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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CASSIUS CLAY, )

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) C.A.No. 05-125 Erie

) District Judge McLaughlin

DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION, et al. ) Magistrate Judge Baxter

Defendants. )

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction

[Document # 41] be denied.

II REPORT

A. Procedural History

On April 28, 2005, Plaintiff, an inmate acting pro se, filed the instant action. Named as

Defendants are: Tracey Reeves, Joanne Miller and Richard Gaydos of the Accounting

Department of SCI-Greensburg; Candis Brimmer, Mail Room Supervisor; Jack Loughry,

Business Manager; Angie Marheafka, Grievance Coordinator and Warden’s Secretary; L.P.

Bennings, Warden; D.J. Wakefield, Warden; Sharon Burks, Chief Grievance Officer of the

Department of Corrections; and Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of Corrections. As relief, Plaintiff

seeks monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.

In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have acted together to deprive him of

his property in the form of money that was erroneously paid out in contradiction of a valid child

support order, and that Defendants denied him access to courts by failing to advance him funds

after the erroneous payout left him without funds to prosecute an appeal of his criminal case. 

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Plaintiff further alleges that Department of Corrections policy DC-ADM 005 is unconstitutional.

On July 24, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction requesting that 1) 

Defendants be ordered to cease payment of child support; 2) Defendants be ordered to not

retaliate against him; and 3) Defendants be ordered not to transfer Plaintiff to another institution

without express leave of court . Document # 41. 

This Court has held two telephonic hearings on this matter and examined exhibits

regarding the child support orders. At the second hearing, it became apparent to this Court that

Plaintiff is not claiming that the Department of Corrections is misinterpreting a state court order

to pay child support, but instead is challenging the validity and legality of the state court order

itself. 

B. Standards of Review

1. Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim

if it appears “<beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.’” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521(1972), quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state

a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper

legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant’s

unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United

States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969)(petition prepared by a

prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”); Smith v.

U.S. District Court, 956 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir. 1992); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949

F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of

litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the

complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d

63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)(discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land

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Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)(same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this

Court has considered facts and made inferences where it is appropriate. 

2. Preliminary injunctions

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the district court must consider: (1) the

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the extent of irreparable injury from the alleged

misconduct; (3) the extent of harm to the movant; and (4) the effect on public interest. Clean

Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 1995); Opticians Ass'n of America v.

Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). The preliminary

injunction remedy "must be reserved for extraordinary circumstances...." Hoxworth v. Blinder,

Robinson & Co. Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1990). If the record does not support a finding

of both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits, then a preliminary injunction

cannot be granted. Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir. 1987). Irreparable injury is

established by showing that Plaintiff will suffer harm that "cannot be redressed by a legal or an

equitable remedy following trial." Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d

797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989)("The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the

plaintiff from harm"). Plaintiff bears this burden of showing irreparable injury. Hohe v. Casey,

868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989). In fact, Plaintiff must show

immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm. ECRI v.

McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987). The case law provides some assistance in

determining that injury which is irreparable under this standard. "The word irreparable connotes

'that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, atoned for...'." Acierno v. New Castle

County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994)(citations omitted). Additionally, "the claimed injury

cannot merely be possible, speculative or remote." Dice v. Clinicorp, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 803, 809

(W.D.Pa. 1995). An injunction is not issued "simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future

injury...." Acierno, 40 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted). 

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C. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine limits this Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim

regarding the legality of the child support order.. The United States Supreme Court has

summarized the doctrine: 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the

kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.

Exxon Mobil Corp. et al. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). See also

Lance v. Dennis, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1198 (February 21, 2006); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust,

263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983). 

This holding is consistent with decisions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals as set

forth in Parkview Associates Partnership v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1055 (2002):

This court has described the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as precluding

lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated or

"inextricably intertwined" with adjudication by a state's courts . . .. 

Further, we have explained that a federal action is inextricably

intertwined with a state adjudication, and thus barred in federal court

under Feldman, "[w]here federal relief can only be predicated upon a

conviction that the state court was wrong." 

225 F.3d at 325 (citations omitted); see also ITT Corp. et al v. Intelnet Int'l Corp. et al, 366 F.3d

205 (3d Cir.2004).

In this case, the state court ordered Plaintiff to pay child support. Thus, application of

Rooker-Feldman in this instance is straightforward, as that doctrine does not "permit a

disappointed state court plaintiff to seek review of a state court decision in the federal court by

masquerading his complaint in the form of a federal civil rights action." Logan v. Lillie, 965

F.Supp. 695, 698 (E.D.Pa.1997). "If it were otherwise, any person dissatisfied with a state ...

award could seek review in the district court under the guise of a federal civil rights violation."

Id. Here, if Plaintiff were to prevail on his claim, this Court would necessarily be finding that

the state court was wrong in its imposition of child support "render[ing] [the state court]

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"domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction since it could be seen as a ruling by this

court on a matter exclusively within the state court's jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards,

504 U.S. 689 (1992)(federal courts divested of power "to issue divorce, alimony, and child

custody decrees").

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judgment ineffectual." FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834 (3d

Cir.1996).

In McKnight v. Baker, 343 F.Supp. 2d 422 (E.D.Pa. 2004), the federal district court was

faced with a civil rights claim concerning a state court custody case and determined that such

claims were barred to the extent that they would represent "an indirect attack on the custody

determination" made in the state court. Id. at 426. The court found that the plaintiff was

"essentially seeking federal court review of the decision of the Family Court denying him

visitation rights" and determined that this was barred by Rooker-Feldman. "McKnight's proper

avenue of appeal lies in the Pennsylvania state courts. . . 'And ultimately to the Supreme Court

under [28 U.S.C.] §1257.'" Id. at 426, quoting Parkview Associates, 225 F.3d at 324. A similar

result applies here. Plaintiff's claims implicate the validity of, and are inextricably intertwined

with, the state court rulings made in the course of the child support determinations. 

Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction1 to adjudicate this claim regarding the legality of the

child support order and therefore, Plaintiff has no likelihood of success on the merits of the

claim, thereby precluding the issuance of injunctive relief by this Court.

D. Retaliation

Plaintiff requests that this Court order Defendants not to harass him in retaliation for the

filing of this lawsuit. As Plaintiff has not shown immediate irreparable injury, a preliminary

injunction should be denied.

III CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for

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preliminary injunction [Document # 41] be denied.

In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Local

Rule 72.1.4B, the parties are allowed ten (10) days from the date of service to file written

objections to this report. Any party opposing the objections shall have seven (7) days from the

date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to timely file objections may constitute

a waiver of any appellate rights.

S/ Susan Paradise Baxter 

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: September 28, 2006

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