2014 UT App 277

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E A L S

D AN NY’ S D R

YW AL LAND A M E RI C AN L I B E R T Y I N S UR AN C E C O ., Peti tioners,

v. L AB OR C OMMI S S I O N AND R AF A E L S UA S T E GUI B E R NAL, Respondents.
Opin i on No. 20121077-CA Filed N ov ember 20, 2014

Or i gin al Proceedi ng i n thi s Court

Mar k D. Dean, Kris ty L. Ber telsen, and ScottR. Taylor , Att or neys for Petiti oners Jaces on R. Maug han, Atto rney fo r Respondent

Labor Co mmi ssi on
Aaro n J. P risbrey and Trev or C. Sander s, Atto rneys for Re spondent Rafael SuasteguiBernal

S E N I OR J UD G E R US S E L L W. B E N C H authore d thi s Opini on, i n whi ch J UD G E S M I C H E L E M. C HRI S T I AN S E N and J OH N A. P E ARC E

concu rr ed. 1

BENCH, Seni or Judge:

¶1 Da nny ’s Drywall and i ts insu rer , Americ an Li ber t y Insurance Co., (collecti vely , Employer) petiti on for judi ci al rev i ew
o f a Labor Commi ssi on deci si on awarding permanent to t a l

1. The Honor able Russ e l l W

. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by speci al assi gnment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6)

.Danny’s Drywall v. Labor Commission

di sabi li ty benefi ts to Rafael Suastegui Bernal (Clai mant). We do not di sturb the Commi ssi on’s deci si on.

BACKGRO UND

¶2 On February 17, 2009, whi le work ing as a drywall installer for Danny’s Drywall, Clai mant “fell 14 feet from a ladder a nd scaffold.” He suffered ext ensi ve bone fractures in hi s face and right hand, as well as tear s in the mus cles and ca r t ilag e of hi s right sho ulder. He also exper i enced back and neck pain. Follo wing tr eatment, Clai mant reached medical stabi li ty from hi s hand and shoulder injuries, but headaches and conti nued chroni c pain in hi s right jaw, neck, and lower back a ff e ct ed hi s acti vity level and abi li ty to sleep. He was event ually di agnosed wi th several tor n and bulging di scs in hi s bac k.

¶3 In April 2010, Clai mant fi led an applic ation for permanent tot al di sabi li ty benefi ts. After a hearin g, the Admini strat i ve Law Judge (th e A L J) deci ded that, due to the confli cting medi cal evidenc e concerning Cl a i m a n t’ s m e d i c a l a n d f u n c ti on a l l i mi tations,

a final deter mina ti on on hi s e li gib i li ty for permanent tot al di sabi li ty benefi ts could not be made wi thout an indep e nd e nt medi cal

rev i ew. As a result, in June 2011, the ALJ appoi nted a medica l panel, consi sting of speci ali sts in pain management and psy chi a try. In the medi cal panel refer ral lette r, the ALJ informed the panel that it wa s “bound by the Fin dings of Fact and Conclus i ons of L a w contai ned in my Inter i m Or der.” As the ALJ explain ed, “[t]he facts

are the hi stor i cal and o t he r l e g al data reg ardin g how the injury occurred, dates a nd tim es, places, persons involv ed, and other relat ed information commonly thought of as the si tuational ci rcums tanc e s s u rr oun d in g the a l l e ge d in jury .” The ALJ also stated,

If you di scover a d di tional facts whi ch are not contrar y to the facts in the Fin dings of Fact and Conclus i ons of Law contai ned in my Inter i m Or der, and you use them in your exa mination and evaluation, i t wi ll be necess ary to inclu de them in

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your repo rt and explain how the addi tional facts affec ted yo ur analysi s and c onclus i ons.

The ALJ then instructed the medi cal panel to answ er the following questi on: “What are [Clai mant’s] permanent physi cal restr i cti ons
as a result of injury from the indus tr i al acci dent on 2/17/2009?” The ALJ further instructed the p a ne l to “address in your answ er the

var yin g opin i ons in the medi cal recor d and relat e [Clai mant’s] func tional and medi cal capac i ty restr i cti ons reg ardin g hi s abi li ty to work an ei ght hour work day inclu ding li mi ts on standing, si tting, mi ssing work days and breaks needed wi thi n the work day.”

¶4 The medi cal panel rev i ewed all r e levant medi cal recor ds, consi dered the opin i ons o f the parties’ ex pert s, and conduc ted i ts

own exami nati on of Clai mant. The medi cal panel there after i ssu ed

a repo rt detailing i ts conclu si ons r egar ding Cl ai mant’s functi onal and medi cal capac i ty restr i cti ons relat ed to the indus tr i al acci dent. The medi cal panel di agnosed Clai mant wi th a numb er of “medi cal condi tions, as a di rect result o f t he F e bruary 17, 2009 indus tr i al acci dent,” inclu ding tr aumatic brai n injury and chro ni c pain. The panel deter mined that C l a i m a n t h a d a var i ety of restr i cti ons relat ed to li fti ng, si tting, and other acti viti es. Accordi ng to the panel, i t was unli kely that Clai mant could be a productive work er for more than fo ur ho urs a day. Even then, the panel expected Clai mant to require addi tional tim e off due to medi cal car e and periodi c exacerbations of hi s problems.

¶5 In response to the medi cal panel repo rt, Employer hi red a physi atr i st, Dr. Jeff Chung, to rev i ew and cri tiq ue t he repo rt

. In prepar ing hi s analysi s, Dr. Chung relied entirely on the panel repo rt and exami ned nei ther Clai mant nor the underlyin g medi cal

recor ds. Altho ug h Dr

. Chung agr eed wi th some of the medi cal panel’s conclu si ons, Dr

. Chung flatly di sagreed wi th the panel’s di agnoses and also opin ed that the panel’s repo rt di d not adequately stat e a basi s for some of i ts conclu si ons.
¶6 E mplo yer fi led an objection to the medi cal panel repo rt, ci tin g Dr. Chung’s cri tiqu e and arg uing (1) that the panel violated the chargin g or der by evaluating matter s not before i t, (2) that the

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repo rt was not based o n reasonable medi cal probabi li ty, and (3) that other sub stanti al evidenc e supp or ted a finding contrar y to the panel’s finding. The ALJ rej ected all of Employer’ s arg uments and admi tte d the medi cal panel repo rt into the evidenti ary recor d

. After consi dering all th e evidenc e, the ALJ adopted the medi cal panel’s opini on r egar ding Clai mant’s func tional and medi cal capaci ty restr i cti ons that were caus ed by the indus tr i al acci dent and ulti mately deter mined that Clai mant was eli gib le for permanent to tal di sabi li ty benefi ts.

¶7 Employ er sub sequently fi led a motion for rev i ew wi th the Commi ssi on, raising the s ame arg uments asin i ts objection to the medi cal panel repo rt

. Li ke the ALJ, the Commi ssi on rej ected Employer’ s arg uments. First, the Commi ssi on conclu ded that “the medi cal panel di d not exceed i ts authority, ei ther in i ts personal exami nati on of [Clai mant], i ts di agnosi s of hi s medi cal problems,

or i ts asses sment of whether those pro bl e ms were caus ed by hi s work acci dent.” Second, the Commi ssi on deter mined that, wh e n view ed as a whole, the medi cal panel repo rt i s based on the panel’s

a s s e s sment of medi cal probabi l i ty

. Thi rd, the C omm i s s i on re a s one d that the exis tence of cont r a d ictory evidenc e was not a suffi ci ent

reason to di sregar d or e x clude the medi cal panel repo rt

. The Commi ssi on there fore rej ected Employer’ s challen ges to the ALJ’s deci si on an d the medi cal panel reporton whi ch i t w as based, and affi rmed the ALJ’s deci si on. Thi s petiti on for judi ci al rev i ew followed.

ISS UES AND STANDARDS O F REVIEW

¶8 Employer fi rst a t tacks the Commi ssi on’s adoption of the medi cal panel repo rt, contending that the panel di sr e g a r d ed the chargin g or der by evaluating medi cal caus ation, di agnosi s, and past and future medi cal care. In particu lar, Employe r a r gues t hat the ALJ di d not refer all of those is sues to t he panel when the ALJ asked the panel to evaluate Clai mant’s “permanent physi cal restr i cti ons as a result of injury from the indus tr i al acci dent.” Becaus e E mp loyer ’s arg ument challen ges the propr i ety of the Commi ssi on’s interpr etat i on of the ALJ’s or der, we rev i ew that

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interpr e t a tion for an abus e of di screti on. See A & B Mech. Contractors v. Labo r Comm’n , 2013 UT App 230, ¶ 7, 311 P.3d 528.

¶9 Employer rais es two other arg uments in challenging the Commi ssi on’s award of permanent tot al di sabi li ty benefi ts to Clai mant, fo cus ing on the Commi ssi on’s adoption of the medi cal panel repo rt

. “Whether the commi ssi on corr ectly or incorre ctly deni ed benefi ts i s a tr adi tional mi xed questi on of law and fact.” Jex

v. Labor C om m ’ n , 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d); see also Murray v. Labor Comm’n , 2013 UT 38, ¶ 33, 308 P.3d 461 (“[A] mi xed questi on aris es when an agency

. . . mus t apply a legal standard to a set of facts uni que to a particu lar c ase.” (ci tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d)). “The standar d of rev i ew we apply when rev i ewing a mi xed questi on can be ei ther defer entialor nondeferential . . . .” Murray , 2013 UT 38, ¶ 36. “Deference on a mi xed questi on is wa r ranted when ‘the mi xed finding i s not “law-l i ke” becau se i t does not lend i tself to consi stent resolution by a uni form body of a p p ellate precedent’ or ‘i s “fact-li ke” becau se the [fac tfi nder] i s in a superi or posi tion to deci de i t.’” Jex, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15 (alterat i on in or i gin al) (emphas i s omi tte d) (qu oting Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 37).

¶10 Next, Employer arg ues that the ALJ’s Inter i m Or der was not suffi ci ently detailed and that the ALJ’s fai lure to prov i de adequate findings o f fact led the medi ca l p a ne l to evaluate matter s beyo nd t he scope of i ts authority. “Whether an admini strat i ve agency ’ s findin gs are adequate i s a legal deter minati on that requires no deference.” Blair v. Labor Comm’n , 2011 UT App 248, ¶ 14, 262 P.3d 456.

¶11 Fin ally, Employer arg ues that the C o mmi ssi on err ed in adopting the m e d i c al panel repo rt becau se, according to Employer, other sub stanti al evidenc e supp or ts findings contrar y to t he medi cal panel’s findings. “We wi ll not di sturb the Commi ssi on’s factual findings unles s the party challen gin g the fin dings demonstra t e s t hat a finding i s not supp or ted by sub stanti al evidenc e.” Swift Transp. v. Labor Comm’n , 2014 UT App 104, ¶ 8, 326 P.3d 678 (ci tin g Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 19); see also Utah Code Ann.

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§ 63G-4- 403(4)( g) (Lexi sNe xis 2011) (authorizing an appellate court to gr ant relief i f an “agency acti on i s based upon a d e t e rmi nati on of fact

. . . that i s not supp or ted by sub stanti al evidenc e”). “In other words, the [Commi ssi on’s] factual findings are accorded sub stanti al deference and will not be ov ert urned i f based on sub stanti al evidenc e, even i f another conclu si on from the evidenc e i s permi ssi

ble.” Cook

v. Labor Comm’n , 2013 UT App 286, ¶ 10, 317 P.3d 464 (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). “I n conduc tin g a sub stanti al eviden ce rev i ew, we do not reweigh the evidenc e and independently choose whi ch inferences we find to be the most r e a sonable.” Becker v. Sun set City, 2013 UT 51, ¶ 21, 309 P.3d 223 (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). “Instead,

we defer to [a lower tr ibunal ’s] findings becau se when reasonably confli cting view s aris e, i t i s the [fac t-finder’s] prov ince to draw the inferences an d resolv e these confli cts.” Id

. (alterat i ons in o riginal) (ci tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).

ANALYS IS
I. Scope o f the Medic al Panel Report

¶12 Employer arg ues that the Commi ssi on abus ed i ts di screti on in adopting the m e d i c a l p a n e l report becau se the panel di sregar ded the chargin g or der by evaluating medi cal caus ation, di agnosi s, and past and future medi cal care. Employer contends that the ALJ’s request that t he panel evaluate Clai mant’s “permanent physi cal restr i cti ons as a result of inj ury from the indus tr i al acci dent” di d not authorize the panel to consi der the i ssu es of causa t io n and di agnosi s.
¶13 Section 34A-2-601 of the Utah Code perm it s an admini strat i ve law judge to refer the medi cal aspects of a case to a
m e d i c a l p a n e l

. Ut ah C od e An n

. § 34A-2-601(1) (a) (Lexi sNexi s Su p p

. 2013). Pursu ant to thi s secti on, an admini strat i ve law j ud g e will appoi nt a medi cal panel “where one or mo r e si gni fi cant medi cal i ssu es may be involv ed.” U t a h Admin. Code R602-2-2(A). Signi fi cant medi cal i ssu es are involv ed when there are, inter ali a,

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“[c] onfli cting medi ca l o pini ons relat ed to a clai m of permanent tot al di sabi li ty.” Id . R602-2-2(A)( 4).

¶14 When a medi cal pane l i s c onve n ed, “[t]he ro le of the Medical Panel i s to ‘evaluat[e] medi cal evidenc e’ and ‘advis[e ] a n admini strat i ve law judge with respect to the admini strat i ve law judge’ s ulti mate fact-finding responsibi li ty.’ ” Blair , 2011 UT App 248, ¶ 18 (alterat i ons in or i gin al) (quoti ng Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2- 601(1)( d)(i i ) (Supp. 2010)). “[T] he ALJ/Commi ssi o n is always the ul t imate fact finder,” Speirs v. Southern Utah Univ ., 2002 UT App 389, ¶ 10, 60 P.3d 42, and “[a]lthough an admini strat i ve law judge i s not bound by the panel’s repo rt, she may base her findings and deci si on on i t,” Blair, 2011 UT App 248, ¶ 18 (ci tin g Utah Code Ann. § 3 4 A- 2

- 6 0 1 ( 2 ) ( e ) ( i ) (Supp. 2010)). Consequently, “[i ]t i s n ot u nu s u a l for an admini strat i ve law judge and the Commi ssi on to adopt the findings of a medi cal panel.” Id. ¶ 19 (ci tatio n a nd internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). “However, i t i s the prer ogat i ve and the d ut y of the Commi ssi on to consi der not only the repo rt of t he

me di cal panel, but also all of the other evidenc e and to draw whatever inferences and deducti ons fai rly and reasonably could be d e rived there from.” Id

. (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Indeed, the medi cal panel’s “proper purpose i s li mi ted to medi cal exami nati on and di agnosi s, the evidenc e of whi ch i s to be consi dered by the Commi ssi on in arr i ving at i ts deci si on.” Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Boa rd of Review of the Indus. Comm’n , 839 P.2d 841, 845 n.5 (Utah Ct. App

. 1992) (ci tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).

¶15 In thi s case, the ALJ appoi nted a medi cal panel after fi rst deter mining that confli cting medi cal evidenc e concerning Clai mant’s medi cal and func tional li mi tations re q uired an independent rev i ew of the medi cal evidenc e. The ALJ speci fi cally di rected the medi cal panel to answ er the fol l owin g q u e s ti on : “ Wh a t

are [Clai mant’s] permanent physi cal restr i cti ons as a result of injury from the indus tr i al acci dent o n 2/17/2009?” In Employer’ s view, the ALJ’s instructi on di d not allow the panel to consi der the i ssu es of caus ation, di agnosi s, an d p a s t and future medi cal care. We

are not persuaded. Instead, we agr ee wi th the Commi ssi on that the ALJ’s charge to the panel consi ste d of several components,

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inclu d ing the i denti ty of Clai mant’s medi cal problems, the li kelih ood that those problems were “a result of” t he indus tr i al acci dent, and an asses sment of the physi cal restr i cti ons resulti ng fr om those work -related injuries. (Internal quotat i on mar k s omi tte d.) Sim i larly, we agr ee wi th t he ALJ that i t i s di ffi cult to understand how the panel co ul d perfor m i ts jo b wi thout addressing the physi cal restr i cti ons and whether they were caus ed by the injuries sus tain ed in the indus tr i al acci dent. Inde e d , Employer has not i denti fi ed any statute or r ul e t ha t the panel’s analysi s violated. Becaus e the medi cal panel was responsi ve to the

var i ous components o f t he ALJ’s chargin g or der and becau se the Commi ssi on was the ulti mate factfinder, we conclu de that the Commi ssi on di d not exceed i ts di screti on in deter mining that the

caus ation and di agnosi s of C l a imant’ s condi tions were i ssu es proper ly before t he medi cal panel.

II. Re asonable Medi cal P ro babi li ty

¶16 Employer challen ges the Commi ssi on’s conclu si on that the medi cal panel repo rt was based on a reasonable medi cal probabi li ty rat her t ha n o n a medi cal possi bi li ty. In supp or t of i ts arg ument that the medi cal pane l r e p or t i s specu lative and

unc ert ain, Employer poin ts to the medi cal panel repo rt ’s use of the words “may” and “possi ble” wi th reg ard to Clai mant’s physi cal

co nd itions

. Becaus e thi s i ssu e “does not lend i tself to consi stent resolution by a uni form body of appellate precedent,” i t i s fact-li ke and the Commi ssi on’s deci si on on the i ssu e i s entitled to deference. See Jex v. Labor Comm’n , 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (ci tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).

¶17 Although Employer i s corr ect that the medi cal panel repo rt

uses the ter ms “may” and “possi ble” o n o ccas i on, the medi cal panel begi ns i ts repo rt of Clai mant’s condi tions wi th the unequi vo cal statement that Cl a ima nt “has the following medi cal condi tions, as a di r e ct r e su lt of the Februar y 17, 2009 indus tr i al acci dent.” When t he repo rt i s r ead as a whole, and in l i ght of thi s cle a r statement that Clai mant “has the following medi cal condi tions,” i t i s evident that the medi cal panel’s opin i on i s based

on the panel’s asses sment of medi cal probabil it y

. We there fore

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di sagree wi th Employer that the Commi ssi on’s or der should be set asi de.

III . The Medi cal P anel’s Examinati on
¶18 Employer clai ms that the Commi ssi on err oneously adopted the medi cal panel repo rt be caus e the panel relied on statements made duri ng it s exami nati on of Clai mant. When the panel interv i ewed Clai mant, Clai mant’s famil y members helped hi m
answ er questi ons and stated t he i r observat i ons of hi s symptoms. Employer asserts that the medi cal panel should not have consi dered these comments becau se they were outsi de the recor d. Becaus e the Commi ssi on i s “in a superi or posi tion to deci de” thi s questi on, we defer to i ts deter minati on. See id. (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omitted).

¶19 The Utah Code allows a medi cal panel to “conduc t a study,” “take an x-ray ,” or “perfor m a test.” Utah Code A nn

. § 34A-2- 601(2)( a)(i )–(i i i ) (Lexi sNexi s Supp. 2013). Accordi ngly, “a medi cal panel may conduc t i ts own medi cal exami nati on and rev i ew of the medi cal recor d.” Certifie d Bldg. Main t. v

. Labor Comm’n , 2012 UT App 240, ¶ 1 2 , 2 85 P.3d 831. Thi s court has there fore allowed Commi ssi on deci si ons to stand where the medi ca l p an e l conduc ted i ts own exami nati on and interv i ew of the clai mant. See, e.g. , id

. ¶¶ 12– 13 (“[T ]he medic al panel was prov i ded the medi cal r ecord and was permi tte d to conduc t i ts own physi cal exami nati on and interv i ew of [the clai mant].”).

¶20 Employer’ s arg ument that the medical panel i mproper ly consi dered ext ra-recor d evidenc e relies on Utah Code secti on 63G4-208, whi ch prov i des that in formal adjudi cati ve proceedings, the presi ding offi cer sh a l l i ssu e an or der wi th “findings of fact based exclusive l y on the evidenc e of recor d in the adjudi cati ve proceedings or on facts offi ci ally noted.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4- 208(1)( a) (Lexi sNexi s 2011). If we assu me, wi thout decidin g, that secti on 63G-4- 208 appli es to a medi cal panel repo rt, the repo rt in thi s case w as based on “the evidenc e of recor d in the adjudi cati ve proceedings or on facts offi ci ally noted.” See id. (emphas i s added). The medi cal panel repo rt expr e ss ly noted information that

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or i gin ated from statements made by Clai mant’s fami ly members duri ng the panel’s exami nati on. In doin g so, the medi cal p anel compli ed wi th the ALJ’s instructi on that i t inclu de in i ts repo rt any “addi tional facts whi ch are not contrar y to the facts in the Fin dings of Fact and Conclus i ons of Law contai ned in [her] Inter i m Or der” th a t the panel used in i ts exami nati on and evaluation. Furth e rm or e, medi cal panels ro utinely obtain information from interv i ews wi th clai mants, se e, e .g. , Certifie d Bldg. Maint ., 2012 UT App 240, ¶¶ 12–13, and Employer has not persuaded us that the me d ical panel in thi s case i mpermi ssi bly gather ed a me d ica l hi stor y that confli cted wi th the ALJ’s i nterim findings.
¶21 Employer no ne theless asserts that the medi cal panel’s consi derat i on of the fami ly members’ statements violated i ts statuto ry right to cross-examine wi tnesse s. In supp or t, Employer ci tes secti on 63G-4- 206 of the Utah Admini strat i ve Procedures Act (the UAPA). Thi s secti on prov i des that “in all formal ad judi cati ve proceedings, a hearin g shall be conduc ted” d u rin g whi ch a l l p a rt i es
are afforded “the oppor tuni ty to present evidenc e, arg ue, respond, conduc t cross-examinati on, and sub mi t rebuttal ev i dence.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4- 206(1)( d) (Lexi sNexi s 2011). Under the UAPA,

an “‘[a]djudi cati ve proceeding’ me a ns an agency acti on or proceeding desc rib ed in Section 63G-4-102.” Id. § 63G-4- 103(1)( a). Section 63G-4- 102, in turn, does not say anything about a medi cal panel’s exami nati on. Id. § 6 3G-4- 102 (Lexi sNexi s Supp. 2013). Employer r e l ies on secti on 63G-4- 206 for i ts clai m that i t was entitled to cr o ss- exami ne the fami ly members, but by i ts plain l a ng uag e, the secti on appli es only to formal adjudi cati v e proceedings. Id. § 63G-4- 206. Employer does not e x p l a in how a medi cal panel’s examinati on of a clai mant, conduc ted pursuant to

se cti on 34A-2-601(2) (a), consti tutes a formal adjudi cat iv e proceeding during whi ch an employer mus t be a fforded an oppor tuni ty to cross-examine all thos e p re s e n t. E m p l oy er there fore has not convin ced us that se ct i on 63G-4- 206 requires the ALJ and the Commi ssi on to afford parties the oppor tuni ty to cross-examine indi vidu als present at a medi cal panel’s exami nati on of a clai mant.

¶22 Employer also contends that the C o mm iss i on violated i ts right to consti tutional due process by permi tting the medi cal panel

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to soli ci t information fr o m Clai mant’s fami ly members wi thout giving Employer an opp or tuni ty to c ro s s
- e xa mine them. Employer, however , has not demonstrate d that i t suffi ci ently p reserv ed the i ssu e duri ng the pr oceedi ngs before the Co mmi ssi on.
¶23 “[T] he preserv ation rule appli es to ever y clai m, inclu ding consti tutional questi ons

. . . .” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. “We do not rev i ew an unpreserved i ssu e unles s exceptional ci rcums tances are present or the err or was plain.” Utah Chapter of Sierra Clu b v. Air Quality Bd. , 2009 UT 76, ¶ 26, 226 P.3d 719. “[T] o preserv e an i ssu e for judi ci al rev i ew i t mus t be rais ed in
a tim ely fash i on before the agency, an d be speci fi cally rais ed wi th supp or tin g evidenc e or relev ant legal authority.” Wintle-Bu tt s v. Career Serv. Review Office, 2013 UT App 187, ¶ 13 n.4, 307 P.3d 665 (ci tation and internal quotation marks omi tte d). “In short, a party may not clai m to have preserv ed an i ssu e for ap p e a l by merely menti oning

. . . an i ssu e wi thout intro ducing s upporting evidenc e
or relev ant legal authority.” Pratt v. Nelson , 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 366 (omi ssi on in or i gin al) (ci tation and int ernal quotat i on marks omitted).

¶24 In i ts motion for rev i ew before the Co mmi ssi on, Employer stated that “[a]ny medi cal or factual information soli ci ted from any thi rd party fa mil y member who atte nded the evaluation i s in violati on of [Empl oye r’s] right to state and federal due process and violati on of th e U tah Admini strat i ve Procedures Act.” Although Employer ci ted secti on 63G-4- 206 as sup p or tin g authority for i ts statuto ry right to cross-e x a mine wi tnesses under the UAPA, Employer fai led to arg ue how i ts consti tutional due process rights

were viol a t e d

. As a result, the Commi ssi on di d not have the

o p p or tuni ty to address Employer’ s consti tutional arg ument. Becaus e Employer di d not adequately preserv e thi s i s s u e b e for e the Commi ssi on, we decline to reach the merits of Employer’ s consti tutional du e pro cess arg ument.

IV. Adequacy of the Int erim Order

¶25 Next, Employer arg ues that the ALJ prov i ded insu ffi ci ent findings of fact in her Inter i m Or der. Speci fi cally, Employer arg ues

20121077-CA 11 2014 UT App 277Danny’s Drywall v. Labor Commission

that the Inter i m Or der “fai led to i denti fy for the panel those condi tions whi ch were caus ed by the indus tr i al acci dent” and that thi s err or prej udi ced Employer becau se i t caus ed the medi cal panel to “stray [] beyond the I nt e rim Or der and err oneously mak[e] i ts own fac tual findings regar ding [the] i ssu e[].”

¶26 In thi s case, the Inter i m Or der di d not contai n findings as to the nature of Clai mant’s diag no ses, whether hi s var i ous medi cal problems were caus ed by hi s work acci dent, or what effect those medi cal problems had on hi s abi li ty to work

. Employer arg ues that these omi ssi o ns render the ALJ’s Inter i m Or der insu ffi ci ently detailed. Employe r , ho wever, fai led to preserv e thi s arg ument before the ALJ or the Comm iss i on. As di scu ssed, an arg ument i s pr e se r v e d for judi ci al rev i ew i f i t i s has been “rais ed in a tim ely fash i on before the agency, and [has been] speci fi call y rais ed wi th

s u p p or ti n g e vi d e n c e or re l e vant legal authority.” Wintle-Butts , 201 3 U T App 187, ¶ 13 n.4 (ci tation and internal quotat i on mark s omi tte d). In i ts reply memorandum in su p p o r t of i ts objection to the medi cal panel repo rt, Employer stated, “In thi s c ase, the interim

or der and char gin g instructi ons were insu ffi ci ent to prov i de gui dance as to what condi tions were ca us a l ly relat ed to the indus tr ia l acci dent.” (Emph asi s omi tte d.) Employer di d not supp or t thi s clai m wi th any relev ant legal authority. Emplo yer made the s a m e a s s e rti on, again wi thout supp or tin g legal authority, in i ts reply to Clai mant’s objection to the motion for rev i ew. Employer there fore has not preserv ed thi s arg ume nt fo r judi ci al

rev i ew.
¶27 But even i f we were to consi der thi s arg ument, we could not agr ee wi th Employer that the medi cal panel stray e d beyond the Inter i m Or der, becau s e the ALJ s p e c i fi cally asked the medi cal panel to evaluate Clai mant’s “permanent physi cal restr i cti ons as a result of injury from the indus tr i al acci dent.” In other words, the medi cal panel was instructed to make findings on “those condi tions whi ch

were caus ed by the indus tr i al acc i dent.” Any defi ci ency in the ALJ’s factual findings would there fore be harmless. See Certifie d Bldg. Maint. v. Labor Comm’n , 2012 UT App 240, ¶¶ 9–11, 285 P.3d 831 (employi ng the harmlessn ess standard when there was a clai m

20121077-CA 12 2014 UT App 277Danny’s Drywall v. Labor Commission

that an ALJ’s interim findings were inadequate); Blair v. Labor Comm’n , 2011 UT App 248, ¶ 16, 262 P.3d 456 (s ame).

V. Substanti al Evid ence
¶28 E mployer arg ues that the Commi ssi on err ed in adopting the medi cal panel’s repo rt “when there was other sub stanti al evidenc e supp or tin g a finding contrar y to the medi cal panel’s [finding].” In supp or t, Employer ci tes Dr. Chung’s analysis and o ther evidenc e i t clai ms conflic t s wi th the panel’s findings reg ardin g Clai mant’s func tional and medi cal c apaci ty.

¶29 As we have explain ed, “[a]n admini strat i ve law judge may base [hi s or her] finding and deci si on on the repo rt of

. . . a medi cal panel.” Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2) (e)(i )(A) (Lexi sNexi s Supp. 2013). Never theless, “an admini strat i ve law judge i s not bound by

a repo rt

. . . i f other sub stanti al confli cting evidenc e in t he case supp or ts a contrar y finding.” Id

. § 34A-2 -6 01(2)( e)(i i ). Employer poin ts to thi s language refer ring to “other sub stanti al confli cting evidenc e” and asserts that “other sub stanti al confli cting evidenc e” exis ts in thi s case that su p port s a finding contrar y to the panel’s finding. Thi s “other sub stanti al confl icting evidenc e,” Employer contends, precluded the ALJ fro m admitting and consi dering the medi cal panel report

. ¶30 The statuto ry language that an admini strat i ve law judge “i s not bound by a [medi cal panel] r e p o rt

. . . i f other sub stanti al confli cting evidenc e

. . . supp or ts a contrar y finding,” id ., i s mor e pert inent to ci rcums tances where the admini strat i ve law judge has adopted a finding contrar y to the medi cal panel repo r t

. S ee, e.g. , Greyhound Lin es, Inc. v. Wallace, 728 P.2d 1021, 1022–23 (Utah 1986) ( re je cting a plainti ff’s challen ge to a finding where the Commi ssi on chose to accept statements of one physi ci an instead of the medi cal panel r e port ); Straub v. Labor Comm’n , 1999 UT App 192U, paras. 2–4 (refusing to gr ant relief where a petiti oner arg ued that the ALJ’s findings were contrar y t o t hose render ed by the medi cal panel and that the ALJ was bound by the medi cal panel’s findings). The presence of confli cting e v ide nce does not negate the admini strat i ve law judge’ s di screti on to base hi s or her findings on

20121077-CA 13 2014 UT App 277Danny’s Drywall v. Labor Commission

the medi cal panel repo r t

. S ee Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2) (e). We agr ee wi th the Commi ssi on that the exis tence of conflict ing evidenc e i s not “a suffi ci ent reason to di sregar d a medi cal panel repo rt or exclude the repo rt from the evidenc e.” Thi s i s especi ally tr ue in li ght of the fact that medi cal panels are us ed preci sely becau se there are confli cting me d ical opin i ons. See Utah Admin. Code R602-2- 2 (stati ng that a medic al panel wi ll be uti li zed by an admini strat i ve law judge wh e n a s i gni fi cant medi cal i ssu e has been shown b y confli cting medi cal repor ts).

¶31 Employer’ s arg ument that sub stanti al evidenc e contradic ts the m edi cal panel’s repo rt boi ls down to an arg ument that “more wei ght should have been given to the evidenc e in i ts favor .” See Timpanogos Hosp. v. Labor Comm’n , 2011 UT App 106, ¶ 7, 251 P.3d 855. But thi s co ur t may not reweigh the evidenc e becau se

“ a ssi gni ng such wei ghts i s the prer ogat i ve of the Commi ssi on.” Id

. ;
see also Migliacc io v. Labor Comm’ n , 2013 UT App 51, ¶ 7, 298 P.3d 676 (“It i s not the ro le of thi s court to reweigh t he evidenc e and sub sti tute our conclu si on for that of the Comm iss i on.” (ci tation

a nd internal quotat i on marks omi tte d)). Employer has fai led t o demonstrate that the Commi ssi on’s findings are not supp or ted by sub stanti al evidenc e. See Swift Transp. v. La bo r Comm’n , 2014 UT App 104, ¶ 8, 326 P.3d 678 (“We wi ll not di sturb the Commi ssi on’s factual findings unles s the party challeng ing the findings demonstrate s that a findin g is not supp or ted by sub stanti al evidenc e.”). A ccordingly, we wil l not set asid e the Co mmi ssi on’s findings.

VI. Att or ney Fee s
¶32 As a final matter , Clai mant requests an award o f a t t o rney fees and costs incu rr ed on appeal pursuant to rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Clai mant asserts that Employer’ s petiti on for judi ci al rev i ew i s fri vo lous and that he i s there fore ent i tled to atto rney fees and costs.

¶33 Rule 33 prov i des that i f an appellate court determin es that

an appeal i s “ei ther fri vo lou s o r fo r delay, i t shall award just damages, whi ch may inclu de single or double costs, as defined in

20121077-CA 14 2014 UT App 277Danny’s Drywall v. Labor Commission

Rule 34, and/or reasonable atto rney fees, to the prev ai ling party .” Utah R. App. P. 33(a). A friv o l o us appeal i s “one that i s not gr ounded in fact, not warrante d by exis tin g law, o r no t based on

a goo d fai th arg ument to ext end, modi fy, or rev erse exis tin g law.” Id

. R. 33(b)

. “But the i mposi tion of such a sanc tion i s a seri ous matter a nd o nl y to be used in egr egious cases, lest the threat of

such sanc tions should chi ll li tigants’ rights to appe al lower court deci si ons.” Redd v. Hill , 2013 UT 35, ¶ 28, 304 P.3d 861. “Sanctions

are appropr i ate [only] for appeals obviousl y wi t ho ut merit, wi th no reasonable li kelih ood of suc cess, and whi ch result in the delay of a proper judgment.” Id

. (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Clai mant has not demonstrate d that thi s i s an “egr egious case[ ],” and we there fore conclu de that Clai mant i s not entitled to

an award of atto rney fees. See id. Howeve r , we gr ant Clai mant’s request for costs incu rr ed on appeal becau se we are not di sturbing the Commi ssi on’s or der. See Utah R. App. P. 34(a) (“[I]f a judgment

or or der i s affi rmed, costs shall be taxe d again st appellan t un less other wi se or dered .

. . .”) ; see a lso id. R. 34( e) (“In all other matter s before t he court, inc luding appeals fro m an agency, costs may be allowed as in cas es on appeal from a tr i al court.”).

CONCLUS ION

¶34 Fo r the for e go ing reasons, we allow the Commi ssi on’ s or d e r to stand.

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