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79–950 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–8] 

TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: 

VIEWS OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 27, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 27, 2013, Transition in Afghanistan: Views of Outside 

Experts .................................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 27, 2013 .............................................................................. 31 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2013 

TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: VIEWS OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Barno, LTG David W., USA (Ret.), Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow, Center 

for a New American Security .............................................................................. 8 

Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies ................................................................... 11 

Dale, Dr. Catherine, Specialist in International Security, Congressional Research Service ....................................................................................................... 3 

Keane, GEN John M., USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........ 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Barno, LTG David W. ....................................................................................... 64 

Cordesman, Anthony H. ................................................................................... 73 

Dale, Dr. Catherine .......................................................................................... 39 

Keane, GEN John M. ....................................................................................... 52 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 35 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 127 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 129 

(1) 

TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: VIEWS OF OUTSIDE 

EXPERTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 27, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning, 

ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets 

today to receive testimony on the Transition in Afghanistan. Today 

we have with us Dr. Catherine Dale, General (Retired) Jack Keane, 

Lieutenant General (Retired) David Barno, and Mr. Anthony 

Cordesman. Thank you all for joining us here today and sharing 

your expertise. 

A discussion on our transition from Afghanistan should start 

with the reminder of why the United States went there in the first 

place. The most lethal and complex terrorist attack in U.S. history 

was plotted and perpetrated by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. But after 

over 10 years of war the American people are understandably warweary. The United States has committed a wealth of resources in 

the form of both blood and treasure to preserve a U.S. vital national security interest and prevent Afghanistan from being used 

again as a safe haven for terrorists. 

The question before us is whether or not we can continue to prevent Afghanistan from being used as such a sanctuary. The NATO 

[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] mission officially ends December 31st, 2014. Although we have not finalized the transition to Afghan security lead, President Obama already has announced withdrawal of half of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, approximately 

34,000 troops, by this time next year. In the near future the President likely will order additional troop withdrawals and determine 

the United States post-2014 mission set and military posture in Afghanistan. 

In my view the President is not adequately evaluating the risk 

associated with rapid and large-scale troop withdrawals in terms of 

both local and regional consequences, as well as U.S. vital interests. The President has decided to conduct the significant withdrawal of U.S. troops during the same time period that the Afghan 

security forces will be in the lead across the entire country for the 

first time. Moreover, the Administration does not have a discern-
2 

ible plan to reinforce the Afghan security forces if they cannot hold 

the gains and/or maintain the necessary security across the country. Consequently the President’s approach is fraught with risk and 

lacks a comprehensive strategy to ensure the security and sovereignty of Afghanistan, and thereby U.S. interests over time. 

Rather, the President’s approach to Afghanistan appears to be 

‘‘withdraw and hope.’’ I am not advocating for a never ending combat mission in Afghanistan, but the President should make decisions on troop withdrawals within the context of the security conditions on the ground, the capability and capacity of the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and the required mission sets after 

December 31st, 2014. We owe nothing less to the victims on 9/11, 

the U.S. troops and their families who have served and sacrificed, 

and our sons and daughters who will have to return if we get this 

wrong. The simple justice that comes from that principled position 

cannot be overstated. 

I look forward to your testimony and insights into the transition 

and way forward for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding 

this hearing and bringing together such a distinguished panel of 

experts on this very important topic, and I also agree that the mission in Afghanistan is very straightforward and clear. We were attacked by Al Qaeda and their organization which was based out of 

Afghanistan. We want to make sure that such an attack cannot 

emanate from that region ever again. We want to degrade Al 

Qaeda as much as possible and weaken their ability and the ability 

of any groups allied with them, and I think we have made considerable progress in that goal. I think the most notable example of 

that of course is getting Osama bin Laden but it is much, much 

deeper than that. The central structure of Al Qaeda has been largely smashed in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan and their 

ability to plot and plan attacks against us has been significantly 

weakened. It has certainly not gone and we shouldn’t elude ourselves about that, but progress has been made in that regard. We 

have also made progress in terms of the number of troops and security forces that we have trained in the ANSF, and we are moving 

in the right direction on that but should have no illusions. This is 

a very, very difficult part of the world. In both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan they have an endless series of problems with governance, 

corruption, education. It is not a stable place, and some of the most 

violent and dangerous ideologies that we face are present there. We 

are always going to have to pay attention to this region for our national security interests, but the question at this point is, is an 

unending U.S. military presence going to significantly change those 

challenges? I don’t believe that it is. I believe that we have gotten 

pretty close to the point where we have done militarily what we 

can do in that region and it is time for the Afghan National Secu-
3 

rity Force and the Afghan people to take responsibility for their 

own security and their own governance. And the only way to do 

that is to transition over to them taking the lead. Now that process 

has begun. In a number of different provinces the ANSF has taken 

the lead on security and we are moving in that direction. 

Again I want to emphasize that I don’t have any illusions here. 

I think perhaps the largest struggle there in Afghanistan is the 

governance piece: What happens in 2014 when President Karzai 

can no longer be president, when there is a new election—who we 

transition to in Afghanistan. How do we deal with the corruption 

issues and the lack of economic opportunity. Those challenges will 

always be present but having 100,000 U.S. troops in the region 

isn’t going to change that past a certain point. I think we have 

reached that point. I think the challenge for the Commander in 

Chief and the challenge for this committee and our experts is to 

figure out the best way to implement that path going forward is. 

I think the President has laid out a pretty reasonable strategy 

for doing that. Again, no guarantees, but it is the most logical thing 

to do at this point to transition over to the Afghan National Security Force, to reduce our presence in the region and move out and 

turn over responsibility to the folks who ultimately are going to 

have to be responsible for it. It is a simple fact that past a certain 

point a large foreign military force is in and of itself destabilizing. 

It does not build confidence in the Afghan, in any country’s government, and any people would be concerned about having a large 

number of foreign military forces on their land. It is time to make 

that transition. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about what the best 

way to do that, the difficult decisions that we face in making that 

decision, but I believe it is time to move in that direction. I look 

forward to the testimony and to the questions from the panel. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Again I appreciate all of you being 

here today. We will proceed with Dr. Dale and then move to your 

left down the table. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CATHERINE DALE, SPECIALIST IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Dr. DALE. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify about transition in Afghanistan. As both a CRS [Congressional Research Service] analyst and as a practitioner I have had 

the privilege of spending considerable time on the ground throughout Afghanistan with our troops and our civilians. They are great 

American heroes. 

This is a critical time of transition in every sense from President 

Obama’s recent announcement about troop drawdowns to the formal transition process, to Afghanistan’s political transition in 2014, 

to broad shifts in international community engagement. 

A time of transition is an opportunity to revisit and affirm or refine U.S. strategy. So to that end it might be helpful to consider 

four basic questions. First, is it working? The campaign on the 
4 

ground aims to reduce insurgent strength and build up the Afghan 

national security forces so that the ANSF can handle the residual 

threat, and it is working. The insurgencies are increasingly degraded, ANSF capabilities and confidence are growing, and our 

forces are successfully reorienting their efforts on advising and 

helping Afghans acquire and use their own organic enablers. 

The key question is whether the logic of the campaign is basically sound. If it isn’t going to work, how can it be worth another 

dollar or another life? Second, what more needs to be done? It is 

not over yet. Campaign gains on the ground in the south still need 

to be consolidated and key challenges remain in the east further 

degrading the Haqqani network, eliminating Al Qaeda incursions 

in upper Kunar and Nuristan provinces and securing the long border with Pakistan. Many Afghanistan commanders are saying this 

is our fight now, but they are still eager for more advising and enabling support and for making sure that their own institutional architecture can support them. 

The choices we make now about the drawdown ramp and the enduring presence will have a major impact on those efforts. Too precipitous a drawdown could mean that Afghan forces attempt too little, ceding territory or striking bargains with the Taliban or that 

they attempt too much, failing catastrophically and destroying confidence in their ability to provide security. 

The key question is what we would need to do over time to help 

ensure that Afghan forces can handle that residual threat, that is 

a troop to task, not a task to troop analysis. Then those conclusions 

can be weighed against costs, risks, and competing exigencies. 

Third, is it sustainable? It is not all near term and it is not all 

about security. There are at least four arenas that could put the 

longer term sustainability of campaign gains and U.S. interests at 

risk. Pakistan, what would it take to make Afghanistan self-resilient enough to provide a bulwark against insurgent incursions from 

safe havens in Pakistan? 

The ANSF, what ANSF end strength and force mix would be 

needed over the longer term to provide sufficient security and protect campaign gains and who is going to pay for it. The economy, 

what would it take to make Afghanistan’s economy truly viable 

over the longer term to make the most of its natural resources and 

human capital. And governance, what basic architecture of governance would be required to protect campaign gains, to hold the 

ANSF accountable, to steward the nation’s resources, to provide access to justice, to foster good faith with Afghanistan’s neighbors, to 

encourage foreign investment and to earn the trust of the Afghan 

people. 

The key question in all four arenas is what it would take to 

make campaign gains genuinely sustainable and what role we ourselves would need to play to make that happen. And then given the 

opportunity costs and realistic prospects for sustainability, is it 

worth it? 

Fourth and finally, how does this end? The war is not going to 

end with a great clash on the battlefield or even with the accumulation of campaign gains on the ground; it is likely to end with a 

political settlement of some kind, one that establishes the fate of 

insurgent leaders and fighters, the disposition of political power, 
5 

the demobilization of some Afghan forces and modalities for societal reconciliation. 

The question is how to achieve a lasting settlement that would 

best protect U.S. interests. Is it a near-term, high-level deal between a government that many Afghans consider rapacious and a 

Taliban leadership that many Afghans fear or is it a longer term 

process that brings to bear Afghanistan’s greatest advantage: the 

95 percent of the Afghan people eager for a stable future? The Afghan people are the ultimate arbiters of stability in Afghanistan. 

A clear shared vision and clarity about future commitment by the 

international community could help dispel Afghan’s powerful tendency to hedge in the face of great future uncertainty. 

One final word, this four-part framework cannot determine the 

best way forward, but it may suggest value if we go forward of 

guiding our steps with clear political strategy, a strategy based on 

U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region, that 

aims at minimum essential conditions necessary to protect those 

interests, that lays out ways and means and rules and responsibilities over time and that very clearly assesses and weighs the associated risks. 

Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Dale can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Keane. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER 

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General KEANE. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Minority Smith, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing 

me to testify today on a critical subject as we transition U.S.-NATO 

operations in Afghanistan. I am honored to be here with such a distinguished panel who I have known for many years, and I do appreciate Dr. Dale’s comments she just made on setting a framework 

for our discussion today. 

Some of the committee members are aware that I have conducted 

several assessments for our military commanders in Afghanistan. 

Having completed my last assessment for Generals Mattis and 

Allen last year, those visits have been invaluable to understanding 

so-called ground truth by assessing the progress or lack thereof of 

our campaign plans, goals, and objectives. 

And let me make an editorial comment, General Allen has 

turned over command in Afghanistan as we all know. I just want 

to make a comment for the record about what a superb commander 

General Allen has been, and he has been given one of the toughest 

tasks any general officer can be in having to prosecute our national 

interests in Afghanistan and he has just been a remarkable person 

and remarkable general officer. 

Given the four panel members today who are all making statements, I am going to make my remarks brief and I have taken 

some license to change my prepared remarks as I received some 

additional information. 
6 

Afghanistan is rapidly moving toward its most critical milestone 

since 2001 when we deposed the Taliban. As 2014 approaches and 

Afghanistan participates in a political, economic and security transition Afghanistan’s future is dependent on the transition success 

of 2014. While the economic and security transitions are driven 

largely by NATO force level reductions, the political transition with 

the national election is exclusively Afghan as it will impact the confidence of the Afghan people and the international community at 

large in the Afghan political process. A relatively fair and open 

election that reflects the people’s choices and results in an improved national government will be a significant step forward in 

the political development of Afghanistan. 

After almost 12 years of war in Afghanistan the central issue for 

me is how do we manage the risk, how do we avoid squandering 

the gains that we have made in Afghanistan. In the brief time 

available I will focus my remarks on that issue. 

Yes, we have been in Afghanistan a long time, ironically driven 

mainly by the United States decision to go to war in Iraq. As such 

Afghanistan in 2002 quickly became a secondary effort, indeed an 

economy of force operation and from 2002 to 2009. When in 2009 

the President of the United States made a decision to conduct 

counterinsurgency operations and to escalate the war by adding 

30,000 surge forces, even this decision did not reflect what Generals McChrystal and Petraeus believed was the minimal force to 

succeed, 40,000 surge forces. Instead they received a force which 

was 25 percent smaller which dictated that the campaign in the 

south and the east be conducted sequentially versus simultaneously. Their campaign in the south was largely successful while 

the campaign in the east has not been completed, because the 

surge forces were withdrawn in my mind prematurely in 2012 over 

General Petraeus’ objection. 

Recently the President of the United States made the decision to 

remove 34,000 of the 66,000 forces remaining by February 2014, 

versus keeping the 66,000 till the end of 2014. These decisions 

must be understood because they all have impacted mission success 

by increasing the risk. 

The most serious security situation lies in the east where we 

have never been able to conduct extensive clear-and-hold operations which led to much of our success in the south. As such there 

are Taliban and Haqqani support zones in the east, some not too 

far from Kabul. It is unrealistic to believe that the ANSF will succeed in eliminating these support zones permanently in the east, 

where NATO and ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] 

has failed to do so. 

In the south what remains is to consolidate the gains that were 

made in achieving relative stability, which has led to improved security and also improved local governance. Can we mitigate the 

risk? Well, I am not certain. I know not to try will doom us to likely fail. 

Three key decisions can begin to mitigate the risk and provide 

a hedge. First is the size and missions of the residual post-2014 

force. There are three missions for the force: counterterrorism, 

training and assistance, and enablers to the ANSF. The 

counterterrorism mission to have the necessary reach to be effec-
7 

tive given the challenges of the terrain in Afghanistan should operate from multiple locations, ideally coast Jalalabad and Kandahar, 

but certainly the commanders will make those decisions. These 

Special Operations Force units require, in addition to their own 

units, drone crews, analysts, helicopters with maintenance, medical 

trauma units and also security forces. If we consolidate the CT 

[counterterrorism] force to a single base, then we are not mitigating the risk; we are in fact increasing the risk by not having an 

effective CT force. 

The training and assisted mission spreads across six Army corps 

with permanent presence in three corps that have the main effort 

and across police zones. This is primarily advisers to assist with 

the continued growth and development of the ANSF. We would also 

be advising the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior 

and of course the corps and where necessary the brigades. There 

would not be embedded in the brigades a permanent advisory force. 

Finally, are the enablers for the ANSF. This is often misunderstood as to its importance. Just about every NATO country in Afghanistan requires enablers from the United States in varying degrees such as helicopters, intelligence, medical logistics, road and 

mine clearance. When the ANA [Afghan National Army], this is the 

army, was organized, recruited and trained the decision was to 

build an infantry force or a boots-on-the-ground force, the point of 

the spear in other words and not the shaft. The enablers would be 

provided by the United States and are similar to what the United 

States provides NATO forces. Eventually the ANA will have its 

own enablers but not until beyond 2014. If the ANA is to be offensive minded, they must have confidence in their support, otherwise 

they will be paralyzed and reduced to defending their bases. At a 

minimum we must accelerate providing those enablers to the ANSF 

now so that we would reduce the requirement for them later. 

A summary of the forces required for 2014, residual force, are 

counterterrorism 7,000. This number includes all the support requirements to include security in addition to about the 2,000 CT 

SOF [Special Operations Forces] units. Training and assistance 

about 5,000, enablers to the ANSF about 8,000. This number can 

be reduced through acceleration of those forces now. That totals 

about 20,000, plus about 6,000 that would come from NATO. When 

the 2014 force level decision is made, I hope that we avoid announcing a drawdown ramp with that decision before we know 

what the impact of that decision is. 

The second mitigation to reduce the risk is the force level for the 

ANSF. Let me just say I believe the growth and development of the 

ANSF has exceeded our expectations. They are an acceptable force, 

which has and enjoys the respect of its people. All that said, it is 

too early to tell how they will do on their own, but the preliminary 

indications are positive based on what has taken place in the south 

where they are operating on their own. Currently at 352,000, which 

is the size of that force now, one of the options is to draw down 

the ANSF post-2015 to a level of 228,000. This makes no sense 

given the NATO–U.S. drawdown which is under way and which 

culminates in 2014, while we obviously do not know yet what that 

impact will be. 
8 

We can mitigate the risk by planning to fund the ANSF at the 

current 352,000 to 2020 and at least until 2018. At some point the 

Afghans will be in a position to making contribution to this funding 

level themselves. 

A third mitigation and my last one is to reduce the risk by authorizing the targeting of the Taliban and Haqqani leaders in the 

sanctuaries in Pakistan. Priority is the Haqqani sanctuary because 

of the unstable situation in the east. This will be an extension of 

the mission the OGA [other government agency] is conducting 

against the Al Qaeda in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas]. 

Once systematic targeting commences the sanctuary will cease to 

exist as we currently know it, a place where strategy, training, 

operational oversight, intelligence and logistics is executed routinely in safe haven. These functions will suffer significantly, which 

will positively impact operations in the east. Additionally it will be 

a huge morale boost for the ANSF. 

Let me conclude by saying I believe there is far too much risk 

to a stable security situation in Afghanistan as we meet here today. 

This is driven mostly by past U.S. policy decisions. I recognize that 

many observers are looking to a political settlement as the most desirable outcome, and certainly it is that. But the harsh reality is 

the more risk there is to mission success the less likelihood of a 

settlement. If the Taliban and Haqqani believe they will gain an 

influence in 2014 and beyond, why settle? If future policy decisions 

on U.S. 2014 force size and ANSF force levels, the two remaining 

key decisions, do in fact increase the risk versus mitigate the risk, 

a favorable outcome is unlikely. 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker, as you many of you know, is an extraordinary diplomat, the very best we have had in the region who 

said, ‘‘How we end the conflict and what we leave behind is more 

important than how we began it.’’ 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane can be found in the 

Appendix on page 52.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Barno. 

STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID W. BARNO, USA (RET.), SENIOR ADVISOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

General BARNO. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

members of the committee, I would like to express my appreciation 

for being invited to appear before you today to address the coming 

U.S. and NATO transition in Afghanistan. I will try and be fairly 

brief. 

As the war now enters its twelfth year Americans deserve a serious look at the plans now in place to responsibly conclude our involvement in this long and difficult conflict. My remarks on the 

topic today reflect my own personal views and are not those of the 

Center for New American Security or any other entity; they are my 

own. 

Unlike our other panelists today I have had the privilege of commanding the Afghan theater of war. My service there spanned 19 
9 

months from October 2003 to May of 2005. That tenure was one 

of the longest among our 11 different military commanders that the 

U.S. has had in the Afghan war, and it certainly occurred at a less 

violent and broadly more optimistic time. But since 2005 I have 

also remained closely in touch with the progress of the war and 

traveled back several times to the theater, both Afghanistan and 

to Pakistan, to observe ongoing operations and speak with Afghans, 

Pakistanis, Americans and our NATO allies across the region. I 

have also written and spoken extensively on the course of the conflict during the last 8 years and appeared before this committee 

and in other congressional committees in excess of 10 times now. 

On a more personal level both my sons are Army captains who 

have served a year or more in combat in Afghanistan. Scores of my 

uniformed and former colleagues’ sons and daughters during our 

time growing up in the military, the former playmates of my children at military posts all across the country, have also served in 

Afghanistan. Some have been wounded, others killed, folks that we 

know well, family members from across the big military family out 

there. So my involvement in this very long fight is both personal 

and professional. I know as a parent what it is like to have a family member in the combat zone. I know that is true of members sitting in the committee today. This outlook is apparent, it is never 

far from my thinking as I try to reach logical conclusions about our 

ongoing efforts and try to think about the road ahead. So our decisions are set in this context broadly. 

As we seek to achieve our long-term strategic objectives with 

that risk of keeping Americans at war in Afghanistan, we have to 

be thoughtful about what we have done and what can still be accomplished in this war. In my judgment the lives of future Americans serving in Afghanistan only deserve to be put at risk where 

vital U.S. interests are at play, and that the risk of those lives is 

demanded by defending those vital interests. I know that that is 

a calculus that this committee takes very seriously. 

So in examining our efforts looking to 2014 and beyond, it is 

worth returning briefly to first principles, what are our vital interests in this region, now and after 2014. What are the absolute essentials and what is the minimum essential military force we need 

to be able to defend those. 

I would characterize perhaps three. The first that we all recognize is preventing the region’s uses of base for terror attacks on the 

United States and our allies. That is why we are in Afghanistan, 

the 9/11 attacks, which we all vividly remember are something that 

can never happen again. 

Second, I think we have a regional vital interest to prevent nuclear weapons or nuclear materials from falling into the hands of 

terrorists or other hostile actors. That of course is outside of Afghanistan but very much in the neighborhood. 

And then third, I think we also have a vital interest in regionally 

preventing a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. So I would 

argue that defending those vital interests in the coming years 

ought to be the focus of our efforts, that we should not be overly 

fixated on our current commitments, what we have done for the 

last decade, but think about how do we use this upcoming transition to make sure we are postured to defend those three vital inter-
10 

ests in the years ahead. Those are I think of overriding importance 

to the United States. 

How do we go about doing that? I think that we clearly need a 

U.S. base in this region from which to exert influence on all the 

regional actors, to keep relentless pressure on terrorist groups targeting the United States and our allies, and to support our friends 

across the region. So I think again, as Keane pointed out, there is 

a two-fold mission here, enduring mission for American forces, one 

counterterrorism and secondly support for Afghan security forces, 

training, advising and assisting them. But whatever we do has to 

be sustainable as well as being able to protect those interests. We 

are in a fiscally austere environment today, we can use a rough 

order of magnitude of math that it is a million dollars per American soldier per year in Afghanistan. Looking ahead and as those 

numbers come down that number might go up because some of the 

economies start to dissipate. So I think we have got to keep that 

in mind as we protect these vital interests. 

In my judgment we can accomplish those two missions, the CT 

mission and the support mission, in Afghanistan with somewhere 

in the neighborhood of 8–12,000 forces, U.S. and NATO combined. 

I would also agree that we need to sustain the size of the Afghan 

military and police, the security forces, at their current levels of 

352,000 for another 5 years. We do not need to be drawing those 

forces down at the very time that American forces are drawing 

down. I think the dollars that we would save there are better invested in maintaining robust Afghan security forces. 

And then finally I would argue most importantly for the Afghans 

we need to continue our financial support for their military. That 

in many ways I think is even more important than maintaining 

large numbers of American forces in Afghanistan attempting to 

help them be successful. I think after 8, 9, 10 years of effort of 

training Afghans, equipping Afghans and supporting Afghans in 

the field at the cost of somewhere in the neighborhood of $50 plus 

billion, the 352,000 Afghan security forces have every ability to defend against about 30,000 Taliban who don’t have an air force, who 

don’t have a large training establishment, who don’t have modern 

equipment. I think that ratio is well within the Afghan’s capabilities. 

So I would just close by thanking you again for the opportunity 

to present my views on this very long, very difficult, very intractable conflict as we consider the road ahead. I think I will agree 

with almost all of our panelists today that this coming transition 

is a tipping point for our long-standing efforts in Afghanistan. 

Making the right choices at this juncture can help us the secure 

the gains paid for by Americans and our allies and so much blood 

and so much of our treasure over the last decade. 

Securing our long-term vital interest is achievable as we end our 

combat presence, but I think it can be done with a limited U.S. and 

NATO footprint, paired with sustained international financial support for the Afghan forces. I think the limited troop deployments 

and outlays are required as a prudent investment to help assure 

stability in a very dangerous part of the world. 

Thank you. 
11 

[The prepared statement of General Barno can be found in the 

Appendix on page 64.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Cordesman. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE 

CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. CORDESMAN. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

and members of the committee, I have a few minutes in which to 

deal with what is an extremely complex and controversial set of 

issues that are shaping whether the ANSF, the Afghan forces, can 

actually support an effective transition. I have provided a detailed 

analysis that really explains what I am about to say in depth and 

I have relied largely on official statistics for most of it as well as 

my own visits to Afghanistan and experience, and I would request 

that that be put into the record. 

But let me quickly focus on what I think the key issues are here. 

Dr. Dale touched on part of this. You can’t have an effective Afghan force mix unless you have effective Afghan leadership and 

leadership that focuses on actually using those forces, allocating 

them, and supporting them effectively. It is highly questionable 

whether we have that in President Karzai and those around him. 

It is even more questionable who will replace him and whether 

there will be enough unity in Afghanistan as transition proceeds to 

actually have effective leadership of Afghan forces. 

Money has historically been a critical metric in supporting any 

forces, whether they are Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan. The fact is 

that we have gone from figures that once were over $9 billion a 

year to $6.7 billion a year, to $4.1 billion a year and no one has 

provided any clear plan or justification for this funding or cost. I 

can’t tell you whether the numbers are high or low, but the numbers emerge after we set the force goals, and it is rather striking 

that we seem to be moving toward less and less as we are attempting to build up to more and more. 

I have to say that any focus on total manning is to me largely 

meaningless, 352,000 going down to 328,000 at some unstated time 

in the future. What force elements are involved? What capabilities 

do they actually have? How are they actually performing in the 

field? And I would say this number is particularly meaningless 

when what you have in terms of actual combat capability is a 

strengthening Afghan National Army, a very uncertain plan for the 

Afghan Air Force, and one effective element of the Afghan police 

which is called the ANCOP, or Afghan National Civil Order Police. 

That makes up 49 percent of the force. The other 51 percent, according to both the most recent report from the Department of Defense and from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction is a largely corrupt and often incapable mix of the Afghan 

Uniform Police and Afghan Border Police. These lack the support 

of effective governance and the other elements of the justice system 

in much of the field, particularly in high risk areas. They are subject to local power broker influence today and in the case of Iraq 

the type of force essentially dissolved as an effective national force 

when we left and did so within about 3 months. National polls do 
12 

not show these forces are as popular as the other forces and do 

show they are intensely corrupt. And that means a focus on building forces should be a focus on the forces that work, not manpower 

goals. 

We also see in the most recent reporting, particularly of the Department of Defense, we have not provided even today adequate 

numbers of trainers and partners for much of the ANA and we 

have drastic shortfalls in the numbers of those partners for the Afghan police. All of that is laid out in the report, the semiannual 

report of the Department of Defense. 

For all the reasons General Keane laid out, we need a clear plan 

for how we are going to provide air power, enablers, trainers and 

partners over time. And we need conditions-based efforts, not some 

fixed number. At this point in time we have no such plan, and we 

are now less than 2 years from transition. 

There is another more public focus on what are called capability 

milestones and commander unit assessment tool scoring systems. 

We say that forces are in the lead, for reasons laid out in the latest 

Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction as well as in 

reporting by the Department of Defense. We have never been able 

to stabilize what we mean in this ranking system for even 3 

months, much of the force is not covered, particularly the police 

force, in the ranking system. The Department of Defense has stated the whole system will be replaced by an Afghan system in the 

course of the next year and no one knows what ‘‘in the lead’’ means 

in terms of practical performance in the field. 

The fact is if you want a meaningful system, you have to describe 

forces by key element of the order of battle in terms of what they 

do in the field. And the problem is not simply the threat, it is how 

stable the overall capability is in terms of do they have support 

from local power brokers, are they getting support from the government, are they properly funded? All of this requires to us have the 

kind of active support presence General Keane has outlined. But to 

measure what they can and cannot do, you need meaningful, unclassified metrics of what is actually happening in the field. We 

now show units in the lead without saying where, doing what, or 

what their impact is. We have largely meaningless statistical reporting on enemy initiated attacks, a terrible measure even if the 

data were accurate, for counterinsurgency, and there is no progress 

by that metric since 2009. If we go back to the Iraq war the dominant metric was SIGACTs, significant acts per month. That showed 

a massive improvement over time. If you look at the Department 

of Defense reporting there is zero improvement over time by that 

metric. We don’t see an improvement in overall IED [improvised 

explosive device] attacks versus bombs actually exploded. And the 

U.N. [United Nations] has reported a 700 percent increase in the 

attacks on Afghan officials in the course of the last 12 months. The 

latest DOD [Department of Defense] report if you look at the annex 

shows that a major insurgent presence still continues in Kandahar 

and Helmand, the reporting on drugs show a very significant increase in drug cultivation in Helmand. That is in other parts of the 

areas we did not occupy and the Taliban influence is not addressed. 

We basically have dropped from all of our reporting progress in the 

81 critical districts and more than 40 districts of interest, which 
13 

were the focus of our strategy until mid-2011. And with that we 

have removed every public indication of progress in governance, in 

aid by district and in the rule of law by district. 

So let me just say if we are going to make this work we need 

patience, we need to be there long after 2014, but above all what 

we really need are honest assessment, honest metrics, and honest 

plans to focus on each element of the Afghan forces separately and 

show two things: what can they really do relative to the insurgents 

over time, and second, how do they relate to the problems within 

the Afghan government and within Afghan power brokers? 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cordesman can be found in the 

Appendix on page 73.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The written statements of 

each of you will be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

General Keane, there was a report in the Washington Post that 

the White House is seriously considering a plan from the Pentagon 

in which the U.S. would retain a residual force of 8,000 troops after 

the NATO mission ends in December 2014 and then reduce the 

number of troops to between 3,500 and 6,000 by 2016. Additionally, 

the option of further reducing the U.S. troop presence to 1,000 

troops by 2017 is under serious consideration. 

What are the reasonable sets of missions that the U.S. military 

would be able to conduct with 8,000, 6,000, 3,000 and 1,000 troops? 

Is there any threshold of troops in which the risk to the U.S. forces 

outweighs the value of having them deployed in Afghanistan? 

General KEANE. Well, that is a great question, Mr. Chairman. 

The fact of the matter is trying to put together a drawdown plan, 

as you suggest, if that is in fact the case, before we know what the 

impact of our current drawdown is, I think is foolish. Clearly conditions on the ground have to drive our policy decisions. I understand 

the urgency and I think the attitude of the American people of 

being tired of this war, but in the same respect it takes leadership 

to deal with the issue. War is fundamentally a test of wills and the 

amount of will that you have to see, to persevere the setbacks and 

disappointments is absolutely critical. In my judgment if we bring 

force levels down below 10,000, it seems awfully difficult for me 

how you will structure a counterterrorism force that is going to 

have the kind of effect we want it to have, which would be a hedge 

against the reduction of our forces, the training assistant mission 

will suffer and so will the enablers. Now there are some things I 

mentioned in my remarks. If we can accelerate the helicopters, the 

C–130s [Hercules strategic airlifters], the MEDEVAC [medical 

evacuation] capability and some of the other support infrastructure 

to the ANSF and put it on fast forward, we can reduce some of 

those numbers. But to get down below—to get to the numbers that 

you suggest and then draw down to 6,000 to 3,000 and 1,000 over 

the next few years I think dooms us to failure. I mean it is a complete disregard of what the reality on the ground is. And if that is 

actually the plan, if that is what we would come out with, I don’t 

know how we justify keeping troops there, given the fact that we 

have given them a mission that they cannot succeed at. 
14 

The CHAIRMAN. The Washington Post article goes on to say that 

Special Operations troops would not be based in Afghanistan after 

2016, but would swoop in from ships or bases in nearby nations. 

If this report is true is it possible to effectively conduct 

counterterrorism missions without a base in Afghanistan in your 

view? And what would be the specific challenges associated with 

conducting effective counterterrorism operations in this circumstance? 

General Keane. 

General KEANE. I thought that was Dave, I am sorry. I am used 

to your pattern of moving down the table. 

I think believing that we can conduct over the horizon operations 

in that region is actually irresponsible. We have a major operation 

taking place, we don’t discuss it very much but we all know it exists conducted by the OGA against Al Qaeda’s central leadership in 

the FATA. That would not be able to go on if we do not maintain 

some kind of security presence in Afghanistan. Those operations 

are conducted from secure bases in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a 

landlocked country. It would be impossible to conduct those operations in my view from outside of those distances which would be 

greater than 600 miles. I mean you just can’t get there, refueling 

helicopters, et cetera, the other support mechanisms that we need, 

refueling drones, it is impossible to conduct that mission with any 

effectiveness. 

So I think it is absolutely irresponsible to think we can do that. 

General Barno is absolutely right. Regardless of how we size this 

force and we are going to argue over ANSF force levels as well, the 

United States in terms of its vital interest in the region has to 

maintain a base in Afghanistan to support our vital interests in 

that region and not the least of which is the relentless and dogged 

pursuit of the Al Qaeda central leadership which is currently resident in Pakistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just two areas of questioning. One, governance is a key piece here, I mentioned in my 

opening remarks the transition coming in 2014. So I am curious 

how you see that playing out and what the challenges are in finding the next president of Afghanistan whether or not we can find 

a reliable partner. 

The other question I have and I don’t think too many people are 

seriously saying that we shouldn’t have a base in Afghanistan. Certainly we are going to need to continue operations there, but I 

think the comparison I will make and the thing that I find puzzling 

is we also have a major national security challenge in the Horn of 

Africa between Somalia and Yemen, and certainly the challenges 

are different I will grant you that. No two situations are exactly 

the same. But certainly they are pretty significant in Somalia and 

Yemen and neither one of those governments are exactly models of 

democracy or even functioning government, Al Qaeda is very 

present, certainly in Yemen, arguably in Somalia. We can’t just 

walk away from that either, we have to have a presence, we have 

to meet our national security interest just like in Afghanistan. And 

yet in that area the exact number as I understand it is classified, 
15 

in that area the number of U.S. troops present is less than four 

digits and that is what we are managing. So when we talk about 

Afghanistan we talk about oh, my goodness, we are going be below 

68,000 or we are going to be below 34,000, I think we are missing 

something in terms of how we should apply our national security 

strategy here. There is unquestionably a national security interest 

in that region that will last frankly for as long as I can envision. 

Maybe 10 years from now something is dramatically different. I 

would bet against it but it is at least possible. We will always for 

some long period of time have an interest in making sure we can 

contain that threat. But I think we just aren’t doing our jobs from 

a national security standpoint if we can’t figure out a way to maintain that threat with less of tens thousands of troops and tens of 

billions of dollars a year. That I think is our charge. It is a huge 

challenge, I grant you, but again it is not like we don’t have that 

challenge in other places. So why is it we are hearing dire predictions about going down to 34,000 and yet again in this other 

place where we have a similar challenge we are able do it for less 

than a thousand? Again granting that there are differences, but we 

ought to be able to get to that place over a reasonable time frame, 

because our mission is not to build and perfect government in Afghanistan, it is not to fix that country or nation-build, it is to protect our national security interests, as the chairman described and 

I think most of you have described. So why can’t we get there in 

a more affordable path? 

General Barno, I will give you the first crack at that. 

General BARNO. Thanks very much. I think first comment on 

your opening note on the political transition in 2014. We are looking at a military transition, we will spend most of our time on that 

today. This political transition may be the most important transition in Afghanistan in the next 5 years. 

Mr. SMITH. I believe that it is. 

General BARNO. I was there for the first election in 2004, I 

watched from Washington the disastrous 2009 election which was 

in some ways not even a legitimate outcome. We can’t replicate 

that again, so we have got to take a much more active role behind 

the scenes to ensure there is for Afghan standards a reasonably 

fair and free election, because if that doesn’t work we have got 

much bigger problems. 

You second question on the size of the force, I think one of the 

fundamental questions that we are dancing around a bit today and 

we will for the next couple of years is to what degree is the United 

States going to continue to fight the Taliban versus fighting Al 

Qaeda after 2014. I think the shape of the transition right now 

would suggest that our new approach in a sense, and I wrote down 

what is our theory of victory over the Taliban here. Our new approach essentially is to empower the Afghan forces to take on that 

role, to backstop them but to give that to them as a principal responsibility and thereby lessen U.S. outlays and resources and 

troops. Pretty sensible, especially after 11 years and a tremendous 

investment in preparing that. 

I would agree with General Keane we do need to accelerate the 

Afghan enablers, their helicopters, their attack helicopters, their 

C–130 airlifts because they need to be relying on their own re-
16 

sources not on American resources. So I think that would be a very 

smart move in addition to maintaining substantial forces for them, 

but I do agree that we can drive our forces down to a significantly 

lower level. I don’t necessarily think the 1,000 Americans or 8,000 

is the right answer but I think in the 10,000 plus or minus range 

is viable. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Mr. Cordesman, do you want to take a stab? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. Yes. I think first we need to be much franker 

about the prospects of what will happen with this election. The Afghans themselves talk about having some kind of loya jirga [grand 

council] so the key factions will actually have some degree of national unity as we depart. 

The election by itself, honest as it may be, is very unlikely to 

produce a leader that will really be able to deal with this on his 

own, because none of us can name that leader, and the people we 

can name have not shown that they are easily able to deal with 

this. But the caution I would give you is when you are dealing with 

the Taliban and the insurgents, it isn’t governance in Kabulstan 

that counts, it is governance in the areas where the threat is 

present or where there are ethnic and sectarian factions that may 

split out. 

Now for all the talk of our training of new civil servants, when 

we went into Kandahar and Helmand we had to waive the qualifications to staff it, and we still have serious problems. 

I think we need to have a much franker picture of what is going 

to happen and stop focusing simply on the legitimacy of the election. 

But let me go on to your point about troop levels. Like it or not, 

we shape this force in many ways to our standard, by our rules. 

We have rushed it forward progressively at almost 6-month intervals, forcing NTM–A [NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan] and 

others to change their mission. It isn’t going to be ready at the end 

of 2014. It is going to need, not simply enablers and trainers and 

partners, we are short about 20 percent of those already for the 

ANA, for the ANP [Afghan National Police] it is more like 35 percent. We are not going into this with a stable basis for meeting our 

requirements. And we are really rushing the Afghans into a training role for which they are not qualified. 

Mr. SMITH. Well let me ask you this: Would it be ready in 2020? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. The answer I think is, is it credible that we 

could do this with the ANA and the ANCOP and the Afghan National Air Force by 2017? If we put the effort into it, yes. Can I 

give you say more than a 60-percent assurance? Even that requires 

a level of prophecy I don’t have. 

Mr. SMITH. I apologize, I have to run to something so I will have 

to close by saying I think that is the point. The challenges you all 

describe present there in 2 years, in 3 years, in 5 years, in 10 

years, in 15 years there is a limitation on the capability of people 

in Afghanistan and us spending a lot more money and risking a lot 

more lives butting our heads up against that just is not the prudent policy. I think we need to begin the transition as best as we 

can. 

I thank you for your answers, I will be right back for the rest 

of your testimony as well. Thank you. 
17 

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] I will yield to myself for 5 minutes. General Barno, let’s talk about political transition for just a 

second. This week or last week President Karzai ordered, supposedly, Special Operations to be removed from one province. It 

seems to me if there is a time deadline, then whether you are the 

president of the country or you are the local tribal leader you are 

going to start hedging your bets because you know that the U.S. 

presence is not going to be there in the future, these other guys 

will be, and so you start partly playing to the crowd and partly 

kind of hedging because you know they are going to continue to be 

there. 

Is that not a challenge for political transition that is caused by 

having time deadlines rather than condition-based changes? 

General BARNO. I am not sure how that plays out at the local 

level from the sense of the 2014 political transition. But what I do 

think is critical, and I think we have sent some mixed messages 

on this that we need to unify and send a single message, which is 

that the United States is not leaving after 2014, and NATO is not 

leaving after 2014. We are drawing down our forces, we are going 

to have a different mission set, we are going to have a different 

footprint around the country. Every district in Afghanistan that 

had American troops in 2009 will not have American troops in 

2014. I think the Afghans actually are rather happy to have that 

outcome, not afraid of it. But I also think that there is a muddled 

message out there about whether the United States actually is 

exiting stage right completely in 2014. And that would very much 

play to the concern that you are expressing about hedging our bets, 

sitting on the fence, starting to look for other players to hedge to. 

So I think we have got to be relentless with our message in the 

international community and here in the United States that we are 

not abandoning Afghanistan, we are going to sustain this commitment. And we have to build it in a way that is credible to them 

as they look at how big it is and how much it costs, too, as well 

as to our own people. I think that is the best way to approach that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. General Keane, General Barno brought 

up this point about to what extent we target the Taliban. You mentioned targeting Taliban and Haqqani in Pakistan. Talk to us a little bit about how you see that playing out. In the future, if we are 

going to have a limited number of people and a counterterrorism 

mission, whatever the number is, are we going to have to just limit 

our operations to people who are card carrying Al Qaeda? The lines 

between these groups seems to me to be a little blurry. As we look 

at this counterterrorism mission, which everybody agrees is the key 

thing that we want to focus on going forward, how do we distinguish the targets, if you will, or the enemy in carrying out that 

counterterrorism mission to prevent Afghanistan from being a base 

for operations again? 

General KEANE. Yes, well, certainly the two major sanctuaries in 

Pakistan where the Afghan Taliban are in residence, down in 

Quetta and also to the east where the Haqqani is, have protracted 

the war. I mean you got to think of these in your own minds as 

military bases where primary functions take place, command and 

control, intelligence. These are military bases where the Pakistani 

military comes in and helps to train, Pakistani military comes in 
18 

and helps to train Afghan Taliban to prosecute war against us. 

These are bases where the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] provides 

intelligence on operations to prosecute war against U.S. forces and 

Afghan National Security Forces. This is what we are really talking about. And we have permitted these sanctuaries to exist. By 

definition, we are in Afghanistan longer because of those policy decisions. And our unwillingness to come to grips with this issue with 

the Pakistanis because of the so-called ‘‘complicated relationship,’’ 

I think that relationship should have changed to a conditions-based 

relationship a number of years ago. For the life of me, if we are 

going to continue to accept the risks that we are taking with force 

levels in Afghanistan that we are currently taking, and that I believe we will take over decisions made in the next year or so, one 

of the major mitigations to be able to absorb that level of risk will 

be to go after those sanctuaries. It would be a jolt in the arm for 

the ANSF to be sure. We do not have to go in there and fight these 

people. We have to go in there and conduct drone operations so we 

disrupt their activities. Right now they are holistically performing 

these functions similar to what we do on military bases. Once they 

receive systematic attacks, those functions are disrupted, they are 

decentralized, the whole fabric of what they are trying to achieve 

is impacted rather dramatically. And that is a major way to reduce 

the risk that we currently have and that we will have in the future. Those operations would be largely and exclusively conducted 

by OGA. That would be an expansion of the current mission we 

have against the Al Qaeda. And I am assuming that would take 

a finding by the President of the United States to be able to do that 

mission and order the OGA to do it. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, all of you, 

for being before us today. Oh, gosh. Mr. Cordesman, I think it was 

you who said we have to look at this from honest assessments, honest metrics, and honest plans for the future when we look at this 

issue of Afghanistan. And obviously, we have been at this for over 

11 years. I do agree with my colleague, Mr. Smith, that we have 

to look at this from a U.S. national security perspective, and not 

from a perspective of building Afghanistan, if you will. So, my 

question goes to all the information that I get back from our men 

and women working mostly in the military on the ground there in 

Afghanistan, but also some of our NGO [non-governmental organization] people and some of the Europeans trying to help in there. 

And this goes to the whole issue that we have sort of set our ability 

to leave Afghanistan and triumph, if you will, in Afghanistan with 

respect to the police and the Army that we have there in Afghanistan, their own security forces. You know, when I hear from people 

that everything at every level is corrupt—I have publicly said this, 

I think Karzai is one of the most corrupt people I have seen. His 

own members of his parliament said that to me once when I was 

out there. But what about, you know, when we look at this army, 

you know, I have people telling me that people who sign up for the 

army, these 300,000-some people that we have out in Afghanistan 

sign up at 63 years of age, don’t show up. I am told about all these 

ghost soldiers that we have on payroll. I am told about, you know, 

we are buying land in Afghanistan to set up police stations. We 
19 

don’t even buy land from people as a Federal Government here in 

the United States to make police stations. And how, you know, one 

day it is clear, we decide, yes, this is what we are going to buy, 

and when we come back now there are squatters there, now we 

have to pay $10,000 to squatters who were not there before but are 

there today. I mean all the corruption that happens at every level. 

So my question to you is do you really think we are going to have 

a police force at the local level and a national army at the federal 

or united level there in Afghanistan that is really going to be able 

to move this country forward and take care of its citizens given the 

corruption at each and every level that is going on there? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. I think we need to be very careful. The Afghan 

National Army has, I think, established by Afghan standards a reasonable level of integrity. It is never going to be by our standards 

a perfect force. Whatever happens in Afghanistan will have corruption by Afghan standards. But I think it would be dangerous to not 

say that there are many people in the Afghan National Army, or 

the ANCOPs within the Afghan police that have established a very 

high standard of patriotism, effectiveness, and integrity. That force, 

if it is properly supported, may—I can’t give you a prediction—be 

able to deal with what is a relatively small and unpopular group 

of insurgents. It will depend a great deal on the level of governance, and it will depend a great deal on the level of aid. When it 

comes down to the police, every report, including the most recent 

Department of Defense report and SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] report, shows it remains highly corrupt. It is not going to change. It is not going to be effective 

in broad terms, although, again, there are elements which are both 

patriotic and honest. But it also is not critical to establishing security. Historically, it is also true that, like it or not, it will be local 

forces like the Afghan local police and militias which will be critical 

in many areas. And here is another reason, perhaps, for keeping 

a Special Forces presence in limited form. But is this a high risk 

operation? Yes, it is a high-risk operation. And that risk I think is 

exemplified again by the Department of Defense reporting on the 

shortfalls in advisors, trainers, corruption, and the lack of independent capability on many elements of the police and the forces 

within it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Cordesman. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you for 

being here today. General Keane, it was distressing to me to hear 

your comments about Pakistan, because this is a country that we 

have worked with for decades providing aid, training the military, 

as you indicated. It is so disappointing, because I have seen where 

the American people have made such a difference. I had the opportunity to see firsthand the American marines providing the hospital care at Muzaffarabad for the victims of an earthquake. The 

relationship that should be there. I know that we have done so 

much when they have floods, with asking nothing except to back 

up and establish a positive relationship. I had the opportunity to 

visit with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto a month and a 
20 

day prior to her murder. There should be so many opportunities, 

understanding that—and we read about terrorist attacks virtually 

weekly across their country. Why can’t we truly establish an ability 

to work together for stability, which would be mutually beneficial 

for the people of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and America? 

General KEANE. I think largely because our interests conflict. 

And the Pakistani interest in Afghanistan is a little different than 

ours. And that is why they have always hedged their bet with the 

Taliban so to speak, because they believe they may in fact have to 

deal with them again. And they are very concerned about the incumbent government and what they perceive to be a closer relationship between that government and India, which is the paranoia 

that the Pakistanis have always suffered from. So this adds to the 

complication, you know, of this relationship, and the fact that they 

are a growing nuclear arsenal in the region with a military oligarchy that truly runs the country, a largely ineffective civilian government. And it gives us a lot of concern, you know, for the region. 

And then you add the added factor of support for the Afghan sanctuaries in Pakistan, and I believe it has paralyzed our ability diplomatically, you know, to deal effectively with them as it pertains 

to the issue on Afghanistan. 

You know, another data point is the two factories in Pakistan 

which produce close to 90 percent of all the ammonium nitrate that 

is used as the explosive ingredient to all the IEDs that kill us and 

maim us every single day. I mean we should have done something 

about those factories a long time ago. Now, I understand that Secretary Clinton has taken this on, and it appears maybe there has 

been some progress recently, although I don’t have any confirmation of that. But I think that is essentially the basic reason is our 

interests do conflict. What I have been disappointed with, I am not 

a diplomat, but what I have been disappointed with is our inability 

to shape the conditions a little bit to bring the Pakistanis closer to 

what our objective is as it pertains to those sanctuaries. And obviously, they have interests that we can influence as well, and a concerted effort to do that. I don’t want to be Pollyannaish about it, 

but I think we could have achieved better diplomatic progress than 

what we have had to date. 

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate your efforts. And General Barno, I appreciate your family’s service. And I had the privilege of you 

hosting me my first visit of 11 to Afghanistan. And I know firsthand your concern for our service members and military families. 

That is why with the incidence of green on blue attacks, what is 

being done to restore trust between our military personnel and to 

protect American and allied forces? 

General BARNO. We have seen, I think very fortunately, a tremendous diminishment of those attacks over the last several 

months. That late summer last year was becoming a debilitating 

strategic problem for us back here at home, it was among the 

forces in Afghanistan. And I think the command in Afghanistan, 

led by General Allen, put in some very smart protective measures, 

guardian angels, where there would always be a soldier or marine 

over watching other soldiers that were engaging in activity with Afghans, requiring higher levels of personal protection around Afghans, looking to modify some of our exposure, and just generally 
21 

raising the threat awareness. I think that has had a very positive 

effect. Let’s all hope that that continues to be a positive direction 

here in this year. 

Mr. WILSON. And that is good news. And I want to thank Mr. 

Cordesman and Dr. Dale for being here today, too. And your 

metrics report is excellent. Thank you very much. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to have all of you 

here with us, although I think that it is very difficult to have a 

sense of optimism coming from any of you. And I think that obviously is reflected in our comments as well. 

General Barno, you mentioned our strategic objectives. And I am 

wondering whether you think that Afghans certainly beyond the security forces themselves should share our strategic objectives, 

which are basically to keep Afghanistan free from terrorism and 

mitigate any nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India. Do they 

share those objectives? And is that what would promote a sustained success in the long run? 

General BARNO. I think there is overlap in our objectives and the 

objectives of the Afghan people and their government. They are certainly not the same, and they don’t have a global perspective, they 

don’t have global responsibilities. They are worried about terrorism 

at home in Afghanistan. We are worried about terrorism being projected from Afghanistan or Pakistan to the United States or to Europe. So we have got a bit of a different horizon than they have. 

But I do think that we certainly broadly share the strategic objectives of having a stable Afghanistan that is not a sanctuary for terrorism in which the government is a reasonably fair elected government in which the economy continues to grow. There has been tremendous growth in the Afghan economy over the last 7 or 8 years. 

That is not remarked much upon here in the United States. The 

Afghans feel that, and are worried about that, returning back to a 

less prosperous time as forces come out and as the security threat 

continues to be problematic. So I think we broadly share some of 

those objectives. But again, our horizon is considerably different 

than I think the Afghans. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I guess people would suggest, though, that the economy has certainly been supported by our activities there, and that 

in fact once we leave in great numbers that that has an opportunity to collapse. 

General BARNO. There is concern about that. But I think the economic analysis I have seen suggested it is going to reduce their 

growth rate, but they are still going to have a fairly substantial 

growth rate of 5 or 6 percent a year. You know, they have been 

doing 12 or better for a number of years, partly because of the 

amount of money we put in. So they are not really looking at a depression or a recession, simply a flattening of that growth a bit. 

And there is a lot of sectors that—telecommunications for example—that are not really driven by military expenditures there that 

are blooming all across Afghanistan. So I think—and again looking 

at their mineral resources that are a number of years down the 

road, they have got some good foundation blocks there if they can 

maintain a government that is moderately effective and a security 

situation that is not chaotic. 
22 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Cordesman, you spoke about the new metrics, 

and really it is about performance. And the Afghan Special Forces 

have been touted as kind of second to none, I guess, even though 

the numbers I think are somewhere in the neighborhood of about 

15,000. Is that something that really we need to focus more on, 

that that is a greater source of optimism than perhaps we have acknowledged? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. I think one has to be very careful, because the 

Afghan Special Forces have done well. How well they will do once 

we cease to support them is a real question. And a lot of that depends not on them, but the other aspects of the MOD [Ministry of 

Defense] and structure and how they are used and actually allocated. But the problem with Special Forces is that just because 

they are very valuable doesn’t mean you can grow more easily. And 

again, at this point we don’t have the trainer base, the partners to 

deal even with the ANA as a whole, much less the police and other 

elements. 

Mrs. DAVIS. If I could just interrupt you quickly, because my 

time is running out, I think the focus on the Afghan people, public 

opinion, apparently that has been fairly strong and constant in 

some areas that people have a sense of confidence in the future. 

And yet as we have an opportunity to work even in remote provinces with women, they do not feel that the police is providing the 

kind of security that will really promote some ideals that we think 

about, which, you know, aspiring of education and work ethic in 

their communities. Is that something, again, that we really aren’t 

focusing on enough, and perhaps would the elements of a civil society are such that that should be part of our national security in 

the area to a greater extent than we are talking about? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. If I may take just a second to answer, part of 

the problem is that it isn’t just the police. There are almost no 

functioning courts, no actual ability to enforce court decisions in 

terms of dealing with women. We have all kinds of numbers on 

civil society, like the number of people educated, where the minute 

you ask you find there is no source for the data. So we are quoting 

the number of women educated with no statistical base for doing 

it. We are talking about GDP [gross domestic product] growth, but 

for example Ken Katzman of CRS says 90 percent comes from aid. 

And the study General Barno referred to would not look at drugs, 

worst cases, corruption, or capital flight. It is a World Bank study, 

which is meaningless. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

panelists. I appreciate both their expertise and their contribution 

to this important discussion on policy and objectives. We have to 

keep in mind the reason why we are in Afghanistan, a result of the 

9/11 attacks on our country. And our goal has been ensuring that 

those responsible for those attacks would be held accountable, and 

that we would ensure that conditions in Afghanistan do not revert, 

and that we prevent similar future attacks. 

One of the issues that I have been most concerned with with respect to the Afghanistan operation has been the issue of the drug 

trade, and my concern of it funding the insurgents, greater instability in the country, and corruption. I have raised this issue with 
23 

President Karzai, Generals Petraeus, Mattis, Allen, and the DEA 

[Drug Enforcement Agency] to try to raise the profile of the issue. 

And General Keane and Mr. Cordesman, I appreciate you both 

raising this issue. So my questions are going to be directed to you 

concerning this. I want to provide you some context of my concern. 

In 2006, General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, stated that, quote, ‘‘The Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. I think the uncontrolled rise of the 

spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that 

it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal element, anything to bring chaos and disorder.’’ General Allen stated 

that the narcotics trade and its linkage to the insurgency contribute to regional insecurity, corruption, volatility in the rule of 

law, and the stagnation of economic development. 

Now, for many of our hearings I have held up this chart, which 

is a study that was done with the United Nations Office of Drugs 

and Crime. And it shows the historical production of opium in Afghanistan from 1991 through 2009. And you can notice in this period where we are there from 2004 through 2009, you see a doubling of the historical levels of opium production in Afghanistan. So 

under our efforts you actually see where there was an increase that 

then was available for the use to fund the insurgents. General 

Petraeus said this chart doesn’t reflect the accomplishments that 

they were making while he was in command. He provided me this 

chart that showed, again, the peak that we had in 2009, and it was 

coming down in 2010, and illustrating a 48-percent decrease from 

2009 to 2010. And they showed an incredible increase in the seizures and in eradication in going after the drug lords, the money, 

the labs, and the like. My concern is that as we are looking to the 

drawdown, if there is a premature effort of U.S. and ISAF forces 

in Afghanistan to withdraw, that we could reverse this trend. I am 

not confident that the Afghan police and the national forces are 

prepared to either continue the downward slope of that, and in fact 

that they might be susceptible to both the corruption and the instability caused by that funding, in addition to not be up to the challenge of what that funding represents in support for the insurgents. 

I would like if both of you, Mr. Cordesman and General Keane, 

if you could speak on your concern or thoughts about the trends in 

the drug trade and the shift to the Afghan leadership. General 

Keane, you want to start? 

General KEANE. Go ahead, Tony. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. All right. Let me just say, if you looked at the 

updated chart you would see all those trends have been reversed. 

The amount of acreage that the U.N. projects has increased steadily between 2010—— 

Mr. TURNER. You are a little bit far away from the microphone. 

That first part I think was really important. Could you speak again 

about the trends being reversed already? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. If you look at the most recent U.N. report for 

2012, you will see that there is a major increase in acreage of cultivation. The decline you saw was not a result of enforcement, it 

was a result of poor rainfall, and it was a result of disease in the 

opium crop. That still is a problem. So it won’t restore in terms of 
24 

the volume. But in terms of the earning power, it has gone up. And 

in terms of the actual area under cultivation, that is very sharply 

up. And it is up in Helmand, which is the area that we were attempting to secure. The other problem that you have here is as we 

pull aid money out, some of the U.N. estimates say that about 40 

percent of the Taliban economy, the GDP came from drug earnings. 

The current estimate is very uncertain because nobody can agree 

on it. So you get anywhere from 6 to 15 percent of the Afghan GDP 

is funded by drugs and criminal networks. The minute we start 

pulling the aid money out, the incentive to do that goes way up, 

partly because you still haven’t solved the agricultural distribution 

problems. 

General KEANE. Yes. I appreciate that discussion. I think the 

drug culture and the drug trade that exists in Afghanistan will be 

there 10, 20 years from now. And I think that is just a harsh reality. Certainly the growth of the Afghan economy, their mineral 

development and their manufacturing capability that comes from 

that could be a major, you know, push against this drug trade continuing to grow. But I think our interest has been, and I think we 

have to have a limited focus here in terms of what is reasonable 

for us to do in the timeframe that we have to do it. And I think 

what we have tried to do is similar to what the Colombians tried 

to do with their drug trade and the FARC [Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia], and that is to separate the support from the 

drug trade to the insurgency. And we have had mixed success with 

that. I mean the fact of the matter is they are still getting money 

from it today, they were getting money from it before, and they are 

going to get money from it. And we have had some highs and lows 

with it. Certain districts we have had some success. But that has 

been a real challenge for us. I still think that the opportunity to 

make progress in Afghanistan as an institution politically, this is 

largely their choice, and also the economy is largely their choice. 

And also with the security situation, I am convinced we can make 

some progress if we mitigate the risk. And I just got to believe that 

we are going to make minimal impact on this drug culture that 

currently exists. And it is going to be there probably for another 

generation. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. General Keane, I wanted to return to your discussion of the sanctuaries and the work that needs to be done 

there. I am a little bit concerned with the number in your report 

of a total of 25,000 troops needed with the counterterrorism, training and assistance enablers, and that those enablers would be supporting not just ANSF forces, but U.S. forces and NATO forces. I 

am going to assume that this 25,000 is exclusive of NATO forces. 

On top of that, we are now talking about working with drone units 

to continue to disrupt sanctuary operations. How long? I mean how 

long would we need to maintain those drones there, those forces 

there to disrupt? Are there metrics? Is there an end-of-mission kind 

of a metric that we can say, okay, we have disrupted them for long 

enough? 

You see my concern with the length of time that we are committing troops for being there. Do we need to do this indefinitely? I 
25 

come to this a little bit from my perspective, having served in the 

National Guard, where we still have forces in Kosovo 13 years 

later. And I just am reluctant to get us into a situation where we 

have a mission that has no ending in sight. 

General KEANE. Yeah, my oral statement had a total force of 

20,000, not 25,000. But I think we are mixing the forces up a little 

bit. The counterterrorism force that would exist in Afghanistan 

would largely be conducting attacks against Afghanistan Taliban 

leadership within the confines of Afghanistan. The suggestion to go 

and violate Pakistan’s sovereignty against their wishes, which is 

the suggestion I am making, that would be done by OGA, and it 

would not be done by U.S. military forces. So that would be an expansion of the mission that already exists, authorized by the President, willingly supported by Pakistan, and that is to target Al 

Qaeda central leadership in Pakistan. That is done, as you know, 

routinely, and we have had some success against that. What I am 

suggesting is we add to that portfolio the mission to at least begin 

with the Haqqani network and have that capability be used against 

that as well. Whether they would have to expand it or not would 

be up to them. So it would not come from forces inside Afghanistan, although we must admit that those operations do originate 

from Afghanistan, and they come from bases that are protected inside of Afghanistan to conduct those operations in Pakistan. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So then would those bases from which the missions would be launched inside Afghanistan, would those require 

additional U.S. enablers, additional forces, or would that come out 

of the 20,000? 

General KEANE. I don’t think so. Right now those—some of this 

is classified, so we got to be careful—but we have different kinds 

of security forces at those bases. And just let me leave it at that. 

I don’t believe an expansion of that particular mission would involve additional force structure in Afghanistan from the United 

States or from NATO. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. And do you have a metric for when, how long 

we would support this additional mission for the OGA of disruption 

of the sanctuaries? Do we do it forever? For example, if we stop, 

would they reconsolidate and return to what they were doing? I understand that this is a little bit of prognostication I am asking you 

to do. But what is the metric for when do we support this? 

General KEANE. I couldn’t give you an answer. But I think you 

would make the judgment based on the effects that you are able 

to achieve as a result of it in Afghanistan itself. And obviously, we 

would have some intelligence on what is taking place there with 

the Haqqani network and also with the Quetta Shura, which we do 

right now. So I think that would give us some sense as to whether 

we are achieving any results and when we could cease those operations. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, General. I yield back my time, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are some who 

would say or have said that the Karzai government is little more 

than a vertically integrated criminal enterprise because of the level 

of corruption. And it doesn’t seem like we have been successful in 
26 

terms of combating that corruption. Unless anybody on the panel 

can tell me, I don’t know of any aid that has been permanently 

withheld because of their practices. And so can somebody speak to 

how do we deal with this extraordinary level of corruption in our 

partner, the Afghan Government? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. I am going to take very briefly, our goal is in 

theory to increase funding to the Afghan Government so it can 

steadily take over the remaining portion of aid. We have dealt with 

corruption in general by not funding through the Afghan Government. So most of the aid money has gone directly around the central government structure. I think in fairness, a lot of this has been 

our fault, a failure to really validate the contracts, measures of effectiveness, control of funds, something General McMaster has 

found in his studies. But your question is a key one. The Afghan 

Government made commitments, very formal commitments that it 

would change this process as part of transition. It is up to you to 

hold them accountable, because it is a fair statement to say that 

the Karzai government has never once honored an anticorruption 

pledge to date. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And didn’t we—obviously, I think we wanted to 

build up their institutions of governance, their capability by initially having the aid flow through the government. But then the 

corruption was so incredible, I think that we diverted that aid and 

tried to give it directly to whatever the intended recipient was. But, 

you know, how do we—I mean do we establish benchmarks to 

where if they fail to meet them that we do permanently withhold 

aid? I don’t think the American taxpayers should be subjected to 

this level of corruption without end. 

Dr. Dale. 

Dr. DALE. Sir, thanks for that terrific question. Absolutely, as 

you characterize, the way that power operates in Afghanistan is 

really on the basis of patronage networks of power and influence. 

And not all of those are malign, but some are, and they distribute 

resources unevenly, disenfranchise some, and do not operate in accordance with the rule of law. We have tried a number of things 

over the last 10 years, some more successful than others. But I 

would like to answer your question by pointing ahead. The mutual 

accountability framework that came out of the Tokyo conference 

last year, that includes a set of commitments, Afghan improvements in the arena of corruption and international reactions that 

based on whether those are complied with is a terrific opportunity. 

What makes it tough is we have got to discipline ourselves in order 

to make that work. The other piece, and ultimately the most helpful one, are frankly the Afghan people. They are the best potential 

checks and balances on the Afghan system. Their voices have not 

been very visible through years of war. But that civil society, it is 

the armed forces, it is the media, it is all of those organizations 

that can eventually be brought to bear to help hold their own system accountable. And that is another arena in which we can, with 

technical support and encouragement, encourage change. 

Mr. COFFMAN. But even if you look at the Tokyo accords, there 

are not specific metrics yet that have been drafted to establish the 

kind of benchmarks I am talking about that makes aid contingent 
27 

upon the Afghanistan Government’s ability to clean up this problem. 

Dr. DALE. So you point to a great point, which is how do you implement this? The idea is look, it is a good foundation, it is a new 

step forward, because everyone agreed there is a lot of money on 

the line, which Afghanistan is going to need some help over this 

decade of transformation in order to sustain the campaign gains 

and be stable. So they have equities in all of this. It is up to us 

as an international community to be very disciplined amongst ourselves in figuring out what accountability really looks like. That is 

hard, but it is not undoable. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe fundamentally that we 

have to be willing to sever this aid is the only way I think we are 

going to clean up this situation for the American taxpayers and for 

the other donor countries that are involved with that. We deserve 

better. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chairman. When we were 

attacked in 2001, I looked at what lay ahead for us as a 30- or 40- 

year effort. And I still look at it that way. In addition to the military role, I look at what our nonmilitary role is down the road. And 

I was just curious to hear your comments on how much are we now 

involved and how much should we be involved in the future, especially in Afghanistan, from an educational role and an economic development role for that country? And what your thoughts are on 

where we have been and where we should go. 

Mr. CORDESMAN. I would certainly, all of us could make a contribution there. But I think our basic problem is this. If we go with 

the existing plan, we will pull most of the aid workers out of the 

field, we will get rid of the PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams], we will become dependent on the government and on the 

Afghans to do this. We in theory have a commitment, and perhaps 

Catherine can correct me, of roughly $1.7 billion a year in civil aid. 

But there is no plan to use it. And AID [Agency for International 

Development] is talking about emerging with the plan in the spring 

of 2014, which is just fine, but the last two fiscal years that influence the war will be over, and by the time the plan is written our 

ability to control the flow of money and assess it is going to be very 

limited. That pushes things down on one group, which is now back 

in Afghanistan, which is the World Bank. The problem is the World 

Bank is technically a client of Afghanistan. And as I mentioned 

earlier, they can’t examine worst cases, drugs, corruptions, capital 

flight, or any of the other key variables. So unless there is a clear 

direction for meaningful planning based on the resources we are 

actually likely to get, and we actually work with Afghans like 

Ashraf Ghani, we end up with all of these slogans, concepts, and 

unstructured plans and ideas. And it is really—we have very little 

time to make this work, or one way or another we will simply have 

to give them the money, and as Catherine has pointed out, hope 

that some of it is used in the right way, and that most of it buys 

stability, even if it doesn’t buy development. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Did you have anything else to add, ma’am? 
28 

Dr. DALE. Sir, from Dr. Cordesman’s remarks, as we look forward with our assistance, a couple things are really critical. 

Prioritization really matters, with fiscal pressure absolutely on all 

of us. That is one thing we have been working, the international 

community, with the Afghan Government through the Kabul process for several years now to focus assistance efforts, where Afghans 

find it necessary and where we can really make a difference. But 

prioritization is absolutely critical. A second piece is our own just 

implementing role, what that looks like. Again as Dr. Cordesman 

points out, our civilian footprint will diminish. That is a good thing, 

frankly, in many ways. But how do we work through Afghan experts who then provide the right technical expertise? And how do 

we maintain some visibility on the results as we lose that direct 

day-to-day connectivity are going to be important questions. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. I yield the remainder of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And ma’am and gentlemen, thank you for your service. And one of the things that has 

not been discussed is China’s role over the next couple of years 

with Afghanistan. Just reading briefly from a USA Today article, 

China, a long bystander, essentially they haven’t helped us, we 

have borrowed money from them to conduct this war. Then it goes 

on to say Beijing signed a strategic partnership last summer with 

the war-torn country that was followed in September with trips 

from their leadership. It talks about China getting the development 

rights in the country. 

My question is why should we spend, why should we borrow one 

more dime from countries like China to operate in Afghanistan 

when 2 years from now, if not sooner, they are going to be the 

country that Afghanistan is depending on and has the strongest relationship with with regard to trade and economic development? 

Ma’am, General Keane? 

Dr. DALE. Sir, thanks for that. Absolutely, China has effectively 

been able to play a freerider role as we worked with Afghan counterparts and other allies and partners to provide security for the 

Afghan people, and frankly the region. And that is true to this 

point. Looking ahead, though, there are great questions. Afghanistan’s future stability depends on the neighborhood and on the big 

players who are engaged. The first trick is simply to be aware of 

those interests and that kind of engagement, first of all. But I 

think we have, as the United States, the great privilege of being 

seen in many quarters as the security partner and the partner in 

many ways of choice. So it is partly up to us what our future commitment looks like and how we want to characterize it. Particularly 

important is how much clarity we can provide about what our future role is. Because that is what tempers the Afghans’ hedging 

against future uncertainty. 

General KEANE. You know, I think certainly China has great interest in Afghanistan, particularly after the survey came out and 

the degree of minerals that are in that country. And as we all 

know, they have been acquiring rights to minerals all over the 

world. And it is something that is clearly one of their major objectives. And certainly that has been the case. And they have been in 

Afghanistan with that intent in mind. But in dealing with Afghan 
29 

leaders on this, I mean I think they are pretty clear-eyed here 

about what China’s interest is, and clearly their own, in maintaining their own growth, economic growth in the future. And I also 

think it is, as you suggest, it is imperative on the United States 

and the international community also to be clear-eyed about what 

is happening here. And we do have a role, an influencing role with 

Afghanistan as it pertains to a new developing partner in China. 

But I think these decisions will largely be Afghan decisions. And 

they will be making decisions in their own national interest. And 

I think we have every right to help shape that, as you are suggesting. And we will just see how this plays out in the future. 

Mostly, this is a good news story for Afghanistan. They have in 

front of them a means to acquire wealth and to begin to grow an 

economy that can serve its people. And we can influence that. But 

largely it is going to be their decisions. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, if I may, and gentlemen, I am sorry, I am 

down to one minute, and you have been here long enough to understand how it goes. I guess my question is Georgia National Guard 

is going to be fighting through the next two seasons with the 

Taliban. Over the next 2 years, China will obviously become a larger holder of American debt. Our men, our women in uniform will 

be paying the price, our taxpayers will be paying the price, and 

China will be sitting back reaping the rewards from both sides. So 

why shouldn’t we come home now and let the Chinese Government 

pay for the security in that country when they are the ones that 

are going to be—they are the next-door neighbor, they are the ones 

that will be helping develop it? 

Why should one more Georgia soldier take a wound, a fatal 

wound in some cases, for a country that is going to be, I believe, 

primarily controlled by the Chinese in the future? I got 18 seconds. 

General BARNO. Tough question, obviously, Congressman. I think 

I would argue that we need to be doing more with the Afghan Government to make sure the United States sees some benefits from 

this mineral wealth inside of Afghanistan as well. I don’t think we 

want to encourage necessarily the Chinese to play a more active 

role or to play a security role. They are there clearly for other reasons. But I think we are the major stakeholder in Afghanistan over 

the last decade. We put tens of billions of dollars in there. There 

ought to be a continuing relationship, and the United States as 

well as the Afghans ought to partner in some of these mineral discoveries as they come to the fore here in the next few years. I don’t 

think the Chinese are going to play as active a role perhaps as you 

might think though. 

Mr. SCOTT. Maybe they could pay us back a little bit? 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you for being here. 

You know, with all that is going on with the sequester and all the 

other things that are being thrown at us, gun control, illegal immigration, violence against women, there are lots of things happening 

here. And I think many people have forgotten we are at war. And 

I thank you for bringing it back to our attention. And these are 

things that we really need to focus on in the near future, at least 

this committee needs to. 

Thank you very much. The committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 27, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 27, 2013 

(35) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Transition in Afghanistan: Views of Outside Experts 

February 27, 2013 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony on the transition in Afghanistan. Today, we have with us Dr. Catherine Dale, General (Retired) 

Jack Keane, Lieutenant General (Retired) David Barno, and Mr. 

Anthony Cordesman. Thank you for joining us today and sharing 

your expertise. 

A discussion on our transition from Afghanistan should start 

with a reminder of why the United States went there in the first 

place. The most lethal and complex terrorist attack in U.S. history 

was plotted and perpetrated by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 

But after over 10 years of war, the American people are understandably war-weary. The United States has committed a wealth 

of resources in the form of both blood and treasure to preserve U.S. 

vital national security interests and prevent Afghanistan from 

being used again as a safe haven for terrorists. 

The question before us is whether or not we can continue to prevent Afghanistan from being used as such a sanctuary. The NATO 

mission officially ends December 31, 2014. Although we have not 

finalized the transition to Afghan security lead, President Obama 

already has announced the withdrawal of half of the U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan—approximately 34,000 troops—by this time next year. 

In the near future, the President likely will order additional troop 

withdrawals and determine the United States’ post-2014 mission 

set and military posture in Afghanistan. 

In my view, the President is not adequately evaluating the risk 

associated with rapid and large-scale troop withdrawals—in terms 

of both local and regional consequences, as well as U.S. vital interests. The President has decided to conduct this significant withdrawal of U.S. troops during the same time period that the Afghan 

security forces will be in the lead across the entire country for the 

first time. Moreover, the Administration does not have a discernible plan to reinforce the Afghan security forces if they cannot hold 

the gains and/or maintain the necessary security across the country. Consequently, the President’s approach is fraught with risk 

and lacks a comprehensive strategy to ensure the security and sovereignty of Afghanistan—and thereby U.S. interests—over time. 

Rather, the President’s approach to Afghanistan appears to be 

‘‘withdraw and hope.’’ 
36 

I am not advocating for a never-ending combat mission in Afghanistan. But the President should make decisions on troop withdrawals within the context of the security conditions on the ground, 

the capability and capacity of the ANSF, and the required mission 

sets after December 31, 2014. 

We owe nothing less to the victims on 9/11, the U.S. troops and 

their families who have served and sacrificed, and our sons and 

daughters who will have to return if we get this wrong. The simple 

justice that comes from that principled position cannot be overstated. 

I look forward to your testimony and insights into the transition 

and way forward for U.S. policy in Afghanistan. 
37 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Transition in Afghanistan: Views of Outside Experts 

February 27, 2013 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding this hearing 

and bringing together such a distinguished panel of experts on this 

very important topic, and I also agree that the mission in Afghanistan is very straightforward and clear. We were attacked by Al 

Qaeda and their organization which was based out of Afghanistan. 

We want to make sure that such an attack cannot emanate from 

that region ever again. We want to degrade Al Qaeda as much as 

possible and weaken their ability and the ability of any groups allied with them, and I think we have made considerable progress in 

that goal. I think the most notable example of that of course is getting Osama bin Laden but it is much, much deeper than that. The 

central structure of Al Qaeda has been largely smashed in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan and their ability to plot and plan 

attacks against us has been significantly weakened. It has certainly not gone and we shouldn’t elude ourselves about that, but 

progress has been made in that regard. We have also made 

progress in terms of the number of troops and security forces that 

we have trained in the ANSF, and we are moving in the right direction on that but should have no illusions. This is a very, very 

difficult part of the world. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan they 

have an endless series of problems with governance, corruption, 

education. It is not a stable place, and some of the most violent and 

dangerous ideologies that we face are present there. We are always 

going to have to pay attention to this region for our national security interests, but the question at this point is, is an unending U.S. 

military presence going to significantly change those challenges? I 

don’t believe that it is. I believe that we have gotten pretty close 

to the point where we have done militarily what we can do in that 

region and it is time for the Afghan National Security Forces and 

the Afghan people to take responsibility for their own security and 

their own governance. And the only way to do that is to transition 

over to them taking the lead. Now that process has begun. In a 

number of different provinces the ANSF has taken the lead on security and we are moving in that direction. 

Again I want to emphasize that I don’t have any illusions here. 

I think perhaps the largest struggle there in Afghanistan is the 

governance piece: What happens in 2014 when President Karzai 

can no longer be president, when there is a new election—who we 

transition to in Afghanistan. How do we deal with the corruption 

issues and the lack of economic opportunity. Those challenges will 

always be present but having 100,000 U.S. troops in the region 

isn’t going to change that past a certain point. I think we have 

reached that point. I think the challenge for the Commander in 

Chief and the challenge for this committee and our experts is to 
38 

figure out what the best way to implement that path going forward 

is. 

I think the President has laid out a pretty reasonable strategy 

for doing that. Again, no guarantees, but it is the most logical thing 

to do at this point to transition over to the Afghan National Security Forces, to reduce our presence in the region and move out and 

turn over responsibility to the folks who ultimately are going to 

have to be responsible for it. It is a simple fact that past a certain 

point a large foreign military force is in and of itself destabilizing. 

It does not build confidence in the Afghan, in any country’s government, and any people would be concerned about having a large 

number of foreign military forces on their land. It is time to make 

that transition. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about what the best 

way to do that is, the difficult decisions that we face in making 

that decision, but I believe it is time to move in that direction. I 

look forward to the testimony and to the questions from the panel. 
39 

Statement of 

Catherine Dale 

Specialist in International Security, Congressional Research Service 

Before the House Armed Services Committee 

On Transition in Afghanistan 

Fehrual-Y 27, 2013 

Not/or publication until released by the HOllse Armed Services Committee 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, Distinguished Members of the House Armed 

Services Committee, 

It is an honor to be invited to testify before this Committee about transition in Afghanistan. It is 

a particular privilege to appear with my three fellow panelists Lieutenant General Barno, Dr. 

Cordes man, and General Keane - all of whom have sharpened my own thinking on these 

important issues. 

I appear here today in my capacity as an analyst with the Congressional Research Service. But I 

have also had the honor of serving as an advisor to a number of our military commanders in 

Afghanistan, as part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (lSAF), and also on 

extended visits as an outside expert, most recently late last year. I am profoundly grateful for the 

privilege of having served alongside our first-rate men and women in uniform and our civilian 

officials. In them, the nation has much to be proud of 

Today's discussion is timely. President Obama's announcement, as part of his State of the Union 

address two weeks ago, that U.S. forces in Afghanistan would draw down by 34,000 troops over 

the next year, established some clear parameters for further U. S. engagement in Afghanistan but 

also left room for further policy refinements as well as choices to make in execution. I His 

announcement took place against the backdrop of a formal Transition process - the staged shift 

of security responsibility from international to Afghan forces - which is set to enter its final 

phase this spring. This is also a time of political transition for Afghans, with the prospect of 

presidential elections in 2014, and a time of transition writ large for every facet of international 

engagement and support. A time of transition offers the opportunity to revisit - and affirm or 

refine - current stratef\Y. 

1 See President Barack Obama. Remarks by the President in the State of the Union (SOTU) Address, Washington, 

DC, February 12, 2013. 
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For the U.S. Government, fundamental components of strategy for Afghanistan include: 

• u.s. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region; 

• the minimum essential conditions - political, economic, security - that would need to pertain 

in Afghanistan and the region in order to protect U. S. interests over the long run; 

• current and projected U. S. approaches, until and after 2014, for helping Afghans establish 

those conditions; 

• the timeline by which, and extent to which, Afghans are likely to be able to sustain those 

conditions with relatively limited support from the international community; 

• risks to U. S. national security interests if Afghans are unable to do so; and 

• the importance of this overall effort - given its likely timeline, risks, and costs compared to 

other U. S. priorities. 

Background 

The Obama Administration has consistently articulated two core goals for the war - to defeat alQaeda and to prevent future safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 2 Yet there is little 

agreement in the broader policy community about what it would take to accomplish those goals. 

What has been missing from the debates, many suggest, is a clear and publicly available 

articulation of the minimum essential conditions - the specific ends - that must be achieved in 

Afghanistan and the region in order to ensure the protection of U.S. interests over the long-term. 

The basic framework for current U.S. Government civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan 

dates back to 2009, when General Stanley McChrystal took command ofISAF and was tasked to 

conduct an initial strategic assessment. That assessment, and the subsequent ISAF campaign 

design it informed, were based on the Administration's two core goals as well as on the novel 

prospect of more troops, more civilian expertise, more resources, more high-level leadership 

attention, and relatively unlimited time 3 

Since then, six major constraints have been introduced: 

• In December 2009, in a speech at West Point, President Obama announced that a troop surge 

would take place, but that those surge troops would begin to draw down in July 2011. 

• In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit, the Afghan Government and the NATO 

Allies, including the United States, agreed to pursue a formal process, Transition, in which 

responsibility for security would shift over time to the Afghan Government. This process 

was to begin soon - in early 2011 - and to be completed by the end of2014. 

• Tn a June 2011 speech, President Obama announced parameters for drawing down the surge 

forces. From the surge peak of about 100,000 U.S. troops, the U.S. troop commitment in 

Afghanistan would decrease by 10,000 troops by the end of2011, and by a further 23,000 by 

2 See for example President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, Washington, DC, March 27, 2009; and President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama in Address 

to the Nation from Afghanistan, May L 2012. However, two weeks ago during his SOTU. President Obama 

referred to the U.S. goal as "defeating the core of al Qaem", a new and narrower formulation, see SOTU, 2013. 

3 General Stanley McChrystaL COMISAF's Initial Assessment. August 30, 2009. I, along with fellow panelist Dr. 

Cordesman and otllers, was part of that assessment team. 
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the end of September 2012, reaching a total of68,000 by that date. Afterwards, the pace of 

further drawdowns would be "steady" and at some point the mission would change "from 

combat to support." 

• In May 2012, at the NATO Chicago Summit, the Afghan Government and NATO Allies 

added a new step to the formal Transition process, the so-called Milestone 2013: Afghans 

would assume lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by mid-20l3, and at 

that point, international forces would shift to playing a primarily supporting role. 

• In January 2013, during President Karzai's visit to Washington, he and President Obama 

announced that Milestone 2013 would be reached earlier - in spring, not summer, 2013. 

• And earlier this month, President Obama announced that the US. troop commitment in 

Afghanistan would draw down by 34,000 more troops by February 2014, and that by the end 

of2014, "our war in Afghanistan will be over.,,4 

3 

At the same time, the timeline for the declared commitment of the international community to 

Afghanistan has been extended well past 2014. In November 2011, at the International 

Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn, the international community pledged broad support 

until 2024, through the so-called decade of Transformation following Transition. In May 2012, 

at the NATO Chicago Summit, participants affirmed that NATO's security partnership with 

Afghanistan would not end with the current campaign. The U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership 

Agreement (SPA), signed in May 2012 a statement of mutual commitment in multiple arenas 

is scheduled to remain in force until 2024. And President Obama, during his recent press 

conference with President Karzai, iterated that U. S. forces would remain engaged in Afghanistan 

after 2014, in "two long-term tasks" albeit "very specific and very narrow" ones including 

"first, training and assisting Afghan forces and second, targeted counterterrorism missions 

against al Qaeda and its affiliates."j 

The juxtaposition of the rough continuity of US. core ends with significant adjustments to ways 

and means has led many to wonder whether the overall US. level of ambition in Afghanistan has 

been lowered. Others question whether current proposed ways and means are consonant with 

stated ends; to what extent any such lack of consonance might pose risks to US. national 

security interests; and to what extent, if any, various forms of longer-term "commitment" might 

mitigate any such risks. 

A Framework for Decision-Making 

Many of the recent debates have focused on US. force levels in Afghanistan: the "ramp" or 

drawdown curve between now and the end of2014, and the "enduring presence" of US. forces 

" See President Barack Obama. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, West Point. NY. December L 2009: NATO Lisbon Snmmit Declaration. Lisbon, 

Portugal, November 20. 20lO: President Barack Obama. Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in 

Afghanistan. Washington. DC, June 22, 201l: Chicago Summit Dcclaration issued by the Heads of State and 

Goverrunent participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago. May 20,2012: Joint Press 

Conference by President Obama and President Karzai, Washington. DC, J~muaf)' I L 2013: and SOTU 2013. 

5 See Afghanistan and the International Comnnmity: From Transition to the Transformation Decade. Conference 

Conclusions, tlle International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December 5, 20 j I: Chicago Summit Declaration: 

Joint Press Conference; and Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and 

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, May 2. 2012. 
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after 2014. But while troop levels and drawdown curves tend to steal the headlines, more 

fundamental still is the question of how coherently all the facets of US. engagement in 

Afghanistan fit together under a single political strategy aimed at bringing the war to a resolution 

that will protect US interests over the long term. 

The following four basic questions form one possible framework for facilitating further decisionmaking: 

• Is it working? Is the campaign demonstrably helping to generate the minimum essential 

conditions necessary to protect U.S. interests -that is, is it succeeding on its own terms? If 

not, then what could be the justification for spending another dollar or putting another life on 

the line to continue it? 

• What more needs to be done? If the basic logic of the campaign is sound, what more 

would need to be done in order to achieve the minimum essential conditions required to 

protect US. interests? What would those steps require in terms of will, resources, and time? 

In turn, ought those steps be taken, given costs, risks, and competing exigencies? 

• Is it sustainable? If the basic logic of the campaign is sound, and a viable way forward in 

the campaign can be charted, then what more would it take to make the campaign gains 

sustainable - and to protect US. interests over the longer term? In turn, ought those steps 

be taken, given costs, risks, and competing exigencies? 

• How does this end? If all other conditions are met including the logic of the campaign, its 

further viability, and the plausible long-term sustainability of campaign gains, how is it 

expected that campaign gains would inform a comprehensive conflict settlement - an end to 

the war? To what extent should the existence, or otherwise, of a viable approach to war 

termination shape decision-making about continuing the fight? 

Is it working? 

The basic logic of the current campaign dates to a key premise of the 2009 McChrystal 

assessment and the campaign plan that was developed on that basis: working with Afghan 

counterparts to reduce the insurgent threat while simultaneously helping Afghan forces develop 

at least minimal competence so that they can handle the residual threat. In particular, one of the 

major conclusions of the assessment was the need for geographical prioritization across the 

entire theater - focusing combined efforts on the same key locations at the same time and 

prioritizing those locations by their strategic importance. Another major conclusion was the 

need for concerted use of unit partnering, in which like Afghan and coalition units live, train, 

plan, and execute together 2417, in order to boost Afghan capabilities, leadership skills, and 

confidence. In turn, unit partnering was not designed to be an end in itself - instead, the theory 

was that matched, equivalent partnerships would evolve over time toward Afghan selfsufficiency with minimal support from the international community. 

Most Afghan and coalition accounts conclude that the basic logic of the security component of 

the campaign has proven so far to be sound. 

The insurgencies are certainly not defeated - and they continue to enjoy the ability to recruit, as 

well as the luxury of safe havens in Pakistan. But by most accounts, including their own, the 

insurgent networks have been degraded and the costs of doing business inside Afghanistan have 

risen substantially for example, some insurgents have been torced to use longer and more 
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treacherous transit routes, and it has grown more expensive to pay some lower-level fighters. 

The changes have been most marked in those parts of Afghanistan - in the south, the Taliban's 

traditional homeland - where the campaign has focused its main effort 6 

In turn, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are not a monolith, and they still face 

various challenges. But by most accounts, including their own, their confidence particularly 

that of the Afghan National Army (ANA) - is rising to match their basic capabilities, and they 

are taking on ever more independent operations at higher levels of organization. In addition, 

Afghan forces - particularly the army and the police - though they continue to harbor some 

institutional-cultural differences, increasingly reach out to each other, with little or no prompting 

from the coalition, to address challenges together. 7 

Meanwhile, the roles of coalition forces have long been evolving correspondingly. U.S. and 

other coalition forces on the ground have not waited for the formal announcement of Milestone 

2013 - as circumstances have allowed, for more than a year now, they have been pulling back 

from shana ba shana ("shoulder-to-shoulder") partnerships, doing less themselves, playing 

different supporting roles over time, and encouraging Afghans to make Afghan systems work. 

The patterns vary from place to place but the basic theory is the same. 8 

What more needs to be done? 

5 

The work remaining to be done on the ground, by the current campaign logic, includes two main 

facets continuing to reduce the insurgent threat and further developing the Afghan forces. Both 

target the same idea: an ANSF capable of handling the residual threat with relatively limited 

support from the international community. 

In practice, the nature of the remaining work reflects deliberate choices made in 2009 about 

where and how to assume risk. Given limitations on available troop levels and other resources, 

choices were made to make the fight in the south the main effort, leaving less attention available 

for other parts of Afghanistan; and to give particular attention to the ANA compared with the rest 

of the Afghan forces. Those choices have produced a campaign whose results to date as of 

early 2013 vary significantly across different parts of Afghanistan and different Afghan forces. 

Afghan and ISAF commanders appear generally satisfied with progress in the south though eager 

to consolidate and protect those gains. They express greater concerns about remaining security 

challenges in eastern Afghanistan. The main focus of the campaign in the east is protecting 

Kabul and its approaches including Highway 1, which connects Kabul and Kandahar. Another 

substantial requirement is continuing to disrupt the sanctuaries and transit routes of the Haqqani 

6 Interviews with Afghan and [SAF officials, 2010. 201 L 2012, and 2013. 

Interyiews with Afghan and ISAF officials, 201 L 2012 and 2013. 

8 lnlenicws with Afghan iUld ISAF officials, 2012 and 2013. The year 2012 witnessed the introduction to theater of 

security force assistance teams (SFATs) - small teams that embed with much larger Afghan units or headquarters, to 

provide advisory support as well as connectivity to coalition enablers. The teams varied in composition, focus, and 

even name depending on their locations within the Afghan system, and on the nationality (and Military Sen·ice) of 

the troop contributor. By late 2012, the U.S. Anny was moving to a model based on snbstituting Security Force 

Assistance Brigades (SF ABs) that include their own organic SF ATs, for traditionaL battlespace-owning Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) supported by SFATs sourced out of other brigades - improving unity of command. The 

much-smaller SFABs, with significantly reduced combat power. preclude by definition "doing it [or them." 
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network in their traditional tribal homeland. And a further challenge is securing Afghanistan's 

long border with Pakistan - made all the more difficult by the fact that, of all the Afghan security 

forces, the Afghan Border Police have benefited the least from unit partnering with coalition 

forces. In addition, U. S. and Afghan officials note with concern the apparent interest of al Qaeda 

and other extremists in establishing a foothold in remote upper Kunar and Nuristan provinces in 

northeastern Afghanistan9 Concerning the ANSF as a whole, remaining work includes 

improving the effectiveness and accountability of some of the police forces; strengthening the 

ability of the ANSF to support themselves with their own organic enablers such as air, fires, and 

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); strengthening leadership development; and 

bolstering the ability of Afghanistan's security institutions to direct and support the force 

responsibly and effectively. 

"Advising and enabling" - a primary focus for remaining U.S. and other coalition forces, now 

and in any enduring presence - aims both to further develop the ANSF in key target areas, and, 

through the ANSF, to continue to reduce the threat. Commanders stress that "advising and 

enabling" is not an end in itself - and it does not simply mean "doing less." Instead, advising 

includes supporting Afghan commanders, staffs, and units by encouraging best practices, 

bolstering confidence, and coaching counterparts through new challenges. 10 Enabling, in turn, 

means helping Afghan forces gain the ability to provide and rely on their own organic enablers. 

Afghan and coalition officials generally agree that Afghan forces will not enjoy the same 

sophisticated enablers that foreign troops have - instead, Afghan forces are likely to use different 

equipment, to do things differently, and to choose not to do some things. 11 

Reductions in U.S. and other coalition troop levels between now and the end of2014, and after 

2014, will necessarily curtail their ability to advise and enable Afghan forces and to contribute 

directly to the further reduction of the insurgent threat. Some see potential benefit to the 

campaign from these drawdowns both Afghan and U.S. officials, for example, suggest that the 

growth of ANSF confidence was catalyzed in part by the final stages of U.S. "surge recovery" 

and its accompanying consolidation of coalition forces at fewer bases and outposts, and the very 

clear message that sent that coalition forces were going home. 12 

But troop drawdowns also carry potential risk. In the near-term, each reduction curtails the 

extent to which coalition forces can provide support to Afghan counterparts in geographical 

reach, depth of coverage, or type of support. Afghan forces might simply choose not to 

undertake a mission from fear of failure; to cede territory altogether as too difficult to control; to 

make local-level accommodations with insurgent forces in areas they do not feel confident they 

can control; or - altogether differently to undertake too-ambitious operations in which they not 

merely fail, but fail so catastrophically that it destroys their own confidence in their abilities, or 

the confidence of the Afghan people in the ability of the ANSF to protect them. For the nearterm 34,000-troop drawdown, a ramp that keeps most of those troops in Afghanistan through the 

2013 fighting season, rather than bringing them home earlier, would tend to reduce the scope and 

9 Interviews with U.S. and Afghan officials. 2011, 2012. and 2013. 

10 Many U.S. Soldiers view those roles as similar to that of Observer Controllers at U.S. Anny Combat Training 

Centers - who typically coach training participants through jobs that they themselves have done while many U.S. 

Marines mention their own "coyote" analogue. 

II For example, Afghans may evacuate casualties by ground, not aiL when appropriate medical facilities are 

available. Interviews with Afghan and ISAF officials. 2012. 

I' Interviews with Afghan and ISAF officials. 2012. 
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scale of the risks to campaign gains that that drawdown introduces. 13 

In turn, potential U.S. force level-related risks beyond the end of2014 would depend a great deal 

on developments between now and then including the timing and slope of the current troop 

drawdown, and the effects generated by the campaign. Post-2014 risks would also depend 

significantly on the balance of AN SF troop levels and U.S. and other Allied troop contributions 

none of those numbers are likely to be static. Further, post-20 14 risks would also depend 

fundamentally on how the ends - the minimum essential conditions - are defined. Will it be 

simply to ensure that key leaders of al Qaeda and affiliates can be eliminated if necessary? Will 

it be, more broadly, to ensure that safe havens cannot coalesce? Or more broadly still, to ensure 

that Afghans can maintain some minimum level of stability? From the perspective of rigorous 

strategy, the key is to map "troops to tasks" rather than "tasks to troops." 

It is also important to bear in mind throughout that not all U. S. forces remaining in Afghanistan 

will be dedicated to the campaign. Significant efforts, and significant time and attention from 

U.S. leadership and troops, will be required for retrograde - the process of bringing troops and 

equipment home again safely. Bringing U.S. troops home from Afghanistan may prove far more 

complicated than from Iraq, given Afghanistan's difficult terrain, its relative dearth of 

transportation infrastructure, and the lack of a "Kuwait" next door to pull back to. 

Is it sustainable? 

Even if the campaign continues to generate gains, developments in four key arenas safe havens 

in Pakistan, ANSF end strength and funding, Afghanistan's economic viability, and Afghan 

governance could put the long-term sustainability of those campaign gains, and the protection 

of U.S. interests, at substantial risk. 

Safe Havens in Pakistan 

First, many Afghans as well as a number of outside observers view the persistence of Afghan 

insurgent safe havens in Pakistan as the greatest long-term threat to sustaining campaign gains. 

The continued availability of safe havens in Pakistan gives Afghan insurgent leaders bases from 

which to direct operations, recruit, provide training, and receive financing, as well as the luxury 

of time to wait out the departure of foreign forces from Afghanistan if they so choose. 

The campaign on the ground has included a fluctuating history of cooperative Afghan-Pakistani 

initiatives at the tactical and operational levels, facilitated by ISAF. At best, these efforts have 

included combined planning and - to some extent - "complementary" operations conducted 

simultaneously on either side of the same border. Yet while Pakistani forces have sometimes 

vigorously targeted their own domestically-oriented insurgencies, they apparently remain unable, 

unwilling, or both, to take action against Afghan insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. 

While some observers view this deadlock as a showstopper - and others hope that a 

breakthrough in high-level political negotiations with the Taliban would render the point moot 

many others suggest that the persistence of safe havens simply imposes a requirement for greater 

13 The fighting season mns from the end of the poppy harvest in the spring until the weather tums cold in the fall. 
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resilience of the Afghan state. Such resilience might mean stronger, more capable, and better 

integrated Afghan security forces, appropriately arrayed; greater competence of the overall 

border regime; and staunch refusal by local Afghan communities to tolerate an insurgent 

presence in their midst. 

Key issues for Congress might include considering whether any strategic, operational, and 

tactical-level outreach designed to encourage Pakistani actions against the safe havens might at 

last yield results; and evaluating the extent to which the threats to lasting campaign gains posed 

by persistent safe havens in Pakistan might be mitigated through stronger and more effective 

Afghan institutions and practices. 

ANSF Endsfrength and Funding 

8 

A second major factor shaping the sustainability of campaign gains is the ability of the ANSF to 

provide security for the Afghan people. That includes, first of all, an overall end strength - and a 

force mix appropriate to anticipated future security challenges. At the NATO Chicago Summit, 

participants broadly agreed to a "gradual managed force reduction" from the current end strength 

of352,000 "to a sustainable level", with a working target of228,500 personneL But ANSF 

leaders and other officials raised concerns about the timeline and slope of that drawdown, and 

the latest thinking reportedly calls for avoiding a steep ANSF drawdown in the immediate wake 

of the end of the NATO TSAF mission. In general, too-Iowan ANSF endstrength introduces the 

risk that Afghan forces might be stretched too thinly to protect campaign gains, or that they 

might choose to leave some areas uncovered, or both. Drawing down too rapidly in an anemic 

economy that lacks follow-on opportunities for demobilized troops who are familiar with 

weapons and accustomed to receiving salaries - might be a recipe for bolstering the ranks of the 

insurgencies, or at any rate of the deeply disaffected. 

The ability of the ANSF to meet future security challenges also depends fundamentally on future 

funding levels based on the continued largesse of the international community, which has 

clearly indicated its lack of eagerness or ability to support an expensive long commitment; or on 

the ability of the Afghan system to generate and collect revenues, still a tall order. The lower the 

levels of available funding, the greater the pressure to draw down ANSF endstrength, or to 

reduce other facets of the Afghan budget that might also be important for state stability, or both. 

Key issues for Congress might include carefully assessing the risks associated with various 

options for post-20 j 4 ANSF drawdowns; balancing the risks of ANSF drawdowns against the 

costs of continuing to support the Afghan force; and weighing any continued assistance against 

the likelihood that Afghanistan would eventually be able to shoulder the financial burden. 

Economic Vzability 

Third, as the challenges of funding the ANSF suggest, Afghanistan's future economic viability is 

critical for ensuring that security gains are sustainable over the longer-term. Tn principle, 

Afghanistan'S natural resources, agricultural potential, and human capital could form the basis 

for a viable future economy. But Afghanistan is on an ambitious timeline, trying to achieve 

signiticant economic self-sufficiency by 2024 - first of all the ability to generate, collect, and 
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spend revenues - and by any measure that will be a stretch. 14 

The potential risks are great: without a viable economy - or open-ended support from the 

international community - the Afghan state would likely be unable to meet even the most basic 

needs of the Afghan people, and thus to secure the people's confidence, so central to basic 

stability. 

The history of efforts by the international community to help Afghans foster a working economy 

has been decidedly mixed. Years of relatively indiscriminate spending led to an array of 

unproductive or counterproductive results, including an inability to track money spent; the flow 

of assistance funds out of the country; the distortion oflabor markets; investment in systems or 

components that Afghans did not want or could not sustain; and the empowerment of "thugS.,,15 

But recent years have witnessed stronger collaboration both between the international 

community and the Afghan Government, and within the international community, aimed at 

crafting and pursuing a single shared approach. The so-called Kabul process encourages a 

shared focus on prioritized Afghan systems including infrastructure, transportation, financial 

mechanisms, the judicial sector, and human capital. A corresponding paradigm shift among 

practitioners on the ground has echoed the same theme with its emphasis on "making Afghan 

systems work.,,16 

9 

The international community, while losing some leverage as troop levels go down, has some 

potential opportunities to help reduce the risks to sustainability posed by Afghanistan's fragile 

economy. One approach would be simply providing as much clarity as possible about future 

forms and levels of assistance many Afghan officials, including provincial and district 

governors, report that the uncertainty is deeply debilitating. Further, the international community 

could also continue to help Afghans establish appropriate accountability mechanisms, and to 

define and adhere to rigorous prioritization. It could encourage discipline within its own ranks in 

implementing the Declaration of the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan. And it could 

address an emerging tension in the assistance community in Afghanistan between pursuing 

emerging traditional development opportunities in more stable parts of the country, and 

protecting campaign gains in still-contested parts of the country. 17 

14 The Afghan Government currently collects about $2 billion per year in revenues. Afghanistan's budget for solar 

year 1391 (which concludes at the 2013 vernal equinox) is $4.89 billion, but that includes some international support 

and docs uot iuclude substautial oIT-budget assistance from international grants and loans. The Afghan Government 

and NATO estilnate that the cost of sustaining the ANSF will be $4.1 billion per year. See Government of the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Towards a Self-Sustaining Afghanistan: An Economic Transition Strategy. 

November 29.2011; and Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Budget 1391. "What's in it for 

youo" 2012. 

i5 Interviews with U.S., Afghan. and other international officials. 2008. 2009, 2010. 2011. 2012. 

16 See Towards a Self-Sustaining Afghanistan. 20 II: and Afghanistan and the International Community: From 

Transition to the Transformation Decade. Conference Conclusions, the International Afghanistan Conference in 

Bonn, December 5. 2011. Interviews with U.S. and Afghan officials. 2012. 

17 Interviews with U.S" Afghan and other international officials, 2012 and 2013. See the Tokyo Declaration: 

Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan. from Transition to Transfonnation. from the Tokyo Conference on 

Afghanistan. July 8. 2012. At the Tokyo Conference. donors pledged support through the Transfonnation decade 

and affirmed their commitment to the principles of the Kabul Process. 
48 

Congressional Research Service 

Key issues for Congress might include determining the extent to which a viable economic 

foundation in Afghanistan constitutes part of the minimum essential conditions necessary to the 

protection of U.S. interests; and weighing the costs of possible further contributions of all kinds 

- including political capital and civilian official presence, in addition to assistance - against the 

likelihood of making a lasting impact. 

Governance 

Finally, most observers suggest that sustainable security in Afghanistan requires an architecture 

of good governance that appropriately and accountably directs the use of its security forces, 

stewards the nation's resources and revenues, and provides access to justice. Good governance 

might also be essential to foster good faith with Afghanistan's neighbors, to encourage foreign 

assistance and investment, and most importantly, to earn at least the tacit acceptance of the 

Afghan people - all of which have a bearing on the sustainability of security gains. 

10 

The challenges are deeply entrenched. Afghan state and society operate primarily on the basis of 

networks of power and influence. While not all Afghans lose out as a result, the distribution of 

patronage is uneven and sometimes deeply divisive, and it generally trumps the rule oflaw. 

These dynamics have led many Afghans to regard their own government as rapacious. The 

problem is exacerbated by the fact that after decades of war and upheaval, Afghanistan benefits 

from few of the societal checks and balances enjoyed at least to some degree in most other states. 

The risks to the sustainabi lity of campaign gains, without good governance, could be quite 

significant: Afghan security forces might have no credible authority to answer to, and popular 

disaffection with randomly distributed or non-existent state protections of all kinds could lead to 

societal fracturing along ethnic or tribal lines, persistent simmering conflict, or even violence. 

The 2009 McChrystal assessment addressed such concerns in one of its main conclusions that 

governance needed to be "on par with" security as a focus of the campaign in order for the 

campaign to succeed. The basic theory was that the primary arbiter oflasting stability in 

Afghanistan is the Afghan people the extent to which they accept the system and are able to 

hold it accountable. But efforts to date by the international community have been distinctly 

uneven in both intent and effects. They have included attempts to define the minimal 

governance requirements at the district level by focusing on the tashkil (personnel structure); to 

exercise leverage to establish left and right limits for key powerbrokers; and to nudge the Afghan 

system into replacing local officials deemed by local residents to be truly up to no good. 18 

Meanwhile, many Afghan thought leaders have pointed to a potentially powerful remedy to help 

correct perceived power imbalances and the lack of accountability - the growing, and 

increasingly organized and powerful, voices of Afghan civil society organizations, women's 

groups, media outlets, private sector pioneers, religious authorities, and traditional local councils. 

Afghans suggest that these voices have great potential to help hold governance in check - if they 

are given time to develop. And while some support from the international community would be 

18 Interviews with U.S., Afghan, and other international officials, 200K 2009, 2010, 20ll, and 2012, and see 

McChrystal Assessment 2008. 
49 

Congressional Research Service 11 

welcome - including technical and advisory support, and continued guarantees of basic security 

- it is Afghans who would do the lion's share of the work and indeed are already doing it. 19 

In principle, the international community could support such efforts by leveraging the Mutual 

Accountability Framework (MAF) a pointed set of commitments, part of the Tokyo 

Declaration, aimed in part at countering corruption 20 or at least by not pointedly foreclosing, in 

their rhetoric and actions, the possibility that Afghan people might contribute increasingly 

toward holding their government accountable. 

Key issues for Congress might include weighing the potential of better Afghan civic organization 

of all kinds, over time, to hold governance in check; evaluating the extent to which accountable 

governance constitutes part of the minimum essential conditions that need to pertain in 

Afghanistan in order for U.S. interests to be protected; and evaluating the roles that might be 

played by members of the international community - not only, perhaps not even primarily, 

governments - in supporting its emergence. 

How does this end? 

Observers agree that the war is highly unlikely to end with a thunderous victory on the 

battlefield. And many if not all agree that it is also unlikely to end based on the gradual accretion 

of campaign gains on the ground. Most suggest that bringing the war to a close in a manner 

likely to protect U.S. interests over the long-term would require a political settlement of some 

kind one that establishes the fate of insurgent leaders and fighters; the disposition of political 

power; the demobilization of some Afghan forces; and modalities for societal reconciliation. 

By numerous accounts, efforts are now underway by multiple stakeholders to engineer a 

settlement, in the relatively narrow sense of a deal between the Afghan Government and 

insurgent leaders. As most frequently described, those efforts seek to identify common ground 

between the primary belligerents, and to use confidence-building measures, as steps toward a 

relatively near-term, high-level agreement. Yet however likely such efforts might be to achieve 

success on their own terms a near-term deal the basic approach has raised concerns among 

many Afghans who feel excluded from the process. A number of Afghans suggest that any such 

deal between the current government, which they consider rapacious, and the Taliban 

leadership, which they fear is hardly likely to provide most Afghans with an inspiring shared 

vision of the future. 

Consequently, some Afghans and a number of outside observers have suggested that a more 

fruitful approach might to recast war termination as a longer -term political settlement process, 

one that brings to bear the full participation of the Afghan people. In such a process, based on a 

highly inclusive national dialogue among all key sectors of society, Afghans might agree 

amongst themselves on a shared future vision of Afghanistan - one that includes former Northern 

Alliance members and southern Pashtuns. A longer timeline might help dispel the current sense 

of urgency that leads insurgent leaders to up their "asks", and the Afghan leadership to seriously 

consider potentially detrimental compromises. And a plausible future vision even though not 

yet realized - might help dispel the grim uncertainty that prompts so many Afghans to hedge, for 

10 Interviews with Afghan thought leaders. 2012 and 2013. 

00 Sec the Tokyo Declaration, 2012. 
50 

Congressional Research Service 

example by shoring up patronage networks, or seeking emigration opportunities, or acquiescing 

in local-level accommodations with insurgents. 

Against that backdrop, the Afghan presidential elections scheduled to be held in 2014, an 

important opportunity for participation, might be reframed as a catalyst of the longer-term 

process, rather than as a deadline by which the groundwork for reconciliation must already be 

laid. And preparations for the elections could help mobilize the emergence of additional voices 

from civil society and other sectors, which might in turn contribute to an increasingly inclusive 

national dialogue about Afghanistan's future. 

In this refined construct, the role of the international community would be a supporting one 

and many roles might be played by non-governmental actors. U.S. opportunities might include 

emphasizing SUppOlt for a broadly participatory settlement process and for an outcome that 

protects long-term Afghan and U.S. interests; and providing support to Afghan civil society and 

other emerging groups. 

12 

Key issues for Congress might include considering the extent to which a coherent and viable 

vision exists for bringing the war to a close; and evaluating the extent to which the form that war 

termination takes, and the outcomes it produces, constitute minimum essential conditions for 

protecting U.S. interests. 

Final Word 

This four-part framework cannot directly provide answers about the best way forward for U.S. 

engagement in Afghanistan. Nor can it help weigh Afghan war considerations against other 

national security exigencies or against wholly unlike concerns such as the domestic economy. It 

might, however, illuminate the broad range of choices that still exists including choices about 

ends, as well as about ways and means. And it begs consideration of the risks - of different 

kinds and different magnitudes that might attend any proposed course of action. 

For those weighing the continuation of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan in some form, this framework 

might help refine a rigorous political strateb,)! that: 

• articulates a clear vision for a future Afghanistan that achieves the minimum essential 

conditions necessary to protect U.S. interests over the long term; 

• lays out the required combination of security, economic, and political "ways and means", 

including how they shape one another and how they change over time, necessary to realize 

those minimum conditions; 

• defines the distribution of roles and responsibilities among the U. S. Government, other 

international actors, and the Afghan Government in carrying out those ways and means, 

including how those roles evolve over time; 

• establishes a realistic timeline for accomplishment; and 

• includes a very clear-eyed assessment of associated risks. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify about these issues, and I look forward to your 

questions. 
51 

CATHERINE DALE 

Specialist in International Secnrity 

Congressional Research Service 

Dr. Dale is a practitioner and scholar of U.S. national and international security issucs. 

Since late 2007, as Specialist in International Security at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) - the 

Congress's "in-house think tank" - Dr. Dale has providcd analytical support to Members and staff to help frame 

critical national security debates. She is the lead CRS analyst on strategy and military operations in 

Afghanistan, and on defense strategy writ large. She also spcarheads CRS's analytical focus on national 

security reform. 

From 2009 to 2010, on leave from CRS, as the Senior Civilian Advisor to Lieutenant General Rodriguez, 11,cn 

the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (HC), the operationallevel NATO headquarters in Afghanistan, she helped to shape and communicate strategy and policy for the 

force; and to integrate tactical, opcrational and strategic-levcl efforts. In 2009 she served as a member of ISAF 

Commander General McChrystal's "60-day Initial Assessment Team"; in 2010 she served as a "Directed 

Telescope" for then-ISAF Commander General Petraeus for two months; in 20 II shc conducted a month-long 

assessment the ISAF Commander General Allen; and in 2012 she conducted another month-long campaign 

assessment for HC Commander Lieutenant General Terry. Also in 2011, she conducted the "initial strategic 

assessment" at U.S. Africa Command for General Ham. 

Prior to CRS, as a Special Assistant to thc Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Dale helped to shape and 

communicate the broad strategic vision of the Department of Defense. She eanle to Washington from Iraq, 

where she served as the Political Advisor to the Commanding General of11,e Combined Joint Task Force-7 (and 

later, the Multi-National Force-Iraq). As POLAD in Iraq, she helped to integrate international civilian and 

military efforts. Earlier, serving for four years as the Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the UN 

Secretary-General for Georgia, she helped craft a UN shuttlc diplomacy effort aimed at achieving thc political 

settlement of the conflict in Georgia's break-away region, Abkhazia. 

As an academic, Dr. Dale's work has focused on politics and security issues in 11,e former Soviet Union and on 

the problems of long-term internal displacement. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She 

holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Political Science from 11,e University of California, Berkelev; an M.S. in National 

Security Strategy from the National War College; and a B.A. in Slavic Studies from Harvard University. 
52 

Congressional Testimony 

Transition in Afghanistan 

House Armed Services Committee 

2118 Rayburn House Office Building 

By 

John M. Keane 

General 

US Army, Retired 

27 February 2013 

1000 hours 
53 

Congressional Hearing 

Testimony 

27 February 

1000 hrs 

Mr. Chairman, ranking minority and members of the committee, thank 

you for allowing me to testify today on such a critical subject as we transition 

US operations in Afghanistan. Am honored to be with such a distinguished 

panel who I have known for many years. 

Many of the committee members are aware that I have conducted 

several assessments for our military commanders in Afghanistan having 

completed my last assessment for Generals Mattis and Allen last year. Those 

visits have been invaluable to understanding so called "ground truth" by 

assessing the progress or lack thereof of our campaign plan's goals and 

objectives. Given four panel members today, I will keep my remarks brief. 

Afghanistan is rapidly moving toward its most critical milestone since 

2001, when the Taliban were deposed, as 2014 approaches and Afghanistan 

participates in a political, economic and security transition. Much of 

2 
54 

Afghanistan's future is dependent on the success of 2014. While the 

economic and security transitions are driven largely by NATO force level 

reductions, the political transition with a national election is exclusively 

Afghan as it will impact the confidence of the Afghan people and the 

international community at large in the political process. A relatively fair and 

open election that reflects the peoples' choices and results in an improved 

national government will be a significant step forward in the political 

development of Afghanistan. I am disappointed that US force levels in 2014 

will be so low that they will have negligible impact on the security of the 

elections. 

After almost twelve years of war in Afghanistan the central issue for 

me is how do we best manage the risk? How do we avoid squandering the 

gains that we have made in Afghanistan? 

Yes, we have been in Afghanistan a long time, driven mainly by US 

decision to go to war in Iraq. As such, Afghanistan in 2002 quickly became a 

secondary effort, indeed, an economy of force operation, from 2002 to 2009, 

when in 2009 the POTUS made a decision to conduct counterinsurgency 

3 
55 

operations and to escalate the war by adding thirty thousand surge forces. 

Even this decision did not reflect what Generals McChrystal and Petraeus 

believed was the minimum force to succeed, forty thousand surge forces. 

Instead, they received a force which was 25% smaller, which dictated that the 

campaign in the SOUTH and EAST be conducted sequentially versus 

simultaneously. The campaign in the SOUTH was largely successful, while 

the campaign in the EAST was never completed, because the surge forces 

were withdrawn prematurely in 2012, over General Petraeus' objection. 

Recently the POTUS made the decision to remove thirty four thousand of the 

sixty six thousand forces by February 2014 versus keeping the sixty six 

thousand till the end of 2014. These decisions must be understood because 

they all have impacted mission success by increasing the risk. 

The most serious security situation lies in the EAST, where we were 

never able to conduct extensive clear and hold operations which led to our 

success in the SOUTH. As such there are Taliban and Haggani sanctuaries in 

the EAST not too far from Kabul. It is unrealistic to believe that the ANSF 

will succeed in the EAST, where NATO / ISAF has not. In the SOUTH, 

4 
56 

what remains is to consolidate the gains that were made in achieving relative 

stability which has led to improved security and improved local governance. 

Can we mitigate the risk') While I am not certain, I know to not try will 

doom us to likely fail. Three key decisions can begin to mitigate the risk and 

provide a hedge: 

POST 2014 RESIDUAL FORCE 

---First, is the size and missions of the residual, post 2014 force. There 

are 3 missions for the force: counter-terrorism (CT), training and assistance, 

and enablers to ANSF. The CT mission to have the necessary reach to be 

effective must operate from 3 locations, Khost, lalalabad and Kandahar. 

These units require drone crews, analysts, helicopters with maintenance, 

medical trauma units and security forces. If we consolidate the CT force 

within a single base then we are not mitigating the risk, we are increasing it 

by not having an effective CT force. 

The training and assistance mission spreads across three Anny Corps and 

across police zones is primarily advisors to assist with the continued growth 

5 
57 

and development of the ANSF. An advisory brigade should be assigned to 

each corps with responsibility for the police zones in the corps as well. 

Finally, are the enablers for the ANSF. This is often misunderstood as to its 

importance. Just about every NA TO country in Afghanistan requires 

enablers from the US in varying degrees, such as helicopters, intelligence, 

medical, logistics and road and mine clearance. When the ANA was 

organized, recruited and trained the decision was to build an infantry force, or 

a "boots on the ground" force. The enablers would be provided by the US 

and are similar to what the US provides NATO forces. Eventually, the ANA 

will have its own enablers but not till beyond 2014. If the ANA is to be 

offensive minded they must have confidence in their support, otherwise they 

will be paralyzed and reduced to defending their bases. 

A summary of the forces required for a post 2014 residual force are: 

CT -12,000 

Training and assistance 5,000 

Enablers - 8,000 

Total- 25,000 

6 
58 

ANSF FORCE LEVEL 

---The second mitigation to reduce the risk is the force level for the 

ANSF. Currently, at 352 thousand one of the options is to drawdown the 

ANSF post 2015 to a level of 228 thousand. This makes no sense given the 

NATO / US drawdown which culminates in 2014 and, we obviously do not 

know what that impact is. We can mitigate the risk by planning to fund the 

ANSF at the current 352 thousand to 2020. At some point the Afghans will 

be in a position to contribute to the funding level. 

PAKISTAN SANCTUARIES 

---A third mitigation to reduce the risk in to authorize the targeting of 

the Taliban and Haggani leaders in the sanctuaries in Pakistan. Priority is to 

the Haggani sanctuary because of the unstable situation in the EAST. This 

would be an extension of the mission the OGA is conducting against the Al 

Qaeda in the FAT A. Once systematic targeting commences, the sanctuary 

will cease to exist as we currently know it; a place where strategy, training, 

operational oversight, intelligence and logistics is executed, routinely, in safe 

haven. These functions will suffer significantly which will positively impact 

7 
59 

operations in the EAST. Additionally, it will be a huge morale boost for the 

ANSF. 

Let me conclude by saying I believe there is far too much risk to a 

stable security situation in Afghanistan as we meet today. This is driven 

mostly by US policy decisions. I recognize that many observers are looking 

to a political settlement as the most desirable outcome, and certainly it is that, 

but the harsh reality is the more risk there is to mission success the less 

likelihood of a settlement. If the Taliban and Haggani believe they will gain 

in influence in 2014 and beyond, why settle? If future policy decisions on 

US post 2014 force size and ANSF force levels do in fact increase the risk 

versus mitigate the risk a favorable outcome is unlikely. In that case, it 

would be hard to justify a US presence beyond 2014. Ambassador Ryan 

Crocker as many of you know is an extraordinary diplomat, the very best we 

had in the region, who said: "how we end a conflict and what we leave 

behind is more important than how we began it". 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

8 
60 

General John M. Keane, United States Army, Retired 

General Jack Keane is president, GSI, LLC. He is a director of MetLife and General Dynamics, 

chairman of the Institute for the Study of War, chairman of the Knollwood Foundation, a 

member of the Secretary of Defense's Policy Board, the George C. Marshall Foundation, the 

Center for Strategy and Budget Assessment, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Smith 

Richardson Foundation, a trustee at Fordham University, and an advisor to two foundations 

assisting our veterans: Welcome Back Veterans and American Corporate Partners. 

General Keane, a four-star general, completed 37 years in public service in December 2003, 

culminating as acting Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army. As the chief 

operating officer of the Army for 4V, years, he directed one million, five hundred thousand 

soldiers and civilians in 120 countries, with an annual operating budget of 110 billion dollars. 

General Keane was in the Pentagon on 9/11 and provided oversight and support for the wars in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. He serves as a national security analyst for Fox News and speaks 

throughout the nation on national security and leadership. Since 2004, General Keane conducted 

frequent trips to Iraq for senior defense officials having completed multiple visits during the 

surge period. He played a key role in recommending the surge strategy in Iraq and is featured in 

many articles and a number of books to include Bob Woodward's The War Within and Tom 

Rick's The Gamble. Still active in national security, Gen. Keane continues to advise scnior 

government officials on national security and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He recently 

completed an assessment in Afghanistan in January 2012. 

General Keane is a career infantry paratrooper, a combat veteran of Vietnam, decorated for 

valor, who spent much of his military life in operational commands where his units were 

employed in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. He commanded the famed IOl st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault) and the legendary 18th Airborne Corps, the Army's largest war fighting 

organization. 

General Keane graduated from Fordham University with a Bachelor of Science degree in 

Accounting and a Master of Arts degree in Philosophy from Western Kentucky University. He 

is a graduate of the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College. 
61 

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2 
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3 
64 

li!i~IG'BI~S~~I!l~tll 

ill ~:SJ,n\lIml~ 

o 

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 

Prepared Statement of LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) 

Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow, Center for Q New American Security 

February 27, 2013 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Committee, I'd like to express my 

appreciation for being invited to appear before you today to address the coming U.S. and NATO 

transition in Afghanistan. As the war now enters its twelfth year, Americans deserve a serious look at the 

plans now in place to responsibly conclude our involvement in this long and difficult conflict. My remarks 

today on that topic renect my own personal views, and do not represent those of the Center for a New 

American Security or any other entity. 

Unlike our other panelists today, I have had the privilege of commanding the Afghan theater of war. My 

service there spanned nineteen months from October 2003 to May 2005. My tenure was one of the 

longest among our eleven different overall U.S. commanders, and occurred at what was certainly a far less 

violent and more optimistic period of our efforts. Since 2005, I have remained closely in touch with the 

progress of the war, and have travelled back several times to the theater to observe ongoing operations 

and speak ,vith Afghans, Pakistanis, Americans and our NATO anies across the region. I have also written 

and spoken extensively on the course of the conflict during the last eight years. 

On a more personal level, both my sons are Army captains who have served a year or more in combat in 

Afghanistan. Scores of my uniformed friends' sons and daughters -- former playmates of my kids at 

military posts all across the country -- have served there, where some have been wounded and some 

killed. My involvement in this very long fight remains thus both personal and professional. I know what 

it's like as a parent to have a family member at risk in the combat zone. And this outlook is never far from 

my thinking as I try to reach conclusions about our ongoing efforts, and attempt to think through the 

road ahead. 

Our decisions ahout transition are set in this context. As we balance seeking to achieve our long-term 

strategic objectives with the risk inherent in keeping Americans at war in Afghanistan, we must be 

thoughtful and clear-headed in understanding what has been done, and what can be accomplished at this 

stage of the war. There is no silver bullet solution, nor any absolute right answer among our looming 

choices here. But the men and women serving at the tail end of our long war in Afghanistan deserve 

careful consideration and about the importance of the ends we seek in balance with the lives of young 

men and women we ask to deliver these ends. In my judgment, their lives only deserve to be put at risk 

where U.S. vital interests in Afghanistan and this region demand that level of commitment. I know that 

this calculus is one that this committee takes very seriously. 

www.cnas<org 
65 

tli~_litISSIBI!JIl~ 

ttlES'iill\ll!1U&~ 

Before examining the size and scope ofD.S. and Afghan security forces looking ahead to 2014 and 

beyond, it's worth returning to first principles: what vital interests are the United States seeking to detend 

in Afghanistan and the region after the end 0[20 14? What are the absolute essentials? Only by fully 

understanding this basic, minimalist expression of our overall policy goals for the region can we 

determine what level of military and financial support will be required in Afghanistan for the this new 

uncharted period. We all recognize as well that the strategic context of ever-tighter budgets at home 

driven by years of trillion dollar defleits and a $16.4 trillion national debt will unquestionably have an 

impact on decisions on our future commitments in Afghanistan. 

In that light then, we must look to U.S. vital interests. As I have noted in previous testimony to this 

committee in 2011, in my judgment there are three U.S. vital interests at stake in Afghanistan and this 

region post-2014. 

1) Preventing the region's use as a base for terror groups to attack the United States and our allies; 

2) Ensuring nuclear weapons or nuclear materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists or other 

hostile actors; and, 

3) Preventing a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. 

In my estimation, protecting these vital U.S. interests in the coming years requires a U.S. base in the 

region from which to exert influence on all the regional actors, and to keep relentless pressure on terror 

groups targeting the United States and our allies. Afghanjstan presents the most logical and likely location 

for such a sustained, if necessarily limited, U.S. military presence. The enduring mission ofV.S. forces 

under this scenario is two-fold: counter-terrorism -- to continue to attack a) Qaeda elements in the region 

who pose a transnational threat to the V nUed States and our allies around the world; and support for 

Afghan security forces ~- to train, advise and assist them in their ongoing fight against the Taliban. 

In order to continue to protect these interests after 2014, but do so in a way that husbands taxpayers' 

scarce dollars, the United States will have to significantly reshape its military presence in Afghanistan. 

This effort is now underway. The President recently announced a withdrawal of 34,000 of the remaining 

66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan between now and this time next year. The bulk of these troops will 

continue to serve in Afghanistan throughout the coming April-to~October fighting season, thus 

preserving maximum flexibility for U.S. commanders on the ground. But the mission of these remaining 

troops has now shifted inexorahly to support for Afghan forces in their fight against the Taliban, rather 

than taking on that direct combat role themselves. This is a ne\iV direction, one that has not been the focus 

of D .S. eflorts for most of the past II years. 

www.cnas.org 
66 

, , 

ilmN~ln!i$is:~mllll! 

11i1\1f(IIICJlN~ , 

As part of this shift in focus, u.s. forces now fully shift to a train, advise and assist role as Afghan security 

forces concurrently take lead for security around the country, while. My colleague Andrew Exum and I 

wrote in December 2011 that the United States should have taken on this primary role in 2012 (which we 

called security force assistance). \Vhile this shift could have come sooner, making this important move 

now without delay is vital. Only by aHowing the Afghan security forces to take lead will we he able to 

discern where shortfalls in training, equipment and organization exist, and use the 22 months remaining 

prior to the end of 2014 to fix those shortcomings. 

While U.S. forces will draw down to approximately 32,000 by February of 20 14, those remaining forces 

will be well-postured to playa supporting role to the Afghan presidential election set for April of next 

year. I should note to this committee that neither the U.S. nor other NATO troops have played, nor in my 

view should play, a central role in the security or administration of previous Afghan elections. Afghans 

view security for their elections as a sovereign responsibility and their security forces are more than 

capable of taking on this role, as they did in both 2004 and 2009. The political legitimacy derived from 

conducting a free and fair election by Afghan standards is an entirely separate question from military 

security. \Vhile critically important in its own right, it does not fall within the scope of the Afghan or 

U.S.lNATO military effort. U.S. diplomacy should be actively working today to help assure such an 

outcome in 2014. Afghans have never needed tens of thousands of NATO troops in order to secure an 

Afghan election. Next year will he no different, although international troops can provide useful 

supporting efforts. 

Upon completion of the Apri12014 Afghan presidential election, the remaining 32,000 U.S. troops will in 

turn be drawn down to the final residual presence that the U,S, plans to maintain post-2014. While no 

decision has yet been announced by the Administration on those ultimate numbers, recent reports from 

the NATO ministerial in Brussels may provide some clues. Press reports have indicated that the overall 

NATO presence might range from between 8,000 to 15,000 troops, including U.S. forces. As I have 

vtTitten recently with my colleague Matthew Irvine in the 'Washington Post, I believe a number in this 

range would be adequate to sustain key u.s, vital interests in the region, Doing so would entail these 

residual forces performing two key missions: counter-terrorism against al Qaeda remnants, and a limited 

effort to train, advise and equip Afghan forces. If the current 2:1 ratio of U.S. troops to NATO forces 

remains in place, that would suggest a number of ahout 8,000 to 10,000 U.S. troops. 

In my estimation, sllch a scenario would see the bulk of residual U.S, forces rightfully focused on the CT 

mission, while other NATO troops would foclls on training and advising Afghan security forces. This 

division oflabor focllses U.S. forces on the protection of American vital interests while at the same time 

providing a long-term viable and important role for our allies. Perhaps most importantly, a 

comprehensive commitment of this nature signifies a long-term and enduring international commitment 

to our Afghan partners. Such a message will not be lost on the Afghan people. their government, nor the 

www,cnas.org 
67 

, f(l~N~BlEI<S.~NiliJ!i' 

lIleSllMDl!Iil 

, ' 

Taliban: that after thirteen years, the West is in fact NOT abandoning Afghanistan. The international 

commitment to a post-2014 enduring (if much smaller) troop presence, accompanied by sllstained and 

significant funding will buttress Afghan confidence immeasurably. At the same time, such a commitment 

entirely undermines the Taliban's core narrative of western abandonment and eventual victory. 

Two final points require emphasis to the committee today. 

First, The United States rnust continue our financial and moral commitment to the nation and people of 

Afghanistan. The Afghan war to date has cost the United States more than $600 billion and over 2, I 00 

American lives, with tens of thousands more wounded. Failing to protect long-term U,S, vital interests in 

this region after 2014 would largely cast aside all of those painful sacrifices. Such an abandonment would 

signal a regional retreat that would embolden our adversaries and frighten our friends around the world at 

a time when many are already deeply worried about U.S. retrenchment Protecting our vital interests in 

this region after 2014 requires not just a commitment of U.S. troops, but a long-term budgetary 

commitment by the Congress of the United States. Along with funding from our international partners, 

we must financially sustain the Afghan security forces that will now be the frontline of the fight against 

the Taliban insurgency. 

Second, the United States and NATO needs to re~look the original plan to reduce Afghan security forces 

trom their peak strength of 352,000 to fewer than 240,000 by 2017. It is increasingly clear that 

implementing this roll-back of Afghan forces while the insurgency continues is deeply uIlV\ise. It will 

undercut the gains made by Afghan forces, undermine their morale at a critical time, and fuel the Taliban 

narrative of looming victory as most western forces depart. Rather than continue this m~advised and 

somewhat arbitrary drawdown, the west should maintain and resource Afghan security forces at current 

levels for at least five years after most U.S. troops depart in 20]4. A five~year period provides adequate 

time for Afghan forces to fully stabilize their capabilities after the departure of most western troops, and 

will enable them to sustain their battles with the Taliban without reducing their forces in the midst of an 

active insurgency fight. This decision will require not only U.S. and international willpower, hut the 

financial support required for Afghan forces to sustain this fight. With Afghan soldier costing about 1/80" 

of the cost of one deployed American, this is a high-return investment in sustaining broader stability in 

the region. As former Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah observed in late 2009, "30,000 Taliban 

v{ill never defeat 30 million Afghans." Continued financial support for robust Afghan security forces is 

the essential ingredient that will allow the Afghan people to ultimately prevail against the Taliban 

insurgency. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to present my views on this long and intractable conflict as the U.S. 

and our international partners consider the road ahead. Tn many ways, the coming transition is a tipping 

point for these long-standing efforts in Afghanistan. Making wise choices at this key juncture can help us 

www.cnas.org 
68 

, , \ 

l!~R~ln!~&t~lII~flj 

!l!ESll'!lil!ll~lIIl\!i , 

secure the gains paid for by Americans and our allies in so much blood and so much treasure over the last 

decade. Securing our long-term regional vital interests is achievable as we end our combat presence. It 

will require a limited U,S. and NATO troop footprint paired ""ith sustained international financial 

support for robust Afghan security forces who will continue to fight a still potent Taliban insurgency. The 

limited troop deployments and budget outlays required are a prudent investment to help assure stability 

in this very dangerous part of the world. 

www.cnas.org 
69 

~li'll1lll(iB!ii:SIl!lt1l!,l!1¥1 

m&~IlSIMli'lllit~ 

, 

LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) 

Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security 

General Barno, a highly decorated military officer with over 30 years of 

service, has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the 

United States and around the world, to include command at every leveL 

He served many of his early years in special operations forces with Army 

Ranger battalions, to include combat in both the Grenada and Panama 

invasions. In 2003, he was selected to establish a new three-star 

operational headquarters in Afghanistan and take command of the 

20,000 U.S. and Coalition Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. For 

19 months in this position, he was responsible for the overall military 

leadership of this complex political-military mission, devising a highly 

innovative counterinsurgency strategy in close partnership with the U.S. 

embassy and coalition allies. His responsibilities included regional 

military efforts with neighboring nations and involved close 

coordination with the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations, NATO International Security 

Assistance Force, the U.S. Department of State and USAID, and the senior military leaders of many 

surrounding nations and numerous allies. 

From 2006-2010, General Barno served as the Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic 

Studies at the National Defense University. Concurrently, he was the Chairman of the Advisory 

Committee on Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Veterans and Families from 

2007-2009. He frequently serves as an expert consultant on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, 

professional military education and the changing character of conflict, supporting a wide-range of 

government and other organizations. General Barno is widely published and has testified before Congress 

numerous times. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute 

of Strategic Studies. 

A 1976 graduate of the u.s. Military Academy at West Point, General Barno also earned his master's 

degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S, Army 

Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College, General Barno has received 

numerous awards for his military and puhlic service. 

www.cnas.org 
70 

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71 

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2 
72 

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3 
73 

11:422/19113 

The Uncertain Role of the ANSF in 

Transition: 

Establishing Real World Criteria 

and Metrics 

'I'","t'1I1"01l'''' to the House Armed Service 
74 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11 :422/19/13 3 

Executive Summary 

The effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are only one clement 

of success in Afghanistan, but they are clitical to providing lasting security and stability 

and denying Afghanistan as a future base for international terrorism and extremism. 

If the US and its allies are to succeed in Afghanistan, it must continue to support the 

ANSF and provide them with the capability to support a successful Transition to Afghan 

responsibility to security. However, for a successful Transition to occur the US must 

change the way in which it evaluates the ANSF's prospects for success, be ready to 

provide the necessary resources, and focus on the actual ability to achicve security rather 

than force building and evaluation tools like the CMA and CUAT system. 

Two key criteria for success are external to the ANSF, and will require careful attention 

and support from the US. First, the ANSF cannot succeed without effective Afghan 

leadership and a reasonablc degree of national unity following the 2014 election. Second, 

the ANSF cannot survive without adequate external funding through at least 2017. 

The US and its allies - including the US Congress - must also understand the challenges 

both US and ISAF trainers and partners face, and the challenges the Afghans face as well. 

Thc prcsent focus on force generation is being driven by pressures that mean changc is 

inevitable once Transition occurs. These pressures include: 

A failure to meet initial CS and [SAF military surge goals, implement the 2010 campaign plan, 

and back the OS bnild-up with a viable civilian surge. 

Major shortfalls in providing the levels of AfgluUl governance and rule of law efforts in the field 

necessary to make ANSF efforts effective. 

The inability of the Afghan govennnent to treat the real world impact of power brokers, corruption, 

narcotics, and criminal networks arouud and within the ANSF and to treat these problems as if 

they did not exist. 

The long history of underl\mding and erratic funding by outside states and shortfalls in trainers 

and partners. 

Loug periods in which salaries were not competitive and high levels of annual attrition and 

tlU1l0Ver took place. 

Steady rises in ANSF force goals based largely on arbitrary numbers aud force goals accompanied 

by steady efforts to reduce the time available to achieve them. 

Ongoing reductions in US and allied force levels, often with limited waming and that are larger 

and sooner than previously anticipated. 

Reductions in out year annual cost from some $9 billion to $6 billion to $4.1 billion. 

Constant changes in pcrfonnancc standards and goals. 

This requires a new approach to assessing the devclopment of Afghan forces based on a 

net assessment of how they actually perform relative to insurgent factions and one linked 

that tied to a similar assessment of the success of Afghan governance in winning popular 

support relative that of the insurgents and other factions. 

Policy-Icvel attention must shifting from a focus on force building metrics to thc overall 

success of the key elements of the ANSF in helping to bring security and stability and 
75 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 4 

win popular support for the government at the provincial and key District level. This, in 

tum, will require ISAF to develop far more realistic and honest reporting on progress in 

security, and the overall success of Transition, than it has made public to date. 

It also seems clear that setting largely arbitrary force goals like 352,000 men - or 228,500 

in the future - needs to be replaced by a focus on the force elements that can actually 

preform effectively in the field. These include the A[ghan National Army (ANA), Afghan 

National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and Afghan Local Police (ALP). It is these forces 

- which make up a little over half of the current ANSF - that will determine whether the 

ANSF can contain and defeat the insurgents during 2013-2014 and beyond. 

Other elements of the Afghan National Police (ANP) - such as the Afghan Uniformed 

Police (AUP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) - will have some utility. They will, 

however, remain corrupt, have limited effectiveness, lack support from effective 

governance in the ficld and from the other clements of a criminal justice system. They 

also are likely to revert to control by local power brokers. 

The US and its allies must also recognize that many elements of the ANSF will not be 

fully ready for transition before 2016-2017, and that- if combat continues - they will 

require outside support in the form of airpower, trainers, intelligence, and sustainment. At 

the same time, current force de\'elopment plans cannot survive engagement with reality. 

The Afghans must restructure their force development plans to do it their way, to cope 

with the problems posed by power brokers, ethnic and tjibal factions, and corruption. 

This requircs more realistic plans for the future of each clement of the ANSF based on 

year-by-year plans [or transition and force building and tied to detailed funding plans. It 

also requires a new approach to force building metrics that adapts the CM and CUA T to 

Afghan needs and capabilities rather than outside standards. The Department of Defense 

reports that US and its allies are already transferring responsibility for this aspect of 

reporting to Afghan developed metrics. The key elements of the ANSF must use this 

opportunity both to develop metrics designed to meet Afghan rather than outside needs 

and their own net assessment approach necessary to determine their capabilities for 

Transition. 

Like every aspect of Afghan governance and politics, the end result is unlikely to meet 

the CUlTent planned goals set by the US, ISAF and aid donors. It may, however, still meet 

real world meet Afghan needs and provide a level of strategic success the US can 

credibly hope to achieve. 
76 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 5 

Table of Contents 

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 1 

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, POLITICS, AND UNITY OF EFFORT .................................................. 1 

THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS, AND CORRUPTION ................................................. 1 

Figure 1: Kabulstan vs. Afghanistan: Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions ..................................... ..4 

FOCUSING ON THE REAL WORLD EFFECTIVENESS OF KEY ELEMENTS OF THE ANSF ................................ 5 

Figure 2: The Power Structure of Afghan Forces During and After Transition in 2014 .... 5 

A CAUTION ABOUT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS .......................................................................................................... 8 

MONEY AS A KEY ANSF METRIC ........................................................................................................ 8 

A HISTORY OF ERRATIC RESOURClNG ................................................................................................................... 9 

THE NEED TO FUND THE FUTURE .......................................................................................................................... 9 

Fib'1.lfe 3: Projected US and Other Donor Support forthe ANSF ............................................... 10 

Figure 4: Afghan Government Dependence on Outside Aid: 2006-2011 ............................ 12 

SECURITY AND TRANSITION ............................................................................................................ 13 

US FORCE CUTS SET THE STAGE ......................................................................................................................... 13 

Figure 5: Changes in US Troop Levels: 2003-2014 ......................................................................... 16 

WITHDRAWAL WITH OR WITHOUT ADEQUATE ADVISORS, TRAINERS, PARTNERS, AND ENABLERS? .16 

AN EXTREMELY UNCERTAIN LEVEL OF SECURITY!N SPITE OFTHE "SURGE" ........................................... 17 

RELYING A LARGELY IRRELEVANT METRIC: ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS ................................................. 18 

Figure 6: No Meaningful Improvement in Afghan Security Metrics: 2009-2012 .............. 19 

OTHER METRICS SHOW No CLEAR IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY AS A RESULT OFTHE "SURGE" ......... 21 

LIES BY OMISSION? DROPPING THE METRICS THAT MAY BE LESS FAVORABLE BUT ALSO COULD 

REFLECT ACTUALANSF PERFORMANCE .......................................................................................................... 21 

Figure 7: Insurgent Attacks by Province in Fourth Quarter 2012 ......................................... 23 

TRANSITIONING DISTRICTS AND PROVINCES TO THE ANSF BY THE CALENDAR WITH No CLEAR 

PICTURE OF ANSF CAPABILITy ........................................................................................................................... 23 

Figure 9: Transitioning Provinces and Districts: Tranches 1-3..... .. .. 24 

THE ANSF, SECURITY, AND POPULAR SUPPORT ............................................................................................. 26 

BUILDING AND SUSTAINING AFGHAN FORCES .......................................................................... 27 

THE LIMITS TO CAPABILITY MILESTONE (CM) AND COMMANDERS UNIT ASSESSMENT TOOL (CUAT) 

RATINGS ................................................................................................................................................................... 27 

BROAD METRICS OF NUMBERS OF OPERATIONS AND AFGHAN-LED OPERATIONS HAVE SOME VALUE 

................................................................................................................................................................................... 28 

Figure 10: Levels of Contingency Operation and Trend in Partnered Operations ............ 29 

MEASURING PROGRESS IN FORCE GENERATION .............................................................................................. 30 

Figure 11: ANSF Development -Institutional Metrics and Benchmarks ............................. 31 

THE MoD AND THE Mol ....................................................................................................................................... 31 

Focus ON THE ANA .............................................................................................................................................. 32 

ACCEPT MARGINAL SUCCESS WITH THE POLlCE AND RULE OF LAW ........................................................... 32 

Focus ON ALP AND FUTURE ROLE OF MILlTlAS ............................................................................................. 34 

Figure 12: Popular Perceptions of Corruption in the ANSF, Government, and Justice 

System ............................................................................................................................................................... 35 

NARCOTICS, CRIMINAL NETWORKS, AND LEADERSHIP FLIGHT .................................................................... 36 

GREEN ON BLUE AND GREEN ON GREEN ATTACKS ......................................................................................... 36 

Figure 13: Insider Attacks on TSAF and ANSF Personnel: 2007-2012 ................................. 38 
77 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 

Introduction 

Any real world assessment of the role of the ANSF in Trunsition must be based on the 

fact that the criteria for assessment have changed fundamentally in the course of the last 

two years. The issue is no longcr the level of progress in generating new clements of the 

Afghan forces with only vague constraints on cost and time. It is whether an effective 

mix of Afghan forces can take over from the remaining elements of US and ISAF forces 

and related support by the end of 2014, and do so in support of an effective Afghan 

govemment with enough resources to survive. 

This does not mean that past metrics are unimportant, but it does mean that many are at 

best of marginal valuc. Using ruting systems to measure progress in creating, training, 

and equipping given unit elements or aspects of the force structure is not a mcasure of 

whether the ANSF will be etTective or sustainable in a post Trunsition period. Neither, for 

that matter, is whether individual units arc capable of operating independently or in the 

lead at some unstated level of performance and combat intensity. 

The test of Afghan forces is not success in meeting some outside scoring system for force 

development. It lies in whether key elements of the force like the ANA and ANCOP can 

maintain or increase security in critical areas, actually assume responsibility for security, 

and contain or defeat insurgent movements like the Taliban and Haqqani Network. The 

issue is one of net assessment, not whether unit elements are "in the lead," and it cannot 

be separated from the quality of the Afghan government and civil political, governance, 

and economic stability of the county 

In short, assessment of the ANSF should now be based on a net assessment of whether its 

key elements will be able to provide security over enough of the country to hold 

Afghanistan together, and do so with far more limited resources and outside aid. This 

involves a very different set of criteria, enablers, and metrics, and one that the US and 

ISAF urgently need to adopt. 

National Leadership, Politics, and Unity of Effort 

Given the past history of force building efforts in Vietnam, EI Salvador, Columbia, the 

Balkans and Iraq; Afghanistan's future leadership, political unity, and overull quality of 

governance in the field arc likely to be most important criteria detelmining the 

effectiveness of the ANSF. No matter how well the ANSF is created, advised, and 

partnered, it cannot succeed with a weak leader in "Kabulsta.n" and/or the lack of some 

viable fOim of unity and governance outside it. 

Tlte Impact of Leadership, Political Alignments, 

and Corruption 

The legitimacy of the election will be an important factor in determining whether the 

leader it produces has popular support. But the leadership qualities of next Afghan leader 

and the unity of the various ethnic and sectarian power brokers will be critical. Real 

legitimacy is never based on how a leader is chosen, but on the quality and popular 

perceptions of how well he leads. 
78 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119113 2 

This has already emerged as a high-risk area for transition and for the future of the ANSF. 

It is not clear that there is an effective replacement for Karzai. Creating honest and 

effective provincial and district governance remains a critical problem and one where 

recent SIGAR studies and Department of Defense reports indicate limited progress has 

been made little additional progress is likely as aid efforts are cut and withdrawn from the 

field during 2013-2014. 

The real political and power structure of Afghanistan still consists of the Afghan 

president's ability to balance givcn factions, ethnic groups, pmver brokers and warlordssome of which are tied to criminal networks, some of which are deeply corrupt, and some 

of which have links to the insurgcnts. 

The real effectivencss of the ANSF depends upon the leader's willingness to commit 

forces where they are most needed, manage and promote on the basis of merit, keep 

corruption to limited and popularly acceptable levels, and make effective use of tactics 

like night raids, air strikes, detentions, and other measures which rcquire a carcful 

balance between military effectiveness and the political and popular impact of the tactics 

involved. They depend on allocating resources for governance and the rest of the legal 

system in ways that build an effective mix of popular support and security, and on the 

willingness to both use and support the usc of US and other ISAF forces where they arc 

needed. 

These are all areas where Karzai showed limited leadership ability, a tcndency to focus 

on power brokering and winning short-term popular support, and created growing 

constraints on the effectiveness of US, other ISAF, and ANSF forces over time. They are 

also areas where Karzai's lack of support for other US and ISAF forces may have helped 

create serious problems in terms of green of blue attacks and popular resentment of 

foreign forces. They arc all areas where Karzai made many promises to deal with 

corruption and either found symbolic scapegoats or use anti-corl1lption to enhance his 

own power. 

As is discussed later, the polling data on corl1lption in the latest SIGAR report track 

closely with reports of groups like Transparency International that warn every element of 

Afghan governance - including the MoD, Mol, and most elements of the ANSF - is 

corl1lpt and perceived as corrupt by the Afghan people. lAs bad as this current situation is, 

it is far from clear that the next leader will be able to balance various factions as well as 

Karzai, and the reemergence of a Northern Alliance is only one warning signal of the fact 

that the leadership that emerges out of the 2014 election will be critical to the future of 

both the ANSF and the ability of the US and outside powers to support it. 

The Febl1lary 2013 Quarterly Report by SIGAR, and work by Catherine Dale and Ken 

Katzman of the Congressional Research Service, warn that key clements of leadership 

and governance will be missing through at least 2014. 2 Effective governance is still 

lacking at the provincial, district, and local level in many areas, and so arc the civil 

elements of a rule of law necessary to allow a police force to work and mainl'lin its 

integrity. The ANSF cannot operate in a vacuum, and weak local governance can ensure 

its ineffectiveness, rcinforce its corruption, and either empowers power brokers or the 

insurgents. 
79 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 3 

Some senior Afghans have pl1vately made it clear that they believe success will not 

depend on the election but on some new agreement among power brokers to makc it 

through Transition. Others have made it clear that that there is a real risk of Transition 

producing a mix of a weak "Kabul stan" and regions under power broker control, or even 

some form of coup within the ANA. 

It is all too clear from examples like Iraq, that there is a risk of an ethnic leader 

effectively taking control of the military, a quick break up of the police into local ethnic 

and sectarian factions, and divisions within the Afghan Army along ethnic lines. The 

basic ethnic divisions in Afghanistan are shown in Figure 1, although this map does not 

distinguish important differences within the Pashtuns, and does not reflect critical tribal 

and geographic divisions within the structure of Afghan politics and power brokers. 

Much of the real world future of Transition will depend on the post-2014 alignment of 

tribal factions in the cast and south both in terms of limiting insurgent inlluence in thc 

border and less populated areas, and in determining to what level key power brokers in 

populated areas will align with the central government. 

There are no metrics that make it possible to estimate the probabilities involved in some 

fonn of factional division of the country and ANSF, but it is striking that OSD reported 

in December 2012 that Tajiks made up some 40% of the officer and 41% of the NCO 

corps (p. 58), while Tajiks only make up roughly 27% of the population according to the 

CIA. Uzbeks, Hazara, and other ethniciseetm1an groups arc badly underrepresented at the 

top while the Pashtuns are also over-represented? 
80 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119/13 4 

Figure 1: Kabulstan vs. Afghanistan: Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions4 

Ethnic Map of Afghanistan 

l:Pashtun 

2:: Tal1k 

'----- 7~Othet 

Ethnic Structure of ANA Q42012 
81 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 5 

This mix of weak central governance, weaker and divided governance in the field, real 

rule by local pO\ver broker and tribal faction, and corruption docs not mean Afghanistan 

cannot function after Transition, but it does mean that the ANSF will be under intense, 

and potentially divisive political pressure. Key clements may divide along regional, 

ethnic, and power broker lines, the relative influence in Pashtun areas will be critical in 

checking the insurgents, and the next President risks becoming steadily more isolated in 

Kabul, tied to regional and ethnic factions, and/or forced to try to use the ANSF to 

preserve personal power. Saigon and Baghdad arc practical examples of the potential 

extremes. 

Focusing on tile Real World Effectiveness of Key 

Elements of the A NSF 

The future effectiveness of the ANSF has to be viewed in both political terms and by 

force element. Figure 2 summarizes their current and probable post-Transition 

capabilities in these tenns, and it should be clear that only two force clements - the ANA 

and ANCOPs - have a high probability of emerging as effective national forces. Even if 

fully staffed their peak-manning goal, they would only total some 186,503 men, or 53% 

of the goal of 352,000. 

The differences bctween given elements of the ANSF, and the external forces shaping 

these differences, are described in more detail later in this analysis. They are summarized 

in Figure 2, and it is important to realize that even the ANA and ANCOP forces will 

have serious problems in their future perfonnanee without effective Afghan political 

leadership and unity. Additionally, many - if not most - of the various other elements of 

the Afghan National Police are likely to remain problematic in tenns of integrity, loyalty, 

and effectiveness well beyond 2014 and indefinitely into the future. 

Figure 2 also shows, however, that the 352,OOO-man goal does not include a goal of 

30,000-40,000 Afghan Loeal Police, 11,000-23,000 Afghan Publie Protection Force 

personnel, and an unknown number of independent militia(s) - some of whieh do receive 

some fonn of government SUppOlt. If these now transitional and uncertain programs go 

forward to their present goals, they would total 41,000 to 63,000 men, and represent 

highly political wild cards in the ANSF. At present, however, there is no clear way to rate 

them and it seems unlikely that neither the ALP nor APPF will emerge at end-2014 in 

anything like their presently planned form. 

Figure 2: The Power Structure of Afghan Forces During and After Transition in 20145 

Force 

Element 

MOD 

Manpower 

Goal Total % 

of ANSF 

NA NA 

Current and Future Status 

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) has a reasonable level of 

leadership integrity by Afghan standards, but is to subject political 

influence and problems with favoritism and con-uption in 

promotions and contracting. Being rushed into premature 

readiness. End-2014 is too early a date of docs not have continuing 

outside support. Future effectiveness will, depend far more on 
82 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 6 

ANA 

AAF 

ANA+AAF 

Subtotal 

lvlOI 

ANCOP 

AUP 

172,055 49% 

195,000 55% 

NA NA 

14,451 4% 

110,279 31% 

post-2014 election leadership than training and readiness to assume 

effective management of ANA. 

The Afghan National Anlly (ANA) had 174,645 personnel 

assigned in Q4 2012. It is a force that is still velY much in 

transition with a growing number of cffectivc combat elements 

(Kandaks = ITS battalions). It has seven corps the size of lTS 

(livisions, a 12,525 man Special Operations Force, and 44,712 men 

(13% of entire ANSF) in support elements. Force development has 

been consistently mshed since 2009 and tlle goal of creating a 

mature force by end 2014 has been severely affected by problems 

in creating the MoD, a shortfall in the number of qualified trainers 

and partners, increases in the force goal levels and condensed 

timing for security transfer. Tne ANA has substantially less 

corruption that any element of ANSF other than ANCOP. But 

there arc still problems and question about links of some elements 

to powerbrokers. Attrition and shortfalls in qualified officers and 

NCOs will remain problems through 2014. May well be capable of 

forcing insurgents to stay out of critical populated areas, or at 

least marginalizing their influence if receive full funding, 

substantial US partnering and enabling during 2014-2017, if new 

Afghan president is eJIective leader, and if political and ethnic 

factions can achieve a working post20J 4 election modus vivendi. 

The Afghan Air Force (AAF) had 5,872 personnel assigned in Q4 

2012. It has had major problems with development and comlption. 

It is not intended to be ready of self-sufficient before the end of 

2016 and even then will have limited combat capability. This may 

make continued lTS air support clitical through at least 2017 - a 

requirement that will continue to raise issues over civilian 

casualties and collateral daInagc. 

A reasonable level of leadership integrity by Afghau standards, but 

far more subject to political influence, problems with favoritism, 

and cormption in promotions and contracting than the MoD. Bcing 

rushed into prcmatme readiness. End-2014 is too early if the MOl 

does not have continuing outside support. Futtu'e effectiveness 

will, again depend far more on post-2014 election leadership than 

training and readiness to assume effective management of vm10us 

eIcmcnts of A1';1', and the Mol will remain far more subject to 

outside political pressure than :VloJ). 

The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is a relatively 

effective pm'amilitary force with 14,383 men assigned in Q4 2012. 

The ANCOP is the only element of ANP consistently capable of 

counte11nsurgency operations. Currently loyal (0 central 

govcrnment, but has a high attrition rate and much depends on the 

next president. 

The Afghml Uniform Police (At 1') had 106,235 personnel 

assigned in Q4 2012. The AFP are a deeply divided force with 

some good elements and many conupt and ineffective elements 
83 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 7 

ABP 

ANP 

Subtotal 

CN'PA 

23,090 7% 

157,000 45% 

2,986? 0.8% 

Total ANSF 352,000 100% 

ALP 30,000-

40,000 

NA 

tied to powerbrokers. There are some elements with probable links 

to insurgents and climinal networks. Opemtions are often very 

limited in Districts with significant insurgent clements. Lacks 

support of effective local govenunent and other clements of justice 

system in many areas. There are major shortages in advisors and 

partners and many clements of the ANSF are umated by. There is 

an uncertain overall ability to sustain readiness and training levels, 

pay, and selection and promotion by mclit if advisors phase down. 

},-!any elements likely to devolve to force elements tied to local 

power brokers, make deals with insurgents, or collapse after 201-'1. 

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) had 21,928 persOimel assigned in 

Q4 2012. The force had some good elements, and others that were 

cormpt, but actively fought or resisted insurgents. However, there 

are many COfl1.lpt and ineffective clements operating as local power 

brokers or tied to powerbrokers. Often guilty of extortion in AOR 

or at checkpoints, and sometimes seizure of boys. Some elements 

with links to climinal networks and working a.lTangements with 

insurgents. SCI10llS probJem in tenns of lost govcnnllcnt revenues 

because of comlption. Many elements likely to devolve to force 

elements tied to local pOlVer brokers, make deals with insurgents, 

or collapse after 201-'1. 

The Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan arc a small force that 

had 2,581 men assigned in Q4 2012. They arc a small force 

charged with helping to implement a large program that has cost 

some $6.1 billion since 2002. Their effectiveness is unclear, and as 

is the broader role of the ANSI' - which often does not operate in 

key narcotic gro\ving areas, or has tailored eradication to support 

given power brokers and respond to bribes. The overaU eJfort bas 

had little impact since 2010, although disease and drought have 

affected total production. U;-..JDOC estimates that the area under 

cultivation increased from 13\,000 hectares in 2011 to 15-'1,000 in 

2012, and major increases took place in southem areas under 

Taliba.Jl influence. 

A force very much in development and maimed at only 16,474 in 

December 2012 with enough problems and links to Taliban so that 

SO.HF was re-validatcd manning. However, it has shown that 

clements have been effective where Afghan, US, and othcr special 

forces or high quality trainers arc present and efforts to improve 

local seculity maintain links to the ANP'MoI are supported by 

govemaIICe and development activity like the Village Stability 

Operations. Recruiting and manning has largely lIibal clements, 

many with ties to local power brokers and some with past ties to 

insurgent elements. Can potentially he a critical clement in 1iluiting 

insurgent presence or control, hut can easily break up or change 

sides as outside advisors withdraw or if the central govennuent 

lacks unity and leadership. 
84 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 8 

APPF 

Militias 

11,000- NA 

23,000 

NA NA 

In theory, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPl"1 will replace 

private seclll'ity companies (PSCs) with an 11,000-2..1,OOOman 

govenllnent nln security force with 270-445 sites. The PSC do 

present major problems in tenns of ties to power brokers, 

COlTIlption, high cost, failure to provide effective secmity, and de 

facto deals with insurgents to pennit movement and cargo transfers 

rather than providing actual seclllity. The creation of the APPF, 

ho\-vcvcr, is IHore a Karzai power grab than a real security rcfonu. 

The APPF has fallen far behind the goal of replacing PSCs this 

year, future capability is highly uncertain, and is likely to be loyal 

to the highest bidder in a post-2014 enviromnent. 

There is no meaningful unclassified data on their number and 

strength, but they range from small local elements to significant 

forces and often playa key role in local security, or in supporting 

power brokers. Little or no real loyalty to government; and often 

exploit and abuse power, are cormpt, tied to criminal networks, or 

make deals with insurgents. As much of a tln'eat to unity and 

effective govClll(UlCe as a check on insurgents. 

A Caution About Peace Negotiations 

There is a further wild card. It is important to realize that peace negotiations cannot be 

decouplcd from plans for the ANSF. At least to date, the official Taliban or "Emirates" 

line is that the Afghan central government is a puppet regime, the ANSF arc tools of the 

US, and any negotiation would require all US and outside forces to leave - presumably 

include trainers and advisors. 

As cases like China, Vietnam and Nepal make clear, peace negotiations can easily be 

turned into an extension of war by other means, and particularly if outside powers use 

them to rush to the exits. Even good plans that separate opposing forces can easily 

become the focus of power struggles and civil connict. The search for peace docs not 

depend on preserving the current plans for the ANSF, but it must not be decoupled from 

clear plans for their future role and size. It is also clear that viltually any plan acceptable 

to the Taliban could mean drastic changes in both the current role and structure of the 

ANSF and outside funding and advisors. 

Money as a Key ANSF Metric 

History provides clear warnings that the continued availability of enough money to fund 

the ANSF, and the degree of honesty in distributing that money, will be another key 

criteria shaping the ANSFs real world effectiveness. At present, there arc no credible 

unclassified data on either the future costs involved or the level of funds that will really 

be made available. 

There have been vague statements about future funding of the ANSF at $4.1 billion a 

year, but with no definition of why the figure is $4.1 billion, where the money will really 

go, or the cost of combat. This disguises the reality that it is more important to have the 

ability to consistently pay for the necessary mix of forces than having scoring systems 

that count equipment, manning, and training, or the level of independence of given units. 
85 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 9 

At present, neither ISAF nor DoD has presented any meaning public details on the 

projeet eost and detailed plan for the future development of the ANSF. SIGAR and GAO 

have, however, provided the kind of cost profiles shown in Figure 3. 

A History of Erratic Resourcing 

The SIGAR data for FY2005-FY2012 at the top of Figure 3 inelude spending that 

accounts for roughly 90% of the total US and other outside funding of the ANSF. The 

data also show something that is all too easy to forget in evaluating both ANSF progress 

and the quality of the training and force building effort. Serious funding did not begin 

until FY2007, and quickly saturated a training and force development base that lacked the 

personnel to do the job. This led to a pause in FY2008, and consistent funding did not 

begin until FY2009. 

Delays between authorization and disbursement meant that the ANSF force building 

effort only gathered full funding momentum in FY2010, and as of end FY2012, SIGAR 

caleulated that only $38.14 billion of $55.37 billion in authorized funds for the Afghan 

Security Force Fund - the chief source of force building money- had actually been 

disbursed. Actually manning the training bases really only took place in FY2010 and is 

still seriously short qualified trainers. 

The Need to Fund the Future 

The key lesson for Congress, the Administration, and other donors should draw from this 

history - and from the collapse of ARVN forces in Vietnam and of Najibullah's Afghan 

forces in the post-Soviet period -is that erratic funding resources for the ANSF and 

manning for trainer/partner roles are at best "force delayers" and at worst "force killers." 

Resourcing the force is as important as shaping it and the same GAO report that provides 

the funding profile at the bottom of Figure 3 warns that," 

Our analysis shows that projected Afghan domestic revennes will be insufficient to cover the cost 

of ANSF through fiscal year 2015. Our analysis of DOD data estimates that the cost of continuing 

to build and sustain ANSF will he at least $25 billion for fiscal years 2013 tiuough 2017. Multiple 

factors are expected to influence the final cost o[ sustaining ANSI', including the size of the 

force-which is expected to decline, according to a preliminary model, from 352,000 to 228,500 

by 2017-as well as planned reductions in infrastmeture and training costs by 2014. According to 

DOD, continuous efforts are made to adjust ANSF capabilities and requirements to achieve cost 

reductions, including the Afghan First (the purchase of goods and services from Afghan 

producers) and Afghan Right (building and procuring items according to Afghan specifications) 

initiatives. 

At the Chicago Summit, the Afghan govenU'tlent pledged to devote at least $500 million in 2015 

and ammally thereafter to funding ANSF, which is abont 14 percent of its 2015 projected domestic 

revenues. However, even if the Afghan govennnent committed 100percent of its projected 

domestic revenues to funding ANSI', this amount would cover only about 75 percent of the cost of 

supporting secmity forces in fiscal year 2015 and would leave tile Afghan government no 

revenues to coycr any non-secmity-related programs, such as public health. 

At the Chicago Summit, the United States and its allies laid out a plan for future funding for 

ANSF; the P.S. mmual contribution is projected to decline over time but still cover the majority of 

the costs. Om mmlysis shows that donors f"lmded about 95 percent ($33.7 billion) of Afghm:ristan's 

total secUlity expenditures, with the Unitcd States funding approximately 91 percent ($32.4 

billion) of lhat amount from 2006 tluougil 2011. 
86 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:4221l91l3 10 

On the basis of projections of u.S. and other donor support for ANSF for fiscal years 2012 

through 2017, we estimate dlat there will be a gap each year from 2015 through 2017 between 

ANSI' costs and donor pledges if additional contributions are not made (see fig. 7). According to 

State, excluding Afghan and C.S. funds, the international community has pledged over $1 billion 

annually to support ANSF from 2015 through 2017. 

Figure 3: Projected US and Other Donor Support for the ANSF7 

Dollars (in billions) 

7 6.7 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2011 

CUMIJIIAlI\!'E OOMPARfSOH 

":PrO]ectedu.s.funding 

II1II Projected non-U.S, funding pledges (Includmg Afghanistan) 

CJ Unpledgedamounts 

Source. GAO analys,s 01 Departments of Defense and State data 

If the US wants the ANSF to be succcssful, it must be prepared to pay what it takes on a 

contingency basis for as long as it takes. This does not mean agreeing to an arbitrary $4.1 

billion a year, but it does mean agreeing to fund a credible Afghan force plan and being 
87 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 11 

willing to adjust that funding at conditions-based levels, Moreover, funding the ANSF 

will be pointless if the US does not also ensure that enough civil aid will be available to 

keep the civil economy from gravely weakening or imploding as aid funds and outside 

military spending in country is cut. 

Economic realism is as critical as realism about the future capabilities of the ANSF. The 

absurd claims that State, USAID, and UNAMA have made about the progress 

Afghanistan has made in terms of increases in GDP and per capita income in past years 

may well come back to haunt the ANSF as well as the Afghan government's ability to 

function and every aspect of Afghan stability, 

Experts like Ken Katzman may overstate dependence on outside funding when they say it 

accounts for some 95% of the GDP,g However, even low end estimates from officials in 

the EXIM Bank indicate it must account for over 40%, and that almost all of the growth 

in the GDP as defined in market terms has been is driven by outside expenditures and not 

development. And even if there was a credible statistical base for an estimate of the total 

Afghan GDP in either market or PPP terms, it still would be meaningless to quote per 

capita income statistics when sources like the Afghan Ccntral Statistics Organization, 

CIA, State, World Bank, IMF, and UN produce estimates of the population varying 

between 26 and 36 million, 

The key role of money in shaping the ANSF's future is further illustrated by the limited 

ability of the Afghan government to fund both the ANSF and all its other needs over at 

least the period through 2020, The present limits to Afghanistan's ability to fund its own 

expenses are summarized in Figure 4, and the GAO reports that,9 

... the U.S. government could not fully detennine the overall extent to which its efforts had 

improved the Afghan government's puhlic financial management capacity because (1) U.S. 

agencies have reported mixed results; and (2) weaknesses in CSAID's performance management 

frameworks, sllch as lack of performlmce targets and data, prevent reliable assessments of its 

results (p. 27). 

Afghanistan's domestic rcvenues funded about 10 percent of its estimated total public 

expenditures from 2006 to 2011. Domestic revenue grew from $0.6 billion to $2.0 billion from 

2006 to 2011 (see fig. 9), an increase of over 230 percent. At the same time, Afghanistan's 

estimated total public expenditures grew from $5.8 billion to $17.4 billion, an incrcase of ovcr 200 

percent, tnaintaining a gap bet\vcen revenues and expenditures. 

Donors funded approximately 90 percent of Afghanistan's estimated total public expenditures 

[rom 2006 to 2011, with the t'nited States providing64 percent of that amount. .. The Fnited States 

flmded an estimated 91 percent of Afghanistan's total security expenditurcs and about 37 percent 

of Afghanistan's total nonsecurity expcnditures between2006 to 2011. In numcrous reports and 

congressional briefings, we have raised concerns about Afghanistan's inability to fund plamlcd 

goyemmcnt expenditures without foreign assistance and raised questions about the sllstainability 

of U.S.-funded road, agriculture, and water infrastl1lctln'e development projects, as well as 

Afghanistan's ability to sustain its national security forces. 

Donors fundcd, on average, 56 percent of Afghanistan's on-budget cxpenditllrcs and 100 perccnt 

of its off-budget expenditures. Between 2006 and 2011 about 79 percent of Afghanistan's 

estimated $73 billion in total puhlic expcnditlll'es were "off-budget"-that is, flUJded by the 

intemational community outside of the Afghan national budget, such as equipment for Afghan 

:-.rational Secmity Forces. The remaining expenditllres were "oll-budget"-that is, within the 

govcrmncnt's budget and funded by domcstic revenues and donor contributions. As a rcsult, a 

majority of Afghanistan's total public expcJl(litures werc outside the direct control of the Afghan 

gove111mel1t. 
88 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 12 

The international community has pledged to continue to support Afghanistan through 2017 if 

certain metrics regarding refonn in Afghanistan are met. Given Afghanistan's future revenue 

generation projections and expenditures, the country willlikcly continue to he reliant on the donor 

comll11Ulity through at least 2024. In July 2012, the intel11ational commnnity committed to 

providing over $16 hillion for Afghanistan's economic development through 2015. 

As Transition proceeds, the outside money that has driven past GDP increases will 

largely disappear, the poverty level will rise for about one-third of the population, 

malnutrition and food supply problems will grow, paying for a massive trade deficit will 

become much more difficult, more money will f10w out of the country, and dependence 

on the narcotics sector will rise. Moreover, narcotics, criminal activity, and corruption 

will become an cven more important part of the domestic Afghan economy.'o 

Vietnam did not collapse because of force quality, Najibullah did not fall because the 

Afghan forces supporting him lacked training, equipment, and sustainability or had a 

poor CM or CUAT rating. He fell because he could no longer pay for the military and 

payoff tribal militias,11US willingness to bear most of the cost of the ANSF well beyond 

2014 will probably be the second most important test of the ANSF after leadership and 

unity - as will the ability of the Afghan govemment to raise its share of the money and 

distribute it with some degree of honesty and integlity, 

Contrasting withdrawal from Afghanistan from withdrawal from Iraq provides a warning 

of the dangers that COlTuption will pose for the funding of the ANSF and its ability to 

operate with suitable civil govemance and popular support. An oil rich Iraq could keep 

funding enough of its forces to hold them together. Recent SIGAR reporting indicates 

that a grossly comlpt Afghan govcrnment may see ANSF money disappear or leave the 

country even if the US does keep providing the necessary funds, 12 

Figure 4: Afghan Government Dependence on Outside Aid: 2006-201113 

Oollal'$ (In biHlons) 

18 

16 

14 

12 

10 

$7.33 

$1926 

$4630 

$72.89 

These problems will be especially severe during 2013-2016 because of the "bow wave 

effect" of past aid funding, Total authorization of US aid funding during rose from 

$39.59 billion in FY2006 to $98,15 billion (if one includes the FY2013 request), and 

averaged around $16 billion a year from FY2010 to FY2012 - before dropping to $9,66 
89 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119113 13 

billion in FY2013. No one in the US government has the faintest idea of how much of 

this money actually reached the Afghan economy in any form, although it is unlikely to 

have exceeded 30-40%. 

The sharp lag between authorization and disbursement means that the l10w of US civil 

and economic aid that actually reaches the country is peaking at a time when Afghanistan 

has to adapt to a coming crash in economic aid since the international community has 

pledged a total of only $16 billion for 2012-2015. 1

" This creates a major incentive for 

Afghan officials to take as much money as possible dUling what SIGAR calls the "golden 

hour" and leave the country (the EXIM Bank has estimated that at least $3 to $6 billion 

has l10wed out of Afghanistan in recent years). Other problems include the fact that 

SIGAR and the GAO have found that measures to control the integrity of spending and 

contracting have not been effective, and most PRTs and field efforts to control and 

evaluate the follow of money will be withdrawn well before the end of 2014. 

Security and Transition 

A third key criteria for evaluating the ANSF is the level of security that can be 

established and maintained in given areas and in the country. Here again, the key to 

meaningful measurement of the effectiveness of the ANSF does not lie in the metrics that 

are most useful in building up individual ANSF capabilities and force elements. For a 

successful Transition, there must be an overall net assessment of the present level of 

security and if the ANSF is likely to be able to maintain and improve that security in the 

face of restricted US and ISAF operations and the withdrawing of combat forces over the 

2013-2014 time period. 

A combination of the ANA, ANCOP, and better elements of the AUP, ABP, and ALP 

may be able to establish such a level of security during 2013-2017 with suitable outside 

funding and support. Much depends, however, on whether the US and other outside states 

actually meet their pledges and provide sustained support, and provide unclassified data 

on the trends in security that have not been driven by politics and spin and actually 

provide a meaningful basis for assessment. 

US Force Cllts Set tlte Stage 

The broad trends in US forces which along with Britain have dominated the fighting -

arc shown in Figure 5. Most allied forces arc likely to follow a similar pattern in terms of 

reductions, shifts away from combat roles, and/or new national constraints on combat. 

For obvious security reasons, most civil aid elements in the field will have to be 

withdrawn during the course of 2013 and early 2014, and some estimates indicate that the 

US alone will have cut back from some 90 US-controlled posts and positions in 

Afghanistan in mid-2012 to a total of only three to five by the end of 2014. 

The White House described new US force cut plans, and US goals for Transition and the 

ANSF, in a statement it issued after President Obama's State of the Union Address on 

February 12,2013: 15 

In his State of the Union address. the President announced that the United States will withdraw 

34,000 American troops from Afghanistan by this time next year, deereasing the nnmber of U.S. 

troops in Afghanistan by half - the next step to responsibly bringing this war to a close. 
90 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119113 14 

Afghans in the Lead: Beginning in the spring of 2013, Afghan forces will assume the 

lead across the country, Even as our troops draw down, they will continue to train, advise and 

assist Afghan forces. In that capacity, wc will no longer be leading combat operations, but a 

sizeable number of U. S. forces will provide support for two additional fighting seasons before 

Afghan forces are fully responsible for their own security. 

Planning for post-2014: We are continuing discnssions with the Afghan government 

about how we can cany out two basic missions beyond 2014: training, advising and equipping 

Afghan forces, and continued counter-terrorism missions against al Qaeda and their alTiliates. 

The Security Transition Process 

At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, the United States, our International Security Assistance 

Force (lSAF) partners, and the Afghan Government agreed to transfer full responsibility for 

Afghanistan's security to the Afghim National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014.This 

transition process allows the international community to responsibly draw down our forces in 

Afghanistan, while prescrving hard-won gains and setting the stagc to achieve our core objectives 

- defeating al Qaeda and ensuring it can never again use Afghanistan as a launching pad for 

attacks against us. 

At the Chicago NATO Summit in May 2012, leaders reaffirmed this ti-amework for transition and 

agreed on an interim milestone in 2013 to mark our progress. This milestone will mark the 

beginning of the ANSF's assumption of the lead for combat operations across the country. When 

we reach that milestone this spring, ISAF's main dfmt will shift from combat to suppmting the 

ANSF.As intemational forces shift our prim my focus to training, advising, and assisting, we will 

ensure that the Afghans have the support they need as they adjust to their new responsibilities. 

Today, Afghan forces are already leading nem-ly 90 percent of operations, and by spring 2013, 

they will be moving into the operational lead across the country. These forces are cun'ently at a 

surge strength of 352,000, where they will remain for at least three more years, to allow continued 

progress toward a secure environment in Afghanistan. 

As thc international community's role shifts and Afghan forces continne to grow in capabilities, 

coalition troop numbers will continue to decrease in a planned, coordinated, and responsible 

manner. By the end of 2014, transition will be complete and Afghan Security Forces will be fully 

responsible for the security of their country. 

The United States believes that Afghan-led peace and reconciliation is ultimately necessary to end 

violcnce and ensure lasting stability of Afghanistan mld the region. As the President has said, the 

United States will support initiatives that bring Afghans together with other Afghans to discuss the 

future of their country. The United States and the Afghan Government have called npon on the 

Tahban to join a political process, including by taking those stcps necessalY to open a Taliban 

office in Qatar. We have been clear that the outcomes of any peace and reconciliation process 

must be for the Tahban mld other anned opposition groups to end violence, break ties with Al 

Qaeda, and accept Afghanistan's constitution, including its protections for the rights of all Afghan 

citizens. 

The Afghan Goyemment will be holding presidential and provincial COlUlCil elections in ApIil 

2014 and the United States intends to provide technical assistance and tlUlding to support a fair 

and inclusive process. 

The U.S. Role After 2014 
91 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 15 

[n May 2012, President Obama and President Karzai signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement to 

cement our long-tenn relationship in the areas of social and economic development, security, and 

regional cooperation. The United States remains fully committed to a loug-tenn strategic 

partuership with the Afghan Governmeut and the Afghan people. The steps we are taking now are 

intended to nornlalizc our relationship, ineluding withdrawing troops in a way that strengthens 

Afghan sovereignty and the Afghan state, rather than abandoning it, as the international 

community did in the 1980' sand 90' s. 

While it is too soon to make deeisions about the number of forces that could remain in 

Afghanistan after 2014, any presence would be at the invitation of the Afghan Government and 

focused on two distinct missions: training, advising and equipping Afghan forces, and continued 

countc"f-telTorism missions against al Qacda and their affiliates. As vve move towards decisions 

about a long-term presence, we will continue to assess the situation on the ground in Afghanistarl, 

asscss the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces, and consult with our Afghan and 

inkrnational partners. We also continue negotiations on a Bilateral Security Agreement with the 

Afghan Government that would provide the protections we must have for any u.s. military 

presence after 2014.We hope that agrcement can be completed as soon as possible. 

Consistent with our goal of ensuring that al Qacda ncver again threatens the United States from 

Afghan soil, the United States has committed to seek funds annually to SUppOlt training, 

equipping, advising, and sustaining the ANSF. Helping to fund the ANSF is the best way to 

protect the investment we all have made to strengthen Afghanistan and insulate it from 

international terrorist groups. 

Strengthening Afghan govemance and economic development is also key to achieving our core 

objective. We've made significant economic and development progress in the past decade, but 

Afghanistan will rcquire substautial intcmational assistarlce through the next decade to grow its 

private sector and promote its integration in greater South Asia's thriving economy. Thc United 

States has committed to seck, on a yearly hasis, funding for social and economic assistance to 

Afghanistan. At thc July 2012 Tokyo Confercnce, the international community and Afghanistan 

agreed on a long-tenn economic partnership, based on the principle of mutual accountability. We 

expect Afghan progress in fighting conuption, carrying out refornl, and providing good 

governance as the international commlmity provides support after 201 4. 

The practical problem with these statements is that the US is clearly accelerating the pace 

of its overall withdrawal at a time when our allies are either doing the same or changing 

their rules of engagement in ways that have a similar effect. The Administration has not, 

however, announced any clear plans for the forces it will retain through 2014 or after its 

fOimal combat mission ends. 

It is not clear what combat rcsources will actually remain, what level of training and 

partnering will exist, or what allied capabilities - if any - will continue. It is unclear 

what the mission of any remain forces will be, how they will support given elements of 

the ANSF, their ROEs, basing, or any other element of their capability. Conceptual 

rhetoric is little more than a smoke and mirrors excrcise for covering up the lack of any 

substantive detail. 

Moreover, the present Afghan support for a continued US mission now seems as 

uncertain as the support Iraq provided during US withdrawal. President Karzai's office 

did formally welcome the President's announcement in a statement on February 13, 

2013: 16 

Afghanistan welcomes the armouncement by President Obarna, who in his state of the union 

address said that the US would be pulling out arl0ther 34000 troops over the next year from 
92 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 16 

Afghanistan. President Obama added, 'Tins spting, our forces will move into a support role, wlnle 

Afghan secmity forces take the lead ... Tlns is somcthing Afghanistan has wantcd for so long now. 

The withdrawal in spting of foreign forces from Afghan villages will definitely help in ensming 

peace and full sCClltity in Afghanistan ... As President Obama underscored Amctica's commitment 

to a unified aud sovereign Afghanistan beyond 2014, we hope the bilateral relations and 

cooperation between the two countries could further expand. 

However, President Karzai has never shown a serious interest in Afghan military 

development, has made it clear for several years that he wants to sharply constraint US 

and ISAF action, and has always focused on politics and power brokering. In many cases, 

he has been as much a problem in creating effective military forces as an enabler. 

It is all too easy to formally transfer responsibility for security to the ANSF and quite 

another thing to have them actually achieve the level of security that is needed in 

Afghanistan. Vague promises and good intentions are not a concrete plan for action, and 

it is still unclear what posture the US or any other ISAF nations will maintain during 

2014 or after 2014. Moreover, USAID has circulated graphs showing how rapidly real 

world funding has been cut in past crises, even concrete pledges are often forgotten, and 

vague commitments are even easier to forget. 

Figure 5: Changes in US Troop Levels: 2003_201417 

Cut from 66,000 In January 2013 to 60,500 by the end of May 2013. By the 

end of November, the number will be down to 52,000. By the end of February 

2014, the troop level is to be around 32,000·34,000. 

No force level announcements for rest of 2014 except withdraw all 

combat forces by end 2014. 

US force plans for post-2014 not announced. NYT estimate below 

9,000. 

No details on future trainers, partners, enablers, combat forces. 

Witlldrawal Witll or Witllout Adequate Advisors, 

Trainers, Partners, and Enablers? 

Like US and allied spending on Afghan forces, it is as yet unclear what kind of training 

and combat support they will have in the future. What is clear, hmvever, is that they still 
93 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11 :42 2/19/13 17 

have not cOlTected the major shortfalls in personnel - much less qualified trainers - that 

have existed throughout the ANSF force generation effort. DoD reporting indicated that 

NTM-A had 1,752 trainers in place at the end of 2,012 or 67% of a requirement of 2,612 

(which had been downsized from a requirement of 2,778 in March 2012). No data were 

provided on how many of these trainers were qualified. 18 

These shortfalls werc partly compensated for by rushing the training of Afghan trainers. 

The ANA had 2,552 of 2,709 required Afghan trainers in place at the end of 2012, but it 

was unclear how qualified these pcrsonnel really were. Moreover, the ANP only had 805 

trained instructors to mcct a requirement of 1,504 or 46.5%.19 

The data are less clear on the shortfall in partners to ANSF units. DoD reported in 

December 2012, that 118 of 295 ANA units were being advised and 91 more were 

partncred. This left a total of 58 units of the ANA that needed outside support or 

assessment that were not receiving either, and another 28 units where NTM-A reported 

that assessment was not necessary. Once again, the shortfalls for the ANP were far more 

severe. A total of ll8 of 609 ANP units were advised and 145 more were partnered. This 

left a total of 143 units of the ANP that needed outside support but had not received 

support or assessment. Another 201 units did not require assessment according to 

reporting by the NTM-A. Once again, the shortfalls for the ANP were far more severe.20 

There is no way to assess these shortfalls. It is clear from past reports that the present 

training and partnering process is being rushed, and that the ANSF will have far less US 

and other ISAF support than was originally planned both before and after 2014. It can be 

argued the forcing the ANA and ANP to rely on their own resources has a positive as 

well as a negative effect. However, it is also clear that fewer and fewer units will have 

outside trainers and partners in 2013 and 2014, and that fewer and fewer units will be 

independently rated. 21 

The end result is a set of force reductions that seem tailored largely to meet political 

timing in an effort to rush to the exits, and one that is not tied to the security conditions 

on the ground. 

An Extremely Uncertain Level of Security In 

Spite of the "Surge" 

Regardless of how the CM, CUAT, or some other set of force building scores are used to 

measure force building progress for the MoD, Mol, and given force elements of the 

ANSF, the real test of ANSF success will the level of seeurity provided on a threat basis 

that incorporates power brokers, criminal networks, insurgents, and other groups that are 

not affiliated with the govemment or anti-insurgent forces. 

It is also largely meaningless to assess ANSF units based on generic descriptions of how 

many force elements are in some form of the lead on a national level, or are rated as 

effective on the basis of training, manning, equipment, facilities, and bureaucratic 

capabilities rather than actual security perfol1nance. It is already all too clear - as it has 

been in cases ranging from in Vietnam and Iraq - that it is pointless to talk about units as 

being in the lead without any cxplanation of what being in the lead actually means in the 

field, what missions and level of combat are involved, and what is their impact on 

security in key districts and populated areas. 
94 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119/13 18 

Moreover, unclassified ISAF reporting on security has become so weak and politicized 

that it cannot be tmsted. ISAF has focused on enemy initiated attacks at a time the 

insurgents still have secure sanctuaries in Pakistan, can largely avoid direct combat and 

still infiltrate into new areas, maintain influence in old areas, and even expand their role 

in areas like narcotics."2 

Relying a Largely Irrelevant Metric: Enemy 

Initiated Attacks 

ISAF reporting - and a great deal of US reporting as well - has come to focus on one set 

of criteria: Enemy Initiated Attacks or EIAs, and on the period between 2010 and 2012. 

They have done this because it presents the most favorable set of statistical trends 

regardless of its lack of military and political meaning. 

Trends in EIAs revert to the same kinetic focus on tactical victories in regular combat 

that characterized a great deal of US and ISAF reporting before the insurgency reached 

the crisis level in 2008, and in ways strikingly similar to pre-Tet assessments in Vietnam. 

The result is reporting that focuses on the areas where US, ISAF, and the best ANA 

forces have a decisive tactical advantage. 

Focusing on EIAs ignores the fact that groups like the TaIiban are fighting a political war 

of attlition against US and other ISAF forccs that have already largely eliminated 

insurgents' offensive combat activity but who will be gone at the end of 2014. It ignores 

that fact the insurgency cannot be defeated by winning tactical clashes, and makes it 

remarkably difficult to assess either ISAF success or the challenges the ANSF face. 

It is also unclcar that there have been meaningful positive trends even in EIAs since 201l. 

ISAF and DoD reporting does indicates that EIA attacks did drop between 2010 and 2011, 

but also indicates they did not drop meaningfully in 2012 and remain far higher than in 

2009. This reporting also shows EIA numbers remained significant in the Kandahar and 

Northem Helmand River Valley in 2012, and the proportion of national EIAs in 

populated areas - which had declined significantly in 2010-2011 - did not decline 

significantly in 2011-2012.'4 

A more detailed breakout of the trend in EIAs by GAO is shown in Figure 6. It not only 

shows no significant progress when 2010 is compared to 2012, it also shows that the 

insurgents kept up the pace of their attacks by shifting mvay from ISAF targets and 

focusing on ANSF and civilian targets. 25 

In short, the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other insurgents have little reason to directly 

challcnge far superior ISAF forccs or the best ANSF forces when they can wait out the 

departure of most ISAF forces, concentrate on building influence, carry out political high 

profile attacks designed to push ISAF out of country and intimidate Afghans, and focus 

on softer Afghan government and ANSF targets. They are fighting a political war, not a 

conventional kinetic one, and this is the war the ANSF will have to fight after the US and 

ISAF essentially end major combat action following the 2013 campaign season. 
95 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 19 

Figure 6: No Meaningfu/Improvement in Afghan Security Metrics: 20lJ9-2012 

Avemge Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported by Type in Afghanistan, December 2005 throngh 

December 2012'6 

Pattern No Better in Terms of Significant Incidents: The Key Metric Used in Iraq 

War27 
96 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition Il:42 2/19113 20 

Targeted Killings - Key Measure of Insurgent Activity - Are Way Up28 

UNAMA documented 1,077 civilian casualties (698 civilian deaths and 379 civilian injuries in 

565 incidents of targeted killings by Anti-Government Elements in 20l2. This represents a 108 

percent increase in civilian casualtiesfrom this tactic compared with 20l1. The number of 

attack on Afghan government official rose by 700% during 20l1-2012,z9 

Targeted Killings: deaths and Injuries 

2010~2012 

No Meaningful Improvement in IEDs, Targeted Killings, or Complex 

Attacks30 

Anti-Government: Element:s 

Civilian Deaths by Core Taetic:s 2010 - 2012 
97 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 21 

Other Metrics Show No Clear Improvemellt ill 

Security as A Result of the "Surge" 

Several non-ISAF sources wam that the ANSF will face far more serious challenges than 

both current ISAF reporting and the pro forma transfers of responsibility for security now 

taking place would indicate. 

If one looks at the reporting on other - non EIA - metrics of security set forth in the US 

Department of Defense December 2012 semi-annual report to Congress, there is little 

indication that the "surge" has produced lasting security benefits relative to the pre-surge 

period in 2009 for the ANSF to build upon: 

Little progress. if any. was made at the nationwide level in fonnal combat metrics between 2011 

and 2012. EIAs actually rose by 1 %. High profile attacks rose by 2%. direct fire incident rose by 

10%, total lED events dropped by 3%, lED and mine explosions went down by 12%, and indirect 

fire dropped by srk.31 

Monthly civilian deaths caused almost exclusively by insurgent forces as ISAF cut its civilian 

casualties - rose in 2012 relative to 2010 and 2011, although they were lower thau duriug their 

peak in August and September 2009." 

Green on Blue or Insider Attacks on ISAF personnel rose from 6 in 2009 to 11 in 2010, 20 in 2011, 

and 37 in 2012 six times higher in 2012 than 2009. Green on Green or Insider Attacks on A"JSF 

persOlmcl rose from 7 in 2009 to 19 in 2010, 26 in 2011, and 29 in 2012 - four times higher in 

2012 than 2009. 'While the numbers were limited, they have a major political impact and raise 

serious issues regarding the protection of military and civilian advisors in the filed dming 2014 

onwards 3 .l They also raise issue about ti,e level of alienation within the ANSF, and infiltration and 

influence by the Taliban and other insurgents that have been met largely through unsubstantiated 

denials as to the scale of the problem. 

High profile attacks - ones that have major political impact and help the Taliban and other 

inslU'gents achieve their goal in pushing outside force and aid out of the COilUtry - have continued 

to have a Inajor itnpact, and given the Taliban and other insurgents Inajor tactical victories in 

strategic C01Illlllmications even when they have little or no real military effect. 

Insurgent reintegree numbers remained very limited dming 2011·2012 and almost all within the 

"Jorth and West where insurgent influence is very limited. Almost no reintegrces came from high 

combat, high Talihan influence areas in the south and southwest. 34 

Total Nationwide Monthly Security Incidents (the key metric used to assess progress in the Iraq 

War) declined slightly dnring 2010-2011, but remained constant dming 2011-2012 and were far 

higher than in 2009 - the year when the lise in insurgent violence ttiggered the "surge. ,0, 

Lies by Omissioll? Droppillg the Metrics that 

May Be Less Favorable but Also Could Reflect 

Actual ANSF Performallce 

What may be even more significant is that even the Department of Defense report - the 

one major official report in the course of the war - has quietly dropped virtually every 

metric that shows progress in substantive terms. Maps showing progress in govemance 
98 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119/13 22 

and security by province and district have been deleted, as have maps showing 

pcrceptions of progress in aid. 

Al! rcferences and maps relating to the original campaign plan are gone, along with any 

reference to progress in the populated 81 Clitical Districts Interest and more than 40 

additional Districts of Interest that were the focus of ISAF objectives in 2009 through 

early 2011. All references to an active campaign in Eastem Afghanistan and to second 

efforts in the center and north have also been dropped. 

No effort is made to assess the growing impact of climinal narcotics or the resurgence of 

narcotics growing in insurgent areas in the south during 2011-2012. Moreover, no 

attempt is now made to provide unclassified maps of the areas of insurgent int1uence, and 

show how they relate to the areas of ANSF int1uence or control. There is no picture of 

where the Afghan government now actually exerts meaningful governance outside 

"Kabul stan," has a functioning justice system, and the ANA and AUP actually maintain 

security. No one discusses the scale of insurgent ratlines, shadow govemments, 

checkpoints and local activity, or lower - but critical - levels of violence like threats, 

extortion, kidnappings, and individual killings. 

Here it is interesting to look an independent assessment of the challenge the ANSF now 

faces and the overall security situation in Afghanistan. The Afghan NGO Security Office 

(ANSO) is an NGO organization with a well-established history of making secUlity 

assessments based on NGO perceptions of violence. It has its own biases and obviously 

does not have to collection capabilities of a government or ISAF. 

Figure 7 is still useful, however, in showing that ANSO has a different perception of the 

current security situation than ISAF. Where ISAF tends to focus on the worse kinetic 

cases, ANSO sees risk in terms any significant volume of attacks - a measurement that 

may provide a clearer picture of what Afghanistan could be like after US and troops 

leave. 36 
99 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 

Figure 7: Insurgent Attacks by Province in Fourth Quarter 20.12 

Extreme (+:3 per day) 

High (1·3!"!,d.y) 

Mode-rate (1 per 2 day) 

tow (1 per 3 day) 

Very low {d per S day} 

Transitiolling Districts and Provinces to tlte 

ANSF by tlte Calendar with No Clear Picture of 

ANSF Capability 

23 

The broad transition plan for giving ANSF forces responsibility for given provinces and 

districts is shown in Figure 8. This figure is based on DoD data, and it makes an 

interesting comparison to Figure 7, since transfers in tranches 1-3 were supposed to be in 

the most secure areas but ANSO clearly assesses security in different terms. 

Figure 8 shows that 261 of some 405 districts have already been formally transferred to 

the ANSF, along with some 76% of the population and all provincial capitals and major 

transportation corridors. The GAO reports that transfers arc supposed to be based on four 

factors: 37 

L 'The capability of ANSF to take on additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF; 

2. The level of security needed to allow the population to pursue routine daily activities; 

3. The degree of development of local governance; and 

4. Whether ISAF is properly positioned to withdraw as ANSF capabilities increase and threat 
100 

Cordes man: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 24 

levels diminish. 

The GA 0 also reports even wider coverage of the population,38 

The transition for each geographic area is a multiphascd process, with ISAF tracking progress 

tlU"()llgh metrics, such as security and govemancc. The areas (provinces, disllicts, and!or cities) are 

gronped into one of fi,'e tranches for transition. As of December 2012, the transition of four of the 

five tranches had been announced, and over 87 percent of the Afghan population was living in 

areas under Afghanlcad security with the military supp0l1 of U.S. and coalition partners. By mid2013, it is expected that all areas will have entered the transition process and that by December 

2014the tmnsition will be complete. 

According to IS AI', ANSI' would need to be under effective Afghan civilian control and fully 

capable of addressiug security challenges on a sustainable and irreversible basis for the transition 

to be successful. 

However, the readiness of the Afghan government to sustain ANSI' has been questioned. 

Figure 9: Transitioning Provinces and Districts: Tranches 1_339 

There is no clear way to know the degree to which Afghan forces have actually assumed 

responsibility in the field or their effectiveness. There is also no way to know what areas 

are under real central govemment control, dominated by local power brokers, or have 

serious insurgent or criminal influence. In broad tenns, the transfers to date have been in 

areas assessed as having a low to relatively low threat - at least in terms of EIAs. DoD 

does, however, report that the actual level of ANSF control is mixed: 40 
101 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 25 

ISAF's mission focus remains to protect the people of Afghanistan hy supporting the sovereign 

govenunent in the development of a national security force eapaolc of assuming the lead 

responsihility for seemity operations. Upon cntry into Transition, the A~SF assume lead secmity 

responsibility for that area and hecome the supported command, with ISAF hecoming the 

supporting command. During the Transition process, staff functions are steadily transferred to the 

,\~SF as their capahility increases. ISAF often retains military asscts in that area, and when 

required, engages in combat operations alongside the A~SF. As the A~SF take on more 

responsibility and become capahlc of more independent operations, ISAF support is reduced, and 

authodty to provide additional support migrates upwards to the Commander IJC (COMlJC) and 

then to the Commander ISA1' (COM1SAF). Areas proceed through Transition on different 

timclincs based upon demonstrated improvement in security, govel1lance, and rule of law, and to 

the increased proficiency of the ANSF. At completion, the A"1SF assume full secmity 

responsibility. 

The DoD assessment of actual progress in security and ANSF performance in this 

mission is the closest thing to an unclassified assessment of ANSF capability in the field 

that do exist, but it is important to note that it seems to be largely based on EIAs, rather 

than meaningful counterinsurgency criteria, and still raises important questions about 

ANSF performanee: 41 

The increasing capability of the ANSF has expanded security gains in 111any Transitioning areas. 

Tranche I and 2 areas (138 districts in 20 provinces) continue to be the most secme areas in 

Afghanistan, both in tenns of objective meaSlU'es and Afghan population perceptions. As u.s. and 

Coalition Forces draw down and re-postme, the A"1SF arc progressively taking the lead in 

transition areas and helping to expand Afghan govenl111Cl1t inf1uence, Inost notably in RC-N, 

where the Coalition will withdraw all of its forces from the eastern- and wcstem-most districts 

toward the end of 2012. 

Additionally, there has heen evidence of the ANSF independently expanding security in areas 

where ISA1' does not have an established presence, showing the initiative and capability to 

establish seem'ity in areas before they have fOlmally entered the Transition process, inclnding 

Nuristan and other diSlliets in the north. Improving and maintaining secnrity in Tranche 3 will be 

more challenging than in the first two tranches because several areas entered Transition at lower 

readiness levels. Additionally, later tranches may also he challenged by snccessfnl operations in 

Tranches 1, 2, and 3 that have cansed some insurgent forces to migrate into less secure areas, 

largely outside of the population centers. 

The DoD report does repeat ISAF's largely irrelevant focus on EIA in discussing 

progress to date: 42 

~otably, during the reporting pet10d, EIAs declined in two of the three Transition Tranches, 

although this reduction was varia hIe by geographic area with some transition areas still facing 

challenges. RIAs declined in transitioning areas overall by four percent, with Tranches 1 and 3 

expedencing nine and seven percent decreases, respectively, compared to the sanle petioLI last 

year. HAs in Tranche 2 went up four percent. In districts that have not yet entered Transition, 

there was a six percent increase in the mnnber of HAs over 2011. Tranches 1 and 2 continue to be 

the most secure areas in Afghanistan by objective measures and Afghan perceptions, although tlle 

most drastic reductions in ElA-related violence in transitioning areas OCCUlTed in RC-SW and RCS. 

EIAs say nothing about the level of insurgent influence, the level of support for the 

government in "Kabul stan," the overall level of security in the field, or the effectiveness 

of ANSF forces in maintaining and expanding security coverage in their area of operation. 

It borders on being a nonsense metric. The DoD report does, however, go on to say that. 

Although these seem;!y gains were significant, progress was uneven across the country and 'within 

regions. with SOlne Transition areas still facing challenges and occasionally regressing insecmily. 
102 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11 :42 2/19/13 26 

Transitioning areas with the greatest reduction in attacks were Helmand, arOlllld the southem 

Helmand River VaHey, and Kandahar, particularly Kandahar City and l:ruzgan, where comhined 

operations were focused over the summer. Additionally, in Kahul, wherc thc ANSF havc full 

security lead, security incidents have stayed at minimal levels, with HPAs declining significantly 

since last year. 

EIA trends in Transition areas in the east were mixed. Many disllicts in Wardak and Kapisa saw 

considerable reductions in HAs, while much of Logar and Ghazni experienced sizable increases, 

likely due to the preponderance of ANSF!ISAF operations those areas and the introduction of an 

adctitional Coalition brigade in Ghazni. The ANSF conducted unilateral operations in southem 

Paktika, establishing secmity and accepting responsihility for security lead. 

Although attacks rose slightly in Transition areas in the west, it was not statistically significant, 

and much of the increase occUlTed in the southem-most and least-populated provinces of FarahiUld 

Ghor - likely a result of spillover from operations in northern IIehnand. Similarly, in the nOlth, 

there was a slight increase in insm'gent-related violence but the overwhelming majority was 

concentrated in the in etlmic Pashtun pockets of tlle Kunduz-Baghlan corridor. 

In general, the ANSF are displaying increased capability and sophistication in transitiolling areas, 

particularly in RC-E and RC-S, where they arc planning and conducting large-scale, multiday 

operations and showing increased coordination and integration across Inilitary and police pillars. 

Kabul remains the safest area in the cOlmtry under ANSF-Ied security. 

However, lack of coordination between A~A and A UP in general continues to be one of thc major 

challenges in tfansitiolling m'eas, along with attacks along access routes to major populatiou 

centers and goveTIllllent ineffectivcncss. Governancc ancl developmcnt tend to lag behind seemity 

mId will require continued assistance through the Decade of Transformation 

This latter assessment has a certain amount or public relations spin, and other groups like 

ANSO have drawn different conclusions about the impact of transfer of responsibility, 

even in the relatively secure areas involved in Tranehes 1-3. ANSO found that six or the 

11 provinces transferred to date in Tranches 1-3 recorded an increase in insurgent activity 

during 2010-2011, while three of the six provinces where insurgent activity increased 

also saw a decrease in ANSF activity. It found that Uruzgan was the only province that 

experienced an increase in ANSF activity.43 

ANSO found that overall, insurgent activity declined by 7% in the transitioned provinces 

in 2010-2011, but it declined by 25'1'0 in the non-transitioned provinces. In short, ANSO 

found that the provinces not transitioned to ANSF control did better in terms of violence 

than those who were not - evidently because of the superior military and secUlity 

capabilities of ISAF. ANSO concluded that, "This leaves us with the conclusion that 

there is no clear corrclation between Transition, reduced AOO (insurgent) activity, and 

increased ANSF activity.,,44 

ANSO mayor may not be correct, but it should be clear that simply stating responsibility 

has been transferred is in no way a measure of merit. Failing to show that transfer is 

effective and lasting - rather than driven by cost, time, and withdrawal deadlines - may 

pave the way to the exit but it is in no wayan honest assessment of the ANSF's 

performance. 

The A NSF, Security, and Popular Support 

More broadly, Afghan security will be shaped by popular support for the government - a 

critical metric in measUling real world ANSF capability and particularly that of the police. 

The issue in net assessment is not simply the strength of the insurgency relative to the 
103 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 27 

ANSF and the level of governance in the field; it is the strength or weakness of popular 

support. 

The Department of Defense report has ceased to report on surveys of popular support for 

the government. However, the SIGAR quarterly report for January 2013 did show the 

results of an Asia Foundation poll that indicated that 32% of Afghans saw corruption as 

the government's most serious failing followed by 23% that saw the key problem as 

security, 18'70 that focused on the lack of job opportunities, 11% that feared suicide 

attacks, 9% that focused on weak government, and 8% that focused on the failure to 

remove the Taliban:5 

SIGAR also showed the results of polls that showed a rise in popular perceptions of 

cormption at the local, provincial and national government level during 2006-2012, and 

that nearly 80% of Afghans saw corruption at the national level as a serious problem in 

2012:6 

What is missing from such surveys is any indication of how the ANSF is now perceived, 

although past surveys indicated that the ANA had won growing respect and that the high 

levels of corruption in the police were at least tolerated. Equally important, what is 

lacking arc popular opinion polls to assess how security, governance, and key elements of 

the ANSF are perceived in key districts and high risk areas, and their popularity relative 

to power brokers and the insurgents. Generic nation-wide polling is no substitute for 

meaningful focus on the areas where Transition presents the most import challenges. 

Building and Sustaining Afghan Forces 

Given this background, it should be clear that many of the metrics used by NTM-A are 

important to the force building, but do not provide a meaningful picture of whether the 

ANSF can be successful in actually taking over responsibility for security. 

Tile Limits to Capability Milestolle (CM) and 

Commallders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) 

Ratings 

As Figure 2 has made clear, Capability Milestone (CM) and Commanders Unit 

Assessment Tool (CUAT) ratings of individual force elements and groups within the 

MoD and Mol are useful to force building and partner operations, but do not provide a 

basis for evaluating success in the field and only cover part of the force. 

Moreover, the standards for assessment keep changing, which makes it impossible to use 

either CM or CUAT effectiveness ratings to analyze trends in readiness and effectiveness 

even by force generation standards. Even if "in the lead" was somehow related to what 

and where, a narrow focus on how many units have top rating in this metric and are said 

to be in the lead in some form has little value except to the trainer and partner. 

SIGAR notes the scale of such problems in its January 2013 report, and its comments are 

broadly supported in the December 2012 reporting by DoD:4? 

In 2010, SIGAR audited the previous assessmeut tool- the Capability Milestone (CM) rating 

system which had been in usc since 2005- and found that it did not provide reliable or consistent 

assessments of ANSI' capabilities. Dilling the course of that audit, DoD and NATO began nsing a 
104 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 28 

new system, the CUAT, to rate the ANSF. In May 2010, the lSAl" Joint Command (UC) issued an 

order to implement the new system which would "provide users the specific rating criteria for each 

[ANSI'] elemcnt to bc reported by the CliA T including leader!commander considerations, 

operations conducted, intelligence gathering capahility, logistics and sllstaitllnent, equipping, 

partnering, persOlmel readiness, maintenance, communications, nnit training and individual 

education, as well as the partner mut or advisor team's overall assessment." 

Since the implemcntation of the CUAT, the titles of the various rating levels have changed, as 

shown in Table 3.3. In July 2012, the Govenunent Accountability Office (GAO) raised concerns 

that the change of the title of the highest rating level from "independent" to 'independent with 

advisors" was, in part, responsible for an increase in the mnnber of ANSI' nnits rated at the highest 

level. GAO also noted that, "the change lowered the standard for unit persomlel and equipment 

levels from 'not less than 85' to 'not less than 75' percent of authorized levels." In a response to 

SIGAR last quarter, the [JC disagreed Witll GAO's assessment, saying a change in title docs not 

"equal a change in definitiOll." Since last qnarter, the LTC has initiated a CtTA T Refinement 

Working Group to standardize inputs and outputs in tile areas covered by the assessments. 

This quarter, LTC included alilullts that had been reported in previous assessments in tile category 

"not assessed." In prior quarters, only lUUts that were required to be assessed (but were not 

assessed) were included in that category. This may, in part, have contributed to a rise in the tolal 

number of ANA units from 267 10 292 and the number of units "not assessed" from 51 to 81, as 

shown in Figure 3.24. For Ihe ANT, tile total number of unils rose from 408 to 536 and tile number 

"not assesscd"from 131 to 301. 

Becanse not every lllUt is reported in every etTA T cycle, the IJC used the most recent assessment 

(IVitlull the last 18 months) to "enable cycle to cycle comparisons." 'Vhen compared tbis way, 19 

more ANA units were "independent with advisors" since las I quarler; three more were "effective 

witll advisors." I'or ti,e ANT, 31 more units were 'independent with advisors" and 10 fewer units 

were "effective Witll advisors." 

Broad Metrics of Numbers of Operations and 

Afghan-Led Operations Have Some Value 

It should be noted, however, that the Department of Defense did provide other metrics 

that are more useful. Its December 2012 report now focuses on the level of contingency 

operations - which is a security and war fighting metric rather than a force generation 

metric. It also now repolts the actual level of ISAF vs. ANSF-led operations - although it 

makes no attempt tic them to its scoring system for the difficulty of the operation, which 

element of the ANSF was involved at what level of force, the level of risk, the location of 

the operation, or its impact on security. These data are shown in Figure 10. They do 

show that the ANSF is making progress toward independence, and they at least make a 

start toward some fonn of meaningful measurement of ANSF capability. 
105 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 

Figure 10: Levels o.fContingency Operation and Trend in Partnered Operations48 

Levels of Risk 

Conventional Partnered Operations 

Special Forces Pm·tnel·ed Operations 

29 

In any case, the Department of Defense reports that the present rating systems will be 

replaced by an Afghan system, and almost regardless of what the US and ISAF want, 

such a system will become one dominated by Afghan standards, values, and accuracy of 

reporting: 49 
106 

Cordesman: Unceliain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 30 

The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) is currently developing a proposed self~assessment capability to 

be used by the Ai\:SF. The proportion of ANSF unils that arc partnered or advised will decline as 

the number of ISAF personnel in theater decreases and as more Ai\:SF lmits arc fielded. As ISAF 

starts receiving fewer and fewer CtTAT reports, it will require an additional system to infonn 

leadership and the international community on progress within the Ai\:SF. Additionally, the ANSF 

itself will need an Afghan~run sclf~assessment system after transition. This ANSF sclf~assessment 

capability is not 111cant to be an entirely new SystClll, rather it is intended to augment and iInprove 

Afghan reporting systems currently used by the ANA and A]'.;P. The existing systems arc the 

Readiness Reporting System (RRS) used by the ANA, and the Force Readiness Report (FRR) 

used by the ANt'. As they are currently designed, neither of these systems is sufficient to replace 

the CUAT because neitl,er system provides an extensive enough assessment of the operational 

capabilities of the ANSF. IJC is also working to augment the existing ANSF capability to validate 

these assessments - a cmdal part of any bonest assessment system. The systems under 

development by IJC arc intended to enhance the existing systems. These enhancements to the 

existing ANSF reporting systems require Afghml assistance to be fully developed mul require the 

support of senior MoD and ,vIol leadership to ensmc successful implementation. 

Measuring Progress in Force Generation 

More broadly, it is time to accept the fact that whatever emerges in 2015 will not be 

based on the kind of detailed force generation plans that exist today. NTM-A and US and 

ISAF partners and advisors have long faced an extremely difficult mission, and the more 

than the US and its allies reduce their forces and efforts, the more the Afghans actually 

do take responsibility (or fail to do so) and the more the actual Afghan force structure 

will change. 

The present force generation exercise is being driven by pressures that mean further 

change is inevitable: 

A failure to meet initial US mId ISA1' military surge goals, implement the 2010 campaign plM, 

mId back lbe US build~up with a viable civilian surge. 

Major shortfalls in providing the levels of AfghM govemMce and mle of law effOlis in the field 

necessary to make A:--rSF efforts effective. 

The inability of the Afghan govenunent to treat the real world impact of power brokers, cOI11.1ption, 

narcotics, and criminal networks arOlmd and within the Ai\:SF and to treat these problems as if 

they did not exist. 

The long history of undelfunding and erratic funding by outside states and shortfalls in trainers 

and partners. 

Long periods in which salaries were not competitive and high levels of annual attrition and 

tumover took place. 

Steady rises in ANSI' force goals based largely on arbitrary mnnbers and force goals accompmtied 

by steady efforts to reduced the lime available to acltieve them. 

Ongoing rednctions in US and allied force levels, often with limited wanting that are larger and 

sooner than previously mlticipated. 

Reductions in out year mmual cost from some $9 billion to $6 billion to $4.1 billion. 

Constant changes in CMA mId CVA T perfonnauce standards and goals to be followed by new 

Afghan systems. 

What is striking in view of these pressures is not the fact the ANSF is far from perfect 

and will have serious weaknesses and flaws well beyond, but rather how much progress 
107 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 31 

has actually been made in force generation to date. Figure 11 summarizes this progress 

in tcnns of manpower, units, and equipment, and it is dear that although many key 

specialties and elements of sustainment are still lacking even within the ANA, there may 

be enough resources for the Afghan government to maintain security in some form 

through and after Transition. But this will depend on if it has effective leadership. enough 

outside aid, and a sufficient number of US enablers to give key elements of the ANSF 

enough time to become effective. 

Figure 11: A NSF Development -Institutional Metrics and Benchmarks 

* Data as of Julte 30. eNI ratings are assessed quarter))'. with the next assessment to be conducted at the end of 

September. 

** Coys are the Afghan equivalent of Companies 

IOC - Initial Operational Capability 

FOC- Full Operational Capability 

Tlte MoD and tlte Mol 

That said there are eertain realities about the future force generation effort that the US, its 

allies, and the Afghan government will have to accept. One is that the current goals for 

developing the MoD and Mol are both too ambitious and too Western-oriented to survive 
108 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119113 32 

engagement with reality, both Ministries will remain highly political, will be caught up in 

Afghan power politics, and significant lcvels of corruption will takc placc. 

Thc realities involved arc already outlined in Department of Defense and SIGAR 

reporting. 50 The more the US phases forces and advisors out, and the more Afghan 

politics become caught up in the full impact of Transition, the more Afghans will do it 

their way. As the key continuing source of funds and advisors, the US must be ready to 

accept this, and it must judge success on the basis of the level of security and stability the 

ANSF can prove and not by either US standards or whether the MoD and Mol come to 

operate as current! y planned. 

Focus 011 tlte ANA 

Success will not be determined by the overall level of progress in the ANSF but - as 

Figure 2 has indicated - by the effectiveness of the ANA and ANCOP forces, and by the 

alignments of the ALP and militias. Resources need to be concentrated on the force 

elements that can actually deal with serious insurgent threats, and on at least trying to 

create local security forces with some ties to the government in "Kabul stan" and that can 

deter or contain extremist element in the field. 

This means the US and its allies must be prepared to support the ANA and ANCOP 

forces where they still have serious shortfalls in areas like sustainment and intelligence 

after Transition. The US must also tolerate the fact that whatever emerges by way of local 

forces will often come under power broker and tribal control, and be justified more on the 

basis of being better than the Taliban and Haqqani Network than any approaching the 

kind of force that the US might desire under more ideal circumstances. 

Here, it is important to notc that DoD reports the ANA still has serious problems that 

deserve attention in tenns of management by exception. One is the lack of adequate 

intelligence and sustainment capability; another is relatively high levels of attrition 

(roughly 3% per month) and AWOL rates, and a shortfall of some 7,100 NCOs. The 

ANA also faces the problem that the AAF will not be ready or capable by end 2014. 51 

Accordingly, it is almost certainly far more important for anyone assessing the probable 

success of the ANSF in broad terms to focus on the key areas where there arc measured 

shortfalls that have an obvious impact on security levels rather than scoring of unit 

elements using systems like the CMA and CUAT systems. 

Fmthennore, the success or failure of the ANA and every element of the ANSF will 

become sharply more dependent on the Afghans ability to depmt from many aspects of 

the current US-ISAF developed plan as more forces arc cut, money and advisors are cut, 

and Afghan truly adapt to doing thing on their own and find ways to do it their way. 

Sticking with the plan is not a meaningful objective. Help the Afghans as they adapt to 

doing it their way is. 

Accept Marginal Success witll tile Police and 

Rule of Law 

Official reporting on the various elements of the ANP has long disguised a largely 

corrupt, failed force, that is actively involved in power brokering at every level and has 
109 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 33 

little over counterinsurgency capability, alienates many Afghans, and is not supp0l1ed by 

thc ncccssary elements of governance other parts of the justice system in much - if not 

most - of Afghanistan. Corruption and incompetence are major problems in Kabul as 

well as most areas. 52 

Both most current indicators, and historical experience in past efforts to build regular 

police efforts in wartime like Iraq, wam that the bulk of the Afghan police will at best 

have limited effectiveness and will be corrupt. Nothing can be done from the outside that 

will detennine the relative post-Transition strength of the Central Govemment versus to 

local power brokers in controlling the police, or the rise of local police leaders that 

become the equivalent of mini-warlords. The question is not how good the AUP and ABP 

will become as Transition proceeds, but how bad? 

The answer is that the best clements of the police will continue to support the central 

government and the MOl, but that most much of the police are likely to remain whal they 

now are, other elements will become tied to local power brokers, and still other elements 

will become passive or reach a modus vivendi with any insurgent or hostile group that 

threatens them. The Westem dream of crcating an effective eivil police force will not 

survive Transition and engagement with reality in much, if not most, of the country." 

The end result will often be corrupt or passive elements tied to local leaders or who 

cooperate with insurgents. This will be the result of problems within key elements of the 

police force. However, it will also be the result of a lack of effective civil governance and 

the other elements of the rule of law in the field. A police force cannot be an effective 

civil police force without the slIpp0l1 and control of effective local governance and all of 

the other clements of the rule of law. The failure to tic the assessment of poliee 

development to these other two criteria for success has made current effectiveness ratings 

of the ANP largely meaningless - a problem compounded by deliberately ignoring the 

scale of corruption. 

The scale of the problems in the rule of law effort are summarized in recent SIGAR and 

DOD reporting as described below:5.I 

Insecurity has continued to impede expansion of nile of law, especially at the disllict level. 

Prolonged dispute resolutions in the fonnal justice system have led many mral Afghans to view it 

as ineffective and inaccessihle. In addition, widespread corruption and inadequate transparency 

continue to stiOe development of a self-sustaining mle of law system. Furthennore, DoD noted 

that the Afghan government's lack of political will to operate and maintain justicc programs 'lIId 

facilities has hindered justice development. 

USAID noted that the judicim'y has also not had sufficieut political will to estahlish genuine 

independence from the executive branch. Rule of law activities will need to he included in the 

overall transition effort and will he most successful in the areas where capable goverlliUlce has 

followed stabilization, accordiug to DoD. 

Although the Afghml governmeut and the international cOlllllllmity have identified 'law and 

justice for all" as an NPP, they have not agreed on prognun specifics that would layout a clear and 

vClifiable roadmap to improve the Afghau justice system. This quarter, donor dissatisfaction at the 

continued failure to finalize the justice progrmnled the European Vnion to indicate that it will put 

on hold its future funding for the sector until the program has been endorsed. All of the 0.1>1'5 were 

supposed to be endorsed by July 2011. The UN Secretary-General noted that the program's 

complexity and wide scope presented challenges, although there was hope for au eudorsemeut of 

the :\'PP in earl y 2013. 
110 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119/13 34 

Weaknesses within both the fOl1nal and infol1nal jllstice systems, along with ineffective linkages 

between the two systems, continne to lead many Afghans to go to the Taliban for (lisputc 

resolution, The Taliban process is based 011 stem religious precepts, but is also rapid, enforced, 

and often considered by Afghans as less corrupt than the formal system, 

The broad scale of the problem of corruption in the police - placed in the context of a UN 

survey of Afghan popular perceptions of corruption in the government and other elements 

of the rule of law is shown in Figure 12. The good news is that perceptions of police 

corruption - while still high - has dropped. The bad news is that it has not improved 

significantly in the rest of the justice system, and the problem of corruption is much 

higher in the south and east where the insurgents present the most serious threat. It is also 

that the UN found that,55 

Some 50 per cent of cmployces in both the National Police and the Border Police admitted to 

receiving ... help in their recmitment, as did roughly half of all provincial, district and municipal 

officers, Approximatdy 6 per cent of these offIcials also acknowledged having paid hribes dnring 

their recmitment, " Of particular conce11l is the recruitment of school teachers, during which over 

half received assistance and more than 21 per cent also conceded to the payment of bribes, 

Furthennore, while between 24 and 30 per cent of prosecutors, Hoqooq and Ministry of .Tustiee 

officers stated that they received assistance during recfuitlnent, a smaller percentage of oilicials in 

the judicial scctor admitted having paid a bribe in order to secure their job in the civil service. 

Focus on ALP and Future Role of Militias 

Local forces may well prove to provide a better level of security in less populated areas 

where insurgents are active than the ANA or ANP. They have marginal or no cost, can 

provide significant security with small arms and little - if any - outside logistic support, 

and have a clear motive to defend their own interests. 

The Afghan Local Police have so far done a good job in the areas where they have had 

US or Afghan SOF advisors and partners - although they have been subject local feuds, 

power brokers, and exploiting the population, Militias - sometimes with de facto 

government support - have played the same role in other areas, although they have been 

guilty of more serious abuses, and are far more subject to inl1uence from local power 

brokers, narcotraffickers/criminal networks, and warlords. s6 

The practical problem is that central government from Kabulstan will be uncertain at best, 

and diminish the moment outside advisors are gone and in any areas where governance 

and the ANP are weak or corrupt. Any divisions by regional or ethnic group will also 

tend to move local forces into the dominant faction in a given area. 

In practice, this will often mean relying on a necessary evil, particularly since the 

remaining level of US and other ISAF forces and advisors is likely to be so limited, and 

their influence will decline sharply as withdrawal proceeds. The frank answer may be that 

government money will bc just as much the key as under Najibullah. Force loyalty, 

capability and restraint will often depend largely on the size of the fee or bribe 
111 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 35 

Figure 12: Popular Perceptions o{Corruption in the ANSF, Government, and .Justice 

. System57 

Percentage of bribe-payers wbo paid a bribe to selected types of public official, Afghanistan (2009 and 

2012 

PrOVince, district or municlj>iil 'Officen 

bnd registry officiillls 

Cusmms officials 

I'olic1i! 'Officers {AIIIP) 

Membi!!nof Af!h4Jn IIIiIltklnai Army {ANA} 

fg/n!wnue officials 

Dm:wn 

IllUfHS/pilf,amedks 

feilthers/lKturen 

Judges 

Prowcumrs 

to% 

2009 IllUOU 

Prevalence of bribery and average nnmber of bribes paid, by region, Afghanistan (2012) 
112 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422119113 36 

Narcotics, Criminal Networks, and Leadership 

Flight 

The problems in dealing with the A UP and ABP are likely to be particularly serious if the 

Afghan government and outside aid do not deal effectively with the economic impact of 

cuts in outside military spending and aid. The failure to assess the impact of corruption 

on progress in the ANP - and to a lesser degree the ANA - is only part of the problem. 

Some studies of Afghanistan indicate that as much as 40% of the GNP was dependent on 

opium at the time of the Taliban. Current studies put the percentage at anywhere from 3% 

to 10% of the GDP, but do not explain any aspect of thc calculation. Moreover, opinm is 

only one of Afghanistan's drug crops and drugs are only a part of the activity of its 

criminal networks. 

As noted earlier, UN DOC stated in a November 20,2012 press release that;SB 

"Opimll poppy cultivation in Afghanistan covered 154,000 hectares (ha) in 2012, 18 per cent 

higher than the 13 1.000 recorded the previous year ... Cultivation increased despite a significant 

154 per cent increase in Govermnent eradication efforts (over 9,600 ha eraclicated in 2012 

compared with just over 3,800 in 2(11). 

The number of poppy-free provinces remains unchanged at 17 but Ghor province in the west lost 

that status in 2012 while Faryab province in the north regained it. This year saw 95 per cent of 

cultivation concentrated in the southern and western provinces where insecurity and organized 

crime are present: 72 per cent in Hilmand, Kandahar, LTrnzgan, Day Ktmdi lU1d Zabul provinces in 

the south. and 23 per cent in Farah, Hirat, and Nimroz provinces to the west. This confinlls the 

link between insecmity and opium cultivation observed since 2007 ... Cnltivation rose 19 per cent 

in Hilmand, which. with over 75.100 hectares, accmmted for armmd half the cultivation taking 

place in Afghanistan . 

.. Looking at the eastern region, cultivation rose significantly in Kunar (121 per cent), Kapisa (60 

per cent) and Laghman (41 per cent). However. the eastem provinces contributed only 4 per cent 

to the national total of opium production in 2012. In the north, opimn cultivation increased by 10 

per cent in Bagblan despite the eradication of 252 hectares in 2012. Badakhshan was the only 

northeastern province to see cultivation tise (13 per cent) in spite of a sizeable 1,700 ha eradicated. 

In Kabnl. the central region's only poppy-growing province, cultivation decreased by 45 per cent." 

It makes no sense to analyze the role of the ANSF in transition - or any other aspect of 

Transition - by aeting as if Afghanistan's main domestie souree of ineome was not 

dependent on a narco-economy, that criminal networks were not as serious a problem as 

corruption, that Transition will not lead to capital and personal flight out of the country, 

and that the ANP or any other element of the ANSF can be treated on a business as usual 

basis. 

Green on Blue and Green on Green Attacks 

Finally, the US and any ally that plans to stay in Afghanistan through 2014 or beyond 

must accept the risks of "insider attacks" and the risks of relying largely on being 

embedded in friendly Afghan forces foree security. Even under the best conditions, this 

will mean further casualties from "fliendly" forces. Figure 13 shows a DoD estimate of 

the trends in attacks by members of the ANSF on US/ISAF (Grecn on Blue) and ANSF 

on ANSF (Green on Green) during 2002-2012. 

No one ean disregard the eosts of such attaeks, and that the eoming withdrawals will 

increasingly expose US military and civil aid advisors to an extent that vmious elements 
113 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 37 

of the ANSF cannot protcct them. If the US wants to succeed in Transition, however, it 

cannot both blow their impact out of proportion and stay in Afghanistan. 

The peak numbers to date are small and may well remain so as the US withdraws most of 

its personnel. The wild cards the US will havc to accept are: the risk that withdrawal will 

anger some Afghans, dependence on a stream of new Afghan recmits (many mral 

Pashtuns) which may be less loyal to the ANSF, increased insurgent efforts to make 

political statements and use insider attacks to level the US out of the country and keep the 

ANSF bottled up, and Afghan resentment of a different set of cultural and religious 

values come to increase the volume of such attacks. 

The DoD noted in a December 2012 report that,59 

The Taliban has adapted its propagm1da, hoping to inspire attacks through themes of praise, 

revengc, and provision of support and sanctuary. For example, in Taliban supreme kader Mullah 

Omar's August 2012 Eid al-Fitr address, he praiscd ANSF membcrs who conduct insider attacks 

m1d urged other ANSF to do as "your brave t!'icuds have done." Taliban statcmcnts have promoted 

thc protection and facilitation of attackers out of Afghanistan, and projected a willingness to 

support those committing insider attacks, evcn those without prior Taliban affiliation. As putt of 

this messaging, the Taliban claims attacks thev did not engineer and exaggerates ISAF casualty 

numbers for attacks that do occur. 

The DoD also, however, desctibed a wide range of steps being taken to reduce the Iisk in 

the future,60 These steps cannot guarantee protection, and many depend on the US having 

enough presence with most elements of ANSF forces to be certain they are effective. 

They depend on good relations between the ANSF and US and other ISAF personnel and 

advisors. Furthermore, Figure 13 wams that this is not a Green on Blue problem in the 

sense that the ANSF does not face nearly the same threat as the US and other ISAF forces 

Nevertheless, the Taliban and other insurgents will have every incentive to use cooption, 

infiltration, impersonation, and personal motives to keep up insider attacks on both 

USIISAF and ANSF targets as the US and ISAF withdraw troops and close the facilities 

thcy secure for themselves. Tragic as the resulting casualties may be, howevcr, they are 

the price of success in both Afghanistan and in any future cases of this kind. The US and 

its allies must accept this, and make it clear to media and legislators why they are 

unavoidable, to succeed in staying in country. 

Moreover, it is now impossible to estimate the level of popular and ANSF support the US 

and other advisory and aid elements will have during and after transition, how many US 

and combat and enabling forces will remain, how exposed US and other advisors and 

trainers will be, how much elements of the ANSF will be able to stand on their own, and 

how active insurgent elements will be in attacking US and ISAF forces as they withdraw, 

the elements to slay in country, and ANSF forces. All that is clear at this point is (i) 

public opinion polls and news reports do indicate a drop in Afghan support for US and 

ISAF forces, (ii) no meaningful US or allied plans have been announced for the number 

of forces and aid workers that will remain in the ficld from 2014 omvards, and (iii) the 

ANSF will steadily evolve so every clement develop Afghan solutions to future 

operations in ways that currently cannot be predicted and will ensure much of the present 

force building program is changes or never fully implemented. 
114 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 

Figure 13: Insider Attacks on ISAF andANSF Personnel: 2007-20]261 

(A ttacks Per Year) 

Insider attacks on ISAF Personnel 

-

Insider Attacks on ANSF Personnel 

--:38 

25 

25 

.. 5 

... 

5 

10 

38 

lIn December 20l2,Transparcncy Intemational's Corruption Perception Index again rated Afghanistan with 

Somalia, and North Korca as thc most conclpt couutries in the world. Afghanistan was ranked 174'" out of 

176 countries. "Countries at the bottom of our C01TUption indices remain largely failed states with 
115 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 39 

repression of human rights, social chaos and continued poverty. Afghanistan is one such country. Sufficient 

evidence suggests that corruption in Afghanistan is getting rampant. According to President Karzai himself, 

the phenomenon is now at a level "never hcfore seen.. cOlTuption rnanirests itself in Afghan society: 

widespread charges of fraud and clection-rigging; a jndiciary subservient to the govemll1ent and officials 

engaging in arbitrary arm;t and detention, torture, extortion, and extrajudicial killings .... Corruption is also 

present in daily life and stands out in puhlic survcys. According to Integrity Watch Afghanistan, one 

Afghan in seven paid a bribe iu 201 0 and the avcrage bribe is cqual to onc third of the avcragc Afghan 

salary ... COlTIlption in Afghanistan also impacts the intcmational community, who need to start thinking 

long-telm. According to an article from Huguette earlier this year, as much as $1 billion of the $8 billion 

donated in the past eight years has been lost to corruption. As much as US$ 60 billion of military contracts 

have hcen lost to ii-aud and waste. The country receives $70 billion in foreign military assistance and 

development aid annually. Afghan govel11mcnt revenue was $1. 3 billion in 2009. The countlY' s futw-e 

depends on tackling corruption more than almost any other. A Transparencv Intemational report last year 

wamed: Conuption, weak institutions and a lack of economic development pose a fatal threat to the 

of and 

'Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstmction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2013, pp. 99-120. Also see Catherine Dale, Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? 

Issues for Congress, CRS Ken Katzman, Afghanistan: Post Taliball Governance, Security, and US Policy, 

January 4, 2013, CRS RL30588, pp. 9-13, 21-32, 62-67; and Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and 

(Jovernmelll Performance, November 30, 2012, CRS21922, especially pp_ 36-52, Key issues in govemance 

are also raised in Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, 

(the 1230 Report) December 2012, p. 103-129 

3 Department of Defense, Report all Progress Toward Security and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, p. 58. 

4GAO, Afghanistan, Kev OverSight Issues, Febmary 2013, GAO-13-218SP p. 36; Department of Defense, 

Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 Report) December 2012, pp. 

58 ... 

5 The mauning totals are taken from Special Inspector General for Afghml Reconstruction (SIGAR) 

Quarterly Report to the United Slates Congress, January 30, 2013, Pl'. 79, 84, 87 and show authorized 

totals as of Q4 2012. 

"GAO, Afghanistan, Key OversighlIssues, February 2013, GAO-13-218SP pp. 21-22. The GAO notes that, 

'~\lthough DOD has developed ANSF cost estimates beyond 2014, it has not provided its long-tenn cost 

estimates for sustaining ANSF in its semimmual reports to Congress. Our analysis of DOD data estimates 

the cost of continuing to SUppOlt ANSF from 2013 through 2017 ovcr $25 hill ion, raising concerus about 

the sustainability of ANSF. We previously recommended, and Congress mandated, that DOD report to 

Congress about the long-tenn cost to sustain ANSF. While DOD's semimnmal reports issued to date 

include inforruation on current or upcoming fiscal year frmding reqlurements for ANSF and donor 

contrihutions, estimates for long-tel111 costs are ahsent. DOD stated that hecause the long-tcrru ANSF cost 

estimates depend all a constantly changing operational cnviromnent, it provides cost infOlmation to 

Congress through hriefings mld testimony, as appropriate. This mechanism, however, does not allow for 

iudependent assessment of DOD's estimates to assist Congress as it considers future budget decisions_" 

"Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Reporl to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2013, pp. 58-59.GAO, Afghanistan, Key OverSight Issues, Fehruary 2013, GAO-13-

218S1' pp. 21-22. 

R See Ken Katzman, Afghanistan: Post Taliban governance, Security, and US Policy, January 4, 2013, CRS 

RL30588, p. 62. His estimate is based on a report hy the National Security Staff released in December 2, 

201, and mandated by the national Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011( Section 1535 ofP_1 b 111-338). 
116 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19113 40 

90AO, Afghanistan. Kev Oversight Issues, Febmary 2013, GAO-13-218SP pp. 25-27. 

10 There are no reliable statistics, but the figures in the CIA World Factbook for Mghanistan seem broadly 

COlTect in illustrating the scale of the problem. For the growing scale of the dmg problem evell before aid 

cnts begin, see the UN Office on Dmgs and Crime (UNDOC) anllual surveys for Opium and Cmmabis 

growing in Afghanistan. Thc UNDOC survey for 2012 found a 7% al1l1ual growth in the total area under 

cultivation. There was little eOITe1ation between area of dl1lg cultivation and combat in south. Helmand 

dropped by only % during the surge, while Kandahar rose by 5% and Nimroz by 22'7;'. The Talibml's ties to 

narcotics effectively moved ont of the lower Helmmld River Valley into upper areas and into different 

provinces. (see the 2012 UNDOC report, p. 29, http:,'iwww.unooc.org!documcntsicropmonitming!Afghanistan/ORAS_report_20l2.pdf.) 

11 The total size of the Afghan forces under the Soviet occupation a11(\ Najibullah was Ulen 25,000-40,000 

regular military supplemented by about 20,000 militia and paramilitary forces. Ken Katzmau, Afghanistan: 

Post Taliban governance. Security. and US Policy, Jmmary 4,2013, CRS RL30588, p. 2. 

12 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstmction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30. 2013, pp. 99-115. A different repmi by UNDOC fonnd iliat, "the total cmTIlption 

cost has increased by some 40 per cent over the last iliree years (2010-2012) to reach $3.9 billion. 

Moreover, in 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public sen·iee ... Sce l.TNDOC, 

C0n11ption in Afghanistml, Recent PattenlS and trends, December 2012, 

hHV_:_}~\Y_~~"_,_!!!lOdc,"Qrgi1Qb'.illI!fQ~."iIrQ!.ltp1!~<;:J~:;.QlIlli!liQ!!.jJJ-i.\J$lg~l~h!an l:I~LJ.l~lt. 

13 GAO, Afghanistan, Key OverSight Issues, Febmary 2013, GAO-13-218SPp. 26. 

14GAO, A/ghanistan, Kev Oversight Issues, Febmary 2013, GAO-I3-218SPp. 26. 

15 The White House, "Fact Sheet: Afghanistan," Office of the Press Secretary, Febmary 12, 2013. 

http:// www. whitehouse. gOV! the-press-otlice!20 13/02! 12ifact-sheet -afghanistan 

16 News linit, Office of the Spokesperson to the President of Afghanistan, 

Presidential Palace (Arg), Kabul, February 13,20]3, 

"Adapted from the Washington Post, Februa.ry 13, 2013, http://www.washingtonposl.cOlniworld!nationalsecurity!us-troops-in-afghanstan/20 13!02! 12ie9a14926-757e-11e2-95e4-6148e45d7adb_graphic.hlml; and 

Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, Decision on Afghan Troop Levels Calculates Political and Military 

Intercsts, New York Times, February 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.comi2013i02!13!usipoliticsiobama-toarmOlmce-troops-rcturn.html"ref=world&_r=O&pagewanted=plinl. 

18 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in A/ghanistan, (the 1210 

Report) December 2012, pp. 52-53. 

19 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stahility in Afghanistan, (the 1210 

Report) December 2012, pp. 52-53. 

20 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 88-89. 

21 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security alld stability in A/ghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 88-89. 

22liNDOC noted in a November 20, 2012 press release that, "Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan 

covered 154,000 hectares (ha) in 2012, 18 per cent higher than the 131,000 recorded the previous 

year. ... Cultivation increased despite a significant 154 per cent increase in GovefUlllent eradication efforts 

(over 9,600 ha eradicated in 2012 compared with just over 3,800 in 2011). See l':~l)OC, Opium-crop 

cultivation rises in Afghanistan. prices remain 

high,~v\v\Y .U1lOdc.orgj]QQcic, en press,'releascs 2012 ;\;ovembcr 'oRimTI-(Top-cJll tiyalion-riscs-in~ 
117 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 41 

23 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in AfghanLvtan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 152-153. 

24 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 162-164. 

"GAO, Afghanistan, Key Oversight Issues, Febmary 2013, GAO-13-218SP p. 17. 

"GAO, Afghanistan, Key Oversight Issues, February 2013, GAO-13-218SP p. 17. 

Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 23. 

28 U:'-lA!v[A, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012, Protection of CiviliilllS in aimed ContEet, Kabul, 

Afghanistan 2012, pp. 22-23. 

29 'Within the 1,077 civilian casualties from overall targeted killings, the deliberate targeting of 

Government employees increased by almost 700 percent. In 2012, l.J"iAMA docnmented 47 

separate incidents of targeted killings of civilian Government workers which killed 107 civilians 

and injured 148. In 2011, l.TNAMA docnmented 23 of the same type of targeted killing incidents 

which killed 23 and injured 11 civilians. l!NAMA, Afghanistan: Al1l1ual Report 2012, Protection of 

Civilians in anued Conflict, Kabul, AfghaIllstan 2012, pp. 21-22 . 

.10 l.NA~!A, Afghanistan: Al1l1ual Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in aI1lled ContEct, Kabul, 

Afghanistan 2012, pp. 28-29. 

31 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Securitv and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, p. 20. 

Department of Defense, Report Oil Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, p. 33. 

33 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 20 12, pp. 34-36. 

34 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 4O-4l. 

35 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, Pl'. 28-30. 

36 ANSO Qnarterly Data Report, Q4, 2012, http:. ·wwIY.JillQsafd\,.o]'g lnde".php"pagcid=8&, p. 15. 

37GAO, Afghanistan, Key Oversight Issues, Febmary 2013, GAO-13-218SP p. 19 . 

.l8GAO, Afghanistan, Key Oversight Issues, Febmary 2013, Gi\O-13-218SP p. 19. 

39 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, p. 15l. 

40 Department of Defense, Report 011 Profvess Toward Security and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, p. 28. 

41 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 29-3l. 

42 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Rep0l1) December 2012, pp. 29-31. 

43 ANSO Quarterly Data Report, Q4, 2012, http: www.ngosafcty.org.index.phpOpageid=88, p. 17 

44 ANSO Quarterly Data Report, QI, 2012, h1!lL~JYJ}gs:'5.i!.(m:~().Dgj[!!khQ!im1nill;£i'L.lill, p. 17 
118 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 42 

45Special Inspector General for Afghan Rcconstmction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2013, Pl'. 99 and 116. 

46Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterlv Report 10 the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2013, Pl'. 99 and 116. 

47Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United Siaies 

Congress, January 30,2013, Pl'. 76-78. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Securilv and 

stability in Ajgh£1nistall, (the 1230 Report) December 2012, 1'1'.89-95. 

48 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 90-91. 

49 Department of Defense, Report 011 Progress Toward Security and stabilitv in Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 91-92. 

50Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterlv Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2013, Pl'. 78-79. Department of Defense, Report Oil Progress Toward Security and 

stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 Report) December 2012, 1'1'.47-52. 

,OJ The key problems in the ANA are slmllnarized in Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward 

Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 Report) December 2012, Pl'. 55-57,60. 

52 Por recent, on-the-scene reporting, see Azam Alnlled, "In Kabul's 'Car Guantanamo: Autos Languish 

and Trust Dies," New York Times, February 19, 2013; Kevin Sieff, "To cut Afghan red tape, bribery is the 

nonn," Washington Post, Pebruary 19,2013. Also see, UNDP, Police Perception Survey - 2011: The 

Afghan Perspective, Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research CACSOR) Surveys, Kabul. 

Langer Research Associates, December 2011; l~TIOC, Comlption in Afghanistan, Recent Patterns and 

trends, December 2012, 

http:www.unodc.orgdocumentsfronlpagCCorruptiol1inAfgllilnistanH:-.;.\L.llilf.pp. 7-21. 

53 The scale of the problems involved in the ANt' is laid out in Department of Defense, Report on Progress 

Toward Security and stability in Afghanistan, (the 1230 Rep(11) December 2012, pp. 67-76; and Special 

Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

January 30, 2013, pp. 84-87. 

54Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2013,1'. Ill. 

55 United Nations Oll'ice on Drugs and Crime (U0,TIOC), Com.lption in Afghanistan: Recent PattenlS and 

trends, 2012, Pl'. 8 & 10. 

56 Some criticism of the ALP has been unfair and confused real ALP, withont meaningful outside or ANSF 

training and tics to the .Mol, with militias or '~\LP" that have designated themselves as ALP. There is, 

however, a range of legitimate criticism of even well-advised and snpported lUllts, just as there is of the 

abusive Qse of force by some elements of the ANA and ANP. See UNAMA, Afghmllstall: Annual Report 

2012, Protection of Civilimls in anned Conflict, Kabul, Afghmlistan 2012, Pl'. 35-56. 
119 

Cordesman: Uncertain Role of the ANSF in Transition 11:422/19/13 43 

"United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (lT~1)OC), Comlption in Afghanistan: Recent Pattems and 

trends, 2012, p. 20. 

58 UN1)OC, Opium-crop eultiYation rises in Afghanistan, prices remain high, 

LljJrhillli.~!J!!l::urL~~~::I~Illilill:highJt1.nll 

59 Department of Defense, Report all Progress Toward Serurity and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, p. 35. 

60 Department of Defense, Report 011 Progress Toward Security and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 23-39. 

M Department of Defense, Report Oil Progress Toward Security and stability ill Afghanistan, (the 1230 

Report) December 2012, pp. 34-35. 
120 

Anthony H. Cordesman 
121 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), ofthe Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives for the I 13th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: Anthony H. Cordesman 

Capacity in which appearing: ( check one) 

_Representative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

entity being represented: 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 

federal grant( s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 

federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 
122 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

Federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government. 

please provide the following information: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) ,,,,ith the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ~N=o=n,,-e ____________ _ 

Fiscal year 

Fiscal year 2011,'-'-'''''''', ___________ . ____ . ___ , 

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: 

Current fiscal year (2013):_None _____________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: None _________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: None ___________________ ' 

List of subjects offederal contract(s) ([or example, ship construction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering 

services, etc,): 

Current fiscal year (2013): None ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: None 

Fiscal year 20 II: None _. ----. __ ._-_ ..... _-

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): None ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: None __________________ . 

Fiscal year 2011: None _________________ _ 

2 
123 

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on 

Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please 

provide the following information: 

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): None _______________ , 

Fiscal year 2012: None ________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: None _________________ ' 

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): None ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: None __________________ , 

Fiscal year 2011: None __________________ ' 

List of subjects of federal grants( s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, 

software design, etc,): 

Current fiscal year (2013): None ____ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: None _____________________ , 

Fiscal year 2011: None ___________________ _ 

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): None ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: None ___________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: None _________________ _ 

3 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 27, 2013 

(127) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 1) There are certainly a broad range of competing interests at 

stake—from the Northern Alliance’s general hostility and difficulty in dealing politically with the Taliban, to the various disparate factions within the Taliban itself. 

Equally pressing are the interests of the Afghan government, as well as the interests of actors in Pakistan who have great sway over those within Afghanistan. Certainly the withdrawal of American and NATO troops affects the dynamics of these 

relationships, as does the implied continued financial support for Afghan security 

signified by a troop presence, regardless of U.S. insistence that negotiations be Afghan-led. Can you share with us how you see the various permutations of residual 

forces affecting the political dynamics of negotiations? 

Dr. DALE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 2) Governance reform is going to be integral to the stability of an 

Afghan government, but has been shunted aside in large part due to other concerns. 

With reduced troop levels and challenges to funding of ANA forces, do you see the 

United States as still having the leverage to encourage governance reform? 

Dr. DALE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 3) Recently, President Karzai ordered the withdrawal of U.S. special forces from Wardak, a key province southwest of Kabul. This follows the ban 

on coalition airstrikes in residential areas last week. With the understanding that 

such controversies will arise, can you speak to the effect of these moves on the 

broader picture? How will this affect the training of and transition to ANA forces, 

and does this strengthen Karzai’s hand in negotiations? 

Dr. DALE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 4) There are certainly a broad range of competing interests at 

stake—from the Northern Alliance’s general hostility and difficulty in dealing politically with the Taliban, to the various disparate factions within the Taliban itself. 

Equally pressing are the interests of the Afghan government, as well as the interests of actors in Pakistan who have great sway over those within Afghanistan. Certainly the withdrawal of American and NATO troops affects the dynamics of these 

relationships, as does the implied continued financial support for Afghan security 

signified by a troop presence, regardless of U.S. insistence that negotiations be Afghan-led. Can you share with us how you see the various permutations of residual 

forces affecting the political dynamics of negotiations? 

General KEANE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 5) Governance reform is going to be integral to the stability of an 

Afghan government, but has been shunted aside in large part due to other concerns. 

With reduced troop levels and challenges to funding of ANA forces, do you see the 

United States as still having the leverage to encourage governance reform? 

General KEANE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 6) Recently, President Karzai ordered the withdrawal of U.S. special forces from Wardak, a key province southwest of Kabul. This follows the ban 

on coalition airstrikes in residential areas last week. With the understanding that 

such controversies will arise, can you speak to the effect of these moves on the 

broader picture? How will this affect the training of and transition to ANA forces, 

and does this strengthen Karzai’s hand in negotiations? 

General KEANE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 7) There are certainly a broad range of competing interests at 

stake—from the Northern Alliance’s general hostility and difficulty in dealing politically with the Taliban, to the various disparate factions within the Taliban itself. 

Equally pressing are the interests of the Afghan government, as well as the interests of actors in Pakistan who have great sway over those within Afghanistan. Certainly the withdrawal of American and NATO troops affects the dynamics of these 

relationships, as does the implied continued financial support for Afghan security 

signified by a troop presence, regardless of U.S. insistence that negotiations be Afghan-led. Can you share with us how you see the various permutations of residual 

forces affecting the political dynamics of negotiations? 
128 

Mr. CORDESMAN. Transition is going to involve continuing Pakistani struggles to 

dominate the east and south of Afghanistan, and use the ISI to manipulate the 

Taliban and Haqqani Network. India will play its own game through aid to GIRoA 

and working with Iran to create new rail and road links to the West. 

Iran will seek influence in western Afghanistan with the Hazara, and to counter 

U.S. influence. Each of the central Asia states will pursue its own interested in the 

north, with links to its own ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Russia will seek to contain any threat and the flow of narcotics, but avoid any new commitment. China 

will pursue its own economic interests cautiously. 

The end result will be a ‘‘new great game’’ and not regional cooperation, regardless of rhetoric to the contrary. It will also be extremely dependent on how well the 

new Afghan leadership actually leads and governs after the 2014 election, and the 

unity of the ANSF. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 8) Governance reform is going to be integral to the stability of an 

Afghan government, but has been shunted aside in large part due to other concerns. 

With reduced troop levels and challenges to funding of ANA forces, do you see the 

United States as still having the leverage to encourage governance reform? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. The U.S. has little meaningful leverage now, aside from occasionally influencing the appointments of provincial and district governors and police 

chiefs. World Bank studies and the DOD 1230 reports indicate that U.S. aid efforts 

have had little effect. The U.S. will, however, see a decline in both its awareness 

of problems and progress and its influence as its forces drop. In general, Afghanistan’s government will be weak and often corrupt, and the Afghan President’s control over appointments and government revenues will make him the decisive factor. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 9) Recently, President Karzai ordered the withdrawal of U.S. special forces from Wardak, a key province southwest of Kabul. This follows the ban 

on coalition airstrikes in residential areas last week. With the understanding that 

such controversies will arise, can you speak to the effect of these moves on the 

broader picture? How will this affect the training of and transition to ANA forces, 

and does this strengthen Karzai’s hand in negotiations? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. As has become all too clear since the hearing, President has 

never shown much concern for military effectiveness and pursues his own political 

interests as well as listens to close advisors that do not support the U.S. and often 

provide grossly exaggerated picture of U.S. military mistakes. These problems can 

be papered over until the 2014 elections, but not without difficulty and the near certainty of new incidents and tensions. The ket test will be the 2014 elections: Whether they are held, their resorts after they, and how the new President and afghan 

senior officials deal with security issues and the US. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 10) There are certainly a broad range of competing interests at 

stake—from the Northern Alliance’s general hostility and difficulty in dealing politically with the Taliban, to the various disparate factions within the Taliban itself. 

Equally pressing are the interests of the Afghan government, as well as the interests of actors in Pakistan who have great sway over those within Afghanistan. Certainly the withdrawal of American and NATO troops affects the dynamics of these 

relationships, as does the implied continued financial support for Afghan security 

signified by a troop presence, regardless of U.S. insistence that negotiations be Afghan-led. Can you share with us how you see the various permutations of residual 

forces affecting the political dynamics of negotiations? 

General BARNO. In my view, negotiations with the Taliban will not reach a serious stage until the bulk of foreign/international forces exit Afghanistan in December 

2014. Once the Taliban and the successor to the Karzai government recognize that 

they remain locked in a potentially interminable Afghan vs. Afghan conflict, options 

for serious talks will likely emerge. I believe the prospects for any type of negotiated 

end to the war prior to the end of 2014 are highly dubious. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 11) Governance reform is going to be integral to the stability of 

an Afghan government, but has been shunted aside in large part due to other concerns. With reduced troop levels and challenges to funding of ANA forces, do you 

see the United States as still having the leverage to encourage governance reform? 

General BARNO. I believe serious Afghan government reform will only come if the 

Afghan government, president and people collectively realize that there is no other 

choice for survival. I see almost no circumstances for that to occur in the next two 

years. Moreover, I believe that ineffective and often corrupt Afghan governance is 

endemic, and unlikely to be influenced through Western leverage. The last ten years 

should provide ample evidence of the degree of difficulty inherent in this effort. If 

we achieved little success in a decade with massive international troop presence and 

financial support, the prospects for a better future outcome in this arena with neither present in Afghanistan are minimal. 
129 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 12) Recently, President Karzai ordered the withdrawal of U.S. special forces from Wardak, a key province southwest of Kabul. This follows the ban 

on coalition airstrikes in residential areas last week. With the understanding that 

such controversies will arise, can you speak to the effect of these moves on the 

broader picture? How will this affect the training of and transition to ANA forces, 

and does this strengthen Karzai’s hand in negotiations? 

General BARNO. These recent moves by President Karzai relate, in my view, to 

his attempts to burnish his legitimacy as a nationalist leader ‘‘pushing back on behalf of his people’’ against western power and influence in Afghanistan. These proclamations have more to do with short-term political gain than any efforts to 

strengthen his negotiating hand for residual presence. In fact, I believe that there 

is substantial danger that Karzai could overplay his hand and so outrage Western 

sentiment that the U.S. and the international community may simply choose a ‘‘zero 

option’’ of no residual troop presence after 2014 if Karzai does not moderate his 

rhetoric. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. 13) As a taxpayer, I find the amount of corruption, and Karzai’s failure to really do anything about it, extremely concerning. The World Bank recently 

estimated that the cost of corruption in Afghanistan has actually increased significantly in the last three years to $3.9 billion. And I am alarmed that SIGAR and 

CRS have warned Congress that key elements of leadership and governance will be 

missing through at least 2014, so it’s likely that we’ll keep contributing to this corruption problem. What steps can DOD or NATO take to make sure that our security 

role isn’t defined by subsidizing this corruption problem? 

Dr. DALE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. 14) Dr. Dale, I think whether or not a program or project is going 

to be sustainable must be one of the first questions we ask for all of our efforts in 

Afghanistan. SIGAR has exposed millions of dollars of projects that will never really 

be used in Afghanistan, including electrical equipment that can’t be installed. And 

on the security side, you point to significant concerns about the political will of the 

Afghan government or the Pakistanis to go after safe havens in Pakistan. You say 

some argue that stronger Afghan institutions might help, but is relying on that really a sustainable, or even a realistic strategy? 

Dr. DALE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. 15) As a taxpayer, I find the amount of corruption, and Karzai’s failure to really do anything about it, extremely concerning. The World Bank recently 

estimated that the cost of corruption in Afghanistan has actually increased significantly in the last three years to $3.9 billion. And I am alarmed that SIGAR and 

CRS have warned Congress that key elements of leadership and governance will be 

missing through at least 2014, so it’s likely that we’ll keep contributing to this corruption problem. What steps can DOD or NATO take to make sure that our security 

role isn’t defined by subsidizing this corruption problem? 

General KEANE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. 16) As a taxpayer, I find the amount of corruption, and Karzai’s failure to really do anything about it, extremely concerning. The World Bank recently 

estimated that the cost of corruption in Afghanistan has actually increased significantly in the last three years to $3.9 billion. And I am alarmed that SIGAR and 

CRS have warned Congress that key elements of leadership and governance will be 

missing through at least 2014, so it’s likely that we’ll keep contributing to this corruption problem. What steps can DOD or NATO take to make sure that our security 

role isn’t defined by subsidizing this corruption problem? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. The Tokyo conference did set clear standards for Afghan reform 

based on Afghan pledges and commitments. The U.S. should hold the Afghan government fully accountable, and make aid and military support conditional on the 

basis of Afghan performance. 

At the same time, the U.S. is as much to blame as the Afghans. Pouring money 

into the country without meaningful plans, management, and accountability has 

had an immense corrupting effect. It has distorted much of the economy, raised 

prices and costs, and vastly exceeded Afghan absorption capacity. The U.S. military 

and USAID did not enforce meaningful accountability and contract standards before 

2011, and SIGAR is just becoming effective. 

No American should ever talk about Afghan corruption without looking in the 

mirror, and no member of Congress should ever forget that Congress failed to en-
130 

force meaningful standards on a grossly negligent State Department and USAID, 

and marginally better Department of Defense. 

Ms. SPEIER. 17) I am very concerned about the transition from private security 

contractors to the APPF, and have been frustrated that both GAO and SIGAR have 

had problems accessing reports assessing their effectiveness. Mr. Cordesman, you 

describe the creation of the APPF as ‘‘more a Karzai power grab than a real security 

reform.’’ What are the political and cost implications of this power grab? 

Mr. CORDESMAN. We don’t know how bad it will be. So far waivers and delay have 

solved the problem, and the APPF has been no more corrupt that the existing PSCs. 

It does seem likely, however, that the APPF will remain weaker than today’s PSCs 

and that this will present growing problems after 2014 that the U.S. may have to 

solve by either using troops to provide security or sharply limiting its State Department and USAID movements in the field and the number of posts it can maintain 

outside Kabul. 

Ms. SPEIER. 18) As a taxpayer, I find the amount of corruption, and Karzai’s failure to really do anything about it, extremely concerning. The World Bank recently 

estimated that the cost of corruption in Afghanistan has actually increased significantly in the last three years to $3.9 billion. And I am alarmed that SIGAR and 

CRS have warned Congress that key elements of leadership and governance will be 

missing through at least 2014, so it’s likely that we’ll keep contributing to this corruption problem. What steps can DOD or NATO take to make sure that our security 

role isn’t defined by subsidizing this corruption problem? 

General BARNO. This will remain a deep-seated problem in Afghanistan well beyond 2014. The U.S. and the international community must continue efforts such 

as SIGAR, using ‘‘name and shame’’ investigations, and sustain recent efforts to ensure western contracts are let with the appropriate ‘‘teeth’’ built in to deliver satisfactory performance and avoid obvious corrupt practices. The delivery of sustained 

aid should be tied to the commensurate ability of the United States to oversee and 

inspect the effective use of that aid. Providing dollars in coming years without adequate oversight is both a very likely outcome, and one guaranteeing waste, fraud 

and abuse of those dollars. 

Æ