NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANGEL L., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.L., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0097 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD32132

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Michelle R. Nimmo

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 9-15-2022
ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Angel L. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his minor child (born in 2020).1 Father 

challenges the court’s order finding statutory grounds for termination as to 

his child (“Child”), that the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) made 

reasonable efforts to provide Father reunification services, and that 

termination of his parental rights was in Child’s best interests. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Mother are the biological parents of Child. In July 

2020, DCS became involved upon learning Child was born substance 

exposed to fentanyl. Mother admitted to using fentanyl consistently for a 

year, though Father claimed he knew nothing about such use and denied 

using any substances himself except for marijuana. Mother and Father 

agreed to submit to uranalysis (“UA”) and hair follicle testing on July 31 

but did not do so until August 4. Father tested positive for marijuana in his 

UA, and his hair follicle tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. Mother

tested positive for fentanyl. Child was temporarily placed in a licensed 

foster care home.

¶3 In November 2020, Child was adjudicated dependent as to 

Father and Mother, and the juvenile court approved a case plan of family 

reunification, which was later changed to termination and adoption. DCS 

offered Father various reunification services, including a psychological 

evaluation, parent aide services, visitation, random UA testing, substance 

abuse treatment, and transportation. Father inconsistently engaged with 

these services. Although he was asked to begin random UA testing on July 

31, Father did not do so until August 14. From October 2021 to March 

1 The parental rights of Child’s mother, Extacy T., were also 

terminated, and she is not a party to this appeal. 
ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

3

2022—the month of the termination hearing—Father completed 10 out of 

24 UA tests. 

¶4 In addition to Father failing to drug-test for “three and a half 

months” before the termination hearing, he did not complete the 

recommended maintenance recovery program from the substance abuse 

treatment program at Terros. He was aware that his participation in such 

“recommended services” was a condition of Child’s return to Father. As a 

result, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to the 

chronic substance abuse and fifteen-months’ time in out-of-home 

placement grounds. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c). 

¶5 At the March 2022 termination trial, the juvenile court found 

Father “voluntarily absented [himself] from the proceedings by not 

appearing” and thus waived his right to contest such proceedings. The DCS 

case manager testified that Child was currently residing with an adoptive 

placement and was otherwise adoptable. The case manager further opined 

that terminating Father’s parental rights would benefit Child by allowing 

him to have permanency in a stable home.

¶6 The court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding clear 

and convincing evidence supported termination and finding by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in Child’s best 

interests. Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8-235(A) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 

103(A).

DISCUSSION

¶7 To terminate a parent’s rights, the juvenile court must find 

clear and convincing evidence that supports at least one statutory ground 

for termination. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 353(C).2 The court must 

also separately find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is 

in the child’s best interests. Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 353(C). We “will affirm the 

juvenile court’s termination order absent an abuse of discretion or unless 

the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous.” E.R. v. DCS, 237 Ariz. 

56, 58, ¶ 9 (App. 2015). A finding is clearly erroneous if no reasonable 

evidence supports it. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 

¶ 8 (App. 2004). We will not reweigh the evidence on appeal because the 

juvenile court, as a direct observer of the parties’ credibility, is “in the best 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules 

cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

4

position to weigh the evidence.” Id. Indeed, “[w]e view the facts in the light 

most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s order.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549 ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶8 Parental rights may be terminated if “the parent is unable to 

discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse 

of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are 

reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a 

prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). 

¶9 Father argues the court abused its discretion by terminating 

his parental rights based on the substance abuse ground because he

successfully completed substance abuse treatment and his UA tests were 

positive for marijuana only (and he had a medical marijuana card). Father’s 

argument ignores other evidence of his drug use, including positive hair 

follicle test results. It also fails to acknowledge the court’s key finding, that 

“Father [was] inconsistent with his testing,” and thus rendered DCS 

“unable to fully assess Father’s sobriety,” which Father was required to 

demonstrate to show his ability to “maintain a safe, stable, sober, and 

sanitary home for himself and his child.” We believe the court’s finding is 

supported by reasonable evidence in the record and reflective of the 

directive that “a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over a parent’s 

uncertain battle with drugs.” Jennifer S. v. DCS, 240 Ariz. 282, 287 ¶ 17 (App. 

2016). Thus, the court’s conclusion to terminate on substance abuse grounds 

was not in error.3

¶10 Citing Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 

192 ¶ 37 (App. 1999), Father contends the court abused its discretion in 

finding DCS made reasonable efforts to provide him with reunification 

services because DCS neglected to offer him services recommended by the 

psychologist who conducted his psychological evaluation. But the treating 

psychologist did not testify at trial. Nor did Father offer any evidence—

such as the psychological evaluation—that would have proved these

recommendations or DCS’ failure to honor those recommended services. 

Therefore, in the absence of evidence on the matter, we cannot confirm the 

existence or nature of the purported recommendation for services or assess 

DCS’ alleged failure to provide them. Where the record is so deficient, 

3 Because we affirm the court’s finding that clear and convincing 

evidence supports the termination order based upon the substance abuse 

ground, we do not address Father’s challenges to the court’s findings on the 

fifteen-months’ time in out-of-home placement ground. Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 3 (App. 2002).
ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

5

Father’s argument cannot prevail. See Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz. 542, 546 

¶ 13 (App. 2014) (explaining it is an appellant’s responsibility to ensure the 

record contains material to which he takes exception).

¶11 And contrary to his argument that DCS failed to make 

reasonable efforts to provide him with reunification services, the record 

reflects Father was offered various reunification services, in which he 

inconsistently participated. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 

Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994) (stating DCS fulfills its statutory mandate to 

make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services where it affords 

the parent “the time and opportunity” to participate in programs designed 

to help become an effective parent, and DCS “is not required to provide 

every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each 

service it offers”). Further, DCS’ case manager discussed the psychological 

evaluation at trial and confirmed that DCS asked Father to self-refer for 

individual and couples counseling based on the same. The case manager 

provided Father with “a list of places” that would accept his insurance. The 

case manager told Father he was required to participate in such counseling 

“on his own,” but further testified that when Father disclosed he had 

encountered problems with his insurance, the case manager sent him to 

Terros. Father also informed the case manager that he “got it all worked 

out” and “was able to get a setup with Terros.” But Father ceased 

communications with DCS in December 2021 and never provided

documentation that he completed counseling. On this record, the juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding DCS made reasonable efforts to 

provide Father with reunification services.

¶12 Finally, Father challenges the court’s best-interests finding.

When a child benefits from termination or is harmed by continuing the 

parent-child relationship, termination is in that child’s best interests. Alma 

S. v. DCS, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). A child may benefit if a current 

adoptive plan exists, see Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 

1, 6 (1990), or if DCS can show the child is adoptable, Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 

150–51 ¶¶ 13–14. The court may also consider whether the existing 

placement meets the child’s needs and adoption is otherwise legally 

possible and likely. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4 ¶ 12 (2016). 

Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during the best-interests inquiry is 

“protect[ing] a child’s interest in stability and security.” Id. at 4 ¶ 15 

(quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286 ¶ 34 (2005)).

¶13 Here, the court found termination would benefit Child,

echoing the case manager’s testimony that “it would further the plan of 

adoption, which would provide [Child] with permanency and stability.” 
ANGEL L. v. DCS, A.L.

Decision of the Court

6

The court also found that Child was residing in an adoptive placement that 

met all of his needs and was considered adoptable. Another placement 

could be located should his current placement be unable to adopt him. 

Father cites no evidence to dispute the case manager’s testimony. Instead, 

he criticizes the weight given this testimony. But the court’s findings are 

supported by reasonable evidence in the record, and we will not reweigh 

that evidence. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 8. The court did not err in 

finding that termination was in Child’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.