Present: All the Justices 

S. F. (JANE DOE), AN INFANT, ETC., ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 950120 November 3, 1995 

WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John E. Clarkson, Judge 

 In this appeal of a declaratory judgment, we consider 

whether a provision in a liability insurance contract is 

ambiguous, and we must determine the amount of insurance 

available under the terms of the insurance contract to 

satisfy any judgments that may be entered against the 

insureds. 

 The West American Insurance Company filed its amended 

motion for declaratory judgment against numerous infants and 

their parents (collectively referred to as "claimants"), 

James E. Owens, William F. Weeks, Thomas A. Conner, Margaret 

Cody, Jean J. Ford, David L. Huffman, and Michael J. Coyle, 

trading as Harbor View Associates (collectively referred to 

as the "insureds"), and Century 21 Landmark Realty. West 

American had issued a policy of liability insurance to the 

insureds who are the owners of Harbor View Apartments, 

located in Norfolk. 

 The claimants had filed seven separate lawsuits against 

the insureds. The claimants alleged that the infant 

claimants were sexually assaulted and/or molested on 

multiple occasions by the insureds' resident manager, 

Charles Raymond Vette. The claimants alleged that Century 

21 Landmark Realty and the insureds were negligent in the 

hiring, selection, retention, and supervision of Vette and 
Century 21 Landmark Realty, and that these parties "knew or 

should have known that Charles R. Vette had a history of 

criminal behavior, was a known child molester, had been 

convicted of child molestation and was on parole at the time 

of the hiring, and knew or should have known Charles R. 

Vette was unfit for the employment situation." 

 West American sought and obtained a declaration from 

the trial court that the claimants' claims which arose "from 

the alleged 'negligent hiring' of Vette[,] constitute[d] no 

more than a single 'occurrence' as defined by the Policy and 

applicable law" and, thus, West American's total potential 

exposure to all the claimants is limited to $1,000,000. We 

awarded the claimants an appeal. 

 West American's policy of insurance contains the 

following provisions pertinent to this appeal: 

 SECTION II--COMPREHENSIVE BUSINESS LIABILITY

 The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all 

sums which the insured shall become legally 

obligated to pay as damages because of bodily 

injury . . . or personal injury caused by an 

occurrence to which this insurance applies. 

 The total liability of the Company for all 

damages, including . . . damages for care and loss 

of services, as a result of any one occurrence

shall not exceed the limit of liability stated in 

the Declarations as applicable to each occurrence. 

. . . . 

 The above limits shall apply regardless of the 

following: 

 1. the number of persons or organizations 

insured under this policy; 

 2. the number of persons or organizations 

who have sustained injury or damage; 

 3. the number of claims made or causes of 
action or suits brought because of 

injury or damage. 

 For the purpose of determining the limit of the 

Company's liability, all bodily injury and 

property damage arising out of a continuous or 

repeated exposure to substantially the same 

general conditions shall be considered as arising 

out of one occurrence. 

Section II of the policy, which contains definitions, states 

in pertinent part: 

 [O]ccurrence means an accident, including 

continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, 

which results in bodily injury or property damage

neither expected nor intended from the standpoint 

of the insured and with respect to personal 

injury, the commission of an offense, or a series 

of similar or related offenses. 

 The claimants contend that the policy's definition of 

occurrence is ambiguous and, thus, this definition should be 

construed so that the policy affords coverage to the 

insureds. West American argues that its definition of 

occurrence is unambiguous. 

 Recently, we stated the following principles which are 

applicable here: 

 An ambiguity, if one exists, must be found on the 

face of the policy. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. 

Wenger, 222 Va. 263, 268, 278 S.E.2d 874, 877 

(1981). And, language is ambiguous when it may be 

understood in more than one way or when it refers 

to two or more things at the same time. Lincoln 

National Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Container 

Corp., 229 Va. 132, 136-37, 327 S.E.2d 98, 101 

(1985). Finally, doubtful, ambiguous language in 

an insurance policy will be given an 

interpretation which grants coverage, rather than 

one which withholds it. St. Paul Ins. v. Nusbaum 

& Co., 227 Va. 407, 411, 316 S.E.2d 734, 736 

(1984). American Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 

238 Va. 543, 547, 385 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1989). 

Granite State Insurance Co. v. Bottoms, 243 Va. 228, 233-34, 

415 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1992). Applying these principles, we 
are of opinion that the definition of occurrence in West 

American's insurance contract is indeed ambiguous because it 

is susceptible to numerous interpretations. For example, 

within the factual content of the claimants' motions for 

judgment against West American's insureds, an occurrence 

could be deemed as any one of the following: the insureds' 

negligent hiring of Vette, or the insureds' negligent 

supervision of Vette, or the insureds' negligent retention 

of Vette. And, it is incumbent upon the insurer to use 

language sufficiently clear to avoid any such ambiguity if 

the insurer desires to limit its coverage. See St. Paul 

Insurance, 227 Va. at 412, 316 S.E.2d at 736. 

 Because the definition of occurrence is ambiguous, we 

must construe the policy in favor of the insureds and, thus, 

we hold that the trial court erred by declaring that the 

insurer's total potential exposure to the claimants is 

limited to $1,000,000. Now, we must now determine the 

maximum amount that the policy of insurance obligates the 

insurer to pay to the claimants on behalf of its insureds in 

the event a judgment is entered against them. 

 West American's declarations page provides a $1,000,000 

limitation of liability for each occurrence. And, as quoted 

above, the insurance contract contains the following 

pertinent provision: "For the purpose of determining the 

limit of the Company's liability, all bodily injury and 

property damage arising out of a continuous or repeated 

exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall 

be considered as arising out of one occurrence." Each 
infant claimant was allegedly subjected to Vette's repeated 

acts of sexual molestation, and the injuries resulting from 

those acts arose out of a "continuous or repeated exposure 

to substantially the same general conditions." Thus, even 

though each infant claimant was subjected to several acts of 

sexual molestation, under the terms of the insurance 

contract, these acts constitute only one occurrence per 

infant claimant. Therefore, we hold that the insurance 

contract requires West American to pay on behalf of its 

insureds all sums which the insureds shall become legally 

obligated to pay to the claimants for an amount not to 

exceed $1,000,000 for each infant claimant. West American's 

total potential exposure to all the claimants cannot exceed 

a maximum total of $7,000,000. 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and enter a final judgment here declaring that the 

insurer must pay on behalf of the insureds all sums which 

they shall become legally obligated to pay in an amount not 

to exceed $1,000,000 for each infant claimant. 

Reversed and final judgment.