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LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT

FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 9, 2013

Serial No. 113–48

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction ...................................................................................................... 9

The Honorable John Herbst, director, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University (former American Ambassador to Ukraine and 

Uzbekistan) ........................................................................................................... 18

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.: Prepared statement ................................. 12

The Honorable John Herbst: Prepared statement ................................................ 21

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 53

(1)

LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT 

FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

TUESDAY, JULY 9, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my good 

friend, Mr. Deutch, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, 

I will then recognize members seeking recognition for 1 minute. 

We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

being here, and without objection your written statements will be 

made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

I’d like to tell our witnesses that our parties are having their 

conferences right now and they’re just getting out. So I’m sure that 

people will be filtering in. The chair now recognizes herself for 5 

minutes. 

The stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq were, at 

the time, the largest such project of its kind that the United States 

Government ever undertook. 

But for all of the good intentions, it was a program replete with 

challenges, over-promises, setbacks and shortcomings. 

Of course, it had its share of accomplishments and successes as 

well. But at the end of the day, when we look back at our approach 

to the rebuilding of Iraq, we’re left with an overall sense that there 

were too many errors, that fraud was widespread and that there 

was an unnecessary amount of waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars. 

Not long into the Iraq conflict, it became clear that our expectations for a limited post-conflict engagement gave way to the hard 

realities on the ground. 

Our mission would quickly have to shift from a short-term operation to a long-term protracted rebuilding effort that would require 

large amounts of human and financial capital that we had neither 

the planning nor the capability to conduct. 

2

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and his excellent team spent 9 years, countless hours, analyzing our efforts 

in Iraq in order to identify the challenges that we faced, what we 

did wrong, where we succeeded, and most importantly, what happened to the $60 billion in taxpayer money used to fund the rebuilding of Iraq. 

What was concluded painted a very grim picture of our ability to 

adequately plan, execute and oversee large-scale stability and reconstruction operations. According to the Inspector General, as much as $3 billion to $5 

billion were wasted from the Iraq relief and reconstruction fund 

alone due to poor accountability, and as much as $8 billion overall. 

Many projects in Iraq ran over budget and behind schedule because of a lack of oversight and a lack of accountability, like the 

Basrah Children’s Hospital. According to the Inspector General’s 

reports, this hospital was supposed to cost $50 million but ran to 

over $165 million and fell more than a year behind schedule. 

Another mismanaged project was the Fallujah wastewater treat- ment system. The IG found that the initial $30 million project tripled in cost to nearly $100 million and only reached one-third of 

the homes originally planned. 

These are but a few examples but they may prove valuable and 

the need for improved oversight going into the future. 

The lessons learned and the recommendations put forth in the 

Inspector General’s final report—and I hope that everyone will 

have a chance to look at it—‘‘Learning From Iraq: A Final Report 

from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,’’ and all 

of the members have the book—serves as an important tool for the 

United States Government and for us in the United States Congress as we find ourselves facing a shift in the post-conflict role in 

Afghanistan. 

Our efforts in Afghanistan have already replaced those of Iraq as 

its nation’s largest ever stabilization and reconstruction operation. 

Among the many challenges we faced in Iraq that the Inspector 

General highlights were a deteriorating security situation and inadequate oversight over the projects and programs being implemented. 

Yet for all of the challenges that we faced and the deficiencies 

that we encountered, nearly all of them lead back to the fact that 

we did not have a proper plan in place beforehand, which hampered our ability to execute and oversee stabilization and rebuilding operations properly. 

We have spent nearly $100 billion in Afghanistan under similar 

circumstances as Iraq, yet we still find ourselves making many of 

the same mistakes that we cannot afford to make as we prepare 

to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. 

It is likely that the United States will find itself in a similar position when examining future reconstruction efforts. 

In Haiti, a recent GAO report that I commissioned illustrated the 

lack of coordination and inadequate use of funds between the 

USAID and the State Department. 

In Syria, we must prepare for the possibility that similar efforts 

may be needed in a post-Assad era, as the conflict further cripples 

the country’s infrastructure. 

3

In order to ensure that we maintain the know-how to properly 

plan, execute, and oversee any future similar operations, we must 

learn from the lessons of Iraq. We must centralize unity of command, advocate for better interagency coordination and use our 

funds more wisely, more efficiently and more effectively. 

And with that, I will turn to my ranking member, Mr. Deutch, 

for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling today’s important hearing. 

It’s been just over 10 years since the United States went into 

Iraq under a false pretense of thwarting weapons of mass destruction. 

Nearly 4,500 brave U.S. soldiers were killed. More than 32,000 

were wounded, including thousands with critical brain and spinal 

injuries and over 100,000 Iraqi civilians were killed. 

And now I think there is an unfortunate perception there was so 

much upheaval in the region over the past 2 years Iraq is no longer 

a priority. Yet at a cost of $2 trillion and the high human toll, we 

will feel the lasting effects of this war for many years. 

The U.S. has spent $60 billion on reconstruction efforts. It’s an 

incredible amount of taxpayer dollars. But we did this to ensure 

lasting security, not just for the Iraqi people but for stability in the 

region and to try to create a reliable partner to help protect U.S. 

strategic interests. 

Even though our military operations have concluded, as we’ll 

hear today there are still thousands of U.S. civilian personnel on 

the ground working to ensure that Iraq has the security and civil 

society institutions necessary to sustain a successful and stable 

state. 

The United States and Iraq are working to implement all eight 

tracks of the Strategic Framework Agreement. But in order to sustain long-term stability, the focus needs to be on more than just security. It must be on economic reforms, infrastructure, and rebuilding and strengthening higher education for a new generation of 

Iraqis. 

The IMF projects a GDP growth rate of 10 percent for 2013. Oil 

production is over 3 million barrels per day, helping to stabilize the 

markets as the U.S. and our partners can continue to find ways to 

shrink Iranian exports. 

For the first time in 2 years, there is dialogue between all of 

Iraq’s political leaders. Although the run-up to April’s provincial 

elections was marred with increased violence, the elections were 

deemed a success. However, sectarian violence has only increased 

with over 2,000 casualties between April and June. 

The greater test will come as the Parliament prepares for next 

year’s national elections followed by Presidential elections. A peaceful transfer of power will be the true test of any democracy. 

In any operation of this scale, with this much money involved we 

owe it to the American people to conduct stringent oversight. For 

the past 9 years, the Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction has audited and investigated the State and 

DoD reconstruction operations on the ground in Iraq. 

4

According to the 220 audits and 170 inspection reports conducted 

by—conducted by the Inspector General, Iraq reconstruction efforts 

have been plagued by waste, fraud and abuse. 

I applaud the IG’s work in securing the successful conviction of 100 fraud cases and recovery of nearly $300 million in misused assistance. But the amount wasted we know totals well into the billions. 

I am most interested to hear from the Inspector General as to 

how waste and fraud can be better controlled in future stabilization, how waste and fraud can be prevented in future stabilization 

and reconstruction operations. 

How do we learn from this? How do we use the lessons learned 

in Iraq to streamline bureaucracy while ensuring better interagency coordination on reconstruction programs? 

How do we maintain oversight, evaluate progress and enforce 

time lines of private security and civilian contractors, particularly 

when you have, at times, over 170,000 private contractors on the 

ground? A recent CNN report indicated that contractors have 

reaped a staggering $138 billion in Iraq—$138 billion. 

And perhaps most importantly, I look forward to hearing how we 

can better achieve host-country buy-in. How do we operate in a situation if the U.S. is looked upon as occupiers by the people? 

How can we achieve this connection, not through bribery at every 

level of government but with the people who will be working in the 

water treatment plant or the mother who could have the chance to 

send her child to a university? 

As the Inspector General prepares to wind down his mandate 

later this year, the title of this hearing is fitting—‘‘Learning From 

Iraq’’—because although I hope we’re never involved in a contingency operation of this magnitude again, appropriate advanced 

strategic planning for any future efforts can mitigate the pitfalls of 

Iraq. 

The chair’s focus on Afghanistan just several minutes ago, focusing on Afghanistan going forward, saving taxpayers’ money, stopping fraud, stopping waste—these are all incredibly important topics that I look forward to hearing our witnesses speak about today. 

I look forward to what I hope will be a productive discussion on 

how we can apply the special Inspector General’s best practices to 

any future operations. 

I appreciate your being here, both of you. And Madam Chairman, 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for your 

opening statement. 

We will then now recognize members for a 1-minute opening 

statement. We will begin with Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and gentlemen, 

thank you for serving your nation and being here. I appreciate it. 

Since I only have 1 minute, I want to just quickly say I’m a veteran of the Iraq War. I’ve been there multiple times over multiple 

years and in fact during that process I saw great improvement, especially after the surge happened, which probably many people still 

in Congress today oppose the surge. And it was amazing to me. 

And then as a Member of Congress, I was utterly shocked to find 

out that the administration decided that they were going to leave 

5

no residual troops at the end of—there was no negotiation of a further Status of Forces Agreement. 

We’re talking about the lessons we’re going to learn in Afghanistan. I think that’s what’s important, because I just read an article 

today in The New York Times that the U.S. is considering a faster 

pullout in Afghanistan. 

In fact, they’re talking about a zero-troops option after 2014, 

which was a number that was randomly pulled out of a political 

generator of saying, hey, politically, 2014 would be a good number. 

I’m very concerned that we repeat the mistakes in Iraq by pulling all troops out of Afghanistan and ending what the American 

people, young men and women, have fought so hard to achieve and 

that the Afghan people have fought so hard to achieve on the edge 

of an Afghanistan victory. 

So with that, I yield back. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you, 

Mr. Bowen, and your team for your hard work. 

You know, the finding that at least 15 percent of the reconstruction money—$8 billion—was wasted is troubling enough. 

But when one contemplates that that’s probably the tip of the 

iceberg when you look at inefficiencies, inappropriate projects, 

projects that half work, projects that aren’t going to have lasting 

value or can’t be maintained, that number climbs rapidly. 

How can we be surprised that the United States finds so much 

waste based on a war that had nothing but false premises and, 

frankly, when the decision was made to go in was inadequate to 

begin with? And the chaos that resulted has cost us dearly. 

And so I hope we focus on the lessons learned and enshrine them 

so we don’t repeat them. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I’d just like to thank the chair and the ranking members for this 

hearing today. This hearing is important because it gives us the opportunity to learn lessons from our past endeavors in the Middle 

East region and hopefully not make the same ones again. 

And if insanity is doing the same thing over and over again expecting different results, let’s hope by having hearings like this and 

talking to you, we can inject a little sanity to our foreign endeavors 

of the future. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and thank them 

for being here today. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I thank the chairman and the ranking member 

for convening this hearing and I certainly want to thank the witnesses for being here. 

I think there has been considerable national debate about our engagement in the war in Iraq. But there should be no question that 

we have an important responsibility to ensure that we’re good 

stewards, not only of the talent of this country but of the treasure. 

6

And this report raises some very alarming concerns. I think, as 

Mr. Connolly says, it ought not be a surprise based on the false 

premises that led us to this conflict. 

But I’m very anxious to hear from the witnesses and to hear your 

recommendations how we might reform this process to safeguard 

not only American lives but safeguard American treasure, and I 

thank you for being here. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. Collins is recognized. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just, again, look forward to the testimony of our witnesses 

today, bringing forth as we’ve heard some of this in other committees and I’m looking forward to that. 

And, again, on what was said earlier, looking forward with a look 

to the past, I think, is appropriate. I think the one thing, though, 

just frankly, I’ll just, as a point of order here and just a point, to 

say as we look forward in what happened, as someone who also has 

served, as Representative Kinzinger, in Iraq and been there, let’s 

look at the report. 

Let’s do what we’re here to do on oversight and let’s focus on the 

fact that real lives were lost, real lives were cost, and the things 

that—our taxpayer money. 

And this idea that we have a false premise for going there or 

other things needs to be left on the table and we need to focus on 

what we can learn and move ahead. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kennedy is recognized. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Thank you very much for holding this hearing. Thank you to our 

witnesses for your service and your important work. 

I’m just going to add my voice to, I think, the voices and the 

thoughts that you’ve heard already this morning. In reviewing the 

report, I join my colleagues in being particularly troubled with 

some of the markups in the contracting that you pointed out. 

Just on one page, $900 for a switch that was valued at $7.05, a 

12,000 percent markup. Another bid that was put in for $80 for a 

piece of PVC plumbing, that was also competitively bid on for 

$1.41, a markup of over 5,000 percent. 

What can we do? Clearly, the systems that were put in place 

were inadequate, to say the least. 

What can we do to make sure that our treasure is spent wisely 

and we are matching the commitment that our service members 

are making abroad? 

So I look forward to your thoughts and thank you for your service. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. Meadows is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you 

for being here to testify. 

Looking back, it’s disturbing to note that we’ve got so much 

waste, fraud and abuse and yet, we still don’t even really know the 

full extent of what happened there, and so that’s troubling. 

7

The chairwoman has pointed out that, you know, we’ve seen 

some 15 to 20 percent of the $21 billion really go up in terms of 

wasted cost. 

A hospital—it cost three times what it should have. Seventy million dollars spent on anti-corruption efforts that really didn’t show 

any results—$70 million. 

And so the money is gone, but what I’m hopeful to hear today 

from each one of you is what we can do in terms of lessons learned. 

I appreciate your work. I’m also intrigued to hear the efforts that 

you’ve gotten in terms of creating the U.S. Office of Contingency 

Operations and the implementation thereof. 

And so I look forward to working with you to find significant 

ways that we can reduce waste and fraud. And with that, I yield 

back, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Ms. Frankel of Florida? 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the madam 

chair, the ranking member for your very articulate comments. 

I want to say, first of all, as the—I’m the mother of an Iraq veteran who served willingly and proudly. He returned safely. 

With that said, I think it cannot be said more that the war in 

Iraq was the wrong war at the wrong time. The real tragedy was 

the lives that were lost and mangled. 

I think it’s very unfortunate that we even have to have this hearing today. I understand the reason for it. Madam Chair, I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cotton is recognized. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you, Madam Chair, for having this hearing. 

There are many important lessons learned. I too was a veteran of 

Iraq. I served with the 101st Airborne and led 40 infantrymen in 

Baghdad. 

One of the hallmarks of the Army is that you always engage in 

self-critique, not just rewarding yourself for the good things to sustain but exploring the failures that you need to improve in the future so you can always gain in your levels of performance. 

I look forward today to hearing more about what we can learn 

from Iraq, how we can apply those lessons to Afghanistan and how 

we can apply them inevitably in the future when we find ourselves 

in conflict again defending our country, defending our country’s values and its interests, and defending our allies around the world. 

I hope that we don’t, unfortunately, devolve into a look backward 

10 years or more into what took us to war in Iraq, but, rather, 

what America can do in the future to make America and Americans safer and make the world more free. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Vargas. 

Mr. VARGAS. I’ll get it right this time. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chair and Ranking Member. I appreciate very much the opportunity to speak but then also the 

hearing. Especially I want to thank the witnesses for being here. 

The numbers are staggering, especially when we take a look at 

sequestration and what we have to do in the sense of cuts in our 

own country. 

8

So I’m very anxious to hear your testimony, also to find out if 

we really are in a better position today than we were, you know, 

10 years ago as we move forward. 

So, again, thank you very much for being here. And Madam 

Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this 

hearing. I want to thank the witnesses for coming. I just look forward to this. 

This is very important. There were a lot of good things we did 

in Iraq. When I was there, I saw a lot of very positive actions, a 

lot of bravery from some of our troops and we did expend a lot of 

blood and treasure there. 

And there were some good things and, obviously, there were 

some not so good things. So I really look forward to learning from 

your report and your testimony. So thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Meng. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member. And 

thank you to our witnesses for your service to our country and for 

being here today. 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report 

provides valuable insights into the reconstruction process in Iraq. 

This is an important opportunity to evaluate our previous rebuilding efforts and consider how to improve our efficiency in any 

future stabilization efforts. 

Considering all the countries in conflict around the world, it is 

critical that we learn from our past mistakes and failures before involving ourselves in any other reconstruction efforts. 

I look forward to exploring how we can use the information contained in this report to develop more effective response systems 

and produce better results. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Mr. Stockman is recognized. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you for allowing me, Madam Chairman 

and Ranking Member, to speak and it’s good seeing you again after 

all these years. 

We live in a hurricane area, hurricane zone. We would never 

vote for a hurricane. We would never want a hurricane. But when 

it happens, we want to be prepared. It’s like Boy Scouts. We want 

to anticipate the worst. 

And now we never want to be in that situation again where we’re 

in Iraq the way we are, but should it happen again I think it’s critical we address how we can do it better and that’s what we’re here 

about today. 

I’m excited that you’re addressing these issues, and I compliment 

you for doing all this under the—under the fire of military while 

you’re trying to audit at the same time. I appreciate your sacrifice 

to our nation and I really look forward to seeing how we can save 

a dollar. 

I think I had the lowest dollar per vote. So this is an issue that 

we need to address, saving money for our taxpayers. And thank 

you, Madam Chairman, for opening up. 

9

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

And I think that I speak for all the members when I say how 

blessed we are to have in our subcommittee, as you heard from our 

members, four veterans of the Iraq war. So for them, they have a 

real deep personal knowledge in what went on there. 

Thank you to Mr. Kinzinger, thank you, Mr. Collins, thank you, 

Mr. Cotton, and thank you, Mr. DeSantis, for your brave service. 

We thank you, Ms. Frankel, for your son, and I’m blessed that 

my stepson and daughter-in-law also served tours in Iraq. So thank 

you very much to all these brave heroes. 

And we are so pleased to welcome back to our committee Mr. 

Stuart Bowen, Jr., the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

Mr. Bowen has served in this position since 2004, overseeing more 

than $63 billion in U.S. funds. 

Over the past 9 years, he has made 34 trips to Iraq and his oversight work has produced financial benefits to the U.S. Government 

in excess of $1.8 billion and has yielded 87 convictions for fraud 

and other crimes. 

Mr. Bowen is a military veteran, having served 4 years on active 

duty as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force. Thank you for 

your service and welcome back to our subcommittee. Thank you, 

Stuart. 

Next, we welcome Ambassador John Herbst, the director of the 

Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University. 

Prior to this, the Ambassador was the Ambassador to Ukraine and 

to Uzbekistan and retired in 2010 with the rank of Career Minister. 

He also served as the State Department’s coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, overseeing the creation of the Civilian 

Response Corps, an interagency group of 1,000 civil servants 

trained and ready to deploy quickly to crises abroad. 

He is a two-time recipient of the Presidential Distinguished Service Award and has also received the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award and the Secretary of State’s Career Achievement Award. 

Mr. Bowen is here with his daughter, Sophie, who is interning 

with the Veterans Affairs Committee, and the Ambassador is here 

with two interns. So we welcome them as well. 

And Mr. Chabot of Ohio has just come in, and I’m wondering if 

he has a 1-minute opening statement before we get to our witnesses. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the chairwoman, but in the interest of time, 

I think I’ll forego so that we can get to the witnesses. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

So we will begin with the Honorable Stuart Bowen. 

Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STUART W. BOWEN, JR., 

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee. It is indeed an honor to appear before you again to discuss our final lessons learned report, 

‘‘Learning From Iraq.’’ And on a personal note, Madam Chairman, 

muchas gracias por todo su apoyo durante mi trabajo en SIGIR. 

10

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You’re showing off. 

Mr. BOWEN. And it’s an honor also for me to be at the table with 

my friend, Ambassador John Herbst, who has truly the most applicable firsthand knowledge about the attempts to address the challenges that arose in Iraq, the attempts to reform our approach to 

reconstruction and, really, the story of how those attempts didn’t 

meet the mark. So thank you, John, for joining us. 

We issued ‘‘Learning From Iraq’’ this March, the ninth lesson 

learned report, emblematic of my understanding of this mission 

from the start, and that is not just to generate audits—we did 220 

of those, inspection reports, 170, and obtain convictions—we’ll have 

over 100 by the time we’re done in September—but to learn from 

what we were observing and to communicate it to operators so that 

it could be applied to improve how U.S. taxpayer dollars were being 

spent in Iraq. 

My mission, as I saw it, was to be the taxpayer’s watch-dog, but 

also to be a support to the mission and an advisor to the operators 

through these reports. This report provides seven chapters that lay out how that $60-

plus billion was spent over the last 10 years but, importantly, concludes with seven lessons that are the focus of today’s hearing. 

And I think that’s what we should absorb from the entire Iraq 

experience—what we can learn from it, how it can be applied to reforming our system for stabilization and reconstruction operations 

so that when we next encounter such an operation—and we will, 

as most of the members have acknowledged—that we are structured to succeed, that we are prepared to win. 

And I have to say in answer to an issue raised already at the 

dais that we are not much better off today than we were 10 years 

ago with regard to planning, executing, and overseeing stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

The seven lessons—here they are. First, begin rebuilding only 

after you’ve established adequate security. As someone said to me, 

why is that a lesson? Isn’t that obvious? 

Well, it’s a lesson because we didn’t apply it effectively in Iraq. 

And thus, to put it in very simple terms, begin modestly. Begin 

with small projects and don’t pursue large ones until the setting is 

stable. 

Second, ensure full host country engagement. Madam Chairman, 

you pointed this out in your opening statement as a key issue, underscoring the truth that we didn’t consult enough with the Iraqis 

at the outset. 

For ‘‘Learning From Iraq’’ I did 44 interviews with leadership, 17 

Iraqi leaders including Prime Minister Maliki, prime minister—

previous Prime Ministers Jaafari and Allawi, and they all essentially focused on this, that we didn’t consult with them about what 

they really needed and thus we built what we wanted. 

As Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns told me, we came to Iraq 

and we tried to do it all and do it our own way, and he underscores 

and echoes the Iraqi point. Consultation is key. 

Third, establish uniform contracting, personnel and information 

management systems. All missing in Iraq. One of our first audits, 

which we issued almost exactly 9 years ago, found that the Coalition Provisional Authority couldn’t account for who was there. 

11

They did not have a staffing system that was apropos, which was 

unsurprising since it was a start-up. And as I’ve called it in this 

report, it was an ‘‘ad-hocracy’’ and, indeed, a series of ad-hocracies 

that unfolded in Iraq. 

That’s the wrong way to protect our national security interest. 

Improvisation is the wrong approach. We have to plan. That’s key. 

And personnel planning is the first and foremost element, I think, 

because you’ve got to take the right people to the situation to succeed. 

But also IT. Our audits repeatedly found that there was no coherent information management system in place to track what we 

built. 

Indeed, we ultimately concluded, after a series of audits, only 70 

percent of what we built was captured in any coherent information 

management system. Unacceptable, certainly. 

Contracting—the Congress has responded to the contracting 

challenges in Iraq. Indeed, the departments have. But have the departments responded in an integrated, effective fashion? And the 

answer still must be no. 

Also unacceptable, because if you want to talk about waste, a lot 

of waste occurred in poor contracting vehicle choice, poor quality 

assurance, poor contract management, ineffective oversight on the 

ground in the implementation of contracts. 

But the most important lesson that these issues can be resolved 

by establishing an entity that would ensure civil military integration of planning, execution and oversight for future stabilization 

and reconstruction operations, and H.R. 2606, introduced by Mr. 

Stockman and Mr. Welch, would do that. 

It provides a structure. It addresses the contracting problem. It 

addresses the personnel problem. Indeed, it puts somebody in 

charge. Occam’s razor: If no one’s in charge, someone should be in 

charge. Accountability is key to success. 

The purpose of this hearing is oversight, to impose accountability. But looking forward, as the members have articulated, 

which we must do, as we learned from Iraq, we have to implement 

reforms that will effectuate a success in future stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

The U.S. Office for Contingency Operations would assure such 

success. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, and members of the committee. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen. 

And, Ambassador, we’d love to hear from you as well. Just push 

that green button. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN HERBST, DIRECTOR, 

CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS, NATIONAL DEFENSE 

UNIVERSITY (FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO 

UKRAINE AND UZBEKISTAN) 

Mr. HERBST. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. A little bit closer to your——

Mr. HERBST. Thank you for inviting me to appear today. It is a 

pleasure to appear alongside Stuart Bowen, my longtime colleague 

and the special Inspector General for Iraq. 

In particular, I am here to offer support for his suggestion to create the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations, USOCO. 

This discussion comes at an inopportune but a necessary moment. The country has been continuously at war since September 

11th, 2001. Our military has been stretched by operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan nearly to the breaking point. It needs time and resources for repair and rejuvenation. 

With our planned withdrawals from Afghanistan next year, the 

U.S. seems to be entering a new era of national security challenges. 

Chastened by the difficulties and cost of Iraq and Afghanistan, the 

American public has expressed in various polls its preference to 

avoid such interventions in the future. 

This clear preference to avoid large-scale interventions has been 

reinforced by the nation’s budgetary woes. This has put serious 

pressure on the Federal budget and, of course, the Pentagon. 

In sum, there is not much support at this time for the U.S. to 

invest its reduced budget resources to ensure that we conduct stability operations in a competent way. 

This is a serious mistake because whether or not the United 

States is entering a new post-Afghanistan era in foreign policy, the 

international scene continues to be characterized by state dissolution and rampant instability. 

Al-Qaeda, holed up in the Taliban-led failed state of Afghanistan, 

launched the September 11th attacks. Today, the extremist group 

Al-Shabaab in Somalia is recruiting among Somali Americans in 

Minneapolis. 

The Center for Complex Operations recently released a new 

book, ‘‘Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the 

Age of Globalization,’’ that highlights how various criminal groups 

are making common cause around the world to the detriment of 

law-abiding states and citizens. 

The Fund for International—the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy issued the 2013 Failed State Index last month. It listed 20 

countries, with Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 

leading the way, as in critical condition and 20 more in serious 

danger. 

In other words, this problem of ungoverned spaces will be with 

us for a generation or more, and there will be contingencies when 

American interests and the American people demand that we act. 

19

For example, Haiti is a near neighbor that has earned its ranking as the eighth most unstable country in the world. This poorlygoverned land has prompted American interventions, both military 

and humanitarian, multiple times over the past century. 

Lately, these interventions have been driven by our desire both 

to alleviate human misery and to prevent a flood of Haitian refugees washing up on our shores. 

These are objectives that the American public can understand 

and support. I was in the State Department during our last intervention in Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake. I recall 

vividly senior officials saying, ‘‘We will do this intervention right so 

there will be no need for future interventions.’’

Well, as the chairwoman pointed out, we did not do it right. Our 

engagement achieved little. There will be an occasion in the future 

where we will have to engage in Haiti. So it is a very good thing 

if we are prepared. 

There is yet one more reason to develop capacity to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations. While the American public 

may be fed up with interventions abroad, many in Congress and 

our broader political class are not. 

We saw this in the run-up to the intervention in Libya. President 

Obama was initially reluctant to engage, but under pressure from 

our allies in the U.K. and France and also from Congress we decided to go in. 

The President put clear limits on our role. We would only use air 

power and we put no soldiers on the ground. Yet this intervention 

was in support of a principle—the responsibility to protect helpless 

citizens from their own leadership—which if applied regularly 

would lead to our intervening again and again around the world. 

Right now, we are witnessing pressure to get involved in Syria. 

This pressure is ongoing despite the failure of our intervention in 

Libya: It was a failure because, while we removed Gadhafi and prevented carnage by Gadhafi on his citizens, this led to the destruction of democracy in Mali and a humanitarian tragedy there, with 

over 450,000 displaced people, both within the country and without. 

Yet pressure is growing for us to engage in Syria, despite the fact 

that the most effective members of the opposition are Salafi extremists. If we go into Syria, we better be prepared. We are not 

prepared at this moment. 

To properly run stabilization and reconstruction operations, the 

U.S. needs a significant civilian capacity to complement our worldclass military. One way to explain our less than successful stability 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is to point out the obvious. 

These civ-mil operations were carried out by professionals on the 

military side but by amateurs on the civilian side. 

This is not to denigrate our State Department professionals or 

our USAID professionals. I was a career Foreign Service officer for 

31 years and I can attest to you that our Foreign Service officers 

are courageous, intelligent and capable. The same is true with our 

USAID colleagues. 

But the point is that neither the State Department nor USAID 

hires or trains people in large numbers for stability operations. 

This was evident during our engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

20

Yes, we deployed hundreds and even thousands of USAID and 

State Department officers, but we eventually staffed it with tens of 

thousands of contractors—people who served one tour and then 

left. 

Their experience vanished with them. Contrast that with the 

military personnel who served three or more tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The problem on the civilian side has been understood for some 

time. It led President Clinton to issue Presidential Security Directive 56 and President Bush to issue National Security Directive 44. 

The purpose of that second directive was to create a rapid reaction interagency force—a civilian response corps—that could be 

used for both conflict prevention and conflict response. It was 

under the control of my old office at the State Department, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

While SCRS was beginning to build the Civilian Response Corps, 

the Obama administration came in. Under the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review under Secretary Clinton, the department took a good step of making my old office a bureau and 

renaming it the Conflict and Stability Operations Bureau, raising 

its profile at State. 

But, unfortunately, for budgetary and perhaps other reasons, 

they decided to take apart the Civilian Response Corps. This corps, 

which once numbered over 1,000, now is reduced to a handful. 

In other words, if we go into a major stability operation today we 

will have to staff the civilian side of this contingency operation 

with contractors. 

We are no farther prepared to staff this with professionals of the 

U.S. Government than we were 10 years ago. That’s the problem. 

Experience has shown that we need a corps of dedicated civilian 

professionals in order to conduct these stabilization operations well. 

This is where USOCO comes in. As we draw down in Afghanistan, 

the military is putting together smaller numbers for stability operations but they have the ability to ramp up. 

We do not have something equivalent on the civilian side. We 

have not had that since USAID was taken apart after the Vietnam 

War. USOCO is a first step toward reestablishing the civilian capacity. The initial cost of this proposal is insignificant—$25 million. 

It can be used to put together a staff of 125 professionals who 

would begin to organize the civilian side for contingency operations. 

It would provide the first stability operation professionals ready to 

respond to emergencies abroad. 

This would put our civilian side, if this proposal is enacted, in 

the same situation as our military, which has ramped down the 

numbers but was able to ramp up in an emergency and which has 

retained the know-how to conduct civ-mil operations. 

We have created the world’s greatest military, but without a professional civilian counterpart, this military will not conduct stabilization operations effectively. A small investment today will help 

us avoid failure tomorrow. 

Thank you. I apologize for going over my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Herbst follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Thank you for excellent testimony, and we will begin the questioning part. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. Mr. Bowen, we have spent nearly $100 billion in Afghanistan already. However, we continue to make some of the same mistakes 

as we’ve done in Iraq. 

One of the lessons learned from your testimony that you pointed 

out is that we should begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security. 

Given the fact, as Mr. Kinzinger pointed out, that we have seen 

press reports this morning that the President is considering leaving 

no troops in Afghanistan after our withdrawal in 2014, how will 

this security vacuum impact our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, based on the lessons learned in Iraq? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think my interview with Secretary Panetta on this 

point shed some light on the decision making with regard to the 

withdrawal from Iraq vis-a`-vis what is occurring in Afghanistan. 

And Secretary Panetta said to me that the inability to negotiate 

a basis for a continuing U.S. military presence in the post-2011 

Strategic Framework Agreement left the United States without important leverage in Iraq. This weakened American capacity to push 

for greater change within the Government of Iraq. 

That’s a lesson, I would say, from the Iraq experience, from Secretary Panetta’s perspective, one that should be listened carefully 

to. And thus, as we look forward to Afghanistan, that lesson ought 

to be kept in mind because the truth is the last quarter in Iraq has 

been the most devastating quarter since the summer of 2008. 

A lot of causes for that—certainly, what’s going on in Syria. But 

the rule of law certainly is not under control in Iraq at this moment. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And speaking of Syria, due to that ongoing 

bloody conflict, the infrastructure needs in Syria will continue to 

increase and the U.S. might be asked to assist in Syria’s reconstruction efforts in the near future. 

Looking beyond Afghanistan, what would you suggest, either one 

of you, our plan should be for a post-Assad Syria within the parameters of reconstruction efforts and how much cost would be involved? 

Can you envision what those could be and what mistakes might 

be repeated there? 

Mr. BOWEN. At a minimum, we should be actively planning for 

participating in a multilateral stabilization reconstruction operation in a post-Assad Syria. We should be planning now. We should 

have been planning for a while. 

Indeed, the U.N., under former Syrian Minister Dhari, is doing 

that now and he’s publicly expressed some frustration at the lack 

of multilateral engagement on the point. 

It’s impossible to project the cost but we do know the devastation 

in Syria is massive and, thus, the stabilization and rebuilding of 

the country will take time. 

But what should be clearly on the table and would be if there 

was a USOCO in existence now is identifying the contractors, the 

personnel, the IT system, the oversight, how money would be managed—the controls, just to put a general rubric over it, to ensure 

30

that we avert fraud, waste and abuse of the kind that we saw in 

Iraq and that we’ve seen in Afghanistan. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. HERBST. I agree with Stuart that we should be planning 

now. We should have begun planning long ago for a possible engagement in Syria after the Assad regime falls. 

Whether or not we actually do that depends on many things, for 

example, whether the government that appears after Assad is one 

that’s friendly to us. But we don’t know and we should be planning 

now for that contingency. 

I believe there has been some planning being done by the Office 

of Conflict Stabilization and Operations at the State Department 

for this. 

But I don’t know how comprehensive it has been and certainly, 

as Stuart said, it needs to be done in conjunction with what’s being 

done by the U.N. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If I could interrupt you, you talk about the 

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations was established in 

November 2011. And this bureau was preceded by the organization 

that you led, the Office of Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

And even though the bureau concentrates more on small crises, 

do you believe that we should increase the capacity of the existing 

bureau within the State Department or establish a new center, 

which you proposed, called the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations? And wouldn’t there be more redundancy and duplicative efforts between those two entities? 

Mr. HERBST. I think there is the possibility for duplication if 

USOCO is established. But here’s how I look at this. The core of 

a successful stabilization operation on the civilian side consists of, 

first, planning, secondly, an integrated core of government professionals. 

And what you have in CSO right now is, I think, an able planning capacity and a small competent staff. But there’s no larger 

interagency core of professionals to do this work properly. 

A conscious decision was taken to reduce that core. Conceivably, 

it could be redone in that office or conceivably be done with Stuart’s proposal for USOCO. There does not seem to be an interest 

right now in the State Department for doing that. 

And even when I was in charge of the SCRS office at State, while 

we were building this there did not seem to be a readiness on the 

part of the rest of the building to use it. It was something of a foreign entity in the State Department. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you for 

good answers. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized for his questioning period. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Inspector General Bowen, you—just two of the points that you 

flag I’d like to explore. You say that—and you spoke today about 

facilitating greater host country buy-in. I’d like you to speak to why 

that didn’t happen in Iraq. 

And then you also recommend ensuring security before rebuilding begins. And I wonder—while that’s important, I wonder the extent to which we can actually do that and whether there’s concern 

31

that it actually prolongs the conflict—prolongs the conflict and 

slows the reconstruction of infrastructure, state institutions, the 

other things that need to happen. If you could speak to both of 

those. 

And then, Ambassador Herbst, as it relates to Syria, if that’s the 

sort of thing that USOCO would do and that’s the view that would 

be taken here, how is it—when is it ever relevant? When is the security situation and who deems the security situation addressed 

well enough to be able to come in and do these other things? Inspector General. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

First, on the consultation point, part of it was the shift from liberate and leave—which was the pre-war plan—to occupy and rebuild—which became the policy just over 10 years ago now. A significant shift from spending $2 billion to $20 billion in the blink 

of an eye, and then $60 billion over 10 years. 

The reality was—is we were planning on leaving by the end of 

September 2003 and, thus, there was no commitment to consultation with that planned short stay. 

When we shifted to a significant infrastructure-based rebuilding 

program, the plan sort of evolved within and among the U.S. contractors that were identified and was developed by the Coalition 

Provisional Authority, and it did not engage with the Iraqis 

enough. That’s their first-person testimony to me about what happened back then. 

But more importantly, it’s something that wasn’t thought of beforehand—the need to consult and the commitment to it, and the 

deference to host country interest capacity and absorptive capacity, 

in particular—what can they do, what can they sustain. On the security front, the key is ensuring sufficient security, not absolute security. 

So it’s a proportional metric. The less secure in the environment, 

the smaller the project. The more secure the environment, the more 

substantial the project you can pursue. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. So just to follow up on that, in Iraq you have 

the assessments being done both about security and about engagement. 

In the absence of USOCO, those assessments were being done by 

our Ambassador and those assessments were being done by the 

generals on the ground. 

So how do they—where are they on this proposal? Do they feel 

that they would have benefited? Did the generals—any of the generals or Ambassadors who served in Iraq feel that they would have 

benefited by having this or——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes sir, Mr. Deutch. Ambassador Crocker says this 

would have enabled him to operate more effectively and he supports the idea of creating USOCO. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And when the—when the U.S. is operating overseas—and I guess we can broaden this, Ambassador, to Syria too—

the Ambassador in Iraq—as we’ve talked about and when the U.S. 

operates elsewhere, it’s the Ambassador who heads the civilian efforts in the country and the commanding general then heads the 

defense operations. 

32

Where does—I understand what Ambassador Crocker said. 

Where does—where would USOCO fit into the chain of command? 

Is it on par with State and DoD? Is it—how does it fit? 

Mr. BOWEN. USOCO’s mission is very discrete and well-defined, 

and its clarity will provide certainty to both the agencies and the 

contractors. 

It would be somewhat like FEMA in that the President would declare when a stabilization reconstruction operation begins. 

USOCO’s jurisdiction then is effectuated and its mission is to oversee the relief and reconstruction activity in the affected country. 

And then upon completion of that mission as identified by the 

President he would declare it over. Its reporting chain would be 

like mine, reporting to the secretary of defense and secretary of 

state and then the national security adviser. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And I only have a few seconds left. Ambassador, 

when would we ever hit that point in Syria? And in Afghanistan, 

at what point would that designation have ever been made? 

Mr. HERBST. In Syria, we would hit it once we decide the situation is appropriate for us to go in and that point is when you have 

a government in Damascus or an emerging government in Damascus which we know we can work with and when conditions on the 

ground are sufficient to permit us to go in. 

To make that—to make that call, you need to have very experienced professionals on the ground, certainly, on the border with 

Syria and hopefully within Syria as well to offer the expert political 

advice that our leaders need in order to make that decision. 

And that’s why you need to have a core of professionals devoted 

precisely to this type of problem. This type of problem is widespread around the world. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And without—I’m sorry, my last question, Madam 

Chairman. So without this core of professionals, we’re not able to 

make the decision about when there’s a government that we can 

work with? 

And shouldn’t there be—shouldn’t there be much more that goes 

into the discussion of the analysis of when to get involved or do we 

always wait until there’s a government that we can work with? 

Mr. HERBST. We should be involved as soon as we see a crisis 

brewing and we should put our intelligence assets and our best 

professionals on the ground to develop a sense as to what’s happening. 

Your question—there has been some skepticism when you said, 

well, do we need these professionals in order to make these decisions. 

My sense is, looking at our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

that it would have been very helpful if we had this type of professional analysis before our political leaders decided to go in in this 

very serious way. 

The decisions to go in in both cases were full of suppositions that 

proved to be false. It was mentioned by many members of the committee before we had a chance to testify. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Deutch. One of our Iraq vets, Mr. Kinzinger, is 

recognized. 

33

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and, again, gentlemen, thank you for being here, as I mentioned in my opening statement. 

You know, I think the big thing we want to know is not should 

we be involved in other parts of the world but, of course, how do 

we do it better. 

One of the concerns I have is in this time in Egypt where you 

have this turmoil that we’re going to rush to the exits to get rid 

of aid and to walk away from that situation. I think it’s important 

that in Egypt the United States stay engaged with aid, with foreign 

aid as they go through this time of instability. 

And I think it’s, you know, also important to recognize that in 

Iraq, I think there were mistakes made in the post-war. 

Number one, I think we should have gone in with far more 

troops. We should have had a plan the point Saddam’s statue fell. 

We should have had a plan for law enforcement and, frankly, we 

should have gotten on TV and said if you work for the Iraqi Government come to work tomorrow because you’re going to continue 

to have a job. And I think that, in the long run, cost us probably 

many years of fighting. 

And so as we look at this, something I want to explore is what’s 

the difference between what happened in Germany and Japan postWorld War II and what we saw in Iraq. 

Is it reasonable to expect that any kind of development aid program can succeed in a highly unstable security environment? I’ll 

start with you, Mr. Bowen. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, that’s a core lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan 

that you must have sufficient security before engaging in substantial rebuilding, relief and reconstruction activity, development and 

aid, and that cost us billions of dollars and too many lives. 

Indeed, we issued a report last summer that found that 719 lives 

were lost while those individuals were engaged in reconstructionrelated activity. Better planning, better capacity, better integration 

among the agencies would avert the kind of fraud, waste and abuse 

we’ve seen in Iraq. 

It would ensure that better execution and would implement effective oversight so that the loss in blood and treasure that we’ve seen 

in Iraq, that we’ve seen in Afghanistan, would be averted in Syria 

in whatever future stabilization and reconstruction operation we 

engage in. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. Mr. Herbst. 

Mr. HERBST. Our occupations in Germany and Japan succeeded 

because the German Government and Japanese Government and 

people accepted the legitimacy of our presence. In Iraq, that was 

always a question and——

Mr. KINZINGER. Let me just ask you—not to interrupt but do you 

believe initially when basically the Saddam statue fell did we have 

the legitimacy at that point and was it a matter of we didn’t enforce laws, we didn’t—you know, we basically did the deBa’athification? Was that the problem or do you think that was in 

question from the beginning? 

Mr. HERBST. Given the complexities of our relationship with the 

Arab world, our legitimacy was in question even as Saddam’s statVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Sep 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\070913\81868 HFA PsN: SHIRL
34

ue came down. Still I believe we had a chance if we had done it 

smart that we could have established some legitimacy. 

And if we had done it smart we would have—we would have established law and order, which we had the capacity to do. As you 

stated, we would have welcomed those who had been part of the 

Saddam government to continue working in the government. We 

would not have disbanded the military the way we had. 

There were many fundamental mistakes that we made, mistakes 

because we were not sufficiently sensitive to the culture of the location. But even had we done everything right, Iraq would have been 

much more difficult than Germany and Japan. 

Let me give you one example from Japan which helped us get it 

right there. The U.S. made the critical decision not to remove the 

emperor of Japan, and the emperor of Japan said to the Japanese 

people, ‘‘Cooperate with these Americans.’’ We had no such wisdom 

in Iraq. 

Mr. KINZINGER. You’re suggesting we should have left Saddam 

Hussein as President? 

Mr. HERBST. No. But we took out Tojo in Japan. The emperor 

was a very different kettle of fish. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Understood. I understand what you’re saying. 

And I thank you for that question. I think as, again, as we look 

forward, I mean, Iraq, they’re very important lessons learned. 

We’re naive if we think America’s never going to have to be in 

this situation again in the next 50 or 100 years, and so I thank you 

for your hard work. 

Looking forward at where we’re at in Afghanistan, again, as I 

mentioned in my opening statement, my big concern is the number 

2014 for the year to withdraw from Afghanistan was pulled out of 

a hat, and it was pulled out for political reasons. 

The President wanted to put a date certain for withdrawal. I’m 

not going to necessarily argue. I disagree. 

But one of my questions, though, and one of my concerns is when 

you look at Afghanistan today, I think it’s something like 60 percent of the people in Afghanistan are under the age of 20 or some 

amazingly young demographic. 

You have the Afghan civil society. People are waking up in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan military now basically controls its entire country. It is standing against resurgent Taliban. 

This is a war that has to continue but we’re on the eve of not 

a victory for America—I think it would be a victory for America—

but a victory for the people of Afghanistan, which in 50 or 100 

years when we look back at the United States, you know, when our 

grandkids or whatever are reading history books, they’re going to 

look at this finite amount of time when there was instability in the 

Middle East, instability everywhere, and say what did America do 

with its position of power. 

And it’s going to lead to a world of chaos, a world of a Chinese 

or a Russian leadership, or a world where America continues to be 

that shining city on a hill. And so I thank you all for your testimony and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you for your service. Thank you. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

35

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much, and I would say to my 

friend from Illinois I appreciate his fingering some of the early mistakes that were proved catastrophic. 

And I would argue part of the problem was our own command 

structure because we, frankly, infused Ambassador Bremer with 

way too much power to make unilateral decisions that actually undercut negotiations the military and State Department were having 

to try to keep the country together immediately post-invasion. 

And someday, Mr. Kinzinger, I’d enjoy talking to you about that. 

I commend a book by Thomas Ricks called ‘‘Fiasco,’’ which documents this in agonizing and painful detail. 

Mr. Bowen, you and I travelled to Iraq together on one of your 

many peregrinations. Two things, and we’ve got to be concise if we 

can do it, but two things that came up in that visit that stay with 

me and you and I have talked about since, one is CERP—the idea 

that the military was going to become an aid distribution entity. 

It’s one thing to have some small sums to fix a problem here to 

try to bolster the role of rebuilding communities, not just being 

seen as occupiers and invaders. 

But this program ballooned with very little scrutiny and I wonder as part of your final report if you’d talk about that. 

And then the second thing is I remember anecdotally when we 

were travelling in a limited way around Baghdad, if you recall this, 

there was the story about the water power plant or water purification plant we rebuilt or we built. 

The problem was that we gave no thought to the capacity of piping in Baghdad. And so we had this brand spanking shiny new 

thing we could point to and we cut a ribbon and we turned on the 

switch and, you know, tens of thousands of Baghdad water pipes 

burst because they weren’t retrofitted to handle this new capacity. 

And that’s what I was saying in terms of over and above the 15 

percent of absolute waste, there were examples like that where we 

just didn’t get it right. Now, maybe it was in haste. Maybe it was 

because we didn’t have the right people on the project. 

Maybe it had to do with the coordination you’re talking about. 

But I wonder if you can just talk about that aspect of it too, not 

just waste. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Yes, on CERP, clearly, as our audits demonstrated, it extended 

far beyond its initial concept as quick hit urgent humanitarian 

need projects. 

That’s a good idea. That’s a weapon in the arsenal of the local 

commander to help address hearts and minds issues at the village 

level. 

What happened instead was we had projects like the Baghdad 

Enterprise Zone, which ballooned up to $38 million, including the 

painting of a mural on a blast wall for $1 million. That entire 

project certainly——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that’s great work if you can get it. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, it was—I would deem it waste. But more importantly it didn’t advance our national security interests locally 

and instead hindered them. 

36

Ultimately the Congress responded by capping CERP projects at 

$1 million unless the secretary of defense approved, and that never 

happened. 

But the Congress shouldn’t be CERP’s program office. That 

should be done at the Pentagon, and thus in future operations 

there should be a program office that carefully defines how it 

should be implemented and ensures training is done. That’s what 

was also missing. 

On the Nasiriyah water treatment system, yes, you’re right. It 

was the largest single infrastructure project we did in Iraq, and it, 

as we documented in our evaluation of it, was only operating at 20 

percent after turnover. 

It is an example of what happens when you don’t carefully consult and effectively oversee and ensure proper execution at the 

local level. It was a project beyond their means and, as you pointed 

out in your opening statement, there’s so much waste at the 

sustainment point—in other words, what the Iraqis cannot sustain. 

The Nasiriyah system is one example of why it’s impossible that 

the $8 billion number is a conservative number when it comes to 

waste. 

By contrast, in Erbil, the parallel water treatment project—the 

fourth largest project we did in Iraq—is a smashing success. It’s 

providing fresh water to the people of the capital city of Kurdistan 

now. 

And why? Because the Kurds committed to it and they did have 

a sustainment plan that they executed. Sustainment is a huge 

issue in any future operation. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate your testimony. You know, we’re talking 

about fraud, waste and abuse and we need to have transparency 

and oversight and all that. And I hear that in every meeting I come 

to but we never find that person that’s held accountable at the top. 

And, you know, with the money that we looked at spending in 

Iraq, $60 billion I think is what I have, and then close to $100 billion in Afghanistan, without the oversight, it just seems when we 

go back to our district—in fact, that’s one of the reasons I’m here—

is the American people are tired of that. We’ve got to change our 

foreign policy and what we do. 

And the reason it worked in Japan and Germany is we beat the 

stink out of them and they surrendered. Nobody surrendered here, 

and so for us to go into a stable—a non-stable government and try 

to rebuild, it’s almost insanity, I think, or ludicrous that we do that 

without that clear defined goal. 

And now we’re looking at Syria to do it again. I want to ask specifically what do you see as the role of the American Government 

in the Middle East? 

Is there a different way that we can approach the Middle East 

to bring stability to that area instead of going in there and bombing, people die and then we have to look at rebuilding with the 

waste, fraud and abuse? That’s the one question. 

37

The other one is, if you could take us through a scenario of how 

money is given to this agency and how it’s tracked so that we don’t 

get into this again. And I—you know, unfortunately, I think we’ll 

be involved somewhere in the future and I’d rather not see that. 

I’d hate to see our young men and women go overseas. They need 

to stay here and build America strong. So I look forward to hearing 

you. 

Mr. HERBST. You ask a big question when you ask if we can provide stability in the Middle East. I think it’s safe to say that it is 

beyond our means to provide stability in each and every country in 

the Middle East. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Mr. HERBST. And we will bankrupt ourselves if we try. We can 

offer an environment and we can, by prudent relations, promote 

stability and that should be part of our goals. And we can also, in 

specific countries at specific times, make a significant difference. 

But we have to be very careful before we go in. We have to have 

excellent intelligence. We have to have goals that are sufficiently 

limited that we can achieve them and goals that are consistent 

with the culture, political and social, of the country where we engage. 

And that means we have to look carefully every time before we 

decide to intervene. And for that, we need to have, again, a serious 

corps of professionals and leaders with wisdom and humility. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Mr. BOWEN. And Dr. Yoho, with regard to reducing fraud, waste 

and abuse in future operations, this is what USOCO would do. 

It would reduce the cost of preparing and executing and overseeing such operations by ensuring that there was effective planning that afforded our national command authorities options. 

That’s what USOCO would do. 

And more importantly, it would not rely on coordination on the 

ground after the operation begins, which is what occurred in Iraq 

and which is what occurred in Afghanistan and which didn’t work. 

That coordination must move to interagency integration so that 

these—there is a civ-mil capacity that exists before the operation 

begins and that’s done the work ahead of time to ensure that there 

are controls in place so that the projects and programs succeed and 

that fraud, waste and abuse is reduced. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, because I was reading in here about the Army 

Corps of Engineers. They did a program where they were burying 

the pipelines and it was billions of dollars. And you were saying 

that we have to rely on better experts and things like that. I mean, 

how do you get better than the United States of America? 

You know, it’s just not acceptable that we’re spending this money 

there and then we go back to our taxpayers and say, hey, guess 

what, you got to send more money in and we’re borrowing 43 cents 

on every dollar to send over here. And it’s just—if we don’t have 

the experts now and they go over there, what are we doing? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, accountability is the key. 

Mr. YOHO. All right, accountability. Who’s——

Mr. BOWEN. Imposing accountability. 

Mr. YOHO. Who’s held accountable? 

38

Mr. BOWEN. And that’s the problem. There’s no one in charge 

now. There was no in charge in Iraq specifically for the rebuilding 

program. 

And when the Commission on Wartime Contracting held its 

hearing on Afghanistan and called State, Defense and AID to the 

table and said, who’s in charge of the rebuilding program, they 

couldn’t provide an answer. That’s what USOCO would do. 

You know, Mike Brown was there to fire when FEMA failed. You 

know, there’s no one there to fire now when a stabilization and reconstruction operation doesn’t go well because it’s not centralized, 

it’s not coordinated, it’s not—there’s no one identified with accountability for the operation. USOCO would solve that problem. 

Mr. YOHO. I yield back. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. Cicilline is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you again to 

the witnesses. 

You know, the contrast of the quality and service of our brave 

men and women in uniform to—compared to the conduct described 

in this report is really stark, and very, very disturbing. And so I 

have—I want to ask, really, three separate questions. 

First is what role does the pervasive corruption in Iraq play in 

this reconstruction effort? You note in the report at Page 104 that 

the United States invested over $67 million since September—as of 

September 2012 in anti-corruption efforts. 

And despite this support for the fight against corruption, apparently little changed between 2003 and 2012 and that Iraq remains 

consistently one of the most corrupt countries in the world. 

I remember from my visit to Iraq hearing from a constituent who 

was part of the rule of law working group about the challenges. 

So I’d like to hear from you about what—whether or not that sort 

of pervasive local corruption impacts the reconstruction efforts, obviously, and our accountability that we’re seeking. 

Second, I’d like to hear from you about the police development 

program. I actually saw that while I was there. Apparently, it 

wasted over $200 million to train Iraqi police that both Baghdad 

didn’t need or want. How did that happen? How does a program 

that no one wants and that’s that ineffective occur? 

And finally, how do you conclude that this new agency would 

somehow provide the kind of streamlining and oversight that we 

have a right to expect? I think the American people see what this 

report reveals and they’ve become enraged at the kind of waste 

when we see crumbling infrastructure in cities and towns all across 

America and we’re told we don’t have the resources to rebuild our 

own country, and we see the colossal waste that occurred in the reconstruction of Iraq. 

And it is, I think, is properly a source of great rage from the 

American people. So I’d like you to address those three issues, 

please. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. The corruption issue in 

Iraq continues to daunt the country, to limit its capacity to grow 

and to hold it back from making progress out of the situation in 

which it’s currently mired. 

39

And as Dr. Basit, who’s the head of the Board of Supreme Audit, 

their chief oversight entity, told me when I interviewed him last 

year, corruption has become an institution in Iraq and it takes the 

form of money laundering-up to $20 billion to $30 billion lost annually to money laundering in Iraq, by some estimates, by his estimate. 

And that drains the economy of its resources and keeps the majority of the population in poverty-stricken circumstances. 

The police development program failed to succeed because of the 

lack of consultation with the minister of interior. When we did our 

audit of it, we met with Minister al-Assadi and he said to us that 

it was shaped and formatted in a way that didn’t really meet his 

needs. 

Yet it was far down the road at that point and upon issuance of 

the audit it began to roll back and eventually was concluded earlier 

this year because of the lack of buy-in. Curiously, you know, this 

late into the program, still there was a consultation problem. 

USOCO would address the fraud, waste and abuse issues, the 

planning issues, the execution issues, by ensuring accountability 

and transparency throughout the process. But most importantly, it 

would promote integration. 

These are civ-mil operations. If you accept that and you accept 

the fact that our current system is not promoting or advancing toward greater civ-mil capacity, then I think reform is necessary. 

There is no other proposal on the table. There is no other office 

in place within the executive branch now that is advancing that interest. 

And that interest ultimately is tied to our national security architecture and protecting our interest in the region. Not learning 

from Iraq, not implementing this kind of reform will leave us worse 

off. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Just a follow-up question. Your report reveals 

that—or references an audit that was done in 2012 that concluded 

that roughly $1 billion was transferred out of Iraq each week via 

currency auctions conducted by the Central Bank and up to $800 

million was laundered money transferred illegally under false pretenses. 

And that cumulatively over the course of a year, this presents 

the possibility that up to $40 billion was leaving the country annually because of corruption. Do you have a sense of what percentage 

of that is American taxpayer money? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is all Iraq money. That is oil and gas money 

flowing from the development fund for Iraq, not U.S. money, and 

that comes from an audit from the Board of Supreme Audit, Iraq’s 

oversight entity, that was related to me by Dr. Basit. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

Another wonderful Iraq vet, Mr. Collins, is recognized. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I appreciate it. I think one of the things that I appreciate in this 

discussion on the questions on both sides is this is a dialogue. This 

is one of the things that I think needs to happen. 

40

And I think what’s interesting, though, is coming to the table 

and thinking about the correlation between World War II and now. 

I think there’s an interesting correlation. 

One, there is no correlation because there were different aspects 

of this. In going into Iraq, as we did, when you’re fighting a war 

and trying to rebuild the place at the same time is not the best way 

to go about it and also, and I think one of the statements that was 

made about not taking into account local interest in this, and that’s 

something we’ve got to look at. 

The question I have, though, comes, and I think it was—one of 

them was the corps of professionals and you keep mentioning 

USOCO, and we’ll get to that in just a second. 

It was interesting to me that there was a breakdown of 75, 15, 

and 10, of the money—75 percent DoD, 15 AID, and then 10 State. 

Even in the past, if you want to use past knowledge, State Department involvement usually would be higher, especially in these 

internals. 

Is that something that you see—and I want to do it short because I got several things I want to get to—State Department role, 

especially in this issue, if we’re there does it seem like it needs to 

be higher? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, Mr. Collins, it does, and especially given the 

fact that the State Department was given policy authority over the 

entire reconstruction program. So you had the authority in one 

agency, yet you had the contracting capacity all in another agency, 

and as I saw it repeatedly on the ground that led to friction that 

led to failure. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, and that’s what I want to follow up because 

it’s disturbing to me that we’re throwing Syria around as quickly 

as we are here and the fact of where we’re at and there has been 

clear evidence of a lot of things going on in Syria. 

And one of the statements, Mr. Herbst, I believe that you made 

that, you know, our job is to go in, for a paraphrase, is to help 

those who are—and I think we’ve got a concern here. 

Because the very things that you’re talking about, when we start 

looking at Syria or we start, you know, Egypt or anywhere else is 

us being involved in a way militarily that’s so functionally different 

in those environments than Iraq and Afghanistan. 

My concern goes back to, if USOCO is implemented, what is the 

cost? What is your estimated cost to set up USOCO? 

Mr. BOWEN. $25 million per year. 

Mr. COLLINS. And who would it report to? I’ve looked at your appendix and I’ve looked at the draft bill. Is it a stand-alone new 

agency? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Where’s the direct reporting? 

Mr. BOWEN. It reports to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and also to the National Security Advisor for Policy. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. That right there I see is an issue right there. 

You have three bosses. 

Mr. BOWEN. I actually report to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, and because they’re civ-mil—these operations—

41

it makes sense. These are unique operations, a creature of the modern era and a——

Mr. COLLINS. But also a direct appointment by the President, 

correct? 

Mr. BOWEN. That’s right. 

Mr. COLLINS. That’s what I read in your draft——

Mr. BOWEN. That’s right. 

Mr. COLLINS. So——

Mr. BOWEN. With Senate confirmation. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. So it would be, as you made note over the 

FEMA issue, we’d fire that person. The President could fire that 

person——

Mr. BOWEN. That’s right. 

Mr. COLLINS [continuing]. That we look at. As we look forward 

here, one of the last things that you stated in one of your lessons 

learned was plan in advance, plan comprehensively in an integrated fashion, have backup plans ready to go. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. One of the issues—and I don’t want to go 

back too far here, but is that in World War II—because it’s been 

referenced before, if all the history that you would read there is 

that the first couple years we were focused on winning the war. 

And then there came the transition as we came to the reconstruction end. 

What I found troubling in Iraq was that it seems to be all of a 

sudden we’re there—oh, my God, what do we do, and then how do 

we do this, and they were sent in to reconstruct. 

Now, we’re not going to discuss the actual reasons why. But that 

is a concern for me. Are you looking at USOCO being an agency 

that is the front end to say—let’s just use an example wherever we 

may go into X state—for whatever reason we decide that firm military involvement needs to be there on a large scale, would you be 

trying to do, again, to repeat the problems of Iraq where you go in 

before the fighting is over? 

Or are we looking at something that where there’s—let’s finish 

it, let’s secure it and then begin our rebuilding process? 

Mr. BOWEN. It would be the latter. I mean, a key lesson from 

Iraq is to ensure sufficient security exists before relief and reconstruction activity pursues in earnest. 

But the ultimate goal of USOCO with regard to planning, Mr. 

Collins, is to provide national command authorities with options; in 

other words, a range of choices with regard to the nature of the aid 

that you might provide to country X, so that you’re not limited by 

circumstances. 

In Iraq, we planned to liberate and leave. We were going to be 

gone by September. But within 6 weeks of arriving in the country 

we shifted to occupy and rebuild with no structure, with no system 

in place to sustain such an operation. 

Mr. COLLINS. And I appreciate your work and you have done yeoman’s work here on both, and I appreciate that. 

I think the concern that I have looking forward here is implementation of USOCO, implementation of this in a—what we’ll call 

a different environment which Iraq and Afghanistan stand alone. 

42

And then you’ve got the smaller areas on how are we fitting in and 

how will that fit in long-term. 

I think these are Madam Chair, I think these are things that we 

need to discuss, especially in the Middle East as we go forward, because that has been the hot spot right now in which we have to 

deal with. 

But it also concerns me deeply that we’re discussing—and we 

throw numbers around here—we’re discussing taxpayer dollars. 

These are dollars that men and women do not understand when we 

send overseas and we don’t have a clear, defined role. 

I think we’ve had a long discussion of where we’ve disconnected 

what foreign aid should be and what it should be about as to what 

we have seen recently and I think that has contributed to the distrust that Americans feel. 

And we have got to restore that trust and this report helps in 

that regard. But I think we’ve got to continue to follow up. Madam 

Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good. Excellent points. And we have 

been joined by the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. 

Engel. We’re so thrilled to have you. How are we doing so far? 

Doing all right? Okay. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida is recognized. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I know——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to your son for his service. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Oh, and thank you, too, for your family and to our 

members who have served. 

So I have another family confession, which is my son also served 

in USAID. So this does not make me an expert, either in the military or in the State Department, okay. I want to say that. 

But I’ve tried to have many discussions with my son about this. 

And incidentally, he now runs a wine bar. He owns a wine bar. So 

you can see he’s changed his direction. 

But here’s what I want to say. First of all, you know, when I 

read this memo from our chairlady—thank you for this memo—one 

thing that really jumps out at me is that SIGIR estimates that 

DoD managed 75 percent of the reconstruction funds. 

That should give a real red alert that the DoD should not be 

managing reconstruction. And, in fact, I mean, I am very, very 

proud of the military. I know you mentioned how they are professional, they’re trained. But I question whether or not their training 

is in development. 

I know—my son trained to be an artillery officer and—which he 

was. And I think that’s a very different job than training to do development. So I think that one of the mistakes we made is having 

the Defense Department manage reconstruction. 

Number two, you talked about USAID, and maybe what I would 

just respectfully suggest is that instead of a new bureaucracy, 

which is called the USOCO, I think one of the failings of government is that every time an agency doesn’t seem to be doing well, 

instead of looking to see what the real problem is we decide to create a new problem. 

Maybe I just want to respectfully suggest—and I’d like to hear 

your comments—maybe USAID is not funded. Maybe USAID does 

not have the authority it needs and maybe if USAID was in charge 

43

of reconstruction, rather than the military, maybe we’d have a different outcome. 

Now, with that said, I’m not sure that either USAID fully funded 

or professionalized to the degree that we would like it to be, that 

our reconstruction efforts were worthwhile either in Iraq or Afghanistan. But we can save that for another day. 

Mr. HERBST. Thank you. You raise a valid question, whether or 

not we need a new bureaucracy or we simply use the bureaucracies 

we have. 

My opinion is that the USAID that existed 40 years ago, the 

USAID that was engaged in Vietnam, would have been able to do 

the reconstruction operation in Iraq or Afghanistan much better 

than we have managed to do it ourselves. 

Conceivably, you could recreate USAID. You would have to infuse it with substantial resources. It’s an agency based almost entirely on contractors. You have to hire many, many more professionals. 

You’d also have to institute a rather drastic cultural change. The 

assistance community in the United States and around the world 

believes very much in assistance for assistance’s sake, as opposed 

to assistance in direct support of American national interests. 

And there are wonderful professionals at USAID but most of 

them believe that. That is not the type of culture that would do a 

stability operation correctly. 

My sense is that given how USAID functions today—and it does 

a wonderful job in what it does—you probably would be faster, 

more efficient by creating a USOCO than trying to redo it with—

in USAID. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Did you want to——

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. I concur with Ambassador Herbst. The reality 

is USAID today functions chiefly through contracting out its work, 

about 80 percent. And so to absorb it within one agency I think has 

already been attempted at State by—through Ambassador Herbst’s 

office, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

Ultimately, placing it within any one agency—State, DoD, 

USAID—will imbue the operation with that particular bureaucracy’s biases. 

And by providing it independence, pulling it out, you’re able to 

develop a new culture, a civ-mil culture, that ensures, Ms. Frankel, 

I think your key point, that a civilian leads the reconstruction mission. 

You led with that, and I totally concur with it. And part of the 

motivation behind the creation of USOCO would be to ensure a civilian lead for our stabilization and reconstruction operations rather than at each appropriation, at each supplemental, having this 

bidding war almost to decide who gets what share of the rebuilding 

money as occurred so often in the course of the Iraq rebuilding venture. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. 

Mr. DeSantis, another Florida colleague, and thank you for your 

service in Iraq. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thanks to the 

witnesses. I really appreciate this. I appreciate the report. 

44

The report obviously talks about that initial decision to fire 

deBa’athification, fire the security forces. General Petraeus, I 

think, was correctly critical of that. 

And I’m just curious, was it just assumed that those folks would 

not have wanted to participate in a new Iraqi Government or was 

there actually evidence that led us to pursue deBa’athification? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think it was influenced by the Iraqi leadership in 

charge and the Shia leadership that were pushing the removal of 

former Sunnis within the government at a level deeper than had 

initially been planned in pre-war plans. 

And that led to, essentially, as has been described by a number 

of interviewees, of—to a firing of the government and the capacity 

was difficult to fill and took years of training and governance assistance. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Appreciate that. In terms of the report, it talks 

about the rule of law efforts that were undertaken, and I remember 

when I was there, I mean, there was a court, I remember built an 

Iraq. We’d send detainees there, what not. 

But was there any measurable success in the time and resources 

that we put into the rule of law while we were there? I know you 

said it’s deteriorated recently. 

But from the time we started—I don’t know when—I know it was 

going on in ’07 and ’08. Was that just a failure? 

Mr. BOWEN. No. I think the interview with Chief Justice Medhat, 

who was also the chair of the Higher Judicial Council in Iraq, indicated that he was satisfied with the support on a number of rule 

of law projects, particularly the Major Crimes Task Force and the 

Judicial Security Support. 

Forty-four judges were killed in Iraq over the last 10 years and 

there was much intimidation of the judiciary by terroristic elements, which prevented the effective rule of law. Over time, that 

security improved and with its improvement came an overall improvement to the rule of law system. 

Mr. DESANTIS. In terms of the corruption, you know, obviously, 

I think in some of the mismanagement of funds, there was some 

serious examples of waste of taxpayer money. 

But is it the case that, you know, sometimes this corruption is 

embedded into the cultures; that is, are there not limits to what 

even a well-administered stabilization operation can achieve in 

terms of rooting out corruption? 

And if that’s the case, specifically with respect to Iraq, I mean, 

do you think that that is just part of kind of what we found when 

we got there? 

Mr. BOWEN. There was a culture of corruption in Iraq and to 

some extent it affects the region. Saddam certainly managed a formalized corrupt system of patronage. 

But our efforts to try and alter that didn’t really alter the culture 

as we’ve seen, as our reporting demonstrates, and as the Iraqis 

have told me. That culture is an almost institutionalized element 

within the system now and billions, tens of billions are being lost 

to money laundering. 

It’s upon them. It’s their duty, it’s their system, it’s their sovereignty now to address it and they are beginning to address it. 

But too much has been lost over the last 10 years. 

45

Mr. DESANTIS. And then, finally, in terms of the CERP project, 

you know, I remember that was being done when I was there and 

it just seemed to me, like, there were some benefits, but this is just 

me on a very low level seeing some of this. 

And I didn’t get a chance to read, you know, kind of how the report appraised that. But from standing here today, do you think 

that that was an effective use of dollars, given the circumstances 

that these commanders were facing at the time? 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, Mr. DeSantis. Our CERP study—our special report on CERP—demonstrated significant reporting from battalion 

commanders about successful CERP projects when they were managed at a limited level, under $100,000. That was the initial plan to—that they should be $25,000 to 

50,000. And tens of thousands of projects at that level were accomplished I think to good effect, especially those local grants, you remember, that helped local businesses accomplish small projects. However, when they became $1 million, $5 million, $10 million 

projects, and then they extended beyond the life of the deployed 

elements, then we lost oversight and then waste and fraud occurred. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. And then, just finally, Mr. Herbst, 

you had mentioned about us not being prepared to do some of these 

operations and so you would not advise us to get involved in a nation-building/stabilization type enterprise in that region right now? 

Mr. HERBST. I think we should be very careful before we make 

any decisions to go in at the present time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. I appreciate the witnesses. I enjoyed 

it. Thanks, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thanks, Mr. DeSantis. 

Now we will recognize Mr. Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I think 

I’ve figured out the button here finally. So thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Only supposed to learn that in your second 

year of service, Juan. 

Mr. VARGAS. It usually takes me about two or three, so thank 

you, Madam Chair. 

First of all, I appreciate very much the testimony that you’ve 

given here today and the information you provided. You know, I 

think for most Americans, when you think of rebuilding you do 

think of the Marshall Plan. I certainly do. And I think of it as a 

success. 

One of the things that you bring out in the report, interestingly, 

is the second point for your seven final lessons learned and that 

was that you begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security and focus first on small programs and projects. 

You know, the Marshall Plan began—I don’t know, you may recall—it didn’t begin right after the war ended. In fact, the Marshall 

Plan didn’t begin until 2 years after the war ended and it was because we had that fear, of course, of the spread of Soviet communism. 

So that’s when President Truman said we’re going to have this 

plan. It was somewhat controversial. 

I went back and looked at the numbers—I thought they were 

going to be important—because I do recall the numbers being giVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:11 Sep 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\070913\81868 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gantic. And it turns out that we spent about $13 billion when we 

had a GDP then of $258 billion for the United States. So it was 

a rather large amount of money. 

There was some controversy with it. But at the same time, people generally understood and the American people got behind it 

saying, yes, those are our allies. They’re enemies now but they’re 

going to be allies long term. 

So, I mean, I appreciate the timing but I think the second part 

is important. That is, that Europe was going to be friendly. It 

doesn’t seem to be necessarily the case with, you know, Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Could you comment a little bit about that? 

Because I think that’s one of the things I think that have the 

American people at some unease because they don’t seem like—it 

doesn’t seem—you know, every dollar we give to Israel we think 

that’s fantastic because they’re friends—they’re going to be friends 

forever—we’re protecting them—you know, we’re on the same 

wavelength on everything. Every dollar you spend on Iraq or Afghanistan, it doesn’t feel right. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, Mr. Vargas. Two points. One, on the Marshall 

Plan, you’re right. We spent 2 years planning for it and thus the 

element of planning to a successful stabilization, reconstruction 

and rebuilding program is proven through the success of the Marshall Plan. 

Also, curious, interestingly, the Marshall Plan’s operational entity, the ECA, reported to two Cabinet secretaries. So there is precedent for that as we’ve described for USOCO. 

With regard to receptivity of the local populace, there is a lesson 

from Iraq on that. In fact, there were two rebuilding programs in 

effect in Iraq—the one in Kurdistan, the northern three provinces, 

and then the one in the southern 15. 

Virtually all the projects in Kurdistan where we were welcomed, 

where we were well received, where we did have substantial support, were successful. Most of the projects in the south were not. 

I think that’s reflective of your core point that ensuring stability, 

local stability, local buy-in, local consultation, local engagement, 

are key to successful programs and projects. 

Mr. VARGAS. How about you, Ambassador? 

Mr. HERBST. There’s no question that our interventions in Germany and Japan were successful, even before the Marshall Plan 

and that’s because, as we’ve all mentioned, the Japanese and the 

Germans accepted our presence as legitimate in the wake of their 

defeat. 

In Iraq, that was never accepted except among the Kurds, because the Kurds had had a very bad time under Saddam Hussein’s 

regime and also the Kurds looked to us as natural friends. 

The Shia were also repressed under Saddam but they did not 

necessarily see us as friends. And so our intervention in Iraq was 

always going to be much more difficult in the post-military phase 

because we were not fully accepted. 

Mr. VARGAS. And I think that’s the unease, I think, that the 

American people feel. I mean, I do think that there is a real unease 

that we have as Americans that we’re spending so much money 

there and that in a few years when we leave they’re not going to 

be our friends. 

47

I mean, they’re going to see the world very differently than we 

do and our allies in the region are going to be their enemies. In 

other words, they’re not going to line up on the same side. 

Mr. HERBST. I think that’s the reason why we need to be cautious as we decide to engage in these countries. 

Mr. VARGAS. Any other comment on that? 

Mr. BOWEN. USOCO would ensure caution because it would offer 

options. We would not be driven by circumstances as was the case 

in Iraq when we shifted from a plan to leave in 2003 to one that 

ended up requiring us to stay for 10 years. 

And USOCO would also provide accountability and transparency 

that it would—that I think would assuage those just concerns that 

the American people have about their dollars being wasted in these 

operations. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

And we thank our excellent witnesses for wonderful testimony. 

And to conclude our subcommittee, I will just read into the record 

the seven final lessons from Iraq based on the final report from the 

Inspector General. 

Number one, create an integrated civilian military office to plan, 

execute and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities 

during stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Two, begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security 

and focus first on small programs and projects. 

Three, ensure full host country engagement in program and 

project selection, securing commitments to share costs, possibly 

through loans, and agreements to sustain completed projects after 

their transfer. 

Four, establish uniform contracting personnel and information 

management systems that all SRO participants use. 

Five, require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation’s inception. 

Six, preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program, that produce success when used judiciously. 

And lastly, seven, plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in 

an integrated fashion and have backup plans ready to go. 

Excellent, gentlemen. We appreciate your testimony. We look forward to working with you in the months ahead. And with that, the 

subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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