1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v

. JARKESY ET AL

.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–859. Argued November 29, 2023—Decided June 27, 2024
In the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress passed a

suite of laws designed to combat securities fraud and increase market transparency. Three such statues ar e relevant: The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advis

ers Act of 1940. These Acts respectively govern the registration of se

curities, the trading of securities, an d the activities of investment ad

visers. Although each regulates different aspects of the securities markets, their pertinent provisions—c ollectively referred to by regula

tors as “the antifraud provisions,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a, 202a— target the same basic behavior: mi srepresenting or concealing mate

rial facts.

To enforce these Acts, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two forums. It can file suit in federal court, or it can adjudicate the matter itself. The forum the SEC selects di ctates certain aspects of the litiga

tion. In federal court, a jury find s the facts, an Ar ticle III judge pre

sides, and the Federal Rules of Evid ence and the ordinary rules of dis

covery govern the litigation. But when the SEC adjudicates the matter in-house, there are no juries. The Commission presides while its Divi

sion of Enforcement prosecutes the case. The Commission or its dele

gee—typically an Administrative Law Judge—also finds facts and de

cides discovery disputes, and the SEC’s Rules of Practice govern.

One remedy for securities violatio ns is civil penalties. Originally, the SEC could only obtain civil pena lties from unregistered investmentadvisers in federal court. Then, in 2010, Congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consum er Protection Ac t. The Act au

thorized the SEC to impose such penalties through its own in-house2 SEC v. JARKESY

Syllabus

proceedings.

Shortly after passage of the Do dd-Frank Act, the SEC initiated an enforcement action for civil penalties against investment adviser George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm, Patriot28, LLC for alleged violations of the “antifraud provisions” containe d in the federal securities laws. The SEC opted to adjudicate the ma tter in-house. As relevant, the final order determined that Jarkesy and Patriot28 had committed se

curities violations and levied a civil penalty of $300,000. Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order on the ground that adjudicati ng the matter in-house violated the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
Held : When the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securi

ties fraud, the Sevent h Amendment entitles th e defendant to a jury trial. Pp. 6–27. (a) The question presented by this case—whether the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the SEC seeks civil penalties for securities fraud—is straightforward. Following the analysis set forth in Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg , 492 U. S. 33, and Tull v. United States , 481 U. S. 412, this action implicates the Sev

enth Amendment because the SEC’s antifraud provisions replicate common law fraud. And the “public rights” exception to Article III ju

risdiction does not apply, becaus e the present action does not fall within any of the distinctive area s involving governmental preroga

tives where the Court has concluded that a matter may be resolved outside of an Article III court, without a jury.

(b) The Court first explains why this action implicates the Seventh Amendment. (1) The right to trial by jury is “of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming cur

tailment of the right” has always been and “should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” Dimick v. Schiedt , 293 U. S. 474, 486. When the British attempted to evade American juries by siphoning adjudications to juryless admiralty, vice admiralty, and chancery courts, the Ameri

cans protested and eventually cited the British practice as a justifica

tion for declaring Independence. In the Revolution’s aftermath, con

cerns that the proposed Constitution lacked a provision guaranteeing a jury trial right in civil cases was perhaps the “most success[ful]” cri

tique leveled against the document du ring the ratification debates. The Federalist No. 83, p. 495. To fix that flaw, the Framers promptly adopted the Seventh Amendment. Ever since, “every encroachment upon [the jury trial right] has been watched with great jealousy.” Par

sons v. Bedford , 3 Pet. 433, 446. Pp. 7–8. (2) The Seventh Amendment guaran tees that in “[s]uits at com

mon law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The right3 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Syllabus

itself is not limited to the “common-law forms of action recognized” when the Seventh Amendment was ratified. Curtis v. Loether , 415 U. S. 189, 193. Rather, it “embrace[s] all suits which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume.” Parsons , 3 Pet., at 447. That includes statutory claims that are “legal in nature.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 53. To determine whether a suit is lega l in nature, courts must consider whether the cause of action resembles common law causes of action, and whether the remedy is the sort that was traditionally obtained in a court of law. Of these factors, the remedy is the more important. And in this case, the remedy is all but dispositive. For respondents’ alleged fraud, the SEC seeks civil pena lties, a form of monetary relief. Such relief is legal in nature when it is designed to punish or deter the wrongdoer rather than solely to “restore the status quo.” Tull , 481 U. S., at 422. The Acts condition the availability and size of the civil penalties available to the SEC based on considerations such as culpa

bility, deterrence, and recidivism. See §§77h–1; 78u–2, 80b–3. These factors go beyond restoring the status quo and so are legal in nature. The SEC is also not obligated to use civil penalties to compensate vic

tims. SEC civil penalties are thus “a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” Tull , 481 U. S., at 422. This suit implicates the Sevent h Amendment right and a defendant would be entitled to a jury on these claims.

The close relationship between federal securities fraud and common law fraud confirms that conclusion. Both target the same basic con

duct: misrepresenting or concealing material facts. By using “fraud” and other common law terms of art when it drafted the federal securi

ties laws, Congress incorporated co mmon law fraud prohibitions into those laws. This Court therefore often considers common law fraud principles when interpreting federal securities law. See, e.g., Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo , 544 U. S. 336, 343–344. While fed

eral securities fraud and common law fraud are not identical, the close relationship between the two confirms that this action is “legal in na

ture.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 53. Pp. 8–13.

(c) Because the claims at issue here implicate the Seventh Amend

ment, a jury trial is required unle ss the “public rights” exception ap

plies. Under this exception, Congress may assign the matter for deci

sion to an agency without a ju ry, consistent with the Seventh Amendment. For the reasons below, the exception does not apply. Pp. 13–27. (1) The Constitution prevents Congress from “withdraw[ing] from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law.” Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Im

provement Co. , 18 How. 272, 284. Once such a suit “is brought within4 SEC v. JARKESY

Syllabus
the bounds of federal jurisdiction,” an Article III court must decide it, with a jury if the Seventh Amendment applies. Stern v. Marshall , 564 U. S. 462, 484. On that basis, this Court has repeatedly explained that matters concerning private rights may not be removed from Article III courts. See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284. If a suit is in the nature of an action at common law, then the matter presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudi cation by an Article III court is mandatory. Stern , 564 U. S., at 484.

The Court also recognizes a class of cases concerning “public rights.” Such matters “historically could have been determined exclusively by [the executive and legi slative] branches.” Id., at 493 (internal quota

tion marks omitted). No involvem ent by an Article III court in the initial adjudication of public rights claims is necessary. Certain cate

gories that have been recognized as falling within the exception in

clude matters concerning: the collection of revenue; aspects of customs law; immigration law; relations with Indian tribes; the administration of public lands; and the granting of public benefits. The Court’s opin

ions governing this exception have no t always spoken in precise terms. But “even with respect to matters that arguably fall within the scope of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the pr esumption is in favor of Article III courts.” Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , 458 U. S. 50, 69, n. 23 (plurality opinion). Pp. 13–18. (2) In Granfinanciera , this Court previously considered whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees th e right to a jury trial “in the face of Congress’ decision to allo w a non-Article III tribunal to adjudi

cate” a statutory “fraud claim.” 492 U. S., at 37, 50. There the issue was whether Congress’s designation of fraudulent conveyance actions as “core [bankruptcy] proceedings ” authorized non-Article III bank

ruptcy judges to hear them without juries. Id. , at 50. The Court held that the designation was not permissi ble, even under the public rights exception. To determine whether the claim implicated the Seventh Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled in Tull. Sur

veying English cases and considerin g the remedy these suits provided, the Court concluded that fraudulent conveyance actions were “quin

tessentially suits at common law.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 56. Because these actions were akin to “suits at common law” and were not “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy process, the Court held that the public rights exception did not apply, and a jury was required. Id., at 54, 56. Pp. 19–20. (3) Granfinanciera effectively decides this case. The action here was brought under the “anti-fraud prov isions” of the federal securities laws and provide civil penalties that can “only be enforced in courts of law.” Tull , 481 U. S., at 422. They target the same basic conduct as5 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

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common law fraud, employ the same terms of art, and operate pursu

ant to similar legal principles. In short, this action involves a “mat

ter[ ] of private rather than public right.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 56. Pp. 20–21. (4) The SEC claims that the public rights exception applies be

cause Congress created “new statut ory obligations, impose[d] civil pen

alties for their violation, and then commit[ted] to an administrative agency the function of deciding wh ether a violation ha[d] in fact oc

curred.” Brief for Petitioner 21. Granfinanciera does away with much of the SEC’s argument. Congress cannot “conjure away the Seventh Amendment by mandating that tradit ional legal claims be . . . taken to an administrative tribunal.” 492 U. S., at 52. The SEC’s argument that Granfinanciera does not apply because the Government is the party bringing this action also fails . What matters is the substance of the suit, not where it is brought, who brings it, or how it is labeled. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. , 458 U. S., at 69 n. 23 (plurality opinion). Pp. 21–22. (5) The Court’s opinion in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n , 430 U. S. 442, is not to the contrary. The litigation in that case arose under the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Facing agency en forcement actions, two employers alleged that the agency’s adjudicatory authority violated the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 448–449. The Court concluded that Congress could assign the OSH Act adjudications to an ag ency because the claims involved “a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law.” Id., at 461. The cases Atlas Roofing relied upon applied the “public rights” exception to actions that were “ ‘not . . . suit[s] at com

mon law or in the nature of such . . . suit[s].’ ” Id. , at 453. Atlas Roofing therefore does not apply here, where the statutory claim is “ ‘in the nature of ’ ” a common law suit. Id., at 453. Later rulings also foreclose reading Atlas Roofing as the SEC does

. This Court clarified in Tull that the Seventh Amendment does a pply to novel statutory regimes, so long as the statutory claims are akin to common law claims. See 481 U. S., at 421–423. And the Court has explained that the public rights exception does not apply automatically whenever Congress as

signs a matter to an agency for adjudication. See Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 52. Pp. 22–27.

The Court does not reach the rema ining issues in this case. 34 F. 4th 446, affirmed and remanded.

R OBERTS , C. J., delivered the opinio n of the Court, in which T HOMAS , A LITO , G ORSUCH , K AVANAUGH , and B ARRETT , JJ., joined. G ORSUCH , J., filed a concurring opinion, in which T HOMAS , J., joined. S OTOMAYOR , J., filed a dissenting op inion, in which K AGAN and J ACKSON , JJ., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the Unit ed States, Washingt on, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov , of any typographical or other formal errors. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 22–859

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

PETITIONER v. GEORGE R. JARKESY, J R ., ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 27, 2024]

C HIEF J USTICE R OBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission initi

ated an enforcement action against respondents George Jarkesy, Jr., and Patriot28, LLC, seeking civil penalties for alleged securities fraud. The SEC chose to adjudicate the matter in-house before one of its administrative law judges, rather than in federal court where respondents could have proceeded before a jury. We consider whether the Seventh Amendment permits the SEC to compel respondents to de

fend themselves before the agency rather than before a jury in federal court.

I A In the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Con

gress passed a suite of laws designed to combat securities fraud and increase market transparency. Three such stat

ues are relevant here: The Securities Act of 1933, the Secu

rities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. §§77a et seq .; 48 Stat.2 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court
881, 78a et seq .; 54 Stat. 847, 80b–1 et seq . These Acts re

spectively govern the registrati on of securities, the trading of securities, and the activities of investment advisers. Their protections are mutually reinforcing and often over

lap. See Lorenzo v. SEC , 587 U. S. 71, 80 (2019). Although each regulates different aspects of the securities markets, their pertinent provisions—colle ctively referred to by regu

lators as “the antifraud provisions,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a, 202a—target the same basic behavior: misrepresent

ing or concealing material facts. The three antifraud provisions are Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. Section 17(a) prohibits regulated individuals from “obtain[ing] money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact,” as well as causing certain omissions of ma

terial fact. 15 U. S. C. §77q(a)(2). As implemented by Rule 10b–5, Section 10(b) prohibits using “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” making “untrue statement[s] of . . . ma

terial fact,” causing certain material omissions, and “en

gag[ing] in any act . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud.” 17 CFR §240.10b–5 (2023); see 15 U. S. C. §78j(b). And finally, Section 206(b), as implemented by Rule 206(4)– 8, prohibits investment advisers from making “any untrue statement of a material fact” or engaging in “fraudulent, de

ceptive, or manipulative” acts with respect to investors or prospective investors. 17 CFR §§275.206(4)–8(a)(1), (2); see 15 U. S. C. §80b–6(4). To enforce these Acts, Congress created the SEC. The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two forums. First, the Commission can adjudicate the matter itself. See §§77h–1, 78u–2, 78u–3, 80b–3. Alternatively, it can file a suit in federal court. See §§77t, 78u, 80b–9. The SEC’s choice of forum dictates two aspects of the litigation: The procedural protections enjoyed by the defendant, and the remedies available to the SEC.3 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court Procedurally, these forums differ in who presides and makes legal determinations, what evidentiary and discov

ery rules apply, and who finds facts. Most pertinently, in federal court a jury finds the facts, depending on the natureof the claim. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 7. In addition, a lifetenured, salary-protected Article III judge presides, see Art. III, §1, and the litigation is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ordinary rules of discovery.Conversely, when the SEC adjudicates the matter inhouse, there are no juries. Instead, the Commission pre

sides and finds facts while its Division of Enforcement pros

ecutes the case. The Commission may also delegate its role as judge and factfinder to one of its members or to an ad

ministrative law judge (ALJ) that it employs. See 15 U. S. C. §78d–1. In these proceedings, the Commission or its delegee decides discovery disputes, see, e

. g ., 17 CFR §201.232(b), and the SEC’s Rules of Practice govern, see 17 CFR §201.100 et seq . The Commission or its delegee also determines the scope and form of permissible evidence and may admit hearsay and other testimony that would be in

admissible in federal court. See §§201.320, 201.326. When a Commission member or an ALJ presides, the full Commission can review that official’s findings and conclu

sions, but it is not obligated to do so. See §201.360; 15 U. S. C. §78d–1. Judicial review is also available once the proceedings have concluded. See §§77i(a), 78y(a)(1), 80b– 13(a). But such review is deferential. By law, a reviewing court must treat the agency’s factual findings as “conclu

sive” if sufficiently supported by the record, e.g. , §78y(a)(4);

see Richardson v. Perales , 402 U. S. 389, 401 (1971), even when they rest on evidence that could not have been admit

ted in federal court. The remedy at issue in this case, civil penalties, also orig

inally depended upon the forum chosen by the SEC. Except in cases against registered en tities, the SEC could obtain civil penalties only in federal court. See Insider Trading4 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court Sanctions Act of 1984, §2, 98 Stat. 1264; Securities Enforce

ment Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, §§101, 201–202, 104 Stat. 932–933, 935–938. That is no longer so. In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re

form and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 124 Stat. 1376. That Act “ma[de] the SEC’s authority in admin

istrative penalty proceedings coextensive with its authority to seek penalties in Federal court.” H. R. Rep. No. 111–687,

p. 78 (2010). In other words, the SEC may now seek civil penalties in federal court, or it may impose them through its own in-house proceedings . See Dodd-Frank Act, §929P(a), 124 Stat. 1862–1864 (codified in relevant part as amended at 15 U. S. C. §§77h–1(g), 78u–2(a), 80b–3(i)(1)). Civil penalties rank among the SEC’s most potent en

forcement tools. These penalties consist of fines of up to $725,000 per violation. See §§77h–1(g), 78u–2, 80b–3(i). And the SEC may levy these penalties even when no inves

tor has actually suffered financial loss. See SEC v. Blavin

, 760 F. 2d 706, 711 (CA6 1985) ( per curiam ).

B Shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC be

gan investigating Jarkesy and Patriot28 for securities fraud. Between 2007 and 2010, Jarkesy launched two in

vestment funds, raising about $24 million from 120 “accred

ited” investors—a class of investors that includes, for exam

ple, financial institutions, certa in investment professionals, and high net worth individuals. App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a– 73a, 110a, n. 72; see 17 CFR §230.501. Patriot28, which Jarkesy managed, served as the funds’ investment adviser. According to the SEC, Jarkesy and Patriot28 misled inves

tors in at least three ways: (1) by misrepresenting the in

vestment strategies that Jar kesy and Patriot28 employed, (2) by lying about the identity of the funds’ auditor and prime broker, and (3) by inflating the funds’ claimed value5 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court
so that Jarkesy and Patriot28 could collect larger manage

ment fees. App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a–86a, 95a–105a. The SEC initiated an enforcement action, contending that these actions violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment Ad

visers Act, and sought civil penalties and other remedies.Relying on the new authority conferred by the DoddFrank Act, the SEC opted to adjudicate the matter itself rather than in federal court. In 2014, the presiding ALJ issued an initial decision. Id ., at 155a–225a. The SEC re

viewed the decision and then released its final order in 2020. Id ., at 71a–154a. The final order levied a civil pen

alty of $300,000 against Jarkesy and Patriot28, directed them to cease and desist comm itting or causing violations of the antifraud provisions, or dered Patriot28 to disgorge earnings, and prohibited Jarkesy from participating in the securities industry and in offerings of penny stocks. Id ., at 152a–154a.

Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. 34 F. 4th 446, 450 (CA5 2022). A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit granted their petition and vacated the final order. Id ., at 449–450. Applying a two-part test from Granfinan

ciera, S. A. v. Nordberg , 492 U. S. 33 (1989), the panel held that the agency’s decision to adjudicate the matter in-house violated Jarkesy’s and Patriot28’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 34 F. 4th, at 451. First, the panel de

termined that because these SEC antifraud claims were “akin to [a] traditional action[ ] in debt,” a jury trial would be required if this case were brought in an Article III court. Id. , at 454; see id. , at 453–455. It then considered whether the “public rights” exception applied. That exception per

mits Congress, under certain circumstances, to assign an action to an agency tribunal without a jury, consistent with the Seventh Amendment. See id ., at 455–459. The panel concluded that the exception did not apply, and that there

fore the case should have been brought in federal court,6 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court where a jury could have found the facts pertinent to the de

fendants’ fraud liability. Based on this Seventh Amend

ment violation, the panel vacated the final order. Id ., at 459. It also identified two further constitutional problems.First, it determined that Congress had violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the SEC, without ade

quate guidance, to choose whether to litigate this action in an Article III court or to adjudicate the matter itself. See id ., at 459–463. The panel also found that the insulation of the SEC ALJs from executive supervision with two layers of for-cause removal protections violated the separation of

powers. See id ., at 463–466. Judge Davis dissented. Id

., at 466–479. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, 51 F. 4th 644 (2022), and we grante d certiorari, 600 U. S. ___ (2023).

II This case poses a straightforward question: whether the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the SEC seeks civil penalties against him for securi

ties fraud. Our analysis of this question follows the ap

proach set forth in Granfinanciera and Tull v. United States , 481 U. S. 412 (1987). The threshold issue is whether this action implicates the Seventh Amendment. It does. The SEC’s antifraud provisio ns replicate common law fraud, and it is well established that common law claims must be heard by a jury. Since this case does implicate the Seventh Amendment, we next consider whether the “public rights” exception to Article III jurisdiction applies. This exception has been held to permit Congress to a ssign certain matters to agen

cies for adjudication even though such proceedings would not afford the right to a jury trial. The exception does not apply here because the present action does not fall within7 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court any of the distinctive areas involving governmental prerog

atives where the Court has concluded that a matter may be resolved outside of an Article III court, without a jury. The Seventh Amendment therefore applies and a jury is re

quired. Since the answer to the jury trial question resolves this case, we do not reach the nondelegation or removal is

sues.
A We first explain why this action implicates the Seventh Amendment.

1 The right to trial by jury is “of such importance and occu

pies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right” has always been and “should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” Dimick v. Schiedt , 293 U. S. 474, 486 (1935). Commentators recog

nized the right as “the glory of the English law,” 3 W. Black

stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 379 (8th ed. 1778) (Blackstone), and it was prized by the American colo

nists. When the English began evading American juries by siphoning adjudications to juryless admiralty, vice admi

ralty, and chancery courts, Americans condemned Parlia

ment for “subvert[ing] the rights and liberties of the colo

nists.” Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, Art. VIII (Oct. 19, 1765), reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties 270, 271 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959). Representatives gath

ered at the First Continental Congress demanded that Par

liament respect the “great and inestimable privilege of be

ing tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the [common] law.” 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, p. 69 (Oct. 14, 1774) (W. Ford ed. 1904). And when the English continued to try Americans without ju

ries, the Founders cited the practice as a justification for8 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court severing our ties to England. See Declaration of Independ

ence ¶20; see generally Erlinger v. United States , 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024). In the Revolution’s aftermath, perhaps the “most suc

cess[ful]” critique leveled agains t the proposed Constitution was its “want of a . . . provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.” The Federalist No. 83, p. 495 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis deleted). The Framers promptly adopted the Seventh Amendment to fix that flaw. In so do

ing, they “embedded” the right in the Constitution, securing it “against the passing demands of expediency or conven

ience.” Reid v. Covert , 354 U. S. 1, 10 (1957) (plurality opin

ion). Since then, “every encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.” Parsons v. Bedford , 3 Pet. 433, 446 (1830).

2 By its text, the Seventh Amendment guarantees that in “[s]uits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” In construing this language, we have noted that the right is not limited to the “common-law forms of action recognized” when the Seventh Amendment was rat

ified. Curtis v. Loether , 415 U. S. 189, 193 (1974). As Jus

tice Story explained, the Framers used the term “common law” in the Amendment “in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence.” Parsons , 3 Pet., at 446. The Amendment therefore “embrace[s] all suits which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume.” Id ., at 447. The Seventh Amendment extends to a particular statu

tory claim if the claim is “legal in nature.” Granfinanciera

, 492 U. S., at 53. As we made clear in Tull , whether that claim is statutory is immaterial to this analysis. See 481 U. S., at 414–415, 417–425. In that case, the Government sued a real estate developer for civil penalties in federal9 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court
court. The developer responde d by invoking his right to a jury trial. Although the cause of action arose under the Clean Water Act, the Court surveyed early cases to show that the statutory nature of the claim was not legally rele

vant. “Actions by the Governme nt to recover civil penalties under statutory provisions,” we explained, “historically ha[d] been viewed as [a] type of action in debt requiring trial by jury.” Id ., at 418–419. To determine whether a suit is legal in nature, we directed courts to consider the cause of action and the remedy it provides. Since some causes of action sound in both law and equity, we concluded that the remedy was the “more important” consideration. Id. , at 421 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see id ., at 418–421. In this case, the remedy is all but dispositive. For re

spondents’ alleged fraud, the SEC seeks civil penalties, a form of monetary relief. While monetary relief can be legal or equitable, money damages are the prototypical common law remedy. See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates , 508 U. S. 248, 255 (1993). What determines whether a monetary remedy is legal is if it is designed to punish or deter the wrongdoer, or, on the other hand, solely to “restore the sta

tus quo.” Tull , 481 U. S., at 422. As we have previously explained, “a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be ex

plained as also serving either retributive or deterrent pur

poses, is punishment.” Austin v. United States , 509 U. S. 602, 610 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). And while courts of equity could order a defendant to return un

justly obtained funds, only courts of law issued monetary penalties to “punish culpable individuals.” Tull , 481 U. S., at 422. Applying these principles, we have recognized that “civil penalt[ies are] a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” Ibid . The same is true here. To start, the Securities Exchange Act and the Investment10 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court Advisers Act condition the availability of civil penalties on six statutory factors: (1) whether the alleged misconduct in

volved fraud, deceit, manipula tion, or deliberate or reckless disregard for regulatory requirements, (2) whether it caused harm, (3) whether it resulted in unjust enrichment, accounting for any restitution made, (4) whether the de

fendant had previously violated securities laws or regula

tions, or had previously comm itted certain crimes, (5) the need for deterrence, and (6) other “matters as justice may require.” §§78u–2(c), 80b–3(i)(3). Of these, several concern culpability, deterrence, and re cidivism. Because they tie the availability of civil penalties to the perceived need to punish the defendant rather than to restore the victim, such considerations are legal rather than equitable. The same is true of the criteria that determine the size of the available remedy. The Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment Advisers Act establish three “tiers” of civil penalties. See §§77h–1(g)(2), 78u–2(b), 80b–3(i)(2). Violating a federal securities law or regulation exposes a defendant to a first tier penalty. A second tier penalty may be ordered if the violation involved fraud, de

ceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard for regulatory requirements. Finally, if those acts also resulted in substantial gains to the defendant or losses to another, or created a “significant risk” of the latter, the defendant is subject to a third tier penalty . Each successive tier author

izes a larger monetary sanction. See ibid. Like the considerations that determine the availability of civil penalties in the first place, the criteria that divide these tiers are also legal in nature. Each tier conditions the available penalty on the culpability of the defendant and the need for deterrence, not the size of the harm that must be remedied. Indeed, showing that a victim suffered harm is not even required to advance a defendant from one tier to the next. Since nothing in this analysis turns on “res

tor[ing] the status quo,” Tull , 481 U. S., at 422, these factors11 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court
show that these civil penalties are designed to be punitive. The final proof that this remedy is punitive is that the SEC is not obligated to return any money to victims. See id ., at 422–423. Although the SEC can choose to compen

sate injured shareholders from the civil penalties it collects, see 15 U. S. C. §7246(a), it admits that it is not required to do so, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 124a, n. 116 (citing 17 CFR §201.1100). Such a penalty by definition does not “restore the status quo” and can make no pretense of being equita

ble. Tull

, 481 U. S., at 422. In sum, the civil penalties in this case are designed to punish and deter, not to compensate. They are therefore “a type of remedy at common la w that could only be enforced in courts of law.” Ibid . That conclusion effectively decides that this suit implicates the Seventh Amendment right, and that a defendant would be entitled to a jury on these claims. See id ., at 421–423. The close relationship between the causes of action in this case and common law fraud confirms that conclusion. Both target the same basic conduct: misrepresenting or conceal

ing material facts. Compare 15 U. S. C. §§77q(a)(2), 78j(b), 80b–6(4); 17 CFR §§240.10b–5(b), 275.206(4)–8(a)(1), with Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, §§9, 13 (2018); see also, e.g. , Pauwels v. Deloitte LLP , 83 F. 4th 171, 189–190 (CA2 2023) (identifying the elements of common law fraud under New York law); Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 45 Cal. 4th 1244, 1254–1255, 203 P. 3d 1127, 1135 (2009) (same for California law); Wesdem, L.L.C.

v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. , 70 F. 4th 285, 291 (CA5 2023) (same for Texas law). That is no accident. Congress delib

erately used “fraud” and other common law terms of art in the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the In

vestment Advisers Act. E

. g ., 15 U. S. C. §77q(a)(3) (prohib

iting any practice “which operates . . . as a fraud”). In so doing, Congress incorporated prohibitions from common law fraud into federal securiti es law. The SEC has followed12 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court suit in rulemakings. Rule 10b–5, for example, prohibits “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and “engag[ing] in any act . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud.” 17 CFR §§240.10b–5(a), (c). Congress’s decision to draw upon common law fraud cre

ated an enduring link between federal securities fraud and its common law “ancestor.” Foster v. Wilson , 504 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (CA9 2007). “[W]hen Congress transplants a common-law term, the old soil comes with it.” United States

v. Hansen , 599 U. S. 762, 778 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our precedents therefore often consider common law fraud principles wh en interpreting federal se

curities law. E

. g ., Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo

, 544 U. S. 336, 343–344 (2005) (evaluating pleading require

ments in light of the “common-law roots of the securities fraud action”); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. , 472 U. S. 1, 7 (1985) (“The meaning the Court has given the term ‘manipulative’ [in §10b of the Securities Exchange Act] is consistent with the use of the term at common law . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Chiarella v. United States , 445 U. S. 222, 227–229 (1980) (explaining that insider trading liability under Rule 10b–5 is rooted in the common law duty of disclosure); Basic Inc. v. Levinson , 485 U. S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In general, the case law deve loped in this Court with re

spect to §10(b) and Rule 10b–5 has been based on doctrines with which we, as judges, are familiar: common-law doc

trines of fraud and deceit.”). That is not to say that federal securities fraud and com

mon law fraud are identical. In some respects, federal se

curities fraud is narrower. Fo r example, federal securities law does not “convert every common-law fraud that hap

pens to involve securities into a violation.” SEC v. Zandford , 535 U. S. 813, 820 (2002). It only targets certain subject matter and certain disc losures. In other respects,13 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

federal securities fraud is broa der. For example, federal se

curities fraud employs the burden of proof typical in civil cases, while its common law analogue traditionally used a more stringent standard. See Herman & MacLean v. Hud

dleston , 459 U. S. 375, 387–390 (1983). Courts have also not typically interpreted federa l securities fraud to require a showing of harm to be actionable by the SEC. See, e.g. , Blavin , 760 F. 2d, at 711; SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc. , 854 F. 3d 765, 779 (CA5 2017). Nevertheless, the close relationship between federal securities fraud and common law fraud confirms that this action is “legal in nature.” Granfinanciera

, 492 U. S., at 53.

B 1 Although the claims at issue here implicate the Seventh Amendment, the Government and the dissent argue that a jury trial is not required bec ause the “public rights” excep

tion applies. Under this ex ception, Congress may assign the matter for decision to an agency without a jury, con

sistent with the Seventh Amendment. But this case does not fall within the exception, so Congress may not avoid a jury trial by preventing the ca se from being heard before an Article III tribunal. The Constitution prohibits Congress from “withdraw[ing] from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law.” Murray’s Lessee

v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. , 18 How. 272, 284 (1856). Once such a suit “is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction,” an Articl e III court must decide it, with a jury if the Seventh Amendment applies. Stern v. Marshall , 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011). These propositions are critical to maintaining the proper role of the Judiciary in the Constitution: “Under ‘the basic concept of separation of powers . . . that flow[s] from the scheme of a tripartite gov

ernment’ adopted in the Constitu tion, ‘the judicial Power of14 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court

the United States’ ” cannot be shared with the other branches. Id ., at 483 (quoting United States v. Nixon , 418 U. S. 683, 704 (1974); alteration in original). Or, as Alex

ander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist Papers, “ ‘there is no liberty if the power of judg ing be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ ” The Federalist No. 78, at 466 (quoting 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 181 (10th ed. 1773)). On that basis, we have repeatedly explained that matters concerning private rights may not be removed from Article III courts. Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 284; Granfinanci

era , 492 U. S., at 51–52; Stern

, 564 U. S., at 484. A hall

mark that we have looked to in determining if a suit con

cerns private rights is whether it “is made of ‘the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.’ ” Id. , at 484 (quoting Northern Pipe

line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , 458 U. S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)). If a suit is in the nature of an action at common law, then the matter presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudication by an Article III court is mandatory. Stern , 564 U. S., at 484. At the same time, our precedent has also recognized a class of cases concerning what we have called “public rights.” Such matters “histo rically could have been deter

mined exclusively by [the executive and legislative] branches,” id. , at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted), even when they were “presented in such form that the judi

cial power [wa]s capable of acting on them,” Murray’s Les

see , 18 How., at 284. In contrast to common law claims, no involvement by an Article III court in the initial adjudica

tion is necessary in such a case. The decision that first recognized the public rights excep

tion was Murray’s Lessee . In that case, a federal customs collector failed to deliver public funds to the Treasury, so the Government issued a “warrant of distress” to compel him to produce the withheld sum. 18 How., at 274–275.15 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court Pursuant to the warrant, the Government eventually seized and sold a plot of the collector’s land. Id. , at 274. Plaintiffs later attacked the purchaser’s title, arguing that the initial seizure was void because the Government had audited the collector’s account and issued the warrant itself without ju

dicial involvement. Id ., at 275. The Court upheld the sale. It explained that pursuant to its power to collect revenue, th e Government could rely on “summary proceedings” to compel its officers to “pay such balances of the public money” into the Treasury “as may be in their hands.” Id ., at 281, 285. Indeed, the Court ob

served, there was an unbroken tradition—long predating the founding—of using these kinds of proceedings to “en

force payment of balances due from receivers of the reve

nue.” Id ., at 278; see id ., at 281. In light of this historical practice, the Government coul d issue a valid warrant with

out intruding on the domain of the Judiciary. See id ., at 280–282. The challenge to the sale thus lacked merit. This principle extends beyond cases involving the collec

tion of revenue. In Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan , 214 U. S. 320 (1909), we considered the imposi

tion of a monetary penalty on a steamship company. Pur

suant to its plenary power over immigration, Congress had excluded immigration by aliens afflicted with “loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases,” and it authorized customs collectors to enforce the pr ohibition with fines. Id ., at 331– 334. When a steamship company challenged the penalty under Article III, we upheld it. Congress’s power over for

eign commerce, we explained, was so total that no party had a “ ‘vested right’ ” to import anything into the country. Id

., at 335 (quoting Buttfield v. Stranahan , 192 U. S. 470, 493 (1904)). By the same token, Congress could also prohibit immigration by certain classes of persons and enforce those prohibitions with administra tive penalties assessed with

out a jury. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. , 214 U. S., at16 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court

339–340. 1 In Ex parte Bakelite Corp ., we upheld a law authorizing the President to impose tariffs on goods imported by “unfair methods of competition.” 279 U. S. 438, 446 (1929). The law permitted him to set whatever tariff was necessary, subject to a statutory cap, to produce fair competition. If the President was “satisfied the unfairness [was] extreme,” the law even authorized him to “exclude[ ]” foreign goods en

tirely. Ibid . Because the political branches had tradition

ally held exclusive power over this field and had exercised

——————

1 The dissent asserts that Oceanic Steam Navigation stands for the proposition that the public rights ex ception applies to any exercise of power granted to Congress. Post , at 10–11 (opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J). It must be reading from a different case than we are. Oceanic Steam Nav

igation expressly confines its analysis to the exercise of Congress’s power

over foreign commerce. 214 U. S., at 339 (“It is insisted that the decisions just stated and the legislative practices referred to are inapposite here, because they all relate to subjects peculiarly within the authority of the legislative department of the Government, and which, from the necessity of things, required the concession that administrative officers should have the authority to enforce designat ed penalties without resort to the courts. But over no conceivable subj ect is the legislative power of Con

gress more complete than it is over that with which the act we are now considering deals.); id

., at 334 (explaining that the statute “rest[s] . . . upon the authority of Congress over foreign commerce and its right to control the coming of aliens into th e United States” (emphasis added)); id ., at 340 (citing “the authority of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United States”); see id ., at 339 (discussing congressional power over “the valuation of imported merchandise,” “ ‘importers,’ ” and “tar

iff[s]” (quoting Bartlett v. Kane , 16 How. 263, 274 (1854)); 214 U. S., at 334 (expressly acknowledging and avoiding comment on “ ‘limitations’ ” of Congress’s “ ‘interstate commerce’ ” power because this case concerns instead Congress’s exercise of its “ ‘plenary power in respect to the exclu

sion of merchandise brought from foreign countries’ ” (quoting Buttfield

v. Stranahan , 192 U. S. 470, 492 (1904); emphasis added). Nowhere does Oceanic Steam Navigation say that the public rights exception applies to cases concerning the securities markets or interstate commerce more broadly. The rules the disse nt purports to locate in Oceanic Steam Nav

igation are therefore wholly inapposite.17 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court
it, we explained that the assessment of tariffs did not im

plicate Article III. Id ., at 458, 460–461. This Court has since held that certain other historic cat

egories of adjudications fall within the exception, including relations with Indian tribes, see United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation , 564 U. S. 162, 174 (2011), the administra

tion of public lands, Crowell v. Benson , 285 U. S. 22, 51 (1932), and the granting of public benefits such as pay

ments to veterans, ibid ., pensions, ibid ., and patent rights, United States v. Duell , 172 U. S. 576, 582–583 (1899). Our opinions governing the public rights exception have not always spoken in precise terms. This is an “area of fre

quently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. , 473 U. S. 568, 583 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court “has not ‘definitively explained’ the distinction between public and private rights,” and we do not claim to do so today. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC , 584 U. S. 325, 334 (2018). Nevertheless, since Murray’s Lessee , this Court has typi

cally evaluated the legal basis for the assertion of the doc

trine with care. The public righ ts exception is, after all, an exception . It has no textual basis in the Constitution and must therefore derive instead from background legal prin

ciples. Murray’s Lessee itself, for example, took pains to jus

tify the application of the exception in that particular in

stance by explaining that it fl owed from centuries-old rules concerning revenue collection by a sovereign. See 18 How., at 281–285. Without such close attention to the basis for each asserted application of the doctrine, the exception would swallow the rule. 2

——————

2 The dissent would brush away these careful distinctions and unfurl a new rule: that whenever Congress passes a statute “entitl[ing] the Gov

ernment to civil penalties,” the defe ndant’s right to a jury and a neutral Article III adjudicator disappears. See post , at 2 (opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J.). It bases this rule not in the co nstitutional text (where it would find18 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court From the beginning we have emphasized one point: “To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state that we do not consider congress can .

. . withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 284. We have never embraced the propos ition that “practical” con

siderations alone can justify extending the scope of the pub

lic rights exception to such matters. Stern , 564 U. S., at 501. “[E]ven with respect to matters that arguably fall within the scope of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the presump

tion is in favor of Article III courts.” Northern Pipeline Con

str. Co. , 458 U. S., at 69, n. 23 (plurality opinion) (citing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok , 370 U. S. 530, 548–549, and n. 21 (1962) (plurality opinion)). And for good reason: “Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmak

ing if the other branches of the Federal Government could confer the Government’s ‘judicia l Power’ on entities outside

—————— no foothold), nor in the ratification history (where again it would find no support), nor in a careful, category-by-category analysis of underlying le

gal principles of the sort performed by Murray’s Lessee (which it does not attempt), nor even in a case-specific functional analysis (also not at

tempted). Instead, the dissent extrap olates from the outcomes in cases concerning unrelated applications of the public rights exception and from one opinion, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442 (1977). The result is to blur the distinctions our cases have drawn in favor of the lega lly unsound principle that just be

cause the Government may extract civil penalties in administrative tri

bunals in some contexts, it must always be able to do so in all contexts.

The dissent also appeals to practice, ignoring that the statute Jarkesy and Patriot28 have been prosecuted under is barely over a decade old. It is also unclear how practice could transmute a private right into a public one, or how the absence of legal ch allenges brought by one generation could waive the individual rights of the next. Practice may be probative when it reflects the settled institut ional understandings of the branches. That case is far weaker when the ri ghts of individuals are directly at stake.19 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

Article III.” Stern , 564 U. S., at 484.

2 This is not the first time we have considered whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial “in the face of Congress’ decision to allow a non-Article III tri

bunal to adjudicate” a statutory “fraud claim.” 492 U. S., at 37, 50. We did so in Granfinanciera , and the principles identified in that case largely resolve this one. Granfinanciera involved a statutory action for fraudulent conveyance. As codified in the Bankruptcy Code, the claim permitted a trustee to void a transfer or obligation made by the debtor before bankruptcy if the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation.” 11 U. S. C. §548(a)(2)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Actions for fraudulent conveyance were well known at common law. 492 U. S., at 43. Even when Con

gress added these claims to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, see 92 Stat. 2600, it preserved parties’ rights to a trial by jury, 492 U. S., at 49–50. In 1984, however, Congress des

ignated fraudulent conveyanc e actions “core [bankruptcy] proceedings” and authorized non-Article III bankruptcy judges to hear them without juries. Id ., at 50. The issue in Granfinanciera was whether this designa

tion was permissible under the public rights exception. Ibid . We explained that it was not. Although Congress had assigned fraudulent conveyance claims to bankruptcy courts, that assignment was not dispositive. See id ., at 52. What mattered, we explained, was the substance of the suit. “[T]raditional legal clai ms” must be decided by courts, “whether they originate in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme or possess a long line of common-law forebears.” Ibid. To determine whether the claim implicated the Sev

enth Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled in Tull . We examined whether the matter was “from [its] nature subject to ‘a suit at common law.’ ” 492 U. S., at 5620 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court (some internal quotation marks omitted); see id ., at 43–50. A survey of English cases showed that “actions to recover . . . fraudulent transfers were often brought at law in late 18th-century England.” Id ., at 43. The remedy the trustee sought was also one “traditionally provided by law courts.” Id ., at 49. Fraudulent conveyance actions were thus “quin

tessentially suits at common law.” Id ., at 56. We also considered whether these actions were “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy regime. Id. , at 54. Some bankruptcy claims, such as “ creditors’ hierarchically or

dered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res,” id.

, at 56, are highly interdependent and require coordination. Resolving such claims fairly is only possible if they are all submitted at once to a single adjudicator. Otherwise, par

ties with lower priority clai ms can rush to the courthouse to seek payment before higher priority claims exhaust the estate, and an orderly disposition of a bankruptcy is impos

sible. Other claims, though, can be brought in standalone suits, because they are neithe r prioritized nor subordinated to related claims. Since fraudulent conveyance actions fall into that latter category, we concluded that these actions were not “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy process. Id ., at 54. We also noted that Congress had already author

ized jury trials for certain bankruptcy matters, demonstrat

ing that jury trials were not generally “incompatible” with the overall regime. Id ., at 61–62 (internal quotation marks omitted). We accordingly concluded that fraudulent conveyance ac

tions were akin to “suits at common law” and were not in

separable from the bankruptcy process. Id ., at 54, 56. The public rights exception therefore did not apply, and a jury was required.

3 Granfinanciera effectively decides this case. Even when an action “originate[s] in a newly fashioned regulatory21 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court
scheme,” what matters is the substance of the action, not where Congress has assigned it. Id ., at 52. And in this case, the substance points in only one direction. According to the SEC, these are actions under the “anti

fraud provisions of the federal securities laws” for “fraudu

lent conduct.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a–73a (opinion of the Commission). They provide civil penalties, a punitive rem

edy that we have recognized “could only be enforced in courts of law.” Tull , 481 U. S., at 422. And they target the same basic conduct as common law fraud, employ the same terms of art, and operate pursuant to similar legal princi

ples. See supra , at 10–12. In short, this action involves a “matter[ ] of private rather than public right.” Granfinan

ciera , 492 U. S., at 56. Therefore, “Congress may not ‘with

draw’ ” it “ ‘from judicial cognizance.’ ” Stern

, 564 U. S., at 484 (quoting Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 284).

4 Notwithstanding Granfinanciera , the SEC contends the public rights exception still applies in this case because Congress created “new statutor y obligations, impose[d] civil penalties for their violation, and then commit[ted] to an ad

ministrative agency the function of deciding whether a vio

lation ha[d] in fact occurred.” Brief for Petitioner 21 (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). The foregoing from Granfinanciera already does away with much of the SEC’s ar gument. Congress cannot “con

jure away the Seventh Amendment by mandating that tra

ditional legal claims be . . . taken to an administrative tri

bunal.” 492 U. S., at 52. Nor does the fact that the SEC action “originate[d] in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme” permit Congress to siphon this action away from an Article III court. Ibid . The constructive fraud claim in Granfinanciera was also statutory, see id. , at 37, but we nevertheless explained that the public rights exception did not apply. Again, if the action resembles a traditional legal22 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court
claim, its statutory origins are not dispositive. See id ., at 52, 56. The SEC’s sole remaining basis for distinguishing Gran

financiera is that the Government is the party prosecuting this action. See Brief for Petitioner 26–28; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 (Principal Deputy Solicitor General) (the “crit

ical distinction” in the public rights analysis is “enforce

ment by the executive”); id. , at 26 (identifying as “the con

stitutionally relevant distinction” that “this is something that has been assigned to a fe deral agency to enforce”). But we have never held that “the pr esence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is . . . sufficient” by itself to trigger the exception. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. , 458 U. S., at 69, n. 23 (plurality opinion). Again, what matters is the substance of the suit, not where it is brought, who brings it, or how it is labeled. See ibid . The object of this SEC action is to regulate transactions between private in

dividuals interacting in a pre-ex isting market. To do so, the Government has created claims whose causes of action are modeled on common law fraud and that provide a type of remedy available only in law courts. This is a common law suit in all but name. And such suits typically must be ad

judicated in Article III courts.

5 The principal case on which the SEC and the dissent rely is Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Re

view Commission , 430 U. S. 442 (1977). Because the public rights exception as construed in Atlas Roofing does not ex

tend to these civil penalty suits for fraud, that case does not control. And for that same reason, we need not reach the suggestion made by Jarkesy and Patriot28 that Tull and Granfinanciera effectively overruled Atlas Roofing to the extent that case construed the public rights exception to al

low the adjudication of civil penalty suits in administrative23 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

tribunals. 3 The litigation in Atlas Roofing arose under the Occupa

tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), a federal regulatory regime created to promote safe working condi

tions. Id. , at 444–445. The Act authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate safety re gulations, and it empowered the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) to adjudicate alleged violations. Id ., at 445–446. If a party violated the regulations, the agency could impose civil penalties. Id. , at 446. Unlike the claims in Granfinanciera and this action, the OSH Act did not borrow its cause of action from the common law. Rather, it simply comm anded that “[e]ach employer . . . shall comply with occupational safety and health stand

ards promulgated under this chapter.” 84 Stat. 1593, 29 U. S. C. §654(a)(2) (1976 ed.). These standards bring no common law soil with them. Cf. Hansen , 599 U. S., at 778. Rather than reiterate common law terms of art, they in

stead resembled a detailed build ing code. For example, the OSH Act regulations directed that a ground trench wall of “Solid Rock, Shale, or Cemented Sand and Gravels” could be constructed at a 90 degree angle to the ground. 29 CFR §1926.652, Table P–1 (1976); see Atlas Roofing

, 430 U. S., at 447 (discussing Table P–1). But a wall of “Compacted Angular Gravels” needed to be sloped at 63 degrees, and a wall of “Well Rounded Loose Sand” at 26 degrees. §1926.652, Table P–1. The purpose of this regime was not to enable the Federal Government to bring or adjudicate

——————

3 The dissent chides us for “leav[ ing] open the possibility that Granfi

nanciera might have overruled Atlas Roofing .” Post , at 25, n. 8 (opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J.). But the author of Atlas Roofing certainly thought that Granfinanciera may have done so. See Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 79 (White, J., disse nting) (“Perhaps

. . . Atlas Roofing is no longer good law after today’s decision.”); see also id ., at 71, n. 1 ( Granfinanciera “can be read as overruling or severely limiting” Atlas Roofing ).24 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court
claims that traced their ancestry to the common law. Ra

ther, Congress stated that it intended the agency to “de

velop[ ] innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safe ty and health problems.” 29 U. S. C. §651(b)(5) (1976 ed.). In both concept and execu

tion, the Act was self-consciously novel. Facing enforcement actions, two employers alleged that the adjudicatory authority of the OSHRC violated the Sev

enth Amendment. See Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 448–449. The Court rejected the challenge, concluding that “when Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may as

sign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment[ ].” Id. , at 455. As the Court ex

plained, the case involved “a new cause of action, and rem

edies therefor, unknown to the common law.” Id ., at 461. The Seventh Amendment, the Court concluded, was accord

ingly “no bar to . . . enforcement outside the regular courts of law.” Ibid

. The cases that Atlas Roofing relied upon did not extend the public rights exception to “traditional legal claims.” Granfinanciera

, 492 U. S., at 52. Instead, they applied the exception to actions that were “‘not . . . suit[s] at common law or in the nature of such . . . suit[s].’ ” Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S

. , at 453 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , 301 U. S., at 48); see Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 450–451 (dis

cussing, e.g. , Murray’s Lessee

, Ex parte Bakelite Corp.

, Helvering v. Mitchell , 303 U. S. 391 (1938), and Oceanic Steam Navigation Co .). Indeed, the Court recognized that if a case did involve a common law action or its equivalent, a jury was required. See 430 U. S., at 455 (“ ‘[W]here the action involves rights and re medies recognized at common law, it must preserve to parties their right to a jury trial.’ ” (quoting Pernell v. Southall Realty , 416 U. S. 363, 383 (1974)); Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 458–459 (jury required25 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court when “courts of law supplied a cause of action and an ade

quate remedy to the litigant”).

Atlas Roofing concluded that Congress could assign the OSH Act adjudications to an agency because the claims were “unknown to the common law.” 430 U. S., at 461. The

case therefore does not control here, where the statutory claim is “ ‘in the nature of ’ ” a common law suit. Id. , at 453 (quoting Jones & Laughlin , 301 U. S., at 48). As we have explained, Jarkesy and Patriot28 were prosecuted for “fraudulent conduct,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a, and the per

tinent statutory provisions derive from, and are interpreted in light of, their common law counterparts, see 15 U. S. C. §§77q(a)(2), 78j(b), 80b–6(4); 17 CFR §§240.10b–5(b), 275.206(4)–8(a)(1); Basic Inc. , 485 U. S., at 253 (opinion of White, J.). The reasoning of Atlas Roofing cannot support any broader rule. The dissent chants “ Atlas Roofing ” like a mantra, but no matter how many times it repeats those words, it cannot give Atlas Roofing substance that it lacks. 4

——————

4 Reading the dissent, one might also think that Atlas Roofing is among this Court’s most celebrated cases. As the concurrence shows, Atlas Roof

ing represents a departure from our legal traditions. See post , at 12–20 (opinion of G ORSUCH , J.).

This view is also reflected in th e scholarship. Commentators writing comprehensively on Article III and agency adjudication have often simply ignored the case. See, e.g ., R. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Ad

ministrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (1988) (no citation to Atlas Roofing ); J. Harrison, Public Ri ghts, Private Privileges, and Article III, 54 Ga. L. Rev. 143 (2019) (same); W. Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (2020) (same).

Others who have consider ed it have offered nothing but a variety of criticisms. See, e

. g ., R. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1281, 1294 (1978) (through its “careless use of precedent,” Atlas Roofing did “not recognize or [mis]und erstood” “careful distinctions developed by . . . earlier judges”); G. Young, Federal Courts & Federal Rights, 45 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1145, 1153 (1979) (“The Atlas Court . . . failed to offer an adequate justification for its interpretation of the sev

-26 SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court

Even as Atlas Roofing invoked the public rights exception, the definition it offered of the exception was circular. The exception applied, the Court said, “in cases in which ‘public rights’ are being litigated— e. g. , cases in which the Govern

ment sues in its sovereign capa city to enforce public rights created by statutes.” 430 U. S., at 450; see id. , at 458. After Atlas Roofing , this Court clarified in Tull that the Seventh Amendment does apply to novel statutory regimes, so long as the claims are akin to common law claims. See 481 U. S., at 421–423. In addition, we have explained that the public rights exception does not apply automatically whenever Congress assigns a matter to an agency for adju

dication. See Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 52. For its part, the dissent also seems to suggest that Atlas Roofing establishes that the public rights exception applies whenever a statute increases governmental efficiency. Post , at 15 (opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J.). Again, our prece

dents foreclose this argument. As Stern explained, effects like increasing efficiency and reducing public costs are not enough to trigger the exception. See 564 U. S., at 501; INS

v. Chadha , 462 U. S. 919, 944 (1983). Otherwise, evading

—————— enth amendment, either in terms of precedent or the language and his

tory of the amendment.”); M. Redi sh & D. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Articl e III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunc

tional Constitutional Theory, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill of Right J. 407, 436 (1995) (criticizing Atlas Roofing for failing to “provid[e] a principled basis upon which to determine the proper scope of congressional power to re

move the civil jury from federal adju dications”); V. Amar, Implementing an Historical Version of the Jury in an Age of Administrative Factfinding and Sentencing Guidelines, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 291, 298 (2005) (question

ing Atlas Roofing for “invert[ing] and turn[ing] on its head the Apprendi doctrine’s central insight that juries are most important to check the power of the state” (emphasis deleted )); C. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 604–605, and n. 189 (2007) (describing Atlas Roofing as “misus[ing]” precedent to “deny the novelty of its holding” and “drive a wedge” into the traditional understanding of the public-private rights distinction) . We express no opinion on these various criticisms.27 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

Opinion of the Court

the Seventh Amendment would become nothing more than a game, where the Government need only identify some slight advantage to the public from agency adjudication to strip its target of the protections of the Seventh Amend

ment. The novel claims in Atlas Roofing had never been brought in an Article III court. By contrast, law courts have dealt with fraud actions since befo re the founding, and Congress had authorized the SEC to bring such actions in Article III courts and still authorizes the SEC to do so today. See 3 Blackstone 41–42; §§77t, 78u, 80b–9. Given the judiciary’s long history of handling fraud claims, it cannot be argued that the courts lack the capacity needed to adjudicate such actions. In short, Atlas Roofing does not conflict with our conclu

sion. When a matter “from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law,” Congress may not “withdraw [it] from judicial cognizance.” Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 284.

* * * A defendant facing a fraud suit has the right to be tried by a jury of his peers before a neutral adjudicator. Rather than recognize that right, the dissent would permit Con

gress to concentrate the roles of prosecutor, judge, and jury in the hands of the Executive Branch. That is the very op

posite of the separation of po wers that the Constitution de

mands. Jarkesy and Patriot28 are entitled to a jury trial in an Article III court. We do not reach the remaining consti

tutional issues and affirm the ruling of the Fifth Circuit on the Seventh Amendment ground alone. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceed

ings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 22–859

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

PETITIONER v. GEORGE R. JARKESY, J R ., ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 27, 2024]

J USTICE G ORSUCH , with whom J USTICE T HOMAS joins, concurring. The Court decides a single issue: Whether the Security and Exchange Commission’s use of in-house hearings to seek civil penalties violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. It does. As the Court details, the government has historically litigated suits of this sort before juries, and the Seventh Amendment requires no less. I write separately to highlight that other constitutional provisions reinforce the correctn ess of the Court’s course. The Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial right does not work alone. It operates together with Article III and the Due Pro

cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment to limit how the gov

ernment may go about depriving an individual of life, lib

erty, or property. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury. Article III entitles individuals to an independent judge who will preside over that trial. And dueprocess promises any trial will be held in accord with timehonored principles. Taken to gether, all three provisions vindicate the Constitution’s promise of a “fair trial in a fair tribunal.” In re Murchison , 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955).

I In March 2013, the SEC’s Commissioners approved2 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
charges against Mr. Jarkesy. The charges were serious; the agency accused him of defrauding investors. The relief the agency sought was serious, too: millions of dollars in civil penalties. See SEC, Division of Enforcement’s Post-Hear

ing Memorandum of Law in In re John Thomas Capital Management Group, LLC , Admin. Proc. File No. 3–15255, pp. 28–29 (SEC, Apr. 7, 2014). For most of the SEC’s 90

- year existence, the Commission had to go to fe deral court to secure that kind of relief against someone like Mr. Jarkesy. Ante , at 3–4. Proceeding that way in this case hardly would have promised him an easy ride. But it would have at least guaranteed Mr. Jarkesy a jury, an independent judge, and traditional procedures designed to ensure that anyone caught up in our judicial system receives due process. In 2010, however, all that changed. With the passage of the Dodd Frank Act, Congress gave the SEC an alternative to court proceedings. Now, the agency could funnel cases like Mr. Jarkesy’s through its own “adjudicatory” system. See 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–1865. That is the route the SEC chose when it filed charges against Mr. Jarkesy. There is little mystery why. The new law gave the SEC’s Commissioners—the same officials who authorized the suit against Mr. Jarkesy—the power to preside over his case themselves and issue judgment. To be sure, the Commis

sioners opted, as they often do, to send Mr. Jarkesy’s case in the first instance to an “administrative law judge” (ALJ). See 17 CFR §201.110 (2023). But the title “judge” in this context is not quite what it might seem. Yes, ALJs enjoy some measure of independence as a matter of regulation and statute from the lawyers who pursue charges on behalfof the agency. But they remain servants of the same master—the very agency tasked with prosecuting individuals like Mr. Jarkesy. This close relationship, as others have long recognized, can make it “extremely difficult, if not im

possible, for th[e ALJ] to convey the image of being an im

partial fact finder.” B. Se gal, The Administrative Law3 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring Judge, 62 A. B. A. J. 1424, 1426 (1976). And with a jury out of the picture, the ALJ decides not just the law but the facts as well. 1 Going in, then, the odds were stacked against Mr. Jarkesy. The numbers confirm as much: According to one report, during the period under study the SEC won about 90% of its contested in-house proceedings compared to 69% of its cases in court. D. Thornley & J. Blount, SEC In-House Tribunals: A Call for Reform, 62 Vill. L. Rev. 261, 286 (2017) (Thornley). Reportedly, too, one of the SEC’s handful of ALJs even warned individuals during settlement discus

sions that he had found defendants liable in every contested case and never once “ ‘ruled against the agency’s enforce

ment division.’ ” Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC , 598 U. S. 175, 213–214 (2023) (G ORSUCH , J., concurring in judg

ment). The shift from a court to an ALJ didn’t just deprive Mr. Jarkesy of the right to an independent judge and a jury. He also lost many of the procedural protections our courts sup

ply in cases where a person’s life, liberty, or property is at stake. After an agency files a civil complaint in court, a de

fendant may obtain from the SEC a large swathe of docu

ments relevant to the lawsuit. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1). He may subpoena third parties for testimony and documents and take 10 oral depositions—more with the court’s permission. Rule 45; Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i). A court has flexibility, as well, to set deadlines for discovery and other matters to meet the needs of the case. See Rule 16. And

——————

1 In many agencies, litigants are not even entitled to have ALJs, with their modicum of protections, decide their cases. These agencies use “ad

ministrative judges.” Some agenci es can replace these administrative judges if they don’t like their decisi ons. And some of these judges may move in and out of prosecutorial and adjudicatory roles, or move in and out of the very industries th eir agencies regulate. See United States v. Arthrex, Inc. , 594 U. S. 1, 36–37 (2021) (G ORSUCH , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).4 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring come trial, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply, meaning that hearsay is generally inadmissible and witnesses must usually testify in person, subject to cross-examination. See Fed. Rule Evid. 802. Things look very different in agency proceedings. The SEC has a responsibility to provide “documents that con

tain material exculpatory evidence.” 17 CFR §201.230(b)(3). But the defendant enjoys no general right to discovery. Though ALJs enjoy the power to issue subpoe

nas on the request of litigants like Mr. Jarkesy, §201.232(a), they “often decline to issue [them] or choose to significantly narrow their scope,” G. Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 45, 68 (2016). Oral depositions are capped at five, with another two if the ALJ grants permission. §201.233(a). In some cases, an administrative trial must take place as soon as 1 month after service of the charges, and that hearing must follow within 10 months in even the most complex matters. §201.360(a)(2)(ii). The rules of evidence, including their prohibition against hearsay, do not apply with the same ri

gor they do in court. §201.235(a)(5); see §201.230. For that reason, live testimony often give s way to “investigative tes

timony”—that is, a “sworn statement” taken outside the presence of the defendant or his counsel. §201.235(b). How did all this play out in Mr. Jarkesy’s case? Accom

panying its charges, the SEC disclosed 700 gigabytes of data—equivalent to between 15 and 25 million pages of in

formation—it had collected during its investigation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a; Complaint in Jarkesy v. U. S. SEC

, No. 1:14–cv–00114 (DDC, Jan. 29, 2014), ECF Doc. 1, ¶49, pp. 12–13. Over Mr. Jarkesy’s protest that it would take “two lawyers or paralegals working twelve-hour days over four decades to review,” ibid. , the ALJ gave Mr. Jarkesy 10 months to prepare for his hearing, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 156a. Then, after conducting that hearing, the ALJ turned around and obtained from the Commission “an extension of5 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring six months to file [her] initial decision.” In re John Thomas Capital Management Group LLC , SEC Release No. 9631,

p. 1 (Aug. 13, 2014). The reason? The “ ‘size and complexity of the proceeding.’ ” Id ., at 2. When that decision eventu

ally arrived seven months after the hearing, the ALJ agreed with the SEC on every charge. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 155a–156a, 212a.

Mr. Jarkesy had the right to appeal to the Commission, but appeals to that politically accountable body (again, the same body that approved the charges) tend to go about as one might expect. The Commission may decline to review the ALJ’s decision. §201.411(b)(2). If it chooses to hear the case, it may increase the penalty imposed on the defendant. Thornley 286. A defendant unhappy with the result can seek further review in court, though that process will take more time and money, too. Nor will he find a jury there, only a judge who must follow the agency’s findings if they are supported by “ ‘more than a mere scintilla’ ” of evidence. Biestek v. Berryhill , 587 U. S. 97, 103 (2019). Mr. Jarkesy filed an appeal anyway. The Commission agreed to review the ALJ’s decision. It then afforded itself the better part of six years to issue an opinion. And, after all that, it largely agreed with the ALJ. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a–74a. None of this likely came as a surprise to the SEC employees in the Division of Enforcement responsible for pressing the action against Mr. Jarkesy. While his ap

peal was pending, employees in that division—including an

“ ‘Enforcement Supervisor’ ” in the regional office prosecut

ing Mr. Jarkesy—accessed confidential memos by the Com

missioners’ advisors about his appeal. See SEC, Second Commission Statement Relating to Certain Administrative Adjudications 3 (June 2, 2023).

II A If administrative proceedings like Mr. Jarkesy’s seem a6 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
thoroughly modern development, the British government and its agents engaged in a s trikingly similar strategy in colonial America. Colonial administrators routinely steered enforcement actions out of local courts and into vice-admiralty tribunals where they thought they would win more often. These tribunals lacked juries. They lacked truly independent judges. And the procedures materially differed from those available in everyday common-law
courts. The vice-admiralty courts in the Colonies began as rough equivalents of English courts of admiralty. E. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 Am. J. Legal Hist. 347, 355 (1967). These courts generally concerned them

selves with maritime matters arising on “the oceans and rivers and their immediate shores.” C. Ubbelohde, The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution 19 (1960) (Ubbelohde). And the proceedings they used ac

corded more with civil law traditions than common law ones. Among other things, th is meant officials could try cases against colonists without a jury. Id. , at 21. Confined to admiralty disputes, perhaps the lack of a jury would have proven unexceptional (as juries were not usu

ally required in such cases then, nor are they today). See,
e.g. , Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. , 531 U. S. 438, 448 (2001). But Parliament deployed these juryless tribunals in the Colonies to new ends that, according to John Adams, could fill “ ‘volumes.’ ” Ubbelohde vii. The creep away from the original province of thos e courts began with the grant of authority over violations of certain trade and customs laws. But in the decade before the Revolution, the drip, drip, drip of expanding power became a torrent, as Parlia

ment allowed more and more a ctions to be brought in colo

nial vice-admiralty courts. Many of the matters added to vice-admiralty jurisdiction in the Colonies would have required juries in England. Id

., at 112. But as the Massachusetts royal governor explained,7 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring colonial juries “ ‘were not to be trusted.’ ” D. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–1776, 16 Wm. & Mary Q. 459, 468 (1959). Even violations that did not implicate the jury right nor

mally would have been heard in England “before a court in [one’s] own neighborhood or co unty where [one] could count on traditional common-law procedure.” Id.

, at 471. But by expanding the reach of vice-admiralty jurisdiction in the Colonies, Parliament denied similar protections to Ameri

cans. See Erlinger v. United States , 602 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (slip op., at 5). Vice-admiralty court judges also lacked independence. While judges in England since the end of the seventeenth century generally enjoyed the protection of tenure during good behavior, colonial judges usually served at the pleas

ure of the royal administration. See United States v. Will

, 449 U. S. 200, 218–219 (1980). And, doing away with the pretense of impartiality entirely, some vice-admiralty judges held dual appointments—for instance, as colonial at

torneys general and vice-admiralty judges. Ubbelohde 162– 163. Like the modern SEC, Britis h colonial officials were not required to bring many of their cases before the vice-admi

ralty courts. Often, Parliament gave those officials the op

tion to proceed in either the ordinary common-law courts or the vice-admiralty courts. Unsurprisingly, though, they sought to file where they were most likely to win. And “[i]n this contest, the vice-admiralty courts were usually the vic

tors.” Id ., at 21.

B The abuses of these courts featured prominently in the calls for revolution. In the First Continental Congress, the assembled delegates condemned how Parliament “ex

tend[ed] the jurisdiction of Courts of Admiralty,” com

plained how colonial judges were “dependent on the8 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring Crown,” and demanded the right to the “common law of England” and the “great and inestimable privilege” of a jury trial. Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, Oct. 14, 1774, in 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, pp. 68–69 (W. Ford 1904 ed.). Two years later, the drafters of the Declaration of Independence repeated these concerns, admonishing the King for “ma[king] Judges dependent on his Will alone,” ¶11, and “[f]or depriving [the colonists] in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury,” ¶20. By that point, however, the “musket fire at Lexington and Concord . . . signaled the end not only of the vice-admiralty courts, but of all British rule in Amer

ica.” Ubbelohde 190. When the smoke settled, the American people went to great lengths to prevent a backslide toward anything like the vice-admiralty courts. Erlinger , 602 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6). One product of these efforts was Article III of the Constitution. There, the Constitution provided that “[t]he judicial Power”— the power over “Cases” and “Controversies”—would lie with life-tenured, salary-protected judges. §§1–2; see Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC , 584 U. S. 325, 346 (2018) (G ORSUCH , J., dissenting). As the Court has recognized, this meant the Executive Branch could “exercise no part of th[e] judicial power.” Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. , 18 How. 272, 275 (1856), “no matter how court-like [its] decisionmaking process might appear,” Ortiz

v. United States , 585 U. S. 427, 465 (2018) (A LITO , J., dis

senting). Nor could Congress “withdraw from judicial cog

nizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty”—the traditional scope of the “judicial Power.” Murray’s Lessee

, 18 How., at 284; see Art. III, §2. Despite these guarantees, many at the founding thought Article III didn’t go far enough. Yes, it promised a defend

ant an independent judge rather than one dependent on9 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
those who hold political power. But what would stop Con

gress from requiring litigants to navigate vice-admiralty’s alien procedures in all federal cases? Or from making “fed

eral processes” even more byzantine, so “as to [effectively] destroy [individual] rights?” Letter from a Federal Farmer (Jan. 20, 1788), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 328 (H. Storing ed. 1981). And what about civil juries? “[T]he jury trial,” one prom

inent Anti-Federalist observed, “brings with it an open and public discussion of all causes, and excludes secret and ar

bitrary proceedings.” Letter from a Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), in id ., at 320 (Federal Farmer 15). The partici

pation of ordinary Americans “d rawn from the body of the people” serves another function, too: “If the conduct of judges shall . . . tend to subvert the laws, and change the forms of government, the jury may check them.” Ibid. As originally composed, however, the Constitution promised a trial by jury for “all Crimes,” but said nothing about civil cases. Art III, §2, cl. 3. Some wondered, did this mean judges, not juries, would be “left masters as to facts” in civil disputes? Federal Farmer 15, at 322. If so, asked another, “what satisfaction can we expect from a lordly court of jus

tice, always ready to protect the officers of government against the weak and helpless citizen”? Essay of a Demo

cratic Federalist (Oct. 17, 1787), in 3 Complete Anti-Feder

alist 61. The answer to these concerns was the Bill of Rights. Erlinger , 602 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). As the Court details, the Seventh Amendment promised the right to a jury trial in “ ‘[s]uits at common law.’ ” Ante , at 8 (quoting Amdt. 7). But because the Constitution was designed to “endure for ages to come,” McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819), this did not mean only those “suits, which the com

mon law recognized among its old and settled proceedings,” Parsons v. Bedford , 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830). The founding10 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring generation anticipated the possibility Congress would in

troduce new causes of action and perhaps new remedies, too. See ibid. Accordingly, this Court has long understood the Seventh Amendment’s protections to apply in “all [civil] suits which are not of equity [or] admiralty jurisdiction.” Ibid. ; accord, ante , at 8–9. In this way, the Seventh Amend

ment seeks to ensure there will be no juryless vice-admiralty courts in the United States. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause addressed remaining concerns about the processes that would attend trials before independent judges and juries. It provided that the government may not deprive anyone of “life, lib

erty, or property, without due process of law.” As originally understood, this provision prohibited the government from “depriv[ing] a person of those rights without affording him the benefit of (at least) those customary procedures to which freemen were entitled by the old law of England.” Sessions v. Dimaya , 584 U. S. 148, 176 (2018) (G ORSUCH , J., concurring in part and concu rring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Erlinger , 602 U. S., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 6–7). More than that, because it was “the peculiar province of the judiciary” to safeguard life, liberty, and property, due process often meant judicial process. 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Editor’s App. 358 (1803). That is, if the government sought to interfere with those rights, nothing less than “the process and proceedings of the com

mon law” had to be observed before any such deprivation could take place. 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Consti

tution of the United States §1783, p. 661 (1833) (Story). In other words, “ ‘due process of law’ generally implie[d] and include[d] . . . judex [a judge], regular allegations, oppor

tunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings.” Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 280. This constitutional baseline was designed to serve11 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring as “a restraint on the legislative” branch, preventing Con

gress from “mak[ing] any process ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.” Id. , at 276.

C These three constitutional provisions were meant to work together, and together they make quick work of this case. In fact, each provision require s the result the Court reaches today. First , because the “ ‘matter’ ” before us is one “which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law,” id.

, at 284, “the responsibility for deciding [it] rests with Article III judges in Article III courts.” Stern v. Marshall , 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011). Nor does it make a difference whether we think of the SEC’s action here as a civil-penalties suit or something akin to a traditional fraud claim: At the found

ing, both kinds of actions were tried in common-law courts. See ante , at 9–13 (discussing civil penalties); see also, e

. g ., Pasley v. Freeman , 3 T. R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K. B. 1789) (action for fraud); Baily v. Merrell , 3 Bulst. 94, 81 Eng. Rep. 81 (K. B. 1615) (same). And that tells us all we need to know that the SEC’s in-house civil-penalty scheme violates Article III by “withdraw[ing]” the matter “from ju

dicial cognizance” and handing it over to the Executive Branch for an in-house trial. Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 284; see supra , at 7–8. Second , because the action the SEC seeks to pursue is not the stuff of equity or admiralty jurisdiction but the sort of suit historically adjudicated before common-law courts, the Seventh Amendment guarantees Mr. Jarkesy the right to have his case decided by a jury of his peers. In this regard, it is irrelevant that the SEC derived its power to sue under a “new statut[e]” or that the agency proceeded under “a new cause of action.” Brief for Petitioner 13, 22 (internal quota

tion marks omitted). As we have seen, the government can

not evade the Seventh Amendment so easily. See ante , at12 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
9; supra , at 8–10. Third , were there any doubt, the Due Process Clause con

firms these conclusions. Cf. Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 275 (explaining that the Article III challenge before the Court could “best be considered” as raising a due process question). Because the penalty the SEC seeks would “depriv[e]” Mr. Jarkesy of “property,” Amdt. 5, due process demands nothing less than “the process and proceedings of the common law,” 3 Story §1783, at 661. That means the regular course of trial proceedings with their usual protec

tions, see Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 280, not the use of ad hoc adjudication procedures before the same agency re

sponsible for prosecuting the law, subject only to hands-off judicial review, see supra , at 10–11.

III A The government resists these conclusions. As the govern

ment sees it, this case implicates the so-called public rights exception. One that defeats not only Mr. Jarkesy’s right to trial by jury, but also his right to proceed before an inde

pendent trial judge consistent with traditional judicial pro

cesses. That is, on the govern ment’s account, not only does the Seventh Amendment fall away; so does the usual oper

ation of Article III and the Due Process Clause. In the government’s view, the public rights exception “ at a minimum allows Congress to create new statutory obliga

tions, impose civil penalties for their violation, and then commit to an administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation has in fa ct occurred.” Brief for Peti

tioner 21 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit

ted). Put plainly, all that need be done to dispense almost entirely with three separate co nstitutional provisions is an Act of Congress creating some new statutory obligation. And, the government continues, this case easily meets that standard because the proceeding against Mr. Jarkesy is one13 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring “brought by the government against a private party” under a statute designed “to remedy harm to the public at large.” Id ., at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court rightly rejects these arguments. See ante , at 19–21. No one denies that, under the public rights excep

tion, Congress may allow the Executive Branch to resolve certain matters free from judicial involvement in the first instance. Ante , at 6, 14–15. But, despite its misleading name, the exception does not refer to all matters brought by the government against an in dividual to remedy public harms, or even all those that spring from a statute. See
ante , at 16–17. Instead, public rights are a narrow class defined and limited by history. As the Court explains, that class has traditionally included the collection of revenue, customs enforcement, immigration, and the grant of public benefits. Ante , at 15–17. How did these matters find themselves categorized as public rights? Competing explanations abound. Some have pointed to ancient practical considerations. In Murray’s Lessee , for example, the Court reasoned that the “[i]mpera

tive necessity” of tax collection for a functional state had long caused governments to treat “claims for public taxes” differently from “all others.” 18 How., at 282. Others have theorized that “the core of the judicial power” concerns the disposition of the “three ‘absolute’ rights” “to life, liberty, and property.” Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif , 575 U. S. 665, 713–714 (2015) (T HOMAS , J., dissenting). Public rights, the theory goes, involve matters originally under

stood to fall outside this core. Id ., at 714. So, for example, “[a]lthough Congress could authorize executive agencies to dispose of public rights in land—often by means of adjudi

cating a claimant’s qualifications for a land grant under a statute—the United States had to go to the courts if it wished to revoke” that grant, which had become the owner’s private property. Id ., at 715. There are still other theories yet. See, e

. g ., Stern , 564 U. S., at 489.14 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
Whatever their roots, tradi tionally recognized public rights have at least one feature in common: a serious and unbroken historical pedigree. See Culley v. Marshall , 601 U. S. 377, 397–398 (2024) (G ORSUCH , J., concurring); ante , at 14–17. For good reason. If the Article III “judicial Power” encompasses “the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts of Westminster in 1789,”
ante , at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted), it follows that matters traditionally adjudicated outside those courts might not fall within Article III’s ambit. See Stern , 564 U. S., at 504–505 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]n Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary”). So too with the Due Process Clause. If that clause sets cus

tomary common-law practice as the ordinary procedural baseline, see Part II–B, supra , clear historical evidence of a different practice might warrant a departure from that baseline, see Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 280. That’s why this Court has said “ ‘a process of law . . . must be taken to be due process of law’ if it enjoys ‘the sanction of settled us

age both in England and in this country.’ ” Culley , 601 U. S., at 397 (G ORSUCH , J., concurring) (quoting Hurtado v. Cali

fornia , 110 U. S. 516, 528 (1884)). With the public rights exception viewed in this light, the government’s invocation of it in this case cannot succeed. Starting with a “ ‘presumption . . . in favor of Article III courts’ ” and their usual attendant processes, ante , at 18, we look for some “deeply rooted” tradition of nonjudicial adju

dication before permitting a ca se to be tried in a different forum under different procedures, Culley , 601 U. S., at 397 (G ORSUCH , J., concurring). We have upheld summary pro

cedures for customs collection, for example, because they were consistent with both “the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors” and “the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of ” the Constitution. Murray’s Lessee , 18 How., at 280; see15 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring

ante , at 14–15. But when it comes to the kind of civil-pen

alty suit before us, that same history points in the opposite direction, suggesting actions of this sort belong before an independent judge, a jury, and decided in a trial that ac

cords with traditional judicial procedures. Ante , at 9–13;
supra , at 11–12. Just as SEC practices themselves largely reflected as recently as 2010.

B If all that’s so, why might the government feel comforta

ble invoking the public rights exception? To be fair, much of it may have to do with this Court. Some of our past deci

sions have allowed the government to chip away at the courts’ historically exclusive role in adjudicating private rights—and juries’ accompanying role in that adjudication. This process began, of all places, in an admiralty case. In Crowell v. Benson , 285 U. S. 22 (1932), this Court faced a constitutional challenge to the Longshoremen’s and Har

bor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927. The Act directed employers to compensate employees for injuries occurring at sea. 44 Stat. 1426. The law further assigned primary responsibility for deciding liability disputes to an Executive Branch official, the deputy commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission. Id ., at 1435–1437; Crowell , 285 U. S., at 42–43. The Court acknowledged that this regi me empowered the deputy com

missioner to decide in the first instance the monetary “lia

bility of one individual to another.” Id. , at 51. The Court recognized that this amounted to a classic “private right” suit of the kind traditionally tried in court. Ibid . The Court even conceded that, under the law, the factual “findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by evidence and within the scope of his authority, shall be final”: An Article III court could not review the facts anew. Id. , at 46. But the Court upheld the scheme and its limited judicial review an

yway.16 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring To get there took a dash of fiction and a pinch of surmise. From time to time, the Court observed, judges appoint their own special “masters and commissioners” to prepare re

ports on fact issues or damages. Id ., at 51. These reports are nonbinding and “essentially . . . advisory.” Ibid

. Judges themselves remain the decisionmakers. In Crowell , the Court embraced the fiction t hat Executive Branch officials might similarly act as assistants or adjuncts to Article III courts. And because judges often adopt the proposed find

ings of their masters and commissioners, the Court sur

mised, Article III posed no bar to Congress taking a further step and requiring judges to treat the findings of Executive Branch officials as essentially “final.” Id ., at 46. “To hold otherwise,” the Court reasoned, “would be to defeat the ob

vious purpose of the legislation”: “to furnish a prompt, con

tinuous, expert, and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to ex

amination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task.” Ibid

. Crowell itself only went so far, however. The case fell within federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, and tribunals sitting in admiralty in England and America alike had long heard certain matters falling within the public rights ex

ception. See Culley , 601 U. S., at 398 (G ORSUCH , J., concur

ring). In deciding those matte rs, courts had long tolerated some flexibility in procedures, had long restricted appellate review of factual findings, and had always proceeded with

out a jury. Crowell , 285 U. S., at 45, 53. Soon, though, none of that mattered. Almost in a blink, the admiralty limitation was discarded, and more and more agencies began assuming adjudicatory functions previously reserved for judges and juries , employing novel procedures that sometimes bore faint rese mblance to those observed in court. Along the way, prominent voices in and out of gov

ernment expressed concern at this development. Consider just two typical examples. Were an agency endowed with17 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
the power to assess civil pe nalties, advised a committee overseen by Attorney General (soon-to-be Justice) Robert H. Jackson, “the aggrieved person” should at least “be per

mitted review de novo by a Fe deral district court.” Final Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 147 (1941). That was the only way, the commit

tee opined, “to resolve any doubts concerning the constitu

tionality of the procedure.” Ibid. Around the same time, a committee of the American Bar Association led by Roscoe Pound sounded a similar alarm. Administrative agencies, the committee warned, had a “tendency to mix up rule mak

ing, investigation, prosecution, the advocate’s function, the judge’s function, and the function of enforcing the judg

ment, so that the whole proceeding from end to end is one to give effect to a complaint. ” Report of the Special Com

mittee on Administrative Law, 63 Ann. Rep. 331, 351 (1938). The high-water mark of the movement toward agency ad

judication may have come in 1977 in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n , 430 U. S. 442. Some have read that decision to suggest the category of public rights might encompass pretty much any case aris

ing under any “ ‘new statutory obligations,’ ” Brief for Peti

tioner 22 (quoting Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 450). It is a view the government essentially espouses in this case. But without reference to any consti tutional text or history to guide what does or does not qualify as a public right, that view has (unsurprisingly) proven wholly unworkable. It did not take long for this Court to realize as much. Just 12 years later, in Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg , 492 U. S. 33 (1989), this Court cabined Atlas Roofing so nar

rowly that the author of Atlas Roofing complained that the Court had “overrul[ed]” it. 492 U. S., at 71, n. 1 (White, J., dissenting); see ante , at 23, n. 3. Far from endorsing the notion that any new statutor y obligation could qualify for18 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring treatment as a public right, for example, the Court in Gran

financieria read Atlas Roofing as having “left the term ‘pub

lic rights’ undefined.” 492 U. S., at 51, n. 8. And since then this Court has, in one case after another, “adhere[d]” only
to Atlas Roofing’s “general teaching” that Congress may constitutionally adopt “new statut[es] ” assigning matters that indeed qualify as “public rights . . . to an administra

tive agency.” 492 U. S., at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e

. g ., Stern , 564 U. S., at 489–490; Oil States

, 584 U. S., at 345. Yet, even after the Court moved away from Atlas Roofing

, our public rights jurisprudence remained muddled. Since then, the Court has suggested that public rights might in

clude those “involving statutory rights that are integral parts of a public regulatory scheme.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 55, n. 10. We have changed course and tried our hand at a five-factor balancing test. See Stern , 564 U. S., at 491 (describing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor , 478 U. S. 833 (1986)). We have replaced that test with one that considers “at le ast seven different” factors. 564 U. S., at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring). And at one time or another, these factors have included the consideration of “the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the re

quirements of Article III.” Schor , 478 U. S., at 851. So, for example, we have asked whether insistence on “the institu

tional integrity of the Judicial Branch” would “unduly con

strict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.” Ibid. Today, the Court does much to return us to a more tradi

tional understanding of public rights. Adhering to Granfi

nancieria , the Court rejects the government’s overbroad reading of Atlas Roofing and recognizes that the kind of atextual and ahistorical (not to mention confusing) tests it inspired do little more than ask policy questions the Con

stitution settled long ago. Yes, a limited category of public rights were originally and ev en long before understood to19 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
be susceptible to resolution without a court, jury, or the other usual protections an Article III court affords. But out

side of those limited areas, we have no license to deprive the American people of their constitutional right to an in

dependent judge, to a jury of their peers, or to the proce

dural protections at trial that due process normally de

mands. Let alone do so when ever the government wishes to dispense with them. This Court does not subject ot her constitutional rights to such shabby treatment. We have “reaffirm[ed],” many times and “emphatically[,] that the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.” Riley

v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc. , 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988). We have rejected a framework for Second Amendment challenges that would balance the right to bear arms against “‘other important governmental interests.’ ” District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U. S. 570, 634 (2008). It is hornbook Fourth Amendmen t law that “[a] generalized interest in expedient law enforcement cannot, without more, justify a warrantless search.” Georgia v. Randolph

, 547 U. S. 103, 115, n. 5 (2006). And even though the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial in criminal cases may have “ ‘its weaknesses and the potential for misuse,’ ” Duncan v. Louisiana , 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968), we con

tinue to insist that it “be jealously preserved,” Patton v. United States , 281 U. S. 276, 312 (1930); see Ramos v. Lou

isiana , 590 U. S. 83, 110–111 (2020) (plurality opinion); Erlinger , 602 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (“There is no effi

ciency exception to the . . . Sixth Amendmen[t]”). Why should Article III, the Seventh Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment’s promise of due process be any different? None of them exists to “prote c[t] judicial authority for its own sake.” Oil States , 584 U. S., at 356 (G ORSUCH , J., dis

senting). They exist to “protect the individual.” Bond v. United States , 564 U. S. 211, 222 (2011). And their protec

-20 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring tions are no less vital than those afforded by other constitu

tional provisions. As American colonists learned under British rule, “the right of trial” means little “when the ac

tual administration of justice is dependent upon caprice, or favour, [or] the will of rulers.” 3 Story §1568, at 426; id

., §1783, at 661. In recognizing as much today, the Court es

sentially follows the advice of Justices Brennan and Mar

shall, “limit[ing] the judicial authority of non-Article III fed

eral tribunals to th[o]se few, long-established exceptions” that bear the sanction of history, and “countenanc[ing] no further erosion.” Schor , 478 U. S., at 859 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).

C The dissent’s competing account of public rights is aston

ishing. On its telling, the Constitution might impose some (undescribed) limits on the powe r of the government to send cases “involving the liability of one individual to another” to executive tribunals for resolution. Post , at 22 (opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J.). But, thanks to public rights doctrine, the dissent insists, the Constitution imposes no limits on the government’s power to seek ci vil penalties “outside the reg

ular courts of law where there are no juries.” Post , at 2. In that field, the Constitution falls silent. The dissent does not even attempt to deploy any of the contrived balancing tests that emerged in Atlas Roofing ’s aftermath to rein in the government’s power. But where in Article III, the Seventh Amendment, and due process can the dissent find this new rule? What about founding-era practice or original mean

ing? And why would a Constitution drawn up to protect against arbitrary government a ction make it easier for the government than for private parties to escape its dictates? The dissent offers no answers. To be sure, the dissent tries to appeal to precedent. It even asserts that our decisions support, “ without exception ,” its sweeping conception of public rights doctrine. Post , at21 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring 12 (emphasis added). But the dissent’s approach to our precedents is like a picky child at the dinner table. It se

lects only a small handful while leaving much else un

touched. To start, the dissent lingers briefly on Murray’s Lessee —but not long enough to explain the opinion’s con

ception of Article III, due process, or the extended historical inquiry that led the Court to conclude the collection of rev

enue concerned a public right. See post , at 9–10; supra , at 8, 10–14. The 19th century behind it (for it does not trouble with the founding era), the dissent turns to Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan , 214 U. S. 320 (1909). Drawing on that decision, the dissent contends that “Congress [has] rou

tinely ‘impose[d] appropriate obligations’ ” by statute and given “ ‘executive officers the power to enforce’ ” them

“ ‘without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.’ ” Post , at 11 (quoting Stranahan , 214 U. S., at 339). Notably absent from the dissent’s account, however, is the decision’s discussion of Congress’s long -recognized and extensive au

thority over the field of immigration, the area of law at issue there. See id. , at 339. Unmentioned, too, is Stranahan ’s explanation that what links immigration to other public rights like “tariff[s], . . . internal revenue, taxation,” and “foreign commerce” is that, “ ‘from the beginning[,] Con

gress has exercised a plenary power’ ” over them “because they all relate to subjects peculiarly within the authority of the legislative department.” Id. , at 334, 339. Really, one has to wonder: If the public rights exception is as broad and unqualified as the dissent asserts, why did our predecessors bother to di scuss history or Congress’s pe

culiar powers when it comes to revenue and immigration? Why didn’t the Court simply announce the rule the dissent would have us announce today: that our Constitution does not stand in the way of “agency adjudications of statutory claims . . . brought by the Government in its sovereign ca

-22 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring pacity”? Post , at 4. The answer, of course, is that the Con

stitution has never countenanced the dissent’s notion that the Executive is free to reassi gn virtually any civil case in which it is a party to its own tribunals where its own em

ployees decide cases and inconvenient juries and traditional trial procedures go by the boards. That my dissenting colleagues plow ahead anyway with their remarkable conception of public rights is all the more puzzling considering how regularly they have argued against that sort of sweeping concentration of governmen

tal power. The dissenters have recognized that a “lack of standardized procedural safeguards” can leave government enforcement schemes “vulnerable to abuse” and individuals subject to coercive “pressure from unchecked prosecutors.” Culley , 601 U. S., at 405, 407 (S OTOMAYOR , J., joined by K

AGAN and J ACKSON , JJ., dissenting). They have con

tended that the Judiciary has an affirmative obligation to supply “meaningful remedies,” trials before judges and ju

ries included, even when “C ongress or the Executive has [already] created a remedial process.” Egbert v. Boule , 596 U. S. 482, 524–525 (2022) (S OTOMAYOR , J., joined by, inter alios , K AGAN , J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted). And like most every current Member of this Court at one time or another, they have acknowledged that the jury-trial right “stands as one of the Constitution’s most vital prot ections against arbitrary gov

ernment.” United States v. Haymond , 588 U. S. 634, 637 (2019) (plurality opinion). The dissent’s conception of public rights is so unqualified that it refuses to commit itse lf on the question whether even muted forms of judicial review—such as asking executive tribunals to muster “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence in support of their rulings—are constitutionally required in the essentially unbounded class of cases that fall within its conception of public rights. See Part I, supra ; post , at 8,

n. 4. Gone, too, is any role for the jury—for why would the23 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring government ever go to court if it may more readily secure a win before its own employees? The only attempt to mitigate the havoc its rule would wreak comes when the dissent de

clares that “ ‘[t]he public-rights doctrine does not extend to . . . criminal matters.’ ” Post , at 27, n. 9. But the dissent does not (and cannot) explain how that fits with all else it says. If, as the dissent insists, a public right is any “new right” that “belongs to the public and inheres in the Gov

ernment in its sovereign capacity,” post , at 28, what could possibly better fit the descript ion than the enforcement of new criminal laws? See Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez , 596 U. S. 366, 376 (2022) (“The power to convict and punish criminals lies at the heart of the States’ residuary and invi

olable sovereignty” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 All but admitting its view has no support in “historical practice dating back to the fo unding,” the dissent chastises the Court for daring to rely on that practice to flesh out the scope of the public rights exception. Post , at 18. It would be so much simpler, the dissent says, to adopt its rule per

mitting the government to ski rt oversight by judge and jury alike whenever it enacts a new law. And, true enough, “a principle that the government always wins surely would be simple for judges to implement.” United States v. Rahimi

, 602 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (G ORSUCH , J., concurring) (slip op., at 6). But looking to original meaning and historical prac

tice informing it is exactly how this Court proceeds in so

——————

2 The best the dissent can do is to observe that “Article III itself pre

scribes that ‘[t]he trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.’ ” Post , at 27,

n. 9 (quoting §2, cl. 3). That response might be reassuring if the dissent’s treatment of the Seventh Amendment didn’t supply a roadmap for work

ing around it. On the dissent’s te lling, the Seventh Amendment can be dispensed with at will: It applies “o nly in judicial proceedings,” and not whenever the government chooses to assign a matter to its own in-house tribunals. Post , at 5. And under that logic, there is no apparent reason why the government could not evade Ar ticle III’s jury-trial right just as easily, simply by choosing to route criminal prosecutions through execu

tive agencies.24 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring many other contexts where we seek to honor the Constitu

tion’s demands—including, notably, when we seek to ascer

tain the scope of the criminal jury-trial right and the de

fendant’s attendant right to confront his accusers. See Erlinger , 602 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–20); Crawford

v. Washington , 541 U. S. 36, 50 (2004). What’s more, this approach has the virtue of “keep[ing] judges in their proper lane” by “seeking to honor the supreme law the people have ordained rather than substituting our will for theirs.” Rahimi , 602 U. S., at ___–___ (G ORSUCH , J., concurring) (slip op., at 4–5); see Crawford , 541 U. S., at 67. It is hard, as well, to take seriously the dissent’s charges of unworkability and unpredictability. At least until today, the dissenters supported procedural protections for those in the government’s sights in civil as well as criminal cases. What kind of protections? Of ten, they have argued, it de

pends on a judicial balancing test. One that is “flexible,” defies “technical conception,” lacks “fixed content,” and will “not always yield the same re sult” even when applied in similar circumstances. Culley , 601 U. S., at 413 (opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have seen, that was essentially the course some pursued, too, when it came to the public rights exception in the fall

out from Atlas Roofing . See Part III–B, supra . But that kind of “ ‘we know it when we see it’” approach to constitu

tional rights, post , at 21, can hardly claim any serious ad

vantages when it comes to workability or predictability. Failing all else, the dissent retreats to Atlas Roofing . At least that decision, it insists, supports its nearly boundless conception of public rights. The dissent goes so far as to accuse the Court of undermining “ stare decisis and the rule of law,” post , at 15, and engaging in “a power grab,” post , at 37, by failing to give Atlas Roofing its broadest possible con

struction. It’s a “disconcerting” accusation indeed, post , at 36, and a misdirected one at that. Construed as broadly as the dissent proposes, Atlas Roofing ’s view of public rights25 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring
stands as an outlier in our jurisprudence—with no appar

ent support in original meaning, at odds with prior prece

dent, and inconsistent with later precedent as well. See
ante , at 25, n. 4; Part III–B, supra . Meanwhile, the Court’s alternative construction of Altas Roofing fits far more com

fortably with all those legal sources. In that respect, the majority’s approach is of a piece with Granfinanciera ’s sim

ilar approach 25 years ago. And, more broadly, it is of a piece with our usual practice of construing “loose language” found in a prior judicial opinion in a way that better con

forms it to the mainstream of our precedents. Groff v. DeJoy , 600 U. S. 447, 474 (2023) (S OTOMAYOR , J., concur

ring). As the dissenters hav e previously acknowledged, that course is neither unusual nor at odds with stare decisis

. See id ., at 474–475; see also Brown v. Davenport , 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022) (“We neither expect nor hope that our suc

cessors will comb these pages for stray comments and stretch them beyond their context—all to justify an outcome inconsistent with this Court’ s reasoning and judgments”). Were there any doubt about the propriety of the Court’s treatment of Atlas Roofing , consider one more feature of the alternative the dissent proposes. In defending the broadest possible construction of Atlas Roofing ’s public rights discus

sion, the dissent necessarily endorses that decision’s excep

tionally narrow conception of the Seventh Amendment. See post , at 6. After all, as public rights expand, so too the jurytrial right must contract. Yet Atlas Roofing ’s discussion of the jury-trial right, no less than its discussion of public rights, is difficult to square with precedent and original meaning. Recall that, from the start, the Seventh Amendment was understood to protect that right “not merely” in suits recog

nized at common law, but in “ all suits which are” of legal, as opposed to “equity [or] ad miralty[,] jurisdiction.” Par

sons , 3 Pet., at 447 (emphasis added); see Part II–B, supra

. This Court repeated that understanding of the Amendment26 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring until well into the 1970s, noting, for example, that “the ap

plicability of the constitutional right to jury trial in actions enforcing statutory rights” was “a matter too obvious to be doubted.” Curtis v. Loether , 415 U. S. 189, 193 (1974) (in

ternal quotation marks omitted); accord, Pernell v. Southall Realty , 416 U. S. 363, 375 (1974) (the Seventh “Amendment requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law”). And the Court rejected the notion that a statute must present “a close equivale nt” to a common-law cause of action; the jury-trial right attached, we said, so long as the “action involve[d] rights and remedies of the sort tradition

ally enforced in an action at law.” Ibid. Atlas Roofing ignored all of that. Instead, it suggested, “[t]he phrase ‘Suits at common law’ has been construed to refer to cases tried prior to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment in courts of law.” 430 U. S., at 449 (emphasis added). That cramped construction of the Seventh Amend

ment was, of course, a key move in Atlas Roofing . For with

out it, the Court would have been hard pressed to suggest the public rights doctrine permits Congress to route any

“ ‘new cause of action’ ” for adjudication before agencies where juries do not sit. Post , at 14 (quoting Atlas Roofing

, 430 U. S., at 461). Almost immediately, ho wever, the Court rejected Atlas Roofing ’s analysis, not just with respect to public rights doc

trine but the Seventh Amendment, too. Returning to our mainstream precedents, the Court reaffirmed the applica

bility of the Seventh Amendment to new causes of action, first in Tull v. United States , 481 U. S. 412 (1987), and then in Granfinanciera . See ante , at 8–9. And by 1990, our case law had come full circle, announcing once again what has always been true: that “[t]he right to a jury trial includes more than the common-law forms of action recognized in 1791.” Teamsters v. Terry , 494 U. S. 558, 564. Today, the Court respects and follows this longstanding27 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

G ORSUCH , J., concurring message in our Seventh Amen dment precedents. The dis

sent chooses another path entirely—adopting a reading of Atlas Roofing that leads not only to an implausibly broad construction of public rights, but to an implausibly narrow understanding of the jury-trial guarantee as well. One wholly at odds with precedents both old and new. Nor is the dissent shy about its real motivation—and it has noth

ing to do with respect for pr ecedent but much more to do with a “power grab”: Holding the government to the Con

stitution’s promise of a jury trial, the dissent insists, would impose “constraints on what,” in its view, “modern-day adaptable governance must look like.” Post , at 37. All of which, at bottom, amounts to little more than a complaint with the Constitution’s revo lutionary promise of popular oversight of government officials—and with those judges who would honor that promise.

* People like Mr. Jarkesy may be unpopular. Perhaps even rightly so: The acts he a llegedly committed may warrant serious sanctions. But that should not obscure what is at stake in his case or others like it. While incursions on old rights may begin in cases against the unpopular, they rarely end there. The authority the government seeks (and the dissent would award) in this case—to penalize citizens without a jury, without an independent judge, and under procedures foreign to our courts—certainly contains no such limits. That is why the Constitution built “high walls and clear distinctions” to safeguard individual liberty. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. , 514 U. S. 211, 239 (1995). Ones that ensure even the least popular among us has an independent judge and a jury of his peers resolve his case under procedures designed to ensure a fair trial in a fair forum. In reaffirming all this today, the Court hardly leaves the SEC without ample powers and recourse. The agency is free to pursue all of its charges against Mr.28 SEC v. JARKESY

G ORSUCH , J., concurring Jarkesy. And it is free to pursue them exactly as it had always done until 2010: In a court, before a judge, and with a jury. With these observations, I am pleased to concur._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 22–859

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

PETITIONER v. GEORGE R. JARKESY, J R ., ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 27, 2024]

J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , with whom J USTICE K AGAN and J USTICE J ACKSON join, dissenting. Throughout our Nation’s history, Congress has author

ized agency adjudicators to find violations of statutory obli

gations and award civil penalties to the Government as an injured sovereign. The Constitution, this Court has said, does not require these civil-pe nalty claims belonging to the Government to be tried before a jury in federal district court. Congress can instead assign them to an agency for initial adjudication, subject to judicial review. This Court has blessed that practice repeat edly, declaring it “the ‘set

tled judicial construction’ ” all along; indeed, “ ‘from the be

ginning.’ ” Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n , 430 U. S. 442, 460 (1977). Unsur

prisingly, Congress has taken this Court’s word at face value. It has enacted more than 200 statutes authorizing dozens of agencies to impose civil penalties for violations of statutory obligations. Congress had no reason to anticipate the chaos today’s majority would unleash after all these

years. Today, for the very first ti me, this Court holds that Con

gress violated the Constitution by authorizing a federal agency to adjudicate a statutory right that inheres in the2 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting Government in its sovereign capacity, also known as a pub

lic right. According to the majority, the Constitution re

quires the Government to seek civil penalties for federalsecurities fraud before a jury in federal court. The nature of the remedy is, in the majority’s view, virtually disposi

tive. That is plainly wrong. This Court has held, without exception, that Congress has broad latitude to create statu

tory obligations that entitle the Government to civil penal

ties, and then to assign their enforcement outside the regu

lar courts of law where there are no juries. Beyond the majority’s legal errors, its ruling reveals a far more fundamental problem: This Court’s repeated failure to appreciate that its decision s can threaten the separation of powers. Here, that threat comes from the Court’s mis

taken conclusion that Congress cannot assign a certain public-rights matter for initial adjudication to the Execu

tive because it must come only to the Judiciary. The majority today upends longstanding precedent and the established practice of its coequal partners in our tri

partite system of Government. Because the Court fails to act as a neutral umpire when it rewrites established rules in the manner it does today, I respectfully dissent.

I The story of this case is straightforward. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) investi

gated respondents George Jarke sy and his advisory firm Patriot28, LLC, for alleged violat ions of federal-securities laws in connection with the launch of two hedge funds. In deciding how and where to enforce these laws, the SEC could have filed suit in federal court or adjudicated the mat

ter in an administrative enforce ment action subject to judi

cial review. See 15 U. S. C. §§77h–1, 77t, 78u, 78u–2, 78u– 3, 80b–3, 80b–9. The SEC opted for the latter. In 2013, the SEC initiated an administrative enforcement action against respondents, alleging violations of the Securities3 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Specifically, the SEC al

leged that respondents falsel y told brokers and investors that: (1) a prominent accounting firm would audit the hedge funds; (2) a prominent investment bank would serve as the funds’ prime broker; and (3) one of the funds would invest 50% of its capital in certain life-insurance policies. In real

ity, the audit never took place, the bank never opened a prime brokerage account, and th e hedge fund invested less than 20% of its capital in the life-insurance policies. In ad

dition to misrepresenting the funds’ investment strategies, respondents allegedly overvalued the funds’ holdings to charge higher management fees. The SEC assigned the action to one of its administrative law judges, who held an evidentiary hearing and issued a lengthy initial decision, concludi ng that respondents in fact had violated the three securities laws. The full Commission reviewed the initial decision and reached the same deter

mination. The Commission also denied respondents’ con

stitutional challenges to the order, including that the agency’s in-house adjudication violated respondents’ Sev

enth Amendment right to a jury trial in federal court. Ul

timately, the SEC ordered resp ondents to pay a civil pen

alty of $300,000 and to cease and desist from violating the federal-securities laws. It also barred Jarkesy from doing certain things in the securiti es industry and ordered Pa

triot28 to disgorge $685,000 in illicit profits. Respondents filed a petition for review in the Fifth Cir

cuit. 34 F. 4th 446, 466 (2022). A divided panel granted the petition and vacated the SEC’s order. The panel held, over the dissent of Judge Davis, that respondents were entitled to a jury trial in federal court under the Seventh Amend

ment because the federal-securities antifraud provisionswere similar to common-law fraud claims to which the jurytrial right would attach. See id. , at 451–459. Because the SEC forced respondents to proceed within the agency, the4 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting Court of Appeals held that th e SEC violated respondents’ Seventh Amendment rights and thus vacated the SEC’s or

der. Id. , at 465–466. 1 The majority affirms the Fifth Circuit’s decision, notwith

standing the mountain of precedent against it. A faithful application of our precedent would have led, inexorably, to upholding the statutory scheme that Congress enacted for the SEC’s in-house adjudication of federal-securities claims.

II The majority did not need to break any new ground to resolve respondents’ Seventh Amendment challenge. This Court’s longstanding precedent and established govern

ment practice uniformly support the constitutionality of ad

ministrative schemes like the SEC’s: agency adjudications of statutory claims for civil penalties brought by the Gov

ernment in its sovereign capacity. See Part II–B ( infra , at 7–14). In assessing the constitutionality of such adjudica

tions, the political branches’ “ ‘[l]ong settled and established practice,’ ” which this Court has upheld and reaffirmed time and again, is entitled to “ ‘great weight.’ ” Chiafalo v. Wash

ington , 591 U. S. 578, 592–593 (2020) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case , 279 U. S. 655, 689 (1929)); accord, Vidal v. El

ster , 602 U. S. 286, 323 (2024) (B ARRETT , J., concurring in part); id ., at 330 (S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Fi

nancial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. , 601 U. S. 416, 442

——————

1 As the majority notes, respondent s also prevailed on two other con

stitutional challenges in th e Court of Appeals. See ante, at 6. The di

vided panel concluded that: (1) the S EC’s discretion to bring the case within the agency instead of federal court violated the nondelegation doc

trine; and (2) a for-cause restriction on the Administrative Law Judge’s removal violated Article II and the sepa ration of powers. 34 F. 4th 446, 459–465 (CA5 2022). I disagree with the ruling below on both points. Because the majority does not reach these issues, though , I address only the Seventh Amendment challenge disc ussed in the majority’s opinion.5 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting (2024) (K AGAN , J., concurring).

A There are two key constitutional provisions at issue here. One is the Seventh Amendment, which “preserve[s]” the “right of trial by jury” in “Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” The other is Article III’s Vesting Clause, which provides that the “judicial Power of the United States . . . shall be vested” in federal Article III courts. This case presents the familiar interplay between these two provisions. Although this case involves a Seventh Amendment chal

lenge, the principal question at issue is one rooted in Article III and the separation of powers. That is because, as the majority rightly acknowledges, the Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial right “applies” only in “an Article III court.” Ante, at 7. That conclusion follows from both the text of the Con

stitution and this Court’s precedents. As to the text, the Amendment is limited to “Suits at com

mon law.” That means two things. First, that the right applies only in judicial proceedings. The term “suit,” after all, refers to “the prosecution of some demand in a Court of justice,” Cohens v. Virginia , 6 Wheat. 264, 407 (1821) (Mar

shall, C. J.), or a “proceeding in a court of justice,” Weston

v. City Council of Charleston , 2 Pet. 449, 464 (1829) (same) (“The modes of proceeding may be various, but if a right is litigated between parties in a court of justice, the proceed

ing by which the decision of the court is sought, is a suit”). Consistent with that understanding, this Court has held re

peatedly that “the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings.” Tull v. United States , 481 U. S. 412, 418, n. 4 (1987); accord, Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 454–455; Curtis v. Loether , 415 U. S. 189, 195 (1974). Factfinding by a jury is “incompatible with the whole con

cept of administrative adjudication,” which empowers exec

utive officials to find the relevant facts and apply the law to6 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting those facts like juries do in a courtroom. Pernell v. Southall Realty , 416 U. S. 363, 383 (1974) (collecting cases). Second, the requirement that the “ ‘[s]uit’ ” must be one

“ ‘at common law’ ” means that the claim at issue must be

“ ‘legal in nature.’ ” Ante, at 8. So, whether a defendant is entitled to a jury under the Seventh Amendment depends on both the forum and the cause of action. If the claim is in an Article III proceeding, then the right to a jury attaches if the claim is “legal in nature” and the amount in contro

versy exceeds $20. Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg , 492 U. S. 33, 53 (1989); Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 454, n. 12,461, n. 16. Yet when, as here, the claim proceeds in a nonArticle III forum, the relevant question becomes whether “Congress properly assign[ed the] matter” for decision to that forum consistent with Article III and the separation of

powers. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC , 584 U. S. 325, 345 (2018). In other words, the question is whether Congress im properly bestowed federal judicial power on a non-Article III forum. See id ., at 334 (Congress cannot “ ‘confer the Government’s “judicial Power” on entities outside Article III’ ” (quoting Stern v. Marshall , 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011))). 2 The conclusion that Congress properly assigned a matter to an agency for adjudication therefore necessarily “resolves [any] Seventh Amendment challenge.” Oil States , 584 U. S., at 345 (explaining that if non-Article III adjudication

——————

2 Since the founding, Executive Branch officials have adjudicated cer

tain matters, while others have requ ired resolution in an Article III court. An executive official properly vested with the authority to find facts, apply the law to those facts, and impose the consequences pre

scribed by law exercises executive po wer under Article II, not judicial power under Article III. See Arlington v. FCC , 569 U. S. 290, 305, n. 4 (2013) (explaining that agency rulemaking and adjudications may “take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, bu t they are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power’ ” (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 1)).7 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting is permissible, then “ ‘the Seventh Amendment poses no in

dependent bar to the adjudicati on of that action by a nonjury factfinder’ ” (quoting Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 53– 54)); see W. Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1571 (2020) (“The Article III analysis should be conducted first, on its own. And then . . . if the non-Article III adjudication is permissible, the Seventh Amendment should be ignored”). When executive power is at stake, Congress does not violate Article III or the Sev

enth Amendment by authorizing a nonjury factfinder to ad

judicate the dispute. So, the critical issue in this type of case is whether Con

gress can assign a particular matter to a non-Article III factfinder.

B For more than a century and a half, this Court has an

swered that Article III question by pointing to the distinc

tion between “private rights” and “public rights.” See Mur

ray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. , 18 How. 272, 284 (1856) (recognizing pub lic-rights exception). The distinction is helpful because public rights always can be assigned outside of Article III. They “ ‘do not require judi

cial determination’ ” under the Constitution, even if they

“ ‘are susceptible of it.’ ” Crowell v. Benson , 285 U. S. 22, 50 (1932) (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp. , 279 U. S. 438, 451 (1929)). The majority says that aspects of the public-rights doc

trine have been confusing. See ante, at 17. That might be true for cases involving wholly private disputes, but not for cases where the Government is a party. 3 It has long been

——————

3 Every case that has expressed consternation about the precise con

tours of the public-rights doctrine, including those cited by the majority, involve only private disputes—or, more precisely, “disputes to which the Federal Government is not a part y in its sovereign capacity.” Granfi

-8 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting settled and undisputed that, at a minimum, a matter of public rights arises “between the government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.” Crowell , 285 U. S., at 50; Oil States , 584 U. S., at 335 (describing the “Court’s longstanding formula

tion of the public-rights doctrine”); accord, Granfinanciera

, 492 U. S., at 51, and n. 8; Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 452, 457; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. , 279 U. S., at 451. Indeed, “from the time the doctrine of public rights was born, in 1856,” everyone understood that public rights “ ‘arise “be

tween the government and others,” ’ ” and refer to “rights of the public —that is, rights pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 68–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see ibid. (collecting sources). So, while this Court has recognized public rights in certain disputes be

tween private parties, see infra , at 19–20, the doctrine’s heartland consists of claims belonging to the Government. When a claim belongs to the Government as sovereign, the Constitution permits Cong ress to enact new statutory obligations, prescribe consequences for the breach of those obligations, and then empower federal agencies to adjudi

cate such violations and impose the appropriate penalty. See Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 450–455 (collecting cases). 4

—————— nanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg , 492 U. S. 33, 55, n. 10 (1989) (involving dis

pute between private parties in bankruptcy court); see ante , at 17 (citing Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC , 584 U. S. 325, 332–334 (2018) (involving patent dispute between private parties before the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. , 473 U. S. 568, 575 (1985) (involving challenge to arbitration procedure for private parties disputing data compensation under federal pesticide regist ration program)); see also Stern v. Mar

shall , 564 U. S. 462, 469–470 (2011) (inv olving dispute between private parties in bankruptcy court); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , 458 U. S. 50, 56–57 (1982) (plurality opinion) (same).

4 Judicial review of these agency decisions allows Congress to avoid9 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting This Court has repeatedly emphasized these unifying prin

ciples through an unbroken series of cases over almost 200

years.

1 Start at the beginning, with Murray’s Lessee in 1856. In that case, the Government i ssued a warrant to compel a federal customs collector to produce public funds that the Government determined the collector had unlawfully with

held. See 18 How., at 274–275. The Government executed the warrant to seize and sell a plot of the collector’s land to make up for the withheld funds. See id. , at 274. In uphold

ing the sale of the seized property, this Court concluded that the Government’s in-house assessment and collection of taxes and penalties based on a federal official’s adjudica

tion of the facts did not violate Article III. The scheme was

—————— any due process concerns that might ar ise from having ex ecutive officials deprive someone of their property with out review in an Article III court. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n , 430 U. S. 442, 455, n. 13 (1977) (“[T]hese cases do not present the question whether Congress may co mmit the adjudication of public rights and the imposition of fines for their violation to an administrative agency without any sort of interventi on by a court at any stage of the proceedings”); accord, Oil States , 584 U. S., at 344 (same); Tr. of Oral Arg. 29 (Principal Deputy Solicitor General) (stating that “the Court has emphasized that judicial review of agency action may well be required” and the Due Process Clau se may “ha[ve] somethin g to say” about that requirement). The concurrence reproaches this dissent for declining to address any potential deficiencies in this administrative scheme, as well as failing to specify which forms of judicial review may be constitution

ally required, see ante, at 22 (opinion of G ORSUCH , J.), even though re

spondents did not raise any due process challenge in this case. Deciding whether this statutory scheme is pr ocedurally deficient and so circum

scribes judicial review that it violat es due process would be inconsistent with the “settled principles of part y presentation and adversarial test

ing.” Vidal v. Elster , 602 U. S. 286, 328 (2024) (S OTOMAYOR , J., concur

ring in judgment) (citing Maslenjak v. United States , 582 U. S. 335, 354 (2017) (G ORSUCH , J., joined by T HOMAS , J., concurring in part and con

curring in judgment)).10 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
constitutional, the Court said, because “public rights” were at issue. Id ., at 284. In other words, the dispute arose be

tween the Government and the customs collector in connec

tion with the Government’s ex ercise of its constitutional power to collect re venue. Congress could have brought such claims, if it wanted, “within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.” Ibid. The Court thus endorsed that constitutional balance: Congress could decide whether to assign a public-rights dispute to the Ex

ecutive for initial adjudication subject to judicial review or to an Article III federa l court for resolution. Fast forward half a century. In Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.

v. Stranahan , 214 U. S. 320, 338–340 (1909), the Court up

held a customs official’s imposition of a penalty on a steam

ship company that violated immigration laws barring the entry of certain classes of people into the country. The cus

toms official determined the facts, adjudicated the viola

tion, and enforced the statutory prohibition on immigration through the assessment of a monetary penalty. See id ., at 329. The Court noted the breadth of Congress’s immigra

tion power and held that the civil-penalty statutory scheme at issue was “beyond all question constitutional.” Id ., at 342. Yet, far from restricting the public-rights doctrine to this particular exercise of cong ressional power or to specific prerogatives, the Stranahan Court went out of its way toexplain that the “settled judicial construction” that civilpenalty claims brought by th e Government could be as

signed to the Executive for initial adjudication extended “not only as to tariff, but as to internal revenue, taxation, and other subjects,” including the regulation of foreign com

merce. Id ., at 339; see also id ., at 334–335. Importantly, Stranahan rejected the “proposition” that, in “cases of penalty or punishment, . . . enforcement must depend upon the exertion of ju dicial power, either by civil or criminal process.” Id ., at 338. In words that could have11 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting been written in response to today’s ruling, the Court ex

plained that such a “proposition magnifies the judicial to the detriment of all other departments of the Government, disregards many previous adjudications of this court, and ignores practices often manifested and hitherto deemed to be free from any possible constitutional question.” Ibid. For that reason, the validity of legislation authorizing the non-Article III adjudication of civil-penalty claims does not turn on the Judiciary’s assessment of whether it is neces

sary for executive officials “to enforce designated penalties without resort to the courts.” Id ., at 339. Whether or not such legislation violates Article III depends on whether Congress acted pursuant to a “g rant of power made by the Constitution,” and not on whether it “relate[s] to subjects peculiarly within the authority of the legislative depart

ment of the Government” or on the circumstances that might have “caused Congress to exert a specified power.” Id ., at 339–340. By the time Stranahan was decided, Congress already routinely “impose[d] appropriate obligations and sanc

tion[ed] their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers th e power to enforce such penal

ties without the necessity of in voking the judicial power.” Id ., at 339. Far from limiting the public-rights doctrine to the particular context in Stranahan and prior cases, thisCourt has expressly rejected the notion that the publicrights doctrine is so confined. See infra , at 18–19. This Court has repeatedly approved Congress’s assignment of public rights to agencies in di verse areas of the law, reflect

ing Congress’s varied constitutional powers. 5 A nonexhaus

tive list includes “interstate and foreign commerce, taxa

tion, immigration, the public lands, public health, the

——————

5 The majority’s fixation on th is dissent’s discussion of Stranahan , see ante, at 16, n. 1, misses the fact that Stranahan exists within a long line of cases recognizing the diverse area s of the law comprising the publicrights doctrine.12 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting facilities of the post office, pensions, and payments to vet

erans,” Crowell , 285 U. S., at 51, and n. 13 (collecting cases); see also, e

. g ., Helvering v. Mitchell , 303 U. S. 391, 401–404 (1938) (administrative penalty for underpayment of taxes); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , 301 U. S. 1, 22–24, 48–49 (1937) (reinstatement of dismissed em

ployee and backpay in adjudication of unfair-labor-prac

tices claim under the National Labor Relations Act); Phil

lips v. Commissioner , 283 U. S. 589, 591–592 (1931) (deficiency assessments for unpaid taxes); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima per Azioni v. Elting , 287 U. S. 329, 334– 335 (1932) (fines for violation of immigration law barring entry of certain classes of individuals); Ex parte Bakelite Corp. , 279 U. S., at 446–447, 451, 458 (adjudication of un

fair-methods-of-competition and unfair-acts claims, and im

position of additional duties under customs law); Passavant

v. United States , 148 U. S. 214, 215–216, 220 (1893) (pen

alty for undervaluation of imported merchandise). The list could go on and on. That is because, in every case where the Government has acted in its sovereign capacity to enforce a new statutory obligation through the adminis

trative imposition of civil penal ties or fines, this Court, without exception, has sustained the statutory scheme au

thorizing that enforcement outside of Article III.

2 A unanimous Court made this exact point nearly half a century ago in Atlas Roofing . That was the last time this Court considered a public-rights case where the constitu

tionality of an in-house adjudication of statutory claims brought by the Government was at issue. That case pre

sented the same question as this one: Whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to commit the adjudication of a new cause of action for civil penalties to an administra

tive agency. 430 U. S., at 444. The Court said it did.13 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting

In Atlas Roofing , the Court explained how Congress iden

tified a national problem, concluded that existing legal rem

edies were inadequate to address it, and then created a new statutory scheme that endorsed Executive in-house enforce

ment as a solution. Specifically, Congress found “that work-related deaths and injuries had become a ‘drastic’ na

tional problem,” and that existing causes of action, includ

ing tort actions for negligence and wrongful death, did not adequately “protect the employee population from death and injury due to unsafe working conditions.” Id. , at 444– 445. In response, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) to require employers “to avoid maintaining unsafe or unhealthy working condi

tions.” Id ., at 445. OSHA in turn “empower[ed] the Secre

tary of Labor to promulgate health and safety standards,” and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis

sion to impose civil penalties on employers maintaining un

safe working conditions, rega rdless of whether any worker was in fact injured or killed. Id. , at 445–446. Two employers that had been assessed civil penalties for OSHA violations resulting in the death of employees chal

lenged the constitutionality of the statute’s enforcement procedures. They observed that “a suit in a federal court by the Government for civil penalti es for violation of a statute is a suit for a money judgment[,] which is classically a suit at common law.” Id ., at 449. Therefore, the employers claimed, the Seventh Amendmen t right to a jury attached and Congress could not assign the matter to an agency for resolution. See ibid. This Court upheld OSHA’s st atutory scheme. It relied on the long history of public-rights cases endorsing Congress’s now-settled practice of assign ing the Government’s rights to civil penalties for violations of a statutory obligation to in-house adjudication in the first instance. See id ., at 450– 455. In light of this “history and our cases,” the Court con

-14 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting cluded that, where Congress “create[s] a new cause of ac

tion, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law,” it is free to “plac[e] their enforcement in a tribunal supply

ing speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved.” Id ., at 460–461. “That is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudi

cation of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law.” Id ., at 455; see id ., at 461, n. 16. The “new rule” and “legally unsound principle” that the majority accuses this dissent of “unfurl[ing]” today, ante, at 17–18, n. 2, is the one that this Court declared “ ‘settled ju

dicial construction’ . . . ‘from the beginning’ ”: “[T]he Gov

ernment could commit the enforcement of statutes and the imposition and collection of fines . . . for administrative en

forcement, without judicial trial s,” even if the same action would have required a jury trial if committed to an Article III court. Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 460 (collecting cases); accord, Elting , 287 U. S., at 334 (Congress “may lawfully impose appropriate obligations, sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, and invest in administra

tive officials the power to impose and enforce them”); Stranahan , 214 U. S., at 339 (Congress may “impose appro

priate obligations and sanction their enforcement by rea

sonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of in

voking the judicial power”).

C It should be obvious by now how this case should have been resolved under a faithful and straightforward applica

tion of Atlas Roofing and a long line of this Court’s prece

dents. The constitutional question is indistinguishable. The majority instead wishes away Atlas Roofing by burying it at the end of its opinion and minimizing the unbroken line of cases on which Atlas Roofing relied. That approach15 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting to precedent significantly undermines this Court’s commit

ment to stare decisis and the rule of law. This case may involve a different statute from Atlas Roof

ing , but the schemes are remarkably similar. Here, just as in Atlas Roofing , Congress identified a problem; concluded that the existing remedies were inadequate; and enacted a new regulatory scheme as a solution. The problem was a lack of transparency and acco untability in the securities market that contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s. See ante, at 1. The inadequate remedies were the then-existing state statutory and common-law fraud causes of action. The solution was a comprehensive federal scheme of securities regulation consisting of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Invest

ment Advisers Act of 1940. See ibid. In particular, Con

gress enacted these securities laws to ensure “full disclo

sure” and promote ethical business practices “in the securities industry,” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu

reau, Inc. , 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963), as well as to “protect investors against manipulation of stock prices,” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder , 425 U. S. 185, 195 (1976). The prophylactic nature of the statutory regime also is virtually indistinguishable from the OSHA scheme at issue in Atlas Roofing . Among other things, these securities laws prohibit the misrepresentation or concealment of various material facts through the imposi tion of federal registration and disclosure requirements. See ante, at 2. Critically, federal-securities laws do not re quire proof of actual reliance on an investor’s misrepresentat ions or that an “investor has actually suffered financial loss.” Ante, at 4; see also SEC v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc. 854 F. 3d 765, 779 (CA5 2017); SEC v. Blavin , 760 F. 2d 706, 711 (CA6 1985) ( per curiam ). OSHA too prohibits conduct that could, but does not neces

sarily, injure a private person. Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 445 (OSHA remedies “exis[t] whether or not an employee is16 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting actually injured or killed as a result of the [unsafe or un

healthy working] condition”). The employer’s failure to maintain safe and healthy working conditions violates OSHA even if there is no actionable harm to an employee, just as a misrepresentation to investors in connection with the buying or selling of securities violates federal-securities law even if there is no actual injury to the investors. Moreover, both here and in Atlas Roofing , Congress em

powered the Government to in stitute administrative en

forcement proceedings to adjudi cate potential violations of federal law and impose civil penalties on a private party for those violations, all while making the final agency decision subject to judicial review. In bringing a securities claim, the SEC seeks redress for a “violation” that “is committed against the United States rather than an aggrieved individ

ual,” which “is why, for exampl e, a securities-enforcement action may proceed even if victims do not support or are not parties to the prosecution.” Kokesh v. SEC , 581 U. S. 455, 463 (2017). Put differently, the SEC seeks to “ ‘remedy harm to the public at large’ ” for violation of the Govern

ment’s rights. Ibid. The Government likewise seeks to remedy a public harm when it enforces OSHA’s prohibition of unsafe working conditions. Ultimately, both cases arise between the Government and others in connection with the performance of the Gov

ernment’s constitutional functions, and involve the Govern

ment acting in its sovereign capacity to bring a statutory claim on behalf of the United States in order to vindicate the public interest. They both involve, as Atlas Roofing put it, “new cause[s] of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law.” 430 U. S., at 461. Neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment prohibits Congress from as

signing the enforcement of these new “Governmen[t] rights to civil penalties” to non-Article III adjudicators, and thus “supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues in

volved.” Id. , at 450, 461. In a world where precedent means17 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
something, this should end the case. Yet here it does not.

III The practice of assigning the Government’s right to civil penalties for statutory violations to non-Article III adjudi

cation had been so settled that it become an undisputable reality of how “our Government has actually worked.” Con

sumer Financial Protection Bureau , 601 U. S., at 445 (K AGAN , J., concurring). That is why the Court has had no cause to address this kind of constitutional challenge since its unanimous decision in Atlas Roofing . The majority takes a wrecking ball to this settled law and stable govern

ment practice. To do so, it mi sreads this Court’s precedents, ignores those that do not suit its thesis, and advances dis

tinctions created from whole cloth. The majority’s treatment of the public-rights doctrine is not only incomplete, but is gerrymandered to produce to

day’s result. See Part III–A ( infra , at 17–21). Unable to explain that doctrine, the majo rity effectively ignores the Article III threshold question to focus instead on two Sev

enth Amendment cases: Tull v. United States , 481 U. S. 412 (1987), and Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg , 492 U. S. 33 (1989). Neither involved the in-house adjudication of stat

utory claims brought by the Government pursuant to its sovereign powers, which is the critical fact under this Court’s precedent. See Part III–B–1 ( infra , at 22–24) (dis

cussing Tull ); Part III–B–2 ( infra , at 24–29) (discussing Granfinanciera ). The majority and the concurrence then predictably fail to distinguish Atlas Roofing , which resolved the Seventh Amendment question for cases like this one im

plicating that critical fact. See Part III–C ( infra , at 29–32).

A To start, it is almost impossible to discern how the major

ity defines a public right and whether its view of the doc

trine is consistent with this Co urt’s public-rights cases. The18 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
majority at times seems to lim it the public-rights exception to areas of its own choosing. It points out, for example, that some public-rights cases involved the collection of revenue, customs law, and immigration law, see ante , at 14–17, and that Atlas Roofing involved OSHA and not “civil penalty suits for fraud,” ante , at 22. 6 Other times, the majority highlights a particular practice predating the founding, such as the “unbroken tradition” in Murray’s Lessee of ex

ecutive officials issuing warrant s of distress to collect reve

nue. Ante , at 15; see also ante , at 13–14 (G ORSUCH , J., con

curring). Needless to say, none of these explanations for the doctrine is satisfactory. What is the legal principle be

hind saying only these areas and no further? This Court has rejected that kind of arbitrary line-drawing in cases like Stranahan and Atlas Roofing

. How does the require

ment of a historical practice dating back to the founding, or “flow[ing] from centuries-old rules,” ante , at 17, account for the broad universe of public-rights cases in the United States Reporter? The majority does not say. The majority’s only other theory fares no better. The ma

jority seems to suggest that a common thread underlying these cases is that “the political branches had traditionally held exclusive power over th[ese] field[s] and had exercised it.” Ante, at 16–17. To the extent the majority thinks this is a distinction, it fails for at least two reasons. First, Atlas Roofing expressly rejected the argument that the public-rights doctrine is limited to particular exercises of congressional power. The employers in Atlas Roofing ar

gued “that cases such as Murray’s Lessee

, Elting , [ Strana

han ], Phillips , and Helvering all deal with the exercise of sovereign powers that are inherently in the exclusive do

-

——————

6 The majority also cites cases involv ing “relations with Indian tribes, the administration of public lands, and the granting of public benefits such as payments to veterans, pensions, and patent rights.” Ante, at 17 (citations omitted).19 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting main of the Federal Government and critical to its very ex

istence—the power over immigration, the importation of goods, and taxation.” 430 U. S., at 456. Cabining the cases in that way, the employers argued that “[t]he theory of those cases is inapplicable where the Government exercises other powers that [they] regard[ed] as less fundamental, less exclusive, and less vital to the existence of the Nation, such as the power to regulate commerce among the several States, the latter being the po wer Congress sought to exer

cise in enacting [OSHA].” Ibid. The Court rejected the em

ployers’ argument, explaining that nothing in those cases turned on those particular exercises of the Government’s authority. See id ., at 456–457; cf. Crowell , 285 U. S., at 51 (offering a list of “[f]amiliar illustrations of . . . exercise[s]” of Congress’s constitutional authority that have fallen within the public-rights exception to Article III). Second, even if Atlas Roofing had not explicitly rejected the proposed distinction here , the majority cannot reconcile its restrictive view of the public-rights doctrine with Atlas Roofing and other precedents. For example, it is unclear how OSHA, or the National Labor Relations Act at issue in Jones & Laughlin , would fit the majority’s view of the pub

lic-rights doctrine, or why the exercise of interstate-com

merce power to enact those stat utes would be any differentfrom the exercise of that same power to enact the federalsecurities laws at issue here. See Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 457 (“It is also apparent that Jones & Laughlin

, Pernell

, and Curtis are not amenable to the limitations suggested by [the employers]”). The majority’s description of the doctrine also fails to ac

count for public rights that do not belong to the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity. See Granfinanciera

, 492 U. S., at 54 (“[T]he Federal Government need not be a party for a case to revolve around ‘public rights’ ”). This Court, after all, has rejected the confinement of public rights to that heartland. See ibid. (“[W]e [have] rejected the20 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting view that ‘a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise “between the government and others” ’ ”). Conspicu

ously absent from the majority’s discussion are, for exam

ple, cases in which this Court held that Congress could as

sign a private federally created action that was “closely integrated into a public regula tory scheme” for adjudication in a non-Article III forum. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agri

cultural Products Co. , 473 U. S. 568, 594 (1985). These cases include, for example, an agency’s adjudication of state-law counterclaims to an investor’s federal action against its broker, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor , 478 U. S. 833, 835–836, 847–850 (1986), and the ar

bitration of data-compensation disputes among partici

pants in the Environmental Protection Agency’s pesticide registration scheme, Thomas

, 473 U. S., at 571, 589–592. Both Thomas and Schor thus upheld the non-Article III ad

judication of disputes between private parties, which natu

rally did not involve the Government in its sovereign capac

ity. Even accepting the majority’s public-rights-are-confusing defense, its “strategy for dealin g with the confusion is not to offer a theory for rationalizin g this body of law,” but to provide an incomplete and unprincipled account of the doc

trine. Haaland v. Brackeen , 599 U. S. 255, 279 (2023). The majority references, but does not explain, “distinctions our cases have drawn,” ante , at 18, n. 2, also cherry-picking some cases and ignoring others. Indeed, in lieu of a coher

ent theory, all the majority has to offer is a list of five “his

toric categories of adjudicati ons [that] fall within the excep

tion,” ante , at 14–17, and maybe (just maybe) OSHA, which the majority reluctantly adds to the mix at the end of its opinion for good measure, see ante , at 22–24. The majority ignores countless public-rights cases and entire strands of the doctrine, and fails to heed its own admonition that “close attention” must be paid “to the basis for each asserted21 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting application of the doctrine.” Ante, at 17. 7 The majority also attacks a strawman when it assertsthat “precedents foreclose th[e] argument” that the publicrights doctrine “applies whenever a statute increases gov

ernmental efficiency.” Ante, at 26; see also ante, at 19 (G ORSUCH , J., concurring). No one has made that argument in this case; not the Governme nt and certainly not this dis

sent. The fact that certain rights might be susceptible to speedy and expert resolution through non-Article III adju

dication is not what makes them “rights of the public —that is, rights pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 68–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It is not clear what else, if anything, might qualify as a public right, or what is even left of the doctrine after today’s opinion. Rather than recognize the long-settled principle that a statutory right belongin g to the Government in its sovereign capacity falls within the public-rights exception to Article III, the majority opts for a “we know it when we see it” formulation. This Court’s precedents and our coe

qual branches of Government deserve better.

B Rather than relying on Atlas Roofing or the relevant pub

lic-rights cases, the majority instead purports to follow Tull and Granfinanciera . The former involved a suit in federal court and the latter involved a dispute between private par

ties. So, just like that, the majority ventures off on the wrong path. Indeed, as explained below, both the majority and the concurrence miss the critical distinction drawn in

——————

7 Among other things, the concurrence accuses this dissent of behaving like a “picky child at the dinner table.” Ante, at 21 (opinion of G ORSUCH , J.). The precedents, though, speak for themselves. It is the majority and concurrence that pick and choose am ong public-rights cases, excluding broad strands of precedent constituting the doctrine.22 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
this Court’s precedents between the non-Article III adjudi

cation of public-rights matters involving the liability of one individual to another and those involving claims belonging to the Government in its sovereign capacity. According to the majority, respondents are entitled to a jury trial in federal court because, as here, Tull involved a Government claim for civil penalties, and Granfinanciera looked to the common law to determine if a statutory cause of action was legal in nature. By focusing on the remedy in this case, and the perceived similarities between the statu

tory cause of action and a common-law analogue, the ma

jority elides the critical distinction between those cases and this one: Whether Congress assigned the Government’s sov

ereign rights to civil penalties to a non-Article III factfinder for adjudication.

1 The majority bafflingly proclaims that “the remedy is all but dispositive” in this case, ante, at 9, ignoring that Atlas Roofing and countless precedents before it rejected that proposition. Not content to ta ke just a page from the em

ployers’ challenge in Atlas Roofing , the majority has taken their whole brief, resuscitating yet another theory that this Court has long foreclosed. The employers in Atlas Roofing argued that the Seventh Amendment prohibited Congress from assigning to an agency the same remedy at issue here: civil penalties. See 430 U. S., at 450 (“Petitioners . . . claim that . . . assign[ing] the function of adjudicating the Gov

ernment’s rights to civil penalti es for [a statutory] violation . . . deprive[s] a defendant of his Seventh Amendment jury right”). This Court rejected t hat argument outright, citing a long line of cases involving the Executive’s adjudication of statutory claims for civil penalties brought by the Govern

ment in its sovereign capacity. Id. , at 450–455 (collecting cases).23 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting As discussed above, this Court has long endorsed statu

tory schemes authorizing agency adjudicators to find viola

tions and award civil penalties to the Government. See su

pra , at 9–12. Long before Atlas Roofing , this Court held that the Constitution permits Congress to enact statutory obligations and then “sanction their enforcement by reason

able money penalties” by govern ment officials “without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.” Stranahan , 214 U. S., at 339; see id ., at 338–339 (collecting cases). That the SEC imposed civil penalties on respondents therefore has little, if any, bearing on the resolution of this case. Again, even if over a century of precedent did not fore

close the majority’s argument, it fails on its own terms. The majority relies almost entirely on Tull , which held that statutory claims for civil penalties were “a type of remedy at common law” that entitled a defendant to a jury trial. 481 U. S., at 422; see id ., at 425. Critically, however, the Tull Court’s analysis took place in an entirely different con

text: federal court. See ante, at 8–9 (“In [ Tull ], the Govern

ment sued a real estate develo per for civil penalties [under the Clean Water Act] in federal court ” (emphasis added)). Tull did not present the question at issue in Atlas Roofing and other cases involving non-Article III adjudication of Government claims in the first instance. Rather, Tull stands for the unremarkable pr oposition that, when the Government sues an entity for civil penalties in federal dis

trict court, the Seventh Amendm ent entitles the defendant “to a jury trial to determine his liability on the legal claims.” 481 U. S., at 425. That conclusion says nothing about the constitutionality of the SEC’s in-house adjudicative scheme. Atlas Roofing and its predecessors could not have been clearer on this point: Congress can assign the enforcement of a statutory obligation for in-house adjudication to executive officials, “even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a24 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.” 430 U. S., at 455. Although “the Government could commit the enforcement of statutes and the imposition and collec

tion of fines to the judiciary, in which event jury trial would be required,” the Government “co uld also validly opt for ad

ministrative enforcement, without judicial trials.” Id ., at 460 (citing Stranahan , 214 U. S., at 339; Hepner v. United States , 213 U. S. 103 (1909); United States v. Regan , 232 U. S. 37 (1914); Helvering , 303 U. S., at 402–403; Crowell

, 285 U. S., at 50–51); Curtis , 415 U. S., at 195 (explaining that Congress can “entrust [the] enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process . . . free from the stric

tures of the Seventh Amendment,” but must abide by the Amendment when it does so “in an ordinary civil action in the district courts”). It would have been quite remarkable for Tull , which in

volved a claim in federal court, to overrule silently more than a century of caselaw involving non-Article III adjudi

cations of the Government’s righ ts to civil penalties for stat

utory violations. Of course, Tull did no such thing. Tull even reaffirmed Atlas Roofing by emphasizing that the Sev

enth Amendment depends on the forum, not just the rem

edy, because it “is not applicable to administrative proceed

ings.” 481 U. S., at 418, n. 4 (citing Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 454; Pernell , 416 U. S., at 383). For the majority to pre

tend otherwise is wishful thinking at best.

2 The majority next argues that the “close relationship” be

tween the federal-securities laws and common-law fraud “confirms that this action is ‘legal in nature,’ ” and entitles respondents to a jury trial. Ante, at 13. That argument does not fare any better than the argument on remedy. Again, the majority bends inapposite case law to an illogical thesis. Granfinanciera , on which the majority relies to make its cause-of-action argument, set forth the public

-25 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting rights analysis only for “dispu tes to which the Federal Gov

ernment is not a party in its sovereign capacity.” 492 U. S., at 55, n. 10. For cases that, as here, involve the Govern

ment in its sovereign capacity, the Granfinanciera Court plainly stated that “Congress may fashion causes of action that are closely analogous to common-law claims and [still] place them beyond the ambit of the Seventh Amendment by assigning their resolution to a [non-Article III] forum in which jury trials are unavailable.” Id. , at 52 (citing Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 450–461). 8 The Court held in Granfinanciera that “a person who has not submitted a claim agains t a bankruptcy estate has a right to a jury trial when sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover an allegedly fraudul ent monetary transfer.” 492 U. S., at 36. In doing so, the Court noted that actions to recover such transfers throug h a claim of fraudulent con

veyance were traditionally available at common law. See

——————

8 The majority leaves open the possibility that Granfinanciera might have overruled Atlas Roofing . See ante, at 22–23. That suggestion strains credulity. By my count, Granfinanciera favorably cites to Atlas Roofing at least 12 times. See 492 U. S., at 48, 51–54, 57, 60–61; see also id ., at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It even reaffirmed the definiti on of public rights from Atlas Roofing , declar

ing that the Court “adhere[d] to that general teaching . . . in Atlas Roof

ing .” 492 U. S., at 51. The majority’s only response is to say that Justice White thought Granfinanciera may have overruled Atlas Roofing . See ante, at 23, n. 3; see also ante, at 17 (G ORSUCH , J., concurring). That is misleading at best. When Justice White said in his Granfinanciera dis

sent that the Court’s opinion in that case could be read as overruling or limiting portions of several cases, including Atlas Roofing , he was refer

ring to his understanding that Atlas Roofing also extended to private disputes. See Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 79–83; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 58–59 (Principal Deputy Solicitor General explaining that Justice White understood “ Atlas Roofing to speak [also] to the private parties cases,” not just to cases involving the Government, which “is really a through line that the Court has neve r questioned”). With respect to claims involving the Government, such as those at issue here, Granfi

nanciera expressly reaffirmed Atlas Roofing and “adhere[d] to [its] gen

eral teaching.” 492 U. S., at 51.26 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting

id ., at 43–49. That did not resolve th e case, however. Un

like in Tull , the proceeding at issue in Granfinanciera was in a non-Article III forum ( i

. e ., a bankruptcy court). So, to answer whether Congress could assign the fraudulent-con

veyance claim to a bankruptcy judge for decision, Congress needed to decide whether the “legal cause of action in

volve[d] ‘public rights.’ ” 492 U. S., at 53. Granfinanciera explains that there are two ways to iden

tify a “public right.” First, there are the matters in which Congress enacts a statutory cause of action that “inheres in, or lies against, the Federal Go vernment in its sovereign ca

pacity.” Id ., at 53 (citing Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 458). These matters necessarily arise between the Government and the people in connection with the Government’s exer

cise of its constitutional authority. See supra, at 7–8. In these cases, the Court said, Atlas Roofing controls the pub

lic-rights analysis. See Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 51, 53. The Court explained that “Congress may effectively sup

plant a common law cause of acti on carrying with it a right to a jury trial with a statutory cause of action shorn of a jury trial right if that statutory cause of action inheres in, or lies against, the Federal Go vernment in its sovereign ca

pacity.” Id ., at 53 (citing Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 458). The second kind of public right that Granfinanciera rec

ognized involves “disputes to which the Federal Govern

ment is not a party in its sovereign capacity,” 492 U. S., at 55, n. 10, that is, usually “[w]holly private” disputes, id ., at 51. The public-rights analysis in these private-dispute cases looks different: “The crucial question, in cases not in

volving the Federal Government , is whether ‘Congress, act

ing for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitu

tional powers under Article I, has created a seemingly “private” right that is so closel y integrated into a public reg

ulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency res

olution with limited involvement by the Article III judici

ary.’ ” Id ., at 54 (quoting Thomas , 473 U. S., at 593–594;27 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting emphasis added; alterations omitted). These two approaches together stand for the proposition that “[i]f a statutory right is not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact, and if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated by an Ar

ticle III court.” 492 U. S., at 54–55 (emphasis added). Once in federal court, “[i]f the right is legal in nature, then it car

ries with it the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.” Id ., at 55. Because Granfinanciera did not involve a statutory right that belonged to the Government in its sovereign capacity, Atlas Roofing did not control the outcome. Instead, the Court applied the private-disputes test to determine whether fraudulent-conveyance “a ctions were ‘closely inter

twined’ with the bankruptcy regime.” Ante , at 20 (quoting Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 54). The Court held that the fraudulent-conveyance actions “were not inseparable from the bankruptcy process,” and t hus the public-rights excep

tion did not apply. Ante , at 20 (citing Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 54, 56). The majority brushes aside this critical distinction be

tween Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera in one sentence. That “the Government is the party prosecuting this action,” the majority writes, is meaningless because this Court has “never held that the ‘presenc e of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is . . . sufficient’ by itself to trigger the exception.” Ante , at 22 (quoting Northern Pipe

line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , 458 U. S. 50, 69,

n. 23 (1982) (plurality opinion)). Here, too, the majority at

tacks a strawman. The SEC does not claim that the mere presence of the United States as a proper party necessarily means that a public right is at issue. See Reply Brief 8, n. 2 (disclaiming this argument). 9 Of course “what matters is

——————

9 Indeed, “the public-rights doctrine does not extend to any criminal28 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting

the substance” of the claim. Ante , at 21. By no means, though, does this case involve a “purely tax

onomic change.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 61. Con

gress did not just repackage a common-law claim under a new label. It created new statutory obligations and an en

tire federal scheme. See supra , at 14–16. 10 Perhaps most importantly, Congress created a new right unknown to the common law that, unlike common-law fraud, belongs to the public and inheres in the Government in its sovereign ca

pacity. That is why, when the SEC seeks to enforce the federal-securities laws, it does so to remedy the harm to the United States. See supra , at 16. It seeks to protect the in

tegrity of the securities market as a whole through the im

position of new and distinct remedies like civil penalties

—————— matters, although the Govern ment is a proper party.” Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. , 458 U. S., at 70, n. 24 (plurality opinion) (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles , 350 U. S. 11 (1955)). That is so not only because this Court has held as much , but also because Article III itself prescribes that “[t]he trial of all Crim es, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.” §2, cl. 3. In other words, Article III requires criminal trials to take place before a jury in federal court, but says nothing about civil-penalty claims brought by the Government. Beyond criminal trials, the Solicitor General also concedes that, under this Court’s precedents, the public-rights doctrine does not apply when the Government brings a common-law claim in a proprietary capacity. See Reply Brief 8, n. 2.

10 The majority spills much ink on th e perceived similarities between federal-securities fraud and common-law fraud, only to conclude that the causes of action are not identical. That conclusion was inevitable be

cause of critical differences between th e two. Even if Congress drew upon common-law fraud when it enacte d federal-securities laws, see ante, at 11–12, this Court has repeatedly disclaimed any suggestion that Con

gress federalized a common-law fraud claim. See, e

. g ., Stoneridge Invest

ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. , 552 U. S. 148, 162 (2008) (“Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law”); SEC v. Zandford , 535 U. S. 813, 820 (2002) (“[T]he statute must not be construed so broadly as to convert every common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation of §10(b)”); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston , 459 U. S. 375, 388–389 (1983) (“[T]he antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coex tensive with common-law doctrines of fraud”).29 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting and orders barring violators from holding certain positions and performing certain activities in the industry. See 15 U. S. C. §§77h–1(f ), and (g), 78u–2, 78u–3(f ). For these reasons, “[a]n action brought by an Executive Branch agency to enforce federal securities laws is not the same as an action brought by one individual against an

other for monetary or injunctive relief of the sort that law courts (with juries) in England or the States have tradition

ally heard.” Brief for Professor John Golden et al. as Amici Curiae 3. Congress did not unlawfully “siphon” a tradi

tional legal action “away from an Article III court” when it enacted the federal-securities laws and provided for their enforcement within the SEC. Ante, at 21. The majority asserts that “ Granfinanciera effectively de

cides this case.” Ante , at 20. That can only be true, though, if one ignores what Granfinanciera actually says: Its publicrights analysis of whether an action is closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program only applies “in cases not involving the Federal Government.” 492 U. S., at 54. The analysis from Atlas Roofing controls where, as here, “ ‘the Government is involved in it s sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute.’ ” 492 U. S., at 51 (quoting Atlas Roofing , 430 U. S., at 458).

C Both cases relied on by the majority, Tull and Granfinan

ciera , reaffirm that Atlas Roofing controls precisely in cir

cumstances like the ones at issue in this case. That is why the majority’s late-stage attempt to distinguish Atlas Roof

ing fails. The majority’s principal argument that the OSHA scheme in Atlas Roofing “did not borrow its cause of action from the common law” and was instead a “self-consciously novel” scheme that “resemble d a detailed building code,” ante, at 23–24, is flawed on multiple fronts. First, OSHA’s cause of action should be largely irrelevant under the majority’s view that the remedy of civil penalties30 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting is effectively dispositive under Tull

. Atlas Roofing , and many other cases involving non-Article III adjudications, also involved civil penalties de signed to punish and deter, and yet the majority does not expressly disavow them. Log

ically, then, either Atlas Roofing and countless other cases were wrongly decided, or the ma jority’s view on civil penal

ties is wrong. Second, because the majority elides the critical distinc

tion between Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera , it fails to grapple with the fact that this case, like Atlas Roofing and unlike Granfinanciera , involves the Government acting in its sovereign capacity to enforce a statutory violation. That makes the right at issue a “public right” that Congress can take outside the purview of Article III, even when the new cause of action is analogous to a common-law claim. Third, the relationship between the federal-securitieslaws (including their antifraud provisions) and commonlaw fraud is materially indistinguishable from the relation

ship between OSHA and the common-law torts of wrongful death and negligence. Unlike their common-law compara

tors, neither statute requires actionable harm to an individ

ual. See supra , at 15. In arguing that OSHA’s scheme was “self-consciously” novel in ways unknown to the common law, the majority points to the granularity of OSHA stand

ards. Ante, at 23–24. Yet lawyers and regulated parties in the securities industry would be surprised to hear that this could be a distinguishing featur e. Anyone familiar with the industry knows securities laws are replete with specific and exceedingly detailed requirements implementing the stat

ute’s disclosure and antif raud provisions. See, e

. g ., 17 CFR §275.206(4)–1(b) (2023) (prohibiting testimonials and en

dorsements that do not satisf y requirements without meet

ing complex disclosure requirements); §275.206(4)–2(a) (prohibiting investment advisers from having custody of cli

ent funds or securities unless specific requirements are31 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting met, including qualifications, notices, and account state

ments). The majority further rests on the notion that Congress drew inspiration from the common law in enacting the an

tifraud provisions of the federal-securities laws, whereas OSHA’s new statutory duty did not bring any common-law soil with it. See ante, at 23–24. Yet both statutes share elements with claims at common law that Congress deemed inadequate to address the national problems that prompted it to legislate. See supra , at 14–15. Still, even accepting that federal-securities laws bring common-law soil with them and OSHA does not, the majority does not explain why that is a constitutionally relevant distinction. 11 In sum, all avenues by which the majority attempts to distinguish Atlas Roofing fail. The majority cannot escape the entrenched principle that a “legal cause of action in

volves ‘public rights’ ” that can be taken outside of Article III if the “statutory right is . . . closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program Co ngress has power to enact” or if it “belongs to [o]r exists against the Federal Government.” Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 53–54. 12 In both Atlas Roof

ing and this case, a public right exists. In both statutory

——————

11 In Tull v. United States , 481 U. S. 412 (1987), for example, there was no common-law soil brought into that federal regulatory regime, and the Seventh Amendment still applied. Ind eed, no one can argue that “[t]he purpose of [the Clean Water Act] wa s . . . to enable the Federal Govern

ment to bring or adjudicate claims that traced their ancestry to the com

mon law.” Ante , at 23–24.

12 The concurrence’s assertion that the majority is “follow[ing] the ad

vice of Justices Brennan and Marshall” by “ ‘limit[ing] the judicial au

thority of non-Article III federal tribunals’ ” is misleading. Ante, at 20 (quoting Schor , 478 U. S., at 859 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting)). Justice Brennan in his Schor dissent wrote that he would limit the authority of non-Article III tribunals to three recognized excep

tions: (1) territorial courts; (2) cour ts-martial; and (3) forums adjudicat

ing public-rights matters. As examples of the pu blic-rights category, Jus

tice Brennan cited Murray’s Lessee

, Ex parte Bakelite

, Crowell

, Thomas

, and his plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline . See Schor , 478 U. S., at32 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting schemes, regardless of any perceived resemblance to the common law, Congress enacted a new cause of action that created a statutory right belonging to the United States for the Government to enforce pu rsuant to its sovereign pow

ers.
IV A faithful and straightforward application of this Court’s longstanding precedent should have resolved this case. Faithful “[a]dherence to precedent is ‘a foundation stone of the rule of law.’ ” Kisorv. Wilkie , 588 U. S. 558, 586 (2019) (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community , 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014)). It allows courts to function, and be perceived, as courts, and not as political entities. “ ‘It pro

motes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent develop

ment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial deci

sions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ” 588 U. S., at 586–587 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991); alterations omitted). That is why, “even in constitutional cases, a de

parture from precedent ‘demands special justification.’ ” Gamble v. United States , 587 U. S. 678, 691 (2019) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey , 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984)). Today’s decision disregards these foundational princi

ples. 13 Time will tell what is left of the public-rights doc

-

—————— 859. As those citations demonstrate, both Justices Brennan and Mar

shall certainly thought th at public-rights matters extend to certain pri

vate disputes that do not involve the Government as a party, as well as disputes involving the Government in connection with different exercises of congressional power. Indeed, it was Justice Brennan who reaffirmed Atlas Roofing in his opinion for the Granfinanciera Court and explained that a public right includes, at a minimum, a statutory right that “be

longs to [o]r exists against the Federal Government.” 492 U. S., at 53– 54.

13 Precedents should not be so easily discarded based on the views of33 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting
trine. Less uncertain, howeve r, are the momentous conse

quences that flow from the majority’s insistence that the Government’s rights to civil penalties must now be tried be

fore a jury in federal court. The majority’s decision, which strikes down the SEC’s in-house adjudication of civil-pen

alty claims on the ground that such claims are legal in na

ture and entitle respondents to a federal jury, effects a seis

mic shift in this Court’s jurisprudence. Indeed, “[i]f you’ve never heard of a statute being struck down on that ground,” and you recall having read countless cases approving of that arrangement, “you’re not alone.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau , 591 U. S. 197, 294 (2020) (K AGAN , J., concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part). The majority pulls a rug out from under Congress with

out even acknowledging that it s decision upends over two centuries of settled Government practice. The UnitedStates, led by then-Solicitor General Robert Bork and thenAssistant Attorney General for the Civil Division Rex Lee, told this Court in Atlas Roofing that “during the whole of our history, regulatory fines and penalties have been col

lected by non-jury procedures pu rsuant to . . . legislative de

cisions,” and that “[i]t would be most remarkable if, at this late date, the Seventh Amendm ent were construed to out

law this consistent rule of government followed for two cen

turies.” Brief for Respondents in Atlas Roofing , O. T. 1976, No. 75–746, etc., pp. 81–82. This Court agreed and upheld that practice, it seemed, once and for all.

—————— some commentators, or on whether or not a particular case is “cele

brated.” Ante , at 25, n. 4. Atlas Roofing and the long line of cases before it are precedents from this Court entitled to stare decisis effect. Indeed, this Court has reaffirmed and repeatedly cited Atlas Roofing with ap

proval. See, e

. g ., Oil States , 584 U. S., at 344–345; Stern , 564 U. S., at 489–490; Granfinanciera , 492 U. S., at 48, 51–54, 60–61; id ., at 65–66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Tull , 481 U. S., at 418, n. 4; Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. , 458 U. S., at 67, n. 18, 69, n. 23, 70, 73, 77 (plurality opinion).34 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting Following this Court’s precedents and the recommenda

tion of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Congress has enacted countless new statutes in the past 50 years that have empowered federa l agencies to impose civil penalties for statutory violations. See 2 P. Verkuilm, D. Gifford, C. Koch, R. Pierce, & J. Lubbers, Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendations and Re

ports, The Federal Administrative Judiciary 861, and nn. 350–351 (1992). These statutes are sometimes enacted in addition to, but often instead of, “the traditional civil en

forcement statutes that permi tted agencies to collect civil penalties only after federa l district court trials.” Id ., at 861. “By 1986, there were over 200 such statutes” and “[t]he trend has, if anything, accelerated” since then. Id ., at 861, and n. 351. Similarly, there are, at the very least, more than two dozen agencies that can impose civil penalties in adminis

trative proceedings. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 78–79 (Principal Deputy Solicitor General) (recognizing two dozen agencies with administrative civil-penalty authorities); see also, e

. g ., 5 U. S. C. §1215(a)(3)(A)(ii) (Merit Systems Protection Board); 7 U. S. C. §§9(10)(C), 13a (Commodity Futures Trading Commission); §§499c(a), 586, 2279e(a) (Depart

ment of Agriculture); 8 U. S. C. §§1324c, 1324d (Depart

ment of Justice); 12 U. S. C. §§5563(a)(2), (c), (Consumer Fi

nancial Protection Bureau); 16 U. S. C. §823b(c) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); 20 U. S. C. §1082(g) (De

partment of Education); 21 U. S. C. §335b (Department of Health and Human Services/Food and Drug Administra

tion); 29 U. S. C. §666(j) (O ccupational Safety and Health Review Commission); 30 U. S. C. §§820(a) and (b) (Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission); 31 U. S. C. §5321(a)(2) (Department of the Treasury); 33 U. S. C. §§1319(d) and (g) (Environmental Protection Agency); 39 U. S. C. §3018(c) (Postal Service); 42 U. S. C. §3545(f ) (De

partment of Housing and Urban Development); 46 U. S. C.35 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting §41107(a) (Federal Maritime Commission); 47 U. S. C. §503(b)(3) (Federal Communications Commission); 49 U. S. C. §521 (Federal Railroad Administration); §46301 (Department of Transportation). Some agencies, like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the SEC, can pursue civil penalties in both administrative pro

ceedings and federal court. See, e

. g ., 12 U. S. C. §§5563(a), 5564(a), 5565(a)(1), (2)(H), and (c) (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); 33 U. S. C. §§1319(a), (b), and (g) (En

vironmental Protection Agency); supra, at 2 (SEC). Others do not have that choice. As the above-cited statutes con

firm, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis

sion, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Fed

eral Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the Department of Agriculture, and many others, can pursue civil penalties only in agency enforcement proceedings. For those and countless other agencies, all the majority can say is tough luck; get a new statute from Congress. Against this backdrop, our coequal branches will be sur

prised to learn that the rule they thought long settled, and which remained unchallenged for half a century, is one that, according to the majority and the concurrence, my dis

sent just announced today. Unfortunately, that mistaken view means that the constitutionality of hundreds of stat

utes may now be in peril, and dozens of agencies could be stripped of their power to enfo rce laws enacted by Congress. Rather than acknowledge the earthshattering nature of its holding, the majority has tried to disguise it. The majority claims that its ruling is limited to “civil penalty suits for fraud” pursuant to a statute that is “barely over a decade old,” ante, at 18, n. 2, 22, an assurance that is in significant tension with other parts of it s reasoning. That incredible assertion should fool no one. Today’s decision is a massive sea change. Litigants seeking further dismantling of the “administrative state” have reason to rejoice in their win36 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting today, but those of us who cherish the rule of law have noth

ing to celebrate.

* * * Today’s ruling is part of a disconcerting trend: When it comes to the separation of powers, this Court tells the American public and its coordi nate branches that it knows best. See, e

. g ., Collins v. Yellen , 594 U. S. 220, 227 (2021) (concluding that the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s “structure violates the separation of powers” because the Agency was led by a single Director removable by the Pres

ident only “ ‘for cause’ ”); United States v. Arthrex, Inc. , 594 U. S. 1, 6, 23 (2021) (holding that “authority wielded by [Ad

ministrative Patent Judges] during inter partes review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office”); Seila Law , 591 U. S., at 202–205 (holding that “the structure of the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] violates the separation of powers” because it was led by a single Director removabl e by the President only “for cause”); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account

ing Oversight Bd. , 561 U. S. 477, 483–484, 492 (2010) (hold

ing “that the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of [Public Company Accounting Oversight] Board members contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers”). The Court tells Congress how best to structure agencies, vindi

cate harms to the public at large, and even provide for the enforcement of rights created for the Government. It does all of this despite the fact that, compared to its political counterparts, “the Judiciary possesses an inferior under

standing of the realities of administration” and how “politi

cal power . . . operates.” Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U. S., at 523 (Breyer, J., dissenting). There are good reasons for Congress to set up a scheme like the SEC’s. It may yield important benefits over jury trials in federal court, such as greater efficiency and exper

tise, transparency and reasoned decisionmaking, as well as37 Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting uniformity, predictability, and greater political accounta

bility. See, e

. g ., Brief for Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 30–32. Others may believe those benefits are overstated, and that a federal jury is a better check on gov

ernment overreach. See, e

. g ., Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 11–25. Those arguments take place against the backdrop of a philosophical (and perhaps ideological) debate on whether the number of agencies and authorities properly corresponds to the ever-increasing and evolving problems faced by our society. This Court’s job is not to de cide who wins this debate. These are policy considerations for Congress in exercising its legislative judgment and co nstitutional authority to de

cide how to tackle today’s proble ms. It is the electorate, and the Executive to some degree, not this Court, that can and should provide a check on the wisdom of those judgments. Make no mistake: Today’s decision is a power grab. Once again, “the majority arrogate s Congress’s policymaking role to itself.” Garland v. Cargill , 602 U. S. 406, 442 (2024) (S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting). It prescribes artificial con

straints on what modern-day adaptable governance must look like. In telling Congress that it cannot entrust certain public-rights matters to the Executive because it must bring them first into the Judiciary’s province, the majority oversteps its role and encroaches on Congress’s constitu

tional authority. Its decision offends the Framers’ constitu

tional design so critical to the preservation of individual lib

erty: the division of our Government into three coordinate branches to avoid the concentration of power in the same hands. The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Judicial aggrandizement is as pernicious to the separation of powers as any a ggrandizing action from either of the political branches. Deeply entrenched in today’s ruling is the erroneous be

lief that any “mistaken or wrongful exertion by the legisla

tive department of its authori ty” can lead to “grave abuses”38 SEC v. JARKESY

S OTOMAYOR , J., dissenting and “it behooves the judiciary to apply a corrective by ex

ceeding its own authority” thro ugh requiring civil-penalty claims to proceed before a federal jury. Stranahan , 214 U. S., at 340. As this Court said over a century ago in this public-rights context, that be lief “mistakenly assumes that the courts can alone be safely intrusted with power, and that hence it is their duty to unlawfully exercise preroga

tives which they have no right to exert, upon the assump

tion that wrong must be done to prevent wrong being ac

complished.” Ibid

. By giving respondents a jury trial, even one that the Con

stitution does not require, the majority may think that it is protecting liberty. That belief, too, is deeply misguided. The American People should not mistake judicial hubris with the protection of individ ual rights. Our first President understood this well. In his parting words to the Nation, he reminded us that a branch of Government arrogating for itself the power of another based on perceptions of what, “in one instance, may be the instrument of good . . . is the cus

tomary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.” Farewell Address (1796), in 35 The Writings of George Washington 229 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940) (footnote omitted). The majority today ignores that wisdom. Because the Court disregards its own precedent and its coequal partners in our tripartite system of Government, I respectfully dissent.