NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

PETE G., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.G., N.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0427

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD28945

The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge Pro Tem

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Maurice Portley joined.
PETE G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

G E M M I L L, Judge:

¶1 Pete G. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his children, A.G. and N.G. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Shai Z. (“Mother”) are the biological parents of 

A.G. and N.G., who were born in 2013 and 2014, respectively.1 In August 

2014, A.G. and N.G. were taken into temporary care by the Department of 

Child Safety (“DCS”). In October 2014, the juvenile court found the 

children dependent and approved a case plan of family reunification 

concurrent with severance and adoption.

¶3 The juvenile court ordered DCS to provide, and Father to 

engage in, reunification services, including substance-abuse treatment and 

testing. Over the next nine months, Father failed to participate in the 

services provided, failed to keep in contact with DCS, and routinely missed 

visits with the children. In August 2015, DCS filed a motion to terminate 

Father’s parental rights under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 

8-533, and an initial severance hearing was scheduled for September 10, 

2015. Father failed to appear at the initial severance hearing, and the 

juvenile court continued the hearing to October 26, 2015.

¶4 Father also failed to appear, without good cause, at the 

October 26, 2015 continued initial severance hearing, and the juvenile court 

proceeded in his absence. See A.R.S. § 8-863(C) (allowing the court to 

proceed with termination proceedings if the parent has notice of them and 

fails to appear without just cause); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 66(D)(2). The court 

found that Father had proper legal notice of the hearings, was absent 

without good cause at the pretrial conference, and was therefore deemed to 

have admitted the factual allegations against him. After receiving 

testimony and exhibits, the court also determined that Father was unable to 

discharge his parental responsibilities due to a history of chronic drug and 

alcohol abuse, and that reasonable grounds existed to believe Father’s 

 

1 Mother’s parental rights were terminated in November 2015, and she is 

not a party to this appeal. 
PETE G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

substance abuse would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.2

Father timely appeals and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Although the right to the custody and control of one’s 

children is fundamental, it is not absolute. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). As applicable here, to justify 

termination of the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must find

clear and convincing evidence supporting at least one of the statutory 

grounds under A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 

Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 18 (App. 2007). We will not disturb the court’s order 

terminating parental rights unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous 

and no reasonable evidence exists to support them. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 78–79, ¶ 9 (App. 2001). “[W]e will presume that the 

juvenile court made every finding necessary to support the severance order 

if reasonable evidence supports the order.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 17 (App. 2004). 

¶6 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the juvenile court may terminate 

parental rights to a child if “the parent is unable to discharge parental 

responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, 

controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period.” 

¶7 At the hearing, the DCS case manager testified that Father 

failed to participate in rehabilitation services offered, including drug 

treatment and drug testing. The case manager explained that, in the tests 

he had provided for DCS, Father tested positive for illegal substances. 

Father then stopped testing altogether. The case manager also expressed 

his opinion that Father would continue to abuse illegal substances because 

of Father’s failure to engage in the rehabilitative services provided. Finally, 

he testified that Father was unable to discharge parental duties, including 

basic care of the children, because of Father’s substance abuse.

¶8 Based on the case manager’s testimony and exhibits 

presented at the hearing, the court found that Father was abusing illegal 

 

2 The court also found that severance was in the children’s best interests. 

Father does not challenge that finding on appeal. 
PETE G. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

substances. The court determined that because of Father’s substance abuse, 

he was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. The court also 

found that Father failed to engage in treatment offered, and thus, Father’s 

substance abuse was likely to continue for an indefinite and prolonged 

period.

¶9 The findings of fact on this record are sufficient to support the 

conclusion that Father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities 

due to substance abuse, and that this condition will continue for an 

indeterminate period. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Moreover, contrary to 

Father’s contention, the court’s findings and conclusions were “sufficiently 

specific to enable the appellate court to provide effective review.” Ruben 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 241, ¶ 25 (App. 2012); see also 

Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 66(F)(2)(a) (requiring that the court “[m]ake specific 

findings of fact in support of the termination of parental rights and grant 

the motion or petition for termination”). 

CONCLUSION

¶10 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination 

of Father’s parental rights to these children.

3 

 

3 Because we find the juvenile court correctly severed Father’s parental 

rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), we need not address Father’s arguments 

that the court did not make adequate findings under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) 

regarding the likelihood that Father would be able to care for the children 

in the future.