NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANN HOFFMAN, Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE KEITH MILLER, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF 

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA, 

Respondent Judge,

v.

MATTHEW HOFFMAN, Real Party in Interest

No. 1 CA-SA 23-0001 

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FN2022-090673 

The Honorable Keith Miller, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Berkshire Law Office, Tempe

By Keith Berkshire, Alexandra Sandlin

Counsel for Petitioner

FILED 2-9-2023
2

The Weingart Firm, PLLC, Tempe

By Adam Weingart

Co-Counsel for Real Party in Interest

Hoffman Legal, LLC, Phoenix

By Amy Wilkins Hoffman

Co-Counsel for Real Party in Interest

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Ann Hoffman seeks special action review of an order granting 

Matthew Hoffman’s motion to convert her petition for dissolution of 

marriage into a petition for annulment, and vacating temporary orders. 

Accepting special action jurisdiction, this court grants relief. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Ann and Matthew are first cousins who married in California 

in 2018, when they were 53 years old. They agree that their marriage was 

valid in California when performed, and remains valid there now. At some 

point after marrying, they moved to Arizona; Matthew apparently then 

moved to Texas, while Ann remains in Arizona. 

¶3 In February 2022, Ann petitioned for dissolution of the 

marriage in Maricopa County Superior Court. Matthew’s response asked 

the court to dissolve the marriage. The court then entered temporary orders, 

including requiring Matthew to pay Ann $1,500 in monthly spousal 

maintenance.

¶4 Matthew then moved to convert the dissolution petition to a 

petition for annulment. Conceding “California does not bar marriages 

between first cousins, and the marriage was valid in the state of California,”

Matthew argued the marriage is not valid in Arizona. His argument was 

based on an Arizona statute providing that first cousins less than 65 years 

old may marry “upon approval of any superior court judge in [Arizona] if 
HOFFMAN v. HON. MILLER/HOFFMAN

Decision of the Court

3

proof has been presented to the judge that one of the cousins is unable to 

reproduce.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 25-101(A) & (B) (2023).1

¶5 Ann argued the Full Faith and Credit Clause required

Arizona to recognize the California marriage, unless Arizona had a strong 

public policy against doing so, adding that the statute Matthew relied on 

shows that Arizona has no strong public policy prohibiting marriages

between first cousins. She also argued that, given their ages, they “had both 

been infertile for many years” before marrying, adding Matthew had a 

vasectomy before the marriage, which had not been reversed. Matthew’s 

reply argued Ann was not infertile at the time of the marriage, and his premarriage vasectomy could be reversed, meaning the marriage did not 

comply with Arizona’s Section 25-101(B).

¶6 After oral argument, the superior court granted Matthew’s 

motion and converted the dissolution petition into one seeking annulment. 

The court noted the parties are first cousins, “neither party is over the age 

of 65, and the parties did not amend their marriage after moving to Arizona 

to avail themselves of” A.R.S. §25-101(B). The court also terminated spousal 

maintenance. This special action followed.

DISCUSSION

¶7 This court has discretion whether to accept special action 

jurisdiction. Lincoln v. Holt, 215 Ariz. 21, 23 ¶ 3 (App. 2007). Relevant factors 

include whether petitioner has an equally plain, speedy and adequate 

remedy by appeal. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a). Legal questions about

interpreting a statute are well suited for special action review, as are issues 

of first impression and of statewide importance. See State v. Bernini, 230 

Ariz. 223, 225 ¶ 5 (App. 2012) (citation omitted). Although Ann could 

challenge the ruling on appeal, this case raises significant legal questions 

that are not resolved by existing law, including a novel interpretation of a 

clear statute enacted more than 30 years ago. Thus, in the exercise of its 

discretion, this court accepts special action jurisdiction.

¶8 By granting Matthew’s motion to convert the dissolution 

petition into one seeking annulment, the superior court implicitly found the 

marriage was void. See A.R.S. § 25–301; see also Means v. Indus. Comm’n, 110 

Ariz. 72, 75 (1973) (action for annulment, unlike divorce, is “based upon a 

marriage that may be void or voidable”); 55 C.J.S. MARRIAGE § 83 (2023) 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
HOFFMAN v. HON. MILLER/HOFFMAN

Decision of the Court

4

(“The theory of an action to annul is that no valid marriage ever came into 

existence.”). But no basis was cited for that finding.

¶9 “Unless strong public policy exceptions require otherwise, 

the validity of [a] marriage is generally determined by the law of the place 

of marriage.” Donlann v. Macgurn, 203 Ariz. 380, 383 ¶ 12 (App. 2002); accord 

In re Mortenson’s Estate, 83 Ariz. 87, 90 (1957) (addressing first cousin 

marriage before amendments to A.R.S. § 25-101 allowing such marriages in 

two circumstances). “The ‘strong public policy exceptions’ we look to in 

determining which state’s law to apply are those pronounced by the Arizona 

legislature.” Cook v. Cook, 209 Ariz. 487, 492 ¶ 17 (App. 2005) (citations 

omitted).

¶10 The parties do not dispute that their marriage is valid under 

California law where it was performed. Matthew’s position, which the 

superior court adopted, is that their California marriage could be

recognized in Arizona only if they sought approval by an Arizona court 

when they moved to Arizona. But Arizona law does not require an Arizona 

court to approve or amend a marriage valid under the laws of another state

when a couple moves to Arizona. Nor does the record show any “strong 

public policy” in Arizona precluding the marriage here.

¶11 By statute, “[m]arriages valid by the laws of the place where 

contracted are valid in [Arizona], except marriages that are void and 

prohibited by section 25-101.” A.R.S. § 25-112(A). Since 1990, the Arizona 

Legislature has authorized marriages in Arizona between first cousins in 

two circumstances. See A.R.S. § 25-101(B). The first would not apply because 

Ann and Matthew are not 65 years old. Id. The second would require Ann 

and Matthew to present proof “that one of [them] is unable to reproduce.” 

Id. Matthew had a vasectomy before the marriage, meaning he “is unable 

to reproduce.” Although arguing his vasectomy could be reversed, it has 

not been, and it was not when the parties were together. Thus, there is no 

record evidence that Matthew can reproduce. Contrary to Matthew’s 

response, facts “not in the record” cannot support the superior court’s 

ruling.

¶12 Matthew’s reliance on Cook, which declined to recognize a 

Virginia marriage, is unavailing for similar reasons. Cook involved first 

cousins who legally married in Virginia and then moved to Arizona, but 

the cousins were not infertile as required by A.R.S. § 25-101(B). 209 Ariz. at 

488 ¶ 3 (noting the couple had a child born during the marriage). Given that 

Arizona law would authorize the marriage between Ann and Matthew, 

subject to “approval of any superior court judge in” Arizona, unlike in Cook, 
HOFFMAN v. HON. MILLER/HOFFMAN

Decision of the Court

5

nothing here shows that “strong public policy exceptions” under Arizona 

law would prohibit Arizona from recognizing their California marriage. See 

Donlann, 203 Ariz. at 383 ¶ 12.

¶13 In sum, California law governs whether the marriage is valid, 

and the parties do not dispute that the marriage is valid under California 

law. Because the marriage occurred in California, Ann and Matthew did 

not have to comply with the requirements applicable if they had married in 

Arizona under A.R.S. § 25-101(B). The very existence of that statute, 

however, shows that the California marriage is not contrary to “strong 

public policy exceptions” under Arizona law that would preclude Arizona 

from recognizing their California marriage. Donlann, 203 at 383 ¶ 12. 

Moreover, given that A.R.S. § 25-101 does not require a couple validly 

married in another jurisdiction to have an Arizona court approve or amend 

that marriage when moving to Arizona, the superior court erred in 

concluding they had to seek such approval.

CONCLUSION

¶14 Accepting special action jurisdiction, the court grants relief by 

vacating the superior court’s September 19, 2022 minute entry in its 

entirety. Having considered the parties financial resources and the 

reasonableness of their positions, Ann is awarded reasonable attorneys’ 

fees under A.R.S. § 25-324 as well as her taxable costs in this special action 

proceeding. Having granted Ann relief, the court rejects Matthew’s 

argument that “Ann’s position is unreasonable, as it is contrary to the plain 

language in the statute,” and denies his request for attorneys’ fees and costs.