[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-961.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -961
D ISCIPLINARY C OUNSEL v. C ORNER
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-961.] Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of th e Rules of Professional Conduct—Oneyear suspension, fully stayed on conditions. (No. 2019-0215—Submitted Decembe r 10, 2019—Decided March 18, 20 20.)
O N C ERTIFIED R EPORT by the Board of Professiona l Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2017-063.

_______________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Beverly J. Corner, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0042725, was admitte d to the practice of law i n Ohio in 1989. {¶ 2} In February 2016, we suspended Corner’s license for two years, with the second year stayed on cond itions, for misappropriating clie nt funds, lying to a client, misusing her client tru st account, failing to competent ly and diligentlyS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 represent a client, and other misconduct. Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner , 145 Ohio St.3d 192, 2016-Ohio-359, 47 N.E.3d 847. Although Corner could have applied for reinstatement in February 2017, she did not do so until Aug ust 2017. In October 2017, we denied her request for reinstatement. Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner , 151 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2017-Ohio-8306, 84 N.E.3d 1045. Although her application indicated that she had complied with the continuing-legal-educa tion requirements for suspended attorneys, she had in fact fallen far short of co mpleting the requisite
number of credit hours. {¶ 3} On December 4, 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Cor ner in a four-count complaint with c ommitting professional miscondu ct after we issued our February 2016 suspension order. On the same day, Corner fi led a second application for reinstatement. Gov.Bar R. V(24)(C)(4), however , permits this court to reinstate suspended attorneys only if “[n]o formal disciplin ary proceedings are pending against the respondent .” On December 15, 2017, we deni ed Corner’s
second reinstateme nt application. Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner , 151 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2017-Ohio-9034, 87 N.E.3d 1263. {¶ 4} The parties stipulated to some f acts and exhibits in the new ca se, but Corner denied that she had violated any ethical rules. After ahearing, a threemember panel of the Board of P rofessional Conduct found that Co rner had engaged
in the misconduct alle ged in count three of relator’s complaint , dismissed the other counts, and recommended that Corn er serve a one-year conditiona lly stayed suspension, commencing upon reinstatement from her February 201 6 suspension. The board issued a report adopting the panel’s findings of misc onduct and
recommended sanction. Relator h as filed objections to the boar d’s report, arguing
that the board should have found that Corner committed the misc onduct alleged in count two of relator’s complaint and that, regardless, Corner’s actions warrant an actual suspension from the practice of law.January Term, 2020

3 {¶ 5} For the reasons explained below, we overrule relator’s objectio ns and accept the board’s findings of misconduct and recommended sanct ion.
Misconduct {¶ 6} Prior to Corner’s February 2016 suspension, her stepmother, Per ciline Beverly, sought her assistance with the purchase of a parcel of real property from
Joe McDaniels. Because McDaniels’s deceased wife had an intere st in the property, he first had to obtai n a certificate from the probate court transferring his wife’s interest to him. Beverly gave Corner a $75 check dated February 2, 2016,
which was the amount of the filin g fee to obtain the certificat e of transfer. {¶ 7} The following day, we suspended Corner from the practice of law

. She nevertheless continued to assist Beverly with filing docume nts and nonattorney tasks relating to the property transfer. For example, in Octob er 2016, Corner purchased a $75 money order that was used to pay the probate co urt filing fee. And after the probate court issued the certificate of transfer, Cor ner filed the certificate in the recorder’s office and paid the $28 filing fee with a che ck provided by Beverly. {¶ 8} In November 2016, relator received an unsigned grievance— purportedly from McDaniels—allegi ng that Corner had continued t o practice law after her suspension. Relator requested that Corner respond to the grievance and explain, among other things, who had paid the filing fees relat ing to McDaniels’s certificate of transfer. In response, Corner admitted that she had filed the certificate at the recorder’s office but denied having paid the filing fee and stated that she was unaware who had paid the probate court fee. {¶ 9} In a follow-up letter, relator requested that Corner further ex plain why
she had filed the certificate of transfer on behalf of McDaniel s. Corner did not directly answer relator’s question and instead described her wo rk as a part-time notary signing agent. Corner stated that in that capacity, she filed documents and paid filing fees on behalf of the “entity” that retained her. Relator then requested Corner to provide the name of the “entity” that had hired her f or McDaniels’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 matter, but Corner refused to ide ntify her stepmother as the pe rson who had sought
her assistance. {¶ 10} The board found that by falsely stating that she was unaware wh o had paid the filing fees and that she had been hired by an “ent ity,” Corner violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement
of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter). Th e board also found that by refusing to provide Beverly’s name when relator request ed the identity of the entity who had retained her, Corner violated Prof.Cond.R. 8 .1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from failing to disclose a material fact in response to a demand for information from a disciplinary authority). {¶ 11} We agree with the board’s findings of misconduct. Relator’s objection to the dismissal of count two {¶ 12} In the only objection to the boa rd’s misconduct findings, relat or asserts that the board erred by dismissing count two of relator ’s complaint. The board’s decision is reviewable, relator argues, because it is “ unclear” whether the hearing panel unanimously dismi ssed count two or merely recomme nded dismissal, and this court should construe any ambiguity in the panel’s rep ort against a
unanimous dismissal. {¶ 13} Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G) expressly authorizes a unanimous hearing panel to “order on the record or in its report” the dismissal o f a count if the panel finds that there is insufficient evidence to support it. As an alternative to a unanimous dismissal, Gov.Bar R. V(12)(H) provides that a hearin g panel may refer its findings of fact and recomme ndations for dismissal to the b oard for review. Here, we find no ambiguity in the panel’s decision dismissing—r ather than recommending dismissal of—count t wo. The panel’s report, which was signed by all three panel members, indicates that relator failed to estab lish the alleged rule violation by clear and convincing evidence and “as such Count T wo is dismissed.”January Term, 2020

5 The panel confirmed this finding later in its report when it no ted that “three of the
counts have been dismissed so we ar e left with the McDaniels co unt.” {¶ 14} “We have previously held that t he unanimous dismissal of a count by a hearing panel in a discip linary hearing precludes further review of the dismissal by the full board or this court.” Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez , 147 Ohio St.3d 329, 2016-Ohio-5586, 65 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 13. Therefore , because the hearing panel unanimously dismissed count two for lack of suffi cient evidence, we are not permitted to consider the merits of relator’s objection

. See Disciplinary
Counsel v. Maciak , 153 Ohio St.3d 185, 2018-Ohio-544, 102 N.E.3d 485, ¶ 20 (“Review of the dismissed count s, for any reason, is not permit ted”).
Sanction {¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for atto rney misconduct, we consider al l relevant factors, including the e thical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. {¶ 16} As aggravating factors, the board found that Corner has a prior disciplinary record and that she refused to acknowledge the wro ngful nature of her
conduct in count three. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) and (7). In mitigation, the
board found that Corner did not act with a selfish or dishonest motive. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2). According to the board, Corner was “very upset ” throughout relator’s investigation because she could not understand why Mc Daniels had filed a grievance against her. As it turned out, McDaniels had not filed the grievance. Instead, the unsigned grievance had been filed by an unknown in dividual who had written McDaniels’s name on the grievance, and relator did not discover that fact until several months after commencing the investigation into Co rner’s conduct. The board noted that although Corner’s conduct during the inves tigation was wrong, considering the circumstances of the fictitious grievanc e, it was “somewhat
understandable.”S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 {¶ 17} To support its recommended sanction, the board cited Disciplinary
Counsel v. Wexler , 139 Ohio St.3d 597, 2014-Ohio-2952, 13 N.E.3d 1168, in which we imposed a six-month conditionally stayed suspension on an at torney who made false statements during the course of a disciplinary investigat ion. Like the panel in this case, the panel in Wexler had unanimously dismissed all the other charges against the attorney relating to a grievance filed against him. {¶ 18} As it did in Wexler , the board recommends a fully stayed suspension in this case. The board recognized that Corner committed the m isconduct while she was suspended. But the board also noted the paucity of evi dence for some of relator’s allegations against Cor ner and that this case has res ulted in her being suspended for much longer than originally intended by our Febru ary 2016 suspension order. The board there fore concluded that Corner ha s already been punished for her misconduct in t his matter and r ecommends that we impose a oneyear suspension, stayed in its entirety on conditions, commenci ng upon her
reinstatement from our Feb ruary 2016 suspension order. {¶ 19} Relator objects to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing th at because this is Corner’s second disciplinary case—and second ca se involving dishonest conduct—an actual suspen sion is warranted. Relator a lso takes issue
with the board’s comments that Corner’s dishonesty was “somewha t understandable” and that she has already been “punished” based on the length of her February 2016 suspension. According to relator, it was irr elevant who had filed the grievance because relator had the authority to investigate anonymous grievances, and relator believe s that accepting the board’s pos ition would set a dangerous precedent by giving a ttorneys “carte blanche permissi on” to provide false information in a disciplinary investigation “simply becau se they believe the allegations are meritless.” Relator also asserts that any dela y in Corner’s
reinstatement was her own fault.January Term, 2020

7 {¶ 20} Relator is correct that a disciplinary authority may investigat e an anonymous grievance or “any matter * * * that comes to its atte ntion.” Gov.Bar R. V(9)(C)(1); see also Disciplinar y Counsel v. Kramer , 149 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016- Ohio-5734, 75 N.E.3d 1174, ¶ 34. The board’s concern here, how ever, was that relator had investigated an uns igned grievance without timely r eaching out to the purported grievant to determine whether he had in fact filed th e document. Regardless, the board concluded—and we agree—that despite the c ircumstances of the grievance, Corner “had a duty to cooperate, be truthful, an d provide material information, all of which she did not do.” We interpret the bo ard’s comment that
Corner’s conduct was “somewhat understandable” as providing con text for her motive in light of the unusual circumstances in this case—not a s establishing precedent condoning her false state ments in connection with the disciplinary investigation. As the board found, there was no excuse for Cor ner’s dishonest conduct and she had a duty “to cooperate with the investigation regardless of how it was instigated.” {¶ 21} Relator is also correct that some of the delay in Corner’s
reinstatement is attributable t o her own conduct. The fact rem ains, however, that she has been suspended for over four years for what was suppose d to be, at most, a two-year suspension, and the charges pending in this case have prevented her reinstatement. We have consistently recognized that “the goal of disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the errant lawyer, but to protect the public.” Toledo
Bar Assn. v. Hales , 120 Ohio St.3d 340, 2008-Ohio-6201, 899 N.E.2d 130, ¶ 21. And “[w]hile consistency is also a goal, ‘we examine each case individually and impose the discipline we believe a ppropriate based on the uniqu e circumstances of
each case.’ ” Id. , quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against Ruffenach , 486 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn.1992). {¶ 22} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine , 144 Ohio St.3d 115, 2015- Ohio-3729, 41 N.E.3d 384, we imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney whoS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 had failed to cooperate in a disc iplinary investigation. We no ted that because the attorney had two prior disciplinary cases in a three-year perio d, a greater sanction might have been warranted. However, because the charges pendin g against the attorney in the third case had prevented him from seeking reins tatement from a oneyear suspension that we had imposed over two years prior, we fo und a six-month suspension to be appropriate. Id. at ¶ 26. {¶ 23} We apply the same rationale here. Although we in no way condon e Corner’s attempts to mislead relator, considering the unique ci rcumstances of this case—including that she has now served a four-year suspension u nder our February 2016 suspension order—the goals of the disciplinary system are served by imposing the stayed suspension recommended by the board. We al so agree that the stayed suspension shall commence upon Corner’s reinstatement fr om our February 2016 suspension order, assuming th at she is able to prove that she has complied with the reinstatement require ments imposed by that order. We therefore overrule relator’s objection and adopt the board’s recommended sanction. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Derryberry , 152 Ohio St.3d 41, 2017-Ohio-8767, 92 N.E.3d 844 (imposing a one-year conditionally stayed suspension on an atto rney who—in his second disciplinary case involvi ng dishonest conduct—made false statements during the disciplinary investig ation and failed to reasonably communicate with a client).
Conclusion {¶ 24} For the reasons explained above, Beverly J. Corner is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, with t he entire suspension stayed on the conditions that she achieve a passing score on th e Multistate Professional Responsib ility Examination and engage in no furthe r misconduct. If Corner violates either condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and she will serve the entire one-year suspension. Corner’s stayed suspension sha ll commence uponJanuary Term, 2020

9 her reinstatement from our February 3, 2016 suspension order. Costs are taxed to
Corner. Judgment accordingly.
F RENCH , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.
K ENNEDY , J., concurs in judgment only.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by F ISCHER , J.
F ISCHER , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’C ONNOR , C.J.

_________________ O’C ONNOR , C.J., dissenting. {¶ 25} Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a fully stayed one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case, I dissent. {¶ 26} The majority correctly agrees w ith the Board of Professional Conduct’s findings that respondent, Beverly J. Corner, violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) by lying in connection with a disciplinary matter and violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) by failing to disclose a material fact in the disciplinary proc ess. But the majority sends mixed signals to members of the public and the legal prof ession by failing to impose an actual suspension while agreeing with the board that “there was no
excuse for Corner’s dishonest c onduct and she had a duty ‘to co operate with the investigation regardless of how it was instigated.’ ” Majority opinion at ¶ 20, quoting the board’s report. Add itionally, although the majorit y acknowledges that “some of the delay in Corner’s r einstatement is attributable to her own conduct,” it incorrectly finds that the dela y warrants a lesser sanction. Id. at ¶ 21. {¶ 27} The only factor the board found i n mitigation here—that Corner did not act with a selfish or dishonest motive—is not supported by the record. In my view, the facts of this case clearly demonstrate that Corner’s misconduct was borne
out of a selfish and dishonest motive. At the time of the viol ations in this case, Corner was already serving a prior suspension for dishonest con duct. By deceiving relator, disciplinary counsel, and withholding information duri ng the disciplinaryS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 investigation that Corner had a duty to disclose, she clearly w as protecting herself from further discipline. {¶ 28} The board and the majority mistakenly rely on Disciplinary Counsel
v. Wexler , 139 Ohio St.3d 597, 2014-Ohio-2952, 13 N.E.3d 1168, to support their conclusions that a fully stayed suspension is appropriate here. Unlike the respondent in Wexler , there is no evidence in the record that Corner made efforts i n the disciplinary proceedings to acknowledge her dishonesty and correct her misconduct through full disclosure . Instead, Corner made an is sue of the identity of the grievant which, as the m ajority correctly acknowledges, is entirely irrelevant to whether an attorney must coope rate during a disciplinary pro ceeding. Additionally, in Wexler , the board found in mitigation that Wexler had not had a prior disciplinary record and that he had presented evidence of his good character and reputation. Id. at ¶ 14. Neither of these factors are present here. For these

reasons, Wexler is distinguishable. {¶ 29} I agree with the majority and relator that Disciplinary Counsel v.
Bunstine , 144 Ohio St.3d 115, 2015-Ohio-3729, 41 N.E.3d 384, is more in structive here, but not for the reasons cited by the majority. In Bunstine , this court found that a six-month actual suspension was the proper sanction for an attorney who had failed to cooperate in the discip linary process and, like Corne r, had a prior disciplinary record and refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing. Id. at ¶ 26. Notably, Bunstine’s misconduct wa s the failure to cooperate wit h the disciplinary process in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b). Id. at ¶ 25. Corner also violated that provision, but she additionally violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) by making a false statement in connection with her disciplinary investigation. T hus, I would find that this additional violation warrants a longer suspension than the six-month suspension imposed in Bunstine

. {¶ 30} The board and the majority also have lost their way by relying on Bunstine for the proposition that the time that has elapsed since Corner ’s FebruaryJanuary Term, 2020

11 2016 suspension supports the imposition of a fully stayed suspe nsion here. In
Bunstine , additional charges of professi onal misconduct that we rejecte d prevented the attorney from seeking reinstatement from a prior suspension when he otherwise would have been eligible. Here, however, Corner was eligible f or reinstatement from her February 2016 suspension in February 2017. But Corner chose to wait until August 2017 to first seek reinstatement. During this tim e, no disciplinary charges were pending. This court expeditiously grants reinstat ement as long as the suspended attorney has complie d with the conditions for reinsta tement set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(24), which includes the completion of the continui ng-legal-education requirements set forth in Gov.Bar R. X. See Gov.Bar R. V(24)(C)(3). Corner’s attempt at reinstateme nt failed because she had been dishonest regarding her completion of the continuing-leg al-education requirements. Thu s, Corner’s delay and dishonesty prevented her reinstatement. {¶ 31} Corner had almost a year to seek reinstatement before relator f iled the disciplinary complaint in this case in December 2017. Cont rary to the majority’s view, I would find that the circumstances surroundin g Corner’s failed reinstatement attempt weigh in favor of additional protection for the public, not less. And I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Corne r has essentially served a “four-year suspension under our February 2016 suspensi on order” and that the goals of the disciplinary system are served by a stayed sus pension. Majority opinion at ¶ 23. Any additional time that Corner served under her prior suspension can be attributed only to her own actions. {¶ 32} For these reasons, I would impose a two-year suspension, with o ne year stayed on the condition that Corner engage in no further m isconduct. Additionally, I would not award Corner any credit for the time that she served under her prior suspension.
F ISCHER , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 F ISCHER , J., dissenting. {¶ 33} I join the first dissenting opinion. I write separately to exp lain why
this court should review the boa rd’s dismissal of count two. {¶ 34} The majority opinion does not consider the merits of relator’s objection to the Board of Profe ssional Conduct’s dismissal of c ount two. Its basis for doing so is that the hearing panel “unanimously dismissed” count two for lack of sufficient evidence. Majori ty opinion at ¶ 14. The majorit y opinion is not

correct. {¶ 35} As I have explained in a prior case, when a hearing panel unanimously dismisses counts pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(12)(G), t he dismissal order is effectively insulated from any type of review. Disciplinary Counsel v.
Mancino , 154 Ohio St.3d 49, 2018-Ohio-3017, 110 N.E.3d 1265, ¶ 15 (Fis cher, J., concurring). Thus, as the majority opinion recognizes, in orde r for a panel’s dismissal to have this preclusiv e effect, the panel’s dismissal must be unanimous. {¶ 36} I disagree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the panel’s dismissal of count two was unanimous. The board’s repo rt states that “the panel feels Relator failed to e stablish by clear and convincing evidence the Respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.4 and Count Two is dismissed .” This language does not specify that the panel’ s dismissal was unanimous and i s in direct contrast to the portion of the board’s report addressing count four: “Re lator submits that Respondent engaged in the unauthor ized practice of law in Virgi nia and as such
violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a), but the panel unanimously finds no clear and convincing evidence to support that position and dismisses this alleged violation.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 37} The board’s use of the word “unanimously” in relation to the
dismissal of count four indicates that when the panel acted una nimously, the board specifically said so. Because the board used neither “unanimou s” nor “unanimously” in relation to t he dismissal of count two, the bo ard’s report isJanuary Term, 2020

13 ambiguous regarding whether the di smissal of count two was unan imous. I would resolve this ambiguity in favor of preserving this court’s abil ity to oversee the practice of law in Ohio and revie w the dismissal of count two. {¶ 38} Because the board’s report is ambiguous regarding whether the p anel dismissed count two unanimously , and because I would resolve th at ambiguity in favor of this court being able t o review the dismissal, I would have this court proceed to consider the m erits of relator’s objection. . {¶ 39} Pursuant to the stipulated fact s in this case, respondent, Beve rly J. Corner, conceded that pursuant t o an order of this court, befor e she entered into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with any at torney or law firm, she had been required t o verify that the attorney or law firm h ad complied with the registration requirements of Gov.B ar R. V(23)(C). She further stipulated that she had entered into an independent-c ontractor relationship with an attorney without first complying with this requirement. In fact, she conceded t hat she had registered this independent-contractor rela tionship only after she had fin ished working with the attorney and only after rela tor inquired as to why she had failed to comply with the requirement. {¶ 40} Corner’s failure to comply with this requirement constitutes a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(c) (prohibiting an attorney from disobeying an obligation under the rules of a t ribunal). This violation prov ides further support for imposing a two-year suspension with one year of that suspension stayed on conditions. I accordingly join the first dissenting opinion.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. Law Office of Philip A. King, L.L.C., and Philip A. King, for r espondent.

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