S. Hrg. 115–295 

FENCING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 4, 2017 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
FENCING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

27–015 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. Hrg. 115–295 

FENCING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 4, 2017 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

JON TESTER, Montana 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

KAMALA D. HARRIS, California 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

BROOKE N. ERICSON, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy 

MICHELLE D. WOODS, U.S. Government Accountability Office Detailee 

SERVANDO H. GONZALES, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Detailee 

MARGARET E. DAUM, Minority Staff Director 

STACIA M. CARDILLE, Minority Chief Counsel 

J. JACKSON EATON, Minority Senior Counsel 

JOEL F. WALSH, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN, Minority National Institute of Standards and Technology Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BONNI E. DINERSTEIN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 2 

Senator Lankford .............................................................................................. 18 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 20 

Senator Heitkamp ............................................................................................ 24 

Senator Harris .................................................................................................. 27 

Senator Hoeven ................................................................................................. 30 

Senator Daines ................................................................................................. 34 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 41 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 42 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2017 

David V. Aguilar, Former Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................... 5 

Ronald S. Colburn, Former Deputy Chief of U.S. Border Patrol at U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security .. 8 

Terence M. Garrett, Ph.D., Professor and Chair, Public Affairs and Security 

Studies Department, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley .................. 10 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Aguilar, David V.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Colburn, Ronald S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51 

Garrett, Terence M., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

APPENDIX 

Majority Staff Report ............................................................................................... 76 

Minority Staff Report .............................................................................................. 181 

Howard Buffett statement referenced by Senator Heitkamp .............................. 188 

Tohono O’odham Nation statement referenced by Senator Heitkamp ................ 192 

Gangs Beyond Borders report referenced by Senator Harris .............................. 195 

Statements submitted for the Record: 

Gerald Dickinson, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh 

School of Law ................................................................................................ 309 

National Immigration Forum .......................................................................... 314 

Texas Civil Rights Project ............................................................................... 321 

Patricia Elena Vidaurri, Land Owner and Citizen of the United States 

of America ...................................................................................................... 325 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record 

Mr. Aguilar ........................................................................................................ 327 

Mr. Colburn ....................................................................................................... 332 

Dr. Garrett ........................................................................................................ 335 

(1) 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

FENCING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 

TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2017 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Hoeven, Daines, 

McCaskill, Carper, Tester, Heitkamp, Peters, Hassan, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. This hearing will come to 

order. I want to welcome the witnesses. Thank you for your testimony. I am looking forward to your oral testimony and answering 

a lot of the questions we are going to have. 

This hearing is obviously called, ‘‘Fencing Along the Southwest 

Border.’’ I ask Unanimous Consent (UC) for my written statement 

to be entered into the record.1

I do want to relay a couple of quotes that were in my written testimony. 

One came from Secretary John Kelly. When Secretary Kelly testified before this Committee in January, he said, ‘‘the number one 

threat to the Nation is that we do not have control of our borders. 

Without control, every other kind of threat—drugs, illegal immigrants, counterfeit manufactured goods and pharmaceuticals, diseases, terrorists, and the list goes on—can enter at will, and it 

does.’’ 

Further, Chief Morgan, the Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol 

(USBP) under President Obama, testified before this Committee in 

November 2016 that fencing does work and that we need more of 

it. 

I was in Israel shortly before Christmas, and we inspected their 

fence along their Southern Border—143 miles—and they constructed it in about 2 years at a total cost of about $2.9 million per 

mile. According to Israeli officials, they cut their illegal immigrant 

crossings from 16,000 to 18. So, again, I think there is ample evidence that fencing, when put in the right places and when it is 

properly designed, absolutely works. 

The purpose of this hearing, though, is to lay out the reality. We 

obviously have limited resources. President Trump has issued a 
2 

1The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

couple of Executive Orders (EOs). The Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Executive Order instructs the Administration 

to take all appropriate steps to plan, design, and construct a physical wall, to identify and plan for long-term funding requirements, 

and release a study on security of the border within 180 days. 

Now, what I am focusing on with that is the planning, designing, 

identifying, and releasing a study on border security within 180 

days. To me, Congress has a real role here, and the purpose of this 

hearing is to lay out the reality—take a look at where fencing will 

work and what is the best type of fencing. When I was in Israel, 

talking to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he told me that 

there are three problems with fencing: tunnels, tunnels, and tunnels. 

So, it is not a panacea. It requires a layered approach. But, this 

is our 22nd hearing on securing our border. This is a top priority 

of this Committee. I am hoping every Member on this Committee 

realizes that there is real risk—there is real danger in not having 

a secure border. And, we have held hearings about some of the victims of people coming to this country illegally, because we do not 

have a secure border. 

So, I hope we can agree that we do need to provide far greater 

border security. We have to make that commitment to do it. But, 

I also hope we can agree that, while there are a lot of different 

opinions, there are a lot of challenges to building that border security—to building walls and to building fences—and that is really 

kind of what this hearing is all about—is to kind of lay out the reality and discuss those challenges, so we can have informed public 

policy, in terms of what we need to do to secure our border. 

So, with that, I will turn it over to my Ranking Member, Senator 

McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL1

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me publicly apologize to the witnesses, to the Chairman, and to the Committee for being tardy this morning. That is rude, and I apologize. 

There is no one on this Committee—and I do not think there is 

anyone in the Senate or in America—that does not want our borders to be secure. I think we can all agree on that. 

But, the other interesting point is, I have not met anyone—either 

a Border Patrol Agent (BPA) or a fellow Member of Congress, who 

actually have said that they think the most effective way to do that 

is to build a continuous concrete wall along the entirety of the 

Southern Border. I have not met anyone who says that is the best 

use of our resources, in terms of securing our border, and the only 

one who keeps talking about it is President Trump. And, I want 

to point out that while this hearing is called ‘‘Fencing Along the 

Southwest Border,’’ you never hear President Trump talk about the 

efficacy of fencing. You never hear President Trump indicate in his 

Executive Orders or anywhere else that he wants to look at this 

in a complex, holistic fashion to figure out what is the combination 

of things we need to do. Is it more resources at the ports of entry 

(POEs)? Is it more resources, in terms of Border Patrol? Is it more 
3 

resources, in terms of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE)? Is it more technology? Is it some sections of wall and maybe 

some sections of fencing? 

I think all of us are open to a variety of ways, and I think the 

thing we should be doing is listening to the people who are tasked 

with securing the border, and they are the first ones to tell you 

that it makes no sense to do a continuous wall along our Southern 

Border. 

So, with that beginning, I think it is important, at this hearing, 

that we stay focused on a couple of basics. What is the wall that 

the President is proposing going to look like? What is it going to 

cost? How is Mexico going to reimburse the American taxpayers for 

the billions of dollars they are being asked to spend on the wall? 

Since the beginning of this Congress, the Committee has conducted ongoing oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and its plans to construct a concrete border wall. I have 

asked my staff to report to this Committee and the taxpayers on 

the results of our oversight of the wall to date. 

Based on information provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials to Committee staff, the wall that President 

Trump has promised could cost nearly $70 billion. That works out 

to more than $200 for every man, woman, and child in the United 

States of America. I am not sure that is a cost the American taxpayer is willing to bear, especially when they were told that Mexico 

would be paying for the wall—not the American people. 

The Department has told us that they plan to use funds intended 

to acquire remote video surveillance for the prototypes of the concrete wall. The $20 million they are using to do the prototypes 

came out of the very fund that all of the Border Patrol Agents told 

me they needed more of. In fact, it was to buy the remote video 

surveillance equipment that they proudly showed me they had put 

together themselves, which allowed them to see a more broad area 

along the Rio Grande River and allowed them to be more effective 

in catching the smugglers that were bringing people across the 

river illegally. 

When I asked Border Patrol agents over and over again, ‘‘What 

do you need?’’, they told me they needed technology and, yes, some 

additional fencing—and I think the Chairman and I agree that 

some additional fencing or wall may be appropriate. But, they definitely said that they needed technology more than they needed additional wall. And so, it is ironic that the prototype for the wall is 

coming out of the very fund that they say they need the most. 

And, what about the big question that I would like to spend some 

time on today: the cost of acquiring the land that is going to be 

needed to build the wall. Two-thirds of the U.S.-Mexico border is 

private and State-owned land. Some of this land has been in people’s families for generations. 

I am not sure everyone realizes what a time-consuming 

process this would be. According to CBP, along one stretch of the 

border—mostly in South Texas—400 land acquisitions were needed 

to build some of the border fencing and security that is in place 

now. Of those 400 acquisitions, they had to file 330 condemnation 

lawsuits—eminent domain—which, by the way, you say that word 

in rural Missouri, and you better run, because somebody is going 
4 

to have their shotgun out. It is really controversial for the government to be seizing land, and that is what this is about—the government seizing private land. 

Over three hundred condemnation lawsuits were filed. Most of 

them were filed in and around 2008. And, of those 330 condemnation cases, more than 90 of them are still pending today—nearly 

a decade later. This is not going to be quick. It is not going to be 

easy—and it is going to be very expensive. According to CBP, the government spent $78 million on land acquisition for the existing fencing—and those were the parcels that 

were the easiest to acquire. Going to people who do not have a lot 

of money and trying to buy them off—that is the easy part. The 

harder part is convincing people that own thousands of acres of expensive farmland—and what that means to them. 

Nobody can tell me how much it is going to cost to seize all of 

the land that will have to be seized to build what President Trump 

has promised the American people. It is going to take $21 million 

or more just to resolve the pending cases left over from 2008. 

In the course of prepping for this hearing, we talked to a lot of 

different landowners in South Texas, who were not happy about 

how they were treated by the government back when existing fencing was built a decade ago. One of these people is a gentleman 

from Brownsville, Texas, whose family runs a farming operation in 

the area. He had the misfortune of living in a house that was too 

close to the Rio Grande River, which is the international border. In 

some cases, there is a mile or two of land between where fencing 

was built and the river, and that is how this man’s house—and 

some of the most fertile land in the world—ended up on the wrong 

side of the fence. 

When the government came knocking on his door, this Brownsville farmer was offered just a few thousand dollars for the narrow 

strip of land where an 18-foot-tall fence would eventually be built. 

He was not offered any money for the dozens of acres of farmland 

that would be trapped between the fence and the Rio Grande River. 

When he went to take out a loan on his valuable land to send his 

three girls to college, the bank told him that his farmland was now 

worthless and they would not lend him any money for his children’s education. 

The horrible part of this story is, not only does he have to pass 

through a gate every time to go home—it is an 18-foot fence—he 

has to go through a gate just to go to the house. Think how isolated 

you would feel. 

But, here is the worst part: A few weeks ago, the house caught 

on fire. The Brownsville farmer told my staff that the fire marshal 

could not get through the fence to save his house from the flames, 

and it burnt to the ground—even though he had been promised 

that local emergency services would have the code to the gate. So, 

he lost the value of his land and now he has lost his home, because 

of the fence or the wall. 

Regardless of how you feel about President Trump’s wall, Mr. 

Chairman, that is not how we should treat people that are landowners in this country. American families need to be treated with 

dignity and respect and need to be fairly compensated for any land 

that is taken from them. 
5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Aguilar appears in the Appendix on page 47. 

I will be the first one to tell you that we need to enforce the immigration laws that we have on the books and provide DHS officials with the tools and resources they need to secure the border. 

And, maybe, that means they need some portions of a wall built 

in some places. But, if we are going to pay to build this thing, we 

need to be honest about some of the true costs to the American people. Let us start, today, by speaking frankly about how much it is 

going to cost, how difficult it will be to acquire the land, how long 

that will take, and the impacts on the American landowners along 

the border—and whether all of those costs justify the benefit that 

we will receive. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from 

the witnesses. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

As I mentioned, there will be challenges. By the way, those cases 

that were unresolved—92 of those are because we could not identify who the owners are. So, yes, there are all kinds of challenges, 

which is what the purpose of this hearing is: to lay out these realities. 

The tradition of this Committee is to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will all rise and raise your right hand? Do you swear that the 

testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. AGUILAR. I do. 

Mr. COLBURN. I do. 

Mr. GARRETT. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is David Aguilar. Mr. Aguilar is a former Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Mr. 

Aguilar served as Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol from 2004 to 

2010 and as Acting Commissioner of CBP from 2011 to 2012. Mr. 

Aguilar. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID V. AGUILAR,1 FORMER ACTING COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION AT 

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. AGUILAR. Good morning. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member McCaskill, and distinguished Members of the Committee. 

I am honored to appear before you today to testify on issues associated with securing the Southern Border of the United States, to include what has obviously taken center stage in the ongoing border 

security discussion: construction of a physical wall along the Southwest Border, what I will refer to mostly as ‘‘infrastructure’’ required along the Southwest Border. 

My testimony is informed by my 35-year career as a Border Enforcement Officer and Department of Homeland Security Executive. 

I served as an agent in multiple Border Patrol sectors, including 

as the Chief of the Tucson Sector at the time when unlawful entries into the United States across our border with Mexico were at 

an all-time high. 

My views also reflect my experience as the former Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Deputy Com-
6 

missioner of CBP, and the National Chief of the United States Border Patrol. It was during my tenure as National Chief that we developed and implemented our Nation’s first-ever National Southwest Border Strategy, doubled the size of the Border Patrol, constructed over 650 miles of border infrastructure, and initiated the 

organized application of technology along the entirety of the Southwest Border with Mexico. 

Maintaining a safe and secure environment along the U.S.-Mexico border is absolutely critical. A safe and orderly border that is 

predicated on the strong rule of law deprives criminal organizations, drug cartels, and criminal individuals the opportunity to 

thrive. It is absolutely important. It also provides a solid foundation for trade and economic development between Mexico and the 

United States as well as provides for improved security and quality 

of life in our border communities and throughout our Nation. 

Illegal border crossings have dropped dramatically. Our border 

communities are some of the safest cities and communities in the 

United States. Trade between our two nations is thriving. The barriers and infrastructure built and expanded between 2005 and 

2011 along the border absolutely played a large part in the enhanced control of the Southwest Border. Now, we have done much 

to secure the border, but there is still much more to do. 

Borders are dynamic—significant challenges remain and new 

ones are developing. Drug trafficking into the United States is still 

a major problem, as is the illegal flow of bulk cash and firearms 

to Mexico from the United States. These criminal activities are the 

principal causes of the violence that has afflicted Mexico. 

Border fences, walls, and tactical infrastructure are absolutely a 

definitive part of the border security solution. Those of us with 

firsthand knowledge and security experience at the U.S.-Mexico 

border understand that infrastructure, technology, and personnel 

are critical aspects of the solution that will ensure enhanced control over the entire border. Walls, fences, and vehicle barriers are 

an integral part of a border enforcement system. Their purpose is 

to impede, deter, and slow down the illegal flow of people and vehicles across our land borders between the ports of entry. Properly 

designed, properly placed, and supported, this type of physical infrastructure creates an environment which enhances the Border 

Patrol’s enforcement capabilities and its efforts to detect, deter, 

identify, classify, respond to, and resolve illegal border activity. 

There is no restriction that would bar DHS from constructing additional fencing or other barriers along the border, provided that 

the Secretary concludes such construction is necessary to achieve 

control of the border. 

Congress has also provided the Secretary broad authority to 

waive ‘‘all legal requirements’’ that may impede construction of border barriers and roads. 

Many issues will have to be taken into account: federally protected lands, private lands, Native American lands, and environmental concerns. But, it is important to note that there is nothing 

more destructive to environmentally sensitive land and quiet communities than the uncontrolled illegal flow of people, smugglers, vehicles, and criminal organizations. The placement of fences and deterrent infrastructure in previously uncontrolled parts of the border 
7 

has actually allowed for the rejuvenation of areas that had previously been devastated due to heavy illegal pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Fences, barriers, walls, and technology have been instrumental to the Border Patrol’s successes on the border. But, we 

must not forget that personnel and technological capabilities are an 

absolutely vital part of integrated border control strategies. 

Barriers in infrastructure—along with significant increases in 

Border Patrol personnel, improved detection and surveillance capabilities, and the strategic deployment of resources to support 

iterative border control strategies—have gotten us to where we are: 

improved control of the border. But, again, I reiterate, more needs 

to be done. 

President Trump has directed the Secretary of DHS to develop 

a strategy to obtain and maintain complete operational control of 

the Southern Border. I believe walls, fences, and border infrastructure will definitively be a part of what the Border Patrol will be 

identifying as current requirements. The Secretary’s findings 

should inform what types of barriers should be constructed, where 

they should be constructed, and construction priorities. 

There are multiple threats that must be addressed at the U.S.- 

Mexico border. These include trafficking of drugs, trafficking of 

arms, contraband within legal trade, and money laundering. The 

criminal organizations that work to defeat our border enforcement 

efforts are too often solely looked upon as drug-smuggling and 

human-smuggling organizations. 

These same organizations will provide illegal access into our 

country for anyone willing to pay the going price. Our military men 

and women are fighting the enemy on foreign ground. We have 

hardened our airports and ports of entry, making it extremely difficult to get to us by air. But, we must act responsibly in addressing our borders. 

Ladies and gentlemen, since the Border Patrol began building infrastructure—fences, walls, and vehicle barriers—along our Nation’s border, there has been an endless debate on its value. Border 

Patrol agents and the Border Patrol as an organization all agree 

that properly constructed, placed, and supported physical infrastructure is essential to border security. 

Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to answering 

any questions that you might have of us. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Aguilar. 

Our next witness is Ron Colburn. Mr. Colburn is the former Deputy Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol. Mr. Colburn served in that role 

from 2007 to 2009. He helped oversee the effort to double the size 

of the Border Patrol and the deployment of more than $1 billion 

worth of technology and tactical infrastructure designed to bolster 

border enforcement efforts. Prior to being named Deputy Chief, Mr. 

Colburn served as the Chief Patrol Agent of the Yuma Sector, 

where he made significant improvements toward securing that sector. Mr. Colburn. 
8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Colburn appears in the Appendix on page 51. 

TESTIMONY OF RONALD S. COLBURN,1 FORMER DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL AT U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. COLBURN. Thank you and good morning. Chairman Johnson, 

Ranking Member McCaskill, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee, I am honored to be here, today and humbled to be invited by you to testify before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) regarding ‘‘Fencing Along the 

Southwest Border.’’ 

I will begin by describing some of my experience with and knowledge of the history of tactical infrastructure—also known as fences 

and barriers—pertaining to the international boundary between 

the United States and Mexico. 

Thirty-five years ago, in southeastern Arizona, I was building 

border fence with a post hole digging tool, a wire-stretching tool, 

a heavy coil of barbed wire, and a very good pair of leather gloves. 

Alone, and with no backup, my partner and I dug post holes and 

strung wire in Douglas, Arizona—standing just inches from Mexico. 

Three or four strands of barbed wire would not halt people from 

crossing or stop the smugglers from defeating our own efforts the 

very next night with a simple pair of wire cutters. But, it marked 

the border. It was our ‘‘line in the sand.’’ 

We have come a long way since the days of steel posts and 

strings of barbed wire. In 1995, a U.S. Army construction battalion 

replaced expanded metal and chain link fencing in another Arizona 

border town, where I found myself in command. That year, we arrested an astounding 116,000 foreign-born nationals illegally attempting to cross the border in just that station area alone. Countless tens of thousands got away from our sparse staff of 62 agents. 

That was our ‘‘thin green line.’’ 

Then came the attack on September 11, 2001 (9/11). After the 

horrendous, deadly attacks on American soil by foreign-born terrorists, the American people strongly communicated to Congress, to 

the Administration, and to the media that they wanted our Nation 

protected first and foremost at our borders. 

In 2005, I found myself serving as the Chief of the Yuma Border 

Patrol Sector in southwestern Arizona and the very southeastern 

portion of California. About 450 agents covered that approximately 

125-mile stretch of the border. They were working 8 to 12 hour 

shifts—overlapping—covering the border 24/7. 

During my first year as the Chief of Yuma, we arrested 138,000 

foreign-born nationals attempting to cross the border illegally from 

Mexico. They crossed under the cover of darkness and during broad 

daylight. They crossed in vast and overwhelming numbers. They 

crossed into Yuma and the urban centers where they could escape 

quickly. And, they were led by unscrupulous smugglers who 

brought them across the Colorado River—a water boundary—remote desert, and towering mountains, where the temperatures can 

skyrocket to 120 degrees or more. 

We seized nearly 36,000 pounds of drugs that were driven or 

backpacked into the United States just in Yuma alone. There were 
9 

over 200 attacks by border bandits recorded by us that year. We 

counted 1,800 victims, mostly from Mexico. The criminal gangs and 

lone bandits from Mexico preyed on their own—robbing, raping, 

and murdering fellow countrymen, including women and children. 

Many of these people were staging to enter from Mexico or in the 

process of entering illegally, led by guides that were actually working in concert with the bandits and sharing the take from those 

robberies and assaults. Assaults on border law enforcement personnel numbered in the hundreds just in that stretch of the border. 

Yuma had become the most dangerous stretch of the border at that 

time. 

So, in response to this, the Yuma Sector became the ‘‘proof of 

concept’’ that America can protect and control its border when the 

proper mix of resources are placed almost instantaneously. The 

Secretary of Homeland Security prudently and thoughtfully exercised his legislated waiver authority in consideration of certain environmental regulations, which posed a hindrance to construction 

initiatives. 

Nine hundred men and women from the National Guard, supporting ‘‘Operation Jump Start,’’ descended upon the border in the 

Yuma area. We built border barriers—fence—along the entire 

stretch of the Yuma Sector. The Army Corps of Engineers and contractors built double pedestrian fencing, vehicle barriers, and what 

is known as ‘‘floating fence’’ in the Imperial Sand Dunes Park region. The style and material used depended on the geographic and 

demographic challenges. We doubled the Border Patrol Agent manpower, and we added sensors and communications technology. 

Violent bandit activity went from that record 200 attacks the 

year before—and over 1,800 victims—to zero after the fence was 

built in Yuma. The number of violent assaults on Border Patrol 

Agents also declined drastically. 

Before fence, Yuma Border Patrol recorded 2,706 ‘‘drivethroughs’’ in a 1-year period. This is where smugglers load up vehicles with their contraband—be it drugs, people, or weapons—and 

simply drive across the open, unfettered border. They cross the 

river in shallow places, destroying wilderness landscape along the 

way. They lose themselves in urban areas and traffic once reaching 

paved roads. And, of those 2,706 ‘‘drive-throughs’’, we recorded a 

mere 13 captures and ‘‘turnbacks.’’ All of the rest got away, and we 

do not know what they brought into the United States. 

But, after fence, the next year, only six vehicles even attempted 

to enter the United States at any place other than a designated 

port of entry—and none of them got away. We captured or turned 

back all of them. So, it went from 2,706 down to 6. Impressive. 

By 2008, Yuma Sector arrests of illicit border crossers and traffickers had dwindled, from over 138,000 my first year there as 

Chief down to 8,363. The known attempts to enter and the ‘‘gotaways’’ dwindled to an equally minimal number, compared to the 

hundreds of thousands that entered and evaded arrest in the previous years. 

I do encourage you to ask those Border Patrol Agents in the field. 

They know. I recently completed a comprehensive tour of the border, myself, in South Texas, receiving robust ‘‘state of the border’’ 

briefings and updates by several Border Patrol Chiefs and their 
10 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Garrett appears in the Appendix on page 56. 

staffs. I have spoken with the majority of Border Patrol leadership 

that covers the Southwestern Border in recent days. 

The bottom line: When I ask them about fence, every one of them 

responds: ‘‘Yes, build new barriers where needed, improve existing 

fence, and maintain timely repairs when breached by criminals or 

damaged by the elements.’’ 

Threats change. The transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) 

simply will not go away. They try methods to defeat the fence, but 

it persistently impedes their ease of entry and their ability to 

quickly ingress into border communities and the interior of the 

United States. It gives the protectors of our borders the time to detect and respond to that illegal activity. It preserves the environment in the border wild lands. 

This system-of-systems approach, implemented broadly and rapidly, is what makes tactical infrastructure—border fence—so valuable as a part of the solution. 

Thank you, esteemed Members of the Committee. God bless the 

men and women of the U.S. Border Patrol, and I remain ready to 

continue this dialogue. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Colburn. 

Our final witness is Dr. Terence M. Garrett. Dr. Garrett currently serves as professor and chairman of the Public Affairs and 

Security Studies Department at The University of Texas Rio 

Grande Valley (UTRGV). He has authored numerous publications 

on eminent domain. Dr. Garrett is a military veteran and received 

the National Defense and Air Force Achievement Medals for his 

service. Dr. Garrett. 

TESTIMONY OF TERENCE M. GARRETT, PH.D.,1 PROFESSOR 

AND CHAIR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND SECURITY STUDIES DEPARTMENT, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS RIO GRANDE VALLEY 

Dr. GARRETT. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Johnson, 

Ranking Member McCaskill, and the rest of the distinguished Senators on the Committee for inviting me here, today to speak to you 

about the topic of fencing along the Southwest Border. Please note 

that my testimony and other remarks today before you are my responsibility and may or may not reflect the views of and are independent of my employer, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley. 

So, one of the things I am interested in discussing, first off, is 

the cost to the U.S. taxpayer for the border wall itself. I have seen 

reports anywhere between a few billion dollars up to $40 billion, 

in a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) story that was 

printed by the New York Times. 

The public of the United States is not in favor. The Pew Research Center shows that 39 percent of those polled were in favor 

of a fence or thought the wall was important to build, while 59 percent did not think the wall was important. The final cost to U.S. 

taxpayers for the construction of Trump’s border wall remains to 

be seen. It will be up to you, of course. 
11 

Bids will likely have to be extended—and they have been—for 

wall building contractors to develop a clearer understanding for 

government officials in charge of the project. 

Now, I can tell you directly about past experience with the building of the wall in the Rio Grande Valley, as an example of this. In 

the past, government contracts of now-existing border fence placements illustrate how corporations have benefited from the building 

of the border fence. Boeing’s Secure Border Initiative network 

(SBInet), for example, received $7.5 million per mile—out of 110 

miles—for constructing an 18-foot-high fence in the Rio Grande 

Valley (RGV) during the period of 2006 to 2009. 

In South Texas, the border fence was placed in areas where wildlife refuges, landowners, farmers, and ranchers were located, resulting in properties being apprehended by provisions of the Secure 

Fence Act of 2006, which was made reference to. 

So, the next thing I want to talk to you about is the account of 

eminent domain issues at the university I was at previously, the 

University of Texas at Brownsville and Texas Southmost College 

(UTB/TSC). I have archived Dr. Juliet Garcia’s personal statement 

archived at the University of Texas (UT). I am going to read some 

pieces from it. 

The President of the University of Texas at Brownsville and 

Texas Southmost College, Dr. Juliet Garcia, refused to sign a U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection document requesting right of entry 

in October 2007. She did not sign the document for the following 

reasons: 

First, there was a risk to our property investment, because the 

government sought access to land from levees to buildings in the 

very heart of our campus, adjacent to the student union and the 

Life and Health Sciences building. The right of entry was meant 

to support preparations for the building of a fence that would jeopardize campus security. 

And, on that point, Mr. Ben Reyna, formerly of the U.S. Marshals Service, was our adviser on this. 

There had been no opportunity for genuine public input. 

UTB/TSC has become a key player in the promotion of industry, especially ecotourism and reclamation of important wildlife areas, inclusive of thousands of acres of the Bahia Grande area. Many have 

worked for decades to design a campus that is respectful of the natural and rich environment of this special ecological zone. 

Finally, the right of entry jeopardized the important historical 

heritage of the campus. The university campus encompasses several significant historical sites, including historic Fort Brown and 

Fort Texas. 

In January 2008, UTB/TSC was sued in Federal court by the 

Federal Government. On July 31, 2008, a final agreement was 

reached with DHS. CBP dropped condemnation actions. The university enhanced its own fencing, a 10-foot-high fence with hightech devices—paid for by the State of Texas, by the way—and 

agreed to establish a center to study border issues, including security. 

I was part of President Garcia’s strategy team, and we went to 

Rancho El Cielo, which is a biological research station 300 miles 

south of Brownsville, Texas—near Gomez Farias, Mexico—along 
12 

1The Majority staff report appears in the Appendix on page 76. 

with UTB/TSC faculty and administrators and UT System attorneys. We considered what we had accomplished, in terms of winning a victory, we thought of as being in the best interests of the 

students, faculty, and citizens of South Texas. However, other citizens along the Rio Grande did not fare as well. 

DHS produced a document entitled, ‘‘Environmental Impact 

Statement for Construction, Maintenance, and Operation of Tactical Infrastructure for the Rio Grande Valley Sector,’’ dated November 2007. This document laid out the strategy for land condemnation proceedings against the citizens of the Rio Grande Valley. The fence went primarily in areas where landowners were economically—mostly citizens whose primary language was Spanish 

and who had lower levels of education attainment. Wealthy landowners, whose primary language was English and had higher education levels, were spared, and this was brought out in a Washington Post report. And, we had faculty, Jude Benavides and Jeff 

Wilson, who conducted a 2010 demographic study on disparities associated with the proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall in Cameron 

County, Texas, in ‘‘Southwestern Geographer’’ in 2010, and they 

found out that there was collusion to actually go after the poor, 

who would not resist. 

Judge Hanen, as mentioned previously—320 eminent domain 

cases wound up in his court, and 91 remain open. When Trump 

signed his Executive Order last month, calling for his big, beautiful 

wall, Hanen knew what that would mean. As he said to National 

Public Radio (NPR): ‘‘What I thought was, ‘Oh, this is going to be 

a lot more work for us,’ Hanen said. It is going to be a lot of headache. The people in South Texas—there are a lot of hard feelings 

about the wall.’’ 

My time is running out, but I have a few quotes here. 

‘‘You show me a 50-foot wall, and I will show you a 51-foot ladder 

at the border. That is the way the border works.’’ that is from 

Janet Napolitano, former Governor of Arizona, in 2005. 

Deputy spokesman for the National Border Patrol Council 

(NBPC) and Local 3307, Rio Grande Valley, Chris Cabrera, recalled 

recently: ‘‘We came with this 18-foot wall, and the very next day 

they had 19-foot ladders. It got to the point where we had so many 

ladders at the station that they told us to stop bringing the ladders 

in. It was just insane, the number of ladders. We had hundreds 

upon hundreds.’’ 

Cameron County Sheriff, Omar Lucio, says, ‘‘It is a waste of 

money. It is not going to work. I do not care what Trump is saying.’’ 

I will stop at this point. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Dr. Garrett. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Let me first start with cost. I hear a lot of 

estimates, and, again, they are all projections. But, let us take a 

look at some actual costs. Again, I will refer people to our Committee’s report1 on my trip to Israel: 143 miles worth of fence, con- structed between 2011 and 2013, at an average cost of $2.9 million 

per mile. 
13 

Now, you can have some inflationary cost increases, but, again, $2.9 million per mile. It is a pretty effective fence—from 16,000 illegal crossings down to 18—1–8. 

By the way, if you would like your Minority report to be entered 

into the record, I am happy to do so. I know you are talking about 

270 acres of land being purchased at an average cost of about 

$42,600. Depending on how you purchase that land—whether you 

do it in furlough versus chain—660 feet by 66—or square 

acres—somewhere the cost per mile of acquiring that land—based 

on that, it would be $340,000 to $1 million. So, tack on $1 million 

to 2.9 for the total cost of a 2,000-mile wall—and I do not think 

anybody here in this hearing room is—maybe they are—suggesting 

2,000 miles. We are looking at the right kind of fencing in the right 

places. But, even that would be less than $8 billion—somewhere 

between $5 and $8 billion. So, again, I want to be talking about 

real costs. 

Mr. Aguilar, the 650 miles of current fencing—again, I am waiting on the study, and it will be interesting when we have real information from DHS with their evaluation and what the real recommendation will be. Can you just give me your evaluation of the 

current fencing? About 350 miles of that is pedestrian fencing and 

about 300 miles is vehicle fencing. How good is it? How much 

needs to be replaced? In your estimation, how much more would 

need to be built? 

Mr. AGUILAR. So, the existing fence right now has been absolutely critical to get us to where we are today—at the level of control that exists along our border with Mexico. But, again, I need 

to reiterate that it is the fence, the technology, and the personnel 

that is needed in order to be responsive to any kind of breaching 

attempt that is done—whether it is with a 19-foot ladder or otherwise—‘‘otherwise’’ being the tunneling, the ultralights flying overhead, the catapulting that is happening, and the bridging of the 

fences. All of these things are, in fact, happening. 

We cannot forget, though, that the purpose of the fence is to 

deter, to impede, and to, basically, create more time and distance 

for the officers to be able to responsibly react and take the actions 

necessary. 

So, of the existing fence that is out there now, there is quite a 

bit of it that needs to be replaced, and the reason for that is what 

Chief Colburn and I as well as other Border Patrol Agents did. We 

actually built those fences back when we did not have the support 

of the American public, as I put it. So, a lot of it needs to be replaced. 

Now, as to how much is required, that is going to depend on the 

chiefs that are in the field right now, which is exactly the position 

that we took—that I took as the National Chief of the Border Patrol—I was going to chiefs in the field, asking them what they 

needed, where they needed it, what the type of fencing was, and 

what the purpose and rationale was, taking into account the 

very difficult decisions that we knew were going to be taking 

place—eminent domain—heart-wrenching. I was born, bred, and 

raised in Texas—not unlike Montana, not unlike Oklahoma, not 

unlike Missouri, where some of these are very touching situations 

and very hard. 
14 

But, I have to say that the oath that people like Mr. Colburn and 

I took was not to Texas, was not to South Texas, and was not to 

southern Arizona. It was to the country. It was what was most 

needed to be done to protect the country—the United States—in 

the best way that we could. That is what we are looking for now 

to move forward. 

Chairman JOHNSON. You talked about the goal being to 

impede—to deter. In Israel, their fence is about a 15-foot fence, and 

the whole design—first of all, you can see through it, which is an 

important design consideration. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I think that is important. But, the whole 

purpose of it was to give them about a 5-minute response time. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Exactly. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, that is what they have: a 5-minute response time. So, it is built with very thick rebar. It cannot be cut 

through and it cannot just be clipped. You would have to have a 

pretty good saw. It takes time, so that you have enough time for 

the border patrol in Israel to respond. Is that basically the primary 

goal of the fencing? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely, it is to deter and impede the flow and 

create that time and distance, which are critically important. 

Now, depending on where you are building the fence, it could be 

minutes, it could be hours, and, in some cases, the Border Patrol 

could need longer than that to impede, in order to take the appropriate actions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. You are talking about the specific challenges in Texas. I am not going to identify the Members of Congress, but I have spoken with Texas Congress Members in the 

House, who say that levees would really work well and are actually 

supported by the public. Can you speak to that as part of the solution? 

Mr. AGUILAR. That was a very unique situation that we took in 

Texas. The levees, as we probably all have heard, are critically important for the flooding of the Rio Grande. And, the actions that 

we took as part of the Border Patrol back then—the sitting chiefs 

basically identified the Rio Grande at South Texas as requiring 

fencing. We worked with the local community on an ongoing basis 

and spoke to them at length about what could be done. 

What we literally did is, we took the existing dirt levees, cut 

them down the middle, and abutted against them—reinforced the 

existing levees with concrete—in some areas as high as 20 or 30 

feet. Above those levees, after we set that abutted concrete, we 

built the walls that needed to be built on top of that to continue 

from the deterrence perspective. 

It worked very well. It was a community effort—community of 

the locals, community of the Border Patrol as an organization, and 

DHS. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, do you think that would be a solution 

in larger areas of Texas? 

Mr. AGUILAR. There will be some areas that can be accommodated like that. One of the things that I am absolutely sure that 

DHS, CBP, and especially the Border Patrol will be doing going for-
15 

ward on this is working with the local communities—as we did 

back then. 

Dr. Juliet Garcia, I worked with her personally on an ongoing 

basis. I met with her three or four times at the University of Texas 

in Brownsville on building and accommodating what we eventually 

built at UTB. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Colburn, in your testimony, you are relating direct experience, similar to Israel—16,000 to 18—similar 

types of dramatic numbers, in terms of fencing barriers actually 

working. I have a little time left here. Of the 650 miles, how much 

do you think needs to be replaced? How much more do you think 

has to be built? And, we are not going to hold you to it, because 

we are going to wait for the DHS study—but, some sort of general 

feel. 

Mr. COLBURN. I will answer it in two parts. First, the collection 

of chiefs of the nine Southwest Border sectors all jointly say that 

they need more fencing, as well as repairs and improvements on 

existing fencing. 

That said, just to name some mileage in Yuma Sector—the sector 

that I served for a period of time as Chief—when the fence was 

started—they currently have over 63 miles of primary fence and 9 

miles of what is called secondary fence behind some of that primary fence. They have over 28 miles of all-weather roads. So, when 

we talk about infrastructure, sometimes it is not just a barrier. It 

is to give access. 

We added nearly 9 miles of permanent lighting, which actually 

the community of San Luis Rio Colorado, Mexico, was very appreciative of—crime went down in Mexico as well. We added 441⁄2

miles of permanent vehicle barriers of a couple of different styles, 

and we even had 9 miles of tertiary fence—in the flanks of the San 

Luis port of entry, three rows of fencing. 

That just gives an example of what is necessary. I think that the 

gates and bridges that were built along the Colorado River, where 

there are also ditches and irrigation usage of the water for farming, 

we added 18 vehicle gates and one bridge to the bridges already 

existing. We even added water wells for access by the agricultural 

land users. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, basically, what you just rattled off there 

and what I have in my briefing—about a couple hundred miles of 

different forms of fencing—how long is Yuma Sector in total? 

Mr. COLBURN. 125 miles. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. COLBURN. So, because it is overlapping, it exceeds that. And, 

uniquely, the Imperial Sand Dunes National Monument area has 

the floating fence, and I know you have probably—you can go online and see. It is quite unique and quite effective. In 2008, we lost 

a brave Border Patrol Agent, Luis Aguilar, because there was no 

fence. 

I was quoted by the Army Corps of Engineers, when they published their book on fencing, on the front cover, as saying, ‘‘That 

will never happen again there,’’ because of that floating fence. 

Chairman JOHNSON. By the way, Israel has technology for sand 

as well. It works quite well. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 
16 

I think additional fencing is essential and repairing fencing that 

is in place is essential, but a couple of things came out in the 

Chairman’s questions, and one is the issue of situational awareness—that if you cannot see through and you do not have the technology to look over, then you are really handcuffing, in my opinion—and I would like to know if you, Mr. Aguilar, and you, Mr. 

Colburn, would agree that you are handcuffing the Border Patrol 

Agents, because they cannot see and respond quickly enough if, in 

fact, this is a concrete wall that you cannot see through and cannot 

see over. Would that be a fair assessment, as to why we need to 

be aware of situational awareness as we make these decisions? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Situational awareness at the border, regardless of 

what kind of infrastructure is built south of the border, in the case 

of Mexico, is absolutely essential for the safety of the officers, for 

reactionary time, for planning, and for taking the appropriate actions at the right time. That is why you will hear every Border Patrol Agent say that there will definitively be a need for infrastructure supported by personnel and supported by technology. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Technology. 

Mr. AGUILAR. There is technology now that can give us that overhead capability. There are tethered drones that will stay up for 

weeks at a time that will give you a view, not just of the wall, but 

north and south as to what is coming at you, the actions to take, 

and the safest actions to take. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And, when they cannot fly, they can use 

those elevated night vision goggles—even at night—to get the situational awareness they need. 

Mr. AGUILAR. That is correct. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is the technology we are talking about. 

I would point out that the prototypes that are being built are 

walls. We took $20 million out of the technology fund that would 

have provided more of that situational awareness, and we are 

building prototypes of walls—not fencing, but walls. And, what I 

am concerned about is that we are headed down a path toward an 

outcome without fully considering what would be the most effective 

use of the American taxpayer dollar, as it relates to securing the 

border. And, that is what I have tried to hammer on—and I think 

the Chairman and I agree on a lot of that. 

Let me talk to Dr. Garrett for a moment about land acquisitions. 

Is the government likely to run into resistance if they attempt to 

condemn more property from Texas landowners? 

Mr. GARRETT. Almost certainly. In fact, I did not get all of the 

way through, but when you are talking about River Bend Golf 

Course, which is a retirement community with hundreds of 

homes—and very valuable—we call them ‘‘winter Texans’’—when 

they come down. They will probably fight it, even though they 

came out in the Washington Post and the owners said, ‘‘Well, we 

will try to work with CBP.’’ But, basically, the implication was, 

‘‘We will fight them.’’ So, they have the resources to fight, and that 

was kind of the point where I was going with the university case. 

There are other places along the border—Cimarron Development 

south of Mission, Texas—that previously did not get the wall. Also, 

you are talking about hundreds of more miles with private landowners that have yet to be—— 
17 

Senator MCCASKILL. And, they are all entitled to a jury trial, correct? 

Mr. GARRETT. They are all entitled to a jury trial. And, if I can 

say something on the levees—if I can add something—Kristian 

Hernandez, in ‘‘the Monitor,’’ he looked at the cost, and he actually 

quotes Representative Michael McCaul, the Chairman of the House 

Homeland Security Committee, which basically—first of all, Ramon 

Garcia, the county judge, and the mayor of McAllen came out with 

a letter that said, in effect, ‘‘We are against the wall. However, if 

you are going to build a wall, we would like to have levee infrastructure similar to what we had in 2007.’’ 

Now, we are talking about over 30 miles of levee infrastructure, according to the article, and it would cost $12 million per mile for 

a total cost of $378.93 million out of President Trump’s $2.6 billion 

proposal. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And, that is just for levee in that one—— 

Mr. GARRETT. That is just for the levee sections in Hidalgo County. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Historically, has the government underestimated the time and the expense of land acquisition, when it 

comes to acquiring the land necessary to build barriers? 

Mr. GARRETT. Yes, absolutely. It has been over—Judge Hanen 

has had many years of cases before him. I was asked by Time magazine a few years ago about it, and the needle has not moved very 

much. And, the problem for the judge is, eminent domain cases 

take a lot of his time, and it appears to me that he also deals with 

criminal activities along the border. Why is he spending time and 

taxpayer money defending—or working with lawsuit defenses on 

behalf—for the plaintiffs, when, in fact, would he not be better 

spending his time dealing with people who are apprehended and 

engaged in criminal activities on the border? 

Senator MCCASKILL. What can you tell me—the fencing that has 

been installed in Brownsville, it is right on the southern tip of 

Texas. It must be, obviously, a dangerous place, because it is so 

close to the Mexican border. What is the security situation like in 

Brownsville? 

Mr. GARRETT. Brownsville, itself, is the least criminal-ridden or, 

violent community in all of Texas, according to the ‘‘Texas Tribune.’’ They looked at U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) data, and 

actually, corresponding roughly with about the time of the war on 

drugs in Mexico by President Felipe Caldero ́n, the border cities 

began to see a precipitous drop in violence within those communities. So, how can you prove the fence works when, in fact, we had 

a partner in Mexico, dealing with some of these criminal organizations? And, what has happened is, crime has dropped on the U.S. 

side of the border. 

Senator MCCASKILL. When you were Commissioner of Customs 

and Border Protection, Mr. Aguilar, I think you ranked personnel 

first, infrastructure second, and technology third. It is my understanding that you would now rank it: technology first, personnel 

second, and infrastructure third? 

Mr. AGUILAR. The ranking now is technology definitively first 

just about anywhere along the border. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 
18 

1The Minority report appears in the Appendix on page 181. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Infrastructure and personnel will be going back 

and forth depending on the area—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Where you are. 

Mr. AGUILAR [continuing]. Where you are going to be placing it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Would you agree with that assessment, Mr. 

Colburn? 

Mr. COLBURN. Yes. To borrow a famous two-word term from 

many lawyers, ‘‘It depends.’’ It really does depend on the topography, the demographics, the geographics, and also the climate. So, 

there are times when manpower has the greatest value assigned, 

other times where the tactical infrastructure does, and other times 

when it is technology. 

It is a chain that cannot be broken, though, so without the tactical infrastructure, we will still not have accomplished border security. With it—along with the technology and manpower—I feel 

that we will finally see that light at the end of the tunnel, and we 

can secure all of the border—not just Yuma, not just other 

stretches, but all of it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. Thank you all. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Lankford. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Just 1 second. Could I ask that the report 

be issued into the record1—the one you referenced? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. Sorry, I forgot. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Senator LANKFORD. Mr. Colburn, you have had a unique experience, in that you were at a location in Yuma, saw the high crime 

rate, saw the large number of people crossing illegally, saw the vehicular traffic, and could not do anything about it. A wall goes up, 

and then you saw the very significant drop in illegal crossings at 

that spot—as well as vehicles and people. 

Let me get some specific questions to you on some of this. What 

did you see as far as delays? There has been a lot of conversation 

about land acquisition. We had delays in construction, permitting, 

road access and such. What did you see in delays? What were the 

causes of those delays? And, did construction move in some areas, 

while they working out the delays in other spots? 

Mr. COLBURN. The delays in Yuma were not as significant compared to, say, South Texas, and significantly, a lot of that has to 

do with the fact that, along that 125-mile stretch of the border, 96 

percent of the land adjoining Mexico on the U.S. side is federally, 

publicly stewarded lands. So, it was the Bureau of Reclamation 

within the Department of Interior (DOI), it was the National Park 

Service (NPS), and it was the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). 

It was Department of Defense (DOD), with the Barry M. Goldwater 

Bombing Range. So, it was a variety of Federal and publicly 

stewarded land. 

That does bring in environmental considerations, but when I 

mentioned earlier about rapidly layering on manpower, technology, 
19 

and tactical infrastructure, that is what made Yuma that case in 

point—was we were able to get that together quickly. 

There are places, because of private ownership—as we have been 

discussing—that are more challenging—as well as there are places 

where the terrain, geographics, and climate will be more costly. 

Levees will cost more than some of the barriers that we were putting in in Yuma at the tune of $1.1 million a mile. So, compared 

to the $5 million per mile in South Texas, it was rather efficient 

in the desert areas of Yuma for much of that part of it. Not everywhere, though. We do have roughly 20 miles of river boundary. 

People forget. They think of Arizona as all land boundary. But, the 

Colorado River does separate, not just the States of California and 

Arizona, but also Baja California Norte and Sonora. So, it is an 

international boundary marked by water. 

What the smugglers were doing there—they were building 

bridges with sandbags, and their engineering was amazing. Overnight, very squared, very level, and just inches below the surface 

of the water, so that the bridges could not be detected off of the 

reflecting angle of the sun in the early morning hours. They could 

drive a number of vehicles laden with drugs across in the early 

darkness hours. They were building those in one night. Talk about 

how sometimes you do not have a technical solution? Well, now 

they have technology that can detect it, and they have barriers that 

can keep them from freely driving over the levees and across the 

bridges. 

But, we still had to wade into the river with machetes and slit 

each bag of sand. So, as they built it during the night, we tore it 

down during the day. And, that is what finally defeated them. It 

became too cost-inefficient for the organized crime groups to 

continue building one overnight. So, sometimes rudimentary 

force—muscle—wading into the river with a knife and slitting open 

bags is the solution. 

As both the Chief and I have mentioned, there it is not a cookiecutter solution anywhere along the border. Each sector—even within each sector—we find different combinations of resources that 

solve that problem. But, certainly in Yuma, we had it easier, because of the publicly stewarded lands. 

Senator LANKFORD. Mr. Aguilar, talk to me about the technologies. That is one of the prime areas to be able to innovate on 

first. What technology is needed? And, what do we have that we 

need more of? Or, what do we not have that we need to put in 

place? 

Mr. AGUILAR. The technologies have been an absolutely critical 

part of anything done anywhere along the border. The type of technology that we are talking about is a technology that will give you 

situational awareness—persistent situational awareness anywhere 

that agents are going to be interested in what is happening along 

the border. 

Today, we have integrated fixed towers (IFTs), which started way 

back when Chief Colburn and I were in the field. We have remote 

video surveillance systems. We have mobile surveillance capability 

systems. 

Senator LANKFORD. Hold on. Slow down. Towers, how frequent? 

Let us get more specific as we are talking through this. When you 
20 

talk about towers, how frequently do you need those? You have a 

2,000-mile border. Is that every 2 miles? Is that every 5 miles? Or 

is that every 500 feet? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Let me step back. Not the towers, because, basically, again, it goes back to the type of geography to decide where 

we are deploying the kind of capability we are looking for. 

In Arizona, for example, when I was the Chief of the Border Patrol, we lined out the exact number of towers that had a viewshed 

that had the capability to cover an entire area. But, along with 

that, we had some problems, because we had, for example, the 

Tohono O’odham Nation for 75 miles of the border of the Tucson 

Sector where I was Chief—bottom line is, we were not allowed, because of the sovereignty of the Tohono O’odham Nation, to build 

that type of technological capability. 

But, today, there are technological capabilities that could now 

basically give that same type of situational awareness—tethered 

drones that basically are going to have viewsheds of 7 or 8 miles 

wide—maybe even higher. So, in areas where we cannot put an integrated fixed tower or a remote video surveillance system—and, 

by the way, the integrated fixed towers have the capability of a 

viewshed of 8, 10, 12, or 13 miles, depending on where they are 

placed—line of sight for infrared capability, line of sight for Doppler radar and line of sight for cameras—very high quality, high-fidelity cameras. 

So, it all depends on where you are going to be placing them. 

There are plans in place by the Border Patrol for the entirety of 

the Southwest Border. 

Now, we also have to take into account that, as an example, integrated fixed towers, which work very well in Arizona, will not work 

as well in South Texas. The reason for that is the vegetation, the 

density, and the triple canopies. So, all of those things need to be 

taken into account. 

But, the chiefs are aware of what they need. There are designs 

out there that, basically, have been put in place for that. 

Senator LANKFORD. Great. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Gentlemen, welcome this morning. 

Particularly, Mr. Aguilar and Mr. Colburn, thank you for your 

service to our country in many different roles. Dr. Garrett, welcome. We are delighted that you are here. 

I am channeling my father this morning. My dad used to say to 

my sister and me, when we would do some bone-headed stunt—he 

used to say, ‘‘Just use some common sense. Just use some common 

sense.’’ We did not have much of it. He said it a lot. 

I am also channeling a woman who once came to one of my town 

hall meetings years ago when I was a Congressman, and it was on 

budget—how do we reduce the budget deficit, which was $1.4 trillion about 8 years ago. Today, it is over $400 billion—$1.4 trillion 

is down to about $400 billion—still way too much. So, we are talking about spending money that we really do not have for a wall. 

But, I remember at this town hall meeting, a woman said to 

me—we were talking about whether or not revenues could be a 
21 

part of the deficit reduction plan, and she said, ‘‘I do not mind paying more taxes. I just do not want you to waste my money.’’ 

‘‘I just do not want you to waste my money.’’ And, I am very 

mindful of that, as we think about the combination of tools that we 

use to make our borders more secure. 

Another one of my guiding principles in life is to find out what 

works and do more of that. Find out what works and do more of 

that. And, I think one of the common themes that comes from this 

discussion here this morning is that there is no one answer. There 

may be several answers. There may be several answers for the 

same area of the border. 

Another point that has not been mentioned—one of the reasons 

why, I think, we saw, Mr. Colburn, that precipitous drop in illegal 

immigration in the Yuma Sector is, the folks from Mexico are no 

longer coming to the United States in such great numbers. In fact, 

as you know, there are more people going back into Mexico from 

the United States than there are Mexicans coming into the United 

States, which is a big help, and that says to me—well, what are 

some ways that we could convince people—where most of the illegal immigration is coming from today—what could we do to convince people in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador not to come 

up here. And, one of the things we could do, as the Chairman 

knows and as Claire knows—the reason why they come to this 

country is because their lives are miserable. Their lives are unsafe. 

There are conditions of misery. We are complicit in their misery, 

because of all of the drugs that we buy that are trafficked through 

their countries. Well, why do we not do something to help in that 

regard? 

There is help on the way. It is called ‘‘Alliance for Prosperity,’’ 

and it is literally taking ‘‘Plan Colombia’’, something that has 

worked over the last 20 years, and replicating it, with respect to 

those 3 countries. The funding for that plan is, I do not know, 

about $500 to $600 to $700 million a year. If we would just take 

half of the money that we are talking about spending for a wall, 

we could fund the ‘‘Alliance for Prosperity’’ for the next two decades, which is how long we have been funding ‘‘Plan Colombia’’, 

which has worked. 

The last thing I want to say is about illegal immigration reform—immigration reform. I am not interested in, basically, saying 

to people that are here illegally, ‘‘Well, you can just stay. We will 

just provide immunity for you guys and let you stay.’’ I am not interested in doing that. Most Americans are not interested in doing 

that. We passed comprehensive immigration reform here in the 

Senate, oh, gosh, 5, 6, 7, 8 years ago that did not do that, but, actually, did give people that were here who played by the rules, got 

in line, worked, paid taxes, and spoke English—we gave them a 

pathway to a legal status. I think that probably makes some sense. 

I think a guest worker program makes some sense. And, Senator 

Johnson and I talked about this more than a few times. A lot of 

the people that are down there, they want to come here and go to 

work and want to be able to go back home—maybe for good—and 

we do not give them a very good opportunity to do that, because 

when they get over here, they get stuck and they cannot go back. 
22 

The last thing I want to say is on force multipliers. We have 

mentioned some of the force multipliers that make sense, and I 

have been down on the border from San Diego, where I used to be 

stationed in the Navy, all of the way almost to Brownsville, where 

we used to fly out of—Brownsville and Kingsport, but—Kingsville. 

But, I have talked to hundreds of Border Patrol officers and said, 

‘‘What do you think we ought to be doing?’’ And, I am just going 

to mention some of the answers they have given me—and some of 

them we have heard here, today. 

Not just helicopters, but helicopters are great. Not just drones, 

but drones can be great. Not just fixed-wing aircraft, but they can 

be great. But, let us make sure they have the right kind of surveillance equipment inside of the aircraft—the Vehicle and Dismount 

Exploitation Radar (VADER) system, which is actually one of a 

number of packages that works very well. But, I used to go out in 

Navy 

P–3 Orion airplanes out over the ocean with my crew—a 13-man 

crew—looking for people that were lost, ships that were sunk, or 

whatever, with binoculars. Good luck. And, when we have a great 

system, like VADER, and we have the aircraft, the drones, and the 

fixed-wing aircraft, for God’s sake, let us make sure the surveillance aircraft is equipped with that technology. 

What have I heard that works? Drones with proper surveillance 

packages. Horses in areas with high grass. And, helicopters, as I 

mentioned earlier. Motion detectors sometimes make a lot of sense. 

Mobile and stationary observation towers with the right kind of observation surveillance equipment on board. 

Better intelligence. We have not talked about better intelligence, 

but that is certainly a good point. Mobile and stationary observation towers. Cooperative agreements with landowners along the 

border. Someone mentioned lighting. Those are all things that 

work someplace along the border. 

And, I have just given you a stream of consciousness here. Mr. 

Aguilar, just react very briefly to some of what you have heard. 

Does any of it make sense? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Everything that you have just lined out there, plus 

more, Senator, is exactly what any Border Patrol Agent that has 

served on our Southern Border—or our Northern Border, for that 

matter—will identify as needs and requirements. It is how you put 

that package together that is critically important. It is those capabilities added—placed against the requirements that the agents in 

the field have. 

So, yes, absolutely all of those things, plus other things that are 

constantly being developed—situational awareness, for example. 

Situational awareness capabilities that exist that should be applied 

so that—terrain change, as an example. From an intelligence perspective, agents need to know when, in a remote or very rural area 

of operation, terrain change has occurred—to notify them that, 

‘‘Hey, you need to be paying attention to this and taking those 

kinds of efforts.’’ 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. Colburn, one of the things I did not mention is, walls work. 

I have been to Israel. They work. But, walls can be tunneled under 

and climbed over. Fences work, and, as we have gone along, we 
23 

have figured out how to make better fences. So, I am not saying 

that those are bad ideas. In some places, they work great. But 

1,900 miles of walls? Really? 

Mr. Colburn, I am almost out of time. Please, briefly. 

Mr. COLBURN. One other item that I—— 

Senator CARPER. I just wanted you to react to my stream-of-consciousness ideas—force multipliers. 

Mr. COLBURN. You have listed some very good ones, and your 

sources being the Border Patrol Agents—as I said in my opening 

remarks, ask the agents, and they will tell you. 

Consequences—a system of consequences is extremely important. 

If there are no consequences for illegal acts, then it encourages return. 

Deterrence. The end game, of course, in the end, is to make the 

criminal organizations that now own the movement of people along 

the border—and drugs and weapons and cash—and create an environment where they believe they can no longer get away with it. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Mr. COLBURN. And, you do that through all of those kinds of 

resourcing, and the right amount of it in the right place. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Colburn. 

Very briefly, Dr. Garrett, please. Just react to the diatribe I just 

went through. 

Mr. GARRETT. Yes, I would say I have a colleague, Dr. CorreaCabrera, who is over at the Woodrow Wilson International Center 

for Scholars. Last year, she was on a $200,000 U.S. State Department grant studying a human-trafficking route—on the eastern 

route from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras through Mexico. 

She is a great expert. She actually interviewed traffickers in prisons in those countries and provided a report to the U.S. State Department. That kind of intelligence, getting to your point, is very 

valuable, I would think, in terms of understanding the connections 

between transnational criminal organizations, which have begun 

diversification—which is another one of her specialty areas—in 

drug trafficking, in human trafficking, and in petrochemicals—hydrocarbons. 

So, it seems to me, we are doing our country a disservice if we 

do not utilize resources like that—like the Wilson Center and like 

U.S. State Department grants. Those are the kinds of things that 

we need to have to improve our intel. 

Senator CARPER. All right. I am out of time. Thank you, Dr. Garrett. 

I would just say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, we 

have a lot of tools in our toolbox. We need to be using them. A wall 

and a fence, is that part of the toolbox? Yes, it is. But, to spend 

$15 to $25 billion, at a time when we have a budget deficit of over 

$400 billion, is unwise, is unneeded, and is unaffordable. 

Thank you so much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Just really quickly—as I stepped out for a 

couple of minutes—in your stream-of-consciousness diatribe—your 

words, not mine—did you mention cutting down vegetation, like 

the carrizo cane? Was that part of the—— 
24 

1The statement of Tohono O’odham Nation appears in the Appendix on page 192. 

2The statement of Howard Buffett appears in the Appendix on page 188. 

Senator CARPER. I did not. That is one of the—I think, as Mr. 

Aguilar or somebody said, there are other ideas. I think, in many 

places, that is good. 

Chairman JOHNSON. That would be a good one. Senator 

Heitkamp. 

Senator CARPER. Let us not use Agent Orange. Been there, done 

that. [Laughter.] 

Chairman JOHNSON. We will use some good tools. 

Senator CARPER. Very good. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first start out by saying that there has been—we have 

had a number of kind of hearings and discussions. There has been 

no one to come before this body and suggest that we need to build 

a concrete wall completely across the border. No one. Not one person—no matter what political persuasion and no matter how they 

represented their political thoughts in the last election. 

So, I just wish we could get beyond it, so we could actually talk 

about what we need to do on the border, because all of us share 

the same goal, which is border security. Border security protects, 

not only this country, but has a way of protecting people to the 

south. I do not think there is any doubt about it. 

And so, I have visited the Southern Border—actually, I am 

known kind of on this Committee as being the person who always 

reminds people that we have a very large Northern Border that we 

need to pay attention to, but I have spent a lot of time on the 

Southern Border, and I have talked to locals and people on the 

Southern Border who think that this is crazy—what we do here, 

because no one really engages the local people, who see it every 

day, and talks to them about strategy and what needs to be done. 

And so, I want to just make that point that, as Senator McCaskill, 

the Ranking Member, I think, eloquently—talking to the personnel 

who actually are responsible for border security—in her opening 

comments talked about we need to spend a lot more time with the 

people who live on and who study the Southern Border. 

To that end, I have a couple of pieces of testimony that I would 

like to submit for the record. One is from the Tohono O’odham 

tribe,1 which has people on both sides, and you know well the work 

that has been done to build relationships there. They are deeply 

concerned about whether those traditional collaborations will, in 

fact, be disrupted. They have some great ideas on helping with 

roads and with other infrastructure on the reservation that will 

help them help the Border Patrol and the Department of Homeland 

Security to secure the border. 

Also, I have a statement from Howard G. Buffett, who has done 

a tremendous amount of work, not only as a rancher down there, 

but also looking at border security and trying to understand all of 

the dynamics. And so, I would ask that these two documents be 

submitted for the record.2
25 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure. Without objection. But, I also just 

want to interject. When you say nobody is talking to them, that is 

what this hearing is about—and we had Howard Buffett testify before this Committee as well. So, we are definitely trying to do 

that—exactly what you—— 

Senator HEITKAMP. There is no one on this panel who actually 

is a Southern Border—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Well, again, we have had 22 hearings on 

this. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Right. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, we definitely are talking to them, and 

we will be doing that. 

Senator HEITKAMP. But, would the Chairman agree that not one 

person has come in front of this Committee suggesting that we 

build a wall on the entire length of the border? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Again, we are discussing the challenges involved here, and we—— 

Senator HEITKAMP. And, we keep dancing around it, but the reality is—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. We are talking to people on the border as 

well, because we had Howard Buffett testify before this Committee. 

Senator HEITKAMP. We would go a lot further if we actually just 

acknowledged that there are ways to secure the border other than 

simply building a wall. 

So, I have a couple of questions. How much private land will 

need to be secured by eminent domain to build a wall along the entire Southern Border? Do we know? 

Mr. AGUILAR. As far as mileage goes, I do not think any one of 

us would put a number on that. I can tell you that, in Texas, it 

would be quite a bit. In places like Arizona, a lot of it is going to 

be federally owned lands—State-owned lands—so we would work in 

coordination with them. 

Senator HEITKAMP. I think we have talked a lot already about 

how barriers can slow the development—create a deterrence. But, 

we know that there needs to be additional assets—especially personnel and technology. And, I think, until we see the report, I do 

not think that we really will have a clear idea on how we deploy 

all of those resources. And, I think, Mr. Colburn and Mr. Aguilar, 

I think both of those factors have come up completely in your testimony, which means take a look at the terrain, take a look at where 

you are, take a look at what is possible and what is not possible, 

and make sure that we have a border strategy that is smart and 

that does not spend money where we do not need to spend money 

just because we promised something during a political campaign. 

Finally, I think one thing that has not been talked about here 

is the role of Mexico. I think we all understand Mexico is not going 

to pay for this wall if it gets built. But, there is a critical role that 

our neighbor to the south plays, in terms of border enforcement. 

And so, I am curious about how you see Mexico playing in border 

enforcement, because it seems to me that Mexico must be a critical 

partner in any effort on our shared border. 

The migration spikes that we are seeing are originating in Central America, as Senator Carper pointed out, not Mexico. But, people are traveling through Mexico to get there. So, what do we need 
26 

from Mexico that they are not doing now to forge a relationship to 

stop the traffic? And, I would include, not only migration of people, 

but also drug enforcement. 

Mr. AGUILAR. So, as it relates to Mexico, first and foremost, I 

think I would say the relationship between Mexico and the United 

States is unprecedented. We have never had the level of relationship that we have with Mexico now—in a very positive way. As we 

speak today, the relationships, the strategies being put forth, the 

efforts, the joint intelligence, the sharing, and the liaison—all of 

those things have been improved dramatically. 

Now, as with Canada, we need to do more of that. Those relationships need to continue to be solidified even beyond. 

Senator HEITKAMP. But, you would agree that our relationship—law enforcement to law enforcement—with Canada is far 

different than our relationship with law enforcement—— 

Mr. AGUILAR. Oh, absolutely. Look, not too long ago, Senator, 

Mexico used to say, ‘‘Treat us more like you treat Canada, not like 

you treat Mexico.’’ I think we are getting closer to that, because of 

the evolution of where we were to where we have gotten. I often 

say that, when I first came into the Border Patrol in 1978, the last 

people that you would think about calling were the Mexicans when 

something happened on the border. Today, they are the first ones 

we call when we have a situation. And, you are absolutely right, 

in that Mexico is pretty much at the place that we were 30 years 

ago with our Southern Border. Their Southern Border is getting 

overrun—not by people that want to stay in Mexico, but by those 

who want to get to the United States. There is absolutely more 

that needs to be done by them, with our assistance, on their Southern Border. There is more that needs to be done by the United 

States and Canada in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, in 

order to increase the rule of law, civil society, health, education, all 

of these things. 

So, that is exactly what we should be talking about, but we constantly focus on the wall—as we should be focusing on our borders. 

But, it needs to be a very systematic approach across the entire 

breadth of what is causing the problems. 

Senator HEITKAMP. I certainly look forward to the Department of 

Homeland Security’s report, and I hope they do include a strategy 

for collaboration with tribal entities that serve on both sides of the 

border—but also the Mexican officials. But, we need to be realistic 

about that relationship—and it is not Canada. I think we can all 

agree on that. 

Mr. AGUILAR. If I might, because I think this is critically important, first and foremost, talk to the agents—talk to the Border Patrol—and I assure you that they are absolutely engaged with the 

communities. Now, they cannot please everybody within the communities, but, if there is any—especially Federal—law enforcement 

agency that has their thumb on the feel of what is going on with 

the communities, it is the Border Patrol. We spend a lot of time 

making sure that we have dealt with them, that we understand 

their needs, understand their concerns, and build the relationships. 

So, when the tough decisions were being made, all of those things 

were being taken into consideration. 
27 

1The report referenced by Senator Harris appears in the Appendix on page 195. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, just to point out, we had a hearing last 

week with the heads of the unions of the agents. We have, on a 

bipartisan basis, a group of staff going down and talking right 

down to the folks who are the boots on the ground. But, Senator 

Heitkamp, when we talk about the insecurity of the Mexican-Central American border, I remember our Congressional Delegation 

(CODEL) in Guatemala, where you could basically walk across 

the—we are here at the Border Patrol entry point, and you can basically walk across the boats. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Right. They are swimming across. But, also, 

Mr. Chairman, I want to remark about the great work that the Department of Homeland Security is doing in those communities to 

try and provide technological solutions—stopping buses—all of the 

issues, especially as it relates to human trafficking. So, that was 

a great trip. I hope we can do something like that again. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Of course. Our guide was General Kelly, so 

he knows what he is talking about. Senator Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRIS 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Aguilar, thank you for your service. According to the strategic plan from 2012 through 2016 of CBP, my understanding is 

that the priorities include, in this order: first, preventing terrorists 

and weapons from entering the United States; second would be 

managing risk, which includes the adoption of technology and all 

you have talked about, in terms of situational awareness; and third 

would be disrupting and degrading transnational criminal organizations. 

Before I was elected Senator, I was the Attorney General (AG) 

of California, and one of the first trips that I took after being elected back in 2011 was down to the border with Mexico. I surveyed 

the tunnels and the border. I saw photographs of tunnels with 

walls as smooth as the walls in this Committee room, lined with 

air-conditioning and lighting, which made an obvious point very 

clear: that there is a large investment of money by the 

transnational criminal organizations—we estimate up to $3 billion 

a year—in creating an infrastructure for them to be able to do their 

business, which is the trafficking of guns, drugs, and human 

beings. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely, yes. 

Senator HARRIS. And, in fact, I commissioned a report shortly 

thereafter, which I, Mr. Chairman, would like to submit in the 

record.1

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection. 

Senator HARRIS. ‘‘Gangs Beyond Borders,’’ which highlights the 

concern that California has about the transnational criminal organizations. 

One of the things that we learned in documenting this report is 

that trafficking takes place because there has been an investment 

in that, as we have discussed. But, trafficking includes not really 

necessarily things coming across the border on foot, but also 
28 

through tunnels and by air. In fact, we document hundreds of 

ultralight aircraft flights for the purposes of trafficking. 

So, back to the point then of this wall. We also document, for example, the use of panga boats, and, Mr. Colburn, you talked about 

the waterways that are used for trafficking. 

Do you agree that if the United States invests billions of dollars 

in wall infrastructure, the cartels will simply invest more in underground tunnels and water and aerial approaches? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. Yes, they will, and that gets to the issue of 

what is making them do that. 

Senator HARRIS. Right. 

Mr. AGUILAR. It is the dollars. It is the draw. It is the draw of 

illegal immigrants into this country. It is the draw of people seeking asylum—political refugees. It is the draw of the narcotics coming into this country. 

Senator HARRIS. Well, let us be clear about that. When we are 

talking about the trafficking of guns, of drugs, and of human 

beings—there have been many people, including, I believe, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, that have acknowledged that a major draw—especially in terms of the trafficking of drugs—is America’s insatiable appetite for narcotics. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator HARRIS. Right, so that is not about immigrants creating 

that appetite. The appetite exists in the United States, and just 

basic principles of capitalism tell us that wherever there is a demand, there will be a supply. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely. 

Senator HARRIS. So, when we are talking about this and we are 

looking at the amount of money that it takes, in terms of our need, 

to keep our border secure from the trafficking of drugs, guns, and 

human beings, can you tell me what you believe the priorities 

should be, in terms of the government funding CBP in its noble effort to keep our borders secure—and, in particular, secure from the 

trafficking of illegal substances into the United States that harm 

Americans in a very direct way? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Well, if you take a look at funding, specifically 

through a silo of CBP—and that is all that we are talking about, 

CBP prioritization? 

Senator HARRIS. Yes, just CBP. Yes, please. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Because, if you go beyond that, there are other priorities before CBP. 

Senator HARRIS. Sure. 

Mr. AGUILAR. But, as it relates to CBP, right now, given the current environment that we face on the border, it is technology—and, 

depending on where you go from there, it is infrastructure and personnel. 

Now, Senator, one of our primary examples of success is, in fact, 

California, when it comes to infrastructure. As young agents, we 

both worked an area known as the ‘‘soccer field.’’ 

Senator HARRIS. Oh, yes. 

Mr. AGUILAR. It was a soccer field. It was American territory 

that was ceded to Mexico. We could not go in there as a two-man 

team. We had to, literally, go in there with a tremendous amount 
29 

of support, because we had ceded—smugglers operated there. 

Today, on the soccer field, we have multi-million-dollar homes. We 

have thriving commercial businesses. We have malls in that area. 

Senator HARRIS. Right, but this is because of the work that happened many years ago. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. 

Senator HARRIS. And, I applaud you for that work, but I think 

we agree—and your testimony has made clear—that times have 

changed—— 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely. 

Senator HARRIS [continuing]. Because of the reordered priorities, 

which have been quite successful. 

Tell me something. The last major hiring surge of CBP agents occurred during your tenure, correct? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. 

Senator HARRIS. And, that surge and the corresponding rise in 

the tactics of cartels to infiltrate CBP led Congress, while you were 

there, I believe, to institute polygraph testing for new border 

agents. Is that correct? 

Mr. AGUILAR. That is correct. 

Senator HARRIS. And, in August 2012, you testified to the House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (OGR) about 

CBP’s efforts to prevent and detect corruption and misconduct in 

its workforce, and specifically you said, ‘‘Background and periodic 

investigations as well as polygraph examinations are consistent 

with, and form the basis of, a comprehensive workforce integrity 

plan.’’ Do you still believe that to be true? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. 

Senator HARRIS. And so, President Trump issued this Executive 

Order mandating the hiring of 5,000 new Border Patrol officers, 

which would result in a 25-percent force increase. Would it not be 

a threat to officer safety and public safety to loosen the processes 

by which we determine who should be eligible and qualified to 

enter the force? 

Mr. AGUILAR. There is not a law enforcement officer—not just a 

Border Patrol Agent—that would not say that lowering qualifications—lowering standards is unacceptable. 

Senator HARRIS. Right. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Now, we have learned a lot from that time frame, 

where we basically doubled the size of the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol is much larger. They have the, benefit of all of the hard 

lessons learned—the school of hard knocks. There are things that 

can be implemented. There are things that we did right and things 

that we could have done much better. 

What you are referring to, I believe, Senator, is taking a look 

now—which I actually applaud—leadership taking a look at what 

it is that has been done in the past and what can we do better. 

But, at the forefront of that, we should not, in any way, reduce 

standards or qualification requirements. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. And, I know you 

know that one of the concerns that we have is, given the amount 

of money that the transnational criminal organizations—Sinaloa 

and other cartels—have invested in making sure that they can 

profit from their illegal activities—is to do a number of 
30 

things—being creative around how they will get over and under 

ground to be able to transport their wares. But also, they have, in 

their history—and based on their business model—a real incentive 

to compromise agents at the border. And so, we have to make sure 

that we have the highest standards, so that we can make sure that 

we are hiring agents, such as yourself and Mr. Colburn, who years 

before were being creative in helping to secure our borders. I thank 

you for your service. 

Mr. AGUILAR. We are in lockstep on that, Senator. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Harris. 

I just have to point out, based on what you said, that there are 

probably far more areas of agreement on this Committee—which is 

what we are trying to do. I will refer you—before you became a 

Senator, on November 23, 2015, we issued a report after 13 hearings and 3 roundtables on border security. Our key finding in the 

report—and I am just going to read it—‘‘America’s insatiable demand for drugs’’—the same words you used. ‘‘America’s insatiable 

demand for drugs, coupled with smugglers’ insatiable demand for 

profits, is one root cause, perhaps the root cause, preventing the 

achievement of a secure border.’’ So, I am in total agreement with 

you. It is our insatiable demand for drugs that is destroying public 

institutions in Central America—crime-ridden—the impunity and 

the corruption. That is something we really have to address. This 

is incredibly complex, but I think there are a lot of areas of agreement. I think we are finding that today, in this hearing, finding 

what we need to do to secure our border, but also understanding—— 

Senator HARRIS. Cause and effect. 

Chairman JOHNSON. ‘‘We have seen the enemy, and it is us.’’ 

Right? 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Hoeven. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOEVEN 

Senator HOEVEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would ask that each of the witnesses talk for just a minute, in 

terms of this balance or mix of infrastructure—meaning a wall, 

technology, and personnel. Talk about your perception of the 

strengths and weaknesses of each and the steps you would take to 

address it right away and in what priority. Mr. Aguilar, if you 

want to start? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Sure. Thank you, Senator. Technology at the current time, in the current environment, with current needs is going 

to reflect the highest needs that the Border Patrol has for several 

reasons. It gives you situational awareness. It gives you intelligence—immediate juridical line intelligence—and it gives you the 

capability to respond in an effective manner and in a safe manner. 

Senator HOEVEN. And, when you say that, do you mean unmanned aerial systems (UAS)? Do you mean sensors? Communications? Define some of—— 

Mr. AGUILAR. It is a combination of those things, dependent on 

what area of the border you are talking about. We have areas, for 

example, that both of us worked in Nogales, Arizona, where the 
31 

canyons are basically so close together that an IFT tower will not 

work. A remote video surveillance system will not work. But, a helicopter can only fly for, I think it is, 2 hours. For Black Hawks, 2 

to 3 hours. Whereas, a drone, a tethered drone—can stay up for 

weeks at a time. Or, if you place a relocatable tower with the capabilities of Doppler radar to detect movement, that has a high-fidelity camera that can go 7 or 8 miles and detect a person—whether 

he is carrying a bundle, a gun, a weapon, a longarm, and so forth. 

These are the things that come into play. 

So, it is the packaging of those capabilities that do exist by the 

way of technology, identifying what best fits the area of the border 

that is of interest, from an operational perspective, and placing it. 

Now, part of that is going to be also asking if that package of 

technology requires infrastructure to do that slowdown, if you 

will—and create that efforts of time and distance and, in addition 

to that, the personnel to respond to it. And, by the way, that personnel response may be in a Black Hawk, because of the area that 

is so remote and rural. 

So, it is all of these things. As the Chairman said, it is very complex. There is not a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ for the border. 

Senator HOEVEN. So, is the Department of Homeland Security—General Kelly and the planners—are they approaching this 

in that holistic way? 

Mr. AGUILAR. I can assure you that they are doing that, absolutely. That is what we have historically done. That is what they 

will continue to do. 

Senator HOEVEN. And then, throw in the metrics piece, 

too—measuring results and knowing what our success rate is out 

there. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely. And, that, again, is going to be a big 

part of the technological capabilities, because it will give you that 

situational awareness of what is happening, when it happened, 

what the results were, and what are the actions needed to take for 

any continued interest in that area of operation. 

Senator HOEVEN. And, you need those metrics to know where 

you have to adjust, improve, and strengthen your effort, right? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely. Yes, sir. 

Senator HOEVEN. Mr. Colburn, your thoughts on the same question and how you would manage—I mean, this is a huge logistics 

challenge, so how would—if you are king of the world and running 

it, how are you going to do it? 

Mr. COLBURN. At the risk of being a bit redundant with what 

Chief Aguilar said—we actually worked together off and on 

through about three decades, so sometimes we tend to think a lot 

alike. But, I will take strengths first and just say simply that the 

right mix rapidly deployed—and that is all of the above that we 

have discussed—so rather than elaborating further. When it comes 

to strengths, it is all of the above. 

For the weaknesses—the missing link. Without tactical infrastructure, then it is too weak. Without the right amount of manpower, it is too weak. And, without the right mix of technology, it 

is too weak. The links in the chain have to be equally strong, and 

it has to be the right mix. And, it is not going to be the same in 

San Diego as it is in Rio Grande Valley in South Texas. 
32 

Lastly, we have talked about how the transnational criminal organizations have created their own business flexibility models. 

They are not the old—as we used to call them—‘‘mom-and-pop’’ 

smugglers of 30 years ago. Now, the TCOs—the cartels—own the 

border. They are the gatekeepers, they are the plaza watchers, and 

they control who plies their trade there through a hierarchy of 

smuggling and gang systems that report up their chain to them— 

very much like a large corporation or a government. 

That said, we talked about CBP and what they need in the silo 

of CBP. One thing I have confidence in Secretary General Kelly as 

well as the chiefs in the Border Patrol and the leadership of CBP 

for, is that they will not ask for more than what they need. But, 

they do need to be given exactly what they need to secure the border. And, that was my challenge in Yuma, and the way I put it to 

both the American people, the Administration, and Congress at the 

time was, it was not about empire building. It was about asking 

for the right mix, but bringing it on—and bringing it on quickly, 

and it made a difference. But, out of 2,000 miles, that was 125 

miles. 

Senator HOEVEN. Again, how do you know when you have the 

right mix? 

Mr. COLBURN. You go to the professionals in the field, and they 

walk it yard by yard, as they have done. They assess it, and they 

identify what they think they need, compared to the kind of—foliage-penetrating radar did not exist in 2005 for the capabilities or 

uses of the Border Patrol that exist now. So, when we talk about 

next year’s technology, and we talk about the challenges of, say, toward, in South Texas versus, say, in Arizona—now they have created foliage-penetrating radar at the ground level—not just from 

the air. So, fortunately for all of us, the technology evolves. And, 

I know you will hear this from the Secretary, himself. If you can 

get the right combination—less expensive is always better. I am a 

taxpayer, too. That is why I say that it should be just what you 

need, not more than what you need—and off-the-shelf and 

integratable. It has to be integratable, so that it can be replaced 

or added to and have an impact that way—whether it is in South 

Texas or California—if it can be integrated. 

Senator HOEVEN. Right, and you have to have a way to measure 

results, something that we agreed to, so you know whether you 

have the right asset mix out there, the right deployment level, and 

so forth, right? I mean, that is really the way—you can have the 

expert tell you what you should do, but you have to have somebody 

to measure what you are doing. 

Mr. COLBURN. Some of the metrics are easy and some of them 

are not so easy, and that is what I have found in the law enforcement world, in general. I remember speaking to an organization in 

Arizona, the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police (AACOP), a few 

years ago, and at the end of my presentation on the state of the 

border in Arizona, one of the municipal chiefs of the largest municipality in Arizona raised his hand, during the question-and-answer 

period and said, ‘‘So, Chief Colburn, when will you finally get absolute control of your border in Yuma?’’ And, I said, ‘‘Chief, when will 

you finally stop all crime in Phoenix?’’ And, he thought about that 

for a minute and shook his head, and said, ‘‘Now I get it.’’ 
33 

Crime will never go away, and they will not stop trying. But, we 

can create a deterrent stature that will stop them. We have come 

a long ways. 

Senator HOEVEN. But, to create good policy in the whole immigration area, we need to understand exactly what we are doing on 

the border. We need to have some agreed-upon metrics, so that everybody does not come in with a different story about what the results are—I mean, get some kind of baseline—some kind of agreement on what is going on. And, that is why the metrics are a very 

important part of doing this. 

Mr. COLBURN. Yes, and you are absolutely right. They have to be 

universally the same and consistently measured that way—or they 

are useless. 

Senator HOEVEN. Right. 

Mr. COLBURN. And, the chiefs demand—— 

Senator HOEVEN. And, to foster some understanding in the public, right? 

Mr. COLBURN. Yes. 

Senator HOEVEN. We need it so that they really know what is 

going on there. I think it is not only important, in terms of national 

security, but also in terms of creating and building support for good 

policy. 

Professor, I wanted to get to you. I know I am over my time, and 

we have a pretty rough Chairman on this Committee, so I have to 

be careful here. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Yes, you do. 

Senator HOEVEN. But, please share just a thought or two briefly. 

Mr. GARRETT. OK. I want to kind of turn it around a little bit 

and look at it slightly differently. Obviously, I cannot address what 

they have. However, what about economic security on the U.S. side 

of the border? When we escalate the trade war or when we put the 

affront of the actual physical barrier—the wall—in front of Mexicans that come over to South Texas, California, and other 

places—I can tell you, the last time the wall went up, we lost millions in the Valley, and in terms of people coming over directly. 

That is the fear this time around. In fact, the mayor of South 

Padre Island is just terrified that Mexicans will not come over this 

upcoming week for Santa Semana. We are going to lose all kinds 

of money because of fear of coming over—because of the rhetoric 

coming out from President Trump, primarily. 

And also, the mayor of McAllen, he says the same thing. He says 

that the effect of a trade war with Mexico would cascade beyond 

lost jobs in the U.S. plants. Downtown stores would lose business, 

lay off workers, and close up shop. Mexican investors would likely 

sell off their U.S. properties, leading to plummeting real estate values. 

McAllen, Texas—all along the Valley—because of what has happened since 2006, lots of Mexican nationals have bought property 

on the U.S. side, along the Rio Grande—and, in particular, about 

one-half of South Padre Island, which is a resort community that 

depends heavily on tourism from Mexico, half of the properties 

there are owned by Mexican nationals. 

So, the idea is, if we terrify the Mexicans sufficiently, it could 

cause a real problem for us along the Rio Grande border. 
34 

Senator HOEVEN. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Daines. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAINES 

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was struck by this press release that came out from U.S. Customs and Border Protection on March 8, which mentioned that we 

saw a 40-percent drop in illegal Southwest Border crossings from 

January to February. My understanding is that was far outside 

normal seasonal trends. So, there is something—it is not just 

within the statistical variation. Something has changed in the process—in the system. Typically, the January to February change is 

actually an increase of 10 to 20 percent. And yet, the numbers reported by CBP say that it was a 40-percent drop. That breaks a 

20-year trend. I am curious, Mr. Aguilar, why? 

Mr. AGUILAR. This has actually happened before, Senator, and let 

me just update that. March 8, I believe you said it was. 

Senator DAINES. Yes. 

Mr. AGUILAR. As of March 31—5 days ago, whatever it is—it is 

actually up to a 67-percent drop, compared to last year. 

Senator DAINES. So these are the February numbers updated further? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. 

Senator DAINES. OK. So, if CBP issued another press release, 

you would say that they have updated the February numbers. It 

was not a 40-percent drop. It is now a 67-percent drop? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Right. 

Senator DAINES. Is that going to come out with another release? 

Mr. AGUILAR. I am sure it will. 

Senator DAINES. OK. 

Mr. AGUILAR. I am sure it will. They should. 

Senator DAINES. My interest is even more piqued, let us say. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Absolutely. And, we have lived this before. This 

has happened before. As it relates to immigration, especially, when 

the United States stands strong and takes certain actions—substantive actions—and substantive may be something—as, primarily, the current Administration saying, ‘‘We are going to do 

this,’’ and something substantive happens to do that. This Administration has said, ‘‘We are going to address illegal immigration.’’ 

ICE has started working in the interior—unlike other times. So, 

that message resonates. 

The problem is that it does not hold for long, unless those substantive actions continue. We saw this under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), under President Reagan, 

when IRCA was passed. It dropped overnight. We saw this on the 

border, when we took effective actions in California. We built infrastructure, we added Border Patrol Agents, and we threw them in, 

literally, overnight. There was a shift over to Arizona. We saw this 

in Arizona, when we added agents to Nogales—we were both 

there—and it shifted over to New Mexico and El Paso. But, then 

what happens? When you cannot maintain that, it defaults right 

back to where it was. 

In the Border Patrol, specifically, when we started down the path 

of strategic application of resources, there were three things that 
35 

we talked about: We have to go into an area and gain the control 

that is needed. Once you gain the control that is needed by way 

of metrics, then you have to be able to maintain and sustain that 

control—and then continue the expansion. So, it was gain, maintain, and expand. 

So, there has to be substantive actions—substantive decisions to 

hold what it is that you are doing. 

Senator DAINES. So, what are the one or two things that we 

need to do now to ensure that we do hold this—maintain, as you 

said—this dramatic decrease in illegal crossings? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Well, what we are talking about here is addressing 

the border—the needs of the border and the needs of the Border 

Patrol, as identified by the current chiefs in the field: technology, 

infrastructure, personnel in the right mix, in the areas that they 

need it. 

In addition to that—and this is a whole other hearing, Senator 

Johnson. You and I have talked about this. The supporting entities 

to the Border Patrol—what happens when an unaccompanied alien 

child (UAC) is apprehended by the Border Patrol—or a family unit? 

There has to be a system in place where it can be handed off, so 

they can get right back to the border. But, now that is not the case. 

And then, our Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) 

system—or immigration judges—are overwhelmed and are docketing cases 8, 10, 15 years from now on people that need to have 

immigration hearings. It is all of these things combined. 

Senator DAINES. So, we are here, today to talk about physical infrastructure—a wall. Clearly, a wall and some kind of physical barriers are a means to an end. The end is to reduce the number of 

illegal crossings. If you were to prioritize—I am going to ask all of 

you this question to think about. If you were to prioritize where 

this Committee—where Congress should place its efforts—because 

you mentioned, for example, the backlog with judges is one part of 

this equation—what would you tell us? I recognize we need to be 

able to do more than just one thing at a time. But, if there were 

two or three things we should prioritize in stacked, ranked order, 

to reduce the number of illegal crossings, what would they be? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Prioritize and—this is the way I would answer that 

question. Prioritize a system that can have the impact. That 

system has to begin with the Border Patrol, given the current environment. There are things happening now that have to be addressed. So, begin with the Border Patrol—its needs and its requirements—and then take a look at the supporting entities for the 

Border Patrol. 

And, by the way, somewhere in that system—and this is up to 

this body and the House of Representatives—you have to take a 

look at what it is we do, from an immigration requirement, in this 

country. Is it comprehensive immigration reform? All of these 

things are part of that systematic approach that needs to be taken. 

But, if we are going to look at the immediate border, it is Border 

Patrol-centric requirements and the supporting entities to the Border Patrol. By that, I mean ICE support, the Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS) support, the Office of Response and 

Restoration (OR&R) support, and EOIR support. That right there 
36 

would be a border-centric approach that would make a world of difference. 

It is not the entire solution, by the way, because there is so much 

more that needs to be done. 

Senator DAINES. Thank you. I am going to run out of time. There 

is so much to talk about here. But, back to the topic at hand, as 

it relates to physical barriers on the border, what is left for Congress to do to get this infrastructure built? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Fund. Fund, appropriate, and—— 

Senator DAINES. So, the authority exists. 

Mr. AGUILAR. The authority exists. 

Senator DAINES. We have all of the legal authority. The constraint is funding? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Funding and identification from the Border Patrol, 

CBP, and DHS as to what the requirements are, yes—and fund 

those requirements. 

Senator DAINES. I am out of time. Mr. Chairman, thank you. You 

probably all wanted to answer the top three, right? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Go ahead and answer, but then we will cut 

it at that. 

Senator DAINES. Mr. Chairman, I want to give everybody a 

chance to—— 

Mr. GARRETT. Can I answer? 

Senator DAINES. Go ahead. Mr. Colburn, do you want to answer 

it as well? 

Mr. COLBURN. Yes, please. 

Senator DAINES. OK. 

Mr. GARRETT. I would say that we need to have a hemispheric 

policy, first and foremost. We need to stem the flow of migrants 

coming across. I think that is far more important than trying to 

stanch the bleeding once they come into this country. So, if we 

were able to use diplomacy, use resources—economic and political—to stabilize these regimes—and, second, I would say, to reduce drug consumption in the United States—I think we have all 

touched on that today—on this side of the border, which is a driving economic reason. So, I would give you those as the two top 

things we need to do. 

Senator DAINES. I am very encouraged by Secretary Kelly. When 

he thinks about this, he thinks as U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) leadership. He brings a much more systemic view of 

this. And, when you talk about the Southern Border, Secretary 

Kelly says, ‘‘Well, it starts 1,500 miles to the south.’’ 

Mr. GARRETT. Absolutely. 

Senator DAINES. The point you are making—Mr. Colburn, please. 

Mr. COLBURN. Thank you. The question that you posed to us actually I asked just recently during my comprehensive border tour, 

in which I was able to get state-of-the-border briefings by a number 

of chiefs—not all nine of the Southwest border chiefs, but most of 

them. And, every one of them said relatively the same thing 

in speculation. There is historically—predictably—a surge in crossings come January—or mid-January forward, if you look back decades—and yet that did not occur this year. 

Senator DAINES. Right. 
37 

Mr. COLBURN. They said that they thought there was actually a 

psychological impact—that there is this symbolic holding of one’s 

breath by the transnational criminal organizations and by the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, because of the new Administration in place—and that it does not 

mean that they will not at some point decide, ‘‘OK, I think we can 

continue plying our illegal trade.’’ But, there is this, I will call it, 

‘‘symbolic’’ or ‘‘symptomatic’’ holding of one’s breath corporately 

across the organizations—and they have slowed down. They are 

watching and waiting to see if Congress, the American people, and 

the Administration have the will to follow through with completing 

it. And, if we do, then we may see this as a continuing down trend 

of crossings—deterrence. 

Senator DAINES. There are early reasons for hope right now, but 

I know many Americans are just so frustrated by this fundamental 

lack of enforcing the rule of law. And, perhaps, that change in tone 

and tenor will be it—again, it is a complicated system. We have 

talked about it at length. There are multiple variables here. But, 

let us just say that I think we are off to a better start. 

Mr. COLBURN. If I may—sorry—another thought occurred to me 

just now. Something else that is historically unprecedented has occurred over the last 2 years, where Mexico deported more Central 

Americans—from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—than 

the United States did. That is very symbolic. My personal history 

with Mexico is sending teams to train those protectors, Grupo Beta, 

the rescuers. It was always easier to call the Mexican people and 

their government leadership as a constituency—it is always to provide support from the United States of America’s government when 

it is saving lives and rescuing people. So, we always started that 

way with Grupo Beta and rescuing. 

But, actually, the late Deputy Assistant Attorney General, I believe his name was Nemesio Lugo, who has since been assassinated 

by the cartels, turned to me over lunch one day and said, ‘‘We have 

a real problem on the Southern Border because they are remaining 

in Mexico and looking for work in Mexico instead of going forward.’’ 

So, Mexico is beginning to experience the economic drive 

that—there are seven billion people in the world, and five billion 

of them want to come to America, because of that economic drive. 

And, Mexico is beginning to experience that, too. 

So, I think we can continue to partner with them and the other 

countries, and as General Kelly said, ‘‘It starts beyond our borders.’’ 

Senator DAINES. Thank you for your candid and insightful comments today. Much appreciated. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Daines. 

I would just summarize kind of what I am hearing. Dr. Garrett, 

you said to ‘‘stem the flow.’’ Overall, I think you have to end the 

incentives for illegal immigration. There is a host of them: our insatiable demand for drugs—I mean the fact that people are coming 

here for the opportunities in America—so have a functioning guest 

worker program. I would say to end the length of the adjudication 

problem, which is incentivizing children from Central America to 

take the very dangerous journey. We had a surge of flow from 
38 

Brazil, and Secretary Chertoff sent those folks right back, and it 

ended the flow. So, I think you focus your attention on how you 

stop the incentives for illegal immigration. 

I just have one final point and a question, because Dr. Garrett 

talked a little bit about the reduction in crime in the border cities. 

In Wisconsin, Al Capone had a really nice vacation spot on an island, and he did not create a whole lot of crime up there. He wanted to keep law enforcement’s attention off of him. And, as I have 

been on the border and I have talked to sheriffs, that is kind of 

their explanation, too. I was actually surprised that there is not a 

whole lot of crime at the border—again, they really do not want 

law enforcement paying a whole lot of attention to what they are 

doing in those towns. I would just ask Mr. Aguilar and Mr. 

Colburn: Is that an accurate assessment? 

Mr. AGUILAR. The sheriffs know their areas, but I lived the chaotic borders of the late 1980s, early 1990s, and so forth. Crime was 

rampant. Crime was absolutely rampant. There was everything 

from stolen vehicles—Senator Hoeven asked about metrics. One of 

the metrics that we actually used, which may sound a little ridiculous—but it was things we were watching. Ladies could not put 

clothing out to dry in their backyards because it was stolen. When 

that stopped happening, we said, ‘‘Wow, something is happening 

here.’’ Merchants could not keep their doors open to their stores, 

because the smugglers were taking over the stores. That is a localized metric. 

The associated criminal activity with an uncontrolled border is 

very high. Breakings into homes—into ranchers’ homes—these 

things went on and on and on. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, what happened? Why is crime reduced 

then? 

Mr. AGUILAR. The increase in personnel—Border Patrol personnel—the increase in infrastructure, and the increase in technology. Those are the things that, basically, lowered the criminal 

activity. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Colburn, do you want to chime in on 

that at all? 

Mr. COLBURN. I will just add that I remember 30 years ago patrolling the border—and I was the new guy as a supervisor, who 

had just arrived in 1 of my 10 duty stations. And, as we were patrolling the border, we came across what I would describe now as 

a palatial estate, with high walls around it, on the U.S. side, just 

within view of the border. And, as we drove by, the journeyman 

veteran agent that was riding with me said, ‘‘Yes, that is the house 

that dope built.’’ A lot of those groups that are investing in America 

are the cartels. A major shootout in San Diego a few months ago 

was cartel on cartel in a bedroom neighborhood. 

So, part of the risk, of course, is as they are killing each other 

in Mexico, and right across from McAllen, Texas, in the Rio Grande 

Valley, South Texas, some of the most violent warfare-like fighting 

is going on, as we speak—where gun battles last 8, 10, or 12 hours 

overnight, blockading and burning vehicles—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Which, by the way, is exactly what we hear 

from the people on the border. They are hearing all that gunfire 

and they are hearing those battles. 
39 

Mr. COLBURN. Most of what I get—I am still a member of 

the—as a private citizen and consultant in retirement from the 

Border Patrol, I am a member of the intelligence and information 

community, but I get open-source information. And, what is going 

on in Mexico—the violence of the cartels makes the Colombians of 

the 1980s look like amateurs. It makes the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS) and the Taliban look like amateurs. That is how 

brutal they are. It is almost a contest to see who can out-brutalize 

each other. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I do not even want to mention the brutality 

I have heard. 

Dr. Garrett, we will let you close it out here. 

Mr. GARRETT. OK. So, in Brownsville—UTB, our campus, has actually been hit by three bullet rounds, but they were from the 

Mexican Army, in a shootout. We were actually in an academic affairs committee meeting when Tony Tormenta of the Gulf Cartel, 

was taken out by the Mexican military. The Mexican military has 

been very instrumental, in terms of battling the groups very violently. That is where the violence is taking place. It is not taking 

place over on the U.S. side primarily. Most of it is in Mexico, unfortunately. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Again, I will attribute that to—I will call it 

the ‘‘Al Capone syndrome.’’ 

Senator McCaskill, do you have anything else? 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Again, I want to thank the witnesses. I 

think this has been an incredibly interesting hearing—again, our 

22nd. We are going to keep laying out these realities, and I appreciate you contributing to that effort. 

The hearing record will remain open for 15 days until April 19 

at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the 

record. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(41) 

A P P E N D I X 
42 

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Hearing on "Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

April4, 2017 

Ranking Member Claire McCaskill 

Opening Statement 

Chairman Johnson, the title of today's hearing is "Fencing Along the 

Southwest Border." Although there are important lessons to be learned from the 

fencing that has already been constructed at the Southwest border, I think it's 

important to remind everyone that President Trump isn't talking about building a 

fence. It's a WALL. It says so very explicitly in the President's January 25 executive 

order. It says so in the Requests for Proposals that Customs and Border Protection 

released last month. And, so, before we get this hearing started, I hope we can all 

agree to speak frankly. This is not a fence we're talking about. It's a WALL. 

Now, what will that wall look like? How much is it going to cost? Exactly 

how is Mexico going to reimburse American taxpayers for the billions of dollars 

they are already being asked to spend on the wall? The Administration has not 

provided the American people with answers to these important questions. 

Since the beginning of this Congress, this Committee has been conducting 

ongoing oversight ofthe Department of Homeland Security and its plans to construct 
43 

a concrete border wall. I have asked my staff to report to this Committee and the 

taxpayers on the results of our oversight of The Wall to date. 

Based on information provided by Customs and Border Protection officials to 

Committee staff, the wall that President Trump has promised could cost nearly $70 

billion. That works out to more than $200 for every man, woman, and child in the 

United States. And I'm not sure that's a cost the American taxpayer is willing to 

bear, especially when we were told day after day that Mexico would be paying for 

the wall -not the American people. 

The Department has told us that they plan to use funds intended to acquire 

remote video surveillance for prototypes of the concrete wall. I was down at the 

border in February and I spent a Jot of time with Border agents. And I asked each 

Border Patrol agent, "What do you need from us? What will make you better able 

to do your job?" Time and time again, they told me they needed technology. 

Technology was the thing that was going to make them better at their job. And now 

the Department is taking money from video surveillance to use for wall prototypes. 

And what about the cost of acquiring all of that land that's going to be needed 

to build the wall? Approximately two-thirds of the U.S.-Mexico border is private 

and state-owned land. Some of this land has been in people's families for 

generations. And I don't think President Trump realizes what a time-consumingand expensive- process the land acquisition piece of this project is going to be. 
44 

According to CBP, along one stretch of the border mostly in south Texas400 land acquisitions were needed to build some of the fencing that's in place now. 

Of those 400 acquisitions, 330 condemnation lawsuits had to be filed by the 

Department of Justice. Most of the lawsuits were filed in and around 2008. And of 

those 330 condemnation cases, more than 90 are still pending today, nearly a decade 

later. This is not going to be the quick and easy process that President Trump says 

it's going to be. 

And it's not going to be cheap either. According to CBP, the Government has 

spent about $78 million on land acquisition for existing fencing. And those were the 

parcels that were the easiest to acquire. It's going to take $21 million or more to 

resolve the cases that are still pending. And nobody I've asked can tell me just how 

much it's going to cost to seize the rest of the land that will be needed to build the 

wall that President Trump has ordered. 

In the course of preparing for this hearing, my staff talked to a number of 

different landowners in south Texas who weren't happy about how they were treated 

by the government back when existing fencing was being built a decade ago. One 

of those people is a gentleman from Brownsville, Texas, whose family runs a 

farming operation in the area. This person had the misfortune of living in a house 

that was too close to the Rio Grande River, which is the international border with 

Mexico in much of South Texas. In some cases, there's a mile or two of land 
45 

between where fencing was built and the river, and that's how this man's houseand some of the most fertile land in the world ended up on the wrong side of the 

fence. 

When the government came knocking on his door in 2006, this Brownsville 

farmer was offered just a few thousand dollars for the narrow strip of land where an 

18-foot-tall fence would eventually be built. He wasn't offered any money for the 

dozens of acres of farmland that would be trapped between the fence and the Rio 

Grande River. When he went to take out a loan to send his 3 girls to college, he 

wasn't able to do so the fence had made his property virtually worthless. 

In this particular case, in order to access the portion of his property that was 

south of the fence, including his house, he had to enter a code on a keypad and then 

a gate would swing open. Can you imagine having to pass through an 18-foot-tall 

fence just to access the land and the house that you own? Think how isolated you'd 

feel how cut off from the rest of the country you would be. For this person in 

Brownsville, those concerns became very real just a few weeks ago when the house 

that he lived in burned to the ground. The Brownsville farmer told my staff that the 

fire marshal couldn't save his house from the flames because, despite the assurances 

of the federal government when the fence was built, the local emergency services 

department had never been given the code to open the gate in the fence. 
46 

Regardless of how you feel about President Trump's wall, Mr. Chairman, 

that's just not how people should be treated. American families need to be treated 

with dignity and respect, and they need to be fairly compensated for any land that is 

taken from them. 

I'll be the first one to tell you that we need to enforce the immigration laws 

that we have on the books and provide DHS officials with the tools and resources 

they need to secure the border. And maybe that means they need a wall. But if 

we're going to pay to build this thing, we need to be honest about some of the true 

costs to the American people. Let's start today by speaking frankly about how much 

it's going to cost, how difficult it will be to acquire the land, and some of the impacts 

on American landowners on the border- and whether the benefits of a wall justify 

those costs. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 
47 

Written Statement for the Record 

Submitted by David V. Aguilar to the 

U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

Hearing on Fencing Along the Southwest Border 

April 4, 2017 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaskill, distinguished members of the Committee. 

am honored to appear before you today to testify on issues associated with securing the 

southern border of the United States, to include what has taken center stage in the 

ongoing border security discussion- construction of a physical wall along the 

Southwest border. 

My testimony is informed by my 35-year career as a Border Enforcement Officer and 

Department of Homeland Security Executive. I served as an Agent in multiple Border 

Patrol sectors, including as the Chief of the Tucson Sector at the time when unlawful 

entries into the United States across our border with Mexico were at an all-time high. 

My views also reflect my experience as the former Acting Commissioner of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Deputy Commissioner of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, and National Chief of the U.S. Border PatroL It was during my tenure 

as National Chief, that we developed and implemented our nation's first-ever National 

Southwest Border Strategy, doubled the size of the Border Patrol, constructed over 650 

miles of border infrastructure, and initiated the organized application of technology 

along our border with Mexico. 

Maintaining a safe and secure environment along the U.S.- Mexico border is critical. A 

safe and orderly border that is predicated on the strong rule of law deprives criminal 

organizations, drug cartels, and criminal individuals the opportunity to thrive. It also 

provides a solid foundation for trade and economic development between Mexico and 

the United States and provides for improved security and quality of life in our border 

communities and throughout our nation. 

Today's Southwest Border Security Challenges 

Illegal border crossings have dropped dramatically, our border communities are some of 

the safest cities and communities in the United Sates, and trade between our two 

nations is thriving. The barriers and infrastructure built and expanded between 2005 

and 2011 along the border played a large part in the enhanced control of our southwest 

border. We have done much to secure the border but there is much more to do. 

Borders are dynamic, significant challenges remain, and new ones are developing. Drug 

trafficking into the United States is still a major problem, as is the illegal flow of bulk 

cash and firearms to Mexico from the United States. These criminal activities are the 

principal causes of the violence that has afflicted Mexico. 

Border fences, walls, and tactical infrastructure, are a definitive part of the border 

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48 

security solution. Those of us with first-hand knowledge and security experience at the 

U.S. -Mexico border understand that infrastructure, technology and personnel are 

critical aspects of the solution that will ensure enhanced control over the entire border. 

Walls, fences and vehicle barriers are an integral part of a border enforcement system. 

Their purpose is to impede, deter, and slow down the illegal flow of people and vehicles 

across our land borders between the ports of entry. Properly designed, placed and 

supported, this type of physical infrastructure creates an environment which enhances 

the Border Patrol's enforcement capabilities and its efforts to detect, deter, identify, 

classify, respond, and resolve illegal border entries. 

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Current Fencing Authority 

The statute which authorizes DHS to deploy barriers along the international borders is 

Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 

and supporting amendments. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 (Public Law 109 367) 

directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish operational control of the 

border to prevent unlawful entries into the United States between the ports of entry. 

The act also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to construct 

fencing and security improvements in the border area from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf 

of Mexico. The executive order on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 

Improvements issued on January 25, 2017 by President Trump restates the authorities 

included in the Secure Fence Act and explicitly directs the Secretary to take all 

appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the 

southern border. There is no restriction that would bar DHS from constructing additional 

fencing or other barriers along the border provided that the Secretary concludes such 

construction is essential to achieve control of the border. 

Congress has also provided the Secretary broad authority to waive "all legal 

requirements" that may impede construction of barriers and roads. Despite these 

authorities, challenges remain, including: 

• Environmental Considerations 

o There are numerous federally endangered or threatened species living along the 

border. 

o In Arizona for example, 85% of the land along the border are Federal lands set 

aside to protect wilderness and wildlife, such as Organ Pipe Cactus National 

Monument and the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge. 

• Land Ownership 

o Most of the land along the Texas border is privately owned. Landowners will 

have to be compensated for use of their lands for either construction or 

construction access. Eminent domain may have to be exercised to take land 

required for the construction of border infrastructure. 

o While the Federal Government does have a 60-foot easement (the Roosevelt 

Reservation) along the border (except in Texas), this will be insufficient to 

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49 

construct certain types of barriers, access roads, and apply supporting 

technology (e.g. double fencing with a patrol lane between them). 

• Tribal Autonomy 

o The Tohono O'odham nation occupies 75 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border in 

Arizona. 

o The U.S. Government will need to reach agreement with this Native American 

nation to construct barriers on their land. 

The Border Patrol's Experience with Barriers at the Border 

The above noted issues will have to be taken into consideration. But it is important to 

note that there is nothing more destructive to environmentally sensitive land and quiet 

communities than the uncontrolled illegal flow of people, vehicles, smugglers, and 

criminal organizations. The placement of fences and deterrent infrastructure in 

previously uncontrolled parts of the border have actually allowed for the rejuvenation of 

areas that had previously been devastated due to heavy illegal pedestrian and vehicular 

traffic. Fences, barriers, and walls have been instrumental to the Border Patrol's 

successes on the border. But we must not forget that personnel and technological 

capabilities are a vital part of an integrated border-control strategy. Situational 

awareness, observation/surveillance capabilities, and Border Patrol resources are 

essential in order to be able to promptly respond to detected border incursions. 

As of May 2015, DHS had installed 353 miles of primary pedestrian fencing and 300 

miles of vehicle fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border. These barriers- along with 

significant increases in Border Patrol personnel, improved detection and surveillance 

capabilities and the strategic deployment of resources to support iterative border control 

strategies- have significantly improved control of the border. Migrant apprehensions at 

the border have decreased significantly, dropping from nearly 1.7 million in Fiscal Year 

2000 to 408,870 in fiscal year 2016. In the first quarter (Oct-Dec) of the current fiscal 

year, the Border Patrol apprehended 136,670 individuals at the U.S.-Mexico border. 

President Trump directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a strategy 

within 180 days to obtain and maintain complete operational control of the southern 

border. I believe walls, fences, and border infrastructure will definitely be a part of what 

the Border Patrol will be identifying as current requirements. The Secretary's findings 

should inform what types of barriers should be constructed, where they should be 

constructed, and construction priorities. 

Other Considerations 

There are multiple threats that must be addressed at the U.S.-Mexico border. These 

include trafficking of drugs, trafficking of arms, contraband within legal trade, and money 

laundering. The criminal organizations that work to defeat our border enforcement 

efforts are too often solely looked upon as drug and human smuggling organizations. 

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50 

These same organizations will provide illegal access into our country for anyone willing 

to pay the going price. Our military men and women are fighting the enemy on foreign 

ground. We have enemies that will pay any price to get to us and our way of life. We 

have hardened our airports and ports of entry making it extremely difficult to get to us by 

air. We must responsibly address our borders. 

Conclusion 

Since the Border Patrol first began building infrastructure (fences, walls, vehicle 

barriers) along our nation's border there has been endless debate on its' value. Border 

Patrol Agents and the Border Patrol as an organization agree that properly constructed, 

placed, and supported physical infrastructure is essential to border security. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony to this committee as you consider 

how to support the Department of Homeland Security in meeting its critical mission of 

achieving a higher level of control, from all threats, at the U.S.-Mexico border. I look 

forward to your questions. 

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51 

OPENING REMARKS AND WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF 

RONALD S. COLBURN 

DEPUTY CHIEF, U.S. BORDER PATROL (RETIRED) 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

HEARING ON 

"FENCING ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER" 

APRIL 4, 2017 
52 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill and distinguished Members 

of the Committee, I am honored and humbled to be invited to testify today 

before the committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

regarding "Fencing Along the Southwest Border." 

I will describe some of my experience and knowledge of the history of tactical 

infrastructure, also known as fences and barriers, pertaining to the 

international boundary between the United States of America and Mexico. 

Thirty-five years ago, in southeastern Arizona, I was building border fence 

with a post hole digging tool, a wire-stretching tool, a heavy coil of barbed 

wire and a good pair of leather gloves. Alone, and with no backup, my 

partner and I dug post holes and strung wire in Douglas, Arizona, standing 

inches away from Mexico. 

Three or four strands of barbed wire would not halt people from crossing, or 

stop smugglers from defeating our efforts with a simple pair of wire cutters. 

But, it marked the border; our "line in the sand." 

We've come a long way since the days of steel posts and strings of barbed 

wire. In 1995, a U.S. Army construction battalion replaced expanded metal 

and chain link fencing in another Arizona border town, where I found myself 

in command, at the time. That year, we arrested an astounding 116,000 illegal 

aliens in that one station's area of responsibility. Countless tens of thousands 

made it past our sparsely staffed "thin green line." 

Then, 9-11-2001 came. After the horrendous, deadly attacks on American soil 

by foreign born terrorists, the American people strongly communicated to 

Congress, the Administration, and the media that they wanted our nation 

protected at our borders. 

In 2005, I found myself serving as the Chief of the Yuma Border Patrol 

Sector, a stretch of the border that spanned southwestern Arizona and 

southeastern California. 

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53 

About 450 Agents covered the approximate 125 mile border with Mexico in 

the Yuma area, working overlapping 8 to 12 hour rotations, 24-seven. 

During my first year as Chief of Yuma, we arrested over 138,000 foreign 

nationals attempting to cross our border from Mexico. They crossed under 

the cover of darkness, and during broad daylight. They crossed in vast and 

overwhelming numbers, into Yuma, and were led by unscrupulous smugglers 

across the Colorado River, remote desert and towering rocky mountain 

ridges, where summer temperatures can push upwards of 120 degrees. 

We seized nearly 36,000 pounds of drugs driven or backpacked into the USA, 

and there were over 200 attacks by border bandits that year. We counted 

eighteen hundred victims, mostly from Mexico. The criminal gangs and lone 

bandits from Mexico preyed on their own; robbing, raping and murdering 

fellow countrymen, women and children, who were staging to enter, or during 

the act of crossing the border. Frequently, the guides acted in concert with 

the bandits, sharing in "the take." Assaults on border law enforcement 

personnel numbered in the hundreds. Yuma had become the most violent 

stretch of the border. 

So, in response to this, Yuma Sector became the "proof of concept" that 

America can protect and control its border, when the proper mix of resources 

are placed almost instantaneously. The Secretary of Homeland Security 

prudently, and thoughtfully exercised his legislated waiver authority in 

consideration of certain environmental regulations which posed a hindrance 

to construction initiatives. 

Nine hundred men and women of the National Guard, supporting Operation 

Jump Start, descended upon the border in the Yuma area. We built border 

barriers -fence--along the entire stretch of the border in Yuma Sector. The 

Army Corps of Engineers, and contractors built double pedestrian fencing; 

vehicle barriers, and what is known as "floating fence" in the Imperial Sand 

Dunes. The style and materiel used depended on the geographic and 

demographic challenges. We doubled the Border Patrol Agent manpower, 

and added additional sensor and communications technology. 

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54 

Violent bandit activity went from the record 200 attacks and over 1,800 

victims the year before, to!£.!:!!, after fence. The number of violent assaults on 

Border Patrol Agents also declined drastically. 

Before fence: Yuma Border Patrol recorded 2,706 known "drive-throughs" in 

a one year period. This is where smugglers load up vehicles with their 

contraband of drugs and people, and simply drive across the open, unfettered 

border, and cross the river in shallow places, destroying wilderness landscape 

along the way. They lose themselves in urban areas and traffic once reaching 

paved roads. Of the 2,706 drive-throughs, we recorded a mere 13 captures 

and turn backs. The rest all got away, with no idea what or who they brought 

in. 

After fence: Only six vehicles attempted to enter, at other than a designated 

port of entry. None got away- we captured or turned back all of them. From 

2,706, down to six. Impressive results. 

By 2008, Yuma Sector arrests of illicit border crossers and traffickers had 

dwindled from over 138,000 down to 8,363. The known attempts to enter and 

the got-aways dwindled to an equally minimal number compared to the 

hundreds of thousands that entered and evaded arrest in previous years. 

I encourage you to ask the Border Patrol Agents in the field. They know. I 

recently completed a comprehensive tour of the border in south Texas, 

receiving robust "state of the border" updates from some of the Border Patrol 

Chiefs and their staffs. I have spoken with the majority of Border Patrol 

leadership covering the Southwestern states in recent days. 

Bottom line: when I ask them about fence, every one of them responds: "Yes, 

build new barriers, where needed; improve existing fence, and maintain 

timely repairs when breached by criminals, or damaged by the elements." 

Threats change; the transnational criminal organizations will not simply go 

away. They try methods to defeat the fence, but it persistently impedes their 

ease of entry and ability to quickly ingress into border communities and the 

interior of the United States. It gives the protectors of our borders the time to 

detect and respond to the illegal activity. It preserves the environment in the 

border wild lands. 

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This system-of-systems approach, implemented broadly and rapidly is what 

makes tactical infrastructure, border fence, so valuable as part of the solution. 

Thank you, esteemed Members of this Committee. God bless the men and 

women of the U.S. Border Patrol. 

I remain ready to continue a dialogue regarding this topic. 

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Please note: Due to the strict time constraints for me to compose a complete and proper testimonial 

statement, I submit the following previously prepared academic conference paper to the United States 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee- Senator Ron Johnson, Chair; Senator 

Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member. Dr. Terence Michael Garrett, March 31, 2017 

American Society for Public Administration 2017 Conference Atlanta, Georgia March 17-21, 2017. 

Session- Monday, March 20,2017 at 8:00AM-9:30AM. 

Session/Panel Title: Social Equity, Economic Integration, and Political Responses to 

Immigration Issues between Mexico and the United States 

Paper Title: Where there's a wall there's a way: The end(?) of democratic discourse regarding 

immigration and border security policy 

Author: Terence M. Garrett, Ph.D. 

Professor and Chair of the Public Affairs and Security Studies Department 

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 

One West University Blvd., BPODI Room l.I20C 

Brownsville, Texas 78520 

Tel. 1+956.882.8825; Fax 1+956.882.8893 

Email: terence.garrett@utrgv.edu 

BIO: 

Terry Garrett (Ph.D., University of Oklahoma, 1997) has doctoral field concentrations in public 

administration, comparative politics, and international relations within the academic discipline of political 

science. Dr. Garrett is currently department chair and professor of Public Affairs and Security Studies 

(PASS) at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, having previously served as department chair in 

the Government Department at the University of Texas at Brownsville (UTB) (201 0-2012), provost 

fellow for leadership (20 I 0) at UTB, and Master of Public Policy & Management (MPPM) graduate 

adviser (2007-2010; 2013 to present), and is currently Master ofpublic Affairs (MPA) adviser in Public 

Policy for the UTRGV PASS Department. Dr. Garrett serves on University of Texas System Chancellor 

(Admiral) McRaven's Texas National Security Network (TNSN) as a member of the TNSN steering 

committee. Prior to entering a twenty plus year career in academe, Terry Garrett was a military technician 

(excepted civil service) in the Oklahoma Air National Guard and was a veteran of the First Gulf War 

having served as an active duty non-commissioned officer in the United States Air Force as a 

communications center operator (September 1990 to March 1991 with a top secret security clearance for 

cryptologic communications security management, AFSC 49171 ), He received the National Defense and 

Air Force Achievement medals for his service. Terry Garrett was honorably discharged in October 1992. 
57 

Abstract: Border walls have become part and parcel to corporate strategies to gamer profits in the new 

era ofpost-911 insecurity. Combined with pre-911 agribusiness, service industry and other corporateindustrial expansion including encouraging the "ongoing" recruiting of undocumented cheap labor, the 

twin corporate policy directives are achieving profits at the expense of the people migrating from Latin 

America. Building on previous work, the authors analyze the problems created by corporations, complicit 

government agencies and elected officials in terms of maintaining a status quo that effectively exploits 

communities from both sides of the US/Mexico border. Policy alternatives are developed, offered and 

examined to alleviate the continuing misery that affects people living on both sides of the border using 

critical and postmodem theoretical frameworks. 

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Donald J. Trump\< 

Our border is being breached daily by 

criminals. We must build a wall & deduct costs 

from Mexican foreign aid! donaldjtrump.com 

189 248 

Figure l: Tweet produced by Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump, Aprill6, 

2015 

Introduction: Defining the Problem of"Walls" in the USA Border Security Context 

As of March 16, 2017, President Trump proposed an initial investment towards border security and 

the wall. Elements include a $2.6 billion "down payment" for the border wall, the hiring of 1,000 

Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents and 500 Customs and Border Protection agents all 

under his proposed budget (Fandos, March 16, 2017, para. I, 8). The fate of funding Trump's wall now 

rests with Congress as part of the overall appropriations process. Additionally, the proposed budget will 

have cuts made in other agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) including the 

Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

(para. I 0). The border wall between Mexico and the USA is now under consideration for being 

constructed, or being extended, once again. 

Walls have long been used as a solution to address public policy situations such as national security, 

economic security, and the prevention of an influx of migrants to cross into sovereign territory. Questions 

arise as to how effective walls are in terms of addressing security and migration issues. Garrett (2012) 

notes that "Justification for increased national or 'homeland' security in the wake of the 'war on 

terrorism' and September II brought about a fusion with the anti-migration policy proponents who have 

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59 

used the events to politically force the US Government to procure land for fencing in the region, through 

the authority of the 2005 Real ID Act and the 2006 Secure Fence Act passed by Congress and signed into 

law by President Bush, in the hopes of attaining a more secure border with Mexico and to prevent a 

terrorist attack sometime in the future" (pp. 74-5). Garrett and Storbeck (20 II) submit that walls- such as 

the USA-Mexico border fence in the Rio Grande Valley- represent potential harm to the people dwelling 

in the region, portraying the II 0-mile long wall as "the consequences of U.S. wall-building policies in 

terms of semiotics [Baudrillard's simulacra], space [Foucault's heterotopias], and subjectivity 

[Agamben's homo sacer] (p. 530). We see a continuation of the policy of"wall building," at least 

rhetorically, with the president-elect of the USA. There are political, economic, psychological, and social 

consequences for this wall as there are for others. 

ln addition to the political consequences, there are economic issues associated with the border wall 

related to migration policy. Garrett (2013) makes the case that ... 

The general lack of a substantive debate over the relative merits of effective 

governmental policies on immigration and border security is indicative of the power of 

the market spectacle. The two market-based solutions: 

(l) bring in the undocumented workers for their cheap (and exploited) labor; or 

(2) keep the undocumented workers out by constructing border fences and 

accumulating surveillance equipment- preclude any viable alternative 

strategies such as, for example, providing legal entry for workers that reflect 

more accurately their true impact on society or providing support to workers in 

their own country of origin. 

Worker products that are relatively inexpensive and plentiful appear to come into 

conflict with corporate interests in border security whereby extensive apparatuses are 

manufactured and systematically maintained. Cheap labor and lucrative government 

contracts trump effective and socially meaningful dialogue (p.34). 

The market "spectacle" is explained as being the ... 

... heir to all the weakness of the project of Western philosophy, which was an attempt to 

understand activity by means of the categories of vision. Indeed, the spectacle reposes on an 

incessant deployment of the very technical rationality to which that philosophical tradition gave 

rise. So far from realizing philosophy, the spectacle philosophizes reality, and turns the material 

life of everyone into a universe of speculation (Debord, 1967/1994, pp. 17-18, adapted from 

Garrett, 2013, p. 33). 

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And now integrated in society as ... 

. . . The spectacle has spread itself to the point where it now permeates all reality. It was easy to 

predict in theory what has been quickly and universally demonstrated by practical experience of 

economic reason's relentless accomplishments: that the globalisation of the false was also the 

falsification of the globe (Debord, 1988, p.6). 

We take a position in this paper that exploitation of labor- that primarily from immigrants from Mexico, 

Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala- is part and parcel of the phenomenon of globalization. The wall 

is a symbolic obstruction, used in all manner to hinder, if not stop, migrants from entering the USA. The 

wall cannot completely prohibit determined migrants. The wall can be, and is, used to as an apparatus 

(Agambcn, 2009) or simulacrum (Baudrillard, 2006) to convince Americans that they are secure, whether 

they are or are not. The border wall is an outgrowth of the society of the spectacle- and is a spectacle. 

Background: Where There's a Wall, There's a Way? 

The terrorist attacks of September II, 2001 provided the impetus for the building of the border wall 

combining fear with policy to enable construction through the passage offedera!laws. The 2006 Secure 

Fence Act and the 2005 REAL ID Act were passed to enable the Secretary of Homeland Security to build 

approximately 650 miles of fence along the US-Mexico border by overriding environmental and property 

laws already passed into Jaw as well as requiring passports, or land-based passport cards, for re-entry into 

the USA by its citizens. The pressure on private land owners, particularly in Texas, brought about 

changes to the Secure Fence Act. According to Dinah Bear, former White House Counsellor, thenSenator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) sponsored and passed an amendment to the 2006 law in 2007 "to 

give the Secretary of Homeland discretion in the fence's location [and she] crafted language that made the 

700-mile mandate a floor, not a ceiling," meaning that 'Trump can build more than 700 miles if he wants 

to ... " (del Bosque, November 18,2016, para. 7). The result is that while Texas land owners along the USMexico border won temporary relief from the initial border fence construction, the 2007 amendment 

enabled further future construction through 2010 before government contracts expired. 

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From 2011 to 2017 no further wall building effectively took place. The Obama administration had in 

place a border fence mostly inherited from policies implemented in the Bush administration. The border 

security policy of the USA consisted of the fence along with increased surveillance apparatuses and an 

increased number of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to 21,3 70 deployed along the USMexico border by 2015, although the employees' union for the CBP Rio Grande Valley sector leadership 

wanted an additional5,000 personnel in testimony to Congress (National Border Patrol Council. March 

17, 2015, para. 13). The addition of 5,000 CBP agents for border security was coincidentally the number 

cited by Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump that found its way eventually into an 

executive order for construction of the border wall. The National Border Patrol Council was one of the 

first government employee unions to back Mr. Trump in March 2016 and viewed the new wall as a "vital 

tool" to control undocumented border crossers (Morrissey, November 18, 20 16). ICE agents are 

represented by the National Immigration and Customs Enforcement Council that "represents 5,000 

immigration officers and law enforcement support staff' out of nearly 20,000 employees (Valverde, 

January 26, 2017, para. 7). Once Donald J. Trump was inaugurated on January 20, 2017, the CBP and 

ICE unions have the president they endorsed. 

The resulting executive order by President Trump on January 25, 2017 is now in effect as law to build 

more fence, or a wall, although Congress has to authorize funding for said wall applicable here as ... 

Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the executive branch to: 

(a) secure the southern border of the United States through the immediate construction of a 

physical wall on the southern border, monitored and supported by adequate personnel 

so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism; [and] ... 

Sec. 3. Definitions. (a) "Asylum officer" has the meaning given the term in section 235(b)(I)(E) of 

the INA (8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(l)). 

(b) "Southern border" shall mean the contiguous land border between the United States and 

Mexico, including all points of entry. 

(c) "Border States" shall mean the States of the United States immediately adjacent to the 

contiguous land border between the United States and Mexico. 

(d) Except as otherwise noted, "the Secretary" shall refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

(e) "Wall" shall mean a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and 

impassable physical barrier. 

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The cost of new border wall is yet unclear, although there is an estimate that the "cost of a border wall is 

potentially enormous, witb initial estimates ranging from a few billion dollars to $14 billion. And that's 

just for constructing the wall or fence; it does not include a range of other expenses, from maintenance to 

border patrol agents to purchasing private property from Texas landowners" (Bade and Bresnahan, 

January 5, 2016, para. 10). Complicating factors for constructing a new wall include a "yet-to-bereleased" Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that "estimates the cost of a single layer fence 

at $6.5 million per mile, or $10.4 million per mile for a double-layer fence" (para. 23). Senator Majority 

Leader, Mitch McConnell, estimates the border wall will cost between $12-$15 billion (LoBianco, Raju 

and Barrett, January 26, 2017). As of February 9, 2017, an internal Trump administration report has 

determined that the cost of the border wall will be between $21.6 billion and $25 billion and take up to 

tbree and one half years to complete (Ainsley, February 9, 2017 sec breakdown in Figure 2 below). The 

largest estimate for border wall construction is from a Massachusetts Institute of Technology Review 

estimate of between $27 billion to $40 billion for one thousand miles (New York Times, February 25, 

2017). The USA public is not in favor of the wall as a recent Pew Center Poll shows tbat 39% of those 

surveyed were in favor, or thought the wall was important to build, while 59 percent did not think the wall 

was important (Sulis, January 6, 20 17). At this point in time, the task of determining the final monetary 

cost of the border wall is difficult and will likely take years before tbe total is complete. 

Phases- Dates Miles of Coverage and Location Estimated Cost 

Phase one: 26 miles ( 42 Kilometers) near San Diego, California; $360 million 

September 2017 El Paso, Texas; and in Texas's Rio Grande Valley 

Phase two: Dates 151 miles (242 km) of border in and around the Rio $11-15 million per mile 

as yet unknown, Grande Valley, Texas; Laredo, Texas; Tucson, 

presumably after Arizona; El Paso, Texas and Big Bend, Texas 

September 20 l 7 

Phase three: Dates Unspecified 1,080 miles (1,728 km) effectively the $11-15 million per mile 

as yet unknown - remainder of Mexico/US border 

final completion 

date end of2020 

.. F1gure 2: Trump Admmtstratlon Internal Cost Estimate Report- $2!.6 b1lhon (low esl!mate) total for the 

Proposed Border Wall (Source: Based on Ainsley, February 9, 20 17) 

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The final cost to US taxpayers for the construction of the Trump administration's border wall remains to 

be seen. Bids will likely have to be extended for wall building contractors to develop a clearer 

understanding for government officials in charge of the project. 

In the past government contracts of now existing border fence placements illustrate how 

corporations have benefited from the building of the border fence. Boeing SBI-Net, for example, received 

$7.5 million per mile- out of a total of II 0 miles for constructing an 18-foot high fence in the Rio 

Grande Valley during the period of 2006 to 2009 (Garrett and Storbeck, 201 I) in order to make 

substantial profits (Garrett, 2012). In south Texas, the border fence was placed in areas where wildlife 

refuges, landowners, farmers and ranchers were located resulting in properties being apprehended by 

provisions of the Secure Fence Act of2006 that granted overriding authority of property and 

environmental laws previously passed by Congress and given to the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security. The fence and other security devices such as surveillance cameras, drones and other 

aerial devices provide lucrative profits to corporations and still do not entirely prevent migrants from 

crossing the US-Mexico border. The ability to acquire cheaper undocumented workers who enter the US 

illegally from other nations is still maintained. The twin pillars of the security state apparatus build up and 

the ongoing underground labor market contribute to current USA border security and migration policies 

that benefit corporations thereby precluding any policy change for the foreseeable future other than the 

current status quo as the powerful interests dominate public discourse (Garrett, 2013). With the new 

administration installed in office as of January 2017, nothing will likely change. The new wall or rather 

the extension of the pre-existing wall - means more corporate profits at the expense of migrants crossing 

the border and making it more difficult but not insurmountable. And a genuine public discussion of the 

consequences of existing border security and migration policies will be shunted aside and displaced by 

the spectacle of the wall. 

One of the consequences of the "renewed" building of the border wall is the alienation of the 

Mexican government by the Trump administration as demonstrated somewhat in Figure I (above). 

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64 

Republican presidential candidate Trump referred to Mexican immigrants as rapists, promised to build a 

wall to keep them out, and pledged to deport those Mexican migrants who had crossed into the USA 

illegally (Ahmed, January 25, 2017). Additionally, candidate and now-president Trump made statements 

to the effect that Mexico would pay for the construction of the border wall, primarily with a twenty 

percent tax on goods imported from Mexico to the United States, although economists and market 

analysts have stated that USA citizens would pay for the costs through higher prices passed on to 

consumers and not Mexico (See, for example, Krugman, January 30, 2017; Bryan, January 29, 2017; and, 

Jacobs, Rushe, and Agren, January 27, 2017). Mexico is the USA's third largest trading partner behind 

China and Canada. Both economies would suffer as a result of raising tariffs in this manner and the 

NAFTA treaty would be effectively moot as a result. 

The border wall proposal has not gone over well in Mexico since it was introduced. Mexico's 

President Nieto declared, "I regret and condemn the United States' decision to continue with the 

construction of a wall that, for years now, far from uniting us, divides us," as he cancelled his state visit to 

Washington, DC to meet with President Trump (Ahmed, January 25, 2017, para. 5). New York Times 

reporter Azam Ahmed notes that "The perceived insults endured [against Mexico) during the campaign 

had finally turned into action. Decades of friendly relations between the nations -- on matters involving 

trade, security and migration- seemed to be unraveling" (para. 7). President Trumps' border wall 

proposal is viewed by the Mexican government as an affront that may have damaged relations 

permanently. 

"The Wall" Critical Theory Framework: Agamhen, Baudrillard, Foucault and Debord 

The society whose modernization has reached the stage of the integrated spectacle is characterized 

by the combined effect offive principal features: incessant technological renewal; integration of 

state and economy; generalized secrecy, unanswerable lies; an eternal present. Guy Debord, 

1988, "Comments on The Society of the spectacle." (para. 19) 

In previous work, Garrett and Storbeck (2011) analyzed the border wall constructed in the Rio 

Grande Valley region of Texas using a theoretical construct based on concepts of semiotics, space and 

subjectivity relying primarily on the works of Jean Baudrillard (2006), Michel Foucault (1970; 1980; 

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65 

2007; and, 2008) and Giorgio Agamben (1995; 2005; 2007; and, 2009). Specifically, we created the 

border wall concept as simulacrum, space-created heterotopias, and migrants and citizens in border 

regions (Mexican and USA) as homo sacer- people "the other" who may be sacrificed without rights in 

the current state of exception - or the perception of the nation-state under siege to justify policies to keep 

out "the other" (See also Pope and Garrett, 2012). These theories will be explained briefly in the 

discussion that follows. In addition to the previous work, we will examine current political, social, and 

economic circumstances with the border wall that has been reprised by the Trump administration to 

include an analysis of Debord's (196711994; 19&8) concept of the society of the spectacle-which we 

believe is central to knowing the phenomenon. 

We employed Jean Baudrillard's (2006) theoretical concept, the simulacrum, which signifies that an 

image that is intended as real, and may in fact exist, can become hyperreal- or something that in reality it 

is not. Garrett and Storbeck (2011) submit the thcoreticai notion that the 18-foot high border fence 

constructed in the Rio Grande Valley is represented or portrayed by government officials and others 

sympathetic to the "wall" as a symbol of security based on events surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacksalthough the terrorists did not cross the USA-Mexico border. Conversely, those people dwelling in the 

region directly affected by the wall sec or perceive it as a threat to their security and well-being. The 

transitory interpretation of the border fence is captured in Figure 3 below as ... 

Fi!!nre 3. 9/11 aud the Border Wall Become Hmerreal, Simulacra 

it [the imagel is the reflection of a profound reality; (the image is a good appearance) 

The border(ence is the image of homeland security. 

it masks and denatures a profound realitx; fit is an evil aErearance) 

The border wall is the image of oppression: loss of land, detrimental to society and 

commerce-leading to despair and (ear. 

it masks the absence of a profound reality; (it plays at being an appearance) 

The border fence/wall gives the impression of a sense of security at the expense of 

those victimized bv its presence in the lower Rio Grande Vallev. 

it has no relation to any realitv whatsoever; (it is no longer of the order ofareearance) __ 

The borderjimce in its 18:foot-high physical construction does not lead to real security (if it is at all 

completely possible)--agents on the ground, electronic surveillance methods, betler international 

immigration and national security policies are proven more effective [leading to: 7 

it is its own pure simulacrum 

The simulacrum or "hyperreal" becomes real. 9111 (itself having become a simulacrum) makes other 

hvperreal actions possible, such as the border fence. The proposed border fence becomes a 

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66 

I 

manifestation of "security" based on the fears of another "9111" by placing a physical structure to I 

impede or stop illegal immigration/!errorism; in real it)', it represents a porous and temporary barrier 

to delay crossinJ< into the United States. 

Source: [(Origmally Figure 2, Storbeck and Garrett, 2011, p. 535.) Adapted from Baudrillard 

(1981!2006), Garrett (2010), and Noe (2002).] 

The border wall, as such, is complex in tem1s of theoretical interpretation. Baudrillard's concept is 

utilized here to capture one key element of the border wall its symbolism. With regard to the Trump 

administration's border wall- nothing has changed in terms of semiotics. 

We could be criticized- and we expect to be- for our analysis of the wall using different 

theoretical concepts. We welcome the criticism but that will not impede us. There arc other elements to 

describe, explain and assess the phenomenon of the border wall. We ask the rhetorical question: Why 

should we limit ourselves to one theory when realistically we have to approach phenomenon in a manner 

that takes into full account its meaning- how it represents itselfto us? So, for Garrett and Storbeck 

(20 11) the next clement for consideration and explanation is the theoretical concept of the border wall as 

a heterotopia (Foucault, 1970; Garrett, 2012). The border wall in the Rio Grande Valley has displaced 

land from farmers, ranchers, and people who dwell in the area in that the wall is mostly distant from the 

Rio Grande. In some instances, the border wall, which mostly follows the levee system designed to 

prevent flooding in the region, is as far as 1.5 miles away from the river. Land is effectively lost and the 

federal government through the US Army Corp of Engineers and the Department of Homeland Security 

have designed a wall that slices through private land holdings in many plaees in south Texas. The land 

between the wall and the Rio Grande becomes what we call a heterotopia- the other place or land that 

is rendered useless or a no-man's land ... 

We see that in the name of state security, or homeland security, people with long-cherished familial 

relations and friendships with neighbors across the border in Mexico are having their way of life 

and existence challenged by the fence structure. While there has always been an clement of 

distance drawn on the international border, the new 18-foot-high concrete-embedded border wall 

with increased surveillance--where it is built and where it does not exist--complicates and 

devalues the space between Mexico and the United States. The heterotopia of the distance between 

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the steel pikes of the border wall and the actual border, centered in the middle of the Rio Grande, 

becomes a place where people will be shut out of their land, livestock and wildlife are cut off from 

access to water, and, most important, the people along both sides of the river arc more effectively 

being stopped from daily economic, social, and political interaction. (Garrett and Storbeck, 20 II, p. 

542.) 

The distance between the Rio Grande and where the actual wall is built remains an important element for 

consideration as to whom will suffer the consequences of the wall's placement. So, whether the area in 

question is along the Rio Grande where actually the midpoint of the river is the border between the state 

of Texas in the USA and Mexico- or in areas such as where New Mexico, Arizona and California meet 

Mexico on land also by treaty, the wall re-presents a place where no one may dwell, or a place that is 

neither sacred or profane in its vicinity. The security apparatus whether wall, cameras, drones, aerial 

blimps or paramilitary troops on the ground, guards against the incursion of the other: undocumented 

border crossers of whatever whereabouts in the world attempting to gain physical entrance into the USA. 

The next aspect of Garrett and Storbeck's (2011) and Pope and Garrett's (2012) analysis of the 

wall is the immediate policy issue for which the border wall is and was designed: to keep out the other, or 

what we refer to as the homo sacer- those who may be sacrificed and are without rights as human beings 

(Agamben, 1995). The current state of exception (Agamben, 2005) allows the USA state to declare that 

the nation is under a state of siege and since the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of 9111, 

through the Obama administration, and finally to the Trump administration, to declare a state of 

emergency authorizing public law and policies to strip the rights of undocumented border crossers from 

Latin America, China, or other parts of the globe. Laws in the USA such as the REAL ID Act of2005, the 

Secure Fence Act of 2006 and now the Executive Order signed by Trump to provide for further 

construction of the border wall and enable the USA government to institute security measures such as the 

increased "para-militarization" of the USA-Mexico borderthrough the massing of over 20,000 Customs 

and Border Patrol agents among other strategies and tactics. 

The reincarnation, or reintroduction, of the border wall has brought about a concern that was 

always "there" -to be observed but we missed and failed to capture in the original analysis although we 

discussed the matter before the final article (Garrett and Storbeck, 2011 ). We realize now that the key 

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element of any discussion of the border wall must center on Debord's (1967/1994) concept of the society 

of the spectacle. While the public is susceptible-· indeed, is held hostage to the spectacle, the 

accentuation of Republican candidate Trump and the current president through the use of social media, 

Twitter especially, is unprecedented. To have a complete theoretical analysis of the border wall we 

insights from Debord include ... 

Spectacular government, which now possesses all the means necessary to falsify the whole of 

production and perception, is the absolute master of memories just as it is the unfettered master of 

plans which will shape the most distant future. It reigns unchecked; it executes its summary 

judgments. It is in these conditions that a parodic end of the division of labor suddenly appears, 

with carnivalesque gaiety, all the more welcome because it coincides with the generalized 

disappearance of all real ability. A financier can be a singer, a lawyer a police spy, a baker can 

parade his literary tastes, an actor can be president, a chef can philosophize on cookery techniques 

as if they were landmarks in universal history. Anyone can join the spectacle, in order publicly to 

adopt, or sometimes secretly practice, an entirely different activity from whatever specialism first 

made their name. Where 'media status' has acquired irifinitely more importance than the value of 

anything one might actually be capable of doing, it is normal for this status to be readily 

transferable; for anyone, anywhere, to have the same right to the same kind of stardom (1988, 

para. 17, italics added for emphasis). 

President Trump with his obsessive use of social media via Twitter is an exemplar of spectacular 

government and the wherewithal to become a star. Those victims of the spectacle who are enthralled with 

the idea of a border wall- its falsifying perception- are sensitized and conditioned as the majority of the 

American public are rendered incapable of exercising what is in their own best political and economic 

self-interest. The billionaire star of The Apprentice, businessman, entrepreneur and six-time filer of 

bankruptcies becomes president of the USA. The wall is simply one spectacle-manifestation of the society 

of the spectacle and its latest and one of the best perpetrators. This is not a recent phenomenon, rather the 

society of the spectacle is ongoing. 

Courses of Action: The Border Wall as Art and Resistance to the Spectacle 

"You show me a 50:foot wall and I'll show you a 51-foot ladder at the border ... That's the way the 

border works." Janet Napolitano, former Governor of Arizona in 2005 (Lacy, July 19, 20! I, para. 

5)' 

"A person who thinks only about building walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is 

not Christian. This is not the gospel." Pope Francis (Burke, February 16, 2016) 

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69 

The construction of a ladder generally is not considered a work of art, rather the ladder is used by 

some migrants to cross into the USA. In the Rio Grande Valley, where the 18-foot high border was 

constructed, crude ladders are constructed to enable the passage of undocumented border crossers as 

shown in Figure 4 below. Art professor and "no border wall" advocate, Mr. Scott Nichol, has followed 

the development of the border wall in the Rio Grande Valley for years, employing his camera to make 

photographs depicting the false sense of security of the construction of the border wall and the struggle by 

migrants crossing from mostly Latin America into the USA. 

Figure 4: Ladder on 

Source: Photog:r,,~;r,, !!;•:! !i;,:;,t;.t!Nii(~,;:i.i •!•;,,i.L:l• •J¥ed by permission. 

Ladders are one means to go over the border wall. There are other options. Some may simply climb over 

in opportunistic places. One may go under the wall via tunnels. Another may buy a plane ticket and over 

stay a visa. The possibilities to migrate to the USA are endless. Where there's a wall, there's still a way to 

get past. 

Art sometimes reflects actual experience in life. In 2000 and 2005 artistic reflection and 

renditions of the conflict over the border were conducted by performers one of whom sent a cloud full of 

names of migrants who died trekking from Mexico into the USA. Another performing artist made a visual 

impression by shooting a man from a cannon in Tijuana, Mexico across the border to San Diego, 

California (Sheren, 2009). Art, in this case, was designed to draw attention to the plight of undocumented 

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border crossers moving across Mexico into the USA. The general working principles for these works was 

to draw public attention to the spectacle of the society of the spectacle. 

In another vein, Gretchen Baer, an artist who does her work painting murals on the Mexican side 

of the border wall in Sonora, states ... 

I have always been a big believer in using anything and everything as a public canvas. Turning 

something that isn't art into art inspires and empowers people. For one small Mexican town, we 

turned the border wall into a giant kids' muraL The wall represents all that Americans fear about 

Mexico. The kids of Naco, Sonora, have responded with the world's longest kids painting of 

flowers, hearts, suns and colorful kid stuff. Now the wall is coming down and replaced. But love 

trumps hate .... Build a bigger wall and we will paint a bigger mural! (January 25, 2017, para. 2). 

The resistance to the wall here signifies a desire not to be overtaken and overwhelmed by the 

circumstances of the wall separating communities along the Mexico-USA border. There are those who 

dwell on the border refusing to accept the spectacle manifested in their own neighborhoods. 

Protest marches ensued shortly after the executive order to build the wall on the Mexico-USA 

border and suspend immigration for 30 days from seven predominantly Muslim countries- Iran, Iraq, 

Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen (Davis, January 25, 2017).1n New York City, hundreds 

marched in protest against the border wall and immigration ban enabled by President Trump's executive 

order. In Washington Park, chants of "No ban! No wall! This is our New York!" And "Say it loud, say it 

clear, refugees are here to stay" as well as "No hate! No fear! Immigrants are welcome here!" (Marino 

and Perez, January 25, 2017, para. 2-3). Similar marches occurred around the USA in San Francisco, San 

Diego, California, Chicago, Illinois, Buffalo and New York City, New York, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 

Austin and Brownsville, Texas and many other events were held throughout the USA include over 2,000 

who protested Trump's border wall and ban at his resort in West Palm Beach, Florida (Yahoo! News, 

February 5, 20 17). The border wall spectacle has created momentum for resistance. Whether it will have 

an effect and continue remains to be seen. 

Discussion and Conclusion: An Assessment of the Border Wall 

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The border wall project continues while it seemingly was stalled for the most part between the 

Bush and Trump administrations. The government contracts that were not quite completed during the 

Bush administration were permitted to be completed during the first term of the Obama administration. 

One of the main talking points for the Trump presidential campaign, and, indeed, the prior Republican 

primary, was the construction of the border wall. Even though the majority of the USA public was clearly 

opposed to the further construction of the wall, the fact of the matter is that candidate Trump was able to 

successfully usc the issue along with an array of other policy changes to successfully motivate enough 

voters and garner the presidency in November 2016. 

The society of the spectacle continues. While we have established that the border wall is a 

combination of simulacrum and heterotopia designed to create homo sacer on both sides of the MexicoUSA border, the fetishizing of production becomes the reality that creates the condition of a presidential 

candidate embodying the characteristics to get elected on a platform containing a plank that the American 

public does not want, but a plurality of voters in his party wanted to have. Mexico will never pay for the 

border wall, despite the urgings of President Trump, who, while as a businessman sent a bill for a wall he 

constructed in Scotland to the locals in 2008 who resisted his business interests and they did not pay 

(Bennhold, November 25, 20 16). Mr. Trump at the time had promised economic development in 

northeastern Scotland, but a local government official has a perspective as to what happened and what 

will happen in the USA under a Trump presidency ... 

"If America wants to know what is coming, it should study what happened here. It's predictive," 

said Martin Ford, a local govcmmcnt representative. "I have just seen him do in America, on a 

grander scale, precisely what he did here. He suckered the people and he suckered the politicians 

until he got what he wanted, and then he went back on pretty much everything he promised" 

(Bennhold, November 25, 2016, para. I 0). 

If President Trump's wall goes forward, it still will not stop undocumented border crossers from entering 

the USA. Economic and political job seekers and refugees will continue to arrive in USA territory. The 

overall issue of the wall will be that corporate interests will be able to bid on lucrative government 

contracts to build the border wall. Affected govemment agencies such as ICE and CPB will continue to 

press for further wall development, as it coincides with their interest to militarize the Mexico-US border 

16 
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along with further personnel, and electronic surveillance- both on the ground and aerial in scope. 

Corporations such as Boeing SBI-Net and others will press the Congress to fund the wall and create 

government contracts. The fact that undocumented border crossers will not be stopped will mean that 

migrants will endure further hardships in order to improve their economic livelihood (Garrett, 2013 ). 

Nothing will change in that regard. 

The implementation of the border wall will mean that border dwellers who have not already been 

impacted by the wall will suffer the consequences of its construction. Private landowners, fanners, 

ranchers, national parks and refuges and other sensitive environmental areas arc in the wake of the 

proposed border wall. Additionally, the Mexican government will not pay for the wall. Any taxes 

imposed, whether 20 percent or some other amount, will be passed along to USA consumers who will pay 

for the projects. Trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will be 

placed in jeopardy and perhaps rendered moot. The economics of the wall construction may have a 

permanent detrimental effect on the USA and Mexican relations. 

In terms of resisting the society of the spectacle, resistance groups will continue whether artistic 

or through social movements that protest. These efforts arc a few of the last vestiges of democratic 

discourse regarding the border wall and are peripheral to the policy. There is little hope that elected 

officials will thwart the border wall spectacle as there are too many corporate interests that have influence 

on the Congress. Partisanship docs not seem to matter. The public record shows that Democrats and 

Republicans in Congress are susceptible to industries who want to obtain lucrative government contracts 

to build and maintain the wall through campaign donations and lobbying. Therefore, the prognosis for the 

construction of at least some sections of the border wall to go forward look positive. There will likely be 

an extension of the current border wall. 

The border wall will be a waste of public money in the USA to the point that the costs will run 

between $21 billion to $25 billion. This aspect is part and parcel to the society of the spectacle. The 

policy objectives it aims to appease will not be met as actual security will not be achieved. Undocumented 

border crossers may be delayed but ultimately they will not be impeded from entering the USA as is the 

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case from the 2006-2009 border wall construction. The same goes for potential terrorists who would not 

attempt to cross the border into the USA from Mexico due to the current level of paramilitary presence of 

the CPB, ICE, and other federal law enforcement agencies. The evidence is from the 9-11 attacks where 

none of the 19 hijackers came into the USA via the Mexican border and the fact that no known terrorists 

have ever crossed into the USA using that venue. The overall migration and border security situation in 

the western hemisphere will worsen before the society of the spectacle and its policy element, the border 

wall project, is rendered useless. 

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immigration policy. Pew Research Center. Retrieved 2/11/17 at http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/20 I 7/0 I /06/less-than-half-the-pub lie-views-border-wall-as-an-important -goal-for -u-s-immigrationpolicy/#comments. 

The New York Times. February 25, 2017. The immigration facts Donald Trump doesn't like. Retrieved 

2/27/17 at https://nyti.ms/21HqCI9. 

Trump, D.J. January 25, 2017. Executive order: Border security and immigration enforcement 

improvements. The White House: Office of the Press Secretary. 

Valverde, M. January 26, 2017. Donald Trump was not 'unanimously endorsed' by ICE, border patrol. 

PolitiFact. Retrieved 1/30/17 at http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/jan/26/donaldtrump/trump-claims-unanimous-endorsemcnt-ice-border-patr/. 

Yahoo! News. At least 2,000 march on Trump's Florida resort. Retrieved 2/11/17 at 

https :/ /www. yahoo. com/news/least-2-000-march-trumps-florida-resort-0412 5 965 I .htrnl ?ref=gs. 

Notes 

i Governor Napolitano later became Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security under the 

Obama Administration. 

20 
76 

THE STATE OF AMERICA'S 

BORDER SECURITY 

Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

114th Congress 

November 23, 2015 

MAJORITY STAFF REPORT 
77 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ........................................................................ .............................................. 3 

Key Highlights ..................................................................................................................... 7 

Part 1: The U.S.- Mexico Border ............................................................................................... 15 

Physical Barriers and Technological Detection Capabilities in the Sectors .................................. 16 

Fencing and lr!fraslructure ................................................................................................ 17 

Technologies ...................................................................................................................... 22 

Experiences on the Border ............................................................................................................ .28 

Border Patrol .................................................................................................................. ... 28 

Local Law Enforcement ..................................................................................................... 29 

Local Landowners .............................................................................................................. 30 

Transnational Crime at the Southwest Border ............................................................................... 31 

Cartels ............................................................................................................................... .31 

Drug Smuggling ....................................................................................................... .......... 32 

Human Smuggling and Trafficking .................................................................................... 34 

Gangs. Criminal Aliens. and Special Interest Aliens ........................................................ .35 

Part II: The U.S.- Canada Border ............................................................................................ 36 

U.S. Canada Joint Operations ..................................................................................................... 38 

Threats to the Northern Border ...................................................................................................... 3 9 

Terrorism ........................................................................................................................... 39 

Drug Smuggling ................................................................................................................ .43 

Human Smuggling and Trafficking ................................................................................... .44 

Threats on Tribal Lands .................................................................................................... .44 

Part III: The Maritime Border ................................................................................................... 46 

Agency Collaboration and Joint Missions .................................................................................... .46 

Threats along the Maritime Border ............................................................................................... .48 

The Atlantic Coast and Caribbean .................................................................... , ................ 50 

The Pacific Coasr ................................................................................................................ 52 

The Great Lakes ......................................................................................................... , ........ 54 

US Ports , ........................................................................................................................... 54 

Part IV: U.S. Ports ofEntry ........................................................................................................ 56 

Visa Waiver Program ..................................................................................................................... 56 
78 

Refugee Resettlement ....................... . ......................................... , ..................................... 59 

Biometric Entry-Exit Program ..................................................................................................... 61 

Preclearance Agreements .............................................................................................................. 64 

Part V: Understanding the Root Causes of Immigration ......................................................... 66 

Central American Migration to the U.S ......................................................................................... 67 

HHS Response .................................................................................................................... 68 

DOJ Response .................................................................................................................... 70 

DHS Response .................................................................................................................... 71 

Mexico Response ................................................................................................................ 74 

U.S. Assistance ro Central America and the Dependency on Remittances ........................ 75 

Unauthorized Immigrant Populations ............................................................................................ 77 

Demographics ofrhe Foreign-Born and Native Born Population ..................................... 79 

Labor Parriciparion and Incentives ................................................................................... 81 

Conclusion and Recommendations for Proposed Legislation ................................................. 83 

Appendix A: Key Findings of Fact from Border Security Hearings and Roundtables ......... 94 

Appendix B: Key Findings of Central America Trip ............................................................... 99 

Appendix C: Acronyms ............................................................................................................. ! 03 
79 

Executive Summarv 

For decades, politicians from both parties have vowed to secure our national borders and fix our 

broken immigration system. Unfortunately, the tough talk has yielded little, if any, real or 

lasting results. 

Since the 1986 comprehensive immigration reform that promised to fix the problem once and for 

all, Congress has passed dozens of laws promising significant reform while the illegal immigrant 

population has steadily grown from a supposedly 3.5 million in 1986 to approximately II 

million today. 

Since becoming Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Atlairs, 1 have made border security a top priority. The Committee has held 13 hearings and 3 

roundtables related to the subject and visited the southwest border, northern border, and Central 

America. Our efforts represent the necessary first step in solving any problem: a sincere attempt 

to fully understand and properly define it. 

Despite dedicated and often heroic etlorts from both the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) and local law enforcement, the accumulated testimony and information the Committee 

has gathered yields an inescapable conclusion: America's borders are not secure. This current 

state of affairs is clearly unacceptable. A secure border is not only a prerequisite to a functioning 

legal immigration system, but it is essential to maintaining national security and protecting 

public health and safety. 

To understand how porous our borders truly are, consider testimony from former Drug Czar 

General Barry McCatTrey and Rear Admiral Peter Brown stating we arc interdicting Jess than I 0 

percent of drugs crossing our land borders and only 11-18 percent crossing our maritime borders. 

These metrics not only reveal the lack of a secure border, they also point to a root causeperhaps THE root cause-of the problem: America's insatiable demand for drugs. 

This demand fueled the rise of drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations that have 

grown and expanded their product lines to include most forms of illegal drugs and human 

trafficking. Sex trafficking is extensive and the drug cartels often use economic migrants as a 

diversion for even higher value dmg and human smuggling. As product moves through Central 

America the drug cartels have dramatically weakened the public institutions and rule of law 

within those nations. The resulting corruption and criminal impunity enjoyed by gangs and 

extortion racketeers have led to high murder rates, destroyed economic opportunity, and created 

significant incentives to migrate to America-the so called "push factors" of illegal immigration. 

Although significant, these push factors pale in comparison to the pull factors, or incentives, that 

fuel illegal immigration. Even during periods of slow economic growth, the opportunities that 

abound in America relative to other countries are the most powerful incentives for both legal and 

illegal immigration. The significant wage gaps that exist between America and our southern 

neighbors are the metrics that prove the point. 

3 
80 

While economic opportunity is the single greatest incentive, we have created numerous other 

incentives within our laws, regulations, and through the lack of enforcement. We create 

sanctuary cities where criminals arc able to avoid deportation and allow our welfare and tax 

systems to be abused by non-U.S. citizens. Combined with the 2008 Human Trafficking bill 

containing extended adjudication rights to unaccompanied minors from non-contiguous 

countries, President Obama's Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) sparked the 

dramatic upsurge in unaccompanied children from Central America arriving at the southwest 

border staring in 2012. 

Regardless of whether or not these laws, regulations, and executive actions actually apply to 

individuals, the reality is that illegal immigrants are allowed to stay in America. Through the use 

of social media, that fact is widely known and becomes its own powerful incentive for even more 

illegal immigration. 

In order to secure our borders we must clearly identify and eliminate these incentives. One way 

to eliminate an incentive would be to immediately return those who illegally cross our borders to 

their country of origin. Both current and former DHS officials have seen firsthand that expedited 

removal of illegal immigrants works as a deterrent. The surge of 30,000 immigrants from Brazil 

in 2005 was virtually stopped in its tracks by responding to it with expedited removal. As this 

example illustrates, we know what works and we simply need the political will and commitment 

to implement smart policy. 

But the problem remains multi-faceted and complex. Unfortunately, the Administration has 

declared it will oppose a process of incremental progress insisting instead it will only support 

comprehensive reform. The last three decades of failed attempts to secure our borders and fix a 

horribly broken legal immigration system lend very little credence to a compressive approach. 

It's well past time to begin identifYing individual problems and enacting solutions on a step-bystep basis. 

This report provides a summary of findings from the Committee's border security hearings, as 

well as a primer on key border security issues and recommendations for "first step" reforms that 

could begin improving security at our borders. The Committee has already begun crafting and 

passing a number of these initial reforms. Six bills related to border security have been reported 

out of Committee, one of which was recently signed into law. 

Based on the information gathered by the Committee, the report presents the following findings: 

I. Despite spending more than $100 billion over the last decade to fund security 

measures along the border, the border is still not secure. America's insatiable demand 

for drugs, coupled with smugglers insatiable demand for profit, is one root cause 

(perhaps THE root cause) preventing the achievement of a secure border. 

2. In certain areas and aspects, the border has become more dangerous and lawless over 

the years. The porous border has made the U.S. more vulnerable to criminal and 

potential terrorist activity. 

4 
81 

3. To truly secure our border, we must identify and eliminate--{)r at least drastically 

reduce-the incentives for illegal immigration. Some key incentives driving 

unlawful migration arc the opportunity to work and the security in knowing that, upon 

illegal entry, you will probably be able to remain in the U.S. 

a. The wage gap, or the difference between wages in the United States and 

countries south of the U.S.-Mexico border, is a driving factor for migration to 

the U.S. and will remain a factor for a very long time. 

b. Both current and former DHS officials agree that expedited removal of illegal 

immigrants works as a deterrent. Unfortunately, the current Administration is 

not removing illegal immigrants, including unaccompanied minors, on an 

expedited basis. 

c. Due to powerful incentives, immigration of unaccompanied minors from 

Central America has exceeded that of Mexican unaccompanied minors. To 

combat this, both pull and push factors should be analyzed and addressed. 

Until the political will exists on a bipartisan basis to solve these problems, comprehensive 

reforms to the state of our border security and immigration system will be difficult, if not 

impossible, to achieve. There arc, however, piecemeal steps we can take now to prepare for 

bigger reforms down the road. These steps will not provide total border security, but they will 

move us in the direction of making our borders more secure. This report presents as 

recommendations the following reforms that the Chairman believes, with leadership and 

cooperation from both parties, can be achieved this Congress: 

A. Require adequate mctrics to measure border security across all U.S. borders-land, 

air, and sea, with appropriate oversight and transparency. 

B. Ensure sufficient safeguards are in place in both the U.S. Refugee Resettlement 

Program and Visa Waiver Program. 

C. Initiate a concentrated public relations campaign to dissuade all Americans, but in 

particular young people, from using and becoming addicted to drugs. 

D. Reform the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 

of2008 (TVPRA) to eliminate incentives for illegal immigration. 

E. Provide Border Patrol agents access to federal lands. 

F. Require DHS to examine the threats on the northern border. 

G. Call on the Chief of the Border Patrol to move agents to areas of high risk. 

5 
82 

H. Provide and maintain adequate manpower on our border and satisfy hard to fill 

vacancies at our ports of entry. 

I. Complete the Congressionally mandated fencing requirement along the southwest 

border and understand our country's fencing needs and other border security assets to 

determine what more is necessary. 

J. Require each border security technology acquisition program to demonstrate it has an 

approved baseline for costs, schedule, and performance. 

K. Ensure that successful state and local programs, such as Operation Stone garden, are 

used appropriately and efficiently to maximize manpower at and near U.S. borders. 

L. Cut off federal funding for sanctuary cities that release criminal aliens into local 

communities, endangering public safety, and provide immunity to law enforcement 

officers so that courts cannot prevent them from honoring federal detainers. 

M. Ensure the continuation of current Border Patrol programs, such as Operation 

Streamline, that provide penalties to recent border crossers in order to reduce 

recidivism. 

N. Emphasize intelligence-based strategies at our borders. 

0. Authorize the Depmiment's preclearance agreements. 

The Chainnan is hopeful that this report \\ill provide useful and authoritative information to the 

public and elected officials regarding a path forward on border security and immigration reform. 

6 
83 

Key Highlights 

1. Despite spending more than $100 billion over the last decade to fund security measures 

along the border, 1 the border is still not secure. America's insatiable demand for drugs, 

coupled with smugglers insatiable demand for profit, is one root cause (perhaps the 

root cause) preventing the achievement of a secure border. 

The Department of Homeland Security has pointed to a declining number of apprehensions along 

the southwest border as an indicator of success in controlling the border and deterring would-be 

trespasscrs 2 However, this does not paint a comprehensive picture of security at the border. 

For one, apprehension data alone ignores the drug smuggling threat along our borders. 

Americans' insatiable demand for drugs is largely driving this trade. Despite spending $25 

billion annually on our war on drugs,3 some estimates state that more than 60 percent of illegal 

crossings are related to drugs 4 According to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the "new 

face of organized crime in America" is "[t]he growing relationship between Mexican-based drug 

cartels and domestic street gangs, coupled with ... an unlimited supply of illegal guns. " 5 In 

addition to being the key drivers of the drug trade, the Mexican cartels have become experts at 

evading the Border Patrol. A former lJ.S. ol1icial testified that CBP "seizes just 5-l 0 percent of 

the illegal drugs smuggled across the border, and interdicts less than 1 percent of the $20 billion 

plus laundered to Mexico each year.''6 Regarding the maritime border, the U.S. Coast Guard 

testified that it only interdicts 11 to 18 percent of the estimated drug flow into the U.S.7 

Moreover, independent experts believe that apprehension rates along the southwest border are 

somewhere between 40 and 55 pcrcent.8 In some sectors, Border Patrol agents and local law 

1 See Lisa Seghetti, CO~G. RFSEARCII SERV., DHS BORDER SECURITY A"[) ~~~ICiRATIOt-; ENFORCC~1ENT STRATEGY, 

APPROPRIATIONS, AND METRICS 4...{) (20 14) (on file with Majority Staff) (noting that from FY2006 through FY2013, 

Congress appropriated $86 billion to CBP and in total about $131 billion on "entorcemcnt-related spending."). 

::Remarks hy Secret my of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Border Security in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP'T OF 

llOMCLi\ND SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/20 14/!0/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-sccurityjeh-johnson-border-security-21st-century. 

'See Lisa N. Sacco & Kristin Finklea, CONG. RESEARCII SERV., R 41535, REAUTIIORIZING THE OFFlCE OC 

NATIO:-cAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY: ISSUES !'OR CONSIDERATJON II (2014). 4 Data provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona 

Sector (Feb. 20 15). 

-;All Hands on Deck: Working Together to End the Trqfficking andAhu.se q(Prescriptian Opioids, Heroin, and Fentanyl Hearing 

Before the S Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of John "Jack" 

Riley, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency). 6 Securing the Border: Assessing the fmpact qlTransnational Crime: Hearing Before the~)'. Comrn. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of General !larry R. McCatn·ey, USA (RET.), 

Former Director, Office ofNational Drug Control Policy). 7 See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the J\1aritime Border: Hearing Before the S 

Comm. on Homeland Securitv & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rear Admiral Peter J. 

llrown. Assistant Commander for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard). 8 Bryan Roberts, Edward A !den, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: /!ow Effective is 

Enforcement:', COUI'<CIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2-3 (20 13) ("The Obama administration has not offered, and 

Congress has failed to insist on, any accountability for the efTectivcness of these huge enforcement expenditures). 

7 
84 

enforcement estimated interdiction rates to be between 30 and 40 percent.9 In other sectors, 

agents estimated they caught one-in-three in areas with a fence, and only one-in-20 in areas 

where no fence was present. 10 Of the 2,000 mile U.S-Mexico land border, only 653 miles, or 

less than 33 percent, is fenced. 11 Finally, at a Committee hearing, a witness testified that agents 

who reported more than 20 "got-aways" had to verify their repoti with a supervisor and would 

likely face retribution. 12 Senior officials at DHS have denied this assertion 13 

It is clear from these numbers and statements that the border is still not secure, and continues to 

be taken advantage of by cartels and other transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) seeking 

to smuggle humans and drugs unlawfully into the country. 

2. In certain areas and aspects, the border has become more dangerous and lawless over 

the years. The porous border has made tire U.S. more vulnerable to criminal and 

potential terrorist activity. 

The Committee has heard numerous anecdotes suggesting the border has become more 

dangerous and lawless O\'er the years. For example, a local law enforcement official testified 

that cartels are responsible for numerous crimes in border towns, including home invasions, 

felony vehicle evasions, extortion, and sexual assault. 14 He also explained that violent 

transnational gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), operate on both sides of the border and 

since 2011 the nwnber ofMS-13 members encountered at the border has increased each year. 15 

One rancher testified before the Committee that parks that were previously used for recreation 

are no longer used for that purpose, because they have simply become too dangerous. 16 The 

same rancher told the Committee about his irrigation district workers being shot at by cartel 

members attempting to scare them off to allow the gangs to smuggle drugs across the border. 17 

Others who live in border regions spoke of similar experiences. One witness testitled that a 

neighboring farmer witnessed smugglers cutting holes in his fence and then driving 46 trucks 

"Majority Staff observations during Senators Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CO DEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley 

Sector (Feb. 20 15); see also Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examinmion of FY2015 Apprehensions: 

Hearing Bej(Jre the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of 

Chris Cabrera, National Border Patrol Council). 10 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona Sector (Feb. 2015). 11 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF 130RDER PATROL, FACILITIES 

MANACiEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACII.ITIES & TACTICAL lNERASTRlJCTURE 

PROGRAM MA1'-:AGEMENT0FEICE (2015) (on file with Committee stall). 12 See Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway.· Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15). 13 Securing the Border Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the S 

Comm. on Homeland Securitv & Governmental Aflairs, I 14th Con g. (20 15). 14 Secw·;ng the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing B~(ore the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of [lenny Mm1inez, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Brooks 

County, Texas). 15 1d 16 See Securing the Southt-rest Border: Penpectives from Beyond the Belru·a;·: Hearing Before the S Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (2015) (statement ofOthal E. Brand, Farmer, McAllen, 

Texas). 

17 /d. 

8 
85 

loaded with drugs across his property. 18 That fam1er was later told by a property appraiser that 

the value of his property had decreased significantly, due to its proximity to the border. Jllegal 

immigration and drug smuggling arc obvious deterrents to potential investors19 

The National Border Patrol Council estimates that criminal aliens-individuals who have 

committed crimes in the U.S., served time in jail, and have been deported--constitute 10 to 20 

percent ofthose who are apprehended at the border20 The July 2, 2015 murder of Kathryn 

Steinle in San Francisco, California by a criminal alien that had been deported five times with 

seven prior felony convictions has brought renewed attention to criminals entering and remaining 

in the U.S? 1 According to ICE, between January I, 2014 and June 30,2015, there have been 

16,495 dclaincrs issued that have not been honored in approximately 200 local "sanctuary" 

jurisdictions. 22 Of those who were released after an ICE detainer was not honored in the first 

eight months of2014, ''approximately 1,900 were later rearrested 4,300 more times on 7,500 

different charges."23 Between FY20 I 0 and FY20 14, 121 criminal aliens were released into the 

U.S. and ·'were subsequently charged with a homicide-related offense," according to U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director Sarah Saldana?4 

While drug smuggling and illegal entry represent important threats to our porous borders, there is 

also a concern that terrorists may be able to exploit these weaknesses to enter the U.S. 

undetccted?5 Experts have strong disagreements on the likelihood of terrorists transiting the 

southwest border, but the potential for exploitation is real, given the changing dynamics and 

backgrounds of the individuals being apprehended at the southwest border in the last few years.26 

Apprehensions include individuals from Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Egypt.27 

18 /d. (statement of Howard G. Buffett, Chairman and CEO, Howard G. Buffer Foundation and Arizona 

Landowner). 

19 !d. 20 Response to Questions for the Record from Shawo Moran, Vice President, National Border Patrol Council, 

Deferred Action on lmmigratiun: Implications and Unanswered Questions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

1/omeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Coog. (20 15) ("These are not economic immigrants in search of 

a better life. These are hardened criminals who arc facing real jail time"). 21 Michelle Moons. Breaking: Pier 14 Murder Suspect Had Been Deported 5 Times With 7 Felonies, BREITBART 

(July 3, 20 15), http:l/www.brcitbart.com/tcxas/20 15/07/03/breaking-pier-14-murder-suspect-had-been-deported-5-

times-with-7-felonies/. 

22 Letter to the Honorable Kelly Ayotte, Senator, Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, from the 

Honorable Sarah R. Saldana, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Aug. 14, 2015). 23 Jessica Vaughn, Protect the Public, not Crimina{ Immigrants, NAT'L REVIEW (July 8, 2015), 

http://www.nationalreview.com/articlc/420898/illegal-alien-criminal-steinle (data from Jan. I, 2014-Aug. 31, 20I4). 24 Joel Gehrke, ICE Failed to Deport 121 Convicts Now Facing Murder Charges, NATIONAL REVIEW (June 15, 

20 15). http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419781 /ice-failed-deport-121-convicts-now-facing-murder-charges-

~oel-gehrke (citing a letter from Sarah Saldana, Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 

-'TEXAS DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND 

OFfiCE OF TilE GOVERNOR 2 (20 15) (Unclassified Version). 26 US Northern Command and Southern Command: Hearing B£!/Ore the S Conun on Armed Services, 114th Cong. 

(2015) (statement of General John F. Kelly, U.S. Southern Command) 27 TEXAS DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO TilE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE A:\Il 

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 2 (20 15) (Unclassified Version); see also American's Heroin Epidemic at the Border: 

Local. State, and Federal Law Enforcement t.j(orts to Combat Illicit Narcotic Trafficking: Hearing B4ore the S. 

Comm. on 1/omeland Security & Governmental Af/i1irs, !I 4th Cong. (2015) (statement of Brandon Judd, President, 

National Border Patrol Council). 

9 
86 

As to the northern border, "the U.S.-Canada border is the longest common border in the 

world."28 Due to its length and the relatively low number of agents patrolling it, experts believe 

that vulnerabilities could be exploited29 In 2011, Alan Bersin, former CBP Commissioner, told 

the Senate Judiciary Committee that regarding terrorism, "it's commonly accepted that the more 

significant threat comes from the U.S.-Canada border."30 In FY2014, the Blaine sector in 

Washington State alone apprehended migrants from 32 different countries31 Finally, there is 

also the possibility that terrorists may exploit legal avenues to enter and remain in the U.S. For 

example, in 20 ll the U.S. discovered two Iraqi refugees were plotting to send missiles, cash, and 

sniper rifles to insurgents to kill American soldiers abroad 32 Other potential vulnerabilities 

include the Visa Waiver Program, student visas, and visa overstays. 

3. To truly secure our border, we must identify and eliminate-or at least drastically 

reduce-the incentives for illegal immigration. Some key incentives driving unlawful 

migration are the opportunity to work and the security in knowing that, upon illegal 

entry, you will be able to remain in the U.S. 

a. The wage gap, or the difference between wages in the United States and countries south 

of the U.S. -Mexico border, is a drivingfitc/or for migration to the US. and will remain 

afactorjor a very long time. 

"The main economic factor influencing migration is the wage gap, or the difference between 

what a potential migrant can earn in the U.S. compared to the migrant's home country. 

Di!Terences in average wages for similar workers between developed and developing countries 

constitute the single largest price distortion remaining in global markets."33 Over the last several 

decades, migrant survey data suggested that the wage gap based on actual labor market outcomes 

in the U.S. and Mexico was approximately $7 to $L if valued at the commercial exchange rate 34 

Today, this gap has fallen to as low as $5 to $1 35 However, this wage gap is expected to 

continue to be above $3 to $1 until 2075 36 The wage gap between the U.S. and Central 

18 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECCRITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY 4 (2012), 

http :1 /www. dhs. gov/x I ibrarylasscts/po licy/ dhs-no nhern-border-strategy. pdf. 29 Garrett Graff, Fear Canada.· The Real Terrorist Next Door, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Oct. 16, 2014), 

http://www.politico.com/magazinelstory/201411 0/fcar-canada-not-mexico-1 I 1919.htmi#.VSYmlpNOeYM. 10 Improving Securi~v and Facilitating Commerce at America's Northern border and Ports of Entry: Hearing Before 

the S. Suhcomm. on Immigration, RejiJgees and Border Securit}' of the S. Comm. on the Judiciwy, 112th Cong. 

(201 I) (statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 31 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015). 31 See, e.i, James Gordon Meek and Brian Ross. Terrorists Once Used Refugee Program to Settle in US., ABC 

NEWS (Nov. 18, 20 I 5), http://abcnews.go.comllntcrnational/terrorists-refugee-program-settlcus/ story id~3 5 25 2 500. 31 Bryan Robe11s, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing 11/egal Immigration to the United States: Hol1-' Effective 

is Enforcement?, COLI'JCII.O" FOREIGN RELATIO"iS 8 (2013) (citing Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and 

Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium.· Wage Differencesfor Identical Workers across the US Border, CENTER FOR 

Gi.OBAI. DEVELOPME"T (2008)). 34 Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing ll/egal Immigration to the United States. How Effective 

is Enj(Jrcement:', COl!~CILON FOREIGN RELATIO"S 8 (2013). 

35/d. 

16 Id at 9. 

10 
87 

American countries in terms of income is larger than the wage gap between the U.S. and 

Mexico37 According to economists, people will relocate if the ratio is above $2 to $1.38 

Therefore, the incentive to enter the U.S. for work will continue far into the future. If 

immigrants cannot find a lawful path to enter the U.S. where they will receive higher wages, they 

will enter the U.S. unlawfully. 

b. Both current and former DHS officials agree that expedited removal a_{ illegal 

immigrants works as a deterrent. Un{ortunately, the current Administration is not 

removing illegal immigrants, including unaccompanied minors, on an expedited basis. 

Both DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson and former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoffrecognize that 

those seeking lo unlawfully migrate to the U.S. are highly responsive to incentives and 

disincentives. During the Committee's DHS Budget Hearing, Secretary Johnson admitted, "you 

have to show the population in Central America that you arc sending people back."39 

In 2005, a large number of Brazilians sought to enter the U.S. illegally due to a change in 

Mexican policy in which the government suspended a visa requirement for Brazilians, allowing 

easy travel 40 According to one account, the number of Brazilians detained at the U.S.-Mexico 

border tripled from the previous year to more than 30,000.41 In response, DHS dedicated bed 

space, detained, and expedited the removal of Brazilians.42 According to Secretary Chertoff: 

"The word spread surprisingly swiftly; within its first thirty days, the operation had 

already begun to deter illegal border crossings by Brm•.ilians. In fact, the number of 

Brazilians apprehended dropped by 50%. After 60 days, the rate of Brazilian illegal 

immigration through this sector was down 90%, and it is still significantly depressed all 

across the border. In short, we learned that a concentrated e!Tor! of removal can actually 

discourage illegal entries by non-Mexicans on the southwest border.''43 

Secretary Johnson has seen similar results. Recently, organized smugglers in the Dominican 

Republic have taken advantage of a U.S. policy that eliminated expedited removal of Haitians 

after the 20 I 0 earthquake by smuggling Haitian immigrants to Puerto Rico44 By the end of 

!d. at Appendix 2: Wage Gap and Other Trends in Central American Source Countries, 

http://wwvl.cfr.org/immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658. 

38 Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differences for 

Identical Workers across the US Border, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2008). 39 See The Homeland Securitv Depar/ment 's Budget Submission for fCiscal Year 2016: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 

on /lome/and Securi(v & Governmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (2015). 10 Chris Kraul & Nicole Gaounte, No-Visa Agreement Backfired on Mexico, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2005), 

http:/ /m1 icles .!at imcs. com/200 51 sep/ 14/world/fg-mexbrazi 114. 

"Id. 

41 Comprehensive Immigration Reform II: Hearing BeflJre the S. Comm. on Judicimy, J 09th Cong. (2005) 

(statement of Michael Chertotf, Secretary. U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 

43 !d. 

H See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the A1aritime Border: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Securiry & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (20 J 5); U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME 

BORDER SFCURITY (2015) (on file with Majority Staff). 

11 
88 

FY2013, 1,760 Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. through the Mona Passage, as 

compared to 39 Haitians in FY2012 45 In FY2014, 1,994 Haitian migrants made the same 

dangerous attempt.46 DHS resumed expedited removal in October 2014 for non-criminal Haitian 

migrants who landed on U.S. Territories in Puerto Rico and the islands of the Mona Passage. 47 

After the first removal, Haitian maritime flow in the Mona Passage decreased by 80 percent.48 In 

the first three quarters ofFY2015, only 277 Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. via the 

Mona Passage compared to l ,430 for the same period in FY201449 

Similarly, after the President's December 17, 2014 announcement regarding the U.S.'s change in 

policy towards Cuba, Cuban migration increased, as many feared that the current "wet-foot, dryfoot" policy-allowing any Cuban reaching U.S. land to stay and pursue citizenship, while those 

caught at sea are returned to Cuba50-would end. Prior to the President's announcement, from 

December 1-16,2014, the Coast Guard interdicted 80 Cubans51 After the President's 

announcement, from December 17-31, 2014 the Coast Guard interdicted 419 Cubans-a 423 

percent increase 5 2 To address this, the Coast Guard deployed direct repatriation and 

immediately began sending those interdicted in the waterways back to Cuba53 As a result, 

Cuban interdictions fell to 254 from January 1-21,2015 and have returned to normal levels. 5

4 

While employing expedited removal at our maritime border has kept Cuban migration at normal 

levels, due to the U.S. wet-foot, dry-toot policy, Cubans may not be removed once they reach 

U.S. soil. As a result, Cubans arriving at U.S. POEs has increased by 78 percent since the 

President's announcement.55 

c. Due to powerfi;l incentives, immigration of unaccompanied minors from Central 

America has exceeded that of Mexican unaccompanied minors. To combat this, both 

pull and push factors should be analyzed and addressed. 

In FY2012, more than 24,000 unaccompanied alien children (UACs) were apprehended at the 

U.S.-Mexico border. 5

6 In FY2014, that number grew to nearly 69,000 57 Also in FY2014, for 

the first time, the number of UACs from Northern Triangle Countries-El Salvador, Guatemala, 

45 /d. 

4()/d. 

47 !d. 

48/d. 

4'! !d. 

'"/d. 

,, ld 

52/d. 

!d. 

54 !d. 55 Data Provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Sept. 15, 20 I 5); see Miriam Jordan, 

US. News.· More Cubans Migrate to U.S., WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 2 I, 2015). 56 Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American A.figration to the 

United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. 1 I 4th Cong. (20 I 5) 

(statement of Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Secretary and Chief Diplomatic Officer, Office of Policy, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security). 

57 /d. 

12 
89 

and Honduras~xceeded the number ofUACs from Mexico58 The Committee heard that many 

factors led to the increased migration of unaccompanied minors from Central America, and these 

factors can be attributed to both the conditions of violence in Central America, as well as 

accurate and inaccurate perceptions regarding the American immigration system. 59 

According to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), factors leading to this increased migration 

include the perception of U.S. policy that led people to believe they would be able to remain in 

the U.S 60 Policies contributing to this pull factor include the President's DACA, DHS's catch 

and release policies, and the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 

Reauthorization Act of2008 (TVPRA). 61 Meanwhile, factors contributing to the push factor 

include violence, extortion, and lack of opportunities in the Northern Triangle 62 

The ability of persons from noncontiguous countries to stay in the U.S. pending a hearing has led 

to campaigns in which smugglers claim that the U.S. is issuing a new "permiso'' for minors 

reaching the U.S. 63 In reality, when unaccompanied minors are apprehended by Border Patrol 

they are released in the U.S. with a notice to appear (NTA) in court. At this point, many assume 

that they are "home free" and that ''by the time they need to appear, there is going to be an 

amnesty or legalization."64 According to one Committee witness, from July 2014 through 

February 2015, 62 percent of the children who were ordered to appear before an immigration 

judge for a hearing failed to show up 65 All of them were ordered deported, but ICE's recent 

enforcement priorities make removal highly unlikely66 Since 2009, DHS has apprehended 

approximately 122,700 unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, 

but has only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6 percent67 In this case, reality reinforces 

perception68 

"U.S. CUSTOMS A Nil BORDER PROTECTION, SOUTHWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN, 

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children. 

59 Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American !l4igraNon to the 

United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Alfairs. ll4th Cong. (2015); The 

201-1 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Revfe·w of the Government's Response to Unaccompanied lvt;nors One 

Year Later. Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (20 15). 

''

0 EL PASO INTEI.I.!GENCE CENTER, MISPERCEPTIONS OF U.S. POLICY KEY DRIVER IN CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRANT 

SURGE(2014) (finding that children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrived in large numbers after 

hearing rumors that the U.S. Government would stop issuing free passes or permisos after June 2014). 61 Section 235 ofTVPRA codified expedited removals for children from contiguous countries and mandated the 

transfer of children from non-contiguous countries to the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. No. 

110-457 (2008). 62 See Securing the Border: Understanding and Addresshzg the Root Causes of Central American A4igration to the 

United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015). 

~ !d. (statement of Roger F. Noriega, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute and Fmmer Assistant Secretary 

for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State). 64 See id. 65 !d. (statement of William Kandel 1 Analyst in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service). 66 See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government's Response to Unaccompanied 

Minors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. 

(2015). 

07 Data provided to Majority Staff by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Oct. 20, 2015). 6

1:l Ongoing lvfigrationfrom Central America: An f"J:amination ofFY20!5 Apprehensions: l!i:!aring Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental A .flairs, I 14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of Kimberly M. 

13 
90 

In response to this humanitarian crisis, the Administration has proposed a $1 billion aid package 

largely focused on the Northern Triangle, advocating that investing in Central American 

communities can decrease the need to migrate and significantly reduce the business of human 

smugglcrs 69 Absent new accountability and reforms in Central America, experts question the 

value of additional resources?) In many of these countries, ·'police and prosecutors are often 

incapable of, or prevented from, carrying out their law enforcement responsibilities," according 

to an expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 71 This is often the result 

of"fcar or intimidation by criminal networks," but also from corruption of the state. 72 

For example, Guatemalan Vice President Roxana Baldetti resigned earlier this year amid a 

corruption scandal in which officials allegedly "defrauded the state of millions of dollars by 

taking bribes to charge lower customs duties."73 On September 2, 2015, Guatemalan President 

Otto Perez Molina also resigned, just days before a new election, due to implications of his 

involvement. 74 Shortly thereafter he was jailed in Guatemala City. 75 Meanwhile, at a 

Committee hearing, one witness testified that Honduras recently "saw millions of dollars stolen 

from its national hospital system by the very people charged with overseeing the system."76 

A recent GAO report highlighted concerns with the effectiveness of assistance the U.S. is 

already providing to Central America77 For example, in El Salvador GAO observed a computer 

lab filled with computers recently provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) but no teachers in the classrooms. 78 Apparently, the Salvadoran Ministry of Education 

had not yet provided salaries for the teachers. 79 GAO concluded that such ineffectiveness "could 

lead to higher levels of migration to the United States, which is not only potentially costly in 

terms of U.S. taxpayer resources but costly and dangerous to the migrants and their families." 80 

Gianopoulos, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office) (explaining that children use 

social media to let those in their horne countries know they made it to and were able to remain in the U.S.). 09 WIIITE HO\JSE, FACT SHEET: PROMOTING PROSPERITY, SECURITY Al'D GOOD GOVERNA:-;CE IN CENTRAL 

AMERICA, https://www. wh itehouse.gov/thc-press-office/20 15/0 I 129/fact·sheet-promoting-prosperity-security-andgood-governance-central-ame. 

70 See Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes qfCentral American A1igration to the 

United Stales: Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. I 14th Cong. (2015) 

(statement of Eric L. Olson, Associate Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars). 

"Jd. 

72 !d. 

" Guatemala Vice President Roxana Baldelli Resigns Amid Corruption Scandal, NY DAILY Nrcws (May 8, 20 15), 

http://www. nyda i lynews. com/new slwor ld/ guatema Ia- vice-president-resigns-corrupt io n-scanda 1-artic 1 e- l .22 16056, 74 Rafael Ramo & Greg Botelho, Olio Pere= Molina Out as Guatemalan President, Ordered to Jail, CNN (Sept. 3, 

20 15). http://www .cnn.com/20 15/09/03/americas/guaternala-president-arrest·warrant/. 

"/d. 

76 See Securing the Border.· Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American A1igration to the 

United States.· Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) 

(statement of Eric L. Olson, Associate Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars). 77 GOV'T 1\c'('Ot:NTABIIITY OFFICE, GA0-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD 

ENHANCE AGCNCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE U!\ACCOMPAN!ED Cllll.DREN MIGRATION (20 15). 78/d. 

79 ld 

80 ld at 41. 

14 
91 

Part 1: The U.S.-Mexico Border 

Each of the nine sectors of the U.S.-Mexico border has unique terrain and faces endemic 

challcnges 81 For example, the RGV sector border is in the middle of the Rio Grande, a narrow, 

often shallow, and easily navigable river. Smugglers cross the Rio Grande by foot, raft, or, in 

some locations. vehiclcs82 This makes enforcement and security quite daunting. In Arizona, 

two mountain ranges provide concealment for smugglers and illegal crossers. Additionally, 

protected lands, including national forests, wildlife refuges, military training ranges, and a Native 

American Reservation, restrict access to approximately 80 percent of the border in the Tucson 

and Yuma sectors. 83 

Figure 1: Nine Sectors of the U.S.-Mexico Border 

Securing one high-risk sector usually leads to shifting pressures on other borders sectors. For 

example, San Diego was previously one of the most highly trafficked areas for illegal crossers 

between ports of entry84 In the mid-1990s, added personnel and other infrastructure resources 

such as fencing through Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego sector decreased total 

81 Nine border sectors abut the U.S.-Mexico border: San Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, Big Bend, Del 

Rio, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF BORDER PATROLSECTORS AND STATIONS, http://ecso.swf.usace.army.miVmaps/SectorP.pdf 82 On a CO DEL in South Texas, Chairman Johnson observed a truck drive across a shallow portion of the Rio 

Grande River. 83 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, ARIZONA INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW (20 15) 

(on file with Majority Staff). 

" U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SAN DIEGO SECTOR CALIFORNIA. http://www.cbp.govlbordcrsccurity/a\ong-us-borders/border-patrol-scctors/san-diego-sector-calitbrnia (''During the seventies, illegal alien 

Ira me steadily increased, rising to more than I 00,000 in 1973 and more than 250,000 by 1976. ln !986. the sector 

recorded its highest number of apprehensions in a single year- more than 628,000 ... San Diego was the busiest 

sector tOr illegal entries. accounting for more than 40 percent ofnatiomvide apprehensions in the early nineties."). 

15 
92 

apprehensions by 95 percent. 85 These efforts to halt illegal crossers in San Diego did not reduce 

the overall t1ow of illegal activity. Instead, the flow shifted to Arizona in the El Paso and Tucson 

sectors 86 Today, RGV is the busiest sector for illegal crossers between ports of entry, and was at 

the epicenter of last year's U AC crisis. 87 

Figure 2: Timeline of Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector 1980-2014 

Physical Barriers and Technological Detection Capabilities in the Sectors 

DHS has worked to address these challenges through deploying various different technologies 

and tactical infrastructure along the southwest border, including nearly 700 miles of fencing, 70 

miles of border lighting, 11,863 border sensors to detect illicit migration, 107 aircraft from the 

Otlice of Air and Marine, 8 unmanned aerial systems, 84 vessels patrolling waterways on the 

85 San Diego Fence Provides Lessons in Border Control, NPR (Apr. 6, 2006), 

http:! /www. npr .org/temp lates/story/story. php?story ld"'53 23 92 8. 86 H. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. I!OUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES, BLUEPRINT FOR SOUTHERN BORDER 

SECURITY 2 (2014). 87 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SOUT!IWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN ClllLDREN, 

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroorn!stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children. 

16 
93 

southwest border, and other new surveillance tools88 Each sector has different physical barriers 

and technological solutions to address its unique terrain challenges. 

Fencing and !nfi·astructure 

\Vhilc sometimes cost prohibitive, fencing, where appropriate, is an important and necessary tool 

in securing our borders. In I 993, Sandia Laboratory issued a study that concluded multiple 

barriers were needed to stop and delay illegal border crossers in San Diego. 89 The study 

determined that "[a] three-fence barrier system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and 

lights will provide the necessary discouragement."90 

Shortly thereafter, the Border Patrol, with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Defense's 

(DOD) Army Corps of Engineers, commenced the first fencing along our southwest border, with 

a 1 0-foot-high, welded-steel fence covering approximately 14 miles of the San Diego sector91 

Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress 

instructed immigration authmities to construct barriers along our international borders to deter 

unauthorized crossers92 Specifically, immigration authorities were instructed to supplement the 

14-mile '·Sandia fence" in San Diego with two additional layers offencing. 93 However, resulting 

environmental concerns and litigation si~nificantly delayed the fulfillment of this requirement 94 

DHS has still not completed this project. ' Today, of its 60 mile border, the San Diego sector 

has 46miles of primary fence, 13 miles of which include secondary fencing96 

Building off the San Diego fence lessons, Congress amended IIRIRA in the REAL ID Act of 

2005 to authorize the DHS Secretary "to waive 'all legal requirements' necessary to ensure 

expeditious construction" of security barriers at the U.S. border97 DHS has executed five 

environmental waivers related to fence construction along the southwest border to expedite 

88 Remarks by Secret my of Homeland .')ecurity Jeh Johnson, Border Security in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP'T OF 

HOMFI.AND SecURITY (Oct. 9, 20 14), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/l 0/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-securityjch-jo hnso n- border-security-21st- century. 

"Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BORDER SECURITY: THE SA" DIEGO FENCE (2007). 90 !d 

91 Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, i3ARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY AUTHORITIES 

REQJJJRFME'iTS 4 (20 15). 

!d at 1; Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §102(a)-(c) (1996). 93 /d. at 7; Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §102(a)-(c) (1996). 94 Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESFi\RCIJ SERV., R 43975, BORDER SECURITY: THE SAN DIEGO FENCE 4 (2007). 45 Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY AUTIIORJTIES 

AND REQLIREME"IS 7, 22 (2015) (while liRIRA Section 102(c) expressly authorized the waiver of the Endangered 

Species At and the National Environmental Policy Act, other federal laws remained applicable to border 

construction projects); see also Michael John Garcia, CO'iG. RESEARCH ScRV., R 43975, BORDER SECURITY: TilE 

SAN DIEOO FENCE (2007). 

"" No triple layered fencing currently exists at the San Diego sector. Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, 

bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015). 

'"Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY AUTHORITIES 

AND RFQUIRE\1ENTS 22 (20 15); Pub. L. No. I 09-13, div. 13, § 102 (2005). 

17 
94 

construction98 But, issues remain. For example, during the Secure Border Initiative project, 

land acquisition problems prevented DHS from meeting its goals to complete fencing projects on 

time 99 Most fencing in California, Arizona, and New Mexico was built on federal land, but in 

Texas, DHS had to purchase most of the land from private individuals. 100 

In 2006, l!RIRA was amended again by the Secure Fence Act, which called for the deployment 

of roughly 850 miles of"at least 2 layers of reinforced fencing, [and] the installation of 

additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors" along five stretches of the 

southwest border. 101 Shortly thereafter, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of2008 modified 

the Secure Fence Act to allow for the construction of not less than 700 miles of fence and gave 

the DHS Secretary waiver authority that reads in part: ·'nothing in this paragraph shall require the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to install fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and 

sensors in a particular location along an international border of the United States, if the Secretary 

determines that the use or placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to 

achieve and maintain operational control over the international border at such location." 102 

Today, according to DHS, there is approximately 652.6 miles of front-line fencing on the 

southwest border: 352.8 miles of primary fence, 103 36 miles of secondary fencing, 104 and 299.8 

miles of vehicle barrier fence. 105 The U.S.-Mexico border is nearly 2,000-miles long. DHS is 

short of the statutory requirements to construct fencing of"not less than 700 miles of the 

southwest border.'' 106 According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), while there is no 

deadline for the completion of the fencing, "changes in DHS's border enforcement strategy and 

prioritization of resources" appears to have halted further construction offeneing along the U.S.-

Mexico border107 

98 U.S. ClJSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES 

MA:\AGEMENT & El'GINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL IMRASTRUCTURE 

PROGRAM MANAGEMESTOFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee Staff). 99 Observations on Deployment Challenges: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Homeland Security, I 10th Cong. 

(2008) (statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Horne land Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability 

Office). 

100 N.C. Aizenman, Border Fence Would Slice Through Private Land, WASH POST (Feb. !6, 2008), 

http://www. wash ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contcnt/artic!e/2008/02/ I 51 AR2008021503 303 .htm I. 101 Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARim:RS ALONG THE U.S. llORDERS: KEY 

AUTIIDRITIES AND REQUIREMENTS 8···9 (2015); Pub. L. No. 109-367, §3(2006). 102 Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, §564(a) (2008). 103 Primary fence is designed to prevent (or at least slow down) people on tOot from crossing the border and disable 

a vehicle traveling 40 miles per hour. 104 Secondary fence is also known as "double-layered fencing." Of the double-layered fencing approximately 9 miles 

is located in the Yuma, Arizona sector; 13 miles is located in the El Paso, Texas sector; and 13 miles is located in 

the San Diego, California sector. 105 Vehicle barrier fence consists of barriers used primarily in remote areas to prohibit vehicles engaged in drug 

trafficking and human smuggling operations to cross the border. These fences can be easily navigated by those on 

foot. 

106 Pub. L. No. I 04-208, div. C, §I 02(a)-(c) ( 1996), asamended by Pub. L. No. I 09-13, div. B, §I 02 (2005); Pub. L. 

No. 109-367, §3 (2006); and Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, §564(a) (2008). 107 Michael John Garcia. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, llARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. BORDERS: KEY 

AUTHORITIES AND REQl;IREMENTS 2 (20 I 5). 

18 
95 

Many interpret the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 as having eliminated the 

requirement of double-layered fencing, now only calling for "a single layer of reinforced 

fencing." 108 This, of course, does not prohibit additional layers offencing. 109 The Act also 

provides more flexibility in regards to fencing location and border infrastructure. 110 

Tbe construction of border infrastructure is complex. Prior to erecting additional fencing, Border 

Patrol has to I) determine tbe environmental impact of the fence; 2) acquire land; and, when 

possible, 3) secure assistance of the National Guard or U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to reduce 

labor costs. 111 

Bollard 

Centro Sector (right). Images provided by OilS. 

Border Patrol determines which fencing style is appropriate based on the topography of each 

area. 112 DI-IS considers primary fencing prototypes based on the ability to disable a vehicle 

traveling 40 miles per hour, its effects on animal migratory patterns, and costs. 113 Similarly, 

DHS builds secondary fencing in areas with large populations. Border Patrol believes that 

pedestrian fencing is necessary in populous cities because illicit crossers can easily blend into the 

community before they can be apprehended. 114 Since Border Patrol's strategy prioritizes fencing 

and personnel resources in or near border cities, illegal traffic has shifted to remote areas. 115 

Border Patrol claims that this approach disrupts traditional crossing routes in border cities or 

along highways and redirects illegal crosscrs to terrain where Border Patrol agents have a tactical 

advantage and more time to apprehend the illegal crosser. 116 

los !d. at 9. 

!09 ld 

110 !d. at9-10. 111 Chad C. Haddal, Yule Kim, Michael John Garcia, CONO. RESEARCH SERV., RL33659, BORDER SECURITY: 

BARRIERS ALONG TilE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER (2009). 112 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-244R, SECURE BORDER !N!TIA TIVE FENCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS 6 

(2009). 

11.1 !d. 

114 The Rise qlthe A1o.·fco Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security: Hearing Before the House Comnt on Oversight 

and Government Reform, lllth Cong. (2009) (statement of Todd Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, 

Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 115 Securing the South-..vest Border: Per.~pectives.from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Securil)/ & Governmental A flairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Dannels, Sheriff, Cochise 

County, Arizona). 116 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OrT!CE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACII.ITIES 

MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee stal1). 

19 
96 

To date, CBP has spent approximately $2.3 billion on fencing. 117 Fencing costs vary based on 

the type of terrain, materials used, land acquisition, contractors, and the need to meet an 

expedited schedule. 118 Whether fencing is built on public or private land drives cost differences, 

as well as whether the fencing is primary fencing or vehicle barrier fencing (see Figure 3). 119 

Private land acquisition remains the primary driver of delay in completing border fcncing. 120 

According to DHS, out of the approximately 400 cases in which the government needed to 

acquire land, 330 required legal means to acquire property through condemnation proceedings 

because the landowner would not voluntarily sell to the government (126 cases), ownership was 

unknown (II cases), or the government underwent "friendly'' condemnation cases in which there 

was no dispute on price, but titles were not fully cleared by the government or the court because 

of multiple landowners (193 cases). 121 Of these 330 cases, 136 remain open. 122 DHS estimates 

that it could cost an additional $50 million to settle these cases. 123 These cases include a class 

action suit in south Texas challcn?ing the location of 40 border gates. Until this case is settled, 

large gaps in fencing will remain. 24 

During previous projects, Border Patrol agents and DOD personnel built fencing to save money 

on labor costs. 125 However, during the Secure Border Initiative fencing projects, DHS 

subcontracted to private companies because using Border Patrol agents removed them from their 

primary responsibility and DOD informed DHS that it would no longer be able to provide 

military personnel to build border fencing. 126 Fencing constructed by private contractors is 

generally more expensive than fencing built by the Border Patrol agents or the military. 127 In 

2009, a GAO report found that in a 70-mile fence project, where 40 percent of the fencing was 

built by Border Patrol and DOD personnel, taxpayers paid $2.8 million per mile. 128 Conversely, 

in a 65-mile project completed solely by private contractors, the average cost was $5.1 million 

per milc. 129 

117 /d. 118 GOV'T ACCOU~TABILITY OFfiCE, GA0-09-244R, SECURE BORDER NITIATIVE FE~CE CONSTRUCTIO:.J COSTS 7 

(2009); GOV'T ACCOUNTA81UTY OFFICE, GA0-08-]3JT, SECIJRE BORDER INITIATIVE: OHSERVATIO;.JS ON 

SHJTTED ASPECTS OF SBINET PROGRAM lMPl.EMENTATION (2007). 119 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-244R, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE FENCE CONSTRUCTION COSTS 8 

(2009) (explaining that by design, it is less expensive to construct vehicle fencing). 120 GOV'T ACCOC;.JTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-896, SECURE ROIUJER INITIATIVE TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT 

DELAYS PERSIST AND THE IMPACT OF BORDER FENCIN<i liAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED !9 (2009). 121 See id at 20; see a/so U.S. CUST0~1S AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF 

BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES MANAGE\1ENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & 

!d. 12.1 /d. 

INFRASTRL'CTCRic PROGRA'<l MANAGEMENT OFFICE (20 15) (on file with Committee staff). 

IH U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 0FrtCE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES 

MA'iAGEMENT & E!'iGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILITIES & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on file with Committee staff). 125 GCiV'T ACCOI;NTARILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-244R, SECURE BORDER lNITIAT!VE FENCE CONSTRIJCTION COSTS 7 

(2009). 

126 ld. 

127 ld at 8. 

!28 Id. 

!29 /d. 

20 
97 

A life-cycle cost study estimated that the ''deRloyment, operations, and future maintenance for 

tactical infrastructure will total $6.5 billion." 30 However, the completion of fencing has led to 

untold economic developments on both sides of the border, greatly enhancing the economies of 

border communitics. 131 CBP has reported that fences have a lifespan of approximately 20 years 

and a large portion of its maintenance funding is to repair breaches in the fence. 132 As of May 

2009, DHS reported 3,363 breaches, with an average cost of$1,300 to repair.IJJ According to 

GAO, ''the fewest breaches occurred in the ballard-style fencing, while more occurred in wire 

mesh fence." 134 With the move towards ballard-style fencing, fence cutting has decreased. 135 

Today, a growing cost for CBP is clearing the vegetation growth surrounding fences. 136 

While fencing can reduce or impede illegal entry, it alone cannot secure the border. 137 Cartels 

and other TCOs are creative in their efforts to circumvent border deterrents. Since 1990, ICE 

and Border Patrol have discovered more than 150 tunnels along the U.S.-Mexico border, 56 of 

which have been located in the San Diego sector.ll8 The Sinaloa Cartel is particularly notorious 

for their elaborate tunnels, most recently constructing a mile-long air-conditioned tunnel in 

central Mexico for their boss, El Chapo Guzman, to escape prison. 139 Importantly, Border Patrol 

in not aware of any people being smuggled across the border via the tunnels. 140 Instead, due to 

the large investments made by the cartels, these tunnels are primarily used to smuggle high value 

narcoties. 1

'

11 

110 GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-896, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT 

DFLA YS PERSIST AND THE IMPACT OF BORDER FE~CING HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED 19, 23 (2009) (this estimate 

includes deployment and operations and future maintenance costs for all tactical infrastructure, including, among 

other things, the fence, road, and lighting). 

':' Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15). 1

'

2 Id at 23. 

m !d. While these are the latest figures available to the Committee, Majority Staff recently requested that GAO 

provide updates to these tlgures. 

"''!d. 

135 U.S. CLJSTOMS A'-;D BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, FACILITIES 

MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE BORDER PATROL FACILIT!IS & TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (2015) (on tile with Committee stall). !16 !d. 137 The Rise qfthe Mexico Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Oversight 

and Government Reform. !lith Cong. (2009) (statement of Todd Owen, Executive Director, Cargo and Conveyance 

Security, Oftlce of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 

'"Sophisticated US.-Mexico 'Drug Tunnels' Discovered, BBC (July !3, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america-18823975; see also Candice Nguyen, Go Inside Secret Border Tunnel Near San Diego. NBC (Apr. 30, 

20 15), http:llwww.nbcsandiego.com/newsllocal!San-Diego-Border-Tunnel-Go-Inside-Video-30182299l.html 

(reporting Border Patrol discovered a sophisticated tunnel with a rail-cart system near the San Ysidro port of entry); 

Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15) (San 

Diego has the best terrain for tunneling of all the southwest border sectors and the majority of these tunnels are 80 

feet deep). 139 See Christopher Woody, '£/Chapa' Guzman's Role in the Global Cocaine Trade is Becoming Clearer, 

MCPHERSON SENTINEL (Aug. 16, 20 15), 

http://www.mcphersonsentinel.com/articleiZZ/20 150816/BUSlNESS/308169989/-1/news. 

"" Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral ST AFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15). j.jj Jd 

21 
98 

An alternative to pedestrian fencing includes a virtual border fence comprised of highly 

integrated fixed sensor towers. In 2005, DHS attempted to deploy such a system under the 

Secure Border Initiative-network (SBlnet), but after repeated technical problems, cost overruns, 

and scheduled delays in 2009, Secretary Napolitano froze funding, except for ongoing 

deployment in Arizona. 142 

Beyond fencing, Border Patrol has requested funding to construct all-weather roads, gates, 

lighting and electrical systems, low-water crossings, bridges, drainage structures, as well as 

vegetation and debris removal in various sectors. 143 

Technologies 

As discussed above, in 2009, DHS largely suspended SB!net, a networked system of sensors, 

radars, and tactical communieations144 Today, after spending approximately $1 billion, close to 

53 miles of coverage, out ofthc 387-mile Mexico-Arizona border, exists. 145 

The Alternative [Southwest] Border Technology Plan, or Arizona Technology Plan, replaced 

SB!net. 146 The plan called for various technology capabilities across Arizona, including 

Integrated Fixed Towers (1FT), Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile 

Surveillance Capability (MSC), Mobile Video Surveillance Systems (MVSS), Agent-Portable 

Surveillance Systems, Thermal Imaging Devices, and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS). 147 

1FT, RVSS, and MSC constituted approximately 97 percent of the plan's estimated costs. 148 

"According to CBP," as GAO reported, "the majority of these technologies will provide the 

mission benefits of improved situational awareness and agent safety,'' as well as "help enhance 

the ability of Border Patrol agents to detect, identify, deter, and respond to threats along the 

bordcr.'' 149 

112 Ajrer SB/net- The Future of Technology on the Border: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Border and 

Maritime Security of" the Comm. on Homeland Security, I 12th Cong., (20 I I) (statement of Mark Borkowski, 

Michael Fisher, and Nicale Kostelnik, U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 143 GOV'T ACCOlJ"TAiliLITY OFFICE, GA0-09-896, SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE TECIINOLOGY DEPLOYMENT 

DEEA YS PERSIST AND Till' IMPACT OF BORDER FENCING liAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED 22-23 (2009). 144 See, supra note 142; see also l:.S. C~STOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION 

(2015) (on file with Majority Staff). 1

'" lei._ see a/so GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 14-4IIT, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 

PLAN ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NeEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS l (2014); GOV'T 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-22, ARIZONA BORDER St;RVEILI.ANCE TECHNOLOGY MORE INFORMATION ON 

PLANS AND COSTS IS NEEDED BEFORE PROCEEDING 2 (20 ll ). 146 /d. at 7; see a/so U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECH"Ol.OGY INTRODUCTION (20 15) (on file 

with Majority Staff). 147 US CuSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (201 5) (on file with Majority 

Staff); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILJTY OFFICE, GA0-15-171 SP, llOMELAND SECURITY ACQUISITIONS MAJOR PROGR,\M 

ASSESSMENTS REVEAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY 44 (20 15). 148 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-14-4 I IT, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENTASD ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2014). 

"''/d. at 9. 

22 
99 

IFTs contain surveillance equipment, such as "ground surveillance radars and surveillance 

cameras mounted on fixed [] towers." 150 Originally, the Arizona Technology Plan called for six 

IFTs, but Border Patrol currently is funded for three. 151 One IFT has been located in Nogales, 

Arizona. 152 Border Patrol has determined that locating a tower in tbe Tohono 0' odham 

Nation-stretching 74 miles across the U.S.-Mexico border-is their highest priority. 153 

Therefore, DHS plans to delay funding for an additional tower for approximately 18 months 

while environmental and tribal negotiations are worked out. 154 DHS has indicated that it does 

not ~Jan to deploy IFTs on the northern border because the geography is not suitable for radar 

use. 55 

Figure 5: Remote Video Surveillance System 

RVSS with images transmitted to Border Patrol station. Images provided by Dl-IS. 

RVSS constitutes 30- to 90-foot towers with two pairs of cameras each-these cameras provide 

multiple color and infrared images. 156 RVSS dit1ers from IFTs in that it lacks radars. 157 RVSS 

is remotely controlled by Border Patrol with images transmitted to their stations. 158 The purpose 

of this technology is to "monitor large areas of the international border or critical transit 

150 !d at 8. 151 GOV'T ACCOIJNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-15-171 SP, HOMELAND SECURITY ACQUISlTIONS MAJOR PROGRAM 

ASSESSMENTS REVEAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABII.ITY 45 (2015). 152 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Staff); 

153 !d 

'" Id (Note, the time estimate of 18 months was provided in May, 20 15). 155 Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2015: Hearing Before the S 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Ajj'airs, !13th Cong. (2014). 156 GOV'T ACCOUNTAlllLITY OFFICE, GA0-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTllEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014). 157 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY 0FFICF, GA0-!4-411 T, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2014). 158 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (20!4). 

23 
100 

routcs." 159 Although originally proposed for Arizona, RVSS has been re-prioritized for the 

RGV, Texas sector. 160 Additional RVSS technology is deployed in the San Diego and Blaine, 

Washington sectors 161 and is scheduled to be deployed on the northern border in the Swanton 

Sector. 162 

MSC consists of a truck carrying a mounted camera and radar. 163 MVSS, also known as a 

"Scope Truck," is similar, but consists only of a camera, and no radar. 164 Secretary Johnson 

recently emphasized that MSC is a priority for his agency. 165 The current MSC fleet consists of 

49 systems in Arizona with plans to locate more in Texas. 166 While the Arizona Technology 

Plan originally called for MVSS, these systems have also been relocated to RGV to address the 

change in threat to that sector. 167 MVSS is also located in other sectors along the border, 

including the San Diego sector. 168 

Agent portable surveillance systems are "ground-sensing radar and surveillance system[s]" 

mounted on tripods that are "operated by Border Patrol agents where tmck-mountcd systems are 

unable to be deploycd." 169 Thermal image devices provide Border Patrol the ability to see "up to 

5 miles in areas that are dimly lit or in total darkness." 170 The feed from this device can be 

159 !d. 160 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Staff). 

161 On the northern border, the Blaine Sector has 32 RVSS and is the only sector with a fiber optic camera system. 

Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015). 

"'

2 Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security) The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2015: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !13th Cong. (2014). 163 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDFD TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014). 

164ld 

165 See FY16 Department of Homeland Security Budget: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Homeland Security of 

the Comm. on Appropriations, !14th Cong, (20 15). 166 U.S. CUSTOMS ANIJ IlORIJI'R PROTECTION, IlORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Staff). 

167 ld 168 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral ST AFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15). 

160 GOV'T ACCOUNTARII.ITY OFFICE, GA0-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOI.OGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT A Nil ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (20 14). 

1701d. 

24 
101 

shown on agent lapt~f:,s._ • Finally,_ UGS are bu:ied underground across the bord ~~ and are used 

to detect movement. - I his ts a fairly mcxpensive option for very remote areas. However, 

UGS are subject to false alarms, such as animals triggering the alarm or sensor dysfunctions. 174 

In Arizona, CBP intended to procure UGS with Imaging Sensors (IS); however, problems of 

inadequate bandwidth in its current radio frequencies arose during testing. 175 CBP will not 

procure UGS with IS technology until it resolves these issues. 176 

Importantly, while several delays have occurred in implementing the Arizona Technology Plan, 

DHS has realized some taxpayer savings. CBP initial!~ estimated that the total life-cycle costs of 

the new plan would be about $1.5 billion for Arizona. 1 7 However, the Department saved 75 

percent on its 1FT contract. 178 These savings have allowed DHS to procure other resources, such 

as tactical aerostats, which, for the most part, have been located in the RGV sector. 179 Aerostats 

have high-definition cameras with 10 miles of visibility, depending on the wind. However, 

smuggling is so pervasive that it is difficult for agents to address everything aerostats 

detect. 180 Despite detection success, acrostats also experience weather and maintenance 

171 U.S. CUSTOMS A'iD BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Staff). 

172 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 8 (2014). 173 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on tile with Majority 

Staf1). 

174 Robert Lee Maril, The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and ll/ega/ Immigration along the U.S-Mexico 

Border, TEXAS TECI-l UNIVERSITY PRESS 99 (20 II) (stating that, according to Border Patrol agents, in 2005 false 

alarms ranged fi·om 50 to 80 percent). 175 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-14-368, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 12 (20 14). 

176 !d. 177 U.S. CUSTOMS AND 130RDER PROTECTION, 130RDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Staff); Gov'T ACCOUNTABII.ITY OFFICE, GA0-12-22, ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECH>JOLOGV MORE 

INFORMATION ON PLANS AND COSTS IS NEEDED BEFORE PROCEEDING 7-8 (20 11 ). 178 The Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and its Impact on Border Security: Hearing Before the House 

Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security of the Comm. on Homeland Security, !13th Cong., (2014) (statement of 

Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Acquisition Executive, Office ofTechnology Innovation and 

Acquisition, Department of Homeland Security). 179 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDFR PROTECTION, llORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Staf1). 

180 See Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force A4ultipliers: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong, (2015); 

25 
102 

challenges and arc only operational 60 percent of the time. 181 It is estimated that each Aerostat 

currently costs $5 million, per year, to operate and maintain. 182 

While Border Patrol has begun experimenting with tactical acrostats to locate illegal pedestrian 

crossers, CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) deploys tethered aerostat radar systems 

(TARS) to identify and locate illegal aircraft crossing the border. 183 OAM has six TARS located 

along the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as two additional TARS located in the Florida Keys and 

Puerto Rico, which provides OAM with persistent surveillance of the air environment along the 

southwest bordcri 8 

OAM also utilizes the Predator B UAS for detection capabilities, particularly with the advent of 

attaching a Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) to the UAS. OAM currently 

operates four V ADERs and is scheduled to acquire two additional VADERs by the end of 

2016. 185 VADER monitors movement on the ground and is very precise; however, if the target is 

static, VADER will not sec it. 186 Since 2012, sensor data obtained from VADER is streamed to 

the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC). 187 

Image provided by DHS. 

OAM has UAS Ground Control Stations in Corpus Christi, Texas: Sierra Vista, Arizona; Grand 

Forks, North Dakota; and Jacksonville, Florida. OAM currently possesses nine Predator B UAS, 

181 Majority Staff observations during Senators' Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CODEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley 

Sector (Feb. 20 15). 182 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Stall). 

'"!d. 

184 !d 181 Data Provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Sept. 9, 20 15). 186 Majority Staff observations during bipa11isan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona Sector (Feb. 20 15). 187 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GFNI'RAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-15-17, 90-DAY STATUS UPDATE 

TO RECOMMENDATIONS FROM U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION'S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

PROGRAM DOES NOT ACIIH'VE INTENDED RESULTS OR RECOGNIZE ALL COSTS OF OPERATIONS (20 15). 

26 
103 

eight of which arc operational. 188 Six of these are assigned to the southwest border, witb two 

used for maritime operations, and the other two are assigned to the northern bordcr. 189 The 

Predators have slanted cameras that provide 10 mile coverage and a laser illuminator that allows 

Border Patrol agents with night vision goggles to locate illegal crossers. The aircraft can remain 

airborne for up to 21 hours; however approximately 30 percent ofUAS missions are cancelled 

due to weather conditions. 190 

In December, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report that found that the 

UAS program has not achieved satisfactory or expected results. 191 Specifically, the OIG found 

that CBP's unmanned aircrafts were "not meeting fli~ht hour goals" and the estimated cost to 

operate the program was "$12,255 per flight hour." 19 Ultimately, the OIG concluded, ''CBP has 

invested significant funds in a program that has not achieved the expected results, and it cannot 

demonstrate how much the program has improved border security." 193 

The Department has disputed the findings of the OIG report in Committee hearings, asserting 

that the UAS contributes to many apprehensions that are not directly credited unless the aircraft 

follows the illegal crosser until the apprehension is made. 194 Instead, unattended aircrafts are 

often used to detect illegal crossings, notify Border Patrol, and continue flying to other locations 

of potential illegal activity. 195 In Arizona, this makes sense, as it often takes illegal crossers days 

to get through the mountains, giving agents more time and opportunity to make an apprehension. 

Moreover, the UAS are often used in drug interdiction operations, and CBP points out that as of 

August 2015, UAS has interdicted over 68,000 pounds of contraband ~cocaine and marijuana), 

with a retail value of over $547 million, or $126,000 per flight hour. 19 

In order to leverage intelli~ence resources, DHS collaborates with DOD through the Joint 

Interagency Task Forces. 1 i In addition, DOD has deployed National Guard troops to assist with 

surveillance efforts and to provide training on recent technologies during Operation Jump Start 

and Operation Phalanx. 198 In 2012, DOD deployed I ,200 National Guard troops to the U.S.-

'" Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral ST AFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015). 

189 !d. 190 U.S. CUSTOMS A!';D BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARI!';F, CORPUS CHRISTI PRESENTATION (2015) 

(on file with Majority Staff). 191 Of'FICE m· INSPECTOR GENERAl., DFPARTMENHlF HOMELAND SECURITY, 010-15-17, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION'S U\iMANNrD AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROGRAM DOES NOT ACHIEVE INTENDED RESULTS OR 

"'"·'''"'"'•'·" ALL COSTS OF 0Pf,RATIONS (20 14). 

ld. 19} !d. 

194 Securing the Border: Fencing, hif'rastructure, and Technology Force A1ultipliers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 

on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Randolph Alles, Assistant 

Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 195 Quantitatively, this is logged as <\detection," not "apprehension,'' even if it results in an apprehension. /d. 196 Data Provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Aug. 28. 20 15). 107 Homeland Threats and Agenc_v Reponses: Hearing Before the,)~. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 

Affairs, I 12th Cong., (2012) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 198 Boots on the Ground and E_J'es in the Sky.· How to Best Utilize the National Guard to A chi eve Operational 

Control: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Border and Afaritime Security qfthe Comm. on Homeland 

Security, I 12th Cong., (2012) (statement of Ronald Vitiello and Martin Vaughan, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security). 

27 
104 

Mexico border. Specifically, the National Guard has assisted CBP's OAM and Border Patrol to 

expand their aerial capabilities by providing military electronic sensor systems that far exceed 

CBP's ground-based and mobile systems. 199 CBP has been flying the Predator B UAS with 

DOD's VADER at the southwest border200 Moreover, the tactical Aerostats and TARS 

mentioned above come from DOD. Currently, DHS is in receiving ownership of over 3,900 

items of excess DOD technology, including Marc bot, which are robots used in San Diego for 

tunnel detection, and Advanced Radar Surveillance Systems (ARSS) 201 

Finally, when examining U.S. border technology, it is important to consider that smugglers are 

also leveraging the latest technology. Recently, a drone transporting more than six pounds of 

methamphetamine crashed in the San Diego sector. 202 Arizona and San Diego are seeing an 

increasing use of"short landers" and "Ultralight Aircraft" (ULAs) described as "flying 

lawnmowers," used to fly over fences and drop illegal drugs. 203 Alarmingly, cartels have begun 

to use minors to fly ULAs due to their light weight and the unlikelihood of their prosecution. 204 

Experiences at the Border 

Border Parra/ 

DHS has devoted a growing number of resources to the southwest border, including increasing 

the number of Border Patrol agents (those that operate between ports of entry) from 8,617 in 

2000 to 18,127 in 2014205 and Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers (those that operate at 

ports of entry) from 4,667 in 2003 to 6,323 in 2015 206 

In 2011, former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said that "the border is better now than it has 

ever been."207 Similarly, DHS Secretary Johnson points to a declining number of apprehensions 

along the southwest border as a key indicator of border security. 208 For example, DHS 

apprehensions totaled 479,000 for FY2014, down from approximately 1.6 million apprehensions 

199 Homeland Threats and Agency Reponses: Hearing B~fore the S. Comm. on !lome/and Security & Governmental 

Affairs, !12th Cong., (2012) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 200 /d 201 U.S. ClJSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, BORDER TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION (2015) (on file with Majority 

Staff). 

201 Laura McVicker, Drone Carrying Meth Crashed Near San Ysidro Port of Entry, NBC SAN DIEGO (Jan. 22, 

20 15), http://www. nbc sand iego.com/news/locai/Drone-Carrying-Mcth-Crashes-Near-San-Ysidro-Port-of-Entry28935360I.html 

203 ARIZONA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRACFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT 2014 62 (2014). 2

" Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15). 705 Rernarks by ,)'ecretary qj'Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Border Securily in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP'T OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 9, 20 14), http://www.dhs.gov/news/20 14/1 0/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-securityje h-johnson-border-security-21st -century. 2

"

6 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15). 

'"Jennifer Epstein, Janet Napolitano: Border securitv better than ever, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 20 I I), 

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51925.html 

~os Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, Border Security in the 21st Century, U.S. DEP'T OF 

HOMELAND SEClJRITY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/l 0/09/remarks-secretary-homeland-securityjeh-johnson-border-security-2 I st -century. 

28 
105 

in FY2000 209 However, as a report issued by Dr. Coburn emphasizes, ''[t]he apprehensions 

figure for FY20 14 follows a three-year trend of steady increases in the number of apprehensions 

since FY20 II, when DHS data shows that Southern border apprehensions hit a low of 

327,000."210 Moreover, experts point out that even if apprehensions have decreased, there is 

limited information of the role immigration enforcement has played in this decline. 211 

Apprehension rates might also be down due to a lack of effectiveness on the southwest border. 

Accordi~ ~ to independent experts, apprehension rates along our southwest border are 40 to 55 

percent.- - Most Border Patrol agents and local law enforcement estlmated mtcrdtctton rates m 

the RGV to be 30 to 40 percent.213 In the Tucson sector, Border Patrol agents predicted they 

caught one-in-three in areas where there was a fence and onc-in-20 where no fence was present, 

which is often in the remote mountainous arcas. 214 

Finally, it is unclear as to the impact that misrcported apprehension data has had on the final 

numbers. 215 Border Patrol agents claim that the difference in their experiences and those 

reported by D HS arc due to manipulation of these statistics.216 Specifically, a Border Patrol 

agent testified to the Committee that agents faced retribution for reporting more than 20 

footprints-a key indicator of"got-aways."217 

Local Law Enforcement 

While Border Patrol agents provide a key level of security at our border, their efforts arc often 

buttressed by local law enforcement. The relationship and connectivity between local law 

enforcement, landowners, and Border Patrol is vital and cannot be overstated. 

Operation Stone garden, a grant program operated through the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), provides funding to state and local governments to increase operational 

capacity at the U.S. border. 218 While those who use the program have emphasized its success, it 

20'

1 ld. slide 26 210 Senator Tom Coburn, A Review of the Departme/11 oj'Homeland Security '.1· Missions and Performance (Jan. 

2015). 

211 Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Tl/egallmmigration to the United States: How Effective 

is Enforcement?, COCNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 2 (20 13) ("The Obama administration has not offered, and 

Congress has failed to insist on, any accountability for the effectiveness of these huge enfOrcement expenditures.'"). 212 ld at 3. 213 Securing the Southvvest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltlvay: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Securitv & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, Border Patrol Agent, 

Rio Grande Va1ley Sector, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 

'"' Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Tucson, Arizona Sector (Feb. 20 15). 215 According to the Border Patrol Council, Border Patrol Agents are required to submit apprehension numbers to 

supervisors. Moreover, staff has been told that agents are instructed to count illegal crossers not caught by border 

~trol ag~nts as "pending law enforcement r~solution'' rather than as a ''got away:" 

- Secunng the Southwest Border: Perspecttvesfrom Beyond the Beltway: Heartng Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, National Border 

Patrol Council). 

217Td. 

218 HOMeLAND SECURITY GRANTS, 0PERATIO" STONEGARDEN, 

http:iiwww.home landsecuritygrants. infoiGrantDetails.aspx"gid=21875. 

29 
106 

is important to ensure that the program is being utilized etTectively to achieve its intended and 

important goals. Moreover, illegal activity at the southwest border stretches beyond the border 

communities themselves. Brooks County, Texas, which operates a checkpoint more than 70 

miles from the border, reported 443 deaths related to illegal immigrants in the past six years.219 

States have also deployed significant resources to increase manpower at U.S. borders. 22° For 

example, former Texas governor Rick Perry's Operation Strong Safety deployed the Texas 

Department of Public Safety to the border, which, according to a recent report, was effective.221 

It is also important to emphasize the other resource impacts our insecure border has on local 

communities. When local law enforcement and Border Patrol agents catch more people, jails fill 

up. Prosecutors refuse to prosecute interdictions below a certain drug possession level due to 

heavy demands on resources. Captured illegal crossers need to he housed and provided medical 

care, which is also fiscally impactful on local budgets. When considering new federal border 

security measures, more boots on the ground is an important component, but not a solution to be 

considered in isolation. 

Local Landov.-ners 

Some landowners experience significant damages to their property due to illegal crossers. Their 

fences have been battered, either from pedestrian illegal crossers or by stolen vehicles. 

Landovmers are responsible for repair costs, some totaling up to $100,000 a year. 222 

Landowners also face threats of break-ins and violence. Firearms, ammunition, cash, jewelry, 

and small electronics have all been reported stolen. One Arizona sheriff told the Committee 

about a rancher who lives in his jurisdiction that has had his home broken into four or five 

times. 223 That same rancher has also encountered scouts for the cartel sitting on his property, 

adding even more fear to his situation.224 According to several witnesses at a Committee 

hearing, scouts face little to no fear of retribution for their presence or assistance to the cartels.225 

219 Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Beji1re the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Benny Martinez, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Brooks 

County, Texas): see also Texas' Brooks County is 'Death Valley 'for Migrants, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2014), 

~~_tp://www .nbcnews.com/storyline/imm igration-border-crisis/texas-brooks-county-dcath-valley-migrants-n 152121. 

~-uSee generafly Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S Comm. 

on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (20 15). 211 TEXAS DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84Tll TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND 

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 2 (20 15) (Unclassified Version). 222 Statement by Fred Cappadona, Double C Cattle Co., South Texans' Property Rights Association Roundtable, 

during Senators' Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CO DEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley Sector (Feb. 2015). 

:m Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltlvay: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Dannels, Sheriff, Cochise 

County, Arizona). :24 !d. 

See Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15) (Elizabeth Kempshall, Executive Director, Arizona 

HIDTA stated, "it has been a challenge for us to prosecute the scouts" due to the lack of laws specific to them, while 

Benny Ma11inez, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Brooks County, Texas confirmed "a good percentage of[ scouts] walk."). 

30 
107 

Cartels have also threatened violence against landowners for contacting the Border Patrol. For 

example, in 2010, Robert Krentz, a prominent rancher in Cochise County, Arizona, was killed by 

an illegal crosser on his property. 226 

Committee witnesses who live on the border have said that an important metric to determine 

whether our border is secure is not quantitative, but rather qualitative: the border is secure when 

landowners on the border have a reasonable expectation that they can leave their homes and 

ranches and their property will not be battered or vandalized.227 

Transnational Crime at the Southwest Border 

Cartels 

Cartels have evolved from smaller, primarily family run smuggling groups to multinational 

entities.228 The cartels are otlen equipped with weapons, communications and surveillance 

equipment, and other paramilitary capabilities that compete with U.S. law enforcement.229 To 

protect their routes, cartels invest heavily in cnforcement.230 According to a Committee witness, 

scouts wear "camouflage uniforms with padded boots for non-tracker, with $2,500 solarpowered, encrypted satellite phones, with AK-47s.'' 231 

According to a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) report, ·'cartels have also been 

effective in corrupting U.S. law enforcement officials at all levels, which not only facilitates 

organized crime, but undermines the public trust in Jaw enforcement."232 Specifically, officials 

at DHS are very aware of attempts by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) "to infiltrate the 

CBP workforce through conspired hiring operations and aggressive targeting" of agents. 233 

According to the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA): 

226 Randal Archibald, Ranchers Alarmed by Killing near Border, NY TIMES (Apr. 4, 2010), 

http://www .nyt imes.coml20 I 0/04/05/us/05arizona.html. 227 Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectivesfrom Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Dannels, Sherif!; Cochise 

County, Arizona). 228 Response to Questions for the Record from Shawn Moran, Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and 

Unamnvered Questions: !-learing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 

(2015). 

229 Diane Washington Valdez, Report. Mexican Drug Cartels Adopting Militwy Tactics, EL PASO TIMES (Aug. 7, 

2011 ), http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci 18632455. 

vo Shannon K. O'Neil, Two Nations !;;divisible: Mexico, The United States, and the Road Ahead 127 (Ox lord 

University Press 20 13). 231 Securing the Rorder: Assessing the Impact of Transnational CrimE': Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of General Barry R. McCafti'ey, USA (RET.), 

Former Director, Office ofNational Drug Control Policv). 212 TEXAS DEP'TOF PUGI.IC SAFETY, OPERATION STRON'o SMETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND 

OmcE OF THE GOVER!'OR 2 (2015) (Unclassified Version). 

m GOV'T ACCOUNTAil!LITY OFFICE, GA0-13-59, BORDER SECURITY: ADDITlONAl. ACTIONS NEEDED TO 

STRENGTHEN CBP EFFORTS TO MITlGATE RISK OF E.\1PLOYEE CORRUPTION AND MISCONDUCT 2 (20 12). 

31 
108 

"The Sinaloa Cartel is considered the most influential and strongest cartel in Mexico, as it 

maintains an extensive corruption network at the local, state, and Federal level, giving it 

more political and judicial cover to protect and secure drug trafficking activities. 

Historically, Sinaloa Cartel operatives maintained a greater ability to adapt to law 

enforcement challenges and foresee potential changes in the drug market more effectively 

than other Mexican cartels. "

234 

From FY2005 through FY2012 GAO found tha, "144 current or former CBP employees were 

arrested or indicted for corruption," representing "less than 1 percent of the entire CBP 

workforce per tiscal year."23 In 2014, Secretary Johnson "delegated to CBP the authority to 

investigate its employees for alleged criminal misconduct."236 On June 29,2015, the Homeland 

Security Advisory Council issued an interim report that found that corruption among Border 

Patrol agents and officers "may be increasing" and that "arrests for corruption of CBP personnel 

far exceed, on a per capita basis, such arrests at other federal law enforcement agencies."237 

Local law enforcement officials and public officials have also been found guilty of taking bribes 

from drug traffickers.238 And, corruption is not limited to the U.S. Recently, 14 Mexican 

"Fedcrales" were arrested for running a kidnapping operation near the Texas border that targeted 

Mexican businessmen239 

Drug Smuggling 

Cartels smuggle illicit drugs into the U.S., and rely on U.S.-based gangs to distribute the drugs 

throughout the U.S?40 More than 90 percent of all cocaine entering the country transits the 

Mexican-Central American corridor from countries further south241 "Mexico remains the 

primaty foreign source of marijuana and methamphetamine destined for U.S. markets and is also 

ARIZO"iA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT 2015, 11 (20 15); see also DEA Maps 

Show Kingpin 'EI Chapa' Guzman's Cartel Controls Nearly the Entire US. Drug lv!arket, FORBES (Nov. 10, 20 15), 

http://www .forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez!20 1511 I! I Oidea-maps-show-kingpin-el-chapo-guzmans-cartel-controlsnearly-the~entire-u-s-drug-market/. 

215 /d. at 8. 236 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CUST0\15 AND BORDER PROTFCTION, CBP BORDER SECURITY REPORT 

~ISCAL YEAR 2014 (2014). 

-·' 7 HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORTOE THE CBP INTEGRITY ADVISORY PA!'-JEL 6 (2015). 

Shannon K. O'Neil. Two Nations indivisible: Mexico, The United States, and the Road Ahead 131 (Oxford 

University Press 2013). 2

'

19 lldefonso Ortiz, I~ Mexican Federates Arrested/or Running Kidnapping Crew Near Texas Border, BREITBART 

(Mar. 7, 20 15), http:/ iwww. brcitbart.com/texas/20 15/03/07/14-mexican-cops-anested-for-running-kidnapping-crewncar-texas-border/. 

240 EXECUTIVE 0FFICF OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL SOUTHWEST 

BORDER COUNTER NARCOTICS STRATEGY 34 (20 13); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE -r-iAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, 

NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 11 (2011). 241 EXECUTIVE OFFICE Of THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CO;JTROL POLICY, NATIONAL SOUTHWEST 

BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY 1 (20 13). 

32 
109 

a source and transit country for heroin." 242 Observations from Border Patrol agents su¥Jlest there 

has also been a recent rise in cocaine, meth, and heroin deriving directly from Mexico. 3 

Mexican DTOs are known to use minors as young as 12 years old to smuggle drugs between and 

through POEs?44 In FY20 14, Arizona apprehended 39 minors as pedestrians "with illicit drugs 

taped to their bodies, concealed within clothing, or in bags. "245 DTOs also recruit high school 

and middle school students-the majority of which are U.S. citizens-believing students "are 

less likely to be identified by law enforcement" and if identified will not be prosecuted246 

Mexican DTOs have become experts at evading the Border Patrol. According to General 

McCaffrey, former Director of the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy, the 

Border Patrol seizes just 5 to 10 percent ofthe illegal drugs smuggled across the border. 247 The 

decreasing cost of drugs in the U.S., particularly heroin, illustrates the point. 

Figure 10 

ILLEGAL DRUG PRICES NATIONAL AVERAGE PRICE PER GRAM. !NfLATION·ADJUSTED DOLLARS 

$1,500 

51,250 

$1,000 

$$00 

0 ,oo, 

242 Id 

243 While refusing to draw a direct inference, Border Patrol agents pointed out that since states have begun to 

legalize marijuana, drugs smuggled into this U.S. have shifted being predominately marijuana to harder drugs. 244 See Evelio Contreras. inside the Life of a Drug-Trafficking Teen. CNN (Aug. 13, 2015), 

http://www .cnn. com/2 0 15/0 8/ 12/us/ ins ide-the-! i fe-of-a-drug-trafficking -teen/ index. htm l?eref~rss __ latest 

(documenting how the Los Zetas gang forced a 12-year-old illegal immigrant living on the Texas side of the border 

to smuggle drugs tor them). 215 ARIZONA HIGH lNlTcNSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, TIIREAT ASSESSMENT 2015 56 (20 !4). 246 !d., see also Lourdes Medrano, Along Key Stretch of US-Mexico Border More Kids Running Drugs, TilE 

CfiRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 16, 20 13), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/07!6/ Along-keystretch-of-US-Mexico-border-more-kids-running-drugs; Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives from Beyond 

Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015). 

Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland 

Securi(y & Governmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey. USA (RET.), 

Former Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy). 

33 
110 

Between the POEs, smuggling groups use ''an extensive system of scouts armed with radios, 

solar-powered radio repeaters, cellular telephones, and weapons situated on high points along 

drug trafficking routes."248 This type of structure provides smugglers with a high level of 

situational awareness of law enforcement presence on both sides of the border. 

At the POEs, cartels have begun smuggling drugs in smaller packages and using deep 

concealment to increase their likelihood of success. Officers at the Otay Mesa POE in the San 

Diego sector have found drugs hidden in batteries, gas tanks, jalapeno jars, and fire 

extinguishers 249 Media repot1s indicate cartels have concealed drugs in "frozen sharks, 

sprinkled on donuts, and crammed into cucumbers.''250 

Human Smuggling and Trafficking 

To enter the U.S., more than 90 percent of immigrants hire coyotes that control the routes from 

Mexico to the U.S. Coyotes move illegal immigrants across the border and into the interior of 

the U.S. through a series of stash houses. 251 Coyotes often use energy drinks to keep people 

awake as they are smuggled across the border and fl·cqucntly leave behind or "sacrifice" those 

incapable of keeping pace.252 Moreover, at a Committee Hearing a Border Patrol agent testified 

that coyotes use migrants as a diversion in order to sneak higher value drugs across the border. 253 

For example, rather than directing unaccompanied children and families to bridges and ports of 

entry along the Rio Grande where they could immediately and safely seek asylum, coyotes 

forced them to take the more dangerous route across the river, tying up Border Patrol agents and 

leaving the border unguarded254 

Sex trafficking organizntions also use coyotes to transport victims across the border en route to 

destinations throughout the U.S. 255 According to the Texas DPS report, "[c]artels, gangs, and 

international sex trafficking organizations have worked closely together for many years now, 

uncharacteristically crossing traditional rivalries in order to tratlic drugs and people for large 

profits. "

256 

248 !d (statement of Elizabeth Kempshall, Executive Director, Arizona Region of the Southwest Border, High 

Intensity Drug Trafticking Area, Office of National Drug Control Policy). 249 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan. bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 2015). 250 See Christopher Woody, 'El Chapa' Gu:man 's Role in the Global Coca;ne Trade is Becoming Clearer, 

McPHERSON SENTINEL (Aug. I 6, 20 I 5), 

http:flwww .mcphersonsentinel.com/articlc/ZZ/20 150816/B USINESS/308169989/- I lbooks/?Start~ I. 251 TEXAS DEP'TOF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND 

0FHCF OF TilE GOVERNOR 29 (2015) (Unclassified Version). 252 Majority Staff observations during Senators' Johnson, Carper, and Sasse CO DEL to the Texas Rio Grande Valley 

Sector (Feb. 20 15). 251 Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY20! 5 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, National 

Border Patrol Council). 

2'dld. 

m TFXAS DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY. OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO TilE 84TII TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND 

GOVERNOR 34 (2015) (Unclassified Version). 

34 
111 

Gangs, Criminal Aliens. and Special Interest Aliens 

Violent transnational gangs such as MS-13 and Los Zetas have a stronghold in border states such 

as Texas, while the Hells Angel Motorcycle Club (HAMC) controls Arizona.257 These gangs 

·•maintain a buyer and seller relationship with Mexican DTOs."258 

Moreover, the number of criminal aliens coming into the U.S. has increased. The Border Patrol 

Council estimates that the number of individuals who have committed crimes in the U.S., served 

time in a jail here, and have been deported constitute 10 to 20 percent of those apprehended.259 

As an example, on March 6. 2015, Border Patrol agents in the Laredo sector arrested an illegal 

immigrant from Mexico convicted of murder in 1992 in Jacksonville, Florida 260 "The subject 

was sentenced to 20 years and was released in 2002, after serving I 0 years."261 Different reports 

indicates there are somewhere between 200-300 sanctuary jurisdictions in this country in which 

local governments refuse to assist in the enforcement of our immigration laws. The recent 

shooting of a young woman in San Francisco, California by a criminal alien that had been 

deported five times with seven prior felony convictions has brought renewed attention to 

criminals entering and remaining in the U.S., largely as a result of sanctuary policies262 

Finally, legitimate concerns remain that terrorists could exploit our country's southwest border to 

enter the U.S. undctected263 While the likelihood of a terrorist group using the southwest border 

as an entry point to complete a terrorist attack is an area of debate, the potential for exploitation 

should be taken seriously given that there was a 70 percent increase from FY2013 to FY2014 in 

OTMs crossing the border. 264 This included individuals from Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. 265 

According to Border Patrol agents on the ground, 51 percent of all Border Patrol apprehensions 

are currently OTMs. 

257 ld at I. ARIZONA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA. THREAT ASSESSMENT 2014 22 (2014) (HAMC is 

known to be involved in murder, drug trafficking, prostitution, weapons trafficking. extortion, arson, and vehiclelheft offenses). 258 ld at 24; FBI NATIONAL GANG ll'TELLIGENCE CENTER, 20 II NATIONAL GA!'G THREAT ASSESSMENT; DEP'T OF 

HOMELA:\D SECURITY, MEXICO: CROSS-BORDER G,\NGS AND TIIEIR MEXICAN DRUG CARTEL AFFILIATIONS (201 1). 159 Response to Questions for the Record from Shawn Moran, Vice President, National Border Patrol Council, 

Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and Unanswered Questions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

flame! and Security & Governmental Affuirs, I 14th Cong. (201 5) ("These are not economic immigrants in search of 

a betler life. These arc hardened criminals who are facing rea1jai1 time."). 200 Laredo Sector Border Patrol Agents Arrest an Undocumented Immigrant from i\1exico Convicted C!f'A1urder, 

U.S. CUSTOMS A"D BORDER PROTECTION (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.cbp.gov/ncwsroom/1ocal-media-releasc/2015-

0J-06-000000/1arcdo-scctor-border-patrol-agents-arresi. 

261/d. 

Michelle Moons, Breaking: Pier 14 Murder Suspect Had Been Deported 5 Times With 7 Felonies, BREITBART 

(July 3, 20 I 5), hitp:/lwww.brcitbart.com/texasi20 15/07/0J/breaking-picr-14-murder-suspect-had-becn-dcported-5-

timcs-with-7-felonies/. 

263 TEXAS DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OPERA T!ON STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO THE 84TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE AND 

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 1 (2015) (Unclassified Version). 261 Brandon Darby, Leaked CBP Report Shows Entire IVorld Fxploiting Open US Border, BREITBART (Aug. J, 

20 14 ), http :1 /www. brc it bart. com/texas/2 0 14/08/03/leakcd-c bp-report -shows-en! ire-world-exploiting-open-usborder/. 

265 !d. 

35 
112 

Part II: The U.S.- Canada Border 

The United States and Canada share the longest common land border in the world266 The 

binational border is 5,525 miles Jong. 267 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the continental 

border along the 49th parallel from Washington State to Maine is almost 4,000 miles 268 

Each day, more than 350,000 people and $2 billion in trade cross the U.S.-Canada border. 269 

Canada is the United States' largest trading partner, with over 120 operating POEs along the 

U.S.-Canada border.270 The busiest ports are located in Detroit, Michigan; Buffalo, New York; 

and Blaine, Washington. 271 Additionally, CBP has nine pre-clearance locations at Canadian 

airports to assist in processing the estimated 750 daily commercial flights to the U.S., as well as 

pre-inspection locations at Canadian rail stations272 

The Border Patrol divides the northern border into eight sectors: Blaine, Spokane, Havre, Grand 

Forks, Detroit, Buffalo, Swanton, and Houlton. Each sector's terrain is diJTerent and the 

challenges are evolving. For example, in the Great Lakes region, TCOs use small vessels during 

the summer and snowmobiles during the winter to transport illicit contraband. 273 Similarly, in 

W~:'hingt_on State a~d Maine, dense forests and open waters r

7

r

4

ovide criminals cover, making it 

dJthcult tor authonl!es to detect cross-border tllegal act!Vlty.· CBP deploys different 

technologies such as UAS, ground and water sensors, ''buckcyes"275 and trail cameras with live 

feeds to maintain domain awareness in areas that are difficult to patrol.276 

266 U.S. DEP'TOF HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY 4 (2012). 267 U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, CEt-:SUS BUREAU, TilE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT225 ( 2012) (including the 

Alaska-British Columbia-Yukon Territory portion). 21>!1 /d. 

269 Protecting our lv'orthern Border: Enhancing Collaboration and Building Local Partnership5·: Hearing Before the 

S SubComm. on the Efficiency and tjfectiveness ofTedera/ Programs and the Federal Workforce of the Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Govern menial Affairs. !13th Cong. (2013) (statement of Christopher Richards, Havre Sector 

Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol); Fact Sheet: Beyond the Border Facilitating Travel at the United StatesCanada Border, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/201!/12/06/factsheet -beyond-border-fac i I it at ing-trave I-united -states-canada-bard cr. 270 /d. 

271 :vlajority Staff observations during a staff briefing on the northern border presented by the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (Apr. 20 15). 272 Protecting our Northern Border: Enhancing Collahoration and Building Local Partnerships: Hearing Before the 

S. SubComm. on the Ej]icienC)' and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Federal Workj(Jrce of the Camm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !13th Cong. (2013) (statement of Christopher Richards, Havre Sector 

Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol); Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, 

Washington Sector (Aug. 20 15). For a discussion on preclearance operations, see Part IV. 271 !d. 

274 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 20 15). 

Buckeyes are off the shelftechnology designed for hunters that consist of portable cameras with motion sensors 

that, when triggered. connect to a cell tower and send images to the agent's phone, revealing what triggered the 

camera. This saves significant resources, as agents are prevented from checking on a sensor that was triggered by 

animals or other non-threat sources. 276 Protecting our Northern Border: Enhancing Collaboration and Budding Local Partnerships: Hearing Before the 

S SuhComm. on the ljficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and the Fee/era/ Workforce of the Com111. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. !13th Cong. (2013) (statement of Christopher Richards, Havre Sector 

Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol). 

36 
113 

Image provided by DHS. 

There is currently no fencing on the northern border. Instead, the demarcation line between the 

two countries is often marked by a ditch, approximately six inches deep.277 

Image taken during bipartisan Washington Sector (Aug. 2015) 

There are cun·ently 2,093 Border Patrol agents and 3,600 Oi1icc of Field Operations officers 

stationed on the northern border.278 DHS believes that current stat1ing numbers are sufficient to 

manage and address northem security threats, because illegal crossing apprehensions and drug 

smuggling volumes at the northern border are much lower than at the U.S.-Mexico border. 279 

Additionally, agents have more time and resources to target each threat, as well as better 

information sharing with Canada.280 

While both the northern and southwest borders are highly active, crossing volumes are ditl'erent. 

For example, in FY2014, northern border officers apprehended 3,338 individuals for attempting 

to enter the U.S. illegal!~, while agents patrolling the southwest border reported a total of 

479,371 apprehensions. 81 

277 Majoritv Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the lllaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015). 278 Data pr~vided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (AprilS, 2015) (as a comparison, 

there are 2,500 Border Patrol agents stationed in the San Diego sector alone). 279 !d. 

2BO !d. 

"'U.S. BORDER PATROL, STATS AND SUMMARIES, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/mediarcsources/stats>title~scctor+profile. The Majority Staff notes that DHS has refused to release figures for FY20 15. 

37 
114 

Table I. Comparison of Apprehensions at U.S. Borders FY2011-FY2014282 

Sector FY20ll FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 

Northern Border Total 

Southwest Border Total 

6,123 

327,577 

4,210 

356,873 

3,230 

414,397 

3,338 

479,371 

Also in FY2014, the U.S.-Canada border recorded a slightly greater volume of trucks and trains, 

while the southwest border processed more buses, personal vehicles, and pedestrian crossings. 283 

Table 2. Recorded Crossing at Both U.S. Borders in FY2014284 

Border POEs Trucks Trains Buses Personal Vehicles Pedestrians 

Northern 5,802,211 28,643 103,749 31,979,736 423,605 

Southwest 5,414,568 10,414 213,780 69,623,693 41,223,292 

U.S.- Canada Joint Operations 

Currently, to secure, monitor, and manage the northern border, the United States and Canada 

coordinate efforts through the Beyond the Border Initiative (BTB). 285 The key priorities ofBTB 

are: I) identifying and addressing threats before they reach the U.S.-Canada border; 2) 

facilitating legitimate trade; 3) integrating cross-border law enforcement efforts; and 4) 

coordinating approaches to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. 286 This approach enhances 

law enforcement cooperation, provides the framework to address security gaps, and ensures that 

lawful trade and travel are not significantly affected by increased security measures. 287 BTB 

enables DHS to improve the allocation of resources, because operation chiefs coordinate with 

their Canadian counterparts to avoid duplicating patrol and surveillance efforts. 288 

Since 2011, the BTB Initiative has institutionalized several information and intelligence sharing 

mechanisms. DIJS states that these air, land, and maritime mobile partnerships provide a greater 

penetration of intelligence, affording U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies an advantage 

point to disrupt terrorist and transnational criminal activity before it reaches the U.S.-Canada 

border289 

Since 1997, intelligence-driven law enforcement teams have been responsible for securing the 

northern border.29° Currently, there arc 24 Integrated Border Enforcement Team (!BET) 

1H2ft.J 

2

" BUREAU OF TRANSPORlA f!ON STATISTICS, BORDER CROSSING/ENTRY DATA: QUERY DETAILED STATISTICS 

(20 14 ), http:! /trans border. bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TB DR BC/TBDR BCQ. html. ~M - -

2

" U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHeET: BEYOND THE BORDER UNITED STATES-CANADA LAW 

ENfORCEMENT COOPERATION (20 II). 286 U.S. DEP'T OF !·IOMEI.!IND SECURITY, BEYOND THE BORDER IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 4 (20!3). 287 Observations presented at Canada Institute, Wilson Center, Beyond the Border Implementation Report Update, 

(20 !4 ), http://www. wilsoncenter.org/event/beyond-the-border-imp lcmentation-report-update. 

" 8 Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (AprilS, 20!5). 28') !d. 

'''

0 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG POI.ICY CONTROL, NATIO"iAL NORTHERN 

BORDER COUNTERNARCOTIC'S STRATEGY !2 (20!4). 

38 
115 

locations, with the majority monitorin~ the Great Lakes region, including four that are operated 

by American and Canadian personnel. 91 The five law enforcement agencies contributing to 

!BETs efforts are: 1) CBP; 2) ICE; 3) U.S. Coast Guard; 4) the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

(RCMP); and 5) the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA). 292 

In addition, since 2005, Border Enforcement Security Taskforces (BESTs) have been 

investigating criminal activity at, near, and across the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders, as 

well as maritime seaport locations.293 At a Committee hearing a DHS official testified that 

''[c]urrently, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has 37 BEST units located across 16 

states and Puerto Rico," four on the northern border, 14 on the southwest border, and 19 

maritime seaport locations.294 According to DHS, these ICE-led operations arc successful 

because they leverage the effm1s and resources of more than 150 federal, state, local, tribal, and 

international law enforcement agencies. 295 Specifically, BESTs have been recognized for 

infiltrating and dismantling TCOs operating in vulnerable areas of upstate New York. 296 

\Vhile DHS states that inter-agency partnerships are critical to secure the northern border, a 2011 

GAO report found that the Department needs to increase oversight to ensure its components are 

coordinating and sharing information.297 For example, northern border state and local law 

enforcement officials, as well as their Canadian counterparts, complained that Border Patrol, ICE 

the U.S. Forest Service, and the DEA do not always share information on operations, which 

leads to duplication and inconsistent compliance with the numerous cross-border agreements to 

confront threats?98 

Threats to the Northern Border 

Terrorism 

In 20 II, then CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, told the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding 

terrorist threats, "~]t's commonly accepted that the more significant threat comes from the U.S.-

Canada border."29 More recently, ·witnesses before HSGAC echoed Bersin's testimony, stating 

291 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, BEYOND THE BORDER: A SHARED VISION FOR PERIMETER SECCRITY AND 

COMPETITIVENESS (20 I 5), http://www.dhs.gov/beyond-border. 

U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELA~D SECURITY, NORTHERN BORDER STRATEGY 10 (20!2). 

m U.S. DEP'T OF !10M ELAND SECURITY, FACT SHeET: BEYOND THE BORDER UNITED STATES-CANADA LAW 

COOPERATION (20 ]] ). 

See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Con g. (20 1 5) (statement of Peter Edge, Executive 

Associate Director, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 295 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OfFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG POL.ICY CONTROL, NATIONAL NORTHERN 

BORDER COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY I! (2014). 296 !d. at 30. 297 GOV'T ACCOUNTAOILITY OFFICE, GAO-ll-508T, BORDER SECURITY: DHS PROGRESS AND CHALLeNGES IN 

THE U.S. SOUTHWEST AND NORTHERN BORDERS 14 (20!!). 

!d. at I 5. 299 Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at America's Northern border and Ports r>[Entry: Heuring 

Before the S. Subcomm. on Immigration, Refitgees and Border Security ofthe S. Comm. on the Judiciary, ll2th 

Cong. (2011) (statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 

39 
116 

that a terrorist trying to cross the border into the U.S. would be able to enter the country much 

more easily from the north than tram the south300 

In 1997, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer entered the U.S. near the Blaine, Washington POE.301 After 

being returned three times, the FBI eventually detained him during a counter-terrorism raid in 

Brooklyn, New York, after being tipped off that Mezer planned to detonate a bomb in a New 

York City subway station.l112 Similarly, in 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a.k.a. the millennium bomber, 

was stopped at Port Angeles, Washington (also located in the Blaine sector) with components 

used to produce a bomb303 After admitting that he was planning to bomb the Los Angeles 

International Airport, he was sentenced to 37 years in prison for terrorist activity304 In FY2014. 

the Blaine sector alone apprehended migrants from 32 different countries. 305 

Recently, Canada has been struggling to confront radicalization and homegrown terrorism. 306 

On February 3, 2015 the RCMP charged three men for recruiting and facilitating the terrorist 

activity of the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) 307 One is in custody, while the other two were 

charged in absentia, as authorities presume that they have left for Syria. 308 In addition, Quebec 

and Ontario have been reporting an exodus of young men and women heading to Syria and Iraq 

to fight for ISIL. 309 For example, in February, responding to Islamic extremism propaganda. 

four young men and two female teenagers left Montreal. 310 Police and community leaders arc 

now scrambling to prevent further radicalization and recruitment311 In March, CBSA arrested a 

man in Toronto for plottinf to bomb the U.S. Consulate and several other buildings in the 

Toronto financial district3 2 

100 Securing the Border: Assessing the impact ofTransnalional Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (2015) (statement ofGenera1 Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (RET.), 

Folmer Director, Oflice of National Drug Control Policy); id (statement of John P. Torres. Former Acting Director, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enft). 301 U.S. DEP'TOE JUSTICE, GAZ! IBRAHIM ABU MEZER, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9803/brbrp2.htm. 302 Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, Potential Bomber Shows Resolve in Trips to U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 

200 I), http:/ lwww .washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/200 1 I 1 0/07 /potentia 1- bomber-shows-rcso lve-in-trips-tous/5c43eb 16-673d-4135-9d08-7bafD80bb628/. 303 FBI, Mll.I.EN>.;HJM PLOT/AHMED RESSAM, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/millennium-plotahmed-rcssam. 

:'104 !d 

305 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015). 306 Garrett Graff: Fear Canada: The Real Terrorist Next Door. POLITICO MAGAZINE (Oct. 16, 2014), 

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/20 1411 0/fear-canada-not-mcxico-11 1919 .htmi#.VSYmlpNOeYM. 

'

07 See Stewart Bell, Undercover Jnforrnant lnflltrated a Swpected !~'US Recruiting Network in Oitawa, Leading to 

Arrest, NATIONAL POST (Feb. 4, 2015), http://news.nationa1post.com/newsicanada/undercover-rcmp-informantin filtrated-a-sus pee ted- isis-recruiting-network-in-ottawa-leading -to~anest. 308 1d Maguire is repm1ed to have died fighting in Syrian in January, 2015. 309 Allan Woods, Quebec Stunned by Exodus of Four Young Men, Two Women to Join Islamic State, THE STAR 

CA~ADA (Feb. 27, 20 15), http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/20 15/02/27/quebec-stunned-by-exodus-of-four-

~~oung-men-two-wornen-to-join-islamic-state.html. 

,,!()!d. 

311 !d. 312 Steward Bell, ISIS Sympathizer Arrested After Plotting to Bomb U.S. Consulate in Toronto: CBSA, NAr'L POST 

(Mar. 11, 20 15), http:/ /news.nationalpost.com/news/canadalisis-sympathizer-arrested-a rter-p lotting-to-bomb-u-sconsulate-in-to ronto-cbsa. 

40 
117 

I Iistorically, security observers have argued that Canada represents a substantial vulnerability, 

because it provides immigrant visas to individuals who pose a significant threat. 313 Witnesses 

testified before the Committee that if someone gets into Canada, they will most likely be able to 

enter the U.S314 However, the Canadian government has changed its approach to national and 

border security after two recent acts ofhomegro'Wn terrorism. The wake-up call came from both 

the 2013 detention of two men for conspiring to derail a VA Rail Canada train en route to New 

York City, and the 2014 Parliament shooting where a military guard was killed during an 

attack 315 

Responding to this new reality, in January 2015 Prime Minister Harper introduced a new AntiTerrorism Act to broaden the powers of the intelligence and law enforcement officers, which was 

signed into law on June 18, 2015.316 Essentially, Bill C-51 I) criminalizes publishing terrorist 

propaganda; 2) creates a no-fly list of suspected terrorists; and 3) allows intelligence and law 

enforcement a~encies to share information on known or suspected terrorists with foreign 

counterparts31 OilS believes this law will improve cross-border counterterrorism efforts by 

legalizing the implementation of a no-fly list that limits known and suspected terrorists' access to 

North America and enabling Canadian intelligence units to dismantle terrorist cells operating 

mostly in Ontario and Quebec.318 To this end, the Canadian government is revoking the 

passports of approximately 130 citizens who have joined violent terrorist groups in Syria and 

Iraq, and is gathering evidence to prosecute more than 80 recently radicalized citizens and 

permanent residents who have returned to Canada after engaging in terrorist-related activities 

ovcrseas 319 

The Canadian government also plans to implement a screening svstetn to deny those with a 

criminal background or on a terrorist watch list from entering Ca~ada. 320 According to DHS, by 

the end of2015 or early 2016, Canada will be prepared to fully implement its Electronic Travel 

Authorization (eTA), which will require all visitors, except Americans, to submit their 

biographic information before they board a Canada-bound airplane 311 Once implemented, all 

travelers will be screened against Canadian and American watchlists 322 

313 TilE 9!11 COMMISSION REPORT 81 (2004). 314 St!curing the Border: Asst!ssing the Impact of Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Securitv & Governmenral Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015). 

m Muslim Leader: Canada Terror A/lack a 'Wake-Up Call', CBN NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), 

http:/ !www. cbn. co m!c bn new s/worldi20 14/0cto ber/M us I im-Leader-S peaks-Out-against -Canada-Attacks/. 316 PAI Announces Anti-Terrorism Measures to Protect Canadians, OFFICE OF THE PRl~E MINISTER (Jan. 30, 2015), 

http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/20 15/0 I /3 0/pm~announces~ant [-terrorism-measures-protect -canadians; PARLIAMENT OF 

CA~ADA, ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 2015, 

http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/Bil!Details.aspx?billld~6842344&Language~E&Mode~ I. 

m !d. 318 Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (AprilS, 2015). 119 Doug Mataconis. The Attack on Canada's Parhament and the 'Lone Wo{f' Terrorist, THECHRJSTIAN SCIENCE 

MONITOR (Oct. 23, 20 14), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Politics-Voices/20 14/1 023/The-attack-onCanada-s-Par I iame nt -and-the-lone-wo If-terra rist. 

J20 DEP'T OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATIO~ CANADA, ELECTRONIC TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION (ETA) (20 12). 311 Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of llomeland Security (April 8, 20 15). 322 !d. 

41 
118 

eTA efforts will complement the current bi-national effort to deny a visa or asylum status to 

criminals and known or suspected terrorists. Since 2014, Canadian immigration officials have 

been sharing biographic and biometric information on visa applicants with DHS and the State 

Departmcnt.323 Previously, Canadian immigration officers would issue visas to individuals from 

a country of interest without consulting American law enforcement and intelligence databases. 324 

This initiative will reduce visa fraud and enable Canada to deny asylum or an immigrant visa to 

individuals who could pose a threat.325 

The nexus between kno\\<n or suspected terrorists in eastern Canada and the northern parts of the 

U.S. represent a significant national security threat. 326 Communities in Minnesota and New 

York, which arc adjacent to Ontario and Quebec, have recently experienced apprehensions of 

individuals on terrorist charges. For example, on November 26, 2014, two men in Minneapolis, 

Minnesota were charged with recruiting and conspiring to provide support to ISIL. 327 Similarly, 

on September 17,2014, a man in Rochester, New York was arrested on similar charges after the 

FBI provided evidence showing that he attempted to recruit fighters and funds for JSJL. 328 

Recently, the U.S. and Canada, to prevent terrorist and criminal travel, agreed to share more 

information on travelers crossing the northern border through land P0Es.329 Under the border 

data exchange program, CBP and CBSA share each traveler's biographic data.JJO Essentially, by 

compiling this information, an entry into Canada constitutes an exit from the U.S. Currently, 

border officials are collecting information on third country nationals, but the scope of the 

program will be extended to include American and Canadian citizens by the end of2015.Jll 

Canada will implement a similar program at air POEs, by requiring airlines to present a manifest 

of all passengers departing the country. 332 

m DEP'T OF CiTIZENS I liP AND lM\liGRATION CANADA. CANADA/U.S. INFORMATION SHARING TREATY SUMMARY, 

(2013). 

""!d. 

!d. 

Garrett Graft; Fear Canada: The Real Terrorist Next Door, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Oct. !6, 20 !4), 

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/1 O/fear-canada-not-mexico-11!919.htmi#.VSYmlpNOeYM. 

m Paul McEnroe, 2 Minneapolis 1Hen Charged with Allempting to Aid Terrorists, STAR TRIBUTE (Nov. 26, 2014), 

http:/lwww.startribune.com/local/minneapo lis/283 85 737l.html. 

"' Pierre Thomas & Mike Levine, New York Man Charged with Trying to Recruit/SIS Fighters in US, ABC NEWS 

(Sept. 16, 20 14) http://abcnews.go .com/US/york-man-charged-recruit -isis- fighters-us/story?id~255 52426. 

""Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (April 8, 20 15). 330 Canada-U.S. Border Program Could Identify El Cheats, Terrorist, CBC NeWS (Jan. 27, 2014), 

http://www. c bc.ca/new s/po I it ics/ canada-u-s-border-pro gram-could-ide nt ify-e i-cheats-terrorists- I .25 12 972. 

m Jim Bronskill, Many Visitors to Canada Will Pay $7 Fee Beginning Next Year Under Security Plan, CTV NEWS 

(June 20, 20 14 ), http://www .ctvnew s.ca/canada/many-visitors-to-canada-will-pay-7-fee-beginning-next -year-undersccurity-plan-1.1879146. 

"'Canada-U.S. Border Program Could !dent if'• El Cheats, Terrorist, CBC NEWS (Jan, 27, 2014), 

http://www. cbc. calnewsipo I itics/c anada-u-s-border-program-could-ident ify-e i- cheats-tenwists- I ,2512 972. 

42 
119 

Drug Smuggling 

While Canada does not face the same dmg threat as Mexico, TCOs exploit border security gaps 

on the northern border to transport drugs and other illicit goods.333 Currently, criminal groups on 

the northern border smuggle ecstasy and high potency marijuana into the U.S. and transport 

cocaine, firearms, cash, and meth from Mexico and South America through the U.S. and into 

Canada334 

Previously, Canada's high potency marijuana, known as Canadian British Columbia Bud (BC 

Bud), had a stronghold in the U.S., as it was able to compete against Mexico's commercial grade 

marijuana.m However, with the legalization of marijuana in several western states and the surge 

in U.S. local indoor production of high potency marijuana, the Canadian market has largely been 

replaced by the domestic market, evidenced by the decline at the Washington-British Columbia 

border of BC Bud seizures 336 However, it is also possible that "Southeast Asia growers have 

moved their marijuana operations from Canada to Washington State in an effort to avoid 

potential border control problems during transport."337 

Canada is the top foreign producer and "primary source ofMDMA [commonly known as 

ecstasy] in North America.:'338 The majority of Canadian ecstasy i;'1

froduce.d in British. 

Columbia, With FY2014 seizures totalmg more than 48 kilograms. · Washmgton State s l-5 

corridor "it the main transportation route into the Pacific Northwest and into British Columbia, 

Canada," where MDMA travels south and cocaine, firearms, and cash travel north---{)ften 

offered in direct exchange 340 Mexican criminal groups are the predominant transporters of 

cocaine into and through Washington341 Recently, Washington State has seen an uptick in 

unlawful crossers transporting drugs while dressed in camouflage, mimicking tactics seen on the 

southwest border and indicating caitel involvement (most likely the Sinaloa Cartel).342 

Like Mexican DTOs, their Canadian counterparts constantly reevaluate their smuggling 

operations to evade U.S. law enforcement. 343 For example, in FY2013, 75 percent of the seized 

marijuana on the northern border was interdicted in the Swanton sector, which includes 

EXECCTIVE OFFICE OF TilE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRIXJ POLICY CONTROL, NATIONAL NORTHERN 

BORDER COIJNTERNARCOTJCS STRATEGY 4 (2014). 

JJI NORTIIWEST HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFfiCKING AREA, THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY FOR PROGRAM 

2015 (2014). 

fd at 23. 116 fd at 20. 

m !d. at 25. 

DS ,)~ecuring the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Bf4fore the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Af!i1irs. !14th Con g. (20 !5) (statement of David Rodriguez, 

Director, Northwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area). 

"'rd. 

l·Hl hl (providing an example in which law enforcement dismantled a group that "regularly delivered 50,000 

[ecstasy] pills to wholesalers in New York and Boston, returning with cash and several kilos of cocaine."). 

l·ll NORTIIWEST HIUJIINTf:NSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING ARE,\, THREAT ASSESSMFNT AND STRII TEGY FOR PROGRAM 

YEIIR2015 33 (20!4). 142 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015). 

!d. 

43 
120 

Vermont, New Hampshire, and part of New York, while in FY2014, 68 percent of the marijuana 

was seized in the Spokane sector, specifically in the states of Montana, Idaho, and 

Washington, 344 

Human Smuggling and Trafficking 

According to the State Department's 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report, Canadian born and 

other foreign girls and women, mostly from East Asia and Eastern Europe, are exploited in sex 

trafficking along the US-Canada border345 In preparation for the 2014 Super Bowl in New 

Jersey, an intelligence report advised that Canada-based traffickers would move their victims 

from major cities such as Montreal, Toronto, Quebec City, and Ottawa to supply demand during 

the cvcnt3 '

16 

Generally, highways along the U.S.-Canada border, including Highway 401, have been used to 

move victims into the U.S347 To address this, DHS implemented a 2012 U.S.-Canada 

Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU).l4R The agreement formalized an information sharing 

mechanism on human trafficking, migrant smuggling networks, and suspected perpetrators. 349 

Threats on Tribal Land 

Concerns have been raised over the challenges faced by tribal lands directly adjacent or in close 

proximity to the U.S.-Canada border350 In Montana, Minnesota, Michigan, and New York, 

some Native American reservations arc located directly on the U.S.-Canada border, while in 

Washington State, Wisconsin, Maine, and North Dakota, reservations are situated within a few 

miles of the international boundar;,_:. 351 TCOs have used these lands to smuggle immigrants, 

narcotics, and other illicit goods.N For example, in 1998, U.S. and Canadian authorities 

dismantled a human smuggling ring operated by 47 Chinese immigrants and members of the St. 

Regis Mohawk Reservation in upstate New York.JSl U.S. authorities estimated that more than 

3,600 Chinese immigrants were smuggled into the U.S. through this corridor, and that 

individuals paid as much as $47,000 for the trip from China to the United Statcs. 354 Similarly, 

.1 44 U.S. Cl:STOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SECTOR PROFILES FY2011-FY2014. 145 U.S. DEP'TOF STATE. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 125 (2014) . 

.l;o U.S. Dcr'T OF STATE. HUMAN SMUGGLII'G AND TRAHICKING CENTER, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: l'OSSIOLE SEX 

TRMFICKINti DURING St;PFR BOWL XLVll I (20 14) . .1<17 ld 148 U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, US., Canada Cooperate to Fight Cross-Border Crime (Mar. 7, 20 12) 

http://canada. usembassy .gov/ncws~events/20 12-ncws-and-events/march-20 12/7-march-20 12-u .s.-canada-coopcratcto-fight- cross-border -crime. :149 /d. 

'

50 Tim Johnson, Indian Reservations on both U.S Borders Become Drug Pipelines, MCCLATCHY (June 16, 2010), 

h?p:i/www .mcc latchydc.com/20 I 0/06/ 16/96003/indian-reservations-on-both-us.html. 

' 1 EXECUTIVE OHICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRL:G POLICY CONTROL, NATIONAL NORTHERN 

80RDER COU'lTER"JARC'OTICS STRATEGY 30 (2014) . .152/d 

m Steven Holmes, Ring is Cracked in Smuggling of !//ega/ Chinese Immigrants, NY TiMES (Dec. 11, 1998), 

http://www.ny1imes.com/1998/12/11/nyregion/ring-is-cracked·in-smuggling-of-illegal-chinese-immigrants.html. 

"'!d 

44 
121 

Mexican drug cartels arc using these areas to evade northern border law enforcement 

authorities.355 For example, in 2010, the DEA found 82,000 marijuana plants in tribal lands 

located in Washington State.356 

American and Canadian tribes are also involved in, or turn a blind eye to, cigarette smuggling 

from the U.S. to Canada.357 The black market for this illicit good is conservatively estimated to 

generate more than a billion dollars, rivaling profits of other low-end narcotics.m Specifically, 

black market dealers capitalize on Canada's high tax on tobacco products. In some provinces 

Canadians pay as much as $64 USD per carton; the average black market dealer sells a carton of 

200 cigarettes for less than $7 USD.JS9 

A 2011 GAO report found that because of a lack ofDHS guidance, in some northern border 

communities, tribal officials: l) were not clear on what suspicious activity they should report; 2) 

how to report it; and 3) to whom they should contact to report incidcnts 360 GAO stated that 

consistent coordination with local and tribal law enforcement officers could help identify 

terrorists and other criminals attempting to exploit the security gaps at the border. 361 

355 Amy Harris, Marijuana Growers Find Cover on 7/·iba/ Lands, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011), 

http://www,seattletimes.com/seattle-news/marijuana-growcrs-find-cover-on-tribal-lands/. 

356 /d. 157 William Marsden, Canada's Boom in ~\~muggled Cigarettes: indian Tobacco Factories, Organized Crime Control 

a Billion-Dollar Black .'vfarket, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (May !9, 20!4), 

http://www. pub I ic integrity .a rg/2009.103/2 7/2913 icanadas- boom-sm ugg led-cigarettes. 

"'Jd. 

J59 Id 

360 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-1!-508T, BORDER SECURITY: DHS PROGRESS liND Clli\l.LENGES IN 

THE U.S. SOUTHWEST AND NORTHERN BORDERS 16 (20 11 ). 

45 
122 

Part III: The Maritime Border 

Protecting America's coastlines is integral to our border security strategy. The United States 

coastline, which includes the Atlantic Coast, Caribbean, Pacific Coast, and Great Lakes region, 

measures 95,471 miles--one of the longest coastlines in the world 362 According to the U.S. 

Coast Guard, the strategy for a secure maritime border takes on a layered approach and addresses 

illicit activity far from the U.S. shores.J6J According to CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM), 

a secure maritime border has: 1) maritime domain awareness; 2) Jaw enforcement information; 

3) response capability and capacity; 4) unity of effort; and 5) small vessel accountability364 

Agency Collaboration and Joint Missions 

OAM and the Coast Guard frequently conduct joint missions. This is done through leveraging 

OAM's more than 250 aircraft and over 280 marine vessels 365 For example, in December 2013, 

OAM and the Coast Guard worked together to interdict a panga boat, or, a small, outboardpowered fishing boat, off the coast of Southern California that was attempting to smuggle 1,500 

pounds of marijuana366 OAM Air Interdiction /\gents tirst spotted the panga from their MultiRole Enforcement Aircraft. 367 OAM then deployed a Black Hawk helicopter, and the Coast 

Guard deployed a Jayhawk helicopter to track the suspect vesseJ 368 At the same time, three 

OAM interceptor vessels and the Coast Guard cutter Blackfin also responded, heading to the 

panga's Jocation369 OAM and the Coast Guard were able to apprehend the vessel, the three 

persons on board, and the marijuana, which had an estimated street value of$675,000. 370 

Earlier this year, an OAM Black Hawk helicopter fired warning shots at a panga boat off the 

coast of La Jolla, California371 The Coast Guard had first spotted the boat and requested OAM 

assistance in stopping it. 372 After the vessel failed to yield, OAM fired the warning shots, which 

prompted the pan¥': boat to stop, resulting in its apprehension by two CBP Midnight Express 

interceptor boats. 7

" 

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPIIERIC ADMI;o;ISTRATION. HOW LONG IS THE U.S. SHOREI.INE". 

http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/shorelength.html. 

363 See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategiesj(>r the A1aritime Border: Hearing Before the S. 

on /lome/and Security & Governmental Aj}airs, !14th Cong. (20!5). 

!d. 165 U.S. ClJSTOMS A~D BORDER PROTeCTION, FROM THE AIR AND SEA, http://www.cbp.gov/bordcr-security/air-sea. 366 CBP and Coast Guard Stop 1,500 Pound Manjuana Smuggling Attempt Of( Southern California Coastline, U.S. 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (Dec. 20, 20 !3). http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-mcdia-releasc/20 !3-!2-

20-000000/cbp-and-coast-guard-stop-!500-pound-marijuana. 

""!d. 

368/d. 

369 !d. 

m !d. 

"'Michelle Moons, Warning Shots Fired at Panga Boat from CBP Helicopter QfJCA Coast, BREITBART (Jan. !9, 

20 15). http:i/www .breitbart.com/californiai20 15/0 I /!9/warning-shots-fired-at-panga-boat-rrom-cbp-helicopter-off. 

ca-coast/. 

372 !d. 

!d. 

46 
123 

Another way in which these two components work together is through the use ofOAM's UAS 

program. This operation is overseen by the Common Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint Program 

Office, which was formed by OAM and the Coast Guard to address common requirements. 

Recently, OAM tinished a deployment of a UAS in El Salvador that netted $362 million in 

contraband.374 These joint operations allow OAM to use drone technologies to track and stay 

with suspects until Coast Guard assets are able to apprehend them. 

As noted above, two of OAM's eight operational UAS are dedicated for maritime use. In 

partnership with the Coast Guard, OAM developed a maritime variant of the Predator B called 

the Guardian, with the purpose of increasing reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and 

acquisition capabilities in maritime operating environments. 375 These Guardians were modified 

with "the addition of a Raytheon Sea Vue Marine Search Radar and an Electro-optical/infrared 

sensor that is optimized for maritime operations. ''376 

In 2012, GAO issued a report that found that there were opportunities to improve the use of both 

OAM and the Coast Guard's air and marine assets. 377 The report states that "OAM could benefit 

from taking additional steps to better ensure that its mix and placement of resources meets 

mission needs and addresses threats. "

378 The report also found that "OAM has not documented 

its analyses to support its resource mix and placement across locations."379 Of the four 

recommendations from that 2012 report, three remain open380 

ICE HSI teams also work with OAM and the Coast Guard to prevent illegal immigration and 

drug trafficking through America's maritime borders. In March 2014, the three agencies worked 

together to seize two men and a "go-fast" boat transporting 533 pounds of cocaine, 22 nautical 

miles southeast ofVieques, Puerto Rico381 The shipment had an estimated street value of$5.7 

million.382 The boat was first spotted by the. Coast Guard, and the apfs~ehension was conducted 

by an OAM manne umt that also had an ICE spectal agent on board. · Accordmg to OAM, 

intelligence is crucial for maritime interdictions, particularly on the northern border where illicit 

trat1ic is less frequent 384 

374 Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technolof!y Force 1Hultipliers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 

on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of Randolph Alles, Assistant 

Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 

m U.S. Cus I'OMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Gi;ARDIAN LJAS MARITIME V 1\RIANT PREDATOR 13, 

http:iiwww.cbp.gov/sites/default/tiles/documents/guardian b_6.pdf. }76 h/. 

377 GOV'T ACCO\Jt-:Ti\BILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-518, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO ENSURE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF 

Of IS'S AIR AND MARINE ASSETS (2012). 378 !d. at passim. 

"' !d. at 28. )80 /d. 181 Federal Authorities Seize $5.7 .l,fillion in Cocaine, Detain Two Smugglers, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/federalauthorities-seize-57-m iII ion-coca ine-deta in-two-smugglers. 

382 /d. 

mid. 

334 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15); 

Majority Staff observations during bipartisan ST AFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 20 15). 

47 
124 

The U.S. is also a partner in Operation Martillo (Hammer), which is a "U.S., European, and 

Western Hemisphere effort targeting illicit trafficking routes in coastal waters along the Central 

American isthmus."385 Fourteen countries are currently participating in the operation386 

According to U.S. South Command, "[a]s of March 2015, Operation Martillo has resulted in the 

disruption of over 400 metric tons of cocaine over the past four years, denying drug traffickers 

$8 billion in potential revenue."387 The U.S. contribution to this program "includes U.S. Navy 

and Coast Guard vessels, aircraft from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, and military and 

law enforcement units from various nations."388 

In June 2015, OAM agents working as part of Operation Martillo assisted in detecting five 

separate trafficking incidents that resulted "in the interdiction of more than 5,900 pounds of 

cocaine, worth more than $441.8 million."38Y Similarly, in November 2014, a Coast Guard Law 

Enforcement Detachment Team (LEDET) was involved in the interdiction of $35 million worth 

of cocaine in an Operation Martillo event off the shores of Puerto Rico. 390 

Threats along the Maritime Border 

While illegal immigration through America's maritime borders is not as widespread as it is 

through the southwest border, "[t]housands of people try to enter this country illegally every year 

using maritime routes, many via smuggling operations."391 The U.S. Coast Guard recently 

testified in front of the Committee that illegal immigration is heavily influenced by U.S. policy 

and perceptions of U.S. policy. 392 

According to DHS, while the number of migrant interdictions has remained somewhat steady 

over the last two decades, these numbers represent a significant drop from its peak in the early 

1990s.393 From 1991 to 1995, the Coast Guard interdicted over 120,000 migrants from 23 

countries394 In 1994, the Coast Guard responded to two mass migrations from Haiti and Cuba, 

in which 63,000 migrants were rescued and prevented from illegally entering the U.S. 395 

'" U.S. participation is led by .I oint Interagency Task Force South. UNITED STAll'S SOUTilERN COMMAND, 

OPER.-\TION MARTIU.O (2015). http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Martillo.aspx. 136 These countries are Belize, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the 

Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Chile has also contributed to 

the operation. !d. 3/!7/d. 

188 /d 

"" CB!' 1'-3 Crew Detects Cocaine Runs Reaching 2.9 Tons, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (June 11, 

20 15), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroomilocal-media-re1ease/20 15-06-11-000000/cbp-p-3-crew-detects-cocaine-runsreaching-29-tons. 

" 0

0peration Marti/la Drug Bust Results in 535 Million of Cocaine, U.S. COAST GUARD (Nov. 29, 2014), 

http :1 /www. uscgnew s. com/ go! do ci 400 7/24 26 3 90/0peration-Marti llo-drug -bust-resu Its-in-35-m i llio n-of-coca in e-. 191 U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIFN MIGRA'iT INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.rnil!hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp. 

'()2 See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the A1aritime Border: Hearing Before the S 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of Rear Admiral Peter J. 

Brown, Assistant Commander for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard). 391 U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIEN MIGRANT INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp. )94 !d. 

'"'Id. 

48 
125 

Table 3. Comparison of Apprehensions at U.S. Borders FY2011-FY2014396 

Sector FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 

Northern Border Total 6,123 4,210 3,230 3,338 

Southwest Border Total 327,577 356,873 414,397 479,371 

Maritime Border 6,552 3,685 3,162 3,942 

Coast Guard 2,474 2,955 2,094 3,587 

Total Maritime 9,026 6,640 5,256 7,529 

The Coast Guard and OAM have joint responsibility for maritime drug interdiction. The Coast 

Guard's mission is to reduce the supply of drugs by denying smugglers the usc of air and 

maritime routes in a seven million square-mile area called the Transit Zone, which includes the 

Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean. 397 Meanwhile, CBP's OAM 

patrols the 12 mile area direct!~ off the U.S. coasts and provides its air and marine assets to assist 

in securing the Transit Zone 39 Both components ·'coordinate[] closely with other federal 

agencies and countries within the region to disrupt and deter the flow of illegal drugs. "399 

The Coast Guard ''accounts for nearly 56 [percent] of all U.S. government seizures of cocaine 

each year. "

400 In FY20 14, the Coast Guard seized 93 vessels, 108,534 pounds of marijuana, and 

198.636 pounds ofcocaine. 401 Already in FY2015, the Coast Guard has seized 72 vessels, 

31,224 pounds of marijuana, and 147,268 pounds of cocainc 402 

In a previous hearing, the Committee heard former drug czar Barry McCaffrey estimate that the 

overall interdiction rate of drugs coming across our land borders is somewhere between 5 to 10 

pcrcent.403 Similarly, the Coast Guard is only able to target approximately 30 percent of the 

illegal drugs it is aware of~ resulting in the interdiction of only 11 to 18 percent of the maritime 

"'"' Table 3 apprehensions at the southwest border, northern border, and maritime border represent those recorded by 

the U.S. Border Patrol. See UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH, 

http://www.cbp.govlsites/default/files/documents/BP%20Totai%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector"/o20and%20 

Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2014~0.pdf. Since the U.S. Coast Guard also interdicts a significant number of migrants 

at our maritime border, a full representation of maritime apprehensions adds these two data points together. See 

U.S. COAST GUARD MARITIME MIGRANT INTERDICTIONS, 

http://www .uscg. mil/hq/cg5/cg53l/ AMIO/FlowStats/currentstats.asp. 307 TI!E WHITE HOUSE, TRANSIT ZONE OPERATIONS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/transit-zone-operations. 

m \1ajority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral ST AFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15). 

m U.S. COAST GUARD, DRUG INTERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/drug~interdiction.asp. 

'DO U.S. COAST GUARD, ENFORCEMENT £>RANCH, http://www.uscg.mii/d8/enforcement//. 401 U.S. COAST GUARD, COAST GUARD DRUG REMOVAL STATISTICS, 

http:i/www.uscg.milihq/cg5/cg53 I /Drugs/stats.asp (updated as of April 30, 20 15). 402/d. 

403 Securing the Border: Assessing the Impact qfTransnational Crime: Hean·ng Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15); see also Securing the Border: Fencing, Infrastructure, and 

Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Refore the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. ll4th 

Cong. (20 15). 

49 
126 

known drug flow toward the U.S. 404 However, when it does set itself on a known target, the 

Coast Guard is 85 to 90 percent successful in completing the intcrdiction. 405 

As for CBP, in FY2014, ''OAM's P-3 aircraft flew 6,000 hours of counter-narcotics missions in 

the drug Transit Zone between South America and the U.S."406 These missions resulted in the 

seizure or disruption of"l26,489 pounds of cocaine with a value of nearly $9.4 billion."407 

The Atlantic Coast and the Caribbean 

The Atlantic coastline and the Gulf of Mexico make up a large and important part of America's 

maritime borders. Due to this coast's proximity to the Caribbean and many of the other small 

island nations, many migrants attempt to enter the U.S. through maritime routes. In addition, 

recent pressures in Central and South America have shifted some of the drug trade to the 

Caribbean, increasing the need for border protection in these regions. 

Most migrants attempting to enter the U.S. illegally via maritime routes come from Cuba, the 

Dominican Republic, and Haiti.408 One factor that has led to the large number of apprehensions 

along the maritime border is the United States' "wet-foot, dry-foot" policy, which allows any 

Cuban reaching U.S. land to stay and pursue citizenship, while those caught at sea are returned to 

Cuba409 This policy, formally known as the U.S.-Cuba Immigration Accord, was written into 

law in 1995 as an amendment to the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. 410 Without this policy, Cuban 

migrants would be processed similar to other foreign nationals caught illegally in the country and 

would be subject to dcportation 411 

Cubans seeking to make it to America use many different methods, including hiring organized 

smugglers, homemade boats, or even clinging to inner tubes and hoping to float to the U.S. 

mainland.412 In the maritime setting, these migrants travel from Cuba across the Florida Straits, 

seeking to reach South Florida. 413 With the recent shift in the relationship between Cuba and the 

U.S., many Cubans are attempting to migrate to America, fearing that America will soon change 

404 U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME BORDER SECURITY (2015) (on file with Majority Staff); Wesrern Hemisphere 

Drug Interdiction Efforts.' Hearing Before the House SubComm. on Coast Guard and Afcwine Transportation of the 

on Transportation and lnfi'asrructure, !14th Con g. (20 15). 

/d. 406 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OrFICC OF AlRAND MARI"E FACT SHEET, 

https:f/www .cbp.govisites/dcfau lt!tilcs/docu ments/oam-factsheet-20 15070 I. pdf. 

"'!d. 

408 U.S. COAST GUARD, ALlEN MIGRANT I~TERDICTION, http://www.uscg.mil!hqlcg5/cg531/AM!0/amio.asp. 40'' Jefferson Morley, U.S -Cuha Migrarion Policy, WASH POST (July 27, 2007), 

http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contcnt/article/2007 /07/27! AR200707270 1493 .html. 

'

10 Pub. Law No. 89-732 ( 1996). 

" 1 Cuhan Migrants Continue Deadly Hide-and-Seek, REUTERS (June 12, 2015), 

http://www. voanews.com/content/cuban-migranls-continue-dcadly-h idc-and-scek/281928l.html. 

m Frances Robles, In Rickety Boats, Cuban lvfigrants Again Flee to U.S., NY TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014), 

http:! iwww. n vt imes. com/20 14/1 0/ 1 0/us/ sharp-rise-in-cuban-m igrat ion-stirs-worries-of-a-mass-exodus.htm!. w !d. -

50 
127 

its wet-foot, dry-foot policy414 Prior to the President's announcement, from Dec. l-16, 2014, the 

Coast Guard interdicted 80 Cubans.415 After the President's announcement, from Dec. 17-31, 

2014 the Coast Guard interdicted 419 Cubans-a 423 percent increase.410 The Coast Guard 

deployed direct repatriation and immediately began sending those interdicted in the waterways 

back to Cuba.417 As a result, Cuban interdictions have returned to normal levels in the maritime 

setting.418 

While Cuban migration has leveled off in the maritime setting where direct repatriation may be 

employed, it has drastically increased at U.S. POEs, where Cubans arc able to gain admittance 

and remain in the U.S. In fact, on a recent Congressional Delegation (CO DEL) to Central 

America, Members on the Committee heard that 50 Cubans a day are caught transiting Honduras 

on their way to the U.S. and apftroximately 90 percent of the Special Interest Aliens caught in 

Honduras are Cuban nationals. 19 

The Dominican Republic has also "historically been a major source country for undocumented 

migrants attempting to enter the U.S."'420 These immigrants enter Puerto Rico by crossing the 

Mona Passage, which is a ·'body of water between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico."421 

They are then smuggled to the U.S. by gangs in Yolas, which are homemade fishing vessels.422 

In 2010, following the earthquake in Haiti, the U.S. ceased its policies of expedited removal of 

Haitians illegally arriving in the U.S. 423 By 2013, migrant smuggling organizations in the 

Dominican Republic caught wind of this change in U.S. policy and began taking Haitian 

immigrants to Puerto Rico via the Mona Passage.424 In fact, by the end of FY20 13, l ,760 

Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. through the Mona Passage, as compared to 39 

Haitians in FY2012. 425 In FY2014, 1,994 Haitian migrants made the same dangerous attempt in 

smuggling ventures, directly resulting in the death of29 Haitians migrants at sea. 420 On October 

6, 2014, DHS resumed expedited removal for non-criminal Haitian migrants who landed on U.S. 

Territories in Puerto Rico and the islands of the Mona Passage427 After the first removal, 

414 Cuban Migrants Continue Deadly Hide-and-Seek, REUTERS (June 12, 2015), 

http://www .voanews.com/contentlcuban-m igrants-continue-deadly-h ide-and-scek/28!928l.html. 415 U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME BORDER SECURITY (2015) (on file with Majority Staft). 416 ld 

417 !d. 

418 ld. 

"'Observations during Johnson-Carper CO DEL to Central America (Oct. 20 15). 420 U.S. COAST GUARD, ALIEN MIGRA~T INTERlllCTIOt;, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg51cg53 l,IAMIO/amio.asp. ·12\ !d. 

422 !d. 421 ,)'ee Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Nfaritime Border: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20!5) 424 Surge of' Migrants Being Smuggled to Puerto Rico, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2014), 

http://www.cbsncws.com/news/surge-of-migrants-being-smuggled~to-united-states-through-puerto-rico/. 

425 See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the llAaritime Border: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015). 126 Id 

m !d 

51 
128 

Haitian maritime flow in the Mona Passage decreased by 80 percent.m In the first three quarters 

of FY2015, only 277 Haitian migrants attempted to enter the U.S. via the Mona Passage, as 

compared to 1,430 for the same period in FY2014. 429 

The Coast Guard has recognized that "[t]he Caribbean region is home to some of the most 

indebted nations in the world" and the "!I Jack of economic resources in the region continues to 

be a m~or factor in the failure to prevent contraband from entering the international supply 

chain." 30 This "lack of state control and jurisdictional coordination challenges over vast areas 

of maritime borders" creates opportunities for TCOs "to smuggle and traffic drugs, weapons, and 

people."431 In fact, as early as 2012, Members of the U.S. Senate recognized that there was the 

potential for an increase in drug trafficking in the Caribbean due to increased security efforts in 

Mexico, Central America, and the Eastern Pacific.432 

In 2011, apJ(oximately four percent of cocaine brought to the U.S. transited through the 

Caribbean. 33 This increased to 16 percent by the end of2013.434 TCOs such as Mexico's 

Sinaloa Cartel or the Italian 'Ndrangheta are becoming more entrenched in the Caribbean as drug 

flow in the region increases.435 These groups work with local counterparts, who are often paid a 

percentage of the shipment or in commodities such as guns436 

The Pacific Coast 

The sheer magnitude of the Eastern Pacific Ocean, equivalent in size to the continental U.S., 

creates many challenges for maritime domain awareness and interdictions. 437 Migrants 

smuggled via maritime routes arc typically found 60 to 70 miles up the coast of California.438 

Smugglers have no regard for the safety of these migrants. For example, when smugglers 

discovered OAM could figure out the number of migrants who had absconded based on counting 

the life vests deserted in the water, smugglers ceased distributing life vests to migrants-many of 

whom cannot swim.439 Additionally, smugglers may require migrants to hug the engines of their 

panga boats, preventing OAM from shooting the engine and safely stopping the boat. 440 

""lei. 

4)0 !d. 

no UNITED STATES COAST GUARO, WESTERN HeMISPHERE STRATEGY (20 14), 

http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadcrship/docs/uscg_whem_2014.pdf(citing C. Ward, Regional Threats: Security 

Capacity Imperatives in the Caribbean, Joint Force Quarterly, 20 I 0, 26-3 I). 4)1 !d 

/d. (citing United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Preventing a Security Crisis in the 

Caribbean, (20 12 ), http :1 iwww. drugcauc us. scnatc.govis itcsi defau ltifi lesi caribbean%20drug%20report. pdt). 

"'Full Circle: An Old Route Regains Popu!arit)' with Drugs Gangs, THE ECONOMIST (May 24, 2014), 

~~tJ~j:www. economist .com/news/am er icas/2 l6026 80-o ld-route-rega ins- popularity-drugs-gangs- fu 11-c ire !e. 

"'!d. 

416/d. 

437 See Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies(or the Maritime Border: Hearing Before the S 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, l14th Cong. (2015) 

'" Data provided to Majority Staff during bipartisan, bicameral STAFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 I 5). 439/d. 

440 ld 

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129 

As another example, on June 18, 2015, Marine Interdiction Agents from OAM encountered a 

vessel off the California Coast near Encinitas 441 Agents hailed the vessel and ordered the pilot 

to yield, but the vessel failed to comply, even after warning shots were tired. 442 After the failure 

to comply, the marine interceptor vessel and the smuggling vessel collided, resulting in the 

capsizing of the smuggling vessel 443 Twenty Mexican mi~rants were thrown into the water, and 

one woman was later pronounced dead at a local hospital. 4 4 All 20 people were suspected of 

attempting to enter the U.S. illegally. 445 

The vast majority of drugs enter the U.S. through the U.S.-Mexico land border; however, some 

cartels have started using pang a boats to move drugs across the U.S. maritime border446 

Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel smuggles marijuana on 50-foot vessels, which are loaded with cargo as 

far south as the port ofMazathin, and then smuggled up the Pacific coast deep into California. 447 

Smugglers using longer-range boats and semi-submersible vessels have also begun taking 

advantage of the remote coasts of Northern California, and have landed as far north as Santa 

Cruz, 350 nautical miles north of San Diego_-148 In July 2015, the Coast Guard in Northern 

California seized six tons of cocaine from a semi-submersible vessel in the Pacific Ocean, to 

date, the largest bust in Coast Guard history449 

Earlier this year, the Oregon HIDT A released a report, which describes the threat that Oregon, as 

a Pacific Coast state, faces from maritime drug trafficking450 The HIDT A report concludes that 

there is a lack of intelligence when it comes to the use of maritime smuggling, and that the threat 

posed by maritime smuggling is "undoubtedly larger than law enforcement is aware." 451 

Washington State also faces unique maritime threats, with small U.S. islands located on the open 

waters in close proximity to Canada. If a Canadian vessel is able to penetrate these islands, those 

on board can catch a ferry to the mainland with very little interaction with U.S. law 

enforcement452 

441 Christian De La Rosa, Woman Dies after CBP, Suspected Smuggling Boats Collide, Fox 5 SAN DIEGO (June 18, 

20 15), http://fox5sand iego .com/20 15/06/18/woman-dies-after-cbp-suspected-smuggling-boats-co llide/. 442 ld 

443 /d +44 !d. 

"'Id. 

416 Western Hemisphere Drug Interdiction Efforts: Hearing Before the !louse SuhComm. on Coast Guard and 

!Vfarine Transport aNon of the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, ll4th Con g. (20 15). 

m Drug Smugglers Take to the High Seas to Avoid Border l'atrol, NY POST (Feb. 24, 2014), 

http :i !nypost. com/20 14/02124/drug-smugg lers-take-to-the-high-seas-to-avoid- border -patro 1!. 

"'!d. 

'"Lisa Fernandez, Record Bust: Coast Guard Seizes 5 Tons of Cocaine Valued at $181M, NBC SOUTHERN 

CAI.IFORNIA (Aug. 6, 20 15), http:i/www. nbc losange!es.com/news/califomia!US-Coast-Guard-in-Aiameda-Seizes-6-

Tons-12000-Pounds-of-Cocaine-Valued-at-181-Million-Largest-Bust-in-History--320897421.html. 

'

150 OREGON HIGH INTE!-;SITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, PROGRAM YEAR 20 !6 THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COU'iTERDRL!G STRATEGY (2015). 45! !d. 452 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 2015). 

53 
130 

The Great Lakes 

There are three Border Patrol sectors that encompass the Great Lakes: Grand Forks, Detroit, and 

Butlalo. These sectors have unique challenges regarding illegal migration and drug trafficking. 

For example, Canadian smugglers often use smaller airports along the Great Lakes for quick 

drop-offs before turning around and heading back to Canada, making it ditlicult for CBP to 

apprehend these smugglers. 453 Additionally, Mexican-based TCOs now operate in the Great 

Lakes region, including the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, and the Tijuana Cartel 454 

In 2012, Dl!S released its Northern Border Strategy, which in part focused on the Great Lakes. 455 

The report states that '·as the shared internal waters of sovereign nations, the Great Lakes provide 

equal opportunity access to both countries."456 The report noted that "[t]he vast maritime border 

with Canada and the open access that small vessels have in the Great Lakes provide an additional 

conduit for potential exploitation.''457 In order to address this challenge, D!-!S has implemented 

the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), which develops and leverages a partnership with the 

small vessel community, as well as the public and private sectors. 458 

The Ship Rider program is also integral to enforcement of the Great Lakes borders. 459 The U.S.-

Canada ShipRidcr program is a "cooperative approach to combating cross border crime" on 

U.S.-Canada shared waters. 460 The program ''involves vessels jointly crewed by specially 

trained and designated Canadian and U.S. law enforcement officers who arc authorized to 

enforce the law on both sides of the international boundary line."461 This cooperative effort 

allows law enforcement officials to secure the border "from threats to national security, as well 

as prevent cross-border smuggling and trafficking. "462 

U.S. Ports 

America's extensive port system is one of its most valuable assets, but also one that faces 

numerous threats and weaknesses. From 2004 to 2013, American ports witnessed a !28 percent 

453 Drug Bust in Michigan's Thumb Exposes Use of Tiny Airports by Canadian Smugglers, AP (May 15, 20 II), 

http :flwww .to lcdo blade. com/loca li20 I 1/05/1 5/Drug -bust-in-M ic h igans-Thum b-exposes- use-of-tiny-airports-byCanadian-smugglers. htrn 1. 451 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NATIONAL DRUG lNTELLIGE)-;C'E CENTER, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 20 l I 

(20 I I), http:i/www.justicc.gov/archiveindic/puhs44/44849/44849p.pdf. 155 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NORTHERN HORDER STRATEGY (2012). ~56 !d. 

157 !d. at 12 (highlighting the challenges of deciphering between bad actors and the commercial trade, recreational 

boaters, icc fishermen, and snowmobilers that also utilize the Great Lakes). 

I5R U.S. DEP'TOF HOMELAND SECURITY, SMALL VESSFL SECURITY STRATFCY (2008), 

https://www.dhs.govixlihrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf. 

459 U.S. DEP' r OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: REYOND THE RORDER: UNITeD-STATES- CANADA LAW 

ENFORCE\1ENT COOPERATION (20 I I), http://www.dhs.gov/news/20 I l/12/06/fact-sheet-beyond-border-united-states-

% E2%80%93 -canada~ la\v -en force me nt ~cooperation. 

460 ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTFD POLICE. CANADA-U.S. SIIIPRIDER, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.caiibet-eipf/shipridereng.htm. 

161 !d. 

~62 /d. 

54 
131 

growth rate, processing the second-most cargo of any port system in the world, second only to 

China. 463 

In an attempt to improve security at America's ports, the Security and Accountability for Every 

Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was passed by Congress in 2006 and signed into law by President 

George W. Bush464 The Act codifies a number of programs to improve the security of U.S. 

ports 465 These programs include additional requirements for maritime facilities, the 

establishment oflnteragency Operations Centers, a Port Security Grant Program, a Container 

Security Initiative (CSI), and a Customs Trade Partnership against Tcrrorism. 466 The Act also 

created the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within DHS, and appropriated funds 

toward the Integrated Deepwater System Program, a long-term Coast Guard modernization 

program467 

A 2007 GAO report on the SAFE Port Act found that federal agencies have improved overall 

port security in numerous ways 468 For example, GAO noted that the Act "increased 

requirements for the scope and frequency" of Coast Guard inspection of ports, leading to a 

doubling in the frequency of both announced and unannounced inspections 469 However, GAO 

also found that "agencies face resource constraints and other challenges" in meeting the Act's 

requirements 470 

'

160 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PORTS AND HARBORS, WORLD CONTAINER TRAFFIC DATA 2014, 

http://www. iaphwor ldports .org/Link C I ick. aspx ?filet icket= A 7 oM k 7 m ROa4 %3d &tabid=48 79. 

""Pub. L. No. 109-347 (2006). ·165 !d. 

406 !d. Under CSI, CBP stations U.S. officers in 29 countries to work with host country counterparts to identify and 

inspect potentially high-risk shipments before they reach the U.S. Today, more than 80 percent of maritime 

containerized cargo destined to the U.S. originates in or transits through a CSI port and is screened prior to being 

laden aboard a U.S. bound vessel. 4(17 !d. 

4

" GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-08- I 26T, THE SAFE PORT ACT: STATUS AND IMPLEMENTATION ONE 

YEAR LATER (2007). 

WI fd. at 6. 

,.JiO !d. at passim. 

55 
132 

Part IV: U.S. Ports of Entry 

The only lawful way to enter the U.S. is through an air, land, or sea port of entry. Upon reachinf 

a POE, CBP OFO officers inspect passengers and cargo to ensure threats do not enter the U.S 47 

Working with other countries, the U.S. has established trusted traveler programs to expedite the 

processin9 of low-risk passengers and cargo. 472 For passengers, these programs include 

SENTRI4 3 on the southwest border, NEXUS474 on the northern border and Global Entry475 at 

airports. For cargo, FAST is available at 17 POEs on the northern border and 17 POEs on the 

southwest border.476 

Despite these programs, significant staffing is needed to process heavy volumes of traffic to 

ensure commerce is not impeded. Therefore, manpower remains a concern across POEs. In 

FY2013 Congress appropriated to CBP additional funding to hire 2,000 officers. 477 However, 

due to attrition and the time it takes to bring on new oi1iccrs, CBP has only realized a net gain of 

approximately 818 ot1lcers. 478 

While discussions of U.S. land and sea POEs are examined above, air POEs located across our 

country are also highly active entry points into the U.S. 

Visa Waiver Program 

In 1986, Congress established the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) as a pilot program under the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act479 The main objective of the program was to facilitate 

tourism and short-term business travel with allies 480 Prior to VWP, foreign nationals traveling 

to the U.S. for a short-term visit needed a nonimmigrant "B" visa, requiring an in-person 

interview at a U.S. consulate or embassy481 On October 30, 2000, with bipartisan support, 

Congress made pem1anent VWP in the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act. 482 

471 U.S. CUSTOMS A:-iD BORDER PROTECTION, OPERATIONS, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/portscntry/operations, 

472 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, TRIJSTED TRAVELER PROGRAMS, https://www.cbp.gov/travel/trustedtraveler-prograrns, 

m U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION. SECURED ELECTRONIC NETWORK FOR TRAVELER'S RAPID INSPECTION 

(SENTRI), https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a _ id/ 184/-/secured-electronic-network-for-travelers-rapid-

; nspect ion-( scntri). 174 U.S. CUSTOMS A:-<D BORDER PROTECTION, NEXUS PROGRAM DESCRIPTION, http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trustedtra ve ler-programs/nexus/ nexus~overview. 475 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, GLOBAL ENTRY, http://www.cbp.gov/traveVtrusted-travelerprograms/global-entry. 

476 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, FREE AND SECURE TRADE PROGRAM (FAST) FACT SHEET, 

http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/o fo _fast_ final_ file __ 3. pdf. 477 Pub. L. No. 133-76. 478 Data Provided to Majoritv Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (June 2, 2015). 479 Pub. L. ~o. 99-603 (1986). 

"" GOV'T ACCOCNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-599T, ADDITIONAL ACTIO:-.IS NEEDED TO MITIGATE RISKS 

AND STRENGTHEN OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT 2 (2012). 481 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, VISA WAIVFR PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, http://www.dhs.gov/visaw a iver-pro gram-requirements 482 Pub. L. No. 106-396 (2000). 

56 
133 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the plot by Richard Reid, also known as the 

Shoebomber, in December 2001 motivated Congress to modernize VWP's security 

rcquirements 483 In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing the 9/11 Commission 

Recommendations Act requiring the Director of National Intelligence to produce intelligence 

reports to assess the threats from VWP countries and more reporting on lost or stolen 

passports484 As part of this modernization, on January I2, 2009, DIIS deployed the Electronic 

System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), an online portal to pre-approve VWP travelers for 

travel to the u.s.485 

At a hearing, the Committee heard that ESTA ''is an example of how U.S agencies effectively 

use information collected from visitors in advance of travel to wrevcnt terrorists and serious 

criminals from boarding a 11ight headed to the United States."4 6 A witness from the State 

Department explained that passengers from VWP countries must receive EST A approval before 

traveling, which: 

''involves filling out an online questionnaire with biographic information and paying an 

administrative fcc, after which, similar to a visa application, EST A screens against 

interagency databases for watchlisted individuals. If there is a positive match, DJ-JS may 

deny the authorization, meaning the individual cannot utilize the VWP to board a U.S.-

bound air or sea carrier. ''457 

If approved, EST A authorization is valid for multiple trips to the U.S. up to 90 days in duration 

for a period of two years. 488 Once a traveler arrives to the U.S., biometric data is collected by 

CBP at the port of entry, prior to admission into the country. 

VWP countries are required to sign agreements with the U.S. to share information related to 

terrorists and criminals.489 The information sharing agreements initiated under VWP increase 

the understanding of global security threats as well as the unique threat profiles of both VWP 

members and at times, non-VWP members 490 Witnesses at a Committee hearing testified that 

"[w]ithout the leverage that VWP provides, the U.S government likely would not receive the 

same amount and quality ofinformation."491 

m Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001). 484 Pub. L. No. 110·53 (2007). 481 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, ELECTRO~IC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION, 

http s: I /est a. c bp. dhs. gov I est a!. 

"" GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-599T, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE RISKS 

AND STRENGTHEN OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT2 (2012). 

487 !d. 

m U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, ESTA LENGTH OF APPROVAL, 

https ://help. c bp .gov lapp/answers/ detai II a_ id/ I I 26/ -/esta---length-o f-approva I. 489 Sec Vtsa Wa;ver Prograrn: Additional Actions Needed to Afitigate Risks and Strengthen Overstay Enforcement: 

Hearing Before the S. SubComm. on Immigration. Reji1gees, and Border Security o(the Comm. on the Judiciarv. 

!12th Cong. (2012) (Testimony of Rebecca Gambler and Michael J. Courts, Government Accountability Office). 490 ld 491 Visa Waiver Program: Implications for U.S. National Security: Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Af(airs. !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Mark Koumans & Maureen Dugan, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security). 

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134 

Under the 2007 Act, DHS and its VWP partners are required to check passports against 

INTERPOL's Lost or Stolen Documents database. 492 In November 2014, DHS added data fields 

to the ESTA application. 493 These upgrades have arguably improved the security of the travel 

ecosystem by encouraging common security standards for travel documents. 494 

However, in a 20 II report, GAO stated that in 2010, two percent, or 364,000 VWP visitors, 

boarded airplanes and arrived in the U.S. without proper ESTA clearance. 495 Given that ESTA is 

the security backbone to screen VWP travelers for security risks, this is a significant 

vulnerability. 496 DHS now notes that it has implemented new safeguards, including re-vetting 

ESTA applications every 24 hours.497 

Moreover, in the wake of the terror attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Copenhagen, the growing 

number of Western foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq, and the surge of Syrian refugees 

entering Europe, there have been calls for oversight of VWP in the context of terrorist travel. 498 

The visa-less nature ofVWP raises concerns because tenorists not yet flagged by U.S. or foreign 

intelligence could enter or re-enter the U.S. within their two-year ESTA period with little 

interactions with U.S. authorities 499 

On August 6, 2015, Secretary Johnson announced the Department's intention to implement 

additional security requirements to enhance VWP. 500 As part of the new directive, foreign 

nationals from the 38 existing member countries501 and new candidate countries will be required 

to use an c-passport in order to visit the U.S. under the visa free program, which are harder to 

tamper with as it contains the electronic photograph, full name, and birthday of the foreign 

192 Pub. L. No. II 0-53 (2007). 

""The data fields include additional passport data, contact information, other potential names or alias, parents' 

name(s), and employment information. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTLCTION, STRENGTHENING SECURITY OF 

TilE VWP THROUGH ENIIANCEMENTS OF ESTA, http://www.cbp.gov/travellintemational-visitors/esta/enhancementsto-esta-faqs; U.S. DEP'TOF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSS1ENT UPDATE FOR THE ELECTRONIC 

SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION (ESTA) 2 (20 14), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/fileslpublications/privacypia-update-cbp-esta-ll 0320 14.pdf. 

"' Letter to the Honorable Ron Johnson, Chairman, Senate llomeland Security & Governmental Affairs, from the 

Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Mar. 20, 2015). 495 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-335, DHS HAS IMPLEMENTED TilE ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL 

AIJTHORIZATION, BUT FURTHER STEPS NEEDED TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL PROGRAM RISKS 18 (20 II). 

""" Gov'TACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-599. ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE RISKS 

AND STRENGTHEN OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT 5 (2012). 

m Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Aug. 28, 2015). 498 Brian Naylor, Critics Worry Visa Waiver Could Allow Foreign Fighters To Slip in, NPR (Feb. 2, 2015), 

http://www. npr.org/20 15102/0213 83214948/critics-point -out ~weakness-of-visa-waiver-program; 

'

109 Letter from the Honorable Ron Johnson, Kelly Ayotte, and Thomas Carper, to the Honorable Jeh Johnson, 

Secretary, U.S. Depattment ofllomeland Security(Mar. 2, 2015). 500 Statement hy Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Intention to Implement Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver 

Program. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 6, 20 15), 

http://www. dhs. gov/new s/2 0 15/08/06/statement -secretary-jeh-c-johnson-intent ion-implement -securityenhancements-visa. 

501 The countries the U.S. currently has VWP agreements with are: Andona, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, 

Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 

Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 

Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom. 

58 
135 

national. 502 In addition, VWP member countries will have to use the INTERPOL Lost and 

Stolen Documents database to screen all travelers crossing their borders and allow more U.S. 

federal air marshals on flights departing to the United States. 503 

Finally, DHS estimates that approximately five million of the current II million illegal 

immigrants in the U.S. are visa overstays. 504 While DHS claims that the overstay rate ofVWP 

countries is collectively less than one percent, the Department has not released data on the 

individual overstay rate ofVWP countries, despite repeated requests for such information by 

Congress505 In its 2011 report, GAO indicated that in 8,200 of34,700 cases, or roughly onequarter ofVWP cases, ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) could 

not locate the suspected overstay506 Based on this percentage, the Majority Staff believes it fair 

to conclude that today, close to a million passengers who entered the U.S. through VWP cannot 

be found. 

Refugee Resettlement 

Each year the President, after consultation with Congress, sets an annual ceiling for the number 

of refugees the U.S. will admit507 For the past several years, the ceiling has been set at 70,000 

refugees 508 The President recently announced plans to raise the refugee ceiling to 85,000 for 

FY2016 and to 100,000 for FY20!7509 Moreover. the President has announced that ofthe 

85,000 refugees that will be admitted into the U.S. in FY2016, 10,000 will come from Syria510 

Due to vetting, interviews, and required screenings, it takes on average between 18 and 24 

months from the time a refugee is referred to the U.S. to their admittance into the country. 511 

502 /d. This means that if you change the picture of a lost or stolen passpot1, it will not match with official biographic 

records. 

" 3 MichaelS. Schmidt, Tougher Standards Set for U.S. Visa Waivers, Citing Militant Threat, NY TIMES (Aug. 6, 

20 15), http://www.ny1imes.com/20 !5/08/07/world/middleeast/us-visa-waiver-program-europe-radicalization-isissyria-iraq.html?_r~O. Changes such as these have been recommended to DHS by key members of Congress. See 

Letter from Senators Ron Johnson, Kelly Ayotte, and Thomas Carper, to the Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (Mar. 2, 2015). 504 F4CT SHEET: Modes of Entr)l for the Unauthorized Migrant Popular/on, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 22, 

2006), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/05/22/modes-of-entry-tor-the-unauthorized-migrant-population/; see also 

Alison Siskin. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM (2014). 505 See, generally, GOV'T AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-08-967, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: Acnm.:s ARE NEEDED 

TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF THF EXPANSION PROCESS, AND TO ASSESS AND MITIGATE PROGRAM RISKS (2008). 506 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-335, DHS HAS IMPLEMENTED THE ElECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL 

BUT FUR TilER STEPS NEEDED TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL PROGRAM RISKS (20 II). 

Andorra Bruno, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31269, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT POLICY I 

(2015). 

503 /d. at 2. 509 U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, U.S. Dcp't of Health and Human Services, Proposed 

Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress Submitted on Behalfofthe President of the United 

States to the Committees on the Judiciary United States Senate and United States House of Representatives (2015). 510 White /louse: US Preparing to Accept or Least/0,000 Syrian Refugees in FY2016, AP (Sept. 10, 2015), 

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/dbO I fl45696043bc8a264c4 7319bfd 19/white-house-us-preparing-accept-least-10000-

syrian~rcfugecs. 

511 The Impact of!S!S on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: Hearing Bej(Jre the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secretary for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State). 

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136 

Various federal agencies are involved in the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program. Put simply, 

the U.S. Department of State is charged with processing the refugees while overseas, the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security determines eligibility for admission into the country, and the 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services assists in the resettlement, placement, and 

support of the refugees. 

ISIS's violence in Syria and Iraq has created a large population of vulnerable, displaced Svrian 

and Iraqi citizens. Over 4 million registered Syrian refugees have left the conflict region. s(2 As of 

August 2015, 121,535 Syrians ~ave arrived in Eu~fpe, seeking asylum, 513 while 1,682 Syrians 

were admlttcd to the U.S. as refugees m FY2015.· 

According to the State Department, refugees go through a rigorous screening process in order to 

be granted access to the United States, 

All refugees undergo multiple security checks in order to be approved for 

U.S. resettlement. Refugees are subject to the highest level of security 

checks of any category of traveler to the United States. The screening 

includes involvement of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); 

the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center; DHS; the Department of Defense; 

and other agencies. Most of the details of the security checks are 

classified. At the same time, refugees complete a health screening. 515 

At a Committee hearing, witnesses from both the State Dcpat1ment and DHS stated that the 

vetting for refugees, particularly Syrian refugees, was more rigorous than for any other migrant 

seeking to legally come to the country. 516 However, in February, FBI Assistant Director Michael 

Steinbach told the House Homeland Security Committee that he was concerned about the risks 

associated with bringir1

& in Syrian refugees, due to our lack of on the ground ;ollection and thus 

mcomplctc databases: · FBI DHector Cotney echoed thts concern dunng HSGAC's annual 

"Threats to the Homeland" hearing in October, admitting that the U.S. faces deficits when it 

512 The UN Retugee Agency's Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 

ht}p :/I data. unhcr. org/syrianre fugees/reg io nal. p hp. 51 "' Drew Dcsilvcr, Europe's Asylum Seekers: Who The}' Are, Where They're Going, and Their Chances of Staying, 

PEW RESEARCII CENTER (Sept. 30, 20 15), http://www.pcwresearch.org/fact-tank/20 15/09/30/europes-asylumseekersMwho-they-are-whcrc-thcyre-going-and-their-chances-of-staying/. 

""Haeyoun Park, Paris Attack.\· Intensify Debate Over How Many ,~yrian Refugees to Allow into the US .. N.Y. 

TIMES (Nov. 16, 20 !5), http://www.ny1imes.com/intcractive/20 !5/1 0/21/us/where-syrian-refugees-are-in-the-unitedstates.html? r~O. 

515 U.S. Dc?t of State, Background Briefing on the Mechanics qfthe United States Refitgee Admissions Program, 

(Sept. II, 20 !5) http://www.state.govir/pa!prs/ps/20 I 5/09/246843.htm. 516 The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Securiry & Governmental Affairs, !14th Con g. (20 15) (statement of Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secretary tor 

Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State and Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 517 Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and !!omegrown Terror: 

Hearing BejiJre the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, !14th Con g. (20 15) (statement of Michael Steinbach, 

Assistant Dit·ector, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 

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137 

comes to vetting Syrian refuges518 NCTC Director Rasmussen expressed concerns at both 

hearings explaining that the U.S. does not have the traditional diplomatic, military, and 

intelligence footprint in Syria to provide law enforcement with lists of known or suspected 

terrorists.519 Thus, while the U.S. may have a system that ensures that all databases are touched 

during the vetting process, "you can only review against what you have." 520 

Biometric Entry-Exit Program 

Terrorists have exploited the U.S. immigration system to enter and remain in the U.S., often by 

entering the country lawfully but then unlawfully remaining in the country after their visa 

expired 521 To address this, Congress has passed eight statutes mandating some form of an entryexit system to track those transiting the country. 522 In 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report 

recommended DHS "complete, as quickly as possible, a biomerric entry-exit screening 

system.''523 That year, DHS "fully implemented a biometric air entry solution into existing 

inspection booths"524 and fully deployed a biometric land entry system in 2005. 525 To date, DHS 

has spent approximately $1 billion on the implementation of a biometric entry-exit program; 

however, a biometric exit solution still does not exist526 

Non-U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents seeking to travel to the U.S. either obtain a 

temporary visa at a U.S. consulate abroad or enter through the VWP (see above). 527 All arriving 

travelers that are not previously cleared through CBP's preclearance program (see below) are 

518 Threats to the Homeland.· Hearing Before the S. Cmnm. on !lome/and Security & Governmental Affairs, ll4th 

Con g. (20 15) (statement ofNicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Oftice of the 

Director ofNationallntelligence). 519 !d. ("the intelligence picture we have of this particular conflict zone is not as rich as we would like it to be."): see 

also Countering Violentlslamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat o.f Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror 

!learing Before the H. Comm. on HomelandSecurit)~ I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement ofNicholas J. Rasmussen, 

Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director ofNationallntelligence). 520 Threats lo the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Securily & Governmental Affairs, I 14th 

Cong. (20 15) (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center. Office of the 

Director ofNational Intelligence). 

::; THE 9/11 COMMISSION RCPORT 527-528 (2004). 

See Pub. L No. 104-208 (1996); Pub. L. No. 106-215 (2000); Pub. L. No. 106-396 (2000): Pub. L. No. 107-56, 

(2001); Pub. L. No. 107-173 (2002); Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004): Pub. L. No. I 10-53 (2007): Pub. L. No. 113-76 

(2013). 

523 THE 9/J I COMMISSION REPORT 389 (2004) (emphasis added). 524 Fulfilling A Key 9/11 Commission Recommendation: Implementing Biometric Exit, Hearing Before the House 

SubComm. on Border and Afaritirne oft he Comm. on /lome/and Security, I 13th Cong. (2013) (statement of David 

Hayman, John Wagner, and John P. Woods, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), available at 

http://www .dhs. go vi new s/20 1 3/09/2 6/writ ten-t estimo ny-cbp-and-ice-house-home land-security-su bcomm ittecborder-and. 

525 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S.-VISIT UPDATE: DHS COMPLETES FOUNDATION Of BIOMETRIC ENTRY 

http:l/www.fosterglobal.com/ncws/BiometricEntrySystem.pdf. 

See Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of' Entry: Public Roundrable Bef'ore the Comm. 

on Home/andSecurily & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong (2015). 527 Lisa Scghctti, CONG. RESEARCH SFRV., R 43356, BORDER SECURlTY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF 

E!'>:TRY 6 (2015). 

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138 

"subject to inspection[) by a CBP officer prior to entering the United States."528 Travelers may 

also "be selected through risk-based screening or at random" for further scrutiny. 529 

When a passenger makes an airline reservation, a Passenger Name Record (PNR) is created 

which includes, among other things, the passenger's itinerary, name, date of birth, and passport 

details 530 The airline is required to provide to CBP the PNR up to and continuously within 72 

hours in advance of travel so that CBP can begin to build a manifest of the passengcr. 531 For 

international flights to the U.S., carriers must transmit passenger and crew manifests to CBP's 

Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) before deRarture, prior to securing the aircraft 

doors, to confirm the passenger actually got on the plane. 32 Both "PNR and APIS data Ll are 

forwarded to CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC), where they arc vetted against intelligence 

and law enforcement databases." '

33 Thereafter, the data is sent to the Arrival and Departure 

Information System (ADIS) to "be held for matching against departure records."534 ADIS is a 

biographic database that reads identity documents, such as a traveler's name, date of birth, 

nationality, gender, and passport number. 535 APIS data sent to ADIS ·'allows DHS to identifY air 

travelers who may have overstayed their visas."536 Entry-exit data is also stored in a biometric 

database, known as the Automated Biometric Identification System (!DENT). !DENT is a fully 

biometric database and includes biographic information, biometric data (all I 0 fingerprints), and 

a report regarding a person's previous immigration record. 537 

01-IS has utilized several different pilot programs to implement a biometric exit solution. From 

2004 to 2007 01-IS placed biometric collection kiosks inside secure checkpoints and biometric 

collection mobile devices in departure gate areas at 12 airports and two seaports. 538 However, a 

series of GAO reports during this lime period highlighted concerns with the pilot.539 

528 /d.; see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP SEARCH AUTHORITY, 

http://www. c bp. gov /tra ve 1/ c bp-search-authority. 529/d. 

530 See Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of Entry: Public Roundtable Before the Comm. 

on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong (20 15). 531 Lisa Seghetti, CONG. ReSEARCH SERY., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF 

9 (2015). 

!d., see also Eleven Years Later: Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America: !learing Before the House 

SubComm. on Border and A1arithne oft he Comm. on Homeland Security, I 12th Cong. (20 12) (statement of Kevin 

Mcllleenan, Assistant Commissioner, Oftice of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 

m Lisa Scghetti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF 

ENTRY 10(2015). 

F-1 Implementation qf an Entl}'-ExU System: Still Waiting After All These Years: Hearing Before the House Comm. 

on the Judiciary, I 13th Cong. (20 13) (statement of David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of 

Homeland Security). 

m Lisa Seghetti, CONG. RESEARCII SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURITY: I~1MIGRATION INSPECTIONS AT PORTS OF 

ENTRY22 (2015). 536 !d. at 27. 

'·"!d. at 23. 538 /d. at 26. 

5l9 GOY' r ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 04-586, HOMELAND SECURITY: FIRST PHASE OF VISITOR AND 

IMMIGRATION STAT! iS PROGRAM OPERATING, BUT IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED (2004); GOV'T ACCOLNTARILITY 

OFFICE, GA0-05-202, HOMELAND SECURITY: SOME PROGRESS MADE, BUT MANY CHALLENGES REMAIN ON U.S. 

VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (2005); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 

62 
139 

Specifically, GAO found that, on average, only 24 percent of travelers subject to the pilot 

complied with the exit procedurc 540 

In 2009, DHS employed a departure biometric pilot program at Atlanta International Airport and 

Detroit Metropolitan Airport, collecting digital fingerprints of non-U.S. citizens at boarding 

gatcs 541 Despite concluding that the pilot generally confirmed that biometric exit data could be 

collected, in 2010, DHS adopted a plan to focus in the near-term on enhanced biographic data 

collection and analvsis to identify potential overstays, and to invest in research and development 

of emerging biometric technology to be employed in a future exit system. 542 

In 2013, CBP and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) announced their plan to 

develop a test facility to examine biometric technology and operational concepts to advance a 

biometric exit program at air and sea ports. 543 Also in 20! 3, "CBP and S&T initiated a joint Air 

Entry/Exit Rc-Engineering (AEER) Apex project" to test both processes and technologies "to 

determine how and when a biometric air exit concept would be feasible." 544 For example, at the 

test facility, S&T is currently testing the efficacy of three biometric technologies-fingerprint, 

retinal scan, and facial recognition equipment-and potential approaches to implement the 

technologies at U.S. airports. 545 Based on the best performing concepts and operations, in 

FY20 I 6, DHS plans to initiate a field trial at one U.S. airport 546 

Meanwhile, in July 2015, CBP launched its testing of"an enhanced mobile device to collect 

biometric exit data from a limited number of foreign national air travelers departing the U.S. at 

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport."'47 As to the land border, CBP plans to initiate 

GA0-06-296, HOMELAND SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF KEY BORDER SECURITY 

PROGRAM NEED TO BE IMPLEMENTED (2006); GOV'T ACCOIJNTA!lll.ITY OFFICE, GAO 07- l 044T, l l0\1ELAND 

PROSPECTS FOR BIOMETRIC lJS-VISIT EXIT CAPAOILITY REMAIN UNCLEAR (2007). 

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-06-296, H0,1El.AND SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE 

MANAGEY1ENT OF KEY BORDER SECURITY PROGRAM NEED TO BE IMPLEMENTED 45 (2006). 

"' DHS Begins Test of' Biometric Exit Procedures at Two U.S Airports, U.S. DEP'TOF HOMELAND SECURITY (May 

2 9, 2009), http://www. dhs. gov/news/2 009 !0 5129/ dhs- beg ins-test-biometric-ex it-procedures-two-us-airports. 542 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, COMPRFIIENSIVE BIOMETRIC AIR EXtr l'!.AN, fiSCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT 

J'O CONGRESS 3 (20!2). 54

~ See Securing the Border: Biometrie En!IJ' and Exit at our Ports of EntJy: Puhlic Roundtable Before the Comm. 

on flomelandSecurity & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of John Wagner, Assistant 

Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 5

-14 Fu(filling a Key 9/11 Commission Recommendation: Implementing Biometric Exit: Hearing B~fore the H. 

SubComm. on Border and Maritime Security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, !13th Cong. (2013) (statement 

of U.S. Customs and Border Protection & U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement). 545 Data provided to Majority Staff by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection during a tour of the U.S. Depmtment 

of Homeland Security Science & Technology facility in Maryland (Aug. I I, 2015). 5

.

16 ld,· see also ,)'ecuring the Border.· Biometric Entry and Exit at our Ports of Entr .. v: Public Roundtable Before the 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Arun Vemury, Chief, 

AEER Pilot, Directors of Science & Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 

S..J? CBP Begins Testing an Enhanced Handheld A1obile Device to Collect Biometric Data, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION (July 14, 20 I 5), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroomlnational-media-release/20 15-07-14-

000000/ cbp-beg ins-testing-enhanced-handheld-mobile-device. 

63 
140 

a facial recognition biometric pilot for pedestrians exiting the U.S. at the Otay Mesa POE in the 

San Diego sector by early December 2015 548 

Preclearance Agreements 

The U.S. also operates a number of preclearance facilities at airports in foreign countries. 

According to DHS, "Preclearance is the process by which CBP officers stationed abroad screen 

and make admissibility decisions about passengers and their accompanying goods or baggage 

heading to the U.S. before they leave a foreign port."549 Committee witnesses have testified as to 

the benefits of preclearance, in that it helps expand our borders and provide important 

information to CBP officers prior to persons entering the country. 550 This effectively adds an 

additional layer of defense. 

Preclearance travelers go through customs, immigration, and agriculture inspections all before 

leaving the foreign port. 551 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requires that the 

screening of both passe~gers and thei;gro?erty at foreign preclearance airports conforms to U.S. 

av1atton secunty screemng standards. - lhts ensures that, UJlOn the arnval to the U.S., 

passengers can disembark without needing to be rescreened.'53 

The purpose of this process is to enable "CBP to stop potential threats before they arrive on U.S. 

soil."554 At a Committee briefing, CBP explained that current preclearance agreements save the 

U.S. $25 million in detention costs annually. 555 In addition, preclearance helps streamline border 

procedures by reducing congestion at POEs as well as facilitating travel between U.S. ports and 

those foreign ports that arc equipped for preclearance. Moreover, CBP has entered into publicprivate partnerships with foreign ports that enable the foreign port to fund up to 85 percent of 

CBP's preclearance operations. 

Currently, preclearance is available at most major Canadian airports 556 There are also 

preclearance locations in Aruba, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Ireland, and the United Arab 

Emirates. 557 

'

48 Majority Staff observations during bipartisan, bicameral ST AFFDEL to the San Diego Sector (Aug. 20 15). 140 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PRECLEARANCE LOCATIONS, http:/iwww.cbp.govibordersecurity/ports~entry/operations/preclearancc. 

550 See Securing the Border: Understanding Threat'\' and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the S 

on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015). 

DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to /0 New Airports, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (May 

29, 20 15), http://www ,dhs,gov/news/20 15/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-l 0-ncw-airports, 5)2/d 

"'Id 

554 U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, D!iS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports, PRESS 

RELEASE (May 29, 20 15), http:liwww .dhs.govlnews/20 15105129/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-1 0-

new-airpOits. 

555 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION. PRECLEARANCE OPERATIONS: OVERVIEW BRIEF (2015) (on file with 

Majority Staff). 156 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, PRECLEARANCE LOCAT!Ol\S, http:/iwww.cbp.gov/bordcrsecurity/ports-cntry/operations/preclearance. 

64 
141 

On May 29,2015, Secretary Johnson announced the U.S.'s intention "to enter into negotiations 

to expand air preclearance options to ten new foreign airports, located in nine separate countries: 

Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and 

the United Kingdom."558 According to the Department, CBP coordinated with TSA and the 

State Department to identity these new airports "and grioritized them based on the greatest 

potential to support security and travel facilitation." 55 Last year, approximately 20 million 

passengers traveled to the U.S. from these 10 airports 560 

DHS is also interested in expanding preclearance to other modes of transportation. On March 

16, 2015, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson and Canadian Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 

Preparedness Steve Blaney signed the Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine, and Air Transport 

Preclearance, which will provide the legal framework to locate CBP and CI3SA personnel to 

offer preclearance at more locations and modes of transportation in both countries561 

Essentially, this agreement will: I) provide security updates that accurately ret1ect the post 9/11 

operating environments; 2) enable preclearance at cruise, rail, and ferry terminals that currently 

only receive pre-inspection;'62 3) allow CI3P and CI3SA officers to carry firearms and restraining 

devices at preclearance locations; 563 and 4) ''enable the exploration of co-location at small and 

remote ports.''564 To implement, both the U.S. and Canada would have to enact legislation. 

557 The airports are: Calgary International Airport, Edmonton International Airport, Halifax Stanfield International 

Airport, Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, 

Toronto Pearson International Airport, Vancouver International Airport, Winnipeg James Armstrong Richardson 

International Airport (Canada), Bermuda International Airport (Bermuda), Grand Bahama International Airport, 

Lynden Pindling International Airport (The Bahamas), Queen Beatrix International Airport (Aruba), Dublin Airport, 

Shannon Airport (Ireland), Abu Dhabi Airport, Dubai International Airport (United Arab Emirates). Jd 

"'DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports, U.S. DEP'TOF HOMELAND SECURITY (May 

29, 20 15), http://www.dhs.gov/news/20 I 5/05129/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-! 0-new-airports. (The 

10 airports are: Brussels Airport, Belgium: Punta Cana Airport, Dominican Republic; Narita International Airport, 

Japan; Amsterdam Airport Schipol, Netherlands; Oslo Airport, Norway; Madrid-Barajas Airport, Spain; Stockholm 

Arlanda Airport, Sweden; Istanbul Ataturk Airport, Turkey; London Heathrow Airport, Manchester Airport, UK). 

559 !d. 

500 !d. 561 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATE AND CANADA SIGN PRECLEARANCE AGREEMENT, 

(20 I 5 ), http://www .dhs.gov/news/20 15/03/ 16/united-states-and-canada-sign-preclearance-agreement. 562 While CBP conducts preclearance at Canadian airports, it currently only provides "pre~inspectionJ' at Canadian 

rail stations. Amtrak estimates that full preclearance could save the passenger 10 to 20 minutes per trip from 

Canada to the U.S. by eliminating the required Customs stop in Blaine, Washington. Majority Staff observations 

during bipartisan STAFFDEL to the Blaine, Washington Sector (Aug. 20 15). 563 Currently CBP officers stationed in Canada are not pem1itted to carry their firearms and must rely on Canadian 

police if assistance is needed. 564 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATE AND CANADA SiGN PRECLEARANCE AGREEMENT, 

(20 I 5 ), http://www .dhs.gov/news/20 15/0311 6/united-states-and-canada-sign-preclearance-agreement. 

65 
142 

Part V: Understanding the Root Causes oflmmigration 

In l'Y2014, more than 479,000 people were apprehended along the southwest border, more than 

3,300 people were apprehended at the northern border, and more than 7,500 were apprehended 

across the maritime border 565 Moreover, countless people entered the U.S. lawfully at a port of 

entry but have sinee overstayed their visas. While these numbers may be somewhat down from 

the late 1990s and early 2000s when infrastructure, technology, and manpower at our borders 

were virtually nonexistent, they still remain high. And, given, the powertul pull factors in this 

country, migration to the U.S. will remain high for a very long time. 

For starters, the wage gap, or the difference between what a migrant can earn in this country as 

compared to his home country, remains "the main economic factor influencing migration." 566 As 

this gap sits at approximately $5 to $1 in Mexico and perhaps as much as $8 to $I in Central 

American countries, we can expect migration to the U.S. to continue as people seek the 

opportunity to work and make money for their families 567 

Moreover, U.S. policies create powerful pull factors that incentivize people to illegally migrate 

to the country. As an example, due to current law the U.S. is unable to immediately repatriate 

unaccompanied minors from noncontiguous countries 568 Instead, the minor must first receive an 

immigration hearing. In practice, once these minors receive their immigration hearings and a 

final order of removal is rendered, the federal government docs not prioritize their removal. In 

fact, since 2009, DHS has apprehended 122,700 unaccompanied children from El Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras, but ICE has only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6 percent.569 In 

the last several years this powerful signal has resulted in a substantial influx of Central 

Americans unlawfully migrating to and remaining in the U.S570 

565 See U~ITED STATES BORDER PATROL TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH, 

http:l/www.cbp.gov/sitcs/default/filcs/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20 

Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2014 O.pdf. Since the U.S. Coast Guard also interdicts a significant number of migrants 

at our maritime border, a full representation of maritime apprehensions adds these two data points together. See 

U.S. COAST GUARD MARITIME MIGRANT INTERDICTIONS, 

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FiowStats/currentstats.asp. 

566 Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States: How Effective 

is Enforcement?, COl;NCILON FOREIGN RELATIO!'S 8 (2013) (citing Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and 

Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium.· Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border, CENTER FOR 

Gi.OllAI. DEVE!.OPMEt-:T (2008)). 567 !d. at 9, Appendix 2: Wage Gap and Other Trends in Central American Source Countries, 

http://www. cfr. a rg/imm igrat ion/managing-i !!ega 1- im m i gratia n-un ited-states/p3 065 8, 568 Section 235 ofTVPRA codified expedited removals for children from contiguous countries and mandated the 

transter of children fi·om non-contiguous countries to the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. No. 

II 0-457 (2008) 

% 9 See The 2014 Jfumanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government's Response to Unaccompanied 

l\4inors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental ... {ffairs, !14th Cong. 

(2015); Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination o[FY2015 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the 

S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 !5). 5

'

0 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SOUTHWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED A LIE~ CHILDREN, 

http://www. cbp .g ov/ncwsroom/ stats/ south west~ bordcr~unacco mpa n ied-ch i ldrcn. 

66 
143 

Central American Migration to the U.S. 

In 2014, unaccompanied minors attempted to cross the southwest border in alarming numbers. 

From FY2009 to FY2013, CBP officers apprehended mostly Mexican minors attempting to enter 

the U.S. 571 However, in FY2014 and for the first time, the number ofUACs from Rl Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras unlawfully entering the U.S. exceeded the number ofUACs from 

Mexico.572 In FY2015, apprehensions ofUACs slightly declined, however numbers began to 

increase in July, and by August monthly apprehensions surpassed that of FY20 14. 

Table 4. Unaccompanied Alien Children Encountered by CBP573 

Country FY FY FY FY FY FY FY 

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

El Salvador 1,221 1,910 1,394 3,314 5,990 16,404 9,389 

Guatemala 1,115 1,517 1,565 3,835 8,068 17,057 13,589 

Honduras 968 1,017 974 2,997 6,747 18,244 5,409 

Total 3,304 4,444 3,933 10,146 20,805 51,705 28,387 

DHS, the State Department, and USAID currently have several programs that attempt to stem the 

f1ow of Central American migrants to the U.S.-Mexico border. These efforts are focused on 

confronting the perceptions of U.S. immigration law, dismantling human smuggling networks, 

and tackling the corruption and citizen security in Central America.574 The Administration 

argues that investing in Central American communities can decrease the need for those 

countries' citizens to migrate and significantly reduce the business of human smugglers, run by 

coyotes. 575 To that end, the Administration has proposed a $1 billion aid package aimed at 

confronting the root causes of the 2014 UAC surgc. 576 However, the U.S. has provided billions 

of dollars in assistance in the past (see Table 7), and CBP continues to report large numbers of 

migrants attempting to enter the U.S. 577 

\Vhile some outside experts report that the spike in UACs last summer was generated by startling 

levels of drug and gang-related violence in Central America, according to an EPIC report, 

perceptions of U.S. immigration policy that led people to believe they would be able to remain in 

571/d 

5'} !d. 

57:< !d. 57'

1 Remarks by the President on Border ~)'ecurity and immigration Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 30, 2014), 

https: I lwww. whitehouse. gov /the-press-a ffice/2 0 14/06/3 0/remarks-presidcnt-border -security-and-im m igra lionreform. 

q, Unaccompanied Alien Afinors: Pressing the Administration for a Strategy Hearing Before the House SubComm. 

on the Western Hemisphere oft he Comm. on Foreign Relations, 1 13th Cong. (2014) (statement of Roberta S. 

Jacobson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State). 576 WHITE ]lOUSE, FACT SHEET: PROMOTING PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND GOOD GOVERNA~CE IN CENTRAL 

AM ERICA, https :i/www. w h itchousc. gov/the-press-office/20 I 5/0 l /2 9/tact -sheet -pro mating-prosperity-security-and-

~.ood-govemancc-central-ame. 

· '' Douglas Farah, Five Myths about the Border Crisis, WASH POST (Aug. 8, 20 14), 

http://www. washingtonpost.com/opinionsifive-myths-about-the-border-crisis/20 I 4/08/08/1 ec90bea-1 ce3- 11 e4-

ab7b-696c295ddfd I _story.html. 

67 
144 

the U.S. also drove the surge. 578 Such policies include the President's DACA, DHS's catch and 

release policy, and the TVPRA of2008. 579 For example, according to interviews conducted by 

GAO, Guatemalans believe they will be eligible for DACA or amnesty provided in 

comprehensive immigration reform, while Hondurans told GAO they believed "migrant minors, 

mothers traveling with minors, and pregnant women" can remain in the U.S 580 On a recent 

CODEL to Central America the President of Honduras warned Members of the Committee to be 

very clear in the laws that they draft, as ambiguities will be exploited by coyotes. 

HHS Response 

Pursuant to the TV PRJ\, children from noncontiguous countries that unlawfully enter the U.S. 

must be transferred to HHS within 72 hours of apprehension while waiting for an immigration 

court hearing; they cannot be immediately repatriated to their home countries. 581 According to 

HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), between October I, 2013 and August 31, 2015, 

!-IllS released a total of77,220 UACs to sponsors in the United States. 582 

Table 5. States Accommodating UACs583 

State I<'Y2014 FY2015* Total 

Texas 7,416 2,769 10,185 

California 5,842 3,061 8,903 

New York 5,956 2,229 8,185 

Florida 5,447 2,485 7,932 

Maryland 3,885 1,497 5,382 

Virginia 3,886 1,375 5,26! 

Wisconsin 84 33 117 

All States 53,550 23,670 77,220 

* FY2015 as of August 31, 2015 

ORR believes its responsibility to track and retain custody of UACs ends when the child is 

released to the sponsor. 584 ORR officials argue that sponsors are responsible for ensuring UACs 

mEL PASO lNTELLIGEC:CE CENTER, MISPERCEPTIONS OF U.S. POLICY KEY DRIVER IN CENTRAL AMERICAN 

MIGRA~T SURGE (20 14) (Children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrived in large numbers after 

hearing rumors that the U.S. Government would stop issuing free passes or permisos after June 20!4). 57g Section 235 ofTVPRA codified expedited removals for children from contiguous countries and mandated the 

transfer of children from non-contiguous countries to the Department of Health and Human Services. Pub. L. No. 

II 0-457 (2008). 580 GOV'T ACCOUNTARIUTY OH!CE, GA0-!5-707, CE:\TRAL A~1ERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD 

E~HA"Cl AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 10 (20!5). 581 Id 

582 U.S. DEP'T OE HEALTH AND !ICMA!'; SERVICES, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, UNACCOMPANIED 

CHILDREN RELEASED TO SPONSORS BY STATE, http://www.act:hhs.govlprogramslorrlprograms/ucs/state-by-state-ucplaced-sponsors. Unfortunately, data provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. 

Department of Justice (DO.J), and U.S, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is inconsistent and fails to 

match up. ~~n !d. 

58'

1 Data provided to Majority Staff by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (June 23, 20!5). 

58 
145 

attend their court hearing and notifying DHS and the DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EO!R) if the UAC relocates to a different address585 The lack offollow-up and 

secondary screening by has led to some dangerous situations for these unaccompanied minors. 586 

For example, press reports have revealed situations in which a 13-year-old boy was forced to 

work rather than attend school to pay off his smuggling debt and eventually became homeless. 587 

In another case, a 14-year-old Salvadoran girl was placed with distant relatives who later passed 

her on to other relatives that abused her. 588 And, finally, a 16-year-old Honduran girl was 

released to a man who had her smuggled in and then molested her. 589 

On June 16, 2015, ORR issued two new requests for proposals (RFPs) for contracts to aid 

UACs 590 The first RFP seeks multiple regional contractors who have the capability to provide 

legal services to UACs. These selected contractors would be responsible for I) managing the 

"Know Your Rights" presentations; 591 2) legal screening procedures to identify UACs that meet 

the criteria for immigration relief: 3) securi~£pro-bono legal counsel tor hearings before EOIR; 

and 4) at tunes duectly representmg UACs. - ORR began the contractmg process on August I, 

2015, for a period of three years. 593 

For the second RFP, contractors will be responsible tor supporting child advocate programs in 

Brownsville; Houston; Chicago; Newark; New York City; Washington, DC; Baltimore; Phoenix; 

San Antonio; and Miami 594 ORR will spend $31 million for legal services and direct 

representation, which, combined with other programs, will total $58 million in FY2015.m As 

for the child advocate program, ORR will spend $3.5 million between FY2015 and FY2017 596 

585 ld 

""Molly Hennessy-fiske, Young Immigrants Placed in Sponsor Homes are at Risk of Abuse, Experts Say, LA 

TIMES (Aug. 18, 20 15), http:/!www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigrant-sponsors-20 150818-story.html. 

\87 /d. 

"'/d. 

~89 !d 

590 U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQ~ISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE 

OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00264 (June 15, 20 15); U.S. 

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICE OF 

REFUGH' RESETTLFMF'iT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00327 (June 15, 2015). 591 "Know Your Rights'' (KYRs) presentations provide information to UACs on why they are in custody, the various 

forms of immigration legal relief, the sponsorship process, the various government agencies involved in the child's 

immigration case, and what to expect at immigration court This information is provided to UACs via a cartoon 

video. ORR also funds legal service providers local to the shelters to provide these KYRs to UACs. 592 U.S. DEPARTME'iT OF HEALTJI AND HGMAN SERVICES, DIVISIO~ OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEllALF OF 

THFOFFICFOF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUESTFOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00264 (June 15, 2015). 

'"'!d. 

"" U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE 

OFFICE OF REFUGEE R[SETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00327 (June 15, 20 15). 595 U.S. DEPARTMEl'T OF HEALTH AND IIUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF ACQUISITIO:\ MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF 

THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00264 (June 15, 2015). 596 U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISIO"i OF ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT (ON BEHALF OF THE 

OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT), RLQUFST FOR PROPOSAL, RFP 15-233-SOL-00327 (June 15, 20 15). 

69 
146 

However, earlier this year the Senate Appropriations Committee rejected a $50 million request 

by the Administration to pay for legal help for UACs. 597 During a HSGAC hearing ORR was 

questioned about their authority to pay for legal counsel, as federal law calls on 1-11-IS to ensure 

that unaccompanied minors receive counsel to the greatest extent practicable but at no expense to 

the govcrnmcnt. 598 ORR asserted it believes it has the authority to pay for counsel, but it has an 

obligation to rely on pro bono services to the greatest extent possible. 599 

DO.! Response 

EOIR is responsible for adjudicating immigration cases as well as removal proceedings. 600 

According to EOIR, since July 18,2014, the agency has been prioritizing the cases of: 1) 

unaccompanied children; 2) adults with a child or children who arc a part ofDHS's Alternative 

to Detention program (ATD); 3) adults with a child or children who arc detained; and 4) recent 

border crossers who are detained. 601 Additionally, EOIR has set the goal for scheduling UAC's 

first master calendar hearing no less than I 0 days and no more than 21 days from the date of 

their issued NTA. For adults with children and those in the ATD program, EOIR attempts to 

have them appear before an immigration judge no less than 10 days and no more than 28 days 

from when DHS released them on parole with a NTA602 

EOIR began tracking UAC removals in July 2014, establishing a new case recording system that 

coincided with the agency's announcement of its revised adjudication priorities in response to 

the UAC surge 603 EOIR data from July 18, 2014 through August25, 2015 shows that DHS 

issued 38,211 NT As to UACs that unlawfully crossed the U.S. border in the past two fiscal 

years 604 As of August 25, 2015, EOIR has processed 31,035 cases requiring lJACs to appear 

before an immigration judge for their initial master hearing605 

Of these cases, 14,613 cases have been completed, of which in 7,571 cases the judge ordered the 

lJAC removed606 Of these removal orders, 6,611 were rendered in absentia, meaning that the 

UAC did not show up to the hearing607 Decisions rendered in absentia proceed to a final order 

of removal, generally clearing the legal hurdles for ICE to begin the UAC's removal 

597 Led b)• Shelby, Senare Blocks Legal Fund for lmmigra171 Children, AP (June 10, 2015), 

http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf!20 15/06/led by shelby senate blocks le.html. 

S'JS See The 201-/ Humanitarian Crisis at our B7:wd;r: A Re---;_,iew o/fhe Go;ernment's Response to Unaccompanied 

Alinors One Year Laler: Hearing Bej(Jre the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. 

(2015). 

599 !d. 600 !d. (statement of .Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice). 601 Adults without children are eligible for expedited removal and do not need to go in front of an EOIRjudge unless 

they claim a certain protection, such as asylum. 

602/d 

603 Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American ,14igration to the 

United States: Hearing BejiJre the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Covernmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (2015) 

(statement of William KandeL Analyst in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service). 604 Data provided to Majority Staff by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (Sept, I 20 15). 605 !d. 

606/d. 

607 /d. 

70 
147 

proceedings. However, ICE has not repatriated most UACs with a final order of removal, 

claiming instead it prioritizes the repatriations of higher value targets, such as criminal aliens. 608 

DHS Rec~ponse 

On November 20, 2014 Secretary Johnson issued a memorandum on enforcement priorities, as 

part of a larger package of executive actions announced by the President. 609 Currently, ICE's 

highest priority is the removal of individuals who represent a threat to U.S. national security, 

border security, and public safety610 Priority I removals include illegal aliens engaged in or 

suspected of terrorism or espionage and illegal aliens convicted or with a violent criminal 

record 611 Priority 2 encompasses illegal aliens convicted of three or more misdemeanors and 

illegal aliens who overstay their visas. 612 Lastly, Priority 3 generally targets illegal aliens with a 

final order of removal issued after December 31, 2013. 613 

Table 6. UAC Removals by Country of Citizenship, FY2009-FY2015 614 

Country FY 2009 FY2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 

El Salvador 96 I 17 136 !36 159 190 167 

Guatemala 534 520 515 626 661 686 519 

Honduras 352 326 297 430 461 503 339 

Total 982 963 948 1,192 1,281 1,379 1,025 

Since 2009, DHS has apprehended 122,700 unaccompanied children from El Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras, but ICE has only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6 percent. 615 

ICE was asked during a Committee hearing what signal is sent to people in Central America that 

as an unaccompanied child, if you reach the U.S., you have more than a 90 percent chance of 

being able to stay616 ICE did not answer the question. 617 According to El Salvador officials, 

"when a potential migrant hears from someone in the United States who has managed to arrive 

and remain there undocumented, the communications can strongly intluencc their decision on 

WR See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review oft he Government's Response to Unan:ompanied 

Aiinors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmentall({kdrs, 114th Cong. 

(2015). 

''

0

'' U.S. DEP'TOF HOMFLANfl SECURITY, MEMORANDUM TO THOMAS S. WI~KOWSKI, AC'TI~G DIRECTOR, U.S. 

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, R. GIL KERLIKOWSKE, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION, LEO~ RODRIQUEZ, DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZE!\SIIIP A~D IMMIGRATION SERVICES, AND AUAN D. BERSIN, 

ACTING ASSISTA~T SEcRETARY FOR PO !.ICY, FR0\1 JFH CHARLES JOHNSON, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

POLICIES FOR TilE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND REMOVAL OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS (Nov. 20, 20 14). 

610 fd 

(,]\/d. 

612/d. 

613 !d. 

614 Data provided to Majoirty Staff by the Department of Homeland Security (July 25, 20 15). 615 See The 20!4 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government's Response to Unaccompanied 

A1inors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Seeurity & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong, 

(20 15); Ongoing Migrationfiwn Central America: An Examination of FY20/5 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the 

S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015). 

6](1 !d 

017 !d. 

71 
148 

whether to migrate."618 GAO recently testified as a Committee hearing that children usc social 

media to let those in their home countries know they made it to and were able to remain in the 

U.S., further incentivizing others to embark on the dangerous journey to the United States 619 

In June 2014, DHS started to challenge perceptions of U.S. immigration policy. Secretary 

Johnson warned Central American parents that their "child will not benefit from DACA if they 

come here now," reminding Central Americans that "DACA is for those who came here 7 years 

ago."620 DHS's "Danger Awareness Campaign" aimed to dissuade parents from sending their 

children with smugglers warning that: 1) "the journey is too dangerous;" 2) "children will not get 

legal papers if they [arrive in the U.S.]"; and 3) children "are the future-let's protect them."621 

The advertisements targeted communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, as well as 

American cities with significant Central American populations such as Houston, Los Angeles, 

Miami, and New York.622 In total, taxpayers spent approximately $1 million on billboards, TV 

commercials, and radio announcements between June 30 and October 12,2014. 623 A recent 

GAO report has called for more review on the effectiveness of these campaigns before 

continuing them624 According to GAO, DHS and the State Department's lack of review as to 

whether these campaigns have been effective is not only costly for the U.S. taxpayer, but also 

costly to unaccompanied minors and their families who ignore the campaigns and risk their lives 

to make the dangerous journey to the U.S. 625 Despite this, in August 2015 DHS announced a 

new $1.2 million campaign called "Know the Facts" to emphasize that pursuant to U.S. law and 

policy immediate deportations will be a priority. 626 

Other DI IS efforts include working with the State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 

Migration (PRM) to employ a new refugee program to provide a legal alternative to parents who 

61 ' GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFfORTS COU!.D 

ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED C!IILDREN MIGRATION ll (2015). 019 Ongoing ""figrationfrom Central America: An Examination of FY2015 Apprehensions: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. an Homeland Security & Govemmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Kimberly M. 

Gianopoulos, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office). 

()20 Transcript ofDHS Secretary Jeh Johnson's Press Conference at U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Headquarters. U.S. DFP'T OF !I OM ELAND SFCURITY (July 12, 20 14), http://www.dhs.gov/transcript-dhs-secretaryjohnson 's-press-con Ference. 

"

11 U.S. Ct:STOMS Al'll BORDER PROTECTION, CBP ADDRESSeS IIUMANITARIAN CIIALI.ENGES OF UNACCOMPANIED 

Ct !!LD M !GRANTS, http://www .cbp.gov/bordcr-security/humanitarian-chalienges. 621 Feds Launch Campaign to Discourage A1igrantsfrom Dangerous Trek to ~US., CBS NEWS (July 3, 2014), 

http://www .c bsnew s. com/ news/ federal-a ftic ia Is-launch-campaign-to-discourage-migrants-from-making-dangeroustrek-lo-u-sf. 

t!13ld. 

62 '' See GOV'T i\CCOUNTA81LITY OFFICE, GA0-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS 

COIJLD ENHANCE AGENCY PRCXiRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED Cl!ILDREl' MIGRA'l!ON 40·A I (20 I 5). 625 See id ("Carrying out ineffective campaigns could lead to higher levels of migration to the United States, which 

is not only potentially costly in terms of U.S. taxpayer resources but costly and dangerous to the migrants and their 

families."). 

626 Marty Graham, U.S Ads Target !/lega/Immigrationfi·om Central America, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 20 15), 

http://www.reuters.com/article/20 I 5/08/l8/us-usa-border-ads-idUSKCNOQN26920 !50818. Ironically, the Majority 

StatTnotes that these are not the facts and that it is actually highly unlikely that unaccompanied minors from Central 

America will be deported. as indicated by the statistics provided above. 

72 
149 

wish to bring their children to the U.S. 627 On November 14,2014, Vice President Biden 

announced the in-country refugee/parole program for minors in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Honduras with parents lawfully present in the U.S 628 This program allows individuals living in 

the U.S. to request a refugee visa for unmarried children under the age of 21 629 Additionally, if 

the second parent in Central America is lawfully married to the parent in the U.S., the second 

parent will be included with the child's petition, making the second parent a candidate for 

refugee and parole status630 

Pursuant to this program, a parent under one of the following categories can request program 

access: I) Lawful Permanent Resident; 2) Temporary Protected Status; 3) Parolee, granted for at 

least a year; 4) DACA recipient; 5) Deferred Action recipient, granted for at least a year; 6) 

Deferred Enforced Departure recipient; and 7) Withholding of Removal grantee 631 The 

Administration allocated 4,000 refuge visas for this program out of the 70,000 globally available. 

According to the State Department, as of September 14,2015, processing centers have received 

4,253 applications: 3,636 in El Salvador, 532 in Honduras, and 85 in Guatemala. 632 

Finally, on June 24,2015, Secretary Johnson announced a change to family detention 

practices.633 Due to the TVPRA and Flores Agreement, DHS is unable to immediately repatriate 

or hold unaccompanied minors in detention facilities. However, adults may be immediately 

repatriated and family units can be detained. At a Committee Hearing, Secretary Johnson 

attributed the decline in the migration of unaccompanied minors this year to the reduction in the 

repatri~;ion times for the adults, increased returning flights, and expanded family unit detention 

space. 

Despite this recognition, two month later Secretary Johnson announced the Department's plans 

to release on bond detained family units able to present a credible fear case. 635 According to 

DHS, the family's bond will be set ''at a level that is reasonable and realistic, taking into account 

627 Unaccompanied Alien M;nors: Pressing the Administraaonfor a StrategY' Hearing Before the House SubComm. 

on the Western Hemisphere of' the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Roberta S. 

Jacobson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State). 628 Ricardo Zuniga, Promoting Prosperity and Security in Central America, TilE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 14, 2014) 

https:/ /www. whitehousc.gov/blog/20 14/ II/ 14/promoting-prosperity-and-security-central-america. 629 U.S. DFP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, lN-COl/NTRY 

REFUGEE/PAROLE PROGRAM FOR MINORS IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND l!ONDURAS WITH PARENTS 

LAWFUI.I.Y PRESENT IN TilE UNITED STATES (2014), 

http://www. state. gov/j/prm!re leases/ factshccts/20 I 4/23 4067. htm. 63D /d. 631 Data provided to Majority Staff by U.S. Department of State's Oftice of Bureau ofPopu1ation, Refugees and 

Migration (Sept. 22, 2015). 632 /d. 

U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY. STATEMENT BY SECRETARY .IEH C. JOHNSON ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL 

CENTERS, http://www. d hs. gov /news/20 1 5/06/24/ statement -secrctary-jeh-c-johnson-family-residential-centers. 634 See The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submissionfor Fiscai Year 2016: Hearing Bef'ore the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Con g. (20 15) (Statement of Jeh Johnson, Secretary, 

U.S. Depm1ment of Homeland Security). 

"''U.S. DLP'T OF HOMELAND SECl:RITY, STATEMENT BY SFCRE I'ARY JcH C. JOIINSON ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL 

CeNTERS, http://www. dhs.go v.'news/2 0 1 5/06/24/statement -secretary-je h-e-johnson-family-res identia !-centers. 

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150 

ability to pay, while also encompassing risk of flight and public safcty." 636 The Department still 

appears to recognize that a recent ruling prohibiting all detention of illegal immigrant families 

can actually entice more illegal immigration. 637 According to DI-!S in filings with the court, "the 

proposed remedies could heighten the risk of another surge in illegal migration across our 

Southwest border by Central American families, including by incentivizing adults to bring 

children with them on their dangerous journey as a means to avoid detention and gain access to 

the interior of the United States."638 DHS and the State Department have stated it is too early to 

determine whether the recent increase in apprehensions at the border is related to this new policy. 

Mexico Response 

In FY2015, CBP apprehended 28,387 unaccompanied minors from Central America, somewhat 

down from FY2014levels639 However, it is unclear how impactful U.S. efforts have been in 

reducing the flow640 According to research conducted by GAO, "individuals in El Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras give more credence to what they hear from relatives and friends than 

to what they hear on the radio and television."641 Instead, many experts point to Mexico's 

increased efforts to detain illegal migrants crossing the Mexico-Guatemala border as a major 

reason behind lower apprehension numbers at the U.S.-Mexico border in FY20!5 642 

According to Mexico's Ministry oflnterior, from January I to August 31, 2015, Mexico detained 

96,830 adults and 22,400 minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These figures 

represent a 64 percent increase in adults and 49 percent increase in minors compared to the same 

period in the previous year, in which Mexico apprehended 58,930 Central American adults and 

15,049 unaccompanied minors 643 

In 2014, the State Department reprogrammed $80 million to help Mexico build up its border 

patrol forces and capabilities to better manage its southern border644 While the Mexican 

Government has significantly increased its presence at the Mexico-Guatemala border, it still 

faces many challenges645 For example, on a recent CO DEL to Central America, Members of the 

6.16 !d. 637 Stephen Dinan, DIIS Admits New Surge of illegal Immigrant Families, Wash Times (Aug. 7, 2015), 

http://www. \V ash in gtont im es.co m/new s/20 I 5 /aug/7/ dhs-adm its- new -surge-i llega 1- immigrant-families/. 618/d. 

""U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SOl;THWEST BORDER UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN, 

http://www.cbp.gov/newsroorn!stats/southwest-border-unaccompanicd-children. 

640 See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS 

COULD ENHANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 36 (2015). 

(J41/d. 

042 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-15-707, CENTRAL AMERICA: IMPROVED EVALUATION EFFORTS COULD 

Et-:IIANCE AGENCY PROGRAMS TO REIJUCE U'JACCOMPANIED CHILDREN MIGRATION 4 (20 15). ("Recent data 

indicate the pace of migration from Central/\merica remains high, though fewer migrants are being apprehended in 

the United States."). ().,l] !d. 

644 !d. 645 Douglas Farah and Carl Meacham, Alternative Governance in the Northern Triangle and Implications for US. 

Fore1gn Policy: Finding Logic within Chaos, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Sept. 21, 20 15), 

http:// cs is. org/ event/ a lternativc-govemance- northem~triang le-and-imp lie at ion s-us-fo rc ign-po I icy-finding- Jog ic-with 

74 
151 

Committee visited the Guatemala-Mexico border and witnessed a number of rafts, in broad 

daylight, being utilized to transport contraband from Guatemala to Mexico. 

Moreover, some observers suggest that increased UAC apprehensions in the U.S. in August and 

September could be a result of smugglers finally finding new routes to avoid detection in 

Mexico. This may explain why the Yuma and Big Bend sectors are seeing very large increases 

in UACs, as compared to FY2014, as human smugglers begin to change their routes. 

U.S. Assistance to Central America and !he Dependency on Remittances 

Including State Department and US AID regional programs, from FY20 14 to FY20 15, Congress 

appropriated $754.8 million in bilateral assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 646 

Also, established in 2008 to assist Central American nations combatting TCOs, the Central 

America Regional Security Initiative (CARS!) provides equipment, technical assistance, and 

counternarcotic training to identify and dismantle TCOs and drug cartels647 In FY2014, most of 

C/\RSI's $161.5 million budget was spent in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 648 

Moreover, in 2006, El Salvador received a $461 million five-year compact through the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 649 to invest in education, public services, and 

transportation infrastructure in its least developed region located ncar the border with Guatemala 

and Honduras. 650 Additionally, in 2014, El Salvador secured another $277 million compact to 

fund a project to connect a border-crossing corridor with Honduras and to fund reforms aimed at 

attracting foreign direct investment 651 

While Guatemala has not received an MCC compact, in 2014 the MCC board approved a $28 

million threshold program to support policies aimed at developing public-private partnerships 

and to enhance the education system to meet 21st century workforce demands. 652 Finally, 

Honduras secured a $205 million five-year grant in 2005 to fund transportation prqjects and to 

improve rural developmcnt653 This grant was not renewed because the government did not 

646 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL 13L:DGET JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED 

PROGRA\1S, FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2015), http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbs/2016/. 

"'' I.J.S. DEP'T OF STATF, OmCEOFWESTI'RN IIEMISPHEREf'ROGRAMS(JNI./WHP), http://www.statc.gov/jiinllwhp//. 

"'

8 Peter J. Meyer, Clare Ribando Sec ike, Maureen Taft-Morales, and Rhonda Margesson. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 

R 43702, UNACCOMPA~IED CHILDRE~ FROM CENTRAL AMERICA: FOREIGN POL.ICY CO~SIDERATIONS (20 15). 649 In 2004, Congressed established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to provide economic assistance to 

developing countries committed to investing in its society, principles of economic freedom, and good governance. 650 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, EL SALVADOR COMPACT, https://www.mcc.gov/wherc-wework/pro gram1

e !-salvador-compact. 651 Mll.LESNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, EL SALVADOR INVESTMENT COMPACT, https://www.mcc.gov/whercw e-work/program/e 1-sa lvador-investment -compact. 652 MILLE:-;N!UM CIIALLENGE CORPORATION, Gl!ATLMAI.A THRESHOLD PROGRAM, https://www.mcc.gov/where-wework/pro gram/ guatema la-thres hold-pro gram. 

"'Maria Rizza Leonzon. No MCC Aid Renewalfor Honduras, DEVEX (Jan. 7, 201 1). 

https://www.dcvcx.com/ncws/no-mcc-aid-rcnewal-for-honduras-72002. 

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152 

address corruption. However, in 20!3, the MCC approved a $15.6 million threshold program to 

build Honduras's public finances management c.apacity654 

A recent GAO report highlighted concerns with the effectiveness of current U.S. assistance. 655 

Specitically, GAO examined an interagency between the State Department and DOJ 

to train Honduran prosecutors and found upon visit to Honduras that there were no active 

prosecutors trying cases in Tegucigalpa, the country's capitol."56 In El Salvador, GAO observed 

''a computer lab tilled with computers recentlv provided by USAID but with no teacher 

prescnt."657 ~fparently, the Salvadoran Mini~try of Education had not yet provided salaries for 

the teachers. 65 ' 

Table 7. U.S. Assistance to El Salndor, Guatemala, and Honduras659 

in million dollars* 

FYlOll FY:l014 

(upended) ( c'l':pentied) 

El Salvador 54 50 44.5 46.6 

Gllal<emala 102.6 

Honduras 93.2 91.6 78.0 71.2 163 

USAID regional NlA NIA NIA 

State regional N/A N/A NIA N/A !27.1 

CARS! Incl. Incl. lncl. 286.5 

Total 250 232.8 2lo.6 544.2 980.9 2,218.5 

*FY2012 to FY2014 t1gures include aid provided State USA !D. DHS, and the Inter-American 

Foundation. FY2015 to FY2016 t1gures only State Department and USAlD. 

In an op-ed published earlier this year, Vice President Biden wrote about the Administration's 

response to the large migration from Central America in 2014 stating. "The challenges ahead are 

formidable. But if the political will exists, there is no Central America cannot become the 

next great success story ofthe Western Hemisphere. Showing their commitment to 

improving conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, on November 14,2014, the 

presidents of the Central American countries announced the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in 

the Northern Triangle 661 The four goals of the plan are to: l) stimulate the private sector; 2) 

develop opportunities for the people of Central America; 3) improve public safety and access to 

654 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, THRESHOLD PROGRAM (20!3), 

OFFII'l', 

PROGRAMS TO REDUCE UNACCOMPANILD CHILDREN MIGRATION (20 15). 

OF THE AI.UANCF FOR PROSPERITY I" THE NORTIIERN TRIANGLE: 

76 
153 

the justice system; and 4) strengthen institutions to increase people's trust in the state 662 Each 

country is responsible for contributing $5 billion to fund these initiatives 663 

In January, the Administration released its FY2016 budget request to implement the "U.S. 

Strategy for Engagement in Central America."664 The budget requests a total of $1.005 billion 

for Central America, the majority of which is allocated for programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, 

and Honduras. 665 

During the last two years, El Salvadorians, Guatemalans, and Hondurans living abroad, mostly in 

the U.S., sent over $25.1 billion to relatives in their countries of origin666 In 2014, remittances 

accounted for 16.8 percent of the GOP ($4.2 billion) in El Salvador, 9.9 percent ($5.5 billion) in 

Guatemala, and 17.7 percent ($3.44) billion in Honduras667 However, the numbers might be 

higher because each Central Bank uses a different methodology and some might not record all 

transfers processed through private accounts. 668 One theory by DHS and the State Department 

for the recent surge at the border is that children and family units are now traveling to the U.S. 

when a family member already in the U.S. sends them money to make the journey. 

Unauthorized Immigrant Populations 

In general, illegal immigration occurs in two ways: either ''when immigrants cross the U.S. 

border without authorization, or when they overstay a legal visa after it expired''669 

As of2014, the Pew Research Center estimates the population of illegal immi~rants in the U.S. 

to be 11.3 mill ion, or 3.5 percent of the total U.S. population of 316.1 million. >70 In 2007 the 

661/d 

''

63 Slowing Migrants to US will Cost $15 Billion, Guatemala says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2015), 

http://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 15-0 1-26/slowing-migrants-to-u-s-will-cost -15-billion-guatemala-says. 664 TilE WHITE HOUSic, FACT SHEET: PROMOTING PROSPERITY, SECURITY AC:O GOOD GOVERNANCE 1"-i CENTRAL 

A\tcR ICA (20 15) https://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 1510 I /29/fact -sheet-promoting-prosperity-securityand-good-governance-central-ame. 

''

65 Of the S I billion requested, $24 million is allocated for programs in Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. 

U.S. DI·.P'T OF STATE, CO:-iCiRESSIO)';AL BUDGFT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS, FiSCAL YEAR 2016 (20 15) http:llwww.state.gov/s/d/rm/rlslebs/20 16/. 606 Manuel Orozco, Laura Porras, and Julia Yansura, Trends and Remi!lances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 

2014 ", !mer-American Dialogue 5 (Inter-American Dialogue 20 15), http://www.thedialogue.org/wpcontent/uploadsl20 15/06/Trends inrcmittancesin20 14 forLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanFIN AL. pdf; see also World 

Bank. Personal Remittances, Received(% ofGDP), 

http:l/data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS. 

'''!d. 

668 GOV'T ACCOUNTAOILITY OFFICE, GA0-06-21 0, !NTER~ATIONM. REMITTANCES: DIFFeRENT ESWvlATIO)'; 

METIIODOLOCiiES PRODUCE DIFFERENT RESULTS (2006). 660 JeffreyS. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorioed Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH 

CENTER 14 (Nov. 18, 20 14), http://www.pewhispanic.org/20 14/11/ 18lunauthorized-immigrant-totals-risc-in-7-

states-fall-in-14i. 

670 lens Manuel Krogstad & JeffreyS. Passel, 5 Facts abaut //legal Immigration in the US .. PEW RESEARCH 

CENTER (July 24, 20 15), http://www.pcwrescarch.org/fact-tank/20 15/07/24/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-theu-s/. In January 2013 it is estimated that there were 13.1 million lawful permanent residents (LPRs), making up 4.14 

percent of the U.S. population and 11.3 million illegal residents, making up 3.54 percent of the U.S. population. 

77 
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illegal population peaked at 12.2 million, or 4 percent of the U.S. population, and declined 

during the recent recession. 611 In 2012, unauthorized immigrants made up about a quarter of the 

foreign-born population of approximately 42 million.672 

In 2012, more than half of the unauthorized immigrant population--<~pproximately 60 percentlived in the following six states: California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and 

Texas 673 Also of note, today African, Guatemalan and Salvadoran immigrants "have a 

substantial presence in the Washington, DC, metropolitan arca.''674 At the opposite end of the 

spectrum, in 20!2 fewer than 5,000 unauthorized immigrants lived in Maine, Montana, North 

Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia 675 

According to some estimates, between 2008 and 2012, approximately 8.1 million unauthorized 

immigrants were born in Mexico and other Central America countries (71 percent); 1.5 million 

from Asia (!3 percent); 8!7,000 from South America (7 percent); 455,000 from Europe, Canada, 

or Oceania (4 percent); 317,000 from Africa (3 percent); and 225,000 from the Caribbean (2 

pcrccnt).676 While Mexicans constitute a majority of unauthorized immigrants (52 percent in 

2012), their numbers have declined in recent years. 677 As the number of people unlawfully in the 

779,929 LPRs naturalized to become U.S. citizens, resulting in 18 million naturalized citizens. That same year the 

U.S. saw approximately 3.9 million births (12.4 per 1,000) and 2.6million deaths (8.2 per 1,000). U.S. DEP'Tor 

fiOMt:I.AND SECURITY, ESTIMATES OF THE LAWFUL PERMANENT RESJDENT POPULATION IN TilE UNITED STATES: 

]A};UARY 2013, https:llwww.dhs.govlsitcs/dcfault/fileslpublicationslois_lpryc_20l3.pdf; As Growth Stalls, 

Unauthorized Immigrant Population Becomes More Settled, PEW RESEARCH CeNTER (Sept. 3, 2014), 

http:! I www. pew hispanic. org/20 14/09103 I as-growth-stalls-unauthorized-immigrant -popu !at ion-becomes-moresettled/; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMElAND SECURITY, U.S NATl!RALI/ATIONS: 2013, 

http:l/www.dhs.govlsitesldefault!tiles/publications/ois _ natz_fr _ 20 13.pdf; CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 

PREVENTION, BIRTH DATA, http:llwww.cdc.govlnchslbirths.htm; CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL A};D PREVENTION, 

DEATJIS ANlJ MORTAUTY, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm. 671 Jeflrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESeARCH 

CENTER 6 (Nov. 18, 20 14 ), http://www. pewhispan ic.org/20 14/ I I I IS/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7 -statesfall-in-141. 

672 /d. at 14; UNITED STATicS CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS: USA, 

http:// quick facts .census .gov I q fdl states/00000. hun I. 673 Jeffi·cy S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH 

CENTER 6 (Nov. 18, 2014 ), http:llwww.pewhispanic.org/20 1411 Ill 8/unauthorizcd-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfa!l-in- 14/; see also lie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration 

in the United States, MIUR.>\TION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2015), 

http:/ !www. m igrat ionpo I icy. org/ article/ frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-imm igrat ion-united-states. 6

;

4 Marc R. Rosenblum and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, An Analysis of Unauthori;ed lnnnigrants in the United States by 

Country ond Region of Birth, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE \ (20 15), 

http: 1/w-..,vw .m igrat ionpo I icy. org/research/ analysis-unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-country-and -reg ion- birth 

(meanwhile, Hondurans arc Janrelv located in Texas, Florida, and the Southeast). 67 'i JeffreyS. Passel and D'Ver; C~ohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 1-1, PEW RESEARCH 

CFNTI'R 7 (Nov. 18. 10 14), http:l/www.pewhispanic.orgi2014/JI/18/unauthorizcd-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfall-in-141. 

676 Jic Zong and Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United 

States. MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2015), http:l/www.migrationpolicy.org/articlc/frequently-requestedstatistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states. 

677 JeffreyS. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14. PEW RESEARCH 

CENTER 9, 18 (Nov. 18, 2014), http:/iwww.pcwhispanic.org/20141111181unauthorizcd-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-

statcs-fall- in-141. 

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155 

U.S. from Mexico declined, the "unauthorized immigrant populations from South America, 

Europe, and Canada held steady" and the "unauthorized immigrant populations from Asia, 

Central America and the rest of the world" increased678 

From 2009 to 2012, seven states saw an increase in their unauthorized immigrant population: 

Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia679 For example, 

"[i]n Maryland, the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants grew to 250,000 in 2012, 

compared with 220,000 in 2007."680 In 14 states, the populations of unauthorized immigrants 

decreased from 2009 to 2012: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, 

Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky. Massachusetts. Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon. 681 In 

13 of these states, this decline was due to a decrease in illegal immigrants migrating from 

Mcxico.682 Illegal populations also decline when immigrants move to other states, "when fewer 

new immigrants arrive, when a greater number decide to leave the country or through deaths. "

683 

Demographics oft he Foreign-Born and Native Born Population 

According to the Department of Labor, ''the demographic composition of the foreign-born labor 

force differs from the native-born labor force.''684 In 2014, the foreign born labor force had more 

men and working adults between the ages of 25 to 54, as compared to the native-born labor 

force. 685 On the other hand, in 2014, "23.8 percent ofthe foreign-born labor force age 25 and 

over had not completed high school, compared with 4.6 percent of the native-born labor 

force."686 The proportion of foreign-born (34.2 percent) and native-born (38.2 percent) persons 

holding a bachelor's degree or higher was more comparable.687 From 2013 to 2014, the 

unemployment rate of foreign-born workers declined from 6.9 percent to 5.6 percent and fell for 

the native-born from 7.5 percent to 6.3 pcrcent 688 

According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the labor force is expected to expand 

more slowly in the future than in the 1980s and 1990s, slowing potential output. 689 Overall, 

678 !d .. see also Marc R. Rosenblum and Ariel G. Ruiz Solo, An Analysis <if Unauthorized Immigrants in the United 

States by Country and Region of' Birth, MIGRATION POLICY !NSTITCTE6 (2015), 

http :!iwww. migrat ionpo licy. org/rcscarch/analys is- unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-country-and-region-birth. 

""' JeffTey S. Passel and D'Vcra Cohn, Unauthorioed Immigrant To!als Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH 

CENTER II (Nov, 18, 2014). http:i/www.pewhispanic.org/2014!11/!8/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-

states-fall-in-14/. 

MW /d. 681 /d. at 12. 682 ld 

"''/d. 

1

'

84 U.S. DEP'TOF LABOR, LABOR FORCECHARACTERISTICSOF FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS (2014), 

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.nrO.htm. 

635 /d. (foreign-born men: 58.1 percent; native-born men: 52.2 percent; foreign-bam ages 25-54, 74.3 percent; 

native-born ages 25-54, 62.7 percent). 

""'Id 

6S7 !d. 

6SR !d. 

" 9 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TilE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2015 TO 2025 4 (2015), 

https://www.cbo.govisites/dcfau ltlfi les/ I 14th-congress-20 15-20 16/reports/49892-0utlook20 I 5.pdf. 

79 
156 

CBO predicts that "growth in the potential labor force will be held down by the ongoing 

retirement of the baby boomers; by a relatively stable labor force participation rate among 

working-age women, after sharp increases from the 1960s to the mid-1990s; and by federal tax 

and spending policies set in cuJTent law."690 The labor force participation rate has dropped in 

recent years, and is expected to continue to do so. CBO estimates that by the end of2019, the 

labor force participation rate will decline to 62 percent, most importantly due to the continued 

retirement of the baby-boomer generation691 

Today, the U.S. is currently at a fertility rate of 1.9692 According to one study, ''as the eightymillion-strong baby-boomer generation [retires]. ... The sixty-million Generation Xers that 

follow will ... leave[] approximately five million open jobs by 2018." 693 Many other countries 

are facing decreasing fertility rates as well. 694 Japan's declining birth rate, for example, is 

expected to result in less than 20 million people by 2050, from its peak of 127.5 million in 

2005fm Even Mexico is facing a decline in birthrates, forcing the country to import farm 

workers from Guatemala696 If cuJTent fertility rates in Europe remain constant, the total 

population of the continent will go from 73 8 million in 2015 to 646 million by the end of the 

century. 697 

Social Security is greatly affected by the number of workers in the labor force. While the 

number of workers paying into Social Security has risen, it has not risen to the level of the 

number of people retiring. In 1940, there were 35.4 million workers supporting 222,000 retirees, 

or 160 workers for every pensioner. 698 By 1950, the ratio fell to 16.5 workers for every retiree, 

by 1980, 3.2 workers for every retiree, and by 2010, 2.9 workers were paying for the benefits of 

each rctiree 699 The Social Security Administration predicts that by 2034, the ratio of workersto-retirees will fall to just 2.1 workers for every retiree as a result of retiring baby boomers and 

declining fertility rates 700 As the worker-to-retiree ratio drops, the tax burden increases. 701 

(>90 ld 

691 Id at 43. 692 United Nations, World Population Prospects The 2015 Revision (New York, 2015). 693 Shannon K. O'Neil, Two Nations Indivisible. Mexico, The United States, and the Road Ahead 57 (Oxford 

University Press 2013) (citing !larry Bluestone and Mark Melnik, After the Recovery: Help Needed the Coming 

Lahar Shortage and How People in Encore Careers Can Help Solve It (Civic Ventures, 2010)). 

'""' S. Philip Morgan. Is Low Fertility a Twenty-First Century Demographic Crisis? 2 (Demography 2003) (Just 3 

percent of the \\··odd's population Jives in countries that are not seeing tCrtility decline), 695 U!'-JITED NATIOt>iS POPULATION DIVISIO!'-J, REPI.ACE\JENT MIGRATION: JAPAN, 

http://www. u n. org! esa/popu lation/pu bl icat ions/migration/japan. pdf. 696 Miriam Jordan, U.S.. Mexico Increasingly Competing.for Farm Labor, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 23, 20 15), 

http://www.wsj.com/articleslu-s-mexico-incrcasingly-competing-for-farm-labor-1422043 153 (citing the birthrate in 

Mexico to be 2.05 children per woman); see also Shannon K. O'Neil, Two Nations lndivisih/e.· Mexico. The United 

States. and the Road Ahead 57 (Oxford University Press 2013) ("After 2020, somewhere between one hundred 

thousand and two hundred thousand fewer Mexicans will be coming of age each year compared to 2010. This 

translates to at least a half million to a million fewer Mexican looking for jobs in the 2020s. The thirty-year wave of 

sufply-led migration between the United States and Mexico has now passed, and will likely never happen again"). 

"'' United Nations, World PopulatiOn Prospects The 2015 Revision (New York, 20 15). 698 SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, RATIO OF SOCIAL SECURITY COVERED WORKERS TO IJENEFICIARIES CALENDAR 

YEARS 1940-20 I 0, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ratios.html. 699 Jd 

'

00 SOCIAL SECURITY AllMINISTRATIO:i, TllF FUTURE OF SOCIAl. SECURITY (2008). 

80 
157 

Labor Parricipation and lncenlives 

In 2013, the foreign born share of the U.S. civilian labor force "accounted for nearly 17 percent 

(26.2 million) of the 158.6 million workers in the civilian labor force."702 From 1990 to 2013, 

"the percentage of forei~n-born workers in the civilian labor force more than tripled, from 5 

percent to 17 percent."7 3 As to wages, ''[i]n 2014, the median usual weekly earnings of foreignborn, full-time wage and salary workers ($664) were 81.0 percent of the earnings of their nativeborn counterparts ($820). 704 

In 2012, 8.1 million illegal immigrants "were working or looking for work," accounting for 5.1 

percent ofthc civilian labor forcem5 In testimony before the Committee, Pew stated that 

"[u]nauthorized immigrants are more likely than the overall U.S. population to be of working 

age." 706 Pew estimates that of the 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants in 2012, only 800,000 

are children and approximately 150,000 are over 65-half of which remain in the labor force 

despite being of retirement age. 707 "Among the states, the share of unauthorized immigrants in 

the labor force is highest in Nevada (10.2 percent in 2012)," followed by California (9.4 percent) 

and Texas (8.9 percent). 708 

According to another study, in 2013, of the 7,741,185 unauthorized population in the workforce 

nationwide, 704,726 (9.I percent) worked in managerial or professional specialty roles; 

!.!57,583 (15 percent) worked in technical, sales and administrative support; 2,128,729 (27.5 

percent) worked in services, such as janitors, maids. housekeepers, groundskeepers; 731,347 (9.4 

percent) worked in farming, forestry, and fishing; l, 175,890 ( 15.2 percent) worked in precision 

production, craft, and repair; and I ,67! ,511 (21.6 percent) worked as operators, fabricators, and 

laborers. 709 

Of course, the numbers and percentages vary by state. In Wisconsin, for example, of the 61,254 

unauthorized population in the workforce in 2013, 9,538 (15.6 percent) of the unauthorized 

701 THE TAX FOUNDATION, SOCIAL SECURITY AMl MEDICARE TAX RATES, 1937-2009. 70

~ Jie Zong and Jeanne 8atalova, Frequently Requested Stat;stics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United 

Stales, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 20 I 5), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requestcdstat ist ics-immigrants-and-im rn igration-un ited-statcs. 7(}3 !d. 

7111 U.S. DEP'TOF LABOR, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS (2014), 

http://www. b Is. gov /news. re lea se/forbrn.nrO. htm. 705 JeffreyS. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals R1:1e in 7 States. Fall in 14, PEW RESEARCH 

CrNH'R 8 (Nov. !8, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/20 14/I I/18/unauthorized-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfal\-in-14/. 

706 Securing the Border: Defining 1he Current Population Living in the Shadmvs and Addressing Future Flows: 

Hearing Before the S Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, I !4th Cong. (2015) (statement of Jeffrey 

S. Passel, PH.D., Senior Demographer, Hispanic Trends Project, Pew Research Center). 

'

07 Data provided to Majority Staff by Pew Research Center. 70 ' JeffreyS. Passel and D'Vcra Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in /4, PEW RESEARCH 

CrNTER 8 (Nov. I 8, 20 14), http://www.pewhispanic.org/20 14/I 1/18/unauthorizcd-immigrant-totals-rise-in-7-statesfall-in-14/. 

7119 CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES, ESTIMATES OF TilE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION FOR STATES, 

http:!/ data, crnsny. org/. 

81 
158 

population worked in farming, forestry, and fishing and 16,450 (26. 9 percent) worked as 

operators, fabricators, and laborersno On the other hand, In Delaware, of the 14,852 

unauthorized population in the workforce, 2,524 (17 percent) worked in managerial or 

professional specialty roles and 2,792 (18.8 percent) worked in technical, sales, and 

administrative support roles. 711 

''The main economic factor influencing migration is the wage gap, or the difference 

between what a potential migrant can earn in the U.S. compared to the migrant's home 

country. Differences in average wages for similar workers between developed and 

developing countries constitute the single largest price distortion remaining in global 

markets."712 

Over the last several decades, migrant survey data suggested that the wage gap based on actual 

labor market outcomes in the U.S. and Mexico was approximately $7 to $1, if valued at the 

commercial exchange rate. 713 Today, this gap has fallen to as low as $5 to $1 714 However, this 

wage gap is expected to continue to be above $3 to $1 until 2075. 715 The wage gap between the 

U.S. and Central American countries in terms of income is larger than the wage gap between the 

U.S. and Mexico716 According to economists, people will relocate if the ratio is above $2 to 

$1.717 

710 /d 

711/d 

'"Bryan Robe11s, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing 11/egal!mmigration to the United States: How Effective 

is Enforcement?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (2013) (citing Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and 

Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differencesji!r Identical Workers across the U.S. Border, CENTER FOR 

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2008)). 713 Bryan Roberts, Edward Alden, John Whitley, Managing 11/egaiimmigration to the United States: How Effective 

is Enj(Jrcement', COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (2013). 

"'!d. 

715 !d. at 9. 716 /d. at Appendix 2: Wage Gap and Other Trends in Central American Source Countries, 

http://www.cfi'.org!immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658. 

"'Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: Wage Differences for 

Identical Workers across the US Border, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVElOPMENT (2008). 

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Conclusion and Recommendations for Proposed Legislation 

It cannot be overstated: our borders are not secure. According to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, 

we will not even have 100 percent situational awareness, much less operational control of our 

borders, by the time this Administration kaves office. 718 Rather than stall important reforms that 

will make our country safer, the Chairman encourages the Administration to work with Congress 

toward important, incremental improvements at our border. 

This report makes the following recommendations for improving border security on America's 

southwest, northern, and maritime borders, as well as at our ports of entry. To truly secure our 

borders, we must identify, eliminate, or drastically reduce the incentives for illegal immigration. 

We also must add more boots on the ground, tactical infrastructure, and technology across all our 

border sectors. This report does not propose major reforms to America's border security 

policies. Instead, it offers a list of realistic, important steps toward continuous improvement that 

the Chairman believes could be achieved in the upcoming months. 

Require adequate mctrics to measure border security across all U.S. borders-land, air, and 

sea, with appropriate oversight and transparency. 

Over the course of the Committee's border security hearing series, the Majority Staff found it 

challenging to obtain basic and consistent information from DHS. One way to improve border 

security is to properly detine the problem. Therefore, DHS should utilize metrics that truly 

define the threats across all of our borders. In order to ensure appropriate oversight, GAO should 

confirm the adequacy of these metrics and the data used to arrive at these metrics should be 

made available to the academic and law enforcement community, as well as the general public. 

Ultimately, understanding these threats will help inform both elected officials and the public as 

to what exactly our border security problems are. Getting this information now will put us on an 

important path towards solving our immigration problems in the future. 

Earlier this year, the Chairman introduced a bill outlining important metrics DHS should utilize 

and provide to the public in order to fully define the security across our borders. This bill 

cleared the Committee on a bipartisan basis. However, a small group of Democrats arc currently 

preventing this bill from proceeding, noting that it is not comprehensive immigration reform and 

therefore should not advance. 

Ensure sufficient safeguards are in place in both the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program and 

Visa Waiver Program. 

After the horrific attacks in Paris, both citizens and elected official across the country have called 

for a review of U.S. security programs. Particular focus had been on the U.S. Refugee 

Resettlement Program and the Visa Waiver Program. 719 In November, the House passed a veto-

"' See The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission/or Fiscal Year 2016: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (20 15). 719 The Impact of'IS!S on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: Hearing B0f'ore the S. Comm. on Homeland 

Security & CJovernmental Affairs, !!4th Cong. (2015). 

83 
160 

proof bipartisan bill that would require supplemental certifications and background 

investigations on certain refugees before they are admitted to the United States. Other Members 

are considering legislation to update the security safeguards in the Visa Waiver Program, 

particularly since the known attackers in Paris were nationals of countries that are part of the 

program. 

Earlier this year, the President announced plans to raise the refugee ceiling to 85,000 for FY2016 

and to 100,000 for FY2017720 During a hearing focused on the topic, Chainnan Johnson pointed 

out to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCJS) that this plan would 

increase the agency's caseload by 21 percent and 43 percent, respectively. 721 US CIS was 

questioned whether the management solution to this increase would be to streamline the vetting 

process. 722 To provide the American public with assurances that the U.S. will not short-circuit 

the vetting process, the Chairman introduced the Senate companion to the house-passed 

legislation mentioned above. As this bill advances and new information regarding U.S. 

vulnerabilities emerges, the Chairman is considering amending the bill to also include Visa 

Waiver Program enhancements. 

Initiate a concentrated public relations campaign to dissuade all Americans, but in 

particular young people, from using and becoming addicted to drugs. 

America's insatiable demand for drugs is one root cause (perhaps the root cause) preventing the 

achievement of a secure border. And yet, we have not had a significant, nationwide ad campaign 

regarding the harms associated with drug abuse since Ronald Regan's "Campaign Against Drug 

Abuse" in the 1980s.723 While appropriate safeguards are needed to identify the costs and 

expected results of such campaigns, it is important that the public understands the risks 

associated with drugs use. Further, we must begin to break down the stigma associated with 

drug usc so people feel free to talk about their struggles and seek recovery options. 

This year, the Committee has explored, and will continue to explore, how the country's heroin 

epidemic has devastated communities across the nation. In New IIamf:shirc, the Committee 

heard a father tell the story of his young daughter's heroin addiction. 7 4 The father explained 

that for too long his family kept their daughter's addiction quiet, ashamed that this was 

happening to them725 In November, the Committee traveled to Arizona to understand both how 

heroin is crossing into the country and how its effects impact the Phoenix community. The 

Committee also plans to travel to Milwaukee for an upcoming tield hearing, as statistics show 

720 U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, U.S. Dep't ofl-lealth and Human Services, Proposed 

Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016 Repmt to Congress Submitted on Behalfofthe President of the United 

States to the Committees on the Judiciary United States Senate and United States House of Representatives (2015). 

721 /d. 

7:!2 !d. 723 Campaign Against Drug Abuse, WETA (Sept. 14, 1986), 

http://www. pbs .org/w gbh/americanexperience/ features/ prirnary-resources/reagan~drug -carnpa ign/, 724 All Hands on Deck Working Together to End the Trafficking and Ahuse of Prescription Opioids, Heroin. and Fentcmyl 

Hearing Befbre the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of 

Doug Griffin, Father of Courtney Griffin). 72' Id 

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161 

that between 2008 and 2012, heroin overdose deaths in Wisconsin tripled. 726 The first step in 

problem solving is to admit that you have one. The Committee will continue to work to bring 

public awareness to this issue. 

Reform the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of2008 

(TVPRA) to eliminate incentives for illegal immigration. 

Children entering the U.S. from Mexico and Canada are screened within 48 hours.727 Upon 

determining that a child does not qualify tor asylum or is not a victim of human trafficking, DHS 

can then offer the minor voluntary removal or expedite their repatriation.728 

Conversely, pursuant to the TVPRA, children from noncontiguous countries such as El Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras, must be transferred to HHS within 72 hours of apprehension while 

waiting for an immigration court hearing; they cannot be immediately transferred back to their 

home countries. 729 HHS releases under parole authority over 90 ~crcent ofUACs into the 

interior of the country to relatives and sponsors living in the U.S. 30 

Institutionalizing a single, consistent procedure to process all UACs can reduce the incentive to 

embark on the dangerous journey to the United States. DHS resources are better utilized when 

legislation is consistent with how we treat those who unlawfully enter the U.S. While some also 

advocate lor additional immigration judges to resolve the crisis, a clearly defined definition of an 

unaccompanied minor can simplify processing procedures and increase the number of expedited 

removals, while continuing to protect victims of human trafficking. Moreover, additionaljudges 

are of little value if minors are not showing up for their court dates. 

As unaccompanied minors and family units arriving at the southwest border is again on the rise, 

the Chairman is considering legislation that would allow for the expedited removal of all illegal 

crosscrs in order to discourage children and families from taking the dangerous, sometimes 

deadly journey, through Central America and Mexico and across the southwest border. 

Not only would eliminating an incentive to migrate illegally to the U.S. protect the lives of many 

children and families, it would also ensure that the very people who are eager to seek opportunity 

remain in and improve their own countries. The Migration Policy Institute estimates that close to 

one in five Salvadorans and approximately one in 15 Guatemalans and Hondurans already reside 

in the U.S. 731 On a recent CO DEL to Central America, the president of Honduras told the 

726 DEA Strategic Intelligence Section, National Heroin Threat Assessment, U.S Dep't of Justice, Drug Enforcement 

Administration. DEA-DCT-DIR-022-15 at 44 (April2015). 727 Pub. L. No. 110-457 (2008). 

728 !d. 

721) !d. 

710 Dara Lind. Thousands of Children are Fleeing Central America to Texas-A/one, VOX (June 4, 2014), 

http://www. YO x. com/2 0 14/6/4/577326 8/ children-migration-centra 1-america-texas-u naccomp an ied-a I ien-ch ildrcnborder-crisis. 

" 1 Marc R. Rosenblum, Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United Stares: The Tension between Protection and 

Prevention, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 12-13 (2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research!unaccompanicdchi!d-migration-united-states-tension-bet\veen-protection-and-prevention. 

85 
162 

delegation that witnessing his people leave their country for opportunities in the U.S. was a "slap 

in the face." Meanwhile, the President-elect in Guatemala argued for a renewed sense of 

nationalism in his country to motivate his people to remain in and fight for Guatemala. 

Provide Border Patrol agents access to federal lands. 

Various federal land agencies have different missions, guidelines, and management plans 

regarding CBP access to federal land under their respective jurisdictions, which has historically 

slowed or im~eded CBP-and its predecessor agency-in conducting border security operations 

on such land. 32 In Arizona, 80 percent of the border has restricted access due to national forests, 

wildlife refuges. military training ranges, and a Native American Reservation.733 

In 2006, in an attempt to resolve ongoing cont1icts between federal land managers and CBP over 

access to federal lands, DHS, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOl) and the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture (USDA) entered into a nationwide MOU concerning border security operations on 

federal lands. 734 However, the MOU has not worked as intended, causing delays and 

impediments that threaten the security of our border. 

For example, a 2011 GAO report found that "14 of the 26 Border Patrol stations along the 

southwestern border reported experiencing delays" in operations due to the time it took land 

managers to complete environmental and historic assessments.735 ln20!0, GAO cited a case 

where Border Patrol needed to improve a road so that a truck could relocate an underground 

sensor, but the federal land agency took eight months to perform a historic property 

assessment736 In another example, Border Patrol was required to wait four months for land 

managers to make a decision to approve the relocation of a mobile surveillance system to a 

different location.717 By the time the land manager completed the environmental assessments, 

"illegal traftic had shifted to other areas.738 During this del-~~9 Border Patrol agents lost their 

abihty to detect Illegal crossers withm a seven-mile radms. · 

At a Committee mark-up, the Committee considered a bill introduced by Senator McCain that 

would provide Border Patrol agents access to federal lands in the Tucson and Yuma sectors. 

While the Majority Staff recommends expanding this bill to all border sectors, the Chairman 

E.g, GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-ll-38, SOUTHWEST BORDER: MORE TIMELY BORDER PATROL 

ACCESS AND TRAINING COliLD IMPROVE SECURITY OPERATIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION ON 

Ff'DERAL LANDS 22 (20 l 0). 

m U.S. CUSTOMS A'iD BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, ARIZONA INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW (2015) 

(on file with Majority Stat1). 

'·''Memorandum of Understanding Among U.S. Department ofllomeland Security and U.S. Department of the 

Interior and U,S, Department of Agriculture Regarding Cooperative National Security and Counterterrorism Efforts 

o,~ Federal Lands along the United States' Border (Mar. 2006). 7

o. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-573T, SOUTHWEST BORDER: BORDER PATROL OPERATIO);S O'i 

FEDERAL LANDS l 0 (20 ll ). 

'·'" GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-38, SOUTHWEST BORDER: MORE TiMELY BORDER PATROL ACCESS 

AND TRAINING COULD IMPROVE SECURITY OPERATIO'iS AND NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTIO'i O'i fEDERAL LANDS 

24 (2010). 

m /d. at 23. 

7.18 /d. 

'" /d. 

86 
163 

supports a piecemeal approach to this solution. Importantly, an amendment offered by Senator 

Heitkamp called for a GAO study to consider the impacts of this access and implications for 

applying this bill across all border sectors. The bill passed the Committee on a bipartisan basis. 

Require DHS to examine the threats on the northern border. 

During the Committee's hearing on the northern border, a clear pattern emerged-the northern 

border is far from secure, and this insecurity poses various threats to America. Experts have 

testified that it is ''commonly accepted" that the more significant terrorist threat comes from the 

U .S.-Canada bordcr74° Canadian cities have seen a recent increase in terrorist threats, as 

illustrated by the incident in October 2014, in which a Canadian soldier on duty was killed at the 

National War Memorial in Ottawa741 

Additionally, the northern border presents significant opportunities for those looking to smuggle 

illicit narcotics into America. A significant portion of the U.S.-Canada border is remote, dense 

forest, making it easier for drug traffickers to cross the border undetected742 Investigations have 

shown that drug traffickers are utilizing these rural areas, as not only does the terrain provide 

natural concealment, but law enforcement agencies lack cross-border detection equipment such 

as radar in those areas. 743 

In addition to threats from terrorists and drug traffickers, the U.S.-Canada border is also transited 

by human smugglers and traffickers. DHS HSI and Canadian law enforcement recently 

intercepted an operation that involved the trafficking of young Romanian women through the 

northern border.~44 

Because the threats at the northern border significantly differ from the threats associated with the 

southwest border, Congress should call on the Department to conduct a threat analysis 

specifically on the northern border. The Chairman joined Senators Ayotte, Heitkamp, and Peters 

in introducing a bill that required this threat assessment. This bill unanimously passed the 

Committee and is set to unanimously clear the Senate in the upcoming weeks. 

Call on the Chief of the Border Patrol to move agents to areas of high risk. 

Over time, different sectors of the border experience different levels of activity. San Diego was 

previously one of the most highly trafficked areas of the border, but added resources and fencing 

740 Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at Arnerica's Northern border and Ports of Entry: Hearing 

Before the S. Subcomm. on Immigration, RefUgees and Border Security of the S Comm. on the Judicimy, 1l2th 

Cong. (2011) (statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 741 Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Northern Border: Hearing Before the 5. 

Comm. on Homeland Securi(v & Governmemal Affairs, I 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Richard Hartunian, U.S. 

Attorney for the Northern District of New York, U.S. Attorney's Office, U.S. Department of Justice). 

m !d. (statement of David Rodriguez, N011hwest High Intensity Drug Traftlcking Area (fl!DTA), Oftlce of National 

Drug Control Policy. 7.t3 hi. 

741 !d. (statement of Richard Hartunian, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York, U.S. Attorney's 

Office, U.S. Department of Justice). 

87 
164 

shifted focus away from that sector (see Figure 2) 745 The Tucson sector then became the most 

heavily trafficked area until the recent influx in children from Central America, which made the 

Rio Grande Valley the busiest sector.746 

Given the ever-changing levels of traffic in the difTerent sectors, the Chief of Border Patrol 

should have the ability to move agents to the areas that arc in the most need of more agents. By 

allowing this, Border Patrol can ensure that the sectors of the border that require the most 

attention are getting the manpower needed in order to ensure the security of the border. 

Provide and maintain adequate manpower on our border and satisfy hard to fill vacancies at 

our POEs. 

One of the main problems with securing the border is the lack ofmanpower747 The National 

Border Patrol Council has testified at three Committee hearings that an additional 5,000 agents 

are needed in order to fully secure the northern and southwest borders748 At another Committee 

hearing, witnesses spoke about Operation Strong Safety, in which Texas Governor Rick Perry 

deployed the Texas Department of Public Safety to the bordcr749 According to the Texas DPS 

report and witness testimony, the operation was extremely successful. 750 

Today, both officer and agent positions remain open on both the notihern and southwest border, 

as well as across our POEs. Members of the Committee have expressed concerns during 

Committee hearings about the need to till these positions.751 In FY20!3, Congress appropriated 

to the Department additional funding to hire 2,000 officers at our POEs. However, due to 

attrition and the time it takes to bring on new officers, CBP has only realized a net gain of 818 

ofJicers. CBP should consider creative options to fill these positions, including utilizing 

partnerships with the Department of Defense, the National Guard, and state and local 

governments. 

745 San Diego Fence Provides Lessons in Border Control, NPR (Apr. 6, 2006), 

http://www. npr. o rg/tcmp lates/ story/ story. p hp? story I d~ 53 23 92 8. 746 H. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BLUEPRINT FOR SOUTHERN BORDER 

SECURITY (2014). 7

'n Securing the Southl~Jest Border: Perspectivesfl·om Beyond the Beltway: Hearing B~fore the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Chris Cabrera, National Border 

Patrol Council). 7

.u; !d., see also Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and Unanswered Questions: Hearing Before the S. 

C'omm. on /lome/and Security & Governmental Affairs. I 14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of Shawn Moran, Vice 

President, National Border Patrol Council); Ongoing Migration from Central America: An Examination of FY201 5 

Apprehensions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Securit)· & Governmental Affairs. !14th Cong. (20 15) 

(statement of Chris Cabrera, National Border Patrol Council). 740 See generally Securing the Border.· AssessinR the Impact r?(Transnational Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 

on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (20 15). 750 /d.; TEXAS DEP'T OF PlJGUC SAFETY, OPERATION STRONG SAFETY REPORT TO TilE 84TII TEXAS LEGISLATURE 

AND OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (2015) (Unclassified Version). 751 Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies fbr the Northern Border.· Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Securitv & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Cong. (20 15) (statement of Senator Heidi Heitkamp). 

88 
165 

To begin to address this problem, the Chairman introduced a bill with Senators Flake, McCain, 

and Schumer that would require CBP and DOD to identify separating service members with 

duties that arc transferable to CBP oUicer duties and make them aware of job opportunities 

within CBP. This bill also requires that the agencies use existing authorities to expeditiously hire 

these separating service members to fill open CBP oflicer positions at U.S. ports of entry. The 

Border Jobs for V ctcrans Act of 2015 passed the Committee and Senate by unanimous consent. 

Shortly thereafter, a companion bill cleared the House and Senate and was signed into law. 

Complete the Congressionally-mandated fencing requirement along the southwest border and 

understand our country's fencing needs and current assets to determine what more is 

necessary. 

The U.S.-Mcxico border is nearly 2,000-miles long. Today, according to DHS, there is 

approximately 653 miles offront-line fencing on the southwest border: 353 miles of primary 

fence, 36 miles of secondary fencing, and 300 miles of vehicle barrier fence. To reach its 

statutory ~·equirement to construct fencing "along not less than 700 miles of the southwest 

border,"N deploying additional fencing is necessary. As the De~artment does not appear to be 

prioritizing resources to complete this Congressional mandate, 75 it is imperative that Congress 

continue to provide oversight to ensure additional fencing is deployed. 

Moreover, it is important to understand where current fencing exists along the southwest border, 

what fencing is most effective, and what fencing needs to be repaired. Many of these questions 

were asked at a Committee hearing but adequate answers could not be provided in an 

unclassified setting. 754 More information should be provided to the Committee and the public at 

large on our fencing and tactical infrastructure needs. The Committee has called on GAO to 

study this important issue and awaits that report to determine next steps. 

Require each border security technology acquisition program to demonstrate it has an 

approved baseline for cost, schedule, and performance. 

At several hearings, the Committee heard how technology acts as an important force multiplier 

towards border security cnforcement.755 However, since 2005, GAO has identified DHS's 

acquisition management as an activity on their "High Risk List." 756 In March 2014, GAO found 

that CBP had a schedule for seven programs within the Arizona Technology Plan-and ''four of 

Pub. L. No. I 04-208, div. C, §I 02(a)-(c) ( 1996), as amended by Pub. L. No. I 09-13, div. B, §I 02 (2005); Pub. L. 

No. 109-367, §3 (2006); and Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, §564(a) (2008). 751 Michael John Garcia, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43975, BARRIERS ALONG TilE U.S. BORDFRS: KEY 

AUTHORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS 9 (20 15). 754 See Securing the Border: Fencing, h?fi·astructure, and Technology Force A1ultipliers: !-fearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental A{firirs, !14th Cong. (2015). 7

:-. 5 See, e.g, Securing the Border: Fendng, !r!frastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers: Hearing Before the S. 

Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, !14th Coug. (20 15) (statement of Ronald Vitiello, Deputy 

ChieC Office of Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Prot.). 756 GOV'T ACCOUNTABil.ITY OFFICE, GA0-15-171 SP, HOMELAND SECURITY ACQt;ISIT!ONS: MAJOR PROGRAM 

ASSESSMENTS REVEAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY ] (20 15). 

89 
166 

the programs would not meet their originally planned completion dates."757 Additionally, the 

status of the Integrated Fixed Tower program's initial operational capability date moved from the 

end ofFY2013 to the end ofFY20!5. 758 While full operational capability was scheduled to 

occur by September 2015. the date has now been pushed back seven years to March 2022. 759 

At a Committee hearing, GAO testified that "CBP has identified the mission benefits of its 

surveillance technologies such as improved situational awareness and agent safety."760 

However, per GAO recommendations, "CBP needs to develop and implement performance 

measures and analyze data it is now collecting to be able to fully assess the contributions of its 

technologies to border security." 761 

There is a clear need for DHS to acquire and implement technologies in a timely manner, which, 

to date, has not occurred. Technology and other force multipliers play an important role in 

securing the border, and will reach their maximum effectiveness if they are both acquired and 

installed in accordance with set time lines. Once the technologies are installed, there should be 

stated and achievable performance metrics that will determine whether these technologies are 

meeting their performance thresholds. 

Senator McCain recently introduced a bill requiring that each border security technology 

acquisition program demonstrate that it has a cost, schedule, and perfonnance baseline approved 

by the relevant DHS authority, and who also certifies that each program meets the thresholds. 

This bill was unanimously approved by the Committee. 

Ensure that successful state and local programs, such as Operation Stonegarden, arc used 

appropriately and efficiently to maximize manpower at and ncar U.S. borders. 

Operation Stone garden, a grant program operated through FEMA, has proven beneficial to those 

who live and work at the border762 The program provides funding to state and local 

governments to increase operational capacity at the border as well as enhance coordination 

among local, state, and federal enforcement agencies. However, in order to ensure that 

Operation Stonegarden remains successful, it is important to confirm that funds are used 

757 GOV'T ACCOU>;TAHIL\TY OFFICE, GA0-15-595T, BOROER SECURITY: PROGRESS AND CHALLE).:GES IN DHS's 

EFFORTS TO IMI'U'MENT AND ASSESS INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECJINOLOGY 3 (20 15) in Securing the Border: 

Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology Force Nfultiphers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 

Governmental Afjc1irs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Sec. and Justice, 

Gov't Accountability Office). 758 !d. 

/d. 760 Securing the Border: Fencing, !nj;·astructure, and Technoloxy Force lv!ultipliers: Hearing Before the 5. Comrn. 

on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, 

Homeland Sec. and Justice, Gov't Accountability Office). 761 /d 7

{' 1 See Securing the ,__)~outhH'est Border: Perspectivesji-om Beyond the Bf:!/Hvay: J/earing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Afjc1irs, !14th Cong. (20 15); see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION, PERFOR~ANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2013,12 (2014) ("Stonegarden funds 

increase operational capabilities tOr multijurisdictionallaw enforcement entities, promoting a layered, coordinated 

approach to law enf(>rccmcnt."). 

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appropriately for actual border security functions. To that end, the Majority Staff will continue 

to conduct oversight on the use of these funds. 

Cut off federal funding for sanctuary cities that release criminal aliens into local 

communities, endangering public safety, and provide immunity to law enforcement officers 

so that courts cannot prevent them from honoring dctainers. 

At a Committee hearing, ICE testified that it is not repatriating unaccompanied minors that 

unlawfully entered the country last summer because it prioritizes its resources on criminal 

aliens 763 However, recently a young woman was shot by a criminal alien who had been 

deported five times and had seven felony convictions 764 ICE testified that in that particular case, 

the criminal alien was released because San Francisco did not honor the ICE detainer765 In fact, 

the criminal alien located to San Francisco because of its lenient enforcement policies 766 

Sanctuary jurisdictions that do not cooperate with the enforcement of federal immigration laws 

or do not honor federal immigration dctainers should not receive federal funding. Moreover, 

legislation should be passed that provides immunity to jurisdictions that honor federal detaincrs 

and hold criminal aliens until ICE can pick them up. This is necessary, as recent court decisions 

have led many jurisdictions to release criminal aliens due to liability concerns. 

In October, the Senate considered a bill offered by the Chairman, along with Senators Vitter, 

Toomey, Grassley, Cruz, Cornyn, Sullivan, Perdue, Isakson, Rubio, and Barrasso, that cut off 

federal funding of certain grants for jurisdictions that follow sanctuary city policies. 

Unfortunately, the Democrats chose to block this important reform. 

Ensure the continuation of current Border Patrol programs, such as Operation Streamline, that 

provide penalties to recent border crossers in order to reduce recidivism. 

Border Patrol has created a Consequence Delivery System guide to demonstrate what 

consequences arc most effective in reducing recidivism for various types of unlawful crossers. 

According to the guide, voluntary returns and similar programs are the least ct1cctive and 

etlicient. 767 On the other hand, programs that emphasize expedited removal have been shown to 

763 See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Revie1r cij the Government's Response to Unaccompanied 

A4mors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govermnental Affairs, ll4th Cong. 

(2015). 

761 Michelle Moons, Breaking: Pier 1-1 Murder Suspect Had Been Deported 5 Times IYith 7 Felonies, FlREITOART 

(July 3, 20 I 5), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/20 I 5/07/03/breaking-pier-14-murder-suspect-had-been-deported-5-

times-with-7-felonies/. 

765 See The 2014 Humanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review of the Government's Response to Unaccompanied 

tl1inors One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, !14th Cong. 

(2015). 

'''"Jonah Lustig and Emily Shapiro, San Francisco Pier Shooting Suspect Francisco Sanchez Allegedly Used 

Federal Agent's Gun, Sources Say, ABC NEWS (July 8, 20 15). http://abcnews.go.com/US/san-francisco-piershoot ing -suspect-franc isco-sanc hcz-meant/sto ry?id= 3 22 815 8 7 767 U.S. CUSTOMS AND FlORDER PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2013,64 

(2014). 

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be extremely effective and efficient. According to CBP, recidivism has decreased each year 

since the implementation of the Consequence Delivery System in 2011 768 

Operation Streamline expedites the criminal processing of illegal border crosscrs by allowing 

groups to have their charges heard at the same time, often resulting in jail time. 769 According to 

the Consequence Delivery System, Operation Streamline has shown itself to be the most 

effective and efficient with those who are apprehended for the first time, those who have been 

apprehended two or three times, and those who are a "persistent alicn."770 In addition, Operation 

Streamline has shown itself to be highly effective and efficient with suspected smugglers, 

targeted smugglers, and criminal aliens. 771 Despite its successes, the Committee has recently 

been notified that the DOJ has indicated that Operation Streamline should no longer apply to first 

time border crossers772 

Policies that eliminate or reduce incentives for illegal immigration should be continued, not 

limited. Therefore, at a future mark-up, the Committee will consider a bill the Chainnan 

introduced with Senators Flake, McCain, and Grassley that expresses the Sense of the Senate that 

Operation Streamline is a successful program that should continue to apply to first time border 

crossers. 

Emphasize intelligence-based strategies at our borders. 

The Committee has heard that smugglers recruit high school and middle school students because 

they believe students are less likely to be identified by law enforcement and this age group will 

not be prosecuted.773 Smuggling networks also utilize scouts who operate along both sides of the 

border with impunity, notifying smugglers of when to cross. 774 To get to the source of the 

problem, DHS should use intelligence-based strategies to investigate, arrest, and prosecute scouts 

and smugglers. DHS should also impose heavier penalties for smugglers who utilize minors to 

carry out their criminal activity. 

Authorize the Department's preclearance agreements. 

DHS components and the American intelligence community benefit from preclearance 

partnerships. By posting immigration and customs officials in foreign countries, 01-!S expands 

768 ld. 

769 Lisa Seghctti, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43356, BORDER SECURJTY: lMMIGRATIO~ ENFORCEMENT BETWEE~ 

PORTS OF E~TRY 8 (2014). 770 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, TUCSON SECTOR: CONSEQUENCE DELIVERY SYSTEM GUIDE, FY2014 

(20 15) (on file with Majority Staff). 77! !d. 771 Letter from Leon N. Wilmot, Sheriff, Yuma County to the Honorable Jeff Flake (Aug. 19, 20 14), 

http://www. flake.senate.gov/publ ic/ _ cache/files/9d45 fS I e- 521 b-42e 1-9df8-407 e5d243 88fiflake-jeff-re-operationstreamline-081920 14.pdf. This letter was subsequently confirmed by Customs and Border Protection. 77

~ See Securing the South\-vest Border: Perspectives from Beyond the Beltway: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, I 14th Con g. (20 15). 771 On a CO DEL in South Texas, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Senator Sasse observed a 

presumed scout perched along the Mexican side of the Rio Grande. 

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America's virtual borders to the point of departure. Preclearance operations help U.S. law 

enforcement authorities better understand threats emanating from participating countries and 

identify terrorists and criminals before they arrive at a U.S. port of entry. 775 

In addition, preclearance operations increase ei1iciencies because foreign travelers are screened 

and cleared abroad, reducing immigration lines and transit times at major international airports in 

the United Statcs.776 In 2013, 69.6 million foreign travelers visited the United State, representing 

a 2.6 million increase from FY2012, a grov.1h pattern of about four percent expected to continue 

through 2018. 777 

By reducing the number of foreign travelers that need to be processed at U.S. ports of entry, 

DHS components can allocate resources to target high-risk travelers. However, Congress should 

ensure that the 10 new international airports DHS is considering expanding preclearance 

agreements to meet the same rigorous standards as U.S. airports prior to approving them for such 

operations. The Committee recently took up and passed a bill that would address this issue. 

775 The Abu Dhabi Pre-Clearance Facility: Implications for U.S. Businesses and National Security, Hearing Before 

rhe House SubComm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade qfthe Comm. on Foreign Ajjciirs. !13th Cong 

(20!3) (statement of Kevin McAieenan, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). 776 DIIS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (May 

20 I 5), http:! /www .dhs.gov/news/20 15/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-prec lcarance-1 0-new-airports. 

Mark Johanson, US Received Record Number of Visitors in 2012 Thanks to These 15 Countries, lNT'L BUSINESS 

TIMES (June II, 2013), http:!/www.ihtimes.com/us-received-record-number-visitors-20!2-thanks-these-15-

countries-!30034 7. 

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Appendix A: Key Findings of Fact from Border Security Hearings and Roundtables 

2/04/2015- Deferred Action on Immigration: Implications and Unan.nvered Questions 

Individuals granted deferred action under the President's executive actions will receive a 

Social Security number, which is a permanent identifier that enables individuals to receive 

Social Security and Medicare benefits. 

Questions remain regarding what financial benefits will flow to non U.S. citizens; how DHS 

plans to combat against fraudulent documents; and the adequacy of background checks. 

If past is prologue, the President's unilateral actions create the potential for renewed surges at 

our borders, similar to the surge of minors last summer in response to DACA. 

3/10/2015- Visa Waiver Program: Implications/or US. National Security 

The Visa Waiver Program was designed to ease travel and promote commerce and today is 

utilized by 40 percent of travelers to America, or 19 million visitors annually. 

However, with the rising concern of Western foreign fighters, the U.S. and European Union 

Members must work together to prevent terrorist travel and address vulnerabilities: the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found loopholes that have allowed travelers to 

arrive in the U.S. without proper approval and identified ICE's inability to locate individuals 

who overstay their 90 day visa free period. 

3/17/2015- Securing the Southwest Border: Perspectives fi'om Beyond the Beltway 

Four out of five witnesses testified: the southwest border is not secure. 

Chris Cabrera, a Border Patrol agent in the Rio Grande Valley sector testified that we are 

only interdicting 30 to 40 percent of illegal crossers, contrary to testimony from U.S. Border 

Patrol leaders, claiming interdiction rates of over 70 percent. 

Cabrera also testified that Border Patrol agents have "a lot of problems" accessing Federal 

lands and Native American Reservations, which drug smugglers and coyotes use to their 

advantage. According to Cabrera, smugglers "know exactly what we can and cannot do, 

where we can and cannot go, and they exploit it." 

Cochise County, Arizona Sheriff Mark Dannels confirmed that due to limited resources, 

some local jurisdictions along the border will not prosecute smugglers possessing less than 

500 pounds of marijuana. 

Sheriff Dannels also testified that drug traffickers often usc teenagers to smuggle drugs, as it 

is unlikely that minors will be prosecuted. 

Many witnesses raised the issue of collaboration: the federal, state, and local levels of 

government need to work together. 

3/17/2015- Central American Ministers olNorthern Triang1e (Member Roundtah1e) 

In 2013, remittances from the U.S. accounted for 16.4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 

(GOP) in El Salvador, 10 percent in Guatemala, and 16.9 percent in Honduras. 

Central American Ministers are strongly supportive of receiving $1 billion in aid [rom the 

U.S. and believe now is the time to invest in Central America. 

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3/24/2015 -US. Ambassadors to Central America (Member Roundtable) 

Plan Colombia (a partnership between the U.S. and Colombia) worked because of strong 

leadership and the political will to solve the problem of crime and terrorism. Corruption is 

still present (if not rampant) in Central American countries. According to the Ambassador 

from Guatemala, "corruption is killing Guatemala; there is no confidence in government." 

According to the Ambassadors, the wage differential between the U.S. and Central American 

countries is as high as $8 to $1. 

3/24/2015- Securing the Border: Understanding the Presence of Transnational Crime 

According to former drug czar General Barry McCaffrey, the U.S. is only interdicting 5 to 10 

percent of illegal drugs crossing our southwest border. 

McCaffrey also testified that in I ,000 communities, 200 major metropolitan areas, ·'the 

principle threat to the American people and organized crime comes out of Mexican cartels." 

Benny Martinez, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Brooks County, Texas asserted ''until the United 

States is serious about securing the border, the transnational criminal organizations will 

continue to operate on the border and within small communities throughout the major cities 

of the Nation." 

Several witnesses confirmed there is a difference in equivalence between problems in Mexico 

and problems in Canada, and importantly, ''there is first-rate intelligence cooperation between 

Canadian and U.S. authorities." 

Witnesses also confirmed that it is extremely difficult to prosecute scouts that are 

apprehended and "a very good percentage of them walk.'' 

3/2512015- Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central 

American Migration to the United States 

More than 50,000 unaccompanied minors and a similar number of families from Central 

America were apprehended in FY2014, three times more than in FY2009. 

While numbers arc down this year-they are still significantly higher than pre-2012 levels. 

Before the Administration's DACA announcement, fewer than 5,000 Central American 

minors arrived at the border annually (3,304 in 2009; 4,444 in 2010; 3,933 in 2011 ). 

According to the Congressional Research Service, 62 percent of unaccompanied minors 

failed to show up for their court date from July 2014 through February 2015. 

A former Assistant for Latin America and the Caribbean at USAJD quoted a journalist who 

interviewed dozens of people in Guatemala in the summer of2014, "Coyotes may appear to 

be uniformed and unsophisticated smugglers, but they pay close attention to U.S. 

immigration laws. One smuggler asserted, quote, 'Obama has helped us with the children 

because they are able to stay in the United States. That is the reason so many children are 

coming.'" 

Another witness testified that human smuggling is a $6 billion business. 

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3/26/2015- Securing the Border: Defining the Current Population Living in the Shadows and 

Addressing Future Flows 

Many witnesses agreed: the wage gap is a primary incentive for illegal immigration. 

According to the Pew Research Center, in 2012 the illegal population stood at 11.2 million. 

Of the 11.2 million, 8.1 million people are working or looking for work. 

Witnesses testified that a good guest worker program is flexible, market driven, allows for 

circularity and portability, and ensures more interior enforcement. 

4/22/2015- Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategiesfor the Northern 

Border 

Experts testified that the northern border threats arc different from those of the southwest 

border, as there arc less illegal crossings and better information sharing with Canada. 

The U.S.-Canada border is a "vast. over-5,000-mile border, with incredibly diverse terrain" 

and "areas that arc tremendously porous." The government appears to be addressing this 

vulnerability through "working closely with the Canadians." 

We should continue working with Canada to improve information sharing, particularly as it 

relates to information on the U.S. and Canadian watchlist and no-fly lists, which today are 

separate and not shared. 

4/28/2015- Securing the Border: Biometric Entry and Exir at our Ports 4 Entry (Public 

Roundtable) 

While DHS has implemented biometric entry, biometric exit is still being developed and no 

timeline for completion has been provided. 

It will be expensive and more difficult to fhlly implement biometric exit along our air, sea, 

and land ports of entry, but biometrics will ollset the costs with the added benefit and 

security of catching things such as name misspellings and forged documents that biographic 

information will not. 

4/29/2015- The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2016778 

Secretary Johnson recognizes that those migrating from Central America arc ''very marketsensitive" and that "you have to show the population in Central America that you are sending 

people back.'' 

Secretary Johnson attributed the decline in the migration of unaccompanied minors this year 

to the reduction in the repatriation times for the adults, increased returning flights, and 

expanded family unit detention space. expressing the Department's interest in expanding 

detention centers, saying that "detention is appropriate in many circumstances." 

Secretary Johnson admitted that the U.S. will not achieve" I 00 percent situational awareness" 

of our borders before the end of this Administration. 

778 While border security was significantly discussed during this hearing. the Committee does not count this towards 

the number of border hearings held, as this is an annual hearing to discuss various Homeland Security issues. 

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5113/2015- Securing the Border: Fencing, Jn[rastructure, and Technology Force Multipliers 

In 2006 Congress mandated DHS construct at least 700 miles of reinforced fencing across the 

2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border but DHS has only constructed 653 miles; half of which is 

primary fencing and half of which is vehicle barrier fencing. 

DHS considers the location and type of fencing across the border "law enforcement 

sensitive," making it difficult for Congress and the public at large to fully understand our 

country's fencing resources and future needs. 

Previous legislation has provided DHS with waiver authorities from environmental and other 

laws but docs not waive the constitution or people's claims during condemnation cases. 

7/07/2015 The 2014 Ilumanitarian Crisis at our Border: A Review ofthe Government's 

Response to Unaccompanied A1inors One Year Later 

Since 2009, DHS has apprehended approximately 122,700 unaccompanied children from El 

Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, but we have only repatriated approximately 7,700, or 6 

percent779 

ICE claims it is prioritizing the deportation of criminal aliens over unaccompanied minors, 

but current events indicate many criminal aliens are being released by sanctuary cities and 

avoiding ICE deportation. 

ICE could not dispute that it sends a strong signal to those living in Central America when 

those illegally entering the U.S. arc able to remain. 

The number of unaccompanied minors unlawfully entering the U.S. this fiscal year is down 

because "Mexico is doing a far better job of policing its southern border, increasing their 

apprehensions by 79 percent." 

HI-IS says its responsibility to track and retain custody of unaccompanied minors ends when 

the child is released to the sponsor. This lack of follow-up and secondary screening has led 

to dangerous situations for children. 

7115/2015 Securing the Border: Understanding Threars and Srrategiesfor rhe Maritime 

Border 

The maritime border constitutes the U.S.'s longest border, and yet we have very little domain 

awareness of this environment. 

Multiple federal agencies, including various components within DHS, work in partnerships to 

secure the maritime border. 

According to the U.S. Coast Guard, it only interdicts 11 to 18 percent of the estimated drug 

flow entering the U.S. fi·om our maritime borders. 

U.S. policies create direct incentives and disincentives for illegal immigration. For example, 

when the U.S. temporarily suspended expedited removal for Haitians, the illegal entry of 

Haitians spiked until expedited removal was re-employed. 

779 At the time of the hearing, 109,000 unaccompanied minors from Central America had been apprehended and ICE 

figures indicated we had only repatriated just over 6,000, or 5. 7 percent. The figure above has been updated to 

reflect FY20 15 data. 

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9/14/2015 -All Hands on Deck. Working Together to Ind /he 7h:rfficking and Abuse ofl'rescription 

Opioid1·, Heroin, and Fen! any/ 

Heroin is not produced in America but instead is manufactured outside the country and 

smuggled across the U.S. border via Mexican Cartels, particularly the Sinaloa Cartel. 

According to the DEA, "The growing relationship between Mexican-based drug cartels and 

domestic street gangs, coupled with ... an unlimited supply of illegal guns, has really created 

the perfect storm for law enforcement." 

To deter drug trafficking, CBP "interdict[ s J heroin in all modes, air, land, and sea, and in both 

the travel and cargo environments." 

Several witnesses talked about the need for increased information sharing, with the DEA 

suggesting that "bad guys really count on law enforcement not talking to each other and not 

connecting the dots." 

Ultimately, we must target criminal organizations, not addicts. 

10/2112015 Ongoing Migrationfi'om Central America: An Examination of FY2015 

Apprehensions 

Although the apprehensions ofUACs were down 50 percent in FY2015, this is no cause for 

celebration. We still apprehended 30,000 UACs and 40,000 family groups this fiscal year. 

A representative of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops recognized that when children 

leave Central America, the countries are "losing their best and their brightest, and it's tragic." 

According to GAO, "Social media outlets enable migrants who arrive in the Unites States to 

share messages and pictures with families in their home countries. This can serve as a 

powerful and influential endorsement of the decision to migrate." 

Another witnesses testified that we are ··very far" from having low enough levels of 

corruption and a strong enough rule of law to provide for opportunities lacking in Central 

America. 

11/23/2015 -America's Heroin Epidemic a/the Border: Local, State, and Federal Law 

En(iJrcement Efforts lo Combat Illicit Narcotic Trafficking 

According to the Arizona HIDT A" Arizona is a primary entry point, trafficking corridor and 

distribution hub for drugs transported from Mexico to the United States by the Sinaloa 

Cartel." 

Mexican DTOs are highly sophisticated-an Arizona sheriff testified that "Aside from the 

normal use of human backpackers (mules), clandestine tunnels, and vehicles, the trafficking 

organizations have resorted to the use of ultra light aircraft which cannot be detected by 

normal radar. cloned vehicles appearing to be law enforcement or other legitimate companies, 

and most recently the use of catapults which hurl bundles of marijuana into the U.S. to 

awaiting co-conspirators." 

One key indicator of the increased supply of drugs into this country is the significant price 

drop in heroin, nationwide. In 1981, the average price per gram of pure heroin was $3,260 

(in 2012 U.S. dollars) by 2012 the price per gram decreased to $465 (in 2012 U.S. dollars). 

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Appendix B: Key Findings of Central America Trip 

Guatemala 

International Bridge between Guatemala and Mexico Borders: 

While the bridge had a check point at the Mexico side, contraband crossed the river on both 

sides of the bridge with impunity. 

The thriving contraband trade across the river indicates that the Mexico-Guatemala border is 

totally open and uncontrolled. 

The border checkpoint is only used if doing so is to the person's advantage. 

• According to Mexican immigration officials, approximately 2,000 individuals use the formal 

crossing point, while thousands use informal alternatives. 

Guatemalan Migrant Repatriation Center 

Members of Congress watched 136 Guatemalan adults (31 of which were women) offload an 

ICE flight from the U.S. to a "Welcome Center" in Guatemala. 

The Welcome Center was clean, professional, and well managed, and the Guatemalans were 

given clothing, food, and transportation. 

• Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) representatives waited outside the center to 

provide assistance and information to the deportees and their families. 

• During the re-orientation speech the Guatemalans were told "it doesn't matter how poor or 

rich, small or big, your country is, this is still your motherland. Remember that you have to 

love your country. Please consider that before attempting to leave for the United States." 

Upon this statement, the Guatemalans erupted in applause. 

El Rufitgio de Ia Ninez, Guatemala City 

• This home without an address protected little girls-the youngest age 11- who had been 

victims of trafficking and were prepared to testify against their trafficker. 

This particular shelter was designed to house 20-25 girls, but 40 girls were currently living 

there. The average age of the girls was 14. Cribs were also located in this shelter. 

What the Members of Congress saw were a bunch of little girls, playing board games, 

hugging everyone as they entered the shelter, and joyfully singing. 

The girls can only stay at the shelter until they are 18 years old. The programs oJfered there 

attempt to prepare them for an independent life if they cannot be returned to their hometown 

to live with their families. 

Meeting with Catholic Relie/Services (CRS) in Guatemala 

Guatemala should leverage the Catholic Church to help its citizens. The church is a way out 

for those who are part of the gangs. 

• Civil society and NGOs should get U.S. funding. There is a concern when you give funding 

to government officials that it will not be used effectively. 

• While broad concepts of funding transportation, economic opportunity, and education have 

been outlined, there needs to be more granular detail of which programs and organizations 

will actually receive U.S. funding. 

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Meeting with Gualemala Presidenr-Elect Jimmy Morales 

• Morales won his election on Oct. 25, by 70 percent of the vote on an anticorruption platform. 

• President-Elect Morales has a keen intellect and understands what he needs to do. He 

recognizes that impunity is a national problem and must be dealt with quickly. 

• Morales plans to re-instill civic love for country and a nationalistic pride. He believes 

Guatemalans must love Guatemala in order to fix it and plans to create opportunities that 

ensure that his people want to stay in Guatemala. 

Morales also talked about reforming the public ministry, tax administration, general 

controller, and prisons. He said they had the will, just needed the patience. 

Final Guatemala Takeaways: 

• People pay smugglers, up front, $10,000-$15,000 for three tries to get into America. Most 

children are able to remain once they reach the U.S.-the U.S. repatriates about 700 

Guatemalan UACs a year. Due to U.S. law, UACs spend 4-5 years in the U.S. going through 

the courts system, at a cost of approximately $100 million a year per child. 

• There is an 80 percent chance that a girl will be assaulted during her journey to the U.S. 

We must stop incentivizing Guatemalan children from leaving their home country. It is not 

compassionate to incentive a country to de-populate itself. 

Those migrating to the U.S. to seek opportunities are the ones who want a stable, secure 

system. 

• In Guatemala there arc the extortionists that prey on the middle and lower class and drug 

cartels that generally want to be left alone. In fact, in some cases drug lords have provided 

security in certain regions. One of the first things that must be done is to solve the layers of 

violence and corruption in Guatemala. 

• Guatemala also suffers from its lack of capability to collect money in order to fund its 

budget. Businesses may not be paying their fair share, although they argue this is because 

they are concerned about where their money goes when they give it to the government. 

Honduras 

Honduran National Police, Special interagency Response Force (TIGRE.')) 

Both the U.S. and Colombians are providing advisors to train the Honduran National Police 

• The Honduran National Police is very small, with only 10,000 police officers for a 

population of close to 9 million. As a comparison, New York City has a similar sized 

population with 35,000 police officers. 

90 percent of the Honduran National Police's budget goes towards salaries, often forcing 

onicers to pay for their own uniforms and bullets. Low salaries and extra expenses could 

incentive the police to work with the drug cartels. 

Women were well-represented in the TIGRES training and historically have always been a 

part of the Honduran National Police. 

• The Honduran government's policy to shoot down known "narco planes" has actually 

hampered its progress in deterring traffickers. 

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Model Police Precincl, Tegucigalpa 

At this model police precinct, the U.S. has helped the Hondurans create an economic, 

educational, community safe zone where Hondurans felt confident they could trust the police. 

This is a valid strategy that has been successfully implemented in this particular community. 

Again, Colombians are working with the U.S. to assist the Hondurans. 

Model police precincts are vital, as security is the tirst condition for a successful society. 

\\'hen Members asked Honduran children about their dreams, they all talked about future 

professions in Honduras. No one said they dreamed of migrating to the U.S. 

One 12-year-old slated: "the youth of Honduras decide what this country is going to be." 

These children knew what they wanted but a conversation later with the Honduran adults in 

the community made it clear that we need a clear path forward on better education. Funding 

to Central America should be spent on teachers and schools. 

Honduran mothers and teachers argued that their society is losing its family values and 

respect for one another because men and children are migrating to the United States. The 

pillars of a healthy society are disintegrating. 

US Customs and Border Protection Road Checkpoint 

CBP and ICE have vetted units in Honduras in which one agent trains 30-50 Hondurans on 

conducting border checkpoints. 

Impressive technology is being using in Honduras, such as technology that slows down 

traffic in order to scan vehicles to locate illicit drugs and occupants. 

While the checkpoint was impressive, there is a concern that this will just redirect the flow of 

illegal contraband and people to somewhere else. 

At this checkpoint Members were told that Hondurans caught close to 50 Cubans a day. 

Close to 90 percent of the ''Special Interest Aliens" caught in Honduras are Cuban nationals. 

Honduras has a catch and release policy. 

During the observation, Members witnessed the Hondurans pull two females from a bus, 

suspected of trying to unlawfully migrate to the U.S. Both were sent to Child Protective 

Services in Honduras. 

Don Bosco Vocational School, Tegucigalpa 

This vocational program provided Hondurans with skills and training to help them obtain 

internships and jobs. 

• For programs like this to really work. you need a growing, successful economy. In order for 

economies to grow, you need security. 

One business owner mentioned that he gets I ,400 applications per vacancy. This 

demonstrates that Honduras's economy is not growing at a significant rate to keep up with 

the increasing number of young adults who are joining the workforce each year. 

Privare Sector Roundrahle 

In order for businesses to be successful, they need the government to provide security and 

infrastructure. For example, agriculture requires roads and tourism requires that people who 

travel to the country feel safe. 

101 
178 

Honduras also may have access to geothermal electricity. If the country can find ways to tap 

into that and have cheap power, there is the potential for manufacturing. 

The business class in Honduras is prepared to pay their fair share, but they want transparency 

in where their tax dollars go. 

• Of a country of close to 9 million, only 100,000 arc registered with the country's tax 

administration. 

J'vfeeting with Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez 

• President Hernandez said it was a "slap in the face" to him personally that so many people 

would want to flee his country. 

President Hernandez expressed that he did not want to sec children leave Honduras and that 

the U.S. needs to be clearer when developing its laws. Unclear laws create mixed messages, 

which coyotes misrepresent and use to encourage children and families to migrate. 

• The President also talked about how the country was improving under his leadership, with 

the economy growing at 2.8 percent and the murder rate decreasing. 

Briefing and Tour at So to Cano Base 

• Honduras is falling victim to the trafficking of serious weapons, such as RPGs. 

Hand guns appear to be moving from the U.S. to Central America. Meanwhile Honduras is 

sending marijuana southbound (not northbound). 

• The Honduran military docs not have control of an eastern state slightly larger than 

Connecticut. Drug trafficking organizations take advantage of this situation and fill the 

power vacuum created by the lack of government presence. 

Final Honduras Takeaways 

There are not major difierences from the Northern Triangle (Honduras, Guatemala, and El 

Salvador) and Costa Rica and Belize. The real difference between the countries is marketing. 

American workers, the state department, and all the agencies represented in Honduras are 

doing extraordinary work that they care about. 

Unfortunately. often the goal in Honduras is to divert the flow of illicit drugs away from the 

country. While this will help Honduras, it ultimately will harm the country where the flow is 

redirected to. 

102 
179 

Appendix C: Acronyms 

ADIS 

AEER 

AMOC 

AMSP 

AoR 

ARSS 

ATD 

BCBud 

BEST 

BTB 

CARS I 

CBO 

CBP 

CBSA 

CO DEL 

CTCEU 

DACA 

DEA 

DHS 

DNDO 

DOl 

DOJ 

DPS 

DTO 

EOIR 

EPIC 

ESTA 

eTA 

FAST 

FEMA 

FY 

GAO 

GDP 

HAMC 

HHS 

HIDTA 

HSI 

IBET 

ICE 

ICMLEO 

!DENT 

IFT 

I!RIRA 

Arrival and Departure Information System 

Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering 

Air and Marine Operations Center 

Area Maritime Security Plan 

area of responsibility 

Advanced Radar Surveillance System 

DHS Alternative to Detention program 

Canadian British Coltunbia Bud, a type of marijuana 

Border Enforcement Security Taskforce 

Beyond the Border Initiative 

Central America Regional Security Initiative 

Congressional Budget Ot1ice 

Customs and Border Protection 

Canada Border Service Agency 

Congressional Delegation 

U.S. ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Department of Homeland Security 

DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

Department of the Interior 

Department of Justice 

Department of Public Safety 

drug trafficking organization 

Executive Ot1ice for Immigration Review 

El Paso Intelligence Center 

Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

Electronic Travel Authoriz.ation 

Free and Secure Trade 

DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Fiscal Year 

U.S. Government Accounting Office 

Gross Domestic Product 

Hells Angel Motorcycle Club 

Department of Health and Human Services 

High Intensity Dmg Trat1icking Area 

ICE Homeland Security Investigation team 

Integrated Border Enforcement Team 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enf(Jrcement Operation 

Automated Biometric Identification System 

Integrated Fixed Tower 

Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of !996 

103 
180 

IS 

ISIL 

J!ATF 

LEDET 

LPR 

MCC 

MDMA 

MOU 

MS-13 

MSC 

MVSS 

NGO 

NTA 

NTC 

OAM 

ORR 

OTM 

PED 

PNR 

POE 

PRM 

RCMP 

RFP 

RGV 

RPG 

RVSS 

SAFE Port Act 

SBinel 

SENTRI 

S&T 

TARS 

TCO 

TECS 

TVPRA 

UAC 

UAS 

UGS 

US AID 

USCIS 

USD 

USDA 

VADER 

VWP 

Imaging Sensor 

Islamic State in the Levant 

Joint Interagency Task Force 

U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Team 

lawful permanent resident 

Millennium Challenge Corporation 

3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine, commonly known as ecstasy 

Memorandum Of Understanding 

Mara Salvatrucha 

Mobile Surveillance Capability 

Mobile Video Surveillance System 

Non-Governmental Organization 

Notice to Appear 

CBP National Targeting Center 

CBP Office of Air and Marine 

HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement 

other-than-Mexicans 

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 

Passenger Name Record 

port of entry 

State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 

Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

request for proposal 

Rio Grande Valley 

Rocket-Propelled Grenade 

Remote Video Surveillance System 

Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 

Secure Border Initiative-network 

Secured Electronic Network for Traveler's Rapid Inspection 

DHS Science and Technology Directorate 

tethered aerostat radar system 

Transnational Criminal Organization 

Treasury Enforcement Communication System 

William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 

of2008 

Unaccompanied Alien Children 

unmanned aircraft systems 

Unattended Ground Sensor 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

U.S. Dollars 

Department of Agriculture 

Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar 

Visa Waiver Program 

104 
181 

WALL 
182 

HSGAC 

SOUTHERN BORDER WALL 

Soaring Cost Estimates and Lack of Planning Raise Fundamental 

Questions about Administration's Key Domestic Priority 

On January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive order on border security and 

immigration enforcement. The President ordered the executive branch "to secure the southern 

border of the United States through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern 

border, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug 

and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism."' 

The Democratic staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs is 

conducting ongoing oversight of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its plans to 

construct a border wall. Democratic members and staff have repeatedly questioned the Trump 

Administration regarding the plans and costs of the border wall in nomination and oversight hearings, 

agency briefings, and investigative request letters. At the request of Ranking Member Claire 

McCaskill, this staff report summarizes information provided to the Committee to date. 

KEY FINDINGS INCLUDE: 

There is no reliable estimate of the cost of construction of the full border wall, but extrapolated estimates 

place fhe construction cost of the wall and associated technology and infrastructure at nearly $70 

billion. That amounts to a total cost to every American man, woman, and child of over $200. A costbenefit analysis of the project Is not complete. 

The projected cost of construction for every mile is rapidly increasing to as much as $36.6 million per 

mile. This does not include the costs of acquiring the land on which the wall will be buill. II also does 

not include the maintenance costs of border barrier, which may total nearly $150 million per year. 

The Department cannot provide a cost estimate of the anticipated land acquisition to the Committee. 

In the past, the U.S. government spent at least $78 million to acquire land where fencing is currently in 

place. 

When the U.S. government has been forced to go to court, the costs ot land acquisition can be much 

higher; in past land condemnation cases involving border fencing, the government spent more than $11 

million on acquiring 271 acres of land from private landowners, an average price of $42,600 per acre. 

In one case in Cameron County, Texas, a landowner was initially offered $233,000 for 3.1 acres. After a 

three-year legal battle, the government eventually paid at least $4.7 million, a nearly 2,000 percent 

increase over the initial otter. 

litigation to acquire the land to build the wall may last a decade or longer. Of the more than 300 

condemnation cases related to past border fencing efforts filed before a district judge in Texas, the vast 

majority ot which were filed in 2008, over 90 condemnation cases remain unresolved and fence has not 

been buill in those locations. 

Concrete prototypes of the wall will be paid for by slashing the budget for mobile video surveillance. 

fxec. Oraer ~3767 82 Fed. Reg 8793 (JO'l 25, 2017) 
183 

E I 2 

NO RELIABLE COST ESTIMATE 

No reliable estimate af the cost of construction for the full border wall currently exists. In January 

2017. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP} informed Democratic staff that "it is premature to provide 

cost estimates without official US Border Patrol fence requirements to include precise fence 

locations. 

DHS Secretary John Kelly recently testified before the Committee, stating: 

"There's no way I can give the commiHee an estimate of how much this will cost. I mean, I don't know 

what it will be made of, I don't know how high it will be, I don't know if it's going to have solar panels on 

each side and what the one side's going to look like and how it's going to be painted-· have no idea. 

So I can't give you any type of an esffmate."' 

PHOTO: Secretary Kelty testifies before Senate Homeland Secvrlty & Governmental Affair.~ Committee 

HSGAC 
184 

PAGE 13 

According to the Government Accountability Office, primary pedestrian fencing in the past has cost 

$6.5 million per mile; however, DHS notes there ore "other factors" that may increase costs not 

included in that calculation. Agency officials explained: 

"The factors include but are not limited to real estate acquisition cost, risks ossocialed with n<!>W 

construction in oreQs where there Is currently no fence ond the increased cost and risk ot building fence 

on the south side of the Levee system In the flood plain, Other assumptions that will. hove to be 

considered are future market fluctuations (e.g. increased fuel costs, labor, raw materials, etc.) •. II is also 

lmporft:~nt to note that estimates can fluctuate as USBP requirements are reviewed and finalized. "4 

PROJECTED PER-MILE COSTS RAPIDLY INCREASING 

CBP officials hove provided select summary budget numbers to Committee staff that provide some 

information on projected wall construction costs. In the short term, DHS intends to reprogram $20 

million to construct multiple wall prototypes, devise wall design standards, and conduct real estate 

and environmental planning. This will also fund design for a levee wall and a new border barrier 

system in the Rio Grande Valley. and complete an enforcement zone in San Diego.' 

CBP also briefed that the Administration's Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 supplemental budget request for $999 

million would continue real estate and environmental planning and design for high priority areas. If 

funded, DHS will also construct 34 new miles of levee wall and border barrier system in the Rio Grande 

Valley, replace 14 miles of existing fencing in the San Diego sector, and build 14 miles of new border 

barriers in the San Diego sector.' CBP also briefed that the DHS budget blueprint for FY 2018 will 

request approximately $2.6 billion to 

construct approximately 71 miles of new 

border barrier and associated technology 

and infrastructure in the Rio Grande 

Valley, Tucson, and/or El Paso sectors? 

The per-mile cost of construction is 

increasing in each fiscal year. The permile cost of the construction extrapolated 

from the FY 2017 supplemental request 

totals $16.1 million per mile and FY 2018 

totals over $36.6 million per mile. DHS 

officials have been unable to provide 

expected land acquisition costs for the 

additional construction.' 

'ld 

"Jd 

$40 

$2') 

$20 

$15 

$10 

AVERAGE COST PER MILE OF 

BORDER BARRIER 

HI'>TGgi(i\L n 2011 2018 

HSGAC 
185 

I 4 

CONSTRUCTION COST MAY TOTAL $70 BILLION 

The per-mile cost derived from information provided by DHS would result in a total cost of the 

construction of the border wall of nearly $70 billion. CBP officials stated that only 127 miles of the 

border are considered unsuitable for construction. This includes 33 miles of bluffs in Big Bend Sector, 

59 miles of lakes in Texas, and 35 miles in the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico' At $36.6 million per 

mile, a 1,827 mile border wall could cost more than $66.9 billion. That amounts to a total cost to 

every American man, woman, and child of over $200 for border wall construction. 

In addition to the calculation derived from FY 2018 budget numbers, Democratic staff has also 

calculated that wall construction could cost at least over $64 billion and possibly over double that 

amount from information included in the contracting documents for the wall prototype. The cost 

presented in the two Requests for Proposal ranges from $200,000 to $500,000 for a single wall 

prototype 30 feet longw The lower cost range to construct a barrier would total at least $64 billion if 

the prototype cost was applied to the full length of the border. 

COST· BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS NOT COMPLETE 

Although the Department has begun the acquisition process for 

wall prototypes, the Department has not completed a cost-benefit 

analysis for the project. A cost-benefit analysis is a quantitative 

method of assessing if a government project or policy is desired 

"when it is important to take a long view of future effects and a 

broad view of possible side-effects."" In her nomination hearing, 

Elaine Duke, the nominee to become Deputy Secretary of the 

DHS, testified that a cost-benefit analysis "is in progress."" CPB has 

informed the Democratic staff that the "U.S. Border Patrol is in the 

planning and development stage for a larger cost-benefit 

analysis." 13 

Effectiveness of existing fencing will be an important component in 

the cost-benefit analysis conducted by the Department. The 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) has determined that 

CBP has not developed metrics that can be used to systematically 

measure the effectiveness of fencing in preventing the illegal entry 

of people, drugs, and other contraband into the United StatesH 

PHOTO: DHS Deputy Secretary Elaine Duke at Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing 

HSGAC 
186 

pAGE I 5 

WALL MAINTENANCE MAY COST NEARLY $150 MILLION EACH YEAR 

The Department may not be properly accounting for the costs of maintaining the border barrier. 

GAO has found that, in major DHS acquisition projects. "sustainment costs can account for more 

than 80 percent of total costs."" CBP informed the Democratic staff that "Projected annual tactical 

infrastructure (TI) maintenance costs are unknown until the full complement of requirements has 

been determined and design for each requirement has been finalized."'' CBP currently maintains 

654 miles of existing border fence and has informed the Democratic staff that it spends, on average, 

as much as "$55 million per year to maintain and repair all of its tactical infrastructure, at the cost of 

$85,000 per mile.''" These costs are associated with access roads, gates, light posts, drainage 

systems, acres of vegetation and other attendant infrastructure. 18 It is logical that a barrier wall 

would have greater maintenance costs than fence, however, if the existing maintenance costs are 

applied to the 1,173 miles of unfenced suitable border the yearly maintenance costs would total 

$99.7 million for the new areas of construction, totaling nearly $150 million for maintenance along the 

entire border each year. 

REQUIRED LAND IS OWNED BY PRN ATE INDNIDUALS 

The Democratic staff of the Committee has obtained extensive information concerning the difficulty 

in acquiring land necessary for barrier wall construction. CBP has acknowledged to the Democratic 

staff: "Reol estate acquisition for border fence construction is a very complex issue.'' 19 In her 

nomination hearing, Elaine Duke testified that land acquisition "is an important concern, and we 

expect that to be a major issue if additional wall is constructed." 2o 

CBP has explained that in the past, the government had to initiate approximately 400 land 

acquisitions for more than 200 miles of fence. 21 Of those 400 acquisitions, 330 condemnations of 

property were required. In 122 cases, the government and the landowners could not reach an 

agreement on the fair market value of the seized property. 22 The vast majority of those cases were 

filed in 2008.'3 According to CBP, the U.S. government has spent at least $78 million to acquire land 

where existing fencing is in place." 

CBP has not provided additional information to the Democratic staff regarding the condemnation 

cases. In order to obtain greater insight into past land condemnation cases involving border fencing, 

Democratic staff has reviewed information collected by NPR regarding more than 300 cases filed 

before a district judge in Texas. 25 NPR found 167 cases that have been resolved. Using NPR's data, 

'ld 

'ld 

HSGAC 
187 

Democratic staff has calculated that, of those resolved cases, the longest legal challenge lasted 

over eight years. The government spent more than $11 million on acquiring the 271 acres of land. In 

total, the U.S. government paid an average price per acre of $42,600. In one case in Cameron 

County, Texas, a landowner was initially offered $233,000 for 3.1 acres. After a three-year legal battle, 

the government eventually paid at least $4.7 million. a nearly 2,000 percent increase over the initial 

offer.26 

The remaining condemnation cases were required to establish land ownership." CBP has informed 

Committee staff thot in over 90 instances, condemnation cases remain unresolved nearly I 0 years 

later and fence has not been built in those locations.28 The potential liability of the pending 

condemnation cases is $21 million." 

Committee staff have been briefed by CBP that they anticipate land acquisition to last 12-24 months. 

CBP informed the Committee staff that they believe it is "too early to say" the cost of the land 

acquisition.30 CBP informed the Committee staff that they cannot provide an upper cost estimate on 

costs until they "start investigating land acquisition." 31 CBP informed the Committee staff that they 

have not yet begun title research for the land. 3' The agency anticipates it will need to hire 12 

attorneys due to "an unprecedented increase in legal support in real property, procurement, fiscal 

law, as well as overall programmatic support to advance the construction of a physical wall."33 

PAYING FOR WALL CONSTRUCTION WITH MONEY FROM TECHNOLOGY 

PROGRAMS 

The Democratic staff has been informed that the $ i 5 million repragraming for the wall prototypes are 

funds being spent from the Mobile Videa Surveillance System (MVSS) within CBP." This program 

provides Border Patrol with short and medium range mobile surveillance equipment mounted on 

telescoping poles.35 The solicitations for wall prototypes do not include technology components. In 

responding to an industry question on their RFP, CBP confirmed that "no technology descriptions are 

required to be included in the Phase I response."36 

Secretary Kelly testified on the importance of mobile surveillance before this Committee: 

9 /d 

-'''ld 

"[A] physical barrier in and of itself will not do the job. It has to be really a layered defense. If you were 

to build a wall from the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico, you would still have to back that wall up with 

patrolling by human beings, by sensors, by observation devices."37 

27. 2017). 

HSGAC 
188 

Statement for the Record 

l'.S. Senate Homeland Security and (;oyernmcnt Affairs Committee Hearing: 

"Fcndng Along the Southwest Border" 

Submitted by !Inward G. Buffett, Chairlllllll and CEO of the Uoward G. Buffett Foundation 

.\pril4. 2017 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the 

opportunity to submit this Statement l(lr the Record on the important topic of·'Fencing Along the 

Southwest Border." 

Background 

I am submitting these comments based on my experience as a border property landowner in both Texas 

and Arizona. In Texas, our private family foundation owns a farm with .75 mile frontage along the Rio 

Grande River. In Arizona, we own two ranches that run parallel to the U.S./Mexico border-one runs 

parallel along 4.5 miles of the border and the other runs parallel along 1.5 miles of border. In addition 

we own a farm in Arizona located 56 miles north of the border, which is also impacted by illegal border 

crossings: drug smugglers break down loads near our farm and sometimes cross our property. 

My statements also, in part, reflect my experience as a volunteer Deputy Commander of the Cochise 

County Sheriffs Office. I have participated on patrols along the border, and I have assisted in entering 

and clearing so-called "stash houses" where undocumented aliens (UDA's) regroup after crossing, or 

smugglers hide and repackage drugs. In Texas, I have ridden on river patrol boats with both the Texas 

Department of Safety and the U.S. Border Patrol. 

I believe three factors are crucial to any discussion ofbartiers along the border: 

I) Variable geography. Our two ranches in Arizona, only 32 miles apart, have very different 

geographical and topographical features from each other. Our ranch along the Rio Grande 

border, meanwhile, is completely different from our Arizona properties. No one style of fencing 

or wall would be effective even among our three properties, much less the entire border. 

However, in many situations, proper barriers are critical to border enforcement. 

2) One of the least appreciated factors affecting border fence or wall design is the need to address 

seasonal llooding. People oil en think of border regions as hot and dry; in Arizona, during the 

annual rainy season huge volumes of water pour down from the surrounding basins and any 

structure must take this into account. 

3) A uniform concrete wall over the length of the border could provide Mexican drug cartels with a 

tactical advantage and could threaten law enforcement officer safety. For example, in some areas 

along our property where old landing mat (solid sheets) arc used as fencing material today, it 

blocks Border Patrol agents from seeing into Mexico. That allows cartel scouts to utilize small 

holes in the fence (or stand on ladders and watch) to track Border Patrol movements while they 

gather groups of smugglers or UDA's to send across the border at opportune times. In fact, in 

these spots it is not uncommon for the scouts to leave ladders placed up against the fence for 

long periods of time because BP cannot see them. 
189 

Experiences at Three Border Properties in Two States 

RIO GRANDE CITY, TEXAS 

The Rio Grande follows a serpentine course creating fingers of land in Texas, with the banks in some 

spots covered in 12-foot tall grass and in others adjoining open Lmn land. The engineering challenge of 

creating a solid barrier would be complicated and perhaps impossible. Our farm buildings arc 

approximately four-tenths of a mile from the river, and floods have pushed water levels in these 

buildings as high as 5 feet. Building barriers in our area would divide properties in ways that would 

make some land unusable. In addition, on our farm we pump water directly from the Rio Grande to 

irrigate our crops; a wall could prohibit regular access to our irrigation pumps for operation and 

maintenance. Securing the necessary land through eminent domain is likely to be contentious, time 

consuming and expensive. A wall would also impact access to the river affecting fishermen, parks, 

recreational areas, and local businesses. You can ask U.S. citizens to make these sacrifices for the 

greater good of our country but not if the solution proposed is ineffective, ine!Ttcient, is unfair or ifther~ 

are better alternatives. A fence (not a wall) could be cticctive in some locations, but it would first 

require a serious cost/benefit analysis compared to other deterrent options. 

NACO ARIZONA 

Our Naco, Arizona ranch is an example of a border area that needs more resources and yet a solid wall 

would not improve security at the border. This area would benefit from improving and upgrading 

existing fence structures. 

The Naco ranch is located on the operational area of responsibility (AOR) seam between Douglas and 

Naco Border Patrol Stations. Today, this property has two Border Patrol tower structures for cameras, as 

well as ground cameras and sensors. We have Border Patrol agents regularly traversing our property by 

vehicle, foot, ATVs and horses. Our "'aco ranch has eight different types offencing running parallel 

along our 4.5 miles of deeded and leased property. Some fencing is very poorly designed and we have 

video surveillance from our property that shows drug tra!Ttckers returning to Mexico scaling the fence in 

seconds. Hydrology is a major concern: our ranch experiences significant seasonal flooding which 

requires large tlood gates built into the fence structure that are opened during monsoon season and left 

open for as long as four months. These gates are similar in size to a small garage door: the gates closest 

to our main property measure 7 feet 6 inches tall and 7 feet wide. 

For years a Mexican cartel scout has operated just across the border from our ranch on a hill 400 feet 

above ground elevation. The scout has a permanent dwelling, communications, and surveillance 

equipment. This scout assists the cartel in moving drugs into the U.S. by relaying Border Patrol 

movements and reporting them to the smugglers. There are many such scouts. A far more effective 

strategy than a wall would be to figure out how to neutralize these scouts, who help direct smugglers 

across any kind of barrier. The area also has an operating railroad approximately one quarter of a mile 

inside the Mexican border which is used occasionally to disguise cartel activity or assist in cartel 

movements. Building a concrete wall would fm1her help to obscure this activity. 

In the Naco area, my belief is upgrading and replacing all of the existing fence from the east side ofthe 

base of the Huachuca Mountains to the east side of Douglas with PVl fence (combined pedestrian and 

vehicle barrier fencing created from tall angled steel tubes with large plates on top) would provide a 

significant improvement and would be a worthwhile investment. PV I fencing also offers another 

advantage: the flood gate system has been redesigned and improved. The new design provides more 

flexibility during the monsoon season while allowing Border Patrol to open the gates without using fork 

Iitts or other heavy equipment. 
190 

The current project as described in the 2016 DHS budget in the Naco AOR (Zone 30), is replacing 

approximately 7.5 miles of inferior fencing with PVl fencing at $5.96 million per mile. At the 

conclusion of the current fence replacement project, the Naco AOR, which covers 32.6 miles of border, 

will have approximately 16 miles ofPVl fencing in place. An additional investment ofapproximate1y 

$98.93 million would allow for the conversion of the balance of the 16.6 miles to PVl fencing. 

The Douglas AOR from the Naco/Douglas seam to the end of the existing fence East of Douglas is 17.5 

miles with approximately 10 miles ofPVl fence in place, leaving 10 miles to upgrade at an estimated 

cost of $59.6 million. I recommend extending this fence an additional4 miles east to force the traffic 

further away from the urban areas, which would require an additional $23.84 million. The estimated 

$182.37 million cost to complete the Naco and Douglas fencing would be a strategic investment to 

disrupt the Mexican cartel activity, would be much more effective than the current fence, and would be 

superior (and likely significantly cheaper) than building a wall. 

SONOITA ARIZONA 

Our Sonoita. Arizona ranch is in the San Rafael Valley, a remote area with rugged terrain. The San 

Rafael Valley is a significant smuggling con·idor and the area should receive a priority status because of 

the remote and challenging topography and the amount of illegal traffic we see crossing our ranch. 

However, due to terrain and hydrology issues, l believe additional air assets, stationary and mobile 

surveillance equipment (including acrostats), K- 9 units and agents would be a much more effective usc 

of resources than a wall or PV 1 fencing. 

The run-off from the Huachuca mountain basin regularly damages our steel fences, some of which have 

three- feet deep concrete footings and have been pushed over flat at times tram the water flow. The 

majority of our ranch fencing in the areas typically affected by water flow have special swing gates, 

allowing water to push them open. This keeps cattle in but it does not keep people out. It also requires 

constant maintenance and if we fall behind or are unaware of debris collected against the fence, the 

fencing is damaged. These same challenges would apply to any structure along this area of the border. 

This ranch has creek beds and valleys that at the highest points have 100-foot sidewalls which conceal 

human activity. This ranch is surrounded by hundreds of square miles of U.S. Forestry Service land with 

no other private property in close proximity. Border Patrol is currently installing eight camera towers in 

this area (some at least 3 miles from the border) which will enhance their ability to identify human 

traffic, but I do not believe these cameras will have the vantage point of detecting human activity in the 

deep crevices that wind through the hundreds of acres of our ranch and adjacent public lands. 

Currently, there is "Normandy'' fencing along a stretch of our ranch's border with Mexico. Normandy 

fencing is only a few feet tall and made up of welded iron barriers; it keeps vehicles out but it is not 

designed to keep people out. I think as vehicle barriers go, it is sutTicient. I do not believe there is any 

positive cost/benefit justification for constructing a wall or PVl fencing in San Rafael Valley, because I 

do not see how it will significantly increase apprehensions or drug seizures. The most effective strategy 

is to increase methods allowing for better detection followed by improved response time. 

This area is particularly challenging in terms of response time with limited road infrastructure. In all 

cases, determined smugglers will figure out a way to defeat a wall. Unless you dramatically increase the 

number of agents patrolling along this remote border, smugglers will have time to successfully breach 

any structure. 
191 

Depending on the engineering and design, building fences here could be a higher cost than the 

construction of the replacement fencing in the Naco area. Using the $5.96 million per mile construction 

number from the 2016 DHS budget, the 24 miles that run between the west base of the Huachuca 

mountains and the east base of the Patagonia mountains would cost approximately $143 million. 

However, the road conditions, remote location and hydrology could mean the costs could run higher. It 

would require significant deep piling to maintain the integrity of the fence in high water flow areas as 

well as significant gate structures to account for the speed and power of the water flow. The gates in the 

new PV I are improved, but from a practical standpoint, it would likely mean these gates would need to 

remain open during the monsoon season, which would amount to little additional enforcement 

capabilities during that 4 month period. Alternatively, Border Patrol agents would have to devote 

valuable time to fence and debris management taking the agents away from enforcement responsibilities. 

Additionally, some of the roads are not adequate to support the transportation of the construction 

equipment so the roads would need to be upgraded and widened, and I anticipate that in this area there 

would be fierce opposition from environmental and conservation organizations. 

Recommendations 

Any physical barrier solution needs to take into account the context. costs, and practical value. 

Install PVl fence across the entire Naco AOR and link it up at the Naco/Douglas seam to east of 

Douglas. This would have a significant impact on reducing the drug mule activity and the drug 

vehicle drive-throughs in this area. 

Except in remote areas where existing vehicle barrier fencing is sufficient. I recommend 

replacing all existing fencing that is not PV I fence with PV I fence. 

There arc areas where barriers arc not practical and have significant negative environmental 

consequences or are not cost effective; in these areas assess and implement other more practical 

and cost effective measures. 

A solid wall would be a detriment to border enforcement because it does not allow our agents to 

view activity on the Mexican side of the border. No law enforcement agency would use tactics 

that provide their adversaries with an opportunity for concealment. 

Do not ignore Mother Nature. Anyone without direct experience along our southern border runs 

the risk of underestimating the natural flow of water- all it takes is one extreme weather event to 

undo months of work and millions of dollars of investment. 

Currently it is estimated that 385 miles of pedestrian/ vehicle fence exist and 301 miles of 

vehicle barrier exists for a total of686 miles of physical barrier. It is very likely that there are 

additional areas of the border that could benefit tram installing PVI fencing or upgrading current 

vehicle barriers. This should be identified and implemented. 

In place of a wall! recommend increasing air support, horse patrol, river patrol, K-9 units and 

keeping BP stations fully staffed (currently every station in Tucson sector has significant 

deficiencies in staff). 

I again thank the Committee for this opportunity to submit this Statement of Record which is based on 

my own experiences and observations on the U.S./Mexico border. 

4 
192 

April3, 2017 

Senator Heidi Heitkamp 

TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION 

OFFICE OF THE 

CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN 

EDWARD D. MANUEL 

CHAIRMAN 

VERLON M. JOSE 

ViCE CHAIRMAN 

516 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Re: ·nlC Impacts of the Proposed Border WaH on the Tohono O'odham Nation 

Dear Senator Heitkamp: 

On behalf of the Tohono O'odham Nation (Nation), thank you for inviting the Nation to share 

our comments and concerns regarding the proposal to construct a wall on the southwest border in 

preparation for the Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee's hearings this 

week. 

The Nation has 34,000 tribal members, with citizens living on both sides of the more than 60 

miles of the U.S.-Mexican border on the southern boundary of our reservation lands. As a result, the 

Nation has extensive, first-hand experience dealing with the wide array of security, enforcement, 

cultural, environmental, and other issues the United States is now grappling with. Indeed, the Nation's 

police force typically spends more than half of its time on border-related issues, unfortunately drawing 

our limited law enforcement resources away from serving our reservation communities. Over the past 

decade, the Nation has spent an average of $3 million of tribal funds annually on border security and 

enforcement. During this time, the Nation has worked closely with Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to improve border security. The Nation has 

several agreements with CBP and ICE already in place, it leads a multi-agency, on-reservation tribalfederal HIDT A task force, and has actively worked with CBP to facilitate enhanced border security 

measures, 

The O'odham and our ancestors have lived in this area since time immemoriaL No one is more 

familiar with the lands along this stretch of the border than the Tohono O'odham. Based on our 

knowledge of this area, and our extensive experience working on border security, the Nation has 

actively supported the construction of vehicle barriers, patrol roads, and on-reservation CBP operating 

bases that are now in place on our border. lt is equally clear to us that construction of a wall simply 

will not further the objective of securing the border. In many places along our border a wall is not 

physically practical due to the ruggedness of the terrain, steep mountain slopes, and large washes that 

flood multiple times a year. Further, even where a wall could be built, most of the border on the 

Nation is in remote locations where undocumented immigrants will simply be able to climb over the 

P.O. Box 837, SELLS, ARIZONA 85634 PHONE: 520.383.2028 FAX: 520.383.3379 
193 

wall or tunnel under it without being detected. The Nation is formally opposed to a wall on its border. 

Resolution No. 17-053, http://www.tolc-nsn.org/docs/actions17/17053.pdf. 

We believe the construction of a wall along the Nation's border will waste taxpayer money that 

would be much better spent on more effective security measures. In particular, funding for the 

Integrated Fixed Tower systems, interagency communications equipment, and other enhanced 

technology to improve surveillance, such as laptop computers in tribal police cars, and providing for 

additional federal and tribal law enforcement personnel, facilities and equipment, would be both more 

eficctivc and more cost-efficient. 

For example, the Nation's police and other first responders have no radio coverage in 35% of 

the reservation, including much of the remote border area, and currently lack the interoperability to 

directly communicate by radio with CBP and other law enforcement partners on the reservation. The 

Nation desperately needs funding to eliminate these dangerous public safety radio coverage gaps and 

to allow the Tohono O'odham Department of Public Safety to communicate directly with all its law 

enforcement partners. These measures would better achieve the overarching goal of increased border 

security, with fewer negative impacts to tribal lands. 

Presently, the Nation's already deteriorated roads sutler further damage from extensive usc by 

heavy CBP vehicles, which arc the primary users of many reservation roads, including those leading to 

on-reservation CBP bases the Nation has authorized over the last several years. The Nation's roads 

used by CBP arc in in very bad condition, with cracks, broken pavement, and large potholes, resulting 

from the fact that appropriations for BIA road repair and maintenance has been seriously inadequate 

for years. The poor condition of these roads makes high-speed usc impossible for law enforcement, 

and undermines the ability of CBP and the Nation to respond to emergencies and support mission 

critical operations. The poor road conditions also create safety hazards for our citizens who live along 

the harder and make it difficult for tribal members to undertake simple day-to-day activities like 

commuting to work or schooL or traveling to the grocery store or the doctor's office. The Nation and 

CBP would like to work together to improve the road conditions, but appropriations law prevents CBP 

from spending fi.mds lor a purpose for which specific appropriations have been made to another 

agency (BIA). Last Congress, Senator McCain introduced an amendment to the Tribal Law and Order 

Reauthorization & Amendments Act (TLORA) that would allow CBP to transfer funds to BIA for 

road repair, but the TLORA as amended was not enacted into law. Legislation that would authorize 

CBP to use its funds or transfer funds to BIA to repair the damage done to the Nation's roads hy CBP 

vehicles would certainly increase the ability ofCBP and the Nation to secure the border. 

The Nation also is extremely concerned about the negative impacts a physical wall will have 

on our cultural and religious rights, and on our environment. Our tribal members need to be able to 

cross the harder for cultural and ceremonial reasons, to visit family, to obtain governmental services 

such as hcalthcare, and for other purposes. The wall also will significantly impact wildlife and plants 

along the border. The wall will prevent wildlife ffom conducting natural migrations essential for their 

survival, injure endangered species such as the jaguar, and destroy culturally significant and 

endangered plants. Additionally, the wall will interfere with the Nation's vital water resources, such 

as the Vamori Wash, which is a large wash that crosses the border. We arc concerned that during 

heavy rains, the wall will essentially act as a dam across Vamori Wash, which will flood the border 

road and harder communities. 

P.O. BOX 837, SELLS, ARIZONA 85634 PIIONE: 520.383.2028 FAX: 520.383.3379 
194 

Finally, the Nation has significant concerns about the lack of meaningful or timely consultation 

with tribes and border communities regarding the border wall. Under the Illegal Immigration Reform 

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (llRIRA), as amended, and pursuant to the Depm1ment of 

Homeland Security (DHS) Tribal Consultation Policy, DHS is required to consult with tribes in a 

timely manner prior to taking actions that may impact tribes. l!RIRA Section I 02(b )(I )(C); DHS 

Tribal Consultation Policy, Il.B. and lii.A. Although the Nation has had meetings with DHS and CBP 

in Washington, D.C. and at the Border Patrol's Tucson Sector, the Nation has not received any details 

from DHS and CBP about proposals for constructing the wall. These consultation requirements are 

not just feel-good requirements-- in addition to the Nation's expertise relating to its own border lands, 

the Nation has a federally-protected property right in its reservation lands. Construction of a wall 

without the Nation's consent will compromise these property rights and raises serious constitutional 

concerns. For these reasons, we urge DHS and CBP to take the time to engage in serious, meaningful 

consultation with the Nation before making a final decision about construction of a physical wall along 

our border or implementing other aspects of Executive Order 13 767. 

Under Section 102(c) of the IIRIRA, the DHS Secretary has the authority to "waive all legal 

requirements" (including, for example, environmental laws) that he determines necessary to ensure 

expeditious construction of barriers along the border. In 2008, the Secretary issued a Section I 02 

waiver for a large portion of the southern border in California, New Mexico, Texas and Arizona, 

including the Nation's border with Mexico. The Nation is deeply concerned that the Administration 

will move forward under the existing waiver without meaningful consultation with the Nation as 

required under the IIRIRA. 

Executive Order 13767 also directs the Secretary to enter into agreements under Section 287(g) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), allowing state m1d local law 

enforcement officers to perform the functions of federal immigration officers. Executive Order 13767, 

Section 10. In addition to numerous concerns and civil rights litigation over the misuse of this 

authority by state law enforcement during prior administrations, the Nation is very concerned that 

287(g) jurisdictions may attempt to unlawfully use such agreements to extend state authority onto the 

Nation's trust lands without the Nation's consent. Therefore, any 287(g) agreement that may impact 

the Nation'sjurisdiction over its lands or its sovereignty must preserve the Nation's authority. 

The Nation is committed to working with the Administration on a government-to-government 

basis and continuing our longstanding working relationships with CBP and ICE to improve border 

security. The safety and wellbeing of our tribal members is ofparmnount importance to the Nation, 

and the construction of a wall will have substantial negative impacts on the O'odham way of life. The 

Nation has significant experience and knowledge regarding the most effective forms of border 

security, and it is our firm belief that a wall is not the answer to improving border security. Thank you 

again for the opportunity to provide our thoughts and concerns on this important issue. 

Sincerely, 

~~ Chainnan Edward D. Manuel 

P.O. Box 837, SELLS, ARIZONA 85634 PHONE: 520.383.2028 FAX: 520.383.3379 
195 

March 2014 
196 

Gangs Beyond Borders 

s ri 

March 2014 
197 

Message from the Attorney General 

California is a leader for international commerce. In close 

proximity to Latin America and Canada, we are a state laced 

with Iorge ports and a vast interstate system. California is also 

leading the way in economic development and job creation. 

And the Golden Stale is home to the digital and innovation 

economies reshaping how the world does business. 

But these same features that benefit California also make the 

state a coveted place of operation for transnational criminal 

organizations. As an international hub, more narcotics, 

weapons and humans are trafficked in and out of California than any other state. The 

size and strength of California's economy make our businesses, financial institutions 

and communities lucrative targets for transnational criminal activity. Finally, transnational 

criminal organizations are relying increasingly on cybercrime as a source of funds 

~which means they ore frequently targeting, and illicitly using, the digital tools and 

content developed in our stole. 

The term "transnational organized crime" refers to a range of criminal activity 

perpetrated by groups whose origins often lie outside of the United States but whose 

operations cross international borders. Whether it is a drug cartel originating from 

Mexico or a cybercrime group out of Eastern Europe, the operations of transnational 

criminal organizations threaten the safety, health and economic wellbeing of all 

Americans, end particularly Californians. 

This is not a new threat~ one of the first official trips I made as Attorney General in 

2011 was to tour the United States-Mexico border and discuss strategies to combat 

transnational crime with slate and local law enforcement. The following year, in 2012, 

we convened a working group to research and issue a report on human trafficking, 

an increasing activity of transnational criminal organizations. That report, The State 

of Human Trafficl;ing in California, proposes innovative strategies to investigate and 

prosecute the perpetrators and victims of trafficking. But human trafficking is only one 

part of transnational crime operations. 
198 

This new report, Gongs Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational 

Organized Crime, addresses all three emerging pillars of transnational criminal activity: 

the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings; money laundering; and high-tech 

crimes, such as digital piracy, hacking and fraud. It is the result of extensive research 

and consultation with federal, state, and local law enforcement, non-governmental 

organizations, and academia. 

The report finds that while transnational organized crime is a significant problem, 

it is not insurmountable. In California, law enforcement at all levels of government 

have made maior strides against these criminal groups, even in the face of declining 

resources. Law enforcement in foreign countries have made steady in-roads, as 

well, as demonstrated by the recent arrest in February 2014 of Joaquin "EI Chapa" 

Guzman Loera, the reputed head of Mexico's notorious Sinaloa Federation cartel. 

The report describes the strategies that are working and sets forth recommendations 

to combat transnational organized crime. A call for sustained law enforcement 

funding and collaboration between federal, state, and local governments are at the 

center of these recommendations. 

As transnational criminal organizations evolve in the search for profits, California will 

continue to be an attractive target. Gongs Beyond Borders sheds light on this threat 

in our state and highlights effective approaches in the fight against transnational 

organized crime. I hope it will be a useful tool for law enforcement and the public. 

Sincerely, 

Attorney General Kamala D. Harris 
199 

Transnational Organized Crime 

Special Project Team 

Jeff Tsai 

Larry Wallace 

Rei Onishi 

Leif Dautch 

Mateo Munoz 

Kent Shaw 

Darren Nelson 

Anthony DaSilva 

Kamala D. Harris 

Attorney General 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

Director, Division of Low Enforcement 

Deputy Attorney General 

Government Law Section 

Deputy Attorney General 

Appeals, Writs and Trials Section 

Director, Office of California-Mexico 

Bilateral Relations 

Advisory Work Group 

Chief, Bureau of Investigation 

Analyst, CA State Threat Assessment Center 

Deputy Attorney General 

Appeals, Writs and Trials Section 

Antonette Cordero Deputy Attorney General 

Jonathon BertranHarris 

Civil Rights Enforcement Section 

Associate Governmental Program Analyst 
200 

Acknowledgements 

The Office of the Attorney General would like to offer its appreciation for the 

assistance and consultation that a range of ir.dividuo!s and organizations have 

provided in the research, preparation, writing, and production of this Report. 

The assistance of a team from the California State Threat Assessment Center, which 

inc!uded Ryan Stonebraker, Matthew Hawkins, and David Herbst, was instrumental 

in orgorizing and analyzing intelligence informalio'1 and trends. 

The dedication of the 'Tlen and women in California law enforcement to combatting 

trarsnational criminal organizations has been the key to our success in disrupting and 

dismantling these groups. In particular, the Attorney General would like to acknowledge 

the advice and help provided by the following individuals and their offices: Alameda 

County Sheriff Gregory Ahern, Los Angeles High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

j"HIDTA") Director Roger Bass, Los Angeles Police Chief Charlie Beck, Citrus Heights 

Police Chief Chris Boyd, Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown, San Diego 

County District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis, Sacramento County Sheriff Scott Jones, 

Campbell Police Sergeant Dan Livingston, San Diego and Imperial Counties HIDTA 

Director Kean McAdam, Long Beach Police Chief Jim McDonnell, El Segundo Police 

Lieutenant Carlos Mendoza, San Bernardino County District Attorney Michael Ramos, 

Central Valley HIDTA Director William Ruzzamenti, los Angeles County Sheriff John 

Scott, Northern California Regional Intelligence Center Director Mike Sena, the 

California Board of Equalization's Investigation and Special Operations Division 

Chief Randy Silva, end Central Coast Gang Investigator Association Executive 

Director Michael Walker. Specici commendatio!l and thanks for research assistance 

and consultotion are also due to the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, 

the Orange County District Attorney's Office, the Chula Vista Police Department, 

the California Department of Business Oversight's Money Transmitlers Division, the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Los Angeles Regional 

Criminal Information Clearinghouse, and the CaiGang Network System. 

The Attorney General is grateful for the insight and support from California's law 

enforcement associations, which represent the men and women who lead the fight 

against transnational organized crime in our communities. Our thanks in particular 

go to the California State Sheriffs' Association, the California Police Chiefs' 

Association, the California District Attorneys' Association, the California Narcotics 

Officers' Association, and the California Peace Officers' Association. 
201 

Our efforts combatting transnational organized crime are shared with federal 

law enforcement in California, and the Office of the Attorney General expresses 

appreciation for case and research information provided by the United States 

Attorneys' Offices for the Central and Southern Districts of California and the 

U.S. Department of Justice's Criminal Division. Additional federal support for the 

preparation and production of this Report was generously provided by the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Investigations). the White 

House's Office of National Drug Control Policy and National Security Council, 

and the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. 

Transnational organized crime reaches into California from abroad, and collaboration 

with law enforcement partners and government entilies outside of our state is vital. This 

Report benefited immensely from the insight and assistance from the staff and members 

of the Southwest Border Anti-Money Laundering Alliance, a coalition made up of 

the Attorneys General off;ces from Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. 

We also would like to acknowledge the cooperation from the Legal Attache of the 

Mexican Attorney General's Office 

Experts from academia, public policy institutions, and private industry provided 

valuable research assistance in the development of the Report. The Office of the 

Attorney General would like to thank Richard Boscovich (Microsoft Corp. Digital 

Crimes Unit), Professor Ami Carpenter (University of San Diego), Dr. Yanda 

Felbab-Brown (Brookings Institution), David Finn (Microsoft Corp. Digital Crimes 

Unit), Beth Givens (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse), Melissa Kriz (Fox Entertainment 

Group, Inc.), Michael Robinson (Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.), 

Professor Stefan Savage (University of California, San Diego), Professor David 

Shirk (University of San Diego), Professor Pamela Starr (University of Southern 

California), and Karen Thorland (Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.). 

Finally, the Attorney General would like to acknowledge the hard work and dedication 

of the many people in the California Deportment of justice- including ils Division of 

Law Enforcement, Criminal Law Division, Public Rights Division, Civil Law Division, 

and Communications and Imaging Resource Center- who made this Report possible. 

Special thanks go to Guillermo Auyon, Danielle Ayers, Julie Basco, Sonia Bui, 

Teresa Carnero, Erasmo Carrizosa, Joe Dominic, Jeremy Dunn, Oscar Estrella, 

Geannie Franco, Jeanne Gahagan, Roy Giorgi, Kimberly Granger, Janette GuntherAllen, Michael Haroldson, Justin Ito, Val Jimenez, Dean Johnston, Dave King, 

Ernesto Limon, Keith Lyon, Mark Mackler, Luis Marquez, Janet Mistchenko, 

Tricia Morgensen, Robert Morgester, Michael Newman, Alex Nocon, Jessica Owen, 

Charles Penn, Somerset Perry, Gloria Pingrey, Mitchell Pryor, Christina Rogers, 

Vicki Sands, Karen Sandusky, Epifanio Sevilla, Peter Shear, Karen Sherwood, 

Randy Sivilla, Robert Sumner, Mike Whitaker, Jon Wolff, and Michele Wong. 
202 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ...... ___ .. 

High tights of the 2014 Report 

Summary of Recommendotior.s 

Introduction 

- . - ' ' i 

ii 

... iv 

.vii 

Chapter 1 -Transnational Criminal Organizations: Structure and Operations 

The Rise of Mexico-Based Drug Cartels . _ ....... 2 

Asian and Eastern European Transnational Criminal Groups _ ...... 5 

Proli'erotio'1 of Transnational Gongs . . . . . . . . . ........ 6 

The Online Criminals; Transnational Hocking, Froud, and Pirating Rings _ 7 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . .. 8 

Chapter 2- California: A Hub for Transnational Criminal Activity .......... 9 

Drug Trafficking Is the Most Profitable Transnational 

Criminal Activity i.'l California .......... l 0 

Trafficking Humans Is Almost as Profitable as Trafficking Drugs . . . . . 1 8 

Co!ifornia Is a Gateway in the Criminal Firearms Trade .......... 20 

Money Laundering Corrupts California's Economy . - 21 

Conclusion '' ' .. '''.' '' '.'.' '' 26 

Chapter 3 -Transnational Criminal Organizations and California Gangs: 

A Growing Threat to Public Safety .. 27 

California Faces a U!lique Threat of Spillover Violence from Mexico . 28 

California Is Threatened by the Alliance of Transnational 

Criminal Organizations with Prison and Street Gongs 

The Criminal Alliances Hove Sparked a Rash of VioblCe ........ _ 

Conclusion 

.. 29 

'33 

. 34 
203 

Chapter 4 New Challenges Facing Law Enforcement in 

Combatting Drug Trafficking .. 35 

New Technologies Facilitate Gong Activities . 35 

Increased Global Trade Has Mode It Harder to Detect Illicit Trafficking . 37 

Transnational Criminal Organizations Are Finding Alternatives to Ports of Entry . . 39 

Globalization Creates New Money Laundering Threats ....... 47 

Conclusion 

Chapter 5- High-Tech Crime: A New Frontier for 

Transnational Criminal Organizations 

Transnational Criminoi Organizations Are Targeting Information 

Systems and Networks for Attock and Exploitation 

Transnational Crimina! Organizations Are Uniquely Positioned 

To Exploit High-Tech Criminal Opportunities 

Emerging High-Tech Crime Trends 

Virtual Currercies Offer New Tools for Money Laundering 

Conclusio.n . 

Chapter 6 - Recommendations 

Trafficking 

High·Tech Crime . 

.. 50 

... 51 

.......... 52 

.. 59 

........... 63 

.. 68 

72 

........ 73 

........ 73 

. ...... 77 

Money Laundering ...................... 78 
204 

Executive Summary 

Over the last ce'ltury, few issues hove grabbed the notion's attention like organized 

criminal activity. In particular, transnational organized crime - crime that reaches beyond 

borders- has been a topic frequently explored, and occasionoliy even glamorized, by 

the media and through film. But for the people of California, transnational organized 

crime is not simply a subject for the silver screen. It is an everyday reality associated 

with drug trafficking, sexual slavery, and shocking violence that affects nearly every 

community in the Golden State. 

Transnational crimina! organiza!ions are self-perpetuating associations operating across 

national borders that use violence, corruption, and fraud !o protect and disguise their 

illicit, orofit-driven activities. This Report examines how these groups- with roots in 

places around the globe - have flocked to California to engage in an increasingly 

diverse range of criminal activities. 

Chapter One !ooks into the varying nature of transnational criminal organizations, 

ranging in size and sophistication from corporation-like drug cmtels and extremely 

violent transnational gangs to Internet-based hacking and financial fraud rings. These 

organizations are incredibly fluid and adaptive, and their profit·rnotivated operations 

run the gamut from traditional crimes -such as narcotics, weapons, or human 

traffickng to complex money laundering schemes and specialized cybercrimes. 

Like parasites, transnational criminal organizations whose operations extend into 

Calibrnia thrive by exploiting their host's strengths. California's economy- a global 

leader owing to its shored border with Mexico and its status as a gateway for 

trade between the U.S. and East .1\sio- aitracts hard-working immigrants from around 

the world and maintai:ls highways and high-speed data networks that speed the 

flow of goods, people, and information throughout the slate. Chapter Two explains 

how transnotiord criminal organizations hove taken advantage of these factors in 

on attempt to transform California into a center of transnational organized crime, 

California is the notion's largest portal not orly for drugs and human trafficking victims 

flowing into the U.S., but aiso for weapons and the laundered proceeds of illicit 

activity smuggled out of the U.S.- often through the very some trafficking routes. 
205 

The harm done by transnational criminal organizations to communities all across 

California is hard to overstate. Not only do these organizations threaten public 

health by driving the supply and distribution of harmful narcotics, but their alliances 

with violent prison and street gangs (a trend addressed at length in Chapter Three) 

have sparked a rash of violence in a period of otherwise declining criminal activity. 

Moreover, the substantial amount of illicit money moving through California's 

economy threatens the security of the state's financial institutions, local businesses, 

and communities, with an estimated $30 to $40 billion in illicit funds laundered 

through California commerce every year. 

Transnational criminal organizations are increasingly taking advantage of new 

communications technology and the interconnectedness of the globalized world to 

further their trafficking activities in California This creates new challenges for law 

enforcement, a topic explored in Chapter Four. But transnational organized crime 

in California extends beyond drugs, weapons, and human trafficking. In the 21st 

century, the problem posed by transnational criminal organizations threatens the 

security of computer and data networks, the integrity of online bank accounts, and 

the rights of intellectual property holders. By virtue of its population and knowledgepowered economy, California is the top target in the nation for this new generation 

of transnational criminal organizations - originating in significant numbers from 

Eastern Europe, but also Africa and China- whose purpose is to commit highly 

profitable hacking, fraud, and digital piracy crimes. This emerging cybersecurity 

threat is discussed in Chapter Five. 

Recognizing the significant threat posed to California's economy and people by 

transnational criminal organizations, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris assembled 

a team of researchers, policy analysts, and law enforcement officials to identify the 

challenges these organizations create and to formulate recommendations to combat them 

in California most effectively (Chapter Six). This report is based on dozens of interviews 

with law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and policy experts, an in-depth review of state 

task force data, and research and investigation by the California Deportment of justice. 

Highlights of the 2014 Report 

Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations ore suspected of trafficking 70 

percent of the U S. supply of methamphetamine through the San Diego port of entry 

alone, making California the primary source for methamphetamine nationwide. In 

2013, border authorities seized over 6,200 kilograms of methamphetamine entering 

California, a three-fold increase since 2009. 

The Sinaloa Federation cartel has emerged from the fragmented Mexican drug 

market as the dominant Mexico-based drug trafficking organization operating in 
206 

California. Sinaloa is now responsible for trafficking the vast majority of Mexicoproduced marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine through the Tijuana 

corridor into California. 

The public safety threat posed by Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations 

has been amplified as cartels have formed alliances with California prison and 

streetgongs to control trafficking routes, distribute drugs, and kidnap, extort, 

and kill as necessary to protect their criminal activities. The Mexican Mafia, for 

example, provides protection for members of numerous cartels both inside and 

outside prison, and various Hispanic Sureno and Norteno gongs in Southern and 

Northern California have teamed up with Sinaloa, La Familia Michoocono, The 

Knights Templor, and other Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations. 

With gong membership up 40 percent notionally between 2009 and 2011, 

California hos seen higher levels of violent crime (particularly assault, extortion, 

home invasion robberies, homicide, intimidation, and shootings), as well as on 

increase in arrests for human trafficking offenses and significant seizures of drugs, 

weapons, and cosh. 

Transnational criminal organizations ore taking advantage of new communications 

technologies and social media to facilitate criminal activity, recruit new members, 

and intimidate or harass their rivals- even from inside prison walls. In 2011, for 

example, over 15,000 cell phones were seized from inmates in California prisons. 

Recent increases in the use of pongo boots to smuggle drugs and people into 

California exemplify the constant tactical adaptation by transnational criminal 

organizations. Boots capable of carrying 12 tons of marijuana have landed as 

for north as Santo Cruz County, with a steady increase in panga sightings and 

landings throughout the Central Coast. 

Between 2009 and 2012, the number of intentional breaches of computer 

networks and databases in the U.S. jumped by 280 percent, with California's 

shore leading the notion. Many of these breaches have been tied to 

transnational criminal organizations operating from Russia, Ukraine, Romania, 

Israel, Egypt, Chino, and Nigeria, among other places. 

In the 2012-2013 fiscal year, California state drug task forces disrupted or 

dismantled 140 drug, money-laundering and gong organizations, arrested nearly 

3,000 individuals, rescued 41 drug-endangered children, confiscated 1,000 

weapons, and seized nearly $28.5 million in U.S. currency in anti-narcotic law 

enforcement actions statewide. Federally-sponsored High Intensity Drug Trafficking 

Areas ("HIDTA") program task forces also identified 305 drug-related transnational 

iii 
207 

criminal organizations operating in California, and 18 street and prison gangs 

with ties to these organizations. 

At the same time, state-led task forces charged with protecting California from 

transnational criminal organizations have suffered severe budget reductions over 

the last five years, with the number of operating task forces dropping from 55 

in 2011 to just 17 in 2013. 

Summary of Recommendations 

0 The Legislature should amend California law to target the leaders of 

transnational criminal organizations operating in California: California does not 

currently have any statutes that specifically target or punish supervisors, managers, 

or financers operating on behalf of transnational criminal organizations. California 

should fill this statutory void by enacting legislation similar to the federal Continuing 

Criminal Enterprise Act to directly attack the leadership of these organizations. 

Federal, state, and local law enforcement should use California's State Threat 

Assessment System as a central hub for sharing information about transnational 

crime: California presently lacks a unified system for collecting, analyzing, and 

sharing information regarding transnational organized crime. California's State 

Threat Assessment System (STASI is uniquely positioned to act as that central hub 

for California's transnational crime information-sharing needs. In coordination with 

the Attorney General's Office, California's tribal, local, state, and federal law 

enforcement agencies should partner with STAS to share information about 

transnational criminal organizations across the state. 

Federal, state, and local authorities should establish a unified maritime task 

force and associated radar network to counter maritime smuggling operations 

along California's coastline: While several regional partnerships and a federal 

task force exist to address maritime smuggling operations along California's 

coast, California needs a multi-jurisdictional Maritime Task Force that leverages 

expertise at the federal, state, and local levels- to combat the threat posed by 

panga vessel smuggling. California should also work with Coast Guard Officials 

to implement a network of high-intensity radar stations or sonar buoys strategically 

located along the coast to better detect maritime threats and coordinate law 

enforcement responses. 

The Legislature and Governor should fund five additional Special Operations 

Units across California: The increasingly sophisticated nature of transnational 

criminal organizations demands an equally sophisticated and coordinated 
208 

response from low enforcement. The California Department of Justice's Bureau of 

Narcotics Enforcement, and related task forces and special operations units, were 

remarkably successful in targeting and dismantling transnational organized crime 

cells in California before severe budget cutbacks in 2011 limited their operational 

capacity. Restoring funding to special operations units in Sacramento, Son Francisco, 

Riverside, Los Angeles, and Son Diego is a necessary step in the fight against 

transnational organized crime in California. 

'" The federal government should continue providing critical funding to support state 

and local law enforcement agencies in investigating and dismantling trafficking 

organizations: In particular, Congress should maintain and increase funding levels 

for methamphetamine law enforcement grants through the US Department of 

justice's Community Oriented Policing Services [COPS) office. Additionally, the 

California Board of State and Community Corrections, which administers federal 

low enforcement grants from the Byrne justice Assistance Grant Program, should 

restore the allocation of these funds to joint state-local task forces. 

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies should increase operational 

coordination in combatting transnational criminal organizations: Given the 

international scope of these trafficking networks, federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies in California must work together- at the investigatory and 

prosecutoriollevels to combat major transnational criminal organizations and 

their alliances with prison and street gongs. 

State and local authorities should develop public-private partnerships to 

leverage technology against transnational organized crime: As the frequent 

target of transnational criminal schemes, the private sector is at the frontline 

defending against numerous high-tech threats. It is not surprising that it often has 

access to information and technologies that the government does not. By forming 

public-private partnerships, state and local authorities con leverage the private 

sector's comparative strengths to counter the ever-changing threats and tactics of 

transnational criminal organizations. 

Businesses should adopt industry best practices designed to protect against 

cybercrime: Lox cybersecurity practices, or the lack of any protections whatsoever, 

allow far too many breaches of computer networks and databases to happen in 

California. All entities, public and private, doing business in California should 

assume that they are a target and defend themselves accordingly by adopting 

the industry best practices identified in the Department of justice's recently released 

report, Cybersecurity in the Golden Stale 

v 
209 

vi 

The Legislature should amend California law to enable prosecutors to 

temporarily freeze the assets of transnational criminal organizations and 

their gang associates before the filing of an indictment: Under current law, 

transnational criminal organizations are often given the equivalent of advance 

warning that their criminal proceeds and assets are about to be seized by 

low enforcement. That is because of o legal void that prevents the seizure of 

any assets until the filing of o formal criminal indictment. As o result, in cases 

where illicit assets ore discovered before on indictment can be filed, criminals 

hove the chance to remove their assets before they con be token. This loophole 

must be eliminated by empowering low enforcement to temporarily freeze on 

organization's illicit proceeds or property in advance of o formal prosecution. 

The Legislature should strengthen California's prohibition against financial 

transaction "structuring": When it comes to proving that o financial transaction 

was "structured" to evade financial reporting requirements, California low imposes 

o special burden on prosecutors that federal low does not. To prove "structuring" 

under California low, prosecutors must show not only that transactions were 

organized to ovoid mandatory reporting requirements, but also that such structuring 

was intended to disguise proceeds from illicit activities. This special burden on state 

and local prosecutors hampers the ability to disrupt money laundering schemes and 

should be eliminated. 

California prosecutors need advanced training to combat sophisticated 

transnational money laundering schemes: At the some time that budget reductions 

hove curtailed investigatory and prosecutoriol capacities, transnational criminal 

organizations ore becoming more and more sophisticated in how they launder 

their illicit profits. A key to disrupting this sophisticated criminal activity is through 

equally sophisticated and aggressive prosecutions. Advanced training and 

technical ossistonce to state and local prosecutors investigating and prosecuting 

complex money laundering schemes is vital to building the capacity to bring 

these prosecutions. 

State authorities should partner with their Mexican counterparts to share 

intelligence and disrupt the illicit flow of money across the border: The ease 

with which Iorge sums of money con be whisked across borders has never been 

greater. For this reason, it is critical that investigators and regulatory officials on 

both sides of the border hove the most up-to-dote information about cross-border 

currency flows and the people behind them and cooperate in disrupting money 

laundering schemes. 
210 

Introduction 

Transnational organized crime in California is as diverse as it is complex, It involves a 

range of profit-motivated criminal activities perpetrated by on ever-increasing array of 

trarsnationol criminal organizations, located both within Coiifornio and abroad, These 

orga'lizotions have taken advantage of the technological revolution of the last two 

decodes, as well as advancements in trade, transport, and giobal money transfers, to 

substantially increase the scale and profitability of their criminal activities in California,: 

Unlike the Iorge, hierarchically-organized irternational crime groups of the late 

1980s and early 1990s, such as the well-known Mede!iin or Coli drug cartels, 

modern transnational criminal organizations are incredibly fluid and adoptive, 

and have diversified their criminal enterprises, Transnational criminal organizations 

varying in size, scope, and influence hove now established a presence in virtually 

every one of California's major urban areas, as well as many smaller cities_ They 

present a real and significant statewide threat to the economic and social fabric 

of California 

Their profit-driven operations run the gamut from more traditional crimes- such as 

narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking (the use of force, fraud, or coercion to exploit 

a victim for profit) -to complex money laundering schemes and sophisticated computer 

attacks designed to steal personal information Ofld money !Figure 1), These crimes, and 

the transnational criminal organizations orchestrating them, exploit millions of Americans 

and impose costs estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars onnuolly2 

Transnational crimina! organizations ore also constantly altering their illicit capabilities, 

refining and adapting their tactics in response to enhanced local, stole, and federal low 

enforceme'lt interdiction efforts. 

Throughout this Report, we make reference to these groups and their criminal conduct 

in various ways- as "lransnationoi gongs," "transnational criminal organizations," or 

the shorthard "TCOs," as we!l as "transnational organized crime," There is ro singular 

or exclusive domestic or international definition of a transnational criminal organization 

and, in fact, the success these groups have enjoyed is due in port to the ambiguity of 

their organizational structures, However, transnational criminal organizations possess 

many common traits and Chapter One of this Reoort discusses those commonalities. 

vii 
211 

Figure 1 

Transnational Organized Crime in California 

The Report is a broad review of transnational criminal activity in California. We analyze 

four types of transnational criminal organizations active in California (Mexico-based drug 

cartels, Asian and Eastern European transnational criminal groups, transnational gongs, 

and Internet-based hacking and fraud rings) and explore their operations in trafficking 

(drugs, human beings, and weapons), money laundering, and high-tech crime. At their 

core, the criminal operations conducted by these organizations all have international and 

domestic dimensions, directly impacting California and its residents. 

vi!i 
212 

Transnational Criminal Organ izotions 

Structure and Operations 

As defined by the National Security Council, transnational criminal organizations ore selfperpetuating associations operating across national borders that use violence and corruption, and exploit transnational commerce and communications, to prated and disguise their 

illicit, profih:Jriven activities. 3 These organizations utilize a number of different organizational 

structures, including hierarchies, networks, and cells, with many transnational criminal 

organizations evolving and adopting over time due to changing circumstances.~ They may 

be tied together by ethnicily, territory, or even personal relationships, or may share a 

focus on particular segments 

of the illicit morketploce5 Figure 2 

Transnational criminal 

organizations hove a 

presence in virtually every moior urban area in 

California, as well as in 

many smaller cities around 

the state. From South to 

North, transnational crimi· 

no! organizations of vary· 

ing types hove permeated 

and penetrated California, 

finding o foothold through· 

out the state (Figure 2). 

TCO Hot Spots in California 
213 

1. The Rise of Mexico·Based Drug Cartels 

The dominant organizational structure of transnational criminal organizations operating 

in California is the corporation-like drug trafficking organization. These organizations 

ore commonly referred to as "cartels," so we will use the terms interchangeably. Traditionally, these Iorge cartels hod rigid hierarchical structures, but analysts hove identified 

a general trend in recent years toward decentralized cells controlled by a governing 

body as the "nerve center. "6 

The primary cartel-like transnational criminal organizations active in California ore 

Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations (commonly referred to as "Mexican 

drug trafficking organizations"). Though Mexican drug trafficking organizations hove 

been in operation for more than a century, the lost 20 years hove witnessed a profound change in the operation and control of the key trafficking routes to the United 

States. The associated emergence of these organizations has been described as "the 

greatest organizational drug threat to the notion. ''7 

Following the dismantlement of the Medellin and Coli drug cartels by the Colombian 

government in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the highly-profitable cocaine trafficking 

routes to the United States were token over by Mexican drug trafficking organizations, 

particularly the Tiiuono cartel (controlled by the Arellano Felix family and also known 

as the Arellano Felix Organization) and the Juarez cartel (operated by the Carrillo 

Fuentes fomily). 8 However, in 2000, the administration of Mexican President Vincente 

Fox, in consultation with the U.S. government, began to target high-level operatives 

first in the Tijuana cartel, and then in the juarez cartel that resulted in the capture or 

death of several Felix and Fuentes family members9 While successful in many respects, 

this crackdown also resulted in fragmentation of the Mexican drug trafficking market, 

leading to increased violence, not only belween the larger drug trafficking 

organizations and the government, but also among smaller "cortelitos" vying for a 

shore of the drug trafficking industry. 

Out of this power vacuum, the Mexico-based drug trafficking organization known as 

the Sinaloa Federation has emerged as the dominant transnational criminal organization operating in California. Sinaloa whose roots con be traced bock to the breakup 

of the Guodoloioro cartel in the 1980s- is now responsible for the vast moiorily of 

drug, weapons, and human trafficking across the California-Mexico border. 10 

Sinaloa and other Mexican drug cartels ore adopting their corporate structures to better 

leverage existing resources and alliances and expand the financial and geographic 

scope of their enterprise. For example, Sinaloa which has allied with the Gulf cartel, 
214 

Los Caballeros Templorios, and the Arellano Felix Organization has adopted a 

decentralized, less-hierarchical structure, whereby leadership directs peripheral 

lieutenants to corry out operations in a "hub and spoke" monner. 11 

This "federation" of Sinaloa-affiliated cells, developed by the cartel's recently--arrested 

leader, joaquin "EI Chapa" Guzman Loera, allows Sinaloa to maintain a presence in at 

least 17 Mexican states and 50 other countries throughout North, Central, and South 

America, Australia, Europe, Southeast Asia, and West Africa, with each subgroup 

enjoying significant autonomy in its business operations and ability to retain profits. 12 

Sinaloa is particularly active in Southern California, where it coordinates with Hispanic 

Sureno street gongs to distribute narcotics. The expansion of Sureno gong territories 

has also allowed the cartel to expand its influence to Northern California (notably, the 

Son Jose area) and into neighboring states like Oregon, Nevada, and Arizona (Figure 

3). 13 This ever-increasing zone of influence has caused friction with existing regional 

gongs that had previously controlled trafficking routes, resulting in threats of violence, 

homicides, kidnoppings, and extortion. 14 

Figure 3 

Sinaloa Presence in California 

3 
215 

4 
216 

2. Asian and Eastern 

Another type of transnational criminal organization is formed when criminals based 

abroad attempt to partner with their counterparts in U.S. immigrant communities in order 

to exploit access to U.S. markets and wealth. The result is a loose transnational confederation between a criminal ring abroad and an autonomous ring here in the U.S., 

tied together along ethnic lines. While much still remains unknown about these groups, 

many of them operate in California, which is home to large immigrant communities from 

around the world and a quarter of all immigrants who have come to the U.S. 15 

Eurasian transnational criminal groups arising from the 15 republics of the former Soviet 

Union and from central European countries maintain an active California presence in 

5 
217 

areas ircluding Burbank, Fresno, Glendale, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, and 

San Francisco. Known for their sophistication and violence, groups like Armenian Power 

are linked to cybercrime, financial fraud (such as identity theft and credit card crimes!, 

outo theft, illegal gambling, and narcotics and hunnan trafficking. 16 

Additionally, once confined to just a handful of urban areas with large Asian-American 

populations, Asian transnational criminal confederations, such as those involving the Tiny 

Rascal Gang and Asian Boyz, are expending to communities in Fresno, Los Angeles, 

Orange, Sacramento, Santa Clare, and San Diego Counties where the growth in the 

number of new immigrants from Asia has been greatest. These criminal organizations 

engage in ~uman and sex trafficking, drug and weapons smuggling, domestic marijuana 

cultivation, various forms of cybercrime, and even wildlife trafficking.' 7 

Although tied together along ethnic li'1es, these confederations show little affection for 

tnose who share their ethnic identity when deciding whom to target. Indeed, immigrants 

who share ethnic ties with these criminal organizations are arguably the most vulnerable to victimization. For example, Armenian Power frequently targets members of the 

Armenian-American community for fraud and extortion, as it did in one Southern California 

fraud scheme described in Chapter Five. The special vulnerability of many immigrant 

communities underscores the urgent need far law enforcement to better understand Asian 

and Eastern European transnational criminal groups so that they can better protect some 

of California's most vulnerable citizens and residents. 

3. Proliferation of Transnational 

Transnational gangs are criminal street gangs operating in the U.S. with ties to gangs of 

the same ethnicily or nationality, or within the same umbrella gang, operating in other 

countries. They are linked to the prolific use of violence or the threat of violence to further 

their illicit activities in California Like Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations, 

transnational gangs have exploited the benetits of an interconnected world to expand 

their increasingly sophisticated criminal activities to a global scale. While still principally 

engaged in narcotics troffickirg (although on a smaller scole than Mexico-based drug 

trafficking organizations!, these gongs deeply involve themselves in crimes ranging from 

money laundering and robbery to extortion a'1d contract killings, as well os emerging 

crimes like intellectual properly fraud and human trafficking. In addition to these profitdriven activities, transnational gangs perpetrate acts of vioience to establish their 

reputation and status in California communities. 

Transnational gangs vary in organizational sophistication, though they predominately 

follow a "hub and spoke" model, with a hierarchical, central point directing regional 

"clique" or "died' leadership. They are increasingly working with other transnational 

criminal organizations, as well as California street and prison gangs (a dangerous union 
218 

examined in Chapter 3), and are coordinating their criminal activities across both state 

and international lines. The primary transnational gangs operating in California are: 

• \J\ora SdwJtrucho the shorthand ·~vs-13'\ MS-13 rs the largest and most violent transnational gang currently operating in California and has been recognized 

by the U.S. Department of Treasury as a transnational criminal organization. OrigiPally founded in Los Angeles during the 1980s by Salvadoran immigrants, MS-13 

began as an ethnic, protection-oriented street gang. A growing Salvadoran immigrant membership, coupled with mass deportations to Central America in 

the 1990s of MS-13 members convicted of certain crimes, helped transform this 

group into a transnational gang According to recent U.N. estimates, MS-13 is 

now one of the world's fastest growing criminal organizations, with an international 

membership of at least 30,000, including 8,000 members in El Salvador, 7,000 

in Honduras, and 5,000 in Guatemala. 18 

• 18th Street Another large criminal street gang, the 18th Street Gang was 

formed by Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles around 1959, with many members 

later deported in the 1990s to Mexico and Centro! American countries. Despite 

their similarities, the l 8th Street Gang, sometimes referred to as M-18 or Barrio 

1 8, is an historic rival of MS·l 3. 

The 18th Street Gang is a large organization with an international membership 

well over 30,000. According to U.N. estimates, 14,000 to 17,000 members are 

based in Guatemala, 8,000 to 10,000 live in El Salvador, and another 5,000 

reside in Honduras. 19 Membership numbers in the U.S. are wei! into the thousands 

and cliques in drHerent coLntries frequently collaborate or form alliances opportunistically. Similar to MS-13, the 18th Street Gang's domestic operations are based in 

Corifornia, with the moiority of their operations in the greater Los Angeles or South· 

ern California region (although operations have also been observed in northern 

California) Gong members also maintain close relationships with Mexico-based 

transnational criminal organizations. 

4, The Online Criminals: Transnational and 

With the rise of a global society connected by the Internet, criminal rings organized to 

commit hacking, fraud, pirating and other high-tech crimes across borders hove rapidly 

proliferated. These rings operate frequently from Eastern Europe, but also from places 

as drverse as West Africa and China, and specifically target the citizens, computer 

networks, and companies of prosperous countries like the U.S. They vary widely in 

size, sometimes partnering with "locals" in the target country. Just as often, however, 

they feel little need to form local partnerships, since the Internet allows them to oper7 
219 

ate remotely, o'ld a lock of a physical presence in the country they ore targeting helps 

them more easily evade detection and criminal prosecution. 

Like other transnational criminal organizations, transnational hocking, fraud, and pirating rings ore profit-driven. But unlike cartels and gongs, these rings do not commonly 

employ fear, violence, and terror as too!s in their arsenal. Instead, their success hinges 

on operating anonymously and surreptitiously, relying on sophisticated tactics to steal 

information, harvest mor.ey, and move money across iurisdictions into their own bonk 

accounts. 

Conclusion 

Transnational criminal organizations hove used their adoptability and fluid organizational structures to expand their networks of criminal activity to every corner of 

California. Mexican drug cartels, particularly Sinaloa, hove been most successful in 

embedding themselves into the fabric of our urban communities by forming alliances 

with prison ond street gongs for protection and distribution of illicit goods. However, 

transnational gongs or'd other organized criminal rings also pose serious threats to the 

physical and financial well-being of Californians 

8 
220 

California: A Hub for Transnational 

Criminal Activity 

California is a global leader on a number of fronts and, unfortunate~, transnational criminal 

activily is one of them (Figure 4). In 2012 alone, 305 drug·related transnational criminal organizations were found operating in the state, including Mexico-based drug cartels in at least 

22 cities from Northern California to the southern border20 Based in port on its population 

and network of inlerstale highways connecting the western U.S., California is a maior portal 

through which drugs flow to other U.S. states and cities, as well as Canada. California is also 

the top slate in the U.S for human trafficking, due in port to its proximily to the U.S. southwest 

border, robust economy, and large immigrant population21 Finally, with a gross domestic 

product of $2 trillion and substantial international trade activily, California's economic and 

financial infrastructure is often lorgeled for transnational criminal money laundering schemes. 

Figure 4 

Impact of Transnational Criminal Organizations in California 

9 
221 

Drug Trafficking Is the Most Profitable Transnational Criminal 

Activity in California 

Mexico-based drug cartels generate billions of dollars annually by trafficking drugs into 

California, both for sale within the state and as a staging base for distribution around 

the country. As shown below in Figure 5, the distribution routes traditionally follow major 

interstate highways, which are the most efficient routes to California's major urban areas. 

Typically, narcotics flow from San Diego to Los Angeles, where they can either continue 

up the Interstate Highway 5 to the Bay Area and Sacramento or move eastward to various distribution points in the U.S. or Canada. 

Figure 5 

Primary Narcotics Trafficking Routes in California (20 14) 

Source: CA State Threat Assessment Center 

Marijuana continues to be the most commonly trafficked ond used narcotic in California 22 

As the Drug Enforcement Administration recently observed in its 20 l 3 National Drug 

10 
222 

Threat Assessment, Mexican drug trafficking organizations such as the Sinaloa cartel 

continue to operate large outdoor marijuana growing fields in Mexico. 

However, in response to interdiction efforts at the border, Mexican-based drug cartels are 

increasingly growing marijuana on public land in California. This is forcing California to 

contend with not only marijuana smuggled into the state, but also with marijuana grown 

in California for distribution to other parts of the U.S. where prices tend to be higher23 

In june 2013, following a month-long investigation by special agents of the California Department of justice, officials arrested four suspected Sureiio gang members in 

Sacramento County and seized more than 7,000 marijuana plants and 100 pounds 

of processed marijuana with an estimated street value of $2 millian. 24 

Figure 6 

Counties with Task Force Seizures of Processed Marijuana 

in Excess of 1 ,000 Pounds 

(FY 2012-20 13) 

II 
223 

In the 2012-2013 fiscal year (from the beginning of july to the end of june), the central 

and southern ports of California accounted for the vast majority of processed marijuana 

seizures. Los Angeles County olone accounted for 54 percent (or 43,090 pounds) of 

statewide seizures. 

The outdoor production of marijuana tokes place primarily on public land in the Sacramento and Son joaquin Volleys, including within California's notional forests, and 

creates o host of problems within the state. Worker exploitation is common, as the 

growing areas ore often operated by Mexican nationals who ore smuggled into the 

country and then forced to work to pay off o smuggling debt25 In addition, outdoor 

marijuana fields produce significant environmental harms stemming from growers' use 

of pesticides, rodenticides, and fertilizers on the crops to expedite the growing process 

and protect the crops from insects or wild onimols 26 Fires ore also o threat particularly 

associated with outdoor cultivation. In August 2009, suspected Mexican drug trafficking organization workers tending too 30,000-plont marijuana field in the Los Padres 

Notional Forest near Santo Barbaro sparked o 1 36-squore mile fire 27 

In 2012-2013, Northern and Central California represented the most significant hot 

spots for outdoor marijuana cultivation. Of almost 1 .5 million plants seized by state 

and local low enforcement in 2012-2013, the top five counties accounted for over 45 

percent of the total statewide seizures. 

Figure 7 

Task Force Seizures of Outdoor Marijuana 

Counties Witl1 Most Sei~eCI DutCioor Mariiuano {Iii¥ 2012·2013) 

l. Sacramento 1 81 ,541 plants 

2. Madera 139,238 plants 

3. Tulare 129,899 plants 

4. Shasta 124,477 plants 

5. Fresno 93,476 plants 

Statewide Total 1 ,470,7 48 plants 
224 

In response to demand for high-grade marijuana (which can sell for up to 30 times the 

price of low-grade marijuana), Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations, as well as 

Asian organized crime groups, are growing increasing amounts of high-grade marijuana in indoor facilities in Alameda, Santa Clara, San Benito and Merced counties, and 

in Mexico. The state is also experiencing heavy indoor marijuana cultivation activity in 

the Bay Area, which law enforcement has attributed to the growing presence of Asian 

transnational criminal organizations like the Asian Warriors 28 The top six counties 

account for approximately 80 percent of statewide totals, with Alameda, Santa Clara, 

and San Benito counties making up three of these iurisdictions. 

Figure 8 

Task Force Seizures of Indoor Marijuana 

1 Shasta 11,138 plants 

2. Mendocino 5,211 plants 

3. Merced 4, 155 plants 

4. Alameda 3,541 plants 

5. Santa Clara 3,153 plants 

6. San Benito 2,937 plants 

Statewide Total 37,949 plants 

13 
225 

California has also witnessed an increase in recent years in the availability of wholesale 

methamphetamine, particularly its most potent form, "ice," with the Sinaloa cartel driving 

supply29 California is now the primary source for methamphetamine nationwide with 

as much as 70 percent of the U.S. foreign supply of methamphetamine being trafficked 

through the San Diego point of entry aloneJ0 Mexican drug trafficking organizations 

obtain multi-ton shipments of precursor chemicals, such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, from countries without strict chemical export regulations, like China or India. 

They then produce increasing amounts of methamphetamine in large "superlabs" inside 

Mexico, 31 a substantial percentage of which is destined for California. 

On October 8, 2013, agents from the Department of justice-run Inland Crackdown 

Allied Task Force arrested four suspected members of La Familia Michoac6na in 

San Bernardino County a~er seizing more than 100 pounds of methamphetamine, 

9 pounds of cocaine, and half a pound of heroin. The street value of these narcotics 

totaled nearly $6 million 32 Officials alleged that transnational criminal organization members imparted the drugs from Mexico and then distributed them to street 

gang dealers in California and ather states. 

According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy's National Methamphetamine 

and Pharmaceuticals Initiative, seizures of methamphetamine at points of entry along 

the U.S. southwest border have increased steadily over the past four years. As noted in 

Figure 9, methamphetamine seizures at California points of entry have more than 

tripled between 2009 and 20 1 3 and now dwarf seizures in our sister border states. 

14 
226 

7000 

6000 

5000 

3000 

zooo 

1000 

Figure 9 

Southwest Border Methamphetamine Seizures at Points of Entry (Kilograms) 

(2009-20 13) 

Z009 2010 2011 201Z zon 

Stole Thceal Assessment Center (rloto from Office of Notional Drug Control Policy, Notional 

and Phorrnaceuticais Initiative) 

!if California 

MArlzona 

dSouth Texas 

Once "ice" has been smuggled into the state, two counties ore now the destinations of 

choice for distribution. In 2012-2013, Los Angeles County in the south and Merced 

County in the Central Volley accounted for more than 66 percent of the "ice" seized in 

California (Figure 1 0) 

Figure 10 

Task Force Seizures of Ice 

f:ounties Witll Most SeizeS tee (EM 2011·2013) 

1 < Los Angeles l ,605 lbs. 

2. Merced 475 lbs. 

3. Fresno 206 lbs. 

4. Riverside 196lbs. 

5. Orange l77lbs. 

6. Son Mateo l771bs. 

Statewide Total 3,146 lbs. 

15 
227 

In other schemes, transnational criminal organization operatives refine methamphetamine in labs here in California, a majorily of which can be found in the Central 

Valley. As with the cultivation of marijuana, these methamphetamine labs can cause 

severe environmental damage by contaminating manufacturing locations with hazardous 

chemicals. But meth labs pose an additional risk as well: they expose Californians to 

the potential for explosions due to the hazardous, often flammable, chemicals used to 

make methamphetamine. For example, in March 2012, officers in search of a stolen 

Apple iPad entered a San jose apartment33 only to discover it was being used as a 

"refining lab" by a suspected Mexico-based transnational criminal organization to 

convert unrefined methamphetamine into the highly dangerous crystal methamphetamineJ4 Subsequent testing revealed extensive contamination of both the apartment 

and adjacent residential units, which required substantial decontamination efforts. 35 

The rise in methamphetamine trafficking by drug cartels reinforces the need for robust 

funding for law enforcement. In this regard, federal funding is critical. In the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 20 14 (Public Law No. 1 1 3-7 6), Congress 

approved Fiscal Year 2014 appropriations totaling $7.5 million toward the creation 

of a methamphetamine grant program. This timely and innovative program- which 

will be administered by the Communily Oriented Policing Services Office in the US 

Department of justice - provides for competitive grants to state law enforcement agencies 

to combat methamphetamine production and trafficking in their states. The California 

Attorney General's Office and other state and national law enforcement leadersincluding those from Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee and the 

National Narcotic Officers' Association Coalition -developed and advocated for the 

program's creation. And with the support and leadership of California's congressional 

delegation, states received a critical federal funding stream to further fight the drug cartels' lucrative methamphetamine trafficking trade. For California, this grant opportunily 

comes at an important time when an aggressive law enforcement response is vital to 

effectively combatting transnational criminal organizations. 

As prescription drug abuse becomes one of the fastest growing drug problems in California and across the country, law enforcement officials have observed an increase in the 

trafficking of pharmaceutical drugs (such as Hydrocodone, Oxycodone, Ritalin, Xanax, 

Morphine, Alprazolam, Diazepam, and Benzodiazepine) across the California-Mexico 

border36 In some of these schemes, Mexican pharmacies fill prescriptions without a 

legitimate prescription and the drugs are smuggled into California. The drugs are then 

packaged and shipped via commercial mail services, frequently to customers who 

ordered the drugs over the Internet. 37 In recent years, border agents have seen an uptick 

in seizure incidents involving prescription drugs. 

1 c.> 
228 

On September 1 1, 2012, border agents seized 637 Hydrocodone tablets, 198 

Oxycodone tablets, 120 Ritalin tablets, 56 Morphine tablets, and $1 ,406 in U.S 

currency when they stopped two women at the San Ysidro border crossing 38 The 

women admitted that they were working with a Mexico-based transnational crimi· 

nal organization that took orders over the Internet for prescription drugs, smuggled 

them from Tijuana to San Diego, and then shipped them throughout the U.S39 

Such seizures have become commonplace 40 

In other schemes, stolen or illegally-acquired prescription drugs are smuggled out of 

California to Mexican pharmacies for distribution by drug trafficking organizations in 

Mexico or back to the U.S. market. 41 

In August, 201 1, officials broke up such a ring with the arrest of 15 individuals 

operating a large U.S.·Mexico drug trafficking organization 42 The group would 

acquire wholesale quantities of controlled pharmaceutical drugs such as OxyContin 

and Hydrocodone, and smuggle them to Mexico for sale. The cash was then brought 

back into the United States to finance criminal operations 43 Border stops throughout 

the two-year investigation resulted in the seizure of 1,288 OxyContin pills, 9,500 

Hydrocodone pills, and more than $66,000 in U.S. currency. 44 

While these norco-trafficking trends reflect a growing diversification of transnational criminal 

organizations, California has experienced a decline in the trafficking of cocaine into the 

state. Although Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations remain the primary wholesale suppliers of cocaine in the U.S., they have reduced their trafficking efforts in recent 

years as nationwide usage and demand have declined 45 For example, cocaine sei· 

zures decreased by 50 percent in California in the last year, though counly·level seizure 

data shows that cocaine remains a substantial problem in California. Los Angeles Counly 

topped the list with aver 58 percent of statewide seizure totals. 

Figure ll 

Task Force Seizures of Cocaine 

C:oun.ties Wittl Most SeizeCI C:cxaine 10 2012·2013) 

l. Los Angeles 1048 lbs. 

2. Imperial 457lbs. 

3. Riverside 135 lbs. 

4. Fresno 68 lbs. 

Statewide Total 1,796 lbs. 
229 

Trafficking Humans Is Almost as Profitable as Trafficking Drugs 

Transnational criminal organizations and gangs are also finding human trafficking to 

be a lucrative and growing criminal enterprise. In fact, human trafficking is believed to 

be one of the most profitable criminal activities, with estimates of profit ranging from 

$13,000 annually per forced laborer to as much as $100,000 or more annually per 

sex trafficking victim. According to the latest estimates from the U.S. Department of 

State, 27 million people are trafficked each year worldwide, with 18,000 to 20,000 

victims in the U.S. aloned6 Based on these figures, revenue from human trafficking 

could be as high as $32 billion per year worldwide and at least $9.5 billion annually in the U.Sd7 Transnational criminal organizations are motivated not only by these 

high profits, but also by a frequently held notion among criminals that human trafficking 

carries with it a lower risk of detection, allows for the renewable exploitation of their 

human "commodities," and risks lighter criminal punishment than narcotics trafficking. 

As highlighted in the California Department of justice's The State of Human Trafficking 

in California, 20 12, California is one of the states most affected by human trafficking, due in part to its proximily to the U.S. southwest border, its robust economy, and 

a large immigrant population 48 Over the past two years, California's nine regional 

Human Trafficking Task Farces identified more than 1 ,300 human trafficking victims, 

18 
230 

180 

Figure 12 

Human Trafficking Arrests Under California Law 

(200 1-20 13) 

.._Human Trafficking for 

Forced Labor 

..,_Sex Trafficking of Minors 

Source: CA State Threat Assessment Center; CA DOj, California justice Information Services 

though the octuol number of victims statewide is almost certainly significantly larger. 49 

A majority of these victims, approximately 56 percent, were trafficked for the purpose 

of sexual exploitation, while 21 percent were destined for forced lobor50 Largely due 

to increased public and low enforcement awareness of the issue, arrests under two 

key human trafficking statutes- human trafficking for forced labor (CA Penal Code, 

§236.1(o)) and sex trafficking of minors (CA Penal Code, §236.1 (c))- have 

increased exponentially in the post six years, as shown in Figure 12. 

Virtually all types of transnational criminal organizations in California participate in 

human trafficking in one form or another. Asian and Eurasian transnational criminal 

rings and gongs like the Asian Gangsters and Armenian Power are key facilitators of 

domestic and international human trafficking in California, particularly sex trafficking. 

They typically traffic victims of a similar ethnic background, using their cultural knowledge and ties to ethnic communities to their advantage. 

In january 201 3, special agents from the California Deportment of justice, building off 

on investigation by the FBI, arrested five suspects accused of running a human trafficking 

network that spanned several northern California counties. Young women, aged 21 to 

30, were trafficked from Mexico and sold for sex to os many os 20 clients in a single 

day. The sex acts occurred in brothels identified in Chico, Stockton, Yuba City, Foi~ield, 

and Sacramento. In May 2013, three of the men pleaded no contest to conspiracy to 

commit pimping and pondering charges and were sentenced to three years in prison 5 1 

19 
231 

California Is a Gateway in the Criminal Firearms Trade 

Increasingly, firearms are being trafficked through California to Mexico-based 

transnational criminal organizations. Growing narcotics-related violence in Mexico 

since 2006 and the needs of Mexican criminal organizations to control lucrative drug 

trafficking routes, combined with restrictive firearms laws in Mexico, have led these 

organizations to source firearms outside of Mexica 52 These organizations, specifically 

the Sinaloa cartel, Los Zetas, and the Gulf cartel, are the leading weapons traffickers 

in the U.S. They utilize their existing U.S.-based narcotics trafficking and money laundering infrastructures to facilitate weapons trafficking back to Mexico, with firearms 

frequently trafficked by the same couriers through the same routes 53 

A recent study estimates that 252,000 guns cross the US-Mexico border each year, 

with fewer than 15 percent seized 5 4 Although the firearms are not necessarily purchased in California due to California's own robust gun laws, this state is increasingly the 

gateway through which Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations move weapons obtained in other states via straw buyers to Mexico, making reverse use of existing 

drug trafficking routes 55 For example, over 20,000 firearms predominantly handguns 

were recovered in California in 2012 alone (Figure 13). These numbers are consistent 

with seizures in past years. These statistics signal the existence of a vast pool of weapons 

that could be at risk to enter the global arms trade. 

Figure 13 

Total Number of Firearms Recovered in California (2012) 

<1% 

Ill Handguns (20,885) 

Ill Rifles (5, 995) 

Shotguns (3, 939) 

Ill Machineguns (52) 

Sou1ce: CA Stole Threat Assessment Center (dolo from U.S DOj, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, firearms and Explosives) 

20 
232 

Money Laundering Corrupts California's Economy 

just as California is a key portal for drugs to flow into the U.S. and Canada, it is also 

at the center of the reverse flow of billions of dollars of illicit bulk cash proceeds 

generated by transnational criminal organizations and their criminal associates. 

According to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), a federal central clearinghouse 

of data on currency and narcotics seizures, California is one of the top two states in 

which norco-dollars are seized and to which seized norco-dollars are destined 56 As 

Figure 14 shows, cash is smuggled from California back to Mexico or points farther 

south- often through the same trafficking routes through which drugs, humans, or 

weapons were originally smuggled -or is laundered through any number of fraudulent 

schemes 5 7 The flow of this illicit money not only fuels ongoing operations of transnational criminal organizations, but also supplies them with the means to expand and 

extend their influence across the globe 58 

Figure 14 

Bulk Cash Hubs and Routes 

San Ysidro 

Consolidation Cities 

Deconsol1dation Cities 

Significant POE Crossing Points 

Major Exit Points tram Mexico 

Third Country Destinations 

Los Angeles is both a consolidation & 

deconsol1dat10n c1ty. 

E! Paso 1s both a deconsolldat1on aty and a 

slgn1flcant POE cross1ng point 

Venezuela 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S.·Mexico Bi·Notionai Crime Proceeds Study (20 I 0) 

21 
233 

Money laundering is, by definition, a process designed to mislead law enforcement 

and mischaracterize the source and origin of the financial proceeds resulting from 

criminal activities, or "dirty money." The process typically begins by breaking up large 

amounts of money into smaller, less conspicuous sums, which are then deposited, or 

"placed," within the financial system. Through "layering," the money launderer then 

engages in transactions designed to distance the money from its original illicit source. 

For example, the funds might be wired through a series of shell corporation accounts 

Figure 15 

Typical Money laundering Scheme 

Collection of 

Dirty Money 

Offshore Bonk 

Purchase of Luxury Assets/ 

Other Investments 
234 

at various bonks around the country, or disguised os payments for non~existent goods 

or services. Finally, to complete the laundering process, the funds ore invested in assets 

such as real estate or business ventures, and thereby "integrated" into the legitimate 

economy59 To ovoid detection by low enforcement, transnational criminal orgonizo~ 

lions frequently change tactics and engineer new schemes. They also outsource certain 

functions, such as the transportation and laundering of illicit proceeds, to other entities 

to minimize risk of loss or opprehension 60 

23 
235 

Both federal and California law target money laundering by criminal enterprises. Some 

provisions prohibit financial transactions involving funds associated with illegal activities.61 Other provisions criminalize the mere possession or transportation of illicit drug 

proceeds 62 Both federal and state law also impose reporting requirements 

on financial institutions with respect to large transactions. For example, federal law 

requires financial institutions to report to financial regulators all currency transactions 

over $10,000, as well as multiple currency transactions that aggregate to be more 

than $10,000 in a single day63 And both federal and state law make it a crime to 

break up or "structure" financial transactions into amounts smaller than $10,000 for 

the purpose of avoiding federal mandatory reporting requirements 64 

Yet, in addressing "structuring," there is an important difference in the legal tools that 

federal and state prosecutors can bring to bear. Whereas federal law does not require 

that the structured transactions be intended to hide the fact that money came from 

criminal activities or facilitates criminal activities, 65 California law requires that state 

prosecutors prove a money launderer intentionally structured a financial transaction to 

disguise that the proceeds were derived from a criminal activity or, alternatively, were 

structured to promote or further criminal activity66 That additional requirement imposes 

a special burden on California prosecutors, often obstructing successful prosecution. 

As discussed in this Report's Recommendations (Chapter Six), California law should be 

amended to remove this special burden. 

The true scope of the money laundering problem in California is unknown. However, 

some experts estimate that approximately 1 .5 to 2 percent of gross domestic product 

("GDP")67 is laundered annually68 Based on California's $2 trillion GDP in 2012, 69 

approximately $30-40 billion could have been laundered in the state in 2012. 

Uncertainty also plagues estimates of the amount of illicit cash proceeds smuggled from 

the U.S. to Mexico every year. Estimates range from $18 billion to as much as $39 

billion 7 ° For its part, California leads the nation in the number of seizures of currency, 

commonly referred to by law enforcement as "bulk cash." 71 The seizures of bulk cash 

increased by 40% in 201 1 and remained relatively consistent in 2012 (Figure 16), 

possibly reflecting law enforcement's success in better detecting currency flowing over 

the border. 

In 2010 and 2012, Mexico enacted a number of anti-money laundering provisions 

to combat the flow of illicit cash from the United States into Mexico by limiting foreign 

currency cash transactions. As a result of Mexico's enhanced efforts to combat money 

laundering, drug trafficking proceeds ore now reportedly returning to the United States 

through ports of entry along the Mexican border, from San Ysidro to Calexico72 

24 
236 

$160,000,000.00 

$140,000,000.00 

$120,000,000.00 

$100,000,000.00 

$80,000,000.00 

$60,000,000.00 

$40' 000' 000.00 

$20,000,000.00 

$0.00 

zoos 

Figure 16 

Bulk Cash Seizures in California 

2009 2010 

Source: CA State Threat Assessment Center (data from EPIC) 

2011 2012 

Federal sources and California financial crime investigators along the border have 

noted a substantial increase in cash imports from Mexico at certain points of entry in 

Southern California. 73 Individuals, claiming to be employees of money service businesses in Mexico (commonly referred to as casas de cambial, with substantial amounts 

of bulk cash in du~le bags and backpacks have been witnessed crossing into California from Mexico. After declaring the amount of cash the individual is bringing into 

California to Customs and Treasury officials, the individual goes directly to nearby 

financial institutions, kiosks, or ATMs to deposit the imported bulk cash 74 These trends 

underscore the need for better cooperation among financial regulators and law enforcement from the federal government, California, other states, and Mexico. This Report's 

Recommendations urge these officials to develop protocols to more effectively share 

information and intelligence that could be used to disrupt illicit cross-border financial 

flows. The Recommendations also emphasize the need to leverage existing partnerships for cooperation, such as the Southwest Border Anti-Money Laundering Alliance. 

The Attorneys General of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas established 

the Alliance in 20 l 0 to enhance and better coordinate investigations and intelligence 

sharing related Ia money laundering in the U.S.-Mexico border region 75 

25 
237 

Conclusion 

California has emerged as the epicenter of transnational criminal organization activity 

in the United States. This is due, in port, to a crackdown by the Mexican government 

on drug cartels and the resulting fragmentation of the trafficking market, with Sinaloa 

emerging as the dominant Mexico-based drug trafficking organization operating in 

California. Sinaloa has fueled methamphetamine and morquono smuggling from Mexico, but domestic cultivation and production of both drugs in California has increased 

as well. Transnational criminal organizations ore also facilitating weapons and human 

trafficking into and around California and ore corrupting regional marketplaces and 

financial institutions through their multi-billion dollar money laundering practices. 

26 
238 

Transnational Criminal Organizations 

and California Gongs: A Growing 

Threat to Public Safety 

The presence of transnational criminal organizations in California exacts a heavy price on 

the state. Transnational criminal organizations contribute significantly to violence and crimi· 

nal activity here, much of it drug· or gang-related. The partnering between Mexico-based 

drug trafficking organizations and California's street and prison gongs has spread those 

problems throughout the state. Due in port to their coordination with Mexican trafficking 

organizations, street and prison gongs now account for an average of 48 percent of violent 

crime in many iurisdictions around the country and up to 90 percent in high trafficking 

regions along the U.S.·Mexico border, such as Arizona, California, and Texas 76 With 

gong membership up 40 percent nationally between 2009 and 20 l l , California is at 

risk for violent crime, particularly assault, extortion, home invasion robberies, homicide, 

intimidation, shootings, and other violence associated with transnational criminal activity, as 

well as an increase in arrests for human trafficking offenses and significant seizures of drugs, 

weapons, and cosh 77 Even Mexico's efforts to crock down on drug trafficking below the 

border hove further fragmented drug trafficking organizations and spurred on increase in 

narcotics-related violence, some of which has spilled over into California. 

This drug trafficking and increased gang activity, as well as the violence such activity 

breeds, pose a serious public safety threat to Californians, particularly our youth. One 

Center for Disease Control and Prevention study found that 61 percent of 15- to 24-year· 

olds murdered in the City of Los Angeles between 2003 and 2008 were victims of 

gang violence78 In the City of Long Beach, the rote was almost 70 percent. More· 

over, a 2006 report from the California Department of Alcohol & Drug Programs found 

that the percentage of Californians using illicit drugs was 1 8 percent above the notional 

overage. More people died from drug abuse in California that year (4, 290) than from 

any other preventable cause that year, including motor vehicle accidents (3,293) and 

firearms (3,094). 80 With about40,000 drug-related emergency room visits every year, 

and on estimated $22.1 billion economic impact (when factoring in lost productivity, 

health core costs, prevention and treatment costs, criminal justice costs, and losses due 

to crime), illicit drug use poses a significant threat to California and its peopleB 1 The 

problem is of particular concern to California communities already facing significant 

challenges from poverty, homelessness, domestic gong activity, and high crime rotesB2 
239 

California Faces a Unique Threat of Spillover Violence from Mexico 

Some reports suggest that the crackdown on large drug cartels in Mexico has sparked a rash 

of violence between cartels and the government and between rival cartelitos. Some of the 

violence has spilled over into border states like California. Out of this has emerged "a new 

generation of criminals, younger and more willing to break with the discipline maintained by 

traditional structures. "83 According to data released by the administration of farmer Mexican 

President Felipe Calderon, there were more than 47,500 organized crime-related homicides 

between December 2006 and September 20 l l , with a particular spike in violent crime in 

juarez and TijuanaB4 Other estimates place the number of homicides during the Calderon 

28 
240 

administration at closer to 65,000, or roughly 10,000 per year. 85 This violence has also 

spilled over the border, with conflicts belween Mexican drug trafficking organizations resulting in homicides and kidnappings in California, Texas, and Arizona. Some analysts fear that 

the recent arrest of Sinaloa front mon, joaquin "EI Chapo" Guzman Loera, will destabilize the 

power structure and lead to increased violence in the Tijuana Corridor and beyond. 

In February 20 1 1 , dozens of agents from the California Department of justice 

arrested three defendants in Palmdale, California, in connection with a murder-forhire plot. The defendants, jorge Ernesto Sillas Rocha, Victor Manuel Magana Gonzalez, and Daniel Cepallo, were hired to assassinate five family members in California in retaliation for a trafficking-related financial debt owed to the Arellano-Felix 

Organization ("AFO"). The hit men were hired by juan Francisco Sillas Rocha, a 

high-ranking AFO lieutenant apprehended by Mexican federal authorities in Tijuana 

in late 2011. In late 2013, the San Diego District Attorney's Office, which prosecuted this case, obtained convictions and sentences of incarceration for all three 

defendants (Sillas- 21 years; Magana - 15 years; and Cepallo- 5 years). 86 

In july 2010, Mexican authorities arrested lwo members of the Barrio Azteca gang, 

an El Paso-based street gang. They were accused of killing a U.S. consulate employee 

and her husband across the border in juarez, Mexico, on behalf of the juarez Cartel. 

52 other gang members were also arrested in connection with the murdersB7 On this 

side of the border, a U.S. border agent was shot and killed by traffickers in a Sinaloacontrolled drug corridor near Nogales, Arizona in December 201088 

California Is Threatened by the Alliance of 

Transnational Criminal Organizations with Prison and Street Gangs 

In recent years, law enforcement officials in California have witnessed a disturbing new 

trend: increasing partnerships belween transnational criminal organizations (particularly 

Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations) and prison gangs, like the Mexican Mafia, 

and Sureno street gangs. These alliances offer significant benefits to both parties. For the 

cartels, a partnership with a local gang in California allows them to: 

" Coordinate the distribution of illicit goods in California without having to set foot 

on U.S soil(and thus without placing themselves within the iurisdiction of U.S. law 

enforcement). 

" Use gangs to collect drug proceeds, act as enforcers, launder money, smuggle 

weapons, commit kidnappings, and identify and scout possible undeveloped profitgenerating criminal ventures. 

' Use gang members who are U.S. citizens to cross the border with less law enforcement scrutiny. 

29 
241 

Toke advantage of street gongs' detailed knowledge of their respective areas, connections to nelvvorks for the distribution and retail sole of illegal drugs, existing transportation 

routes lin the case of outlaw motorcycle gongs), familiarity with low enforcement tactics, 

and ability to respond quickly and effectively to changing local conditions 89 

,, Establish redundancies or alternative partnerships designed to minimize disruptions 

to operations resulting from low enforcement actions. 

In exchange for their assistance, prison and street gongs are given a shore of the 

drug proceeds and ore allowed to bypass mid-level wholesale dealers and receive 

discounts of up to 50 percent on bulk drug purchases. 

30 
242 

Although tronsnationol criminal organizations typically prefer to partner with gangs 

of the same ethnicity, they have consistently demonstrated that profits come above all 

else. Thus, they will sometimes partner with the criminal organizations that best achieve 

their goals regardless of their initial racial or ethnic preferences. Examples of ethnicallysimilar and dissimilar unions include: 

Sinaloa works with the Mexican Mafia, Surenos gangs, and transnational gangs 

like MS-13 90 

La Familia Michoc6na has ties to numerous ~pes of 

gongs with diverse ethnic backgrounds: criminal street 

gangs (Bloods, Crips, Avenues, Nortenos, and Surenos), 

prison gangs (Aryan Brotherhood, the Mexican Mafia, 

and La Nuestro Familia). and traditionally-white motorcy 

de gangs like the Hells Angels and Outlaw Motorcycle 

Gongs. 

0 Aryan Brotherhood is affiliated with the Mexican 

Mafia and Arellano-Felix Organization in drug, 

weapons, and stolen vehicle trafficking 91 

MS-13 and other transnational gangs have became 

central players in narcotics ond human trafficking in California, partnering with Mexico-based 

transnational criminal organizations and Surenos 

gangs to facilitate cross-border smuggling of people 

and drugs, sell drugs on the retail market, perform 

contract killings, and launder the proceeds through 

seemingly legitimate local businesses 92 

" Tiny Rascal Gang, which was originally a gang of 

Cambodian iuveniles, has grown to include Filipinos, Latinos, and African Americans. Their allies 

include Asian groups, such as Wah Ching, which 

originated in San Francisco in the early 1960s and 

is now one of the largest and most ruthless Chinese 

transnational criminal organizations operating in the U.S93 

Asian transnational criminal organizations from Southeast Asian counties like 

Vietnam and Malaysia have ties to Asian street gangs operating in Santa Clara 

County, like the Asian Boyz, Asian Warriors, and Asian Gangsters. 

31 
243 

---_-=--- ~ - -=-- ~--=--=-=- ~--=.-- --=--=-~--~-=--~-=----~-=c-=--==- -=-~---:._~~.:::--=._=--,;;_:__- -.::: --=---=.- -~-

~~~-- -~-~~ -~~~!"£=-~;!l-~-~~-~~~_;~~~~1!"~~~ -~ ---~ -

One of the most significant unions in 

recent years between a Mexico-based 

transnational criminal organization and 

a prison/ street gang was the 201 1 

alliance between La Familia Michoacana 

("LFM") and the Mexican Mafia. As outlined in the july 2013 indictment in US. v. 

Rodriguez-Lando (CD Cal. 201 31, 

representatives of the Mexican Mafia 

entered into an agreement in April 

2011 with LFM historically one of the 

most significant Mexico-based methamphetamine trafficking organizations- to 

help LFM become a dominant distributor and seller of methamphetamine and 

marijuana in Southern California. 

Under the agreement, dubbed "The 

Project," the Mexican Mafia would 

protect LFM's drug shipments and soles, 

prevent other criminal gangs from 

taxing LFM's drug shipments and sales, 

collect drug debts owed to LFM, and 

provide protection to incarcerated 

LFM members in prison and jail. In 

exchange, LFM provided approximately 

$500,000 to Mexican Malia leaders 

upfront, with a share in drug proceeds 

going forward and discounted rates on 

methamphetamine for Mexican Mafia 

members and associates. 

Figure 17 

"The Project" 

LFM providM lh<: Mexlean 

• $500,000 up front 
244 

The Criminal Alliances Have Sparked a Rash of Violence 

The deepening associations between Mexican drug trafficking organizations and 

gongs in California have, in turn, increased the potential for harm to California. Based 

on the best numbers currently available, there were approximately 4,897 gangs and 

1 86, 119 gang members in California in August 2013, making California one of the 

most gang·dense states in the country94 In particular, in 2011, two California counties, Los Angeles and San Bernardino, ranked first and third in the country in terms of 

the ratio of gong members to population (Figure 1 8) 95 

The rise of Mexico-based drug cartels at a time when gang involvement is at record 

highs ieopardizes an otherwise encouraging trend in the reduction of crime in recent 

years. While the state's homicide rate has reached its lowest level since 1966, nearly 

30 percent of all killings committed in California from 2009 through 2012 1 ,911 

homicides were gang-related. For example, the City of San Jose reported a 300 

percent increase in gong-related homicides between 20 l 0 and 20 l 1. Similarly, the 

City of Modesto reported a 21 3 percent increase in gong-related aggravated assaults 

between 2011 and August 2012, with corresponding increases in the number of 

both iuvenile perpetrators and victims. Some California iurisdictions have reported that 

"gangs are responsible for at least 90 percent of [violent] crime."96 

This is due in part to territorial ba~les as transnational criminal organizations and gangs 

expand their operations into new territories. For example, in order to expand their field of 

influence into Northern California, Mexican drug cartels sometimes rely on established 

connections with Surena gongs based out of Southern California. However, the historic antipathy between Surenos and Nortenos creates friction when Sureno gang members move 

into regions controlled by Nortenos. This dynamic is seen in places like San jose where, in 

January 201 1 , gang members working for a Mexican drug trafficking organization stormed 

33 
245 

Source: CoiGong 

Figure 18 

Gangs and Gang Members In California 

Identified by Law Enforcement Agencies 

Totlll Number of Gang ~'lcmbers 

.. >10,000 

.. 5,001·10 000 

2,501-5,000 

CJ 1.001-2 500 

C=:J 501-1,000 

CJ 101-500 

[=:J Q .. 1QQ 

Total Number of Gangs 

IIIII > 500 

CJ 101-500 

C_:] SHOO 

CJ 11-50 

CJ 0-10 

o nightclub in on attempt to kidnap the owner over o drug debL97 A shootout ensued 

between rival gang affiliates, and three people were killed Instances of such violence demonstrate the impact of transnational criminal organizations and gongs competing to expand 

the geographic scope of their drug distribution networks. 

Conclusion 

Transnational criminal organization activity poses o significant public safety threat in 

California In particular, clashes between Mexican drug trafficking organizations over 

control of profitable trafficking routes hove led to increasing violence in Mexico, in California, and along the southwestern US border Transnational criminal organization 

reliance on street and prison gangs for protection and distribution of illicit goods has 

reenergized existing and dormant gong rivalries, leading to increased gang casualties 

in on era of otherwise declining criminal activity. 
246 

New Challenges Facing Low Enforcement 

in Combatting Drug T1·afficking 

The increased presence of transnational criminal organizations in California has 

created new challenges for low enforcement. As discussed above, the relatively new 

alliances between transnational criminal organizations and California prison and 

street gongs give transnational criminal organizations both greater organizational 

stability and access to more territory. New forms of digital communications 

technology, such as smartphones, the Internet, and social media, have made it easier 

for criminal networks to coordinate their activities without detection and even to 

track their targets. Moreover, the process of globalization has outpaced the growth 

of global governance, creating massive opportunities for criminal organizations to 

grow their business. Finally, new trafficking strategies, including maritime smuggling, 

and the use of cross·border tunnels and ultra-light 

aircraft, pose nevi threats to law enforcement. 

Despite these and other challenges, including 

massive budget cuts, law enforcement has made 

some important inroads against transnational 

criminal activity in California. 

New Technologies Facilitate Gang Activities 

Not surprisingly, transnational criminal organizations 

and gangs have embraced mobile communications 

technologies, such as the Internet and cell phones, 

not ius! to recruit new members and expand their 

social networks, but also to build and operate 

criminal networks without the geographic proximity 

once needed for communication. 

Even in California's prisons, inmates are increasingly 

using cell phones to coordinate criminal activities 

and to intimidate or harass other gang members 

or innocent people outside prison walls. In 2007, 

l ,400 illegal communications devices were 

confiscated from prisoners. By 2011, the number 

35 
247 

of seizures hod eclipsed 15,000, a 10-fold increose 98 In 2010, there were 200 

incidents directly traced bock by the California Deportment of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation ("CDCR") Investigative Services Unit to inmates using cell phones to 

conduct criminal activities from inside CDCR institutions. In 201 1, CDCR's Office 

of Victim and Survivor Rights and Services recorded I 19 contacts mode by CDCR 

inmates using ceil phones to contirue victimizing people from inside CDCR institutions. 

To address this problem, CDCR implemented on 11-doy pi!ot program in 2011 at lwo 

state prisons in Solano and Vacaville aimed at curbing the unauthorized use of cell 

phones. Using "managed access" technology to block or "jom" signals to unauthorized 

devices, officials were able to detect 2,593 illicit wireless devices in the prisons and 

24,190 unauthorized communication attempts. "In one day on one yard in one institution, 

the system prevented 400 unauthorized devices and blocked 4,000 unauthorized 

communication attempts from those devices," resulting in a 64 percent increase in the 

use of authorized poyphones 99 

Building off the success of this pilot program, CDCR contracted with Global Tei*Link 

-a prison telephone company to develop and implement a three-stage plan to install 

rnonoged access systems in 34 prisons across the state by june 1, 2015. Phose 0 of 

this plan was completed on October 31, 2012, with jamming technology installed at 

Avenal State Prison In Phose I of the plan, 17 additional adult facilities were retrofitted, 

with Phose II calling for installations in 16 more adult facilities by june 1, 2015. 

The use and adoption of communications technology to engage in transnational criminal 

activity has continued to expand beyond just the use of cell phones. Drug wholesalers 

con now sell illegal drugs and prescription pills over the Internet and track their shipments 

online, alerting the intended recipients of these illegal drugs to a possible interception. 100 

Some particularly sophisticated networks even use specialized hackers to encrypt and 

protect their communications from low enforcement. '

01 Traffickers also toke advantage 

of e-commerce ond Internet bonking to move money and pay suppliers and operatives 

without the risks associated with physical transfers of money. And human smugglers 

similarly make extensive use of e-mail, disposable cell phones, and encryption systems, 

while sex traffickers make sicken1ng use of the Internet to "display the wares in the 

cyberspace equivalent of slave ouctions." 102 

Even os communications technology has developed, some tronsnotionol criminal 

organizations and gongs, particularly prison gongs, hove continued to use more 

traditional means to convey messages to their operatives. In one example, o member 

of the Mexican Mafia imprisoned in Pelican Boy State Prison issued a "kite," a small 

piece of paper containing instructions to Florencio-1 3, a Sure no street gong in Los 

Angeles (Figure 19). 103 The letter outlined rules concerning: ( l) governance structure; 

(2) drug and prostitution schemes; (3) dispute resolution systems; (4) rules for contract 

kiliings; and (5) methods for identifying and pur.ishing informants. ro4 
248 

Figure 19 

"Kite" Issued by Imprisoned Mexican Mafia Leader 

Source: U.S /\llornoy's Office, Central Drstr~cl of California (20 I 3) 

Increased Global Trade Has Made It Harder to Detect Illicit Trafficking 

The post quarter century has witnessed unprecedented growth in global trade, finance, 

travel, and communication. 105 But the process of globalization has outpaced the 

growth of global governance, creating massive opportunities for criminal organizations 

to make their business prosper. 106 People and goods con move between countries 

more cheaply and efficiently than ever before, making it harder to distinguish between 

licit and illicit transfers. 107 

Taking advantage of these developments, transnational criminal organizations hove 

"diversified, gone global and reached macro-economic proportions," with illicit goods 

frequently sourced from one continent, trafficked through another, and sold on o third. 108 

In this way, the criminal underworld has become inextricably tied to the global economy, 

with transnational criminal organizations using trade, bonking, and communications 

networks (whether shipping routes, financial centers, or the Internet) to traffic growing 

quantities of contraband. 111 

Transnational criminal organizations engaged in drug, human, and firearm trafficking 

hove responded to globalization and increased international trade by adopting 

their strategies and methods to exploit the heavy cross-border flows of goods and 

37 
249 

Figure 20 

Growth in International Trade (1948-2008) 

lXJIHO 

J(l,1100 

!4J\l)l} 

v J:'>,noo "' l!lJllJO 

X,t)j)() 

6.0{}0 

4,UHti 

::,non 

Y·.'.tr 

Source: Pd. Steve Suranovic, lnlernalional Trade: Theory and Policy 1201 0) 

people. 112 Moreover, faced with enhanced border security regimens resulting from 

the terrorist attacks of September l l, 200 l, they have modified traditional forms of 

concealment and developed new methods to evade detection at the California-Mexico 

border. 113 This increasing level of operational awareness and sophistication presents a 

unique challenge for local, state, and federal low enforcement personnel in California. 

Historically, the vast moiority of all narcotics, weapons, and human smuggling by 

transnational criminal organizations has been done over land, where transnational 

organizations can exploit the high vehicle and pedestrian traffic at border crossings. 

As a result, the most popular smuggling methods of Mexico-based criminal 

organizations to traffic smaller quantities of narcotics into California have been 

pedestrian couriers and privately-owned vehicles, particularly those with hidden 

comportments in the engine, cor frame, gas tonk, trunk, tires, and seats. 

For larger shipments, Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations hove frequently used 

commercial vehicles to move narcotics, weapons, and humans across the U.S. border. 

By hiding drugs, weapons, or persons within otherwise legitimate freight transported by 

commercial trucks, these traffickers have exploited opportunities arising from the growth 

of legitimate international trade. 
250 

In US. v. Molinero (CD. Cal. 20 13), a Mexico-based drug trafficking organization 

smuggled over a period of lwo years over 36 kilograms of heroin, over 30 

kilograms of cocaine, and more than 2,400 pounds of methamphetamine inside 

PVC pipes. These pipes were further concealed in tractor trailer axles on commercial 

trucks driven across the border in Arizona and routed to Los Angeles for distribution. 

Similarly, in US. v. Mendozo-Horo (D. Colo. 20 12), prosecutors alleged that 

Mexico-based traffickers transported methamphetamine and bulk cash between 

Colorado and California, in some instances hiding drugs in loads of milk and, in 

at least one instance, strapping cash to the body of a minor as he was driven from 

Colorado to California. 

Although these smuggling methods remain popular, they are highly vulnerable 

to interdiction. Consequently, Mexican drug trafficking organizations have more 

recently begun to utilize a number of strategies to reduce the risks of detection 

and seizure: 

Lookouts, commonly known as halcones, are frequently used to monitor border 

crossings, recognize vulnerabilities of ports of entry, and detect periods of 

decreased law enforcement presence. 

~ Illegal drugs are sometimes transported in convoys, with lead cars intended to 

be inspected by border agents, thereby decreasing the chances that subsequent 

loads will be seized. 

Recently, cartels have begun to smuggle methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin 

into the U.S. in liquid form. The narcotics are dissolved into liquid in Mexico, 

smuggled across the border, and then converted back to powder or crystalline 

form for distribution. Trafficking via this method can retain up to 90 percent purity 

or better, depending upon the capabilities of the conversion lab. 

Transnational Criminal Organizations Are Finding Alternatives 

to Ports of Entry 

While land-based trafficking through ports of entry remains the most common 

trafficking strategy, transnational criminal organizations are increasingly shifting 

resources to maritime and air trafficking. 112 These trafficking methods include 

the use of ponga boats and ultra-light aircraft, as well as cross-border tunnels, all 

of which have proven challenging for law enforcement to monitor or ·Intercept. 

Transnational criminal organizations are increasingly exploiting California's extensive 

coastline and beaches to smuggle narcotics and people into the state. Pongas, also 

39 
251 

Figure 21 

"Super Panga" Boat Found in Santa Barbara County 

Source: Sonlo Barbaro County Sheriff's Office (?0 13) 

known as lonchos, are the primary maritime trafficking threat to California. These 

low profile fishing vessels- between 20 and 3 8 feet in length -ore fast (over 40 

knotsL effective, and economical. Most importantly, due to their fiberglass construction 

and low profile, pongos are extremely difficult to detect by radar or night vision. 

This, coupled with the sheer size of California's coastline, means that most pango 

discoveries are made either through tips or by happenstance. 

Typically, pongos are launched from coastal communities in Baia California, such as 

Rosarito Beach, with few crew members. The vessels then sail north, often to a staging 

area well within international waters, before moving at high speeds into California to 

offload their illicit cargo. 113 The Sinaloa cartel is the primary Mexican cartel conducting 

ponga smuggling operations along California's coast. In recent months, U.S. Coast 

Guard crews and local officials have interdicted suspected Sinaloa-affiliated "super 

pongo" vessels capable of carrying several thousand pounds of drugs. The super pongo 

above was designed to carry as much as 10-12 tons of marquana (Figure 21). 

The increasing reliance on ponga-based maritime smuggling by Mexico-based drug 

trafficking organizations is evidenced by seizure activity over the past several years. 

Pongo boat interceptions doubled between 2009-2010 and 201 (}20 11, while ponga 

drug seizures have increased significantly in recent years, with seizures of marquana from 

pongas ballooning from 3,800 pounds in 2008 to 120,000 pounds in 2012. 114 

40 
252 

Figure 22 

Panga Boat Smuggling Routes (201 0-2013) 

Source: CA State Threat Assessment Center 

These statistics correspond with a period of decreasing marijuana seizures at land 

border crossings, suggesting a shift in the strategy of Mexican drug rings toward 

exploiting the vastness of the sea in order to smuggle drugs into the state. 115 

The majority of pongo incidents before 201 0 were confined to the Southern 

California coastline between Son Diego and Los Angeles. However, there are now 

indications of pongo operations that head further north along the coast beyond 

Ventura, Santo Barbaro, and Son Luis Obispo Counties, with landings reported as 

far north as Santo Cruz and Monterrey Counties (Figure 22). 116 

Santa Cruz County: On September 30, 2013, a 20-foot pongo wrecked off 

the shore of Four Mile Beach north of Santo Cruz. Eighty pounds of marijuana 

washed ashore, though officials suspected the croft was originally carrying 

considerably more. 117 This followed a similar incident on july 27, 2013, when a 

pongo was discovered near Bonny Doon Beach in Santo Cruz carrying 1,200 

pounds of marijuana valued at $2.1 million. 118 

41 
253 

42 

San Luis Obispo County: On September 11, 2013, San Luis Obispo County Sheriff 

deputies and state park rangers discovered a beached 3Q-foot panga vessel near San 

Simeon State Park Campground In addition, officers found a 3Q-pound package of 

marijuana with a reported street value of $18,000 Investigators believe traffickers 

offloaded several thousands of pounds of marijuana from the boat the night before, 1 19 

Santa Barbara County: The first confirmed ponga landing in Santa Barbara County 

occurred in March 2010, when over one ton of marijuana was recovered. '

20 

However, review of a GPS device found on the panga revealed frequent trips 

to San Luis Obispo County. 121 Since then, Santa Barbara has experienced a 

steady increase in panga recoveries, with 8 pango incidents in 2011 and 21 

pango incidents in 2012. 122 Officials state that about one out of every five 

panga boats intercepted contains human cargo. 123 Moreover, some intercepted 

pangas have been operated by unaccompanied juveniles, including one off 

the coast of Santa Barbara that contained three females aged 1 1, 14, and 17 

years old. 
254 

San Diego County: In recent incidents, U.S. Coast Guard crews patrolling the San 

Diego coastline interdicted a super panga carrying 122 bales of marijuana weighing 

2,900 pounds, and a pongo that carried $210,000 worth of the drug "bath salts." 125 

The use of pangos by Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations presents new 

threats to agents trying to prevent the flow of illicit goods into California. Interdiction 

efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard or local law enforcement officials have led to highspeed chases, with smugglers trying to dispose of their illegal cargo before being 

detained. In one tragic incident in December 2012, a Coast Guard Chief Petty 

Officer was killed off the coast of Santa Barbara when a Sinaloa-affiliated ponga 

intentionally rammed an inflatable Coast Guard boat. 126 In another incident in 

October 201 3, the Coast Guard apprehended a pong a boat carrying 31 bales of 

marijuana (with a street value between $2 million and $3 million) after an extended 

high-speed chase off the shore of San Diego. 127 

In contrast to cheap, often one-use pongos, cross-border tunnels are a significant 

investment for Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations. These organizations are 

increasingly exploiting specific areas underneath the California-Mexico border at 

places such as San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, and Calexico, due in part to limited law 

enforcement resources to counteract the subterranean threat. 128 Cross-border tunnels 

primarily facilitate multi-ton shipments of narcotics from Mexico to the U.S., but are 

also used for smuggling people. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, approximately 169,000 pounds of narcotics, valued in excess of $200 

million, have been seized from cross-border tunnels since 1990. 129 The Sinaloa 

cartel is the main Mexico-based transnational criminal organization suspected of 

constructing cross-border tunnels. Indeed, the vast majority of cross-border tunnels 

are discovered in California and Arizona, sites for Sinaloa-controlled territories. 130 

Cross-border tunnels range in sophistication from the rudimentary to highly 

sophisticated. 131 Sophisticated tunnels are extremely well-constructed and can stretch 

for more than 2,000 feet, using a system of ventilation, lighting, ond rail. 132 

Since the 1990s, more than 161 cross-border tunnels have been discovered, with 

more than 75 detected since 2006. 133 According to DHS, cross-border tunneling 

activity has increased 80 percent since 2008, with California leading the nation in 

the number of sophisticated tunnels discovered. 134 

43 
255 
256 

Ultra-light aircraft are single-pilot, three-wheeled platforms that use hang-gliders and 

single-propeller engines to fly in excess of 70 miles per hour. They are inexpensive 

and can exploit the vast airspace along rural stretches of the California-Mexico border 

to drop hundreds of pounds of narcotics at designated drop locations in agricultural 

fields, rural roads, or the desert in San Diego and Imperial Counties (Figure 25). 

Since 2008, when the first eight sightings were reported, there have been more than 

200 incidents involving ultra-lights. For example, on August 29, 2013, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection agents found an abandoned ultra-light aircraft in the Southern 

California desert community of Niland, near the Mexican border Agents found nearly 

190 pounds of marijuana and 13 pounds of methamphetamine valued in excess of 

a half-million dollars still strapped to the aircraft. 135 While the frequency of ultra-light 

incursions is likely to increase in the near term, its significance as an emerging trafficking 

threot will not likely outpace panga maritime smuggling or cross-border tunnels given 

the cargo limitations of the aircrafts. However, as drone technology develops and 

becomes more widely available, law enforcement will have to be prepared to contend 

with these unmanned aerial trafficking threats. 

Figure 25 

Seized Ultra-Light Aircraft 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
257 

46 
258 

Globalization Creates New Money Laundering Threats 

As globalization increases and California's participation in international trade continues 

to intensify, transnational criminal organizations have exploited the associated increase in 

the volume of goods and services crossing international boundaries to disguise, launder, 

and smuggle the money they reap from the sale of drugs and trafficking of persons. One 

example of this phenomenon is trade-bosed money laundering. 

47 
259 

An integral part of the Pacific Rim economic community and, on its own, one of 

the world's largest economies, California is a major hub for international trade and 

commerce. 136 In 2012, international trade flowing through California's ports totaled 

$579.6 billion. 137 Los Angeles exported $121.3 billion worth of goods and imported 

$282.6 billion in foreign goods. Combined, Los Angeles' imports and exports 

represent more than 69 percent of California's total international port trode. 138 

California's substantial international trade provides a platform for complex tradebased money laundering schemes to flourish .

139 In these schemes, cash derived from 

criminal activity is laundered through trade and commerce transactions that appear 

to be legitimate. 140 While trade-based money laundering in the U.S. has not been 

studied systematically, some experts estimate it to be the most significant method 

used to launder money from the country. Not surprisingly, transnational criminal 

organizations are using it with increasing frequency. 141 

One mechanism used by these organizations to finance trade-based money 

laundering is the Black Market Peso Exchange (Figure 26) The scheme exemplifies 

a trend towards decentralizing and outsourcing money laundering functions to limit 

exposure to criminal liability. 

In the Black Market Peso Exchange scheme, a transnational criminal organization's 

money laundering is outsourced to a Money Laundering Organization (Peso Broker), 

which helps finance an international trade transaction using cash derived from 

criminal activity, such as the sale of drugs. The Peso Broker arranges for the delivery 

of a trafficker's drug cash to a U.S. vendor to pay for goods ordered by a business 

customer based in Mexico. The trade goods are then shipped to Mexico and sold by 

the Mexican business customer. The Mexican business customer reimburses the Peso 

Broker, in pesos, for the dollars used to purchase the U.S. trade goods. The Peso 

Broker, in turn, pays the transnational criminal organization, in pesos, the amount of 

illicit drug money used to finance the international trade transaction. 

In this way, the transnational criminal organization has transferred the norco-dollars 

from the U.S. to Mexico and, for a relatively small fee, has effectively converted the 

proceeds to Mexican pesos. The Mexican business has also reduced its costs in 

conducting an international trade transaction, thus increasing its profit margin. The Peso 

Broker has made a commission from both the transnational criminal organization and 

the Mexican business customer without exposing itself to criminal liability associated 

with the smuggling and distribution of narcotics. And the U.S. vendor, a business 

engaged in international trade and commerce, has generated a profitable cash 

transaction, increasing its market share over its competitors. 

48 
260 

Figure 26 

Trade-based Money Laundering Scheme 

The laundering of cash drug proceeds through products and hard goods has come 

under scrutiny by law enforcement in California. In cases from 2010 to 2013, the 

federal government has prosecuted several Los Angeles-based international trade 

vendors and their owners who were engaged in laundering transnational criminal 

organization cash drug proceeds through the sale of silk flowers and toy bears. The 

three companies, Angel Toy Corporation, Woody Toys, Inc., and Peace and Rich, 

collectively laundered approximately $17.7 million in U.S. currency through tradebased money laundering schemes. 142 

All three vendors received significant amounts of bulk cash from third parties !drug 

money couriers) to pay for international orders by Mexican and Colombian businesses 

seeking delivery of toys and or silk flowers. Bulk cash deliveries in amounts exceeding 

$10,000 were then broken up into smaller amounts by the defendant businesses 

before being deposited to avoid triggering notice requirements by the banks to federal 

regulators. Angel Toy executed approximately 63 structured cash deposits, while Woody 

49 
261 

Toys involved approximately 59, and Peace and Rich involved approximately 151. 

Anonymously structured cash ba1k deposits were funneled from various cities around 

the country, including New York City, Chicago, and Laredo, Texas, to the defendants' 

business bank accounts, with credit assigned to the international customers. 

Due to the substantial amount of illicit drug proceeds flowing through the community 

and the willingness of some Los Angeles business owners to launder money on 

behalf of transnational cri;ninal organizations, law enforcement officials consider 

Los Angeles and its many specialty business districts- the toy, iewelry, flower, 

garment and fashion districts- to be a "Mecca for narco-doliars" and a "target-rich 

environment" for money laundering ''

13 

Conclusion 

The adaptability ond fluidity of modernday transnational criminal organizations 

ensures constant new challenges for law enforcement officials Transnational criminal 

organizations in California are taking advantage of new technologies to communicate, 

recruit, propagandize, and intimidate. Transnational criminal organizations have 

also used the increase in global trade to mask their trafficking activities, increasingly 

relying on pongo boats to transport drugs, weapons, and human cargo from 

Mexico up the coast into California. These organizations hove further proven highly 

sophisticated in exp!oiting the complexities of international commerce to disguise, 

launder, and smuggle money made from the sale of drugs 

and trafficking of persons. 
262 

High-Tech Crime: A Ne\v Frontier for 

Transnational Criminal Organizations 

The emergence of the Internet and of a global society linked together by high-speed 

information networks has transformed the ways in which businesses, governments, 

and individuals communicate and engoge in commerce. Sellers on one side of the 

world can now advertise directly to buyers on another side of the world. Sales and 

financial transactions con take place instantaneovsly and anywhere there is an Internet 

connection. And goods and services themselves ore increasingly being delivered 

digitally through the Internet. The benefits of these transformations for the global 

economy, and ultimately for consumers, have been dramatic. At the same time, these 

transformations have also given rise to a new set of dangers, as some of the same 

technologies that enable people across the globe to connect instantaneously with one 

another and exchange money or information also facilitate criminal exploitation: 

Dangers posed to our information systems and networks. Information systems 

and networks serve as the primary platform for our digital economy, while at the 

same time house the sensitive personal information of millions of consumers 

and citizens. Highly vulnerable to intrusion and manipulation, these systems and 

networks are regularly bl·eached. As a result, miilions hove been subiected to 

identify theft and fraud, to say nothing of the severe damage this causes to the 

overall economy. 

Dangers stemming from consumer vulnerability in the online marketplace. 

As consumer trust in online commerce has grown, so olso has criminal interest in 

exploiting that trust. The result is an explosion in Internet-reliant scams aimed at 

defrauding unsuspecting consumers. Every year, thousands of Americans report 

being victims of online marketing fraud schemes and suffering losses exceeding 

tens of miliions of dollars as a resul!. 144 The losses of Californians are higher than 

those of residents of any other state. 145 

Dangers arising from Internet-enabled markets for illicit goods and content. The 

Internet has helped foster new economic models fueling the sale and distribution of 

counterfeit goods, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, pirated entertainment content, illegal 

drugs, and child pornography. These markets not only enable criminals to profit 
263 

from illicit goods and content, but also further fuel the growth of the underlying illicit 

activities. The Mexican Attorney General estimated in 2009 that the total revenues 

from La Familia's sophisticated network for distributing counterfeit movies, music, 

and software could be more than $2 million o day. 146 

Eager to exploit these vulnerabilities in their quest for profit and power, organized crime 

has developed increasingly sophisticated techniques and patterns of organization. The 

result is o new generation of transnational criminal organizations that ore more flexible, 

decentralized, and global than ever before. 

Transnational Criminal Organizations Are Targeting Information 

Systems and Networks for Attack and Exploitation 

The digital infrastructure upon which consumers, businesses, and government all rely to 

store, process, and shore information is highly vulnerable to attacks by sophisticated 

assailants operating remotely. Once breached, this infrastructure affords assailants the 

freedom to impersonate legitimate users, assume their privileges, and ultimately steal 

from them. According to the White House, cybercrime "costs consumers billions of 

dollars annually, threatens sensitive corporate and government computer networks, and 

undermines worldwide confidence in the international financial system." 147 

These dangers ore particularly acute in California. By o Iorge margin, California tops 

all states in the number of hocked systems, the number of computer systems infected 

by molwore, the number of victims of Internet crimes, the losses suffered as o result of 

those crimes, and the number of victims of identity fraud. In addition, because of the 

outsized role new technologies and moss-media entertainment ploy in its informationbased economy, California is particularly vulnerable when its networks become 

infected and its intellectual property is stolen. 

In 2012, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse recorded at least 331 breaches in the 

U.S. caused by criminals who were purposefully trying to compromise databases or 

networks_ 8 Seventeen percent of these intentional breaches occurred in California 

o for higher percentage than in any other state- which, in turn, contributed to 

putting at risk the sensitive personal information of at least 2.5 million Californians 

that yeor. 149 At the some time, 12.6 million U.S. adults or 5.3 percent of the adult 

population become victims of identity fraud in 2012. Costs associated with this 

pool of victims ore estimated to be o staggering $21 billion. 150 

The data represented in Figure 27 shows that the problem is getting worse. Between 

2009 and 2012, the number of intentional breaches in the U.S. iumped by 280 

percent. 151 With new breaches now numbering in the hundreds per year, the rote of 

increase may be finally slowing, but it remains high. Between 2011 and 2012 alone, 

5') " L 
264 

350 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

Figure 27 

Number of Intentional Data Breaches Designed to Compromise Systems 

(2009-20 12) 

2009 2010 2011 2012 

Source Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 

the number of breaches rose by 3 2 percent nationwide and by 27 percent 

liiCA 

BUS 

in California, while the number of identity fraud victims in the U S. increased by 

8 percent. 152 

When cybercrime first emerged, it was mostly orchestrated by people with strong 

technical skills who primarily wanted to enhance their reputation and popularity 

within a relatively small hacker network. 153 Those days are over. As the potential 

profitability of cybercrime has become clearer, it has attracted a flood of individuals 

and groups with more pecuniary motives. 154 

There are several ways in which criminals can engineer breaches of databases, 

nelworks, and computer systems. 

'" In a phishing attack, a victim is tricked into giving an assailant system access by 

being directed to a website that purports to be that of the victim's financial institution. 

This website asks the unsuspecting victim to enter his account number, username, 

password, and other personal identification information. Although the website is 

in fact a fake, the victim frequently complies with the request because the website 

appears to be legitimate-- complete with bank logos and legal disclaimers. 

53 
265 

An assailant may also trick a victim into installing malware- or malicious softvvare 

-on a targeted computer system. This malware is usually installed surreptitiously 

aher the victim is induced to click on an attachment or link embedded in an e-mail 

message. In one recent case, an e-mail appeared as if it were from the National 

Center for Missing and Exploited Children. 155 Once installed, malware can redirect 

information within a system to the assailant's computer. Some types of malware 

can log a user's keystrokes or record screen shots whenever a victim attempts to 

connect to a targeted financial website and enter account information. 156 Other 

types are even more sophisticated. "Web injects" associated with the Gozi virus 

and the Citadel botnet, for example, actually alter how the webpages of particular 

banks appear on infected computers in order to trick a victim into divulging sensitive 

information (Figure 28). 1

57 

Figure 28 

Webpage Screen Shot of a "Web Inject" 

Source: Microsoft Corporation 

'" "Skimming" is a type of attack that targets payment card networks in particular. It 

involves the installation of devices at credit/ debit card terminals (usually located at 

gas stations or retail stores) that surreptitiously record card information as cards are 

swiped and PINs entered (Figure 29). 

54 
266 

Figure 29 

Skimmer Placed in a Gas Station Payment Terminal in Martinez, CA 

Source: Northern California Computer Crimes Task Force 

Less technologically sophisticated, breaches by insiders occur when insiders 

abuse access privileges and supply sensitive information to criminals for a profit. 

Many breaches caused by insiders are never detected. 

Once a victim's unique credentials are stolen, a criminal can use them to transact 

business instantaneously ond from anywhere in the world. Criminals can withdraw 

cash, digitally transfer money to their own accounts, or purchase goods in exactly 

the same way as the legitimate account holder. All of this can happen before a 

victim even realizes his or her credentials have been stolen. 

Because governments also rely heavily on unique identification numbers (e.g., Social 

Security numbers) to assign benefits or process taxes, a wide range of fraud becomes 

possible when government databases are breached or these numbers are otherwise 

stolen. Successful schemes have included billing the government for medical services 

never provided and pocketing another taxpayer's refund. 158 Through such high-tech 

fraud, large sums of taxpayer money may be siphoned off to criminals and away from 

its intended purposes. 

The threat posed by digital infrastructure vulnerability is not limited to identity theft and 

associated fraud. Computer networks and systems themselves may also be hijacked 

and used to launch attacks against additional computer systems. The principal way 

in which this occurs is through a "botnet," or a network of computers infected with 
267 

malicious software - usually without the knowledge of the end-user. Computers 

may become infected when a user "inadvertently interacts with a malicious 

website advertisement, clicks on a malicious e-mail attachment, or downloads 

malicious software." 159 Once infected, "the malicious software establishes a 

secret communications link to a remote 'botmaster' in preparation to receive new 

commands to attack a specific target." 160 The computers can then be controlled by 

the botmaster to "operate in concert to disrupt or block Internet traffic for targeted 

victims, harvest information, or[] distribute spam, viruses, or other malicious 

code." 161 Because of their versatility, botnets such as Citadel (Figure 33) have been 

described as the "Swiss Army knives of the underground economy." 162 Moreover, 

because Citadel and similarly dangerous botnets concentrate in areas with 

substantial technology presence, California is uniquely affected. The Los Angeles 

and Silicon Valley areas in particular have suffered significant infections by malware 

linked to Citadel (Figure 30) 

Figure 30 

Hot Spot Locations of Malware Infections Linked to the Citadel Botnet 

Source: Microsoft Corporation 120131 
268 

By dramatically increasing the numbers of victims that con be targeted by a single 

scheme, botnets ore a game-changer for criminals. Botnets enable criminals to 

launch millions of attacks against protected networks or computer systems and exploit 

vulnerabilities within hours, if not minutes. This ability to exponentially expand the pool 

of victims, in turn, con make otherwise unprofitable criminal strategies successful. 163 

Botnets significantly increase the profitability of any scheme that depends on taking 

small amounts of money from Iorge numbers of victims so as to ovoid detection. 164 

In the some way, botnets increase the threat posed by transnational criminal 

organizations exponentially by allowing perpetrators based outside the country to 

reach out to millions of Americans at once through spom e-moil. 165 

Not surprisingly, transnational organized crime has topped into this new criminal 

frontier. Cases strongly suggest that transnational criminal organizations ore behind the 

biggest schemes to breach systems and exploit captured identification credentials. 

A particularly devastating phishing 

operation involved on Egyptbased transnational criminal 

organization that expanded 

its operations into California. 

The Egypt-based hackers used 

phishing tactics to obtain bonk 

account numbers and related 

identification of U.S. bonk 

customers. They then teamed 

up with three California-based 

individuals who supplied them 

with California bonk accounts to 

which they could transfer stolen 

funds. 166 The individuals who 

opened the California accounts 

then withdrew these fraudulently 

obtained funds, which were 

eventually transferred to the 

original hackers in Egypt. 167 

The multinational investigation 

into this crime, dubbed 

Operation Phish Phry, resulted in 

charges against 53 defendants in 

the U.S. (Figure 31 ). Most were 

Figure 31 

OPERATION 

PHISH PHRY 

STEPl 

l:gyptian huckcrs gain fin.anoal information 

through s.endH19 phishlng emails that mimic 

actual b~~nk ema!ls. 

STEP 2 

Cahfomia-based ringleaders recwlt runners to 

crcJte fraudulent bank accolmts 

STEP3 

Runners California, Nevada, and North 

Carolina set up fraudulent .accounts 

STEP 4 

After communicating v1a email and chatrooms. 

Egyptian hackers transfer funds fmm compromlsed 

ilccounts to fraudulent accounts. 

STEPS 

Runners withdraw money from fraudulent accounts 

and transfer .:l p12rcentage of stolen funds back to 

Egypti-an hacke-rs. 

57 
269 

arrested and prosecuted in Southern California. Authorities in Egypt also charged 

47 defendants linked to the scheme. 168 

In U.S. v. Drinkmon (D.NJ 20 13), one of the largest hocking and do to breach 

cases ever, o confederacy of Eastern European criminals harvested over 160 

million credit cord numbers by attacking numerous companies around the world, 

including notional retailer Wet Seal, Inc., which is headquartered in Colifornio. 169 

Unique molwore placed within the targeted payment networks allowed the 

organization to capture payment cord credentials and other information in real time 

as the information moved through the network. 170 The organization then sold the 

credentials on the block market (priced ot $ 10 for American credit cord numbers 

and $50 for European numbers) and the information was eventually used to make 

counterfeit payment cords. 171 Losses from the scheme totaled in the hundreds of 

millions of dollors. 172 

In 2009, members of the Armenian Power transnational criminal organization 

caused more than $2 million in losses when they installed skimming devices 

at several 99<1: Only Stores in Southern California, ond then used the skimmed 

information to create counterfeit credit and debit cords. 173 

In the largest Medicare fraud scheme ever committed by o single enterprise and 

criminally prosecuted by the U.S. Deportment of justice, on Armenian-American 

transnational criminal organization, the Mirzoyon·Terdjonion Organization, used 

fraudulent Medicare billings to steal more than $163 million. 174 After stealing 

the identities of real doctors, the organization set up phony clinics and applied to 

become Medicare providers. Once approved, the clinics used stolen information 

from beneficiaries from around the country to bill Medicare for services never 

provided Although Medicare was able to identify and shut down many of the 

fake clinics, they were promptly replaced by new ones, often in another stote. 175 

In all, at least 11 8 bogus clinics were opened in 25 stotes. 176 Many of the 73 

defendants eventually prosecuted operated out of the Los Angeles oreo. 177 

As these cases suggest, transnational criminal organizations ore leading efforts in 

California to target information systems and networks to steal identification credentials 

that con be converted into money. One of the largest global surveys on data breaches 

has found that in 2012 organized criminal groups were responsible for at least 55 

percent of all incidents of unauthorized access to confidential information of o business 

or government entity by on external actor. 178 Many of these criminal groups were 

transnational criminal organizations operating out of Eastern Europe that targeted 

businesses and governments in the U.S. and Western Europe. 179 

58 
270 

Transnational Criminal Organizations Are Uniquely Positioned 

To Exploit High-Tech Criminal Opportunities 

Like drug trafficking, high-tech crimes tend to be highly profitable in many cases even 

more so than trafficking. For example, DVDs containing pirated software can be 

produced for iust $0.50, but sold for more than $50. 18° Credit card information 

linked to personal information about the owner can be obtained for as little as $1 0 

and then exploited to reap hundreds or even thousands of dollars' worth of goods. 

Yet, unlike drug traff'ding, the risks to criminal organizations of much of this activity are 

comparatively low. 181 High-tech crimes are often extremely difficult to detect. And even 

if prosecuted, offenders are likely to receive penalties that are lower by comparison to 

violent crimes and drug trafficking. 182 

Transnational criminal organizations are uniquely able to exploit the opportunities 

presented by the high-tech criminal frontier. Their ability to structure criminal activity 

transnationally in many cases makes them virtually immune from arrest or prosecution 

due to formidable obstacles that law enforcement often encounters when trying to 

track perpetrators from one country into a foreign iurisdiction. 

Transnational criminal organizations also have greater access to the expertise, 

specialization, and coordination required to successfully pull off most high-tech crimes. 183 

And while in the past criminal cross-border cooperation was cumbersome, expensive, 

and vulnerable to law enforcement, the Internet and other advances in high-speed 

international communication have dramatically reduced these "transaction costs." Now, 

far-flung criminal network operatives can exploit new criminal opportunities from their 

desktops without even having to leave their homes let alone their home countries. 184 

In the past, a criminal organization entering the cybercrime arena may have needed to 

possess a fairly high level of computer hacking skills. But increasingly the specialization 

needed to launch high-tech criminal attacks is being achieved by outsourcing -

specifically, by purchasing highly specialized services online from the "dark market." 

Clandestine websites offer virtually any service needed to perpetrate high-tech crime. 

Pay-per-install services, for example, take malware and disseminate it by infecting 

computer and Internet systems for a price as low as $100 per 1 ,000 downloads. (See 

Figure 32.) Transnational criminal organizations are turning to this market with increasing 

frequency precisely because of the diversity of specialized and competitively-priced 

services offered. Buyers can even comparison shop to get the best price. 185 

59 
271 

Figure 32 

Price List for Services Available on the "Dark Market" 

Malware installation (payper-install) 

(targeting US.-based computers) 

Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attack 

(1-hour) 

I 1-week) 

Cheap e-mail spamming service 

ZeuS Botnet builder kit 

Purchase of botnet capable of launching 

DDoS attack 

Hacking Email 

(gmail.com account) 

(corporate email account 

$100-150 (per 1,000 downloads) 

$10 

$150 

$10 (per 1 million e-mails) 

$100 

$700 

$85-130 

$500 

Source: Max Gonchorov, Russian Underground I 0 I, Trend Micro Incorporated (20 1 2) 

This dark market offers hacking services that are not only highly specialized but that can 

even be customized to the particular target of the criminal enterprise. This customization 

promotes accessibility particularly for non-specialists and is enabling "a much wider 

range of people to become [high-tech crime] offenders, not just those with a special gih 

for computing." 186 In response to demand for these services, providers are offering ever 

more sophisticated products. For example: 

• Whether the service offered is a "distributed denial-of-service" attack, spamming, or 

pay-per-install, multiple options exist on the dark market for tailoring the service to the 

attacker's specific needs. For example, a distributed denial-of-service attack, in which 

60 

a computer is used to attack a website by sending overwhelming data requests, is not 

only available for purchase, but can be tailored to persist as long as one month and as 

short as one hour. 187 
272 

Malware, botnets, and other products are increasingly being packaged with 

"a high degree of after-sales service." 188 The creator of the Citadel botnet, for 

example, uses a "customer relationship management" tool to communicate with 

"customers" who purchased a botnet "builder kit" about "updates to Citadel code, 

support with technical problems, and best practices in deploying, running, and 

defending their Citadel botnets." 189 According to Microsoft, the Citadel creator is 

"swift to add new features and fix bugs and has released multiple versions on a 

fast schedule to provide the Citadel botnet operators with the latest updates." 190 

In addition, the Citadel creator collaborates with customers, inviting them to suggest 

new features and vote on which features should be implemented. 191 

Figure 33 

Citadel Botnet Case 

John Doe 1 

Source: Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1-82, No. 3: 13-cv-319 (W.D.N C. May 29, 20 13) 

61 
273 

62 
274 

Emerging High-Tech Crime Trends 

The shift toward selling and buying goods online is one of the most significant 

transformations ushered in by the Internet. It would not be possible if consumers did 

not trust that goods they purchased online would be reliably delivered days later. 

But the same trust that helps fuel online commerce is also ripe for exploitation. One 

industry estimate in 2009 suggested that various online scams swindled more than 

$2 billion from U.S. companies and citizens. 192 

Criminals may trick a buyer into thinking he is part of a legitimate transaction. Once 

the buyer has made a payment often for a high-value item, such as a car the 

goods are never delivered. 193 To enhance the con, the criminals may make it appear 

as if a "third-party" agent is receiving the payment. These agents sometimes even 

maintain websites with online delivery tracking systems. 194 

A related type of fraud dupes victims into thinking they can acquire a large sum of 

money by paying a small amount in advance. Many Americans know this type of 

fraud from having received an unsolicited e-mail from a well-connected person who 

attempts to enlist them in a plot to smuggle millions of dollars out of Nigeria. 195 

The solicitor asks only that the victim pay a small amount- often for a bribe- to 

secure a percentage of the millions in loot. Other versions of this fraud trick people 

into believing they have won a lottery and promise delivery of the winnings once 

the victim has paid the requisite taxes, legal fees, or escrow fees. 196 While these 

"advance fee" schemes have existed for decades, the Internet and other technologies 

have helped expand their reach exponentially. 197 

Because it is estimated that only one percent of people or businesses need to be 

duped for the fraud to be profitable, botnets frequently determine whether such 

schemes succeed. 198 For example, because most people no longer open let alone 

act on the spam e-mail messages that underlie phishing attacks and mass-marketing 

fraud, the profitability of these strategies is heavily dependent on whether huge 

numbers of spam messages can be sent out in a short period of time. 199 By employing 

multitudes of computers to automatically send millions of such e-mails, botnets make 

these schemes viable 200 In one mass-marketing fraud case, botnets were employed 

to distribute spam aimed at fraudulently driving up the prices of certain stocks. Once 

the stock prices rose, the chief organizer of the worldwide conspiracy sold the stocks 

at the artificially inflated prices, reaping approximately $2.8 million. 201 

Data from the Internet Crime Complaint Center confirms that mass-marketing fraud 

schemes continue to be both widespread and highly profitable. In 2012, for example, 

thousands of Americans reported being victims of online auto fraud, with direct losses 

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exceeding tens of millions of dollors 202 Online scams involving housing rentals, 

timeshores, and various limited-time investment "opportunities" ore also common, 

causing millions of dollars in reported losses nationwide in 2012 203 According 

to the Internet Crime Report, the losses Californians suffer as o result of these 

crimes top by o Iorge margin the losses reported in any other stote 204 

As with other lypes of cybercrime, fraudulent moss-marketing schemes ore increasingly 

perpetuated by transnational criminal orgonizotions. 205 Transnational criminal 

organizations based in Romania, for example, hove orchestrated two of the biggest 

cases involving fraudulent online soles. In both cases, the Romanian organizations 

advertised high-value items for sole online, using Internet auction sites popular with 
276 

Americans, such as eBoy or Cars. com. 206 The organizations instructed the buyers 

where to wire payments. "Arrows," U.S.-bosed accomplices recruited to retrieve those 

payments, then transmitted the funds to Romonio 207 Both schemes netted millions 

of dollars, with the gains in one topping $10 million 208 Many "advance fee" fraud 

scams hove also been linked to West African transnational criminal organizations, 209 

whose loosely connected cells ore located not only in Africa but around the world 210 

And on Israel-based transnational criminal organization employed o lottery scam over 

several years to defraud hundreds of U.S. victims, mostly elderly, out of approximately 

$25 million 211 

Online commerce not only makes it easier for consumers to shop and purchase goods, 

but has also obviated the need for sellers targeting the U.S. market to be located in the 

U.S. This, in turn, has created o significant regulatory hole, as government regulators 

con no longer effectively regulate what consumers purchase simply by targeting the 

U.S.-bosed entities that directly sell to consumers. Because of this regulatory hole, 

myriad illicit markets hove been able to emerge and thrive alongside online markets 

for legitimate goods and services. Growth in the market for counterfeit goods and 

pharmaceuticals has exploded as the Internet has helped link price'(:onscious consumers 

in the U.S. with manufacturers in Asia that con produce increasingly sophisticated 

goods at low cost. Other markets experiencing Internet-related growth involve illegal 

drugs and child pornography. By directly linking suppliers to vast numbers of consumers 

worldwide, online illicit markets help increase the profitability- and, therefore, the 

growth -of criminal activity. 

The new marketplace for counterfeit goods is dominated by transnational criminal 

organizations. According to the United Notions Interregional Crime and justice 

Research Institute (UNICRI), "[c]ounterfeiting and piracy hove long presented o tempting 

target market for organized criminals." But especially in recent years, UNICRI notes, 

transnational criminal organizations hove moved "deliberately and in great numbers" to 

grab control of supply chains and consolidate power over these rapidly growing block 

markets. 212 For example, Italian transnational criminal organizations like the Neapolitan 

Comorro hove long played o major role in the production and distribution of counterfeit 

luxury goods. With the massive growth of Chinese manufacturing, Italian transnational 

criminal organizations ore adopting by increasingly portnering with Chinese criminal 

enterprises 213 Pursuant to these partnerships, the Chinese enterprises manufacture the 

products, while the Comorro sells and distributes them 214 

Because the success of on Internet-based business model depends on attracting 

sufficient numbers of customers to the counterfeiters' websites, counterfeiters may 

outsource their advertising work to specialized transnational criminal organization that 

deploy botnets. These botnets help counterfeiters reach millions through spom e-mail 

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and the sophisticated manipulation of search engine results 215 The success of these 

Internet-enabled counterfeiting networks has significant consequences. In the global 

pharmaceutical market, for example, sales for legitimate businesses that play by 

the rules decline, reducing incentives for expensive investments into potentially lifesaving drugs. In addition, since counterfeiters may dilute or misrepresent the active 

ingredients in counterfeit pharmaceuticals, recipients may not get the treatment they 

need, imperiling their health? 16 

Today, the Internet provides virtually unfettered access to a range of intellectual 

property content. However, the creators of this content are also arguably more 

vulnerable than ever to having their works stolen and distributed without their consent. 

According to a recent study by the British brand-protection firm NetNames, the 

amount of Internet traffic used for copyright infringement in North America, Europe, 

and the Asia Pacific has grown nearly 160 percent from 2010 to 2012 and now 

accounts for 24 percent of total Internet traffic. 217 In 201 1, it was estimated that more 

than 17 percent of Internet traffic in the U.S. was infringing. 218 While new digital 

services for the authorized dissemination of music, film, television, and software have 

proliferated, 219 services facilitating illicit distribution continue to evolve and thrive. 

Such services include cyber lockers, peer-to-peer networks, BitTorrent, streaming 

websites, and literally hundreds of mobile applications. 220 Another major source of 

pirated content are China-based enterprises that produce and ship pirated DVDs with 

packaging that is often "shockingly sophisticated and nearly indistinguishable from 

legitimate product." 221 These developments, in turn, have fostered astonishing growth 

in the global market for pirated digital content. For example, in 2011, the global 

commercial value of pirated software is estimated to have reached $63.4 billion, 

more than double what it was in 2003. 222 

Contrary to the myth that illicit distribution services are only interested in helping to 

propagate content, these services are in fact primarily profit-driven. One business model 

offers paid subscriptions for the pirated content. Another model offers the content free, 

but profits by inducing consumers to click online ads. In either case, as consumers 

use these piracy services to view content or download software, they siphon revenues 

away from content creators and into the pockets of criminals. Given the importance 

of the music, television, and film industries in California, the economic damage within 

the state of such Internet-enabled digital piracy is disproportionately severe. While 

estimates of exact losses vary greatly, there is little doubt that over the years digital 

piracy has robbed creative industries based in California of hundreds of millions of 

dollars in revenue and jobs. 

In addition to depriving intellectual property creators of their earnings, a further threat 

posed by the marketplace for digital piracy is the distribution of malware. More and 

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more, pirated content whether downloaded or on a physical disk is "laced" 

with malware that, once installed on a computer, can steal information or otherwise 

compromise that system 223 According to McAfee, 12 percent of sites known to 

distribute pirated content "are actively distributing malware to users who download 

[the] content." Moreover, some of these sites appear to "have associations with 

known cyber crime organizations. " 224 

Virtual Currencies Offer New Tools for Money Laundering 

New Internet-reliant technologies threaten to revolutionize the way in which 

transnational criminal organizations finance their activities and launder their proceeds 

Until now, these organizations have had to sacrifice speed and profit margins in order to 

transfer money securely and secretly. For example, to avoid the registration and reporting 

requirements of banks and other international money transmitters, transnational criminal 

organizations avoid digital bank transfers in favor of physically transporting cash in 

bulk and participating in complicated trade-based money laundering schemes. These 

schemes are not only slow and subject to law enforcement interdiction, but also involve 

multiple "fees" to compensate launderers for their efforts and risk-taking. However, the 

emergence of new technologies over the last few years hints at a future in which speed 

and profit margins no longer need to be sacrificed in exchange for security and secrecy. 

One example of these new technologies is the pre-paid, open-system stored-value cards 

such as "Green Dot" cards. Prepaid open-system cards allow their holder to connect to 

global debit and automated teller machine IATM) nefvlorks. These prepaid cards often 

do not require the cardholder to open a bank account or verify his or her identity. 225 This 

lack of an accountholder relationship, coupled with the fact that the cards are not subject 

to any cross-border reporting requirements, 226 can enable a cardholder to transfer an 

unlimited amount of money across the global payment system anonymously227 

Perhaps the most notorious new technology in transnational criminal organization finance 

is virtual currency, a category that includes e-Gold, Liberty Reserve, and Bitcoin, as well 

as currencies used in online games that can be bought and exchanged for dollars 228 

These currencies are "virtual" because they operate like currency within their designated 

ecosystems, but lack the legal tender status of real currencies in any jurisdiction. 229 Virtual 

currencies can be used to quickly and confidently move illicit proceeds from one country 

to another. And as long as the government is unable to link virtual currency accounts or 

addresses to their owners, the identities of those sending and receiving the proceeds 

are effectively shielded. According to the U.S. Secret Service, "[t]hese attributes make 

[virtual] currencies a preferred tool of transnational criminal organizations for conducting 

their criminal activities, transmitting their illicit revenue internationally, and laundering their 

profits"230 The foilowing examples illustrate this trend. 

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Founded in 1996, e-Gold was a pseudonymous digital currency that was originally 

backed with gold coins stored in a safe deposit box in Florida. To open an e-Gold 

account, a person needed no more than a valid e-mail address. Once the account was 

established and funded, the account holder "could gain access through the Internet 

and conduct anonymous transactions with other e-Gold account holders anywhere in 

the world." 231 As a result, e-Gold "quickly became the preferred financial transaction 

method of transnational cyber criminals- particularly those involved in the trafficking 

of stolen financial information and [personally identifiable information] of U.S. citizens 

and a tool for money laundering by cyber criminals." 232 At its peak, e-Gold moved 

more than $6 million each day for more than 2.5 million accounts. 233 In 2007, the 

federal government shut down e-Gold. Its owners pleaded guilty to charges of money 

laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business 234 

Incorporated in Costa Rica in 2006, Liberty Reserve S.A. for years operated one 

of the world's most widely used virtual currencies. It provided what it described as 

"instant, real-time currency for international commerce," but it was 

allegedly designed to intentionally help criminals conduct illegal transactions and 

launder the proceeds of their crimes. In particular, it permitted users to conduct financial 

transactions under multiple layers of anonymityn5 

According to federal prosecutors, Liberty Reserve was one of the principal means by 

which cyber criminals from around the world, including credit card thieves and computer 

hacking rings, laundered their illicit proceeds 236 Liberty Reserve's website offered a 

"shopping cart interface" that "merchant" websites could use to accept Liberty Reserve 

currency as payment 237 The "merchants" who accepted Liberty Reserve currency were 

overwhelmingly engaged in criminal activities. They included traffickers in stolen credit 

card data, computer hackers for hire, and underground drug-dealing websites 238 

With an estimated one million users worldwide, and more than 200,000 in the 

United States, Liberty Reserve processed more than 12 million financial transactions 

annually, with a combined value of more than $1.4 billion 239 From 2006 to May 

201 3, Liberty Reserve is believed to have laundered in excess of $6 billion in 

criminal proceeds240 

In May 2013, federal prosecutors in New York charged Liberty Reserve and its founders 

with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, and conspiring to commit 

money laundering. 241 The principal founder, as well as lwo other defendants, are 

pending extradition. 242 Another defendant has entered a guilty plea and lwo others are 

at large. The site has been shuttered and effectively put out of business. 

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Unlike most other virtual currencies, such as e-Gold and Liberty Reserve, Bitcoin is a 

decentralized digital-payments system. In other words, there is no centralized repository 

or administrator who serves to mediate transactions. Instead, all users install the 

open-source software on their computing devices, thereby creating a peer-to-peer 

network through which Bitcoin transactions are conducted and bitcoin "balances" 

are independently calculated. Significantly, Bitcoin transactions are possible from 

anywhere in the world there is an Internet connection. They are irreversible once 

conducted, and have few, if any, fees. 

Figure 35 

Screen shot of Illicit Drugs For Sale on Silk Road Website 

015.25 

Bitcoin was established in 2009 and its popularity has grown wildly in the past two 

years. While its use in legitimate commerce is growing, its use in criminal financial 

transactions was illustrated by its adoption as the exclusive payment mechanism for Silk 

Road. O~en referred to as the "eBay for drugs," Silk Road was an anonymous online 

market that sold everything from marijuana to prescription drugs to weapons (Figure 35). 

According to the FBI, it was "the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace 

on the lnternet."W One FBI inventory found 13,000 listings for controlled substances, 

159 offerings for "services" (including a tutorial on hacking ATMs), as well as hundreds 

of offerings of hacked accounts and counterfeit 1Ds 244 Between February 20 l 1 and 

July 2013, this "dark market" served more than 100,000 customers and facilitated 

approximately $1.2 billion worth of transactions. 
282 

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In October 2013, the federal government shut down Silk Road, arrested the principal 

operator- a U.S. citizen living in the Bay Area -and charged him with narcotics 

trafficking, computer hacking, and money laundering, among other crimes 245 Top 

sellers and significant users in other locations around the world were also arrested. 

Most recently, in January 2014, federal authorities arrested a co-founder and chief 

executive of one of the Internet's most popular bitcoin-dollar exchangers for conspiring 

to sell and launder over $1 million in bitcoins in connection with Silk Road drug 

purchases 246 Nonetheless, attempts to resurrect Silk Road continue. 

Conclusion 

As information systems and networks, consumer bank accounts, and digital content 

have all become vulnerable to high-tech exploitation, organized crime has evolved 

to seize new profit opportunities. In this new world, identification credentials and 

intellectual property have become the primary targets for illicit acquisition and 

distribution, criminals can purchase data and highly specialized skills from each other 

on the "dark market," and cutting-edge technologies enable transnational criminal 

organizations to evade detection and protect their illicit gains from law enforcement 

authorities in ways that are still not adequately understood. 
284 

Recom mendotions 

Trafficking 

The legislature should amend California law to target the leaders of 

transnational criminal organizations operating in California. 

California has no statutory authority that specifically targets or punishes supervisors, 

managers or financers who conduct operations locally on behalf of transnational 

criminal organizations. Currently, high-level prison or street gang members who super· 

vise, manage, or finance their local gang associates in the distribution and retail sales 

of drugs are treated as 'co-conspirators" or "aiders and abettors" of their underlings 

ond foot soldiers. However, other states and the federal government have enacted laws 

that increase the punishment and seize the working capital of the prison or street gang 

leaders who work on behalf of drug trafficking organizations. 

For example, Congress enacted the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act (Criminal Enter· 

prise Act)20 in an effort to combat drug cartels by directly attacking their leadership2 " 8 

Under the Criminal Enterprise Act (21 U.S C. §848), a director of an illegal criminal 

organization may be sentenced to prison for not less than twenty years to life without 

the possibility of parole2 '

19 In addition to lengthy incarceration, the Criminal Enterprise 

Act authorizes the seizure of the director or manager's ill-gotten monetary gains, 250 thus 

depriving the criminal organization of its working capital. And in statehouses, Maryland 

and New jersey passed laws similar to the Criminal Enterprise Act to increase the crimi· 

nalliability of large-scale narcotics oporators boyond that of their "employees." 251 

To more effectivoly combat transnational criminal organizations and their criminal gong 

associates, the California legislature should broaden existing law to increase criminal 

penalties for organizers, supervisors, managers or financers of criminal enterprises. This 

could be accomplished by amending current law to include a Criminal Enterprise Act 

and to increase potential sentences and fines. By doing so, law enforcement can more 

effectively target the "shot-callers" of theso criminal organizations and destabilize their 

operations. 
285 

Federal, state, and local law enforcement should use California's State Threat 

Assessment System as a central hub for sharing information about transnational 

crime. 

California lacks a unified system for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information about transnational organized crime. Police departments and task forces regularly 

maintain data related to the activities of known organized crime ligures, but such data 

is rarely shared outside that immediate county or affected region. California's State 

Threat Assessment System (STASI is uniquely positioned to act as the central hub for 

California's transnational crime information-sharing needs. The STAS already provides 

critical tactical and strategic intelligence about trends and emerging patterns relating to 

criminal activity statewide and ensures first responders and policymakers are provided 

with timely, accurate, and relevant situation awareness about transnational criminal 

tactics and techniques. In coordination with the Attorney General's Office, California's 

tribal, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies should partner with the STAS 

to develop a platform to share information about transnational criminal organizations 

across the state. 

Federal, state, and local authorities should establish a unified maritime task 

force and associated radar network to counter maritime smuggling operations 

along California's coastline. 

Various local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies coordinate their activities 

to interdict maritime smuggling operations along California's coast. These partnerships 

are often regional in nature and are typically established on an as-needed basis. California needs a new multi·iurisdictional Maritime Task Force that leverages expertise at 

the federal, state and local levels to combat the threat along its coastline, especially 

from panga vessel smuggling, and to coordinate strategy between affected counties. 

In addition to the creation of the Maritime Task Force, California should work with federal agencies to implement a network of high-intensity radar stations, sonar buoys, or 

other appropriate and effective technologies strategically located along the coast, like 

the large radar receiver recently placed at Carlsbad's Ponto Beach by federal officials, 

to better detect maritime threats and coordinate law enforcement responses. 
286 

The Legislature and Governor should fund five additional Special Operations 

Units across California. 

Transnational crime involves an increasingly decentralized array of international and 

domestic criminal actors conducting a range of trafficking, financial, and high-tech 

crimes. The sophisticated nature of these groups and their criminal activities requires an 

equally sophisticated and coordinated law enforcement response. 

The multi-million dollar budget cuts in 201 l to the California Department of justice's 

Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement resulted in cutbacks to numerous task farces and special 

operations units I"SOUs") across the state focused on drug-trafficking organizations and 

violent gangs. Despite these cuts, the one remaining SOU, operating out of Fresno, has 

been successful in comba~ing cartel and gang activity in the Central Valley. For example, in june 20 11 , the Fresno SOU completed a six-month investigation involving high 

ranking members of the Nuestro Familia prison gang and various Nortefio street gangs 

that were selling cartel-supplied drugs in Merced and Madera counties. 252 The investigation led to the arrest of l 01 suspects and the seizure of 27 weapons and $6.6 million in 

U.S. currency. Building off this crackdown, the Fresno unit opened 23 additional investigations and closed 14 of them in 2012 and 201 3. During these investigations, agents 

debriefed informants and cooperators and learned that Nuestro Familia was working 

with Mexican drug cartels, including La Familia Michoacana and the New Milenio Cartel ian off-shoot of Sinaloa), to distribute drugs in the Central Valley, provide protection on 

the street and in prison, and even commit fire bombings and murders. 253 

Given the success of the Fresno SOU, California would benefit greatly from adding a SOU 

in each of the Division of Law Enforcement's regional offices in Sacramento, San Francisco, 

Riverside, Los Angeles, and San Diego. With a relatively modest total budget of $7.5 million, these five new learns would help local and feceral authorities build cases against the 

most dangerous transnational criminal organizations operating in California. 

The federal government should continue providing critical funding to support 

state and local law enforcement agencies in investigating and dismantling 

trafficking organizations. 

In California, methamphetamine trafficking has reached staggering levels. The overwhelming 

maiority of the foreign supply of methamphetamine flows through California's port-of-entry 

border in San Diego. Amongst the U.S. states that share a border with Mexico, methamphetamine seizures in California dwarf the seizures of our sister states by a factor of five. 

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Based on the advocacy of the California Attorney General's Office and other state and 

national law enforcement leaders, Congress appropriated $7.5 million in january 2014 

for state law enforcement grants to be administered by the U.S. Department of justice's 

Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office to target methamphetamine production and trafficking. These funds will help state law enforcement agencies directly combat 

one of the most lucrative and dangerous activities perpetrated today by transnational 

criminal organizations. In California, which suffers disproportionately from foreign- and 

domestic-refined methamphetamine trafficking by drug cartels, grant funds will support 

close collaboration betvleen the California Department of justice's Division of Law Enforcement and local agencies in investigating and dismantling the organizations behind 

the methamphetamine epidemic in the hardest-hit and underserved communities. But, 

sustained funding is crucial to law enforcement's ability to make a lasting impact against 

methamphetamine trafficking. Congress is preparing to consider appropriations for Fiscal 

Year 20 15, and it should continue to fund at or above current levels the resources for this 

critical federal methamphetamine grant program. 

Of equal importance is the restoration of federal funds for other task forces focused 

on combatting transnational criminal organizations. For several years, federal funding 

through the Byrne justice Assistance Grant Program ("Byrne JAG") has enabled the 

California Department of justice to lead task forces across the state composed of 

federal, state, and local law enforcement. In California, the Board of State and Community Corrections administers the distribution of Byrne JAG funding. For California's 

20 l 3-2014 Fiscal Year, the Board awarded the Department of justice $2 .l million, 

which helped support 17 ioint state-local task forces. However, this represents a 46 

percent reduction from the $3.9 million in funding awarded to the Department of 

justice in Fiscal Year 2009-2010. Because of the critical role played by these highly 

trained ioint state-local task forces in responding to drug trafficking activities, the Board 

should fully restore funding for these task forces at their 2009-20 l 0 level. 

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies should increase operational 

coordination in combatting transnational criminal organizations. 

Given the international scope of trafficking nelvlorks, local, state and federal law enforcement 

agencies in California must coordinate to combat maior transnational criminal organizations 

such as the Sinaloa cartel. This coordination should be focused on operations and capacity 

building. 

Operational coordination allows law enforcement agencies to better utilize limited 

resources and leverage prosecutorial authority under state and federal law. Potential 

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projects could include: ( 1) improvements to intelligence exchange and information sharing involving state task forces and federally-sponsored HIDTA teams; (2) partnerships 

between state law enforcement officials and the National Park Service and U.S. Forest 

Service to combat marijuana cultivation on public land; and (3) coordination between 

state and federal public health and corrections officials to reduce demand for drugs trafficked by transnational criminal organizations. 

In addition to operational coordination, capacity building is essential to ensure that 

expertise is developed to combat transnational criminal organizations. Thus, state 

officials should support existing federal government programs designed to enhance 

Mexico's capacity to combat transnational crime. The foundation for this cooperation 

was laid in August 201 3 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between 

the California Department of justice and the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. This agreement provides the framework for 

cooperation between California and the State Department on training and advising foreign 

legal personnel, and on assisting judicial reform and police training initiatives in other countries. 

High-Tech Crime 

State and local authorities should develop public-private partnerships to 

leverage technology against transnational crime. 

Because it is so often targeted by transnational criminal schemes, the private sector 

is usually the best source of information about high-tech threats. Additionally, in the 

realm of technology, the private sector is often in o better position thon government to 

develop tools ond techniques to com bot criminal activity, especially new ond emerging schemes used by transnational criminal organizations. Law enforcement should find 

ways to take advantage of the resources available in the private sector to develop new 

ond innovative ways of countering ever-changing criminal threats and tactics. 

Business should adopt industry best practices designed to protect against cybercrime. 

Lax cybersecurity practices, or the lack of any protections whatsoever, allow for too 

many breaches of computer networks and databases to happen in California, resulting in billions of dollars in economic losses. To help guide businesses and other entities 

throughout the state, the California Department of justice earlier this year released Cybersecurity in the Golden State (h~p:/ /oag.ca.gov/cybersecurity), a report exploring the serious 

cyber-threats facing business and offering them practical guidance on how to minimize cyber 

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vulnerabilities. All entities, public and private, doing business in California should assume they 

are a target and consider and adopt the industry best practices identified in that report. 

Money laundering 

The Legislature should amend California law to enable prosecutors to 

temporarily freeze the assets of transnational criminal organizations and 

their gang associates before the filing of an indictment. 

There is currently no provision in California law for the seizure of criminal proceeds 

and assets to prevent their dissipation prior to the filing of a criminal case or, in drug 

cases, prior to the filing of a civil asset forfeiture petition 254 California law should be 

modified to allow for pre-indictment freezing of a transnational criminal organization's 

illicit proceeds or property to prevent their dissipation or disbursement. The ease with 

which money laundered in California is returned to Mexico via electronic or physical 

transportation often outpaces the ability of prosecutors to commence criminal proceedings to freeze transnational criminal organization assets. 

Unlike California law, federal law authorizes a pre-indictment seizure of assets and 

property with or without prior notice255 The prosecution can request a temporary 

restraining order without notice if it can establish probable cause that, upon conviction, 

the property will be subject to forfeiture, and that notice will jeopardize the availability 

of the property for future forfeiture 256 Alternatively, a federal prosecutor can request a 

noticed hearing where he or she must demonstrate that there is a substantial probability that the government will prevail on the issue of forfeiture, failure to allow seizure will 

result in the property being destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction, and the need to 

preserve the seized property outweighs the hardship on the opposing party257 

California prosecutors should be given equal authority to preserve assets and property prior to filing criminal cases. This could be accomplished by amending existing 

law by expanding the class of transnational "profiteering" activities subject to seizure. 

Preservation of such assets would, for example, assist in the recovery of the costs of 

disposing of toxic waste from, and cleaning up of sites damaged by, clandestine methamphetamine conversion labs. Lacking this authority, a transnational criminal organization's assets can quickly be removed from California prior to the commencement of 

formal legal proceedings. 

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290 

The Legislature should strengthen California's prohibition against financial 

transaction "structuring." 

Federal law requires financial institutions to report to financial regulators all currency 

transactions over $10,000, as well as multiple currency transactions that aggregate 

over $10,000 in a single day258 Federal law makes it a crime to break up or "structure" financial transactions into amounts smaller than $10,000 for the purpose of 

avoiding the mandatory reporting requirements 259 Federal law does not require that 

the structured transactions be intended to hide the fact that money came from criminal 

activities or to facilitate criminal activities 260 The mere structuring of financial deposits, coupled with notice of the reporting requirements, is sufficient to charge a money 

launderer with a federal financial crime. 

By contrast, California's laws require state prosecutors to prove a money launderer 

intentionolly structured o financial transaction to disguise that the proceeds were derived 

from a criminal activity or, alternatively, were structured to promote or further criminal 

activity261 Requiring a prosecutor to establish a defendant's subjective intent in a 

structuring case enables transnational criminal organizations to conduct unmonitored 

transactions and launder their money with a reduced risk of state criminal liability. 

California's anti-structuring statute should be amended so that breaking up financial 

transactions into smaller amounts for the purpose of avoiding the reporting requirements is, in and of itself, a criminal act. 

California prosecutors need advanced training to combat sophisticated 

transnational money laundering schemes. 

Significant budget reductions have curtailed the investigatory and prosecutorial capacities 

of law enforcement agencies to combat transnational crime. Meanwhile, transnational 

criminal organizations have employed increasingly sophisticated schemes to launder 

their illicit profits. These emerging schemes require prosecutors to dissect complex international trade transactions and finance mechanisms in order to demonstrate criminal 

liability and successfully dismantle criminal organizations and syndicates. 

The Department of justice should leverage existing resources and partnerships to provide advanced training and technical assistance to prosecutors investigating complex 

money laundering schemes. Such training will expand the pool of trained and experi79 
291 

enced prosecutors in the fight against organized crime in California and enhance our 

ability to disrupt this criminal activity. 

State authorities should partner with their Mexican counterparts to share 

intelligence and disrupt the illicit flow of money across the border. 

Emerging money laundering strategies by Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations include the use of non-bank financial institutions such as money transmitters 

to deposit and transfer illicit funds into the financial system. Unregistered money 

transmitting businesses, which mask that they are in the business of transferring funds 

through the international financial system, present a challenge for tracking and prosecuting money laundering transactions. 262 For example, financial crime investigators 

have observed individuals who claim to be agents or employees of licensed money 

services businesses operating along the California-Mexico border entering California 

from Mexico with satchels full of bulk cash. 263 The investigators need to have available 

to them in real time an upto-date database of registered agents and employees of 

California-licensed money service businesses and would benefit from having similar 

information available from money services businesses operating in Mexico264 

Bilateral anti-money laundering initiatives are underway in the U.S. and Mexico. For 

example, in October 2013, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network IFinCEN) 

reached an agreement with Mexico's National Banking and Securities Commission to 

share information related to their respective responsibilities on fighting money laundering.265 Reportedly, this marks the first time that FinCEN has entered a relationship with 

a regulator outside the U.S. to share information.'266 

Given California's pivotal role in cross-border transnational money laundering activities 

involving Mexico, California financial regulators and law enforcement officials should 

similarly partner with Mexico's Banking and Securities Commission to share intelligence 

in a timely manner about the methods, modus operandi, and trends and routes used 

by criminal organizations operating between California and Mexico and cross-border 

currency flows. California and Mexico should incorporate the latest technology to 

collect, analyze, and disseminate critical financial intelligence, including cross-border 

wire transactions. 267 

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Endnotes 

' Andre Standing, Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo Convention: A 

Reality Check \December 201 0), International Peace Institute, p. 2. 

US Department of justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, The Economic Impact 

of iliicit Use on American Society, 201 1 201 1), p. ix, 2011-00317-

002, 

3 National Security Council, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: 

htlp./ 

4 ld. 5 United Notions Office on Drugs and Crime, Digest of Organized Crime Cases 

\20121, p 13. 

6 United Notions Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 I 0), p. 3. 

7 US. Deportment of justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, National Drug Threat 

Assessment 20 13(May 20 13), p. v. 

8 Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Maiar Trends 

in the Twenty-First Century (Aug. 20 12), Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, Latin American Program, p. 8. 

9 ld; Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Organized Crime And Terrorist 

in Mexico, /999-2002 (Feb. 2003), p. 3, 

10 june S. Beitiel, Mexico5 Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the 

Violence, Congressional Research Service (Apr, 15, 2013), pp, 11-12. 

11 !d. at p. 3, Scott Stewart, The Real 'EI , Stratfor: Global Intelligence (Nov, 

l, 2012), 

12 !d. at p. 

13 Interview with Santa Clara Counly Sheriff's Office Gang Expert (Oct. 22, 20 13). 

81 
293 

14 !d. 

15 Hans Johnson & Morisol Cuellar Mejia, Immigrants in California (May 20 13), 

accessed on February 7, 

2014. 

16 California Deportment of justice, Division of Low Enforcement, Bureau of 

Investigation, Organized Crime in California 20 I 0 Report, pp. 31-34; James 

Finchenouer, Russian Organized Crime in the United Stoles, Notionollnstitute of 

justice, I 17 California Deportment Justice, Division Low Enforcement, Bureau of 

Investigation, Organized Crime in California 20 I 0 Report, pp. 14-15. 

18 United Notions Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in 

Centro/ America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment (Sept. 20 12), p. 27, 

19 !d. at p. 28. 

20 U.S. Deportment of justice, Notional Drug Intelligence Center, Situation Report: Cities 

Where Mexican Drug Organizations Operate Within the United States (April 

2010), pp. 5-6, 

21 California 

2012), p. 3, 

Coalition to Abolish and Trafficking, A Serious Problem -

and in the USA, accessed on Feb. 6, 2014. 

22 The White House, Office of Notional Drug Control Policy, State Profile, California 

Conlro/UpdoteUon. 15, 2012), 

23 U.S. Deportment of justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Notional Drug Threat 

Assessment Summary (20 13), p. 11. 

24 Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris: DO) Tokes 

Down $2 Million Operation in Sacramento County Uune 20, 2013), 

25 U.S. Department of justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, Notional Drug Threat 

Assessment 20 II (Aug. 2011), p. 30; Tim McGirk, Mexican Cartels Set Up 

in California Parks, Time Magazine (Aug. 22, 2009), lime. 

8599, 19 I Notional Drug Intelligence 

Center, Marijuana and Methamphetamine Trafficking on Federal Lands Threat Assessment (Feb 2005), I 0/ I 

accessed on Feb. 6, 20 14. 

82 
294 

26 U S Department of justice, Central Valley California High Intensity Drug TraffickArea, Marijuana Production in California Uune 4, 20 10), p. 4, 

ac<:es:sea on Aug. 5, 2013; jerome Adamstein, Environmental impact of marijuanagrowing in California, L.A. Times (Dec. 22, 20 12), 

I l 

?l Tim McGirk, Mexican Drug Cartels Set Up Shop in California Parks, Time 

Magazine (Aug 22, 2009), 

0, /917547 

28 Interview with Santa Clara County Sheriff's Office Gang Expert (Oct. 22, 2013). 

29 U.S. Department of justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, Notional Drug Threat 

Assessment 20 II (Aug. 20 11), p. 30; Office of the Attorney General, Organized 

Crime in California, 20 l 0 Annual Report to the Legislature, at p. 24, http/ 

IO.pdf. 

30 !d.; National Methamphetamine & Pharmaceuticals Initiative, Meth Update: Status 

and Factors Affecting the US. Uuly 2013), pp. 3-5, accessed on Aug. 5, 2013; 

jill Reploge and Fronteras, San Diego Crocks Down on Mexican Meth, Seizures 

Expected to Surpass 2012 Records, PBS Newshour (Aug. 6, 20 13), 

1 

31 National Methamphetamine & Pharmaceuticals Initiative, Meth Update: Status and 

Factors Affecting the US. Uuly 2013), pp. 1-2; United Nations, Office on Drugs 

and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: 

A Threat Assessment (Sept. 201 2), p. 44, 

accessed on Aug. 6, 2013. 

32 Associated Press, Stole Agents Arrest 4 in 

available at: 

Cartel Investigation (Oct. 9, 20 1 3), 

I 0/09/stoteogents-orrest 

john Cote, Son jose Meth Bust: 750 Lbs, San Francisco Chronicle (Mar. 4, 

201 2). available at 

,750/bs 3379571 

34 Interview with a Deputy District Attorney in the Santo Clara County District 

Attorney's Office (Oct. 23, 2013) 

35 !d. 

36 Son Diego Regional Pharmaceutical Narcotic Enforcement Team {RxNET), Annual 

Report (20 12), p. 7; Monica Garske and Shin, Dangerous 'Phormo-Cartels' 

Trafficking Painkillers' (Oct. 24, 2012), 

37 San Diego Regional Pharmaceutical Narcotic Enforcement Team (RxNET). Annual 

Repor/(2012), p. 7. 

83 
295 

38 /d. at p. 1 0. 

39 /d. 

40 !d. at p. l 1 . 

41 /d. 

42 Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces 

Dismantling of International Drug Trafficking Scheme 

43 /d. 

44 /d. 

45 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World 2013 (May 

2013),p.37, unodc 13/World_ 

accessed on Aug. 6, 2013; Bruce Bagley, Drug 

and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty-First 

Century, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American 

Program (Aug. 2012), p. 2. 

46 U.S. Department of justice, Trafficking in Persons Report: Introduction Uune 2013), 

p. 7, 10737 

47 California Department of justice, The State of Human Trafficking in California (November 201 2), p. 63, https/ /oag co gov/sites/a/1/files/pdfs/ht/human-troffick 

12 pdf; International Labour Office, Special Action Programme to Combat 

Forced Labour, fLO Global Estimate of Forced Labour Uune 20 12), 

48 California Department of Justice, The State of Human Trafficking in California 

(November 20 12), p. 3, 

49 !d. at p. 47. 

50 !d. at p. 52. 

51 Office of the Attorney General, 

Sentencing in Transnational Human 

52 U.S. Department of justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 

Project Gunrunner Fact Sheet, 

accessed on 

53 /d.; Luis Astorga, Arms Trafficking from the United States to Mexico: Divergent 

Responsibilities (Mar. 201 0), International Drug Policy Consortium, IOPC Policy 

Briefing, p. 2. 

84 
296 

54 juan Carlos Garzon, et al., The Criminal Diasporo: The Spread of Transnational 

Organized Crime and How to Contain its (20 13), p. 7, 

55 Colby Goodman & Michel Marizco, U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: New 

Data and Insights Illuminate Key Trends and Challenges (Sept. 201 0), Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, at p. 192, 

56 U S. Deportment of the Treasury, (Dec. 2005), Tables 8 and 9, 

accessed on Aug. 8, 20 l 3. 

57 U.S. Deportment of Homeland Securily, United States of America-Mexico Bi-National 

Criminal Proceeds Uune 201 0), 

accessed on Feb. 7, 20 14; U.S. Deportment of the 

Threat Assessment (Dec. 2005), p. 33, www. 

58 Brien, et al., A Bilateral Study on Money Laundering in the United States and Mexico (May 2011), Columbia School of International and Public Affairs and Global 

Financiallntegrily, ~ ~ 62-63, 

59 Financial Action Task Force, www. 

60 U.S. Deportment of Homeland Securily, United States of America-Mexico BiNational Criminal Proceeds Study, Uune 201 0), 

61 CAPen. Code, § 186.10 

62 CA Health & Safely Code, §§ 11370.6, 11370.9. 

63 31 US.C. § 5313, and regulations thereunder. 

64 31 U,S.C. § 5324; CAPen. Code, § 14166. 

60 31 U.S.C. § 5324, subd. (a)(3) 

66 CA Pen. Code, § 14166. 

67 GDP is a measure of a country's economic output as measured by the market value 

of all goods and services produced in a country. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Charting International Lobar Comparisons (Sept. 201 2), p. 13. 

68 U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Buck Stops Here: Improving U.S Anti-Money Laundering Practices: 2013 Senate Report (Apr. 20 13), p. 11. 

69 Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy, Numbers in the News Uuly 

2013),atp.1, I 

2012 

85 
297 

70 U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Buck Stops Here: 

Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices 2013 Senate Report (Apr. 20 13), 

p. 11, citing Notional Drug Intelligence data; Brien, et ol., A Bilateral Study on 

Money Laundering in the United Stoles and Mexico (May 2011), Columbia School 

of International and Public Affairs and Global Financial Integrity, p. 4. 

71 El Paso Intelligence Center, Notional Seizure System, Nationwide Bulk Cosh 

Seizures, FOIA 14-00002-F Uon. 1, 2008 Dec. 31, 20 12). 

72 U.S. Deportment of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Advisory: 

Newly Released Mexican Regulations Imposing Restrictions on Mexican Bonks for 

Transactions in U.S. Currency Uune 21 , 201 0), 

l0-o007 

71 Interview with Special Agent Ernesto Limon, California Deportment of Justice, California Anti-Money Laundering Alliance (Sept. 2013); Interview with New Mexico 

Money Laundering Task Force Investigator (Aug. 20 13), Interview with Chula Vista 

Police Deportment, TEAM ONE, Task Force Investigator (Sept. 2013). 

74 ld, 

75 Alliance, About Us, 

, accessed on Feb. 18,2014. 

76 Notional Gang Intelligence Center, Notional Gong Threat Assessment: Emerging 

Trendsi2011), pp. 9, 15. 

77 !d. at pp. 9, 11, 15. 

78 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Gong Homicides Five U.S. Cities, 

2003-2008 Uon 27, 20 12), 

mm6l03o2 I 

79 !d. 

8

° California Deportment of Alcohol & Drug Programs, Facts and Figures On Alcohol 

and Other Drugs (Sept. 2006). 

81 !d. 

82 Office of Notional Drug Control Policy, Notional Southwest Border Counternorcotics Strategy 120131, p. 59, /WW\V um''"'lcn' 

83 Juan Carlos Garzon, et al., The Criminal Diosporo: The Spread of Transnational 

Organized Crime and How to Contain its Expansion 120131, at p. 4, 

84 june S. Beittel, Mexicos Drug Trafficking Organizations. Source and Scope of the 

Violence (April 15, 20 13), Congressional Research Service, at p. 23. 

85 /d. at p. 1 . 

86 
298 

86 Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris, Suspects 

Arrested in Murder-for-Hire Plot Commissioned by Mexican Drug Cartel (Feb. 17, 

2011), hire87 Daniel Borunda, Barrio Azteca threat targets law officers, El Paso Times (Mar. 25, 

2010), 1475],158 

88 CNN Wire Staff, Border Agent Shot By Bandits Who Target Immigrants, Union 

Chief (Dec. 15, 201 0), I 0/CRIME/ I I 

89 U.S House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the 

Threat at the Southwest Border (2006), p. 14; National Gang Intelligence Center, 

National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends (20 l l), p. 27. 

90 ld. at p. 80. 

91 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Electronic Communication, 183-7396, Aryan 

Brotherhood Prison Gang, Information Concerning RICO, Non-LCN, OC Type, p. 

56, UNCLASSIFIED; Kevin johnson, Drug Cartels Unite Rival Gangs to Work for 

Common Bad, USA Today (Mar. 16, 201 0), 

10031 

2014. 

92 U.S. Deportment of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Office 

of Inspector General, CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Crass-Border Tunnels (Sept. 

2012), p. 2, OIG-12-132, http/ 12/ 

I I U.S. House Committee on Security, A Line 

the Threat at the Southwest Border (2006), pp. 

I 

93 Matt Isaacs, Twice Burned, SF Weekly Uune 14, 2000), 

I , accessed 

on Feb. 7, 20 14; US. Department of justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, 

National Drug Threat Assessment 20 l l (Aug. 2011), p. 27. 

94 Col/Gang, National Gong Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment: 

Emerging Trends (20 11), pp. 47-48. 

95 California County News, New FBI Slats: Two CA Counties Rank I sf and 3rd in the 

Nation for Most Gang Members (Oct. 25, 201 1), 

accessed on Feb. 

96 National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging 

Trends (2011), p. 15. 

97 Interview with Santa Clara County Sheriff's Office Gang Expert (Oct. 22, 20 13). 

87 
299 

98 California Deportment of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Contraband Cell 

Phones in CDCR Prisons and Conservation Camps (April 20 12) 

99 California State Assembly, Assembly Committee for Senate Bill 26 (Aug. 

17, 2011), p. 5, http//wwvv. I i 12/bill/sen/sb_OOOI 

11081 I h!ml. 

100 Moises Noim, illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats ore Hiiocking the 

Global Economy (2006), pp. 77-78. 

101 ld. 

102 Jd. at p. 102. 

103 Michael Montgomery, How Imprisoned Mexican Mafia Leader Exerts Secret Control Over LA Street Gongs (Sept. 19, 20 13), 

I 17/ll 

104 !d. 

105 United Notions Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnotional Organized Crime Threat Assessment (201 0), p. ii. 

106 /d. at pp. ii, 29. 

107 !d. at p. 29. 

108 ld. at p. ii 

109 !d. 

110 Moises Noim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats ore Hiiocking the 

Global Economy (2006), p. 75. 

111 Jerome P. Bielopero & Kristen M. Finklea, Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge 

for US Low Enforcement, Congressional Research Service Uon. 6, 20 12), p. 3. 

112 U.S. Deportment of justice, Notional Drug Intelligence Center, Notional Drug 

Threat Assessment 20 lO (Feb. 201 0), pp. 21, 23, 

I /movef)lcnl accessed on Feb. 8, 2014. 

113 Cynthia Lomberyl Pango Boots Running Drugs from Mexico ore Pushing North, 

Landing on SLO County Beaches, The Tribune (Dec. l, 20 12), 

12/1 

uc.c.c;;;t,uOn Feb. 8, 2014. 

11 'j Jeanette Steele, Coast Guard Touts Drug Busts at Sea, Son Diego Union-Tribune 

88 

Uune 7, 2013), I 3/)un/07/ 

, accessed on Aug. 9, 2013; Cynthia Lombery, Pongo Boots Running Drugs from Mexico ore Pushing North, Landing on 
300 

SLO County Beaches, The Tribune (Dec. 

12/1 I 

on Aug. 9, 2013. 

115 El Paso Intelligence Center, National Seizure System, 20080 l 0 1·20 121 231 

California-Specific Narcotics Data Land Crossings Only, UNCLASSIFIED (Sept. 

2013) 

116 ld.; CBS News, Sinaloa Cartel Tokes to the High Seas (Dec. 12, 20 12). 

117 Stephen Baxter, Drug Smuggling Boat Wrecks, 80 Pounds oF Pot Found North 

oF Santo Cruz, Santo Cruz Sentinel (Oct. l, 20 13), 

I 

118 !d. 

119 

120 Santa Barbaro County Sheriff's Deportment, Special Investigations Bureau, Transno· 

tiona/ Organized Crime (Sept. 19, 20 13) 

!21 /d. 

122 !d. 

123 Interview with Detective from Santo Barbaro County Sheriffs Office (Oct. 151 2013}. 

124 Santa Barbaro County Sheriff's Office, Special Investigations Bureau, Transnational 

Organized Crime (Sept. 19, 20 13) 

125 Susan Shrader, Pango Yields Nearly $1.8 million in Pot (Feb. 

I 

126 U S. Coast Guard News Release, ChieF 

Low Enforcement Mission (Dec. 3, 201 0), 

127 Jennifer Jensen, U.S. Coast Guard Intercepts 31 Bales oF Moriiuono AFter High· 

Speed Chase on the Ocean, ABC 10 News (Oct. 8, 201 3), 

I 

1007201 J. 

128 White House, Office of Notional Drug Control Policy, Notional Southwest Border 

Counternarcotics (20 13), p. 69, 

129 U.S. Deportment of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Office 

of Inspector General, CBP's to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels (Sept. 

2012), p. 2, OIG-12·132, 12/ 

I I I 

89 
301 

/d. 

131 !d. at pp. 2-3. 

132 /d.atp.3. 

134 U.S. Department of Homeland Securily, Customs and Border Protection, Office 

of Inspector General, CBP's to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels (Sept. 

2012), p. 2, OIG-12-132, !2/ 

135 

2013. 

136 California Department of Finance, Foreign Trade Through California Ports, 19702012, 

cessed on Aug. 10, 2013. 

137 !d. 

138 ld. 

ac139 Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, 

Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Combating Transnational Organized 

Crime: International Money Laundering as a Threat to our Financial Systems (Feb. 

8, 2012) 

14° Financial Action Task Force- Groupe d'Action Financiere, Best Practices on Trade 

Based Money Laundering Uune 2008), p. 1. 

141 U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Buck Stops Here: Improving US. Anti-Money Laundering Practices 2013 Senate Report (Apr. 20 13), 

p. 19. 

142 US v. Angel Toy Corporation, eta/, No. 21 0-CR-00718 (CD. Cal. 201 0); 

US v. Woody Toys, Inc, eta/, No. 212-CR-00329 (CD Cal. 2012); US 

v. Peace and Rich, eta/. (Silk Flower Case), No. 213-CR-00 107 (CD Cal. 

2013) 

143 Interviews with Los Angeles Interagency Metropolitan Police Apprehension Crime 

Taskforce (LA IMPACT) officials and Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of 

California, Los Angeles Uune:iuly 20 13). 

90 
302 

144 Notional White Collar Crime Center, 2012 Internet Crime Report, p. 8. 

145 !d. at p. 24. 

146 Francisco Gomez, Piroteria, el Otro Frente del Norco, El Universal (Mar. 1, 

2009), 166099. accessed on 

Jon 2, 2014. 

147 The White House, Strategy To Combat Transnational Organized Crime Uuly 

2011), p. 7. 

148 Rights Clearinghouse, Chronology of Data Breaches (Dec. 31, 201 3), 

breoch. The list compiled by Privacy Rights 

Clearinghouse does not purport to be o complete listing of all breaches in o given 

year. Rother, it includes only breaches that hove been reported in the news media, 

on government websites, and on blogs. For this reason, the list likely understates 

the actual number of breaches. For more information, please see: 

149 California Deportment of justice, Attorney General's Data Breach Report 2012, p. 7. 

150 Office of the Attorney General, Identity Theft, (reporting 

statistics from Javelin Strategy and Research, 2012 Identity Froud Report). 

\51 Rights Clearinghouse, Chronology of Data Breaches (Dec. 31, 20 13), 

152 !d.; Office of the Attorney General, Identity Theft, (reporting statistics from javelin Strategy and Research, 20 12 Fraud Report}. 

Cloy Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy 

Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (2008), p. 9. 

154 Joson Franklin, et ol, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 

Internet Miscreants (2007), p. 1; Cloy Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Congressional Research 

Service (2008), p. 9. 

155 Federal Bureau of Investigation, APT Actors Send Speor-Phishing Email with 

Missing Children Theme, Private Sector Advisory (Aug. 9, 20 13). 

156 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Bonking Fraud, news release (Oct. l, 

2010); Complaint at p. 22, Microsoft Corp. v.john Does 1-82, No. 3:13-cv319 (WDNC May 29, 2013) 

157 Complaint at p. 23, Microsoft Corp. v. john Does 1-82, No. 3: 13-cv-319 

(WDNC May 29, 2013) 

158 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fraud and Organized Crime Intersect, news 

release (Oct. 1 3, 20 l 0); Lizette Alvarez, With Personal Data in Hand, Thieves 

File Early and Often, New York Times (May 26, 20 12) 

91 
303 

159 Complaint at p. 6, Microsoft Corp. v. john Does 1-82, No.3: 13-cv-319 

(WD N.C May 29, 2013) 

16° Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, ond Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities ond Policy 

Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (2008), p. 5. 

161 /d. 

162 ld. 

163 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 1 OJ p. 204. 

164 /d. 

165 jerome P. Bjelopera & Kristin M. Finklea, Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, Congressional Research Service (2012), p. 12. 

166 U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, Five Domestic Defendants 

Linked to International Computer Hacking Ring Conspiracy Guilty of Federal Fraud 

Charges, news release (Mar. 26, 2011 ). 

167 Indictment at pp. 9-10, U.S. v Lucas eta/, No. CR09-0 1005 (CD Cal. Sept. 

30, 2009) 

168 Federal Bureau of Investigation, One Hundred Linked to International Computer 

Hacking Ring Charged by United States and Egypt in Operation Phish Phry, news 

release (Oct. 7, 2009) 

169 Second Superseding Indictment at pp. 4-1 1, United States v. Drinkman eta/., No. 

1 09-cr-00626 (D NJ 2013) 

170 /d. at pp. 13-15. 

171 ld. at p. 16. 

172 Nathaniel Popper & Somini Sengupta, U.S. Says Ring Stole 160 Million Credit 

Card Numbers, New York Times Uuly 25, 201 3) 

173 U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, Armenian Power Organized 

Crime Group Targeted in Federal Indictments That Allege Racketeering Offenses, 

Including Bank Fraud Schemes, Kidnappings, and Drug Trafficking, news release 

(Feb 16, 20 I 1 ). 

174 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fraud and Organized Crime Intersect, news release (Oct 13, 201 0). 

175 !d. 

176 !d. 

177 !d. 

178 Verizon, 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report, pp. 20-21. 

179 !d. at pp. 15, 21-22. 

180 Gregory F. Treverton et al., Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism (RAND 

2009), p. 28; see also Rick Orlov, Gangs Turning to Pirated DVDs, COs To Cash 

In, Daily News Uuly 7, 2009), p. A3. 

92 
304 

181 Joshua Philipp, Cybercrime the New Face of Organized Crime, Says Manhattan 

DA, Epoch Times (May 14, 20 13); International Moss-Marketing Froud Working 

Group, Mass-Marketing Fraud A Threat Assessment Uune 201 0), p. 13. 

182 National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, Intellectual Property 

Rights Violations: A Report on Threats to United States Interests at Home and 

Abroad (Nov. 201 l), p. v; United Notions Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute ("UNICRI"), Confiscation of the Proceeds of IP Crime (2013), p. 9. 

183 International Moss-Marketing Froud Working Group, Mass-Marketing Fraud: A 

Threat Assessment Uune 20 l 0), p. 12 

184 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A 

Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 1 0) pp. 203-204. 

185 Max Goncharov, Russian Underground l 0 l, Trend Micro Incorporated (20 12), 

p. 18. 

186 United Notions Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A 

Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 1 0), p. 204. 

~ 87 Max Goncharov, Russian Underground l 0 1, Trend Micro Incorporated (20 1 2L p. 8. 

188 Complaint at p. 8, Microsoft Corp. v. john Does l-82, No. 3: 13-cv-319 

(WD N C May 29, 2013) 

189 /d. 

190 !d. at p. 10. 

191 ld. at pp. 8·9. 

192 Jeremy Kirk, Advance Fee Fraud Scams Rise Dramatically in 2009, Compuworld 

Uon 28, 2009) 

193 National White Collar Crime Center, 2012 Internet Crime Report, p. 8. 

194 Ross Anderson, et ol., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime (20 12), p. 15. 

195 The connection to Nigeria is so frequent, in fact, that this type of scam is also 

known os a "419 fraud" after the applicable section in the Nigerian criminal 

code. 

196 Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime (20 12), pp. 15-16. 

197 International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group, Mass-Marketing Fraud: A 

Threat Assessment Uune 201 0), p. 16 

198 Blaise j. Bergiel, et al., Internet Cross Border Crime: A Growing Problem, journal 

of Website Promotion, val. 3, (2008), p. 135. 

199 United Notions Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A 

Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 1 0), p. 204. 

200 International Mass-Marketing Froud Working Group, Mass-Marketing Fraud: A 

Threat Assessment Uune 201 0), p. 16; UNODC, The Globalization of Crime: A 

Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 1 0), p. 204. 

93 
305 

201 U.S. Attorney's Office, District of New Jersey, Organizer of International Securities 

Froud Ring Sentenced to Prison for Using Hackers to Falsely Inflate Stock Prices, 

news release (May 13, 2013). 

202 National White Collar Crime Center, 2012 Internet Crime Report, p. 8. 

203 !d. at pp. 14-15. 

204 !d. at p. 24. 

205 International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group, Moss-Marketing Froud: A 

Threat Assessment Uune 201 0) pp. 4, 12, 14. 

206 Indictment at pp. 2-3, United States v. Butoi, eta/., No. l: 12-cr-00785 (E.D.N.Y. 

Jan 9, 20 13); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Organized Romanian Criminal 

Groups Targeted by DO) and Romanian Low Enforcement, news release Uuly 15, 

2011) 

207 /d. 

208 /d. 

209 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Consumer Alert: Online Rental Ads Could Be 

Phony Uuly 29, 2009), 

httrx/' 210 International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group, Moss-Marketing Froud: A 

Threat Assessment Uune 201 0), p. 15. 

211 U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, Manhattan U.S. Attorney 

Announces Extradition of Four Israeli Defendants Charged in Multi-Million-Dollar 

Phony 'Lottery Prize' Schemes, news release Uan. 4, 2012). 

212 UNICRI, Confiscation of the Proceeds of IP Crime (2013), pp. 9, 13. 

213 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnotional Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 1 0), p. 176; UNICRI, Confiscation of the Proceeds of IP Crime (20 1 3), p. 11. 

214 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globolizotion of Crime: A 

Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (20 1 0), p. l 80. 

215 Damon McCoy, et ol., PhormoLeaks: Understanding the Business of Online Pharmaceutical Affiliate Programs (20 12) p. 2. 

216 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 

Assessment (20 1 0), p. 1 84 ] 

217 David Price, NetNames, Sizing the 20 13), 

218 !d. 

219 Letter to Victoria A. Espinel from the Motion Picture Association of America, et al. 

(Aug. 10, 2012), pp. l-2. 

94 
306 

220 National intellectual Property Rights Center, Intellectual Property Rights Violations: A 

Report on Threats to United States Interests at Home and Abroad (Nov. 201 1), p. 29. 

221 Letter to Stan McCoy from Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (Sept. 14, 

2012), p. 2. 

222 William Kerr & Chad Moutray, Economic Impact of Global Software Theft on US. 

Manufacturing and Competitiveness Uan. 30, 2014), p. 5. 

223 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pirated Software May Contain Malware, Con· 

sumer Alert (Aug. 1, 2013); National intellectual Property Rights Center, Intellectual 

Property Rights Violations: A Report on Threats to United States Interests of Home 

ondAbroad(Nov 2011), p. 27. 

224 Paula Greve, Digital Music ond Movies Report: The True Cost of Free Entertain· 

men/(2010) p. 10. 

225 Money Laundering Threat Assessment Working Group, US. Money Laundering 

Threat Assessment (Dec. 2005), p. 20. 

226 U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Buck Stops Here: lm· 

proving US Anti-Money Laundering Practices. 2013 Senate Report (Apr. 20 13), 

pp. 27·28, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering 

Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of justice, Combating Transnational 

Organized Crime: /ntemationol Money Laundering os o Threat to our Financial 

Systems (Feb 8, 20121, p. 8. 

227 U.S. Department of justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, Notional Drug 

Threat Assessment 2009, p. 50. 

228 ld. 

229 Statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Nov. 19, 201 3), p. 2. 

230 Prepared Testimony of Edward Lowery Ill before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Nov. 1 8, 20 13), p. 3. 

231 /d. 

232 /d. 

233 Statement of the Hon. Mythili Raman before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Nov. 1 8, 20 13), p. 4. 

234 Prepared Testimony of Edward Lowery Ill before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Nov 18, 20 13), p. 3. 

235 U.S. v. Liberty Reserve S.A1 et of., (S.D.N.Y. 2013), Case No. 13 CRIM 368. 

236 I d. at ~ ~ 9 ond 2 l. 

237 /d. at ~ 20. 

238 /d. 

239 /d. at ~ 10. 

240 ld. 

95 
307 

241 !d. at ~43 

242 Statement of the Han. Mythili Raman before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Nov. 18, 2013), p. 4. 

243 Sealed Complaint at p. 6, United States v. Ulbricht (S D NY Sept. 27, 2013) 

244 David Segall Eagle Scout. Idealist. Drug Trafficker?, New York Times Uon. 18, 

2014) 

245 Stuart Pfeifer, Shan Li, & Walter Hamilton, End of Silk Road for Drug Users as FBI 

Shuts Down !/licit Website, Los Angeles Times (Oct. 2, 2013). 

246 U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Bitcoin Exchangers, Including CEO of Bitcoin Exchange 

Company, for Scheme to Sell and Launder over $ I Million in Bitcoins Related to 

Silk Road Drug Trafficking, news release Uan 27, 20 14). 

247 21 U.S.C. § 848 

248 Garrett v. United States ( 1985) 471 U S. 773, 781. 

249 Steven Burnholtz, et al., International Extradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C. J. lnt'l L. 

& Com. Reg. 353, 358 ( 1985); see also 21 US. C. § 848, subd. (a)(1)(c). 

25o 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853. 

251 Md. Criminal Law Ann. § 5-607, subd. (b)(1); NJ Stat. § 2C:35-3 (20 13). 

252 Interview with Commander of the Fresno Special Operations Unit (Sept. 20 13). 

!d. 

254 People v. Green (2004) 125 Cai.App.4th 360, 374, fn. 9 (["[Penal Code s]ection 1 86. 1 1 gives the People no way to prevent the dissipation of assets before a 

complaint or indictment has been filed "]) 

255 18 U.S.C. § 1963, subd. (d). 

2so 18 U.S.C. § 1963/ subd. (d){2). 

257 18 U.S.C. § 1963, subd. (d)(I)(B){iii). 

258 31 U.S.C. § 5313, and regulations thereunder. 

259 31 U.S.C. § 5324. 

260 31 U.S.C. § 5324 1 subd. (o)(3). 

261 CAPen. Code, § 14166 

262 ld. 

263 Interview with CAMLA Task Force Commander, SAS, Ernesto Limon, CA DOJ 

(Sept. 2013) 

264 !d. 

265 FinCEN News Release (Oct 24, 20 13), 

131 

96 
308 

266 Statement of jennifer Shosky Calvery, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network, Upon Signing o Memorandum of Understanding with Mexico's Notional 

Bonking and Securities Commission, Oct. 24, 2013, http/ /fincen gov/pdf/ 

Sto Iemen t% 20( or7~20MOU%20sign i ng %20with %20CN B V pdf. 

267 Celina B. Reoluyo, It's All About the Money: Advancing Anti-Money Laundering 

Efforts in the US. and Mexico to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute (May 20 12), p. 27. 

97 
309 

University of Pittsburgh 

Sthool of Law 

Barco Law Building 

3900 Forbes Avenue 

Pittsburgh, PA 15260 

Office: 412-624-24!5 

Emnil; gemld,dickinson@pitt.edu 

April4, 2017 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Chahman 

340 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairman Jolmson and Ranking Member McCaskill: 

TI1e Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Ranking Member 

442 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

It is with great pleasure that I submit tllis written testimony at the request of the Office of the 

Ranking Member, Senator McCaskill. I am pleased that the Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee is devoting its April 4, 2017 hearing to an exanlination of 

effmis to secure the southwest border through the construction of a wall. Further, as a law 

professor who writes and teaches in the areas of constitutional property and land use, I take great 

interest in fue committee's focus on the legal authorities related to t11e wall construction along 

the U.S.-Mexico border. · 

On March 5, 2017, I penned an op-ed in the Washington Post highlighting the eminent domain 

conflicts that lie ahead if Congress approves fimding for and the Executive Branch proceeds with 

the construction of a physical wall. 1 I would like to focus your attention on several concerns 

raised in the op-ed, specifically the application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as well 

as statutmy requirements necessary to acquire the land to build the wall. 

The Executive Order ordering the securing of the "southern border of the United States through 

the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border" raises serious questions 

regarding the use of federal eminent domain powers.2 Countless private property owners, along 

with local and state governments and Native American reservatiqns, maybe subject to lengthy 

eminent domain disputes across approximately 1,300 miles of the border. Only about one-third 

of the land the wall would sit on is owned by the federal government or by Native American 

tribes, according to the Government Accountability Office. The rest of the border is conh·olled 

by states and private properiy owners, especially along the Texas-Mexico border. A significant 

portion of the land in Arizona is occupied by the Tohono O'odham Nation reservation extending 

along 62 miles of the border. 

The Takings Clause states that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 

compensation."3 This longstanding prohibition agahist uncompensated takh1gs has been applied 

over the years to an increasing variety and types of enlinent domain takings, such as building 

highways, bridges, airports and dams to taking private prope1iy for purposes ofurlian renewal 
310 

and economic development. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court held, in Kelo v. Ciry of 

New London, that a local government's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of 

economic development satisfied constitutional "public use" requirement.4 This ruling was 

consistent with longstanding precedent giving deference to legislatures over matters of health, 

safety and general welfare. However, many in the broader public disagreed with the Supreme 

Comt, which led to widespread outrage cutting across gender, racial, party and ideologicallines.5 

In response to the 1uling, forty-five states amended their eminent domain statutes to restrict or 

bur economic development takings, while eleven states changed their constitutions to provide 

greater constitutional protection for property. In fact, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a 

resolution denouncing the Kelo decision by a lopsided margin. 6 

Often times, when the affected litigant in a condemnation challenge is a sympathetic singleparcel homeowner like the one in the Keto saga, as opposed to a commercial developer or owner 

of undeveloped land, state actors and the general public are more likely to resist or oppose 

federal takings doctrine where court rulings are perceived to threaten investments in singlefamily homes. By extension, eminent domain actions by the Executive Branch for purposes of 

building a wall that affects hundreds, if not thousaods, of single-parcel homeowners, as well as 

ranchers, farmers and Native tribes along the southwest border, risks being perceived as federal 

overreach and abuse ofptivate property rights on a level potentially exceeding the backlash from 

Kelo. Many single-parcel homeowners -the kind that brought outrage post-Kelo- are the kind 

of affected landowner-litigants that would probably draw intense public attention to the 

conslluction of the wall. Research also indicates that compensation awards in takings cases often 

fail to fully compensate owners (even for the fair market value required by the courts, much less 

their full losses), which will only exacerbate the harm likely to be caused by such a large takings 

project like the construction of a physic.al wall along the border.7 

Indeed, the construction of a physical wall is unlikely to be completed without the exercise of 

federal eminent domain powers ptu·suant to the Declaration of Taking Act ("DTA")8 and the 

General Condemnation Act ("GCA").9 Willie the GCA gives the federal govemment the general 

power to exercise eminent domain, the DTA created a procedure to expedite the taking of title 

and possession oflands to enable the United States to begin constmction work before final 

judgment. This expedited procedure has raised concerns amongst affected landowners as to 

whether the federal government will adeq1mtely negotiate or properly consult with landowners 

prior to, durlng or after condemnation proceedings. Congress mandates some level of negotiation 

between the federal government and the affected landowner of a property interest prior to the 

institution ofeminent domain procedures.10 The negotiation must be a bona>fide effmi. 11 Further, 

a federal court may direct additional negotiations as a condition precedent to condemnation if it 

finds negotiations inadequate. 12 

The Executive Order also references the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIR1RA") which gives the Attomey General the authority to 

purchase or bring condemnation actions to acquire lands in the vicinity of the United StatesMexico border. 13 This federal statute became the focus of litigation in 2007 and 2008 under the 

Bush Administratiou when the Attomey General and Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security ("DHS") took just one of many actions to acquire easements or condemn land outright 

for the construction offences along the southwest border of Texas _pursuant to the Secure Fence 

2 
311 

Act of2006.14 Wbile the United States prevailed in condemning some land, the litigation and 

negotiation process for just one case took years to resolve. It was troublesome during some of 

these condemnation proceedings that the United States attempted to circumvent compliance with 

the federal law, which requires the United States to engage in some level of consultation with 

prope11y owners, local and state governments and Native American tribes prior to the institution 

of eminent domain procedures. 15 Indeed, the mandat01y language of the consultation clause 

inserted by Congress pennits courts to find it proper to require compliance as a condition prior to 

entry onto the affected land. 16 

Wbile federal comts have held such requirements to be valid, looming in the backdrop of this 

large-scale land acquisition for a wall is a lesser-known, but powerful and sweeping, authorlty 

under Section 102(c)(l) of the IIRIRA as amended by the REAL ID Act of2005. Under the law, 

Congress gave the Secretary ofDHS the power to waive all legal requirements that the Secretary 

determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of baniers along the border. 17 The 

Secretary may selectively waive rules and regulations in every area of the law beyond the 

department's specialized expetiise without giving any reason for the waiver. More concerning is 

that Congress also made the waivers unreviewable by federal comts except on constitutional 

grounds. •~ To put this "big waiver" power into perspective, 19 former Secretary of DHS Michael 

Chertoff issued five waivers nullifying 30 statutes that govemed various rules, regulations and 

legal requirements along tbe border. These nullified laws included environmental protections, 

religious freedom restoration, administrative procedures, and Native American territory. Having 

given the Secretary authority to waive such requirements, Congress has raised serious 

constitutional concerns. In other words, the Secretary of DHS has been given, and exercised, 

such broad discretion that articulates no standard for exercising the authority and the ability to 

choose among a variety of federal laws to waive, en top of curtailing judicial review.20 

The Supreme Court has only been asked several times to review the consiitutionality of such a 

broad sweeping waiver power, and it declined to review at the time.21 In fact, members of tbe 

House of Representatives filed an amicus brief in 2009 in support of a petition requesting the 

Supreme Court to review the waiver powers, stating the law "greatly undetmines - and manifests 

an utter lack of respect for- the many laws that the amici curiae (and members of prior 

Congresses) have drafted, debated and defended.'m Federal courts of appeals, likewise, have 

never reviewed such broad delegation of legislative power to the executive bninch since they 

were stripped of such judicial review by Congress.23 The only prccedential rulings to date by 

federal district courts have held the waiver authority coustitutional.24 

fndeed, if construction of the wall begins and federal condemnation powers are employed to 

acquire land, we could be facing a constitutional showdown in the next several years. It is 

important to note that while the waiver authority may allow tl1e DHS to forego negotiation and 

consultation requirements prior to instituting condemnation proceedings, this docs not permit the 

DHS to waive and effectively circumvent the constitutional requirements of public nse and 

limitations on uncompensated takings under the Fifth Amendment. ~ Thus, waiver of these 

negotiation and consultation requirements (which, in and of itself, would be a serious and 

conceming step) would still yield significant litigation along the border on the Takings Clause 

questions. To date, the DHS has not waived the statutory requirements of negotiation or 

conS11ltation in condemnation proceedings along the border. However, given the magnit\lde of 

the proposed construction of a physieal wall along approximately 1,300 miles of borderland, one 
312 

would expect that such power is already being contemplated by the Executive Branch, thus 

raising the possibility of a constitutional showdown. The combination of federal challenges over 

"big waiver" authority and federal exercises of eminent domain could trigger decades of court 

disputes before anything is built, while siinultaneously sparking the potential for a backlash 

similar to the Kelo saga. 

John F. Kelly, Secretary ofDHS, will testify before this conunittee on April 5, 2017. It is 

imperative that members also raise questions concerning the use of eminent domain along the 

border and the extent to which the Secretary will exercise the broad powers authorized by 

Congress in constructing a physical wall. 

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

cc: The Honorable Tom Cmper 

The Honorable Steve Daines 

The Honorable Michael Enzi 

The Honorable Kamala Ranis 

The Honorable Margaret Hassan 

The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp 

The Honorable Jolm Hoeven 

The Honorable James Lankford 

The Honorable John McCain 

The Honorable Rand Paul 

TI1e Honorable Gary Peters 

The Honorable Robe1t Portman 

The Honorable Jon Tester 

4 

Sincerely, 

~~~~ 

Gerald S. Dickinson 

Assistant Professor of Law 

University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
313 

1 Gerald S. Dickinson, The biggest problem for Trump's border all f.sn 't the money. It's gelling the laud, WASH. 

POST, Mon:lt 5, 2017. 2 Exec. Order No. 13767,82 FR 8793 (2017), 1 U.S. Canst. amend, V. 

'Kelo v. City ofNew Loudon, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 

j llya Somin, Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2008). 

' H.R. Res. 340, 1 09tlt Cong. 2005; 151 Cong. Rec. H5592-93 (daily ed, June 29, 2005) (enacted). 7 !lya Somin, THE GRASPrNG HAND: "KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON" AND THE l,JMITS OP EMINENT DOll-lAIN, 

University of Chicago Press (2015). 8 40 u.s.c. § 3114. 

'40 u.s. c.§ 3113. 10 8 u.s.c. § 1103(b)(3). 11 United States v. Certain Interests in Property fn County of Cascade, State of Montana, 163 F.Supp. 518, 524 

(D.Mont. 1958}. 11 U.S •. v. L04.Acres.ofLand,.More or. Less, 538 F.Supp.2d 995 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing County of Cascade, 163 

f-.Supp. 518, 524 (D.Mont.l958)). 

'8 u.s.c. § 1103. 

"U.S. v. 1.04 Acres of Land, More or Less, 538 F.Supp.2d 995 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 

I) Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Pub.L. No. 110-161, § 564, 121 Stat, 1844,2090-91 (2007). 

"8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (Section I 02(b)(l)(C)). 17 The REAL lD Act of2005 § 102 amended Section 102 of the rllegallmmigratfon Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act of 1996 and both are codified at 8 U,S,C. § 1103 note. 18 REAL lD Act§ 102(c)(2)(A). 19 David J. Banon & Todd D. Rakoff, ill Defense of Big IVail'el', 113 COLUM, L, REV. 265 (2013). 20 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (c)(2)(A). 21 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 128 S.Ct. 2962 (2008} cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 

2962 (2008); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, County ofEI Paso v. Chertoff, 129 S. Ct. 2789 (2009) cert. denied 129 

S.Ct. 2789 (2fr09). . 22 Brief ofFourteen Members of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 128 S, 

Ct. 2962, (No. 07-1180) 2008 WL 1803435 (U.S.) Amici were House Committee Chairpersons, Members of the 

Committee on Homeland Security, and Members representing districts in stntes that border Mexico. They were 

Homeland Security Committee Chairmun Bennie G. Thompson, Energy & Commerce Committee Chaimtan John D. 

Dingetl, Transportation & Jnfrastructme Committee Chairman James L. Oberstar, Education and Labor Committee 

Chairman George Miller, Rules Committee Chainvoman Louise Slaughter, Veteran Affairs Chairman Bob Filner, 

Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes, Congressman Solomon Ortiz ofTcxas, Congressman Sam Farr 

of California, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee of California, Congresswoman Susan A. Davis of California, 

Congresswoman Hilda Solis of California, Congressman Raul M. Grijalva of Arizona, and Congresswoman Yvette 

D. Clarke of New York, 

"8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (c)(2)(A). 24 Defenders of Wildlife v. Chert off, 527 F. Supp. ll-9 (D.D.C • ..2007) (finding waiver "valid. delegation-of authority" 

and thus constitutional); Save Our Heritage Org. v. Gonzales, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding "the 

Secretary's wniver authority is not an impemtissible delegation of power to the Executive Branch and ... is 

constitutional") 

"Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,29 (1968) (noting the powers of" Congress or the States ... to legislate in eertain 

areas ... are always subject to the limitations that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other various 

provisions oflhe Constitution,"). 
314 

NATIONAL 

IMMIGRATION 

FORUM 

Statement for the Record 

U.S. Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee 

Hearing on 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

April4, 2017 

The National Immigration Forum (Forum) advocates for the value of immigrants and 

immigration to the nation. Founded in 1982, the Forum plays a leading role in the national debate 

about immigration, knitting together innovative alliances across diverse faith, law enforcement, 

veterans, labor and business constituencies in communities across the country. Coming together 

under the Forum's leadership, these alliances develop and advocate for legislative and 

administrative policy positions. Through our policy expertise and work with diverse 

constituencies, the Forum works to uphold America's long-standing tradition as a nation of 

immigrants and build public support for comprehensive immigration reform, sound border 

security policies, balanced enforcement of immigration laws, and ensuring that new Americans 

have the opportunities, skills and status to reach their full potential. 

Introduction 

The National Immigration Forum thanks the Committee for the opportunity to provide its 

views on the matter of fencing and border security along the Southwest Border. While it is 

important to have effective barriers that promote safety along the Southwest Border, leading 

national security officials agree that having a 21'' century immigration system that promotes 

safety and security, benefits American workers and our economy, and provides earned 

legalization for othem~se law-abiding undocumented immigrants would have the most significant 

impact in promoting security at our borders' We urge the members of the Committee to address 

the on-going need to fix our broken and out-of-date immigration system. 

We also urge the members of the Committee to consider the economic and cultural bridges 

that allow the Southwest Border region to thrive. The United States and Mexican border states 

together represent the world's 4th largest economy, with more than $soo billion in bilateral trade 

a year.ii Nearly six million jobs in the United States depend directly on trade vdth Mexico. iii From 

its people to its economy, the Southwest Border region depends on bridges, not walls. We must 

choose policies that keep us safe, but that also facilitate trade, tourism and the economic health 

of the United States. 

Finally, we fully support effective barriers along our borders where necessary to keep our 

country safe, but a border wall is not the only solution. Congress should explore other equally 

effective but less costly measures to complement a border wall. The Department of Homeland 

Security (DRS) estimates that building a wall spanning the entire Southwest Border would cost 

about $21.6 billion, though other estimates put the figure as high as $31.2 billion just to build.iv It 

would also cost additional billions of dollars to maintain over the next ten years." 
315 

Congress should also consider the views of people who live in the border regions. 

Residents in the Southwest Border know that their area is one of the safest regions in the country.vi 

Research has shown that 72 percent of border community residents in the United States oppose 

the construction of a wall.';' Some residents and experts have expressed opposition to a wall 

because of its significant cost to taxpayers,';ii its damaging environmental and cultural impact,'' 

and the imposition it would pose on private property OVvTlcrs who live along the border and have 

owned their land for generations.' A~ San Diego Mayor Kevin Faulconer noted on January 25, 

2017, his city already "[has] a safe and secure border ... [and has] strong economic and cultural 

binational ties."xi We can continue to secure and enforce our borders while remaining a welcoming 

nation by choosing policies that are thoughtful, effective, and improve border management. 

Build Fencing Where Needed 

The Border Patrol identified a total of 652 miles of the Southwest Border in 2011 as 

operationally necessary for fencing and barriers.xii By 2015, the United States had built border 

fencing along 653 miles of the Southwest Border, including 353 miles of primary pedestrian 

fencing, 300 miles of vehicle fencing, 36 miles of secondary fencing behind the primary pedestrian 

fencing and 14 miles of tertiary pedestrian fencing behind the secondary fence.xiii Constructing a 

wall or fence along the entire 2,000 miles of the Southwest Border region is not cost effective. A 

one-size fits all solution for a diverse region, which runs along riverbanks, through remote deserts, 

marshlands, and hill country "'~ll not work. Furthermore, building a fence along the entire 

Southwest Border would require the government to pay for miles of private land,xiv particularly in 

Texas, that have been owned by families for generations and to obtain agreements from American 

Indians to access reservations."'' Already, the cost of building a wall along the Southwest Border 

is expected to range from $21.6 billion to $31.2 billion, not including the cost of maintaining the 

wall and other physical barriers over the years."'; 

Another reason a 2,000 mile wall or fence is not cost-effective is because the number of 

apprehensions at the border has dropped from about 1.6 million in FY 2000 to less than 416,ooo 

in FY 2016."'" This reduction represents a 75 percent decrease and is the lowest number of 

apprehensions since at least l<'Y 1971."';;; Furthermore, on March 8, 2017, Secretary Kelly 

announced that border crossings along the Southwest border have fallen an additional40 percent 

between January and February 2017.xix Tbe drop is a continuation of the doVvTlward trend in 

border crossings that started in FY 2009. Between l<'Y 2009 and FY 2014, the net migration to the 

United States from Mexico was negative with more people leaving and going to Mexico than 

entering the U.S. During this time, approximately 140,000 more Mexican immigrants decided to 

leave the U.S. for Mexico than came and stayed in the U.S.xx As the number of people crossing the 

border dropped, the amount spent by the Border Patrol per apprehension at the border increased 

almost 1,300 percent from $630 per apprehension in l<'Y 2000 to over $8,760 per apprehension 

in FY 2016.xxi Investing in a wall or fencing along the Southwest border will not provide significant 

returns on border security because the number of people attempting to enter the United States is 

trending down. 

Congress should pro\~de funding to build a fence in the Southwest Border only where the 

use or placement of such a barrier is the most appropriate solution and fencing has not already 

been built. It is also important that Congress provide DHS with the discretion, after consultation 

with local communities, to determine whether a fence or wall is the most appropriate option to 

secure any area of the border. Border Patrol agents have stated that a fence, not a wall, is 

preferred, so that they can sec the other side of the border and see who is on the other side to keep 

safe from criminals thrmving rocks or armed Vv~th other weapons.xxii For those areas DHS docs 

not deem appropriate for fencing, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can attain 

2 
316 

operational control of the border areas through the use of its current Border Patrol agents, which 

are at an all-time high at 21,370 Border Patrol agents,xxiii and modern technology. 

Establish a Virtual Fence Where Effective 

CBP relies heavily on technology in order to secure the United States' borders and ports of 

entry. In 2015, CBP had at least 273 remote v~deo surveillance systems with day and night cameras 

deployed on the Southwest Border."i' In addition, the agency used 49 mobile surveillance 

systems, which are truck-mounted infrared cameras and radar.= CBP also has applied mobile 

surveillance systems, remote ~deo surveillance systems, thermal imaging systems, radiation 

portal monitors and license plate readers in the Southwest Border and operates at least 10 

Predator B unmanned aerial drones, which pro~ de surveillance of the border along Arizona, New 

Mexico and Texas.xxvi Congress should continue to support CBP's use of modern technology to 

build a v~rtual fence in areas on the Southwest Border in which a physical barrier is not the most 

appropriate solution to secure the border. 

Prm~de the Border Patrol with Greater Access and Visibility 

Another step to ensure safety at our borders is to eradicate the invasive and nonnative 

Carrizo cane and salt cedar plants along the Rio Grande Valley in Texas, which would pro~ de the 

Border Patrol with greater visibility and access to the Rio Grande.''xvii As border communities 

residents like Dennis E. Nixon, the CEO of International Bank of Commerce in Laredo, Texas, 

have noted, the density of the Carrizo cane and salt cedar plants allows the plants to become a 

hiding place for immigrants and criminals who unlavvfully enter the United States and, in that 

process, makes the Border Patrol and other law enforcement agents vulnerable to criminal 

groups.XX\111 

These plants, which cover between 30,000 and 6o,ooo acres, must be removed from the 

riverbanks and re-populated v.~th native prairie grasses that have limited growth potential and 

can be easily and economically maintained. Estimates indicate that it would cost approximately 

$200,000 to remove 700 acres of the Carrizo cane and salt cedar plants. The total cost to remove 

up to 6o,ooo acres of cane would be approximately $17.1 million.xxix Once the Carrizo cane and 

salt cedar plants are eradicated, the Border Patrol v.~ll have access to patrol the riverbank and full 

view of the area. Furthermore, the Border Patrol's visibility of the riverbank can be enhanced with 

more investments in modern technology: motion detectors, cameras, and infrared sensors. Unlike 

a wall or obstructive fence, which would limit physical access to the riverbanks and block Border 

Patrol agents' visibility, eradicating the Carrizo cane and salt cedar plants is a faster, more 

affordable and more effective approach to patrol and control the Rio Grande. This approach 

grants Border Patrol agents the physical access and ~sibility to protect the border. 

3 
317 

Invest in Personnel and Infrastructure at Ports of Entr:y CPOEs) 

CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO), which oversees the flow of commerce and 

immigrants at all328 ports of entry in the United States, is understaffed. CBP OFO plays a critical 

role in the economic health and national security of our country. In FY 2016, CBP OFO welcomed 

more than 1 million travelers each day - or 390 million for the year - and processed a total of 

nearly $2.3 trillion in trade and more than 27 million cargo containers.xxx Yet, through FY 2014, 

CBP OFO identified a shortage of 3,811 OFO officers."'"; The magnitude of the shortage is 

amplified by the fact that adding a single OFO officer to a port of entry would result in annual 

benefits of a $2 million increase in our country's Gross Domestic Prodnct (GOO), $64o,ooo saved 

in opportnnity costs and 33 jobs added to the economy.xxxii 

We also need to invest in infrastructure at our ports of entry. The revenue gained from 

trade at the border generates jobs for Americans - nearly six million American jobs depend 

directly on trade with Mexico.xxxiii Yet, wait times to cross the border are often long, sometimes up 

to a 55 minute delay for commercial vehicles,xxxiv which can detract from commerce and lead to 

billions of dollars in spoiled goods and opportunity cost. Furthermore, research shows that 

because enforcement resources have been so focused between ports of entry, processing at ports 

of entry is often lacking. Individuals entering the United States without documentation through a 

land port have only about a 1 in 4 chance of being apprehended, compared to go percent for those 

entering between ports of entry.=· The understaffing also leaves land ports more susceptible to 

transnational drug, weapons and human smuggling. We believe that investment at our ports of 

entry, including in personnel and infrastructure, is an important aspect of border security and 

management. 

4 
318 

Develop New Border Security Metrics 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) needs to adopt transparent metrics to measure 

border security. The lack of metrics has greatly contributed to the lack of clarity surrounding our 

nation's border security and dissemination of resources at the border. This has made it difficult 

for Congress to hold the agency accountable and to know what additional resources are needed, 

or perhaps not needed, to secure the Southwest Border. Congress must direct CBP to establish 

measures that assess achievement and progress at the border by moving away from input 

measures, such as how many Border Patrol agents are stationed on the border or how many people 

are apprehended at the border every year, and into outcome measures, such as the probability, or 

rate, of apprehension at the border and at-the-border deterrence rate."'""; Because input measures 

consist of the resources that are put into a process in order to achieve a goal, CBP needs to develop 

and use outcome measures to better assess achievement and progress at the border over time. 

This way, Congress will know how best to allocate resources at the border in order to achieve true 

border security. 

Conclusion 

The National Immigration Forum looks forward to working with the Committee to bring 

our immigration system up to 21st century standards. We thank the Committee for holding this 

hearing and considering the best policies to secure and enforce our borders while facilitating 

trade, tourism and the economic health of the United States. We support fencing or other barriers 

on the Southwest Border where appropriate. CBP has already built fencing or other physical 

barriers on the areas that they have determined are operationally necessary. We also support 

other policies that are thoughtful, effective, and improve border management, including 

investment in modern technology at the border, providing Border Patrol agents with greater 

access and visibility, investments at ports of entry and developing new border security metrics. In 

conclusion, one of the most important aspects to ensuring that our borders are secure is to pass 

legislation that would create a iJuJnigraJj()Jl,'):~ll!Jtl. 

; Chertoff, Michael, Janet Napolitano and Tom Ridge, "8th Anniversary of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) Roundtable," interview by Andrea Mitchell, Georgetown University (March 2, 2011): 

b t 1 IJs:/ /\nny .d h~,1U)~",)Jcw~/ :.~_q tJ / ()'J/ ();I/ Rth- _<}n ni\\'!'::~1 n~~nl!H!_0l;l Uk_-~t.tltn~n:_ipt . ;; Alcocer, Sergio M., "Managing the Mexico-U.S. Border: Working for a More Integrated and Competitive 

North America," The Anatomy of a Relationship: A Collection of Essays on the Evolution ofU.S.-Mexico 

Cooperation on Border Management, Wilson Center Mexico Institute (,June 2016): 25, 

's_i_t(:::ihkf<luiU1il~'5.Li\!JD.1.t_m.n:_ 

df. 

iii Ibid. 

''"Edwards Ainsley, Julia, "Exclusive- Trump Border 'Wall' To Cost $21.6 Billion, Take 3.5 Years To 

Build: Internal Report," Reuters (February 9, 2017): htJvj ilcl.l"~'g'li\\TU.~<mVi\LlickLno.o\lS<l::lU!1Dll: 

immi_;:zru!_io_p_~\V<~lJ::('~_dusi\T-:-it\1 ;~_KB\J.3\)~Z0 . Nowrasteh, Alex, "A Tax on Remittances Won't Pay for a 

Border Wall," CATO Institute (January 24, 2017): h.ttll"-'"-;//b_·~~~'Y.-h'Jt.\~!--<Jrg/blm?i1~Fi::l1'illiHann1:_:J~J?_lJ!:::l!<~l:: 

bqH_kr:-\'~itll. 

,. Bier, David, "A Wall is an Impractical, Expensive, and Ineffective Border Plan," CATO Institute 

(November 28, 2016): 11111\~.iL~:r~~-· cat o ,iH.:gih10_.si12w( ?JSlG_L·:l.\J!lJ:Jm n G!.Gtknh~1i]W It;>_i.}:~:·jll~ ff('dh:~n.Lm . ,; Aguilar, Julian and Alexa Ura, "Border Communities Have Lower Crime Rates," The Texas Tribune 

(February 23, 20 r6): l l Un".: l ;' .\.n YJ.LlD_J_:ltil1 u IL\'_._( _lJ1!J:2 o lflJ~()'.JJ__ ;~.Jihw:d.t.L:J:n.nuntmitk.\: h;ll1::1U.l~:(J~::£.!.iJJJL: 

r:ltc--;/. 

5 
319 

"; Corchado, Alfredo, "Border Poll: Part 1; Common Ground: Poll Finds U.S.-Mcxico Border Residents 

Overwhelmingly Value Mobility, Oppose Wall," The Dallas Morning News (July 18, 2016): 

htJp:J.~ j lll \ 'nlcl i\\'S,( bll<E-~1)~\\:~'-·(_'\ 111)/ ;,'< ~ l_{}_t_flQ_nkr- p<)Jl/ . 

,;,; Nowrasteh, "A Tax on Remmittances Won't Pay for a Border Wall." 

""Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry," Congressional Research Service 

2016): 29-30, 

Border Wall is Daunting Task in Texas, Where Most Land is Privately Owned," Fox News 

(January 1, 2016 ): ll t tp_;l/~~~}~:l'." JuXDhYS_,_UJl ll/ p<!J i!is~ii2i-Ub i_t ))J~ Q !i \_·<_mw kULtJ!,-_bDxdex:-~s~:dJ- l0~-d~Jl1J_U iiJP..= 

ln~k_:_ln _ ~ ('X~l~_-_l•TJ s:_-JIJU5t.--:l;)_!J.~l.-_j_i_~nr!_\_Ht~'JJ-~1!1lli1 . 

"Garrick, David, "Faulconer Gives 'Unwavering Support' to Ties with Mexico in Face of Trump 

Crackdown," The San Diego Union-Tribune (January 25, 2017): 

hJll):J/\\'\Y\\__,_:~{-l_n_dl.t:'4~lHH(Qil!riJ~JIDC:CPJ1t/I.JJ:__\~:~"iiP~!l!tir;,L_".d~FE~_:J~\\L)i,Dil(;1::-.l?.\lJ:~k_r:·.~-oJz()L~:.fli)D·_.hli!ll. 

,;; Testimony of Michael J. Fischer, Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

"Docs Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operation Control of the Border?" 

House Committee on Homeland Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 112th U.S. 

Congress, 1" session, (October 4, 2011): 

mi"~/~\~Jl_{~f! !{2/! 

bu~t?.nUl_l_Jl~U1t~_(lJ5_(J:d:iiT:.ln. 

~i Bier, "A Wall is an Impractical, Expensive, and Ineffective Border Plan." 

~;,"United States Border Patrol: Total Monthly Apps by Sector and Area, FY 2000 to FY 2016," U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (October 2016): 

33. Aliens Apprehended: 1925 to 2015," U.S. Department 

(2015): htLp...,:, /·wh \\ .dh:q;,n\:·']ll}.i11lg(:ltiinl -.:tati:·d k~;'lt>\_rhl~!k/:..:Ol;J/t,thle~tj. 

"'James, Mike, "Homeland Chief: Illegal Border Crossings 40%," USA Today 

b! tp:/' 

d{)\)JJ~<JO/D8.9~JS~lV( ; • 

"Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana, "More Mexicans Leaving Than 

(November 19, 2015): 

thc~!L~L 

"';"United States Border Patrol: Enacted Border Patrol Program Budget by Fiscal Year," U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (2016): h ltp:·<, /'Y)\l_\_,d!J2_.JU2Yj.~_i_l~0/d,:f;ttti~D lk:i/ <1~0L;t~/ d\JC_unwuL'>/:l.OJ(t: 

Cict, ; "United States Border Patrol: Total Monthly Apps by 

Sector U.S. Customs and Border Protection (October 2016): 

"Trump Wants a Wall. Border Experts Want a Fence, 

\\ \\'\\ .qm.cntn/·Jo !7/lJ:.:.;~ \(!/ politk:-,:·'tnJn)p_Jmnkr:\Y;l_ll/. 

Border Patrol Agent Nationl'<ide Staffing by Fiscal Year," U.S. Customs 

2016): 

6 
320 

mi "Privacy Impact Assessment for the Aircraft Systems," U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(September 9, 2013): 4, hJ t n~:l h':. ~YJ.\.dJl -,,_g~!\:/~H!~c.:L\h~J~tuJtLhl~~;:;/ P.llblkiJ! iillld.Luill:rr.rJ __ ~ Ei~4~J.:hlcillrr:rnft: 

)l~t~'ID0::~~Ql.309~(2,J)(if · 

xx•ii Aguilar, Juan) "New Effort to Wipe Out Carrizo Cane 

1/·ibune (Aprils, 2016): 

n:i"1lik,·old-d<'!J<Iii. 

;:,;,;7-N~~;,~-~)~;,;,·i;E., "Common Sense Border Security: Thoughts from Dennis E. Nixon," (January 2017): 

:J, http,:; 

1J ~ :' :"\ t '_\ \_~'lJYlDlLFtJJ ·mn c PJ .s / l \! Pll!l o lJ ~'i~ :.;_Q.~f!l:.·~T-~0-~_uJ1u.nk r:.yL~~D~_tQJ ri r.J~~~~?liLd u1i_Q!h'i_,_mlf . 

nix ''Texas Spends $8oo Million on Border Security, But Shorts Carrizo Cane Eradication Project," The 

Texas Tribune (,June 15, 2016): l}ttp_:j"":_\_;l]}J.Tf~rllruL\·i!J1J/D(:~-.2/l\.!1~<lLit:.{';J~-~tp('_Jl~ls··ti_Q_Q,:JllilJi.D.ll-_()H: 

b1 ,t_·llcr-secqrity:·bui ·:::ilHH't~,- ~·.a r-rVn· \,'<m~:-~'radi\'<tti()n~ prQj~'l_t_. 

"'"CBP Facilitates Record Level of Travelers and Modernizes Trade Systems in FY 2016," U.S. Customs 

and Border Proteetiou (January 12, 

the Mexico-U.S. Border," 25. 

"''"Becker, to Reduce Border Wait Times is 

Commerce (January 19, 2016): tmm.U:<:r,.<:<"JJlLi\f/<_1}_\:cltll'::.ill~J/llli'':l::cJ:<'!lll<:c:JJ.Ql\I::r:.~illlt 

! liJJ~:i·:c':l~LtJQn'Glrd.-:-_U:;_t{_h: . 

mv "Without Strategy: America's Border Security Blunders Facilitate and Empower Mexico's Drug 

Cartels," Texas Border Coalition (January 12, 2012): 3, 

U~)F}T. __ (:v~tli_l hm/\\'_t ·knpw fih 's/'I]}['Y~~(l)l~.'IHH'J: 

7 
321 

TEXAS --·--- CIVIL RIGHTS 

PROJECT 

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

340 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

\'('ashington, DC, 20510 

(202) 224A751 

;\pril 3, 2017 

Re: TCRP's Congrcssinmtl testimony regarding the impacts of additional fencing along the Tcxas-

;\kxico Border 

Dear ;\!embers of the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 

The Texas Civil Rights Project ("TCRP") rcsrcctfully submits this statement for consideration before the 

L'.S. Senate's Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' hearing on fencing along the 

southwest bonJcr, scheduled for Tuesday, April 4, 2017. 

Over the course of its 26-ycar history, TCRP has fought to empower Texas communities through legal 

advocacy, including those living on the U.S.--0.-[cxico border. In particular, with offices in El Paso and the Rio 

Grande Valley, we have longstanding and direct connections with the residents of border communities. \"Xrc 

share our expertise \Vith you in hopes that you wit! fully appreciate the negath·e effects of additional fencing 

in Texas' border communities 

Approximately 674,433 people live in El Paso and 1,305,782 in the Rio Gmndc Valley. 1 E! Paso, combined 

'-Vith the larger Paso Del ::--.lortc metropolitan area, is home to the largest bilingual and binational work force in 

the \"\?estern Hemispherc.2 In the Rio Grande Valley, the agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism industries 

rely on the daily flow of people back and forth between the U.S. and Mexico} Last year alone, Texas' exports 

to :\kxico exceeded 92 billion dollars:'~ Adding more fencing or other physical barriers to this shared border 

would not only irreparably damage the economic viability of these communities, but also threaten the human 

rights of U.S. citizens and other border residents. 

In El Paso County alone, over 200 privatdy-mvned parcels of land lie along the bordcr. 3 In the R.io Grande 

V:o1!lcy, privately-owned border properties number nearly 300.6 Over 50 of these parcels house Americanowned small businesses, including ranches, factories, and farms. 7 :\fany of these private citizens and small 

I United States Census Bureau, 

(hstvis.ited 

and juarez know what 

2017, http;, 

3 Rio Grande 

4 Department 

February 2017, 

Hidalgo 
322 

TEXAS 

CIVIL RIGHTS 

PROJECT 

businesses were previously forced to relinquish their private property to the federal 

g-overnment when it em harked upon a fencc~building project under the Secure I-<'ence Act of 2006. 8 As the 

community is acutely a'-'"'arc, the resulting fence cost over L2 billion dollars and has not reduced unauthorized 

border crossings by any significant degrcc. 9 nuilding a new wall or additional fencing would further strip away 

the property rights of individual and business landm-Yncrs without any evidence of increased utility. 

Countless Texas families have already suffered the devastating effect of having their land taken by the feclcral 

gm:crnmcnt. Indeed, many communities are still reeling from the 2008 border fence construction, when 

horncO\vners were systematically offered wholly inadccp .. uu-c comrcnsation for properties seized through 

eminent domain proceedings and subsequently saddled with government fences and security towers in their 

backyards. 10 After the construction of the fence, non·ler Patrol enforcement actions and constant fence 

rcpajrs damaged so much private property that the government had to set up a special claims system to allow 

landowners to collect damagcs.11 

The story of one ofTCRP's clients, l\15. Eloisa Tamez, illustrates how local families were harmed by that first 

round of fcnce·-related condemnation actions in 2008.12 Ms. Tamez and her family, who arc members of the 

Lipan Apache tribe, have lh,cd in the community of E! Calahoz, ncar BrO\vnsvillc, for over five generations, 

smcc before Texas was even part of the C nited States. That land \vas their home, and there was no amount of 

money that could constitute "just compcnsation"~as rcguircd by the Constitution-when the government 

wanted to take it ;nvay from them. 

:\Is. Tamez's prnperry is now bisected by a metal fence that has devalued her land irreparably. To visit the 

southern part of her land, which tics bcrwccn the fence and the Rio Grande River, she must kcy~in an access 

code to go through the a gate in the fence. That the fence on her property includes a gate that can be opened 

everyday illustrates that this fence was not truly aimed at stopping unauthorized border crossings, but rather 

serving as a political statement. 

R :\ list of .134 fence-related eminent domain actions can be consulted at: 

cd-..:.(~~'nHn\ 

STATES Of' AMERICA v. 0.07 r\CRE OF LA:-;D, more or less, et al (S1,200.00 

STATES OF A~!ER!C;\ v. 0.04 r\CRE of L.\l"D, MORE or LESS, ct al ($1,250.00 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. 0.04 of Acres of Land, "fore or Less ct al ($1,000.00 

0.23 ACRES OF LAND, more or less, situated in Hidalgo 

County, et al ($1,000.00 settlement). 

11 United States Government Accountabiliry Office, "Southwest Border: Issues Related to Private Property 

" 201 S, available at 

11 Sn· v. 1.()4 atre.r q/lrmd, more or less, sittMted in Cameron County, Te.vaJ, and Eloi.ra G, Tamev eta/., No. 

1:08-CV-00044, Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division. . 
323 

AS 

CIVIL RIGHTS 

PROJECT 

Tht' current administration·'s plan to expand the border \vall would cost over 20 

P ( l, Bo\ 2 ~ \) 

T>\ 

'!::;(, 01~J:,p', 

U·'\,i~Cin!n!J.h:sprown or~ 

billion dollars,l l and estimates have placed that figure as high as 40 billion dollars, although it is not dear 

\Vhcther these figures have taken into account the full price of providing just compensation to landowners, 14 

As noted above, expanding the \Vall would also involve exercising eminent domain over hundreds of parcels 

of privately held land in Texas. Conversations with community members, increasingly reported by the press, 

show that border landmvncrs overwhelmingly oppose new construction, and are determined to resist eminent 

domain actions. 

ln addition to the monetary impact, taking land away from Texan families also carries an incalculable human 

cost. Such is the case of a landowner in Suilivan City, who has owned land in the community of Los Ebanos 

for generations, She still lives on land that the government has tried to expropriate, and expressed it this way 

to TCRP attorneys: 

!rhm the ___ P,OJ/f17!1!1etJ/ coml'sjimtJ !f7a_rbit{gton to take ONr land here in the bordr'r, tb~y don't kflOIJ' UJ, Th~y don't 

ktwu' otJr communi(y. Th~y don't knoll' our mighbors. Tht)' don't know how hard our Jf.umlieJ bare JJ!orked for 

gmrmtious, jOr dmJrks, to OJI)JJ and prrserw tbtS !a!ld. Thm one fLy tb~y .rimp!y mme fl!ld f~)' to hJke JPhatevfr th~y 

Jwnt, t~)'ing to P<!Y LJJha!ftH'r tlltY want. Tb('Y are ojjfrin"'~ tts l;2,900.00 for ol/er 1.2 acre.r qf land! That iJ imulting! 

W'hfn tbr' )!,Ot•em;r;mt treafJ tts like that, we fed like tb~y don'! el'ffl ron.rider HJ bNJtJa!l. ff'e Jet! like, to the 

,got•emtJ;en!, we'n' !J)Orth notiJitlg. 

J t \vas clear in 2008, and it is clear today, that building a fence \vas not and is not an effective solurion to 

unauthorized immigration~~instcad, it represents a political game, played with the property rights of some of 

the poorest communities in the country. l"'or that reason, TCRP is prepared to represent lando\\'ners, 

particularly those from historically marginalized backgrounds, and me public education efforts to protect the 

rights of all Texans who call the borderlands their home. \X/e honored this commitment in 2008 when we 

helped landowners on the border file defenses to eminent domain proceedings for the first round of fence 

building, and we will honor that commitment again now. 

Thank you for the opportunity to offl:t this testimony. lf you ha-...c questions or dt'sire additional information, 

please contact: 

EfrCn C. Olivares 

FV1rial and Eamomic_fu.rtice Director 

ll "Trump border wall funding facing delay," BBC, l\1arch 29, 2017, 

visited April 3, 2017), 

Trump'swal!, 
324 

TEXAS 

CIVIL RIGHTS 

PROJECT 

Texas Civil Rights Project 

P.O. Box 219 I Alamo, TX 78516 

T: 956.787.8171 ext. 121 

Brooke N. Bischoff 

Attom~y, Equal Justice Works Fellow 

Texas Civil Rights Project 

0: (915) 532-3799 ext. 146 

h1_'{_l( lkc(ffitcxas(i\' i lngh 1 "flfi )icct .(Jf)J: 

4 

fl.(), Bn>. 219 

.\Ltmo, TX ~~.'i!(J 

9.')(1_7)-i~.H! ~ 1 ~p· 1)5(>.-87 .()34S(t) 

ll'}...!"-l:i\·i!righr~projcd.nrg 
325 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Chairman 

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

340 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill 

Ranking Member 

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 

442 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

I am writing to you to express opposition to the border wall being proposed along the Texas Mexico 

border. The proposed wall will be a detriment to the history of our family land as well as detrimental to 

the memory of our ancestors who have worked hard to maintain this land for 266 years. 

By way of background, our family land is very rich in history and was an original Spanish Land Grant 

established in 1750 and was named Nuestra Senora de los Dolores land grant. History books tell the story 

oft he land being established to raise cattle and became a very important port . The ruins of the once 

thriving community are still visible on the land and serve as a reminder of our rich history. In addition, 

there is a cemetery that served as the central burial ground for our ancestors and those who made this 

important area of land a success. Included on the burial ground is our father Roberto J. Vidaurri. 

My father Roberto J. Vidaurri was a very proud American and was proud of the fact that he was able to 

maintain the legacy of his ancestors. In addition to being a rancher, my father was a United States Marine 

veteran and proudly served in World War II where he served and was wounded in the battle of lwo Jima. 

He received the esteemed Purple Heart Medal for combat wounds he received during the battle. 

Our opposition to the border wall cuts to the fact that we have the privilege to own the land and have the 

responsibility to continue to maintain the legacy of the land we have inherited ti·om our ancestors. 

Inclusive of that legacy includes maintaining the burial ground where our father and his ancestors are 

interred. A border wall could potentially be built in an area that would forever prohibit us to visit our 

fathers burial ground, but would also sacrifice sacred ground. 

In addition, a border wall would restrict the access to the Rio Grande River. The land is a farming ranch 

and our family owns water rights from the State of Texas and a border wall would prohibit the acquisition 

of water from the river to irrigate the crops. 

Senators, thank you in advance for entering this letter into the record for the hearing on the border wall 

and for taking the time to consider this opinion. The wall will pose more problems for fanners and 

ranchers and more importantly impede on the 266 year legacy of our land. 
326 

Sincerely, 

Patricia Elena Vidaurri 

Land Owner and Citizen of the United States of America 

Electronic signature 
327 

Land Acquisition 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to David Aguilar 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

April4, 2017 

During the hearing on April4, 2017, hearing participants discussed the difficulty of acquiring 

tribal and private land for the building of fencing/border wall. 

1) Is technology an adequate solution in areas where border wall can't be constructed due to 

land acquisition issues or environmental hazards? 

A. It is a given that border wall/infrastructure will not be able to be built in all areas 

along the border or even in areas where the Border Patrol may deem it necessary to 

enhance operational capabilities. Technology that provides situational awareness 

throughout the border enforcement zones where the Border Patrol identifies a need 

will provide a tremendous force multiplier which will enable the Border Patrol to 

undertake preventive and deterrence activities. The technology based situational 

awareness capabilities will provide the Border Patrol with the means to identify any 

breaching of the border that occurs, classify it as activity that needs to be addressed, 

and to take actions to timely resolve illegal border incursions. Technology will be of 

tremendous assistance. 

2) What should CBP and the Department of Justice do to improve the process for notifying 

landowners of the need to procure their land for the wall, and to provide appropriate 

compensation for wall used for the border wall, as well as any land on their property 

adversely affected by the construction of a border wall'' 

A. Eminent Domain is very procedural but to the degree possible outreach as early as 

possible in the process should be undertaken with the affected and potentially atTected 

land owners and communities. Compensation should take into account the holistic 

effect on the land owners. It is not just the fair market value that affects the owners 

but in some cases, as we experienced in the past, eminent domain was exercised and 

land taken from families and family members that had been in the family lineage 

since Spanish Land Grants. 
328 

3) In your time at CBP what did you do to ensure that poor lando\\11ers had adequate legal 

representation when their land was condemned for the building of fence? 

A. The Department of.Justice working with the Office of General Counsel at DHS and 

the Office of Chief Counsel at CBP handled all eminent domain takings. 

Fcasibilitv and Effectiveness of the Wall 

4) How do you build an "impassable" wall that prevents all illegal border crossings? 

A. We must be realistic, an ''impassable wall" cannot be built. The Border Patrol has 

never looked to build an "impassable wall''. The Border Patrol looks at designing, 

building, and placing a wall or infrastructure not as an "impassable wall" but rather as 

a deterrent and secondly as a means to highly elevate the difficulty of breaching the 

border. In this manner the Border Patrol has a higher degree of control over the flow 

of illegal crossings of the border. Technology arrayed in support of border 

infrastructure and comprised of capabilities to detect, deter, identify, classify, and 

help in resolving an attempt at breaching a wall or interdicting subjects that have 

successfully defeated a physical wall/infrastructure is essential to a border 

enforcement system. 

5) Is it possible to prevent l 00 percent of all illegal entries into the United States? 

A. No 

6) Do you both feel that a reinforced concrete wall is appropriate for the Border Patrol, or 

would a solid concrete wall in any way hinder Border Patrol agents' situational 

awareness? 

A. The Border Patrol will identify the type of wall/infrastructure that will best suit the 

operational environment where they feel infrastructure is required. The vast majority 

of the border will more than likely require infrastructure that will support visibility 

capabilities through the wall/infrastructure for operational requirements. Reinforced 

concrete wall may be appropriate in minimal areas along the border but I do not see it 

being applied in large measure along the border. In those areas where solid 

infrastructure may be required, the Border Patrol will more than likely identify and 

require technological capabilities to gain situational awareness as operationally 

required. 
329 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to tbe Mr. David Aguilar 

From Senator Jon Tester 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

Apri14, 2017 

l. When CBP is negotiating with Native American tribes regarding access to tribal lands, 

what are some of the usual sticking points for both parties? 

A. Sovereignty is the biggest issue when communicating or negotiating with Native 

American Tribes. They want to be included in all matters relating to activities or 

considerations being undertaken relative to their lands. This is not an unreasonable 

expectation. In my experience, outreach and communication as early as possible 

when contemplating activities or efforts which may in any manner aiTect Native 

American communities has been critical to negotiation processes and reaching 

agreements. 

2. What does the process look like to get tribal agreement not just on physical barriers. but 

also on basic infrastructure such as roads? 

A. My experience with the Tohono O'dham Nation and the Mohawk Nation at 

Akwasasne is what I base my response to this question. The process requires 

consistent engagement with the highest political levels within the Native American 

communities and outreach to the populace. The political governing bodies place great 

emphasis on ensuring that their populations understand the reasoning, rationale, and 

requirements for US Government actions on their lands. The political bodies require 

information, time, and accessibility to US Government decision makers to assist them 

in communicating what is being asked of the Nations and their people. Accessiblity to 

Native American Nations' lands arc a very sensitive matter. Statutory authority li:>r 

access by US Border Patrol to Native American lands is unquestioned but they 

require notification, information, and explanation for operational concepts. Privacy 

and privacy protection of their populations and cultural activities are of great concern; 

therefore. operationally enhancing technology which provides situational awareness 

is always controversial and of high interest and concern. 
330 

3. Would you say that the relationship between U.S., tribal, and Mexican ot1icials has been 

improving over the last several years? 

A. Relationships between the U.S. and the Tohono O'dham Nation has continued to 

improve dramatically since the late 1990's and the peak period of illegal cross border 

activities of the early 2000's. The Tucson Sector of the Border Patrol, as an example, 

has had a Tribal Liaison Agent assigned since the early 2000's and has made 

tremendous strides on building up relationships with the Tohono O'dham political 

bodies and the TO nation's communities. 

4. Where do you believe the relationship stands today? 

A. The relationship is very good but needs to continue to be nurtured and improved 

especially in light of the potential for increased operational requirements that may 

need to be applied on the Nation. Continued outreach, attention to evolving concerns, 

and persistent communications are vital. The Border Patrol, rightfully, has built up 

capabilities and capacity around theN ation. Evolving operational necessity drove 

application of these resources. This was not done intentionally but resulted because 

the Nation refuses to allow certain technology and infrastructure (ie, 1FT's, roadway 

building/improvement, barriers, ... ) to be applied. This has resulted in a situation 

where the nation, due to Jack of enforcement infrastructure and certain technology is 

more vulnerable to illegal incursions than immediately surrounding areas. Criminal 

organizations are taking and will continue to take advantage of this vulnerability. 

Commissioner Aguilar, following up on your testimony, you said that "eminent domain may 

have to be exercised to take land required for the construction of border infrastructure." 

And the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2018 supports the addition of"20 attorneys 

under the Department of Justice to pursue federal efforts to obtain the land and holdings 

necessary for the southwest border and another 20 attorneys and support staff for immigration 

litigation assistance." 

5. What are your thoughts about exercising eminent domain in order to take land away from 

private owners in order to build out border infrastructure? 

A. Eminent domain should be exercised as a last resort. The taking of private lands 

should be exercised only after very thorough consideration to all options which may 

avoid the need for the taking of private lands. 

6. Do you believe that an additional40 attorneys at the Department of Justice would be 

enough to expedite lawsuits that would likely arise if the federal government were to take 

people's land for them? 
331 

A. Respectfully, this question should be addressed to the Department of Justice and DHS 

011ice of General CounseL 

7. There has been a lot of testing, studies, and work that the Border Patrol has already 

completed on border fencing. Do you believe they are currently able to pull an old plan 

off the shelf, dust it off, and implement it? If not, what has changed? 

A. The Border Patrol and CI3P have done a considerate amount of testing, studies, and 

planning on border fencing and infrastructure requirements but I believe that revisiting the issue is important. The border has been transformed from the time that we 

built the original infrastructure and increased the si2e of the Border Patrol. While the 

threats remain constant, the criminal organizations, smuggling routes, and threats 

have evolved aro1md the successes that our nation has had on our borders. It is 

important to evolve our border enforcement strategy to the current and evolving 

border challenges, threats, and concerns. 

8. Could you estimate how much it has cost CBP in personnel hours and department budget 

to develop fencing plans over your tenure at CBP? 

A. This is not a figure that I would venture to estimate without access to historical 

information I would need. 
332 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Deputy Chief Ron Colburn 

Senator John McCain 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

April 4, 2017 

I. Are there additional policies in place to review the hiring process to address the shortages 

in men and women at the border? 

2. What additional policies and strategies should this committee consider in alleviating the 

shortages to secure our borders? 

3. In your statement, you discussed improvements made along the stretch of the border in 

Yuma Sector. What has been the main contribution of Yuma Sector's drastic decrease in 

violent assaults? 

4. Do you believe the border should be composed of a mix of technology and physical 

fence? 

5. What additional sensor and communications technology should this committee consider 

in protecting our border? 

6. You stated that transnational criminal organizations have tried different methods to defeat 

the fence. What are some ofthe methods that have been tried? What solutions did Yuma 

Sector implement to address these challenges? 

7. Can you expand on the arrests and smuggling activities along the border? 

\Vitness responses to questions submitted for the record were not received 

by time of printing. 
333 

Land Acquisition 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Ronald Colburn 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

April4, 2017 

During the hearing on April 4, 2017, hearing participants discussed the difficulty of acquiring 

tribal and private land for the building of fencing/border wall. 

1) Is technology an adequate solution in areas where border wall can't be constructed due to 

land acquisition issues or environmental hazards0 

2) What should CBP and the Department of Justice do to improve the process for notifying 

landowners of the need to procure their land for the wall, and to provide appropriate 

compensation for wall used for the border wall, as well as any land on their property 

adversely affected by the construction of a border wall? 

3) In your time at Border Patrol what did you do to ensure that poor landowners had 

adequate legal representation when their land was condemned for the building of fence? 

4) How long do you estimate it will take to acquire the remaining land on the Texas/Mexico 

border and is acquisition of all of the land feasible? 

Cost-Benefit Analysis 

5) In your time at Border Patrol did you ever conduct a cost-benefit analysis for the use of 

fencing versus the use of technology on the border0 

Feasibility and Effectiveness of the Wall 

6) How do you build an "impassable" wall that prevents all illegal border crossings? 

7) Is it possible to prevent I 00 percent of all illegal entries into the United States? 

8) Do you both feel that a reinforced concrete wall is appropriate for the Border Patrol, or 

would a solid concrete wall in any way hinder Border Patrol agents' situational 

awareness? 
334 

Witness responses to questions submitted for the record were not received 

by time of printing. 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Mr. Ron Colburn 

From Senator .Ton Tester 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

Apri14, 2017 

I. When CBP is negotiating with Native American tribes regarding access to tribal lands, 

what are some of the usual sticking points for both parties? 

2. What does the process look like to get tribal agreement not just on physical barriers, but 

also on basic infrastructure such as roads? 

3. Would you say that the relationship between U.S., tribal, and Mexican officials has been 

improving over the last several years? 

4. Where do you believe the relationship stands today? 

5. There has been a lot of testing, studies, and work that the Border Patrol has already 

completed on border fencing. Do you believe they arc currently able to pull an old plan 

off the shelf, dust it off, and implement it? If not, what has changed? 

6. Could you estimate how much it has cost CBP in personnel hours and department budget 

to develop fencing plans over your tenure at CBP? 

Witness responses to questions submitted for the record were not received 

by time of printing. 
335 

Land Acquisition 

Post·Hea1·ing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to Dr. Terence Garrett 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

April 4,2017 

During the hearing on April4, 2017, hearing participants discussed the difficulty of acquiring 

tribal and private land for the building of fencing/border wall. 

1) Is technology an adequate solution in areas where border wall can't be constructed due to 

land acquisition issues or environmental hazards? 

Qr. Tercnc~Garrett: Perhaps. Technology is preferable than the cont1scation of citizens' 

private property used for wall buiiding. Walls have caused flooding- creating deaths and 

property damage- in Nogales, Sonora, Mexico as debris collected along the installed 

fencing with a Hash flood. The indiscriminant building of walls along the Rio Grande that 

defeat levees and other structures established by the International Boundary Waters 

Commission and mutually agreed to in total by both Mexico and the USA- must be 

adhered to under treaty obligations and not swayed or intimidated by Customs and 

Border Patrol or other Department of Homeland Security agencies. Also, endangered 

species such as black bears, jaguars, mountain !ions, ocelots, jaguarondis, the Texas 

tortoise, and other animals clearly need to move across the borderlands to maintain 

healthy populations. Finally, the treaty with the Tohono O'odham Nation must be 

respected and honored by the USA government. 

Be careful with technology! It does not always work, The IG for DHS and the GAO 

discovered massive fraud, waste and abuse in the Nogales sector from the Boeing SBINet contract (the company cost US taxpayers $1 billion- see the following link: 

http:iiww"·"!l'lSS!m/20ll/US/Ol/l4!hordcr.vir!ual.(c;.[lc~! ). By the way, I noticed that my 

co-panelists, Mr. Colburn and Mr. Aguilar, now are consultants for technology firms. 

2) What should CBP and the Department of Justice do to improve the process for notifying 

landowners of the need to procure their land for the wall, and to provide appropriate 

compensation for wall used for the border wall, as well as any land on their property 

adversely affected by the construction of a border wall? 

Dr. Terence_S}arr£.\!: There were several problems in the first fence land acquisition 

process. Armed CBP and other DHS agents would show up unannounced on people's 

door steps with legalistic documents that were demanded to be signed on site. The DHS 

held "fake" town hall meetings where when citizens would have the temerity to appear, 

their concerns were not listened to by federal agents. Rather, they were told and 

instructed as to what was going to occur. Along the Rio Grande in South Texas, 
336 

landowners who resisted were intimidated by CBP. Case in point [and anecdotally], Dr. 

Eloisa Tamez, a colleague and friend of mine at UTRGV and who is director of the 

graduate nursing program, refused to sign the survey/land acquisition documents. Her 

renter, a security guard in Brownsville who lived next door to her, was harassed 

repeatedly by CBP personnel when he came home from work late at night or in the early 

hours of the morning. They would pull him over and search his car on a regular basis and 

tell him to show his citizenship papers. Dr. Tamez believes this threatening behavior was 

intended to cause her to lose the renter and cause a loss of income for her. When CBP 

eventually took her .26 acre of land, the harassment stopped. 

Federal Judge Hanen (South Texas District) had over 300 cases dealing with all sorts of 

land and land accessing issues. Any further building of fence without dealing honestly 

and forthrightly by the federal government in terms ofjust compensation will be 

magnified by the hundreds of miles of privately held land in Texas. 

There is still plenty of anger and hostility in south Texas today with regard to the 2006-

2009 wall project and how it was conducted. News of more land acquisition will generate 

far greater opposition if the border wall is extended or built in the region. The Texas Civil 

Rights Project, for example, is getting Texans ready for the next border wall, as shown 

partially below by TCRP's April 19, 2017 Campaign Newsletter: 

RELEASE: Texas Civil Rights Project launches campaign to assist borderland 

property owners, oppose border wall 

TCRP prepares to represent Texas landowners targeted by the federal government 

to build a border wall. The know your rights video offers concerned landowners 

assistance to ensure they receive fair treatment. 

Alamo, TX Today, the Texas Civil Rights Project launched a new campaign, 

including bilingual videos, to protect the civil rights of Texas landowners while 

delaying construction of a wall that is offensive to communities and ineffective as a 

matter of immigration policy. 

TCRP will represent border landowners who will soon face eminent domain actions 

by the federal govemment attempting to build a border wall on their property. Our 

campaign will also involve training and deploying legal volunteers to ensure that 

landowners have the representation they deserve, particularly those who arc poor 

and/or lack the skills to successfully navigate the judicial system. 

As part of our outreach, TCRP's new videos detail, in English and Spanish, the 

protections landowners have under the U.S. Constitution to be notified in writing, 

provided just compensation, and heard by a jury of their peers to determine the 

value of their land before it is taken. TCRP will conduct know your rights trainings 

and distribute the video extensively across the Texas borderlands. 

As an organization, TCRP was founded in the Texas borderlands to fight back 

against civil rights threats in that community- and later, across the state. With 

attorneys in the Rio Grande Valley and El Paso, TCRP is ready to protect residents 
337 

in the borderlands from the proposed border wall that threatens to divide and harm 

millions of residents. 

Efren Olivares, Racial and Economic Justice Director at the Texas Civil Rights 

Project, said: 

"We are ready for a contested, protracted resistance alongside Texan landowners. 

Under the rules governing federal condemnation actions, a landowner who 

disagrees with the amount offered by the government has the right to request a jury 

trial. Our team at the Texas Civil Rights Project is ready to represent landowners, 

as well as train and deploy legal volunteers to ensure that all landowners have the 

representation and respect they deserve. 

Ultimately, we know that the proposed border wall is the type of wrongheaded 

policy that threatens our community and distracts from the real issues facing our 

broken immigration system." 

The Texas Civil Rights Project uses legal advocacy to empower Texas 

communities and create policy change. In its twenty-five year history, TCRP has 

brought thousands of strategic lawsuits, defending voting rights, fighting 

institutional discrimination, and reforming systems of criminal justice. Today 

with dozens of high-caliber attorneys and professionals in Austin, Dallas, El Paso, 

Houston and the Rio Grande Valley, and an extensive network of pro bono counsel 

and community allies TCRP is among the most inf1uential civil rights 

organizations in the Lone Star State. 

So, in addition to well-funded landowners, poorer Texans will be better prepared and 

represented for the next border wall. 

3) How long do you estimate it will take to acquire the remaining land on the Texas/Mexico 

border and is acquisition of all of the land feasible? 

Dr. Terence Garrett: With the 2006-2009 border wall project as a guide roughly 650 

miles previously- people along the border are now quite aware of the tactics and strategy 

that DHS used. The first time around, the DHS went after the poor, undereducated, and 

Spanish-speaking population in south Texas. The next time will be different. Federal 

parks and refuges will be relatively easy (Big Bend, etc.), although even there, 

environmental organizations will fight with all the legal resources they can muster. ·n1e 

DHS will be dealing with a public relations nightmare. Private lands will take twice as 

long to procure because landowners will be "lawyered up." The low hanging fruit of the 

first fence project was relatively easy. The next time around will be far more difficult. 

Judge Hanen's docket- and other judges- will be overwhelmed with lawsuits. Even 

with the 2005 REAL ID Act and the 2006 Secure Fence Act in place, we may be talking 

decades before any massive border wall project is ultimately resolved. 

Cost-Benefit Analysis 
338 

4) Are you aware ifCBP has ever conducted a cost-benefit analysis for the use of fencing 

versus the use of technology on the border? 

Dr. Terence Garrett: No. Perhaps this would be a good project for the Government 

Accountability Office. GAO should look at past costs in both categories for previous 

fencing in addition to potential future border wall applications. Another factor should be 

conducting an analysis ofCBP and ICE personnel costs for overall border security. 

Feasibility and Effectiveness of the Wall 

5) How do you build an "impassable" wall that prevents all illegal border crossings? 

Dr. Terence Garrett: No one can build such a walL It is not possible. 

6) Is it possible to prevent I 00 percent of all illegal entries into the United States? 

Dr. Terence Garrett: It is not possible. There will always be job and political asylum 

seekers corning to the USA no matter what policies are adopted. 

7) Do you both feel that a reinforced concrete wall is appropriate for the Border Patrol, or 

would a solid concrete wall in any way hinder Border Patrol agents' situational 

awareness? 

Dr. Terence Garrett: Walls arc not effective for border security. Congressman Henry 

Cucller (D-TX) has noted "We can't come in with the new administration and have a 

very simplistic view that you have a 14th century solution to a 21st century problem."-

See more at: http://www. ro lie a II. c_9!DLm:.'ITJ2.QLill0fs:_llt:l!llr-s u gg£2t_-x1It\illl: 

bordcriisthash.eRcDnQ~iL.tJnuf 
339 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Dr. Terence Garrett 

From Senator Jon Tester 

"Fencing Along the Southwest Border" 

April 4, 2017 

Commissioner Aguilar stated in his written testimony that "eminent domain may have to be 

exercised to take land required for the construction of border infrastructure." 

Further, the President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2018 supports the addition of"20 

attorneys under the Department of Justice to pursue federal efforts to obtain the land and 

holdings necessary for the southwest border and another 20 attorneys and support staff for 

immigration litigation assistance." 

1. What are your thoughts about exercising eminent domain in order to take land away from 

private owners in order to build out border infrastructure? 

Dr. Terence Garrett: Senator Tester, I will give you the same response that I gave to Senator 

McCaskill that also answers your question ... 

There were several problems in the first fence land acquisition process. Armed CBP and other 

DHS agents would show up unannounced on people's door steps with legalistic documents that 

were demanded to be signed on site. The DHS held "fake'' town hall meetings where when 

citizens would have the temerity to appear, their concerns were not listened to by federal agents. 

Rather, they were told and instructed as to what was going to occur. Along the Rio Grande in 

South Texas, landowners who resisted were intimidated by CBP. Case in point (and anecdotally), 

Dr. Eloisa Tamez, a colleague and friend of mine at UTRGV and who is director of the graduate 

nursing program, refused to sign the survey/land acquisition documents. Her renter, a security 

guard in Brownsville who lived next door to her, was harassed repeatedly by CBP personnel 

when he came home from work late at night or in the early hours of the morning. They would 

pull him over and search his car on a regular basis and tell him to show his citizenship papers. 

Dr. Tamez believes this threatening behavior was intended to cause her to lose the renter and 

cause a loss of income for her. When CBP eventually took her .26 acre of land, the harassment 

stopped. 

Federal Judge Hanen (South Texas District) had over 300 cases dealing with all sorts of land and 

land accessing issues. Any further building of fence without dealing honestly and forthrightly by 

the federal government in terms of just compensation will be magnified by the hundreds of miles 

of privately held land in Texas. 

There is still plenty of anger and hostility in south Texas today with regard to the 2006-2009 wall 

project and how it was conducted. News of more land acquisition will generate far greater 

opposition if the border wall is extended or built in the region. The Texas Civil Rights Project, 
340 

for example, is getting Texans ready for the next border wall, as shown partially below by 

TCRP's April 19, 2017 Campaign Newsletter: 

RELEASE: Texas Civil Rights Project launches campaign to assist borderland 

property owners, oppose border wall 

TCRP prepares to represent Texas landowners targeted by the federal government to 

build a border wall. The know your rights video offers concerned landowners 

assistance to ensure they receive fair treatment. 

Alamo, TX Today, the Texas Civil Rights Project launched a new campaign, 

including bilingual videos, to protect the civil rights of Texas landowners while 

delaying construction of a wall that is offensive to communities and ineffective as a 

matter of immigration policy. 

TCRP will represent border landowners who will soon face eminent domain actions 

by the federal government attempting to build a border wall on their property. Our 

campaign will also involve training and deploying legal volunteers to ensure that 

landowners have the representation they deserve, particularly those who are poor 

and/or lack the skills to successfully navigate the judicial system. 

As part of our outreach, TCRP' s new videos detail, in English and Spanish, the 

protections landowners have under the U.S. Constitution to be no titled in writing, 

provided just compensation, and heard by a jury of their peers to determine the value 

of their land before it is taken. TCRP will conduct know your rights trainings and 

distribute the video extensively across the Texas borderlands. 

As an organization, TCRP was founded in the Texas borderlands to tight back against 

civil rights threats in that community and later, across the state. With attorneys in 

the Rio Grande Valley and El Paso, TCRP is ready to protect residents in the 

borderlands from the proposed border wall that threatens to divide and harm millions 

of residents. 

Efren Olivares, Racial and Economic Justice Director at the Texas Civil Rights 

Project, said: 

We are ready for a contested, protracted resistance alongside Texan landowners. 

Under the rules governing federal condemnation actions, a landowner who disagrees 

with the amount offered by the government has the right to request a jury trial. Our 

team at the Texas Civil Rights Project is ready to represent landovmers, as well as 

train and deploy legal volunteers to ensure that all landowners have the representation 

and respect they deserve. 

Ultimately, we know that the proposed border wall is the type of wrongheaded policy 

that threatens our community and distracts from the real issues facing our broken 

immigration system." 
341 

Æ 

The Texas Civil Rights Project uses legal advocacy to empower Texas communities 

and create policy change. In its twenty-five year history, TCRP has brought thousands 

of strategic lawsuits, defending voting rights, fighting institutional discrimination, and 

reforming systems of criminal justice. Today -·with dozens of high-caliber attorneys 

and professionals in Austin, Dallas, El Paso, Houston and the Rio Grande Valley, and 

an extensive network of pro bono counsel and community allies TCRP is among 

the most influential civil rights organizations in the Lone Star State. 

So, in addition to well-funded landowners, poorer Texans will be better prepared and 

represented for the next border wall. The next eminent domain actions taken to build 

border infrastructure will be met with massive resistance- just in Texas alone. 

2. Do you believe that an additional 40 attorneys at the Department of Justice would be 

enough to expedite lawsuits that would likely arise if the federal government were to take 

people's land from them? 

Dr. Terence Garrett: Senator Tester, the answer is "no." The much bigger problem will be 

the federal district judges' case loads that will go up dramatically along the USA/Mexico 

border with all the emininent domain cases and land acccssability problems by 

landowners because of the wall.