1 Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding

for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TANIELLE SHURNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 1: 05cv196

v. )

)

SCOTT’S ECONO INN, INC., )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., DISTRICT J.

This civil action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 and arises from Plaintiff

Tanielle Shurney’s claim that she was subjected to a warrantless felony arrest and

subsequent incarceration without sufficient probable cause. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Presently pending before the Court are the Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment. For the reasons set forth below, these motions will be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no

genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 1 of 15
2

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary

judgment, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion. International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 898

F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir.1990). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating

that, given the evidence of record, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party, who must go beyond its pleadings and designate specific facts by the use of

affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Wilson v.

Lemington Home for the Aged, No. 99-1893, 2000 WL 33712287 at *1 (W.D. Pa. April

12, 2000). Entry of judgment is mandated against any party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

322; Wilson, supra, at *1. Viewing the evidence in this case most favorably to the

Plaintiff, we recite the pertinent facts.

II. BACKGROUND

The underlying dispute in this action arises from an incident involving

unauthorized charges made to a debit/credit card belonging to Tonya Traylor, a 33-year

old female who lives and works in the Cleveland, Ohio area. The charges in question

were made to secure the purchase of passes to Splash Lagoon (a water park located in

Erie, Pennsylvania) and a room at the Econolodge (a hotel which provides

accommodations for patrons of Splash Lagoon).

The undisputed evidence of record establishes that, on June 25, 2004, a woman

identifying herself as Tanielle Shurney telephoned the Splash Lagoon reservation

center to reserve a hotel room and five passes to Splash Lagoon for two adults and

three children for July 3, 2004. The caller was informed that she would need a credit

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 2 of 15
3

card to place the reservation. The caller indicated that she did not have a credit card

but would call back. Later that same evening a female, who again identified herself as

Tanielle Shurney, called the reservation center back and spoke with Kristen Mooney, a

reservations clerk. During the course of this conversation, the caller indicated that her

cousin, “Tracey Smith,” would put the charges on her credit card. An individual

identifying herself as Tracey Smith then got on the phone and provided a Master Card

account number, which was accepted by the Splash Lagoon reservation system,

immediately charging the card holder’s account in the amount of $198.79. The account

number used to purchase the reservation did not belong to either Tanielle Shurney or

Tracey Smith, but instead belonged to Tonya Traylor.

On June 30, 2004, Ms. Traylor discovered that her Master Card account with

Key Bank was overdrawn and that several unauthorized charges had been placed on

her account. The first unauthorized charge was the June 25, 2004 charge to Splash

Lagoon in the amount of $198.79. Upon discovering this activity, Ms. Traylor

immediately contacted Splash Lagoon and reported that she had neither made the

reservation nor authorized the use of her debit account to secure the reservation.

Ms. Traylor also reported the activity to Officer Jon Hurley of the Streetsboro,

Ohio Police Department, who undertook an investigation. On July 2, Officer Hurley

contacted Patty Purchase, manager of the Splash Lagoon reservation center. Ms.

Purchase faxed him reservation documents confirming that a reservation had been

placed in the name of Tanielle Shurney for July 3, 2004 using the account number

belonging to Ms. Traylor. Officer Hurley indicated to Ms. Purchase that he would be in

contact with the Pennsylvania State Police concerning the case and he requested that

the Econolodge check-in-desk notify the state police when Ms. Shurney arrived to claim

the reservation. Officer Hurley then contacted the state police in Erie, informed them of

the situation, and asked that a trooper be dispatched to the Econolodge when Ms.

Shurney checked in.

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 3 of 15
4

On the night of July 2, 2004, a female, again identifying herself as Tanielle

Shurney, telephoned the reservation center to confirm her reservation. Ms. Purchase

spoke with the caller who confirmed her identity as “Tanielle Shurney” and provided her

address and telephone number. The caller advised Ms. Purchase that the credit card

used to make the reservations belonged to “Tracey Smith” and requested that no

additional charges be made to the card for incidentals. Ms. Purchase confirmed the

reservation and advised the caller that she could come to the hotel at noon the

following day to claim her passes.

On July 3, 2004, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Plaintiff arrived at the Econolodge

along with a party of two other adults and four children. Plaintiff went alone into the

Econolodge and signed for the hotel room and passes that had been purchased with

Ms. Traylor’s debit card account number. Plaintiff advised the Guest Services Agent

that she was not in possession of the Master Card that had been used to pay for the

reservation. She presented photo identification and obtained the room key and Splash

Lagoon passes. An Econolodge employee then contacted the state police and advised

that Tanielle Shurney was on the premises.

Shortly thereafter, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Sean Pierce came to the

Econolodge accompanied by his police training coach, Trooper James R. Szymanski. 

Trooper Szymanski remained in the patrol car while Trooper Pierce interviewed the

Guest Services Agent who had processed Plaintiff’s reservation. The agent confirmed

that Tanielle Shurney had arrived at the Econolodge to claim a reservation made in her

own name using the Master Card account number that had been reported stolen by Ms.

Traylor. The agent further advised Trooper Pierce that Shurney had signed for the

room using that same account number but did not have the Master Card in her

possession. Physical evidence included documents from the reservation center bearing

Plaintiff’s name and the account number of Ms. Traylor’s Master Card, as well as

copies of Plaintiff’s photo driver’s license and the receipt for the room which was signed

by Plaintiff using the unauthorized Master Card account. Trooper Pierce presented this

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 4 of 15
2

 Although Splash Lagoon personnel had received information that “Tracey

Smith” was Tanielle Shurney’s cousin, Trooper Pierce testified that Plaintiff referred to

“Tracey Smith” first as her sister, then as a friend whom she considered to be “like a

sister.” Trooper Pierce subsequently tried to make contact with Tracey Smith but was

unable to locate anyone by that name at the address supplied by Plaintiff.

5

evidence to Trooper Szymanski, who determined that there was probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff on charges of Theft by Deception and Access Device Fraud. Trooper

Szymanski then approached Plaintiff in the parking lot of the Econolodge and placed

her under arrest.

Plaintiff was transported to the state police barracks where she waived her

Miranda rights and was questioned by Trooper Pierce. During questioning, Plaintiff told

Trooper Pierce that the reservations had been made by Tracey Smith, for whom

Plaintiff provided an address, but no telephone number.2 This was the first time that

Trooper Pierce had heard of the name Tracey Smith or her alleged involvement in the

reservation. Plaintiff further denied having called the Econolodge on July 2 to confirm

her reservation. Following his questioning of Plaintiff, Trooper Pierce (upon the prior

directive from Trooper Szymanski) prepared a Criminal Complaint and Affidavit of

Probable Cause setting forth the factual information in support of the arrest and

charging Plaintiff with one count of theft by deception and one count of access device

fraud.

Following her arrest, Plaintiff was preliminarily arraigned before District Justice

Frank Abate, Jr.. At her preliminary arraignment, Plaintiff maintained that Tracey Smith

had made the reservation and had provided the necessary credit card information. 

District Justice Abate nevertheless set bail and committed Plaintiff to the Erie County

Prison. Plaintiff was later released on July 9, 2004 after paying a bail bondsman

$1,000.00.

On August 13, 2004, a preliminary hearing was held before District Justice

James Dwyer. At that hearing, the charges were dismissed on the theory that the

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 5 of 15
3

 We presume the John Doe defendant refers to Trooper Szymanski; however,

Trooper Szymanski has not been formally substituted as a defendant herein.

4

 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend IV.

6

Commonwealth could not establish Plaintiff’s intent to defraud or actual involvement in

the alleged crimes.

Plaintiff subsequently filed this action, naming as Defendants Scott’s Econo Inn,

Inc. (which we refer to as “Econolodge”), Scott’s Splash Lagoon, Inc. (referred to simply

as “Splash Lagoon”), Trooper Sean Pierce (individually and in his official capacity as a

state trooper) and John Doe3 (individually and in his capacity as the supervisor of

Defendant Pierce). Plaintiff claims that these Defendants are responsible for her being

subjected to a warrantless arrest and subsequent incarceration without adequate

probable cause. Her complaint seeks, among other things, injunctive relief,

compensatory damages and a punitive damages award stemming from this incident. 

III. DISCUSSION

To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a violation of a right

secured by the federal constitution or laws occurred and that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law. Groman v. Township of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.1995); DiNicola v. DiPaolo, 25 F. Supp. 2d 630,

637 (W.D. Pa. 1998). Here, Plaintiff appears to be asserting a claim for false arrest,

false imprisonment and/or malicious prosecution, in violation of her Fourth Amendment

right against unlawful seizure.

4

 

A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been

or is being committed. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (citing cases). 

“Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 6 of 15
5

 The crime of theft by deception is defined as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or

withholds property of another by deception. A person deceives if he intentionally:

7

from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. (citing

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). The standard is therefore an objective

one. See id. at 153 (“[A]n arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he

knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”). Probable cause has been

defined as “facts and circumstances . . . that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person,

or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Camiolo v. State Farm

Fire and Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo,

443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (ellipsis in the original).

The record here is undisputed that, at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, Trooper

Pierce was aware that fraudulent credit card charges had allegedly been made to

secure a room at the Econolodge and passes to Splash Lagoon. Trooper Pierce knew

that, based on these allegations, a criminal investigation had been commenced by the

Streetsboro, Ohio Police Department. He was aware that the name “Tanielle Shurney”

(and, to his knowledge, only that name) had been mentioned in connection with the

allegedly fraudulent reservation. To his knowledge, Tanielle Shurney was the person

who would receive services paid for through the unauthorized charges. He was further

aware that Tanielle Shurney had appeared at the Econolodge at the scheduled time to

claim the reservation made in her name, that she signed for the room and passes, and

that the room and passes were paid for through unauthorized charges on Ms. Traylor’s

debit card account. Trooper Pierce received access to copies of reservation

documents, Plaintiff’s signed receipt, and Plaintiff’s driver’s license. He shared all of

this information with Trooper Szymanski, who concluded that there was probable cause

to arrest Plaintiff for theft by deception5 and access device fraud.6 Moreover, Plaintiff

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 7 of 15
(1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as

to law, value, intention or other state of mind ...

(2) prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his

judgment of a transaction; or

(3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously

created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing

another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.

18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3922.

6

 The crime of access device fraud is defined as: “[use of] an access device to

obtain or in an attempt to obtain property or services with knowledge that ... the access

device was issued to another person who has not authorized its use. 18 Pa. C.S.A.

§ 4106 (a)(1)(ii).

7

 At the preliminary arraignment, a neutral magistrate makes an independent

determination as to probable cause. See Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 228 (3d

Cir. 2001) (“It is the function of the reviewing neutral magistrate to determine ‘whether

the facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest would warrant a man of

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed.’”) (quoting Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)). The defendant may not be detained unless the

magistrate finds that probable cause existed. Pa. R. Crim. P. 540(D).

8

admits that, at the time of her arrest, she did not assert to Trooper Pierce that the

reservation had been made by Tracey Smith, nor did she claim to be unaware that a

third party’s debit card number had been used to make unauthorized reservation

charges. In the Court’s view, these facts establish, as a matter of law, that the

Troopers possessed probable cause to believe Plaintiff had committed the crimes for

which she was arrested.

Apparently, at the time of her preliminary arraignment before District Justice

Abate, Plaintiff did assert that the debit card account number had been supplied by her

cousin, Tracey Smith. Nevertheless, DJ Abate found that the Commonwealth had

established probable cause for the arrest,7 set bond, and committed Plaintiff to custody

at the Erie County Jail. Although the deference normally accorded to a magistrate’s

probable cause finding does not apply in a § 1983 action, see Merkle v. Upper Dublin

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 8 of 15
9

School Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 789 (3d Cir. 2000); Dintino v. Echols, 243 F. Supp. 2d 255,

262 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 91 Fed. Appx. 783, 2004 WL 474134 (3d Cir. Mar. 11,

2004), the fact that a neutral magistrate made such a finding – even factoring in

Plaintiff’s assertion that someone else besides her had made the reservation – supports

our independent conclusion that Trooper Pierce possessed probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that Pennsylvania’s laws

requiring the existence of probable cause for arrests and a neutral magistrate’s review

of that probable cause determination within 48 hours satisfies all that the Fourth

Amendment requires, see Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2001),

and we find that these mandates were fully complied with here beyond any genuine

factual dispute. See also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (where

confinement has been imposed “pursuant to a legal process,” damages may not be

sought under a claim of false arrest).

Plaintiff places great reliance on the fact that the charges against here were

ultimately dismissed at the time of her August 13, 2004 preliminary hearing. However,

the fact that the charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage does not

thereby negate the existence of probable cause to support Plaintiff’s initial arrest and

detention. Fundamentally, courts have interpreted Pennsylvania law as requiring

differing levels of proof to support a finding of probable cause versus a prima facie case

of guilt at the preliminary hearing stage. As the Third Circuit has explained:

The different terms chosen to describe the Commonwealth's burden at the

time of arrest and preliminary arraignment and its burden at the time of

the preliminary hearings, suggest to us that prima facie case standard

was intended to require different and greater assurance of guilt. 

“Probable cause,” of course, speaks in terms of a probability while “prima

facie case” has been defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as

evidence“ such that if presented at the trial in court, and accepted as true,

the judge would be warranted in letting the trial go to the jury.”

Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 502 Pa. 359, 466 A.2d 991, 996 (Pa.1983)

(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Thus, while the Commonwealth

need not convince the preliminary hearing judge of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt, it must nonetheless present admissible evidence at the

preliminary hearing that would warrant a reasonable jury in finding each of

the elements of the offense by that standard. Id. It is thus not surprising

to find Pennsylvania cases recognizing that the standard of probable

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 9 of 15
10

cause and the prima facie case standard are conceptually distinct. See

Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 482 Pa. 6, 393 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. 1978)

(plurality opinion) (finding that probable cause had existed for the

institution of criminal proceedings, though a prima facie case had not

been established); Commonwealth v. Days, 718 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa.

Super. 1998) (stating in the context of affirming that a magistrate properly

determined that probable cause existed to issue a search warrant that

“[p]robable cause is based on a finding of probability, not a prima facie

showing of criminal activity”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 279 Pa. Super. 8,

420 A.2d 717, 720 (Pa. Super. 1980) (“It would be unreasonable to

require payment of costs every time the Commonwealth wanted to

challenge a finding of lack of prima facie case when there had not even

been a hint of harassment or failure to show probable cause.”).

Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d at 229-230. See also Egolf v. Witmer, 421 F. Supp. 2d

858, 867 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (a prima facie case requires a higher standard of proof than

that required to establish probable cause) (citing Stewart, supra).

Plaintiff also objects that Trooper Pierce should have conducted a more

thorough investigation before making the decision to arrest her and insists that the

existence of exculpatory evidence precludes a finding of probable cause. Plaintiff

maintains that at least two other individuals, Tracey Smith and Lisa Chapman, were

implicated in the posting of unauthorized charges and should have been investigated. 

Plaintiff has suggested in the alternative that the unauthorized use of Ms. Traylor’s

account number was merely the result of an innocent mistake. 

We find Plaintiff’s arguments unconvincing. At the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, only

the name Tanielle Shurney had been made known to Trooper Pierce in connection with

the investigation of unauthorized charges at Splash Lagoon. Trooper Pierce would

have had no reason to doubt the reports from other law enforcement personnel and/or

Econolodge representatives that established: “Tanielle Shurney” had called the hotel to

make, and later, to confirm, the reservation placed in her own name; the reservation

was paid for with the debit card account number belonging to Ms. Traylor; the charges

at issue were not authorized and were the subject of a criminal investigation by Ohio

police; Plaintiff had shown up and personally signed for the room and water park

passes, again utilizing the account number owned by Ms. Traylor; and Plaintiff did not

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 10 of 15
11

possess the card used to make the purchases. This information alone was objectively

sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that Plaintiff had committed theft by deception

and access device fraud especially since, at the point of her arrest, Plaintiff did not deny

knowledge of the unauthorized charges or mention the alleged involvement of “Tracey

Smith.” See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (the relevant time for

determining whether probable cause existed is at the time the arrest was made). To

the extent Plaintiff did subsequently deny involvement in the unauthorized charges,

Trooper Pierce was not required to take her denial at face value. See Garcia v. County

of Bucks, Pennsylvania, 155 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“An arresting officer

does not, of course, have to accept at face value an arrestee's claim of innocence or

mistaken identity.”).

Moreover, to the extent that Trooper Pierce was made aware that “Tracey Smith”

or “Lisa Chapman” had surfaced as possible suspects in connection with unauthorized

charges to Ms. Traylor’s account, his failure to investigate these individuals does not

negate the existence of probable cause supporting Plaintiff’s arrest. Trooper Pierce

was “not required to undertake an exhaustive investigation in order to validate the

probable cause that, in his mind, already existed.”) Merkle, 211 F.3d at 790 n. 8

(officer’s failure to interview additional witnesses prior to arresting teacher for theft

offense did not undermine finding of probable cause). See also Walker v. Spiller, 54 F.

Supp. 2d 421, 426 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(“A police officer's failure to investigate a suspect's

alibi does not ‘negate the probable cause for the warrantless arrest in the absence of a

showing that the [officer's] initial probable cause determination was itself

unreasonable.’”) (alteration in the original) (citations omitted).

 In addition, the possible complicity of other individuals – including Plaintiff’s

“cousin” Smith – in the unauthorized charges to Ms. Traylor’s account does not

necessarily tend to exculpate Plaintiff. In fact, there is nothing in the record to suggest

that further investigation into these leads would have necessarily produced information

favorable to Plaintiff. Despite the fact that Plaintiff allegedly has a close relationship

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 11 of 15
8

 It is also worth noting that, on the date of her arrest, Plaintiff was found to be in

possession of two photo IDs, only one of which was her own.

12

with Smith and had apparently intended to accompany Smith’s child to Splash Lagoon,

Plaintiff could provide only an address (and no phone number) as a means of contact

with Smith. Moreover, when Trooper Pierce subsequently attempted to make contact

with Tracey Smith, he was unable to locate anyone by that name at the address Plaintiff

supplied. Interestingly, there is no indication in the record that “Tracey Smith” has ever

made an appearance or given a statement on Plaintiff’s behalf, either in Plaintiff’s

criminal proceedings or in this case.8

As for Plaintiff’s suggestion that the unauthorized charge to the Econolodge/

Splash Lagoon was somehow the result of an inadvertent mistake, there is nothing in

the record to suggest this as a realistic possibility. Plaintiff has produced no evidence

to suggest, for example, that Tracey Smith was in possession of a credit/debit card with

an account number substantially similar to the one belonging to Ms. Traylor. In fact,

Ms. Purchase testified that, when reservations are made for Splash Lagoon, the clerk

double checks the account number with the customer; if a number is entered incorrectly

the system flags it as inaccurate. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s proffer falls short of

establishing a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issue of probable

cause. 

In sum, the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that the objective facts

available to Trooper Pierce at the time he and Trooper Szymanski arrested Plaintiff

were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that she had committed theft and access

device fraud. The existence of probable cause is fatal to the Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims against the Troopers. See DiNicola, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (the lack

of probable cause is an essential element for plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims

premised on alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution). 

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 12 of 15
13

We note that Plaintiff has also lodged Fourth Amendment claims against the

Econolodge and Splash Lagoon under the theory that those Defendants requested

and/or instigated the Plaintiff’s arrest or at least ratified it by aiding in the investigation,

arrest and prosecution. Courts have recognized that a third party may be liable for

malicious prosecution in initiating or pressing unfounded criminal charges if they are in

possession of information not provided to the police that would have negated probable

cause for the plaintiff’s arrest. See Merkle, 211 F.3d at 794-95 (notwithstanding the fact

that police officers acted with probable cause in arresting teacher for alleged theft,

school district could be liable for initiating criminal proceedings and pressing what

proved to be unfounded charges where evidence was sufficient to support finding that

school district acted on motivation to retaliate against teacher for protected speech). 

Here, however, the record is uncontroverted that neither Econolodge nor Splash

Lagoon initiated or pressed the criminal charges against Plaintiff. At most, these

Defendants cooperated in the criminal investigation, but there is no evidence that they

manipulated the arrest by, e.g., withholding materially exculpatory information. Plaintiff

complains that Ms. Purchase failed to disclose to Trooper Pierce that Tracey Smith had

purportedly supplied the debit card account to secure the Plaintiff’s reservation. As we

have already discussed, however, this information – even if initially known by Trooper

Pierce – would not have vitiated the probable cause that supported Plaintiff’s arrest. 

Trooper Pierce had available to him credible information that Tanielle Shurney had

called the Econolodge twice to book and confirm her reservation, that the debit charge

had been procured on behalf of Tanielle Shurney – and apparently at her request – for

the purpose of securing her reservation, and that Tanielle Shurney showed up to claim

this reservation and signed for it, utilizing the unauthorized charge as her means of

payment. A reasonably prudent officer in Trooper Pierce’s position could certainly

conclude that Tanielle Shurney committed the crimes of theft and access device fraud.

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 13 of 15
14

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment will be granted. An appropriate order follows.

Case 1:05-cv-00196-SJM Document 54 Filed 06/23/06 Page 14 of 15
15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TANIELLE SHURNEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 1: 05cv196

v. )

)

SCOTT’S ECONO INN, INC., )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, to wit, this 23rd day of June, 2006, for the reasons set forth in the

accompanying Memorandum Opinion,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Joint Motion [Doc. # 34] for Summary

Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Scott’s Econo Inn, Inc. and Scott’s Splash

Lagoon, Inc. and the Motion [Doc. # 38] for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of

Defendant Sean Pierce are GRANTED.

JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of all DEFENDANTS and against Plaintiff,

Tanielle Shurney.

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin 

SEAN J. McLAUGHLIN

United States District Judge

cm: All counsel of record.

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