Department of Homeland Security
 

CBP’s Strategy to Address Illicit Cross Border Tunnels 

OIG-12-132 September 2012
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

SEP 2 6 2012 

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Rafael Borras 

Under Secretary for Management 

Department of Homeland Security 

Michael J. Fisher 

Chief, U.S. Border Patrol 

~~ ~M~er Protection 

FROM: L C~r ton I. ann 

Acting Deputy Inspector General 

SUBJECT: CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Crass-Border Tunnels 

Attached for your action is our final report, CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border 

Tunnels. We incorporated the formal comments from the Department, and the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection in the final report. 

The report contains two recommendations to U.S. Customs and Border Protection and 

two recommendations to the Department to enhance the overall effectiveness of 

counter-tunnel efforts. We received one consolidated response from the Department 

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Your offices concurred with three of the 

recommendations and did not provide sufficient detail for concurrence or nonconcurrence with one recommendation. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland 

Security Directive 077-1, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General 

Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please 

provide our office with a written response that includes your (1) agreement or 

disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, arid (3) target completion date for each 

recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting 

documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of each 

recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, recommendations 1, 

2, and 3 will remain open and resolved, and recommendation 4 will remain open and 

unresolved. 

During this audit, it came to our attention that a family member of a senior OIG official 

was employed by an entity associated with this audit. To ensure that this impairment 

did not affect our findings and conclusions, we thoroughly reexamined our work on this 

audit, as well as results. Through this reexamination, we verified that the impairment 

did not affect our results; our evidence is sound and fully supports our findings and 

conclusions. 

/ .. 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Anne L. Richards, Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 1 

Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 

Results of Audit................................................................................................................... 5 

CBP Counter-Tunnel Strategy and Need for Tunnel Detection Technology ........... 6 

Recommendations .................................................................................................. 9 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis .......................................................... 10 

Appendixes

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................ 13 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ............................... 15 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report ................................................ 18 

Appendix D: Report Distribution........................................................................ 19 

Abbreviations

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

HSI U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security 

Investigations 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-12-132 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary

Illicit cross-border tunnels along the southwest border of the United States represent a

significant and growing threat to border security. Criminals primarily use the tunnels to 

transport illegal narcotics into the United States. Since 1990, law enforcement officials 

have discovered more than 140 tunnels that have breached the U.S. border, with an 80 

percent increase in tunnel activity occurring since 2008. We performed this audit to 

determine whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has developed an 

operational strategy to detect and remediate cross-border tunnels, and has acquired 

tunnel detection technology. 

CBP detects and remediates cross-border tunnels as part of its overall border security

and law enforcement missions. It has modified its field operations to better detect and 

respond to the threats posed by the tunnels. However, CBP does not have the 

technological capability to detect illicit cross-border tunnels routinely and accurately. 

Until CBP has this capability, criminals may continue to build cross-border tunnels 

undetected. 

CBP is creating a program to address capability gaps in countering the cross-border 

tunnel threat. As part of this effort, CBP is drafting the documents required by the DHS 

Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001 to develop and acquire tunnel detection 

technology. Additionally, CBP plans to establish a Program Management Office to 

provide leadership, strategy, and organization to the Department-wide counter-tunnel 

efforts. 

The program must address the mission needs of both CBP and Homeland Security 

Investigations, a directorate of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, because both 

have concurrent mission responsibility for combating cross-border tunnels. However, 

the program has not matured to a point where it demonstrates how it will consider the 

needs of Homeland Security Investigations. The Department has ultimate responsibility 

for approving CBP’s acquisition program, as well as allocating resources and making 

decisions to counter the tunnel threat. If the program does not take into account the 

needs of both components, there is an increased risk of not achieving the Department’s 

goal of disrupting criminal organizations that engage in cross-border smuggling. 

We are making two recommendations to CBP to improve consideration of the needs of 

both CBP and Homeland Security Investigations. We are also making two 

recommendations to the Department to improve coordination and oversight of CBP and 

Homeland Security Investigations counter-tunnel efforts. The Department and CBP 

agreed with three of our recommendations and did not provide sufficient detail for 

concurrence or non-concurrence with one recommendation. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

The illegal use of cross-border tunnels is a significant homeland security vulnerability 

and an unchecked method of entry into the United States. Since 1990, law enforcement 

officials have discovered more than 140 cross-border tunnels, with an 80 percent 

increase in tunneling activity occurring since 2008. The increase in the number of 

tunnels over the past 4 years may be attributed to border fencing and an increased 

number of Border Patrol Agents. Tunnels are primarily used to smuggle narcotics. Law 

enforcement has recovered approximately 169,000 pounds of narcotics, valued at more 

than $200 million, from drug traffickers using tunnels. Criminals also attempt to use 

cross-border tunnels to smuggle contraband, currency, and weapons. 

An illicit tunnel is an underground passageway used to conceal the movement of 

humans or contraband with the intent of circumventing the border defenses of the 

United States. It must be purposefully constructed, cross the U.S. border, and have an 

entry or exit point. 

There are three main types of tunnels: rudimentary, interconnecting, and sophisticated. 

Rudimentary tunnels are shallow, crudely constructed, and travel only a short 

distance. Rudimentary tunnels often cause a sinkhole, or ground surface collapse. 

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Interconnecting tunnels are constructed to connect with existing subterranean 

infrastructure, such as storm drains or sewers, to gain cross-border access. 

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Sophisticated tunnels are elaborately constructed and may use shoring, 

ventilation, electricity, and rail systems. Such tunnels have stretched more than 

2,000 feet. Often the tunnel entrances and exits are located within existing 

structures, such as in residences or warehouses. 

Source: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement News Release, November 2011. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Rudimentary

Interconnecting

Sophisticated

Figure 1 breaks down the percentage of detected tunnel types. 

Figure 1. Percentage of Detected Tunnels by Type as of December 2010 

Source: DHS OIG from HSI Baseline Assessment of Illegal Tunnel Activity, December 2010. 

16%

42%

42%

Rudimentary

Interconnecting

Sophisticated

Through 2010, the majority of cross-border discovered tunnels were in Arizona and 

California. Geography and surrounding infrastructure heavily influence the number and 

type of tunnels constructed in different areas along the southwest border. For example, 

in Nogales the existing underground drainage and sewage system provides opportunities 

for interconnecting tunnels. In San Diego, the clay-like soil facilitates the construction of 

sophisticated tunnels, and the buildings on both sides of the border allow for the 

concealment of tunnel entry and exit points. In contrast, areas along the border with 

surface water, such as the Rio Grande in Texas, are at a low risk for tunneling activity. 

Figure 2 illustrates the detected tunnels by State and tunnel type.

Figure 2. Detected Tunnels, Classified by State and Type, as of December 2010 

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

49

37

21

8 9

14

1 1 0

Texas California Arizona
 

Source: DHS OIG from HSI Baseline Assessment of Illegal Tunnel Activity, December 2010. 

Note: This graph does not include tunnels for which there were insufficient reporting data. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a strategic goal to disrupt and 

dismantle criminal organizations that engage in smuggling and trafficking across the 

U.S. border. CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI) have mission responsibilities to combat narcotics smuggling and 

trafficking, which include countering threats from the construction and use of crossborder tunnels. CBP’s responsibilities for combating tunnel threats include detecting 

and remediating tunnels. HSI is responsible for investigating individuals and criminal 

organizations engaged in illegal tunneling activity. The DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate supports CBP’s tunnel detection efforts by assisting with the development 

and evaluation of detection technology. 

We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP has developed an operational 

strategy to detect and remediate illegal cross-border tunnels, and has acquired tunnel 

detection technology. 

Results of Audit 

CBP detects and remediates illicit cross-border tunnels as part of its overall border 

security and law enforcement missions. CBP has modified its operations to better 

detect and respond to the threats posed by the different types of tunnels. However, 

CBP does not have the technology to allow it to detect tunnels routinely and accurately. 

CBP has stated that it can best address this capability gap through the acquisition of

tunnel detection technology. Until CBP has this detection capability, criminals may 

continue to build cross-border tunnels undetected. 

CBP is creating a program to address capability gaps in countering the cross-border 

tunnel threat. As part of this effort, CBP is drafting the documents required to develop 

and acquire tunnel detection technology. Additionally, CBP plans to establish a Program 

Management Office to provide leadership, strategy, and organization to DHS-wide 

counter-tunnel efforts. The program must address the mission needs of both CBP and 

HSI, because both have concurrent mission responsibility for combating cross-border 

tunnels. However, the program has not matured to a point where it demonstrates how 

it will consider the needs of HSI. The Department has ultimate responsibility for 

approving CBP’s acquisition program, as well as allocating resources and making 

decisions to counter the tunnel threat. If the program does not take into account the 

needs of both components, there is an increased risk of not achieving the Department’s 

goal of disrupting criminal organizations that engage in cross-border smuggling. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

CBP Counter-Tunnel Strategy and Need for Tunnel Detection Technology 

CBP’s Strategy for Counter-Tunnel Efforts 

CBP addresses the illicit cross-border tunnel threat as part of its overall strategy 

to secure the U.S. borders and facilitate legitimate trade and travel. Within CBP, 

the Office of Border Patrol has primary responsibility for preventing the entry of 

those who attempt to enter the United States illegally or smuggle goods into the 

country between the ports of entry. 

Modified Operations to Detect and Respond to Threats 

The type of tunnel—rudimentary, interconnecting, or sophisticated—dictates 

CBP’s method of detection and response. CBP has modified its operations to 

address the different types of tunnels. For example: 

•	 CBP conducts routine patrols to detect sinkholes and ground surface 

collapses associated with rudimentary tunnels. 

•	 CBP has created teams of Border Patrol Agents to patrol and stop illegal 

activity in existing storm drain and sewer infrastructure in response to 

the interconnecting tunnel threat. These teams also map the existing 

infrastructure in high-risk areas. 

•	 CBP participates in counter-tunnel task forces led by HSI. These task 

forces gather information concerning border-area criminal activity. The 

resulting intelligence has proven useful in locating sophisticated tunnels. 

The task forces also conduct criminal investigations to assist in the 

prosecution of those involved in illegal tunneling activity. 

•	 CBP remediates discovered tunnels. Remediation involves closing the 

tunnel with concrete or other material, rendering it unusable. 

CBP also uses intelligence to identify areas at high risk for illegal cross-border 

tunnels. This intelligence can either be actionable, identifying the location of a 

specific tunnel, or strategic, identifying trends across the southwest border. CBP 

has developed a tunnel threat map that uses the locations of prior tunnel 

discoveries, soil conditions, and geography to identify areas along the southwest 

border at high risk for tunneling activity. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Although CBP has modified its operations to address the tunnel threat, it does 

not have the technological capability to detect tunneling activity routinely and 

accurately. Until CBP has this capability, criminals may continue to build crossborder tunnels undetected. CBP has stated that it can best address this 

capability gap through the development and acquisition of detection technology. 

However, CBP has not been able to identify any existing tunnel detection 

technology that functions effectively in its operating environment. 

CBP’s Efforts To Acquire Technology

In 2008, CBP began collaborating with the DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate, other Federal partners, and private industry to develop and acquire 

tunnel detection technology. As part of this collaboration, CBP conducted 

market research, but concluded that existing commercial technologies do not 

meet its needs. CBP is piloting and evaluating commercial and Department of 

Defense tunnel detection technologies, but these pilot programs are not yet 

complete. Even if one of these piloted technologies proves to be effective, CBP 

does not have an acquisition program in place to procure that technology. 

In March 2010, CBP designated the Office of Border Patrol as the lead office 

responsible for tunnel detection efforts. The Office of Border Patrol determined 

a need to develop a Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. This program 

will provide CBP with the authority and funding it needs to develop and acquire 

technologies. To guide program development, CBP formed an Integrated 

Product Team, which includes members from the Office of Border Patrol, HSI, 

the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, and other stakeholders. The 

Integrated Product Team is responsible for drafting the acquisition planning 

documents that CBP and DHS require to create a program. In conjunction with 

the acquisition effort, CBP plans to establish a Program Management Office to 

provide leadership, strategy, and organization to Department-wide countertunnel efforts. 

Creation of a Tunnel Detection Technology Acquisition Program 

In accordance with the DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001, 

several key documents must be in place and approved by CBP before DHS 

approves the program. Figure 3 presents these key documents. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 3. Key Acquisition Documents To Be Developed Prior to Program Approval 

Document Name Answers the question... 

Mission Needs Statement What do we need? 

Concept of Operations How will it be employed in the field? 

Analysis of Alternatives What is our best option in terms of 

cost, schedule, and performance?

To date, the only program document that the Integrated Product Team has 

prepared is a draft copy of the Mission Needs Statement. The statement 

identifies CBP mission needs and capability gaps related to cross-border tunnels. 

However, because Mission Needs Statements are not required to consider the 

operational dependencies of other components, this document, as appropriate, 

does not define or assess the interdependencies between CBP and HSI. 

To meet the Department’s strategic goal of preventing the cross-border 

smuggling of narcotics, the program needs to address both the investigative 

needs of HSI and the detection capability requirements of CBP. HSI conducts 

criminal investigations and is operationally dependant on CBP’s use of 

technology not interfering with its investigative efforts. For example, to support 

HSI investigations, tunnel detection technology may need to operate covertly so 

as to not alert criminals to the presence of law enforcement.

CBP has not completed the documentation required for program approval, and is 

not required to do so before the Department approves the Mission Needs 

Statement in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. Thus, the program has not 

matured to a point where it can demonstrate how it will consider the needs of 

HSI. If the program does not address the needs and operational dependencies of 

HSI, it may not achieve the Department’s strategic goals. 

To mitigate this risk, CBP plans to develop an Analysis of Alternatives. This 

analysis will identify alternative ways of filling the capability gaps identified in 

the Mission Needs Statement. It should consider the capabilities provided by 

both CBP and HSI, and identify a solution at an optimum level of cost, schedule, 

and risk. To support the Analysis of Alternatives, CBP plans to fund a study, to be 

completed in June 2013, of how to address joint capabilities through existing 

processes or procedures. Additionally, the Integrated Product Team plans to 

draft a Concept of Operations document to describe how acquired technology 

will be employed in the field. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Departmental Responsibility 

Acquisition programs go through both component and departmental review. 

The DHS Under Secretary for Management is designated as the Chief Acquisition 

Officer, and has the final approval authority for major acquisition programs, 

including the CBP Tunnel Detection and Technology program. As such, it is 

ultimately a departmental responsibility to ensure that CBP identifies and

considers key operational dependencies, relationships, and corresponding 

program risks for both CBP and HSI before approving the program. 

Because illicit cross-border tunnels are a departmental issue, the capabilities and 

strategies to counter this threat need to be developed jointly, optimized to meet 

departmental needs, and ensure unity of effort. Although the CBP Program 

Management Office seeks to provide leadership, strategy, and organization to 

DHS tunnel threat efforts, it cannot make decisions regarding the best way to 

assign counter-tunnel resources outside of CBP. Because this office may not 

have sufficient information and authority to make strategic decisions affecting 

both CBP and HSI, a departmentally designated authority is needed that can 

make these strategic decisions on counter-tunnel policies and procedures. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Chief, U.S. Border Patrol: 

Recommendation #1: 

Conduct the planned study of how CBP can address tunnel detection capabilities 

through existing processes and procedures in support of the Analysis of 

Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program.

Recommendation #2:

Complete the planned Concept of Operations document describing how the 

identified capabilities need to function from a cross-component perspective to 

support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology 

Program. 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Management: 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation #3:

Provide oversight to ensure that CBP identifies and considers key operational 

dependencies, relationships, and corresponding program risks for CBP’s Tunnel 

Detection and Technology Program efforts prior to approving the program. 

Recommendation #4:

Designate an authority to provide leadership, strategy, and coordination of DHS 

counter-tunnel efforts. This authority should have the information and ability to 

make strategic decisions on counter-tunnel policies and procedures across DHS 

components. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Department and CBP provided comments on the draft of this report. A copy 

of the response in its entirety is included in appendix B. CBP also provided 

technical comments and suggested revisions to our report in a separate 

document. We reviewed CBP’s technical comments and made changes 

throughout our report where appropriate. 

Management Comments to Recommendation #1 

Concur. CBP awarded the contract to conduct the planned study on August 31, 

2012. The study’s results are expected to be available between May and August 

2013. The results will be used to determine how CBP will address tunnel 

detection capabilities through existing processes and procedures that support 

the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. 

The estimated completion date is September 2013. 

OIG Analysis 

We consider the ongoing action taken by CBP to be responsive to the 

recommendation and the recommendation resolved. However, the 

recommendation will remain open until we receive and review a copy of how 

CBP has addressed its tunnel detection capabilities through existing processes 

and procedures that support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel 

Detection and Technology Program from the planned study’s results. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Management Comments to Recommendation # 2 

Concur. CBP plans to complete the planned Concept of Operations document 

with an expected approval date by September 30, 2013. 

OIG Analysis 

We consider the ongoing action taken by CBP to be responsive to the 

recommendation and the recommendation resolved. However, the 

recommendation will remain open until we receive and review a copy of the 

approved Concept of Operations document. 

Management Comments to Recommendation # 3 

Concur. DHS plans to review in FY 2013 the CBP Tunnel Detection and 

Technology program against established thresholds in DHS Acquisition 

Management Directive 102-01. Additionally, the DHS Office of Program 

Accountability and Risk Management manages and implements the 

Department’s acquisition and governance policy and process, and provides 

senior leaders and program managers objective analysis of major investments. 

The estimated completion date is December 31, 2012. 

OIG Analysis 

We consider the ongoing action taken by Department to be responsive to the 

recommendation and the recommendation resolved. However, the 

recommendation will remain open until we receive and review a copy of the 

signed Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the official record of the Acquisition 

Decision Event that provides approval for CBP’s Tunnel Detection and 

Technology program. This document should describe the approval or other 

decisions made during consideration of approval of the program and any action 

items that need to be satisfied as a condition of the decision. 

Management Comments to Recommendation # 4 

The Department responded that the Under Secretary of Management is not the 

best individual to make a determination for whether a designated authority is 

needed. The Department stated that the DHS Office of Policy is the appropriate 

Office to address this recommendation because it has responsibility for 

developing DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning to promote and ensure 

quality, consistency, and integration across all Homeland Security missions. It 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

also provides thought leadership and analysis to the Secretary and other 

Department leaders to facilitate decision making. The Office of Policy will ensure 

this recommendation is addressed with the Deputy Secretary for her 

consideration, as appropriate. The estimated completion date is September 30, 

2012. 

OIG Analysis 

Although we consider the ongoing action by the Office of Policy to be responsive 

to the recommendation, the Department did not provide sufficient detail for 

concurrence or non-concurrence with the recommendation. Therefore, until the 

Office of Policy addresses the recommendation with the Deputy Secretary, we 

will consider the recommendation open and unresolved. The Office of Policy 

needs to ensure that a designated authority is established to maintain a unity of 

effort for CBP and HSI in developing capabilities and strategies to counter tunnel 

threats since both have concurrent mission responsibilities for combating crossborder tunnels. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

We conducted this audit to determine whether CBP has developed an operational 

strategy to detect and remediate illegal cross-border tunnels, and has acquired tunnel 

detection technology. We limited the scope of our audit to illicit cross-border 

underground tunnels along the southwest border between the United States and 

Mexico. We did not continue this audit past our survey phase because the program 

under review is being established and CBP is drafting the preliminary acquisition 

documents. However, we determined that there was sufficient information to provide 

an audit report on the status of the program and make recommendations to mitigate 

risks. 

We reviewed Federal, Department, and CBP policies, processes, and strategies related 

to acquisition and counternarcotics. These included the DHS Acquisition 

Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001; CBP Draft Program Process Lifecycle Guide, Version 

1; and CBP National Tunnel Remediation Task Team Handbook; as well as the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy; DHS 

Counternarcotics Doctrine; DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016; and CBP 

Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2009 to 2014. We also reviewed CBP and HSI reports on 

illicit tunnel activity and discoveries, including HSI’s Baseline Assessment of Illegal 

Tunnel Activity, December 2010; CBP’s Cross-Border Tunnels, Fiscal Year 2011 Report to 

Congress, First Semiannual Report, May 2011; and CBP’s Tunnel Remediation Situation 

Report, January 2012. 

We also reviewed documentation related to CBP operations on the southwest border 

and its Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. This included the CBP Cross-Border 

Tunnel Threat Integrated Products Team Charter, the draft CBP Cross-Border Tunnel 

Threat Operations Preliminary Mission Need Statement, CBP Tunnel Program Draft 

Operational Requirements Document, as well as the CBP California Corridor Unified 

Command Charter and the Homeland Security Advisory Council Southwest Border Task 

Force Report, Third Set of Recommendations, Fall 2011. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Additionally, we reviewed documentation related to the development and evaluation of 

tunnel detection-related technologies. This included the Raytheon Tunnel Threat Map

reports, the HSI Tunnel Detection Capability Assessment, and the CBP Technology 

Evaluation and Sustainment reports. 

We visited the Office of Border Patrol, San Diego Sector, and observed illicit crossborder tunnels currently secured by the Office of Border Patrol that were awaiting 

remediation. We also observed a previously remediated tunnel that CBP is using to test 

tunnel detection technologies. 

We interviewed senior officials within DHS, including those from CBP, HSI, and the DHS 

Science and Technology Directorate. 

We conducted this performance audit between December 2011 and March 2012 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally 

accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS), except that we identified an 

impairment to our independence in appearance. Following completion of our audit, it 

came to our attention that a family member of a senior OIG official was employed by an 

entity associated with this audit. In our opinion, the impairment to our independence in 

appearance did not affect the findings and conclusions developed during this audit. 

GAGAS requires that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives, and that the impairment 

to our independence in appearance did not affect this evidence or any findings and 

conclusions.

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-12-132 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report

l .S. Do:plrIOICDIIlC Iiomo:llmi S"" .. rily 

Wa,h ingl[)!l. O.C 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

Augu~t 1, 20 12 

MEMORANDUM FOR, Charles K . Edwards 

Acting ]nspector General 

Jim II. Crumpacker \c.!\.t~_~ Director \ ) 

Dcpartmcntal GAO-OIG Liaison Office 

SUBJECT, Draft Rcport, "eBP's Strategy to Addrcss Illicit Cross-Border 

Tunnels" (Proj ect Number 12-04I -AUD-CBP) 

Dear Mr. F.dward~: 

Thank. you for the opportunity 10 revit!w and r.;ommt!nl on this dran repnn. The Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the Ottice of Inspector General's (~IG s) work in 

pimming and conducting its review and issuing tills report. 

The Department is pleased to note OIG's positive recognition that U.S. Customs alll.! Bunlt:r 

Protection (eBP) has modified its operations to better detect and respond to the threats posed 

by different types of illicit subterranean cross-border tunnels. DHS devotes significant levels 

of personnel, technology, and resources in support of our border security efforts, working 

24n with state, local, tribal, and federal law enforcement to target illicit networks trafficking 

in people, drugs, weapons, and money. 

Smugglers and OTher cross-border criminal organizations use a wide range of ever-eyolving 

methods to nttempt to move their contraband into the Uruted States, making our mission more 

complex and challenging. When tunnels are detected, DHS personnel follow established 

protocols for coordination. confirmation, assessment, investigation, exploitation, and 

remediation. 

Since March 20ID, CBP's Office of Border Patrol (OBP) has led eBP Tunnel Detection and 

Technology Progmm efforts with support from the CBP Office of Technology Innovation and 

Acquisition . This program has worked 10 integraTe DHS, CBP, U.S . Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations, thc DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate, the Drug Enforcement .I\dministration, and other efforts into a single entity that 

addresses tunnel-related activities and technology. 

The successes have been many, such as the discovery, using state-of-the-art electronic 

surveillance teclmology and Dlhcr in vt!stigative tt!.:hniqut!s, last Novemher of a sophisticated 

400-yard underground cross-border turmel near San Diego that was over 40 feet deep and 

equipped with rail, lighting, and \'entilation sysLems. DHS is 1.:1Immilled lo provid ing its 

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 O

 

FFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

frontline agents and officers with the tools they need to effectively achieve their mission of 

securing America 's borders and fac ilitatmg the movement of legitimate travel and trade. 

The draft report contained four recommendations with which DHS concurs. Specifically, 

01(1 recommended: 

Recommendation 1: That the Chief, U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) conduct the plunned study 

of how CBP can address tunnel detection capabilities through existing processes. and 

procedures in support of the Analysis of Alternati ves tor the Tunnel Detection and 

Technology Program. 

Response: Concur. The contract to conduct a planned study is scheduled to be awarded at 

the end of August 2012. Expected ddiverablcs arc: Doctrine, Training Material, Leadership, 

Personnel, Facilities plus Regulations, Grants, and Standards (DOTMLPF+RJO/S). The study 

is expected to take 9 to 12 months and should be available between May and August 20 13. 

LSOP will review the results then determine how CDP will address tunnel detection 

capabilities through processes and procedures that support the Analysis of Alternatives for the 

Tunnel Detection and Technology Program. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): 

September 30, 2013 

Recommendation 2: That the Chie( USBP, complete the planned Concept ofOperl'ltions 

document describing how the identified capabilities need to function from a cross-component 

perspecti .... e to support the Analysis of Alternatives for the Tunnel Detection and T cchnology 

Program. 

Re~ponse : Concur. OBP will complete the planned Concept of Operations document. The 

projected approval dale for the Preliminary Concept of Operations is September 18, 2012 . 

The process for approval oflhe Concept of Operations will be initiated the following day. 

Specifically, a Mission Needs Statement will be prepared and tentatively approved by 

October 18, 2012. Approval by an Acquisition Review Committee is expected by 

February 28, 2013. After receiving the DOTMLPF+RlO/S study results in August 20 13, the 

Operation Requirement Document will be drafted and submitted for approval. The Concept 

of Operations is expected to be approved by September 30, 2013. 

Recommendation 3: That the DHS Under Secretary for Managerru:::nl pruvioe uvt:r~ight to 

ensure that CBP identifies and considers key operational dependencies, relationships, and 

corresponding program risks for CBP'~ Tunnel Detection and Technology Program efforts 

prior to approving the program. 

ResJlonse: Concur. DHS reviews its acquisition portfolio annually to develop the Major 

Acquisition Oversight List. Acquisition and service programs are reviewed against the 

thresholds established in DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01. For Fiscal Year 

20 13, the CBP Tunnel Detection and Technology program will be reviewed in accordance 

with the guidance. The DHS Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management 

manages and implements the Department's acquisition and governance policy and process, 

and provides senior leaders and program managers objective analysis of major investments. 

ECD: December 31. 2012 

2 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 

Re~ommendation 4: That the Under Secretary for Management designate an authority to 

provide leadership, strategy, and coordination of UHS counter-tunnel efforts. This authority 

should have the information and ability to make strategil,; lh~l,;i!)ions un cuunter-tunnel pulil,;jes 

and procedures across DHS components. 

Response: The DHS Under Secretary for Management is not the most appropriate individual 

to determine whether this designation is needed and, if so, to make it. The DHS Office of 

Policy is responsible for developing DHS-""ide policies, programs, and planning to promote 

and ensure quality, consistency, and integration across all Homeland Security missions. It 

a lso provides thought leadership and analysis to the Secretary and other Department leaders to 

facilitate decision making. Along these lines, the Office of Policy will ensure this 

recommendation is addressed with the Deputy Secretary for her consideration, as appropriate. 

ECD: September 30, 2012 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft repon. Technical 

t.:urnrm::flts wen:: provided under separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 

questions, We look forward to working with you in the future. 

3 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Brooke Bebow, Director 

Maryann Pereira, Audit Manager

Shawn Cosman, Senior Auditor 

Nick Jathar, Auditor 

Johnson Joseph, Auditor 

Dawn E. Pizarro, Senior Auditor 

Tristan Weir, Program Analyst 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Peter Christopher, Referencer 

www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-12-132 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Under Secretary for Management 

Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Audit Liaison, Management Directorate 

Audit Liaison, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Audit Liaison, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-12-132 
 

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