NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SOLOMON UPSHAW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5104

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00058-JFM, Senior Judge James F. 

Merow. 

______________________ 

Decided: November 10, 2014

______________________ 

SOLOMON UPSHAW, of Cape Neddick, Maine, pro se. 

WILLIAM B. LAZARUS, Attorney, Environment and 

Natural Resources Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, SCHALL, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
2 UPSHAW v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Solomon Upshaw (“Upshaw”) appeals from the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims (the 

“Claims Court”) dismissing his complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the 

Rules of the Court of Federal Claims. See Upshaw v. 

United States, No. 14-cv-0058 (Fed. Cl. May 30, 2014) 

(“Order”). Because the Claims Court did not err in dismissing Upshaw’s complaint, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On January 24, 2014, Upshaw filed a complaint 

against the United States in the Claims Court, in which 

he sought damages from the United States based on a 

January 2014 decision by the Eastern Band of Cherokee 

Indians (“Band”) declining to enroll him as a member. 

Order at 1. The government moved to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. In response, Upshaw submitted documents 

showing the rejection in 1907 of an application by 

Georgeana Upshaw, in which Georgeana Upshaw requested a share of a fund appropriated by Congress for 

the Cherokee Indians. Upshaw asserted that he was a 

descendant of Georgeana Upshaw and that he had suffered injury by reason of the 1907 rejection. Id. The court 

granted the government’s motion and dismissed Upshaw’s 

complaint after concluding that his claims were beyond 

the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. Id. at 2.

Upshaw appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Claims Court’s decision to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Waltner v. 

United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence, Taylor v. United States, 

303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and “the leniency 
UPSHAW v. US 3

afforded pro se litigants with respect to mere formalities 

does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements,” 

Demes v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) (citing 

Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 

(Fed. Cir. 1987)).

Upshaw generally alleges that the Claims Court erred 

by failing “to take into account power and authority.” 

Appellant’s Informal Br. 1. The government responds 

that Upshaw has provided no argument to establish how 

the Claims Court specifically erred and that the Claims 

Court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over 

Upshaw’s complaint.

We agree with the government that the Claims Court 

lacked jurisdiction. The Claims Court is a court of limited 

jurisdiction. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 

(Fed. Cir. 1997). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, limits 

the jurisdiction of the Claims Court to claims for money 

damages against the United States based on sources of 

substantive law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.” United 

States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Claims Court correctly determined that it 

lacked jurisdiction over Upshaw’s claims relating to his 

failure to enroll with the Band because the federal government has no statutory obligation to act in Cherokee 

enrollment issues. Moreover, to the extent that Upshaw 

specifically attempts to seek damages based on the 1907 

rejection of Georgeana Upshaw’s application, even if the 

provision of the fund appropriated by Congress could be 

considered to be a money-mandating statute, we agree 

with the Claims Court’s finding that the matter was timebarred by the six-year statute of limitations and thus 

beyond the jurisdiction of the Claims Court for that 

reason. 
4 UPSHAW v. US

We have considered Upshaw’s remaining arguments 

and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Claims Court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs.