IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BILLY CLIFFORD STANLEY, )

Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 08-137 Erie

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

)

RAYMOND J. SOBINA, et al., )

Respondents. )

OPINION AND ORDER1

I. Introduction

On February 10, 2005, an Erie County jury convicted Petitioner Billy C. Stanley of

several crimes, including burglary, numerous counts of assault, and recklessly endangering a oneyear-old child. Pending before this Court is his Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus [Document

No. 1], which he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He raises two claims. In Claim 1, he

contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel

because his trial attorney rejected a plea offer without consulting with him and first receiving his

permission. In Claim 2, he contends that his due process rights were violated because the

evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of burglary. 

II. Relevant Background2

Early in the morning on August 8, 2004, Petitioner broke through the front door of his

sister Shawn Crass's apartment and proceeded to assault his fifteen-year-old niece, Nichole

Mazola and her boyfriend, seventeen-year-old Shon Loucks. Petitioner entered the bedroom

where the two were sleeping and attacked them. He hit Mazola and punched Loucks repeatedly. 

 

1

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United

States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final judgment.

2

Respondents have submitted the relevant transcripts and the original state court record ("SCR"). The SCR contains 60

documents and shall be cited to as "SCR No. __ ."

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During the assault, he stepped on a one-year-old baby, Lilly Myers, who was sleeping on the

floor next to the bed. 

Later that same morning, Petitioner attacked Mazola's stepfather, James Wilson, at his

residence. Wilson's son, Jeffrey, attempted to intervene and was punched by Petitioner. The

Wilsons called the police and Petitioner fled the scene. The police eventually located him hiding

in a back closet of a neighboring trailer. He was handcuffed and placed inside a police vehicle. 

Once inside the vehicle, he continued his violent behavior and kicked out its back window. The

police were able to gain control of him only after they subdued him with pepper spray. 

The District Attorney of Erie County filed an Information charging Petitioner with the

following crimes: 

Count 1 burglary of Crass's apartment (a felony in the first degree); 

Count 2 criminal trespass of Crass's apartment (a felony of the third degree);

Count 3 simple assault of Loucks (a misdemeanor of the second degree); 

Count 4 institutional vandalism for kicking out the rear window of the police

vehicle (a misdemeanor of the second degree); 

Count 5 simple assault of Mazola (a misdemeanor of the second degree);

Count 6 simple assault of James Wilson (a misdemeanor of the second degree); 

Count 7 harassment of Jeffrey Wilson (a misdemeanor of the second degree); 

Count 8 recklessly endangering Loucks (a misdemeanor of the second degree);

Count 9 recklessly endangering Mazola (a misdemeanor of the second degree);

Count 10 recklessly endangering James Wilson (a misdemeanor of the second

degree); 

Count 11 recklessly endangering Jeffery Wilson (a misdemeanor of the second

degree); 

Count 12 recklessly endangering Lilly Myers (a misdemeanor of the second degree); 

Count 13 criminal mischief for damaging the front door jamb, deadbolt, and

molding of Crass's home (a summary offense); 

Count 14 disorderly conduct for assaulting five victims, and for damaging the police

vehicle and Crass's front door, while under the influence of alcohol (a

misdemeanor of the third degree); 

Count 15 public drunkenness (a summary offense); and,

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Count 16 simple assault of a child under twelve years of age (Lilly Meyers) (a

misdemeanor of the first degree)

(SCR No. 2). 

Wayne G. Johnson, Esq., represented Petitioner. On January 5, 2005, the Assistant

District Attorney, Michael E. Burns, Esq., sent a letter to Johnson containing the following plea

offer:

For purposes of case resolution, the Commonwealth will accept the plea of guilty

to Counts 1, 3, 4 (amended to Criminal Mischief, grading to be determined), 5, 6,

7 (amended to Harassment (S)), and 12 through 16 inclusive. The remaining

counts would be nol prossed with costs on the defendant.

(1/5/05 Letter, attached as Ex. B to SCR No. 33). Johnson forwarded the Assistant District

Attorney's letter to Petitioner on January 14, 2005, and wrote to him:

I am also enclosing the letter that I have received dated January 5, 2005, in which

the District Attorney's office extended a plea offer which is obviously not even

worth speaking about. As it looks like there will be no plea bargain, your case

should be coming to trial in the February term.

(1/14/05 Letter, attached as Ex. A to SCR No. 33) (emphasis added)). Petitioner contends that

Johnson improperly rejected the plea offer without consulting with him and first receiving his

permission. 

Petitioner proceeded to trial on February 9, 2005. The next day, the jury found him guilty

of Count 1, Counts 3-7, Count 12, and Count 14. The trial court found him not guilty of Counts 3

13 and 15. The Commonwealth withdrew Count 2 and Counts 8-11. The court imposed an

aggregate sentence of 113-260 months of incarceration, to be followed by 90 days of probation. 

Because Petitioner now contends that Johnson was ineffective for failing to consult with

him regarding whether to accept the plea offer, and the Commonwealth counters that Petitioner

suffered no prejudiced because the results of his trial were more favorable than the plea offer, the

following chart compares the terms of the plea offer with the outcome of the trial:

3

At some point, and at the Commonwealth's request, Count 4 had been amended from institutional vandalism to

criminal mischief, which is one of the things the Commonwealth had offered to do in its January 15, 2005, plea

proposal. See also footnote 6.

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Case 1:08-cv-00137-SPB Document 20 Filed 05/12/10 Page 3 of 12
Count Charge Terms Of Plea Offer Actual Result

Count 1 burglary guilty guilty

Count 2 criminal trespass nol prossed with costs on

Petitioner

withdrawn

Count 3 simple assault guilty guilty (merged with

Count 1)

Count 4 institutional vandalism guilty (amended to

criminal mischief)

guilty (amended to

criminal mischief)

Count 5 simple assault guilty guilty (merged with

Count 1)

Count 6 simple assault guilty guilty (merged with

Count 1)

Count 7 simple assault guilty (amended to

summary harassment)

guilty (amended to

summary harassment)

Count 8 reckless endangerment nol prossed with costs on

Petitioner

withdrawn

Count 9 reckless endangerment nol prossed with costs on

Petitioner

withdrawn

Count 10 reckless endangerment nol prossed with costs on

Petitioner

withdrawn

Count 11 reckless endangerment nol prossed with costs on

Petitioner

withdrawn

Count 12 reckless endangerment guilty guilty

Count 13 criminal mischief guilty not guilty

Count 14 disorderly conduct guilty guilty

Count 15 public drunkenness guilty not guilty

Count 16 simple assault guilty not guilty

After the denial of his post-sentence motion (SCR No. 26), Petitioner filed a direct appeal

with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. He claimed that the evidence was insufficient to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of burglary because Crass testified that she allowed

him to be in her apartment (Day 2 Trial Tr. at 100-03), thereby vitiating an element of the crime

(that he was not "privileged" to enter). That is the same claim that he raises in the instant federal

habeas petition as Claim 2. 

On May 10, 2006, the Superior Court issued a Memorandum affirming Petitioner's

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judgment of sentence and denying the insufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits. 

Commonwealth v. Stanley, No. 879 WDA 2005, slip op. (Pa.Super. May 10, 2005) ("Stanley

1"). On January 17, 2007, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied a petition for allowance of 4

appeal. 

Next, on or around January 29, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se motion under

Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA.CONS.STAT. § 9541, et seq. (SCR

No. 33). Petitioner asserted, as he does in the instant federal habeas petition at Claim 1, that he

was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because Johnson failed

to have any follow-up communication with him regarding the plea offer so that he could weigh it

against the prospect of proceeding to trial. The PCRA Court appointed William J. Hathaway,

Esq., to represent Petitioner, and Hathaway filed a supplement to the PCRA motion and a request

for an evidentiary hearing. (SCR No. 35). 

On June 26, 2007, the PCRA Court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the petition

without a hearing, along with an attached opinion setting forth the court's reasoning. (SCR No.

41). It held that Petitioner could not prevail on his claim because Johnson's advice was sound

and he incurred no prejudice, as "[t]he outcome from Petitioner's jury trial was an improvement

on the plea bargain":

Had Petitioner accepted the plea offer, the Commonwealth would have withdrawn

[Counts 2, 8-11] with Petitioner paying costs. When Petitioner went to trial, each

of the remaining counts were dismissed by leave of court at trial.

... Petitioner was found guilty of eight (8) criminal counts. Had Petitioner

accepted the plea offer, he would have pled guilty and been sentenced on eleven

(11) criminal counts in addition to paying costs for all withdrawn charges. Thus,

his counsel's advice was appropriate and better served Petitioner's interests.

(SCR No. 41 at 9-10). 

Petitioner filed pro se objections. (SCR 43). He contended that the PCRA Court was

misreading the Assistant District Attorney's January 5, 2005, letter, and that the Commonwealth

in fact had offered to reduced the burglary charge (Count 1) to criminal mischief if Petitioner

4

Stanley 1 is attached hereto as Ex. A.

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Case 1:08-cv-00137-SPB Document 20 Filed 05/12/10 Page 5 of 12
agreed to plead guilty to criminal mischief. In an Order dated July 12, 2007, the PCRA Court

rejected Petitioner's contention and dismissed the PCRA petition, holding:

Petitioner's allegation is factually false. The Burglary charge was Count 1 of

Petitioner's Information. The Commonwealth's plea offer required a guilty plea to

Count 1 as Burglary. The Commonwealth did offer to amend Count 4 from a

charge of Institutional Vandalism to a charge of Criminal Mischief. In fact, at

trial, this amendment occurred. 

(SCR No. 44).

Petitioner proceeded on appeal pro se. On April 18, 2008, the Superior Court issued a

Memorandum in which it affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. (SCR No. 60, Commonwealth v.

Stanley, No. 1366 WDA 2007, slip op. (Pa.Super. Apr. 18, 2008) ("Stanley 2")). It held:

Even assuming arguendo defense counsel did not exercise due diligence in

conveying and explaining the Commonwealth's January 5, 2005, plea offer,

[Petitioner] was not prejudiced as a result thereof. 

---- 

In sum, if [Petitioner] had accepted the Commonwealth's offer his

exposure to criminal liability would have been greater than it was after the jury

rendered its verdict. Indeed, had [Petitioner] accepted the Commonwealth's plea

offer, he would have been convicted of an additional first-degree misdemeanor

[Count 16] and two additional summary offenses [Counts 13 and 15]. 

(Id. at 7-8).

Next, Petitioner filed with this Court a pro se Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus.

[Document No. 1]. Respondents have filed their Answer [Document No. 15] and the SCR. 

III. Discussion

A. Standard Of Review

Because the Superior Court rejected both of Petitioner's claims on the merits, the standard

of review enacted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")

(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) applies. AEDPA provides that a federal habeas court may not

grant relief as to a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless that

adjudication resulted in a decision that was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law," or resulted in a decision that was based on an "unreasonable

determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir. 2004). The state courts' factual

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findings are presumed to be correct unless the presumption is rebutted by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Claim 1 – Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 

The "clearly established Federal law," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), in which to analyze

Claim 1 under AEDPA is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Pursuant

to Strickland, Petitioner must show that Johnson's "representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 688; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91. He also

must show that he was prejudiced by Johnson's alleged deficient performance. Id. at 694. 

The Superior Court's resolution of Claim 1 was not "contrary to" or an "unreasonable

application of" Strickland, nor was it an unreasonable determination of the facts. First,

Johnson's advice to Petitioner – that the Commonwealth's plea offer "was not worth discussing"

and should be rejected – was sound. It was not in Petitioner's best interest to accept the

Commonwealth's plea offer, as its terms were not favorable and he had a viable (if ultimately

unsuccessful) defense to the burglary charge (that Crass allowed him to enter her apartment at

any time). If the jury had credited Crass's trial testimony, it would have acquitted him of

burglary. Thus, it was objectively reasonable for Johnson to advise Petitioner to proceed to trial

and take a chance at an acquittal, rather than accept the Commonwealth's plea offer and plead

guilty to burglary. 

Second, even if I assume for the sake of argument, as the Superior Court did, that

Johnson was ineffective for (allegedly) rejecting the plea offer without first receiving permission

to do so from Petitioner, there was no prejudice. As set forth above, if Petitioner had accepted

the plea offer, his exposure to criminal liability at sentencing, as well as what he would have had

to pay in court costs, would have been greater than it was after the verdict. As such, Petitioner

ended up in a more favorable position after his trial than he would have been in had he accepted

the Commonwealth's offer and pleaded guilty to burglary and paid courts costs for the withdrawn

claims. 

In an attempt to avoid the obvious conclusion that he was not prejudiced by Johnson's

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alleged ineffectiveness, Petitioner insists that the Commonwealth actually offered to reduce the

burglary charge (Count 1) to criminal mischief. The state courts expressly rejected this argument

and found as fact that the plea offer extended by the Commonwealth required Petitioner to plead

guilty to the burglary charge and that it would, among other things, amend the institutional

vandalism charge to criminal mischief. There is no basis for this Court to disturb the state courts'

factual finding under AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The state courts did not misinterpret the 5

Commonwealth's plea offer. The Assistant District Attorney's January 5, 2005, letter is

unambiguous and the state courts read it accurately. (1/5/05 Letter, attached as Ex. B to SCR 6

No. 33). 

C. Claim 2 – Sufficiency Of the Evidence 

As explained by the trial court in its instructions to the jury, to convict an individual of

the crime of burglary under Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the defendant entered into an occupied structure;

(2) with the intent to commit a crime once inside (in this case, the crimes of simple assault); and

5

AEDPA, as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), limits the ability of a federal district court to hold an evidentiary

hearing in habeas review. See Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000); Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386,

392-94 (3d Cir. 2010); Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 104-05, 109 n.11, 117 (3d Cir. 2009). If the failure to develop

the record before the state court is attributable to the petitioner, AEDPA prohibits an evidentiary hearing in federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). When the failure to develop the factual basis of a claim in the state court is not

attributable to the petitioner, it is within the district court's discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing on a claim.

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-75 (2007); see also Palmer, 592 F.3d at 395 ("bald assertions and conclusory

allegations do not afford a sufficient ground for an evidentiary hearing" on a habeas petition).

I will assume that because the PCRA court denied Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing,

§ 2254(e)(2)'s prohibition on federal habeas hearings does not apply. I will make this assumption because even if it is

within my discretion to have a hearing, I would still deny Petitioner's request for one. The Commonwealth's plea offer

is contained in writing in the SCR. Therefore, no additional testimony or information is needed to evaluate Claim 1.

6

The Commonwealth later requested that the institutional vandalism charge [Count 4] be amended to criminal mischief.

(See Day 2 Trial Tr. at 109). See also footnote 3. At sentencing, it established that Petitioner caused $599.50 in

damage to the police vehicle when he kicked out its window, which made it a third-degree misdemeanor. (Sentencing

Hr'g Tr. at 16; see also SCR No. 60, Stanley 2, No. 1366 WDA 2007, slip op. at 7 n.14 ("While the Commonwealth

originally did offer to substitute an ungraded criminal mischief charge for the third-degree institutional vandalism

charge, criminal mischief offenses are graded according to the pecuniary loss caused by the defendant... [If Petitioner]

had accepted the Commonwealth's plea offer, he would have pled guilty to third-degree misdemeanor criminal

mischief.)).

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(3) that he was not licensed or privileged to enter the structure. (Day 2 Trial Tr. at 130-31). See

also 18 PA.CONS.STAT. § 3502(A). "[A] person is privileged, within the meaning of [the]

burglary statute, if he may naturally be expected to be on the premises often and in the natural

course of his duties or habits." Commonwealth v. Corbin, 446 A.2d 308, 311 (Pa.Super. 1982)

(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Importantly, "a person who is privileged may still

commit burglary if he would not reasonably be expected to be present[.]" Id. 

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction 

because his sister, Crass, testified that he was allowed to be in her apartment and he did not have

to ask permission to enter. She also testified, in an attempt to show that Petitioner had not

broken through her front door, that she had caused the damage to it about a month before the

incident when she had locked herself out and had to break into her own apartment. (Id.)

The "clearly established Federal law" in which to analyze Claim 2 is set forth in Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In a habeas corpus proceeding, where the sufficiency of the

evidence is in contention:

[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a criminal conviction .... does not require a court to ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt... Instead, the relevant question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145, 147 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19)

(internal citations and quotes omitted). See also Robertson v. Klem, 580 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir.

2009)).

In rejecting Claim 2, the Superior Court applied the Pennsylvania equivalent of the

Jackson v. Virginia standard. Stanley 1, No. 879 WDA 2005, slip op. at 3. See also Evans v.

Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, 959 F.2d 1227, 1233 (3d Cir. 1992) (the test for

insufficiency of the evidence is the same under both Pennsylvania and federal law). It noted that

the jury was free to decide that Crass's testimony was not credible, which is exactly what it did. 

Id. at 5. The Superior Court then reviewed the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth from

which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was not privileged to

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enter Crass's apartment early in the morning on August 8, 2004, including testimony and physical

evidence to show that Petitioner forcefully broke down the front door. (See Day 2 Trial Tr. at

14-15, 73-74). It held:

Testimony other than that of Ms. Crass established that [Petitioner] was not

privileged to enter the apartment when he did.... Ms. Crass did not inform Nichole

and Shon that they should expect [Petitioner]. Shon testified that he was

awakened by a loud crash at the door in the front of the residence. [Petitioner]

rushed into the bedroom and commenced his assaultive behavior. Further, Shon

testified that he was under the impression that [Petitioner] was not permitted to

enter the apartment. The jury was free to determine that [Petitioner's] manner of

entry was not in conformity with that of a person who was privileged to enter the

apartment. 

Stanley 1, No. 879 WDA 2005, slip op. at 6 (citing Day 2 Trial Tr. at 32, 40-41 (emphasis

added)).

In sum, the jury's burglary verdict was supported by the constitutional minimum of

evidence necessary and the Superior Court's adjudication of Claim 2 withstands review under

AEDPA. Therefore, Claim 2 is denied. 

 C. Certificate of Appealability

28 U.S.C. § 2253 governs the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate

review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that "[a] certificate of

appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right." Where the federal district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its

merits, "the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong[.]" Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d

299, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Applying this

standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the claims raised in the 

Petition For a Writ Of Habeas Corpus are without merit. Accordingly, a certificate of

appealability should be denied.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the claims raised in the Petition For a Writ Of Habeas Corpus

are denied and a certificate of appealability is denied. An appropriate Order follows.

 

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: May 12, 2010

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Case 1:08-cv-00137-SPB Document 20 Filed 05/12/10 Page 11 of 12
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BILLY CLIFFORD STANLEY, )

Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 08-137 Erie

)

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

)

RAYMOND J. SOBINA, et al., )

Respondents. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this12th day of May, 2010;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition For a Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To

28 U.S.C. § 2254 [Document No. 1] is denied and a certificate of appealability is denied. The

Clerk of Courts is directed to close this case.

/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:08-cv-00137-SPB Document 20 Filed 05/12/10 Page 12 of 12