## IN THE COUR T OF CRIMINA L APPEALS OF TEX AS

N o. P D - 0145- 09

EX PA R TE JO H N C H R I STO PH ER C O V EY , JR. , A ppe l l ant

ON APP ELLANT’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW I N CA USE NO . 1 1 - 0 8 - 0 0 1 9 0 - CR FRO M THE ELEVENTH CO URT O F AP PEALS NO LAN CO UNTY

H OL C OM B , J. , del i vere d t he opi ni on of t he C ourt , i n w hi ch M E YE RS , P RI CE , W OMACK , J OHNS ON , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . C OCHR AN , J ., f i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on, i n w hi c h J OHNS ON , J ., jo in e d . K ELL ER , P .J ., c o n c u r r e d in th e r e s u lt . K E AS L E R and H ERVEY , JJ . , di s s e nt e d.

JohnChr ist op he r Cov e y , J r. , sou g ht ha be a s cor pu s re lie f o n th e g ro un d th a t hi s p le a of no lo contende re ha d been involuntar y due to the inef

fec tive assistance of t ri al counse l. The trial cour t denied r elief, a

nd the cour

t of appe als aff

irmed. We now re verse . On June 14 , 20 05 , a No lan County g ra nd jur y re tur ne d a n in dic tme nt c ha

rg ingCov e y

wi th
t h e fe lony

offe nse of attempted sexual assault. See T e x. Pe n . Co d e § § 1 5

. 0 1 ( a ) & 2 2

. 0 11(a) (1). Sometime therea fter, Cove y enter ed into plea ne g otiations with t he State.COVEY -- 2

Trial counse l’s letter to Covey was a dmitted in evidence a t the habea s hear ing. T he 1 State has neve r disputed the authe nticity of the letter

. The leg al ef

fec t of a plea

of nolo contende re ( “no conte st”) is “the same as that of a plea 2 of g uil ty , e xce pt t

hat su c h p le a

may no t be us e d a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant a s a n a dmi ssi on

in a ny c ivi l s u it b a s e d u p o no r g r o w in g o u t o f

th e a c t u p o nw h ic h th e c r im in a l p r o s e c u ti o nis b a s e d

. ” T e x. (continued...) On De c e mbe r 2 8, 20 05 , tr ia l c ouns e l, i n r e sp on se to an inq uir y fr om Cov e y , s e nt a

le tte r to

1 him that r e a d in

re le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: “As y ou know, this matter [i.e., the p r o secution of Covey for attempted sexual assault] is s et for guilty plea on January 9, 2006 at 9:00 a.m. You have reque sted that Iadvise on whe ther y ou would be subjec t to the sex offe nder reg istration prog ram’s require ments incident t o y our pl ea. This letter shall confirm my finding s conce rning same. Clearly , y ou would be re quired to re g ister as a sex offender

upon entry

of y our p l e a i nN o l anC o u n t y. “F ortunately , Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 62.404 provides f or permissive ear ly termination from reg istration. E arly termination would requir e the filing of a motion with the court requesting same a ccompa nied by a (1) written explanation of the event g iving rise to the repor ting r equire ment; and (2) a cer tified copy of a w ritten repor

t detailing the outcome of a n individual risk assessment evaluation. The written re port i s co m p i led by the Council on Sex Offe nder Treatment and eva luates the likelihood of repe at offe nses and potential da ng er to the c o m m u n i t y. “I have spoke n with the D.A. who indicated that the J udg e in the 32 District nd would likely

not even contemplate such a mot ion until y ou’ve established some sort of trac k rec ord on proba t i o n . Howeve r, I have le arne d y ou will not be eligible f or ear ly termination of probation pursuant to A rt. 42.12 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Procedur e bec ause of

the re quirement for

sex offender

reg istration. There fore , y ou must ‘walk the line’ f

or 8 y ear s to successf

ully complete your probated sentenc e. “ Mo re ov e r, since y ou wi ll b e pla c e d o n p ro batio n, the dis tr ic t ju dg e is require d by

statute to order

that y ou reg ister as a

sex offender

. . . . “I n s h o rt, a s I r e a d th e la w , y o u w o u ld p r o b a

b ly n o t b e e li g ib le to f

ile a motion for ear ly

termination until y ou have succe ssfully completed all 8 y ear s of y our prob a ti o n . T h e d is tr ic t j u d g e w il l a p p ar e n tl y h a v e th e s o le d is c r e ti o nto d etermine whether to rele ase y ou from reg istration require ments. Obviously , Art. 62.404 does not gua rante e that y ou will be able to be r elea sed fr om the sex offender reg istration require ments at all and [y ou] wil l remain unde r its require ments for life.” (I talics and underlining in orig inal.) On J anuar y 9, 2006, Covey

pled nol o contende re, pursuant to a plea ag ree ment, to attempted 2COVEY -- 3

(...continued) 2 Code Crim. Proc. art. 27.02(5)

. All refe renc es to article s are to those in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

. 3 sexual assault. The t rial court, in acc ordanc e with the pl ea ag ree ment, defe rre d an adjudication of Covey ’s g uilt, placed him on community supervision for e ight y ear s, fined him $750, and orde red him to complete 160 hours of c ommunity service

. See Art. 42.12, § 5(a ). I n the cour se of the ple a 3 hear ing, the following occur red: The Court: Do y ou have a ny other que stions concer

ning this d ef

er re d adjudication probation that I ’m inclined to follow at this time? Covey : I t say s that there ’s a chance of g etting taken off of the sexual offe nder e arlier tha n p ro batio n is up . Wh a t’ s – wh a t are the ru le s o n th a t? The Court: Discre tionary

with the court. So, there ’s not like a checklist that y ou can do and automatica lly

g et any thing done . There are rea lly no promises to y ou other than that it’s subject to being revie wed. On April 14, 2008, Covey filed a ha beas c orpus application in the trial court, asking that he be allowe d to withdraw his plea of n o l o co n t en d ere . See Art. 11.072. In his application, Covey argued that his nolo plea ha d been “ involuntary ” and “ unknowing ” beca u s e h i s t rial counse l had

re nd e re d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e : “Applica nt c omplains that he was not a ffor ded eff ective assistance of counse l in v iol a tio n o f t

he Sixth A me ndme nt a

nd the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla

us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment to the Constituti on of the United Stat es . Appl icant’s tria l counsel aff irmatively

misadvised [hi m] that [he] was e ligible f or ea rly termination from the sex offender

reg istration require ments. By written cor responde nce dated Dec ember 28, 2005, Applicant’s tria l counsel advised that Art. 62.40 4 [ o f the Texas Code of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure ] al low e d th e Judg e of the tr ia l court

‘s ole dis c re tio n’ to r e le a se Applicant from the s ex offe nder reg istration require ment. Applicant’s tria l counsel was incor rec t. Art. 62.404 does not apply to Applicant, and there wa s n ev er any possibili ty

that Applicant mig ht be re lease d from the r eg istration obligation. * * * “Applica nt would never have waived his r ight to ple ad ‘not g uilty ’ but for theCOVEY -- 4

aff irmative misinformation provided to [him] by his trial counsel. Applica nt relied on his tr ia l c ouns e l’ s mis inf or ma tio n, and

tha t r e lia nc e re nd e r[e d] in vo lun tary [his ] plea of ‘no conte st.’” Atta c he d to Cov e y ’s a

pp lic ati on for

ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f w a s h is a ff

ida vit , w hic h r e a d in

re le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: “I understood [when I

pled nolo contende re] that Iwould be subjec t to the sex of fe nd e r r e g istratio n la

w, bu t it wa s my

fu rt he r u nd e rs tand ingtha

t th e Court

wo uld have the dis c re tio n to te rm inate my re g ist rat ion ob lig a tio n. Iha d n o d ou bt i n my a bil ity to s uc c e ssf

ull y c omp le te my prob a tio n. F ur the rm or e , I

ha d n o d ou

bt i n my ability to demonstrate my self wo rthy of re lease from the se x offe nder r eg istration re qu ir e me nts

. * * * “My decision to waive my

rig ht to plea d ‘Not Guilty ’ was a difficult dec ision to m a ke . O n th e e ve ni ng of th e a lle g e d atte mpt e d s e xua l a ssa ult , I wa s se ve re ly i n t o x icated. I

had a pr ior relationship wit h the complainant. I have no me mory

of perf orming the ac ts that were alleg ed in the indi ct m en t

. T h e off ense a lleg ed wa s e nti re ly inc on sis te nt w ith my c ha ra c te r – I ha d no cr imi na l re c or d exce pt f or tr a ff ic vio la tio ns . Apa

rt fr om b e inga c c us e d, Idid no t ha ve any ind e pe nde nt r e a so n to be lie ve that I

c omm itt e d th e of

fe ns e . I did

no t be lie ve that I

wa s g uil ty . I

a bs olute ly wa s n ot wi lli ng to ple a d ‘ g uil ty .’ Ne ve rt he le ss, Iwa s d isa dv anta g e d b y my ina bil ity to r e me mbe r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he a lle g e d a ssa

ult

. “My attorney explained to me [ befor e I pled nolo contende re] that the testimony of the a lleg ed victim would be sufficient to sustain a jury verdic t of ‘g uilty .’ Howe ver, I

also understood that a jury could have considere d the evidenc e and re turned a

verdic t of ‘not g uilty .’

* * * “My attorney [i n his Dece mber 28, 2005, letter ] fur t h er ex plained that the Court ha d the dis c re tio n to te rm inate my re g istra tio n r e qu ir e me nts a ft e r s ome or a ll of my probation had been serve d. And while my attorney explained that there w as no g uara ntee that my

reg istration require ment would be ter minate d , I w a s a ssured that ear ly termination was a po ssi bil ity

. * * * “I relied on my

attorney ’s advice that Iwas e ligible f or ea rly rele ase f rom the regi s t ra t i on require ments. The possibility that Icould later

have my reg istration re qu ir e me nt t e rm inate d w a s th e sin g le mos t im po rt ant f a c tor in my fi na l de c isi on

to acc ept the plea

ag ree ment .

. . . I f I

had known that ‘ attempted sexual assault’ wa s no t e lig ibl e fo r e arl y

te rm inatio n o f t

he re g ist ratio n r e qu ir e me nt, Ide fi nit e ly wo uld have ple aded ‘ not guilty .’ * * * “I f my t ri al counse l had [advised me cor rec tly reg ardingthe law of

sexCOVEY -- 5

of fe nd e r re g istratio n], I wo uld have ple a de d ‘n ot g uil ty ,’ and ho pe d fo r [a ] favo ra ble [j ury ] verdict. Even thoug h I would have risked conviction by a jury , Ialso believe that Iwould have r ece ived a pr obated se ntence if Ihad bee n convicted. * * * “B ut for my

trial attorney ’s bad a dvice to me, I would have ple aded ‘ not g uil ty .’ An d wh e n I a sk e d the Cou rt [at the ple a he ari ng ] ab ou t e arl y

te rm inatio n, if the Court had told me that I was not elig ible for e arly release f rom the re g istration re qu ir e me nt, Iwo uld im med iate ly have wi thd

ra wn (o r atte mpt e d to wi thd

ra w) my plea of ‘no contest,’ prior to the C ourt’s announcement that it would approve the plea ag ree ment.” (Italics and pa renthe tical mater ial in orig inal.) On J une 9, 2008, the tria l c ourt held an evidentiar y hear ing on Cove y ’s application for habe as corpus r elief. A t that hear ing, Cove y testified in c ong ruenc e with his a ffidavit, quoted a bove. No one else testified. At the conc lusion of Covey ’s t es t imony , habea s counsel, ag ain citing both the ri g ht t o c ouns e l and

the ri g ht t o d

ue pr oc e ss o f l aw, argue d a s f oll ow s:

“ Judg e, I be lie ve y ou ’v e g ot s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to f

ind that Mr . Co ve y , in making his decision to waive his rig ht to a trial by jury , he did so with an incorr ect understandingof the law . He be lieved that by his abili t y

to perfor

m well on pr ob a tio n, he wo uld be abl e to d e mon str a te to you that he wa s w or

thy of e arl y rele ase. A nd that belief is w hat cause d him to go the r oute that he did, we ighing , y ou know, cost/bene fit analy sis sort of thing. B ut, it – i t was just not an er roneous mis un de rs tand ing ; it

wa s an e rr on e ou s mis un de rs tand ing that his a tto rn e y g a ve him

. * * * “What I ’m arguing is involuntary plea based on improper infor mation give n to him by his attorney .” At the conc lu s i o n o f t he evide ntiary hear ing, the trial court de nied the re lief re quested, explaining that, bec ause t h e s ex offe nder r eg istration require ment was “ of such a non-punitive
nature ,” the court did not “fe el

. . . that the harm ha[d] been established to war ra n t gra n t i n g the defe ndant’s wr it of habea s corpus.” On J une 27, 2008, the tria l court issued written f indings o f fac t reg ardingCovey ’s habe as

co rp u s ap p l i ca t i o n . T h o s e f i n d i n gs i n cl u d edt h e f

o l l o wi n g:

“ 3. Pr ior to t he [Janu ary

9, 20 06 ] ple a

he ari ng , App lic ant [Co ve y ] wa s advi sed i nCOVEY -- 6

writing by counsel that he was elig ible to a pply for ear ly rele ase from the s ex offe nder r eg istration require ment, under A rt. 62.404 C.C.P

. I n fac t, Applicant is not e lig ibl e to b e re le a se d f

ro m th e se x off

e nd e r r e g ist

ratio n r e qu ir e me nts

. * * *

“ 6. Ap pli c ant re lie d on c ouns e l’ s e rr on e ou s state me nt wh e n he de c ide d to w a ive his ri g ht t o a jur y tr ia l. “7. I f Applica

nt ha[d] not been e rrone ously advised, it is more proba

ble than not that Applicant would have pleade d ‘not g uilty .’” On di r e c t a

p p e a l, Co v e y r e it e r a te d h is ar g u me n t th a t h is p le a o f n o lo c o n te n d e r e had bee n inv olu nta ry du e to t he ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of his tr ia l c ouns e l: “Appe lla n t ’s p l eawa s i n v o l u n t ary b ec au s e h e r el i edo nerroneous informa tion from trial counsel [reg arding sex off ender reg istration] that actua lly induced his no con tes t ple a . T his e rr on e ou s in fo rm a tio n w a s c or ro bo rate d b y

the tr ia l c ourt

wi th absolute silence on the par t of t rial counsel. Thus, Appellant is entitled to withdraw his plea.” The State a

rg ued in re sponse: “[Trial couns e l’ s a lleg ed misadvice to Covey ] was not deficient pe rfor mance . The stat e of the lawreg ardingear ly termination [of the sex offender reg istration require ment] i s unsettled at this tim e. When the state of the law i s u n s ettled, trial c ouns e l w ill no t be fo un d in e ff e c tiv e wh e n b a sin g his a dv ice on a re a so na ble interpre tation of the statutes and c ase la w.” The c ou rt o f appeals rejec ted Covey ’s ar g ument and af firmed the tr ial court’s de nial of habea s relief

: “The rec ord before us doe s not support appellant’s c ontentions that his trial counsel’s r epre sentation fell below a n objective st an d ar d of re asonable ness or that th e t ri al court abused its discretion by denying his a

pplication for wr it of habea s corpus. I n his letter [of Dec ember 28, 2005], t rial counse l corre ctly stated that there wer e no g uara

ntees whe n appellant c ould petition for ear ly rele ase a nd no g uara

ntees that appellant would ever be gra nted ea rly rele ase. The trial court likewise stressed the se same re pr e se ntatio ns in o pe n c ourt . T ri a l c ouns el’ s str a te g y wa s c le arl y

to allow appe l l ant t he opportunity to avoid having a fe lony conviction on his rec ord. T h i s t ri al s t ra t egy wa s co n s i s t en twi t h ap p el l an t ’s t es t i m o n y [ at t h e h ab ea s h ea ri n g]COVEY -- 7

Covey ’s g round for

revie w re ads: “The Court of Appea ls erre d in holding Appe llant has 4 not established he r ece ived ineff ective a ssistance of tr ial counsel.” Our s ta te me nts re g ard ingg uil ty ple a s a pp ly e qu a lly to n olo c on te nd e re ple a s. 5 Courts and litigants fr equently use the ter

m “voluntary

” whe n they

actua lly mean 6 “voluntary

and intellige nt.” Also, courts a nd litigants fr equently

use the ter

ms “intellige nt” and “knowing ” interc hang eably

. See 38 Geo. L . J . Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 416 (2009). I n the instant c a se , f or e xamp le , Co ve y

argue s th a t hi s n olo ple a

wa s “ inv olu

nta ry” wh e n h e a c tua lly

me ans it was “ unintelligent” or “unknow ing” beca use it was base d in part on a misunder standing of the (continued...) t h at t h e ‘ m o s t i mp o rt an tt h i n g’ t o h i m wa s t h e l o n g-t er m ef fe ct o f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs ag ainst him.” Cov e

y v . S tat e [si c], No. 11-08-00190-CR (Te x .App.–Eastland, De c. 11, 2008), slip. op. at 9 (not desig nated f or publication). Covey later f

iled a petition for discr etionary revie w that asser

ted one g round for

revie w, which we g rante d. See Tex. R. App. Proc. 66.3(c ). In their re spective br iefs, the pa rties make the 4

same argume nts to t

his Court that th e y ma de to t he c ourt of a pp e a ls. This case involves the interplay of the Six th and Four teenth Amendme nts to the Const itution of the United States. The Six th Amendment prov i d es t h at “[ i] n all criminal prose cutions, the

acc used shall enjoy

the rig ht . . . to have the Assistanc e of C o u n s el fo r h is defenc e.” O nce the adver sarial judicial proce ss has been initiated, this rig ht to counsel gua rante es t o the def

endant the ri gh tt o h av e t h e e ff

ec t i v e a s s i s t an c e o f c o u n s e l at al l cr i t i ca l s t age s o f t h e c ri m i n al p ro ce ed i n g. United St ates v. W

ade , 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967). The time at w hich a def endant is ca lled upon
to e nter his ple a to a fe lony char g e is such a c ritical stag e. McM ann v. Richardson , 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). T h e F o u rt e e n t h A m e n d m e n tp r o v i d e s t h a tn o s t at e m ay “ d e p r i v e an y p e r s o no f l i f e , l i b e rt y,

or pr op e rt y , w ith ou t du e pr oc e ss o f law. ” Con sis te nt w iththat g ua ra nte e , a g uil ty ple a is v a lid

on ly 5 if it repre sents a volunt ary and int ellige nt choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 6COVEY -- 8

(...continued) 6 law. defe ndant. Nor th C

ar oli na v . A lfo rd , 4 00 U. S. 2 5, 31 (1 97 0) ; Brady v. U nited States , 397 U.S. 742, 74 7 ( 19 70 ); McCarthy v . United States , 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel may preve nt a defenda

nt from ente ring a voluntary and intellige nt plea. Tollett v. Henderson , 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973). I f a de fenda

nt challeng es the va lidity of his g uilty

plea ba sed on ineffe ctive assistanc e of

c ouns e l, w he the r t

hat c ha lle ng e is bro ught d ir e c tly un de r t he Sixth A me ndme nt o r i nd ir e c tly via

“ inv olu nta ri ne ss” un de r t

he F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt, the n th e de fe nd ant, in o rd e r t o p re va il, mus t sh ow tw o th ing s: ( 1) tha

t c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e fe ll b e low

an o bje c tiv e sta

nd ard of re a so na ble ne ss and (2) t h at t here is a rea sonable proba bility that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the defe ndant would not ha

ve pled g uilty and would have insisted on goingto trial. Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). Covey , citing both the Sixt h and Fourtee nth Amendments, argues that his nolo plea wa s “involuntary” due to the ine ffe ctive assistance of his trial counsel. More specific ally , Covey argues that trial counsel a ffirmatively misadvised him r eg arding his e ligibility for ear ly rele ase a nd failed
to corre ct the trial court when the trial court misadvised Covey that ear ly rele ase w as discre tionary with the court. See G. Dix & R. Dawson, Te x as Prac tic e Se rie

s: Cri mi na l P ra c tic e an d P ro c e du re § 34.111 (2nd ed. 2001) (counse l’s materia l misadvice may rende r g uilty plea involuntary ). Covey also argues that, but for c ounsel’s two unprof essional er

rors, he would not have pled nolo c ontender e and would have insisted on goingto trial. Trial counse l’s advice to Covey , as ref lected in tr ial counsel’s letter of Dec ember 28, 2005,COVEY -- 9

wa s th a t: (1 ) C ov e y , o nc e he ple d n olo c on te nd e re and re c e ive d d e fe rr e d a dju dic a tio n c omm un ity sup er v i s i o n , would be leg ally require d to reg ister as a sex offender

for life ; (2) Ar

ticle 62.404 pr ov ide d for dis c re tio na

ry e arl y re le a se fr om t

hat li fe tim e re g istra

tio n r e qu ir e me nt; (3 ) C ov e y wo uld probably become elig ible to file a mot ion for early rele ase only afte r he ha d completed a ll eight y ear s of his community

supervision; (4) the tria l court would have discretion whe ther to g rant the motion for e arly rele ase; a nd (5) Article 62.404 did not g uara ntee that Covey

would ever

g et ea rly rele ase. Trial counsel’s advice was inac curate and misleading . Under Article 62.001( 5)(A) and (G ) and Arti cle 62.051( a), Covey , once he pled nolo contende re a nd rec eived de fer

red a djudication community supervision, was require d to r eg ister as a sex off ender , as counse l advised, but he wa s not require d to reg ister for life . Un d er Ar t i cle 62.101(c)( 2), Covey ’s duty to reg ister expires ten y e ars a ft e r h e c omp le te s h is e ig ht y e ars of c omm un ity su pe rvis io n, a

tot a l of e ig hte e n y e a rs . Mo re ov e r, Cov e y

is n ot e lig ibl e fo r e arl y re le a se fr om the re g istra tio n re qu ir e me nt, be c a

us e Ar tic le 62 .4 04 a pp lie s o nly

to p e rs on s with a “ re po rt a ble a dju dic a tio n or c on vic tio n” that a pp e ars on a lis t compi led and published by the Council on Sex Offe nder Tr eatment, a division of the Texas Depa rtment of State He alth Service s, pursuant to Article 62.402, a nd the Council has neve r compiled

and pu bli sh e d s uc h a

lis t. B a sic le g a l r e se arc h w ou ld h a ve un c ov e re d th e se fa c ts. Did trial counsel’s perfor

mance , in aff

irmatively misadvising C ovey and in fa iling to cor rec t the trial cour

t, fall below a

n objective standa

rd of r easona

bleness? We hold that it did. “In assessing [attor ne y ] co mpe te nc e , w e have he ld c ouns e l a c c ounta ble fo r know led ge, or

the a bil ity to atta in knowledg e, of r eleva

nt leg al matters that a

re n ei t h er n ovel nor unsettled.” Ex parte M oody , 991 S.W .2d 856, 858 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999)

. The sex off ender reg istration require ment is a direc t andCOVEY -- 10

Even if the se x offe nder r eg istration require ment wer e a c ollatera l conseque nce of 7 pleadingg uilty

to attempted sexual assault, numerous cour ts have he ld that an attorne y ’s aff irmative misadvice r eg ardinga collate ral matter may constitute deficie nt perfor mance . See W. L aF ave, e t al., Cri mi na l P ro c e du re § 21.3(b) at n. 70.1 (3rd ed. 2007 & Supp. 2009-2010) (c iting case s). sig nif ic ant , albe it n on -p un iti ve , c on se qu e nc e of ple a din g g uil ty

to atte mpt e d s e xua l a ssa ult , 7 An de rso n v . S

tat e , 182 S.W. 3d 91 4, 91 9- 20 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Mi tsc hk e v . S tat e , 129 S.W .3d 130, 135 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004), and it could be re levant to a r easona ble def endant in dec iding whether to pl ea d gu i l t y . Fur

thermore , the statutory

law re g ardingthe sex offende r re g istration require ment is neither novel nor unsettled. Once Covey asked his trial c ounsel to advise him on the sex offender

reg istration require ment, trial counsel had a duty to advise him corr ectly . Trial counse l

a lso ha d a

du ty to c or re c t th e tr ia l c ourt

wh e n the tr ia l c ourt

mis a dv ise d Co ve y

re g ard inge a rl y rele ase, so that Covey

would not have a

n incorre ct under standing of the e arly rele ase la w. I n addition, as we note d previously , the t rial court found, as a matter of fact, t hat, but for tria l counsel’s misadvice t o Covey reg arding his elig ibilit y for early rele ase, Covey would not have pled nolo contender e and would have g one to tr ial. The rec ord – specific ally , Covey ’s af fidavit attac hed to his habeas application and his testimony at t he habeas hearing – supports that fac t-finding , and, there fore , we a cce pt it. See E x parte Pe terson , 117 S.W .3d 804, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Covey has satisfied the two- prong test of Hi llv. L ockha rt , 474 U.S. 52. Accor dingly , we

re ve rs e the jud g me nt o f the c ourt of a pp e a ls, va c a te the jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ourt

in N ola n Co un ty

cause number 10176, a

nd rema nd Covey into the custody

of the sher iff of N olan County to answer the ind ic tme nt. DEL I VERED MARCH 31, 2010 DO NO T PU B L I SH