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UNITED STates institute of peace

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“ While acknowledging the 

importance of elections, the 

Washington Appeal demands 

that they are placed in the appropriate context. It suggests 

that a sole focus on elections 

produces tension and precludes attempts to address 

some of the underlying issues 

that may continue to threaten 

peace beyond the elections. 

Ivorians must therefore 

look beyond elections and 

engage in a discussion on 

the future of the country.”

October 6, 2010 

Persistent Challenges to Long-Term 

Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 

Summary

•	 The announcement that 429,000 fraudulent or possibly foreign names were on the voters 

registry halted the preparations for already delayed 2009 presidential election and revived the 

divisive discussion of citizenship and identity in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivoirité).

•	 The stalled electoral process highlighted unresolved issues such as the failed demobilization 

and disarmament processes and the marginalization of civil society from the implementation 

of the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement.

•	 In April 2010, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Community of Sant’Egidio and George Mason 

University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution brought key leaders of Ivorian civil 

society and the religious community to Washington, D.C. to develop an approach for resolving 

the present political impasse and to actively participate in the peace process.

•	 The April meeting resulted in the Washington Appeal, which urges Ivoirians to tolerate ethnic 

and political diversity, reduce the tensions around elections, identify longstanding grievances, 

and expand the role of civil society in the peace process.

Introduction 

After a failed coup d’état in 2002 sparked a brief civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, the country remained 

divided. The government controlled the south, while the rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN), controlled 

the north. After the failure of four peace agreements,1 the March 2007 Ouagadougou Political 

Accord (OPA) seemed particularly promising because it was a product of the “Direct Dialogue,” the 

direct negotiations between President Laurent Gbagbo and the leader of the FN, Guillaime Soro. 

However, it is clear that the OPA is strictly a political agreement, as its name suggests, between 

Soro and Gbagbo; it does not contain provisions that address the root causes of violence. The OPA 

resulted in a power-sharing arrangement between Gbagbo and Soro.

A critical component of the OPA is the organization of presidential elections, which have been 

repeatedly postponed since 2005. In February 2010, elections—which had been rescheduled 

for November 2009 after several other delays—were officially called off when the ruling Front 

Populaire Ivorien (FPI) declared that 429,000 names on the revised voters list were fraudulent and 

possibly those of foreigners. Concurrently, the government criticized the FN over their failure to 

demobilize and disarm ahead of the presidential elections. Recently, a new date was set for the 

elections: October 31, 2010. However, the issues that arose after the February postponement—

Dorina A. Bekoe

E-mail: dbekoe@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.4708

Andrea Bartoli

E-mail: abartoli@gmu.edu

peaceBrieF60
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Persistent Challenges to Long-Term Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 

page 2 • PB 60 • October 6, 2010

namely the demobilization and disarmament—have not been seriously addressed, raising questions about the tasks to be accomplished before elections can take place.

After the postponement of the elections in February 2010, civil society began to more forcefully 

highlight its marginalization from the peace process, upon concerns that elections held within 

the present context may be accompanied by violence, and that the stalemate may indicate the 

possible return to war. In April 2010, the Community of Sant’Egidio,2 George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), brought 

together key members of Ivorian civil society and religious leaders to develop a platform to resolve 

the immediate crisis and impact the peace process in general. From April 27 to 30, the participants 

discussed the current crisis, the role that civil society can play in its resolution, and crafted a public 

appeal to lay the foundation for a resolution of the political crisis. This Peace Brief reviews the 

continuing saliency of citizenship and identity issues as conflict triggers in Côte d’Ivoire, examines 

the consequences of holding elections with the presence of an armed group, and summarizes the 

Washington Appeal issued by civil society and religious leaders.

Planting Seeds of Political Violence: Who is Ivorian? 

The charge that foreign names could be used to cheat in an election is part of Côte d’Ivoire’s 

history.3 In other contexts, foreigners were blamed for Côte d’Ivoire’s declining economic fortunes 

in the 1990s and served as a pretext for defining who is an Ivoirian (Ivoirité). Since foreigners hailed 

from the northern countries of Mali and Burkina Faso and shared names with northern Ivorians, 

the divisive notion of Ivoirité resulted in discrimination and harassment of legitimate Ivorian 

citizens, as well as foreigners. It also fueled the violence and tension in the Ivorian 2000 presidential elections, and was among the main grievances articulated by the FN when they launched their 

failed coup d’état in September 2002. Thus, the announcement that 429,000 names (most of which 

are northern sounding) on the voter registry may be suspicious or foreign raised the specter of this 

dark history. 

The contention over who is Ivorian finds its roots in the rule of President Félix HouphouëtBoigny, the country’s first president. Houphouët-Boigny’s encouraged migrant farmers from 

northern and central Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso to develop land.4 Moreover, before 1990, 

immigrants—who comprised approximately between one-quarter to a third of the population – 

had been voting in elections and were entitled to citizenship.5 By 1990, Côte d’Ivoire’s economy 

had contracted: the price of cocoa (the county’s chief export) had dropped, corruption was rampant, agricultural productivity was declining, the currency was overvalued, and living standards 

had dropped 38 percent in 15 years.6 With natives of Mali and Burkina Faso sharing names similar 

to those in northern Côte d’Ivoire, many began to openly discriminate against those with northern 

sounding names, presupposing that they were not citizens. 

Ivoirité as a Trigger of Conflict 

Citizenship and identity have been central to all elections. In 1995, President Henri Konan Bédié 

found himself in a potential battle against Alassane Ouattara, a northerner.7 Bédié inserted a 

clause into the electoral code that required the parents of presidential candidates to prove their 

Ivorian citizenship, that the candidate had not renounced Ivorian citizenship or taken up citizenship of another country, and stipulated that the candidate must have lived in Côte d’Ivoire for five 

years preceding an election. Ouattara had not decided to run, but with his past possession of a 

Burkinabè passport and doubts surrounding his father’s citizenship, this electoral code would have 

affected him directly. Bédié’s action was perceived as anti-northern.8
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Persistent Challenges to Long-Term Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 

page 3 • PB 60 • October 6, 2010

Before the 2000 elections, two new laws solidified the establishment of Ivoirite. In 1998, the 

national assembly voted to prohibit foreigners from owning land, specifically nullifying any existing property rights they might have acquired.9

 Then, in 2000, a referendum led by President Robert 

Gueï amended the constitution to include a provision that only those with both parents of Ivorian 

birth could hold political office.10 Ouattara, along with 13 other candidates were disqualified, 

leaving only Gueï and Laurent Gbagbo as the major presidential candidates.11

Gueï dissolved the electoral commission on October 24, 2000 and proclaimed himself as 

president when he realized that Gbagbo was going win. In response, Gbagbo gave orders to 

his supporters to protest. Gueï fled the country the next day, and Gbagbo assumed power. But 

Ouattara’s supporters demanded new elections, charging that the October elections were unfair. 

In demonstrations on October 26, Ouattara’s supporters were met violently by the government 

forces, now acting on behalf of Gbagbo. Two days of fighting between FPI and RDR supporters left 

approximately 170 people dead12 and exacerbated the ethnic and regional divisions in Côte d’Ivoire. 

The Ouagadougou Political Accord 

While the previous agreements required the disarmament of militia forces, the resolution of identity issues and elections, the OPA differed significantly in its approach. First, the OPA did not have 

outside mediators—although Burkinabè President Blaise Compaoré facilitated the agreement—

and only involved President Gbagbo and FN leader Guillaume Soro; other political parties were 

not included. President Campaoré underscored the unique arrangement: the two parties present 

would be the only ones held accountable for the failure or success of the negotiations. Secondly, 

the OPA stipulated that those on the 2000 voters list would automatically receive national identity 

cards. Official figures estimated that 5 million people would need identification and voter registration cards. Those who had become eligible to vote (at 18 years) between 2000 and 2007 and those 

who had been considered foreigners in 2000 could appear before specially designated mobile 

courts to obtain a birth certificate, which could in turn be used to obtain national identity cards 

and voter registration cards. The opportunity to obtain identity cards was a major political victory 

for the FN and addressed one of the root causes of the Ivorian conflict. As high-ranking Burkinabè 

officials affirmed: “If Ivorians have to choose between obtaining a national identity card and a voter 

registration card, they will choose the identity card.”13

Differing Views on Disarmament 

As Côte d’Ivoire’s elections were most recently postponed for a sixth time, an old debate over 

when the FN should disarm resurfaced. While approximately 4,300 FN had disarmed and demobilized by January 2010, about 12,000 had yet to do so. The “Direct Dialogue” did not address 

whether disarmament should occur before or after the identification process. Gbagbo preferred 

to have disarmament take place immediately, while the rebel forces did not. Rather than directly 

dealing with the issue, it was addressed by debating whether the militia groups should be integrated into the national army. 

The parties decided that the most recent members – about 20,000 young FPI and non-FPI 

members who joined after the start of the war—would be integrated into a national civil service 

program, which provided them professional training to facilitate their re-entry into the workforce 

or school system. For those who would be integrated into the army, the parties decided to put 

together mixed groups comprising members of the FN and the government forces, who would 

be led by a unified command. However, the FN remains largely intact; the national civil service, 

integration, or disarmament have not evolved as planned. 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Persistent Challenges to Long-Term Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 

page 4 • PB 60 • October 6, 2010

Currently, the government contends that the Fourth Complementary Accord to the OPA 

mandates the FN (and all other militia) to disarm two months before the elections.14 The FN responded by pointing to a preceding article in the same accord stating that an integrated national 

defense force (of which they were to be a part) could only be formed after the inauguration of the 

new president—in other words, after the elections.15 Thus, exploiting this inconsistency, the FN 

contended that they are not required to disarm until after elections. While there are now plans to 

restart disarmament, it is not certain that the current effort will be more robust than past efforts. 

Yet, disarming the FN before the presidential elections is critical. The experiences in the Republic of 

Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola demonstrate that proceeding with elections without disarmament can lead the losing side to react violently. 

Civil Society’s Call for Peace: The Washington Appeal

Anxious to avoid an escalation of current tensions, key leaders of Ivorian civil society and the 

religious community in April 2010 issued the Washington Appeal. At its core, the appeal is meant 

to encourage Ivorians to keep working toward peace by focusing on ethnic and political tolerance, 

reducing the tension around elections, identifying longstanding grievances and expanding the 

role of civil society. 

The Washington Appeal rejects the divisive issues around nationality. It cites specifically that 

Côte d’Ivoire’s diversity is its strength and a resource upon which to build. Moreover, the participants in the April meeting implored Ivorians to work toward social reconciliation and tolerance. 

While acknowledging the importance of elections, the Washington Appeal demands that they 

are placed in the appropriate context. It suggests that a sole focus on elections produces tension 

and precludes attempts to address some of the underlying issues that may continue to threaten 

peace beyond the elections. Ivorians must therefore look beyond elections and engage in a discussion on the future of the country. 

Finally, the Washington Appeal called for greater involvement of civil society in the peace 

process and closer engagement with political stakeholders. Urging civil society to go beyond 

documenting the peace process, the participants demanded a more inclusive and substantive role 

for civil society to ensure that information about the peace process and the obstacles impeding its 

progress be transparently communicated and monitored. To this end, some advocated that civil 

society take part in monitoring the upcoming elections. 

Advancing Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 

The appeal distinguishes between short and long-term peace. In the short term, the participants 

in the Washington Appeal called for peaceful elections and the involvement of civil society in 

the peace process. In the long term, the participants stressed the need to look beyond elections, 

toward the root causes of the conflict. 

Indeed, neither elections nor the full implementation of the OPA will resolve the most pressing 

issues fueling tensions in Côte d’Ivoire. First, constitutional and institutional reforms are imperative to address uncertainty over land rights and tenure. Currently, there is little legal guidance for 

resolving the conflicts over land tenure among indigenous, immigrant, and foreigners that have 

arisen in the last 20 years, and which serve to deepen ethnic divisions. Legal reforms should also 

address the plight of the immigrant families who held Ivorian land for generations, but now find 

themselves without property rights. Secondly, whereas the issuance of identity cards to identify 

citizenship status of residents has been completed, those who are not citizens of Côte d’Ivoire 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

About This Brief

This Peace Brief reviews the 

factors that continue to divide 

Ivorian communities and stall the 

peace process in Côte d’Ivoire and 

provides reflections of a meeting 

of Ivorian civil society and religious 

leaders in Washington, D.C. 

or their place of origin face an uncertain future. Finally, although Côte d’Ivoire is still the leading 

exporter of cocoa, the heyday of the cash crop has long faded, causing economic hardships and fueling anger at foreigners; legislation is sorely need to address these changing economic dynamics. 

Endnotes

1. The previous agreements included: the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (2003); Accra Agreements II and III (2003 and 2004); and Pretoria Agreement (2006). The first Accra Agreement was a 

summit called by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in September 2002, 

two weeks after the attempted coup.

2. The Community of Sant’Egidio was present during the direct dialogue sessions at 

Ouagadougou.

3. See Daniel Chirot, “The Debacle in Côte d’Ivoire,” Journal of Democracy, Vol 17, no. 2 (April 

2006), pp. 67-68, and Richard C. Crooke, “Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics: The 

Failure of the Opposition in 1990 and 1995 Elections in Côte d’Ivoire,” African Affairs, vol. 96, no. 383 

(April 1997), pp 222-223.

4. See Chirot, p. 66; Crooke, p. 222; Catherine Boone, “Electoral Populism where Property Rights 

are Weak: Land Politics in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa,” Comparative Politics, January 2009.

5. Chirot, p. 66; Crooke, p. 222. 

6. Chirot, p. 64.

7. Crooke, p. 223; 225.

8. Ibid, pp. 227- 229.

9. Boone, p. 192.

10. See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). “Statement on Political 

Developments in Côte d’Ivoire,” August 11, 2000. Accessible at http://www.afrol.com/Countries/

CIV/documents/ndi_political_dev.htm 

11. See Human Rights Watch, “The New Racism: The Political Manipulation of Ethnicity in Côte 

d’Ivoire,” August 2001, Section I; “Côte d’Ivoire: France Denounces Exclusion of Presidential Candidates,” Agence France Press October 7, 2000; “Paper on Upcoming Referendum,” L’Inter, July 15, 2000.

12. Human Rights Watch, Section V. 

13. According to Mario Giro, personal observation during the negotiations. It was assumed that 65 

percent of Ivorians did not have any form of identity cards, whether national identity cards or birth 

certificates.

14. Fourth Complementary Accord to the Ouagadougou Political Accord, December 22, 2008, 

Article 3.

15. Ibid, Article 2.

Persistent Challenges to Long-Term Peace in Côte d’Ivoire 

page 5 • PB 60 • October 6, 2010