FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J UNE 21 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1548 9 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-01830 -CV -O RL -31-KR S DA RRE LL J. Y OU

NG , I ndiv iduallyand as guardian of Da 'Mond Young, a m inor, EME RAL D MC NE IL , I ndiv iduallyand as guardian of Da 'Mond Young, a m inor, Pl ai nti ff s- Appe lle es , ve rs us DO NA LD F. ES LING ER , in his official c apacity as the Sheriff

of Sem inole Coun ty

Sherif f's O ffice , CH A RL E S B. F A G A

N , D ep uty

S he ri ff , in his in di vi du al cap aci ty, etal., D ef en dants -Appe llants .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ (J un e 21, 200 7) Be fo re BI RC H , MA RC U S an d C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.2

PE R CU RIA M: Plaintiffs D arre ll J. Y oung and Em erald McN eil, a cting for them selves and as guardians of their m inor son Da ’ Mond Young, su ed Donald Eslinger, in his official
ca pa ci ty a s th e Sh er if

f of S em ino le Co unty ; De puty Sh er if fs Ch ar le s F ag an , Wytos ia W ile y , a nd J ef

fr ey W ilb ur ; S en ior

A ge nt Ray Br onso n; an d Se rg eant Je ff D unc an , a ll in th ei r in di vi du al cap aci ti es . T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtg r a n t e ds u mmary j u d g me n t t o D e f e n d a n t s o n a l l c l a i ms
ex cep t: (1) th e Co un t VII S ect io n 1 98 3 F ou rth Am en dm en t cl ai m s ag ai nst D ef en da nts Fa g a n , W i l e y , W i l b u r , B r o n s o n , a n d D u n c a n ; a n d ( 2 ) t h e C o u n t I s t a t e la w f al se
ar re st/ im pr iso nm en t c la im

a ga ins t D ef

en dant E sli nge r. T he D ef en dants ( ex ce pt f

or W ile y ) ap pe al the de nia ls o f sum m ar y j udgm en t. Af ter initial briefs w ere filed in this case, the c ourt is sued a j urisdictio nal qu es ti on . Hav in g rev ie wedth e p art ie s’ su bm is si on s i n re sp on se to th atqu es ti on , we
co nc lud e tha t w e ha ve jur isd ic tio n to de ci de the qua lif ie d im m uni ty que sti ons pr es en te d in the ap pe al
. Bu t, w e do not ex er ci se j ur isd ic tio n to r ev ie wthe de nia l of
sum m ar y j udgm en t t o D ef

en dant E sli nge r on the state law fa lse a rr es t/i m pr iso nm en t cl ai m . E sli nge r ar gue s that the dis tr ic t cour t er re d in de ny ing him sum

m ar y j udgm en t on thi s claim

because: (1) under F lorida law, probable cause is a com plete bar to such
an act io n, an d (2 ) pr ob ab le cau se ex i s t e d t o st op , det ai n, an d s earc h P la in ti ffs . He3

doe s no t arg ue tha t he is enti tle d to sum m ar y j udgm en t be ca

use he e nj oy ed

a ny kin d of im m uni ty f or his a ct ion s. T his is not

a n a ppe al of a fi na l j udgm en t, so we ha ve no ind ep en de nt j ur isdic tio n to c onsi de r w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in de ny ing E sli nge r sum

m ary jud gm en t onthi s c la im
. A nd, w e de cl ine to ex er ci se a ny dis cr et ion ar

y pe nde nt a

ppe llat e juri sdi ct ionw e m ay ha ve be ca

use E sli nge r is n ot a party to the appe al of

the qua lif

ie d im m uni ty iss ue s, a nd the que sti on he ra ise s is n ot

“ ne ce ssary to ens ur e m eanin gf ul r ev ie w ” of

the qua lif ie d im m uni ty de ci sio n be ca

use
w e re sol ve the qua lif

ie d im m uni ty qu es tio ns b y

f ind ing a rg uable pr oba

ble c as e an d/o r arg ua bl e rea so na bl e su sp ic io n. Swint v. Chambers County Comm 'n , 514 U
. S. 35, 51, 115 S. Ct. 1203 , 1212 (1995). 42 U . S. C . § 19 83 W e con clude that the district court erred in deny ing Defe ndants Fagan, W ilbur, Bro nson , a nd D unc ansum m ar y j udgm en t onthe S ec tio n 19 83 F ourth A m en dm en t cl ai m s. E ac h D ef

en dant i s e nti tle d to ase parate a na ly sis of th e ap pli ca bil ity of the q u al i fied im

m unitydoctrine to his action s. I m portantly , f

or purposes of each in di vi du a l De f

e n d a n t ’s qu a l i f

i e di mm u n i t y d e f e n s e t o aF o u rt h Ame n d men tc l a im , we do no t ask whether r easona b l e suspicion or probable cause ac tually existed. When a lawenforce m ent officer seeks summ ary

j udgm ent on the basis of qualified im m unity , w e determi ne o nl y

“ ‘ whe the r

r e a so na bl e o f f icers in the sam e circ um stances4

and poss essing th e s ame knowledge as the D efendants could have believed th at [rea sonable su spicion or] probable cause exi sted.’ ” Swint v. City of W adley, Ala ba ma , 51 F. 3d 988, 996 (1 1th Ci r. 199 5) ( quot ing Von Stein v. Brescher , 904 F
. 2d 572, 579 ( 11th C ir
. 1990 )) ; se e als o J ac ks on v . Sau ls , 206 F. 3d 1156, 1165 -6 6 ( 11th Ci r. 200 0) ( ci tin g Sw int , 51 F. 3d at 996 ). De putyFagan De putyFagan w as the uniform ed officer who s topp ed Plaintiffs’ vehicle. A cc or din g to the und isp ute d f ac ts, D ep uty

F ag an st opped the ve hic le on the instructio n of another officer
. Fagan w as provided with inform ation that th ere wa s
an unrestrained child in Plaintiffs’ vehicle. And, Fagan knew that his duty on t hat da y was to s top ve hic le s th at ha d be enide nti fi ed

by und er co ve r of

fi ce rs a s be ing inv olv ed in a dr ug inv es tig at ion
. G ive n th is i nf orm at ion , F ag ana ct ed

w itha rg uable
re as ona ble sus pic ionin pe rf

orm ing the sto p and d et ai nin g P la int if fs unt il th e d

r u g dog
a r r i ve d. Se e U

nit ed Sta tes v . P er

ki ns , 3 48 F
. 3d

9 65 , 9 70 ( 11 t h C i r . 2 003). Furtherm ore, after

De puty Wil b u r and his drug dog circled the vehicle, F agan wa s inf orm ed by W ilb ur that th e do g ha d a le rt ed to dr ugs in P la int if

fs ’ ve hic le
. T hus, whe n h e se arch edPla in ti ffs ’ ve hi cl e, Fag an act ed wit h arg ua bl e pr ob ab le cau se . See M erre tt v. M

oore , 58 F. 3d 1547 , 155 1 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1995 ) (“ [A ] n alert by a narc otics5

trained dog establishes probable cause to believe a car contains illegal narcotics.”)
. F a g a n i s e n t i t l e dt o qu a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. D ep uty W ilb ur De putyW ilbur was the offic er w ho hand led the drug do g. He also p articipated in the se ar chof

P la int if fs ’ ve hic le af

te r he pe rc ei ve d th at

the dr ug d og a le rt ed

to the pr es en ce of dr

ugs in the ve hic le
. Pl ai nti ff s dis put e w he the r the dog ac tua lly a le rt ed ; but , the y do n ot p ro vid e an y

e vid en ce to ra ise a n issue of fa ct as to whe the r W ilb ur be lie ve d th at

the dog a le rt ed
. W ilb ur him se lf te sti fi ed to tha t be lie f. Gi ve n the
unc ontro ve rt ed

e vid en ce that W ilb ur

be li ev ed that the dr

ug d og a le rt ed

to the pr es en ce of

dr ugs in P la int if

fs ’ ve hic le , W ilb ur

a ct ed w itha rg uable pr oba

ble c au se i n p r o c e e d i n g t o s e a r c h P l a i n t i f f s ’ v e h i c l e . Wi l b u r i s e n t i t l e dt o qu a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. Se nio r A ge nt B ro nson Se nio r A ge nt B ro nsonr ece ive d in fo rm at ionf ro m a nothe r of

fi ce r in the f

ie ld that a vehicle conform ing to the description as Plaintiffs’ s vehicle had been invol ved in a drug transaction with the subject of an ong oing narcotics investigatio n. Ba sed on that i n fo rmation, S enior Agent Br onso n ordered the stop of Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Bronson ac ted as a reasonable officer poss essing this knowledge w ould ; he h ad
a r g u ab l e r e a s o n ab l e s u s p i c i o n . Th u s , h e i s e n t i t l e dt o qu a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. Sergeant Duncan6

Se rg eant D unc anw as not inv olv ed in the sto p or

se ar chof P la int if fs or the ir
ve hic le
. H is o nly

r ole on the day

in que sti on wa s to rad io to othe r of fi ce rs w orkin g the narcotics case that he had seen a transaction at t he gas station b etwe en Earl Jack W illiam s (a known drug dealer) and persons in a dark SU V. Whether Plaintiffs w ere the pe rs ons D unc ansawa t the st at ionm ay be dis put ed , but

w ha t he r ep orte d is not i n d i s p u t e. Pl ai n t i ff

s o ff ern o ev i d en ce ra i s i n g a n i s s u e o f f ac tre g ar d i n g Du n ca n ’s
ve ra ci ty in re portin g w ha t he saw . Mo re ove r, D unc an did not or de r the sto p. H e did not detain Plainti ffs. He did not participate in the searc h. F or those reasons, D uncan
cannot be he ld l ia

ble f or a ny vio la tio n of

P la int if fs ’ F ourth A m en dm en t r igh ts. Fo r the fo re goi ng re as ons, D ef en dant E sli nge r’ s a

ppe al is D IS MI SS E D
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of

sum m ar y j udgm en t f

or D ef en dants F ag an , W ilb ur , Br onso n,
an d Du nc an on th e Sec ti on 19 83 cla im s i s REVERSED. T he cas e is REMANDED
w ithi n s tr u c tio ns t o e nte r sum

m ar y j udgm en t f

or D ef en dants F ag an , W ilb ur , Br onso n,
an d Du nc an on th e Sec ti on 19 83 Fo ur th Am en dm en t cl ai m s. DISMI SSED IN PAR T; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED W ITH IN ST RUC TI ON S.