1Robinson previously filed an application for DIB which was denied at the initial level on

August 27, 1998 (AR 65).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TAMMY S. ROBINSON, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 06-6 Erie

 )

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McLAUGHLIN, SEAN J., J.

Plaintiff, Tammy S. Robinson, commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§

405(g) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Robinson filed an application for DIB on December 5,

2002, alleging that she was disabled since August 26, 2002 due to herniated discs in her cervical

spine, back pain, shoulder pain and leg discomfort (Administrative Record, hereinafter “AR”, at

46-48; 56).1 Her application was denied on April 11, 2003, and she requested an administrative

hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) (AR 27-31). A hearing was held on March

10, 2004 and following this hearing, the ALJ found that Robinson was not entitled to a period of

disability or disability insurance benefits under the Act (AR 10-19; 247-271). Robinson’s

request for review by the Appeals Council was denied (AR 5-8), rendering the Commissioner’s

decision final under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The instant action challenges the ALJ’s decision. 

Presently pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons

that follow, we will deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant Defendant’s motion. 

 

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2

I. BACKGROUND

Robinson was born on December 19, 1954, and was forty-nine years old at the time of the

ALJ’s decision (AR 14, 46). She has a high school education, and past relevant work experience

as a production and process control worker at a food processing plant (AR 57).

Prior to her alleged onset date of August 26, 2002, Robinson was injured in an

automobile accident on December 6, 1997 (AR 155). On December 16, 1997, she began

treatment with Joseph Thomas, M.D., for complaints of neck, back, shoulder and gluteal pain as

a result of the accident (AR 155). Between December 1997 and July 2002, Dr. Thomas

prescribed various pain medications, administered epidural injections, and recommended

physical therapy (AR 125-156). A cervical MRI conducted in December 1997 showed a midline

to slightly right paracentral disc herniation at C3-4, and a diffuse bulge and left paracentral disc

herniation at C6-7 (AR 153-154). A lumbar MRI showed a subligamentous midline and bilateral

disc herniation at L4-5 (AR 153). Although Robinson reported some improvement in her

symptoms following a nerve root block on July 5, 2002, she requested a surgical consultation

(AR 126).

Upon referral by Dr. Thomas, Robinson was evaluated by Matt El-Kadi, M.D., Ph.D., a

neurosurgeon, on July 25, 2002 for complaints of cervical and lumbar pain (AR 168-170). 

Robinson complained of cervical pain which radiated into both her shoulder areas, down her left

upper extremity and into the occipital area causing headaches (AR 168). She also complained

she dropped things with her left hand (AR 168). Dr. El-Kadi noted that a lumbar MRI conducted

on May 3, 2002 showed a disc bulging at L3-4 and L4-5, with some stenosis at L4-5 (AR 169). 

A cervical MRI conducted on July 15, 2002 demonstrated a large herniated disc at the C6-7 area

paramedian to the left causing foraminal stenosis, a small central disc protrusion at the right C4-5

area, and a cental disc protrusion at the C3-4 area with mild right foraminal stenosis (AR 169). 

On physical examination, Dr. El-Kadi found Robinson’s bilateral muscle strength was 5/5

in all major muscle groups (AR 169). He noted decreased sensation over the left ulnar aspect,

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3

into the first and second fingers and in the palm of the left hand (AR 169). Dr. El-Kadi

considered Robinson’s cervical symptoms much worse than her lumbar symptoms, and not likely

to respond to conservative treatment (AR 169-170). He recommended surgery of the C6-7 area

of the cervical spine (AR 170). 

Robinson underwent surgery to repair her herniated cervical disc at C6-7 on October 2,

2002 (AR 158-163). Her postoperative course was unremarkable, and she was discharged the

next day with prescriptions for Vicodin and Valium (AR 162). 

Robinson returned to Dr. El-Kadi on October 24, 2002 for follow-up (AR 171). She

stated that she felt eighty-five percent improved compared to her preoperative status and that her

left upper extremity pain had improved fifty percent (AR 171). Dr. El-Kadi reported that she

ambulated with a steady gate, motor strength testing of her upper extremities revealed no motor

deficits, and physical examination revealed a well healed incision (AR 171). Dr. El-Kadi opined

that he was pleased with Robinson’s postoperative progress, and requested Dr. Thompson obtain

cervical spine x-rays for his review (AR 171). Cervical spine x-rays conducted on October 29,

2002 showed postoperative changes of anterior spinal fusion at the C6-7 level and were

otherwise normal (AR 177).

On December 26, 2002, Robinson was seen by Dr. Thomas and reported some

improvement in her neck, shoulder and arm pain since surgery (AR 195). She complained of

increased back and bilateral sacral pain (AR 195). On physical examination, Dr. Thomas

reported that her vital signs were stable and she had a fair cervical range of motion with a well

healed neck scar (AR 195). She exhibited pain across the lower back at the L4-5 level, with

increased pain on flexion at seventy to eighty degrees and extension at ten to twenty degrees (AR

195). She was assessed with improved cervical radicular complaints since surgery and continued

L4-5 radicular complaints (AR 195). Dr. Thomas administered a lumbar spine injection for her

complaints of low back pain (AR 195). 

Robinson returned to Dr. Thomas on January 27, 2003 noting pain in the right cervical

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area and right shoulder (AR 225). Dr. Thomas found tender trigger points along the right

paracervical and scapular border, with positive jump signs on palpation (AR 225). Robinson had

a fair cervical range of motion, with fair shoulder girdle and arm strength (AR 225). Dr. Thomas

administered trigger point injections (AR 225). 

Pursuant to the request of the Commissioner, Robinson underwent a consultative

examination on February 25, 2003 performed by John Kalata, D.O. (AR 197-206). Dr. Kalata

noted that she had a very slow gait (AR 197) She reported an onset of neck pain radiating to her

shoulders and upper arms and lower back pain radiating to her lower extremities following an

automobile accident in 1997 (AR 197; 199). She indicated that prior to her cervical surgery, she

had an eight to nine pain response, and after surgery, it dropped slightly to a seven (AR 197). 

Robinson relayed that diagnostic studies revealed a bulging disc at the L3-4 and L4-5 levels, with

some stenosis at the L4-5 level (AR 197). On physical examination, Dr. Kalata reported that

Robinson could not raise her arms over 120 degrees and had discomfort on raising her legs

during the straight leg raising test (AR 200). He found tenderness in the cervical area with

restricted motion, and tenderness in the lumbar area (AR 200). She had 5/5 motor power and a

stable station and gait (AR 201). Dr. Kalata’s impressions were, inter alia, status post cervical

disc herniation surgery, residual pain, discogenic disease of the lumbar spine with radiculopathy

to both lower extremities and cervical spondylosis (AR 200). 

Dr. Kalata assessed Robinson’s ability to perform work-related physical activities (AR

205-206). He opined that she could lift and carry two to three pounds frequently and ten pounds

occasionally; stand and/or walk for one hour or less and sit for four hours during an eight-hour

workday; and was limited in her pushing and pulling ability with her arms and legs (AR 205). 

Dr. Kalata further opined that she could never stoop, crouch or balance, but she could perform

postural movements such as bending, kneeling and climbing on an occasional basis (AR 206). 

She had limitations with respect to reaching, feeling and seeing, and had some environmental

restrictions (AR 206). 

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On March 13, 2003, Robinson returned to Dr. Thomas and complained of lower back and

cervical pain, with some right leg complaints (AR 224). On physical examination, Dr. Thomas

noted mild tenderness along the paracervical region on the right, with fair cervical spine range of

motion (AR 224). Tenderness was noted at the L4-5 level of the lumbar spine, particularly on

the right (AR 224). Dr. Thomas reported that Robinson’s cervical surgery had been successful 

(AR 224). He assessed her with mild cervical spasms, as well as right radicular complaints, and

administered a lumbar spine injection (AR 224). 

On March 27, 2003, Gregory Mortimer, M.D., a non-examining state agency reviewing

physician, reviewed the medical evidence of record and completed a Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment form (AR 208-218). Dr. Mortimer concluded that Robinson could lift

and/or carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently; could stand, walk

and/or sit for at least two hours and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; was

unlimited in her pushing and pulling abilities; could never crawl and climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolds, but could occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop and crouch (AR 209-210). 

Dr. Mortimer opined that Dr. Kalata’s findings in February 2003, as well as the other objective

evidence, did not support the restrictions imposed in his assessment (AR 218).

Robinson returned to Dr. Thomas on April 25, 2003 complaining of intermittent pain into

the cervical region, as well as lower back and right leg pain (AR 223). She exhibited left and

right lateral rotation to forty degrees, cervical flexion and extension to fifteen degrees, and had

good shoulder girdle and arm strength (AR 223). Robinson had mild discomfort across the lower

back and toward the right sacrum, trace favoring of right gastrocnemius strength, and dorsi

flexion with mild decrease in the heel reflex (AR 223). Dr. Thomas assessed Robinson with

residual cervical spasm and pain post spine surgery, with some intermittent L5 radiculopathy

(AR 223). He recommended that she continue strengthening both cervical and girdle support,

and suggested she consider a surgical opinion regarding her continued radiculopathy despite

intermittent epidural injections (AR 223).

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6

On August 8, 2003, Dr. Thomas found Robinson’s vital signs were stable, she had a full

cervical spine range of motion, and good shoulder girdle and arm strength (AR 222). She

exhibited some pain across her lower back with sensory complaints in both calves (AR 222). Dr.

Thomas assessed her with persistent L4-5 herniation with some L-5 root symptoms (AR 222). 

On September 4, 2003, Robinson was again evaluated by Dr. El-Kadi with respect to her

complaints of lower back pain (AR 235-236). Dr. El-Kadi noted that he had last seen her eleven

months earlier when her condition was eighty-five percent improved (AR 235). Robinson

reported that she suffered from back pain which radiated into the bilateral lower extremities with

numbness and tingling from the anterior and lateral thighs to the knees (AR 235). She claimed

that epidural injections administered by Dr. Thomas had failed to provide any long term relief

(AR 235). Dr. El-Kadi reviewed a lumbar MRI dated August 25, 2003 which showed evidence

of a central disc protrusion at the L4-5 level with degenerative disc disease (AR 235). He found

no evidence of neuromuscular deficit on physical examination (AR 235). Based upon a review

of Robinson’s MRI, Dr. El-Kadi opined that surgery was not warranted (AR 235). He advised

Robinson that she pursue a comprehensive physical rehabilitative/pain management-type

program (AR 235). 

Robinson was also treated by Mary A. Wendel, D.O., her primary care physician, from

February 2000 through the relevant time period (AR 176-193); 226-234). These progress notes

reflect that Dr. Wendel treated Robinson for a variety of complaints, such as inter alia, yeast

infections, high blood pressure, cholelithiasis, GERD, dehydration, sinusitis, and urinary tract

infections (AR 176-193; 226-234). Although Robinson intermittently complained of neck and/or

back pain, these notes reflect that Dr. Wendel did not treat her for these complaints since she was

followed by Dr. Thomas and/or Dr. El-Kadi (AR 176-193; 226-234). 

Finally, Robinson submitted two reports from Dr. Wendel post-hearing (AR 238-240). 

On December 10, 2003, Dr. Wendel opined that Robinson could occasionally lift and carry two

to three pounds; stand and/or walk for somewhere between one and five hours in an eight-hour

Case 1:06-cv-00006-SJM Document 15 Filed 10/19/06 Page 6 of 18
7

workday; sit for three hours during an eight-hour workday; and was limited in her pushing and

pulling ability (AR 238). She further opined that Robinson could occasionally bend but could

never kneel, stoop, crouch, balance or climb; had limited ability to reach and handle; and should

avoid exposure to vibration (AR 239). 

On March 11, 2004, Dr. Wendel reported that Robinson had persistent neck and back

problems with numerous complaints of pain (AR 240). She stated that Robinson had tried

multiple medications and injections in an attempt to alleviate her pain, but had weaned herself off

the medications due to the side effects she had experienced (AR 240). Dr. Wendel reported that

she was quite disgruntled secondary to persistent pain, and had decided against further surgery or

injections (AR 240).

Robinson and Fred Monaco, a vocational expert, testified at the hearing held by the ALJ

on March 10, 2004 (AR 247-271). Robinson testified that she suffered from constant pain in her

neck and lower back, shoulder pain, and headaches a couple of times per day (AR 254-255). She

further testified that she experienced pain in her right leg a couple of times per week for which

she wore a brace (AR 254). She claimed that her neck pain however, had subsided some since

her surgery, but she still wore a neck brace approximately three times per week (AR 254; 265). 

She testified that she wore a back brace at night to sleep (AR 265). According to Robinson,

medication took the edge off her pain, but caused problems with her stomach, caused memory

loss and fatigue (AR 257-258). She claimed she had trouble holding on to objects and things just

slipped out of her hands (AR 264). 

Robinson further testified that she was unable to turn her head around to look behind her,

could not perform work with her arms raised above her shoulders or in front of her, could only

lift approximately two to five pounds, stand for approximately 45 minutes before she needed to

sit down, sit for approximately 45 minutes, and walk one block (AR 255-257; 263). Although

she was able to drive, her sister or daughter normally drove since she was unable to look back

and forth or reach out in front of her (AR 264). Robinson testified that she had not undergone

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8

recommended physical therapy due to a lack of insurance (AR 262).

The ALJ asked the vocational expert if work existed for an individual of Robinson’s age, 

education, and work history, who was able to perform work that did not require exertion above

the sedentary level or more than occasional balancing, stooping, crouching or kneeling, that

required no climbing or crawling, and that allowed such individual to alternate sitting and

standing (AR 268). The vocational expert testified that such an individual could perform work as

a surveillance system monitor, cashier and document preparer (AR 268). The vocational expert

further testified however, that such individual would not be able to work if she could only stand

and walk up to one hour or less in an eight-hour day and sit for approximately four hours (AR

278-279). 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision which found that Robinson was

not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance under the Act (AR 13-19). 

Robinson’s request for review by the Appeals Council was denied making the ALJ’s decision the

final decision of the Commissioner (AR 5-8). She subsequently filed this action. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the determination of the Commissioner unless it is not supported

by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence does not mean a large or

considerable amount of evidence, but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988)

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see Richardson v.

Parales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It has been defined as less than a preponderance of evidence

but more than a mere scintilla. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Jesurum v. Secretary of the

United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

A person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he or she is unable

to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

Case 1:06-cv-00006-SJM Document 15 Filed 10/19/06 Page 8 of 18
2

In order to be entitled to DIB under Title II, a claimant must additionally establish that

her disability existed before the expiration of her insured status. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (c). The

ALJ found that Robinson satisfied the insured status requirements of the Act through the date of

his decision (AR 18). 

9

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

The Commissioner uses a five-step evaluation process to determine when an individual meets

this definition:

In the first two steps, the claimant must establish (1) that he is not

engaged in “substantial gainful activity” and (2) that he suffers

from a severe medical impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 140-41 (1987). If the claimant shows a severe medical

impairment, the [Commissioner] determines (3) whether the

impairment is equivalent to an impairment listed by the

[Commissioner] as creating a presumption of disability. Bowen,

482 U.S. at 141. If it is not, the claimant bears the burden of

showing (4) that the impairment prevents him from performing the

work that he has performed in the past. Id. If the claimant satisfies

this burden, the [Commissioner] must grant the claimant benefits

unless the [Commissioner] can demonstrate (5) that there are jobs

in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Ferguson

v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3rd Cir. 1985).

Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 117. Here, the ALJ resolved Robinson’s case at the fourth step. He

determined that Robinson’s degenerative disc disease was a severe impairment, but determined at

step three that she did not meet a listing (AR 15). The ALJ found that she had the residual

functional capacity to perform work that did not require exertion above the sedentary level or

more than occasional balancing, stooping, crouching or kneeling, with no climbing or crawling,

and that allowed the alternating of sitting and standing (AR 15). At the final step, the ALJ

determined that Robinson could perform the jobs cited by the vocational expert at the

administrative hearing (AR 17). The ALJ additionally determined that Robinson’s complaints

concerning her limitations were not entirely credible (AR 18). Again, we must affirm this

determination unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

A. Whether the ALJ erred in relying on the HALLEX manual in denying

Plaintiff’s request for a supplemental hearing 

Case 1:06-cv-00006-SJM Document 15 Filed 10/19/06 Page 9 of 18
3HALLEX is the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law manual of the Social Security

Administration. It contains “guiding principles, procedural guidance and information” to the

agency’s Office of Hearings and Appeals, and it “also defines procedures for carrying out policy

and provides guidance” for administrative processing and adjudication of claims at the ALJ,

Appeals Council and court review levels. HALLEX I-1-0-1. 

10

Robinson first argues that the ALJ failed to comply with HALLEX I-2-5-56(A)3 in

denying her request for a supplemental hearing based upon Dr. Wendel’s assessment submitted

after the administrative hearing. As previously indicated, Dr. Wendel concluded that Robinson

could only lift or carry two to three pounds occasionally; stand and/or walk for somewhere

between one and five hours in an eight-hour workday; sit for three hours during an eight-hour

workday; was limited in her pushing and pulling ability and reaching and handling ability; and

could occasionally bend but never kneel, stoop, crouch, balance or climb (AR 238-239). 

Robinson claims that “new” hypothetical questions were necessary based upon Dr. Wendel’s

assessment. We disagree.

The operative HALLEX provision provides that the ALJ may identify the need for

vocational expert evidence after the administrative hearing in certain situations. For example,

the claimant may submit evidence after the hearing which establishes the existence of another

severe impairment which raises issues that require vocational expert testimony at step five of the

sequential evaluation process. Alternatively, the ALJ may determine that additional vocational

expert testimony is necessary when the evidence submitted after the hearing indicates that the

claimant’s functional limitations differ from those covered in the hypothetical question to which

the vocational expert responded at the hearing. HALLEX I-2-5-56(A). 

Robinson’s reliance on the cited provision does not mandate a supplemental hearing in

this case. The first example is not applicable in this case; Dr. Wendel does not identify the

existence of another severe impairment that would impact step five of the sequential evaluation

process. Robinson’s reliance on the second example is unavailing, since the ALJ rejected Dr.

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4We recognize that Robinson challenges the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Wendel’s assessment. 

However, for the reasons discussed later in this opinion, we find no error in the ALJ’s evaluation

of Dr. Wendel’s assessment. 

5Robinson cites Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (3rd Cir. 1985) in support of her

contention that the ALJ mechanically applied the grids in this case. The facts in Kane are

distinguishable however, since unlike the claimant in Kane, Robinson was not within days of her

fiftieth birthday, and the unlike the ALJ in Kane, the ALJ here fully addressed the age regulation. 

 

11

Wendel’s assessment of her functional limitations (AR 16).4 The ALJ specifically considered

Robinson’s request for a supplemental hearing, but denied her request concluding that the

residual functional capacity assessment adopted was consistent with the other medical evidence,

including Dr. Wendel’s own treatment notes (AR 13). In light of the fact that Dr. Wendel’s

assessment had no impact on the hypothetical question which the ALJ posed to the vocational

expert at the administrative hearing, we find no error in this regard.

B. Whether the ALJ erred in classifying Plaintiff as a “younger person”

Robinson next argues that the ALJ erred in classifying her as a “younger person” pursuant

to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). A “younger person” is a person “under age 50.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1563(c). Robinson acknowledges that she was forty-nine years old on the date of the ALJ’s

decision, but claims that the ALJ should have classified her as a “person closely approaching

advanced age,” i.e., “age 50-54.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). That age category, combined with

her remaining vocational factors, would have entitled her to a determination of disability. 

The Commissioner’s regulations state that the age categories will not be mechanically

applied in a borderline situation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b).5 Rather, if a claimant is within a few

days to a few months of reaching an older age category, and using the older age category would

result in a determination or decision that a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers whether to use

the older age category after evaluating the overall impact of all the factors in a claimant’s case. 

Id. 

Here, the ALJ acknowledged that Robinson would turn fifty years old on December 19,

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12

2004, and engaged in the “sliding scale” approach utilized in borderline situations. HALLEX II5-3-2. Under this approach, the claimant must show progressively more additional vocational

adversities to support the use of the higher age. Id. Examples of vocational adversities include:

the presence of an additional impairment which infringes upon, without substantially narrowing,

a claimant’s remaining occupational base; the claimant is barely literate in English; the claimant

has only a marginal ability to communicate in English; or the claimant has a history of work

experience in an unskilled job in one isolated industry or work setting, such as fishing or forestry. 

Id. 

Utilizing the sliding scale approach, the ALJ found that Robinson was a high school

graduate and had not worked in an isolated industry (AR 17). He further found that she had not

shown an additional impairment that infringed upon her occupational base (AR 18). Because

these findings are supported by substantial evidence, we find no error in the ALJ’s decision to

classify Robinson as a “younger person” for purposes of determining whether there were a

significant number of jobs in the national economy that she could perform in light of her work

restrictions, vocational factors and age.

C. Whether the ALJ erred in his RFC determination

Robinson further challenges the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment (“RFC”). 

The ALJ found that Robinson could perform work that did not require exertion above the

sedentary level or more than occasional balancing, stooping, crouching or kneeling, with no

climbing or crawling, and that allowed the alternating of sitting and standing (AR 15). She

contends that this finding is conclusory and that the ALJ erred in failing to address all of the

relevant evidence in the record. 

We first note that an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence when determining an

individual’s residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); Burnett v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3rd Cir. 2000). “‘Residual functional capacity is defined as

that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her

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impairment(s).’” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121, quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 n.1 (3rd

Cir. 1999); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). An individual claimant’s RFC is an administrative

determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2). Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-5p provides:

The assessment is based upon consideration of all relevant

evidence in the case record, including medical evidence and

relevant nonmedical evidence, such as observations of lay

witnesses of an individual’s apparent symptomatology, an

individual’s own statement of what he or she is able or unable to

do, and many other factors that could help the adjudicator

determine the most reasonable findings in light of the evidence. 

 

SSR 96-5p (1996), 1996 WL 374183 *5.

Consideration of all relevant evidence however, does not mean that the ALJ must

explicitly refer to each and every finding contained in a report. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d

34, 42 (3rd Cir. 2001) (ALJ not required to discuss every treatment note). Moreover, the failure

of an ALJ to cite specific evidence does not necessarily establish that such evidence was not

considered. Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 Fed.Appx. 775, 777 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2004); Lozada v. Barnhart,

331 F. Supp. 2d 325, 336 (E.D.Pa. 2004). Indeed, requiring an ALJ to exhaustively address each

and every finding in the record would prove too burdensome. As long as the ALJ “articulates at

some minimum level [his] analysis of a particular line of evidence,” a written evaluation of every

piece of evidence is not required. Phillips, 91 Fed.Appx. at 777 n.7.

We find that the ALJ evaluated all of the relevant evidence consistent with the above

standards. A review of his decision reveals that he evaluated the objective medical evidence, the

examining physicians’ opinions, and Robinson’s credibility in fashioning her RFC (AR 15-16). 

We conclude, contrary to Robinson’s contention, that the ALJ did not improperly focus on any

one finding to the exclusion of others. The ALJ’s decision reflects that the ALJ recognized that

Dr. Thomas had been her treating physician since 1997 (AR 15). The ALJ observed that a

December 1997 MRI showed degeneration in the cervical spine, but that her complaints of pain

had improved in March 1998 (AR 15). He noted that in December 2002, Dr. Thomas found fair

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14

range of cervical motion studies, but increased pain upon flexion and lumbar extension, and

administered another injection (AR 15). Finally, the ALJ observed that in August 2003, Dr.

Thomas found intermittent cervical pain and increased lower back and leg complaints, but she

had full range of cervical motion studies (AR 16). We therefore find no error in this regard.

We also reject Robinson’s claim that the ALJ failed to accord proper weight to the

opinion of Dr. Wendel, her family physician. It is well settled in this Circuit that the opinion of a

treating physician is entitled to great weight and can only be rejected on the basis of contrary

medical evidence. Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3rd Cir. 1988). An ALJ must

articulate in writing his or her reasons for rejecting such evidence. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d

700, 705 (3rd Cir. 1981). In the absence of such an indication, “the reviewing court cannot tell if

significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.” Id. Further, “a court

considering a claim for disability benefits must give greater weight to the findings of a treating

physician than to the findings of a physician who has examined the claimant only once or not at

all.” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3rd Cir. 1993). Finally, a treating source’s medical

opinion concerning the nature and severity of the claimant’s alleged impairments will be given

controlling weight if the Commissioner finds that the treating source’s opinion is “well-supported

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with

the other substantial evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). 

 Dr. Wendel concluded that Robinson could occasionally lift and carry two to three

pounds; stand and/or walk for somewhere between one and five hours in an eight-hour workday;

sit for three hours during an eight-hour workday; and was limited in her pushing and pulling

ability (AR 238). She further opined that Robinson could occasionally bend but could never

kneel, stoop, crouch, balance or climb; had limited ability to reach and handle; and should avoid

exposure to vibration (AR 239). The ALJ found that Dr. Wendel’s office notes essentially

reflected routine office visits and that Dr. Wendel failed to cite to clinical records in support of

her conclusion (AR 15-16). See Mason, 994 F.2d at 1065 (“Form reports in which a physician’s

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15

obligation is only to check a box or fill in the blank are weak evidence at best.”). The ALJ also

noted that while Dr. Wendel’s treatment records provided a reasonable basis for her findings of

pain and some limitation in motion, Robinson’s examination results did not rule out sedentary

work (AR 16). Finally, we observe that Dr. Wendel’s opinion is inconsistent with the other

medical evidence of record as discussed below. 

The record reflects that less than one month after surgery, Robinson reported an eightyfive percent improvement in her condition, and cervical spine x-rays were normal (AR 171, 177). 

Following her surgery, she complained of only intermittent cervical pain, and by August 2003,

she exhibited full cervical spine range of motion, good shoulder girdle, and good arm strength

(AR 222-223). As noted by the ALJ, while an August 2003 MRI showed a central disc

protrusion at the L4-5 level, Dr. El-Kadi found no neuromuscular deficits on physical

examination (AR 235). Based upon a review of her MRI, Dr. El-Kadi opined that surgery was

not warranted, and recommended a physical rehabilitation/pain management program (AR 235). 

There is no indication in the record that Robinson ever followed through with Dr. El-Kadi’s

recommendation. Finally, Dr. Wendel’s report dated March 2004 indicated that Robinson had

weaned herself off pain medications, albeit due to side effects, but she also had decided against

further surgery or injection therapy (AR 240). 

We also find that the ALJ did not err in according only limited weight to Dr. Kalata’s

opinion. Dr. Kalata opined that Robinson was limited to lifting and carrying two to three pounds

frequently and ten pounds occasionally; could stand and/or walk for one hour or less in an eighthour day; was limited in her pushing and pulling ability with her arms and legs; could never

stoop, crouch or balance, but could perform postural movements such as bending, kneeling and

climbing on an occasional basis (AR 205-206). Robinson claims that the ALJ erred in according

Dr. Kalata’s opinion limited weight, since it is similar to Dr. Wendel’s opinion and essentially

negates her ability to perform sedentary work with certain restrictions.

We first note that the treating physician rule does not apply to a consulting physician’s

Case 1:06-cv-00006-SJM Document 15 Filed 10/19/06 Page 15 of 18
6Parenthetically, we observe that Dr. Kalata’s findings were not entirely consistent with

his RFC assessment. While he found Robinson had some tenderness in the cervical and lumbar

area, she nonetheless exhibited 5/5 motor power and a stable station and gait (AR 201). 

16

opinion. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1067 (doctrine had no application to physician who examined

claimant once). Nonetheless, the Commissioner’s regulations provide that the ALJ must

consider the extent to which the opinion is supported by a logical explanation, the degree of the

medical source’s specialization in a relevant field, and the extent to which the source’s opinion is

consistent with the entirety of the evidence. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(6). 

The ALJ here evaluated Dr. Kalata’s opinion consistent with the above standards. The

ALJ considered Dr. Kalata’s reported findings based upon his physical examination of Robinson,

and noted that his examination was performed only four months post-surgery when some residual

effects were to be expected (AR 16). He examined Dr. Kalata’s opinion in light of the remaining

treating physicians’ opinions and concluded that his examination did not rule out a reduced range

of sedentary work (AR 16). Specifically, he noted Dr. El-Kadi’s findings of eighty-five percent

improvement within one month of surgery, and that Robinson had no neuromuscular deficits in

September 2003 (AR 16). He further noted Dr. Thomas’ findings of improvement in December

2002, with a full range of cervical motion in August 2003 (AR 16). All of these findings

(without repeating such findings here) are supported by the record, and, consequently, we find no

error in this regard.6 

D. Whether the ALJ erred in his credibility determination

Finally, Robinson challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination. An ALJ must consider

subjective complaints by the claimant and evaluate the extent to which those complaints are

supported or contradicted by the objective medical evidence and other evidence in the record. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Subjective complaints must be seriously considered, whether or not they

are fully confirmed by the objective medical evidence. See Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968 (3rd

Cir. 1981). The ALJ as the finder of fact can reject, partially or fully, subjective complaints if he

finds them not credible based on other evidence in the record. Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d

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17

309, 312 (3rd Cir. 1974). The ALJ is empowered to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and his

determination is entitled to deference by this Court. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F2d 871,

873 (3rd Cir. 1983). 

Robinson claims that the ALJ failed to adequately explain why he believed her testimony

was not credible. We disagree. The ALJ found that Robinson’s testimony regarding her physical

limitations was not consistent with the medical findings or her self-reported activities of daily

living (AR 16). The ALJ noted that her degenerative back condition provided a reasonable basis

for pain, but not for pain so severe that even sedentary work was ruled out (AR 16). Finally, the

ALJ found that she was able to engage in many household activities, although with difficulty

(AR 16). The ALJ’s RFC assessment fully accommodated Robinson’s subjective complaints and

limitations relative to her impairments. 

IV. CONCLUSION

An appropriate Order follows.

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18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TAMMY S. ROBINSON, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 06-6 Erie

 )

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2006, and for the reasons set forth in the

accompanying Memorandum Opinion, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.

8] is DENIED, and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 13] is

GRANTED. JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Defendant, Jo Anne B. Barnhart,

Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff, Tammy S. Robinson. The clerk is

directed to mark the case closed. 

s/ Sean J. McLaughlin

United States District Judge

cm: All parties of record. 

 

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