we have said is we need to reset OCO funding for 3 years 

after the last equipment comes back that allows us to work 

through all the depots, get it out the other end and then impact 

the readiness. 

And just to let you know what that will end up doing is, that $20 

billion worth of equipment that is sitting in Afghanistan right now, 

we have estimated it will cost us about $8 billion to reset it and 

that will improve our readiness equipment on-hand and our units 

from about 88 percent up to about 92 percent for all three 

composts. A significant, positive impact to readiness. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mason, I appreciate you talking about the need in future 

years and the impact on future budgets. I think one of the things 

that we are struggling with right now is to meet the 12-month 

number with quite honestly a lifetime’s worth of responsibilities to 

form basic duty of protecting the United States citizens and their 

property. 

I have a 13-year-old son, so I want to talk with you briefly as 

a father who thinks that our world is more dangerous today than 

it was yesterday and thinks that it will probably be more dangerous in the year 2020 than it is today. And that is an important 

year to me because that will be my son’s freshman year of college. 

And I don’t know if any of you have children in that age range but 

certainly that is—if you do, I think you will understand where I am 

coming from with this. 

And I want to ask you, when you get a chance, to look at page 

189 of the President’s budget. And I want to just give you a couple 

of numbers from that and I am going to read directly from them. 

‘‘With regard to total federal spending between this year and 

2020, we will increase total federal spending by $1.2 trillion,’’ according to the President’s budget in this country. Non-defense dis-
18 

cretionary spending will go up. Social Security will go up. Medicaid 

will go up. Every other mandatory program will go up. Net interest 

on the national debt—net interest on the national debt, assuming 

that we are able to manipulate interest rates the same way they 

are currently being manipulated, will exceed, according to the 

President’s budget, what we spend on national security in 2020— 

the year that my child is a freshman in college. 

Total defense spending in that budget in 2020 is scheduled for $601 billion—$601 billion, well below where it is today. And so, 

when I hear the talk about the lack of training, well when our men 

and women aren’t training, then we are putting them at risk, more 

so than they already are when we send them into action. 

When I hear that a minimum of the cuts that we are going to 

have, it is a delayed response. We can’t wait. The minute when 

they put on the uniform, they go—when the bell sounds and we are 

going to continue to do that as Americans, and I guess, you know, 

when I look at all of this, and I look at the vision of the President 

for the country and there are a lot of us up here who really want 

to help you put some of these things right, and get our military 

back to the place it needs to be, and I am pretty frustrated with 

the DOD, and I feel like that some of the leadership at the DOD 

comes over here and they say, you know, ‘‘Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. 

May we have another cut.’’ 

And so the question I have or that my request from you before 

I get into specific question is, when you are not on the cameras, 

please, please, look at that sheet, because if we can’t help you, if 

the DOD is going to come over here and say, ‘‘Yes, we are going 

to take these cuts,’’ if the—if the executives are there to—so, with 

that said, one of the questions that is on everybody’s mind is BRAC 

[Base Realignment and Closure]. 

And General Mason, I will offer this to you because I am down 

to a minute and a half and I know I don’t have time for everybody 

to speak to this. But it cost $2.4 billion, is the request for the 

BRAC in this year’s budget. Given the uncertainty, given the lack 

of training, given the need to reset, couldn’t that money be used 

to offset some of the reductions in those areas that we all agree are 

so necessary for us to do our fundamental duty to protect the 

American citizens? 

General MASON. The—I know that the Secretary of Defense 

talked about BRAC during his testimony and discussed whether 

that would be something to put on the table or not. So, I will obviously defer to the Secretary of Defense. 

It is a base realignment and closure type environment. Do we 

need to do some realignment potentially in the outyears? Is there 

closure out there that may need to be done? I think it is—I think 

as the military officer, we look at options, so I think it is one thing 

that it needs to be discussed and let the facts take us to where it 

make sense. 

Do we have the dollars to spend on that or should we spend 

those dollars somewhere else? I think the analysis needs to be done 

and we need to let the facts drive us to what the right decision is. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, in their force reductions in Europe that we 

have had, how much are the—we are reducing them by about 45 

percent. Are we see a corresponding amount of infrastructure re-
19 

duction and are these reductions in your—likely to save that much 

money? 

General MASON. I am not sure. I will take it for record on how 

much money it is because I am not familiar with that specific dollar figures. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

General MASON. I would say that, you know, I have served in 

Europe, sir. We have come down significantly as you know and 

there is a study ongoing right now for a European restructuring. 

Do we have it right from an Army standpoint and all the other 

Services so that I have members on that team that are looking at 

right now, we have a responsibility to go back to the Secretary. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, my time for this round is expired. Thank 

you very much and I—again, page 189—— 

General MASON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. I hope that you will take a serious look 

at that and where this country is headed. 

General MASON. Sir, I will. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Excuse me. Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Visot, congratulations on becoming the Deputy Commanding General of Operations of USAR. 

General VISOT. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ENYART. You are welcome. Good to see you again, Luis. 

General Mason, the fiscal year 2014 budget shows a request for $2.4 billion for MILCON [Military Construction], and could you estimate for me what percentage of that is going to go to active installations and what percentage is going to go to Army National 

Guard installations? 

And what particularly concerns me is the fact that more than 46 

percent of Army Guard Readiness Centers are over 50 years old 

and at the current level of funding, it looks like it will take 154 

years. So let’s see, that is roughly from the Civil War to today to 

modernize those facilities. So, I appreciate if you could tell me what 

that looks like. 

General MASON. Yes, Mr. Congressman. 

First off, military construction is not in my area of responsibility 

or do I have a lot of depth in it. I mean, obviously, as an Army 

officer of 34 years, I have touched military construction. But currently, that is managed by our Installation Management Command 

Commander Mike Ferriter and also the Corps of Engineers. So I 

will certainly take part of your question for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

General MASON. I will tell you that my experience over the last 

10 years of what the Congress has given us to improve our installations I think is pretty dramatic, and I think if you travel—and I 

am sure you have—to our installations across the compost, I think 

the investment that the Nation has put in our facilities is really 

amazing and we appreciate it. 

So, I can’t speak to the specifics but I will take that for the 

record and make sure that the appropriate folks answer that and 

come back to you sir. I don’t know if you have any questions, com-
20 

ments about the Reserve Component infrastructure, but I will have 

to take that for the record. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General, I was just picking on you because you are four; four gets everything. 

General MASON. [Off mike.] 

Mr. ENYART. If it is log-related, I am going to pick on you. 

General Huggins, with the pivot to the Pacific, can you tell me, 

without going into any kind of classified level, what the Army’s 

plans are to support AFRICOM [United States Africa Command]? 

General HUGGINS. The biggest concept is our regionally aligned 

forces concept which will be supported by the Army Force Generation model. Currently, we are working our first proof of principle 

for AFRICOM with the designation of a brigade combat team which 

will provide forces for the combatant commander. Some of those 

will go into Djibouti, others will become crisis reaction forces that 

we have been called to establish since the Benghazi incident. 

Mr. ENYART. So, you are talking about one BCT? 

General HUGGINS. Sir, due theater security cooperation, that is 

correct. We will also go further and regionally align divisions and 

corps, but those forces will obviously not be forward-positioned. 

But we will work the home station training with—as the term 

we used which even confuses us—some of us in uniform, is now 

distributed, so we used to have allocated and apportioned and our 

forces command has—whose proponent of running the regionally 

aligned forces model that is talked about a distribution of forces to 

where we assign corps and divisions and then brigade combat 

teams to align for the combatant commanders. Sir. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General. 

General Huggins, I will pose this to you but if you want to pass 

part of this off, I will certainly understand. You know, the—of 

course, the Army War College teaches us its ends, ways, and 

means. 

And with what we see happening with sequestration, with the 

budget problems that we have and with the cutbacks, and the size 

of the military and proposed further cutbacks, do you believe or do 

you foresee a mismatch—a significant mismatch between the ends 

that we proposed to accomplish with our military force and the 

means with which we will be attempted to accomplish those ends? 

General HUGGINS. Sir, I personally see the potential for a mismatch. As Chairman Wittman stated at the beginning, I mean, the 

strategy must drive where we need to go, what the Army must accomplish and then the force structure designed to accomplish that 

task. 

And we are in significant discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through our strategic choices management review 

process which has all the Services a part of that to look at the defense strategic guidance and other governing documents to determine the way ahead. 

But we also know that it is an exceptionally, fiscally constrained 

environment, and what we hope not to go to is an environment that 

tells us what to build in force structure based upon resources as 

opposed to strategy. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Enyart. 
21 

Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to thank our witnesses for their service to our 

country and also for being here today for your testimony. There is 

absolutely no secret that our Nation faces some very serious financial challenges. 

You know, I think many of us in Congress, we advocate for cutting spending but there is a responsible way of cutting spending 

and there is a—I guess a dumb way of cutting spending, and sequestration I think falls on—in the latter, mindless cuts to defense. 

Yes, I think 50 percent of all the cuts to date are coming from defense when we only make that almost less than 20 percent of the 

budget. 

So having said that, my kind of—my heart lies with the Reserve 

and the Guard. I love our Active Duty men and women in uniform, 

but being a reservist and a guardsman—my citizen soldier life. 

I want to—real quick—because I do have three questions. I want 

to ask you, do you foresee us going from an operational—the Guard 

and Reserve—going from an operational force back to a Strategic 

Reserve because—and there are other discussions going on of that 

nature, Major General, then we could go to Brigadier General 

Fountain, so? 

General VISOT. Congressman Palazzo, first, thank you very much 

for your service to our Nation as a guardsman in the State of Mississippi. I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Pales in comparison to you all’s. 

General VISOT. No. So, from my perspective, you know, in terms 

of—we cannot afford, you know, to lose what we have gained as a 

result of 11 years of experience in the battlefield with—you know, 

from an Army Reserve perspective, with the National Guardsman 

an Active Component. 

I don’t think the Nation can afford, you know, to give away on 

that investment because that is what it is. You know, the Army Reserve is a positive investment for the United States and for our Nation. And to give away what we have earned, we feel very strongly, 

it is not a thing that we can afford to do in our Nation. And we 

hope that, you know, throughout the years with the support from 

the Congress that we will continue to do that and not go back to 

a Strategic Reserve. 

General FOUNTAIN. Congressman, the Army has no intent, in my 

professional opinion is, in to returning us to a Strategic Reserve. 

The reality and what I hope to have captured during my opening 

statement is that the readiness has already been discussed that 

was developed over the last 12 years is perishable, that it was a 

significant investment for us to make the transition from a Strategic Reserve to a full partner in an operational force that is a 

function of resourcing, and the resourcing is where we will depend 

on your assistance to see that we do not return to that point. 

The—I think the three components together are stronger together than we are at different levels of readiness. That is what 

has brought us to this point. So, there is no intent for us to return 

to that point. It is just a reality of resourcing. 
22 

If we cannot continue to do those things to train as we have in 

the last 12 years, if we do not maintain our equipment, all those 

second-, third-order effects to resourcing or a lack thereof. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, General, I agree with you both. I have served 

in both the Strategic Reserve Component and also the operational 

force structure. And I would much rather—I don’t—I would hate to 

see us waste that investment and some hard-earned lessons. 

Real quick, I know last year, the 11th annual QRMC [Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation] actually proposed the possibility of cutting Guard and Reserve pay by 50 percent. Now, personally, I think that would be devastating to readiness recruitment 

and retention especially as the Active forces are downsizing. We 

would like our Active Duty men and women to look to the Guard 

and Reserves because we would like to see that become a repository of their hard-earned skill and knowledge and training. 

Real quick and I know I am kind of running short, are you all 

hearing this and are you all squashing it as that possibility may 

come up and in you all’s conversations? 

General VISOT. Congressman, we have heard about that. As you 

all know, the critical part of this is not just the pay, you know, to 

attend a battle assembly. It is all the cost that is also associated 

with that, so just travel cost, hotel cost, you know, lodging cost, 

that are just not, you know, within that enough, especially when 

you look at a, you know, a sergeant, you know, in an Army that 

has to travel distances. 

So all those things come into play, so I think the way that we 

currently are, you know, paid for our service to our Nation is a very 

small investment for the return that we get. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. General Fountain. 

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congressman, the Army National 

Guard’s position is very similar in that we feel the current compensation system meets the requirement, is fair, and clearly added 

value to the resource you get from the Army National Guard. 

While there could be merits in reviewing any compensation plan, 

we think that a full review would have to be done as to whether 

or not you actually get cost savings if you start considering different benefits that would come with a day’s order or something of 

that scenario. 

So, a full review and all potential second-, third-order effects for 

readiness I think would be due before you can make a decision 

such as that. 

Mr. PALAZZO. All right. Thank you, gentlemen. 

General FOUNTAIN. Sir. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo. 

Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

service and I am going to echo some of my colleagues’ comments 

but I certainly did not support these cuts to our national defense 

and I was glad to be part of the Budget Committee to help restore 

the defense spending in the 2014 budget that was passed out of the 

House. We are going to continue to try to do that. 

But in the meanwhile, I want to follow up on some of the President’s proposal regarding the BRAC. I know my colleague asked 
23 

some questions here earlier. But has there been an assessment 

done within the Department of Army on excess infrastructure on 

army installations? 

General HUGGINS. Ma’am, one was done for the last BRAC. We 

are currently not doing a continuing assessment other than what 

General Mason mentioned for Europe which is a specific look for 

those forward-deployed. 

But to the—really the—to set the context, I mean, we currently— 

we are looking at—as the Active force goes to 490,000, we are looking in going through our programmatic environmental assessment 

process. 

And we are currently in our listening, we have gone out to communities and are conducting our listening sessions to hear firsthand what the impacts are from them. 

And then we will make a decision after that is done in terms of 

what kind of a recommendation as to where we think future stationing will be. And then, that may potentially drive us to look at 

places for—where excess capacity or excess equipment exists. But, 

we are a little bit away from that at this point in time. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I just don’t quite understand the move to try to 

push a BRAC when—it is my understanding you had 490,000 before 9/11, isn’t that correct? It is about the same force structure we 

had pre-9/11. And we had a BRAC in 2005 which took some excess 

infrastructure out. 

So basically, you are having the same number of soldiers on our 

bases with less infrastructure right now. So, why is there a move 

to push for more infrastructure to be taken out? 

General HUGGINS. Well, we are at a high of 569,000—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. 

General HUGGINS [continuing]. Now from—so we have grown and 

we have put structure in places as we look for the best places to 

build divisions, build enablers that would support those divisions 

on installations. Going down to 490,000, we have got to take a holistic review of everything to make sure we have it. And efficiencies 

will play in that obviously, but—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. 

General HUGGINS [continuing]. I think it is prudent that we do 

that. But right now, we are—again, as we are still trying to gain 

the rest of the information from the community. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. And I understand that you are moving to 

move down to force structure but I still think with the excess cost 

that we see haven’t even broke even yet from the 2005 BRAC. It 

cost $37 billion, now you are supposed to break even to 2018 and 

then we have all these other cuts and less resources and then $2.4 

billion cost to do any more. I am reticent to support that. 

But I wanted to shift and follow up on my friend from Mississippi’s comments to the Guard and Reserve. I certainly appreciate the role that you play. My dad was in the U.S. Army Reserves, and so I grew up appreciating that very, very, much. 

And I know in the defense strategy that came out last October, 

there was a move and a shift to continue to place more and more 

of the responsibilities of our National Defense on an Active operational force of the Guard and Reserve. 
24 

And I guess my question is, with sequestration and the current 

budgetary environment, do you feel like, that you are going to have 

what you need to be able to continue at that level of proficiency? 

General VISOT. Congresswoman, thank you very much for the 

question. As far as the Army Reserve, as I stated earlier, we just 

cannot afford, you know, to lose that tremendous investment on our 

capability to remain an Operational Army Reserve. 

The impact of sequestration we will have is one for example, of 

civilian pay and furlough. It will have an impact upon depot maintenance, you know, as my—as General Mason mentioned specifically in reset. It will have also an impact upon OPTEMPO in terms 

of the training, you know, that we have going on. The, and lastly, 

the impact will be in sustainment restoration and modernization. 

All those four items combined, you know, will have a significant 

impact in us in order for us to be able to sustain our ability to remain an Operational Army Reserve which I don’t think at this 

point in time in our history we can afford to do that as a nation. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Exactly. General Fountain. 

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congresswoman. The same impacts of 

sequestration that the Army suffers and the USAR suffers, so will 

the Army National Guard. The sequestration from strictly Army 

National Guard perspective impacts that investment of time, just 

as my colleague mentioned from the USAR. 

It simply is a situation where—and I believe the Chairman of 

Joint Chiefs General Dempsey made a statement during his discussion in reference the fiscal year 2014 budget when he stated that, 

‘‘It is less expensive to stay ready than to get ready,’’ and that I 

am probably messing that quote up but that is the bottom line. 

From our perspective, we have through investment from what 

this great country have transitioned from an Operational Reserve— 

Strategic Reserve to an operational force at a great cost, and to lose 

that investment to us would be buying high and selling low. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. There we go. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler. We are going to begin 

a second round of questions and I want to focus on the DOD’s new 

strategic guidance that was released in January of 2012 and then 

the accompanying document from the Secretary on Defense budget 

priorities and choices. 

And as you know, there is a significant element in there that relates to readiness in the U.S. Pacific Command and I wanted to get 

each of your perspective on how does that affect Army readiness? 

What are the challenges that that new strategic directive provides to the Army to get your perspective on where things are 

going? 

And again, it goes back to the earlier comments about strategy 

and making sure that strategy is driving how we determine how 

resources are allocated, not the other way around looking at resources and then say that that drives a strategy and we have some 

clear strategy directives now. 

So I wanted to get each of your individual perspectives on this 

new strategy initiative and then the Secretary of Defense’s comments and directives on our defense budget priorities and choices. 

And we begin with you General Huggins. 
25 

General HUGGINS. Chairman, thank you. Obviously, the strategy 

drove us to the Pacific in terms of—as we looked at our national 

vital interest. The Army has taken in and now is upgunning the 

three-star headquarters we have in U.S. Army Pacific at Fort 

Shafter to four-stars, so that is measure one. 

And we don’t do that to create another four-star position but because the oversight on the responsibility for increased capability 

there requires such. And that increased capability is, first and foremost, in the form of the 25th Infantry Division which is now forced 

into the PACOM [United States Pacific Command] area. We have 

also gone to Fort Lewis—or Joint Base Lewis-McChord and allocated it also. 

So, the first corps as the JTF [Joint Task Force] and we are 

working training exercises with PACOM and USARPAC [U.S. 

Army Pacific] to certify those headquarters as a combined joint 

task force level—take resources, but once there are probably good 

investments for a strategic hedge given especially our current 

world situation in that area. 

There are—the brigades have also been taken off of our—what 

we have notionally called the ‘‘patch chart’’ that shows the deploying units for our combat operations. So, we have taken the 25th Infantry Division brigades—the brigades in Alaska and two of the 

Stryker Brigades at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and basically protected them to work their readiness for response to the Pacific area 

and those threats. 

That said, Sir, we are only training those forces to the squad 

level. 

Now, the exception to that are the forces that are committed to— 

on the peninsula of Korea already, which again we will maintain 

a higher level of readiness for. It is an impact, but we have—in this 

case, we have clear priority so we move to—to those priorities. We 

just wish we could gain higher level of readiness for each of those 

divisions, the corps and the BCTs and our soldiers within them. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

General Mason. 

Thank you, General. 

General MASON. Mr. Chairman, I have got four tours in the Pacific, a little over 10 years. Most recently, 3 years ago, I commanded the two-star headquarters there, so I spent a fair amount 

of time. 

To me, it is a region of opportunities and challenges. There are 

great opportunities there, well, for our Nation economically. And 

there are opportunities there for us as a military to train with 

other forces to become interoperable to—and most of those militaries in that part of the world are actually predominantly Army, 

and so there is—although it is a big ocean out there, there is a land 

force out there, and so connecting with that land force and staying 

with them. 

And there is great exercise programs both at the joint and the 

Army level, so it can improve our readiness. 

And as General Huggins mentioned, rotating forces in and out of 

there and getting them used to that part of the world, we can leverage capabilities of these other nations. They bring incredible ca-
26 

pabilities—our particular allies, the Australians, others that are 

there. 

We also preposition stocks out in the Pacific. APS [Army 

Prepositioned Stocks] sets, both brigade sets, that is—as well as 

what we call operational project stocks. They—so we have got land 

out there, we can put on the ground, so our allies in Japan, in 

Korea and other places. You know, we are discussing it with the 

Australians potentially. But it has challenges. 

Probably the primary challenge is the tyranny of distance. Traveling in the Pacific is expensive. You got to have ships, then you 

get to a location. You got to have planes to get deeper in locations, 

and it is very helicopter-intensive, so it has got some challenges for 

training that does increase your cost. But I think the opportunities 

in the Pacific both at the strategic operational tactical level are 

worth those kinds of costs. And I think we are going to be a better 

Army by staying engaged in the Pacific. I think we are going to be 

a better nation by staying engaged in that part of the world. 

And there is cost-sharing that occurs. We have cost-sharing with 

the Koreans. They bear some of the cost of our capabilities there. 

And potentially, there is other cost-sharing relationships. 

Some of our strongest alliances and treaties are in the Pacific. So 

it is a dichotomy of challenges and opportunities, Sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

General Visot, if you could do that quickly and General Fountain, 

then in the interest of time for—so I get to Ms. Bordallo. 

General VISOT. Mr. Chairman, we are definitely committed to 

continuing to support because we presently have about 4,000 soldiers that are located in the Pacific Command area of support, and 

we continue to provide the sustainment and support, you know, capabilities within that area and align ourselves with the strategy of 

aligning regional alignment forces through our Army Reserve engagements cells and Army Reserve engagement teams, we will be 

able to fulfill the Nation’s requests. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. General Fountain. 

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Army National 

Guard also feels that we can make the transition and support the 

chief staff of the Army’s regional alignment forces strategy as well. 

Whether it would be security cooperation or building partnership 

capacity, we feel that that would be a natural evolution of our 65 

partnerships across the globe today. And the Army Force Generation Model is adaptable enough to focus mission training and deployment and keep us engaged as an operational force to the strategy. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. And that is a great lead-in to Ranking 

Member Bordallo, who has a great National Guard component 

there in Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. I was going 

to mention that, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted—just whoever you think, if the answer is the same between the two Services, then I guess, we will just go to those that 

may have a different idea on this. What flexibilities or exceptions 

did you request in terms of furloughing civilian personnel? And 

also, what is the impact of using borrowed military manpower to 

backfill the civilian positions? 
27 

General HUGGINS. Ranking Member Bordallo, we ask for no exceptions based on the guidance that were given to us. We have 

looked at the impact in terms of the furlough. And as was stated 

before, we are, even today, working drilldowns as we go from 14 

to 7 and possibly to zero on furloughs because we do think that is 

going to impact on the way ahead. 

I would tell you it will impact, you know, our readiness in the 

long-term because of exactly what has been stated in terms of what 

we are going to have to defer. 

The minimum amount that—and General Mason can speak more 

of this—that we are trying to do to keep our depots operating so 

we don’t have to go into a cold status and then have to start them 

up over again. But I will see if General Mason has anything else 

to add. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General. 

General MASON. To the second part of the question about our 

military manpower, we have taken very—very seriously, Ma’am, 

and we are looking at them. The G3 holds weekly meetings and we 

are looking at where can we use soldiers appropriately that aren’t 

too far outside of their military occupational specialty. But based 

on the constraints we have got now with dollars, we likely are 

going to have to have some borrowed military manpower. 

Now we have done it in the past and it is one of those things 

that commanders take a hard look at because you want to balance 

training with all the other requirements on there, and we are 

working our way through that. 

As far as the furlough impact on the depots, it will be significant. 

And, you know, as a depot operates, you don’t want to shut a depot 

down, you want to keep it on, yes, while you are on two or three 

shifts as you well know. So our concern is this herky-jerky kind of 

situation with a furlough. And that will be challenging, and we will 

see where the numbers come out, but obviously the less furlough 

the better for us in the depots. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Would the others like to comment, General? 

General VISOT. Yes, ma’am. From the Army Reserve, our position 

is we would like not to have to furlough, you know, our civilian 

military technicians because of the fact those are GS–5s and GS– 

7 employees. As you know, when you cut 20 percent of their salary 

for, you know, 14 days or so, that has significant financial impact 

not only on the soldiers themselves, but also on their families. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And General Fountain. 

General FOUNTAIN. Ranking Member Bordallo, as the impact 

goes with the Army National Guard is that our—we have very few 

civilians. Our full-time manning provides a baseline of readiness 

for support of the other 83 percent of our force which is part-time 

or traditional guardsmen. Military dual-status technicians are actually members of those Army National Guard formations and 

deployable assets whether at home or abroad. 

The areas where we did request some exception was at the area 

of physical security, emergency response services and others. But 

the primary impact will be for us is readiness that the administration, training, and maintenance that is done by these individuals. 

And the part utilized and borrowed military manpower really 
28 

doesn’t apply to Reserve Component in that we are a part-time 

force. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

How are any of you using sequestration as an opportunity to do 

business differently at the headquarters or administrative levels? 

Are any of you—if you could give me a quick answer because my 

time is running out. 

General HUGGINS. We all can refine and look for that opportunity. Madam Chairperson, it is a matter of really looking at our 

processes. 

For instance, in our modernization processes, we are going 

through with our acquisition community and finding efficiencies. 

Some were forced that way because of just absolute need where, in 

the past, perhaps it was easier to try and do it another way. But 

there have been multiple opportunities. And it is not a good thing, 

but we try to find the best we can out of it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So you are going to become businessmen? 

General HUGGINS. I would scare most of you if we try that, but 

I would sure take that for the record, Ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Thank you. 

Was there anything else you wanted to add just very quickly? 

General MASON. No, ma’am. I think we don’t want to become 

businessmen, but we will use business practices where they are appropriate for sure just as you described. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. All right. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that I am extremely 

proud of the service that has been rendered by the Reserves, the 

Air Guard, the National Guard. 

And currently, as Mr. Chairman said, I just returned from the 

State of Mississippi where I witnessed the briefing of 600 of the 

Guam National Guard. That is quite a number for a small United 

States territory, and we are very proud of them. 

And I also want to thank you for your leadership with all the different organizations that you represent here. And I join my colleagues, and I do not agree with the deep cuts to our Armed Services. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to talk with you briefly about AFRICOM 

and—and just about Africa, in general, and the challenges that are 

there. As somebody who just looking at the raw numbers, you are 

talking about approximately a billion people. 

You are talking about 20 percent of the land mass of the world. 

You are talking about 54 countries plus Somalia and—I am sorry, 

Somaliland and Morocco, so we got 56 different governments that 

you would potentially have to deal with. We are talking about 

downsizing our military both in the terms of manpower and in the 

terms of our weapon systems and capabilities. 

Why is the military convinced or the leadership of the country 

convinced that we can engage in Africa with the type of challenges 

that are there while, at the same time, engaging in all of these 
29 

massive cuts to our military and the equipment and the training 

that they need would be my first question. 

And the second question I have would be, is China downsizing 

their military? Is Russia downsizing their military, are any of those 

countries that could potentially be our foes in the future 

downsizing their military? 

General HUGGINS. Congressman Scott, thank you very much for 

the question. First to set the stage for the AFRICOM piece, you 

certainly bring up a great topic because there is an awful lot of 

human suffering going on in that area. 

I have great confidence in General Rodriguez who just took the 

helm there in terms of defining the requirements to us as the Army 

service to support his engagements. Currently that demand signal 

does not exist that much, but I would have to be honest and say 

that probably is more a function of everything we have committed 

for years to Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Hopefully as we see that situation begin to downsize even further 

if the situation require. We can support it. We could see a strategy 

that might allow other forces to go to other places. But I believe 

first and foremost the Africa piece is probably a whole-of-government approach to work engaging. And then our piece is working 

with the various militaries to try and build capacity at that level, 

which we are doing. 

Our National Guard brothers engage right now in Partnership 

for Peace activities, the State Partnership Exchanges. But what we 

have found in our previous engagements there, our capabilities so 

outmatch many of the Armies that are in that country. And I am 

really talking more about Central Africa, West Africa, and the 

south, not all the way to South Africa, that they want basic levels 

of instructions. And we are able to help them with that. 

The real issue is, is how we are going to address the whole continent writ large as in—and that becomes a multiple COCOM 

[Combatant Command] requirement or challenge when we look at 

the partnering space with Central Command, Sir. 

General MASON. I would add, Sir, that we need to stay engaged 

in that part of the world, but the engagement doesn’t necessarily 

to be in large formations, even brigades. 

Many times just well drilling, building a bridge, and engagement 

with USDA or Department of Agriculture, those kinds, that wholeof-government piece, I think, many times pays back greater dividends. You put a small footprint in there. 

Now we have a command—— 

Mr. SCOTT. General, if I may—— 

General MASON. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. I certainly mean to be as respectful as 

I can. I am down to about 1 minute. With all due respect, Sir, you 

are talking about nation-building, and that is not the reason we 

have the Armed Services of this country. But that is nation-building when we are doing wells and other things along those lines. 

And again, I think that we want to do what we can to help people. But my fear is that we are leaving our country vulnerable. 

And if you look at where we are today, we don’t talk about Iran 

that much because Syria heated up. We don’t talk about Syria that 

much because North Korea heated up. I mean, we are still in Af-
30 

ghanistan. We spent a fortune in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have 

been up against a capable enemy, but not an enemy that is capable 

technologically of taking down insignificant numbers. 

Our aircraft, not that any loss is insignificant, but we have not 

been up against China or Russia, or anybody who has got the aircraft to take us one on one. 

And I guess, my concern again is, you know, with due respect, 

you are talking about nation-building. And as we take these cuts, 

I really think we got to focus on making sure that we protect America first because if we don’t protect America first, we can’t do anything to help the men and women in the other countries out there. 

General MASON. Sir, I very much appreciate that. My point 

would be is if you can build stability in a country, the opportunities 

for terrorists to come in and for other agents to create an environment such as in Afghanistan with the Taliban may be less. So I 

think it is directly related to national security, but I understand 

your point. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mason, you used the words ‘‘organic industrial base.’’ 

Just so that we are on the same page, can you tell me what you 

mean when you say ‘‘organic industrial base’’? 

General MASON. Yes, Ma’am. When I talk about the organic industrial base, I am talking about the industrial base that United 

States Army and, of course, the other Services have similar. But 

we have what we call hard-iron depots—Anniston, Red River, depots of that nature. 

We also include our arsenals, which have manufacturing capabilities such as Rock Island Arsenal and Watervliet. Watervliet 

does cannons. Rock Island does a real fine type of metalwork. So 

those are our arsenals and our hard-iron depots where we do rebuild and reset of trucks, tanks, helicopters. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

You also mentioned the fact that, you know, we are teaming up 

with others. And this is because of your experience in the Pacific. 

I don’t think my colleagues are aware of the fact that as far as the 

U.S. Army Pacific that you really have now an Australian general 

in a dominant, quite obvious position for us in Hawaii. 

So can you explain to us what the position of the Australian general is and what he is anticipated to do and participate? Does he 

have full range of participation? 

General MASON. And all of the three perhaps can answer this, 

but he is the deputy commander there so he has all the full responsibilities of a—just as a U.S. general was. And, in fact, I did a 2- 

year exchange in the Australian Army, so I understand it very 

well. In fact, I commanded Australian forces during my tour, so I 

had full rights and responsibilities as a—in that military. So that 

is his role, and I think it is a great partnership. 

As you know, we have Canadian down with Fort Hood, so this 

relationship with some of our greatest allies is very powerful. And 

I think it is a really good thing here in USARPAC. 
31 

Ms. HANABUSA. Do we have any concerns about any kind of confidential information or anything like that, General Huggins? 

General HUGGINS. No, ma’am. There are certainly limits. And we 

typically have an acronym we use for the five eyes for the nations 

that we have the highest level of clearance rate. But we still protect some information. 

But the Australians are great partners. And more importantly, 

it sends a message to all of our Pacific partners the team that is 

trying to be built there because it will be, you know, a multicultural, a multinational solution here. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

General Fountain, one of the things that I have always been curious about is Title 32 and Title 10 interface. And I do understand 

the amount of investment that we have made as a country both in 

the Guard as well as in the Reserve, and it would be a travesty 

to lose that. 

Having said that, however, as far as the Guard is concerned, you 

know, you are the State militia primarily, which means to a certain 

extent, well, maybe not even to a certain extent, technically the 

Governor of the State—of respective States are really your co-commander. 

So as you come before us and you say that we want to ensure 

the continuation of the Guard, there still is this other player out 

there called the Governor, Title 32. 

So have you given any consideration or Generals, yourselves as 

well as to how as you want to maintain, and there is nothing that 

I am necessarily opposed to, but how are you going to do that if 

a Governor, for example, does not cooperate and says, ‘‘We don’t 

want—whatever minimum amount it may cause the State, we don’t 

want that expense.’’ How do you intend to basically get that in line 

with what you want to do? 

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congresswoman. I cannot speak for each 

Governor or the Governors Association, but I would simply say that 

it is a challenge and just as running our democracy is a challenge. 

However, I do believe each Governor is very aware that that capability and capacity that resides within their Title 32 Army National Guard and Air National Guard, for that matter, is developed 

through our relationship with our Title 10 services. And those Title 

10 services man, train, and equip to fight and win America’s wars. 

But that capability and capacity is leveraged by the Governors and 

their adjutant generals to support that State, regional, and in some 

instances, national mission set here in the homeland. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So we would be—we will be on—I mean, I would 

be correct. If I were to say that if, for example, the Army decided 

that it didn’t want the level of participation that you have now that 

they probably would be very little for them to—for a Governor to 

leverage under your scenario. 

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congresswoman. 

The Army Total Force Policy is something that all three components are committed to. And we believe that the Army Total Force 

Policy is essential to us remaining in the operational force. So provided resources are available to continue to maintain those hardfought gains, I believe that we will continue to be that equitable 
32 

partner, and the Army will continue to leverage us for those areas 

where we are very skilled in our contribution to the total Army. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa. 

And with that, if there are no other questions to come before our 

witnesses we will adjourn the Subcommittee on Readiness for the 

House Armed Services Committee. 

[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 16, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 16, 2013 

(37) 

Statement of Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness 

Hearing on 

The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Army 

April 16, 2013 

Welcome to this afternoon’s hearing. I would like to thank our 

panel of experts for being here today to address the readiness posture of the United States Army. 

Over the past 12 years, the Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve— 

has deployed more than 1.1 million soldiers to combat with more 

than 4,500 giving the last full measure of devotion for this country. 

More than 32,000 soldiers have been wounded—9,000 requiring 

long-term care. In that time, soldiers have earned more than 

14,000 awards for valor to include 7 Medals of Honor and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses. 

The Army’s contributions to our national security have been numerous and continue around the world today. This hearing comes 

at a time of strategic inflection for the Army. 

After more than a decade of protracted counterinsurgency operations and cyclic combat operations in Middle East, the Army must 

find a way to return to full-spectrum operations, reset and reconstitute the force, responsibly draw down operations in Afghanistan, 

and fully develop its role under the new Defense Strategic Guidance. 

The Army must find a way to do all this under a tightening 

budget and the compounding challenges of sequestration, continuing fiscal challenges in Afghanistan, and do so with a smaller 

force. 

To discuss how the Army plans to meet the challenges of tomorrow in this austere budgetary environment, we have with us this 

afternoon: • Lieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; • Lieutenant General Raymond V. Mason, the Army’s Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics; • Major General Luis R. Visot, the Deputy Commanding General for Operations for the U.S. Army Reserve; and • Brigadier General Walter E. Fountain, the Acting Deputy 

Director of the U.S. Army National Guard. 

Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here today. I appreciated your thoughtful statements and your insights into our 

Nation’s Army. 

General Huggins, General Fountain, and General Visot, I understand that for each of you this is your first time testifying before 
38 

the Armed Services Committee, welcome. General Mason, welcome 

back. 

Last year this subcommittee spent a great deal of time exploring 

our current state of readiness and discussing how we remain prepared to meet the challenges we are likely to face in the future. 

Time and time again, we heard of a force that was described as 

being ‘‘on the ragged edge.’’ Today we again explore readiness, this 

time, in the context of how the Army is reshaping itself to be ready 

for the future conflicts of the 21st century. 

The Administration continues to argue that we can afford a 

smaller force with a smaller Army—an Army with less capacity, so 

long as we have a more capable one. 

To enable a skilled, superior Army, one that can meet the Nation’s needs and respond to a wide range of threats, will require 

timely, thoughtful, and targeted investments. 

The Army must spend every dollar wisely as it seeks to remain 

ready. Anything less would result in far-reaching and long-lasting 

implications for the Army and for this Nation. 

Congress has a responsibility and constitutional duty to train 

and equip our soldiers—to ensure they are ready for the job we 

have asked them to do. I look forward to learning about what investments in readiness you are making and how the Army plans 

to meet its mission in these challenging times. 
39 

STATEMENT OF 

LTG JAMES L. HUGGINS, JR 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

And 

LTG RAYMOND V. MASON 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

And 

MG LUIS R. VISOT 

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL- OPERATIONS 

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

FIRST SESSION, 113 TH CONGRESS 

ON 

THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

16 APRIL 2013 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
40 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today on total Army readiness with my fellow 

panel members. 

America's Army remains at war and has been in a state of continuous war for the 

past twelve years, the longest in our nation's history. More than 167,000 Soldiers are 

deployed or forward stationed in nearly 160 countries worldwide. We serve as a total 

Army--Active, Army Reserve and National Guard-and deploy as a joint and combined 

force, serving side by side with Marines, Airmen and Sailors and coalition partners, all 

working to achieve one goal: to fight and win our nation's wars. After more than a 

decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the nation and our Army are in a period of 

transition, a turning point characterized by a fiscally constrained environment and a 

global security environment that is more complex and uncertain than at any time since 

the end of World War II, pointing to further instability. The Army remains a key guardian 

of our national security. Our ability to provide a trained, ready and capable force to fulfill 

global commitments and mission requirements is predicated upon continued investment 

in readiness. 

Current Readiness 

The Total Army (Active, Reserve and National Guard) conducts missions 

worldwide in support of national security objectives, as well as within the United States 

in support of civil authorities. This force provides the foundation for global security 

posture by engaging partners and dissuading adversaries. As the demands for Army 

forces in Afghanistan will continue to decrease, the requirement for strategic landpower 

capable of worldwide deployment will endure. 

The Army's Active, Reserve and National Guard Soldiers are currently 

committed to operations around the world - in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Philippines, 

Horn of Africa, Turkey, Sinai Peninsula and throughout the Middle East. The Army's 

ability to perform these vital missions is at risk due to sequestration, budget uncertainty 

and shortfalls in Overseas Contingency Operations funding. We cannot afford to allow 

the Total Army to fall behind in readiness or modernization; we must place our Soldiers 

in position for success by giving them the best leaders, training and equipment that the 
41 

Nation can afford, We must providing combatant commanders the most capable 

Soldiers and units possible to execute our national security goals, In other words, 

investment in our readiness is a strategic necessity, History has proven that we cannot 

narrowly define the conditions for which our Army must be ready, The nation has paid a 

heavy price for its historic pattern of unpreparedness at the start of major conflicts; 

therefore, we must be prepared now and in the future to dominate across the entire 

spectrum of conflict Failure to do so can result in a "hollow" Army, dangerously unable 

to protect the nation's interests, placing our national security at risk and threatening the 

readiness of our Soldiers, No level of risk is acceptable if it threatens the ability of our 

Soldiers to fight and survive in combat 

Maintaining an Army capable of performing its vital role of winning the 

nation's wars in an environment of budgetary uncertainty translates into significant 

readiness issues over the next several years for our military and civilian populations, 

The nation cannot afford to give up the readiness achieved since the events of 

September 11th, The Army faces dramatic cuts to its personnel, force structure and 

modernization programs, For the past twelve years, we have relied heavily on a 

combination of Active, Reserve and National Guard capabilities, Every year, an 

average of 24,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized and seamlessly 

integrated to support the total force, In addition, more than fifty percent of the National 

Guard Soldiers are veterans of a deployment, many having served multiple tours just as 

their active counterparts, Total force operational proficiency is inextricably linked to our 

operational Army Reserve and National Guard readiness, The Army Reserve and Army 

National Guard each have distinct roles and legal authorities and we be believe 

maintaining these forces ensures the Total Army is well postured to meet both domestic 

and overseas mission requirements, Again, sequestration will tremendously impact the 

Total Army's ability to fulfill the goals and objectives outlined in both the National 

Security Strategy and Defense Strategic Guidance and Priorities, 

The Army is committed to balancing the current demands with a realistic strategy 

that ensures America's dominance in military operations remains unchallenged and that 

our forces remain ready and relevant ConSidering that the Total Army currently 

supports operations in approximately 160 countries around the world, the importance of 
42 

managing and mitigating these impacts and risks to readiness based on our 

responsibilities to execute current military strategy objectives is critical. 

The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army remain committed 

to winning the current fight, sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, preparing trained and 

ready forces for a full range of operations and increasing future force capabilities based 

upon lessons learned from 12 years of war. To prepare for operations in a postwar 

environment based upon the current fiscal constraints, the Secretary of the Army and 

the CSA outlined steps they must take to reduce expenditures while mitigating risk to 

readiness. 

Ready and Available Forces. 

Future Force Generation. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) puts the Army 

on a rotational readiness cycle which enabled us to provide cohesive units to combatant 

commanders for enduring missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. ARFORGEN provides the 

mechanism to adjust training, equipping and manning of our units to meet the 

requirements of persistent conflict. Lessons learned from more than 12 years of war 

demonstrate the need for a force generation cycle built on a demand-based model 

rather than a supply-based model; we are in the final stages of developing a new 

Future Force Generation model that will realign our institutional systems to support this 

goal. However, the efficiency gained by the new model which will prioritize training for 

decisive action with a focus on combined arms maneuver and wide area security, will 

not solve all the problems that falling under certain budget levels will create. Future 

Force Generation will allow the Army to apply scarce resources and project 

manpower at the correct time and place to minimize risk, ensure readiness, 

specifically identifying those capabilities critical to meeting the National Military 

Strategy, allowing us to project steady-state requirements while retaining the 

capability and flexibility to surge for the most stressing war plan. The Army will focus 

resources only on those units deployed, deploying or with critical contingency response 

missions. The gap in readiness will be for those units associated with contingency 
43 

response to missions outside of the annual priorities identified by the joint staff with an 

acceptable level of risk for the nation. 

Regionally Aligned Forces. Maintaining an Army capable of winning the 

nation's wars, even in an environment of budgetary uncertainty and reduced 

resources, is critical. To be more responsive to all combatant commanders and better 

enable our joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners, the Army is 

regionally-aligning its forces to provide rapidly deployable, tailored capabilities that are 

consistently available for all requirements. Regionally Aligned Forces are the Total 

Army Force. Regional alignment leverages the critical partnership and unique skills 

of the Army Reserve and National Guard, in combination with the ready capabilities 

of the Active Component. To assist in planning support for regionally-aligned 

missions, the Army Reserve is creating Army Reserve Engagement Cells at the 

Army Service Component Command. These cells will deliver critical planning and 

support, ensuring the unique combat support and combat service support 

capabilities of the Army Reserve are maintained and used. 

Operational missions, operations support, theater security cooperation 

activities and bilateral and multilateral exercises are at risk due to the baseline 

training that focuses on combined arms maneuver and wide-area security which 

requires developing language skills, regional expertise and cultural training necessary 

for Soldiers to operate in combatant commanders' areas of responsibility. This training, 

which includes joint exercises and operations with partners and allies, is paramount to 

the CSA's vision of the Army's role in protecting American interests at home and 

abroad. Soldiers who receive regionally-specific training and equipment and 

participate in regionally-focused missions will contribute to the shaping of their 

regional security environments with much greater effectiveness. Adequate 

resources are required to ensure that as missions evolve and new threats emerge, 

aligned forces are trained, ready and tailored to support the mission as necessary. 

Training Readiness. The changed conditions of warfare necessitate that we 

can no longer accept increased levels of risk in how we train and prepare for war. 
44 

Training and leader development are focused on three strategic ends: training units to 

be versatile and ready to support combatant commanders worldwide; developing 

leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st Century; and holding commanders 

responsible for progressive and realistic training, guided by the doctrine of mission 

command. The Chief of Staff of the Army's immediate priority is to ensure Soldiers in 

Afghanistan and those next to deploy are trained and ready. Training for operational 

adaptability will take place at home station, combat training centers, in Army institutions 

and while deployed. Army leaders must recognize that there are no predetermined 

solutions to problems, so training and leader development must continue to foster 

creativity at every level. The Army's Force Generation process is central to future 

training readiness. The Army Reserve and National Guard will remain on a 60-month 

process, providing a cost-effective progressive readiness model. The Active Army 

Force Generation process is changing from a 36-month to a 24-month process leading 

the Army to change the timelines for conducting training. 

The Army is also revitalizing home station training and the training management 

skills of commanders so they will be more effective and efficient in preparing units and 

Soldiers for the future. Similar to the pre-9/11 Army, our ability to execute demanding 

home station training will provide the strategic depth necessary for the Nation to 

respond to unforeseen contingencies. 

This is essential given that non-deploying units will face the most direct impact of 

reduced resources. The Army will continue to prioritize efforts to maintain readiness 

across non-deployed forces according to the Secretary of Defense's Strategic Planning 

Guidance against these known requirements: Homeland Defense (HLD) units; 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) units; Korean forward deployed units; the global 

response force (GRF); and other combatant command contingency response forces. 

Immediately and most profoundly, the vast majority of non-deploying Army units will 

train less often and to a lower level of proficiency. In addition, the Army may curtail the 

training of critical enablers, skills and functions. Some examples of the current effects 

of resource reductions on the Army's individual and collective training are: 
45 

• Curtailing training for 78% of all non-deploying or non-forward stationed units 

• Cancelling five Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Brigade Warfighter 

Exercises (WFXs), and one Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Exercise 

Our inability to train non-deploying units will degrade our units' readiness posture and 

reduce the progressive build of unit capability to meet early FY14 missions, emerging 

requirements and timelines associated with Combatant Commander war plans. These 

examples illustrate how curtailing training will impact our units' basic warfighting skills 

and create shortfalls across critical specialties including aviation, intelligence and 

engineering. Training shortfalls will also impact our ability to recruit new Soldiers into 

the Army. 

Sequestration will have significant short and long term impacts on instructional 

capability, institutional training and certifications as a result of civilian furloughs. The 

impact will be felt across all 32 Army Schools organized under eight Centers of 

Excellence managed by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the 18 NonTRADOC Schools that execute branch specific training (Special Warfare, Medical and 

Judge Advocate General), component specific training (U.S. Army Reserve and Army 

National Guard), and specialty schools (Inspector General, Corps of Engineers, School 

of Music, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, etc.). Annually, these 

centers and schools train approximately 500,000 Soldiers, Civilians and other service 

members in initial military skill training, professional military education and functional 

duty specific training, to include Ranger and airbome qualification. The majority of 

these schools use Department of the Army (DA) Civilians as instructors; their absence 

one day a week will require training institutions to implement less than optimal 

alternatives. These alternatives include, but are not limited to, filling the instructional 

shortfall with part time contractors, extending the program of instruction time period and 

creating a student throughput delay/backlog, and/or keeping the program of instruction 

time period as is and accepting risk in training standards. 

Moreover, sequestration will be noted in the Army Reserve through degraded 

training support systems, range operations and airfield operations capabilities, again 

due to civilian furloughs, requiring the Army to borrow qualified military manpower to 
46 

replace DA Civilian shortfalls. Some of these training support capabilities include the 

expanded use and increased maintenance of simulators (flight and ground vehicle, 

weapon, tactical), distributed leaming facilities, and training aids, devices and 

simulations. For the Army Reserve, lack of funding will make it difficult to maintain 

Depot Maintenance initiatives; more than 40% of ARFORGEN-critical equipment, and 

disaster relief and Homeland Defense missions will be negatively impacted as 

equipment may not be repaired. Reductions in the Army Reserve Sustainment, 

Restoration and Modemization (SRM) resources may lead to subsystem failures, further 

impacting Army Reserve facility readiness in support of Soldier training. 

Another negative effect will be degraded administrative support in the areas of 

resource management, quality assurance and course program management, potentially 

causing a disruption to student services. Incremental funding of Mission Command 

Training contracts will reduce workforce available to support units' preparations for 

future training exercises with furloughs further limiting civilian availability to offset 

reductions. 

Sustaining Readiness. 

Ready and Resilient. The Ready and Resilient Campaign is designed to guide 

the Army's efforts in building and maintaining resilience across the Total Army- Soldiers, 

Family Members and Army Civilians, improving unit readiness and further reinforcing 

the Army Profession. Commanders are ultimately responsible for Soldier resilience and 

unit readiness. Leaders at all levels must understand that high standards of 

professionalism and discipline represent readiness within their formations. The 

campaign reinforces leadership at the first line supervisor-level. Leaders are 

empowered and enabled to enforce standards of professionalism and discipline, and 

they are held accountable for maintaining and improving resilience and readiness within 

their formations. Incorporating resilience as a critical component in determining Soldier 

and unit readiness, emphasizing the importance of physical, psychological, and 

emotional factors in determining comprehensive fitness, and promoting a deliberate 

approach to building and sustaining resilience. 
47 

Retrograde. We have the policies, authorities, and processes in place to 

support the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan and maintain operational 

flexibility. The operational campaign plan drives the pace of retrograde operations. Up 

to this point, the Army is successfully retrograding equipment from Afghanistan while 

concurrently conducting combat operations. Our goal remains to have all non-enduring 

equipment out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Supporting CENTCOM retrograde 

goals will cause us to take risks in other Army accounts. One cost driver is that multimodal (air lift out of Afghanistan) is currently the primary means to retrograde 

equipment from Afghanistan because the Northern Distribution Network (NON) and the 

Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC) modes continue to progressing 

slowly. Surface lines of communication (NDN/PAKGLOC) are critical to achieving the 

retrograde volume necessary to meet timelines and decrease costs. The Army plans to 

retrograde approximately $20 billion worth of Army equipment to meet future 

requirements and improve Equipment on Hand Readiness across the Total Army. 

Reset. Reset funding must continue as long as we have forces deployed and for 

three years after the last piece of equipment leaves Afghanistan to ensure readiness for 

future missions. A fully-funded Reset program ensures that battle damaged equipment 

is replaced and equipment worn-out by prolonged use in harsh environments is returned 

to a fully ready state commensurate with a unit's future mission. In the forecast for 

FY13, the Army expects to Reset (repair) approximately 100,000 items at its industrial 

facilities, and more than 600,000 pieces of equipment on site where units are stationed 

(including more than 400 aircraft). However, sequestration will cause us to defer some 

of these requirements to future fiscal years, immediately impacting equipment 

readiness. Equipment Reset is a vital means for maintaining Army equipment 

readiness in order to sustain a force that can meet our National Military Strategy. Since 

its inception, the Reset Program has improved the condition and readiness levels of 

Army ground and air systems. A conSistently, fully-funded Reset program enabled the 

Army to maintain operational readiness of equipment at more than 90% and 75% for 

ground and aviation, respectively, in theater. 
48 

Modernization. As the Army prepares for another drawdown after more than 12 

years of war, budget impacts and reduction in forces will negatively impact continued 

modernization of combat systems. The majority of our combat systems are legacy 

platforms tied to the fundamental design and technical constraints from the 1980s. 

While modernization actions have lengthened service life and added capabilities, the 

operational utilization rates, such as miles driven and hours flown, have continued to 

soar due to combat operations, well beyond the anticipated service life of the system. 

The length of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly degraded equipment and the 

Army must continue to Reset and modernize vehicles, weapons systems and aircraft for 

future contingencies. For example, the Army Reserve has 86% of its needed 

equipment but only 65% has been modernized. The equipment readiness lessons 

learned from the Vietnam War, a time when the Army's vehicles, weapons systems and 

aircraft readiness levels were unsatisfactorily low, are informative to our current 

situation. 

Army Organic Industrial Base. The current fiscal uncertainty could drastically 

impact our strategy and threaten our requirement for an Army Organic Industrial Base 

that is a modern, reliable, cost effective, and highly responsive to meet both wartime 

and peacetime requirements, while maintaining the ability to surge during rapidly 

developing contingency operations. During times of war, the Army requires the Organic 

Industrial Base to repair and manufacture equipment as quickly and efficiently as 

possible to ensure it is available to train and support next deployers, as well as those 

deployed over the past decade. The Army's Organic Industrial Base Depots and 

Arsenals surged to double capacity, and in some cases, tripled their pre-war output. As 

the Army's Organic Industrial Base transitions from wartime production to peacetime 

requirements, we must ensure it remains effective, efficient, and capable of meeting 

current and future Army contingency requirements. A reasonable predictable funding 

program is critical to the health and readiness of our Organic Industrial Base 
49 

Closing. 

The Total Army must always be capable of providing strategic landpower that 

can prevent conflict, shape the environment and win the Nation's wars. The security of 

our nation is the result of the committed, experienced, well-led professional force of men 

and women who come from every corner of the United States to serve and protect this 

great country. In their service to the nation, our Soldiers have never failed to meet any 

demand that the nation has asked and expected. Therefore, the nation and our Army 

must never accept the risk of unprepared, untrained leaders and Soldiers because that 

risk will be paid for in the lives of our men and women. Now more than ever, Soldiers 

who willingly sacrifice for this great Nation, tour after tour, need the steadfast and loyal 

support of the American people and Congress to sustain our readiness, prepare our 

force for current and future contingencies, Reset the force and ensure we continue to 

modernize and transform equipment, and most importantly, fulfill our commitment to 

Army Families. The Army understands the Nation's fiscal constraints and we assure 

you that we will be good stewards of the resources given to us to prepare trained and 

ready forces for the future. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Thank you 

again for the opportunity to speak here today. It is an honor to serve our great nation. 
50 

Lieutenant General Jim Huggins 

Lieutenant General James l. Huggins, Jr., was commissioned as a 

second lieutenant of Infantry through ROTC in 1980. His military education includes the Infantry 

Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms Staff Service School, United States Army 

Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and the United States Army War College. 

He holds a Masters Degree from Central Michigan University. 

Lieutenant General Huggins has commanded airborne infantry units at the company, battalion, 

brigade, and division levels. His service as a staff officer includes tours as an S3/G3 Operations 

officer at battalion, brigade, and division levels. Following brigade command in Operation Enduring 

Freedom, he served as the Chief of Staff, 82nd Airborne Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and 

Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg and the Multi-National Corps- Iraq, and Deputy 

Commanding General (Maneuver) 3rd Infantry Division during the Operation Iraqi Freedom surge, 

LTG Huggins then served as Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Washington. DC. In August 2010 he assumed command of the 82nd Airborne 

Division and led CJTF 82 & Regional Command-South in Operation Enduring Freedom until 

September 2012. LTG Huggins has been afforded many unique professional experiences and 

opportunities to include tours with the 3rd and 25th Infantry Divisions, PACOM, 82nd Airborne 

Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, as well as two operational deployments and seven combat tours in 

OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI 

FREEDOM tours. On 8 March 2013, LTG Huggins assumed duties as the HQDA G-3/5/7. 
51 

United States Army 

Lieutenant General 

RA YMOND V. MASON 

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 

United States Army 

500 Army Pentagon 1E394 

Washington, DC 20310-0500 

Since: July 2011 

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC 

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES 

James Madison University BA - Commercial Marketing and Merchandising 

Florida Institute of Technology - MS - Procurement/Contract Management 

National Defense University MS - National Resource Strategy 

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED 

Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses 

United States Army Command and General Staff Collcge 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded 

PROMOTIONS 

2LT 

lLT 

CPT 

MAJ 

LTC 

COL 

BG 

MG 

LTG 

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 

16 Dec 78 

ASSIGNMENT 

16 Dcc 80 

I Oct 82 

1 Oct 90 

1 Mar 95 

1 Jun 00 

I Jan 05 

16 May 08 

1 Sep 11 

Jun 79 Sep 80 Supply Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, Headquarters and A Company, 205th 

Transportation Battalion (A VIM), 3d Corps Support Command, V Corps, United States Army 

Europe and Seventh Anny, Germany 

Sep 80 Jun 81 Supply Platoon Leader, 699th Maintenance Company, 85th Maintenance Battalion, 3d Corps 

Support Command, V Corps, United States Anny Europe and Seventh Army, Germany 

.lui 81 Oct 82 Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 3d Corps Support Command, V Corps, United 

States Army Europe and Seventh Anny, Gennany 

Nov82 Jul 83 Student, Quartennaster Officer Advanced Course, United States Anny Quartermaster School, 

Fort Lee, Virginia 
52 

Aug83 Jul 86 

Aug86 Dec86 

Dec 86 Jun 87 

Jun 87 Jun 89 

Jul 89 Jun 90 

Jun 90Jun 91 

Jun 91 May92 

Jun 92 Jun 93 

Jul 93 Jun 95 

Jul 95 Jun 96 

Jul 96Jun 98 

Aug 98 Jun 99 

Jun 99 Jun 00 

Jun 00 Jul 02 

Jul 02 Sep 03 

Sep 03 Sep 05 

Oct 05 Oct 06 

Oct 060ct 07 

Oct 07 Aug 09 

Aug 09 .luI 11 

J ul II Present 

Assistant S-3 (Plans and Operations), Division Support Command, later Commander, E 

Company (Rigger), 407th Supply and Services Battalion, later Plans Officer, G-4 (Logistics), 

82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and OPERATION URGENT FURY, 

Grenada 

Student, United States Army Logistics Management College, Fort Lee, Virginia 

Student, Florida Institute of Technology, United States Army Logistics Management Ccnter, 

Fort Lee, Virginia 

Exchange Officer, Australian Army, with duty as Commander, Supply Services Company, 21st 

Supply Battalion (Australian Army), Canberra, Australia 

Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Chief, Officer Branch, Office of the Quartermaster General, United States Army Quartermaster 

Center and School, Fort Lee, Virginia 

Aide-dc-Camp to the Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command, 

Alexandria, Virginia 

Support Operations Officer, 702d Main Support Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United 

States Army, Korea 

Speeehwriter, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, 

Washington, DC 

Executive Officer, Division Support Command, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina 

Commandcr, 407th Forward Support Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina 

Student, Industrial College oflhe Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 

Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, Washington, 

DC 

Commander, Division Support Command, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, 

Hawaii 

Deputy Director, J-4, 1he Joint Staff, Washington, DC 

Commander, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, Defensc Logistics Agency, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania 

Deputy Commander, United States Army Field Support Command with duty as Commanding 

General, Army Materiel Command Forward-Southwest AsialC-4, Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, Kuwait 

Commanding General, 19th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Eighth United States 

Army, Korea 

Commanding General, 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii 

Deputy Chief of Staff. G-4, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia 

Assistant Deputy Chicf of Staff~ G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS DATE GRADE 

Colonel 

Colonel/Brigadier 

General 

Deputy Director, 1-4, The loint Staff, Washington, DC lui 02 Scp 03 

Commander, Defcnse Supply Center Philadelphia, Defense Logistics Agency, Sep 03 - Sep 05 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ASSIGNMENTS DATE 

Deputy Commander, United States Army Field Support Command with duty Oct 05 - Oct 06 

as Commanding General, Army Materiel Command Forward-Southwest 

Asia/C-4, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Kuwait 

GRADE 

Brigadier General 
53 

MAJOR GENERAL LUIS visor 

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL - OPERATIONS 

Major General Luis R. Viso! assumed the responsibilities of Deputy Commanding General (Operations) June 9, 

2012. As Deputy Commanding General (Operations), MG Visot provides oversight of the 16 Army Reserve 

Operational and Functional Commands. 

MG Visot, born in Ponce, Puerto Rico, was commissioned as a 2L T in May 1978. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in 

Spanish from Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI and a Masters in Education from the University of Georgia in 

Athens, GA. MG Visot received a Masters in Strategic Studies from the United States Army War College. His 

military education includes: Infantry Airborne Basic Course, Quartermaster Officer Basic Course, NBC Defense 

Course, Transportation Officer Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College, the Associate Logistics 

Executive Development Course, the United States Army War College, the Advanced Joint Military Professional 

Education (AJPME), the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, and CAPSTONE. 

MG Visot has held a variety of command and staff positions. MG Visot assumed command of the 377th Theater 

Sustainment Command, New Orleans, LA, on May 16, 2009. Prior to this assignment, MG Visot served as the 

Commanding General, 4th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), San Antonio, TX. MG Visot served as the Deputy 

Commander, 1 st Theater Sustainment Command, Ft. Bragg, NC and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(2007-2008). MG Visot has served as Commander, 3rd Transportation Command Element in Anniston, AL; Chief of 

Staff for the 143rd Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in Orlando, FL; and Commander, 32nd Transportation 

Group (Composite) in Tampa, FL. As Commander, 32nd Transportation Group (Composite), MG Visot deployed his 

unit in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to Kuwait and Iraq in 2003-2004. MG Viso!'s previous assignments 

include Commander, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) at Ft. Eustis, VA under the 7th Transportation Group 

(Composite), as part of the Battalion Command Exchange/Integration Program; Commander, 3-347th Regiment, 2nd 

Brigade, 87th Division (Training Support); and Commander, 146th Transportation Detachment (Air Terminal 

Movement Control Team) in Orlando, FL. As Commander, 146th Transportation Detachment (Air Terminal 

Movement Control Team), MG Visot deployed his unit in support of Operation Joint Endeavor to Taszar, Hungary and 

Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-1991), he served as the 32nd Transportation 

Group Liaison Officer to 22nd Support Command in the Logistical Operations Center and as a Logistical Planning 

and Analysis Cell Analyst, 22nd Support Command, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 

MG Viso!'s awards/decorations include: Army Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with 

oak leaf cluster, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service medal with silver and bronze oak leaf 

clusters, Army Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Army Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters, 

Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal with silver oak leaf cluster, National Defense Service Medal, Armed 

Forces Expeditionary Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Service 

Stars, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Armed Forces Service 

Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Service Medal with Bronze Hourglass, "M" and "3" devices, Army Service Ribbon, 

Army Overseas Service Ribbon, Army Reserve Components Overseas Training Ribbon with "4" devices, NATO 

Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait), 

Meritorious Unit Citation, and Parachutist Badge. 

MG Visot is married to Dr. Cindy S. Visot, who is the Chief of Staff and the Director of Board of Trustees Operations 

at the University of South Florida. 
54 

STATEMENT BY 

BRIGADIER GENERAL WALTER E. FOUNTAIN 

ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

FIRST SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS 

ON 

ARMY READINESS 

APRIL 16, 2013 

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION 

UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
55 

Opening Remarks 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, members of the 

subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today, representing 

the over 355,000 Soldiers in the Army National Guard, induding 23,000 

members currently mobilized at multiple locations around the world 

defending our national interests. For 376 years Citizen Soldiers have 

been central to how the nation defends itself at home and abroad. 

Through resolve and readiness, Army National Guard Soldiers deliver 

essential value to our nation and its communities. 

The Army National Guard of 2013 is the best-manned, besttrained, best-equipped, best-led and most experienced force in its long 

history. This is a direct result of the resourcing and legal authorities that 

Congress has dedicated to this purpose over the past decade-plus of 

conflict. The Army Guard has used those resources wisely, and is today 

an operational force that provides capabilities and strategic depth to 

meet U.S. defense and homeland security requirements. On the 

domestic front, in fiscal year 2012 Army Guard members served over 

447,000 duty days under the control of the states responding to 

domestic emergencies - and that was, historically, a slow year. This 

current fiscal year (FY), which began with Hurricane Sandy, will likely 

post far higher numbers. 

The bedrock of an operational force - a force that is actively 

engaged and is postured for employment at home and abroad whenever 

1 
56 

called - is ready Soldiers. In order to ensure that Army National Guard 

Soldiers are ready, they must have effective training, modern equipment 

and capable facilities. They must also be physically ready for service, 

and be present in sufficient numbers to support the wide range of 

missions the Army National Guard is called to perform. Without these 

key elements, the nation's substantial investment in an operational Army 

National Guard, built at great expense in blood, sweat and treasure over 

a decade of conflict, will surely atrophy. 

Personnel Readiness 

One persistent false impression is that the Army National Guard is 

a "tired force" whose Soldiers, families and employers are worn out from 

the strain of more than a decade of conflict. No doubt, there has been 

strain. However, the Guard's Soldiers continue to show a strong appetite 

for service, and the Guard's appeal as a winning team that embodies 

selfless service to both nation and community continues to draw 

America's youth to its ranks. The Army National Guard recruitment rate 

is 102 percent of goal, while the retention rate stands at over 94 percent 

of goal (as of March 31, 2013). Every member of the Army Guard has 

made a conscious decision to join or continue to serve since September 

11, 2001. This is a key point, as today's Guard differs from that of the 

pre-9/ 11 period in that today's Soldiers anticipate being deployed home 

and abroad in service to their country. 

2 
57 

Indeed, nearly 50 percent of the Soldiers in the Army Guard today 

are veterans of a deployment, many having served multiple tours. 

Retaining this core of experience is critical to maintaining an operational 

force, and this year and the next present a particular challenge as the 

large cohort of Soldiers that grew the Army National Guard in 2007-8 

becomes eligible for re-enlistment. While bonuses and incentives play an 

important role in deciding to stay in the Guard, the desire for relevant 

training and utilization at home and abroad drew many of these men and 

women to enlist in the first place, and will playa role in their decisions to 

stay. A key component of the operational Army National Guard is that it 

is a force that sees regular use, through a progressive readiness model -

such as Army Force Generation - that prepares Soldiers and units for 

deployment every five years. This gives Soldiers, their families and 

civilian employers the predictability they need to plan their civilian lives 

and careers, while developing critical military skills exercised through 

tough, realistic training and operational employment. 

The Army National Guard provides a balanced range of essential 

capabilities through our current end strength of 358,200. We are 

planning on reducing our end strength to 354,200 by the end of FY 

2014. This end strength supports a force structure which consists of 40 

percent combat maneuver forces, 24 percent support forces, 25 percent 

sustainment forces, and 11 percent generating forces. At the current 

level of manning, this balanced force provides an optimal set of dual-use 

3 
58 

capabilities for supporting overseas contingency operations as well as 

concurrent state/territory requirements for Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities (DSCA). 

It is these comprehensive and complementary capabilities - of 

combat maneuver, support, sustainment and generating forces that keep 

the Army National Guard as a viable operational force. 

Individual Soldier medical readiness is critical to build and 

maintain a ready and relevant operational force. The Guard has made 

great strides in leveraging leadership, best practices, and innovation to 

build efficiencies in how we use our funding and to improve the accuracy 

in how we account for each Soldier in order to increase medical readiness 

and manage the non-deployable force. Only 41 percent of Army National 

Guard Soldiers were considered fully medically ready in 2007; today 79 

percent of the Guard is fully medically ready. That is the highest return 

on your investment and percentage of individual medical readiness ever 

recorded by the Army National Guard. Your continued support is 

essential, as we strive to attain 85 percent or greater medical readiness 

by December 2014. 

Medical readiness extends beyond the physical well-being of 

Soldiers - leadership at all levels must ensure that Soldiers under their 

charge receive the mental healthcare screening and treatment that they 

need. The Army National Guard takes seriously its responsibility to 

ensure that Soldiers are given every resource and opportunity to address 

4 
59 

mental health issues before they manifest into the tragic outcome of a 

suicide or other high-risk behavior. Resources have been dedicated to 

ensuring that each state and territory has a suicide prevention program 

manager, who provides training and oversight on suicide prevention 

matters for Army National Guard units within their states. In addition, 

the Vets4Warriors program has been expanded to ensure that all military 

personnel have nationwide 24/7 access to comprehensive non-clinical 

peer counseling and support services. The Army National Guard also 

works with DoD's Defense Suicide Prevention Office to promote 

awareness of the Military Crisis Line, a service that provides 24/7, 

confidential crisis support to those in the military and their families. The 

professionals at the Military Crisis Line are specially trained and 

experienced in helping Service members and their families of all ages and 

circumstances-from those coping with mental health issues that were 

never addressed to those who are struggling with relationships. They 

provide immediate access to care for those who may be at risk of suicide, 

along with additional follow-up and connection with Service members 

and Veterans to mental health services. 

Additionally, the Army National Guard members have access to the 

expanding Partners in Care program. The program, originally started by 

the Maryland National Guard, leverages faith-based organizations to 

provide counseling, education and mentoring, transportation, and many 

other services to members of the National Guard and their families. It is 

5 
60 

based on the belief that local faith communities can bring hope, offer 

support and continuity of spiritual care, and increase the resilience of 

rural and other dispersed military populations. 

The Army National Guard has also established Master Resilience 

Training Centers at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin and Ft. Custer, Michigan, 

training over 2,800 Master Resilience Trainers and over 7,400 Resilience 

Trainer Assistants, who themselves will provide resilience training at the 

company and platoon level. 

The Army National Guard has uniformed behavioral health officers 

and specialists that drill on the weekends, attend annual training and 

deploy to support Soldiers throughout the ARFORGEN cycle. They can 

provide military-mandated behavioral health screening in support of 

personnel and medical readiness. Because the Guard does not have fulltime behavioral health providers, the Army National Guard has 

resourced 55 contract Directors of Psychological Health to provide 

behavioral health assessments, referrals, and track Army National Guard 

Soldiers as they receive care. 

Suicide prevention, regardless of component, is a challenge for 

leadership. However, due to geographical dispersion and in-person 

contact between Soldiers and leaders being generally limited to drill 

weekends and exercises, it is a greater challenge for Army National 

Guard forces. When Army National Guard Soldiers are not drilling or 

otherwise on duty, suicide prevention support and services are limited. 

6 
61 

Even when Soldiers are participating in inactive duty training, medical 

providers are only allowed to provide care in order to save life, limb or 

eyesight. These factors make identifying and treating potential 

precursors to suicide exceptionally difficult. 

Another challenge facing today's military is sexual assault within 

the ranks. In calendar year 2012, the Army National Guard had 182 

reported sexual assault cases - an increase of 39 reported sexual assault 

cases from the 2011 total. While the exact cause of the increase is 

unknown, we believe that enhanced education, a better understanding of 

the reporting process by Army National Guard Soldiers, and the strict 

confidentiality of the reporting have led to an increase in reporting. It is 

important to note, however, that according to Department of Defense 

data, the majority of sexual assaults continue to go unreported in all 

branches of the armed services. 

There is no question that much more must be done to prevent 

sexual assaults and provide assistance to victims. For this reason, the 

Army National Guard increased awareness amongst senior leaders in 

every State and supported Sexual Harassment/ Assault Response and 

Prevention (SHARP) training initiatives. The Army National Guard 

implemented the SHARP program in all 54 States, Territories, and the 

District of Columbia. Since 2011, more than 1,500 Army National Guard 

Soldiers have been trained in the 80-hour SHARP course. Currently, the 

Army National Guard has 88 of the targeted 108 full time SHARP/Sexual 

7 
62 

Assault Response Coordinators and victim advocates at each State Joint 

Force Headquarters, with the remaining 20 personnel slated to be in 

place September 30,2013. In addition, a National Guard Bureau (NGB)-

level investigation team comprised of Army Criminal Investigation 

Division-trained Judge Advocates was established to provide impartial, 

third party investigative support at the request of State Adjutants 

General. The NGB investigation team provides investigative capability 

and reports back to the State leadership, augmenting state-level 

investigative capabilities. 

Underlying the readiness of Army National Guard Soldiers, 

facilities and equipment is the cadre of full time manning personnel. 

From training Soldiers, to maintaining equipment, to administering 

programs and everything in between - the Soldiers and civilians of the 

Army National Guard full time manning workforce ensures that the Army 

National Guard continues to meet Army and Department of Defense 

standards for readiness. With full time manning levels currently at 72% 

of the 1999 Army-validated requirements, and with temporary full time 

manning levels drawing down as their war-related funding is decreased, 

it is more critical than ever to ensure that the level of full time manning 

remain where it is today. Any further reductions in full time manning 

will not only ensure that the already-stretched force is taxed even 

further, but there is a distinct likelihood that critical activities for normal 

unit operations and continued readiness will be negatively impacted. 

8 
63 

Training Readiness 

Realistic, regular individual and collective unit training is critical to 

ensure that Guard Soldiers are ready to serve in the full spectrum of 

operations, both globally and domestically. Over the last decade, 

Congress has provided substantial resources for enhanced Army 

National Guard training, including the use of realistic (and cost-effective) 

battlefield training simulators, rotations through live individual and 

collective, unit-based training, and providing Army National Guard units 

with rotations through large-scale training exercises. 

However, despite gains in training quality and availability, due to a 

combination of sequestration and the Continuing Resolution Act (CRA), 

units have been significantly challenged to provide adequate funding to 

support all individual training required to achieve required readiness 

levels. Low resource availability has caused the Army National Guard to 

reduce the number of Soldiers that can be sent to schools this fiscal year 

by over 17 percent. Further, state Regional Training Institutes (RTIs) may 

be forced to reduce training seat capacity by nearly 7,000 throughout the 

remainder of FY13. 

In addition to the impact on Army National Guard individual 

Soldier training, budget shortfalls due to sequestration have eroded Army 

National Guard collective training. For instance, sequestration has 

caused the cancellation of the 56th Stryker Brigade's Warfighter staff 

9 
64 

training exercise in March and the 72nd Infantry Brigade's Warfighter 

staff training exercise in May 2013. The 40th Infantry Division 

Warfighter staff training exercise may be cancelled due to lack of 

resources to execute the event. The 33rd IBCT's Joint Readiness 

Training Center rotation in June 2013 and the 48th IBCT's National 

Training Center rotation in September 2013 have been cancelled due to 

current fiscal constraints. The Army National Guard's Exportable 

Combat Training Capability (XCTC) is the primary venue for enabling 

Army National Guard units to meet Platoon level maneuver and live fire 

training requirements at home station in accordance with the Army 

Training Strategy; three brigade-level XCTC rotations are currently at 

risk due to lack of ammunition. While units will still receive a portion of 

their required training, resource reductions will prevent them from 

receiving all the training they require in order to meet the training and 

readiness requirements. 

Just as reductions in training resources have negatively impacted 

readiness, so too has the reduction in the overseas operational use of the 

Army National Guard. In order to maintain levels of readiness that the 

nation expects and has invested in over the past decade-plus, Army 

National Guard Soldiers and units must see regular, predictable use. 

Now that the war in Iraq is over, and the war in Afghanistan is drawing 

to a close, there are fewer opportunities for Army National Guard 

Soldiers to participate in the kinds of missions and exercises that have 

10 
65 

enabled their current levels of readiness. And, due to sequestration, the 

Army has been forced to cancel deployments of Army National Guard 

units for missions they have traditionally performed. 

If the Army National Guard is to maintain the nation's substantial 

investment in its readiness and continue to be a cost-effective option for 

national defense, it must be used in a regular, predictable way. A force 

that is poorly trained and seldom used will be unable to respond with the 

efficacy the nation expects when called upon for the next war, 

contingency or disaster. Through the authority granted by Congress in 

the recent revision of 10 USC 12304(b), the nation's military leaders have 

full flexibility to use Army National Guard Soldiers for regular, 

foreseeable mission requirements. Without high-quality training and 

regular use, today's operational Army National Guard may return to a 

strategic reserve, unable to effectively support the Army's Total Force 

policy. 

Equipment Readiness 

The Army National Guard has received significant investment in its 

equipment over the last few years, increasing Equipment on Hand (EOH), 

Critical Dual-Use (CDU) equipment, and the overall modernization levels 

of equipment. 

The Army's goal is to ensure that Army National Guard units are 

equipped properly with Critical Dual Use (CDU) capabilities to execute 

11 
66 

missions both at home and abroad. The Army's goal is to equip the Army 

National Guard with at least 80 percent of the CDU requirement. 

Overall CDU EOH is at 90 percent of goal, an increase from 86 

percent two years ago and a significant increase from 65 percent at the 

time of the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005. Army National Guard 

EOH for Modified Table of Organization (MTOE) units is currently at 88 

percent of goal (an increase from 85 percent two years ago). Of the 88 

percent EOH for MTOE units, 83 percent is currently at home station 

(not mobilized) and considered available for domestic operations. Of the 

total quantity of EOH, 70 percent is considered modernized, while 18 

percent of the on-hand equipment is not modern. 

While modernization levels overall are good, and within one percent 

of active component levels, there are still areas of concern. The Army 

Guard's UH-60 Blackhawk fleet is the oldest in the Army, and current 

modernization plans have the Army National Guard falling further 

behind. Sixty-five percent of the active Army UH-60 fleet will be digital 

by 2020, at which time the Army National Guard UH-60 fleet will be less 

than 23 percent digitized. By 2025, the active Army will be completely 

digitized, while the Army National Guard will not be fully digitized until 

2036. This ever-widening gap may eventually render a preponderance of 

Army National Guard UH-60s non-deployable for overseas contingency 

operations because of theater-specific restrictions. 

12 
67 

The procurement and fielding of the UH-60M has already been 

delayed. Subsequent delays will result in Army National Guard lagging 

further behind the active component in modernizing the UH-60 fleet. 

And, due to sequestration, induction of UH60As into the UH-60A to L 

remanufacture line will stop in April 2013, further eroding UH-60 

readiness. 

Equipment reset, including field and depot level maintenance, also 

has a significant impact on overall equipment readiness. Currently, the 

Army is developing strategies and plans for the way forward as it copes 

with cuts in maintenance due to sequestration. As it currently stands, 

approximately 1,000 pieces of Army Guard equipment from eight 

brigades and 450 individual units will not enter Automatic Reset 

Induction during FYI3. The brigades impacted hail from Minnesota, 

Oklahoma, Ohio, Hawaii, New York, Missouri, and two from Texas. The 

Army's reset priorities are driven by the readiness requirements of units 

that are next to deploy, the global response force, and forward-deployed 

units. As fewer Army National Guard units deploy, especially given the 

sequestration-driven decision to cancel Army National Guard 

deployments, the equipment reset backlog will certainly increase over 

time. 

Simply stated - equipment procurement, reset and modernization 

equals readiness. Troops without adequate equipment are unable to 

deploy. Plus, equipment that is not able to be maintained once in use 

13 
68 

puts Soldiers and those they are serving in danger. The public depends 

on modern, safe Army National Guard equipment to effect rescues and 

save property during disasters here at home, and Soldiers on the 

battlefield depend on the same equipment to ensure their missions are 

accomplished and they return home safely. Today, the Army National 

Guard has the appropriate mix of CDU EOH to support domestic 

operations, including disaster response and recovery. Continuing to 

maintain investments in equipment modernization, maintenance and 

procurement will be critical to ensuring the Army National Guard is 

ready to respond to any mission or requirement. 

Facilities Readiness 

The Army National Guard has facilities in more than 2,600 

communities nationwide. In many towns and cities these facilities are 

the only military presence, with the Guard serving as the most visible 

link between hometown America and the nation's armed forces. 

Facilities are critical to readiness and support unit administration, 

training, equipment maintenance, and storage. They serve as platforms 

for mobilization during times of war as well as command centers and 

shelters during domestic emergencies. 

While the Army National Guard transformed from a strategic 

reserve to an operational force during more than a decade of 

deployments, many facilities have not been updated in several 

14 
69 

generations. Currently, more than 46 percent of Army Guard readiness 

centers are over 50 years old. Many fail to meet the needs of a 21st 

century operational force, cannot accommodate modern equipment and 

technology, are poorly situated, and are energy inefficient. In some 

facilities, modern equipment cannot fit into old storage and maintenance 

bays. 

At current levels of funding, it will take 154 years for all Army 

National Guard facilities to meet the majority of the wartime/primary 

missions of the units assigned to those facilities. 

Investment in Army National Guard facilities is truly an investment 

in local communities as well as in the Army National Guard. The majority 

of Army National Guard military construction is completed with local 

materials and local construction companies. Military construction funds 

flow directly into the communities in which the facilities are built, and 

many facilities serve as civilian facilities when not in active use by the 

Army National Guard. 

Closing Remarks 

Resources remain the principal reason why the Army National 

Guard is now a ready, operational force and will determine whether it 

stays that way. Resources have allowed the Army Guard to reach its 

authorized end strength levels and retain valued experience in the ranks. 

Resources have permitted the Guard to achieve individual and unit 

proficiency with advanced training devices and simulations, attend Army 

15 
70 

schools, and participate in live and constructive exercises at the Army's 

premier training centers. They have allowed the Guard to surge 

personnel on active duty in order to better prepare units for scheduled 

deployments. They have equipped the Guard to a higher level of 

modernized equipment on hand than at any time in its history. 

As the military enters a period of constrained resources and the 

Services conduct their analysis of the proper mix of active and reserve 

forces needed to accomplish national strategic goals, the Army National 

Guard as an operational force stands as a cost-effective and efficient 

solution to a wide variety of mission sets, and should continue to play an 

integral role in the fabric of our nation's defense. 

16 
71 

National Guard Bureau 

General Officer Management Office, Arlington. VA 

BRIGADIER GENERAL WALTER E. FOUNTAIN 

Support Special Assistant to Director, Army 

National Guard 

Brigadier General Walter E. Fountain is Support 

Special Assistant to the Director, Army National 

Guard. As the Support Special Assistant, he is a 

liaison between the Director and Headquarters, 

Department of the Army leaders as well as 

National Guard Bureau Joint leadership. General 

Fountain represents the Director at a number of 

forums including State level, the National Guard 

Bureau Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, public meetings, presentations and 

conferences. He provides policy recommendations 

to the Director on high priority programs such as 

Recruiting and Retention, Personnel, Logistics, 

Sustainment Restoration and Modernization 

(SRM), Military Construction, Information 

Technology POlicies, Programs and Plans, Military 

Construction, Suicide Prevention, Morale, Welfare 

and Recreation and Equipping of the National Guard's 350,000 Citizen-Soldiers serving in 54 

states and territories. 

General Fountain was commissioned in 1981 through the Federal Officer Candidate School. 

In previous assignments, he has served as the Director, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Operations, Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma National Guard; Chief, National Guard 

Affairs in Iraq; Commander, 90th Troop Command, Oklahoma Army National Guard; and 

Assistant Adjutant General - Army, Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma National Guard. 

General Fountain has commanded at the company, battalion and brigade level. 

EDUCATION: 

1996 T. A. Edison State College, Bachelor of Science, Applied Sciences, Trenton, New 
72 

Jersey 

1998 Oklahoma State University, Master of Science, Natural and Applied Science, Stillwater, 

Oklahoma 

2002 United States Army War College, by correspondence 

2002 United States Army War College, Master of Strategic Studies, by correspondence 

2003 Joint Air Command and Control Course, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 

2006 Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, National Defense 

University, Norfolk, Virginia 

2011 Joint Task Force Commanders Course, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado 

2012 Level IV Antiterrorism Executive Seminar, Arlington, Virginia 

2012 General Officer/Senior Executive Service Force Integration Course, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

2012 Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, National Security Management 

Course, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York 

2013 George C. Marshall Center Senior Executive Seminar, Central Asia After ISAF 

Transition: Regional Challenges and Cooperative Responses, Garmisch, Germany 

ASSIGNMENTS: 

1. December 1981 - November 1982, Platoon Leader, Detachment 1, Company A, 1st 

Battalion 179th Infantry, Fairfax, Oklahoma 

2. November 1982 - July 1983, Student, Rotary Wing Aviation Course, Fort Rucker, Alabama 

3. July 1983 - March 1986, Pilot, Detachment 2, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

45th Infantry Brigade, Lexington, Oklahoma 

4. April 1986 - September 1987, Section Commander, Detachment 1, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 45th Infantry Brigade, Lexington, Oklahoma 

5. September 1987 - February 1989, S-1, Troop Command (Aviation), Lexington, Oklahoma 

6. February 1989 - September 1991, Platoon Leader, Company B, 1st Battalion 245th 

Aviation, Lexington, Oklahoma 

7. October 1991 - September 1994, Commander, Company C, 1st Battalion 245th Aviation, 

Lexington, Oklahoma 

8. September 1994 - August 1996, Airfield Commander, Headquarters, State Area Command, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

9. September 1996 - August 1997, Commander, Army Aviation Support Facility, 

Headquarters, State Area Command, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

10. September 1997 - August 2001, S-3 (Air), Headquarters, State Area Command, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

11. September 2001 - August 2003, Commander, 1st Battalion, 245th Aviation, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma 

12. September 2003 - June 2005, Commander, 90th Troop Command, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma 

13. July 2005 - November 2008, Director, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 

Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

14. November 2008 - June 2009, Chief, National Guard Affairs, MUlti-National Corps -

Baghdad, Iraq 

15. June 2009 - November 2011, Director, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 

Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

16. November 2011 - July 2012, Assistant Adjutant General - Army, Joint Force 

Headquarters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

17. July 2012 - Present, Special Assistant to Director, Army National Guard, National Guard 
73 

Bureau, Arlington, Virginia 

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS: 

Bronze Star Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters) 

Army Commendation Medal 

Army Achievement Medal 

Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with 1 Silver and 2 Bronze Oak Leaf 

Clusters) 

National Defense Service Medal (with Bronze Service Star) 

Iraq Campaign Medal (with Bronze Service Star) 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Humanitarian Service Medal 

Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Silver Hourglass Device and 'M' Device) 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award 

Army Service Ribbon 

Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon (with Bronze Numeral 2) 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION: 

Second Lieutenant 3 December 1981 

First Lieutenant 2 December 1984 

Captain 2 April 1987 

Major 4 December 1991 

Lieutenant Colonel 10 October 1996 

Colonel 11 September 2003 

Brigadier General 8 November 2011 

(Current as of February 2013) 

The date of publication indicated on this biography reflects the most recent update. It does not necessarily 

reflect the date of printing. 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 16, 2013 

(77) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

General MASON. No. The current budget uncertainty caused us to shift our efforts 

from lower priority to higher priority programs, and like all depots and arsenals, 

Anniston had some program cancellations or deferrals to FY14. 

Workload is not evenly distributed across the depot’s shops and some workload 

will be delayed while awaiting parts and materials. Production gaps for some equipment lines began in the April/May timeframe. Many of the remaining lines will operate at substantially reduced quantities, but will remain open and continue to repair assets. 

As of 10 April, Anniston has released 449 personnel. Anniston has utilized the 

Voluntary Early Retirement Authority/Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay 

(VERANSIP) to minimize non-voluntary permanent employee separations. [See page 

15.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

General MASON. The Army over the past several years has aggressively moved to 

reduce costs and shrink its facility footprint in Europe. For example, in 2006 there 

were 54,000 Soldiers stationed in Europe. The Army projects this number to be 

30,000 by 2016. This wi1l represent a 45% reduction in end strength since 2006. 

Our total facility square footage in Europe is declining from 143 million gross 

square feet (GSF) to 68 million GSF by 2017. This decline amounts to an infrastructure reduction of 54% which corresponds closely with the reduced end strength and 

force structure. The Army projects these reductions in end strength and infrastructure to be accompanied by an approximately 57% reduction in the annual operating 

budget, which will drop from $2.37 billion in 2006 to $1 billion by 2017. [See page 

19.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART 

General MASON. The Army’s FY14 Military Construction base budget request is 

$1.615 billion, of which $1.12 billion is for Active Army, $321 million is for Army 

National Guard, and $174 million is for Army Reserve. [See page 19.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 16, 2013 

(81) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. How will utilization of regionally aligned forces (RAFs) support the 

new strategic guidance? How will they be funded? Is the RAF construct viable under 

sequestration? What is the Guard and Reserve’s role? 

General HUGGINS. The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy calls for strong security partnerships with allies and partners. In response, the 2012 Department of Defense Strategic Guidance directed the U.S. military services to strengthen allied and 

partner relationships, and to pursue new partnerships. Knowing that these partnerships are fundamental to regional and global security, and to ensure better and faster Army responsiveness to Combatant Command security cooperation and operational requirements, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army to improve 

its ability to be globally responsive and regionally engaged. The goal of regional 

alignment is to provide Combatant Commands (CCMDs) with reliable and responsive capability to meet requirements across the full range of military operations, to 

include operational missions in response to crisis or contingency, operations support, 

theater security cooperation activities, and bilateral and multilateral military 

exercises. 

—‘‘Resource requirements for the successful implementation of RAF will be managed within existing Army resource levels’’ (HQDA EXORD dated 21 December 

2012). In other words, the cost to implement the RAF concept will be a zero sum 

gain with offsets required to cover major structural changes (APS, OCO to Base, 

Army Language and Culture Enterprise etc). 

—In contrast, the demand costs associated with implementing the National Strategy are the responsibility of the CCMDs. Regional Alignment of Forces does not create new, unfunded requirements but, rather, offers an efficient, focused, Army resource to fulfill existing, funded requirements. Rather than creating demand, RAF 

better focuses Army capabilities against existing demand. It is a better sourcing solution for forces, not the funding. 

—While RAF implementation is viable under sequestration, the ability for the 

concept to reach full potential in supporting CCMD requirements will be significantly delayed across additional budget years. This is mainly due to decreased funding for CCMD programs, exercises, DoS Title 22 programs, as well as the well-documented problems with decisive action training for units in FY13. 

—RAF are drawn from the Army Total Force (Active Army, Army National Guard 

and Army Reserves). Many elements of the Reserve Component are already regionally aligned (civil affairs) and the Army National Guard State Partnership Program 

is seen as both complementary and supporting the Regional Alignment of Forces 

concept. 

Mr. WITTMAN. To the extent that you can in this setting, can you explain the impact of current anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities on the Army’s ability to 

execute its mission? How is the Army mitigating/compensating for A2/AD in the 

region? 

General HUGGINS. The proliferation of current A2/AD capabilities around the 

globe results in greater importance and need for Army engagement and shaping activities with partners and allies to build new and strengthen current relationships 

to assure access necessary to conduct potential operations. 

The Army has developed the Regionally Aligned Force concept, which focuses capabilities across the Active Component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve 

to support combatant commanders. Regionally aligned forces will improve 

partnering capabilities: Daily steady-state activities with partner armies are potentially the Army’s most significant and durable contribution to mitigating A2/AD 

challenges. They maintain the foundations for basing and operational access necessary to prevail should a conflict occur. The National Guard State Partnership Program continues to be one of the Army’s most valuable investments in ensuring operational access throughout the world. 

The Army will habitually align corps and division headquarters, where practical, 

to geographic combatant commands for planning and mission preparation in accordance with the combatant commander’s priorities. These units will also complement 
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existing capabilities at the theater army level for providing Joint Force Capable 

Headquarters to those combatant commands. 

The Army provides invaluable contributions to overcoming A2/AD capabilities, 

from the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, providing much 

of the Joint Force’s administrative and logistics backbone, as well as combat and 

support contributions for the Global Response Force. 

The Army is continuing to refocus its training institutions back towards developing the skills necessary for successful combined arms maneuver in an A2/AD environment, while retaining the base of knowledge gained in stability operations. In 

support of U.S. Pacific Command the Army maintains a forward presence with eight 

Active Component Brigade Combat Teams, twelve batteries of Patriots, and theater 

enabling units. The combination of regionally aligned forces and those trained in 

combined arms maneuver deter regional threats while reassuring allies, before a 

conflict even starts. The foundations laid in regional engagement are essential in 

enabling the Joint Force to prevail against A2/AD challenges should the need arise. 

Mr. WITTMAN. To what level are you able to repair your equipment now? Can you 

achieve the maintenance standards required in technical manual 10–20, or are you 

having to settle for less? If less, what is the impact of not achieving 10–20? 

General HUGGINS, General MASON, and General VISOT. The Army currently maintains ground equipment for units preparing to deploy or forward deployed at Technical Manual (TM) 10/20 standards. The Army maintains aviation equipment at 

Fully Mission Capable (FMC). Due to the effects of budget uncertainty and sequestration, for all other ground equipment (including missile systems, communications 

and electronic systems and watercraft) the TM 10/20 maintenance standard is 

waived and the equipment is maintained at a Fully Mission Capable Plus Safety 

standard. 

As a result of maintaining ground equipment at FMC Plus Safety, the Army will 

defer approximately $392M in Operations & Maintenance, Army funds from FY13 

to FY 14. Deferred maintenance will impact future Army readiness if not addressed 

in subsequent years. Capacity constraint limits Army’s ability to address deferred 

maintenance in a single year and could require 2–3 years to restore selective ground 

equipment to TM 10/20 standards. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Does sequestration call into question our ability to maintain an 

Operational Reserve? What would be the impacts of reverting to a Strategic Reserve? 

General VISOT. Yes, sequestration, by reducing programmed funding in the President’s Budget, adversely affects personnel, training and maintenance of our equipment and thereby impedes readiness of our Soldiers and units. As a consequence, 

sequestration does indeed hinder our ability to maintain an Operational Reserve. 

Reversion to a Strategic Reserve would clearly increase the risk of our not being 

able to promptly deploy ready Army Reserve Soldiers in support of various contingencies that we might otherwise be more than able to do. 

The sequester has had the biggest impact on the Army Reserve due to the 2d and 

3rd order effects of cancelled training for Active Component (AC) units into which 

Reserve Component units were integrated. Key cancelled AC training includes: 

—6 x Combat Training Center Rotations affecting 1537 Soldiers. 

—2 x Major Functional Exercises affecting 2058 Soldiers. 

—Reduced 2013 ODT requirements affecting 429 Soldiers. 

It is crucial that the Army Reserve continue to be resourced as an Operational 

Reserve in order to continue to provide critical life-saving and life-sustaining capability to all Services and all components. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Does sequestration call into question our ability to maintain an 

Operational Reserve? What would be the impacts of reverting to a Strategic Reserve? 

General FOUNTAIN. Yes. Sequestration is an important factor in determining 

whether the Army National Guard (ARNG) remains an operational force. Ongoing 

loss of readiness due to sequestration may have far-reaching implications for overseas missions as well as no-notice emergencies here at home. 

In its first few weeks, sequestration has led the Army to off-ramp the mobilization 

of ARNG units in the remainder of FY 13 in order to use base program funds to 

resource Unfunded Requirements and avoid the expense of mobilizing these troops. 

Subsequently, the Army has announced its intentions to off-ramp ARNG units 

scheduled for mobilization in FY14. An unintended consequence of off-ramping is 

the hardships it creates for Citizen Soldiers and their families who have already 

made major life decisions in preparation for the deployment. 
83 

Regular, predictable employment is critical to leader development and maintaining the operational force. Loss of deployment and training opportunities deprives 

ARNG units and Soldiers of valuable operational experience, which directly impacts 

future ability to conduct both overseas and domestic missions. It is the readiness 

to conduct wartime missions that enables the ARNG to execute domestic operations 

with skill and efficiency. Of course, the ARNG will always respond domestically, but 

the response may be slowed due to lower levels of readiness in equipment, personnel 

and training. 

As a result of sequestration, the Army has cancelled rotations at its Combat 

Training Centers for all but deploying units, leading to the cancellation of rotations 

for several ARNG Brigade Combat Teams and enabling units. CTC rotations occur 

less frequently for the Guard than for Active Component forces; if missed, Guard 

leaders may not have another opportunity to gain this training for several years, 

if ever. In terms of equipping, another key measure of readiness, the Army National 

Guard’s Equipment On Hand (EOH) and modernization rates are expected to decline as sequestration causes the Army to procure less new equipment in coming 

years. Sequestration has also led to the postponement of Field and Depot level reset 

of equipment, both, limiting the availability of thousands of items of equipment in 

the present, and creating a maintenance backlog which will take time and money 

to address in the future. 

The Army’s funding of Contract Logistical Support (CLS) has been affected by the 

sequestration with flying hours for UH–72 helicopters reduced by 30%. The FY 13 

programmed funding plan will also curtail new UH–72 fielding and may administratively ground the aircraft due to total loss of contract logistical support this summer. The UH–72 is critical in providing support to Southwest Border and 

counterdrug operations, flight training courses, medical evacuation and other civil 

support requirements. 

Sequestration is expected to have an impact on the roughly 45% of the ARNG fulltime force who are dual-status Military Technicians. While technically civilian employees, the 27,100 dual-status military technicians in the Army Guard are required 

to be members of the units in which they serve and wear their military uniform to 

work every day. They perform the vast majority of maintenance on Guard ground 

and aviation equipment, and perform myriad other tasks that make the 83% of the 

Guard which serves part-time a capable and ready force. The expected 11-day furlough of Technicians will be another drag on readiness, particularly the readiness 

of Guard vehicles for short-notice or no-notice domestic response missions. 

OPTEMPO funding is another area that will be impacted significantly. As a result, units will have fewer tank miles and flying hours, less money for repair parts, 

and less time to train to the required level of proficiency. This will lead to an increase in the amount of post-mobilization training required in order to prepare units 

for operational employment. 

The Congress’ decade-long investment in the Army National Guard has been substantive and sustained. It can be measured in billions of dollars that have raised 

equipment on hand levels to historic highs, recruited quality Soldiers, and provided 

them with superb training. The payoff can be seen in more than 518,000 separate 

Soldier deployments of Citizen Soldiers, the overwhelming majority in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. When deployed, numerous experts attest that Guard Soldiers perform on a par with their Active Component counterparts. When not deployed, the Nation retains this superb capability at 

about a third of the cost of a full-time Soldier. In fact, when factoring in the relative 

costs of retirement and the lower usage of housing and medical benefits, Guard Soldiers cost less than the Active Component even when deployed. Given this relative 

value, it would be a terrible waste of resources to allow the Army National Guard, 

a superb operational force, to revert to its previous status as a Strategic Reserve. 

It takes only a continued modest investment to maintain an operational force when 

compared to the Strategic Reserve the Nation had prior to 9/11. 

Mr. WITTMAN. To what level are you able to repair your equipment now? Can you 

achieve the maintenance standards required in technical manual 10–20, or are you 

having to settle for less? If less, what is the impact of not achieving 10–20? 

General FOUNTAIN. The Army National Guard (ARNG) objective is to maintain all 

equipment at a 10/20 level of readiness. The ARNG is currently maintaining overall 

fleet readiness rates at levels which are comparable to the last five years. 

Due to budget constraints, the Army has authorized commands and organizations 

to begin maintaining ground systems, including missile systems (less Patriot missile 

systems), communications and electronic systems and watercraft at ‘‘Fully Mission 

Capable Plus Safety’’ level. 

The ARNG has not adopted this mitigation measure at this time, but may consider such mitigations as the impact of constrained budgets becomes clearer. 
84 

It is also important to consider the implications of not achieving 10/20 maintenance standards: 

Delayed or deferred maintenance does not go away. It remains required maintenance and builds a backlog which is expensive to correct. 

If 10/20 standards are not maintained, the Army National Guard can expect lower 

equipment readiness and mission capabilities. This could have a particularly serious 

impact on the Guard’s domestic emergency response missions, which—unlike overseas deployments—occur with little or no notice time with which to bring equipment 

up to standards. 

Funding required for delayed maintenance will relationally increase with the 

length of delay. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER 

Mr. BARBER. General Huggins, thank you for your service and your testimony 

today. I understand the Army is in the midst of a precarious balancing act due to 

budget cuts and general uncertainty. The Army must determine how best to restructure the force as a result of mandatory spending caps while simultaneously maintaining its readiness. Meanwhile, General Odierno has mentioned that the Army 

might need to reduce the total Army force by an additional 100,000 service members 

as a result of sequestration. There can be no doubt these cuts will impact the 

Army’s ability to carry out its assigned missions. General as you know, Ft. 

Huachuca is in my home district, and the fort carries out the important mission of 

building partner capacity by training foreign military officers. General, my question 

to you is this, how will another drawdown affect the Army’s ability to continue the 

important mission of building partner capacity, such as the training offered at Ft. 

Huachuca? 

General HUGGINS. The Army is committed to providing the best possible training 

for foreign military officers, through any end strength reductions, and to continue 

building international partnerships through this training. Army force structure reductions may influence the size of the institutional training force; however, those 

decisions have yet to be made. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What do you see as the impact of budget cuts to readiness and 

how industry and the Army can move forward in partnership to sustain the industrial base and provide best value to the Army? Performance Based Logistics programs have demonstrated value and DOD is seeking to increase the effective use 

of PBLs. How do you see the Army optimizing readiness with PBLs? 

General HUGGINS, General MASON, and General VISOT. The budget cuts present 

a significant challenge to the Army’s ability to maintain readiness and will require 

tough choices for how to best apply limited resources to optimize readiness as the 

Army navigates through the difficulties of transitioning from an Army at War to an 

Army preparing/training for the next contingency. 

The challenges of this fiscally uncertain environment will require the Army to explore new partnerships and expand existing ones with industry to achieve the best 

value. The Army has consistently recognized the need to build strong relationships, 

either with Sister Services, Allies, or the Host Nation populace, and is committed 

to achieving best value in acquisition programs, through performance based agreements to include sustainment throughout equipment lifecycles. 

This commitment to best value is demonstrated through existing Public-Private 

Partnerships and Performance-Based Logistics product support strategies, as well as 

support of the Department of the Defense’s (DOD) Better Buying Power initiative. 

Additionally, the Army recognizes the benefits of PBLs such as the AH–64 Apache 

Helicopter and the Patriot Missile Defense System, which have optimized readiness 

and life cycle costs. The Army is a key member of a DOD led Integrated Project 

Team responsible for evolving current PBL product support strategies to the ‘‘Next 

Generation’’ PBL that will broaden usage of PBLs as the product support strategy 

of choice across the DOD. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What do you see as the impact of budget cuts to readiness and 

how industry and the Army can move forward in partnership to sustain the industrial base and provide best value to the Army? Performance Based Logistics programs have demonstrated value and DOD is seeking to increase the effective use 

of PBLs. How do you see the Army optimizing readiness with PBLs? 
85 

General FOUNTAIN. Budget cuts present a significant challenge to the Army’s ability to maintain readiness and will require tough choices for how to best apply limited resources as the Army navigates from a wartime to a peacetime—but still actively engaged—standing. 

The challenges of this fiscally uncertain environment will require the Army to explore new partnerships and expand existing ones with industry to achieve the most 

value. The Army has consistently recognized the need to build strong relationships, 

either with sister Services, allies, or the host nation populace. The commitment to 

achieving best value in acquisition programs includes sustainment throughout the 

lifecycles of systems, services, or products. This commitment to best value is also 

demonstrated through existing Public-Private Partnerships and Performance-Based 

Logistics (PLB) product support strategies, as well as support of the Department of 

the Defense’s (DOD) Better Buying Power initiative. 

Additionally, the Army recognizes the benefits of PBLs through existing PBLs 

such as the AH–64 Apache Helicopter and the Patriot Missile Defense System, and 

continues to look for new PBL opportunities. Finally, the Army is a key member 

of a DOD-led Integrated Project Team responsible for evolving current PBL product 

support strategies to the ‘‘Next Generation’’ PBL that will broaden usage of PBLs 

across the DOD. 

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