UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The War in the Pacific 

THE FALL OF THE 

PHILIPPINES 

by 

Louis Morton 

CENTER OF MIliTARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D. c., 1993 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 53-63678 

First Printed 1953-CMH Pub 5-2-1 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(As of 1 January 1953) 

james P. Baxter 

President, Williams College 

Henry S. Commager 

Columbia University 

Douglas S. Freeman 

Richmond News Leader 

Pendleton Herring 

Social Science Research Council 

john D. Hicks 

University of California 

William T. Hutchinson 

University of Chicago 

S. L. A. Marshall 

Detroit News 

E. Dwight Salmon 

Amherst College 

Col. Thomas D. Stamps 

United States Military Academy 

Charles S. Sydnor 

Duke University 

Charles H. Taylor 

Harvard University 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief 

Chief Historian 

Chief, War Histories Division 

Chief, Editorial and Publication Division 

Chief, Editorial Branch 

Chief, Cartographic Branch 

Chief, Photographic Branch 

·Succeeded Capt. K. E. Hunter 28 April 1952. 

1lI 

Kent Roberts Greenfield 

Col. George G. O'Connor 

Col. B. A. Day 

joseph R. Friedman 

Wsevolod AglaimofT 

Capt. A. T. Lawry· 

· . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword 

The soldier reading these pages would do well to reflect on the wisdom of the 

statement exhibited in a Japanese shrine: "Woe unto him who has not tasted 

defeat." Victory too often leads to overconfidence and erases the memory of 

mistakes. Defeat brings into sharp focus the causes that led to failure and 

provides a fruitful field of study for those soldiers and laymen who seek in the 

past lessons for the future. 

The statesman and the informed citizen reading these pages will realize that 

our military means as well as our estimates and plans must always be in balance 

with our long-range national policy. This lesson~signposted by the Battle of 

Manila Bay; the Treaty of Paris, signed in December 1898 when we decided to 

keep the Philippines; the Washington Conference of 1921-22; and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931~we ignored before Pearl Harbor. The result was defeat 

on the field of battle and the loss of the Philippine Islands. 

The author of The Fall of the Philippines, Louis Morton, served overseas as 

a historical officer in the South Pacific area and in the Philippines during World 

War II. Since 1945 he has been chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief 

of Military History, Department of the Army. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy 

degree from Duke University, is the author of a volume on American colonial 

history, and has written a number of articles dealing with military affairs. 

Work on this volume was begun in early 1947. The reader may gain some 

idea of the size of the task of writing this history by an appraisal of The Sources. 

Washington, D. C. 

26 June 1952 

Vll 

ORLANDO WARD 

Maj. Gen., U. S. A. 

Chief of Military History 

Preface 

The author's debts for aid in preparing this volume are numerous and heavy. 

The largest is to· those officers who survived the campaign and the ordeal of prison 

camp. Their memories, and the precious notes they had hidden so carefully 

during the bitter days of Japanese imprisonment, provided material without 

which the record of this campaign would have been forever lost. These officers 

gave freely of their time and their contribution is apparent on every page and 

in almost every footnote. In a sense, they are as much the authors as the writer 

of this preface. 

Special acknowledgments must be made to Mr. Stanley L. Falk and Dr. 

George C. Groce who, with ingenuity and perseverance, aided the author in his 

search for the materials needed for this work. The search was an exciting and 

rewarding adventure and is described in full at the end of the book. Both men 

also labored long and mightily to mold the fragmentary materials thus assembled 

into a form which greatly eased the author's work and performed cheerfully the 

many other arduous and time-consuming tasks which are the lot of every author. 

Without Mr. Falk's special knowledge of the enemy's records and operations, 

reinforced by information willingly furnished by the enemy himself, this volume 

would have been less precise and far longer in preparation. 

The author owes a large debt also to many individuals who directly and 

indirectly gave him much valuable assistance: to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, 

Chief Historian and General Editor of this series, for his wise counsel and 

guidance, for encouragement and never-failing support; to Mr. Wsevolod 

Aglaimoff and his staff who spent many months at the drafting boards to provide 

the maps to guide the reader through the jungles and mountains of the Philippines; 

to Miss Margaret E. Tackley who searched diligently and in remote comers for the 

pictures with which to illustrate this volume; to Miss Ruth Stout, the editor, and 

Mr. Ronald Sher, the copy editor, who edited the manuscript and guided it 

through the printers; to Mr. Leonard B. Lincoln, the indexer; to Mr. Is~ael Wice 

and his aides who patiently filled the author's numerous requests for aid in 

securing records; and to those of his colleagues, in and out of uniform, who read 

this volume in manuscript and made numerous and helpful suggestions. All these 

and others placed their special knowledge and skill freely and generously at the 

disposal of the author, but he alone is responsible for any shortcomings this volume 

may possess. 

Washington, D. C. 

26 June 1952 

IX 

L.M. 

Contents 

PART ONE 

Prewar Plans and Preparations 

Chapter 

I. THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS . 

The Islands . . . . 

The Philippine Army 

II. U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

The Recall of General MacArthur 

The Organization of USAFFE 

U. S. Army in the Philippines . . . 

Philippine Army: Mobilization and Training 

III. THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. 

Ground Forces 

Air Forces. . 

Naval Forces . 

Summary .. 

IV. PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 

The Japanese Plan . . 

The Plan of Defense. . 

The Last Days of Peace . 

PART TWO 

The Isolation of the Philippines and the Japanese Landings 

V. THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

The Attack on Clark Field. . . 

The Fleet Moves South . . . . 

The Japanese Gain Air and Naval Supremacy . 

Xl 

Page 

3 

4 

8 

14 

15 

19 

21 

25 

31 

32 

37 

45 

48 

51 

51 

61 

71 

77 

79 

90 

92 
CONTENTS 

Chapter 

VI. THE FIRST LANDINGS 

Batan Island. . . . . 

The Landings on North Luzon 

The Legaspi Landing. 

Landings in the South. . . 

VII. THE IMPACT OF WAR. 

VIII. THE MAIN LANDINGS. 

The Lingayen Landing . . 

Consolidating the Lingayen Beachhead 

The-Lamon Bay Landings 

IX. STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS 

The Pensacola Convoy. . . 

Far East and Pacific Strategy 

The Base in Australia . . . 

PART THREE 

The Withdrawal to Bataan 

X. THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

"WPO-3 Is In Effect". . . . 

The Norfh Luzon Force Plan 

To the Tarlac-Cabanatuan Line 

Supply ........ . 

The Tarlac-Cabanatuan Line . 

XI. WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 

Withdrawal From Mauban . 

Withdrawal From Atimonan . 

Out oj South Luzon . . . . 

XII. HOLDING THE ROAD TO BATAAN 

The Difense oj Calumpit . . . 

The D-5 Line: Bamban-Arayat 

Escape Through San Fernando 

XIII. INTO BAT AAN . . . . 

The Guagua-Porac Line 

Behind the Gates 

XII 

Page 

98 

100 

100 

109 

112 

115 

123 

125 

132 

138 

145 

145 

148 

152 

161 

161 

166 

169 

179 

180 

190 

191 

195 

199 

203 

205 

210 

214 

216 

216 

223 
Chapter 

XIV. THE END OF AN ERA 

The Occupation of Manila 

Strategic Views on the Philippines 

PART FOUR 

The Siege of Bataan 

XV. SETTING THE STAGE 

The American Position . 

The Status of Supply . . 

The Enem.y and His Plan 

XVI. THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

Attack Against II Corps: The Abucay Line 

Attack Against I Corps: The Mauban Line 

The Abucay Line Is Turned 

The Withdrawal . . . . 

XVII. THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

The Service Command Area 

LongoskawO:.yan and Quinauan Points . 

Anyasan and Silaiim Points 

XVIII. TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

The Orion-Bagac Line 

The Fight jor Trail 2 

The Pocket Fights. . 

XIX. THE JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL 

XX. COMMAND ....... . 

The Evacuation of MacArthur 

Wainwright Assumes Command 

XXI. THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

Food and Clothing . 

Health 

Morale 

XXII. "HELP IS ON THE WAY". 

Running the Blockade . 

Last Efforts . . . . . . 

Xlll 

CONTENTS 

Page 

232 

235 

233 

245 

247 

254 

261 

265 

266 

278 

285 

290 

296 

296 

300 

312 

325 

325 

330 

336 

347 

353 

353 

360 

367 

367 

376 

384 

390 

390 

401 
CONTENTS 

Chapter 

XXIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 

The American Line 

Japanese Preparations. 

Prelude tu Attack 

XXIV. THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE. 

Capture of Mt. Sama! 

6 April: The Day of Decision . . . . . 

XXV. THE DISINTEGRATION OF II CORPS 

7 April: Disintegration 

8 April: Chaos 

XXVI. SURRENDER . 

PART FIVE 

Corregidor and the Southern Islands 

XXVII. THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR . 

The Harbor Difenses of Manila Bay. 

The First Aerial and Artillery Attacks 

The Second Aerial Bombardment 

XXVIII. THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS. 

The Islands and Their Difenses . 

The Visayas 

Mindanao . . . . . . . . . 

XXIX. JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES. 

The Japanese Plan. . 

The American Difenses . . . . . . . 

XXX. THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 

The Prelimina,:y Bombardment 

Health and Food . . . . . 

The Preassault Bombardment 

XXXI. THE FALL OF CORREGIDOR 

XXXII. THE END OF RESISTANCE 

General Wainwright'S Orders 

The Surrender of Corregidor 

Surrender in the South . . 

XlV 

Page 

405 

405 

411 

417 

421 

421 

431 

442 

442 

448 

454 

471 

471 

479 

493 

498 

498 

502 

507 

520 

521 

527 

536 

536 

541 

546 

552 

562 

562 

564 

574 
CONTENTS 

THE SOURCES 585 

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 603 

INDEX .............. . 607 

Tables 

No. Page 

1. Strength of Philippine Division, 31 July 1941 . . . . . . . . . . .. 22 

2. Strength and Composition of U. S. Army Troops in the Philippine Islands, 

31 July 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . .. 24 

3. Aircraft in Philippines and Hawaii, 1 December 1941 . . . . . . .. 42 

4. Strength and Composition of U. S. Army Troops in Philippine Islands, 

30 November 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 

S. Organization and Disposition of Japanese Army, 1 December 1941 . . 55 

6. Assignment of Forces, USAFFE, 3 December 1941 . . . . . . . . . 70 

7. Weapons and Equipment Captured by 74th Army, 20 February 1942 . 349 

8. Rations, 25 March 1942 . . . . . . . . . . 368 

9. Armament on Corregidor . . . . . . . . . 474 

LO. Armament on Forts Hughes, Drum, and Frank 476 

L1. Strength, Harbor and Beach Defenses, April 1942 . 529 

Maps 

1. Japanese Plan and Disposition of the Armies, November 1941 

2. Disposition of U. S. Army Forces, Far East, 8 December 1941 

3. Advance Japanese Landings, 8-20 December 1941 

4. Lingayen Gulf Landings, 22-24 December 1941 . 

S. Lamon Bay Landings, 24 December 1941 . . . . 

6. Withdrawal in the North, 25-31 December 1941 

7. Withdrawal in the South, 25-31 December 1941 

8. Holding the Road to Bataan, 31 Decemher 1941-1 January 1942 

9. Through Layac Junction, 2-6 January 1942 . 

to. Situation on Bataan, 8 January 1942 .. 

11. The Abucay Line, 9-23 January 1942 . . . 

12. The ~lauban Line, 18-25 January 1942 .. 

13. Japanese Landings on Bataan, 23 January-1 February 1942 . 

14. Longoskawayan Point Area. 

1 S. Quinauan Point Area, . . . . . . 

xv 

53 

68 

99 

124 

140 

167 

192 

204 

217 

246 

267 

278 

297 

301 

303 
CONTENTS 

No. 

16. Anyasan and Silaiim Points Area . . . . . . 

17. The Orion-Bagac Line . . . . . . . . . . 

18. Fight for Trail 2, 27 January-2 February 1942 

19. The Pockets . . . . . . . . . . . 

20. Japanese Plan of Attack, 3 April 1942 

21. Japanese Penetration, 3·-6 April 1942 

22. Japanese Advance, 7-9 April 1942 

23. Corregidor Island. . . . . . . . . 

24. The Fight for Mindanao, 29 April-9 May 1942 

25. Japanese Landings on Corregidor, 5-6 May 1942 

Illustrations 

The Philippine Islands . . . . . . . . . 

Signing the Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth 

Manila Harbor . . . . . . . . 

Philippine Scouts . . . . . . . 

Ceremony at Camp Murphy, Rizal 

Aircraft in the Philippines, December 1941 . 

Clark Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

General MacArthur 

Japanese Air Attack on 10 December 1941 

Luzon ............... . 

15S-mm. Gun Emplacement Near Dagupan 

26th Cavalry (PS) Moving into Pozorrubio 

Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, 74th Army Commander 

VilIasis-Carmen Bridge 

Agno River ....... '. 

Tarlac Railroad Station 

Bicycle-Mounted Japanese Troops. 

Motorcycle Messenger Catnapping 

Camouflaged ISS-mm. Gun M1917 (GPF) 

Mount Arayat . . 

Calumpit Bridges. 

San Fernando . . 

The Open City 

Japanese Light Tanks. 

Fortifications on Bataan 

Bridges on Bataan . . 

Inspection. 

Brig. Gen. Maxon S. Lough 

XVI 

Page 

313 

325 

333 

336 

415 

423 

443 

471 

509 

554 

2 

5 

8 

20 

25 

40,41 

44 

66 

93 

101 

130 

137 

143 

171 

172 

175 

185 

193 

198 

205 

209 

211 

233 

237 

253 

'2.60 

268 

292 
USAFFE Headquarters on Bataan, February 1942 

Standing Formation . . . . 

Medical Care on Bataan 

Japanese Propaganda Leaflets 

"Voice of Freedom" 

Seeking Cover in a Trench Near Lamao 

Surrender on Bataan 

Discussing Surrender Terms 

Corregidor 

Malinta Hill. . . . . . . 

Diagram of Malinta Tunnel 

Fort Drum ....... . 

Gun Emplacements on Corregidor 

USAFFE Headquarters in Malinta Tunnel 

Maj. Gen. William F. Sharp and His Staff . 

Cebu. ..... . ..... 

Heavy Clouds Over Corregidor 

Marine Sergeant Teaching Filipinos 

Life in Malinta Tunnel 

Battery Crockett . . . . . . . . 

Battery Way ........ . 

Japanese Bombers Over Corregidor 

Searchlight on Corregidor . . . . 

The Meeting of Wainwright and Homma 

General 'Vainwright Broadcasting 

American Generals in Captivity. . 

Photographs are from the Department of Defense files, except for that on page 533, the J apanese photographs on pages 143, 233, 465, 539, 548, 

568, and 573, and the photograph on page 583, 

reproduced through the courtesy of Col. William 

C. Braly. 

XVII 

CONTENTS 

Page 

351 

374 

382 

386 

388 

419 

462,463 

465 

472 

473 

475 

477 

483 

492 

500 

504 

520 

530 

532, 533 

539 

541 

548 

556 

568 

573 

583 

PART ONE 

PREWAR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 
CHAPTER I 

The Philippine Islands 

Since the third century, the Philippine 

Islands had been under foreign influence, 

first from Hindu-Malayan empires in Sumatra, Indochina, and Borneo, and then 

from the Chinese beginning with the early 

Ming dynasty. Shortly after 1400 Mohammedanism was introduced, and for more 

than ('ne hundred years all of the islands 

south of Luzon, and the southern portion 

of that island, were subject to the Mohammedans of Borneo. During this period, the 

Japanese established a loose control over 

northern Luzon and maintained a trading 

post at Aparri, on the north tip of the island. 

European interest in the Philippine Archipelago began with the visit of a Spanish 

expedition under Ferdinand Magellan in 

1521. But it was not until 1565 that the 

Spaniards established a permanent settlement in the Islands, on Cebu. Five years 

later they conquered Manila and then gradually extended their control over many of 

the Islands. Late in the sixteenth century 

the military ruler of Japan, Hideyoshi, 

claimed suzerainty, over the Islands. This 

claim was apparently neither intended nor 

taken seriously, but the Spanish did pay 

"tribute" for a short time to avoid trouble, 

secure trading rights in Japan, and protect 

the Jesuit missionaries there. Until 1898, 

despite unsuccessful efforts by the Portuguese and Dutch and one successful effort 

by the British (1762-1764) to wrest the Islands from her, Spain ruled the Philippines. 

The impress of these centuries of foreign 

influence and control gave to the Philippines a strange mixture of Oriental and Occidental institutions. The original inhabitants were pushed back into the mountains 

and the Malayans became the dominant 

racial type. From later invasions came the 

Mohammedan religion and the Moslem custom5 prevalent in the south; from China 

came the impetus to trade and commerce, 

still largely controlled by the Chinese; and 

from Spain came the dominant religion, 

Christianity, the Roman law, and other features of Western civilization. 

The United States seized the Philippine 

Islands from Spain in May 1898 after Admiral Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, during the Spanish-American War. Formal 

title to the Islands was granted the United 

States by the Treaty of Paris in December of 

that year. By the acquisition of the Philippjnes the United States at one step advanced 

its frontiers nearly 7,000 miles across the 

Pacific Ocean and "gave hostages to fortune in a sense which the American people 

have never fully realized." 1 Possession of 

the Islands made the United States an 

Asiatic power, with full responsibility for 

maintaining the peace and status quo in 

that area. 

The government of the Islands was placed 

in the hands first of a Philippine commission 

and later of a governor general, both appointed by the President of the U oited 

1 Hector C. Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific 

(rev. I'd., Boston and New York, 1934), p. 254. 
4 

States. The Filipinos, once their opposition 

ended, were allowed an increasingly large 

measure of self-rule and elected the members 

of the lower house of the legislature, the 

Philippine Assembly. In 1913, they were 

granted free trade with the United States, 

and three years later, in the Jones Act, were 

permitted a limited autonomy. 

A succession of able American governors 

established a happy relationship between the 

two countries, and a steadily increasing 

sentiment for Philippine independence 

found ready support in the American Congress. A bilI for Philippine independence 

was passed by Congress, over President 

Hoover's veto, in January 1933, but vetoed 

by the Philippine legislature. It was passed 

again, with some changes, as the TydingsMcDuffie Act, on 24 March 1934, and this 

time approved by the Philippine legislature. 

The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for 

the recognition of Philippine independence 

after a ten-year transitional period. During these ten years the United States would 

be allowed to "maintain military and other 

reservations and armed forces" in the Islands, and the President of the United 

States would have the power "to call into 

the service of such armed forces all military 

forces organized by the Philippine Government." 2 When the transitional period was 

over, the United States would abandon all 

military installations in the Islands. 

The Tydings-McDuffie Act left open the 

question of naval reservations, but authorized the President to negotiate with the 

Philippine Government for American naval 

bases in the Islands. The closing date for 

such negotiations was set at two years after 

the recognition of independence. Until 

• 48 U.S. Statutes at Large, H.R. 8573, pp. 456-

65, The Philippine Commonwealth and Independence Law, 'P.L. 127, Sec 2(a) 12, approved 24 

Mar 34. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

then "the matter of naval reservations and 

fueling stations," the Act provided, "shall 

remain in its present status." 3 

A year after the p~age of the TydingsMcDuffie Act, the Filipinos adopted a liberal constitution based on the American 

model and established an interim government known as the Commonwealth. Elections in which Manuel Quezon was chosen 

as president followed soon after, and before 

the end of 1935 the Philippine National 

Assembly met to draft plans for local defense. 

The Islands 

Comprising almost 7,100 known islands 

and islets, the Philippine Archipelago lies 

approximately 500 miles off the Asiatic 

mainland and extends 1,150 miles almost 

due north and south from Formosa to 

Borneo. Strategically situated in the geographic heart of the Far East, the Islands 

are centrally located in relation to Japan, 

China, Burma, French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. 

They lie athwart the trade routes leading 

from Japan and China through the South 

China Sea to southeast Asia and the rich 

supplies of oil and minerals in the Indies. 

Vital areas in Japan and along the Chinese 

coast are within quick striking distance 

by sea and air of the Philippines. Over 

5,000 miles from Honolulu and 7,000 miles 

from San Francisco, Manila, the chief city 

and capital of the Islands, is only 1,800 

miles from Tokyo. Formosa and Hong 

Kong are less than 700 miles distant, Singapore 1,500 miles, and Truk in the Caroline 

Islands 2,100 miles.4 The Caroline, Marianas, and the Marshall Islands, stretching 

across the Central Pacific, lie along the 

'Ibid., Secs .lOCb) and 11. 

• All distances are in airline statute miles. 
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 5 

SIGNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, 23 MARCH 1935. Seated, left to right: George H. Dern, Secretary of 

War; President Franklin D. Roosevelt, signing the Constitution of the Philippine 

Commonwealth; Manuel L. Quezon, President, Philippine Senate; standing, left to 

right: Brig. Gen. Creed F. Cox, Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department; 

Frank Murphy, Governor General of the Philippine Islands; Cordell Hull, Secretary 

of State; Key Pittman, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, U. S. Senate; 

Pedro Guevara, Philippine Resident Commissioner; Miguel Cuaderno, Vice President, 

Philippine National Bank, Manila, P. I.; Manuel Roxas, Representative, Philippine 

Legislature, Delegate, Constitutional Assem.bly; Francisco A. Delgado, Philippine 

Resident Commissioner. 

United States lines of communication with 

the Philippines. 

The land area of the archipelago totals 

about 115,000 square miles. Only 460 of 

the Islands have an area greater than one 

square mile, and only eleven boast an area 

greater than 1,000 square miles. These 

eleven islands account for 94 percent of the 

total land area in the archipelago. The 

largest and most important is Luzon 

(40,420 square miles) in the north, where 

Manila is located. Next in size to Luzon 

is Mindanao (36,527 square miles) in the 

south, followed by the islands in the central group, the Visayas: Samar, Negros, 

Panay, Leyte, Cebu, and others.5 

The climate of the Islands is tropical, 

with an average yearly temperature be-

, Unless otherwise noted, this description of the 

Philippine Islands is based upon Civil Affairs Handbook: Philippine Islands, 12 vols., Army Service 

ForGes (ASF) Manual M 365-1 to 12. 
6 

tween 78° and 80° F. The year may be 

divided generally into dry and wet seasons, 

which come at different times on the east 

and west coasts because of shifts in the seasonal winds or monsoons. From June to 

September, when the monsoon blows from 

the southwest, the weather offers little difficulty to the landing of a hostile military 

force on the favorable beaches along the 

east coasts. The period of the northeast 

monsoons, October through April, is the 

best time for landings along the western 

China Sea coasts. Most of Mindanao, a 

portion of the Visayas, and southern Luzon 

have no dry season and no pronounced 

maximum rainy season. 

The people of the Philippines are mostly 

of Malayan stock, and in 1941 numbered 

17,000,000. In that year, Cebu and central Luzon were the most heavily populated 

areas, and Manila, with 684,000 inhabitants, was the la"rgest city. There were 

nearly 30,000 Japanese nationals in the 

Islands, more than two-thirds of whom 

were concentrated in Davao, the chief port 

of Mindanao. The 117,000 Chinese constituted the largest foreign group in the 

Islands; on Luzon there were almost 9,000 

American civilians. 

Over sixty-five dialects are spoken in the 

Islands. When the United States acquired 

the Islands, a small percentage of the people 

spoke Spanish; after forty years of American occupation about 27 percent spoke 

English and 3 percent Spanish. Of the 

many native dialects, Tagalog, the language 

of the wealthy and influential residents of 

central Luzon, was chosen as the basis for 

a national language in 1937, although twice 

as many people spoke the Visayan dialect. 

While the many dialects have certain simiIarities, it is not possible for the natives in 

different parts of the Islands to understand 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

each other readily. This fact made the recruitment of Filipinos for military service 

on a national scale difficult, since troops 

recruited from one island often could not 

understand their American or Tagalog 

officers, or troops from other islands. 

The Philippines are predominantly agricultural, the principal crops being rice (the 

chief element in the Filipino diet), copra, 

sugar, hemp, tobacco, and corn. The farranging mountain areas are a source of gold 

and silver, and of the more important base 

metals, such as iron, chrome, manganese, 

copper, and lead. Sixty percent of the 

Philippines is covered by forest, much of it 

hardwoods. The fishing banks off Manila 

Bay and the Sulu Archipelago supplement 

the Filipino diet and are the basis of one of 

the more important industries in the Islands. Even after many years of American 

occupation there was little manufacturing 

in the Philippines, most of the inhabitants 

being engaged in home industries or in the 

processing of agricultural products such 

as sugar, hemp, and coconuts. 

With interisland and coastal shipping 

carrying the bulk of Philippine products, 

there was no great need for roads and railroads. Only on Luzon was there a road 

and rail net adequate to support largescale military operations. Of the 14,270 

miles of highway in the archipelago in 

1940, more than half were in central and 

southern Luzon. There were only 50,000 

motor vehicles in the Islands; the Filipinos 

relied on the powerful carabao, or water 

buffalo, for transportation as well as labor. 

The two railway systems in the Islands, the 

government-owned Manila Railway Company on Luzon and the American-owned 

Philippine Railway Company on Panay 

and Cebu, had a total of 840 miles of narrow gauge track. 
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

Most of the principal towns and cIties 

were linked by telephone, telegraph, or 

radio, and all parts of the archipelago by 

the government postal system. The American-owned Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company connected Manila with 

most important towns on Luzon, as well as 

the principal population centers on Panay, 

Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao. In addition, 

forty provincial governments operated their 

own telephone systems so that many small 

towns and villages had at least one telephone joining them with Manila. Cable 

connected Manila with Guam, Shanghai, 

and Hong Kong, and four transoceanic 

radio stations provided communication with 

the outside world. 

The Philippine Islands are largely mountainous, with elevations as high as 10,000 

feet. Narrow coastal plains can be found 

on most of the islands, -and there are numerous short, swift-running streams. Large 

plain areas and navigable rivers are few. 

On every island are sand beaches, some of 

them extensive, but few open on lowlands 

where there is space for military maneuver. 

Luzon, with one tenth of its total area a 

large plain, and another 5,000 square miles 

forming a magnificent river valley, is the 

one island in the Philippines whose terrain 

permits military operations on a large scale. 

In the north, closed in by mountains on the 

east and west, is a valley extending southward for over 120 miles and with an average width of 40 miles. Flowing north 

through the valley is the Cagayan River. 

Along the west coast is a narrow plain offering only limited opportunities for military 

operat~~ns. A road runs along this coast 

from the tip of Luzon towards Manila. 

Southern Luzon is a volcanic region, part 

plain and part mountain, with numerous 

deep indentations forming bays and gulfs, 

7 

and with many beaches suitable for the 

landing of a military force. 

The central portion of Luzon is composed of a plain extending north about 120 

miles from Manila Bay to the Lingayen 

Gulf. With mountains to the east and 

west, the plain is well protected from invasion except at its two extremities. It is 

the most highly developed economic area 

in the Philippines and the one most suitable 

for mobile warfare.6 

The three most important military highways on Luzon are Routes 1, 3 and 5-twolane, all weather roads with concrete or asphalt surface. Each enters the capital and 

each has numerous access roads linking 

Manila with all parts of the island. Of the 

704 miles of railroad on Luzon in 1941, 

about half were in the central plain, which, 

in addition, contained 250 miles of private 

railway lines. All of the road, with the exception of a short stretch above Manila, 

was single track. 

From the South China Sea the southern 

entrance to the central plain is through 

Manila Bay, one of the finest natural harbors in the Far East. Opening out from a 

12-mile-wide entrance between high headlands, the bay expands toward the low-lying plain to a width of thirty miles. Thirty 

miles from the entrance lies Manila, and to 

its north and south are other harbors large 

enough to shelter seagoing vessels. Mariveies, just inside the northern entrance, is 

an excellent and easily reached anchorage, 

and the headland of Sangley Point, where 

the Cavite naval base was located, has always been recognized as one of the finest 

ports in the bay. 

• Data on the central Luzon plain comes from 

Terrain Study 94, Philippine Series: Central Luzon, 

I, prepared by the Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ 

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 18 Oct 44. 
8 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

MANILA HARBOR. The Bataan peninsula, partly shrouded in fog and clouds, is 

visible twenty-five miles across Manila Bay. 

On either side of the entrance to Manila 

Bay are high volcanic peaks covered with 

luxuriant tropical foliage. North of the entrance is the Bataan peninsula; to the south 

is Cavite Province. From a military point 

of view, the more important and more easily 

defended of the headlands is the Bataan 

peninsula, a rocky extension of the Zambales Mountain range which separates the 

central plain of Luzon from the China Sea. 

Across the entrance to Manila Bay are 

scyeral small islands. The largest and 

most important, Corregidor, lies two miles 

off Bataan and, with Caballo, separates the 

entrance into the North and South Channels. Shaped like a tadpole with its tail 

to the east, Corregidor measures three and 

one half miles in length and one and one 

half miles at its widest point. One mile 

south of the tip of the tail is Caballo, less 

than one third the size of Corregidor. In 

the South Channel, about a mile from the 

southern headland, lies El Fraile, a rock 

about 200 by 100 yards jutting up into the 

entrance of Manila Bay. Just outside and 

to the south of the entrance is Carabao, the 

fourth of the small islands whose location 

in ~1anila Bay gave them a strategic importance out of all proportion to their size. 

In the history of American plans for the 

defense of the Philippines, these islands 

loom large. 

The Philippine Army 

Before the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, no effort was 

made to prepare the Philippines for their 
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

own defense. The Vnited States had assumed all obligations for national defense 

and maintained a garrison in the Islands for 

that purpose. This garrison numbered 

about 10,000 men, half of whom were 

Philippine Scouts, a V.S. Army unit in 

which the enlisted men, with some exceptions, were native Filipinos and most of the 

officers American. After 1913 the Philippine garrison was called the Philippine Department, a regular V.S. Army establishment commanded by an American general 

officer. The Philippine Constabulary, first 

organized in 1901, was the national police 

force, but by training and organization had 

a military character. Thus, except for their 

experience with the Constabulary, the Filipinos had had no military tradition upon 

which to build a national army.7 

One of the first problems of the newly 

established Commonwealth Government 

was to make provision for the defense of the 

archipelago. Such a task required a man 

with proven military and executive ability, 

and, since there was no likely candidate in 

the Philippines, the President-elect Manuel 

L. Quezon turned to the Vnited States for 

help. In the summer of 1935, he induced 

his friend, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, then 

Chief of Staff of the V.S. Army, to become 

the military adviser to the new government 

in its effort to organize a national army.s 

President Roosevelt's consent was readily 

obtained and arrangements quickly concluded. 

'The Philippine Anny: Its Establishment, Organization, and Legal Basis, prepared by Phil Research and Info Sec, U.S. Army Forces in the Far 

East (USAFFE), 26 Jan 45, p. 1, copy in Office of 

the Chief of Military History. A large number of 

the sources used in the preparation of this volume 

are on file in that office, hereafter referred to as 

OCMH. 

• Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York, 

1946), pp. 153-55. 

9 

MacArthur's title in his new assignment 

was Military Advisor to the Commonwealth 

Government; his mission, to aid in the "establishment and development of a system of 

National Defense." The authority given 

him was unusually broad. He was authorized to deal directly with the Secretary of 

War and the Chief of Staff and, "in all cases 

not specifically covered," to use his own 

judgment. "Your mission must be accomplished-," he was told, "ways and means 

are largely left to you." 9 Although there 

was no official connection between the 

Philippine Department, the U.S. Army 

command in the Islands, and the Office of 

the Military Advisor, the department commander, Maj. Gen. Lucius R. Holbrook, 

was informed that assistance to General 

MacArthur was "the most important peacetime mission of your command." 10 

General MacArthur selected Majs. 

DwightD. Eisenhower and James B. Ord 

as his principal assistants. With the aid of 

a special committee from the Army War 

College, they prepared a plan to provide 

the Philippine Commonwealth with a system of national security by 1946, the date 

the Islands would become independent. 

This plan called for a small regular army, a 

conscription system, a ten-year training program of two classes a year to build up a reserve force, a small air force, and a fleet of 

small motor torpedo boats to repel an enemy 

landing. The tactical organization of thii'l 

army was to be based on divisions of approximately 7,500 men. Armament and 

• ·Ltr of Instructions to Gen MacArthur, signed 

by the Acting Adjutant General, 18 Sep 35, in War 

Plans Division, War Department General Staff 

(WDGS), file 3389-31. At the time this letter was 

prepared General MacArthur was still Chief of Staff, 

U.S. Army. This file is hereafter referred to as 

WPD with appropriate file number. 

,. Ltr of Instructions to CG Phil Dept, signed by 

Actg TAG, 18 Sep 35, WPD 3389-31. 
10 

equipment for the new army was to be of a 

type suitable to the economy and terrain in 

the Philippines.lt 

The staff of the Military Advisor was always small. In addition to the officers he 

took with him, General MacArthur secured 

the services of four other officers from the 

Philippine Department when he reached 

Manila. He also employed as a civilian 

assistant a retired naval officer, Sidney L. 

Huff, to advise in naval matters. On the 

death of Colonel Ord in an airplane accident in 1938, Lt. Col. Richard K. Sutherland was brought into the staff, and when 

Colonel Eisenhower returned to the United 

States the next year, Lt. Col. Richard J. 

Marshall was chosen to replace him. In 

October 1937, Capt. Hugh J. Casey joined 

MacArthur's staff to advise in engineer matters, and later Maj. William F. Marquat 

was designated antiaircraft officer. All 

of these men remained with General MacArthur through the war years. 12 

The first legislative measure of the Philippine National Assembly was the passage, on 

21 December 1935, of the National Defense 

Act, which embodied the plan proposed by 

General MacArthur. In explaining the bill 

to the Assembly, President Quezon emphasized that the defense program must be carried out economically and should be "passively defensive." It would be impossible 

11 Memo, Maj Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower for 

President Quezon, 22 Jun 42, Operations Division, 

WDGS, Executive Office files (hereafter cited as 

OPD Exec 0). This memorandum with accompanying notes is included in an article by Louis 

Morton, "The Philippine Army 1935-1939: Eisenhower's Memorandum to Quezon," Military Affairs, 

XII (1948), 103-07. 

12 Intervs, author with Maj Gen Richard J. Marshall, ret., 7 Apr 48, and with Col LeGrande A. 

Diller, formerly aide to Gen MacArthur, 28 Apr 48. 

The author's notes on these and certain other interviews are on file in OCMH. Interviews on which 

no notes were taken have no file designation. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

for reasons of economy, he declared, to 

develop an adequate fleet in the short time 

allotted and with the money available.13 

The National Defense Act provided for 

a regular force of 10,000 men and a reserve force which was expected to reach 

400,000 by the middle of 1946. The regular establishment was also to include the 

Philippine Constabulary, then consisting of 

about 6,000 men, so that more than half of 

the regular army from the start consisted 

of partially trained men. All Filipinos between the ages of twenty-one and fifty were 

liable for military service. After a 51'2-

month training period Filipinos would become a part of the reserve force. There 

were to be two classes a year, each to consist of 20,000 men with the regulars serving as training cadres. F or the training 

of junior officers a military academy patterned after West Point was to be established 

at Baguio on Luzon. It was expected to 

graduate about 100 officers each year.14 

F or military purposes the Commonwealth was divided into ten military districts with functions comparable to those of 

the prewar corps areas in the United States. 

Each district had an approximately equal 

population, and each was to provide initially one reserve division and ultimately three. 

Luzon, together with several outlying islands 

(Mindoro, Palawan, Masbate), had five 

military districts; Mindanao and the Sulu 

Archipelago together constituted another; 

and the Visayas four more. In each district the military commander was responsible during peacetime for training and for 

" Message to the First National Assembly on National Defense, 25 Nov 35, in Joseph R. Hayden, 

The Philippines, A Study in National Development (New York, 1942), p. 738. 

14 The Philippine Army: Its Establishment, Organization, and Legal Basis, pp. 4, 18. The Constabulary was separated from the Army in 1938, 

but again made a part of it late in 1941. 
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

the preparation of defense plans; in time of 

war for the defense of his district. The provincial governor was responsible for the enforcement of the recruitment and mobilization laws.15 

Although the district commanders were 

responsible for defense plans, the Office of 

the Military Advisor drew up the plans for 

all the major islands-Luzon, Cebu, Negros, 

Panay, Leyte, Mindanao, Bohol, Mindoroas well as many of the smaller ones. Since 

these plans were to be employed by the 

Philippine Government after that nation 

had received its independence, they were 

based on the assumption that there would 

be no U.S. Army forces in the Islands and 

that all forces would come from the Philippine Army. The plans of the Military Advisor also called for the establishment of 

seacoast defenses along the seven straits 

which give access to the inland waters of the 

Philippine Islands.16 

The defense of the coast line-longer than 

that of the United States-posed an extremely difficult problem. The National 

Defense Act made no provision for a navy 

but established in the army an Off Shore 

Patrol. This organization was to consist 

of fast motor torpedo boats of a British 

design. Contracts for thirty-six of these 

vessels, to be completed by 1946, were placed 

with British shipbuilders under specifications that called for a boat 65 feet long, with 

,. The National Defense Act, Commonwealth Act 

No.1, Titles II and III, Secs 17 to 59, in The 

Philippine Army: Its Establishment, Organization, 

and Legal Basis, App. I, p. 12. 

1. Ltr, Maj. Gen William C. Dunckel, ret., to 

author, 11 May 48, OCMH. General Dunckel 

was on ,MacArthur's staff, and was responsible for 

the preparation of the plans. In all, he prepared 

about seventy documents including estimates of 

the situation, general and special staff annexes, and 

the like. Interv, author with Lt Gen Richard K. 

Sutherland, ret., formerly chief of staff to Gen 

MacArthur, 12 Nov 46, OCMH. 

11 

a 13-foot beam, three 12-cylinder engines, 

and a speed of 41 knots. Armament would 

consist of two torpedo tubes, depth charges, 

and light antiaircraft guns.17 "A relatively 

small fleet of such vessels," said General 

MacArthur, " ... will have distinct effect in 

compelling any hostile force to approach 

cautiously and by small detachments." 18 

The National Defense Act also made 

provision for an air force, to be utilized 

primarily for coast defense. By 1946 the 

Commonwealth expected to have a fleet of 

approximately 100 fast bombers, supported 

by other tactical types. They would be used 

with the Off Shore Patrol to keep hostile 

craft away from the Philippine coast. 

The basic concepts which determined 

the nature and organization of the Commonwealth military establishment are perhaps best explained by MacArthur himself. The underlying principle, he said in 

a speech in 1936, was to create a defensive 

force of such strength as to make an invasion so costly in lives and money that "no 

Chancellory in the W orId, if it accepts the 

opinions of the military and naval staffs, 

will ever willingly make an attempt to willfully attack the Philippines . . .." The 

Islands, MacArthur pointed out, had 

"enormous defensive advantages" in their 

geographical separation from possible enemies, mountainous character, heavy forests and jungles, narrow beaches and 

limited communications. Luzon, the probable objective of an enemy, he reminded his 

listeners, had only two areas in which "a 

hostile army of any size could land." 

"Each of these," he added, "is broken by 

strong defensive positions, which if properly 

"Catherine Porter, "Preparedness in the Philippines," Far Eastern Survey, April 7, 1941, pp. 65-

66. 1. Philippines Herald, January 26, 1940, quoted 

in Hayden, The Philippines, pp. 740-41. 
12 

manned and prepared would present to 

any attacking force a practically impossible 

problem of penetration." 

When the development of the Philippine 

Army was completed, MacArthur believed 

it would be strong enough to oppose successfully "any conceivable expeditionary 

force." It would have a great advantage 

also in being assigned only one mission: defense of the homeland. Each unit of the 

army would operate over ground it knew 

well and which had been "deliberately 

selected and organized for defense." 

The absence of a battle fleet in the plan 

of defense, MacArthur explained, was due 

to the defensive mission of the military establishment. The major duty of a large 

navy, he pointed out, was to protect overseas possessions. For the Philippines, 

which had no colonies, the only naval task 

was that of inshore defense. This defense 

would be provided by "flotillas of fast torpedo boats, supported by an air force," 

whose task would be to deny the enemy an 

opportunity to bring its forces close enough 

to Philippine shores to debark his troops 

and supplies. All these preparations, he 

believed, would, by 1946, place the 

Islands "in a favorable posture of defensive 

security." 19 

The development of the Philippine Army 

was slow. The year 1936 was devoted to 

the building of camps, organization of 

cadres, and the special training of instructors, drawn largely from the Constabulary. 

The commander of the Philippine Department provided Philippine Scouts as instructors and detailed V.S. Army officers to assist in the inspection, instruction, and ad1. The quotations in this and the preceding two 

paragraphs are from the speech delivered in 1936 

and printed in Cornejo's Commonwealth Directory 

of the Philippines (1939 ed.), pp. 759-84. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ministration of the program. By the end of 

the year instructors had been trained and 

camps established. 

The first group of 20,000 men was called 

up on 1 January 1937 and by the end of 

1939 there were 4,800 officers and 104,000 

men in the reserves. Infantry training was 

given at camps scattered throughout the 

Philippines; field artillery training was 

concentrated in the vicinity of the V.S. 

Army's Fort Stotsenburg near Angeles, 

about fifty miles north of Manila, and 

specialized training was given at Fort William McKinley just south of Manila. 

Coast artillery instruction was carried on at 

Fort Stotsenburg and at Grande Island in 

Subic Bay by personnel supplied largely by 

the American commander at Corregidor.20 

One of the greatest difficulties encountered in the organization of the Philippine 

Army was the creation of a satisfactory 

officer corps. In the Constabulary were 

Filipino officers with excellent training and 

experience, but their interests lay in law 

enforcement rather than military training. 

Some of the best officers came from the 

Philippine Scouts; these men rapidly became senior officers in the Philippine Army. 

The great problem was to train junior officers to command the training camps and 

reserve units once these were formed. 

Since no graduates could be expected from 

the projected military academy at Baguio 

for four years the most promising men in 

each semiannual class of reservists were 

selected for an additional six months' training as noncommissioned officers. The best 

of these were chosen for officer training and 

20 Notes on the Philippine Army, 1941-1942, a 

typescript, undated and unsigned, evidently prepared in Hq USAFFE during the war, pp. 1-3, 

OCMH; memo, Eisenhower for Pres Quezon, 22 

Jun 42, OPD Exec O. 
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 

became 3d lieutenants upon graduation 

from Officer Candidate School. Senior 

ROTC units in colleges and universities 

were established to provide additional junior reserve officers. 

The air program of the Philippine Army, 

though its development was slow, met whh 

few serious obstacles. The first Philippine 

Army airfield was built just outside of Manila, and by the time the first runway was 

completed three trainers were available for 

pilot training. This course was supplemented by courses in military flying and 

technical training given in the United States 

to selected air force students. By 1940 the 

Philippine Army Air Corps had about forty 

planes and one hundred trained pilots. 

Practice in light bombing and gunnery had 

been given, and the entire instructional system, General Eisenhower observed later, 

was "on a very sound basis." 21 

The program for the building of a fleet 

of motor torpedo boats did not progress well. 

Only two had been delivered by the end 

of 1939 when the war in Europe destroyed 

any hope of securing additional boats from 

England. An effort was made to produce 

the torpedo boats locally by purchasing the 

engines and the right to build from the British design, but by October 1941 only one 

n Memo, Eisenhower for Pres Quezon, 22 Jun 42, 

OPD Exec O. 

13 

boat had been completed. Meanwhile, 

with the assistance of the U.S. Navy, the 

training of boatmen and mechanics continued.22 

No military plan for the defense of an 

archipelago such as the Philippine Islands 

could have had serious prospects of success 

against a determined enemy with a powerful fleet without great reliance on more effective naval support than that provided by 

patrol boats. The Philippine Government 

had neither the industrial capacity nor the 

wealth to build and support a navy which 

could compete with that of a first class naval 

power. President Quezon had frankly admitted this in November 1935. Such naval 

support could come only from the United 

States. No provision, it is true, had been 

made in the Tydings-McDuffie Act for the 

use by the U.S. Navy of naval bases in the 

Islands after 1946. But such a possibility 

had not been specifically denied and it was 

undoubtedly believed that arrangements for 

their use would be made at a later date. 

Certainly, the Philippine Government did 

not anticipate that the United States would 

stand idly by if the security of the Philippines was threatened. 

"Porter, "Preparedness in the Philippines," 

Far Eastern Survey, April 7, 1941, p. 66; interv, 

author with Gen R. J. Marshall, 7 Apr 48; itr, 

MacArthur to Gen George C. Marshall, Chief of 

Staff, U. S. Army, 28 Oct 41, WPD 4477-2. 
CHAPTER II 

u.s. Army Forces, Far East 

By the middle of 1941 international developments had heightened the tension between the United States and Japan and 

made the defense of the Philippines an urgent problem. The Nazi-Soviet pact, followed by the German Army's march into 

Poland in September 1939, had destroyed 

completely any hope for a peaceful settlement in Europe. The events of the following year made it evident that the United 

States might soon be involved in war with 

the Axis in Asia as well as Europe. Denmark and Norway had been invaded by 

Hitler's armies in April, Holland and Belgium were conquered in May, and on 21 

June France surrendered. Not long after, 

Japanese troops, with the acquiescence of 

the Vichy Government, moved into French 

Indochina. In September, Germany, Italy, 

and Japan concluded the Tripartite pact, 

and the following April, Russia and Japan 

reached agreement and signed a neutrality 

pact, thus freeing the latter for extension 

of her empire southward. 

American efforts to halt Japanese aggression in Asia had met with little success. 

On 26 July 1940 Japan was notified that 

the commercial treaty of 1911 would be 

abrogated. On the same day Congress 

granted the President authority to control 

exports to Japan. Immediately he put the 

export of oil and scrap iron under government license and banned the shipment of 

aviation gasoline to that country. By the 

early part of 1941 shipments of scrap iron, 

steel, gasoline, and other important war 

material from the United States to Japan 

had practically ceased. 

While the United States market was 

being closed to Japan, American economic 

support to China was increased. In November 1940 Chiang Kai-shek's government was lent $50,000,000 through the Export-Import Bank; by the end of that year 

loans to China had reached a total of 

$170,000,000. Despite these moves, perhaps because of them, Japan continued to 

exert pressure on the French and Dutch 

colonies in Southeast Asia to "co-operate" 

in economic matters. 

The possibility of war in the Far East was 

too real to be ignored and a reluctant Congress began to loosen the purse strings. But 

the years of neglect could not be remedied 

quickly. The ~emand for planes and 

weapons was great and the supply was limited. The Philippines was only one 0'£ 

many bases that had to be protected. 

Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama-which 

formed a strategic triangle whose defense 

was considered essential to the safety of the 

continental United States-had also been 

neglected and their needs had to be filled 

first. "Adequate reinforcements for the 

Philippines at this time," wrote Gen. George 

C. Marshall, "would have left the United 

States in a position ~f great peril should 

there be a break in the defense of Great 

Britain." 1 

1 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the 

United States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30,1943 

to the Secretary of War (Washington, 1943), p. 6. 
U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

What the United States needed more 

than anything else was time. But Japan's 

occupation of naval and air bases in southern Indochina on 22 July 1941 gave warning that time was short. The Philippine Islands, already almost entirely surrounded, 

were now further threatened and America's 

position in the Far East rendered precarious. 

Measures to strengthen the defense of the 

Philippines could be put off no longer. 

The Recall of General MacArthur 

The establishment of a new American 

command in the Fat- East and the recall of 

General MacArthur to active duty in the 

U.S. Army were already under consideration when Japan moved southward in July 

1941. A month earlier Joseph Stevenot, 

a prominent American businessman in 

Manila and president of the Philippine 

Long Distance Telephone Company, in an 

interview with Secretary of War Henry L. 

Stimson in Washington, had urged a closer 

relationship between the Military Advisor 

and the commander of the Philippine Department. Stimson had relayed this suggestion to General Marshall at a meeting 

during which both men discussed MacArthur's status and agreed he was the logical 

man to command in the Far East in the 

event of an emergency. 2 

2 Henry L. Stimson, Diary, entry of 21 May 

41; memo, Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow for Chief 

of Staff, 29 May 41, sub: Consultation with Mil 

Advisor ... , WPD 3251-49; itr, Marshall to 

MacArthur, 20 Jun 41, OCS 20850-15. Chief of 

Staff is hereafter referred to as CofS and the Office 

of the Chief of Staff as OCS. General Gerow 

was at the time acting chief of WPD. The relevant portion of Mr. Stimson's diary was made 

available to the author by Mr. Rudolph A. Winnacker, formerly historian of the Office of the Secretary of War and the author of a forthcoming 

volume in this series on the history of that office. 

15 

By a coincidence, on the same day that 

Stimson talked with Stevenot, Maj. Gen. 

George Grunert, the Philippine Department 

commander, asked permission from the War 

Department to include representatives of 

the Commonwealth Government in conferences then being held in Manila. The purpose of these meetings was to formulate 

plans, based on the expected use of $52,-

000,000 in sugar excise funds, for improving the defenses of the Islands. The reason 

for Grunert's request was to permit him to 

work more closely and directly with General 

MacArthur without going through official 

government channels. Close contact between the department commander and the 

Military Advisor, he pointed out, was an 

obvious necessity in making defense plans. 

General Marshall approved Grunert's request without question, adding that "MacArthur's support will be invaluable to you 

in the accomplishment of the difficult task 

with which you are confronted." 3 

The first direct bid for the recall of General MacArthur came from the former Chief 

of Staff himself and was contained in a letter to General Marshall.4 In this letter 

Frazier Hunt, in his book MacArthur and the 

War Against Japan (New York, 1944), page 12, 

states that MacArthur offered his services to President Roosevelt early in the spring of 1941. The 

author has been unable to find the documentary 

evidence in the files of the Department of the 

Army to support this assertion. 

S Ltr, MarshaU to Grunert, 29 May 41, WPD 

3251-49. 

'The author has been unable to find a copy of 

this letter in the files of the War Department but 

its contents are summarized in a memorandum 

written by General Gerow and addressed to the 

Chief of Staff on 6 June 1941 (WPD 3251-50). 

From internal evidence it appears that MacArthur 

on the same day wrote a letter covering the same 

subjects to the President and the Secretary of War. 

See also ltr, Marshall to MacArthur, 20 Jun 41, 

WPD 3251-50. 
16 

MacArthur stated that since the Philippine 

Army was to be absorbed by the V.S. Army 

in the near future-a step not yet contemplated by the War Department-he intended to close out the office of Military 

Advisor. A new American military command embracing all V.S. Army activities in 

the Far East, comparable to the British command in that area, should be established, he 

told the Chief of Staff, and he, MacArthur, 

be named commander. 

The idea of creating a high command in 

the Far East had been broached before, but 

never by so influential a source. In J anuary 1941 the intelligence officer of the 

Philippine Department had recommended 

to his superior in Washington that such a 

command be established. This proposal 

differed from MacArthur's in that the department commander was to be designated 

commander in chief of such a command, 

while MacArthur put forward his own nomination." The Philippine Department G-2 

continued to urge this move during the first 

six months of 1941, but there is no evidence 

that it was ever considered by the General 

Staff in Washington until June of that year, 

after General MacArthur's letter to the 

Chief of Staff. 6 

MacArthur's proposaJ was sent to the 

War Plans Division of the General Staff for 

study. On 6 June Brig. Gen. Leonard T. 

Gerow, acting chief of the division, sent his 

recommendations to the Chief of Staff. He 

agreed that the British had created such a 

command, but pointed out that their situation was quite different from that faced by 

• Ltr, G-2 Phil Dept to G-2 WD, 18 Jan 41, 

sub: Comments on Current Events, 8-18 Jan 41, 

Military Intelligence Division 10641-374-50. Military Intelligence Division is hereafter referred to 

as MID with appropriate file number. 

• Ibid.; see also ltrs, 13 and 26 Mar 41, MID 

10641-374-58, -59. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the Americans. The British had accepted 

strategic direction of naval forces in the Far 

East, and their troops were scattered 

throughout the area. V.S. Army forces 

were concentrated in the Philippines and 

had responsibility only for the defense of 

the Islands. Gerow therefore recommended 

against the establishment of a new command in the Far East. If MacArthur 

was called to active service, he wrote, it 

should be as commander of the Philippine 

Department. 7 

Despite the recommendations of the 

chief of War Plans, the official reply to MacArthur's letter expressed a sentiment entirely favorable to the proposal. This reply 

was contained in a letter dated 20 June from 

the Chief of Staff to General MacArthur. 

In it Marshall told the Military Advisor that 

the War Department's plans for the Philippine Army were not as broad as MacArthur 

believed, but that the decision to close out 

his office rested with him. All that the U.S. 

Army planned to do at the present time, he 

said, was to train about 75,000 Filipinos 

for a period of from three to nine months, 

contingent upon the appropriation by Congress of the sugar excise and currency devaluation fund. 

Both the Secretary of War and I [Marshall 

continued] are much concerned about the 

situation in the Far East. During one of our 

discussions about three months ago it was decided that your outstanding qualifications and 

vast experience in the Philippines make you 

the logical selection for the Army Commander 

in the Far East should the situation approach 

a crisis. The Secretary has delayed recommending your appointment as he d~es not feel 

the time haS" arrived for such action. However, he has authorized me to tell you that, 

at the proper time, he will recommend to the 

7 Memo, Gerow for CofS, 6 Jun 41, WPD 3251-

50. 
u.s. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

President that you be so appointed. It is my 

impression that the President will approve his 

recommenda tion. 8 

The appointment of General MacArthur 

as commander of all Army forces in the Far 

East was part of the larger problem ,of 

mobilization and training of the Philippine 

Army. By July 1941 it was clear that some 

decision on the use of the Philippine Army 

would soon have to be made. On 7 July 

MacArthur presented his views on the mobilization and training of the Philippine 

Army in a personal letter to the Chief of 

Staff, adding that the creation of a high 

command for the Far East "would result 

iiI favorable psychological and morale reactions." 9 A week later General Gerow 

summarized for the Chief of Staff the steps 

being taken for improving the defenses of 

the Philippine Islands, and on 17 July made 

the following specific recommendations: 

1. That the President, by executive order 

call into the service of the U.S. for the period 

of the emergency all organized military forces 

of the Commonwealth. 

2. That General MacArthur be called to 

active duty in the grade of Major General 

and assigned as commander of Army Forces 

in the Far East. 

3. That $10,000,000 of the President's 

Emergency Fund be allotted to cover the costs 

of mobilization and training of the Philippine Army for a period of three months. 

. 4: That the training program of the PhilIppme Army for an additional six to nine 

months be financed from the sugar excise 

• Ltr, Marshall to MacArthur, 20 Jun 41, oes 

20850-15; see also unused draft of this letter in 

WPD 3251-50. The last paragraph of the copy 

sent stated: "This letter is also an acknowledgment of your letters to the President and to the Secretary of War. Please keep its contents confidential for the present." 

.. The writer has been unable to find a copy of 

thiS letter. A summary of its contents can be 

found in a memo, Gerow for CofS, 14 J ul 41, sub: 

Philippine Islands [P.L], WPD 3251-52. 

17 

fu?d, or from other funds appropriated for 

thIS purpose. 

5. That 425 Reserve officers be sent to the 

Philippines to assist in the mobilization and 

training of the Philippine Army.lO 

Within a week these recommendations 

had been approved by the Chief of Staff 

and the Secretary of War. The Secretary 

immediately requested President Franklin 

D. Roosevelt to issue the necessary executive 

order, already drafted and approved, for 

calling the military forces of the Commonwealth into active service of the United 

States. "Due to the situation in the Far 

East," Stimson wrote, "all practical steps 

should be taken to increase the defensive 

strength of the Philippines Islands." One 

of the most effective measures to accomplish this would be to call the Philippine 

Army into active service for a year's training. Such a program, Stimson estimated, 

would involve about 75,000 men and would 

cost about $32,000,000, which would be 

met by the sugar excise fund. Pending appropriation by Congress, the funds to initiate the program could be met from the 

President's emergency fund.ll 

Stimson's recommendations reached the 

President at a time when he was thoroughly 

aroused by Japan's occupation of air and 

naval bases in Indochina on 22 July. Already he had broken off negotiations with 

Japan for a settlement of Far Eastern problems and was considering economic reprisals in the form of a freeze on Japanese assets in the United States. On 26 July, the 

day after Stimson made his recommendations, the President put the freeze into effect 

and issued the military order which would 

,. Ibid.; memo, Gerow for CofS, sub: Emergency 

Mobilization and Tng of Phil Army, 17 Jul 41, 

WPD 3251-52. 

U Ltr, Stimson to President, 25 Jul 41, OCS 

18136-34. 
18 

bring into the service of the United States 

the armed forces of the Philippines.12 

The President's military order did not 

mention General MacArthur by name; it 

was carefully worded so as to place the 

forces in the Philippines under a general 

officer of the United States Army, "to be 

designated by the Secretary of War from 

time to time." The actual induction of 

Philippine Army units was to be accomplished by orders issued by that general 

officer. 

The War Department immediately followed up the President's action by establishing, that same day, a new command in 

the Philippines, with headquarters in 

Manila. This command, to be called U.S. 

Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), 

would consist of the Philippine Department, those military forces of the Commonwealth ordered into active service for the 

period of the emergency, and such other 

forces as might be assigned. At the same 

time, MacArthur was recalled to active 

duty, effective on 26 July, with the rank of 

major general, designated as the general 

officer referred to in the military order, and 

put in command of U.S. Army Forces in 

the Far East.is With the establishment of 

USAF FE and the simultaneous induction 

of the military forces of the Commonwealth Government, the two separate military establishments which had existed in the 

Philippine Islands since 1935 were placed 

for the first time under one command. 

The recall of Douglas MacArthur to 

active duty at the age of 61 brought back 

into the U.S. Army "one of its most able and 

12 The military order and other material relating 

to this subject are filed in WPD 3251-52. 

13 Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 26 Jul 41, OCS 

18136-35; ltr order, CofS to MacArthur, sub: 

Active Duty, Tab C, Incl 4, WPD 3251-52. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

experienced senior officers. Son of General Arthur MacArthur of Philippine fame, 

he had graduated from the Military Academy in 1903 as a second lieutenant of engineers. Since then his record had been 

one of rapid advancement and brilliant 

achievement. His first assignment had 

been in the Philippines as a construction 

officer and he had been aide to his father 

when the senior MacArthur was chief military observer with the Japanese Army in 

the war against Russia. In 1907 he served 

as aide-de-camp to President Theodore 

Roosevelt. After various assignments in 

the United States he was ordered to Washington in 1913 for duty with the Chief of 

Engineers. The following year he accompanied the Mexican expedition to Vera 

Cruz as assistant engineer officer. 

In World War I Douglas MacArthur's 

record was outstanding. Transferring to 

the infantry, he served as chief of staff of 

the 42d Division, the Rainbow Division, \ 

and as commander of the 84th Brigade of 

that division. He was wounded twice, 

served briefly in the occupation and returned to the United States in 1919 as a 

brigadier general of the National Army. 

That year, at the age of 39, he was appointed Superintendent of the Military 

Academy at West Point over a number of 

senior generals. From West Point he went 

to the Philippines where he commanded in 

tum the District of Manila and the 23d 

Brigade. In January 1925 ~e was appointed a major general and returned to 

the United States the following month. 

F or the next three years General MacArthur commanded a corps area in the 

United States. In 1928 he returned to 

Manila as commander of the Philippine Department. Upon completion of this assignment he was brought back to the United 
V.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

States where he commanded the Ninth 

Corps Area on the west coast for a month 

and on 1 November 1930 was appointed 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. He held this 

post five years before going to the Philippines as Military Advisor to the Philippine 

Commonwealth. On 31 December 1937, 

after thirty-eight years' service, eighteen of 

them as a general officer, MacArthur retired from the Army with the rank of general, to become field marshal in the Philippine Army a short time later. His return 

to active duty on 26 July 1941 was as a 

major general, his permanent rank before 

retirement. The next day action to promote him to the rank of temporary lieutenant general was initiated and approved two 

days later, effective 27 July. 

The Organization of USAFFE 

The immediate tasks facing General MacArthur were, first, to establish his headquarters and organize his command on an efficient basis; second, to induct and train the 

Philippine Army; and third, to secure the 

necessary supplies and reinforcements to put 

his forces on a war footing. 

The first task was quickly accomplished. 

From the small group of Army officers who 

had been detailed to the Office of the Military Advisor and from V.S. Army organizations in the Philippines, MacArthur secured 

enough officers to form a nucleus for his 

headquarters. By mid-August he had a 

small and highly efficient staff in Headquarters, USAFFE, located at No.1, Calle Victoria, in the walled city in Manila. His 

principal staff officers were men who had 

been with him for some time. For the most 

part they were men in the prime of their 

lives. The chief of staff and deputy chief 

of staff were 47 and 46 years old respectively 

19 

at the time USAFFE was organized and had 

already served under MacArthur for several years. All the officers on the general 

staff were under 50 years of age, and of the 

three special staff officers who had been requested specifically by name, the youngest 

was 43 and the oldest 52. 

For his chief of staff, General MacArthur 

selected the senior officer of the military 

mission, Lt. Col. Richard K. Sutherland. 

Entering the army as a private after his graduation from Yale in 1916, Sutherland rose 

to the rank of captain before the end of 

World War I. During the peace years, he 

attended the Infantry School, Command 

and Staff School, Ecole Superieure de 

Guerre, and the Army War College. Conceded by most to be a brilliant, hard-working officer, he was selected for MacArthur's 

staff in 1938 after a tour of duty in Shanghai. 

Gen. George C. Kenney, who served with 

him for four years, remarked, "He knew so 

many of the answers that I could understand why General MacArthur had picked 

him for chief of staff." But he also noted 

that among Sutherland's traits were egotism 

and "an unfortunate bit of arrogance." 14 

Promoted directly to brigadier general in 

August 1941, Sutherland remained MacArthur's chief of staff until 1946, rising 

finally to the rank of lieutenant general. 

For the next important post in USAFFE, 

the deputy chief of staff, MacArthur chose 

Lt. Col. Richard J. Marshall who had occupied a similar position in the Military 

Advisor's office. Promoted rapidly, first 

to colonel and in December 1941 to brig..; 

adier general, Marshall had, in MacArthur's opinion, "no superior as a supply officer in the Army." 15 

14 Gen. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New York, 1949), p. 26. 

,. Rad MacArthur to Marshall, No. C-62, 10 Jul 

42, OPD Strategy File, III. 
PHILIPPINE SCOUTS at Fort McKinley firing a 37-mm. antitank gun in training, 

above; below, engineers preparing sections for a pontoon bridge. 
U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

U.S. Army in the Philippines 

When General MacArthur assumed command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, 

the Philippine Department consisted of 22,-

532 men, 11,972 of whom were Philippine 

ScoutS.16 Of the 1,340 officers, 7i 5 were 

reservists on active duty. The largest group 

of men-7,293-was assigned to the infantry, and the Coast Artillery Corps was 

next with 4,967. Almost the entire strength 

of the command was stationed on Luzon. 

The largest single U.S. Army unit in the 

Philippines was the Philippine Division, 

commanded by Maj; Gen. Jonathan M. 

Wainwright. Theoretically, it was a square 

division, but was not equipped as such, and 

lacked a brigade organization and some of 

its organic elements. All of the enlisted 

men in the division, except those in the 31st 

Infantry and a few military police and headquarters troops, were Philippine Scouts; the 

31st was the only American infantry unit 

in the Islands composed entirely of Americans. In addition to this regiment, the 

Philippine Division contained the 45th and 

57th Infantry (PS).17 Authorized strength 

for these Scout regiments was 2,435 officers 

16 Unless otherwise noted, this and subsequent 

material on the strength of American and Philippine troops is taken from Phil Dept., Machine Rcds 

Unit Station Strength Rpts, 31 Ju1 41, Strength 

Accounting Branch, and from Phil Dept War Plan 

ORANGE, 1940 Revision (Short title HPD WPO-3). 

Flyleaf of Copy No.6 has an AG strength report of 

21 J ul 41 attached. 

Up to January 1941 the Scouts had had a 

strength of 6,500; at that time the President of the 

United States had authorized an increase in their 

strength to 12,000. Telg, TAG to CG Phil Dept, 

No. 635, 28 Jan 41, AG 320.2 Phil Dept (1-19-

41 ). 

17 The 43d Infantry (PS) is also listed in some 

reports. Actually, this unit consisted of 329 men, 

formerly part of the 45th Infantry, who had been 

detached for duty at Zamboanga in Mindanao and 

at Camp Jphn Hay, near Baguio on Luzon. 

21 

and men, and for the 31 st, 1,729. In July 

1941 the former were slightly below strength 

and the latter was 402 overstrength in officers and enlisted men. IS 

Field artillery ~omponents of the Philippine Division consisted of the two-battalion 

24th Regiment (truck-drawn British 75-

mm. guns) with 843 officers and enlisted 

men, and one battalion of the 23d, with 401 

men and armed with 2.95-inch mountain 

guns (pack). Plans existed for the organization at a later date of the 26th Field Artillery and a separate battalion of IS5-mm. 

guns for use with the division. The division 

also included the standard engineer, ordnance, signal, military police, medical, and 

quartermaster units. The total strength of 

the Philippine Division on 31 July was 10,-

473 men, distributed as shown in Table 1. 

The Philippine Division rarely functioned 

as a division, for its elements were scattered. 

Headquarters and the bulk of the division 

were at Fort William McKinley, just south 

of the city. The 31st Infantry was stationed 

at the Post of Manila, in the city itself, and 

a battalion of the 12th Quartermaster Regiment was located in the Manila port area. 

The 1st Battalion, less one company, of the 

45th Infantry was stationed at the Post of 

Limay on the southeast coast of the Bataan 

peninsula. The rest of the division, including the artillery components, the 12th 

Ordnance Company, and a platoon of the 

quartermaster regiment, was at Fort Stotsenburg, about fifty miles north of Manila, 

close to Clark Field. 

The major nondivisional U.S. Army 

ground elements in the Philippines in July 

,. HPD WPO-3, G-1 Annex, Exhibit F. 

Strength figures in this source were computed from 

tables and are the estimated strengths as of Mobi1i~ 

zation (M) Day. Those figures are close to the 

actual strength at the beginning of 1941 when the 

plan was prepared, but some of the units listed in 

Table 1 were not yet organized. 
22 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

TABLE I-STRENGTH OF PHILIPPINE DIVISION, 31 JULY 1941 

I Enlisted 

Unit Total Officers 

I 

Total American I Philippine Scouts 

All Units ................•...••....•.... 10,473 I a 516 9,957 

I 

2,036 7,921 

Hq and Hq Co ..•.........•.•.•....••......•. 181 I 30 151 i 4 147 

Special Troops ..•.....•..•.•........•..••..•. 5 5 0 

I 

0 0 

31st Infantry ••..•.......•........•........•.• 2,100 114 1,986 1,986 0 

45th Infantry •.••.•..............•............ 2,265 117 2,148 1 2,147 

57th Infantry •.••.•••••.....•................. 2,279 118 2,161 0 2,161 

23d FA Regt .•...•.••.••.............•..•.••• 401 10 391 0 391 

24th FA Regt ......•.................•..••...• 843 39 804 0 804 

12th MP Co ............................•••..• 136 5 131 5 86 

12th QM Regt ......•..........•.....•...•.••• 592 18 574 0 574 

12th Med Regt ••...•..............•.....•.••. 421 22 399 0 399 

12th Ord Co .••....•.••................•••••. 142 3 139 0 139 

12th Sig Regt •..•••.•.....••............•••.• 227 10 217 0 217 

14th Engr Regt ••..••.•.•.•••.........•..•..•• 870 24 846 0 846 

4th Vet Co ..•••...••••............•.••.•••.•• 11 1 10 0 10 

• Includes 15 Philippine Scout Officers: 2 Hq, 2 Sp Trs, 3 45th Inf, 1 57th Inf, 5 24th FA Regt, 1 12th QM Reg!. and 

1 14th Engr. 

Source: Phil DePt, Machine Reds Unit Station Strength and Misc., Officers and Enlisted Men, Jul 41. 

1941 included the Harbor Defenses of 

Manila and Subic Bays, a cavalry regiment, 

two field artillery regiments, and quartermaster, signal, and military police units. 

The Harbor Defenses were commanded by 

Maj. Gen. George F. Moore, who had his 

headquarters at Fort Mills on Corregidor. 

They included not only the defenses of Corregidor, but also those 'on Caballo Island 

(Fort Hughes), El Fraile (Fort Drum), and 

Carabao (Fort Frank)-all at the entrance 

to Manila Bay-and Fort Wint on Grande 

Island at the entrance to Subic Bay. 

The 26th Cavalry was a Philippine Scout 

organization with two squadrons of three 

troops each. I t was considerably smaller 

than a similar regiment in the United States 

and had a strength of 784 enlisted men and 

54 officers. The home station of the regiment, except for one troop, was at Fort 

Stotsenburg; Troop F was stationed at 

Nichols Field, south of Manila.19 Also at 

Fort Stotsenburg were two Philippine Scout 

field artillery regiments, the 86th and 88th, 

the first with a strength of 388 and the second with 518 men. 

Service and supply elements in the Philippine Department at the end of July 1941 

totaled approximately 2,500 officers and 

men, exclusive of those serving with the Air 

Forces. The largest part of these troops 

were assigned to quartermaster and medical 

units, stationed at the various posts on 

Luzon, and at Pettit Barracks in Zamboanga 

,. Lt. Col. William E. Chandler, "26th Cavalry 

(PS) Battles to Glory," in three parts, Armored 

Cavalry Journal, LVI, Nos. 2--4 (March-August 

1947) . 
U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

(Mindanao). A military police company, 

the 808th, was stationed in Manila, as were 

the headquarters of the Philippine Department and of USAFFE. (See Table 2.) 

On 4 August, the air forces in the Philippines were brought under the control of 

MacArthur's headquarters, "except for 

routine administration and supply," and 

redesignated the USAFFE Air Force. It 

was only a token force. Of the 210 aircraft in the Islands, only the thirty-one 

P-40B's could be considered modem aircraft; the others, consisting of P-26's, P35's, B-lO's, B-18's, A-29's, C-39's and 

observation planes, were largely obsolescent. 

One field alone, Clark Field near Fort 

Stotsenburg, could accommodate heavy 

bombers.20 

Air Forces headquarters was located at 

Nielson Field on the outskirts of Manila; 

the majority of the planes were based at 

either Nichols, also near Manila, or Clark 

Field. The 4th Composite Group at Clark 

Field had under it a headquarters squadron, 

three pursuit squadrons, one bombardment 

squadron, and an observ.ation squadron. 

The 20th Air Base Group at Nichols Field 

contained miscellaneous supporting units, 

including the 27th and 28th Materiel 

Squadrons, and the 19th Air Base Squadron. Total strength of the air forces was 

254 officers and 2,049 men!1 

With the establishment of USAFFE, the 

Philippine Department became a subord20 USAFFE GO 4, 4 Aug 41, copy in History of 

Fifth Air Force (and Its Predecessors), Air Hist 

Off; Army Air Action in the Philippines and the 

Netherland East Indies, p. 11, prepared by the 

Asst Chief of Air Staff Intel, Hist Div, and filed in 

Air University Hist Off. 

21 Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 11. The 

aircraft in the 4th Composite Group at this time 

were as follows: 21 P-26's, 56 P-35's, 31 P-40B's, 

10 0-46's, 3 0-19E's, 10 A-9's, 1 C-39, 9 A-27's, 

14 B-I0Bs, and 18 B-18's. 

23 

inate command. The headquarters staff 

was left largely intact, although General 

MacArthur designated some of its members 

to serve on his staff in addition to their regular duties, but the mission of the Department was narrowed until its principal task 

became the training and supply of the 

Philippine Anny. In effect, it became a 

service command, "an administrative echelon," MacArthur explained, "analagous to 

a Corps Area." 22 Planning and the tactical control of field troops, organized into 

task forces, were now centered in USAFFE. 

Under the circumstances, there seemed 

little need for the services of so senior an 

officer as General Grunert, and MacArthur recommended that he be relieved and 

another officer "who had not enjoyed such 

high command" be appointed to the position. Pointing out that Grunert would 

complete his tour of duty in less than four 

months, MacArthur declared, "It would be 

advantageous to relieve him, as I am loath, 

as long as he is here, to contract the functions of the Department Commander. 

" 23 The War Department accepted 

this suggestion and on 23 October named 

MacArthur commander of the Philippine 

Department, relieved Grunert, and ordered 

him back to the United States.24 Thus, the 

Philippine Department, which had been for 

so long the highest Anny command in the 

Far East, became, in fact first and later in 

name, a service command. The headquar22 Extract of rad from CG USAFFE in memo, 

Maj Gen William Bryden, DCofS for ACofS G-l, 

13 Oct 41, OCS 18136-78; see also memo, Bryden 

for WPD, 7 Oct 41, OCS 18136-71. 

23 Extract of rad from CG USAFFE in memo, 

Bryden for ACofS, G-l, 13 Oct 41, OCS 

18136-78. 

24 Memo, Bryden for TAG, n.d., sub: Order for 

Gens Grunert and MacArthur, AG 210.311. Note 

on memo: "Action taken, October 23, 1941." 
24 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

TABLE 2-STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF U.S. ARMY TROOPS IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 

31 JULY 1941 

Unit 

All Units ..................•..••...... 

Hq USAFFE ....•.....•••.••..•..........••• 

Hq and Hq Det Phil Dept ...•.....•........• 

Philippine Division •.......•......•....•.... 

26th Cavalry ...•......•..................... 

43d Infantry ...••.•.....•......•.••......... 

86th FA •••.............................•.•• 

88th FA .•..............................•... 

808th MP Co .•...•••.••....•.•...•.•.•••••• 

Harbor Defenses (Ft MiJls) ..............•... 

Hq and Hq Buy . .....................••• 

59th CA ...••.........•.•.....•......... 

60th CA ..•.•....•••.•......•........... 

91st CA •...••....•...•.•............•.. 

92d CA ....••.......................... 

USAMpb Harrison •••.. ••..•....•....•.. 

Station Hospital. ....................••.. 

Chemical Warfare Det .......•......•.... 

Air Corps •....•.•...•... ' .........•.•.•...•.. 

Headquarters •.•.......•.......••.•..•.. 

4th Composite Group ••.........•.••••.. 

20th Air Base Group •.•........••.••.... 

Tow Target Det .......•.........•.••.... 

Weather Det ............................ 

Service Detachments ......................•.• 

Quartermaster Corps •.•••.•••••...•••••. 

Medical Dept •..•.....•...•........•.•.. 

Ordnance Dept •.•.•..••.••....••..•.•.. 

Corps of Engineers •••.•.•...........•.. 

Signal Corps •..•..•..••..•..•....•..••• 

Chemical Warfare Service ...•..•..•••...• 

Finance Dept ..•....•..•.....•••...••.... 

Other D ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

• Includes 26 Philippine Scout Officers. 

b U.S. Army Mine Phnter, 

Total Officers 

22,532 ·1,434 

5 5 

289 125 

10,473 516 

838 54 

329 16 

388 12 

518 17 

69 4 

5,360 204 

418 32 

1,415 34 

1,896 41 

783 26 

653 26 

47 7 

144 35 

4 3 

2,407 275 

109 18 

1,393 232 

842 19 

42 1 

21 5 

1,836 188 

505 31 

526 132 

173 9 

196 7 

348 6 

68 2 

20 1 

20 18 

• Includes officers and enlisted men for which no specific unit was indicated. 

Enlisted 

---_.-

Total American , 

I 

21,098 9,161 

0 0 

164 163 

I 9,957 2,036 , 784 0 

313 0 

376 0 

501 0 

65 65 

5,156 3,698 

386 316 

1,381 1,381 

1,855 1,855 

757 0 

627 0 

40 36 

109 109 

1 1 

2,132 2,132 

91 91 

1,161 1,161 

823 823 

41 41 

16 16 

1,648 1,065 

474 182 

394 233 

164 164 

189 189 

342 224 

66 54 

19 19 

2 2 

SOllrce: Phil DePt, Machine Reds Unit Station Strength and Misc •• Officers and Enlisted Men, ]uI 41. 

I Philippine Scouts 

11,937 

0 

1 

7,921 

784 

313 

376 

501 

0 

1,458 

70 

0 

0 

757 

627 

4 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

583 

292 

161 

0 

0 

118 

12 

0 

0 
U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 25 

CEREMONY AT CAMP MURPHY, RIZAL, 15 August 1941, marking the induction of the Philippine Army Air Corps. Behind Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, from 

left to right, are Lt. Col. Richard K. Sutherland, Col. Harold H. George, Lt. Col. 

William F. Marquat, and Maj. LeGrande A. Diller. 

ters which had made the plans and preparations for war had no tactical control when 

war came. 

Philippine Army: Mobilization and 

Training 

The m<1jor task of the hurriedly assembled staff of Headquarters, USAFFE, was 

to work out a plan for the mobilization, 

training, and supply of the Philippine Army. 

Within a few days of his appointment, General MacArthur had selected 1 September 

as the day when mobilization of the Philippine Army would start. This left thirty 

days in which to select camp sites, enlarge 

and improve existing camps for the first reservists, and build new camps. 

The integration of the armed forces of 

the Philippine Commonwealth into the service of the United States was to be gradual. 

Elements of the ten reserve divisions were 

to be called into servic~ at regular intervals 

until 15 December 1941, when the mobilization would be complete. The Philippine 

Army Air Corps would be inducted separately. Reserve units engaged in their normal yearly training were not to be inducted 

unless war came. It was hoped in this way 

to continue the development of the Commonwealth's defense program and at the 

same time mobilize and train the Philippine 

Army. Commonwealth forces coming under United States control would retain their 

national integrity; they would have their 

own uniforms, rations, military law, scale 
26 

of pay, and promotion list; would requisition through their own supply channel until 

1 December; but would be paid by the V. S. 

Army. The Regular Army of the Philippine Commonwealth and the Constabulary 

were not to be inducted immediately. 

A construction program was to be started 

immediately since there was only enough 

housing for about one third of the 75,000 

men scheduled for induction. Camp sites 

would have to be selected and facilities for 

training built. The first units called would 

use existing or temporary quarters and, as 

camps were completed, additional units 

would be inducted. By 15 December, when 

the last units would be mobilized, the entire construction program would be completed.2lI 

On 15 August, less than three weeks after 

he had assumed command of VSAFFE, 

General MacArthur incorporated into the 

American forces the Philippine Army Air 

Corps of six squadrons and approximately 

500 men. A few days later he issued orders 

calling into the service by 1 September ten 

infantry regiments-one from each of the 

.. Notes on the Philippine Army, 1941-1942, p. 

2; Sixth Annual Report of the U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, 1 July 1941-30 

June 1942 (Washington, 1943), p. 16; Admin Plan 

for Ten Reserve Divs ... , Hq USAFFE, 10 Aug 41, 

OCMH; Report of Operations of USAFFE and 

USFIP [U.S. Forces in the Philippines] in the Philippine Islands, 1941-1942, pp. 3 If. This last report with its eighteen annexes constitutes the basic 

Army report on the various aspects of the Philippine campaign and was prepared in 1946 by a staff 

under General Wainwright, formerly commander of 

USFI'P. Each of the annexes is separately titled 

and paginated and was prepared by officers in the 

relevant headquarters. The basic report is cited 

hereafter as USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns; its annexes will be referred to by their own titles, listed 

in The Sources, page 588, below. 

This report was prepared in five copies, one of 

which is on file in AG and another in OCMH. The 

author has used throughout this volume the copy 

in OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

reserve divisions-and the cadres of most 

of the other divisional units. 26 

As housing facilities became available, 

VSAFFE brought other elements of the 

Philippine Army into service. Early in N 0-

vember the second infantry regiment of 

each of the divisions was called up, to be 

joined before the end of the month by the 

division headquarters and the service elements. But time was running out. When 

war came not a single division had been 

completely mobilized and not one of the 

units was at full strength. None of the 

antitank battalions was ever organized because of the lack of equipment, and the 

shortage of organic artillery forced many of 

the divisions to go into battle without full 

artillery components.27 

To each division were assigned about 

forty V.S. Army officers and twenty American or Philippine Scout noncommissioned 

officers who served as instructors. The officers were usually attached to division and 

regimental staffs; the enlisted men served in 

battalions and companies. The position of 

the instructor was an anomalous one. 

When one instructor asked for a clarification 

of his status he was told: "You have no 

command status. You have no authority. 

But you are directly responsible for the success or failure of the regiment." 28 

While it is not possible to state definitely 

the strength of the Philippine Army by midDecember 1941, an estimate of the number 

of Filipinos available for combat can be 

"USAFFE GO 6, 19 Aug 41, copy in OCMH; 

Sixth Annual Report of High Commissioner, p. 15. 

"USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp .. 13, 14: 

2. Col Richard C. Mallonee, senior instructor of 

21st FA(PA), Bataan Diary, 2 vols., I, 23. The 

diary was borrowed by the author and a photostat 

copy is on file in OCMH. See also South Luzon 

Force (SLF) and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 4, Annex 

V, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns. 
U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

made. On the basis of the authorized 

strength of a Philippine division (7,500 

men), the total divisional strength of the 

Philippine Army reserve would be 75,000 

men. To this figure must be added the 

strength of the 1st Regular Division, a part 

of the regular establishment, and the Constabulary, plus nondivisional and provisional 

units formed after the start of war. A rough 

estimate of the number of men in the Philippine Army, therefore, would be approximately 120,000, a figure which is confirmed 

by later reports on the number of men surrendered and by postwar claims for back 

pay and pensions.29 

Upon mobilization of the first elements of 

the ten reserve divisions, schools were established to provide special training for officers 

and selected enlisted men of the Philippine 

Army who in turn would train other Filipinos as the mobilization progressed. At 

Baguio a command and staff school was 

established to train a few American colonels 

and senior Philippine officers who were to 

command Philippine Army divisions, as 

well as certain key officers slated for the 

staffs of these divisions. Schools for the 

training of infantry cadres were established 

in each division mobilization district. I 

Americans and Philippine Scouts served as 

instructors, and the students consisted of the 

cadres of the infantry elements of the divisions, regimental and battalion staffs, com2. Memo, CofS for Secretary of War (SW), n.d., 

sub: Reinforcement of the Philippines, OCS 18136-

124; memo, Col Joseph K. Evans, Chief, SE Asia 

Sec, for Maj Thomas R. Clarkin, SW Pacific Sec, 

OPD, 5 Aug 42, sub: US and ·PA Divs in Phil 

Campaign, OCMH; memo, Cal John R. Deane for 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, 7 Feb 42, OCS 18136-

232; intervs, author with numerous officers on the 

division and corps level who served in the Philippine 

<;ampaign. The author had been unable to find 

any strength reports of the Philippine Army by 

USAFFE after 31 October 1941. 

27 

pany commanders, platoon leaders, first 

sergeants, cooks, and company clerks. In 

addition to specialized training, each student took the basic infantry course.ao 

Coast artillery schools were established at 

Fort Mills (Corregidor) and Fort Wint 

(Grande Island), and field artillery cadres 

were trained at the Philippine Army training center at Camp Dau, near Fort Stotsenburg. Two engineer schools were established, with instructors from the 14th Engineer Regiment ( PS ), the engineer component of the Philippine Division. A signal 

and a medical school were organized at Fort 

William McKinley; a second medical 

school was established for the training of 

non divisional cadres; and in the port area 

of Manila was a quartermaster motor transport school. S1. 

The training of the Philippine Army was 

beset with numerous difficulties. In many 

units there was a serious language barrier, 

not only between the American instructors 

and the Filipinos but also among the Filipinos. The enlisted men of one division 

spoke the Bicolanian dialect, their Philippine officers usually spoke Tagalog, and the 

Americans spoke neither. 32 In the Visayas 

the problem was even more complicated 

since most of the officers were Tagalogs from 

central Luzon and the men spoke one or 

more of the many Visayan tongues. Transfers were made to alleviate the situation, but 

no real solution to the problem was ever 

found.ss 

3. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 3-4; interv, 

author with Brig Cen Clifford Bluemel, 14 Apr 

48, OCMH. General Bluemel comrnand~d the 31st 

Division (PA). 

"USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 8. 

32 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 6. 

sa Visayan-Mindanao Force (V-MF) Rpt of 

Opns, p. 17, Annex XI, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of 

Opns. 
28 

Discipline in Philippine Army units left 

much to be desired, according to V.S. Army 

officers. V ntil war was declared there were 

no courts-martial. Since the Philippine 

Army retained its national integrity after 

induction, Philippine Army headquarters 

was responsible for discipline and punishment. Many of the officers and noncommissioned officers were untrained and unqualified for their assignments. There 

were some first sergeants and company 

clerks who could neither read nor write. 

Training facilities and equipment were 

almost nonexistent. Target ranges had 

been hurriedly improvised but many units 

went into battle without ever having fired 

their weapons. There was a serious shortage in almost all types of equipment. The 

clothing was old and much of it not fit for 

use; shoes were rubber soled and quickly 

wore out. The uniform usually consisted 

of the blue fatigue suit, and when that wore 

out, anything that could be found. There 

were serious shortages in personal equipment, blankets, mosquito bars, and shelter 

halves. The supply of Enfield and Springfield '03 rifles was adequate but that of 

many other weapons, entrenching tools, gas 

masks, and steel helmets was not. After 

the outbreak of war, units secured supplies 

wherever and whenever they could, and the 

amount was usually dependent upon the 

initiative and energy of the individual supply officers.34 

The difficulties of mobilizing and training 

the Philippine Army can best be shown by 

following the experiences of a single division. 

The 31st Division (PA) was organized on 

18 November at a camp near San Marcelino 

.. Ibid., pp. 17-20; SLF and II Corps Rpt of 

Opns, pp. 6-7; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 

19-20. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

in Zambales Province, Luzon.S5 An American Army officer, Col. Clifford Bluemel, 

who had commanded the 45th Infantry 

(PS) and later the staff and command 

school at Baguio, was assigned as division 

commander with a staff consisting of Philippine Army and Scout officers. 

When the division was organized, its 

camp was still under construction. The 

buildings were about 80 percent complete, 

and in the absence of a water system a few 

shallow wells were used. Work on sanitary 

installations had just begun. 

One of the division's regiments, the 31st 

Infantry (P A), had been mobilized on 

1 September and was already in camp when 

Colonel Bluemel arrived. The 32d Infantry had been inducted on 1 November but 

did not join the division until 6 December. 

Starting on 25 November the third infantry 

element of the division, the 33d Infantry, 

began arriving in camp. Between 18 and 

30 November, the medical battalion, motor 

transport, service, and division headquarters companies were mobilized. The signal 

company was organized on 1 December 

when a cadre which had been in training 

at Fort McKinley for three months arrived 

at camp. The 31 st Field Artillery Regiment began mobilizing on 12 December, 

after the outbreak of war, and was finally 

organized with two battalions on 26 December, after the division had already 

moved to Bataan. 

The 31st Division, like the other Philippine Army divisions, suffered from shortages in personal and organizational equipIS This account is drawn from the Report of General Bluemel on the 31st Division Philippine Army. 

It was borrowed from the author and a copy is on 

file in OCMH. Cited hereafter as Bluemel, 31st 

Div (PA) Rpt of Opns. 
U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST 

ment. Every man was equipped with a 

rifle, the .3D-caliber Enfield rifle used by 

American troops in World War 1. The 

stock was too long for the small Philippine 

soldier and the weak extractor often broke 

and could not be replaced. Of the other 

infantry weapons, there was one Browning 

automatic rifle for each infantry company 

and eight .30-caliber Browning watercooled machine guns for each machine gun 

company. Each infantry regiment had two 

.SO-caliber machine guns and six 3-inch 

trench mortars, 70 percent of the ammunition for which proved to be duds. Artillery equipment for the division consisted 

of eight W orId War I model 7S-mm. guns 

which were delivered to the division on the 

evening of 7 December, without sights Or 

fire control equipment. The 31 st Field Artillery, therefore, could only organize two of 

the six firing batteries it was authorized. 

Organic transportation was virtually 

nonexistent. Division headquarters and 

the motor transport company could muster 

only one sedan, one command car, one 

bantam car; one 1 Y2-ton truck and one 

Y2-ton truck. The 31st Infantry had only 

one command car and eight 1 Y2-ton trucks, 

which was more than the other regiments 

had. The division was deficient also in 

communications and engineer supplies, 

office equipment, spare parts, and tools. 

The personal equipment of the Philippine soldier in the 31 st Division left much 

to be desired. His unifonn consisted of 

shorts, short-sleeved shirt, and cheap canvas shoes with a rubber sole that wore out 

in about two weeks. Some of the men were 

fortunate enough to draw leather shoes. 

For wannth and protection against mosquitoes, the Filipino wore his blue fatigue uniform. There were no surplus stocks for is29 

sue or replacement. The division received 

no steel helmets, but did have gas masks. 

Rations were purchased by the individual organizations with funds furnished the 

unit commanders by the Philippine Army. 

Zambales Province, where the 31 st Division 

was located, did not produce enough food 

for its own needs, and as additional units 

joined'the division the procurement of food 

became a difficult problem. The division 

railhead scheduled to open on 1 December 

did not begin operations until a week later, 

after the war had started, because of the inexperience of Filipino supply officers. 

The training program of the division 

began theoretically on 1 September, when 

the 31 st Infantry was mobilized, but it was 

not until 24 November that the men first 

fired their rifles on the target range at the 

Olongapo Naval Station. One battalion 

fired fifty rounds per man, and another 

twenty-five rounds. The third battalion 

never fired at all, for permission to use the 

range was withdrawn by the Navy when the 

4th Marine Regiment arriving from China, 

was stationed at Olongapo. No other 

range was available for the division, and the 

one under construction was not completed 

when war came. 

The men in the 31st Infantry were more 

fortunate than those in the other regiments, 

many of whom never even fired a rifle before entering combat. Nor had their previous five and a half months' training under 

Philippine Anny supervision been of much 

value, according to Colonel Bluemel. Practically none of the men, he observed, had 

fired as many as five rounds with the rifle or 

the .3D-caliber machine gun. None had 

fired the .50-caliber-machine gun or the 

mortar. Bluemel's judgment of the value of 

the early training program was borne out 
30 

by the experience of other Philippine Army 

division commanders.36 

The field artillery units received even less 

training than the infantry. As soon as the 

two batteries were organized, they fired two 

rounds per gun. Most of the men had never 

fired a 75-mm. gun and many had never 

even seen one fired. The engineer battalion 

had been constructing a road since its arrival in camp and received no other training. The cadre of the signal company was 

commanded by a Filipino who had received 

inadequate training at Fort McKinley. 

36 In addition to General Bluemel's report, see 

Col. Clyde A. Selleck, Notes on the 7lst Division, 

pp. 2-8, and Col. Ray M. O'Day, History of the 

21st Division (PA), 2 vols., 1,1-5. Colonel Selleck 

commanded the 71st Division (PA) and Colonel 

O'Day was the senior American instructor with the 

21st Division (PA). Both documents were borrowed from the authors and copies are on file in 

OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

This man, who was to be division signal 

officer, was unable to establish radio communication with units a mile away in the 

same camp. 

All officers in the division, with few exceptions, were Filipinos with little or no 

knowledge of tactics or of the method of 

training troops for combat. In some cases, 

their understanding of English was inadequate. As the war progressed, it became 

necessary to replace many of the Filipino 

battalion commanders with American officers. The enlisted men seemed to the division commander to be proficient in only 

two things: "one, when an officer appeared, 

to yell attention in a loud voice, jump up 

and salute; the other, to demand 3 meals 

per day." 37 

37 Bluemel, 31st Div(PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 4. 
CHAPTER III 

The Reinforcement of 

the Philippines 

When General MacArthur assumed command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, 

there was no program in the War Department for any immediate large-scale reinforcement of the Islands. As a matter of 

fact, the War Department specifically tol<;1 

MacArthur that he could have "no additional forces, except approximately 400 reserve officers to assist in training the Philippine Army.· ... " 1 Within a few days, 

there was a complete reversal of policy in 

the War Department. The first sign of 

this change came on 31 July when General 

Marshall approved a proposal by the War 

Plans Division to reinforce the Islands' defense "in view of the possibility of an attack." 2 The next day MacArthur was informed that he would receive substantial reinforcements and Marshall told his immediate staff, "It was the policy of the 

United States to defend the Philippines." 

This statement so impressed the Chief of the 

War Plans Division that he entered it in 

his office diary.3 

The reasons for this change of policy are 

nowhere explicitly stated. Undoubtedly 

'Rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 1712,28 Jul 

41, OCS 18136-39. 

2 Memo, WPD for CofS, 31 Jul 41, sub: Additional Armament for Phil, OCS 18812-61. 

3 Gen Gerow's Off Diary, entry of 31 Jul 41, 

OPD Exec 0; rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 1197, 

31 Jul 41, AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf 

for USAFFE. 

many factors both political and military contributed to the American Government's 

firm stand in July and August 1941. One 

of these was recognition of the potentialities 

of air power and especially of the Army's 

new heavy bomber, the B-17, called the 

Flying Fortress. In Stimson's opinion, the 

success of B-17 operations in Europe was 

responsible for creating an optimistic view 

in the War Department that the Philippines 

could be successfully held. 4 A striking force 

of such heavy bombers, it was argued, would 

act as a deterrent to Japanese advances 

southward and would strengthen the United 

States position in the Far East. 

Another cause for optimism was the recall 

of General MacArthur to active duty. No 

one knew as much as he about the. Philippines and no one believed more completely 

that it could be held if the Japanese allowed 

sufficient time for reinforcement. 

The possibility of establishing an effective 

defense against Japan in the Philippines 

and thereby preventing Japanese domination of the Western Pacific without altering 

the major lines of strategy already agreed 

upon "had the effect," Stimson said, "of 

making the War Department a strong proponent of maximum delay in bringing the 

4 Henry L. Stimsol). and McGeorge Bundy, On 

Active Service in Peace and War (New York: 

Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 388. 
32 

Japanese crisis to a climax. . . . In their 

[Stimson's and Marshall's] eyes the Philippines suddenly acquired a wholly new importance and were given the highest priority on all kinds of military equipment." 5 

Ground Forces 

The first official War Department program for a large-scale reinforcement of the 

Philippines during this period was proposed 

by War Plans on 14 August. In a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, General 

Gerow argued that those reasons which had 

limited the size of the Philippine garrisonlack of funds, personnel, and equipment, 

plus the inability of the Navy to support a 

large force-were no longer entirely valid. 

"Vith its present strength, he pointed out, 

there was a real doubt if the Philippine garrison could resist a Japanese attack, a contingency which he considered probable in 

view of Japan's attitude. To strengthen 

the garrison and increase its chances of holding Luzon and especially Manila Bay, General Gerow recommended that the Philippines be reinforced by antiaircraft artillery, 

modern combat planes, and tanks. The 

amount that could be sent, Gerow admitted, 

would be limited by the number of ships 

available for transport duty to the Far East. 

"The best that can be done at the moment," 

therefore, would be "to adopt a definite plan 

of reinforcement and carry it forward as 

availability of shipping permits." 6 

Gerow's recommendations were approved and two days later, on 16 August, 

General MacArthur was notified that the 

following units would sail from San Francisco between 27 August and 5 September: 

• Ibid., pp .. 388-89. 

6 Memo, Gerow for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Reinf 

of Phil, WPD 3251-55. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) 

consisting of 76 officers and 1,681 enlisted 

men; the 194th Tank Battalion (less Company B), with 54 tanks, 34 officers, and 390 

enlisted men; and one company (155 men) 

of the 17th Ordnance Battalion. 7 

There hid been some mention earlier of 

the possibility of sending a division to the 

Philippines, and on 5 September the Chief 

of Staff asked MacArthur if he wanted a 

National Guard division (probably the 

418t) . M acArth ur replied that he did not 

need this division since he already had one 

U.S. Army division (the Philippine Division) and was mobilizing ten Philippine 

Army divisions. He asked instead for authority to reorganize the theoretically 

square Philippine Division into a triangular division, adding, "Equipment and sup--

ply of existing forces are the prime essential." "I am confident if these steps are 

taken with sufficient speed," he said, "that 

no further major reinforcement will be 

necessary for accomplishment of defense 

mission." 8 

The reinforcement of the Philippines 

now enjoyed the highest priority in the 

"Var Department. MacArthur's request 

for permission to reorganize the Philippine 

Division was approved immediately. He 

was promised additional aircraft as well as 

the funds needed for airfield construction 

and the antiaircraft guns and equipment 

to protect the fields once they were built. 

"I have directed," wrote General Marshall, 

"that United States Army Forces in the 

T Rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 56,16 Aug 41; 

memo Brig Gen Harry L. Twaddle for TAG, 15 

Aug 4'1, sub: Augmentation of Phil Dept. Both in 

AG 370.5 (8-1-41), Part I. 

• Rads Marshall to MacArthur, No. 121, 5 Sep 

41 and MacArthur to Marshall, No. 277, 7 Sep 41, 

both in AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for 

USAFFE. 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 33 

Philippines be placed in highest priority 

for equipment including authorized defense reserves for fifty thousand men." 9 

As a result, General MacArthur's requests for men and supplies during the next 

few months received almost instant approval by the War Department. "I wish 

to express my personal appreciation for the 

splendid support that you and the entire 

War Department have given me along 

every line since the formation of this command," he told the Chief of Staff in a personal letter. "With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid." 10 

Through no fault of the War Department or a lack of desire on the part of the 

Chief of Staff, General MacArthur's confidence in the rapid development of an adequate defense for the Philippines was not 

entirely justified. The task was a heavy 

one and limited by many factors beyond 

the control of the military. The industrial 

capacity of the United States was only just 

beginning to turn to the production of war 

material; the needs of a rapidly expanding 

citizen army had to be met; Great Britain 

and Russia were in critical need of supplies; 

and shipping space was extremely limited. 

The reinforcements promised MacArthur on 16 August were dispatched with 

the greatest speed and by 12 September 

General Marshall was able to report considerable progress. The antiaircraft artillery 

regiment, the tank battalion of 54 tanks, 

and reserve supplies had already been 

shipped from San Francisco. During the 

month, 50 more tanks, and 50 self-pro9 Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 137, 9 Sep 

41, AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for 

USAFFE. 

10 Memo, CofS for President, 9 Sep 41, OCS 

18136-48. 

pelled mounts for 75-mm. guns were to be 

sent.ll 

These reinforcements reached MacArthur before the end of September. The 

arrival of the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) gave him 12 additional 3-inch 

guns, 24 37-mm. guns, and a similar number of machine guns. Armored reinforcement consisted of the 192d and 194th Tank 

Battalions each with 54 tanks. And he 

could count on 25 more 75-mm. guns on 

self-propelled mounts (SPM) already en 

route and due to arrive in Manila on 15 

October.'2 

The arrival of the two tank battalions 

with their 108 light tanks, M-3, were a welcome addition to the Philippine garrison. 

On 21 November a Provisional Tank 

Group consisting of the 192d and 194th 

Tank Battalions and the 17th Ordnance 

Company (Armored) was established, with 

Col. James R. N. Weaver in command. 

As Military Advisor, MacArthur had proposed a plan to protect the inland seas by 

emplacing heavy coastal guns at the entrance to the key straits leading into these 

waters. The War Department had approved this plan and sent 24 155-mm. guns 

(without fire control equipment) to the 

Philippine Commonwealth to carry out this 

program, scheduled for completion in April 

1942. MacArthur now proposed to extend 

this plan to include northern Luzon and 

asked the War Department for 4 12-inch 

and 4 8-inch railway guns, 22 more 155-

mm. guns, and 30 searchlights. When em11 Memo, Marshall for Stark, 12 Scp 41, OCS 

18136-56-1/2. 

12 Memo, Gerow for SW, 2 Oct 41, sub: Personnel and Supplies for Phil, OCS 18136-70; memo, 

Brig Gcn George F. Moore for CofS, 28 Oct 41, 

sub: Shipment of Tanks and SPM's, OCS 18136-

65B; intcrv, author with Brig Gen Charles G. Sage, 

formerly CO 200th CA, 28 Feb 51. 
34 

placed, he argued, these guns would present 

an enemy advancing on Manila with "fixed 

position gunfire, the lightest of which will 

be of sufficient proportions to interfere with 

troop landings and the operations of lightly 

armored vessels." 13 The letter was received 

in Washington at the beginning of December, too late to result in action.14 

General MacArthur's request for authority to reorganize the Philippine Division as 

a triangular division had been readily 

granted. To accomplish this reorganization, MacArthur said he needed an infantry 

regiment, a field artillery headquarters and 

headquarters battery, two field artillery battalions, a reconnaissance troop, and a military police platoon for the division. 15 The 

·War Department agreed to provide these 

units and the staff began the detailed work 

necessary to select and ship them. 

MacArthur's plans for the Philippine Division were explained in a letter he wrote to 

the Chief of Staff on 28 October. He 

wished, he said, to have the division at war 

strength and trained intensively for combat. "It would be impolitic," he thought, 

"to increase the number of Philippine Scouts 

above the authorized 12,000, for all recruits 

would be taken from Philippine Army reservists to serve at higher rates of pay than 

the Philippine Army can pay." The only 

way, then, to increase the strength of the 

division was to secure an additional infantry regiment and two battalions of artillery 

from the United States. With these units 

and the American 31st Infantry, he could 

form two American combat teams in the 

13 Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 17 Nov 41, WPD 

3251-69. 

"Ltr, Marshall to MacArthur, - Dec 41 (not 

sent), WPD 4477-2. 

15 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 354, 17 Sep 

41, AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for 

USAFFE. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Philippine Division. The Scouts thus rele~sed could be used to bring the 91st and 

92d Coast Artillery Regiments of the Harbor 

Defenses up to strength, retain several small 

units already in existence, and provide station complements for Forts McKinley and 

Stotsenburg. The Philippine Division 

would then be free to train for combat and 

would be available "for instant use." "The 

entire plan," he told General Marshall, 

"will be placed in effect upon the arrival of 

the new regiment." 16 

MacArthur's plans included also the establishment of four major tactical commands, directly subordinate to USAFFE. 

On 2 October he requested authority, which 

was readily granted, to activate a headquarters and headquarters company for each 

"with average strength approximately those 

of Army Corps." 17 He also asked for army 

and corps troops to establish a balanced 

force, and for a field artillery brigade, a 

chemical company, three signal battalions, 

a medical supply depot, and a military police company, all at full strength and with 

complete organization and individual equipment. By the end of October he had requested almost 12,000 men: for the Philippine Division, 209 officers and 4,881 enlisted men; for army and corps troops, 340 

officers and 6,392 enlisted men. 

During the next month MacArthur continued to ask for additional units and individual specialists, and by the middle of November the War Department had approved 

for transfer to Manila 1,312 officers, 25 

nurses, and 18,047 enlisted men belonging 

to units. Individual specialists totaled 200 

officers and 2,968 enlisted men. The units 

1. Ltr, MacArthlu to Marshall, 28 Oct 41, WPD 

4477-2. 

11 Rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 465, 2 Oct 41, 

AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf of USAFFE. 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 35 

selected for this overseas movement, including the 34th Infantry for the Philippine 

Division, were scheduled for shipment, first 

for January 1942, but later, ironically, on 

8 December 1941.18 

These reinforcements and supplies were 

all intended for the regular U.S. Army establishment; requisitions for the Philippine 

Army were made and considered separately. 

His plan of induction had hardly been completed when MacArthur began to request 

from the War Department large amounts 

of supplies for his Philippine troops. During August alone he called for 84,SOO 

Garand rifles (M 1), 330 .30-caliber machine guns, 326 .SO-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, 4S0 37-mm. guns, 217 81-mm. 

mortars, 288 7S-mm. guns with high-speed 

adapters, and over 8,000 vehicles of all types 

for the ten Philippine Army divisions he 

planned to mobilize.19 On 18 September 

he was told that because of lend-lease commitments and production schedules it would 

not be possible to send most of these items. 

Especially unwelcome was the news that 

Garand rifles were not available and that 

the Philippine Army divisions would have 

to continue to use the Enfield and '03's with 

which they were equipped. 20 

MacArthur nevertheless continued to 

request equipment for the Philippine Army, 

asking, on 10 September, for 12S,000 steel 

18 Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Oct 41, WPD 

4477-2; rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 354, 17 

Sep 41, and memo, Twaddle for CofS, 4 Nov 41, 

sub; Reinf for Phil Dept, both in AG 320.2 (7-28-

41) Orgn and Reinf for USAFFE. 

19 Rads, MacArthur to TAG, Nos. 122,184, and 

236, dated 15, 23, and 28 Aug 41, AG 400 (8-12-

41) Supplies and Equip for USAFFE. 

20 Rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 181, 19 Sep 

41, and ltr, TAG to CG USAFFE, 23 Sep 41, sub: 

Supplies for Phil Army and Phil Dept, both in AG 

400 (8-12-41) Supplies and Equip for USAFFE. 

helmets, as well as chemical, engineer, and 

signal equipment. A month later, the request for the helmets was approved. They 

would be shipped immediately and the 

other equipment would be shipped at a 

later date. 21 

Since the Philippine Army was not limited in size by law as was the U.S. Aimy, 

MacArthur was in the unique position of 

being able to raise as many troops as the 

War Department could equip. On 20 

September he asked for "complete organizational equipment" for a number of army 

and corps units to be formed principally 

of Philippine Army personnel. Included 

were 2 155-mm. and 3 105-mm. howitzer 

regiments, a motorized battalion of 155-mm. 

guns, 3 antitank gun battalions, and service, 

signal, and medical units.22 These requests 

were approved and a shipping schedule 

established. 

Most disturbing was the shortage of light 

artillery and machine guns in the Philippine Army divisions. By the end of September the Philippine Army had only 48 

75-mm. guns. At least 240 were required 

to equip the artillery regiments of the ten 

reserve divisions and another 36 for field 

artillery training centers. Also needed were 

37 -mm. guns for the antitank battalions 

and .50-caliber machine guns. Realizing 

that the supply of these guns was limited, 

MacArthur expressed a willingness to accept as substitutes obsolete models or 

smaller weapons. "Strongly recommend," 

he appealed to the Chief of Staff, "improvisation to the extent of providing substi21 Memo, Actg ACofS for TAG, 6 Oct 41, sub: 

Issue of Equip to USAFFE, G-4 27573-18. 

22 Rad, CG USAFFE to TAG, No. 378, 20 Sep 

41, AG 400 (8-12-41) Supplies and Equip for 

USAFFE. 
36 

tute arrangement in spite of lowered efficiency for any types available in the United 

States." 23 

By mid-November, the War Department 

had taken action to ship 40 105-mm. 

howitzers to the Philippines. These 

weapons were to be given to U.S. Army 

units and would release to Philippine Army 

units a like number of 75's. In addition, 

10 75-mm. pack howitzers were to be taken 

from the vital Canal Zone and 48 British 

75-mm. guns and 123 .30-caliber machine 

guns from the equally important Hawaiian 

garrison for the Philippine Islands, an indi~ 

cation of the importance which the defense 

of the archipelago had acquired in the eyes 

of the War Department. From the United 

States itself would come 130 75-mm. guns, 

35 37-mm. guns (M1916) and 14 .30-caliber machine guns.24 

No action was taken until October to 

supply the thousands of vehicles MacArthur had requested. During that month 

a large number of jeeps, ambulances, trucks, 

and sedans became available and on the 

15th the War Department released these 

vehicles for the Philippine Army, "subject 

to the availability of shipping." 25 A request for clothing for the Philippine Army 

was also approved, as was the equipment 

for ten 250-bed station hospitals and 180 

23 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 430, 27 Sep 

41, AG 400 (8-12-41) Supplies and Equip for 

USAFFE. 

.. Rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 506, 12 Nov 

41; memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Nov 41, sub: Machine Guns, 37-mm. Guns and 75-mm. Guns for 

Ten Phil Army Div; rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, 

No. 541, 15 Nov 41. All in AG 400 (8-12-41) 

Supplies and Equip for USAFFE. 

25 Ltr, TAG to QMG, 15 Oct 41, sub: Issue of 

Equip to USAFFE, AG 400 (8-12-41) Supplies 

and Equip for USAFFE. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

sets of regimental infirmary equipment.26 

An early requisition for 500,000 C rations 

and enough 55-gallon drums to hold 

1,000,000 gallons of gasoline was filled during the summer. Strangely enough, the 

drums arrived filled although the gasoline 

had not been requested. This unexpected 

windfall proved extremely fortunate. A 

large portion of the gasoline was stored on 

Bataan and was most welcome during the 

campaign.27 

The approval of requisitions and orders 

for shipment did not result in any immediate 

increase in the supplies of the Philippine 

Army. Time was required to order the 

stocks from depots and factories, pack and 

ship them to the port of embarkation, find 

the vessels to transport them, and finally 

get them to the Islands. In September, the 

Navy began sending cruiser escorts with 

Army transports and merchant ships on 

their voyages between Hawaii and Manila. 

This procedure frequently meant that the 

transports had to stop at Honolulu, sometimes reload, and then sail west at a speed 

equal to that of the slowest vessel in the 

convoy. 

The shipment of supplies was dependent 

upon the number of cargo vessels available 

to the Army. This number was never large 

and the Navy, for a time, threatened even 

this limited supply. In September the Navy 

announced its intention to convert three 

transports to escort carriers. General Marshall protested this decision vigorously, 

.. Rad, QM USAFFE to TQMG, no number, 1 

Oct 41; memo, SGO for G-4, 9 Oct 41, sub: 

Medical Supplies and Equip for Phil Army; itr, 

TAG to SGO, 19 Nov 41, same sub. All in AGO 

400 (8-12-41) Supplies and Equip for USAFFE. 

21 QM Rpt of Opns, p. 4, Annex XIII, USAFFEUSFIP Rpt of Opns. 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 37 

pointing out to the Chief of Naval Operations that it would delay the delivery of 

much-needed reinforcements to MacArthur 

by over two months. 28 Despite the favorable outcome of this protest, a large backlog of troops and approximately 1,100,000 

tons of equipment destined for the Philippines had piled up in U.S. ports or depots by 

November. A group of shipping experts, 

including representatives from the War Department General Staff, Office of the Quartermaster General, the Navy, and Maritime 

Commission, met on 10 November to discuss ways of breaking the shipping block. 

As a result of this meeting a shipping schedule was established which recognized the 

priority of the Philippines over Hawaiian 

defenses and advanced the troop movements 

scheduled for mid-January to 17 and 20 December. Altogether, nine vessels were assigned to the Manila route, to sail in November and December. They would bring 

to MacArthur one light and one heavy bombardment group, a pursuit group, one 

reconnaissance squadron, a regiment of infantry, a brigade of field artillery, two battalions of light artillery, together with 

ground and air service units.29 Had these 

vessels, the last of which was to leave the 

United States on 20 December, reached the 

Philippines the Japanese would have faced 

a far stronger force when they landed on 

Luzon. 

Air Forces 

In July 1941 the air force in the Phili ppines was still a token force, unable to 

withstand "even a mildly determined and 

ill-equipped foe." 30 Air Corps headquar-

.. Memo, Marshall for Stark, 25 Sep 41, sub: 

Conversion of Troop Transports, OCS 17396-56B. 

.. Memo, Gerow for ASW, 10 Nov 41, sub: Shipping for Phil, OCS 18136-121. 

ters in Washington had been urging for 

some time that additional planes be sent to 

the Philippines and the Joint Board, early 

in 1940, had proposed an increase in air 

strength for the island garrison.31 The following July 1941 Maj. Gen. Henry H. 

Arnold, chief of the newly created Army Air 

Forces, came forward 'With the strongest 

proposal yet made for the reinforcement of 

the Philippines. This proposal called for 

the transfer to the Philippines of four heavy 

bombardment groups, consisting of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit 

groups of 130 planes each.32 These planes, 

wrote Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, chief of the 

Air Staff, would not be used for an offensive 

mission, but to maintain "a strategical defensive in Asia,sa 

General Arnold's recommendations, approved in August, were not easily carried 

out. 34 To have raised that number of 

planes in the summer of 1941 would have 

meant stripping the fields in the United 

States as well as all other overseas bases. 

Moreover, many of the heavy bombers were 

still on the production lines. What could 

be scraped together was shipped immediately and by mid-August General Gerow re-

•• Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The 

Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and 

Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942 

(Chicago, 1948), I 77. 81 Mark Skinner Watson, The Office of the Chief 

of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950) p. 416. 

at Memo, Arnold, for CofS, 19 Jul 41, cited in 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, I, 178. 

33 Memo, Spaatz for Maj Gen George H. Brett, 

26 Aug 41, cited in Army Air Action in Phil and 

NEI, p. 12. 

,. MacArthur on 31 July had already been told 

of plans to send him a squadron of B-17's. Rad, 

TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 1197, 31 Jul 41, AG 

320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for USAFFE. 
38 

ported to the Chief of Staff that thirty-one 

modern fighters of the P-40 type were on 

their way. Meanwhile General Arnold 

made arrangements to send fifty more directly from the factory. These, too, were 

soon on their way and by 2 October had 

arrived in the Philippines.:!:> 

Some weeks earlier a historic flight of 

nine Flying Fortresses had reached Manila 

by air. These planes were part of the 19th 

Bombardment Group (H), which had been 

selected for transfer to the Far East. Mter 

a flight from Hamilton Field near San Francisco, the Group's 14th Squadron, under 

Maj. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., left Hickam 

Field in Hawaii on 5 September for Clark 

Field via Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, 

and Darwin. This pioneering 10,OOO-mile 

flight, almost all of it over water, was successfully concluded a week later, establishing the fact that the Philippines could be 

reinforced by air.B6 But the Midway-Wake 

route could not be considered safe in the 

event of war with Japan since it passed over 

the mandated islands and work was begun 

after October to develop a South Pacific 

ferry route.37 

.. Memo, Gerow for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Reinf 

of Phil, WPD 3251-55; rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, 

No. 56, 16 Aug 41, and memo, Twaddle for TAG, 

15 Aug 41, sub: Augmentation of Phil Dept, both 

in AG 370.5 (8-1-41» 'Part I; memo, CofS for 

Stark, 12 Sep 41, OCS 18136-56-1/2; memos, 

Gerow for SW, 2 Oct and 10 Nov 41, subs: Personnel and Supplies for Phil and Shipping for Phil, 

OCS 18136-70 and 121. 

.. The arrangements made for this flight and the 

details of the trip are described in Army Air Action 

in Phil and NEI, pp. 12-20. A readable account of 

the flight can be found in Walter D. Edmonds, 

They Fought With What They Had (Boston, 1951), 

pp. 1-13. 

,. For a full discussion of this important route, 

which later became the chief link between the 

United States and New Zealand and Australia, 

see Development of the South Pacific Air Route, 

AAF Hist Study 45, Air University Hist Off. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Once the pioneering flight had been successfully concluded, all heavy bombers sent 

to the Philippines went by air via the Central Pacific route. On 9 September, General Marshall told MacArthur that two 

additional squadrons of the 19th Groupthe 30th and 93d-would leave the next 

month. At that time the ground echelon 

of the two squadrons and the headquarters 

sailed from San Francisco. The air echelon 

of twenty-six B-17's followed soon after. 

By 22 October these planes had arrived at 

Hickam Field in Hawaii. After a short 

stopover they flew on to Clark Field where 

all but two reported on 4 November; the 

other two followed soon after. 

The flight of the 30th and 93d Squadrons 

was one in a scheduled series which called 

for the shipment of 33 heavy bombers in 

December, 51 in January 1942, and 46 

more in February. By March 1942 the 

War Department planned to have 165 

heavy bombers in the Philippines. 88 

Scheduled for shipment after the 19th 

Bombardment Group was the 7th. The 

ground echelon reached Hawaii late in November and was held there until naval escort could be secured. The air echelon, 

scheduled to fly to the Philippines via the 

Midway route during late November and 

early December, had completed only the 

first leg of the journey before war came.89 

In addition to heavy bombers, MacArthur was also promised a light bombardment group of three combat squadrons. 

Selected for shipment was the 27th Bomas Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, pp. 24, 

29. Estimated production of B-I7's and B-24's 

for the period was 220 aircraft, thus demonstrating 

the importance which the War Department attached to the defense of the Philippines at this 

time. 

.. Ibid. 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 39 

bardment Group (L). The Air Corps experienced some difficulty in securing the 52 

A-24's for this group but by early November the planes had been collected. The 

pilots and ground personnel reached the 

Philippines during November but the A24's, loaded on a separate transport, were 

held at Hawaii with the ground echelon of 

the 7th Bombardment Group and failed to 

reach their destination.40 

At the end of November General Marshall summarized for the Secretary of War 

the air reinforcements already shipped or 

scheduled for shipment to the Philippines. 

At that time, he noted, there· were 35 

B-I7's already in the Islands and 52 A-24's 

were due there-they never arrived-on 

the 30th. Fifty P-40's had reached MacArthur in September, Marshall explained 

to Stimson, thus giving him a total of 81 

modern fighters. In addition, 24 P-40's 

had left San Francisco on 19 October, and 

40 more on 9 November. By 31 December, 

General Marshall estimated, the Philippines should have a total of 240 fighters of 

the latest type!! 

By now the War Department was fully 

committed to an all-out effort to strengthen 

the air defense of the Philippines. General 

Arnold, in a letter to the commander of the 

Hawaiian Air Force on 1 December, expressed this view when he wrote: "We must 

"Ibid. 

<1 Memo, Marshall for SW, 25 Nov 41, sub: 

Reinf of Phil, OCS 18136-124. A detailed account of the air reinforcements sent to the Philippines can be found in Army Air Action in Phil and 

NEI, Chs. I and II. A condensation of this account has been published in Craven and Cate, The 

Army Air Forces in World War 11, I, 175-85. 

For training and state of readiness of the Far East 

Air Force, see Edmonds, They Fought With What 

They Had, pp. 43-56. 

get every B-17 available to the Philippines 

as soon as possible." 42 His statement was 

not an exaggeration. On the outbreak of 

war there were 913 U. S. Army aircraft 

scattered among the numerous overseas 

bases. This number of aircraft included 

61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers and 636 fighters. More than half of 

the total of heavy bombers and one sixth of 

the fighters were already in the Philippines.43 (See Table 3.) Within a few 

months this number would have been 

raised considerably. 

The arrival of the bombers and additional pursuit planes, with the promise of 

more to come, led to a reorganization of 

the air forces in the Philippines. Early in 

the fall of 1941 General MacArthur had 

asked for Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, a 

senior air officer, as his air commander. 

This request was approved and early in 

October Brereton was relieved of command 

of the Third Air Force and called to Washington. There, in a series of conferences at 

Army Air Force headquarters, the form of 

a new air organization, to be called the Far 

East Air Force, was drawn up." 

General Brereton arrived in the Philippines on 3 November. He saw MacArthur 

that same day, and gave him the latest 

views about reinforcements and developments within the War Department. By 

the middle of the month the reorganization 

of the air forces had been accomplished and 

a short time later MacArthur told Marshall, 

.. Ltr, Arnold to Maj Gen Frederick L. Martin, 

1 Dec 41, quoted in Craven and Cate, The Army 

Air Forces in World War 11, I, 193. 

.. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War 11, I, 193; Army Air Forces in the War 

Against Japan, 1941-1942, (HQ AAF, 1945), pp. 

2 ff. 

.. Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 31. 
AIRCRAFT IN THE PHILIPPINES, DECEMBER 1941 

Douglas B-18A 

Martin B-lOB 

Republic P-3.5 
AIRCRAFT IN THE PHILIPPINES, DECEMBER 1941 

Boeing B-1 7D 

Curtiss P-40E 

Boeing P-26A 
42 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

TABLE 3-AIRCRAFT IN PHILIPPINES AND "Brereton has taken hold in an excellent 

HAWAII, 1 DECEMBER 1941 manner." 45 

Type and Model Philip· Hawaii pines 

Bombers: 

B-17C' 35 12 

B-17D' 

B-18A 18 33 

A-20A • I 

0 12 

A-27 9 0 

B-lOB 12 0 

Fighters: 

P-40C' 0 12 

P-40B a 0 87 

P-40E b 107 39 

P-36A 0 14 

P-26A 16 0 

P-35A 52 0 

Misc. (Incl. Obsn, Cargo, 24 

etc.) 34 22 

TOTAL 277 231 

• Modern combat aircraft. 

b There is disagreement in all sources on the figure of 107 

P-40's. Some writers place the figure at 90 and Walter D. 

Edmonds estimates that there were "only 54 first·line. combat· 

worthy fighter planes to throw against the Japanese on the 

morning of December 8." They Fotlght With What They 

Had, p. xii. 

SOtlrc.s: For the Philippines. memo. Gerow for CofS, -

Nov 41, sub: Airplanes in P. I., Inel I, 19 Nov 41, WPD 

3633·20, The P-4o strength is from memo, CofS for SW, 

2S Nov 41, sub: Reinf of Phil. OCS 18136·124; Craven and 

Cate, The Army Air Forces in Warld War II, I, 191-92. 

For Hawaii, Craven and Cate. The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, I, 171. 

The newly activated Far East Air Force, 

with headquarters at Nielson Field in Manila, included the V Bomber Command, the 

V Interceptor Command, and the Far East 

Service Command. The main element of 

the bomber command, led by Lt. Col. 

Eugene L. Eubank, was the 19th Bombardment Group with its thirty-five B-17's. 

Only two squadrons of the original group, 

the 30th and 93d, were in the Philippines. 

On 16 November, the 28th Squadron, a 

medium unit, was also assigned to the group 

and equipped with B-I7's and on 2 December the 14th Squadron joined the group. 

In addition to heavy units, the bomber command also contained the ground echelon of 

the 27th Bombardment Group, whose fiftytwo A-24's were delayed at Hawaii and 

never reached the Philippines.48 

The V Interceptor Command, first under 

Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett and later Col. 

Harold H. George, consisted initially of the 

24th Pursuit Group with the 3d, 17th, and 

20th Squadrons. When, in November, the 

.. Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brer.eton 

Diaries, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945 (New York: 

William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1946), p. 18; 

Itr, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Nov 41, WPD 

3489·21; USAFFE GO 28, 14 Nov 41, copy in 

History of the Fifth Air Forces (And Its Predecessors), App II, Doc 3, Air University Hist Off. 

.. Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings Before the Joint 

Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl HayborAttack (Washington, 1946), Part II,pp. 5317-

39. This source will be hereafter cited as the 

Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings. The Joint Committee hearings produced altogether 39 volumes, 11 

of which contain the hearings themselves and 18 

the exhibits presented during the course of the 

hearings. A separate volume, the 40th, contains 

both the majority and minority reports. 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 43 

21st and 34th Squadrons arrived in Manila, 

they were attached to the group, pending 

arrival of their own organization (which 

never arrived). The Interceptor Command was considerably modernized during 

the fall of 1941 and by 7 December all but 

one of its pursuit squadrons were equipped 

with P-40'S.47 

The prerequisites for an effective air force 

are not only modern and sufficiently numerous attack and interceptor aircraft, but 

adequate fields, maintenance and repair facilities, and the antiaircraft artillery and air 

warning service to defend these installations. The lack of fields in the Philippines 

was recognized early. Within eighty miles 

of Manila there were six fields suitable for 

pursuit planes and only one, Clark, for 

heavy bombers. Outside of Luzon were 

six additional Army fields, useful principally 

for dispersal. More were needed to base 

the large number of modern aircraft due to 

arrive before the end of the year. In August General MacArthur was allotted $2,-

273,000 for airfield development and in 

October $7,000,000 more. The largest 

part of these funds was to be expended on 

Luzon, at Nichols and Clark Fields, with 

auxiliary fields at Iba, on the Zambales 

coast west of Clark, and various points on 

northern Luzon.<8 

In mid-November. MacArthur decided 

to establish a heavy bomber base in northern Mindanao at Del Monte, which since 

September had had a strip capable of landing B-17's. This decision was based on 

the belief that heavy bombers on Luzon 

would be subject to attack and that they 

.. Anny Air Action in Phil and NEI, pp. 33, 43. 

.. Ibid., pp. 11, 22. 

should therefore be moved south, out of 

reach of the enemy. His plans, MacArthur 

told the Chief of Staff on 29 November, 

called ultimately for a b ... ,mber base in the 

Visayas, but until such a base was completed he expected to use the field at Del 

Monte.49 Work on Del Monte Field was 

rushed and by the beginning of December 

it was able to accommodate heavy bombers.50 

Despite the arrival of reinforcements and 

the airfield construction program, the ai r 

defense system remained inadequate because of the shortage of antiaircraft artillery and aircraft warning equipment. 

MacArthur had requested warning equipment in September and had at that time 

presented a plan for the establishment of 

an air warning service. The War Department had approved the project and by midSeptember three radar sets had been 

shipped with three more scheduled for shipment in October. In addition, $190,000 

was allotted for aircraft warning construction, with an additional $200,000 to be 

included in the supplemental estimate for 

the fiscal year 1942 for the construction of 

three detector stations and one information 

center. 

The one air warning service company of 

200 men in the Philippines was entirely 

inadequate to the needs of the Far, East Air 

Force. In November General Arnold recommended, and the Chief of Staff approved, the shipment of an aircraft warning 

.. Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Nov 41, WPD 

3489-21. 

50 Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 47; 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, I, 188; Edmonds, They Fought With What 

They Had, pp. 53-56 . 
44 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

CLARK FIELD looking westward. In the upper left center, abutting the foothills 

of the Zambales Mountains, lies Fort Stotsenburg. T he rectangular, tree-lined 

area is the parade ground. 

service battalion to the Philippines.51 The 

557 th Air Warning Battalion was organized in the United States and on 6 December 1941 arrived in San Francisco, too late 

for shipment to the Philippines. 

When war came there were seven radar 

sets in the Islands, but only two had been 

set up and were in operation. In the absence of the necessary equipment and personnel, USAFFE had organized a makeshift air warning service. Native air watchers stationed at strategic points reported 

plane movements by telephone or telegraph 

to the interceptor command at Nielson 

Field, which in turn relayed the information to Clark. It was this primitive system, 

", Memo, Spaatz for CofS, 13 Nov 41, sub: Equip 

for Phil AWS, OCS 18136-112. 

augmented by the radar sets established at 

Iba and outside Manila, that was in operation when war came. 52 

That other prerequisite for a balanced 

air force, antiaircraft artillery, was also 

slow in reaching the Far East. In the Islands when MacArthur assumed command 

was the 60th Coast Artillery (AA). In 

anticipation of heavy reinforcements he organized in August the Philippine Coast Artillery Command with Maj. Gen. George F. 

"Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 45; 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, I, 186. On the basis of interviews and 

other evidence, and despite the statement of the 

aircraft warning officer, Walter Edmonds concludes that only one set, the one at Iba, was in 

operation. They Fought With What They Had, 

p. 59n. 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 45 

Moore in command. Plans provided for an 

area defense of the four fortified islands in 

Manila Bay (Corregidor, EI Fraile, Caballo, and Carabao) and the southern tip 

of Bataan. One antiaircraft gun battery 

with a platoon of searchlights was stationed 

at Fort Wint in Subic Bay. When the 

200th Coast Artillery (AA) arrived in September it was ordered to Fort Stotsenburg 

to protect Clark Field. Both antiaircraft 

units were equipped with 3-inch and 

37-mm. guns, .50-caliber machine guns, 

and 60-inch Sperry searchlights. The 3-

inchers were an old model with a vertical 

range of 27,000 feet.53 

The two antiaircraft units alone obviously could not defend the fields of the rapidly growing Far East Air Force, let alone 

meet civilian defense requirements. Of 

necessity, therefore, the air defenses included only the Manila Bay area and Clark 

Field; all other installations were left virtually without defense against air attack. 

General Brereton was rightly concerned 

about the lack of antiaircraft defense and 

observed, even before he left Washington, 

that sending heavy bombers to the Philippines without providing proper antiaircraft 

protection would probably be suicide. But 

there was little that could be done in the 

short time available. Maj. Gen. Joseph A. 

Green, Chief of Coast Artillery, suggested 

that elements of the Harbor Defenses be reURad, TAG to CG USAFFE, No. 1197,31 Jul 

41, AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for 

USAFFE; Rpt of Phil CA Command and Harbor 

Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, pp. 1-10, 

Annex VIII, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns. 

An attempt was made after 7 December 1941 to 

provide the city of Manila with additional protection from air attack by splitting the 200th and 

forming another regiment, the 515th Coast Artillery 

(AA). 

assigned to antiaircraft duty, but the proposal was rejected. 54 

The War Department and the Air Forces 

continued to show concern over the antiaircraft defenses of the Islands, about which 

they did not have too clear a picture. A 

radio to General MacArthur for information elicited the reply on 27 November that 

an increase in armament was required and 

that detailed plans were being forwarded 

by mai1.55 These plans were sent on 1 December but even before then War Plans 

had recommended the dispatch of three 

antiaircraft regiments and two antiaircraft 

brigade headquarters to the Philippines. 

These units were to utilize the equipment 

then in the Islands, thus reducing shipping 

requirements. Action on this proposal was 

begun at the end of November, when time 

had almost run out. When war came, the 

antiaircraft defenses in the Philippines were 

little better than they had been three months 

earlier:'l6 

Naval Forces 

Naval forces assigned to the defense of 

the Philippines were organized into the U.S. 

Asiatic Fleet. Normally stationed in Asiatic 

waters, this fleet by mid-1941 was based in 

.. Memos, Green for CofS, 5 and 7 Nov 41, 

sub: AAA Defenses in Phil, AG 320.2 (7-28-41) 

Orgn and Reinf for USAFFE; Army Air Action in 

Phil and NEI, p. 44. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 991, 27 Nov 

41, AG 320.2 (7-28-41) Orgn and Reinf for 

USAFFE. 

M Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Dec 41, WPD 

3489-21; Itr, Gen Moore to CG USAFFE, 29 Nov 

41, sub: Modification of Armament, AG 320.2 (7-

28-41) Orgn and Reinf of USAFFE; memo, Gerow 

for CofS, 29 Nov 41, sub: AAA Personnel for 

Phil, WPD 4559-8. 

On 29 November permission was requested and 

secured to convert one battery of the 59th Coast 

Artillery (US) and two batteries of the 9Ist (PS) 

to antiaircraft. 
46 

Manila with headquarters in the Marsman 

Building. Admiral Thomas C. Hart commanded the fleet and reported direcdy to 

the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. The 16th Naval District headquarters was at Caviteon the south shore 

of Manila Bay. 

Hart's fleet consisted of the flagship, the 

heavy cruiser Houston; 1 light cruiser; 3 

destroyer divisions with 13 overage fourstack, flush-deck destroyers of World War I 

vintage; and 17 submarines. The underwater craft were organized into Submarine 

Squadron 20, supported by tenders and 1 

rescue vessel. Air elements of the fleet were 

under Patrol Wing 10, composed of 24 

PBY's and 4 seaplane tenders. Patrol and 

miscellaneous craft included 7 gunboats, 1 

yacht, 6 large minesweepers, 2 tankers, and 

1 ocean-going tug. Also a part of the fleet 

but stationed in Shanghai was the U.S. 

Marine Corps' regiment, the 4th Marines.51 

Obviously such a force was not capable 

of withstanding even momentarily the Japanese Combined Fleet, and Admiral Hart 

had authority to retire to bases in the Indian Ocean if necessary. From the small 

detachments of sailors in the 16th Naval 

District little more could be expected than 

assistance in protecting local naval installations. The 4th Marines could be of considerable help in the defense of the Philippines if it could be taken out of China in 

time. 

Although Allied naval forces in the Far 

East were not expected to provide direct 

support for the Philippine Islands in case of 

war with Japan, they would, if Japan attacked them, fight the common enemy. 

The British, in May 1941, had in Far EastOf Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 5, 26 May 

41, in Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 18, Exhibit 129, p. 2932. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ern waters 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 

4 heavy and 13 light cruisers, and a few 

destroyers. The Dutch could contribute 3 

light cruisers, 7 destroyers, and 15 submarines. By December of that year the 

British Fleet in the Far East had been augmented by 3 battleships and 3 destroyers.58 

The bulk of American naval strength in 

the Pacific was assigned to the Pacific Fleet. 

Before 1940 the main body of the Pacific 

Fleet had been based on the west coast of 

the United States. In May 1940 the Navy 

announced that the fleet, which had sailed 

to Hawaiian waters for war games, would 

be based at Pearl Harbor indefinitely. This 

decision had been made by President Roosevelt in the belief that the presence of the 

fleet would act as a deterrent to J apan. ~9 A 

year later the Pacific Fleet, now based at 

Pearl Harbor and commanded by Admiral 

Husband E. Kimmel, consisted of 9 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 12 heavy and 8 

light cruisers, 50 destroyers, 33 submarine.s, 

and 100 patrol bombers. The strength of 

this fleet was substantially the same on 7 

December 1941 when the attack on Pearl 

Harbor came. 60 

.. Ibid., Part 15, Exhibit 86, pp. 1901-06, and 

Exhibit 49 (The United States-British Staff Conversations report of 27 Mar 41), pp. 1485-1550. 

The short title of this second report is ABC-I. 

.. lbid., Part 16, Exhibit 106, pp. 2161-69; Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval 

Operations in World War 11, Vol. III, The Rising 

Sun.in the Pacific, 1931-Aprill942 (Boston, 1948), 

pp.56-58. 

.. Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 5, in Pearl 

Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 18, Exhibit 129, 

p. 2932. The vessels in the Southeast Pacific Force 

wert: added to those of the Pacific Fleet in these 

computations. These figures should be compared 

with those presented at the Joint Congressional 

Investigation and published in Part 15, Exhibit 86, 

pp. 1901-06. The latter figures show more light 

cruisers and destroyers than are listed in the RAINBOW plan. 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 47 

Although Admiral Hart had been told in 

May 1941 that he would receive no additional surface ships for his fleet, he was able 

to do much to put his force in readiness for 

action before the outbreak of war. Beginning in July, three to six PBY's maintained 

constant watch along the southern boundary 

of the archipelago and later linked with the 

Dutch Navy's air patrol north of Borneo. 

The mining of Manila and Subic Bays was 

pushed through to completion, in co-operation with the Army, by the end of August 

and provided security against all but submarines and shallow-draft surface craft. 

The Navy's base at Mariveles, on the southern tip of Bataan, was rapidly built up and 

on 22 }1,lly the drydock Dewey was moved 

there from Olongapo. By the end of the 

month the base at Olongapo was being used 

by the navy only as an auxiliary air base and 

as a station for Marines and some naval personnel.81 

In the six months before war the Asiatic 

Fleet was reinforced strongly in underwater 

craft. On 8 November 8 large submarines 

of the Pacific Fleet arrived in Manila and 

on the 24th 4 more, accompanied by the 

tender Holland, joined the fleet. Together 

with those already assigned, Admiral Hart 

now had 29 submarines.62 

The fleet was further reinforced in Septem~er by six motor torpedo boats, considered ideally suited for operation in Philippine waters. Twelve had been allocated 

but the remainder were :qever received. In 

addition, General MacArthur told Admiral 

Hart that he would mobilize the naval com-

~ Admiral Thomas C .. Hart, Narrative of Events, 

Asiatic Fleet Leading up to War and from 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942 (hereafter cited 

as Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet), pp. 

16-18 . 

.. Ibid., pp. 27,31. 

ponent of the Philippine Army, with its two 

motor torpedo boats, whenever Hart 

desired.63 

Early in November the Navy Department directed Hart to withdraw the 

marines and the gunboats from China, a 

move which the admiral had proposed earlier. Five of the gunboats made the trip 

from China to Manila successfully, leaving 

the Wake J stripped and ready for demolition-it was later seized by the Japaneseand the Tutuila for the Chinese. Two 

President liners were chartered and sent to 

Shanghai where the majority of the 4th 

Marines was stationed; the detachments at 

Pekin and Tientsin were to load at Chinwangtao. On 27 and 28 November the 

regiment, with attached naval personnel 

and civilian refugees, embarked on the two 

vessels for the Philippines. Arriving on 30 

November and 1 December, the regiment 

was assigned the mission of guarding the 

naval stations on Luzon, particularly the 

new base at Mariveles. One of the vessels, 

the President Harrison, started back to 

Chinwangtao to embark the remaining 

marines but fell into Japanese hands. With 

its weapons and equipment, and consisting 

of long service men and a full complement 

of regular officers, the 4th Marines 

(strength, 750 men) formed a valuable addition to the infantry force in the Islands.64 

.. Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Oct 41, WPD 

4477-2; William L. White, They Were Expendable 

(Cleveland, 1944), pp. 4-6. 

•• Hanson W, Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at 

Corregidor," in four parts, Marine Corps Gazette 

(November 1946-February 1947), Part 1, p. 14; 

Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 32-33; 

Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 155; Brig 

Gen Samuel L. Howard, Rpt on 4th Marines, Sep 

41-6 May 42, 26 Sep 45, USMC Hist Sec. This 

last report was written from memory and notes by 

Howard after his release from prison camp in 1945. 
48 

Summary 

In a letter prepared on 5 December 1941 

but never sent, General Marshall outlined 

for General MacArthur what had been and 

was being done to strengthen USAFFE. 

"Reinforcements and equipment already 

approved," he said, "require over 1,000,000 

ship tons." Fifty-five ships had already 

been obtained and approximately 100,000 

ship tons of supplies were en route, with 

twice this amount ready for immediate 

shipment to ports of embarkation. Requests for equipment for the Philippine 

Army, except those for the Ml rifle, had 

been approved, and uncontrolled items of 

supply were being shipped as rapidly as 

they could be assembled and loaded on 

ships. "Not only will you receive soon all 

your supporting light artillery [130 75-mm. 

guns]," Marshall told MacArthur, "but 48 

155-mm. howitzers and 24 155-mm. guns 

for corps and army artillery." Except for 

certain types of ammunition, the defense 

reServe for the U.S. Army forces in the 

Philippines would be completed in April 

1942, and for the Philippine Army by July 

of that year. Three semimobile antiaircraft artillery regiments were scheduled to 

leave the United States soon, but the 90-

mm. antiaircraft gun could not be sent 

since it had not yet been fully tested. A sum 

of $269,000,000 had been requested from 

Congress for the support of the Philippine 

Army, and early passage of such legislation 

was expected. "I assure you," Marshall 

closed, "of my purpose to meet to the fullest extent possible your recommendations 

for personnel and equipment necessary to 

defend the Philippines." 65 

.. Draft ltr, Marshall to MacArthur, -Dec 41 

(not sent), WPD 4477-2. Memorandum attached 

states letter was prepared 5 December, but WPD 

on 11 December recommended it not be sent. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The last vessels carrying supplies to the 

Philippines were assembled in convoy in 

Hawaii and on 7 December were still on 

the high seas. In the convoy were the 52 

dive bombers of the 27th Bombardment 

Group, 18 P-40's, 340 motor vehicles, 48 

75-mm. guns, 3,500,000 rounds of .30- and 

.50-caliber ammunition, 600 tons of bombs, 

9,000 drums of aviation fuel, and other 

heavy equipment and supplies. Also 

aboard were the two light field artillery battalions and the ground echelon of the 7th 

Bombardment Group (H). 

The military force in the Islands at the 

beginning of December, while not as large 

as MacArthur soon hoped to have, was considerably larger than it had been five months 

earlier. The air force had been reorganized, modem bombers and fighters had 

been brought in, and a start made on the 

creation of a balanced force. The strength 

of air force troops on 30 November was 

5,609, more than double the July strength. 

The Far East Air Force had more than 250 

aircraft, concentrated largely on Luzon. 

Less than half of these planes were suitable 

for combat, and much of the equipment was 

still in ports of embarkation. There were 

35 B-l7's at Clark Field and 107 P-40's at 

various fields on Luzon. A primitive aircraft warning system was in operation, and 

an antiaircraft artillery regiment was stationed at Clark Field. Much remained to be 

done, but the Philippines could boast a 

stronger air complement of modem combat 

aircraft on 7 December than any other base, 

including Hawaii and Panama. 

Naval forces assigned to the Asiatic Fleet 

had also been considerably strengthened. 

By 7 December this fleet consisted of 1 

heavy and 2 light cruisers, 13 old destroyers, 

32 PBY's, 6 gunboats, 6 motor torpedo 

boats, and miscellaneous vessels. Its 
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 49 

TABLE 4-STREKGTH A:-.1D COMPOSITION OF U.S. ARMY TROOPS IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 

30 NOVEMBER 1941 

I 

Unit I Total 

AOU"''' ...................................... ±, 

Hq USAFFE .............•.................... ·············· 

Hq and Hq Co Det Phil Dept. ............................. . 

Hq N Luzon Force ......................................... . 

Hq S Luzon Force ............................. ............ . 

Hq Visayao.Mindanao Force .................. ............. . 

Philippine Division ........................................ . 

26th Cavalry ........•...................................... 

43d Infantry ............................................... . 

86th FA Regt ........•...................................... 

88th FA Regt ........•...................................... 

808th MP Co .................................. · .......... . 

192d Tank Bn ...........•...............•........ ·.· ..... ·. 

194th Tank Bn ............................................ . 

200th CAAA .......••....................... ·············· 

Harbor Defenses .......................................... . 

Hq and Hq Blry ...................................•.... 

59th CA .........•..................................... 

60th CA .............................................. . 

91st CA ............................................... . 

92d CA ...............•................................ 

USAMP Harr;'on •..•..•......•......•..•............... 

Station Hospit.l.. •.••.••••••.•••••••••••••••••••.••.•.. 

Chemical Warfare net ............ ..................... . 

Air Corps ..... _ ........................................... . 

Far East Air Force ....... ............................. . 

Headquarters .......... , ............................... . 

4th Composite Group ............................. ..... . 

191h Bomb Group ..................................... . 

24th Pursuit Group ........ '" ......................... . 

27th Bomb Group .................................... . 

2d Obsn Sq .........•.................................. 

20th Air Base Group ................................... . 

Tow Target Det ............... , ...................... . . 

Weather Det .................................... _ .. _.,. 

5th Air Base Group ................................... . 

V Bomber Command .................................. . 

48th Materiel Sq ...................................... . 

Chemical Warfare Det ................................. . 

Service Detachments ............. .......................... . 

Quartermaster Corps ................... ................ . 

Medical Dept .....•..•.................................. 

Ordnance Dept ... _ ..... ............................... . 

Corps of Engineers .................................... . 

Signal Corps ...... ... _ ................................ . 

Chemical Warfare Det ................................. . 

Finance Dept .......................................... . 

61 

553 

38 

10 

9 

10,233 

842 

328 

395 

538 

160 

5B8 

410 

1,809 

5,225 

438 

1,303 

1.765 

837 

672 

46 

160 

4 

5,609 

237 

147 

326 

1,374 

1,264 

B04 

183 

584 

49 

20 

204 

21 

216 

180 

4,268 

821 

757 

1,050 

744 

629 

240 

27 

Officers 

• 2,504 

61 

249 

3B 

10 

9 

517 

55 

15 

22 

34 

5 

36 

36 

77 

335 

42 

66 

72 

49 

45 

8 

50 

669 

43 

47 

11 

183 

187 

87 

42 

24 

6 

1 

16 

11 

10 

317 

38 

187 

40 

29 

16 

Enlisted 

Total American 

28,591 16,643 

0 0 

304 304 

0 0 

0 0 

0 0 

9,716 1,807 

787 0 

313 0 

373 0 

504 0 

155 155 

552 552 

374 374 

1,732 1,732 

4,890 3,318 

396 326 

1,237 1,237 

1,693 1,693 

788 27 

627 0 

38 34 

110 0 

4,940 4,940 

194 194 

100 100 

315 315 

1,191 1,191 

1,077 1,077 

717 717 

141 141 

560 560 

43 43 

19 19 

188 188 

20 20 

205 205 

170 170 

3,951 3.452 

783 487 

570 507 

i,OIO 1,010 

715 

613 488 

235 224 

25 21 

()~_e~~:_ 19 l'" 0 .. :~.~ .............................. . _:..."---___ I~i ____ -L ____ _ 

• Includes 31 Philippine Scout Officers. 

b Includes officers for which no specific unit was indicated. 

Source: Phil Dept, Machine Reds Unit Station Strength and Misc., Officers and Enlisted men, Nov 41. 

Philippine 

Scouts 

11,957 

o 

7,909 

7B7 

313 

373 

504 

o 

o 

o 

o 

1,572 

70 

o 

o 761 

627 

4 

110 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

499 

296 

63 

o 

o 

125 

11 

4 

o 
50 

strongest element was the submarine force 

of 29 underwater craft. 

Ground forces in the Philippines had been 

considerably reinforced, too, in the few 

months since General MacArthur had assumed command. The ten reserve divisions 

of the Philippine Army had been two-thirds 

mobilized and although poorly equipped 

arid trained represented a military force of 

some size. Wthin a week after the outbreak 

of war it numbered over 100,000 men. The 

U.s. Army garrison in the Islands had been 

increased by 8,563 men since 31 July. The 

number of Philippine Scouts, fixed by law, 

remained the same, approximately 12,000. 

The number of American enlisted men increased by 7,473 and officers by 1,070. (See 

Table 4; compare with Table 2.) The 

largest proportionate increase was among 

service troops. As of 31 July, 1,836 men 

were assigned to service detachments; four 

months later the number had increased to 

4,268. During this same period, the number of Air Corps troops had increased from 

2,407 to 5,609.88 Total strength of the en-

.. This strength is from a Machine Records Unit 

report dated 30 November 1941. The strength of 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

tire U.S. Army garrison on 30 November 

1941 was 31,095 officers and enlisted men. 

In the four months since General MacArthur's assumption of command, the flow 

of men and supplies to the Philippines had 

increased tremendously and all preparations 

for war had been pushed actively and aggressively. Time was running out rapidly, 

but at the end of November many still 

thought it would be several months before 

the Japanese struck. The month of April 

1942 was commonly accepted as the critical date and most plans were based on that 

date. By 1 December MacArthur had organized his forces, but still needed much to 

place them on a war footing. Most of 

his requests had been approved by the War 

Department and men and supplies were already on their way or at San Francisco 

awaiting shipment. The record of accomplishment was a heartening one and justified the optimism which prevailed in Washington and in the Philippines over the capacity of the Philippine garrison to withstand a Japanese attack. 

the air forces as of 7 December 1941 was 754 officers and 6,706 enlisted men. Craven and Cate, 

The Army Air Forces in World· War II, I, 170. 
CHAPTER IV 

Prewar Plans, 

Japanese and American 

By the summer of 1941, as the United 

States was beginning to strengthen the 

Philippines, Japan had reached "the crossroads of her fate." 1 The economic sanctions imposed by America, Great Britain, 

and the Netherlands had cut her off from 

the strategic materials necessary to support 

the war in China and threatened eventually 

to so weaken the Japanese economy as to 

leave Japan defenseless in a struggle with 

a major power. The leaders of Japan were 

faced with a difficult choice. They could 

either reach agreement with the United 

States by surrendering their ambitions in 

China and southeast Asia, or they could 

seize Dutch and British possessions by force. 

The second course, while it would give 

Japan the natural resources so sorely needed, 

almost certainly meant war with Great Britain and the Netherlands. In the view of 

the Japanese planners, the United States 

would also oppose such a course by war, 

even if American territory was not immediately attacked. Such a war seemed less 

dangerous to Japan in the fall of 1941 than 

1 History of the Army Section, Imperial General 

Headquarters, 1941-45, p. 9. This volume is No. 

72 in the series, Japanese Studies in World War II, 

of which 113 are now available in OCMH in both 

the original and translated versions. Although 

both versions have been used in the preparation of 

this volume, reference throughout is to the translated version unless otherwise noted. For a description of this series see below, The Sources, 

pp.595-96. 

ever before and, if their calculations proved 

correct, the Japanese had an excellent 

chance of success. The British Empire was 

apparently doomed and the menace of Russian action had been diminished by the German invasion of that country and by the 

Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. 

The major obstacles to Japan's expansion 

in southeast Asia was the United States. 

But Japanese strategists were confident they 

could deprive the United States of its western Pacific base in the Philippines and neutralize a large part of its Pacific Fleet at the 

start of the war. In this way they hoped 

to overcome America's potential superiority 

and seize the southern area rapidly. 

The Japanese Plan 

Japanese strategy for a war with the 

United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands was apparently developed in about 

six months by Imperial General Headquarters.2 Although this strategy was never em2 Statement of Lt Gen Masami Maeda, CofS 

14th Army, 7 Mar 50, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), Document 56234, in 

Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Philippines-Japanese Invasion, Mil Hist Div, GHQ 

Far East Command (FEC) and Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), 2 vols., II. Joint 

Statements of Col Takushiro Hattori and Capt 

Sadatoshi Tomioka, chiefs of the Army and Navy 

Operations Sections, respectively, of Imperial GHQ, 

3 May 49, ATIS Doc 50459, and of Lt Gen Shinichi Tanaka and Col Hattori, 3 May 49, ATIS 

Doc 52361, both in Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, 

4 vols., I, 352-53, IV, 196. 
52 

bodied in one document, it can be reconstructed from separate Army and Navy 

plans completed by the beginning of November 1941. Thereafter it was modified 

only in minor respects. 3 

Strategic Concepts 

The immediate objective of Japanese 

strategy was the capture of the rich Dutch 

and British possessions in southeast Asia, 

especially Malaya and the Netherlands 

Indies. (Map 1) To secure these areas 

the Japanese believed it necessary to destroy 

or neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl 

Harbor, deprive the United States of its 

base in the Philippines, and cut America's 

line of communications across the Pacific 

by the seizure of Wake and Guam. Once 

the coveted area to the south had been secured, Japan would occupy strategic positions in Asia and in the Pacific and fortify 

them immediately with all the forces available, chief reliance being placed on mobile 

3 The plan of operations worked out by Imperial 

GHQ about the middle of November 1941 was 

destroyed by fire. Certificate of Yozo Miyama, 

Chief, Archives Sec, 1 st Demobilization Bureau, 

Defense Doc 2726, International Military Tribunal 

for the Far East (IMTFE). 

The description of Japanese strategic concepts 

is derived from the following documents: ( 1) 

Central Agreement Between the Japanese Navy 

and Army, (2) The Imperial Navy's Course of 

Action in Operations Against U.S., Great Britain, 

and thc Netherlands, (3) Combined Fleet Top 

Secret Operation Order 1, 5 November 1941, and 

(4) Comments of Former Japanese Officers regarding The Fall of the Philippines. The first 

two are reproduced in United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), Apps. 13 and 14, 

pp. 43-49; copies of the last two are in OCMH. 

The orders and plans of the Army General Staff 

can be found in Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ; 

History of Southern Army 1941-1945, Japanese 

Studies in World War II, No. 21; 14th Army Opns, 

2 vols., Japanese Studies in World War II, Nos. 1 

and 2. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

naval and air forces. These positions were 

to form a powerful defensive perimeter 

around the newly acquired southern area, 

the home islands, and the vital shipping 

lanes connecting Japan with its sources of 

supply. 

The area marked for conquest formed a 

vast triangle, whose east arm stretched from 

the Kuril Islands on the north, through 

Wake, to the Marshall Islands. The base 

of the triangle was formed by a line connecting the Marshall Islands, the Bismarck 

Archipelago, Java, and Sumatra. The 

western arm extended from Malaya and 

southern Burma through Indochina, and 

thence along the China coast. The acquisition of this island-studded area would give 

to Japan control of the resources of southeast, Asia and satisfy the national objectives in going to war. Perhaps later, if 

all went well, the area of conquest could be 

extended. But there is no evidence that it 

was the intention of the Japanese Government or of the Army and Navy to defeat 

the United States, and so far as is known no 

plan was ever drawn up for that purpose. 

Japan apparently planned to fight a war of 

limited objectives and, having gained what 

it wanted, expected to negotiate for a favorable peace. 

Operations to secure these objectives and 

others would begin on the first day of war 

when Japanese military and naval forces 

would go into action simultaneously on 

many fronts. Navy carrier-based aircraft 

would attack Pearl Harbor. Immediately 

after, joint Army and Navy air forces would 

strike American air and naval forces in the 

Philippines, while other Japanese forces hit 

British Malaya. After these simultaneous 

attacks, advance Army units were to be 

landed at various points in Malaya and the 

Philippines to secure air bases and favor-
JAPANESE PLAN 

AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMIES November 1941 

___ ApPROllIMAT[ l iMIT OF JAPANESE OBJECTIVE ARf,I 

~ The unils allocated 10 SOUTHERN ARMY 

ttl'" slolloned In FrenCh IndOC1llno, Chino, 

Monel/uno, ond Jopon 

CHI N A 

D Luzon 

~. PHILIPPINE 

/ fiJ~~ IS fO Polouls 

,". \ \ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ GENERAL DEFENSE \\ 

COMMAND 

(Homeland and adJocent 

islands) 

SOUTHERN ARMY 

14 1h Army - 10 Philippine. 

15 1h Army - 10 Thai land 

16 1h Ar my - to Ea. t Indies 

25th Army - to Malay 

Guoml 

TfUk Is, 

CA R O L INE ISLANDS 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ Woke I \ 

MARSHA'.l IS 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

I 

/ 

." ~,, ~ . ,," .. . 

- 20' 

- 0' 

• • .," '1> ... BIS "AR "" '$ •• ARC" "'J?'I> ~., '~_- I.':>. SO . , <0<1, 

' .• : '" {!1- ~ , ", ", 

200 .00 600 BOO 

~M)\~ir 60

0 

AUSTRALIA STATu TE MillS 00 

MAP 1 

I 

100' I 

120' I 

14'" 

I 

100' 
54 

able positions for further advances. The 

results thus obtained were to be immediately exploited by large-scale landings in the 

Philippines and in Malaya and the rapid occupation of those areas. At the same time 

Thailand Wa.'l to be "stabilized," Hong 

Kong seized, and Wake and Guam occupied. The conquest of the Bismarck Archipelago would follow the seizure of the last 

two islands. 

The occupation of Java and Sumatra was 

to begin after this initial period. While Java 

was being attacked from the air, Singapore 

was to be taken under fire from the land 

side by Japanese forces moving down the 

Malay Peninsula. Once that fortress was 

reduced these forces were to move on to 

northern Sumatra. Meanwhile, other 

Japanese forces moving southward through 

the Netherlands Indies were to join those 

in Sumatra in the final attack on Java. 

Japanese planners anticipated that certain events might require an alteration of 

these plans and accordingly outlined alternative courses of action. The first possibility was that the Japanese-American negotiations then in progress would prove successful and make war unnecessary. If this 

unexpected success was achieved all operations were to be suspended, ev~n if the final 

order to attack had been issued.4 The second possibility was that the United States 

might take action before the attack on Pearl 

Harbor by sending elements of the Pacific 

Fleet to the Far East. In that event, the 

Combined Fleet would be deployed to intercept American naval forces. The attacks 

against the Philippines and Malaya were 

to proceed according to schedule. 

If the Americans or British launched 10-

• Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 10, 15; 14th 

Army Opns, 1,15. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

cal attacks, Japanese ground forces were 

to meet these while air forces were brought 

into the area to destroy the enemy. These 

local operations were not to interrupt the 

execution of the grand plan. But if the 

United States or Great Britain seized the 

initiative by opening operations first, Japanese forces were to await orders from Imperial General Headquarters before beginning their assigned operations. 

The possibility of a Soviet attack or of a 

joint United States-Soviet invasion from 

the north was also considered by the Japanese planners. If such an attack materialized, operations.against the Philippines and 

Malay would be carried out as planned 

while air units would be immediately transferred from the home islands or China to 

destroy Russian air forces in the Far East. 

Ground forces were to be deployed to Manchuria at the same time to meet Soviet 

forces on the ground. 

The forces required to execute this ambitious plan were very carefully calculated 

by Imperial General Headquarters. At the 

beginning of December 1941 the total 

strength of the Army was 51 divisions, a 

cavalry group, 59 brigade-size units, and 

an air force of 51 air squadrons. In addition, there were ten depot divisions in 

Japan.6 These forces were organized into 

area commands widely scattered throughout 

the Far East. (See Table 5.) The largest 

number of divisions was immobilized in 

China and large garrisons were maintained 

• Data on the strength of the Japanese Army and 

Navy are derived from Hist Army Sec, Imperial 

GHQ, p. 30. A mixed brigade at this time consisted of three to six infantry battalions in addition 

to supporting and service troops. Strength varied 

from 3,000 to 10,000 men. An air regiment was 

generally composed of three squadrons and was the 

basic operational unit in the Japanese Army Air 

Force. 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 55 

TABLE 5-0RGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE ARMY, 1 DECEMBER 1941 

Area Headquarters Divisions Brigades. Air 

Squadrons 

Imperial GHQ General Defense Command b 

Eastern District Army 52 Division 4 

Imperial Guard, 2d, 3d, 51st, 

Homeland 57th Depot Divisions 

Central District Army 53, 54th Divisions 3 

4th, 5th, 55th Depot Divisions 

Western District Army 6th, 56th Depot Divisions 3 

Northern District Army 7th Division 1 

1 st Air Group 9 

Kwantung Army 10th, 28th, 29th Divisions 1 

3d Army 9th, 12th Divisions 4 

4th Army 1st, 14th, 57th Divisions 5 

5th Army 11 th, 24th Divisions 4 

Manchuria 6th Army 23d Division 1 

20th Army 8th, 25th Divisions 4 

Defense Command 5 

Air Corps (Directly attached 21 

units) 

2d Air Group 35 

China Expeditionary Army 

North China Area Army 27th, 35th, 110th Divisions 5 

1st Army 36th, 37th, 41st Divisions 3 

12th Army 17th, 32d Divisions 3 

Mongolia Garrison Army 26th Division, Cavalry Group 1 

11th Army 3d, 6th, 13th, 34th, 39th, 40th 2 

China Divisions 

13th Army 15th, 22d, 116th Divisions S 

23d Army 38th, 51st, 104th Divisions 1 

4th Division (at Shanghai under direct command of Imperial GHQ) 

lst Air Brigade 16 

Korea Korea Army 19th, 20th Divisions 

Formosa Formosa Army 

Southern Army (l 21st Division 1 

14th Army 16th, 48th Divi.ions I 1 

15th Army 33d, S 5th Division. 

I 

16th Army 2d Division 1 

25th Army Imperial Guard, 5th, 18th, 

For the South 56th Divisions 

3d Air Group 48 

5th Air Group 20 

21st Ind Air Vnit 2 

South Seas Detachment <at 1 

Banins under direct command of Imperial GHQ) 

Total 51 59 151 

Remarks: 

• Brigades include all brigade size units, i. e., garrison forces in China and Manchuria, South Seas Det., etc. 

b Command of the General Defense Command over each district army and the 1st Air Army in the Homeland was 

limited to only the matters pertaining to defense of the Homeland. 

o Although the 21st, 33d and 56th Divisions were assigned to the Southern Army, they were still in North China, 

Central China and Kyushu, respectively, On 1 December 41. Their departures from the above areas were 20 January 1942 

13 December 1941 and 16 February 1942, respectively. 56th Division was placed under the command of 25th Army on 

27 November 1941. 

Sour~e: Compiled hy the Reports and Statistical Division of the Demobilizatilm Bureau, 14 January 1952. 
56 

in Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, 

and the home islands. Only a small fraction of Japan's strength, therefore, was 

available for operations in southeast Asia 

and the Pacific. 

In the execution of this complicated and 

intricate plan, the Japanese planners 

realized, success would depend on careful 

timing and on the closest co-operation between Army and Navy forces. No provision was made for unified command of the 

services. Instead, separate agreements 

were made between Army and fleet commanders for each operation. These agreements provided simply for co-operation at 

the time of landing and for the distribution 

of forces. 

The Plan for the Philippines 

The Japanese plan for the occupation of 

the Philippines was but part of the larger 

plan for the Greater East Asia War in 

which the Southern Army was to seize 

Malaya and the Netherlands Indies while 

the Combined Fleet neutralized the U.S. 

Pacific Fleet. The Southern Army was organized on 6 November 1941, with Gen. 

Count Hisaichi Terauchi, who had been 

War Minister in 1936, as commander. 

His orders from Imperial General Headquarters were to prepare for operations in 

the event that negotiations with the United 

States failed. Under his command were 

placed the 14th, 15th, 16th and 25th 

Armies, comprising ten divisions and three 

mixed brigades. Southern Army's mission 

in case of war would be to seize American, 

British, and Dutch possessions in the "southern area" in the shortest time possible. 

Operations against the Philippines and 

British Malaya were to begin simultaneTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ously, on orders from Imperial General 

H eadquarters.6 

Southern Army immediately began to 

prepare plans for seizure of the southern 

area. To 14th Army, consisting of the 16th 

and 48th Divisions and the 65th Brigade, 

was assigned the task of taking the Philippine Islands. The campaign in the East 

Indies was to be under the control of 16th 

Army; the 15th Army would take Thailand. The 25th Army was assigned the 

most important and difficult mission, the 

conquest of Malaya and Singapore, and 

was accordingly given four of the Southern 

Army's ten divisions. Air support for these 

operations was to be provided by two air 

groups and an independent air unit. The 

5th Air Group was assigned to the Philippine campaign/ 

Beginning on 10 November a number of 

meetings attended by the senior army and 

navy commanders were held in Tokyo to 

settle various details in the execution of the 

plans. The commanders of the 14th, 16th, 

and 25th Armies, in session with the Premier (who was also the War Minister), the 

Army Chief of Staff, and General Terauchi, 

were shown the Imperial General Headquarters operational plans, given an outline of the strategy, and told what their 

missions would be in the event of war. In 

the discussions between Army and Navy 

commanders that followed this meeting a 

few modifications were made in the general 

strategy and the specific operational plans 

• Southern Army Opns, p. 6. The operations 

order given by the commander of the Southern 

Army was destroyed by fire. Certificate of Yozo 

Miyama, 1st Demob Bureau, Defense Doc 2726, 

IMTFE. 

T Southern Army Opns, pp. 4-6. An air group 

was roughly the equivalent of a U.S. numbered 

air force, and was the largest tactical unit in the 

Japanese Army Air Force at that time. 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 57

were put into final form.8 On the 20th

Southern Army published its orders for the

forthcoming operations, omitting only the

date when hostilities would start.

Specific plans for the seizure of the

Philippine Islands were first developed by

the Japanese Army's General Staff in the

fall of 1941. As the plans for the southern

area were developed, the Philippine plan

was modified to conform to the larger

strategy being developed and to release

some of the forces originally assigned 14th

Army to other, more critical operations.

The final plan was completed at the meetings between the 14th Army commander,

Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, and the commanders of the 5th Air Group (Lt. Gen.

Hideyoshi Obata), the 3d Fleet (Vice

Adm. Ibo Takahashi), and the 11th Air

Fleet (Vice Adm. Nishizo Tsukahara),

held at Iwakuni in southern Honshu from

the 13th to the 15th of November.

The general scheme of operations for

the Philippine campaign called for simultaneous air attacks starting on X Day, the

first day of war, against American aircraft

and installations in the Philippines by the

5th Air Group (Army) and the 11th Air

Fleet (Navy). While the air attacks were

in progress, advance Army and Navy units

were to land on Batan Island, north of

Luzon; at three places on Luzon: Aparri,

Vigan, and Legaspi; and at Davao in Mindanao. The purpose of these landings was

to seize airfields. The air force was to move

to these fields as soon as possible and continue the destruction of the American air

and naval forces from these close-in bases.

When the major part of American air

strength had been eliminated, the main

force of the 14th Army was to land along

Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila, while another force would land at Lamon Bay, southeast of the capital. These forces, with close

air support, were to advance on Manila

from the north and south. It was expected

that the decisive engagement of the campaign would be fought around Manila.

Once the capital was taken, the islands defending the entrance to Manila Bay were to

be captured and Luzon occupied.

Imperial General Headquarters and

Southern Army expected General Homma

to complete his mission in about fifty days;

at the end of that time, approximately half

of the 14th Army, as well as the Army and

Navy air units, were to leave the Philippines

for operations in the south.9 The remaining elements of the 14th Army were then to

occupy the Visayas and Mindanao as rapidly as possible. Little difficulty was expected in this phase of the operations and

detailed plans were to be made at the appropriate time. The Japanese considered

it essential to the success of Southern Army

operations to gain complete victory in the

Philippines before the end of March 1942.

Forces assigned to the Philippine campaign,

small as they were, were required in other

more vital areas.

The Japanese plan was based on a detailed knowledge of the Philippine Islands

and a fairly accurate estimate of American

and Philippine forces.10 The Japanese were

aware that the bulk of the American and

8

 Ibid., pp. 6-8; 14th Army Opns, I, 14. Unless

otherwise specified, this account of the 14th Army's

plan for the conquest of the Philippines is taken

from the 14th Army Opns, I and II. The translation has been checked against the original Japanese

study prepared by the 1st Demob Bureau.

9

 Statement of Col Hattori, 2 Nov 47, ATIS Doc

49125, Statements of Japanese Officials on World

War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 315. 10

 Japanese estimates of the strength and composition of the Philippine garrison, military installations, terrain, and weather, are discussed in 14th

Army Opns, I, 5-8, 10-14.

PREW AR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 57 

were put into final form.s On the 20th 

Southern Army published its orders for the 

forthcoming operations, omitting only the 

date when hostilities would start. 

Specific plans for the seizure of the 

Philippine Islands were first developed by 

the Japanese Army's General Staff in the 

fall of 1941. As the plans for the southern 

area were developed, the Philippine plan 

was modified to conform to the larger 

strategy being developed and to release 

some of the forces originally assigned 14th 

Army to other, more critical operations. 

The final plan was completed at the meetings between the 14th Army commander, 

Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, and the commanders of the 5th Air Group (Lt. Gen. 

Hideyoshi Obata), the 3d Fleet (Vice 

Adm. Ibo Takahashi), and the 11 th Air 

Fleet (Vice Adm. Nishizo Tsukahara), 

held at Iwakuni in southern Honshu from 

the 13th to the 15th of November. 

The general scheme of operations for 

the Philippine campaign called for simultaneous air attacks starting on X Day, the 

first day of war, against American aircraft 

and installations in the Philippines by the 

5th Air Group (Army) and the 11th Air 

Fleet (Navy). While the air attacks were 

in progress, advance Army and Navy units 

were to land on Batan Island, north of 

Luzon; at three places on Luzon: Aparri, 

Vigan, and Legaspi; and at Davao in Mindanao. The purpose of these landings was 

to seize airfields. The air force was to move 

to these fields as soon as possible and continue the destruction of the American air 

and naval forces from these close-in bases. 

8 Ibid., pp. 6-8; 14th Army Opns, 1,14. Unless 

otherwise specified, this account of the 14th Army's 

plan for the conquest of the Philippines is taken 

from the 14th Army Opns, I and II. The translation has been checked against the original Japanese 

study prepared by the 1st Demob Bureau. 

When the major part of American air 

strength had been eliminated, the main 

force of the 14th Army was to land along 

Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila, while another force would land at Lamon Bay, southeast of the capital. These forces, with close 

air support, were to advance on Manila 

from the north and south. It was expected 

that the decisive engagement of the campaign would be fought around Manila. 

Once the capital was taken, the islands defending the entrance to Manila Bay were to 

be captured and Luzon occupied. 

Imperial General Headquarters and 

Southern Army expected General Homma 

to complete his mission in about fifty days; 

at the end of that time, approximately half 

of the 14th Army, as well as the Army and 

Navy air units, were to leave the Philippines 

for operations in the south.9 The remaining elements of the 14th Army were then to 

occupy the Visayas and Mindanao as rapidly as possible. Little difficulty was expected in this phase of the operations and 

detailed plans were to be made at the appropriate time. The Japanese considered 

it essential to the success of Southern Army 

operations to gain complete victory in the 

Philippines before the end of March 1942. 

Forces assigned to the Philippine campaign, 

small as they were, were required in other 

more vital areas. 

The Japanese plan was based on a detailed knowledge of the Philippine Islands 

and a fairly accurate estimate of American 

and Philippine forces.1o The Japanese were 

aware that the bulk of the American and 

• Statement of Col Hattori, 2 Nov 47, ATIS Doc 

49125, Statements of Japanese Officials on World 

War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 315. 

10 Japanese estimates of the strength and composition of the Philippine garrison, military installations, terrain, and weather, are discussed in 14th 

Army Opns, I, 5-8, 10-14. 
58 

Philippine forces was on Luzon and that the 

V.S. Army garrison had been increased 

since July 1941 from 12,000 to 22,000. 

Eighty percent of the officers and 40 percent of the enlisted men were thought to be 

Americans and the rest, Filipinos. American troops were regarded as good soldiers, 

but inclined to deteriorate physically and 

mentally in a tropical climate. The Filipino, though inured to the tropics, had little 

endurance or sense of responsibility, the 

Japanese believed, and was markedly inferior to the American as a soldier. The 

American garrison was correctly supposed 

to be organized into one division, an air 

unit, and a "fortress unit" (Harbor Defenses 

of Manila and Subic Bays) . The division 

was mistakenly thought to consist of two 

infantry brigades, a field artillery brigade, 

and supporting services. The Japanese 

knew that MacArthur also had one battalion of fifty-four tanks-which was true 

at that time-and believed that there was 

also an antitank battalion in the Islands. 

The harbor defenses were known to consist 

of four coast artillery regiments, including 

one antiaircraft regiment. 

The Japanese estimated that the American air force in the Philippines was composed of one pursuit regiment of 108 planes, 

one bombardment regiment of about 38 

planes, one pursuit squadron of 27 planes, 

and two reconnaissance squadrons of 13 

planes. American aircraft were based on 

two major fields on Luzon, the Japanese believed. They placed the pursuit group at 

Nichols Field, in the suburbs of Manila, and 

the bombers at Clark Field. Other fields 

on Luzon were thought to base a total of 

20 planes. The Japanese placed 52 Navy 

patrol and carrier-based fighter planes at 

Cavite and 18 PBY's at Olongapo. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The strength of the Philippine Army and 

the Constabulary, the Japanese estimated, 

was 110,000 men. This strength, they 

thought, would be increased to 125,000 by 

December. The bulk of the Philippine 

Army, organized into ten divisions, was 

known to consist mostly of infantry with 

only a few engineer and artillery units. This 

army was considered very much inferior to 

the V.S. Regular Army in equipment, 

training, and fighting qualities. 

Though they had a good picture of the 

defending force, Japanese knowledge of 

American defense plans was faulty. They 

expected that the Philippine garrison would 

make its last stand around Manila and when 

defeated there would scatter and be easily 

mopped up. No preparation was made for 

an American withdrawal to the Bataan 

peninsula. In October, at a meeting of the 

14th Army staff officers in Tokyo, Homma's 

chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, had 

raised the possibility of a withdrawal to 

Bataan. Despite his protests, the subject 

was quickly dropped.ll Staff officers of the 

n Interrog of Gen Maeda, 10 May 47, Mil Hist 

Div, GHQ FEC; statement of Gen Maeda, 2 Mar 

50, ATIS Doc 56234; statement of Lt Col Yoshio 

Nakajima, 6 Feb 50, ATIS Doc 56349; statement 

of Lt Col Monjiro Akiyama, 2 Mar 50, A TIS Doc 

56232; statement of Lt CoL Hikaru Haba, 2 Mar 

50, ATIS Doc 56233; statement of Col Motoo Nakayama, 21 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56640. Colonel 

Nakajima was, at the beginning of the Philippine 

Campaign, Intelligence Officer, 14th Army, and 

subsequently its Operations Officer. When Colonel Nakajima was made Operations Officer, Colonel Haba, formerly Assistant Intelligence Officer, 

14th Army, was promoted to Intelligence Officer. 

Colonel Akiyama was 14th Army Air Officer, and 

Colonel Nakayama, Senior Operations Officer, 14th 

Army. Copies of these ATIS documents and interrogations are in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I and II. 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 59 

48th Division also claimed to have discussed 

the question of Bataan before the division 

embarked at Formosa. The consensus then 

was that while resistance could be expected 

before Manila and on Corregidor, Bataan 

"being a simple, outlying position, would 

fall quickly." 12 

The Japanese originally planned to assign to the Philippine campaign six battalions for the advance landings, two full 

divisions for the main landings, and supporting troops. So meager were the forces 

available to Southern Army that General 

Homma was finally allotted for the entire 

operation only 2 divisions, the 16th and 

48th. Supporting troops included 2 tank 

regiments, 2 regiments and 1 battalion of 

medium artillery, 3 engineer regiments, 5 

antiaircraft battalions, and a large number 

of service units. Once Luzon had been 

secured, most of the air units and the 48th 

Division, as well as other units, were to be 

transferred to the Indies and Malaya. At 

that time Homma would receive the 65th 

Brigade to mop up remaining resistance and 

to garrison Luzon. The 16th Division 

would then move south and occupy the Visayas and Mindanao. 

The 14th Army commander had also 

counted on having the support of a joint 

Army and Navy air force of 600 planes. 

But one of the two air brigades of the 5th Air 

Growp and some of the naval air units 

originally destined for the Philippines were 

transferred to other operations. The addition of the 24th Air Regiment to the 5th 

Air Group at the last moment brought the 

combined air and naval strength committed 

12 Statement of Col Moriji Kawagoe, CofS 48th 

Div, 9 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56354; statement of 

Maj Makoto Nakahara, Opns Officer, 48th Div, 13 

Max 50, ATIS Doc 56372, ibid. 

to the Philippine campaign to about 500 

combat aircraft. 

Air and Naval Plans 

Air operations against the Philippines 

would begin on the morning of X Day when 

planes of the Army's 5th Air Group and the 

Navy's J Ith Air Fleet, would strike American air forces on Luzon. These attacks 

would continue until American air strength 

had been destroyed. For reasons of security, 

there was to be no aerial or submarine reconnaissance before the attack, except for highaltitude aerial photographs of landing 

sites.llI 

By arrangement between the Japanese 

Army and Navy commanders, Army air 

units were to operate north of the 16th degree of latitude, a line stretching across 

Luzon from Lingayen on the west coast to 

the San IIdefonso Peninsula on the east. 

Naval air units were made responsible for 

the area south of this line, which included 

Clark Field, the vital Manila area, Cavite, 

and the harbor defenses. This line was 

determined by the range of Army and 

Navy aircraft. The Navy Zero fighters 

had the longer range and were therefore 

assigned missions in the Manila area. Carrier planes of the 4th Carrier Division, 

originally based at Palau, were to provide 

18 The material on naval plans is taken from 

Naval Operations in the Invasion of the Philippines, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 13, 

2d Demob Bureau, pp. 1-6. Like other studies in 

this series, it is filed in OCMH and has been 

checked against the original. Morison, Rising Sun 

in the Pacific, pp. 161-63, is useful for the organization of Japan's naval forces. See also Combined 

Fleet Top Secret Operations Order 1, in Pearl 

Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 13, Exhibit 8, pp. 

432-84. 
60 

air support for the landings at Davao and 

Legaspi.14 

Once the advance units of 14th Army had 

landed and secured airfields, the main force 

of the 5th Air Group was to move up to the 

fields at Aparri, Laoag, and Vigan, while 

naval air units would base on the fields at 

Legaspi and Davao. The airfield near 

Aparri was mistakenly believed to be suitable for heavy bombers and the bulk of the 

5th Air Group was ordered there. It was 

anticipated that the forward displacement 

of the air forces would be completed by the 

sixth or seventh day of operations. During 

this week a naval task force from the 3d 

Fleet was to provide protection for the convoys and carry out antisubmarine measures 

in the Formosa area and in Philippine 

waters. 

Naval surface forces assigned to the 

Philippines operations were under the 3d 

Fleet. This fleet, commanded by Admiral 

Takahashi, was primarily an amphibious 

force with supporting cruisers and destroyers. Its principal mission was to support 

the landings in the Philippines by minelaying, reconnaissance, escorting the troops 

during the voyage to the targets, and protecting them during landing operations. 

No provisions was made for surface bombardment of shore objectives, presumably in 

the interests of secrecy.15 

Because of the many landings to be made 

at widely scattered points in the Philippine 

archipelago it was necessary to organize 

H The 11th Air Fleet had originally planned to 

use carrier-based fighters to neutralize southern 

Luzon, but the pilots trained for this mission were 

transferred with their planes to the Pearl Harbor 

operation. During the fall of 1941 the improvement of the Zero fighters and the rapid advancement in pilot training made it possible to utilize 

land-based fighters on Formosa for long-distance 

sorties against Luzon. 

,. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 166. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the 3d Fleet into numerous special task 

forces. For the landing on Batan Island 

the Third Surprise Attack Force of 1 destroyer, 4 torpedo boats, and other small 

craft was organized. The naval escort for 

the landing of the advance units on Luzon 

consisted of the First, Second, and Fourth 

Surprise Attack Force, each composed of 1 

light cruiser, 6 or 7 destroyers, transports, 

and other auxiliary craft. The Legaspi 

Force (Fourth Surprise Attack Force) was 

to be staged at Palau, and since it could not 

be supported by the planes of the 11 th Air 

Fleet it included the South Philippines Support Force, comprising the 4th Carrier Division and 2 seaplane carriers with 20 

planes each. The units landing at Davao 

were to be covered by this same force. 

To support the main landings Admiral 

Takahashi created the Close Cover Force, 

which he commanded directly, composed 

of 1 light and 2 heavy cruisers, and 2 converted seaplane tenders. Two battleships 

and 3 heavy cruisers from Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo's 2d Fleet, then operating in 

Malayan and East Indian waters, were also 

to support the landings, which would be 

additionally supported by 3 of the escort 

groups. The Lamon Bay Attack Group, 

in addition to 1 light cruiser and 6 destroyers, included 6 converted gunboats and 1 

battalion of naval troops. 

Concentration of Forces 

Early in November the forces assigned to 

the Philippine campaign began to move to 

their designated jump-off points. The 5th 

Air Group arrived in southern Formosa 

from Manchuria during the latter part of 

the month. On 23 November two of the 

advance detachments stationed in Formosa boarded ship at Takao and sailed to 

Mako in the Pescadores. Between 27 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 61 

November and 6 December the 48th Division (less detachments) concentrated at 

Mako, Takoa, and Kirun, and made final 

preparations for the coming invasion. The 

first units of the 16th Division sailed from 

Nagoya in Japan on 20 November, followed five days later by the remainder of 

the division. Part of this division concentrated at Palau and the main body at 

Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus. On 1 

December, when General Romma established his command post at Takao, he received final instructions from Southern 

Army. Operations would begin on 8 

December (Tokyo time). 

The Plan of Defense 

Plans for the defense of the Philippine 

Islands had been in existence for many 

years when General MacArthur returned 

to active duty. The latest revision of these 

plans, completed in April 1941 and called 

War Plan ORANGE-3 (WPO-3 ), was 

based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE 

plan of 1938, one of the many "color" plans 

developed during the prewar years. Each 

color plan dealt with a different situation, 

ORANGE covering an emergency in which 

only the United States and Japan would be 

involved. In this sense, the plan was strategically unrealistic and completely outdated 

by 1941. Tactically, however, the plan was 

an excellent one and its provisions for defense were applicable under any local 

situation.16 

,. Unless otherwise noted, this section is based 

on the Philippine Department Plan ORANGE, 1940 

Revision. (Short title: HPD WPO-3), AG 326. 

The author has also had the benefit of conversations with the Philippine Department Commander, 

General Grunert, with Generals Sutherland and 

Marshall, and with various division commanders 

and staff officers who participated in the planning 

and execution of the plan. 

WPO-3 

In War Plan ORANGE it was assumed 

that the Japanese attack would come without a declaration of war and with less than 

forty-eight hours' warning so that it would 

not be possible to provide reinforcements 

from the United States for some time. The 

defense would therefore have to be conducted entirely by the military and l,1aval 

forces already in the Philippines, supported 

by such forces as were available locally. 

The last category included any organized 

elements of the Philippine Army which 

might be inducted into the service of the 

United States under the Tydings-McDuffie 

Act. 

An analysis of Japanese capabilities, as of 

1 July 1940, led the Philippine Department 

planners to believe that the enemy would 

send an expedition of about 100,000 men to 

capture Manila and its harbor defenses in 

order to occupy the Philippines, sever the 

American line of communications, and 

deny the United States a naval base in the 

Far East. It was expected that this operation would be undertaken with the greatest secrecy and that it would precede or 

coincide with a declaration of war. The 

garrison therefore could expect lit de or no 

warning. The attack would probably come 

during the dry season, shortly after the rice 

crop was harvested, in December or J anuary. The enemy was assumed to have extensive knowledge of the terrain and of 

American strength and dispositions, and 

would probably be assisted by the 30,000 

Japanese in the Islands. 

Army planners in the Philippines expected the Japanese to make their major 

attack against the island of Luzon and to 

employ strong ground forces with heavy air 

and naval support. They would probably 
62 

land in many places simultaneously in order 

to spread thin the defending forces and assure the success of at least one of the landings. Secondary landings or feints were 

also expected. It was considered possible 

that the Japanese might attempt in a surprise move to seize the harbor defenses with 

a small force at the opening of hostilities. 

Enemy air operations would consist of longrange reconnaissance and bombardment, 

probably coming without warning and coordinated with the landings. The Japanese would probably also attempt to establic;h 

air bases on Luzon very early in the campaign in order to destroy American air 

power and bomb military installations. 

Under WPO-3 the mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to 

Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese 

naval forces. There was no intention that 

American troops should fight anywhere but 

in central Luzon. U.S. Army forces, constituting the Initial Protective Force, had 

the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat 

those forces which succeeded in landing. 

If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved 

successful, the Initial Protective Force was 

to engage in delaying action but not at the 

expense of the primary mission, the defense 

of Manila Bay. Every attempt was to be 

made to hold back the Japanese advance 

while withdrawing to the Bataan peninsula. 

Bataan was recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, and it was to be defended to the "last extremity." 

To reinforce the Initial Protective Force, 

Philippine Army units were to be mobilized 

immediately upon the outbreak of war and 

would be ready to participate in the defense of Bataan. If used as anticipated in 

WPO-3, which was prepared before July 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

1941, the Philippine Army would be under 

the command of the Philippine Department 

commander and would be utilized to defend 

Manila Bay. The plan did not contemplate using Philippine Army units for the 

defense of the entire archipelago. 

WPO-3 divided Luzon, the principal 

theater of operations, into six sectors with 

a mobile reserve. Detailed plans for the 

defense of each sector were made by the 

sector commanders. The commander of the 

Philippine Division, the only U.S. Army 

division in the Philippines, in addition to 

conducting operations in the sector or sectors assigned to him, was to organize the 

defenses of Bataan and to command operations there if necessary. 

Air support was to be provided by the 4th 

Composite Group, the predecessor of the 

Far East Air Force. This group was to obtain information of enemy location, strength, 

and . disposition by continuous reconnaissance, attack the Japanese whenever conditions were favorable, and support ground 

operations. In order to keep this air force 

in operation as long as possible, its planes 

were to be employed "conservatively" and 

every effort was to be made to supplement 

the strength of the group by taking over the 

Philippine Army Air Corps and commercial 

planes. 

The navy was to set up defensive coastal 

areas at the entrances to Manila and Subic 

Bays. At the first sign of an attack a defensive area was to be set up around Manila to control all shipping and a patrol system established for Manila and Subic Bays. 

The Army, through the Department quartermaster, would control all shore facilities at the port of Manila. 

The supply plan in WPO-3 was a complicated one. Provision had to be made to 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 63 

supply the six sectors during the initial phase 

of operations and to withdraw supplies into 

Bataan where a base would be established to 

support a prolonged defense. Supply officers estimated that they would probably require enough supplies for 31,000 men (the 

Bataan Defense Force )-later raised to 40,-

000 men-to last 180 days. The defense 

reserve already on hand, except for ammunition, was considered by the planners 

sufficient to supply such a force for the 

period required in a defensive situation. 

The bulk of the supplies was stored in the 

Manila area which lacked adequate protection from attacking aircraft. In the event 

it became necessary to move the supplies to 

Corregidor and Bataan, the enemy would 

have to be delayed long enough to carry out 

this operation. 

Prior to the start of operations on Bataan, 

supplies were to be moved rapidly to the 

peninsula. At the same time the Corregidor reserves, set first at a 6-month supply 

for 7,000 men and then for 10,000 men, 

were to be brought up to the authorized allotment. Philippine Department depots 

and installations in the Manila area were 

to be maintained just as long as the tactical situation permitted. Depots at Fort 

Stotsenburg, Fort William McKinley, Tarlac, San Fernando, Manila, and elsewhere 

would supply the various sectors. A Bataan 

Service Area was to be established, initially to assist in organizing the final defense 

positions and ultimately to supply the entire force after it had withdrawn to Bataan 

for the last stand. All stocks in the Department, except those of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, would 

eventually be transferred to Bataan. 

Plans for local procurement included the 

exploitation of the Manila area with its 

commercial warehouses, factories, and 

transportation facilities. Procurement districts, coinciding roughly with the sector 

boundaries, would be established later. 

Troops would take the field with two 

days of Class I supplies (rations), one emergency ration, and two days of fire. Class 

I and III supplies (gasoline and lubricants) 

would be issued automatically thereafter at 

rail or navigation heads; Class II, IV, and 

V supplies (clothing, construction and other 

heavy equipment, and ammunition) would 

be requisitioned from depots as needed. 

The issue of supplies to Philippine Army 

units would depend upon the speed with 

which they were mobilized 'and their location. 

The transportation of troops and equipment, the planners realised, would be a difficult problem. There was a large number 

of passenger buses on Luzon, centrally organized and operated. The 4,000 trucks 

on the island were of varying type, size, and 

condition and were mainly individually 

owned. Passenger buses were to be requisitioned immediately by the Army for 

use as personnel carriers. Since it would 

take longer to requisition trucks, cargo requirements were to be kept to an absolute 

minimum. In the initial move by the mobile forces toward the threatened beaches, 

little difficulty was expected with motor 

transportation. Later, as supply requirements rose and as troops moved back toward Bataan (if the enemy could not be repelled at the beaches), motor pools were to 

be formed. When' Philippine Army units 

were mobilized the drain on the motor transport services was expected to increase 

greatly since these units had no organic 

motor transportation. 

Nothing was said in WPO-3 about what 
64 

was to happen after the defenses on Bataan 

crumbled. Presumably by that time, estimated at six months, the U.S. Pacific Fleet 

would have fought its way across the Pacific, 

won a victory over the Combined Fleet, and 

made secure the line of communications. 

The men and supplies collected on the west 

coast during that time would then begin to 

reach the Philippines in a steady stream. 

The Philippine garrison, thus reinforced, 

could then counterattack and drive the 

enemy into the sea. 

Actually, no one in a position of authority 

at that time (April 1941 ) believed that anything like this would happen. Informed 

naval opinion estimated that it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet 

to fight its way across the Pacific. There 

was no plan to concentrate men and supplies on the west coast and no schedule for 

their movement to the Philippines. Army 

planners in early 1941 believed that at the 

end of six months, if not sooner, supplies 

would be exhausted and the garrison would 

go down in defeat. WPO-3 did not say 

this; instead it said nothing at all. And 

everyone hoped that when the time came 

something could be done, some plan improvised to relieve or rescue the men 

stranded 7,000 miles across the Pacific.17 

The MacArthur Plan 

'General MacArthur had the answer to 

those who saw no way out of the difficulty 

in the Philippines. The defeatist and defensive WPO-3 was to be transformed into 

an aggressive plan whose object would be 

the defeat of any enemy that attempted the 

1T Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy 

in the Far East," Military Review, XXIX (December 1949), 22-40. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

conquest of the Philippines. An optimist 

by nature, with implicit faith in the Philippine people, MacArthur was able to inspire 

the confidence and loyalty of his associates 

and staff. His optimism was contagious 

and infected the highest officials in the War 

Department and the government. By the 

fall of 1941 there was a firm conviction in 

Washington and in the Philippines that, 

given sufficient time, a Japanese attack 

could be successfully resisted. 

In pressing for a more aggressive plan, 

enlarged in scope to include the entire archipelago, MacArthur could rely on having a 

far stronger force than any of his predecessors. His growing air force included by 

the end of November 1941 thirty-five B-17's 

and almost 100 fighters of the latest type. 

Many more were on their way. The performance of the heavy bombers in early 

1941 justified the hope that the South China 

Sea would be successfully blockaded by air 

and that the Islands could be made a "selfsustaining fortress." 18 

MacArthur could also count on the Philippine Army's ten reserve divisions, then 

being mobilized and trained, and one regular division. During his term as Military 

Advisor, he had worked out the general 

concept of his strategy as well as detailed 

plans for the use of this national army. As 

commander of U.S. Army Forces in the 

Far East he could plan on the use of the 

regular U.S. Army garrison as well as the 

Philippine Army. He was in an excellent 

position, therefore, to persuade the War 

Department to approve his own concepts for 

the defense of the Philippines. 

Almost from the date of his assumption 

of command, MacArthur began to think 

about replacing WPO-3 with a new 

" Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 388. 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 65 

plan/9 From the first, as is evident from 

his establishment of the Philippine Coast 

Artillery Command, he apparently intended 

to defend the inland seas and the entrances 

to Manila and Subic Bays. By September 

his plans had progressed sufficiently to enable him to inform General Wainwright of 

his intention to reorganize the forces in the 

Philippines and to give that officer his 

choice of commands.~o 

The opportunity to request a change in 

plans for the defense of the Philippines 

came in October, after MacArthur received 

a copy of the new war plan, RAINBOW 5, 

prepared by the Joint Board some months 

earlier. This plan, which was world-wide 

in its provisions and conformed to arrangements with the British staff, called for a 

defensive strategy in the Pacific and Far 

East and recognized Germany as the main 

enemy in the event of a war with the Axis. 

Based on the assumption that the United 

States would be at war with more than one 

nation and would be allied wit;h Great 

Britain, RAINBOW accepted implicitly the 

loss of the Philippines, Wake, and Guam. 

Like ORANGE~ it assigned Army and Navy 

forces in the Philippines the mission of 

defending the Philippine Coastal Frontier, 

defined as those land and sea areas which 

it would be necessary to hold in order to 

defend Manila and Subic Bays. Also, as 

in ORANGE, the defense was to be conducted entirely by Army and Navy forces 

already in the Philippines, augmented by 

"Interv, author with Col Diller, 20 May 49. 

Wainwright mentions also that as Philippine Division commander he worked during May, June, 

and July 1941 to secure revisions of WPO-3. 

General Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, the Account of FOUT Years of Humiliating Defeat, Surrender, and Captivity (New 

York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), p. 10. 

,. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 

p. 21. 

such local forces as were available. 21 No 

reinforcements could be expected. 

MacArthur immediately objected to 

those provisions of RAINBOW relating to the 

Philippines and called for the revision of 

the plan on the ground that it failed to recognize either the creation of a high command for the Far East or the mobilization 

of the Philippine Army. In a strong letter 

to the War Department on 1 October, the 

former Chief of Staff pointed out that he 

would soon have a force'. of approximately 

200,000 men organized into eleven divisions with corresponding corps and army 

troops, as well as a strengthened air force. 

There could be no adequate defense of 

Manila Bay or of Luzon, he said, if an enemy was to be allowed to land and secure 

control of any of the southern islands. 

With the "wide scope of possible enemy 

operations, especially aviation," he thought 

such landings possible. He urged, therefore, that the "citadel type defense" of 

Manila Bay provided in the ORANGE and 

RAINBOW plans be changed to an active defense of all the islands in the Philippines. 

"The strength and composition of the defense forces projected here," General MacArthur asserted, "are believed to be sufficient to accomplish such a mission." 22 

The reply from Washington came 

promptly. On the 18th General Marshall 

informed MacArthur that a revision of the 

Army mission had been drafted in the War 

Department and was then awaiting action 

by the Joint Board, "with approval ex-

... Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW 5, Joint Board (JB) 325, Serial 642-5, OPD 

Reg Doc. 

.. Ltr, MacArthur to TAG, 1 Oct 41, sub: Opns 

Plan R-5, WPD 4178-18. MacArthur repeated 

the same request, in virtually the same language, in 

a personal letter to Marshall on 28 October 1951, 

WPD 4477-2. 
GENERAL MACARTHUR with Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright on 10 

October 1941. 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 67 

pected within the next ten days." MacArthur's recommendation that the Philippine Coastal Frontier be redefined to 

include all the islands in the archipelago, 

Marshall continued, would also be presented to the Joint Board for approval. 

The assignment of a broader mission than 

that contained in RAINBOW, Marshall explained, was made possible because of the 

increased importance of the Philippines "as 

a result of the alignment of Japan with the 

Axis, followed by the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia." 23 General 

Marshall took advantage of the fact that 

Brereton was just then leaving for the Far 

East to send his reply to MacArthur by 

personal courier. 

Brereton arrived in Manila on 3 November and was warmly greeted by his commander in chief. After reading Marshall's 

note, MacArthur, in Brereton's words, 

"acted like a small boy who had been 

told that he is going to get a holiday from 

school." He jumped up from his desk, 

threw his arms around Brereton and exclaimed, "Lewis, you are just as welcome 

as the flowers in May." Turning to his 

chief of staff, General Sutherland, he said, 

"Dick, they are going to give us everything 

we have asked for." 24 

With this notice that his plans would soon 

be approved by the Joint Board, MacArthur immediately organized his forces to 

execute the larger mission. On 4 November 

he formally established the North and South 

Luzon Forces, and the Visayan-Mindanao 

Force, all of which had actually been in 

existence for several months already.25 

Approval by the Joint Board of the 

.. Memo, Marshall for MacArthur, 18 Oct 41, 

sub: USAFFE, WPD 4175-18 . 

.. Brereton, Diaries, p. 19. 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 15. 

RAINBOW revisions requested by MacArthur was forwarded from Washington on 

21 November. In the accompanying letter, 

General Marshall made the significant observation that air reinforcements to the 

Philippines had "modified that conception 

[purely defensive operations] of Army action in this area to include strong air operations in the furtherance of the strategic 

defensive." 26 He also told MacArthur to 

go ahead with his plans "on the basis of 

your interpretation of the basic war plan." 

In the revised joint RAINBOW plan, the 

Philippine Coastal Frontier, which had been 

defined as consisting of 'Luzon and the land 

and sea areas necessary to defend that 

island, was redefined to include "all the 

land and sea areas necessary for the defense 

of the Philippine Archipelago." 27 In effect, 

this gave MacArthur authority to defend 

all of the Philippine Islands. 

The Army task originally assigned in 

RAINBOW was simply to defend the coastal 

frontier. The November revision not only 

enlarged the coastal frontier but gave MacArthur the following additional tasks: 

1. Support the Navy in raiding Japanese 

sea communications and destroying Axis 

forces. 

2. Conduct air raids against Japanese 

forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases. 

3. Co-operate with the Associated Powers 

in the defense of the territories of these 

Powers in accordance with approved policies 

and agreements.28 

... Ltr, CofS to CG USAFFE, 21 Nov 41, sub: 

U.S.-British Co-operation in the Far East, WPD 

4402-112. The first draft of this letter used the 

phrase "strong offensive air action" in the place of 

"strong air operations in the furtherance of the 

strategic defensive." 

'" Ibid., incl, extract copy of Changes in Joint 

Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 5 . 

"Ibid, 
NORTH LUZON FORCE 

(Gen WOinwriQht) 

4 Inf Divi sions I Cov ReQimenl 

LUZON 

RESERVE FORCE 2 Inf Divis ions I--'''l---rf.~ 

-. ' () 

BORNEO 

MAP 2 

VISAYAN-MJNDANAO 

(Gen Sharp) 

3 Jnf Divis ions 

•. ()JOIO 1. 

·· ·~ .' . t' .c?I':' , . 

DISPOSITION 

OF U. S. ARMY FORCES. 

FAR EAST 

8 December 1941 

--xxx- FORCE SECTOR BOUNDARY 

.,<oo"-""",.,,,O_::-:::O~ __ --l.!'OO MI LES 

SOUTH LUZON FORCE 

(Gen Porker) 

2 Inf Divisions 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 69 

It also provided specifically for a defense 

reserve for 180 days, instead of the 90-day 

level originally granted to General Grunert. 

These additional tasks recognized the existence of an effective air force in the Philippines capable of striking at Japanese lines of 

communications and bases, such as Formosa, and the fact that the Philippine Army 

had been inducted into federal service by 

including it with forces available to accomplish the tasks assigned. 

Once his plan to defend all of the islands 

had been approved, General MacArthur 

was able, on 3 December, to define the missions of the four major tactical commands 

created a month earlier. (M ap 2) The 

North Luzon Force, which had been under 

the command of Brig. Gen. Edward P. 

King, Jr., from 3 to 28 November, now 

came under General Wainwright. This 

force had responsibility for the most critical 

sector in the Philippines, including part of 

the central plains area, Lingayen Gulf, the 

Zambales coast, and the Bataan peninsula. 

General Wainwright was instructed to protect airfields and prevent hostile landings 

in his area, particularly at those points opening into the central plains and the road net 

leading to Manila. In case of a successful 

landing the enemy was to be destroyed. In 

contrast to WPO-3, which provided for a 

withdrawal to Bataan, MacArthur's plan 

stated there was to be "no withdrawal from 

beach positions." The beaches were to "be 

held at all costs." 29 

Immediately on receipt of these instructions General Wainwright was to prepare 

detailed plans to execute his mission. Front-

'" Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG North Luzon 

Force (NLF), 3 Dec 41, sub: Defense of Phil, AG 

381 (12-3-41) Phil Reds. Brig. Gen. Maxon S. 

Lough assumed command of the Philippine Division 

when General Wainwright transferred to North 

Luzon Force. 

line units were to make a reconnaissance of 

their sectors and emplace their weapons. 

Positions four hours distant from the front 

lines were to be selected for the assembly of 

troops. 

On 3 December, when Wainwright received his mission, his North Luzon Force 

consisted of three Philippine Army divisions-the 11 th, 21st, and 31st-the 26th 

Cavalry (PS), one battalion of the 45th 

Infantry (PS) on Bataan, two batteries of 

155-mm. guns, and one battery of 2.95-

inch mountain guns. The 71st Division 

(PA), though assigned to North Luzon 

Force, could be committed only on the authority of USAFFE. Wainwright was 

promised additional troops when they arrived from the United States or were mobilized by the Philippine Army. 

The South Luzon Force, under Brig. 

Gen. George M. Parker, Jr., was assigned 

the area generally south and east of Manila. 

Like the force to the north, it was to protect 

the airfields in its sector and prevent hostile 

landings. General Parker was also enjoined 

to hold the beaches at all costs. The South 

Luzon Force was much smaller than that 

in the north. I t consisted initially of only 

two Philippine Army divisions, the 41 st and 

51 st, and a battery of field artillery. Additional units were to be assigned at a later 

date when they became available. 30 

The Visayan-Mindanao Force under 

Brig. Gen. William F. Sharp was charged 

with the defense of the rest of the archipelago. Its primary mission was to protect 

the airfields to be built in the Visa yas; its 

secondary mission was to "prevent landings 

of hostile raiding parties, paying particular 

attention to the cities and essential public 

utilities." Since landings in force south of 

.. Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG SLF, 3 Dec 41, 

sub: Defense of Phil, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Reds. 
70 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

TABLE 6-ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES, USAFFE, 3 DECEMBER 1941 --- .. ---------------------------- -~~-------

Troop Assignment 

Sector 

U.S. Army Philippine Army 

Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.) 11th Division 

26th Cavalry (PS) 21st Division 

North Luzon Force Dne bn, 45th Inf (PS) 31st Division 

Btry A, 23d FA (Pk) (PS) 7lst Division (used as wBtrys Band C, 86th FA (PS) reeted by USAFF'E) 

66th QM Troop (Pk) (PS) 

South Luzon Force Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.) 41st Division 

Hq and Hq Btry, Btry A, 86th FA (PS) 51st Division 

Force Hq and Hq Co (PS) 61st Division 

Visayan-Mindanao Force 81st Division 

10 1st Division 

Hq, Philippine Dept 91st Division 

Reserve Force Philippine Division (less one bn) Hq, Philippine Army 

86th FA (PS) less dets 

Far East Air Force 

Headquarters 

59th CA (U.S.) 

60th CA (AA) (U.S.) 

Harbor Defenses 91st CA (PS) 

92d CA (PS) 

200th CA (U.S.), assigned to PCAC 

SOllrce: Ltr Orders, CG USAFFE to CG NLF. SLF, V-MF, 3 Dec 41, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Reds; USAFFE·USFIP 

Rpt of Opns, pp. 17-18. 

Luzon would not have had any decisive results, no mention was made of the necessity 

of holding the beaches.S

! 

The Visayan-Mindanao sector would also 

include the coastal defenses of the inland 

seas when these were completed and General Sharp was to provide protection for 

these as well. One battalion of the force 

was to be prepared to move to Del Monte 

in Mindanao with the mission of guarding 

the recently completed bomber base there. 

81 Ltr Order, CG USAFFE to CG V-MF, 3 Dee 

41, sub: Defense of Phil, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil 

Reds. 

No American or Philippine Scout troops 

were assigned to the Visayan-Mindanao 

Force, except those in headquarters. For 

the rest, the force consisted of the 61st, 81st, 

and 101st Divisions, all Philippine ~y. 

(See Table 6.) 

On Luzon, between the North and South 

Luzon Forces was the reserve area, including the city of Manila and the heavily congested area just to the north. This area was 

directly under the control of MacArthur's 

headquarters and contained the Philippine 

Division (less one battalion), the 91st Di-. 

vision (P A), the 86th Field Artillery (PS), 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 71 

the Far East Air Force, and the headquarters of the Philippine Department and the 

Philippine Army. The defense of the entrance to Manila and Subic Bays was left, 

as it always had been, to Gen. Moore's Harbor Defenses augmented by the Philippine 

Coast Artillery Command.32 

During the last few months of 1941 the 

training of both V.S. Army and Philippine 

Army units progressed at an accelerated 

pace. The strength of the Scouts, an elite 

organization with a high esprit de corps, had 

been hrought up to its authorized strength 

of 12,000 quickly. Membership in Scout 

units was considered a high honor by Filipinos and the strictest standards were followed in selection. To provide the training 

for the new Scout units, as well as Philippine Army units, a large number of officers 

was authorized for USAFFE. By the fall of 

1941 they began to arrive in Manila. 

Training of V.S. Army units was also intensified during this period. By the beginning of December, General Wainwright 

later wrote, "the American and Philippine 

Scout organizations were fit, trained in combat principles and ready to take the field in 

any emergency." The omission of Philippine Army units is significant. s3 

The Last Days of Peace 

Already there had been warnings of an 

approaching crisis. On 24 November the 

Pacific and Asiatic Fleet commanders had 

been told that the prospects for an agreement with japan were slight and that japanese troop movements indicated that "a 

surprise aggressive movement in any direc32 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 17-18; Ltr 

Order, CG USAFFE to CG Phil Div, 6 Dec 41, 

sub: Movement Plans, AG 381 ( 12-3-41) Phil 

Rcds . 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 26. 

tion, including attack on Philippines or 

Guam was a possibility.34 Three days later 

a stronger message, which the War Department considered a "final alert," went out to 

Hawaii and the Philippines. The Army 

commanders, MacArthur and Lt. Gen. 

Walter C. Short, were told: 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only 

the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable 

but hostile action possible at any moment. If 

hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided 

the United States desires that Japan commit 

the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a 

course of action that might jeopardize your 

defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you 

are directed to undertake such reconnaissance 

and other measures as you deem neessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur 

you will carry out the tasks assigned in RAINBOW 5 .••. 83 

At the same time the Navy Department 

sent to its Pacific commanders an even 

stronger message, to be passed on to the 

Army commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines. "This dispatch," it read, "is to 

be considered a war warning. Negotiations with japan ... have ceased and 

an aggressive move by Japan is expected 

.. Rad, OPNAV to Comdrs Pacific and Asiatic 

Fleets, 24005, 24 Nov 41 in Pearl Harbor Attack 

Hearings, Part 14, p. 1405. This message was 

given to MacArthur by Hart. 

so Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 27 Nov 41, OCS 

18136-118; Report of the Joint Committee on the 

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th 

Cong., 2d sess., Doc 244 (Washington, 1946), cited 

hereafter as Pearl Harbor Attack Report, pp. 

199-201. The message sent to Hawaii, Panama, 

and the Western Defense Command included a 

statement that the civilian population should not be 

alarmed. Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 14, 

p. 1389. Ibid., Part 39, p. 84, contains M.r. 

Stimson's account of these events; Part 3, p. 1021, 

includes a· memo, Gerow for Marshall, 27 Nov 41, 

sub: Far Eastern Situation, WPD 4544-13. 
72 

within the next few days." Navy commanders were alerted against the possibility 

of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, 

Thailand, or Malaya, and were told to take 

appropriate defensive measures,56 

Immediately on receipt of the 27 November warning, MacArthur, Hart, and 

the Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, met 

to discuss the measures to be taken. Sayre 

presented the President's view to Mr. Quezon and told him that Roosevelt was relying upon the full co-operation of the Commonwealth. s7 The next day MacArthur 

reported to the Chief of Staff the measures 

taken in the Philippines to prepare for a 

Japanese attack. Air reconnaissance had 

been extended and intensified "in conjunction with the Navy" and measures for 

ground security had been taken. "Within the limitations imposed by present state 

of development of this theater of operations," he said, "everything is in readiness 

for the conduct of a successful defense." S8 

The first week of December 1941 was a 

tense one for those in the Philippines who 

had been informed of the latest steps in the 

negotiations with Japan. American planes 

continued to notice heavy Japanese ship 

movements in the direction of Malaya, and 

unidentified aircraft-pres~med to be Japanese-were detected over Luzon. On the 

5th of December the commander of Britain's Far Eastern Fleet, Admiral Sir 

Tom Phillips, came to Manila to confer 

with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur about joint plans for defense. The 

next day news was received that a Japanese 

force had been sighted in the Gulf of Siam 

.. Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Part 14, p. 1406. 

:rr Ibid. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 1004,28 Nov 

41, OCS 18136-118. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

heading westward. Admiral Phillips left 

immediately by plane for Singapore where 

his flagship, Prince of Wales, lay at anchor, 

next to the battle cntiser Repulse.59 

On 6 December, Saturday, MacArthur's 

headquarters ordered North Luzon Force 

to be ready to move promptly to its assigned 

positions on beach defense, and Wainwright 

noted that around his headquarters at 5totsenburg "the tension could be cut with a 

knife." ~ In response to a warning against 

sabotage, MacArthur told General Arnold 

that a full air alert was in effect and all aircraft dispersed and placed under guard.41 

Sunday, 7 December-it was the 6th in 

Washington-was a normal day, "nothing 

ominous in the atmosphere, no forebodings 

or shadows cast by coming events." 42 Men 

went about their work as usual. The only 

excitement arose from the fact that the 

Clipper, with its anxiously awaited mail 

sacks, was due. The last letters from home 

had reached the Islands ten days before. 

That night the 27th Bombardment 

Group gave a party, recalled as a gala affair 

with "the best entertainment this side of 

Minsky's," at the Manila Hotel in honor of 

General Brereton.4s Brereton records conversations with Rear Adm. William R. Pur-

.. Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 36; 

Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 156-57, 

188-89. Specific instances of Japanese reconnaissance missions are noted in Edmonds, They Fought 

With What They Had, pp. 61-63. 

.., Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 17. 

"- Rad, MacArthur to Arnold, 6 Dec 41, quoted in 

Brereton, Diaries, pp. 36-37; Craven and Cate, The 

Army Air Forces in World War II, 1,191. 

.. Col James V .. Collier, Notebooks, 4 vols., 1,42. 

Colonel Collier was Assistant G-3, USAEFE and 

later G--3, Luzon Force. He kept these notebooks 

for his three sons while he was in prison camp. 

They were loaned to the author, and a photostat 

copy is on file in OCMH. They will be hereafter 

referred to as Collier, Notebooks, with the appropriate number . 

.. Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 52. 
PREWAR PLANS, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN 73 

nell and Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, 

Hart's and MacArthur's chiefs of staff, during the course of the evening. Purnell told 

him that "It was only a question of days or 

perhaps hours until. the shooting started" 

and that he was standing by for a call from 

Admiral Hart. Sutherland confirmed what 

Purnell had said, adding that the War and 

Navy Departments believed hostilities might 

begin at any time. Brereton then immediately instructed his chief of staff to place all 

air units on "combat alert" as of Monday 

morning,8 December.44 

Except for the few senior officers who had 

an intimate knowledge of events, men went 

to bed that night with no premonition that 

.. Brereton, Diaries, pp. 37-38. 

the next day would be different from the 

last. The Clipper had not arrived, and the 

last thoughts of many were of family and 

home, and the hope that the morrow would 

bring "cheerful and newsy letters." 45 Many 

listened to the radio before going to bed, 

but the news was not much different from 

that of previous days. Some heard American music for the last time. At Fort Stotsenburg a few officers of the 194th Tank 

Battalion listened to the Concerto in B Flat 

Minor before turning in. On the last night 

of peace Tschaikowsky's poignant music 

made an impression which was to be deep 

and lasting.46 

.. Collier, Notebooks, I, 42 . 

.. Col. Ernest B. Miller, Bataan Uncensored 

(Long Prairie, Minn., 1949), p. 64. 

PART TWO 

THE ISOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND 

THE JAPANESE LANDINGS 

CHAPTER V 

The First Days of War 

For those on the west side of the international date line, the "date which will live 

in infamy" came on 8 December 1941. 

Few responsible military or naval men had 

believed that the Japanese would be able to 

strike in more than one place. The number 

and diversity of their attacks took the Allies 

completely by surprise. During the early 

morning hours of the 8th, Japanese naval 

and air forces struck almost simultaneously 

at Kota Bharu in British Malaya (0140), 

Singora, just across the border in Thailand 

(0305 ), Singapore (0610), Guam (0805), 

Hong Kong (0900), Wake, and the Philippines.I 

Landing operations began almost immediately. By dawn, Japanese forces were in 

possession of Shanghai. Even as the first 

bombs were dropping on Hong Kong, J apanese troops were on their way into the 

leased territory. By the end of that day 

they were only a few miles from Kowloon, 

which they took on the 13th. Hong Kong 

fell on Christmas Day. 

Within an hour after the first bombardment of Kota Bharu, Japanese troops from 

Indochina began to land on the beaches 

against bitter opposition. The same day, 

when the main force of the 25th Army arrived, the beachhead was secured. The 

landings at Singora were unopposed. 

There, the troops marched down the east 

1 All times are Tokyo time. 

coast of the Kra Isthmus, while one division crossed the Thailand-British Malay 

border and moved down the west coast. 

Thus began a two-month campaign which 

ended with the fall of Singapore on 15 February. 

On Guam the air attacks continued for 

two days. Finally, at dawn on the 10th, 

the South Seas Detachment and supporting 

naval units landed on the island. A few 

hours later, the garrison there surrendered. 

This was the first American possession to 

fall into Japanese hands. At Wake Island, 

the Marine detachment under Maj. James 

P. S. Devereux was better prepared for the 

enemy and offered heroic resistance. The 

first attempt to land was beaten off and the 

Japanese returned to Kwajalein to lick 

their wounds and collect more troops for 

the next attempt. They were back at Wake 

on the 22d and the next morning landed in 

force. That same day the garrison surrendered.2 

The fall of Wake and Guam cut the line 

of communications between Hawaii and 

the Philippines and left the United States 

with no Central Pacific base west of Mid-

• Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., The Defense of 

Wake (USMC Hist Sec, 1947); Opns of South Seas 

Detachment, 1941-42, Japanese Studies in World 

War II, No. 36, p. 3. For operations at Hong Kong 

and in Malaya, see Japanese Landing Operations, 

December 8, 1941-June 8, 1942, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Campaign Study 3. 
7B 

way, 4,500 miles from Manila. But even 

before this, on the first day of war, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had destroyed 

the Battle Force of the Pacific Fleet and 

nullified all plans to come to the aid of the 

Philippines. 

East of the date line, Vice Adm. C. Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Striking Force of six 

carriers reached its launching position 200 

miles north of Oahu exactly on schedule, at 

0600 on the morning of 7 December (0100 

of the 8th, Tokyo time). Two Jakes (Zerotype reconnaissance planes), which had 

taken off at 0530 to reconnoiter, returned 

with the report that, except for the richest 

prize, the three carriers, the entire Pacific 

Fleet was in port. Pilots of the First Air 

Fleet, amidst shouts of "banzai" from their 

comrades, took off from the flight decks 

and climbed above the overcast into a magnificent sunrise. At 0750, while "Pearl 

Harbor was still asleep in the morning 

mist," 3 the Japanese planes came in over 

the island. Five minutes later, just an 

hour before Nomura presented his government's reply to Mr. Hull, they dropped their 

first bombs.' 

The next two hours of that Sabbath 

morning in Hawaii were a nightmare. 

Bombs and torpedoes dropped everywhere, 

on the ships in the harbor, on Army installations, on depots, and other targets. Dive 

bombers machine-gunned planes on the 

ground and men on the ships. Within a 

a The quotation is from an account by a Japanese 

naval officer and is quoted in Morison, Rising Sun 

in the Padfic, p. 94. 

• At 0800, Admiral Kimmel broadcast the message: "Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill .. " 

Secretary Knox, when he read the message in Washington' exclaimed, "My God! This can't be true, 

this must mean the Philippines." Pearl Harbor 

Attack Report, p. 439. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

half hour every battleship at Pearl Harbor 

had been badly damaged. 

Hickam and Wheeler Fields were 

struck in the first attacks. The Army 

planes, parked in close order, wing tip to 

wing tip, made perfect targets. By ten 

o'clock the raid was over and the last Japanese planes had returned to their carriers, 

leaving behind them death and destruction. 

Tactical surprise had been as complete as 

strategical surprise.5 

The Japanese pilots knew exactly what 

to go after. Though there were ninetyfour naval vessels in the harbor they concentrated on the Battle Force, sinking 3 

battleships, capsizing 1, and damaging 4 

more. In addition to the battleships, 3 light 

cruisers, 3 destroyers, and miscellaneous 

vessels were badly damaged. Ninety-two 

naval planes were lost and 31 damaged. 

The Army lost a total of 96 planes, including 

those destroyed in depots and those later 

stripped for parts. Army and Navy installations were badly hit. Fortunately, the 

Japanese failed to destroy the repair shops 

at Pearl Harbor or the oil tanks, filled to 

capacity. The carriers, then at sea, escaped 

the attack altogether. American casualties 

for the day were 2,280 men killed and 1,109 

wounded. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft and 5 midget submarines. "The astoundingly disproportionate extent of 

losses," concluded the Joint Committee 

which investigated the attack, "marks the 

• The best account of the attack on Pearl Harbor 

has been written by Morison, Rising Sun in th. 

Pacific, Ch. V. For the Air Forces story, see 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, I, 194-iOl. Much personal testimony and 

first-hand accounts of the attack can be found scattered through the Congressional hearings on the 

Pearl Harbor attack.. A summary of the action can 

be found in Pearl Harbor Attack R.port. pp. 53-72. 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

greatest military and naval disaster in our 

Nation's history." 6 

With this smashing blow, the Japanese 

made obsolete the carefully prepared plans 

of defense in the event of war in the 

Pacific.7 The RAINBOW plan called for the 

progressive movement of the Pacific Fleet 

across the Central Pacific by the capture of 

the Caroline and Marshall Islands and the 

establishment of an advanced base at Truk. 

The fleet would thus open the line of communications, establish superiority in the 

western Pacific, and come to the relief of 

the Philippine Islands. Along this protected line of communications would flow 

the supplies and men that would enable 

the Philippine garrison to beat back any 

Japanese effort to seize the Islands. By 

1000 on the morning of 7 December, the 

force required to put RAINBOW into effect, 

the Battle Force of the Pacific Fleet, lay in 

ruins in Pearl Harbor. The Philippines 

were isolated, cut off from the nearest base 

5,000 miles away, even before they had felt 

the first blow of the war. Their only hope 

now lay with the Far East Air Force and 

the Asiatic Fleet. 

The Attack on Clark Field 

The duty officer at Asiatic Fleet headquarters in the Marsman Building in Ma-

• Pearl Harbor Attack Report, p. 65. The breakdown of casualties is as follows: 

Killed 

Navy and MarineL _______ 2,086 

Army__________________ 194 

TotaL_______________ 2, 280 

Wounded 

749 

360 

1,109 

In an earlier volume of this series, Watson, Chief 

of Staff, page 517, the number of dead is placed at 

2,403, including civilians. Mr. Watson's figures 

are from Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, page 

126, and are based on 1947 estimates. 

'Min, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41, OPD Reg Doc. 

79 

nila on the night of 7-8 December (Philippine time) was Lt. Col. William T. Clement, USMC. At 0230 of the 8th (0800, 

7 December, Pearl Harbor time), the 

operator at the Navy station intercepted 

the startling message, "Air Raid on Pearl 

Harbor. This is no drill." Recognizing 

the technique of the sender, an old friend 

stationed at Pearl Harbor, the operator 

brought the message to Colonel Clement. 

Within a half hour, it was in Admiral Hart's 

hands. He broadcast the news to the fleet 

immediately, and then, with his chief of 

staff, hurried to his office.s 

Shortly after 0330 General Sutherland 

received the news of the Pearl Harbor attack, not from the Navy but from commercial broadcasts. He passed the news on to 

MacArthur over the private wire to the 

general's penthouse apartment in the Manila Hotel, then notified all commanders 

that a state of war existed with Japan. 

Troops were ordered to battle position immediately.9 

At Clark Field the news flash about Pearl 

Harbor was also picked up from commercial broadcasts. The operator immediately 

notified headquarters at the field and all 

units were alerted. "I knew," Brereton 

later wrote, "we could expect an attack 

from the Japs any time after daylight." Before leaving for MacArthur's headquarters, he ordered Colonel Eubank, the 

• Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 

36-37; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 168-

69. Captain Morison secured additional information from Admiral Hart by interview after the war. 

• Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against Japan, 

p. 27; Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 

p. 18; intervs, author with Col Diller, 24 Aug 

49, Gens Sutherland and Marshall, 12 Nov 46 and 

7 Apr 48, OCMH. Admiral Hart states that 

Colonel Clement, unable to "get response from 

USAFFE Headquarters," passed the news "to one 

of the staff duty officers at his home." Ltr, Hart 

to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 19 Dec 51, OCMH. 
80 

bomber commander at Clark Field, to come 

down to Manila at once. At about 0500 in 

the morning Brereton was waiting outside 

MacArthur's office for orders.10 

By breakfast, the news of the attack on 

Pearl Harbor had reached all ranks. The 

men had for so long accepted the fact that 

war with Japan might come that the event 

itself was an anticlimax. There was no 

cheering and no demonstration, but "a 

grim, thoughtful silence." 11 War with 

J a pan was not, for the American and Philippine troops, a remote war across a wide 

ocean. It was close and immediate. 

Prologue to Attack 

On Formosa airfields, 500 miles away, 

Japanese Army and Navy pilots were standing by, their planes gassed and ready to 

take off for Luzon, when the first news of 

Pearl Harbor reached Manila. Around 

midnight of the 7th dense clouds of heavy 

fog had closed in on the island, blanketing 

airfields and preventing the scheduled takeoffs at dawn. 

This unforeseen development filled the 

Japanese commanders with nervous apprehension. The timetable for the attack was 

extremely close and left little leeway. As 

the early morning hours rolled by, anxiety 

increased. By this time, the Japanese believed, the American high command in the 

Philippines would have received news of 

Pearl Harbor and either sent the Far East 

Air Force southward or set up an effective 

defense against the impending raid. All 

hope of surprise would be lost. 

Even more frightening was the possibility 

10 Brereton, Diaries, pp. 38-39. It is evident from 

internal evidence that the diary for this period was 

put in its present form at a later date and cannot 

therefore be considered always a contemporaneous 

record. 

11 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 34. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

that this delay would enable the heavy 

bombers of the Far East Air Force to attack 

the planes lined up on Formosa fields. Indeed, at 0800, the Japanese intercepted an 

American radio message which they interpreted as meaning that such an attack 

would come off in two hours. At 10 10 a 

Japanese plane mistakenly reported B-l7's 

approaching Formosa and the frightened 

Japanese began passing out gas masks.12 

Japanese fears of an American attack 

against Formosa were not without foundation. Such plans had already been made 

and target data had been prepared. The 

objective folders were far from complete, 

however, and lacked calibrated bomb-target 

maps and bomb release lines for given 

speeds and altitudes. "But we had something complete enough," thought Capt. Allison Ind, a Far East Air Force intelligence 

officer, "to make this bombing mission a 

very far cry from the blind stab it would 

have had to be otherwise." 13 

" Interrog of Capt Takahashi Chihaya, Imperial 

Japanese Navy (IJN), 20 Oct 45, and of Comdr 

Ryosuke Nomura, Opns Officer, 23d Air Flotilla, 

11th Air Fleet, 28 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols. (Washington 

1946) 1,74-76; II, 531; 14th -Army Opns, 1,41. 

It is difficult to understand the origin of the 0800 

message.. While there was discussion of such a raid 

at USAF FE, there was no need to send radios on 

the subject. I t is possible that orders sending 

. B-17's at Clark aloft to avoid being caught on the 

ground were in some way intercepted and misunderstood by the apprehensive Japanese. 14th Army 

Opns, I, 41, refers to the report as "intelligence 

reports," but does not indicate its origin any further. 

5th Air Gp Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 

No.3, p. 6. 

U Lt. Col. Allison Ind, Bataan, The Judgment 

Seat (New York, 1944), p. 92. Material used with 

the permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers. 

The official air force account of the attack on 

Clark Field is contained in Craven and Cate, The 

Army Air Forces in World War 11, I, 201-14. 

General Brereton has a full ac't:ount in his Diaries, 

pages 38-44, which must be considered as the evidence of an interested party in the dispute which 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

On his first visit to USAFFE headquarters about 0500, General Brereton had been 

unable to see MacArthur and had talked 

with Sutherland. At that time he had requested permission to carry out a daylight 

attack against Fonnosa. MacArthur's chief 

of staff had told him to go ahead with the 

necessary preparations, but to wait for MacArthur's authorization before starting the 

attack. Brereton returned to his headquarters at Nielson Field, where he talked with 

Colonel Eubank, who had just flown down 

from Clark Field. Orders were issued to 

get the B-l7's ready. At about 0715 Brereton apparendy went to MacArthur's headquarters again to request permission to attack Fonnosa. Again he was told by 

Sutherland to stand by for orders.14 

later arose over responsibility for the disaster. 

Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, Chapter III, 

covers the Clark Field attack and is substantially 

the same as that given in the air force history. 

Official records of the events surrounding the 

attack are practkally nonexistent. An effort has 

been made by the author to supplement the existing 

accounts with interviews with those participants 

not interviewed by the air force historians. Persons 

interviewed were Generals Sutherland and R. J. 

Marshall, Colonels Diller, Collier, and Campbell, 

the last of whom was aircraft warning officer of 

USAFFE. 

Mr. Walter D. Edmonds, who was commissioned 

by the air force to write the account of air operations 

in the Philippines, interviewed General Sutherland 

in Manila in June 1945, as well as a large number 

of air force officers. A copy of his notes taken on 

the Sutherland interview is included in Army Air 

Action in Phil and NEI, Appendix 9, and a portion 

is printed in Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces 

in World War II, I, 205. The information Edmonds secured is directly at variance with information the present author secured in two interviews 

with General Sutherland. Edmond's findings are 

embodied in an article entitled "What Happened at 

Clark Field," The Atlantic (July 1951), pp. 20-33. 

10 Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, 

entry of 8 Dec 41, in Air University Hist Off. This 

document is evidently a tran~cription from notes 

hastily made during December 1941. Errors in 

dating the year of entry are explained as the result 

81 

About this time the Far East Air Force 

commander received a transoceanic telephone call from his air force chief, General 

Arnold. Brereton explained what he was 

trying to do, and Arnold told him what had 

happened at Pearl Harbor, so that, as he 

later explained, Brereton would not be 

caught in the same way and have his "entire 

air force destroyed." 1.3 

By this time, reports of enemy flights 

were being received at air force headquarters and planes of the Interceptor Command 

were sent up. Around 0800 the heavy 

bombers at Clark Field were ordered aloft 

on patrol, without bombs, to avoid being 

caught on the ground. 

At 1000 Brereton renewed his request to 

take offensive action. "I personally called 

General Sutherland," he says, "and infonned him ... that if Clark Field was attacked successfully we would be unable to 

operate offensively with the bombers." 16 

Again the request was denied. Ten minutes later, Colonel Eubank started back to 

Clark Field with instructions to dispatch a 

photogra phic reconnaissance mission immediately to southern Formosa. 

of "harried field conditions." Despite the imperfections of this document it remains one of the few 

written contemporary sources for the events of 

8 December 1941. Ltr, Col Wilfred J. Paul, Air 

University Hist Off, to Gen Ward, 7 Dec 51, 

OCMH. The official air force account in Craven 

and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 

I, 206 note, takes cognizance of the mistakes in 

dating in this document. Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," pages 24-26, contains an 

excellent account of the discussions at air force 

headquarters that morning. 

111 Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New 

York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 272. 

10 Brereton, Diaries, p. 40. The author has also 

used a letter written by Brereton to the AAF Hist 

Off expanding the diary entries. lst Ind, Brereton 

to Paul, 30 Jan 43, Air University Hist Off. See 

also Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," 

p.25. 
82 

No sooner had those orders been issued 

than Brereton received a telephone call 

from General MacArthur. He told MacArthur that since Clark Field had not yet 

been attacked, he would hold the bombers 

in readiness until he received reports from 

the reconnaissance mission already authorized. They agreed that if no reports 

were received, the bombers would attack 

Formosa late that afternoon. MacArthur 

left to Brereton "the decision for offensive 

action." 17 

Brereton called in his staff and told them 

of his conversation with MacArthur. Orders were then dispatched to Clark Field to 

call in the heavy bombers. Three were to 

be readied for the photo reconnaissance 

mission; the others were to be briefed for 

offensive missions. At 1120 Field Order 

No.1 of the Far East Air Force was sent 

by teletype to Clark Field. It confirmed 

Brereton's instructions to Eubank, given at 

1045, to attack southern Formosa with two 

heavy bombardment squadrons "at the 

latest daylight hour today that visibility will 

permit." By 1130 the bombers were 

back on the field, being loaded with 100-

and 300-pound bombs; the fighters had 

also returned to base for refueling. At 1156 

Brereton gave Sutherland a full report of 

the situation over the telephone, and informed him that he planned to attack Formosa fields late that afternoon.18 

General Sutherland's account of the pro11 Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, 

entry of 8 Dec 41. General Brereton omits entirely any mention of his conversation with General 

MacArthur, and states that he received the authorization to attack Formosa at 1100 from General 

Sutherland. In an interview with the present 

author in June 1951, Sutherland declared that he 

does not recall that Brereton spoke with MacArthur 

that morning. Brereton, Diaries, p. 41. 

18 Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, entry 

of 8 Dec 41. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

posed raid on Formosa differs from the air 

force story. On one occasion, Sutherland 

recollected that there had been some plan 

to bomb Formosa on 8 December but that 

"Brereton said he had to have the photos 

first." On another occasion Sutherland 

took the opposite and more consistent position that when Brereton asked for permission to attack Formosa, he, Sutherland, had 

ordered a reconnaissance first.lD 

General MacArthur's statements do not 

throw any light on this question. He had 

received word from Washington early that 

morning (at 0530) that hostilities with J apan had begun, and that he was to carry 

out the tasks assigned in RAINBOW. 20 

Brereton's surmise, therefore, that he was 

not permitted at first to attack Formosa because MacArthur was under orders not to 

attack unless attacked first and that the 

Pearl Harbor attack "might not have been 

construed as an overt act against the Philippines" must be dismissed.21 MacArthur had authority to act, and RAINBOW 

specifically assigned as one of his missions 

"air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius 

of available bases." 22 

,. The first version was given in his interview 

with Walter D. Edmonds in Manila in June, 1945. 

The second version was given in an interview with 

the present author in November 1946. This author 

interviewed Sutherland a second time in June 1951 

and on being presented with both versions, Sutherland was most emphatic in asserting that it was he 

who had ordered the reconnaissance because 

Brereton did not have sufficient information to 

warrant an attack against Formosa. USAFFE and 

air force records do not contain any material relating to this incident. 

... Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 736, 7 Dec 

41, WPD 4544-20. 

lit Brereton, Diaries, p. 39n; Itr, Brereton to Paul, 

Air University Hist Off. 

.. Ltr, CofS to CG USAFFE, 21 Nov 41, sub: 

U.S.-British Co-operation, incl, War Plan RAINBOW 5, WPD 4402-112. 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

General Brereton's surmise, however, 

was not entirely without foundation. It 

was evidently based on the 27 November 

warning from the War Department. That 

warning had stated that "if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires 

that Japan commit the first overt act." 23 

The War Department had been careful, 

however, not to restrict MacArthur's freedom of action, and had authorized him 

in the same message to "undertake such 

reconnaissance and other measures as you 

deem necessary" prior to hostile Japanese 

action. In the event of war he was to execute the tasks assigned in RAINBOW. 

In the period between the receipt of this 

message and the outbreak of hostilities, the 

B-17's had flown reconnaissance missions 

north of Luzon in the direction of Formosa. Their search sectors, according to 

General Sutherland, reached to "the southern edge of Formosa with one segment of 

the pie running up the east coast of the island a little way." 24 But General Brereton 

declares that he was instructed by MacArthur to limit reconnaissance to "twothirds of the distance between North Luzon 

and Southern Formosa." 25 Later, he says, 

he secured permission to extend the northern limit of the search sector to the international treaty boundary between the Philippines and Formosa.26 On the basis of Sutherland's statement, then, it was possible to 

conduct a partial reconnaissance of Formosa before the war; according to Brereton there was no prewar reconnaissance on 

MacArthur's orders. 

.. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 27 Nov 41, No. 

624, WPD 4544·13; see above, Ch. IV, p. 71. 

.. Inte.rv, Edmonds with Sutherland, Jun 45, and 

confirmed in interv, Morton with Sutherland, 12 

Nov 46. 

II Brereton, Diaries, pp. 34-35. 

"Ibid. 

83 

On Brereton's proposal to bomb Formosa, General MacArthur expressed himself most clearly. When Brereton's diaries 

were published in 1946, MacArthur released a statement to the press recounting 

in full his recollection of the events of 8 

December 1941. The press release, issued 

on 27 September 1946, read: 

General Brereton never recommended an 

attack on Formosa to me and I know nothing 

of such a recommendation having been 

made .... That it must have been of a most 

nebulous and superficial character, as no official record exists of it at headquarters. That 

such a proposal, if intended seriously, should 

have been made to me in person by him; that 

he never has spoken of the matter to me either 

before or after the Clark Field attack. That 

an attack on Fonnosa with its heavy concentrations by his small bomber force without 

fighter support, which because of the great 

distance involved, was impossible, would have 

had no chance of success.27 

On 8 December, in summarizing the results of the Japanese attack, MacArthur had 

told the War Department: "I am launching a heavy bombardment counterattack 

tomorrow morning on enemy airdromes in 

southern Formosa." 28 It is evident, then, 

that MacArthur himself planned, by the 

afternoon or evening of the 8th, to execute 

an attack against Formosa with the remaining B-17's. 

Faced with these conflicting accounts, the 

historian can be sure only of five facts: (1) 

That an attack against Formosa was proposed; (2) that such an attack was deferred 

in favor of a photo reconnaissance mission 

requested either by Brereton or Sutherland; 

( 3) that about 1100 on 8 December a strike 

lIT New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6 . 

2' Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1133, a Dec 

41. The raid was canceled the next day. Rad, 

MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1135,9 Dec 41. Both 

in AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 
84 

against Formosa, to take place that day, 

was finally authorized; (4) that the heavy 

bombers were back on Clark Field after 

1130 on the morning of 8 December; and 

( 5) that MacArthur planned an attack 

against Formosa for the morning of 9 

December. 

The Attack 

The Japanese, fearing an air attack 

against Formosa, had meanwhile made 

haste to get their planes off the ground. The 

fog, which had grounded the 11th Air 

Fleet, had lifted to the east at dawn, permlttmg twenty-five twin-engine Army 

bombers to take off for Luzon.29 

Shortly before 0900 the Japanese Army 

bombers were reported by the aircraft warning service on Luzon to be heading south 

over Lingayen Gulf in the direction of 

Manila. It was probably this report that 

sent the B-17's at Clark Field aloft without 

bombs. The 20th Pursuit Squadron at 

Clark took off to intercept the strike and 

the 17th Pursuit Squadron rose from Nichols Field to cover Clark. But the Japanese 

Army planes, limited to targets north of 

the 16th latitude, turned east as they approached Lingayen Gulf. One group 

struck Tuguegarao at about 0930 while another concentrated on barracks and other 

installations at Baguio, the summer capital 

of the Commonwealth, where Quezon was 

staying at this time. The Japanese bombers returned to base without having sighted 

any American aircraft. Far East Air Force 

reports between 1000 and 1030 of a flight 

of enemy bombers, first in the Cagayan 

valley, and then "turned around and pro-

.. 5th Air GP Opns, p. 16. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ceeding north," apparently referred to these 

Japanese Army planes. 3o 

By the time the false report of approaching B-l7's had been received on Formosa, 

the fog had lifted sufficiently to permit the 

naval planes of the 11 th Air Fleet to take 

off. At 1015, a force of 108 twin-engine 

bombers escorted by eighty-four Zeros set 

out for Clark and Iba. Only the very best 

and most experienced pilots had been assigned to this important mission. 31 

As the Japanese planes approached northern Luzon, the airborne American aircraft 

received the all-clear signal and were instructed to land. By 1130 nearly all the 

planes were back at their bases. The two 

squadrons of B-17's were on Clark Field, 

loading with gas and bombs for the raid 

against Formosa. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was also at Clark after its vain attempt 

to intercept the last Japanese flight. At 

Nichols, the 17th Pursuit Squadron, which 

had been covering Clark, was landing to 

refuel. The 3d and 34th Pursuit Squadrons were standing by at Iba and Del Carmen. 32 

Shortly before 1130, reports of an approaching enemy formation began coming in to the plotting board at Nielson. 

.. Summary of Activities, Far East Air Force, 

S Dec 41; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces 

in World War II, I, 207-08; Edmonds, "What 

Happened at Clark Field," p. 24; 5th Air GP Opns, 

p. 16; USSBS, Japanese Air Power (Washington, 

1946), p. 7. 8l Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 

6-7; interrog of Capt Takahashi and Comdr 

Nomura, USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 75; II, 531. 

.. The account of the attack is based, except where 

otherwise noted, on Craven and Cate, The Army 

Air Forces in World War II, I, 207-13; Brereton, 

Diaries, pp. 38-44; History of the Fifth Air Force 

(and its Predecessors); Edmonds, "What Happened 

at Clark Field," pp. 28-31; Japanese Naval Opns 

in the Phil Invasion, p. 6; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 12. 
THE FIR~T DAYS OF WAR 

In addition to radar reports, almost every 

postmaster along the northwest coast of 

Luzon reported the high-flying enemy bombers to the air warning center by telephone 

or telegraph.83 Colonel George, chief of 

staff of the Interceptor Command, was in 

the plotting room when the reports were 

coming in, and predicted "that the objective of this formidable formation was Clark 

Field." 84 

At about 1145, according to Col. Alexander H. Campbell, the aircraft warning 

officer, a warning message went out to 

Clark Field by teletype. If the message did 

not get through, as is frequently asserted, 

this fact was not known to the officers in 

the plotting room at Nielson. It is asserted 

also that an attempt to warn the field by 

radio over the Far East Air Force net was 

made, but with no success. The reason for 

this failure can only be guessed. Col. James 

V. Collier, a 0-3 officer in USAF FE headquarters, later stated, "The radio operator 

had left his station to go to lunch," and 

another source states, "Radio reception was 

drowned by static which the Japanese probably caused by systematic jamming of the 

frequencies." 85 Apparently other available means of communication, such as the 

long distance telephone lines, telegraph, and 

the command radio net to Fort Stotsenburg, 

were not used or thought of. Colonel 

Campbell did get a telephone message 

through to Clark Field and talked with an 

unknown junior officer there. This officer 

intended, said Campbell, to give the base 

commander or the operations officer the 

message at the earliest opportunity.86 

.. Collier, Notebooks, I, 49. 

'" Ibid. 

.. Ibid., 50; Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, 

p.55. 

•• Interv, author with Col Campbell, Sep 46; 

Collier, Notebooks, I, 50. Colonel Campbell's note85 

Meanwhile, Colonel George at Nielson 

had dispersed his fighters to meet the attack. The 34th Squadron was ordered to 

cover Clark Field; the 17th, the Bataan peninsula; and the 21st, the Manila area. The 

3d Squadron at Iba was dispatched to intercept a reported enemy formation over 

the South China Sea.31 At Clark Field, two 

squadrons of B-l7's and the 20th Pursuit 

Squadron were still on the ground. Sometime shortly before 1145 the fighters were 

ordered aloft as soon as refueling was completed to cover their own base.38 

The 3d Pursuit Squadron took off from 

Iba to intercept the enemy flight over the 

South China Sea. A thick haze of dust 

prevented the 34th at Del Carmen from takingoff, and at 1215 the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark, whose planes had just completed refueling, made ready to take off.39 

At that moment the first formation of 

Japanese bombers appeared over Clark 

book contains the following entry: Sgt. Alfred H. 

Eckles, Hopkinsville, Ky., was on duty with Maj. 

Sam Lamb's communication detail Hqrs. F. E. A. F. 

Dec. 8th and carried message to Teletype operator 

re flight of planes heading toward Clark Field, saw 

it sent and acknowledged as received by them. 

This at about 11 :45 (?) A. M., about 30-45 min. 

before arrival of bombers and bombing of Clark 

Field. I, together with Coyle, George and Sprague 

watched this particular flight for considerable length 

of time. I kept urging them to do something about 

it, but they insisted on waiting until they reached 

a certain distance from field. Sprague typed wrote 

out message showed it to George and myself. I 

asked what "Kickapoo" meant in message. Was 

told it meant, "Go get 'em." Sprague then took 

message into Teletype Room for transmission, about 

15 minutes before bombing. 

8'1 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War 11, I, 209 . 

.. Hist of Fifth Air Force, p. 16. This statement 

would imply that Colonel George was in communication with the pursuit squadron at Clark Field 

after 1145, although the Bomber Command could 

not be reached at this time . 

.. Hist of Fifth Air Force, p. 16. 
86 

Field.40 All but one of the B-17's was lined 

up on the field and the fighters were just 

getting ready to take off. After the warning of the Pearl Harbor attack, and after 

the loss of several valuable hours because of 

bad weather, the Japanese pilots did not 

expect to find so rich a harvest waiting for 

them. But they did not question their good 

fortune. The first flight of Japanese planes 

consisted of twenty-seven twin-engine 

bombers. They came over the unprotected 

field in a V-formation at a height estimated at 22,000 to 25,000 feet, dropping 

their bombs on the aircraft and buildings 

below, just as the air raid warning sounded. 

As at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese achieved 

complete tactical surprise. 

The first flight was followed immediately 

by a similar formation which remained 

over the field for fifteen minutes. The 

planes in this formation, as in the first, accomplished their mission almost entirely 

without molestation. American antiaircraft 

shells exploded from 2,000 to 4,000 feet 

short of the targets. After the second formation of bombers, came thirty-four Zeroswhich the Americans believed were carrier based-to deliver the final blow with 

their low-level strafing attacks on the 

grounded B-l7's, and on the P-40's with 

their full gasoline tanks. This attack lasted 

for more than an hour. 

With the first high wail of the siren, the 

men on the field below streamed from the 

mess halls. As the bombers passed over, 

.. It is not possible to state the exact time of this 

attack. Like so many other matters, this question, 

too, is controversial. The author has selected this 

time, about 1220, since it is supported by the weight 

of evidence. Walter D. Edmonds gives the time as 

1240 in his account of the attack. They Fou.ght 

With What They Had, pp. 100, 102n. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the Americans could see the falling bombs 

glistening in the sunlight. Then came the 

explosions, hundreds of them, so violent that 

they seemed to pierce the eardrums and 

shake the ground. Throwing aside momentary disbelief and stupefaction, the men 

rushed to their battle stations. The scene 

was one of destruction and horror, unbelievable to the men who only a few minutes before had been eating lunch or servicing the 

planes. Flash fires sprang up and spread 

rapidly to the trees and long cogon grass 

around the field "roaring and crackling like 

an evil beast." 41 Dense smoke and a heavy 

cloud of dust rose over the field. 

Against such odds, the Americans could 

offer little opposition. The 200th Coast 

Artillery (AA) experienced considerable 

difficulty with its 3-inch gun ammunition, 

the most recent of which was manufactured 

in 1932. The percentage of duds was abnormally high and "most of the fuses were 

badly corroded." Only one of every six 

shells fired, says one observer, actually exploded. 42 Acts of personal heroism were 

commonplace. Ground and combat crews 

manned the guns of the grounded planes, 

and men dashed into flaming buildings to 

rescue their comrades as well as supplies 

and equipment. Others braved the strafing 

gunfire to aid the wounded. One private 

appropriated an abandoned truck and made 

seven trips with wounded men to the station 

hospital. 

During the attack, 3 P-40's of the 20th 

Pursuit Squadron managed to get into the 

air, but 5 more were blasted by bombs as 

<1 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 67. 

"Ibid.; Prov CA Brig (AA) Rpt of Opns, p. 3, 

Annex IX, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns; interv, 

author with Gen Sage, 28 Feb 51. 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

they taxied for the take-off. 43 A similar 

number was caught in the strafing attack. 

The 3 airborne fighters shot down 3 or 4 

Japanese fighters. 

The 34th Pursuit Squadron, still at Del 

Carmen, could see the great clouds of smoke 

rising from Clark. The old P-35's of the 

squadron finally managed to take off and 

were soon in action against the superior 

Zeros over Clark. Though outclassed and 

outnumbered, the squadron knocked down 

three enemy fighters without loss to itself. 

But few of its planes were without serious 

damage. The 17th and 21st Pursuit Squadrons, on patrol over Bataan and Manila, 

made no effort to attack the Japanese aircraft, presumably because the communications center at Clark had been bombed out 

and news of the raid did not reach the Interceptor Command in time to dispatch 

aid. 44 

The 11th Air Fleet's attack against Clark 

was even more successful than the worried 

Japanese had expected. The operation had 

been well planned and executed. The first 

flights of bombers had concentrated on the 

hangars, barracks, and warehouses, and left 

them a burning ruin. Some of the grounded planes had been damaged in these bombings but the greatest casualties were inflicted by the low-level attacks of the Zeros 

which followed. Cailualties in men were 

fifty-five killed and more than one hundred 

wounded. 

Simultaneously with the raid against 

Clark, other 11 th Air Fleet planes were at-

.. This account of the operations of the 20th Pursuit Squadron is based on an interview with the 

squadron commander, Col. Joseph H., Moore, 12 

August 1949. It varies slightly from the official 

air force account which places four planes in the 

air before the attack. 

.. I t is strange that the pilots over Bataan and 

Manila did not see the heavy columns of smoke and 

dust rising from Clark, only fifty miles away. 

87 

tacking the fighter base at Iba. The 12 

planes of the 3d Pursuit Squadron, which 

had been patrolling over the China Sea, 

Iowan gas, returned to baile. As they were 

circling to land, Iba Wail struck by 54 J apanese twin-motored naval bombers escorted 

by 50 Zeros. Effective action by the P-40's 

resulted in the loss of 2 Japanese fighters 

(pro babies) and kept the Zeros from carrying out the low-level attacks which were so 

successful at Clark. But the losses at Iba 

were almost as great as at Clark. Barracks, 

warehouses, equipment, and the radar station were destroyed. Ground crews suffered heavy casualties and all but 2 of the 

3d Squadron'S P-40's were lost. 

The reaction from Washington headquarters of the Air Forces Wail delayed but 

explosive, despite a radio from MacArthur 

stating that the losses had been "due to 

overwhelming superiority of enemy 

forces." 45 General Arnold, when he received the news of the losses in the Philippines, "could not help thinking that there 

must have been some mistake made somewhere in my Air Force command," and he 

decided "to tell Brereton so." 43 Brereton 

had just returned from an inspection of 

Clark Field when he received a transoceanic 

telephone call from an irate General Arnold 

asking "how in the hell" an experienced 

airman like himself could have been caught 

with his planes down. Apparently he felt 

his explanation had not satisfied General 

Arnold, for he immediately reported the 

conversation to MacArthur and asked his 

help in presenting the situation to the Army 

Air Forces chief. According to Brereton, 

MacArthur was furious. "He told me to 

go back and fight the war and not to worry," 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Arnold, 10 Dec 41, AG 381 

(11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

•• Arnold, Global Mission, p. 272. 
88 

Brereton recorded in his diary. "As I 

walked out of his office he asked Sutherland 

to get General Marshall on the phone." 47 

Unfortunately, there is no record of the telephone conversation that followed. 

Thus, after one day of war, with its 

strength cut in half, the Far East Air Force 

had been eliminated as an effective fighting 

force. Of the modern combat aircraft, 

only 17 of the original 35 B-17's remained. 

Fifty-three P-40's and 3 P-35's had been 

destroyed, and an additional 25 or 30 miscellaneolls aircraft (B-lO's, B-18's, and 

observation planes) were gone. In addition, many of the planes listed as operational 

were heavily damaged. Installations at 

Clark and Iba were either burned out or 

badly hit. Total casualties for the day 

were 80 killed and 150 wounded. The 

total cost to the Japanese was 7 fighters. 48 

The conclusion of the Joint Congressional 

Committee which investigated the Pearl 

Harbor attack, that it was the greatest military disaster in American history, is equally 

applicable to the Philippines. 

Post-M ortem 

The catastrophe of Pearl Harbor overshadowed at the time and still obscures the 

extent of the ignominious defeat inflicted on 

American air forces in the Philippines on 

the same day. The Far East Air Force had 

been designed as a striking force to hit the 

enemy before he could reach Philippine 

.. Ibid.; Brereton, Diaries, p. 50. General Sutherland has no recollection of such a telephone . call. 

Interv, author with Sutherland, 12 Jun 51. 

.. Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 7. 

An additional fighter of the 4th Carrier Squadron 

was lost at Davao. Craven and Cate, The Army 

Air Forces in World War II, I, 213. There is some 

disagreement on the number of P-40's lost, some 

sources placing the figure as low as 42. USSBS, 

Japanese Air Power, p .. 7. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

shores. The heavy bombers were an offensive weapon, thought capable of striking 

the enemy's bases and cutting his lines of 

communication. Hopes for the active defense of the Islands rested on these aircraft. 

At the end of the first day of war, such hopes 

were dead. 

The tragedy of Clark Field, where the 

heavy bombers were caught like so many 

sitting ducks, becomes even more tragic 

when one considers the strange sequence of 

events that preceded it. Even before the 

war, the danger of basing the B-17's on 

Clark Field had been recognized. General 

MacArthur had written to General Marshall on 29 November, "The location of 

potential enemy fields and types of aircraft 

indicate that heavy bombers should be located south of Luzon where they would be 

reasonably safe from attack." He intended 

at the time to base the bombers in the 

Visayas. 49 Time did not permit the construction of fields there, but before the outbreak of hostilities he did order General 

Brereton to move the heavy bombers from 

Clark Field to Mindanao.5o 

During the first week in December, 

Brereton had sent two squadrons of B-l7's 

to the recently constructed field at Del 

Monte in Mindanao. The decision to move 

only two squadrons, Brereton states, was 

based on the expected arrival from the 

United States of the 7th Bombardment 

Group which was to be stationed at Del 

Monte. Had all the heavy bombers on 

Clark been transferred to Mindanao, there 

would have been no room for the 7th when 

it arrived. 51 

.. Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, '29 Nov 41, WPD 

3489-21. 

•• New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6; 

interv, author with Sutherland, 12 Nov 46. 

OJ Brereton, Diaries, pp. 35-36. 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

General Sutherland's version of the same 

incident differs considerably from that of 

the air force commander. It was at his insistence, he recollected, that even the two 

squadrons were sent south. "General 

Brereton," he says, "did not want them to 

go." Sutherland says he had ordered all 

the B--17's moved to Del Monte. On checking, he had found that only half of the 

planes had been sent and that General MacArthur's orders had not been obeyed.52 

Wherever the responsibility lies for failing to move all the B-I7's south, there still 

remains the question of why the remaining 

bombers were caught on the ground. 

Brereton argues that had he been permitted 

to attack Formosa when he wished, the 

planes would not have been on the field. 

Implicit is the assumption that if the raid 

had been successful, the Japanese could not 

have made their own attack. MacArthur 

denied knowledge of such a proposal in 

1946, but in a radio sent on 8 December 

1941 he stated that he intended to attack 

Formosa the next morning. General Sutherland, in one interview, claimed that Brereton was responsible for deferring the 

attack, and in another interview, that he 

himself deferred the attack because the Far 

East Air Force did not have sufficient target 

data for such an attack. It is clear that 

this project was discussed by Brereton and 

Sutherland, that MacArthur mentioned it 

in a radio that day, and that authorization 

to execute the attack was delayed until 1100 

that morning. 

Whether such an attack would have 

had a serious chance of success is not argued by either Sutherland or Brereton. 

Knowing now what the Japanese had at 

•• Intervs, author and Edmonds with Sutherland. 

General Kenney was also told this story by Sutherland. General Kenney Reports, p. 27. 

89 

Formosa, the possibility of a successful raid 

by the B-I7's seems extremely remote. 

The Far East Air Force admittedly had 

sketchy information on the strength and 

disposition of the Japanese forces on Formosa. Had it been known that there were 

over five hundred Japanese planes waiting 

on Formosa, ready to take off, it is doubtful 

that anyone would have considered the 

project seriously. Moreover, the B-I7's 

would have had to fly to Formosa, out of 

fighter range, unescorted. Once there, 

they would have been greeted by swarms of 

Zeros. "An attack on Formosa, with its 

heavy air concentrations," MacArthur 

later wrote, " ... was impossible, would 

have had no chance of success." ~3 Sutherhmd's request for a photo reconnaissance 

mission prior to an attack would appear, 

therefore, to have been entirely justified. 

The heavy bombers were indeed far too 

valuable to risk in so hazardous a mission. 

Another unresolved question is why the 

warning of approaching Japanese aircraft 

did not reach the bomber commander at 

Clark Field in time to meet the attack. All 

forces in the Philippines had knowledge of 

the attack on Pearl Harbor hours before the 

first Japanese bombers appeared over Luzon. A dawn raid at Davao had given 

notice that the Japanese had no intention 

of bypassing the archipelago. The early 

morning bombings on Luzon gave even 

more pointed warning that an attack 

against the major airbase in the Islands 

could be expected. Colonel Campbell testifies that Clark Field had received word of 

the approaching Japanese aircraft before 

the attack. Colonel Eubank states that no 

such warning was ever received. Other officers speak of the breakdown of commu53 New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6. 
90 

nications at this critical juncture. There 

is no way of resolving this conflicting 

testimony. 

Assuming that Colonel Eubank did not 

receive the warning from Nielson Field, 

there still remains one final question. Were 

the aircraft on the field adequately dispersed for wartime condition? It is not 

possible to state definitely how the aircraft 

were dispersed when they came in at 1130. 

There surely must have been some recognition of the danger of an enemy air attack at 

any moment. The Japanese state that they 

were "surprised to find the American aircraft lined up on the field." 34 And at least 

one flight of four B-I7's was lined neatly 

on the field when the Japanese came over. 

Captain Ind tells of finding photographs, 

one of which was taken by an American 

pilot flying over the field, showing the 

planes inadequately dispersed for any but 

high-level bombing attacks. "This entire 

set of photographs," he says, "was removed 

from my desk a few nights later. No one 

seemed to know what had happened to 

them." s.5 This question, like the others, 

remains unanswered. 

The full story of the events which preceded the Japanese air attacks against the 

Far East Air Force on the first day of the 

war will probably never be known. There 

was no time for reports, and if any records 

ever existed they have since been lost. The 

historian must rely on the memories of participants whose stories conflict at numerous 

points. General Arnold, eight years after 

the event, wrote that he was never able "to 

get the real story of what happened in the 

Philippines." Brereton's diary, in his opin-

.. Interrog of Oomdr Nomura, 28 Nov 45, USSBS, 

Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 531; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 6. 

.. Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, p. 101. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ion, did not provide "a complete and accurate account," and General Sutherland's 

story "does not completely clear it up, by 

any means." 56 

Whatever the answers to the questions 

one may ask about the events of 8-9 December 1941 on Luzon, the significance of 

these events is clear. As at Pearl Harbor, 

the Japanese had removed in one stroke the 

greatest single obstacle to their advance 

southward. The Philippine garrison could 

expect little help in the near future. It was 

now almost entirely surrounded. The only 

path open lay to the south, and that, too, 

soon would be closed. 

The Fleet Moves South 

The mission of the Asiatic Fleet in the 

event of war was to support the defense of 

the Philippines "as long as that defense 

continues." The actual employment of local naval defense forces was entrusted to 

the commander of the 16th Naval District, 

who was responsible for the joint tactical 

and strategical employment of his forces in 

co-operation with the Army. The commander of the Asiatic Fleet, at his discretion 

and when the situation demanded, was authorized to "shift base to British and Dutch 

ports." 57 

The. force assigned for this task was pitifully small and deployed over a distance of 

more than 1,500 miles, from northern Luzon to Borneo. In the Manila Bay area 

were 5 destroyers, 2 of which were under 

repair and 3 on patrol; 27 submarines with 

their 3 tenders-3 of the underwater craft 

IS6 Arnold, Global Mission, p. 272 . 

"Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW 5 (Short Title: 

WPL-46) , 26 May 41, Oh. III, reproduced in 

Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings, Exhibit 129, Part 

18, p. 2875. 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

were being overhauled; 28 Catalinas (twinengine patrol bombers or PBY's) ; 4 utility 

planes; and 1 observation plane. The 

planes were organized into Patrol Wing 10 

under Capt. F. D. Wagner, with one full 

squadron operating from Sangley Point, 

Cavite, and the remainder from Olongapo. 

In addition, there were 6 gunboats, a similar number of motor torpedo boats, 5 minesweepers, and other auxiliary craft in the 

area. At Mariveles was the floating dry 

dock Dewey. The installations of the 16th 

Naval District, commanded by Rear Adm. 

Francis W. Rockwell, were centered in Manila and Subic Bays-at Cavite, Corregidor, and Olongapo--with approximately 

2,000 officers and men assigned. The reorganized and strengthened 4th Marines, 

with a strength of 1,600 and commanded by 

Col. Samuel L. Howard, was at Olongapo.58 

The bulk of the surface strength of the 

Asiatic Fleet, organized into Task Force 

5, was based south of Manila Bay. The 

flagship of the task force, the heavy cruiser 

Houston, was at Iloilo, in Panay. The 

light cruiser Boise, which belonged to the 

Pacific Fleet, was also in the Visayas, off 

Cebu, where she had gone after her arrival 

in Manila on 4 December with an Army 

convoy. At the Dutch Borneo port of 

Tarakan was the light cruiser Marblehead 

accompanied by 5 destroyers, and at Balikpapan were 4 more destroyers and a tender.59 The remaining 2 submarines of the 

'S Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 

30 ff; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 

158-60. Strength of the 16th Naval District and 

4th Marines was obtained from papers lent to the 

author by Admiral Rockwell, and from rad, COM 

16 to OPNAV, 31 Dec 41, Off of Naval Rcds. 

'" The deployment of the fleet southward had 

been made as a result of the war warning of 27 

November which ordered a "defensive deployment." 

91 

Asiatic Fleet were on patrol off the Luzon 

coast, 1 in Lingayen Gulf and another in 

Sorsogon Bay. Patrolling to the south and 

linking up with the Dutch patrols from 

Borneo were 2 small aircraft detachments, 

1 at Davao and another on a small island 

south of Palawan.60 

On the morning of 8 December, the only 

portion of the Asiatic Fleet to come under 

fire was the small aircraft detachment at 

Davao with the tender Preston. After the 

attack from the Ryujo-based dive bombers 

and fighters, Preston let pass four Japanese 

destroyers, and then slipped out of Davao 

Gulf to escape southward. 

Before noon of the 8th, Rear Adm. William A. Glassford, commander of Task 

Force 5 and recently arrived from China, 

left by plane for Iloilo to hoist his flag 

aboard the Houston. He was joined there 

by the Boise from Cebu. That evening the 

aircraft tender Langley, protected by two 

destroyers, slipped out of Manila Bay under 

cover of darkness to join the cruisers at 

Panay. From there Glassford, on orders 

from Admiral Hart, led his small fleet south 

to Dutch Borneo to pick up oil and to assemble the rest of his force. He met no 

enemy ships on the way, only a long line 

of merchant vessels making good their escape.B1 Thus, by the end of the first day 

of war, the striking force of the Asiatic 

Ltr, Hart to Ward, 19 Dec 51, OCMH. The destroyers at Balikpapan were ordered to Batavia on 

6 December, and en route were redirected to Singapore. They were later recalled to Borneo to join 

the rest of Task Force 5. Hart, Narrative of 

Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 36, 4l. 

00 The disposition of the fleet is also covered in 

The Java Sea Campaign, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Combat Narratives, pp. 1-6. 

., Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 37; 

The Java Sea Campaign, ONI Combat Narrative, 

pp.4-6. 
92 

Fleet, Task Force 5, was steaming south, 

and on 10 December had left Philippine 

waters. 

The .lapanese Gain Air and Naval 

Supremacy 

The Japanese followed up their successes 

of the first day of war with a series of air 

attacks aimed at destroying or driving 

American air and naval power from the 

Philippines. Before dawn of the 9th 7 Japanese naval bombers struck Nichols Field 

near Manila. The Japanese had planned a 

larger attack but the fog had again rolled 

in over Formosa during the early morning 

hours. The 7 bombers were enough to do 

the job. The loss of 2 or 3 P-40's, as well 

as other planes, and the destruction of 

ground installations completed the havoc 

begun at noon the previous day.6z 

On the 9th ground crews worked desperately to patch up the damaged planes, 

and units were reorganized. Antiaircraft 

defenses, especially in the Manila area, 

were strengthened, and one battery of the 

60th Coast Artillery (AA) which had left 

Corregidor after dark on the 8th was in position on the morning of the 9th to furnish 

local protection for the port area, Nichols 

Field, and the oil storage and railroad 

yards.63 About five hundred men of the 

200th Coast Artillery (AA) from Clark 

Field were dispatched to Manila during the 

day, supplied with equipment from the 

Philippine Ordnance Depot, and organized 

into a provisional antiaircraft regiment, later 

designated the 515th.64 

.. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 213; Japanese Naval Opns in 

Phil Invasion, pp. 6-7. 

"' HarboT Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 18. 

.. Prov CA Brig Rpt of Opns, p. 1. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The air attack against Formosa which 

General MacArthur had promised for the 

9th never materialized. 65 At 0800 one 

B-17 took off from Clark Field for a photo 

reconnaissance mission over Fonnosa but 

was forced back because of mechanical difficulty. Army fighters flew reconnaissance 

missions over northern Luzon and the 

PBY's of Patrol Wing 10 continued their 

patrols to the west and northwest. Numerous reports of enemy sightings were received but on investigation proved to be 

unfounded. Such reports, Hart noted, 

placed all Japanese vessels in one of two 

categories, "either a Transport or a Battleship !" 66 The Japanese also searched north 

Luzon during the day for evidence of American air activities.67 

On the 9th, the thirteen heavy bombers 

on Mindanao moved forward to Luzon. 

Six of the Flying Fortresses landed at illfated Clark Field at 1430; the rest reached 

San Marcelino, an emergency field along 

the west coast of Luzon, later in the afternoon. The B-17's at Clark refueled and 

took off immediately after their arrival, remaining in the air until dark to avoid being 

caught on the ground as had the others the 

day before. 6s 

50 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1133,8 Dec 

41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

.. Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 38; 

Brereton, Diaries, p. 45; interv, Edmonds with 

Sutherland, Jun 45. 

" 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 16. 

<. Graven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 214. There seems to be some 

confusion as to the number of B-I7's at Del Monte. 

The History of the Fifth Air Force states that only 

12 heavy bombers were based there. Brereton 

states that 16 B-I7's had gone to Mindanao on 

the 5th, and Craven and Cate, as well as Brereton, 

state that 13 flew up from Mindanao to Clark Field 

on the 9th. Brereton, Diaries, pp. 36, 44-45; 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

WaT II, I, 214. The author has accepted these 

last figures. 
JAPANESE AIR ATTACK ON 10 DECEMBER 1941 left warehouses on fire at 

Nichols Field, above; below, at Cavite Navy Yard, small-arms shells explode (left) 

as the torpedo-loaded barge (center) burns. 
94 

The weather over Formosa on the morning of 10 December was threatening, but 

the Japanese, anticipating a change for the 

better, decided to press their advantage. 

Naval planes took off about 1000 to strike 

Luzon again. This time the target was the 

Manila Bay area. 69 First warning of the 

approach of Japanese planes reached the 

Interceptor Command at Nielson Field at 

1115, and fighters were immediately dispatched to cover Manila Bay, the port area, 

and Bataan. A half hour later, the enemy 

aircraft hit the Del Carmen Field near 

Clark, and the Nichols and Nielson Fields, 

near Manila. So severe was the attack 

against Nichols and so great the number 

of bombs dropped that the men at Nielson, 

nearly two miles away, thought the bombs 

were falling on their own field. The pattern set at Clark Field two days earlier was 

repeated. High-level bombers came in first 

and hit the barracks, offices, and warehouses. The fighters then came in at low 

level to strafe the grounded planes and installations. American planes returning to 

refuel were attacked by Zeros and destroyed. 

There was no antiaircraft fire and no fighter 

protection over the field; all the pursuits 

were engaged over Manila Bay.N 

The naval base at Cavite received no 

less attention than Nichols Field. The 

Japanese force had divided north of Manila, 

and part had turned east toward the army 

installations. The rest, 54 bombers, had 

continued south toward Cavite on the south 

shore of Manila Bay. Half of these bombers attacked ships and small craft in the 

bay and the remainder went on toward the 

... Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 7-8. 

,0 Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, pp. 119-20; 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, I, 218; Diary of Cpl L. Arthutick, 17th 

Pursuit Sq, OCMH; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil 

Invasion, p. 7. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

naval base. With maddening deliberation, 

the bombers flew over Cavite, dropping 

their bombs from a height of 20,000 feet, 

above the range of the 9 3-inch antiaircraft 

guns protecting the base. Almost every 

bomb fell within the navy yard. After the 

first run, the first flight withdrew and the 

other 27 bombers, having completed their 

attack against ships in the bay, flew in to 

strike the target. 71 

The attack lasted for two hours. As at 

Clark and Nichols, the opposition was feeble 

and the damage extensive. The entire yard 

was set ablaze; the power plant, dispensary, 

repair shops, warehouses, barracks, and 

radio station received direct hits. Greatest 

damage was done by the fire which spread 

rapidly and was soon out of control. Admiral Rockwell estimated that five hundred 

men were killed or seriously wounded that 

day.72 The large submarine Sea/ion received a direct hit, but Seadragon was 

pulled away in time by its tender. The 

most serious loss to the submarine force, 

however, was the destruction of well over 

two hundred torpedoes. 73 

Throughout the attack, Admiral Hart 

had watched the destruction of Cavite from 

atop the Marsman Building. That night, 

after receiving an account of the damage 

done, he reported to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington that he regarded 

Manila untenable as a naval base since the 

... Admiral Rockwell, Narrative of Naval Activities in Luzon Area, 1 Dec 41-19 Mar 42, p. 4, Off 

of Naval Rcds; J apanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 7; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 

p. 171. 

T. Rockwell, Naval Activities in Luzon Area, p. 4. 

TO Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p .. 172; The 

Java Sea Campaign, ONI Combat Narrative, p. 6. 

Admiral Hart states that the submarine torpedoes 

had been moved to Corregidor and that the torpedoes lost were destroyer torpedoes. Ltr, Hart to 

Ward, 19 Dec 51, OCMH. 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

enemy had control of the air, but promised 

to "continue submarine and air operations 

as long as possible." 74 He then sent 2 destroyers, 3 gunboats, 2 submarine tenders, 

and 2 minesweepers south to join Task 

Force 5. "It is unfortunate," he noted in 

his report, "that two or three additional 

small ships were not sent south at this 

time." 7~ 

The naval vessels were not the only ships 

to move south. At the start of the war 

there had been about forty large merchant 

ships, many with valuable cargoes, in Manila Bay. The Navy had promptly closed 

the bay to all outbound traffic, and had 

extinguished the lighthouses on Corregidor 

and two other outlying islands.76 Fortunately the merchant vessels had escaped 

attack during the first day of operations. 

In the next two days, many commercial 

vessels sought protection in Manila Bay and 

were guided through the mine fields by the 

inshore patrol. During the attack of the 

10th, the Japanese had dropped a few 

bombs among these ships, scoring one hit. 

Admiral Hart had told the shipmasters on 

the 11 th that their vessels would be safer 

in Visayan ports, and that evening the commercial vessels began to steam out of Manila 

Bay. All but one finally escaped.77 The 

Japanese had missed a golden opportunity 

to cripple Allied shipping. 

On the morning of the 11 th the fires at 

<ORad, CINCAF to OPNAV, 10 Dec 41,101330, 

War Diary of 16th Naval Dist, Off of Naval Rcds. 

The Navy Department approved Hart's action and 

at a meeting of the Joint Board on 10 December 

informed the Army of Hart's decision. Min, JB 

Mtg, 10 Dec 41, OPD Reg Doc. 

.. Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p., 39. 

•• Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 17. Later, 

on 16 December, limited use of the lighthouse on 

Carregidor was allowed. 

'1'l Ibid.; Hart, Narrative of Events, As,iatic Fleet, 

pp.39-40. 

95 

Cavite were burning more fiercely than 

ever. Evidently there was no chance of 

saving the yard. When Rockwell reported 

to Hart in Manila that day the two men 

agreed to salvage as much as possible from 

the ruins. Remaining supplies were to be 

distributed among the installations at 

Manila, Corregidor, and Mariveles. The 

base at Sangley Point was to be maintained 

as long as possible, and when no longer 

tenable the radio station and fuel supply 

were to be moved to Corregidor.1s 

Meanwhile, the Japanese air force continued the systematic destruction of the air 

and naval forces remaining in the Philippines. There had been no raids on the 

11 th, largely because the weather over 

Formosa had been bad. The planes returning from the raid on the 10th had been 

forced to set down wherever they could, 

thus scattering units among the many Formosan fields. The next day was spent in 

reassembling the units:9 On the 12th 

and 13th the Japanese again attacked 

in force. On these two days hundreds of 

Japanese Army and Navy planes struck 

targets on Luzon at will in a final effort to 

destroy the remnants of the Far East Air 

Force and the Asiatic Fleet. 

By this time 'American air power was at 

a low ebb. There were only 22 P-40's in 

commission, with 6 more promised if they 

could be repaired in time. In addition, 

between 5 and 8 P-35's and a handful of 

the obsolete P-26's were operational. Sixteen heavy bombers were still in commission but 5 of these were suitable only for 

low-altitude flights and another 4 were not 

fit for tactical missions. With the Far 

East Air Force thus reduced in strength it 

'II Rockwell, Naval Activities in Luzon Area, pp. 

5-6. 

.. Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 7-8. 
96 

was decided to use the remaining planes 

for reconnaissance in order to conserve them 

as long as possible. The pursuit planes 

were based at Clark and Nichols, and the 

heavy bombers were withdrawn to Del 

Monte. On the morning of the 12th few 

American planes remained to hinder the 

Japanese.so 

The enemy attack on the 12th came at 

noon, the hour when Clark and Cavite had 

been hit. Sixty-three naval bombers from 

Takao in Formosa arrived over Central Luzon between 1130 and 1200 and struck Iba 

and Clark Fields. Only a small number of 

planes flew over Clark; the remainder delivered the main attack against Iba, reporting the destruction of ten planes on the 

ground. 81 

That morning, the PBY's at Olongapo 

had been dispatched on a fruitless search 

for a nonexistent Japanese carrier reported 

off the Luzon coast. They were followed 

in by a Japanese force of Zeros which had 

been escorting a large number of bombers 

in a scheduled strike against one of the 

Manila fields. When the mission was canceled on account of poor weather over the 

target, the Zeros sought targets elsewhere. 

The returning PBY's offered an opportunity too good to be missed. Unseen by the 

Americans, the Japanese planes waited for 

the seven Navy patrol bombers to land, and 

then destroyed them at leisure.~2 These 

same planes then went on to attack Batangas before returning to Formosa. MacAr8() Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 218-19; Brereton, Diaries, p. 51; 

Ind. Bataan, The Judgment Seat, p. 124; Hist of 

Fifth Air Force, p. 22. 

S1 Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p .. 8. 

American sources do not mention an attack at Iba. 

82 Ibid.; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 173. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

thur reported at the end of the day that "the 

crescendo of enemy air offensive was rapidly 

rising," with attacks by at least 113 planes. 

"Pilots have been ordered to avoid direct 

combat," he explained, in order to make a 

"show of strength and to have air reconnaissance." 83 

The next day almost 200 Japanese planes 

were over Luzon. The first attack came at 

dawn against Del Carmen. At 1030 and 

at 1100 Clark Field was attacked. About 

the same time Baguio and Tarlac were hit. 

These early strikes were made by Army 

planes. At 1230 the naval bombers put in 

an appearance. During the afternoon, Del 

Carmen, Clark, Nichols, Cabanatuan, and 

Batangas were hit at least once. The fields, 

already strewn with wrecked planes, received further damage. Over Subic Bay 

additional PBY's were destroyed, leaving 

less than a full squadron in Patrol Wing 10. 

By the end of the day, American Army and 

Navy air power in the Philippines had been 

virtually destroyed.84 

One thing was clear to Admiral Hart by 

this time: the United States forces in the 

Philippines were on their own. With the 

loss of air power the possibility of effective 

naval support was extremely limited and the 

sea lanes along which reinforcements could 

be expected to travel were closed. He felt, 

therefore, that he must salvage what he 

could of the Asiatic Fleet for later operations in the defense of the Malay Barrier. 

On 14 December he sent out the remaining 

bombers of Patrol Wing 10, together with 

three tenders and such extra personnel 

83 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, 12 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

84 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 22; Japanese Naval Opns 

in Phil Invasion, p. 8; The Java Sea Campaign, 

ONI Narrative, p. 7. 
THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR 

and spare parts as could be carried southward.8lS Staff officers, including the chief 

of staff of the Asiatic Fleet, followed by 

plane and by boat. All that remained of 

the Asiatic Fleet in Philippine waters were 

2 destroyers (1 under repair), 6 motor torpedo boats, 2 tenders, 3 gunboats, and various small craft, in addition to the 27 submarines. Admiral Hart himself decided to 

remain in Manila as long as the underwater 

craft could be operated and serviced from 

there.86 

The position of the heavy bombers in 

Mindanao had by now become precarious. 

The Japanese were flying extensive reconnaissance missions in an effort to discover 

the remaining American aircraft. Thus far 

they had been unable to find the Del Monte 

field, but it was only a question of time before this last haven would be discovered and 

destroyed. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult to service the B-17's with 

the inadequate facilities at Del Monte. 

There were no spare parts, engines, or propellers for the B-17's in the Philippines; 

B-18's and damaged B-l7's had to be cannibalized to keep the bombers flying. The 

only tools were those in the possession of 

the crews. The men who worked on the 

planes all night often got no rest the next 

day because of air alerts. On some days the 

heavy bombers had to remain aloft during 

the daylight hours to avoid destruction on 

the ground. They dodged back and forth 

... Hart, Narrative of Events. Asiatic Fleet, p. 4l. 

.6 Ibid.; rad, CINCAF to Naval Observer, Singapore, 16 Dec 41, 160755, War Diary of 16th Naval 

Dist, Off of Naval Reds. 

97 

between Mindanao and Luzon, playing "a 

game of hide-and-seek that wore out men 

as well as planes." 81 

Under these conditions, it was evident 

that the remaining heavy bombers could 

not operate efficiently in the Philippines. 

General Brereton therefore requested authorityon 15 December to move the B-17's 

to Darwin in northwest Australia, 1,500 

miles away, where they could be based 

safely and serviced properly. His intention 

was to operate from fields near Darwin, using Clark and Del Monte as advance bases 

from which to strike enemy targets in the 

Philippines. Sutherland approved the plan 

the same day and secured General MacArthur's concurrence. The planes were immediately prepared for the long flight 

southward, and two days later the first group 

of B-I7's left Del Monte airfield. By the 

following evening ten of the bombers had 

reached Batchelor Field outside Darwin. 

They had left Mindanao none too soon, 

for on the 19th the field at Del Monte received its first major air attack from Japanese planes based on the carrier RyujO.B8 

By 15 December the air strength of the 

Philippines had been reduced to a handful 

of fighters. All hopes for preventing the 

main Japanese landings soon to come and 

for keeping the supply routes open rested 

now on these few planes and on the submarines of the Asiatic Fleet. 

.. Brereton, Diaries, p. 55 . 

.. Hist of Fifth Air Force, p. 21 ; Brereton, Diaries, 

pp. 55, 57, 59; Craven and Cate, The Army Air 

Forces in World War II, I, 221-22. The Darwinbased B-l7's flew missions against the Japanese in 

Mindanao on 22 and 24 December. 
CHAPTER VI 

The First Landings 

The Japanese did not wait for the destruction of American air and naval forces 

to begin landings in the Philippine Archipelago. Hours before the first Japanese 

plane had taken off to attack targets in the 

Philippine Islands, three task forces had 

sailed south from Formosa ports under cover 

of darkness on the evening of 7 December 

(Tokyo time). Their destination was the 

Philippine Islands; two were to land on 

northern Luzon, and the third was headed 

for the tiny island of Batan about 150 

miles to the north. The next day another 

task force left Palau and steamed toward 

Legaspi, near the southeast tip of Luzon. 

At the same time, a fifth task force, scheduled to seize Davao, the principal port in 

Mindanao, was assembling at Palau. 

(Map 3) 

Altogether, the Japane~e planned six advance landings: Batan Island, Aparri, Vigan, Legaspi, Davao, and Jolo Island. All 

but the last two were on or near Luzon 

and were designed to provide the Japanese 

with advance bases from which short-range 

fighters could attack the fields of the Far 

East Air Force and support the main landings to follow. A base at Legaspi, the Japanese believed, would, in addition to providing an airfield, give them control of San 

Bernardino Strait, between Luzon and 

Samar, and prevent the Americans from 

bringing in reinforcements. The landings 

at Davao and Jolo Island were designed to 

secure advance bases for a later move southward into the Netherlands Indies. The 

Japanese hoped also, by landing in Mindanao, to isolate the Philippine Archipelago 

from Allied bases to the south and to cut 

the American route of withdrawal and 

supply. 

The forces assigned to these landings were 

small, even for such limited objectives. But 

to secure so many detachments for the advance landings, General Homma had had to 

weaken seriously the two combat divisions 

Imperial General Headquarters had allotted to him for the Philippine invasion. Not 

one of the advance landing detachments was 

strong enough to withstand a determined 

counterattack; the largest was only about 

as large as a regiment, and the smallest was 

hardly stronger than a company. Moreover, the timetable for invasion was a complicated one and could easily be upset by 

any unexpected event. 

It has been claimed that the preliminary 

landings were part of a clever Japanese 

scheme to draw the American forces toward widely separated points and then cut 

them off by later landings.1 There is no 

evidence for such a view. General Homma 

had no intention of drawing the American 

troops to the landing points and was not 

naive enough to hope to deceive the Americans by so obvious a ruse. Nor did he have 

the troops to spare for such an effort. The 

size of the forces assigned to the preliminary 

1 Japanese Land Opns, 8 Dec 41-8 Jun 42, Campaign Study 3, 18 Nov 42, MIS; Wainwright, The 

Wainwright Story, p. 27; Hunt, MacArthur and the 

War Against Japan, p. 36. 
ADVANCE 

• 

~ JAPANESE LANDINGS ~ 

~ 8 -20 Dec ember 1941 

". MINOO~ 

"VV Q'q ~.'~ li"i '. b' V '-:) • SAMAR 

: ANAY ~~ LEYTE lJ ~ , 

. ,q Q 

NEGROS ~ , 

<l • 

BORNEO 

R. Jo/tu/Oll.e 

MAP3 
100 

landings and the places selected for the 

landings revealed their true purpose almost 

immediately to the American command. 

Batan Island 

The first Japanese invaders on Philippine soil went ashore on Batan Island in 

Luzon Strait, midway between Formosa 

and Luzon, at dawn 8 December. The 

invasion force, which had left the Formosan ports of Takao and Hozan on the 

evening of the 7th, consisted of 2 transports 

escorted by 1 destroyer, 4 torpedo boats, 

and a large number of other small vessels. 

Aboard the transports was a naval combat 

unit of 490 men as well as air corps troops 

who were to establish an airbase on the island. The combat troops quickly seized 

the airfield near Basco, and air force troops 

came ashore1 to inspect the field. It was 

found to be barely suitable for fighter and 

reconnaissance planes, but to require expansion for large-scale operations. The 

next day, while construction crews worked 

on the field, planes of the 24th and 50th 

Fighter Regiments began operations from 

the Basco base. 

When the success of the attack on Clark 

Field became known, the Japanese discontinued work on the Batan Island field. 

Such a base was now unnecessary. Early 

on the morning of the 10th, the men of the 

3d Gunboat Division, part of the Batan Attack Force, seized Camiguin Island to the 

south. A seaplane base was immediately 

established on the island by the naval base 

force, thus providing the Japanese with an 

airbase only thirty-five miles north of 

Aparri.2 

'14th Army Opns, I, 40; Japanese Naval Opns 

in Phil Invasion, p. 11; 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 12, 

16; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp., 161, 174. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The Americans did not oppose the Batan 

Island landing and seem to have been entirely unaware of it. In fact, General MacArthur reported on the 9th after the 

Batan Island landing, that the enemy had 

not yet landed.s It is extremely unlikely 

that even if USAF FE had been warned of 

the assault any effort would have been made 

to meet it. On the morning of the 8th, 

American planes were being sent aloft to 

intercept reported enemy flights over Luzon. 

By the 10th the Far East Air Force had 

already been reduced to half strength, and 

the Japanese had begun to land on the 

island of Luzon itself. 

The Landings on North Luzon 

Luzon is a curiously shaped island. The 

northern part of the island is about 125 

miles wide, with only one major indentation along the west coast, at Lingayen Gulf. 

Mountain ranges extend along the east and 

west coasts to the central plains just above 

Manila. The range on the east extends 

southward to Tayabas Bay. To the west of 

the central plain are the Zambales Mountains which face the South China Sea across 

a narrow coastal plain. The southern portion of Luzon is narrow and irregular in 

shape, trailing away in a southeasterly direction for 180 miles. 

North of Manila, the island of Luzon is 

shaped like a mittened, giant right hand, 

palm down, with the index finger pointing 

directly at Formosa. Lingayen Gulf lies 

between the thumb and the forefinger. 

From Lingayen south across the top of the 

hand, like so many veins, are the highways 

and roads leading to Manila. At the tip of 

the ring finger lies Aparri, and midway 

• Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1135,9 Dec 

41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 
LUZON 
102 

along the forefinger is Vigan. Both were 

next on the Japanese timetable for invasion. 

Aparri was, before the war, a fairly large 

port with a population of 26,500. Located 

at the mouth of the Cagayan River and at 

the head of the Cagayan valley, with 

formidable mountain ranges to the east, 

west, and south, Aparri could be reached 

from the central plains only by way of 

Balete Pass from the south or by the coastal 

road around the northern tip of Luzon. 

The most direct route from Manila to 

Aparri, along Route 5 through the pass, 

was 275 miles long; the more circuitous 

route along the coast was 100 miles longer. 

The Americans could safely assume that 

any force landing at Aparri would not have 

Manila as its destination. The Cagayan 

valley was not the route of invasion. 

Vigan, the capital of Hocos Sur Province, 

lies on the western shore of Luzon, about 

220 miles north of Manila on Route 3. To 

the east lie the Cordillera Mountains separating the Cagayan valley from the narrow 

coastal plain. About three miles south of 

Vigan is the mouth of the Abra River, one 

of the five principal waterways of Luzon. 

The port for Vigan is Pandan, on the north 

bank of the river's mouth, linked to the 

provincial capital by a hard-surface, allweather road. 

Both Aparri and Vigan were in the area 

defended by General Wainwright's North 

Luzon Force. With only three Philippine 

Army divisions, a Philippine Scout cavalry 

regiment and infantry battalion, one battery of field artillery, and a quartermaster 

troop, General Wainwright had to defend 

an area about 625 miles long and 125 miles 

wide at its widest point. The most he could 

spare for the entire northern portion of 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Luzon was one partially trained and 

equipped Philippine Army division, the 

11 th, commanded by Col. William E. 

Brougher. His task was made even more 

difficult by the absence of headquarters personnel and corps troops necessary to direct 

and support operations in so large an area. 

The 11 th Division, like the other Philippine Army reserve divisions, had begun to 

mobilize in September. At the start of the 

war, its infantry regiments were only at twothirds their authorized strength of 1,500 

men per regiment; its artillery was in the 

process of mobilization and had not yet 

joined the division; service elements had 

joined, but had not yet been organized or 

trained as units. Transportation was practically nonexistent. The division suffered 

from a serious shortage of equipment. Individual training, especially in rifle marksmanship, scouting, and patrolling, was inadequate. Only one regiment of the 

division had begun to train in units larger 

than company or battery size.4 

The 11 th Division, with responsibility for 

the entire area north of Lingayen Gulf, was 

spread butter thin. Most of the division 

was in position along the gulf as far north 

as San Fernando, La Union.5 Beyond that 

point it maintained only small patrols. One 

battalion of the division, the 3d Battalion, 

12th Infantry, was assigned to defend all 

of the Cagayan valley. This battalion had 

its command post at Tuguegarao, with one 

• NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 3-5, Annex 

IV, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns; USAFFEUSFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 10. 

~ There are two towns named San Fernando in 

northern Luzon, both of which figure largely in the 

campaign. One is in La Union Province, along 

the shore of Lingayen Gulf. The other is in 

Pampanga Province, and is the gateway to Bataan. 
THE FIRST LANDINGS 

company posted fifty miles to the north, at 

Aparri. There were no troops at Vigan.6 

For the landings in north Luzon General 

Homma organized two forces from the 48th 

Division's 2d Formosa Infantry Regiment. 

The force which was to land at Aparri 

numbered approximately 2,000 men. Its 

main infantry element was the regimental 

headquarters, the 2d Battalion, and half of 

the 1st Battalion. In command was Col. 

Toru Tanaka, the regimental commander, 

hence the name Tanaka Detachment. The 

unit scheduled to take Vigan was known as 

the Kanno Detachment, after the commander of the 3d Battalion, 2d Forrriosa.1 

It was of approximately the same size and 

composition as the Tanaka Detachment, 

and included the rest of the 2d Formosahalf of the 1st Battalion and the 3d Battalion.a 

The Japanese attached a great deal of 

importance to the success of the Vigan and 

Aparri landings, and what they lacked in 

ground troops they made up in naval escort. As a cover force, Vice Adm. Ibo Takahashi personally led a flotilla consisting of 

• NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 6-8; Capt 

Wayne C. Liles, 12th Infantry (PA), p. 4, Chunn 

Notebooks, OCMH. The notebooks of Capt Cal. 

vin E. Chunn, an officer of the 45th Infantry (PS), 

contain a large number of brief unit histories. 

These were compiled in prison camp where Captain 

Chunn interviewed officers from many of the units 

which had fought in the campaign and then wrote 

the information in his notebooks. Copies of the 

unit histories are on file in OCMH where they are 

collected in a folder entitled Chunn Notebooks. 

References to these histories throughout this volume 

specify their location in Chunn Notebooks. 

, Full name and rank of Kanno is unknown. He 

was either a lieutenant colonel or major. 

8 14th Army Opns, I, 32-33. Interrogs, Col 

Nakajima, 14th Army staff officer, 25 Apr 47; Col 

Haba, 14th Army staff, Apr 47; Lt Gen Susumu 

Morioka, comdr of 16th Div, 24 Apr 47; Maj 

Kotoshi Doba, 5th Air Gp staff, 19 Apr 47, all in 

Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil 

Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I. 

103 

two heavy cruisers, the Ashigara and Maya, 

one light cruiser, two destroyers, and a converted seaplane tender. He left Mako on 

8 December with his fleet, and on the morning of the 10th was about 200 miles west 

of Vigan.9 

The transports left Mako on the evening of 7 December, about the same time as 

the Batan Island Attack Force. The 14th 

Army staff watched them sail with misgivings. The success or failure of these 

preliminary landings would have a tremendous effect upon the main landings to 

follow, and the Japanese feared that the 

Americans might discover and heavily 

damage, if not destroy, the two detachments.'O 

Careful provision had been made for 

air support. With the first light of day, 

planes of the 24th and 50th Fighter Regiments appeared overhead to protect the 

convoy from air and naval attack. All 

that day and the next, 5th Air Group planes 

covered the two convoys.ll In the early 

morning hours of the 10th, the convoys had 

arrived at their anchorages. Not a single 

American aircraft had been sighted during 

the entire trip. "It was a miracle," stated 

the Japanese, "that it [the convoy] wasn't 

detected by the enemy." 12 Before dawn 

the Tanaka Detachment was waiting off 

• Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 

10-11; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 161, 

174; interrog of Capt Kawakita Ishihara, 3d Fleet 

Staff, 22 Oct 45, USSBS, Interrogations of Jap~ 

nese Officials, I, 83. 

1. 14th Army Opns, I, 43. 

11 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 9, 16. Captain Morison 

states that the converted seaplane tender Sanyo 

M aru provided air patrol for the Aparri landings. 

Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 176. There is some 

evidence from 2d Demob Bureau, Interrogations of 

Former Japanese Officers, G-2, FEC, that the 

Sanyo Maru was still in port being fitted out at the 

time of the Aparri landing. 

,. 14th Army Opns, I, 43. 
104 

Aparri'; the Kanno Detachment was off 

Vigan. The wind was strong and the seas 

high. The next few hours would be the 

most critical and hazardous of the entire 

voyage. 

The Landings at Aparri and Gonzaga 

In the first light of dawn, 10 December, 

the men of the Tanaka Detachment began 

to transfer from the transports to the landing craft. Under cover of fighter aircraft 

from the recently captured field on Batan 

Island, two companies made the trip to 

shore successfully. But strong northeasterly winds and rough sea threatened to do 

what the Americans thus far had made no 

effort to do-frustrate the landings. The 

convoy commander therefore decided to 

land the remaining troops at Gonzaga, over 

twenty miles to the east, where Cape Engano offered partial protection from the 

heavy surf. The convoy sailed east along 

the coast, leaving the two companies at 

Aparri, and on reaching the new anchorage 

the rest of the Tanaka Detachment began 

to debark immediately.13 

The first report o{ the landing force, estimated as a regiment in size, reached MacArthur's headquarters late in the day, and 

aircraft were ordered aloft immediately to 

attack the landing force. 14 The purpose of 

the landing was apparently well understood. Lt. Col. James V. Collier of the 

"Ibid., 42-43; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 13. The 

14th Army history states that the landing at Gonzaga was completed at 0550. This is extremely unlikely in view of the change in plans made during 

the Aparri landing, and the length of time it must 

have taken to reach the new anchorage. 

14Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1148, 10 

Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; 

USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 36; Collier, Kotebooks, I, 69. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

G-3 Section noted that the Japanese "most 

assuredly" were attempting to seize airfields 

from which fighters could support Formosabased bombers."5 That night, the staff at 

USAFFE prepared to take the field, and a 

general plan for establishing an advance 

headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, 

with a rear echelon in Manila, was discussed."6 

General Wainwright, the North Luzon 

Force commander, first heard of the Aparri 

landing, this time estimated as a reinforced 

brigade of 3,000 men, while he was inspecting the beach defenses of the 11th and 21st 

Divisions at Lingayen Gulf. Believing that 

the landing was a feint "to pull some of my 

forces up to that point and weaken the already weak defenses in the Lingayen Gulf 

region," Wainwright decided not to offer 

any opposition to the Tanaka Detachment.]1 

Since the only route south was down 

the Cagayan Valley, and since he believed 

that a battalion at Balete Pass could stop "a 

fairly considerable force," he made no disposition to meet the attack. He was certain, 

he later wrote, that the main Japanese 

landings would come "in the areas where I 

had the chief weight of my troops"-Lingayen Gulp8 But he did take the precaution of sending several scout cars of the 26th 

Cavalry (PS) to the Cagayan Valley to provide communication with the 11 th Division 

troops in that area.19 MacArthur's headquarters in Manila issued orders to destroy 

to Collier, Notebooks, I, 69. 

"Ibid. This plan was never carried out and 

USAFFE headquarters rerpained in Manila until 

the move to Corregidor at the end of December. 

17 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 27. 

This decision may have been made by USAFFE. 

If made by Wainwright, it was undoubtedly confirmed by MacArthur's headquarters. 

" Ibid. 

,. NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 6. 
THE FIRST LANDINGS 

bridges in the valley and to establish a block 

at Balete Pass. 20 

The company of the 3d Battalion, 12th 

Infantry, located at Aparri on the morning of 10 December was commanded by a 

young reserve officer, Lt. Alvin C. Hadley. 

When the two companies of the Tanaka 

Detachment came ashore at dawn, Lieutenant Hadley reported the landing to battalion headquarters at Tuguegarao and was 

ordered to attack immediately and drive the 

enemy into the sea. Estimating the size of 

the force as considerably larger than it was 

he prudently withdrew south along Route 

5, without, so far as is known, firing a shot. 21 

The reaction of the American air forces 

was more spirited. As the Tanaka Detachment was unloaded at Gonzaga, two 

B-17's appeared overhead. They had 

taken off from Clark Field at about 0930 

with orders to attack and sink the naval vessels and transports. The first plane, carrying eight 600-pound bombs, flew over the 

transport area dropping its bombs. Before 

being driven off by the Japanese fighter aircraft, the pilot reported a hit on one of the 

transports. In the second plane was Capt. 

Colin P. Kelly, Jr., the first war hero and 

winner of the Distinguished Service Cross. 

Under orders to attack a Japanese carrier 

mistakenly supposed to be near Aparri, 

Captain Kelly had taken off hurriedly in 

the midst of an air raid with only three 600-

pound bombs. When he was unable to find 

a carrier, Kelly decided to attack what he 

20 Rad, MacArthur to AG WAR, 10 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

21 Col Glen R. Townsend, CO 11th Inf (PA), 

The Defense of the Philippines, p. 10, OCMH. 

The title of this document is misleading. Actually 

it is an account of the operations of the 11 th Infantry. According to Colonel Townsend, Lieutenant Hadley told him that 10,000 Japanese landed at 

Aparri that morning. 

105 

thought was a large battleship, later presumed to be the H aruna. Of the three 

bombs, one is supposed to have been a direct 

hit; two, near misses. As the B-17 flew 

away, the vessel appeared to have stopped, 

with black smoke rising in a heavy cloud 

above it.22 On return to base, the plane was 

jumped by two enemy fighters and shot 

down. All of the crew except Kelly bailed 

out safely. Captain Kelly's body was later 

recovered in the wreckage. 

Actually Captain Kelly had not attacked 

a battleship, and certainly not the H aruna. 

Nor had he sunk any vessel of the Japanese 

fleet. There were no battleships in Philippine waters at this time; the H aruna was 

hundreds of miles away supporting the 

Malayan invasion. Only Admiral Takahashi's cover force, with the heavy cruisers 

Ashigara and Al aya, was in the vicinity, 

and it was 200 miles off the west coast of 

Luzon. Kelly was nowhere near this force, 

although the Japanese report it was attacked by heavy bombers that day.23 

The air attacks did not seriously hinder 

the Japanese landing at Gonzaga. Two 

other attacks against shipping resulted in 

the reported sinking of a transport. Actually, the Japanese suffered only minor damage; one minesweeper run aground and another heavily damaged. 24 

22 Hist of Fifth Air Force, p. 18; Army Air Action 

in Phil and NEI, pp. 63-65. 

'" Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 11; 

Interrog of Capt Ishihara, 22 Oct 45, USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 83. American 

sources do not mention an attack against the cover 

force. 

24 Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses 

During World War II, Joint Army-Navy Assessment 

Committee, p. 1; interrog of Capt Mitsugo Ihara, 

3d Fleet staff, 10 Nov 45, USSBS, Interrogations of 

Japanese Officials, I, 275; Japanese Naval Opns in 

Phil Invasion, p. 10. 
106 

The Tanaka Detachment was ashore and 

in Aparri by 1300, when it reported the 

capture of the airfield. In Aparri it was 

joined by the two companies that had 

landed there earlier. By evening elements 

of the detachment had penetrated six miles 

south to occupy the strip at Camalaniugan.26 

Construction troops and air service units 

moved in immediately and began to extend 

the airfields, establish depots, and ready the 

strip for operations. It had not been possible to bring much heavy equipment ashore 

that day because of the air attacks, and 

some supplies, such as drummed oil, had 

been lost or floated ashore because of the 

transport crews' anxiety to retire.26 

Early the next morning the Tanaka Detachment began to march south toward Tuguegarao, along Route 5. Aircraft from the 

50th Fighter Regiment and the 16th Light 

Bombardment Regiment flew over the highway, bombing likely targets. The 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry retreated quickly down the Cagayan valley, offering no opposition, and by 0530 on 12 December elements of the Tanaka Detachment had 

reached Tuguegarao airfield, fifty miles to 

the south.27 

The Landing at Vigan 

Simultaneously with the landing at Aparri, the Kanno Detachment of 2,000 men 

began to debark at Pandan, near Vigan. 

A P-40 pilot flying reconnaissance gave 

the first warning of the attack at 0513 of 

the 10th. Alerted by this message, the 

os 14th Army Opns, I, 42; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 13. 

"" Situation of Both Sides Prior to War, ATIS, 

Current Translation 46, 2 Jun 43; Morison, Rising 

Sun in the Pacific, p. 176. 

.., Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 174-76. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Far East Air Force readied five B-l7's and 

escorting P-40's and P-35's to bomb the 

invaders. By 0600 the planes were airborne, flying north to the threatened area/III 

The reception of the Kanno Detachment 

promised to be a warm one. 

As at Aparri, bad weather and heavy seas 

upset the landing schedule. Only a small 

portion of the Japanese force was able to 

get ashore at Pan dan that morning, but 

these men quickly moved on to seize Vigan 

by 1 Q30. Meanwhile the convoy came under attack from American planes and suspended all efforts to land the rest of the 

force. 29 The five B-l7's, each loaded with 

twenty 1 aO-pound demolition bombs, came 

in for their first run over the target shortly 

after 0600. They were covered by P-40's 

of the 17th Pursuit Squadron. After the 

B-I7's had dropped their bombs, the P-40's 

dived through the antiaircraft fire to strafe 

the ships. The P-35's of the 21st Squadron 

now arrived on the scene and, despite the 

lack of armor and leakproof tanks, flew low 

to strafe the invaders again and again. One 

of the transports, hit by a B-17 bomb, exploded during the last P-35 run, destroying 

the squadron commander's plane.30 

Later in the day, three more heavy bombers attacked the Vigan Attack Force. The 

first B-1 7 to arrive over the target dropped 

its bombs on what was thought to be a carrier, with no observed effect. The second 

attacked a cruiser unsuccessfully, but managed to score a direct hit on a transport. 

The last plane had had time to load only 

one 600-pound bomb, and this the bom-

.. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 215 and n.,60. 

"14th Army Opns, I, 43; 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 

13, 17-18. 

80 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 215; Brereton, Diaries, pp. 46--49 . 
THE FIRST LANDINGS 

bardier released over the water, near the 

transports. a~ 

Despite the presence of eighteen naval 

fighters and planes of the Army's 24th 

Fighter Regiment, the Japanese were unable to fend off the American attack. As 

a result of the day's action, the enemy lost 

the transports Oigawa Maru and Takao 

M aru, both badly damaged and beached, 

and one minesweeper, sunk. The Japanese 

also suffered casualties aboard the destroyer 

Murasame and the light cruiser Naka, Rear 

Adm. Shoji Nishimura's flagship, which was 

slightly damaged.a2 

The successful attacks of the 10th were to 

be the last co-ordinated effort of the Far 

East Air Force. On that day the Japanese 

attacked Nichols, Nielson, and Cavite, completing the destruction begun two days earlier at Clark. Thereafter the American 

fighters with few exceptions flew only reconnaissance missions over assigned areas; the 

21st and 34th Squadrons covered south Luzon while the 17th and 20th patrolled the 

northern part of the island. 88 

There was no activity near Vigan during 

the night of the 10th, but from Lingayen 

Gulf, 100 miles to the south, came reports 

of another Japanese landing. Around midnight "several dark shapes" were observed 

approaching the mouth of the Agno River. 

When confirmation was received, one battery of the 3d Battalion, 21st Field Artillery 

( P A), opened fire. "I t was like dropping 

a match in a warehouse of Fourth of July 

81 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 215; Edmonds, They Fought With 

What They Had, pp. 121-25. 

·'14th Army Opns, I, 43; Japanese Naval Opns 

in Phil Invasion, p. 7; Japanese Naval Merchant 

Ship Losses During World War II, pp., 1, 29; 

interrog of Capt Ihara, 10 Nov 45, USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 275 . 

.. Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, pp. 67--68. 

107 

fireworks," wrote the American instructor 

assigned to the regiment. "Instantly Lingayen Gulf was ablaze. As far as the eye 

could see the flashes of artillery, shell-bursts, 

tracer machine gun bullets and small 

arms. . . . Thousands of shadows were 

killed that night." 34 When morning came, 

all that was found of the supposed invasion 

was one life preserver with markings which 

may have been Japanese characters. The 

absence of sunken ships did not prevent the 

21st Division commander, Brig. Gen. Mateo Capinpin, from reporting to Manila that 

an attempted hostile landing had been repulsed.a5 

What actually happened that night was 

that the Japanese had sent one motor boat 

into Lingayen Gulf on a reconnaissance mission. The Japanese had no force near Lingayen then and no plan for a landing in 

the area at that time. Nevertheless, the 

news of the frustrated enemy landing was 

reported in the press as a great victory and 

the 21st Field Artillery was officially credited with repulsing an enemy landing.88 

Meanwhile, the Vigan Attack Force, unable to land troops and supplies in the face 

of rough seas, had moved four miles to the 

south. Protected by a squadron of fighters, 

the Japanese were finally able to put the 

Kanno Detachment ashore. A small force 

was immediately dispatched north, along 

Route 3, to Laoag, the capital of Hocos 

Norte Province, fifty miles away. By the 

.. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 52 . 

.. Collier, Notebooks, I, 70. 

Be Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 52-53. Colonel 

Mallonee did not believe that the Japanese had 

tried to land at Lingayen on that night or on the 

succeeding two nights. Hunt mistakenly reported 

that the Japanese had twelve transports at Lingayen 

that night, two of which were sunk, and that the 

enemy was "bloodily repulsed .. " Hunt, MacArthur 

and the War Against Japan, p. 36. 
108 

following evening that town and its airfield 

had been occupied.31 

The Japanese now had a firm foothold 

in northern Luzon, with planes of the 5th 

Air Group operating from fields, however 

inadequate, at Aparri, Vigan, and Laoag.38 

Originally Homma had intended to leave 

the Tanaka and Kanno Detachments in 

position, but the American reaction had 

made it evident that there would be no 

counterattack. He decided therefore to 

leave only small garrisons to hold the seized 

airfields and to send the bulk of the two detachments, forming substantially the 2d 

Formosa Regiment, to Lingayen Gulf to 

meet the main force of the 14th Army when 

it came ashore. Colonel Tanaka was to 

march around the north tip of Luzon along 

Route 3 to Vigan, and there join forces with 

Kanno. The combined force would then 

move south along the coastal road to Lingayen Gulf. At the same time Homma sent 

his chief of staff, General Maeda, to Luzon 

for a personal inspection and to brief the 

commanders on the change in plans. 

Maeda arrived at Aparri on 14 December 

and after talking with Colonel Tanaka 

placed him in command of both detachments and gave him his new mission.39 

By 20 December the Tanaka and Kanno 

Detachments had joined and were ready to 

move south toward Lingayen Gulf. At 

1300 that day Colonel Tanaka led his reconstructed regiment (less three companies ) 

ttl 14th Army Gpns, I, 42-43; 5th Air Gp Gpns, 

p.18. 

18 5th Air Gp Gpns, )Jp. 18-20. The 5th Air 

Group moved into Vigan on 11 December and into 

Laoag the next day. 

OIl 14th Army Opns, I, 39; On Phil Landing Opns 

(Amphibious), prepared by 2d Demob Bureau in 

answer to a series of questions by Lt Comdr Henry 

Salomon, Jr .. , ATIS Doc 1989-6A. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

out of Vigan, along Route 3. Repairing 

destroyed bridges along the line of march, 

forward elements of the regiment reached 

Bacnotan the next evening. There they 

made contact with the 11 th Division troops, 

but by a flanking movement to the left 

( east) were able to force part of the defenders back, while cutting off others who 

made their way eastward to the mountains. 

Colonel Tanaka finally reached San F ernan do, La Union, on the morning of the 

22d.40 

Just a few hours earlier the main strength 

of the 14th Army had begun to land across 

the beaches at Lingayen Gulf, a short distance to the south. Colonel Tanaka just 

missed being on the beaches to greet his 

comrades. 

The advance landings on northern Luzon, seen in retrospect, accomplished little. 

The fields seized were poor and, by the 

time they were ready for operations, were 

of small value. The detachments that 

landed did not require close air support, 

since in no case did the Americans offer any 

determined resistance. The 5th Air Group 

had planned to operate mainly from Luzon 

bases by 17 December, and by the following day had placed a number of Japanese 

air units on the recently seized fields. But 

they were not needed. As events turned 

out, Japanese misgivings were entirely unfounded; the dispersion of force! entirely 

unnecessary. But this was small comfort 

for the Americans. In General Wainwright's words, "The rat was in the 

house." 41 

.. 14th Army Gpns, I, 42; Capt Liles, 12th Inf 

(PA), p. 5, and 1st Lt Raymond W. Bliss, 13th 

Inf (PA), pp. 8, 9, both in Chunn Notebooks; 

interv, author with Col Donald D. Blackburn, Apr 

49; NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 10. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 27. 
THE FIRST LANDINGS 

The Legaspi Landing 

The area held by General Parker's South 

Luzon Force was ninety miles at its widest 

point and stretched from the Rosario-Infanta line, southeast of Manila, sixty miles 

to the Atimonan-Padre Burgos line. In 

this region were five bays, all suitable for 

landing operations, and two large lakes, 

Laguna de Bay and Lake Taal. Altogether 

there were 250 miles of possible landing 

beaches. The area contained a good network of roads and one railroad which extended from Manila southeast to Daraga. 

Along the west coast the terrain was rugged, restricting the defenders to the roads. 

On the east coast, which was mountainous a 

good part of the way to Atimonan, the terrain presented a formidable obstacle to any 

military force. Beiow Atimonan was the 

Bicol Peninsula, trailing away in a southeasterly direction like the tail of a downcast 

dog. Near its tip, in Albay Gulf and only 

one mile from the southern terminus of the 

Manila Railroad, lay Legaspi, the next 

Japanese objective. 

To defend south Luzon, General Parker 

had two Philippine Army divisions. On 

the west was the 41st Division (PA) commanded by Brig. Gen. Vincente Lim, a West 

Point graduate and former deputy chief 

of staff of the Philippine Army. On the 

east was Brig. Gen. Albert M. Jones's 51st 

Division (P A), with its northern boundary 

along the line Pililla-Infanta and its southern boundary at Atimonan-Padre Burgos. 

The 51st Division, like Colonel Brougher's 11 th Division (PA), was poorly equipped and imperfectly trained. Presumably 

all the men had had five and one half 

months training some time during the past 

five years, but, said General Parker, "this 

109 

was never apparent." 42 The enlisted men 

of the division spoke the Bicolanian dialect, 

and the majority of the officers, who were 

from central Luzon, spoke Tagalog, making 

training even more difficult than it would 

otherwise have been. One infantry regiment had had thirteen weeks' training, another five weeks, and the last none at all. In 

the opinion of General Jones, the only troops 

in his division capable of offering any effective resistance were those of the 52d 

Infantry.43 

For the landing in south Luzon General 

Homma had organized a force of approximately 2,500 men from the 16th Division." 

Led by Maj. Gen. Naoki Kimura, infantry 

group commander of the division, this force 

consisted of infantry group headquarters, 

the 33d Infantry (less 1 sf Battalion), a battery of the 22d Field Artillery, and engineer 

detachments. Accompanying the Kimura 

Detachment was the Kure 1st Special Naval 

Landing Force with 575 men.45 

Two days before General Kimura's men 

boarded their transports at Palau, Rear 

Adm. Takeo Takagi sortied from that base 

with an impressive naval force. By dawn 

of the 8th he had reached a point about 120 

.. SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 6. 

.. Ibid., pp. 4-8. Diary of Maj Gen Albert M. 

Jones, OPD 319.1 PTO (3 Oct 45). This diary 

covers the operations of the South Luzon Force 

during the period 24 December 1941-1 January 

1942, when Jones was in command. The text of 

the diary is reproduced as App. II to SLF and II 

Corps Rpt of Opns. All references to this document are to the diary itself and not to the SLF and 

II Corps Rpt. 

.. Ltr, Chief, Hist Div SSUSA to G-2 GHQ FEC, 

9 Nov 48, 3d Ind, 16 Aug 49, OCMH . 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 42; Japanese Naval Opns 

in Phil Invasion, p. 12. The infantry regiments of 

a Japanese division are under an infantry group 

headquarters whose commander, a major general, 

controls the infantry elements of the division as 

well as other elements that may be assigned for specific missions. 
110 

miles east of Davao. From here, the carrier 

Ryujo launched the attack against Davao 

which the Preston had evaded. Following this strike Takagi turned northeast and 

early the next morning joined Kimura's 

transports, which had left Palau at 0900 the 

day before. Accompanying the transports 

was the Legaspi Attack Force; to the rear, 

en route from Palau, was the 17th Minelayer Division.46 

By 1100, 11 December, this combined 

force was 135 miles east of San Bernardino 

Strait. Here the minelayers broke formation. Escorted by 2 destroyers, one column 

headed for San Bernardino Strait; another 

column, accompanied by 1 light cruiser 

and 2 destroyers, turned south for Surigao 

Strait. By midnight both groups had 

reached their destinations and had begun 

laying mines. The U.S. submarines S-39 

on patrol in San Bernardino Strait, was 

attacked and driven off by 2 Japanese 

destroyers without inflicting any damage 

on the Japanese force. 4

? From a point 

about 100 miles offshore, planes of the 

Ryu jo covered the convoys as it moved 

toward the shores of Albay Gulf. Admiral 

Takagi's force remained behind to provide 

distant cover. As the convoy approached 

the beaches, the Japanese planes shifted 

operations to the, Legaspi area.4S 

The Kimura Detachment began to land 

at Legaspi early on the morning of 12 

December. No difficulty was experienced 

and there was no opposition; the nearest 

American and Filipino Quops were 150 

miles away. By 0900 the Japanese were in 

control of the airfield and the terminus of 

the Manila Railroad. A few hours later, 

.. Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 

11-13 . 

.. Ibid.; Log of S-39, II Dec 41, cited by Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 177. 

.. Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 13. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

when he had a firm grip on Legaspi, General Kimura sent advance detachments to 

the northwest and southeast. The next 

day the huge cover force returned to Palau 

to prepare for the next landing.49 

The initial report of a Japanese landing 

at Legaspi came from the railroad stationmaster there. The apocryphal story is told 

that his call was switched from the railroad 

central to USAFFE headquarters in Manila and the following conversation took 

place: 

STATIONMASTER: "There are four Jap boats 

in the harbor, sir, and the J aps are landing. 

What shall I do?" 

USAFFE OFFICER: "Just hang onto the 

phone and keep reporting." 

STATIONMASTER: "There are about twenty 

Japs ashore already, sir, and more are earning." A pause. "Now there are about three 

hundred Japs outside the station, sir, What 

am I to do?" 

USAFFE OFFICER: "Just sit tight." 

STATIONMASTER: "Sir, a few of those Japs, 

with an officer in front, are coming over here." 

USAFFE OFFICER: "See what they want." 

STATIONMASTER: "Those Japs want me to 

give them a train to take them to Manila, 

sir. What do I do now?" 

USAFFE OFFICER: "Tell them the next 

train leaves a week from Sunday. Don't give 

it to them." 

STATIONMASTER, hanging up: "Okay sir." 50 

The subsequent conversation between the 

Japanese officer and the stationmaster-if 

it ever took place-is not recorded. 

When South\ Luzon Force headquarters 

received news of the landing, it considered 

a proposal to send a strong force south to 

surprise the Japanese and push them back 

into the sea. There were many practical 

difficulties in the way of such an expedi-

•• Ibid.; 14th Army Opns, I, 42. 

6. Clark Lee, They Call it Pacific (New York: 

Viking Press, 1943), p. 73; interv, author with 

Clark Lee, Apr 51. 
THE FIRST LANDINGS 

tion, the most serious of which was how 

to surprise an enemy who had control of 

the air and sea. The proposal was soon 

dropped, but General Jones's 51st Division 

(PA) was ordered to send units south into 

the Bicol Peninsula to destroy highway and 

railroad bridges and to evacuate as much 

railroad rolling stock as possible. 51 Two 

companies of the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, each with an attached machine gun 

platoon, were sent south to outpost Route 

1 and the Manila Railroad, the only two 

routes north from Legaspi, and a specially 

trained detachment of the 51st Engineer 

Battalion was ordered to prepare all bridges 

for demolition in order to delay the enemy 

advance.52 

First American reaction to the Legaspi 

landing came on 12 December when 2 

fighters struck the Japanese-held airfield, 

killing three and injuring two men. Two 

days later 3 of a group of 6 Del Montebased B-I7's, ordered to attack the landing 

force, reached the area. They attacked a 

Japanese minesweeper and a transport, 

thought to be a destroyer, with meager results, and 9 naval aircraft based on the 

Legaspi strip. The unescorted bombers 

were no match for the Japanese fighters 

and soon beat a hasty retreat. Only 1 of 

the B-17's was able to make its way back to 

Del Monte; the others had to crash-land 

short of their base. The Japanese lost at 

most 4 fighters. 53 

OJ. Supplement to Diary of Maj Gen Albert M. 

Jones, OPD 319.1 PTO (20 Nov 45). This document, though unsigned, was prepared by Col. Stuart 

C. MacDonald, Jones's chief of staff, and consists of 

three separate documents: Important Dates, SLF; 

Notes on Left Subsector, I Phil Corps; and Pocket 

Fights. It will be cited hereafter as MacDonald, 

Supplement to Jones Diary. 

.. Jones, Diary, p. 5. 

.. Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 12; 

Brereton, Diaries, p. 54; Morison, Rising Sun in the 

111 

With Legaspi firmly in Japanese hands, 

the Kimura Detachment moved northwest 

along Route 1 toward Naga. Ground 

units first made contact on 17 December 

when a Japanese patrol ran into a demolition detachment of the 51st Engineer Battalion working on a bridge near Ragay. The 

engineers managed to destroy the bridge 

and establish themselves on the near bank 

of the gorge, whereupon the Japanese patrol 

withdrew. The next day the Kimura Detachment entered Naga. 54 

Pushing northwest from N aga, rebuilding bridges and repairing roads as they advanced, the Japanese reached Sipoco on 

the 19th _with an estimated force of one battalion of infantry. Patrols were still active 

near Ragay, and reports reaching the 

Americans mentioned other Japanese elements moving along Route 1 toward Daet. 

By this time, the two outposted companies 

of the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, were at 

Aloneros and Sumulong, and had thrust 

strong combat patrols forward. Luzon at 

this point forms a very narrow neck only 

seven miles wide, and any force from Legaspi must pass through one of the two barrios, Aloneros on the Manila Railroad or 

Sumulong on Route 1. The position was 

an excellent one. 55 

On 21 December, the division commander, recently promoted to brigadier 

general, ordered Lt. Col. Virgil N. Cordero, the regimental commander, to move 

on Sipoco with Companies Band C of the 

52d Infantry. At 0500 the next morning, a 

Japanese force estimated to be a company 

attacked Company B at Timbuyo, just east 

Pacific, p. 177. For a full account of the air attack against Legaspi, see Edmonds, They Fought 

With What They Had, pp. 151-60 . 

"'14th Army Opns, 1,42; Jones, Diary, p. 6 . 

.. Jones, Diary, p. 6; MacDonald Supplement to 

Jones Diary. 
112 

of the Negritos Camp along the highway. 

The Filipino troops, under the command of 

lst Lt. Matt Dobrinic, were in a well-organized position and drove off the Japanese, 

chasing them down the road for about six 

miles. They inflicted heavy losses on the 

enemy, suffering about IS-percent casualties themselves. 56 

On 23 December General Jones ordered 

his troops to withdraw from the Bicol Peninsula when a Japanese invasion force appeared off Atimonan. Part of the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry, was cut off by the 

Japanese landing at Atimonan that night, 

but some of the men made their way back 

into the Amer:ican lines. The 51 st Division had accomplished its objective. It had 

delayed the enemy advance and prevented 

an immediate juncture of the Kimura Detachment with the main elements of the 

16th Division soon to land at Lamon Bay.Z7 

Landings in the South 

The Japanese landings in the southern 

Philippines, in Mindanao and the Sulu 

Archipelago, were intended primarily to 

provide bases for the 16th Army's drive on 

Borneo. They had no effect on Japanese 

plans for Luzon, except to prevent reinforcements from reaching that island from Allied 

bases to the south and to cut the American 

route of withdrawal. 

Two landings were scheduled in the 

south, one at Davao in Mindanao, and another on Jolo Island in the Sulu Archipelago. Two detachments, both under Maj. 

.. Jones, Diary, p. 6; Itr, Col' John R. Boatwright, 

formerly CO 53d Inf, to George Groce, research 

asst to author, 22 Mar 49; Luzon Campaign of 

16th Division, 24 Dec 41-3 Jan 42, ATIS, Enemy 

Publications 355, p. 2. The Japanese claimed a 

victory in this action. 

., MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, p. 8; 

Itr, Boatwright to Groce, 22 Mar 49. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Gen. Shizuo Sakaguchi, infantry group 

commander of the 16th Army's 56th Division, were organized for these landings. 

The first, originally scheduled to capture 

Davao alone, was led by Lt. Col. Toshio 

Miura and consisted of the 1 sf Battalion of 

the 16th Division's 33d Infantry, plus engineer and service elements. To it was 

later added the Sakaguchi Detachment, 

composed of the 56th Division's 146th Infantry, at;! armored unit, and one battalion 

of divisional artillery. The strength of the 

entire force was about 5,000 men.58 

This combined force was under 16th 

Army control, although the date of departure from Palau was set by 14th Army 

headquarters in Formosa. Once Davao 

was seized, the Miura Detachment was to 

revert to 14th Army control and the 16th 

Army's Sakaguchi Detachment was to move 

on to Jolo Island on its way to Tarakan in 

Dutch Borneo. For the Jolo Island operation, the Kure 2d Special Naval Landing 

Force from Legaspi and a naval airfield 

maintenance unit were to be added to the 

Sakaguchi Detachment. 59 

The combined force left Palau at 1400 

on 17 December in fourteen transports. 

Admiral Takagi's force provided naval escort. Direct support was given by a destroyer squadron, while a cruiser squadron 

and the carrier Ryu jo constituted a close 

covering force.oo On the afternoon of the 

"14th Army Opns, I, 31-32; interrogs of Gen 

Morioka, 24 Apr 47 and Col Nakajima, 25 Apr 47, 

in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil 

Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I; Comments of Former Japanese Officers Regarding The Fall of the Philippines, 

pp. 25-26, OCMH. 

.. The Jolo Island Opns, Japanese Studies in 

World War II, No. 23, p. 1, 1st ./Jemob Bureau, 

FEC; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 17. 

50 14th Army Opns, 1,43; Japanese Naval Opns 

in Phil Invasion, pp. 15-16; Morison, Rising Sun 

in the Pacific, pp. 163,182. 
THE FIRST LANDINGS 

19th, from a point about 200 miles east of 

Davao, the Ryujo launched six planes to 

attack the radio station at Cape San Augustin, the tip of the eastern arm of Davao 

Gulf, while the seaplane carrier Chitose 

launched its own planes to reconnoiter over 

Davao. The transports arrived off the city 

after midnight on the night of 19-20 December.61 

At 0400 troops of the Miura Detachment, covered by carrier-based aircraft, began landing in the northern section of Davao while elements of the Sakaguchi Detachment came ashore along the coast southwest of the city. Defending this sector of 

the island were about 2,000 Philippine 

Army troops led by Lt. Col. Roger B. Hilsman, commander of the 2d Battalion, WIst 

Infantry.52 

The Miura Detachment was momentarily mistaken for an American naval or marine force when it was first sighted. When 

a Japanese destroyer began shelling the 

beaches, this misapprehension was quickly 

removed. The only opposition offered to 

the landing force came from a machine gun 

squad which inflicted numerous casualties 

on the enemy before it was knocked out by 

a direct hit from a Japanese shell.63 Thereafter Colonel Miura's men met no further 

opposition. The casualties suffered made 

it necessary to commit those elements of the 

Sakaguchi Detachment which the Japanese 

were saving for the Jolo Island operation. 

By about 1030 that morning, Colonel 

Hilsman had pulled his men out of the city 

on Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 

15, 16. 

• , Ltr, Col Howard N. Frissell, formerly CO 3d 

Bn, lOlst Inf, to author 5 May 49; statement of 

Maj Charles I. Humber, Jr., 30 Jan 42, in Gen 

Sharp's papers loaned by Mrs. Sharp to author and 

in OCMH. 

.. Humber Statement; Jolo Island Opns, p. 2. 

113 

along the road leading northwest into the 

hills, leaving behind three of the eight 2.95-

inch guns which constituted the artillery of 

the Visayan-Mindanao Force. The troops 

remaining in Davao were directed to withdraw also and set up defensive positions 

along the heights surrounding the city.54 

The Sakaguchi Detachment apparently 

met no resistance southwest of the city. 

Moving northeast along the coastal road, it 

entered the city and made contact with 

Colonel Miura's force early in the afternoon. By 1500 the city and its airfield were 

occupied. That evening a seaplane base 

was established south of the city, and the 

next morning naval shore units began bringing Japanese nationals into Davao.65 

General Sakaguchi lost no time in dispatching the Jolo Force, consisting of one 

infantry battalion (less two companies), 

with attached artillery, engineer, and communications units, and the Kure 2d Special 

Naval Landing Force. Its departure was 

delayed first by the unexpected casualties 

to the Miura Detachment and then by a 

B-17 attack. Nine of the bombers had 

come from Batchelor Field near Darwin, 

Australia, and they hit the Japanese at sunset of the 22d. The raid came as a complete surprise to the Japanese. Fortunately, 

for them, visibility was poor and the Jolo 

Force suffered only minor damage. The 

next morning the convoy set out from 

Davao, reaching its destination on Christmas Eve.66 

.. V-MF Rpt of Opns, p. 173; Humber Statement. 

.. Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 16; 

14th Army Opns, 1,43 . 

.. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 223-24; Japanese Naval Opns in 

Phil Invasion, pp. 16-17. Edmonds claims that the 

B-1?,s sank a lO,OOO-ton tanker. They Fought 

With What They Had, p. 180 . 
114 

First warning of the approaching force 

reached the defenders, 300 Constabulary 

troops, at 1700 of the 24th. The landings 

began three hours later. The Constabulary 

were able to offer only slight resistance, and 

by the following morning, the Japanese were 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

in the town of Jolo." From Davao and Jolo 

the Japanese were in position to launch an 

attack against Borneo. 

67 Jolo Island Opns, p. 3; statement of 1st Lt 

Jose V. Valera, Jan 42, in Sharp Papers; V-MF 

Rpt of Opns, p. 575. 
CHAPTER VII 

The Impact of War 

The transition from peace to war in the 

Philippines was a sudden one. The civilian 

population and the untrained Filipino soldiers were ill prepared to withstand the initial shock without displaying signs of nervousness and apprehension. Although a war 

with Japan had been expected for some 

time, bomb shelters had not been completed 

and the Philippine Army was still in the 

process of mobilization. A voluble and excitable people, the Filipinos saw danger 

everywhere and their fertile imagination 

produced reports of enemy activity that 

kept the USAFFE staff busy searching for 

the grain of truth in the wild tales that came 

in over the wires. 

The most fantastic reports were accepted 

and widely circulated. During the first air 

raids, the belief that the Japanese bombers 

were "at least partially manned by white 

pilots" was given sufficient credence to be 

reported to the War Department.1 Dewey 

Boulevard was supposed to be lined, the 

planeless 27th Bombardment Group heard, 

with A-20's ready to fly into combat. The 

same unit also reported a telephone message 

stating that its A-24's were at the docks 

being unloaded. A frantic but unprofitable 

rush to the water front followed. 2 

Many residents in Manila reported hearing short-wave messages to Japan, but the 

most careful search by Army authorities 

1 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1135,9 Dec 

41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

• Army Air Action in Phil and NEI, p. 74. 

failed to reveal a short-wave transmitter. 

One day there was news that the fleet was 

sailing across the Pacific to the rescue; another day that the water supply in Manila 

had been poisoned and that poison gas had 

been spread in the port area. Again, the 

Japanese were supposed to have sailed into 

Manila Bay and put ashore 1,000 men at 

the mouth of the Pasig River. 3 From 9 

December on, Admiral Hart wrote, "An 

extraordinary crop of incorrect enemy information flowed in over the warning net. 

Too many reports came in of enemy sightings when nothing actually was sighted. 

••• " 4 "The Army," said one writer, "was 

travelling as much on rumors as on its 

stomach." 5 

Each fresh rumor made the civilian population more uneasy. No one knew what to 

believe. Numerous air raid alarms, all of 

them false, and the blackout added to the 

tense and foreboding atmosphere. The air 

alarms in Manila became so frequent that 

General Sutherland had to order wardens 

to clear through the Army headquarters before sounding the sirens. 

The blackout was rigorously enforced, 

and the criminal element in the city took 

full advantage of the darkness and confusion. They were unwittingly aided by 

3 Charles Van Landingham, "I Saw Manila Die," 

Saturday Evening Post, September 26, 1942, pp. 

13, 71. 

4 Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, p. 38. 

• Quoted in Craven and Cate, The Army Air 

Forces in World War II, I, 222. 
116 

guards, sentries, and air raid wardens, who 

"popped up seemingly at every corner to 

issue a nervous challenge." 6 If not answered promptly and satisfactorily, they 

fired. In an effort to control crime and reported fifth-column activity, the police were 

given orders to shoot if the reply to a challenge was not satisfactory. Many interpreted their orders narrowly, challenging 

and firing at the same time. With sentries, 

air raid wardens, and police shooting, sometimes at each other, the confusion became 

even worse. Finally, USAFFE ordered all 

firearms turned in. 

Manila showed all the signs of a modern 

city under attack. Shop windows were covered with adhesive tape and entrances barricaded with sandbags. Improvised bomb 

shelters appeared in shops and public buildings. Those fortunate enough to have cellars in their homes spent their nights there. 

Transportation was commandeered by the 

Army and gasoline was rationed. Those 

who drove cars had to shade their headlights 

in the approved fashion. 1 Street traffic became disorganized, and trucks, ambulances, 

and official cars raced through the streets 

at top speed with complete disregard for 

traffic signals. 

Life in Manila during these days was 

topsy-turvy. Residents fled the city to seek 

safety in rural areas, and their country 

cousins flocked to the city for the same 

reason. Main thoroughfares were blocked 

with trucks, animal-drawn vehicles, and 

handcarts moving in both directions. Vehicles were loaded with household goods, 

trussed pigs, and chicken crates. To the 

rear trailed the dogs. To their barking 

• Collier, Notebooks, 1, 75. See also Amea 

Willoughby, I Was on Corregidor (New York, 

1943), pp. 93-94. 

T Van Landingham, "1 Saw Manila Die," p. 13. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

was added the squealing of the pigs and 

the clucking chatter of the fowls. The skies 

were watched anxiously for any sign of 

Japanese planes. People began to hoard 

food. Radio and cable offices were filled 

and it was impossible to handle all the messages to the outside world.s 

With the first bombs the people rushed 

to the banks to withdraw their money. 

Frantic mobs pushed and milled outside the 

banks and swore at the tellers. Those banks 

and commercial houses that had not already 

done so sent their gold to Australia and the 

United States. After several days withdrawals were limited to 200 pesos in paper 

money weekly. Filipinos hoarded silver 

money and the result was a shortage in 

change. Most merchants sold only for cash, 

thus increasing the difficulties of the business community.9 

During these days of confusion, military 

and civilian authorities worked closely to 

restore the confidence of the people. Bomb 

shelters were constructed and the people 

began to pay less attention to the air raid 

warnings when the Japanese failed to attack 

the city. The Commonwealth Assembly 

met in emergency session and made available to President Quezon the sum of 20,-

000,000 pesos for defense. The United 

States contributed an equal sum for civilian 

relief. Government employees were given 

three months' advance in pay so that they 

could move their families out of the city 

to places supposedly safer than Manila. 

But it never became necessary to establish 

martial law, and after a week or two the 

Filipinos quieted down and life in the capital became more normal. 

The troops were just as nervous as the 

civilians. Most of them were convinced 

• Ibid., p. 12; Collier, Notebooks, 1, 75. 

• Van Landingham, "1 Saw Manila Die," p. 12. 
THE IMPACT OF WAR 

that a well-organized Japanese fifth column 

existed in the Philippines. Flares, rockets, 

strange lights, descending paratroopers, cut 

wires, and interrupted communications 

were all observed and cited as evidences for 

this belief. Rumors circulated as widely 

among the troops as the civilians and were 

as firmly believed. 

The assistant supply officer of USAFFE, 

Maj. Frank F. Carpenter, Jr., on a visit to 

a barrio about fifteen miles north of Manila, 

heard stories of American convoys, shortages of ammunition, the landings at Aparri, 

and other military matters, which the average American soldier did not know. He 

was told that Germans wearing the American uniform had been seen and that 1,500 

Japanese soldiers in civilian clothes were 

living in Manila, "all set to take action at 

the proper time." It was Major Carpenter's considered judgment that fifth columnists in the uniform of the American soldier 

were spreading information and creating 

dissatisfaction, and he asked the intelligence 

officer to investigate.lo 

Almost all survivors of the campaign 

agree that they saw flares or that they know 

someone who did. These lights were apparently unlike signal flares; they were 

small, orange in color, and could be seen 

close to the ground or just above the trees. 

Other observers noted rockets rising over 

uninhabited areas, and series of lights forming a straight line pointing to an airfield or 

military target just before an attack. 

Colonel Collier tells this stoG of the predawn raid on Nichols Field on the morning of 9 December: As the sound of the 

Japanese planes became audible, an old 

automobile near Nichols burst into flames, 

casting a glow over the field. At the same 

,. Memo, Maj Carpenter, to G-2 USAFFE, 16 

Dee 41. AG 383.4 Phil Reds. 

117 

time, about a dozen fishing boats were observed in the bay, just outside the breakwater. They formed a circle with their 

lights pointing toward the center. The 

straight line from this point to the blazing 

automobile formed a line which the Japanese bombers presumably followed to reach 

the field.ll 

Similar stories are told about the raids on 

Clark Field and Cavite. One witness states 

that he learned from an unnamed cavalry 

officer-since killed-that a Filipino who 

operated a bar near Clark Field was largely 

responsible for the success of the Japanese 

attack on 8 December. This Filipino is supposed to have had a powerful short-wave 

transmitter with a beam director in a room 

in back of the bar and to have informed 

the Japanese when all the B-17's were on 

the ground. He was discovered at the dials 

of his transmitter after the raid and a "grim 

sergeant from the 26th Cavalry went into 

the place with a tommy gun." 12 The presence of collaborators at Clark is also mentioned by Lt. Joseph H. Moore, commander 

of the 20th Pursuit Squadron, who states 

that he found a mirror tied to a tree above 

his quarters. Presumably the reflections 

from the mirror guided the Japanese aircraft to the field.Is 

A variation of the Clark Field story was 

told of the raid on the Cavite Navy Yard. 

Here a secret radio transmitter was also 

supposed to have been found. The operators, according to this account, were an 

AmeriGan with a Japanese wife, both later 

discovered and arrested. At Cavite, also, an 

attractive girl of Japanese ancestry, who was 

11 Collier, Notebooks, I, 62-63; Ind, Bataan, The 

Judgment Seat, pp. 107,110-14. 12 Van Landingham, "I Saw Manila Die," pp. 

12-13; Lee, They Call It Pacific, p. 45. 

13 Interv, author with Col Moore, 12 Aug 49, 

OCMH. 
118 

employed in a trusted position at the yard, 

was "caught red-handed in act of treachery." Someone decided she had to be executed immediately and the officers drew 

lots. The task fell, so the story goes, to a 

young naval officer who was in love with the 

beautiful spy. He led her outside and performed the sentence "without hesitation." 14 

Official records do not support any of the 

stories told about secret radio transmitters, 

beautiful spies, or fifth columnist barkeepers. 

Reports of paratroops were frequent also, 

but upon investigation all proved to be 

false. A drop of 20,000 paratroops about 

ten miles east of Clark Field was reported 

on 10 December. USAF FE placed 

enough reliability on the report to order 

the Philippine Division there to meet and 

destroy the enemy. When the reported 

Japanese paratroopers failed to appear, the 

division was ordered elsewhere.15 

Interrogation of Japanese officers after 

the war and a study of Japanese and American records fail to support the belief that 

a Japanese fifth column existed in the 

Philippines. There is not a shred of evidence to indicate that any organized effort 

was made by the Japanese to utilize the 

sympathies of the Japanese population in 

the Islands or of Filipino collaborators. To 

have done so would have involved knowledge by a Japanese organization in the 

Philippines of the 14th Army's detailed 

plans well in advance of the attack, communications with the airfields on Formosa, 

and an elaborate organization to receive information from agents and relay it on to 

Japanese headquarters on Formosa. Such 

an organization did not exist. If an effort 

14 Lee, They Call It Pacific (Viking), p. 46. 

'" USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 27-29. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

to assist the attacking Japanese was made, it 

must have been sporadic and on an individual basis. 

It is possible to explain some of the observed phenomena on grounds other than 

fifth-column activity. The flares may have 

been caused by American and Filipino 

troops using faulty .30-caliber tracer ammunition of World War I vintage. No one 

was ever able to find any person who fired 

flares, and examination invariably revealed 

that the strange lights and flares came from 

an area where American troops were stationed. Sometimes those searching for the 

origin' of the flares used lights which others 

reported as signs of fifth-column operations. 

The reports of Japanese paratroopers can 

be explained by parachuting pilots from 

damaged aircraft, by the descending burst 

of antiaircraft fire, or by jettisoned spare gas 

tanks. The heated imagination of men during the first days of war is capable of conjuring up visions far more fantastic than 

strange lights and descending paratroopers. 

The possibility of sabotage and fifth-column activity had been anticipated in prewar 

plans. The Philippine Department G-2 

and the Commonwealth secret service had 

listed enemy aliens and had kept many individuals under surveillance. Provision 

had been made to secure information and 

locate enemy agents in the event of a Japanese attack. Several FBI operators of 

Japanese parentage (nisei) had been 

brought from Hawaii before the war to circulate among the Japanese population. 

Many American businessmen, engineers, 

and planters had been enrolled secretly in 

the intelligence organization and provided 

a potential American fifth column in the 

event of a Japanese occupation of the 

Islands. The Philippine Constabulary also 
THE IMPACT OF WAR 

provided secret agents for counterespionage.16 

At the outbreak of hostilities, all suspected 

persons were quickly and quietly taken into 

custody. Japanese civilians living in the 

Japanese section of Manila were ordered to 

remain in their homes, and the military 

police took over the guard of this area.17 On 

the first day of war, General MacArthur 

reported to the War Department that 40 

percent of the enemy aliens in Manila, and 

10 percent of those in the provinces had 

been interned.1s The Philippine Constabulary picked up aliens wherever found-in 

homes, offices, clubs, and on the streets. On 

13 December, two days after Germany and 

Italy declared war on the United States, 

German and Italian residents in the Philippines were also interned.19 The aliens were 

first screened at Bilibid Prison in Manila and 

those cleared were released at once. Those 

not able to explain their business satisfactorily were then transferred to a camp south 

of the city to await examination by a board 

consisting of a representative of the High 

Commissioner and several Army officers.20 

Although the civilian population and the 

untrained troops were nervous during the 

first days of war, the task of mobilizing the 

Philippine Army continued. According to 

the prewar plan the last units were scheduled for induction on 15 December, a week 

after the attack came. Some, such as the 

43d Infantry, had already been brought in 

and, as soon as hostilities opened, all re-

,. Brief Hist of the G--2 Sec, GHQ SWPA, pp. 

1-2. 

"USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 34; Van 

Landingham, "1 Saw Manila Die," p. 12. 

1. Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1133, 8 Dec 

41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

,. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 37; Collier, 

Notebooks, I, 65. 

.. Collier, Notebooks, I, 65. 

119 

maining units were immediately mobilized. 

Those divisional elements not yet in service, 

usually the third infantry regiment and the 

field artillery regiment, were brought in immediately. A provisional Constabulary 

regiment, later designated the 4th, was 

formed and, with the 1st and 2d Regiments, became the basis for the 2d Regular 

Division, organized early in January and 

consisting entirely of Constabulary troops. 

The 1st Regular Division (PA), which in 

peacetime consisted mainly of cadres for 

training reservists, was brought up to 

strength and inducted, without an artillery 

regiment, on 19 December. It was assigned to the South Luzon Force and its 1st 

Infantry moved at once to the Mauban 

area along Lamon Bay.21 

In the Visayas and in Mindanao, mobilization was about one-half completed when 

war came. On orders from MacArthur's 

headquarters, the 72d and 92d Infantry 

(PA) were sent to Luzon on 9 December. 

Numerous provisional units were organized 

and equipped by local commanders. These 

units consisted of volunteers, ROTC cadets, 

and reservists not yet called or who had 

failed to report.22 

All reservists were ordered to report to the 

nearest unit or mobilization center on 8 December. As a result, some units found 

themselves overstrength and additional 

units were hastily organized. Men undergoing instruction and not yet assigned were 

organized into separate units. Coast artillery personnel at Fort Mills (Corregidor), 

for example, was organized into the 1st 

Coast Artillery (PA), with a headquarters 

battery of twenty-eight men and four gun 

:It USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 15; 

USAFFE GO's 47 and 50, 19 and 21 Dec 41. 

"V-MF Rpt of Opns, p. 21; Notes on Phil 

Army, 1941-42. 
120 

batteries of one hundred men each. The 

coast artillery reservists at Fort Wint in 

Subic Bay were similarly organized.23 

In some cases, units were formed to utilize 

armament or equipment lying in warehouses or elsewhere. At the suggestion of 

General King, MacArthur's artillery officer, 

the 301st Field Artillery (PA) was formed 

from two groups of volunteers, altogether 

700 men, and equipped with 24 woodenwheeled ISS-mm. guns of World War I 

type, and 2 ISS-mm. howitzers of the same 

vintage. These were the IS5's that had 

been sent to the Philippines to protect the 

straits leading into the inland seas and were 

the only weapons of this caliber in the Philippines, outside of Corregidor. Col. Alexander S. Quintard was brought from Mindanao to command the unit.24 At about the 

same time, three separate provisional battalions of field artillery of four 4-gun batteries each were formed. These units were 

armed with 48 of the 50 7S-mm. guns on 

self-propelled mounts that had been shipped 

to the Philippines in October. Personnel 

was secured from the Philippine Scouts, 

Philippine Army reservists, and the 200th 

Coast Artillery (AA). Two of the battalions were assigned to the North Luzon 

Force, and one to the South Luzon Force.25 

Immediately upon the outbreak of war, 

USAFFE ordered all procurement agencies 

to fill their needs by purchase in the local 

.. Notes on Phil Army, 1941-42. For a list of 

units inducted with dates and stations, see Plan 

of Induction of Phil Army; Arrival of Units from 

the United States, Annex II, USAFFE-USFIP 

Rpt of Opns . 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 8, 22; 

USAFFE GO's 45 and 49, 17 and 21 Dec 41; 

Collier, Notebooks, II, 13-18; Col Quintard, CO 

301st FA (PA), Diary, entries of 8-12 Dec 41. 

This diary was borrowed from Colonel Quintard 

and a photostat copy is on file in OCMH. 

.. Collier, Notebooks, II, 18-23. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

markets. The quartermaster bought all 

the new and used automobiles and trucks 

he could find, as well as large quantities of 

clothing and food. Several motor transport companies were taken over by the 

Army, lock, stock, and barrel. The Signal 

Corps purchased all available photographic, 

radio, and telephone equipment, and took 

control of the Manila Long Distance Telephone Company, commissioning its president, Joseph Stevenot, a lieutenant colonel. 

The Medical Corps gathered up all the 

medicine, bandages, and surgical equip:. 

ment it could find in the Islands. Buildings 

of all kinds were occupied by the Armythe] ai Alai Club became a hospital; Rizal 

Stadium, a medical depot.26 The officers 

assigned to the former inherited the food, 

chefs, and service of the club, and for a few 

days dined sumptuously on onion and mushroom soup, steak, broiled lobster, and Viennese pastry, served on snowy linen gleaming with silver by waiters in natty green and 

white uniforms. After headquarters heard 

of this arrangement, the medics ate Army 

fare. 21 

Manila, the commercial center of the 

Islands, was exploited for supplies to supplement existing stocks. On orders from 

General MacArthur the quartermaster took 

over from the large oil companies all their 

bulk petroleum products stored in the vicinity of Manila. He sought especially to 

procure food from local sources, for it was 

evident already that there would be a 

shortage should the campaign last long. 

From Chinese merchants in Manila, the 

Army secured thousands of 125-pound 

sacks of polished rice, and from ships in the 

.. Ibid., pp. 3-6; QM Rpt of Opns, pp. 13-23. 

., Alfred A. Weinstein, Barbed-Wire Surgeon, 

(New York, 1948), pp. 5-6; Brig Gen Charles C. 

Drake, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 5, 

OCMH. 
THE IMPACT OF WAR 

harbor large quantities of food. The quartermaster took over from Armour, Swift, 

and Libby large quantities of canned meats 

and other foods.28 

Within a few days after the opening of 

hostilities, the port area in Manila had become crowded with rapidly expanding military installations. Fort Santiago, headquarters of the Philippine Department, was 

on the edge of this area, as was the mouth of 

the Pasig River, now jammed with interisland freighters and other craft. The supply services that had warehouses and depots in the area decided it would be safest 

to move out, although Manila had not yet 

been bombed. The engineers were the first 

to go; they moved to the University of the 

Philippines. The quartermaster took over 

Santo Tomas University, and the other 

services followed. By 20 December most of 

the service installations in the port area had 

quietly moved to safer quarters.29 

An unexpected addition to the tanks of 

Col. James R. N. Weaver's Provisional 

Tank Group was received shortly after the 

start of war. The Japanese attack left 

marooned in Manila Harbor the Don Jose, 

a vessel belonging to the Canadian Government and carrying a cargo of motor equipment for two Canadian motor battalions in 

Hong Kong. MacArthur immediately requested that this materiel be released for 

use in the Philippines, and the War Department secured the Canadian Government's 

consent. The cargo included fifty-seven 

Bren gun carriers, forty of which were made 

available to Colonel Weaver. U nfortunately, the guns for the carriers were not 

2. Alvin P. Stauffer, Quartermaster Operations 

in the War Against Japan, Ch. I, p. 45, a forthcoming volume in this series. This excellent manu" 

script was made available by the author before 

publication. 

29 Collier, Notebooks, II, 5-6. 

121 

included in the cargo, and they had to be 

armed by the Manila Ordnance Depot.3o 

The immediate reaction at Headquarters, USAFFE, to the first Japanese landings was one of calm. General MacArthur optimistically reported that the Philippine people had withstood the shock of 

war "with composure," and that there were 

"no signs of confusion or hysteria." 31 The 

Japanese moves were correctly analyzed 

but a counteroffensive was not launched to 

drive off the invaders. "We did not disperse forces," says General Sutherland, "but 

waited for what we felt would be the main 

attack." 112 

More concern was felt during the first 

days of the war over the rapid dissolution 

of the Far East Air Force than over the 

Japanese landings. "The present phase of 

enemy action," MacArthur told the War 

Department on 12 December, "involves a 

series of concentric thrusts probably intended to confuse and demoralize northern 

movement. Probably has the additional 

objective of securing airdromes for operation of land based aircraft.".3B The next 

day he declared that the enemy's intent was 

clearly revealed. The Japanese, he said, 

were seizing airbases outside the heavily defended area of central Luzon,and ground 

action could be considered sporadic and 

unimportant. U 

.. Memo, Asst QMG for G--4, 20 Dec 41, sub: 

Canadian Supplies, G-4 33817; memo for red, 

Brig Gen Brehon B. Somervell for TAG, n.d., approved by DCofS, OCS 18136-165. 

31 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1135, 9 

Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

32 Interv, author with Sutherland, 12 Nov 46, 

p. 4, OCMH. 

33 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, 12 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

3' Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, 13 Dec 41, AG 

38lt (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 
122 

This view was expressed also in Col. 

Charles A. Willoughby's intelligence estimate to the War Department on 13 December 1941. He expected the Japanese 

forces at Aparri, Vigan, and Legaspi to be 

reinforced, but pointed out that the landing areas were not suitable for the employment of strong forces, in offensive operations. The purpose of the landing, he 

correctly analyzed, was to establish advance airbases. "As soon as air support 

is established," he warned, "a major landing effort can be expected; it is estimated 

after 15 days." 36 

The only change in plans made by MacArthur as a result of the Japanese landings 

was the new mission given the North Luzon 

Force on 16 December. Before that time 

General Wainwright had been charged 

with the defense of all northern Luzon, and 

his orders were to meet the enemy at the 

beaches and drive him back into the sea. 

The main line of resistance was the beach. 

Such a mission was impossible of execution 

with the available means and in the absence of air and naval support. On the 

16th the North Luzon Force was relieved 

of responsibility for the defense of that por-

"Rad, Willoughby to War Dept G-2, 13 Dec 

41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East, 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

tion of Luzon north of San Fernando, La 

Union, and required only to hold the enemy north of an east-west line through that 

city.as 

Within a few days after the landings the 

pattern of the Japanese plan had become 

clear to the American command. First, 

Japanese air and naval forces were to cut 

off the Philippine Islands from all possible 

aid. Then, Japanese aircraft could destroy 

or neutralize the defending air and naval 

forces and gain superiority in the air and 

on the sea. At the same time, Japanese 

ground forces would secure advance bases 

at the northern and southern extremities of 

the island of Luzon and on Mindanao 

where the opposition was negligible or nonexistent. The major enemy effort, it was 

clear, was still to come. That it would 

come soon-Colonel Willoughby thought 

28 December-there was no doubt, and 

when it did the objective would be Manila, 

the capital. Before the year was out, the 

worst fears of the early pessimists were to 

be realized. Even before the advance 

landings were completed, the main elements 

of General Homma's 14th Army were 

already nearing the Luzon coast. 

86 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 30. 
CHAPTER VIII 

The Main Landings 

The first part of Imperial General Headquarted plan for the conquest of the Philippines had been successful beyond the hopes 

of the most optimistic. American air and 

naval power had been virtually destroyed. 

Five landings had been made at widely 

separated points and strong detachments 

of Japanese troops were already conducting 

offensive operations on Luzon and Mindanao. The 5th Air Group was established 

on Luzon fields, and the Navy had its own 

seaplane bases at Camiguin Islands, Legaspi, and Davao. Army short-range fighters 

were in position to support Japanese ground 

troops when required. All this had been 

accomplished in less than two weeks. 

The main landings, to be made on Luzon 

north and south of Manila, were still to 

come. There would be two landings: the 

major effort at Lingayen Gulf, and a secondary effort at Lamon Bay. (M ap 4) The 

forces assigned to these landings had begun 

to assemble late in November. The 16th 

Division (less the 9th and 33d Infantry) 

left Osaka in Japan on 25 November and 

arrived at Amami Oshima in the R yukyus 

on 3 December. Three days later all of the 

48th Division less the Tanaka and Kanno 

Detachments) was concentrated at Mako, 

in the Pescadores, and at Takao and Kirun, 

on near-by Formosa. The major portion of 

the shipping units was in Formosa by the 

end of November and began to load the 

convoys soon after. 

There was much confusion during the 

concentration and loading period. The 

greatest secrecy was observed, and only a 

small number of officers knew the entire 

plan. These men had to travel constantly 

between units and assembly points to assist 

in the preparations and in the solution of 

detailed and complicated problems. Unit 

commanders were given the scantiest instructions, and worked, for the most part, 

in the dark. Important orders were delivered just before they had to be executed, 

with little time for study and preparation. 

Such conditions, the Japanese later regretted, "proved incentives to errors and confusion, uneasiness and irritation." 1 Moreover, after 8 December, the Japanese lived 

in fear of an American bombing of Formosa ports, where the vessels were being 

loaded with supplies and ammunition. 

Despite fears, confusions, and mistakes, 

the separate convoys were finally loaded and 

ready to sail by 17 December. The uneasiness arising from ignorance and secrecy 

persisted aboard ship. Even now the men 

were not told where they were going. Adding to the nervousness was the restriction 

placed on the use of maps. Only a few 

officers were allowed to see them. "All the 

units," the Japanese later observed, "were 

possessed of a presentiment, arising from the 

general atmosphere, that they were on their 

way to a very important theater of operations." 2 The 14th Army staff, which did 

know the destination, shared the nervous1 Phil Landing Opns (Amphibious), A TIS Doc 

1989-6A. 

, Ibid. 
LINGAYEN GULF 

MAP4 

LlNGAYEN GULF LANDINGS 

22- 24 December 1941 

• fI);;»»m»)f 

'0 

JAPANESE UNI TS 

AXIS OF JAPANESE AOVANCE 

U. S. POSiTrONS (APPROK.), 

NIGHT 24 -25 DECEMBER 

o 

MILES 

'0 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

ness of the troops. Everything depended 

upon the success of this operation. All that 

had gone before was but a preliminary to 

these landings. If they did not succeed, the 

plans of the Southern Army and of Imperial General Headquarters would fail. 

"During all my campaigns in the Philippines," said General Homma when he was 

on trial for his life, "I had three critical 

moments, and this was number one." 8 

The Lingayen Landing 

On the morning of 21 December, Filipinos near Bauang along the shores of 

Lingayen Gulf observed' a Japanese trawler cruising leisurely offshore. Unmolested, it took soundings and then serenely 

sailed off to the north.4 Late that night, 

seventy-six heavily loaded Army transports and nine Navy transports, all under 

strong naval escort, steamed into Lingayen 

• Proceedings of the trial, United States of 

America vs. Masaharu Homma Before the Military 

Commission Convened by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Western Pacific, 

p. 3050, testimony of Homma. 

The transcript of the trial includes 30 volumes 

of testimony before the military tribunal, 5 volumes of exhibits, and 1 volume of the trial review 

by Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The volumes of 

testimony are numbered 1 through 30-each volume covering one day of the trial, held during the 

period December 19, 1945, to February 11, 1946-

and are paginated seriatim. They will be hereafter referred to as USA vs. Homma with appropriate page. The 5 volumes of exhibits include 

3 kinds of documents: Prosecution Exhibits, 

1-425, Defense Exhibits, A-Y, and Commission 

Exhibit I, and will be hereafter cited as USA vs. 

Homma, Prosecution, Defense, or Commission Exhibits with appropriate number or letter. When 

used, the transcript of the proceedings of this tribunal and the exhibits were on file in the War 

Crimes Division of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. 

• Interv, author with Col Blackburn, 11th Div 

(PA), 13 May 49. Colonel Blackburn was stationed near Bauang at this time. 

125 

Gulf and dropped anchor. The main assault was on. 

The Landing Force 

Aboard the transports was the main 

strength of General Homma's 14th Army, 

altogether 43,110 men.5 The major combat strength of the Lingayen Force was 

drawn from Lt. Gen. Yuichi Tsuchibashi's 

48th Division. Activated in Formosa in 

late 1940 and as yet untried in battle, this 

division was composed of the 1st 'and 2d 

Formosa Infantry Regiments, the 47th Infantry, and artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and transport regiments. Attached 

to it for the landing was a large number of 

combat and service units, but the 2d Formosa had been lost by the establishment of 

the Tanaka and Kanno Detachments. Although probably the best motorized division in the Japanese Army at this time, the 

48th by American standards could hardly 

be said to have sufficient motor transportation. One battalion of each infantry regiment was equipped with bicycles. Divisional artillery consisted of the 48th M ountain A rtillery, similar to a standard field artillery regiment except that the basic weapon was the 75-mm. mountain gun (pack).6 

• Ltr, Chief, Hist Div SSUSA to' G-2 GHQ 

FEC, 9 Nov 48, 3d Ind, 16 Aug 49. The breakdown of the troops landing between 22 and 28 

December 1941 is as follows: 

14th Army __________________ 34,856 

Shipping Units_______________ 4, 633 

Anny Air Force______________ 3,621 

TotaL ____________________ 43, 110 

• Order of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces, 

WD G-2, 1 Mar 45, p. 108; USA vs. Homma, p. 

3054-55, testimony of Homma; Handbook of Japanese Military Forces, TM-E-30-480, 15 Sep 44, 

p.37, 
126 

In addition to the 48th Division, the 

Lingayen Force contained the 16th Division's 9th Infantry, and part of the 22d Field 

Artillery with 8 horse-drawn 75-mm. guns. 

Larger caliber pieces were provided by the 

9th Independent Field Artillery Battalion 

(8 1S0-mm. guns), the 1st Field Artillery 

Regiment (24 1S0-mm. howitzers), and the 

8th Field Artillery Regiment (16 lOS-mm. 

guns) . Included in the Lingayen Force 

were between 80 and 100 light and heavy 

tanks distributed between the 4th and 7th 

Tank Regiments. 7 A large number of 

service and special troops completed the 

force. 

The vessels that reached Lingayen Gulf 

on the night of 21 December were organized in three separate convoys. The first to 

leave had come from Kirun in northern 

Formosa and had sailed at 0900 of the 

17th. It contained twenty-one transports 

and had been escorted by the Balan Island 

Attack Force, which had returned to Formosa after the landing on 8 December.s 

The convoy loaded at Mako in the Pescad ores, being second farthest from the 

Philippines, was the next to depart. At 

noon on 18 December, the twenty-eight 

transports of this group, accompanied. by 

the Vigan Attack Force, left port. The last 

convoy left Takao in Formosa at 1700 on 

the 18th, escorted by the naval force which 

had supported the Aparri landing. 

With each convoy went a large number 

T One of these was a heavy tank regiment, whose 

tanks were the equivalent of the U.S. 13-ton light 

tank; the other was light. The Japanese do not 

indicate which is the heavy and which is the light 

tank regiment, but it appears that the 4th contained the light tanks. 

814th Army Opns, I, 46; II, 8, Un translated 

Chart 5; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, 

p. 14; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 162. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

of landing craft, altogether 63 small landing 

craft, 73 large ones, and 15 others, which 

the Japanese called "extra large." In addition, there were 48 small craft, best described as powered sampans. The smallest 

of the landing craft weighed 3 tons and was 

apparently used as a personnel carrier. The 

large landing craft, Daihatsu Model A 

(Army), was probably the one that saw 

most service in the Pacific war. Resembling 

a fishing barge in appearance, it weighed 5 

tons, was SO feet long, was capable of 6 to 

10 knots, and had a draft of 3 to 4 feet 

and a capacity of 100 to 120 men for short 

hauls. 9 The "extra large" landing craft, 

or Tokubetsu Daihatsu, weighed 7 to 8 tons 

and was capable of carrying the later model 

tanks. Its end could be dropped, enabling 

the tanks to climb in and out under their 

own power.1I> 

In addition to the direct support provided 

by the naval escorts with each convoy-altogether 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, and 

a large number of torpedo boats, minesweepers and layers, patrol craft, and miscellaneous vessels-a large naval force led 

by Vice Adm. Ibo Takahashi, 3d Fleet 

commander, moved into position to furnish 

distant cover. On 19 December this force 

sortied from Mako and sailed to a point 

about 250 miles west of Luzon. There it 

was joined by units of Vice Adm. Nobutake 

Kondo's 2d Fleet, detached from support of 

the Malayan invasion. Altogether, the 

Japanese had a force of 2 battleships, 4 

heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 2 seaplane 

• 14 Army Opns, II, 1-5, 8, Un translated Charts 

1 and 5; Handbook of Japanese Mil Forces, pp. 

327-30. 

,. Answers by 1st Demob Bureau to Questionnaire on Phil Campaign prepared by author, 5 

Aug 49, ATIS Doc 49692. 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

carriers, and some destroyers in position to 

meet any Allied naval attempt to disrupt 

the landing of the Lingayr.n Force.l1 

The Plan 

The Japanese plan called for landings at 

three points along the shores of Lingayen 

Gulf, to begin at 0500 of the 22d.12 Each 

of the convoys constituted a separate task 

force and each was to land at a different 

point. The southernmost landing was to 

be made by the Takao convoy carrying the 

47th Infantry (less one battalion), 4th Tank 

Regiment (less one company), and supporting elements. This force was to land at 

Agoo, a small village just inland from the 

eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf, about five 

11 Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, p. 14; 

Interrogs of Vice Adm Kazutaka Shiraichi,· CofS, 

2d Fleet, 15 Oct 45, and of Capt Masamichi Fujita, 2d Fleet staff, 20 Oct 45, USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 26, 72; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 178. 

U The landing plan was drawn up in Formosa on 

1 Dec 41 and is reproduced in 14th Army Opns, 

II, 1-5. The author used the untranslated 

version. 

Unless otherwise noted, the account of the 

Lingayen landing and the consolidation of the 

beachhead is based on the following sources: ] 4th 

Army Opns, I, 46-48, 51-52; 5th Air Gp Opns, 

pp. 31-37; Statement of Col Moriji Kawagoe, 

former CofS, 48th Division, 30 Jun 49, ATIS Doc 

62707, in Statements of Japanese Officials on 

World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, II, 124-

28; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, pp. 8-

9, 13-14; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 

179-83; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 31ff; 

NLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 7-10; Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 33-35; 

Lt Col William E. Chandler, "The 26th Cavalry 

(PS) Battles to Glory," Armored Cavalry Journal, 

Nos. 2 and 3 (March-June 1947), Part 1, pp. 14-

16, Part 2, pp. 7-11; ltr, Col Clyde A. Selleck to 

Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: Statement for 

Reinstatement of Rank, pp. 7-9, copy supplied 

author by Col Selleck, and in OCMH; and Itr, 

Col Halstead C. Fowler, formerly CO 71st 

FA(PA) to author, 30 Apr 49. 

127 

miles north of Damortis. Starting at 0500, 

the troops, already loaded into the sixtynine landing craft assigned to this force, 

were to head for the beach. The first wave 

was scheduled to touch down at 0540. The 

round trip time of the landing craft in this 

wave was to be two hours; thereafter it 

would be one hour. Altogether each of the 

craft would make ten round trips during the 

first day. 

The landing craft of the Mako convoy, 

carrying the lst.Formosa and 7th Tank 

Regiment, were to move out thirty minutes 

after the 47th Infantry, and at 0550 would 

hit the shore at Caba, seven miles north of 

Agoo. To carry the troops of this force 

ashore, 57 landing craft and 19 powered 

sampans were assigned. The third force, 

consisting of the 9th Infantry and called the 

Kamijima Detachment, was not to start 

landing operations until 0700.13 At that 

time the troops would be loaded into 20 

landing craft and 29 sampans and would 

head for Bauang, about seven miles north 

of Caba, the first wave reaching shore at 

0730. Thus, 14th Army expected to hold 

a fifteen-mile stretch of beach, from Bauang 

on the north to Agoo on the south, along the 

narrow coastal plain between Lingayen 

Gulf and the Cordillera central range, by 

0730 of D Day, 22 December. 

The position chosen for the landing was 

an excellent one. Between the mountains 

and the shore was a narrow level strip along 

which ran Route 3, an excellent hard-surface, two-way highway. At Bauang was 

a road intersecting Route 3 and leading 

eastward through a mountain defile to 

Baguio, whence it turned south to join 

Route 3 again near Rosario. At Aringay, 

just above Agoo, was a river which formed 

"The name Kamijima also appears as Uejima. 
128 

a small valley through the mountains. 

Through this valley ran a partially surfaced 

road which led from Aringay to Rosario, 

one of the key road intersections in this 

area. South of the landing beaches was 

the central plain of Luzon. Route 3 opened 

directly on to the road network leading into 

Manila. 

Once ashore the troops were to destroy 

any American forces in the vicinity and 

move inland without waiting to consolidate 

the beachhead. Later waves would perform that task. The Kamijima Detachment 

at Bauang was to send one element north 

to occupy San Fernando, La Union, and 

another east along the Bauang-Baguio 

Road, to seize the Naguilian airfield and 

then press on to Bag-uio. By seizing Baguio, 

the Japanese would prevent an American 

counterattack from the east through the 

defile. The occupation of San Fernando 

to the north would effect a consolidation 

with Colonel Tanaka's force moving south 

from Vigan and would protect the rear of 

the Japanese southward advance. 

The forces landing at Caba and Agoo 

were to press south toward Damortis and 

Rosario. Two roads would be used: the 

coastal highway to Damortis, and the partially surfaced road which paralleled the 

Aringay River and led to Rosario. Once 

at their objectives, these troops were to assemble and "prepare to advance" toward 

the bank of the Agno River, the first formidable obstacle to a force moving south from 

Lingayen Gulf to Manila. 

The Landing 

The voyage of the Lingayen Force to the 

target was uneventful. In an effort to avoid 

detection and to create the impression that 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the destination was Indochina, the transports at first followed a southwesterly course. 

Only a typhoon in the South China Sea 

hindered the approach; no American planes 

or ships appeared. 

The combined invasion force was without air cover, such support no longer considered necessary, until the 21st when 

twenty planes of the 24th and 50th Fighter 

Regiments, based at Laoag, came out to 

meet the ships and escort them during the 

last leg of the journey. At the same time, 

six light bombers struck Fort Wint on 

Grande Island at the entrance to Subic 

Bay, hoping thus to make the real landing site. Between 0110 and 0430 on 

22 December, the three convoys, after a slow 

voyage at an average speed of 8 knots, dropped anchor in Lingayen GUlf.14 The weather was chill, the skies were dark, and an 

intermittent rain was falling. 

At this point things began to go wrong. 

The convoy leaders, warned against stopping short of their targets, went to the other 

extreme. The initial anchorage was to have 

been between San Fernando and the Aringay River, but the lead ship, .unable tc 

locate the river in the darkness, overshot 

the mark, and dropped anchor off Santo 

Thomas, about four miles south of Agoo. 

The other transports followed, dropping 

anchor at intervals over a distance of fifteen 

miles. As a result, the landing craft now 

had to make a longer trip than anticipated 

to reach their designated beaches.15 

14 Answers to Questionnaire on Phil Campaign, 

5 Aug 49, A TIS Doc 49692; Interrog of Gen 

Maeda, CofS, 14th Army, 10 May 47, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, 

GHQ FEC, I; USA vs. Homma, p. 3049, testimony of Homma. 

"Interrog of Gen Maeda, 10 May 47; Phil 

Landings Opns (Amphibious), ATIS Doc 1989-

6A. 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

Under cover of cruiser and destroyer gunfire, the troops began going over the side 

shortly after 0200. By 0430 two battalions 

of the 47th Infdntry and one battalion of 

the 48th Mountain Artillery were in the 

landing craft, ready to strike out for shore. 

At 0517 the first troops touched down on 

the beach south of Agoo. Less than fifteen 

minutes later, at 0530, the 1st Formosa Infantry, the main strength of the 3d Battalion, 48th Mountain Artillery, and tanks 

began landing at Aringay, about two miles 

south of Caba. Two hours later part of the 

Kamijima Detachment came ashore near 

Bauang; the rest of the Detachment landed 

at Santiago, three miles to the south, at 

0830.16 

The transfer of the troops to the landing craft had proved extremely difficult 

because of high seas. The light craft were 

heavily buffeted on the way to shore and 

the men and equipment soaked by the 

spray. The radios were made useless by 

salt water, and there was no communication with the first waves ashore. Even 

ship-to-ship communication was inadequate. The men had a difficult time in the 

heavy surf, and it proved impossible to 

land heavy equipment. The high seas 

threw many of the landing craft up on 

the beach, overturning some and beaching 

others so firmly that they could not be put 

back into operation for a full day. The 

northernmost convoy finally had to seek 

shelter near San Fernando Point, where the 

sea was calmer. The second wave could 

not land as planned, with the result that 

the entire landing schedule was disrupted. 

The infantry, mountain artillery, and some 

of the armor got ashore during the day, but 

16 Interrog of Capt Ishihara, 3d Fleet staff, 22 

Oct 45, USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, I, 83. 

129 

few· of the heavy units required for support were able to land. 

Luckily for the Japanese, they had been 

able, by skillful handling of the transports, 

to enter shoal waters before the American 

submarines could get into action. Once 

inside, however, the vessels were strung out 

for fifteen miles, presenting a perfect target 

for those submarines that could get into the 

gulf. The S-38 pushed into shallow waters 

and sank the Army transport H ayo M aru 

while it was following the gunboats( which 

were preparing to lay mines a few miles 

west of the anchorage. But on the whole 

the results obtained by the submarines were 

disa'ppoin ting.17 

To increase the Japanese worries, four 

of the B-17's that had come up from 

Batchelor Field to bomb the Japanese at 

Davao flew on to Lingayen Gulf and 

managed to slip through the covering 

screen of the 24th and 50th Fighter Regiments that morning to strafe the cruisers and destroyers and inflict some damage 

on the Japanese. Even Admiral Takahashi's cover force, now about 100 miles 

northwest of Lingayen Gulf, came under 

attack. PBY's and Army planes went for 

the flagship Ashigara, mistaking it for the 

H aruna. Although they scored no hits, the 

planes reported the H aruna sunk. The 

cover force finally slipped away into a rain 

squall. 

Meanwhile, the. rising sea had forced 

many of the Japanese ships to shift anchorage and they moved into the inner bay. 

There they ran into more trouble when they 

came into range of the I55-mm. guns of the 

86th Field Artillery Battalion (PS). This 

battalion had two guns at San Fabian and 

17 Apparently many of the transports were shallow draft, converted fishing vessels, presenting difficult targets for the undersea craft. 
130 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

I55-MM. GUN EMPLACEMENT NEAR DAGUPAN 

two at Dagupan, and these apparently 

opened fire on the southernmost elements 

of the invasion force. Although claiming 

to have sunk three transports and two destroycrs, the coastal guns actually did no 

damage except to give General Homma 

many nervous moments.18 

The Japanese landing at Lingayen did 

not surprise the high command in the Philippines. It was the logical place to land a 

large force whose destination was Manila. 

On 18 December G-2, USAFFE, had received information of the movement of a 

"Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 34, 22 Dec 

41, AG 381 (11~27-41 Gen) Far East; account of 

86th FA En, from diary of an unidentified officer 

who died at Cabanatuan as a prisoner of war, 

OCMH. 

hostile convoy of about eighty transports 

moving toward the Philippines from the 

north. This information had been relayed 

to naval headquarters which already had 

submarines in the area.19 At 0200 of the 

20th, 16th Naval District headquarters reported to USAFFE that a large convoy had 

been sighted forty miles north of Lingayen 

Gulf. On the night of 20-21 December, 

USAFFE, acting on information received, 

warned the units stationed in that area 

that a Japanese expedition "of from 100 

to 120 vessels" was moving south and could 

be expected off the mouth of the gulf by 

,. Collier, Notebooks, II, 10. This information 

is not corroborated by naval sources or by the 

meager official accounts, but it corresponds with 

the known facts. 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

evening of the 21st.20 The first report of 

the arrival of the invasion force came from 

the submarine Stingray which had been on 

patrol off Lingayen for several days. Before any action could be taken, the landings 

had begun. 

Despite the warning, the Americans 

seem to have been ill prepared to drive off 

the invaders. At this time the 120-milelong coast line of Lingayen Gulf was defended by two Philippine Army divisions, 

only one of which had divisional artillery. 

The southern edge of the gulf where the 

landing was expected and where the bulk of 

the artillery was emplaced, was in the 21 st 

Division sector. The eastern shore, as far 

north as San Fernando, was held by the 11 th 

Division. The 71st Infantry (71st Division) , with only ten weeks' training, was attached to the 11 th Division and posted in 

the Bauang-Naguilian area. The 26th 

Cavalry (PS), led by Col. Clinton A. Pierce, 

had been moved from North Luzon Force 

reserve at Rosales to Pozorrubio on Route 3 

about twelve miles south of Rosario, in the 

path of the Japanese advance. 

Only at Bauang were Filipino troops 

waiting at the beach. Here the Headquarters Battalion, 12th Infantry (P A), with 

one .50-caliber and several .30-caliber machine guns, faced the oncoming Japanese. 

As the Kamijima Detachment approached 

the shore, the Filipinos took it under fire. 

The .50-caliber gun caused heavy casualties 

among the Japanese, but the .30's had 

dropped out of the action early with clogged 

firing mechanisms, due to faulty ammunition. Despite the casualties, the Japanese 

20 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 58.. The author 

has been unable to find a copy of this radio 

message. 

131 

pushed ahead and established a foothold on 

shore, whereupon the Filipinos withdrew.21 

Behind the beach at Bauang was Lt. Col. 

Donald Van N. Bonnett's 71 st Infantry 

(PA). On the 21st Bonnett had been given 

orders to halt Colonel Tanaka's 2d Formosa 

at San Fernando, La Union. One battalion, with a battery of 75-mm. guns 

(SPM) attached, was to move up the coastal 

road to meet the 2d Formosa head on. Another battalion was to advance along a secondary road to the east and attack 

Colonel Tanaka on his left flank. This 

maneuver, if well executed, might have destroyed the 2d Formosa, but the inexperienced and poorly equipped Filipinos were 

not capable of a swift and sudden onslaught.2:2 

Before the 71 st Infantry could complete 

its movement the Japanese landed. Patrols 

from the Kamijima Detachment immediately moved north along Route 3 and at 

1100 made contact with a 2d Formosa 

patrol. By 1400 the main bodies of both 

units had joined. Meanwhile, Colonel 

Kamijima's 2d Battalion, 14th Army reserve, had pushed into Bauang immediately 

after landing and by 1700 had secured the 

town and surrounding area. The 3d Battalion, in accordance with the plan, moved 

:n USA vs. Homma, p. 3054, testimony of 

Homma; Interrog of Gen Maeda, 10 May 47; Phil 

Landing Opns (Amphibious), ATIS Doc 1989-

6A; interv, author with Col Blackburn, 13 May 

49. The ammunition had been buried in the sand. 

22 The remainder of the regiment was at Bauang. 

71st Infantry (PA), extract from the diary of Maj 

William J. Priestley, pp. 1, 2, copy on file in 

OCMH. This diary consists of a series of notebooks prepared by Major Priestley in prison camp 

after talking with the officers and men of the various units whose contribution to the Philippine 

campaign he describes. 
132 

out along the Bauang-Baguio road to the 

east, toward the N aguilian airfield. 

With Colonel Kamijima's 9th Infantry 

ashore, the position of the 71st Infantry 

units became untenable. One battalion 

moved down the coastal road and the other, 

with elements of the 11 th Division, fell back 

to the east in the face of the Japanese adyance. Bonnett's orders now were to withdraw through Baguio to the south, clearing 

the Philippine summer capital by dark.23 

Farther south Col. Hifumi Imai's 1st 

Formosa and the 48th Mountain Artillery 

(less 1st and 2d Battalions) had landed at 

Aringay and by 1030 had concentrated for 

the advance. Colonel Imai's mission was 

to move his force south toward Damortis 

and Rosario. Early in the forenoon the 

regiment moved out, down the coastal road, 

and by 1600 the column had joined the 

48th Reconnaissance and the 4th Tank 

Regiments, which had come ashore at 0730, 

north of Damortis. 

The landing at Agoo, where Col. Isamu 

Yanagi's 47th Infantry with a battalion of 

the 48th Mountain Artillery had come 

ashore, was unopposed initially. Without 

waiting for motor transportation, Colonel 

Yanagi moved inland toward the Aringay 

Road, thence south to Rosario. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. William E. Brougher, 

11 th Division commander, had sent forward a battalion of infantry to meet the 

Japanese coming down the coast and, if 

possible, disrupt the landing at Agoo. By 

this time the 48th Reconnaissance and 4th 

Tank Regiments were ashore, and in the 

brush that followed easily routed the Philippine Army troops who beat a hasty retreat 

to Damortis.24 

.. Ibid., p. 1. 

.. Collier, Notebooks, II, 35. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Thus, by afternoon of the 22d, the Japanese had pushed ashore elements of three 

infantry regiments, with supporting artillery and tanks; the main force of the 14th 

Army was still aboard the transports. Hard 

fighting lay ahead before the initial objectives of the Lingayen Force would be attained and the Japanese freed from the 

danger of being driven back into the sea. 

Consolidating the Lingayen Beachhead 

While his troops at Lingayen were pushing ahead, General Homma remained 

aboard ship in Lingayen Gulf. He had 

done all he could in the planning and preparation for the invasion. Now his troops 

were committed and their failure or success 

was out of his hands. His anxieties, the lot 

of any commander during the amphibious 

stages of an operation, were increased by 

lack of communications with the men 

ashore and the confusion caused by high 

seas and heavy surf. He had no knowledge 

of the disposition of his troops, moving in 

many columns in all directions, and no way 

of controlling the action. He had pushed 

his infantry and approximately half his 

armor ashore between Bauang and Agoo, 

but all the artillery save one regiment was 

still aboard the transports in the gulf. Cut 

off from his troop commanders, he had no 

way to lessen his apprehension by assurances 

that all was well. 

There was some basis for General 

Homma's fears. The position of the Japanese troops ashore, while generally favorable, might easily become precarious. The 

landing had been made in a narrow corridor 

crossed by numerous streams, each of which 

afforded the defender an opportunity for 

delaying action. Although the plain to the 

south provided an excellent route to Manila, 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

it could also be used by the Americans and 

Filipinos as the base for a concerted counterattack against the Japanese as they 

streamed out of the corridor. A vigorous 

and well-timed attack by the four divisions 

of the North Luzon Force, spearheaded by 

the well trained' and equipped Philippine 

Division in USAFFE reserve, might well 

"wipe out the invader." ~5 If, at the same 

time, sufficient air and naval forces could 

be mustered to attack the transports and 

naval escort lying at anchor in the bay, the 

Japanese line of retreat would be cut and 

all Homma's achievements and plaus 

brought to naught. 

According to the Japanese plan, the 

troops, once they had landed at Lingayen, 

were to move on without waiting for the 

concentration of the entire landing force. 

But a difference of opinion now arose in 

14th Army headquarters. The more cautious staff officers, believing it would be 

suicidal to proceed with the advance as 

planned, argued for the establishment of a 

strong, well-organized beachhead before 

moving further. Their troops, they reasoned, were at present confined to the long, 

narrow coastal plain, and the Americans 

from their positions along the commanding 

heights to the east might well hold up any 

Japanese advance long enough to allow 

General MacArthur to send up his reserves. 

The results would be disastrous. 

The more aggressive wished to execute 

the original plan. They argued that the 

American commanders would not risk an 

offtmsive in front of the Agno River line. 

Even if the Americans decided to attack 

:III Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 60. The four divisions were the 11 th, 21 st, 71st and 91st Divisions 

(PA). With the state of training, lack of equipment and transportation, and the absence of communication, such an attack was impossible. 

133 

earlier, the bolder 14th Army staff officers 

felt that the advantages gained from continuing the advance were great enough to 

justify the risk. If the plan succeeded, the 

Japanese would gain bridgeheads across the 

Agno and would be in position to advance 

rapidly on Manila. Also, it would assure 

the safety of the beachhead. The views of 

the more aggressive won out, and General 

Homma agreed to continue the advance as 

planned.26 

As the first day passed and no word came 

from the advancing troops, General Homrna's fears increased. With no prospect of 

a calm sea in which to land his artillery and 

heavy equipment next day, and still fearing 

an American counterattack, he determined 

to shift anchorage. At 1730 of D Day he 

ordered the convoy to move farther south 

during the night, to a point off Damortis, 

and continue landing operations there the 

next day. Fearing artillery fire at the new 

anchorage, he ordered General Tsuchibashi, the 48th Division commander, to 

take San Fabian, where there were two 

155-mm. guns, thus extending the Japanese 

drive southward along the Lingayen coast.27 

Damortis and Rosario 

As the Japanese invasion force made 

ready to land, the Americans made lastminute preparations to meet the attack. 

USAFFE attached twelve 75-mm. guns on 

self-propelled mounts to Wainwright's 

North Luzon Force and ordered the 192d 

Tank Battalion to his support, but did not 

place them under his command. Wainwright in turn sent Colonel Pierce's 26th 

.. Phil Landing Opns (Amphibious), A TIS Doc 

1989-6A. 

27 USA vs. Homma, pp. 3053-54, testimony of 

Homma. 
134 

Cavalry (PS) from Pozorrubio to Rosario 

and by 0500 the Scouts were on their way. 

While the main body of the 26th Cavalry 

advanced toward Rosario, the Scout Car 

Platoon (less detachments) moved ahead 

quickly to Damortis. When it found the 

town unoccupied it pushed northward along 

the coastal road. A few miles to the north 

the Scout platoon ran into the forward 

elements of the 48th Reconnaissance and 

4th Tank Regiments and fell back to 

Damortis. 

Meanwhile the rest of the 26th Cavalry 

at Rosario had been ordered to Damortis 

and directed to hold that town. Upon its 

arrival the regiment established defensive 

positions, which would permit a delaying 

action in the event of a forced withdrawal. 

At 1300 the cavalrymen came under attack 

from Japanese ground units supported by 

planes of the 5th Air Group. 

Colonel Pierce, who now had, in addition 

to his own cavalry, a company of the 12th 

Infantry and one from the 71st under his 

command, was hard put to hold his position 

and called on General Wainwright for help. 

At about the same time Wainwright received word that an enemy force mounted 

on cycles or light motor vehicles was approaching Damortis. To meet this emergency, Wainwright requested a company of 

tanks from Brig. Gen. James R. N. Weaver, 

the Provisional Tank Group commander. 

Because of a shortage of gasoline, Weaver 

could furnish only a platoon of five tanks 

from Company C, 192d Tank Battalion. 

These moved out to the threatened area and 

near Agoo met the enemy's light tanks. The 

command tank, maneuvering off the road, 

received a direct hit and burst into flames. 

The other four, all hit by 47-mm. antitank 

fire, succeeded in returning to Rosario but 

were lost by bombing later in the day. At 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

1600 elements of the 1 st Formosa and 48th 

Mountain Artillery, which had landed earlier in the day at Aringay joined the attack. 

Colonel Pierce, finding himself completely 

outnumbered, withdrew to his first delaying position east of Damortis. By 1900, the 

Japanese were in complete control of the 

town.ZB 

Earlier that afternoon Wainwright had 

attached the 26th Cavalry to the 71st Division and had ordered Brig. Gen. Clyde 

A. Selleck to take his 71st Division (less 71st 

Infantry), then at U rdaneta, to Damortis, 

a distance of about twenty~five miles, and 

prevent the Japanese from moving south. 

The 26th Cavalry was to cover the right 

flank of the 71st Division and hold the junction of the Rosario-Baguio road, east of 

Rosario, in order to permit Major Bonnett's 

force, the 71st Infantry (less 1st Battalion), 

then at Baguio, to clear that point and join 

the North Luzon Force. 

At about 1630 General Selleck, accompanied by the 72d Infantry commander and 

Lt. Col. Halstead C. Fowler of the 71st 

Field Artillery, arrived at Rosario, which 

had by now become the focal point of American resistance. There he learned that Japanese troops were not only approaching 

from the west along the Damortis road, but 

also from the northwest where Colonel 

Yanagi's 47th Infantry was advancing from 

Agoo along the Aringay River valley. On 

his way to Damortis, Selleck found Colonel 

Pierce in his defensive position and learned 

of the exhausted condition of the 26th Cavalry. Since 71st Division troops had not 

28 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 94; ltr, Weaver 

to Wainwright, 20 Nov 45, copy made available to 

author by General Weaver, and in OCMH; 

Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 3, 

OCMH; Prov Tank Gp, Rpt of Opns 1941-42, 

p. 9, Annex X, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns. 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

yet come up, he ordered the cavalrymen to 

fall back slowly on Rosario. 

The Japanese by this time had a sizable 

force advancing along the Damortis-Rosario road. With the 48th Reconnaissance 

Regiment in the lead and Colonel Imai's 

1st Formosa supported by the 48th Mountain Artillery (less 1st and 2d Battalions) 

forming the main body, the Japanese threatened to overwhelm Colonel Pierce's weary 

cavalry. The tankers, Company C, 192d, 

supporting the Scouts, claimed to have orders from General Weaver, the Provisional 

Tank Group commander, to fall back at 

2000 to Rosario, and at the appointed time 

began to pull out. As the last of the tanks 

passed through the American lines, the rear 

guard of the 26th Cavalry was penetrated 

by Japanese tanks. In the confused action which followed, the Japanese tanks, 

merged in the darkness with the struggling 

men and the terrified riderless horses, cut 

up the defenders and exacted a heavy toll. 

Only bold action by Maj. Thomas J. H. 

Trapnell in blocking a bridge over a small 

river a few miles west of Rosario with a 

burning tank halted the Japanese and prevented a complete rout. 

When the retreating cavalrymen reached 

Rosario, they discovered that Troop F, 

which had been defending the trails northwest of the town, had been forced back by 

Colonel Yanagi's troops. It was now fighting a pitched battle in the town's public 

square. Fortunately for the Scouts, part 

of Colonel Yanagi's force had just been detached and ordered back to Agoo for the 

drive on San Fabian. Troop F held until 

the rest of the regiment had passed through 

Rosario. Then it broke off the action and 

followed, leaving the Japanese in possession. There was no pursuit; the 47th In135 

lantry was content to wait for the 1st Formosa and the tanks, a few miles west of the 

town on the Damortis road. 

Things had gone no better for Major 

Bonnett's force at Baguio. Busily tracking 

down rumors of Japanese units approaching in every direction, Bonnett spent the 

night at Baguio instead of pushing south 

to Rosario. Lt. Col. John P. Horan, the 

commander of Camp John Hay at Baguio, 

kept MacArthur's headquarters informed 

by radio of Japanese movements in the 

area and of the predicament of the force 

under Bonnett. 29 A few minutes before 

midnight of the 22d Horan radioed that 

the Japanese were "reported in Rosario" 

and that Bonnett desired "to move south at 

once if way is clear." "Can you contact 

Selleck by radio," he asked, "and inform 

us?" 20 

Although Horan received no reply, 

Wainwright, about midnight of the 22d, 

ordered Pierce to hold the junction of the 

Baguio and Rosario roads. Bonnett, unaware of this effort and believing that the 

Japanese held Rosario, remained at Baguio, 

and the 26th Cavalry finally had to withdraw the next morning when the position 

became untenable. 31 Bonnett later moved 

east over the mountains into the Cagayan 

valley, but Horan remained at his post 

throughout the 23d. The next morning, 

with the Japanese advancing from all sides, 

Horan pulled out after sending a final message to MacArthur: "My right hand in a 

vise, my nose in an inverted funnel, con29 Colonel Horan's radios to MacArthur are in 

AG 370.2 (19 Dec 41) Phil Reds. 

30 Rad, Horan to CG USAFFE, 22 Dec 41, AG 

370.2 (19 Dec 41) Phil Reds. 

" lnterv, author with Col Blackburn, 13 May 49; 

Liles, 12 lnf (PA), pp. 5-6; unsigned account of 

13 lnf (PA), pp. 9-10. 
136 

stipated my bowels, open my south paw. 

••• " 82 So ended the American occupation 

of the Philippine summer capital. 

Thus, by the end of D Day, the Japanese 

had secured most of their objectives. They 

had landed safely along the beaches between 

Bauang and Agoo, and, pushing north, 

south, and east, had seized the defiles 

through the mountains, effected a juncture 

with Colonel Tanaka's force, and occupied 

Damortis and Rosario. The Japanese were 

now in position to debouch on to the central 

plain. Only their inability to get artillery 

and supplies ashore marred the day's 

success. 

All the honors in the first day's fight had 

gone to the Japanese. Only the Scouts of 

the 26th Cavalry had offered any serious 

opposition to the successful completion of 

the Japanese plan. The untrained and 

poorly equipped Philippine Army troops 

had broken at the first appearance of the 

enemy and fled to the rear in a disorganized 

stream. Many of them, moving back along 

the coastal road, had passed through the 

21st Field Artillery command post at the 

bend of the gulf. Col. Richard C. Mallonee, American instructor with the regiment, thought, "Their presence presages 

disaster." Although he reorganized them 

and sent them back to division headquarters, 

few of them, he felt sure, ever arrived. 

Their stories were always the same. 

Always they were subjected to terrible, horrible mortar fire. Always the storyteller continued to bravely fire his rifle, machine gun 

or 75, as the case might be; always their officers ran away-or if the teller is an officer, 

then his superior officers ran first; always the 

enemy planes dropped many bombs and fired 

many machine guns; always there suddenly 

appeared many hostile tanks, headed straight 

so Rad, Horan to CG USAFFE, 24 Dec 41, AG 

370.2 (19 Dec 41) Phil Reds. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

for him; always he was suddenly surprised and 

astonished to realize that he was absolutely 

alone, all the others having been killed, ordespicable cowards-ran away. Then and 

only then, with the tanks a few feet away 

had he flung himself to one side where-and 

there the story has two variations, first he is 

captured but escapes that night; second he 

hides until night when he returns to our 

lines-but doesn't stop there. But from there 

on the threads of the story re-unite; they are 

very tired, they seek their companions, they 

are very hungry, and, Sir, could they be transferred to the Motor Transport Corps and 

drive a truck.3:J 

The Approach to the Agno 

The morning of 23 December found the 

71 st Division (less 71 st Infantry) in position astride Route 3 south of Sison, the 72d 

Infantry and the 71st Engineers in the front 

lines, with the 71st Field Artillery in support to the rear. The 26th Cavalry, which 

had suffered heavily, was under orders to 

fall back through the 71st Division line to 

Pozorrubio to reorganize. The 91st Divi-

'sion, USAFFE reserve at Cabanatuan, had 

been attached to the North Luzon Force, 

and its 91st Combat Team had been ordered north to reinforce the 71 st Division. 

It was to arrive at noon and occupy a position north of Pozorrubio, along the road 

leading south from Rosario. 

The action on the 23d opened when two 

battalions of the 47th Infantry, moving 

south from Rosario, struck General Selleck's 

line near Sison. Largely because of Colonel 

Fowler's artillery, the Japanese advance 

was held up until noon. During the early 

afternoon the 47th Infantry was joined by 

the 48th Reconnaissance and 4th Tank 

Regiments. Aided by planes of the 10th 

.. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 62-63. See also 

Collier, Notebooks, II, 35-38. 
THE MAIN LAKDINGS 137 

26TH CAVALRY (PS) MOVING INTO POZORRUBIO pass a General Stuart 

light tank, M3. 

Independent and 16th Light Bombardment 

R egiments, the Japanese now began a concerted attack. 

The Filipinos of the 71st Division, 

like those of the 1 J th, broke and fled 

to the rear, leaving the artillery uncovered. The line might have held if the 

91st Combat Team, en route from Cabanatuan, had reached Sison in time. But 

the 91st had run into bad luck. Japanese 

light bombers ranging far in advance of 

the ground troops had knocked out a bridge 

across the Agno River in the path of the 

91st advance. The 91st Combat Team 

was forced to detour and at this critical 

moment was far from the scene of combat. 

The situation was serious. A meeting of 

the American commanders was hastily 

called and it was agreed that the 7 I st Division would have to withdraw to a line just 

north of Pozorrubio. The 9Ist Combat 

Team, it was hoped, would reach that place 

in time to set up a line there. The 26th 

Cavalry in 715t Division reserve at Pozorrubio was to retire to Binalonan where it 

would set up an outpost line through which 

the remainder of the division could fall 

back if necessary. 

At 1900, as the Japanese entered Sison, 

the 26th Cavalry began to move out toward 

Binalonan and the 9Ist Combat Team 

reached Pozorrubio. That night the enemy 

attacked the 9Ist and drove it out of the 

town. With its rout, all hopes of holding 

a line at Pozorrubio came to an end. 

Even before the Japanese had entered 
138 

Sison that afternoon, General Wainwright 

had telephoned MacArthur's headquarters 

at Manila. After explaining that further 

defense of the Lingayen beaches was "impracticable," he requested permission to 

withdraw behind the Agno River. This 

request was readily granted. Believing that 

he could launch a counterattack if he had 

the Philippine Division, then in USAFFE 

reserve, Wainwright also asked for the division and for permission to mount an attack 

from the Agno. He was directed to submit his plans. "I'll get my plans there as 

soon as possible," he replied, but asked for 

an immediate answer on whether he would 

get the Philippine Division. After a slight 

delay, he was told that his chances of securing the division were "highly improbable." 

Nevertheless he began to make his plans for 

a counterattack. 34 

The action of 24 December placed the 

Japanese in position for the final drive toward the Agno River. At about 0500, with 

the 4th Tank Regiment in the lead, the 

Japanese made contact with the 26th Cavalry outposts nQrth and west of Binalonan. 

Although the Scouts had no antitank guns, 

they were able to stop the first attack. The 

tanks then swung west to bypass the American positions, leaving the infantry to continue the fight for Binalonan. By 0700 the 

26th Cavalry had blunted the assault and 

inflicted many casualties on the enemy. 

Pursuing their advantage, the Scouts counterattacked and the Japanese had to send in 

more tanks to stop the 26th Cavalry. Even 

with the aid of tanks, the Japanese made 

no progress. Sometime during the morning 

the 2d Formosa joined the attack, and the 

cavalrymen found themselves in serious 

trouble. Too heavily engaged to break off 

•• Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

35-36. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the action and retire, they continued to fight 

on. 

At this juncture, General Wainwright 

arrived at Binalonan to see Selleck. He 

found neither General Selleck, who had 

gone to Wainwright's command post to report, nor any 71 st Division troops, but did 

find the 26th Cavalry, which now numbered 

no more than 450 men. He ordered Pierce 

to get his wounded men and supply train 

out as quickly as possible and to fight a delaying action before withdrawing southeast across the Agno to Tayug. For more 

than four hours the cavalrymen held their 

position against overwhelming odds, and 

at 1530 began to withdraw. By dusk the 

last elements had reached Tayug and the 

2d Formosa entered Binalonan. "Here," 

said General Wainwright, himself a cavalryman, "was true cavalry delaying action, 

fit to make a man's heart sing. Pierce that 

day upheld the best traditions of the 

cavalry service." 85 

Despite the heroic struggle by the 26th 

Cavalry, the Japanese had secured their 

initial objectives and had established a 

firm grip on northern Luzon. They were 

now in position to march south to Manila 

along the broad highways of the central 

plain of Luzon. Only the southern route 

to the capital remained to be seized. That 

task was the mission of the Lamon Bay 

Force, already moving into position. 

The Lamon Bay Landings 

Simultaneously with the departure of 

the Lingayen Force from Formosa, Lt. Gen. 

Susumu Morioka, 16th Division commander, had left Amami Oshima in the 

Ryukyus on 17 December to begin his six-

.. Ibid., p. 39. 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

day voyage southward to Lamon Bay, 200 

road miles southeast of Lingayen. With 

the landing of his force, the Japanese plan 

to place troops in position to attack Manila 

from the north and south would be complete. 

Organization and Preparation 

The Lamon Bay Force had a secondary 

role in the seizure of Luzon and was consequently much smaller than the Lingayen 

Force. Its combat elements consisted primarily of General Morioka's 16th Division 

(less the 9th and 33d Infantry and some 

supporting elements) and numbered 7,000 

men. In addition, it contained a number 

of attached service and s.upporting units. 

General Homma did not expect much from 

this force; in his opinion, the 16th Division, 

which had seen action in China, "did not 

have a very good reputation for its fighting qualities." 36 

The plan for the Lamon Bay landing had 

been prepared during November, while the 

division was still in Japan. The original 

objective had been Batangas Bay on the 

southwest coast of Luzon, where the beaches 

were suitable for landings and where a direct route led through favorable terrain 

toward Manila to the north.37 (M ap 5) 

But when the number of aircraft assigned 

to the Philippine operation was reduced, 

16 USA vs. Homma, p. 3232, testimony of 

Homma. The strength of the division at this time 

is computed from Order of Battle information and 

from Japanese tables of organization . 

., Except as otherwise noted the account of the 

Lamon Bay landings is based upon: 14th Army 

Opns, I, 28, 32, 54-55; II, 6-7; Luzon Campaign 

of 16th Division, 24 Dec 41-3 Jan 42, ATIS 

Enemy Pub 355, pp. 1-3; Japanese Naval Opns in 

Phil Invasion, p. 15 ; Jones, Diary, pp. 8-11; and 

SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 12-15. 

139 

and when intelligence sources reported 

American reinforcements in bombers and 

submarines, the target had been changed 

to Lamon Bay on the southeast coast. 

The new landing site was undesirable on 

two grounds. First, the line of advance to 

Manila from Lamon Bay lay across the 

Tayabas Mountains, and secondly, Lamon 

Bay offered poor landing sites during the 

winter months because of prevailing winds. 

Despite these objections, Lamon Bay was 

chosen as the target of the 16th Division. 

The final plan developed by Morioka 

called for landings at three points along the 

shore of Lamon Bay-at Mauban, Atimonan, and Siain. General Morioka expected to take the Americans by surprise, 

but was ready, if necessary, to make an assault landing. His troops were to rout any 

American forces on the beaches, rapidly 

cross the Tayabas Mountains, and then concentrate in preparation for an expected 

counterattack. In order to avoid congestion on the narrow beaches and during the 

crossing of the mountains, the troops were 

to move ahead rapidly in several columns 

immediately after landing, without wait· 

ing for supporting troops or for the consolidation of the beachhead. The main force 

of General Morioka's division was to advanc'e west along Route 1, then sweep 

around Laguna de Bay to drive on to Cavite 

and Manila from the south. 

The force scheduled to land at Mauban 

was the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, and a 

battery of the 22d Field Artillery under Lt. 

Col. N ariyoshi Tsunehiro. After landing, 

it was to strike out to the west to Lucban, 

where it would be in position to move southeast to support the Atimonan force. If such 

support proved unnecessary, Tsunehiro was 

to turn northwest to Laguna de Bay, skirt 
140 

MAP5 

the southern shore, then strike north along 

Route 1 to Manila. 

The main force of the 16th Division, under direct command of General Morioka, 

was to make the assault on Atimonan. Included in this force were the 20th Infantry 

(less than 2d and most of the 1st Battalion) ; 

the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment, with 

one company of light armored cars; the 

16th Engineers; and the 22d Field Artillery (less 2d Battalion and one battery of 

the 1st). Once ashore, these troops were 

to move west across the mountains along 

Route 1, then north along the shore of 

Laguna de Bay and on to Manila. American troops and positions encountered along 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

LAMON BAY LANDINGS 

24 December 1941 

-+ AXIS OF JAPANESE ADVANCE 

TfTTT1TT1TTTT1T U. S. POSITIONS IAPPROX IMATE l. 

NIGHT OF 24-25 DECEMBER 

Devotions in feet 

10 o 10 20 

MILES 

TAYABAS BAY 

U Brooks 

the way were, so far as possible, to be bypassed and mopped up later. The main advance was not to be held up. 

Simultaneously with the landing at Atimonan, the 1 sf Battalion, 20th Infantry (less 

one company), with artillery support, was 

to land near Siain to the south, and cover 

the left flank of the main force. Having 

fulfilled this mission, the Siain force was 

to pass into division reserve. 

The 24 transports carrying the invasion 

force left the staging area at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus at 1500 on 17 December, six hours after the first Lingayen convoy 

pulled out of Kirun Harbor in northern 

Formosa. The transports were escorted ini-
THE MAIN LANDINGS 

tially by 4 destroyers and 4 minesweepers, 

but they had not gone far before they were 

joined by Rear Adm. Kyuji Kubo's force 

of 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers, 2 minesweepers, and 1 minelayer from Legaspi. 

The voyage from Amami Oshima was 

smooth and uneventful until the 23d, when 

the American submarine Sculpin forced 

the convoy to adopt evasive tactics. No 

damage was caused. At 0130 of the following morning, after the Lingayen Force 

had already been ashore for two days, the 

transports dropped anchor in Lamon Bay. 

An hour later the troops were ready to 

move to shore. as 

The Landing 

From the American point of view, the 

Japanese could not have landed at a more 

inopportune moment. Maj. Gen. George 

M. Parker's South Luzon Force was badly 

dispersed. The 41 st Division (P A) on the 

west coast was in position, but elements of 

the 51st Division along the east coast were 

in the process of movement. The South 

Luzon Force had been reinforced during 

the past few days by the recently inducted 

1 st Regular Division (P A), but only the 

1st Infantry of this division had actually 

moved into the area. Its orders were 

to relieve the 3d Battalion, 52d Infantry, 

north of Mauban. By evening of the 23d 

the relief had been accomplished, and one 

battalion of the 1st Infantry was in position at Mauban, another at Infanta; the 

remaining battalion was in reserve at a 

road junction northeast of Lucban. This 

move had just been completed when MacArthur's headquarters transferred the 1st 

Infantry to North Luzon Force. General 

.. American sources do not confirm the attack 

by the Sculpin. 

141 

Parker-and General Jones-protested the 

order vigorously, and it was finally rescinded, but the movement of the 3d Battalion, 52d Infantry, was in progress when 

the enemy landed. 

That same evening the 51st Division 

troops, who had moved south to delay the 

movement northward of the Kimura Detachment from Legaspi, were pulled back 

and were in the process of moving when 

the Japanese landed. The results for them 

were more tragic; many of them were cut 

off and never returned to the American 

lines. 

Not only were the forces along the east 

coast dispersed at the moment of the landing, but those units in position were handicapped by the absence of artillery. The 

South Luzon Force included two batteries 

of the 86th Field Artillery with 6 155-mm. 

guns, and a battalion of 16 7 S-mm. guns 

on self-propelled mounts. But none of 

these pieces were emplaced in the Lamon 

Bay area. They were all on the west 

coast-at Batangas, Balayan, and Nasugbu 

Bays. General Jones had requested that 

at least 2 of the 15S-mm. guns be moved to 

Atimonan, and Parker, concerned over this 

lack of artillery along the east coast, had 

twice asked MacArthur's headquarters for 

additional artillery. Both times he had 

been turned down, despite the fact that he 

used "the strongest arguments possible." 31J 

The failure to move some of the guns from 

the west coast to Lamon Bay, especially 

after the Japanese landing at Legaspi, can 

be explained only by the fact that MacArthur's headquarters feared to uncover the 

west coast beaches which offered a direct 

route to Manila across favorable terrain. 

.. SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 13; Itr, 

Jones to Ward, 3 Jan 52, OCMH; Itr, Col S. C . 

MacDonald to Jones, 21 Dec 51, OCMH. 
142 

By accepting the difficulties of a Lamon Bay 

landing, the Japanese unconsciously gained 

a great advantage. 

Thus, during the night of 23-24 December, as the Japanese were loading into 

the landing craft, the Lamon Bay area 

"vas without artillery support and was the 

scene of confusion, with several units in 

the process of movement from one place to 

another. Fortunately, the 1st Battalion, 

1st Infantry, was in position at Mauban, 

and Headquarters and Company A of the 

1 st Battalion, 52d Infantry were at 

Atimonan. 

News of the approach of the Japanese 

I eached the defenders at 2200 on the night 

of the 23d, when the transports off Atimonan were sighted. Four hours later troops 

were reported debarking there and at 

Siain. First word of a landing at Mauban 

was received by General Jones of the 51st 

Division at 0400. All these reports greatly 

overestimated the strength of the Japanese 

force. The Atimonan force was thought 

to be a reinforced division, and the troops 

coming ashore at Mauban were estimated 

as a reinforced brigade. 

Under cover of aircraft from the seaplane 

carrier Mizuho, Colonel Tsunehiro's 2d 

Battalion, 20th Infantry, came ashore at 

Mauban, northernmost of the three landing 

sites, in the first light of dawn. Immediately 

it ran into an effective crossfire from the 2d 

Battalion, 1st Infantry, dug in along the 

beach. At about this time, American planes 

struck the Japanese, inflicting heavy casualties on the troops and causing considerable 

damage to the ships.40 By 0800, after much 

t() Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War 11, I, 224, states that 12 P-40's and 

6 P-35's attacked a Japanese landing force at San 

Miguel Bay, 85 miles from Lamon Bay, on the 

morning of the 23d. There was no such landing, 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

heavy fighting, the Philippine Army regulars had been pushed back into Mauban. 

Thirty minutes later Colonel Tsunehiro's 

troops were in control of the village. The 

2d Battalion, 1 st Infantry, fell back five 

miles to the west, where it set up a defensive 

pOSItIOn. At 1430 the Japanese reached 

this position and there the advance came to 

a halt before the stubborn defense of the 

Filipinos. 

The 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, landed 

at Siain without difficulty. At 0700 one 

company moved out to the southwest along 

the Manila Railroad toward Tayabas Bay 

while the rest of the battalion pushed southeast on Route 1 to effect a juncture with 

General Kimura's troops moving northwest. 

Both columns made satisfactory progress 

during the day. By evening the company 

moving toward Tayabas Bay was within 

five miles of Padre Burgos. The rest of the 

force ran into sporadic opposition from 

Colonel Cordero's 52d Infantry troops in 

the Bicol Peninsula, and it was not until 

three days later that the 1st Battalion, 20th 

Infantry, joined with the Kimura Detachment. 

General Morioka's main force came 

ashore on the morning of 24 December 

about two and one half miles southeast of 

its target. The first troops landed were held 

up by Company A, 52d Infantry. The next 

wave containing the 16th Reconnaissance 

Regiment, landed beside the infantry but 

avoided action by moving off to the side, 

in accordance with instructions not to delay 

the main advance. The regiment then 

and it is possible that Lamon Bay is meant. Japanese sources state that there was an American 

air attack at the time of the Mauban landing. 

General Jones denies that American aircraft hit 

the Japanese at this time. Ltr, Jones to Ward, 3 

Jan 52, OCMH. 
THE MAIN LANDINGS 143 

LT. GEN. MASAHARU HOMMA, 14TH ARMY COMMANDER, coming ashore 

at Lingayan Gulf, 24 December 1941. 

struck off into the mountains, bypassing 

Atimonan. The town itself was secured by 

1100, although the Philippine Army troops 

fought stubbornly. 

The 16th Reconnaissance Regiment 

pushed along Route 1 toward Malicbuy, 

where the 2d Battalion, 52d Infantry, was 

frantically setting up defensive positions. 

Planes of the 8th Air Regiment (light 

bombers) provided cover for the advancing 

Japanese and attacked Malicbuy several 

times during the morning, destroying a 

number of vehicles and impeding the efforts 

of the troops to establish an adequate defense. When the 16th Reconnaissance 

reached the town, the 2d Battalion, 52d 

Infantry, already weakened by air attacks, 

fell back after a short fight. The Japanese 

entered Malicbuy without further interference. 

The American forces set up their next 

defensive position along a river near Binahaan, about four miles to the west. Here 

they were joined by the 53d Infantry (less 

two battalions) and the 3d Battalion (less 

one company) of the 52d Infantry. Late 

in the afternoon, when the Japanese at Atimonan had completed mopping-up operations in the town, they joined the main body 

at ~1alicbuy. The entire force then struck 

the delaying position at Binahaan. Under 

cover of darkness the defenders withdrew 
144 

along Route 1 toward Pagbilao, the next 

objective of the 16th Division.41 

By the evening of 24 December the J apanese had successfully completed the first and 

most difficult part of their plan for the conquest of the Philippines. In the south, at 

a cost of 84 dead and 184 wounded, General Morioka had landed his reduced division of 7,000 men. American resistance 

had held up the advance of some units, but 

the main force of the 16th Division had 

swept ahead, with the armored cars of the 

16th Reconnaissance in the van. Unloading had progressed satisfactorily, and many 

of the service and supporting units had already landed. The roads leading westward 

through the Tayabas Mountains had been 

secured, and the troops of the Lamon Bay 

Force were in position to reach Tayabas 

Bay the following morning. General Homrna had not expected much from this force. 

41 1st Lt John Shaw, 52d Inf (PA), p. 1, Chunn 

Notebooks, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Its success came, therefore, as "quite a surprise" to 14th Army headquarters at Lingayen Gulf, and, as the Japanese later confessed, "The result realized was more than 

expected." 42 

North of Manila the Lingayen Force 

stood ready to drive on to the Agno River. 

After several days of difficulties, the beachhead had been organized and heavy supplies and equipment brought ashore. San 

Fabian to the south had been occupied and 

the American artillery there driven out. 

The north and east flanks of the coastal corridor had been secured, and Japanese troops 

were pouring out on to the central plain to 

add their weight to the advance on Manila, 

100 miles away. That day, 24 December, 

General Homma brought his staff ashore at 

Bauang, where he established 14th Army 

headquarters. The Japanese were evidently in the Philippines to stay. 

.. Phil Landing Opns (Amphibious), A TIS Doc 

1989-6A. 
CHAPTER IX 

Strategy and Logistics 

The success of the Japanese after 7 December had been phenomenal. Not only 

had they won air and naval supremacy in 

the western Pacific and landed a large number of troops on Luzon and Mindanao, but 

they had taken Guam on 10 December and 

Wake two weeks later; Hong Kong was to 

surrenda on Christmas Day. In the Malay 

States, Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25th 

Army was advancing steadily in two parallel columns down the east and west coasts. 

By 23 December it had reached a point 

about 250 miles from the tip of the peninsula. Once there, the Japanese would be in 

position to bring Singapore under assault. 

On the 24th a small Japanese force landed 

at Kuching and a week later another force 

landed at Brunei in British Borneo, thus inaugurating the two-pronged offensive 

against the Netherlands Indies. By the end 

of the year the Japanese had established 

themselves at Davao, on Jolo Island, and 

on British Borneo, astride the Allied line of 

supply between the southern Philippines 

and northwest Australia. 

The electrifying news of Pearl Harbor. 

followed by the declaration of war by Germany and Italy, united the American people 

as nothing else could have don.e. The attention of the country, until then centered on 

the war in Europe, focused now on the 

Pacific and Far East where American troops 

were putting up a valiant defense. There 

was a strong feeling that everything possible 

should be done to aid the beleaguered forces 

in the Philippines, and General MacArthur's name became a symbol of American resistance to a foe who was meeting 

with success everywhere. 

At the very start of the war there was a 

general acceptance among military and 

naval authorities in Washington of the 

view that the Philippines would soon be lost. 

Acceptance of this view did not mean, however, that every effort should not be made 

to reinforce General MacArthur. The 

President, the Secretary of War, and the 

Chief of Staff all felt strongly, with the 

American people, that the country had an 

obligation, no matter what the risks, to do 

all in its power to aid the Philippine people. 

Only final defeat would end that obligation. 

The question was what could be done and 

how much could be spared from the more 

important task, the defense of the United 

States. 

The Pensacola Convoy 

The question of reinforcing the Philippines arose on the first day of war. Already on the high seas in the South Pacific 

when the Japanese opened hostilities was a 

convoy of seven ships, escorted by the heavy 

cruiser- Pensacola and the subchaser 

Niagara, en route to Manila via the southern route. Aboard the vessels were badly 

needed planes for the pilots of the 27th 

Bombardment Group, two regiments of 

artillery, and large quantities of ammuni-
146 

tion and supplies.1 The convoy was immediately ordered to put in at Suva in the 

Fiji Islands until a decision could be made 

on its ultimate destination. 

The decision was made on 9 December 

at a meeting of the Joint Board. The chief 

planners of the Army and Navy, General 

Gerow and Rear Adm. Richmond K. 

Turner, wanted the convoy brought back 

immediately to' Hawaii to reinforce that 

badly battered garrison. General Gerow's 

position was more extreme than that of his 

naval counterpart. He suggested that if 

the convoy was not sent to Hawaii it should 

be brought back to the United States. Following discussion, the Joint Board approved 

the plan to recall the Pensacola convoy to 

Hawaii. 2 

While the safety of the Hawaiian Islands 

was undoubtedly of prime importance, the 

decision to bring back the Pensacola convoy 

was, in effect, an abandonment of the 

Philippine Islands. General Marshall was 

willing to concede the importance of Hawaii, but felt_ keenly the obligation to send 

help to General MacArthur. He had already assured the USAFFE commander on 

the afternoon of 7 December that he had 

"the complete confidence of the War Department," and that he could expect "every 

1 The seven vessels were the Holbrook, Republic, 

Meigs, Bloemfontem, Admiral Halstead, Farmer, 

and Chaumont. The vessels carried a field artillery brigade with 20 75-rnrn. guns j the ground elements of the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group; 18 

P-40's; and 52 A-24's, 500,000 rounds of 50-caliber armor-piercing and tracer ammunition; 9,600 

rounds of high explosive for 37-mm. antiaircraft 

guns; 2,000 500-pound and 3,000 30-pound bombs; 

and miscellaneous vehicles and equipment. The 

total number of U.S. troops aboard was 4,600. 

Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 776, 12 Dec 41, 

WPD 4628. 

• Min, JB Mtg, 9 Dec 41, DPD Reg Doc. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

possible assistance within our power." 3 On 

the morning of the 10th, "concerned with 

just what to say to General MacArthur," 

he discussed the Joint Board decision with 

Mr. Stimson. He confessed that "he did 

not like to tell him [MacArthur] in the midst 

of a very trying situation that his convoy 

had had to be turned back, and he would 

like to send some news which would buck 

General MacArthur up." 4 

At a White House meeting later that day, 

the question of the Pensacola convoy was 

again discussed, and the President indicated 

his desire that the vessels should continue to 

the Far East. He referred the matter back 

to the Joint Board, and at its meeting that 

afternoon the Board decided to send the 

convoy on to Brisbane, Australia. The 

Army members reversed their stand of the 

previous day and expressed the opinion that 

Hawaii could be supplied from the United 

States. They now wished, they said, to 

make every effort to send aircraft, ammunition, and other critical material to the 

Philippines.5 

On 12 December the commander of the 

Pensacola convoy was ordered to proceed to 

Brisbane, his later movements to be determined "following arrival and depending 

upon the situation." ~ At the same time, 

the U.S. military attache in Melbourne, Col. 

Van S. Merle-Smith, was notified of the 

impending arrival of the vessels and given 

instructions to be passed on to the senior 

Army commander in the convoy, Brig. Gen. 

Julian F. Barnes. In these instructions 

• Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 736, 7 Dec 

41, WPD 4544-20. 

• Min, mtg in DCS, 10 Dec 41, Notes on Conf, 

WDCSA, CofS Confs, II. 

"Ibid., 12 Dec 41. 

"Ibid., 12 Dec 41. 
STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS 

General Barnes was ordered to place himself under MacArthur's command and told 

that his principal task was to get the aircraft, mF.n, and supplies in the convoy to 

the Philippines as quickly as possible. Upon 

arrival in Australia, he was to assemble the 

A-24's immediately and send them north 

to the Philippines. Before unloading the 

other troops and supplies, he was to find 

out from the Navy if the vessels could be 

escorted northward. If they could not, they 

were to be unloaded in Brisbane and used 

"as the situation dictates," with first priority 

given to the defense of the Philippines.1 

General MacArthur received the welcome news that reinforcements were on the 

way on 13 December.s Immediately he 

conferred with Admiral Hart on the possibility of escorting the ships from Brisbane 

to Manila. He emphasized to Hart the 

necessity for bringing in supplies and reinforcements and explained how limited were 

the resources at his disposal. "I suggested," 

he reported to the Chief of Staff, "that he 

[Hart] should endeavor with his own surface forces and with assistance of Australian 

and Dutch naval and air forces to bring in 

the present convoy and keep my line open." 

But Admiral Hart's answer was extremely 

discouraging. He pointed out that the British and Dutch were fully engaged trying 

to hold Singapore and the Malay Barrier 

and that he could not take the responsibility 

of protecting the convoy with the weak 

forces at his disposal. The Japanese, he 

believed, would have established a complete 

blockade of the Philippine Islands before 

the convoy could arrive. "In effect," Mac-

'Memo, CofS for Comdr D. H. Harries, RAN, 

Australian Naval Attache, 12 Dec 41, sub: Msgs 

for U.S. Mil Attache, WPD 4628-1; rad, OPNAV 

to COM TF 15, 10 Dec 41, WPD Msg File. 

R Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 776, 12 Dec 

41, WPD 4628. 

147 

Arthur reported, "he [Hart] seemed to be 

of the opinion that the islands were ultimately doomed." 9 MacArthur's own view 

was that there was no serious obstacle to the 

safe convoy of vessels from Brisbane to 

Manila "provided reasonable naval and 

air protection are furnished." 10 

While the matter of the Pensacola convoy was being settled in Washington, MacArthur made specific requests for reinforcements based upon his ideas for offensive action. On the recommendation of General 

Brereton he asked for 300 pursuit planes, together with air warning equipment. If the 

aircraft in the Pensacola convoy could be 

ferried to Luzon and be ready for operations 

by 1 January, he felt he could meet the immediate situation with 250 dive bombers. 

At this time, 14 December, he first advanced the idea that the planes be brought 

within operating distance of the Philippines 

by means of aircraft carrier. He asked also 

for additional .50-caliber ammunition and 

suggested that it be brought in by the dive 

bombers or by Pan American Airways 

planes shuttling between Australia and the 

Philippines. Altogether, he declared, he 

had or would soon have fourteen airfields 

capable of accommodating the aircraft he 

was requesting.ll 

The receipt of these specific requests in 

Washington resulted in immediate action. 

General Gerow, in a personal note to General Marshall, pointed out that the Pensacola convoy was due in Brisbane very 

shortly and an immediate decision on the 

• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 Dec 41, OPD 

Exec 0; ltr, Hart to Ward, 19 Dec 51, OCMH. 

,. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 Dec 41, OPD 

Exec O. 

11 Memo, Brereton for MacArthur, 14 Dec 41, 

cited in Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces 

in World War II, I, 222; rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec O. 
148 

Navy's willingness to convoy the vessels 

northward was necessary. "If the ships can 

go directly to Manila, the supplies, except 

aircraft, should not be unloaded in Australia," Gerow noted. "Admiral Stark is 

the only one that can make the decision." 12 

Marshall had already discussed this 

problem with Stimson, who felt that to 

abandon the Philippines would "paralyze 

the activities" of the Allied forces in the Far 

East. The question was discussed at the 

White House, and the President instructed 

the Navy to do all in its power to assist the 

Army in reinforcing General MacArthur.1s 

General Marshall thereupon assured MacArthur that there would be "no wavering 

in the determination to support you." Although naval losses had complicated the 

problem of reinforcement, he declared that 

fighters and bombers would be rushed to the 

Philippines as quickly as possible.14 

Quick action followed the President's instructions to send help to the Philippines. 

Orders were issued to load the transport 

Polk in San Francisco harbor and the 

Coolidge, due in port soon, with pursuit 

planes and ammunition and dispatch them 

immediately to Australia. Two additional 

shipments were scheduled to reach Brisbane 

early in January. The arrival of these vessels would place in Australia 230 aircraft. 15 

At the same time, two Pan American clippers were loaded with .50-caliber ammunition and dispatched to Australia via the 

12 Note, Gerow to Marshall on WPD copy of rad, 

MacArthur to Marshall, 15 Dec 41, OPD Exec O. 

18 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 

395-96 . 

.. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 787, 15 Dec 

41, WPD 4544-31. 

,. Memo for Rcd by Gen Gerow, 15 Dec 41, OPD 

Exec 0; memo, Arnold for CofS, 15 Dec 41, sub: 

Aerial Reinf for Hawaii and Phil, WPD Msg File; 

rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 824, 18 Dec 41, 

WPD 4622-28. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

South Atlantic-Africa route. Fifteen heavy 

bombers were also immediately diverted to 

MacArthur, and a flight schedule was established which would give him three planes 

a day until the new year. The sum of 

$10,000,000 was made available to the future commander of the base in Australia to 

enable him to carry out his mission of supporting the defense of the Philippines. By 

18 December Marshall was able to inform 

MacArthur that the War Department "is 

proceeding with utmost expedition to provide necessary supplies at base with early 

emphasis on most critical items." 16 

On 22 December the Pensacola convoy 

with its valuable cargo of aircraft, artillery, 

and ammunition arrived in Brisbane. It 

was still a.. long way from Manila, but the 

first leg of the journey had been completed. 

A way now had to be found to send the 

planes and supplies from Australia to the 

Philippines. 

The program to reinforce the Philippines was in full swing. The necessity for 

reaching a decision on the destination of 

the Pensacola convoy had raised the question of reinforcement immediately on the 

outbreak of war and brought the issues into 

sharp focus. But the settlement of this 

question had raised broader strategic problems. These were not so easily solved. 

Far East and Pacific Strategy 

The basic strategy of the war had been 

established during staff talks with the British between January and March 1941 and 

was embodied in the RAINBOW plan. This 

,. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 824, 18 Dec 

41, WPD 4622-28; Itr, Maj Gen Richard C. Moore, 

DCofS, to Maj Gen George H. Brett, 19 Dec 41, 

OCS 18136-161. The way in which the $10,000,-

000 was spent is described in Chapter XXII, 

below. 
STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS 

strategy provided that the principal effort 

of the Allies would be made against Germany and that the decisive theater would 

be in the Atlantic and Europe. Except for 

certain limited offensive operations assigned the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, the 

most important of which were the defense 

of Hawaii and the Philippines and the capture of positions in the Japanese mandated 

islands, operations against Japan were to be 

defensive. The destruction of the Battle 

Force of the Pacific Fleet and the attack 

against the Philippines made it evident that 

a different strategy for the Far East would 

have to be evolved to meet the new situation. 

As soon as the results of the Pearl Harbor 

attack were assessed, the Navy knew that 

it could not execute the missions assigned 

in RAINBOW 5. At the 8 December meeting of the Joint Board, the Navy members 

had pointed out that as a result of the losses 

at Pearl Harbor the Pacific Fleet would not 

be able to advance across the Central Pacific.17 Two days later, when the decision 

was made to send the Pensacola convoy 

on to Brisbane, Admiral Stark, Chief of 

Naval Operations, told the Joint Board 

that the Navy had decided that the Asiatic 

Fleet should be withdrawn from the Philippines, "in view of the destruction at Cavite 

and the untenability of Manila as a fleet 

anchorage." Admiral Hart was to be left 

free to execute the withdrawal and to select a future base of operations.18 

The Navy Department's views on Far 

East strategy did not include any strong 

measures for the defense of the Philippines. 

Admiral Stark declared that he was not 

surprised by the success of the Japanese but 

only by the vigor of the attack, which had 

IT Min, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41, OPD Reg Doc. 

"Ibid., 10 Dec 41. 

149 

resulted in such unexpectedly rapid advances. He expected that with the fall of 

Singapore and Luzon-which he seemed to 

regard as inevitable-the Japanese would 

move into the Netherlands Indies. To him, 

the essential problem was to hold the Malay 

Barrier-the line Malay Peninsula-Sumatra-Java-Australia-Iong enough to 

build up the defenses of northwest Australia. Apparently the defense of Luzon 

did not, in his opinion, contribute to this 

mission.19 

Stark approved Hart's orders sending the 

major surface units of the fleet to Borneo, 

and cautioned the Asiatic Fleet commander not to delay his own withdrawal 

lest the Japanese mine the exits of Manila 

Bay. There was no indication in his messages to Manila of any intention to carry 

out offensive operations against the Japanese Navy or of a determination to hold 

the Philippines, although Hart was reminded of his obligation to s.upport the 

Army's defense of Luzon as long as it was 

practicable. 

On the all-important question of getting 

reinforcements to the Philippines, Admiral 

Stark merely told Hart what he already 

knew-that a convoy was soon to arrive in 

Brisbane and that he was to get in touch 

with General MacArthur "as to present 

orders for this force." The Chief of Naval 

Operations pointed out that the convoy 

carried aircraft and artillery which, he 

added significantly, "may be very important for the defense of Port Darwin and 

vicinity." He said nothing about the necessity of bringing the convoy to Manila. 

This is a surprising omission, since the reinforcements were intended for MacArthur, and every effort was being made in 

,. Rad, OPNAV to CINCAF, 14 Dec 41, copy in 

AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 
150 

Washington to provide safe convoy of the 

vessels northward from Australia. He further suggested to Hart that the minesweepers and small craft in Manila would be useful at Darwin, and concluded by placing 

the U.S. naval observer there under Hart's 

command. 20 

The Army planners shared the Navy's 

pessimism about the fate of the Philippines 

and on 9 December had been as anxious as 

the Navy members of the Joint Board to 

bring back the Pensacola convoy. While 

still feeling that there was little hope for the 

Philippine garrison, they reversed their 

views after 10 December and supported 

strongly the program for reinforcement. 

Mr. Stimson, after the war, explained his 

reasons for supporting General MacArthur 

as follows: 

I laid before them [his three civilian assistants] the issue which was now pending before 

us, namely as to whether we should make 

every effort possible in the Far East or 

whether, like the Navy, we should treat that 

as doomed and let it go. We all agreed that 

the first course was the one to follow; that we 

have a very good chance of making a successful defense, taking the southwestern Pacific 

as a whole. If we are driven out of the Philippines and Singapore, we can still fall back 

on the Netherlands East Indies and Australia; 

and with the cooperation of China-if we can 

keep that thing going-we can strike good 

counterblows at Japan. While if we yielded 

to the defeatist theory, it would have not only 

the disastrous effect on our material policy of 

letting Japan get strongly ensconced in the 

southwestern Pacific ... but it would psychologically do even more in the discouragement of China and in fact all of the four 

powers who are now fighting very well together. Also it would have a very bad effect 

on Russia. So this theory goes. It has been 

accepted by the President, and the Army is 

"Ibid. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

taking steps to make a solid base at Port 

Darwin in Australia.21 

It was admitted by Army and Navy planners that the Philippines were no longer defensible, and some urged that the limited 

resources of the United States should be 

used to "defend the defensible,'" But the 

issue was not entirely a military one. "Politically," says Stimson, "it was still more 

important that this defense be supported as 

strongly as possible, for neither the Filipino 

people nor the rest of the Far Eastern world 

could be expected to have a high opinion 

of the United States" if it abandoned the 

Philippines at this critical moment. 22 It 

was because of these considerations that 

Stimson and Marshall strongly supported 

General MacArthur and firmly opposed 

any signs of a defeatist attitude in the General Staff. In this effort they had the support of the President. 

In the Philippines there was strong disagreement between the Army and Navy 

commanders. Admiral Hart agreed with 

his Washington superiors that his fleet 

should be withdrawn and had already sent 

the major portion of his surface forces southward. He was still resolved, he told Admiral Stark, to use his submarines and small 

craft in the defense of the Philippines, but 

pointed out that the undersea craft could 

not prevent enemy landings or the blockade 

of the Islands.23 

MacArthur, unlike his naval colleague 

and many officers in Washington, refused 

to accept the inevitability of the loss of the 

21 Stimson's Diary, 17 Dec 41, cited in Stimson 

and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 396-97. 

" Ibid., p. 395. 

.. Rads, CINCAF to OPNAV, 101330 and 

131026, 10 and 13 Dec 41, War Diary, 16th Naval 

Dist, Off of Naval Reds. 
STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS 

Philippines. Instead, he urged upon the 

War Department an offensive strategy in 

the Far East. The enemy, he asserted, was 

overextended, presenting the Allies with a 

"golden opportunity . . . for a master 

stroke." The "master stroke" he had in 

mind was a strong air attack against the 

Japanese home islands from the north. If 

successful such an attack would inflict great 

damage on the enemy and force him to pull 

in his widely dispersed air forces to protect 

the homeland.24 The aircraft and carriers 

needed to carry out such a raid were not 

available at this time, and MacArthur's 

bold plan was shelved. But it is of more 

than passing interest to note that the Halsey-Doolittle raid against Tokyo on 18 April 

1942, five months later, conformed to 

General MacArthur's suggested offensive 

against Japan, although it came too late to 

achieve the results he had hoped for. 25 

General MacArthur reacted. strongly to 

Hart's pessimistic attitude. After the meeting on 13 December, when MacArthur 

asked Hart to escort the Pensacola convoy 

to Manila, the general wrote that he was 

greatly concerned over the Navy's estimate 

since "he [Hart] is charged with the security of the Army's supply lines." The acceptance of the view that the Philippines 

could not be reinforced, General MacArthur pointed out, meant the virtual abandonment of the Philippine Islands and the 

Philippine people. "If the suspicion of such 

action ever materializes," he warned the 

•• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 198, 10 Dec 

41, WPD 4544-26 . 

.. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 389-90, 

credits Admiral King with the idea of proposing the 

raid and initiating studies for its execution in January 1942. Actually, the President suggested the 

raid at a White House meeting on 28 January. 

WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42). 

151 

Chief of Staff, "the entire structure will collapse over my head." 26 

MacArthur's reaction to Hart's views 

brought immediate results. The President 

on the 14th told the Acting Secretary ot 

the Navy that "he was bound to help the 

Philippines and the Navy has got to help in 

it." 27 Thus prodded by the White House, 

the Navy was forced to modify its attitude 

somewhat. Recognizing Hart's inability 

to guarantee safe transport of the Pensacola convoy to Manila, the Chief of Naval 

Operations suggested an "effort when appropriate to pass through such support as 

may be practicable." With this lukewarm 

injunction, Admiral Stark also directed 

Hart to "cooperate with the Army" in the 

transportation by air of particularly needed 

supplies "when practicable." His authority to transfer his headquarters farther 

south was reiterated, but he was told to "assure MacArthur" that he would continue 

his "full support" of the defense of the 

Philippines. He was further instructed to 

tum over all naval stores to the Army on 

his departure from Manila and to place all 

marines and bluejackets under MacArthur's 

command.28 

In the firm belief that the Philippines 

could be defended successfully against the 

Japanese, General MacArthur argued for 

a review of the strategic situation "lest a 

fatal mistake be made." Despite assur~ 

ances of support from the War Department 

he felt that the importance of the Islands 

was not appreciated and that not enough 

was being done to support him. "The 

Philippine theater of operations," he as-

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 Dec 41, OPD 

Exec O. 

11 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 396. 

"Rad, OPNAV to CINCAF, 170105, 17 Dec 

41, War Diary, 16th Naval Dist, Off of Naval Rcds. 
152 

serted categorically, "is the locus of victory 

or defeat." "If the Philippines and the 

Netherlands East Indies go," he warned, "so 

will Singapore and the entire Asiatic continent." 29 

MacArthur's solution was to concentrate the resources of the Allies against J apan and so reverse the basic strategic decision of the war. Japan, he pointed out, 

was isolated from her Allies and "completely 

susceptible to concentrated action." He 

proposed therefore that the combined resources of the United States and its allies 

should be employed in the Pacific to delay 

Japan's advance. This delay, he argued, 

could be accomplished by sending more 

pursuit and bombardment aircraft to the 

Philippines. The retention of the Islands, 

he concluded, fully justified the diversion 

of the entire air production and other resources of the United States to the Philippines.so 

. The final answer to MacArthur's plea for 

~ reversal of strategy and the concentration of Allied resources in the Far East was 

provided by the first of the wartime U .S.-

British conferences, held in Washington between 24 December and 14 January. With 

the Pacific Fleet in ruins at Pearl Harbor 

and with the Philippines under strong attack, the British had good reason to fear 

that the United States would now abandon 

the earlier informal agreement to exert its 

principal effort against Germany. Their 

fears were groundless. The Washington 

conference reaffirmed the thesis that Germany was the main enemy and that the 

major effort must be made in the North At-

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 Dec 41, OPD 

Exec O. 

.. Ibid. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Ian tic and Europe. 81 MacArthur's efforts 

to secure a change in basic strategy had 

failed. 

The Base in Australia 

The discussions over strategy did not interrupt the efforts to send supplies to the 

Philippine garrison. These efforts inevitably involved the use of Australia as a base of 

operations for American forces. With the 

line of communications across the Central 

Pacific cut by the Japanese, the only way 

remaining to reach the Philippines was 

northward from Australia. Such a possibility had not been anticipated in prewar 

plans except as an air ferry route; the Australian. base developed simply as a result 

of improvisation during the first days of the 

war. Once the Pensacola convoy was 

routed to Brisbane and it was decided to 

support General MacArthur, American effort in the Southwest Pacific turned to the 

build-up of supplies in Australia and the 

establishment of a line of communications 

northward. 

To supervise the establishment of an advanced American base in Australia General Marshall selected Brig. Gen. Dwight D. 

Eisenhower. Having served on MacArthur's staff for three years, Eisenhower 

was peculiarly qualified for the task. He 

knew the situation in the Far East well, 

understood General MacArthur's plans and 

requirements, and could be presumed to 

have the confidence of the USAFFE commander. From his post as Chief of Staff, 

.. This meeting, called the ARCADIA Conference, 

is discussed in full in Maurice Matloff and Edwin 

M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, ]941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1945) . 
STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS 

Third Army, at Fort Sam Houston, Eisenhower was called to Washington on 12 December and reported to General Marshall 

two days later. After outlining for Eisenhower the situation in the Far East, Marshall abruptly asked what our line of action 

should be. Evidently his reply would determine his worth, and Eisenhower asked 

for and secured time to prepare an answer. 

He returned to his desk in the War Plans 

Division to work out his reply, resolved that 

it "should be short, emphatic, and based 

on reasoning." 32 

After some hours of thought, Eisenhower 

returned to the Chief of Staff with his answer. He admitted that there was little 

chance that the garrison in the Philippines 

could hold out for long, but declared that 

everything possible should be done to support it. The risks and the money involved 

should not deter the United States from 

making a determined effort to help the 

Philippine Commonwealth. The trust and 

friendship of the people of Asia were 

important to the United States; failure 

might be excused, but never abandonment. 

To aid General MacArthur, Eisenhower 

believed, it would be necessary to convert 

Australia into a military base from which 

supplies might be ferried northward to the 

Philippines.33 

Eisenhower's views coincided exactly 

with those of Marshall and Stimson and 

had already been approved by the President. Eisenhower had passed the test, and 

Marshall told him to do his best to save the 

Philippines. During the next few months, 

.. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in EuTope (New York, 1948), p. 18. 

sa Ibid., p. 21-22. An unsigned and undated 

paper entitled Assistance to the Far East, OPD 

Exec 0, is probably the one prepared by Eisenhower on 14 December. 

153 

first as head of the Pacific Section of the 

War Plans Division and then as chief of the 

division, he devoted himself almost exclusively to the task of reinforcing the Philippines. 

By 17 December Eisenhower had developed and Marshall had approved a plan 

for establishing the base in Australia.34 The 

forces in the Pensacola convoy were to form 

the nucleus for the new commands which 

was to be essentially an air base. Barnes, 

when he arrived in Brisbane, was to be relieved by Brig. Gen. Henry B. Claggett, 

then commanding the Interceptor Command in the Philippines. Claggett was ordered to Australia immediately. Ultimately, the base, to be known as U.S. Army 

Forces in Australia, was to be commanded 

by Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, who was in 

Chungking attending an Allied conference. 

Col. Stephen J. Chamberlin, a highly qualified G-4 officer on duty with the General 

Staff, was sent to Australia to serve as 

Brett's chief of staff. 

While the establishment of this new 

command implied a larger purpose than 

the support of the forces in the Philippines, 

the War Department made it clear that the 

primary mission of U.S. Army Forces in 

Australia was to get vitally needed supplies 

to General MacArthur. General Brett was 

informed that his command was to be considered as an advanced base of a communications zone "for the support of 

USAFFE" and that he would operate under the orders of General MacArthur. He 

was further instructed to co-operate with 

U.S. naval authorities "in assuring the 

safety of sea routes used," and to fly the 

planes in the Pensacola convoy northward 

.. Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Dec 41, sub: Plan 

for Australian Base, WPD 4628-1. 
154 

with all the ammunition they could carry. 

Any course that would achieve these results 

was authorized.35 

On 22 December, the same day the Pensacola convoy reached Brisbane, General 

Claggett arrived from the Philippines. He 

was immediately handed the instructions 

for the new base by Colonel Merle-Smith, 

the military attache. Already General 

MacArthur had indicated that the convoy 

should proceed to the Philippines and that 

the aircraft should be assembled and flown 

north. Every attempt was made to comply with these instructions, but the situation was changing rapidly and there were 

numerous obstacles to be overcome in unloading and rerouting the ships. 

General Marshall had done all he could 

to assure the arrival of the supplies in the 

convoy to MacArthur. He had reminded 

both Claggett and Barnes repeatedly of the 

urgent necessity of getting the planes and 

.50-caliber ammunition to the Philippines 

and told them to spare neither effort nor 

expense to accomplish this task.38 The 

Navy had also instructed its representatives in Australia to assist in every way, and 

the Chief of Naval Operations asked Admiral Hart, still in Manila, to "impress 

upon the Australian Naval Board the importance of their full cooperation" in keeping open Torres Strait as a route for U.S. 

reinforcements to the Philippines and 

northwest Australia.31 

.. Ltr, R. C. Moore to Brett, 19 Dec 41, OCS 

18136-161; rad, Marshall to Military Attache, 

Melbourne for Brett, No. 31, 17 Dec 41, WPD 

4628-1. See also the Administrative Order dispatched to CG USAFIA, 20 Dec 41, AG 381 (12-

20-41) MSC-D-M. 

.. Rad, Marshall to Military Attache, Melbourne, 

No. 36, 22 Dec 41, WPD 4630-2. General MacArthur received copies of the radios sent to Australia. 

• T Rad, OPNAV to CINCAF, 222302, 23 Dec 41. 

War Diary, 16th Naval Dist, Off of Naval Reds. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

MacArthur had been kept fully informed 

of these measures. "The President has 

seen all of your messages," Marshall told 

him, "and directs Navy to give you every 

possible support in your splendid fight." 38 

Despite these assurances and the efforts 

of the men in Australia, the aircraft, reinforcements, and supplies failed to get 

through. When the planes were brought 

ashore and assembled, they were found to 

lack parts such as trigger motors, gun sights, 

and self-sealing gas tanks, all of which would 

be required in combat.39 The field artillery brigade and the naval supplies were 

placed aboard the two fastest ships in the 

convoy, the Holbrook and Bloemfontein, 

which sailed from Brisbane on 28 December. By that time the Japanese had established bases in Borneo, and it was realized 

that the ships would not be able to get 

through the blockade. General Brett, who 

had arrived in Australia on 31 December, 

therefore ordered the troops debarked. 

Most of the artillerymen came ashore at 

Darwin; the rest went on tQ Surabaja in 

Java. None of the planes, men, or supplies of the Pensacola convoy ever reached 

the Philippines. 

But General MacArthur had not yet 

given up hope that the planes might be 

brought into the Philippines. On the 14th 

he had suggested that air reinforcements be 

brought in by carrier, thus eliminating the 

problem of bases between Australia and Luzon. On the 22d, the day on which the 

Japanese landed at Lingayen Gulf, he observed that enemy air and naval forces were 

threatening his line of communications 

southward and called for some American 

as Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 855, 22 Dec 

41, AG 381 (1l-27-41 Gen) Far East. I. Hist of Fifth Air Force, Part I, p. 44 and App . 

2, Doc 67; Arnold, Global Mission, p. 290. 
STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS 

naval effort to limit the enemy's freedom of 

movement along the vital sea lanes. Pointedly he asked for "any inkling" of the strategic plans for the Pacific Fleet and reminded Marshall that carriers could bring 

pursuit planes within operating radius of 

the Philippines. "Can I expect anything 

along that line," he asked.40 

The answer was no. Admiral Stark asserted that the use of aircraft carriers as 

transports was "impracticable in the existing strategic situation," and Marshall was 

forced to tell MacArthur that he would 

have to rely on the ability of cargo ships and 

aircraft to make their way northward from 

Australia by way of Torres Strait and the 

Netherlands Indies.41 

Apparently MacArthur's suggestion that 

a navai threat be made against Japan 

brought an inquiry from the Chief of Naval 

Operations to Admiral Hart. The Asiatic 

Fleet commander explained that MacArthur had sent his message without consulting him, and that the reference "was meant 

to apply forces other than this [Asiatic] 

fleet." 42 The next day, 24 December, Hart 

received another message from his chief in 

Washington asking for a full report of his 

operations in support of the Army, "as my 

information on this subject is meager." 

The Army, Stark explained, was "bringing 

heavy pressure for greater naval activity in 

Philippine waters." 43 

.. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 22 and 

40,22 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

., Memo, Stark for Marshall, 23 Dec 41, sub: 

Transportation of Aircraft to Phil, AG 381 (11-

27-41 Gen) Far East; rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 

23 Dec 41, OPD Exec O . 

., Rad, CINCAF to OPNAV, 220830, 22 Dec 41, 

War Diary, 16th Naval Dist, Off of Naval Reds . 

.. Rad, OPNAV to CINCAF, 231601, 23 Dec 41, 

War Diary, 16th Naval Dist. 

Hart's reply, dated the 24th, was that until he 

rece-ived reports from the suhmarines still at sea he 

155 

By the time Hart received this message 

he had already determined to join his surface forces in the Indies. 44 The next morning, 25 December, he turned over to Admiral Rockwell full command of all naval 

activities in the Philippines and at 0200 of 

the 26th left Manila aboard the submarine 

Shark. The two remaining destroyers followed the next day, when General MacArthur reported to the War Department 

that "Admiral Hart has left Manila to join 

naval forces in the south, destination to be 

reported later. Admiral Rockwell now in 

command of naval forces with headquarters 

on Corregidor." 45 

Before he left, Hart made available to 

General MacArthur all naval personnel, including the marines. The submarines were 

to continue to operate in Philippine waters 

as long as "practicable and profitable," and 

then retire southward. All that was to remain in the Philippines were 3 gunboats, 3 

minesweepers, 6 motor torpedo boats, and 

a few tugs and yachts for inshore patrol. 

Orders were issued for the destruction of 

all oil and gasoline in storage in Manila, the 

evacuation of the Cavite Navy Yard and 

Sangley Point, and the shipment of all remaining stores to Corregidor and Marivdes, 

at the southern tip of Bataan.46 

The submarines began to withdraw after 

Christmas and by the 31st the last one had 

would be unable to give a full report. Rad, 

CINCAF to OPNAV, 241225, 24 Dec 41, War 

Diary, 16th Naval Dist . 

.. Hart, Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, pp. 

45-46; rad, CINCAF to OPNAV, 241225, 24 Dec 

41, War Diary, 16th Naval Dist. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to AGW AR, 26 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; Rockwell, Naval 

Activities in Luzon Area, pp. 0-8; Itr, Hart to 

MacArthur, 25 Dec 41, sub: Move of Comd Post, 

War Diary, 16th Naval Dist. 

.. Rockwell, Naval Activities in Luzon Area, p. 7. 
156 

left Manila Bay.41 Thus ended the activities of the underwater craft in Philippine 

waters. Constituting the largest single undersea force in the Navy, the submarines 

were expected to exact an impressive toll 

from any approaching Japanese fleet. In 

the eight separate landings the Japanese 

made in the period between 8 and 25 December, the submarines proved unable to 

impede the enemy or even inflict any serious 

damage. Their record, like that of the 

B-17's, was most disappointing. 

The withdrawal of the Asiatic Fleet coincided with the movement southward of 

the Far East Air Force whose heavy bombers were already based in Australia. On 

24 December, General Brereton was called 

to MacArthur's office and told that he was 

to go to Australia with his headquarters to 

"organize advanced operating bases from 

which . . . you can protect the lines of 

communication, secure bases in Mindanao, 

and support the defense of the Philippines." 48 Brereton offered to stay on, but 

MacArthur told him that he would be more 

useful in Australia. 

Brereton closed his headquarters at Fort 

McKinley at 1600 of the 24th, and in a 

PBY left that evening to join his bombers 

at Batchelor Field near Port Darwin. To 

the War Department General MacArthur 

radioed "Operations heavy bombardment 

no longer possible from bases here. B-17's 

have been moved to Australia and Netherlands East Indies bases. Brereton with skeleton staff departed on 24th." 49 

fII Rpt, COMSUBS to COMINCH, War Activities, Submarines, u.S. Asiatic Fleet, I Dec 41-1 

Apr 42, Off of Naval Reds. 

.. Ltr Order, USAFFE to CG FEAF, 24 Dec 41, 

reproduced in Brereton, Diaries, p. 62. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, 25 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

With Brereton's departure, the small 

number of fighters, all that remained of the 

once formidable Far East Air Force, came 

under the command of Col. Harold H. 

George, formerly chief of staff of the Interceptor Command. Fighter fields were established on Bataan and preparations were 

made to continue operations from there. 

The 650 men of the 19th Bombardment 

Group left Luzon before the end of December to join their planes in Australia. Their 

comrades in the 24th and 27th Groups were 

not as fortunate. They remained behind 

and, since few men were required to fly and 

service the planes still in operation, eventually became infantry soldiers on Bataan. 50 

All hopes of reinforcing the Philippines 

.with pursuit planes were now at an end. 

Even if these planes could be flown from 

Australia northward, there were no longer 

any fields on Luzon outside Bataan on which 

they could base. The War Department 

told General MacArthur frankly that its 

plans for sending fighter aircraft to him 

were now jeopardized and that "the day to 

day situation" in the Philippines and 

Borneo-where the Japanese had landed 

on the 24th-would determine what could 

be done. He could draw what small comfort he could from fresh assurances that the 

United States would develop a strong air 

force in the Far East and that the Secretary 

of War approved fully his plans and orders.51 

General Brett, still in Chungking when 

news of the decision to withdraw reached 

Washington, was directed to get to Australia 

as quickly as possible. He was informed 

•• Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, I, 224-25; Brereton, Diaries, p. 62; 

Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, passim. 

., Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 879, 24 

Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 
STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS 

of the changed situation and asked to submit recommendations on the "location, 

composition, and future operations of U.s. 

Forces in Australia."·2 The air forces in 

Australia, he was told, were to be built up 

in the hope that long-range bombers would 

be able to aid the Philippine garrison and 

that the entire force would be useful in supporting the Allied attempts to halt the Japanese advance along the Malay Barrier.53 

By 24 December every effort to bring supplies and reinforcements to General MacArthur had failed. The Pensacola convoy had reached Australia, but no way had 

been found to move its cargo northward. 

General MacArthur had not received a 

single piece of equipment or one additional 

man to reinforce his garrison. The supplies and men destined for the Philippines 

remained in Australia, which was rapidly 

being developed into an advanced Allied 

air and supply base. 

Within a period of three weeks, from 8 

December to 25 December, the Japanese 

had achieved astounding results in the 

Philippines. They had completed one 

major amphibious assault and at least seven 

•• Rad, Marshall to Military Attache, Melbourne 

for Brett, No. 41, 25 Dec 41, WPD 4628-3. 

.. Ibid. 

157 

minor landing operations; they had placed 

a large number of troops ashore on Luzon, 

north and south of Manila, and were ready 

to move on the capital; they had cut the 

line of communications between the Philippines and Australia. 

During this three-week period, the Japanese had also established complete aerial 

and naval supremacy in the Philippines 

and forced the Asiatic Fleet and the Far 

East Air Force to retire to the line SurabajaDarwin, 1,500 miles from Manila. General MacArthur summed up his situation 

on 27 December as follows: "Enemy penetration in the Philippines resulted from our 

weakness on the sea and in the air. Surface 

elements of the Asiatic Fleet were withdrawn and the effect of the submarines has 

been negligible. Lack of airfields for modern planes prevented defensive dispersion 

and lack of pursuit planes permitted unhindered day bombardment. The enemy 

has had utter freedom of naval and air 

movements." 54 To these reasons, he could 

have added the unsatisfactory performance 

of the ill-trained and poorly equipped Phi1~ 

ippine Army reservists. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, 27 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East; see Brereton's views 

on the same subject in his Diaries, pp. 64-67 . 

PART THREE 

THE WITHDRAWAL TO BATAAN 

CHAPTER X 

The Withdrawal Begins 

The success of the Japanese landings at 

Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay ended all 

hopes for an American victory in the Philippines. Only one day after the landing to the 

north, on 23 December, General MacArthur decided that he would have to fall 

back to Bataan and fight a delaying action 

there until help could arrive. This decision, made only under the greatest necessity, 

was the basic strategic decision of the campaign in the Philippines. 

"WPO-3 Is in Effect" 

Before the war, General MacArthur had 

determined that he would meet a Japanese 

attack by offensive action, not by what he 

considered to be the passive defense provided for in WPO-3. Accordingly, he had 

ordered his force commanders to meet the 

Japanese at the beaches and to drive them 

back into the sea. There was to be "no 

withdrawal from beach positions." The first 

Japanese landings between 8 and 10 

December had caused no change in this 

strategy. 

Once the Japanese had landed, General 

MacArthur had to consider seriously the 

prospect of an eventual withdrawal to 

Bataan and the evacuation of Manila. To 

prepare President Quezon for the worst, he 

sent word to him on the morning of the 

12th to be ready to move to Corregidor on 

four hours' notice. 

Shocked and wholly unprepared for this 

"startling message," Quezon arranged a 

conference with MacArthur that night at 

the Manila Hotel. At the meeting, MacArthur explained that there was no immediate cause for concern, and that he was 

only "preparing for the worst in case the 

Japanese should land in great force at different places." In such an event, it would 

be unwise, he told Quezon, to have his forces 

scattered. He intended to concentrate his 

army on Bataan, and to move his headquarters, the High Commissioner's office, and the 

Commonwealth Government to Corregidor 

and declare Manila an open city. "Do you 

mean, General," asked Quezon, "that tomorrow you will declare Manila an open 

city and that some time during the day we 

shall have to go to Corregidor?" MacArthur's answer was an emphatic "No." He 

did not seem to be certain that the move 

would even be necessary, and was evidently 

only preparing the President for such a possibility. The meeting closed with Quezon's 

promise to consider the matter further. Later 

he consented, with reluctance, to move to 

Corregidor if necessary.l 

The possibility of a withdrawal seems to 

have been in the minds of other officers in 

MacArthur's headquarters before the main 

Japanese landings. During an inspection 

of the 21st Field Artillery sector along Lingayen Gulf, Col. Constant L. Irwin, MacArthur's G-3, showed little interest in the 

1 Quezon, The Good Fight, pp. 194-98. Present 

at the meeting also were Col. Manuel Nieto, the 

President's aide, and Lt. Col. Sidney L. Huff, MacArthur's aide. 
162 

tactical placement of the guns. He seemed 

concerned, instead, with the location of the 

ammunition and supply routes, selected to 

conform with the mission of holding at the 

beaches. "He took a look at our ammunition disposition and the dangerous supply 

routes," wrote Colonel Mallonee, instructor 

of the 21st Field Artillery, "and very violently announced that it would be impossible to withdraw the ammunition in time 

to save it. ..." 2 This was the first time, 

remarked Mallonee, that he heard the 

word "withdraw." He explained to Colonel Irwin that his orders were to hold at 

all costs, and repeated Wainwright's order: 

"We must die in our tracks, falling not 

backward but forward toward the enemy." 

The answer of the G--3 officer was, "Don't 

believe everything you hear." 3 

Colonel Mallonee, as well as the chief of 

staff and senior instructor of the 21st Division, was now thoroughly confused about the 

mission and after a conference decided to 

request clarification from General Wainwright's headquarters. They were told that 

the mission was still to hold at all costs, but, 

added Colonel Mallonee, "by the manner 

in which it was issued it was evident that 

there is considerable doubt in the minds of 

the North Luzon Force command as to 

whether the mission is actually as given." 4 

2 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 56; see also Itr, Brig 

Gen. Constant L. Irwin, ret., to Ward, 13 Jun 51, 

OCMH. The author discussed the question of the 

withdrawal with Generals Sutherland and R. J. 

Marshall and with Colonel Collier. 

'Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 56. The conversation between Irwin and Mallonee took place in the 

presence of the senior American instructor of the 

21st Division (PAl. Col. Ray M. O'Day, the division chief of staff, and several other officers. Colonel 

O'Day did not get the idea of a withdrawal from 

Irwin, but did say that such a remark was made 

in reference to the ammunition. Ltr, O'Day to 

author, 16 Nov 49, OCMH. 

• Mallonee, Bataan Diary, 1,57. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

As early as 12 December, then, General 

MacArthur was preparing the ground 

for measures that would have to be taken 

if he decided that it was necessary to 

withdraw to Bataan. When General 

Homma landed his 14th Army at Lingayen Gulf ten days later, on 22 December, MacArthur still made no change in 

his plan. But his message to General 

Marshall on that date shows that he now 

believed he might have to withdraw 

quickly. He estimated that the Japanese 

disembarking from the seventy to eighty 

transports in Lingayen Gulf had a 

strength of 80,000 to 100,000 men, and 

reported that he had on Luzon only about 

40,000 men "in units partially equipped." 

He anticipated that "this enormous tactical discrepancy" would force him "to 

operate in delaying action on successive 

lines through the Central Luzon plain to 

final defensive pOSItIOn on Bataan." 5 

When forced to do so, he told General 

Marshall, he would declare Manila an 

open city to save the civilian population 

and move his headquarters, together with 

the Philippine Commonwealth Government and the High Commissioner's office, 

to Corregidor, which, he said, "I intend 

• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No.3, 22 Dec 41, 

AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. Although MacArthur stated that he had only 40,000 men on 

Luzon, an analysis of the units present indicates 

that thc number of troops was actually much 

higher. The strength of the American garrison, 

even without the air force, could not have been 

less than 20,000, including the 12,000 Philippine 

Scouts. To this figure must be added the strength 

of seven Philippine Army reserve divisions and one 

regular division, as well as the Constabulary, inducted into the service of the United States in 

December. Many of the units were undoubtedly at 

two-thirds strength, but even at half strength, the 

total number of troops on Luzon at this time could 

not have been less than 75,000-80,000. The number of Japanese troops who landed at Lingayen between 22 and 28 December was about 43,000. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

to hold."" General Marshall immediately 

replied that his proposed line of action 

was approved and tha"l he was doing his 

utmost to send aid. 7 

The fighting in North Luzon on 22 and 

23 December and the rapid advance by 

the Japanese to Rosario apparently convinced MacArthur that the time had 

come to put the scheme for withdrawal 

into effect. General Wainwright's request 

on the afternoon of the 23d for permission 

to withdraw behind the Agno River must 

have confirmed this decision. To these 

military considerations must be added 

General MacArthur's desire to save the 

city of Manila from destruction. 

But the chief reason for the withdrawal 

order was the failure of the troops to hold 

the enemy. Up to this time General MacArthur seems to have had the greatest 

confidence in the fighting qualities of the 

Philippine Army reservists and in the 

ability of his forces to hold the central 

Luzon plain. The events of the 22d and 

23d forced a revision of this view. "General MacArthur, viewing the broken, fleeing North Luzon Force," wrote Colonel 

Collier, a sympathetic observer, "realized 

that his cherished plan of defeating an 

enemy attempt to advance toward Manila 

from the north was not now possible. "8 

MacArthur's position on 23 December 

1941 was somewhat akin to the position 

in which General Yamashita found himself three years later, when the victorious 

Americans were preparing to invade Lu-

• Ibid. 

'Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 22 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. This message 

implied approval of MacArthur's plans by the President, for it contained the statement that the President had seen all of MacArthur's messages. 

• Collier, Notebooks, II, 38. 

163 

zon. Realizing that his opponent's air and 

naval forces were far superior to his own, 

that American ground forces were free to 

land on any beaches they chose, and that 

their superior mobility and fire power 

were too great for him, he concluded that 

the Japanese would be unable "to conduct 

warfare on flat land." Yamashita, therefore, decided to withdraw from Manila 

and the central Luzon plain, and to fight 

a delaying action to "divert American 

forces in Luzon so as to keep them from 

attacking Japan as long as possible." 

Unlike General MacArthur, Yamashita 

hoped to accomplish his objective by 

withdrawing into the mountains of northern Luzon. He might have been more 

successful if he had retired to Bataan, as 

the Americans had four years earlier. 

From there he could have maintained his 

forces intact and have denied the Americans, for a time at least, the use of 

Manila Bay.9 

The decision having been made to withdraw to Bataan, USAFFE notified all force 

commanders that "WPO-3 is in effect.mo 

Nothing more was required. WPO-3 was 

an old plan, well known to all U.S. Army 

officers who had been in the Philippines six 

months or more. Under it, the Philippine 

Department headquarters, after the experience of numerous maneuvers, had selected 

• A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita 

(Chicago, 1949), pp. 21-22. Most of the Japanese 

officers who read this volume in manuscript form 

did not agree with the author that a withdrawal 

to Bataan by Yamashita would have resulted in a 

more successful defense. Comments of Former 

Japanese Officers Regarding The Fall of the Philippines, p. 41, OCMH. 

10 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

36. Wainwright received the order on the night of 

the 23d, but General Parker did not get the order 

until about 1000 of the 24th, when he was ordered 

to Bataan to organize the Bataan Defense Force. 

Ltr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, OCMH. 
164 

certain delaying positions along the central 

Luzon plain. These positions had been 

reconnoitered and were considered fairly 

strong defensive lines along the route of 

withdrawal to Bataan. It only remained to 

issue written orders to supplement the 

announcement that WPO~3 was in effect. 

The next morning, 24 December, at 

1100, the USAFFE staff was called to a 

conference. General Sutherland announced 

the decision and stated that the headquarters was to be moved to Corregidor that 

evening. Each man was to take with him 

only field equipment and one suitcase or 

bedroll. By special order all officers in the 

headquarters, except those of high rank who 

had been promoted a few days earlier, were 

promoted one grade. To the War Department General MacArthur sent news of his 

decision, as well as the further information 

that the Japanese had landed at Atimonan 

and Mauban that morning.H "Tonight I 

plan to disengage my forces under cover of 

darkness," he wrote. "For the present, I am 

remaining in Manila, establishing an advanced headquarters on Corregidor." After 

evacuating the High Commissioner and the 

Commonwealth Government, he told the 

Chief of Staff, he would declare Manila an 

open city.12 

On the afternoon of the 24th, President 

Quezon and High Commissioner Sayre, 

with their personal and official families, 

sailed to Corregidor aboard the interisland 

steamer Mayan. Many Philippine officials 

simply packed a few belongings and left the 

'" Rad, CG USAFFE to AGW AR, 24 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. MacArthur mistakenly reported that the Japanese were standing 

off Nasugbu. No landing was ever made there. 

12 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

city, despite the order that all Commonwealth officials would remain at their posts.1S 

The headquarters began to move out on 

the Don Esteban after 1900 that day. "It 

was a beautiful moonlit night," wrote Colonel Collier, "and the cheerful, peaceful 

murmuring of the rippling waves from the 

cutting prow of the ship belied the havoc of 

war." 14 It was Christmas Eve, and the men 

sat around on deck talking in hushed tones 

and watching the flames rising from the 

Navy's fuel dump where over 1,000,000 

gallons of oil had been fired earlier in the day. 

The Don Esteban docked at Corregidor at 

2130, and the next morning Headquarters, 

USAFFE, opened on the island. That day, 

MacArthur reported to the War Department that his headquarters had moved.ls A 

rear echelon, headed by Brig. Gen. Richard 

J. Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff, remained behind in Manila to close out the 

headquarters and supervise the shipment of 

supplies and the evacuation of the remaining troopS.16 

There was much to do in the days that 

followed to prepare Bataan for the troops 

destined to make their last stand there. On 

the morning of the 24th, Col. Lewis C. 

Beebe, G-4, USAFFE, and Brig. Gen. 

Charles C. Drake, Quartermaster, were 

called to General Marshall's office and there 

told of the decision to withdraw all troops on 

Luzon to Bataan and to evacuate Manila. 

General Drake was instructed to move his 

base of operations to Bataan immediately 

and to check on the reserves at Corregidor 

,. Collier, Notebooks, I, 80--81; II, 40. 

14 Ibid., II, 42. 

"Ibid., 44; rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, 25 Dec 

41, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

10 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 33, 40; 

interv, author with R. J. Marshall, 7 Apr 48. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

to be sure that there was enough to supply 

10,000 men for six months. Small barges 

and boats required to move the supplies 

from Manila to Corregidor and Bataan were 

quickly gathered, and within twenty-four 

hours Corregidor was completely stocked 

with the supplies for a six months' campaign. At the same time, all supplies were 

immediately started on their way to Bataan 

by every available means-water, truck, and 

rail. Ammunition had already been stored 

in the peninsula, together with certain defense reserves including 300,000 gallons of 

gasoline, lubricating oil, and greases, and 

about 3,000 tons of canned meats and fish.17 

In Manila, the rear echelon worked valiantly to get all the supplies out of the city 

before the Japanese moved in. Those small 

craft not transferred to Corregidor and Bataan were destroyed; demolitions were carried out with efficiency and dispatch. By the 

time General Marshall and his men moved 

out on New Year's Eve, most of the supplies 

that might possibly be of value to the enemy 

had been destroyed.1!J 

At the same time that a revised supply 

plan was put into effect, a revised plan of 

operations was quickly worked out. The object of these plans was to gain time to prepare defenses on Bataan and to permit an 

orderly withdrawal into the peninsula. 

17 QM Rpt of Opns, pp. 20-21. 

18 Interv, author with R. J. Marshall, 7 Apr 48; 

Carlos P. Romuto, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines 

(New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1942), 

pp.68-90. 

The first specification in the charge against General Homma when he was tried as a war criminal in 

Manila in 1946 was the violation of an open city. 

Since Manila was used as a base of supplies, and 

since a U.S. Army headquarters was based in the 

city and troops passed through it after 26 December, 

it is difficult to see how Manila could be considered 

an open city between 26 and 31 December 1941. 

Nevertheless, the charge against General Homma 

stood. USA vs. Homma, specification of charges. 

165 

\Vainwright's North Luzon Force was to 

hold the Japanese north of the key city of 

San Fernando, Pampanga-where Route 7, 

the main highway leading into the Bataan 

peninsula, began-until 8 January, then 

withdraw into Bataan.19 This would provide 

time for the South Luzon Force to move up 

past Manila and into Bataan and give those 

troops already on Bataan an opportunity to 

establish a line. The withdrawal was to be 

in five phases, or along five lines. On each 

line Wainwright's men were to hold only 

long enough to force the enemy to prepare 

for an organized attack. The object was to 

delay, not defeat, the enemy and to reach 

Bataan intact. 20 

General Parker's South Luzon Force was 

to withdraw west and north along successive defense lines through and around 

Manila, across the Pampanga River, 

spanned by the two bridges known collectively as the Calumpit Bridge, to San 

Fernando, and then to Bataan. All of the 

South Luzon Force was to clear the bridge 

before 8 January. The Calumpit Bridge 

therefore became a critical point in the plan 

for withdrawal. It had to be held until all 

the troops in the South Luzon Force passed 

over.21 

To prepare defensive positions on Bataan, 

the Bataan Defense Force was organized on 

the 24th. General Parker was placed in 

command and given two Philippine Army 

divisions, the 31st and 41st (less 42d Infantry) , in addition to the troops already in 

Bataan to do the job. Command of the 

South Luzon Force, which consisted during 

,. The date was later changed when it was found 

that North Luzon Force could not hold until the 8th. 

San Fernando, Pampanga, should not be confused with San Fernando, La Union. 

20 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 33; Collier, 

Notebooks, II, 47. 

21 Ibid.; Itr, Sutherland to CG 51st Div (PA), 

24 Dec 41, sub: Opns Orders, AG 371 Phil Reds. 
166 

the withdrawal of the 51st Division (PA), 

one regiment of the 1st Division, the 42d 

Infantry, plus supporting tanks and SPM's, 

passed to General Jones. 22 

The only troops in Bataan when Parker 

reached there at 1700 of the 24th were the 

Philippine Division (less 57th Combat 

Team and one battalion of the 45th Infantry) and a provisional air corps regiment. 

The 14th Engineers (PS) marked out the 

defensive positions and the Philippine Army 

troops, when they arrived on the peninsula, 

moved into these positions and began to dig 

foxholes and put up wire. Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel's 31st Division (PA), stationed along the Zambales coast was the 

first into Bataan. Its movement was completed by 26 December. Two days later the 

41 st Division (P A), less elements, took up 

its position along the skeleton line.23 

The plan for the withdrawal of the forces 

in north and south Luzon called for a difficult maneuver requiring accurate timing 

and the closest co-ordination. Should the 

forces in north and south Luzon fail to pull 

back to Bataan, or should the Japanese seize 

the road net leading into the peninsula, 

then the strategic objective of the withdrawal, the denial of Manila Bay to the 

enemy, would be jeopardized. 

The North Luzon Force Plan 

The North Luzon Force plan of withdrawal was based on the five delaying positions or lines selected and reconnoitered 

during peacetime. Separated by the estimated distance which could be covered in 

one night's march, these lines utilized the 

,. USAFFE GO 54, 27 Dec 41; SLF and II 

Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 16, 19. 

"SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 19; 

USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opm, pp. 33-35. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

terrain features advantageous in defenserivers, high ground, and swamps. Each was 

anchored on high ground and took full advantage of natural barriers. They lay across 

the face of the central Luzon plain and covered the main approaches to Manila, Routes 

3 and 5. (Map 6) 

The first defensive line, known as D-1, 

extended in an easterly direction from 

Aguilar, south of Lingayen Gulf on Route 

13, through San Carlos to Urdaneta on 

Route 3. As Col. William F. Maher, Wainwright's chief of staff, has observed, the D-1 

line "was simply a line on which we hoped 

to be able to reorganize the badly disorganized forces north of the Agno River." 24 

The second position, the D-2 line, extended in general along the arc of the Agno 

River, one of the formidable natural barriers in the central plain. After holding for 

one day on this line, the troops were to retire 

next to the D-3 line, stretching from Santa 

Ignacia on the west through Gerona and 

Guimba to San Jose on the east. The D-4 

line was approximately twenty-five miles 

long and extended from Tarlac on the left 

(west) to Cabanatuan on the right. Small 

rivers and streams intersected this line, 

which, at Cabanatuan, was anchored on the 

Pampanga River. 

The final and most southerly position, 

called the D-5 line, stretched from Bamban 

in front of Mt. Arayat, across Route 5 to 

Sibul Springs. Southeast of Mt. Arayat, between the Pampanga River and Route 5, 

was the Candaba Swamp, which broke the 

central plain into two narrow corridors 

leading toward Manila. Of the five lines, 

only the last, the D-5 line, was to be organized for a protracted defense. Plans 

called for a stand here until the South Luzon 

.. Ltr, Maher, formerly NLF CofS, to author, 11 

Nov 49, OCMH. 
L/NGAY£N 

G UL F 

MANILA BAY 

MAP 6 

WITHDRAWAL IN THE NORTH 

,-, 

,-, 

-.. 

25-31 December 1941 

OnA1ING 1'O$' ''OfIIA_Xl, AS 'lANNCO, 

AND Dare ~£&eH[O 

J a, ... [S[ UN.T 

All., 0' J.PA~n[ AOVANC[ 

EI''''f1fltJnl m ,.,1 
168 

Force could slip behind the North Luzon 

Force, up Route 3, into San Fernando.25 

During its withdrawal to Bataan, the 

North Luzon Force was to be supported by 

General Weaver's Provisional Tank Group, 

whose job it would be to cover the withdrawal, sweep enemy avenues of approach, 

and halt hostile mechanized movement. 

The tanks were deployed on alternate sides 

of the road, at curves and bends, to achieve 

maximum sweep of their weapons with a 

minimum of exposure. Always they were to 

take care that they left themselves a route of 

escape. When required to withdraw, the 

tanks were to move back one at a time, under cover of the forward tank. The tankers 

were to select their positions after a careful 

reconnaissance, and with an eye to fields of 

fire, alternate positions, avenues of approach, and emergency escape routes.26 

The success of the withdrawal would depend to a large degree on the engineers. 

Their task was twofold: to maintain roads 

and bridges ahead of the retreating columns, and to destroy the bridges and block 

the roads already passed to halt the enemy 

advance. Demolitions and the construction 

of obstacles before the D-l line were to be 

accomplished by the front-line units; North 

Luzon Force engineers, consisting principally of the engineer battalion of the 91st 

Division (PA), were made responsible for 

all work south of that line. The destruction 

of railroad bridges was left to a special detachment of demolition experts from MacArthur's headquarters, attached to North 

Luzon Force. Demolitions were to be exe-

.. Collier, Notebooks, II, 82; NLF and I Corps 

Rpt of Opns, p. 11. 

.. Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 10-11; Itr, 

Col Ernest B. Miller to Ward, 31 Dec 51, copy in 

OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

cuted by the engineers when ordered by the 

division or covering force commander and 

when the tanks and vehicles of the last 

elements of the rear guard had cleared the 

bridge.27 

The term line, applied to the five delaying positions, is misleading. Actually the 

front was too wide to be held continuously 

by the forces available to General Wainwright. Unit commanders were given considerable leeway in occupying their positions 

and usually could do little more than place 

their troops so as to cover the most likely 

routes of approach. Each line was to be occupied before dawn, held during the day, 

and evacuated at night, the troops withdrawing to the next line. Their withdrawal 

would be covered by a shell, a small part of 

the retiring force, whic~ was to remain in 

position until just before dawn when it was 

to pull back hastily to rejoin its parent unit 

on the line below. This shell, in theory, 

would consist of an infantry-artillery team, 

but in practice often included only one of 

these arms. 

By occupying these positions successively 

and holding them with a shell while the bulk 

of the force retired to the safety of a prepared position to the rear, MacArthur 

hoped to force the enemy to halt and deploy 

for an attack before each position. By the 

time he was ready to attack, the line would 

be evacuated. In this way, the Japanese advance southward would be considerably 

delayed, and time would be gained to prepare defenses on Bataan and to permit the 

South Luzon Force to pass into the pen iniT Memo, NLF Engineer for CofS NLF, 1 Aug 42, 

sub: Orgn and Opns of NLF Engineers 8 Dec 41-6 

Jan 42, pp. 1-10, copy made for author by Col 

Harry A. Skerry, the NLF Engineer, and on file in 

OCMH. This memo will hereafter be cited as 

Skerry, NLF Engineer Rpt of Opns. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

suI a behind the North Luzon Force. The 

danger of the scheme lay in the Japanese 

control of the air, which made it possible 

for them to play havoc with the retiring 

road-bound tanks and artillery. The risk 

was a calculated one, but the danger was 

minimized by limiting important movement" to the hours of darkness. 28 

The supply of the troops during the withdrawal would be difficult. The problems 

ordinarily encountered in supplying large 

bodies of mobile troops during a retrograde 

movement would be complicated by the 

shortage of supplies and trained supply officers, the necessity of moving a large amount 

of equipment to Bataan, and the destruction 

of those supplies which could not be saved. 

The fact that most of the men were inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and often 

undisciplined would add considerably to the 

difficulties. 20 

To the Tarlac-Cabanatuan Line 

On Christmas Eve the North Luzon 

Force stood generally along a line extending 

from Tayug on the east through Urdaneta 

and San Carlos to Aguilar on the west. 

(lv! ap 4) All units were under orders to 

hold for twenty-four hours before falling 

back to the Agno. 

On the right (east) was the 26th Cavalry 

(PS). That afternoon the Scouts had been 

forced to retreat from Binalonan across the 

Agno River to Tayug, thus actually anchoring the North Luzon Force at the start of 

the withdrawal on the D-2 line. At Tayug, 

the cavalrymen had relieved the 71st Engineer Battalion (P A) covering the river 

28 Ltr, Maher to author, 11 Nov 49, OCMH; 

Collier, Notebooks, II, 82; Mallonee, Bataan Diary, 

I, 67; NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 14. 

" QM Rpt of Opns, pp. 4-5. 

169 

crossing and had joined the 91st Division 

(PA) and the remnants of the 71st.3D 

'tV est of Tayug, holding the center of the 

North Luzon Force line from Urdaneta to 

San Carlos, was General Brougher's 11 th 

Division (P A). Also in the center was the 

192d Tank Battalion, at this time the only 

armor in support of the North Luzon Force. 

On the afternoon of the 24th it was moving 

south toward the Agno, under orders to 

deploy along the south bank. Already on 

its way toward the river was the 194th, 

which had left Manila that morning with 

orders to assemble in the vicinity of 

Carmen. 3! 

Extending the North Luzon Force line 

west from San Carlos to the Zambales 

Mountains, straddling the Agno, was General Capinpin's 21 st Division (PA). Stationed initially along the southern shore of 

Lingayen Gulf, this division had not yet 

come in contact with the enemy. Its orders 

were to withdraw at 1900 on the 24th in 

two columns along the two roads, one on 

each side of the river. 

Withdrawal to the Agno 

At the appointed hour, 1900 of 24 December, the 21st Division began to withdraw. 32 Wire communication between the 

5. Lt. Col. William E. Chandler, "26th Cavalry 

(PS) Battles to Glory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry 

Journal (May-June 1947), p. II; Skerry, NLF 

Engineer Rpt of Opns, pp. 3, 5, 9. 

81 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 88-91; Prov 

Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 10-11; II th Inf (PA), 

Beach Defense and Delaying Action, 8 Dec 41-5 

Jan 42, p. 19, OCMH. The latter is Part 2 of an 

unsigned and undated account entitled The II th 

Infantry Regiment (PA). Part I is entitled 

Mobilization and Training. 

32 The plan of withdrawal of th", 21st Division 

: PA) can be reconstructed in some detail from 

personal papers loaned to the author and on file 

in OCMH. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 62, 67-70; 
170 

division command post and front-line units 

was discontinued and signal troops began 

reclaiming the wire for later use. The first 

units to move out were the 22d Infantry and 

the 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery. Blowing the large bridges to the rear, they retired 

down the road toward San Carlos. 

West of the Agno, the 21st Infantry began to withdraw from its beach positions at 

about 1900. By 2130 of Christmas Eve, division headquarters had reached its new 

command post on Route 13, eleven miles 

south of San Carlos. So quiet had the night 

been that Col. Ray M. O'Day, division instructor, turning on his radio to hear the 

midnight mass, "looked up at Heaven and 

could hardly believe it was a war-torn 

world." ss 

The withdrawal continued all through 

the night. By about 0400 of 25 December 

the bulk of the 21st Infantry had reached 

Aguilar and, when the sun rose, its 3d Battalion moved across the Agno in bane as to 

take up positions along the east-west road 

to San Carlos. It was not until late afternoon that the last covering units reached the 

D-l line. They had been held up by delays 

in the destruction of many small bridges, 

and in one case, premature demolition of a 

bridge had forced the abandonment of 

precious vehicles. There had been no hostile 

contact during the withdrawal. 

The rest of the North Luzon Force spent 

a less peaceful Christmas. The enemy, prevented from reaching the Agno on 24 December by the stiff defense of the 26th CavQ'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 10-11; Brief History of 

22d Infantry (PA), p. 3; Rpt on Opns of 21st Inf 

(PA), 7 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, p. 2; Capt Grover C. 

Richards, Outline of Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 

3--4; Itr, [CO, 21st Inf] to TAG PA, 30 Dec 45, 

sub: Opns of 21st Inf (PA), 7 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, 

p.2 . 

.. O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 11. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

aIry, continued his efforts the next day. 

With Binalonan in his possession, General 

Tsuchibashi, the 48th Division commander, could now split his force into two columns. One he sent south on Route 3 to U rdaneta, where the 11 th Division was posted; 

the other went east toward Tayug. (Map 

6) The column along Route 3 would consist of the 1st and 2d Formosa Infantry 

with the 4th Tank Regiment. The remainder of the 48th Division (less 1st Battalion, 

47th Infantry at Damortis), concentrated 

in the Pozorrubio-Binalonan area during 

the night of 24-25 December.S4 

At 0200 of Christmas morning, the 1st 

and 2d Formosa and the 4th Tank Regiment moved out against U rdaneta, which 

was defended by elements of the 11 th Division's 13th Infantry (PA). The fight lasted 

all morning but the Japanese proved too 

strong for the Filipinos and by noon had 

control of the town. The 11 th Division then 

began falling back toward the Agno.85 

Meanwhile, on the right flank of the 

North Luzon Force there had been a shuffling of units. The 71st Division, ordered to 

San Fernando, Pampanga, for reorganization, was moving out of the line. The 91st 

Division, with the 26th Cavalry attached, 

was under orders to pull back to the next 

line at 2100, leaving a shell on the river until 

dawn of the 26th. The cavalry was to hold 

the river line at Tayug to cover General 

Stevens' withdrawal and to protect the force 

right flank. A shell from the 91 st Division, 

the 92d Combat Team, was to take up a 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 52-53; Answers to Questionnaire on Phil Campaign, 5 Aug 49, ATIS Doc 

49692; Statement of Col Moriji Kawagoe, CofS 

48th Diu, in Statements of Japanese Officials on 

World War II, 11,126-27 . 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 53; Col Glen R. Townsend, 

CO, 11th Inf (PA), Defense of the Philippines, p. 

12, OCMH; Q'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 11. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 171 

VILLASIS-CARMEN BRIDGE over the Agno River on Route 3. (Photograph 

taken in 1935.) 

position to Pierce's left, along the Agno as 

far south as Carmen. 36 

By evening of 25 December, the 11 th 

Division, in the center, stood on the Agno 

River and was in its D- 2 positions. Defense 

of Carmen and its important bridge, rebuilt 

by the 91 st Engineer Battalion, was assigned 

to the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, in force 

reserve since the second week of hostilities. 

To it'> left (west) along a 2,000-yard front 

west of Carmen, was the 13th Infantry. The 

rest of the 11 th Division sector, extending 

,,, Maj William E. Chandler, An Outline History 

of the 26th Cavalry (PS), p . 4, OCMH ; see also 

the same author's article, "26th Cavalry (PS ) 

Battles to Glory,'" Part 2, Armored Cavalry JournaL 

(May- June 1947), pp. 11-12 ; Ltr, Selleck to Board 

of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: Reinstatement of Rank, 

p. 9, OCMH; unsigned account of 92d InC (PA), 

p. 1, OCMH. 

to Bautista, was held by the 11th Infantry. 

The 21st Division was on the left, the 92d 

Combat Team and the 26th Cavalry on 

the right of the D-2 line. Spread thin along 

the Agno River between Carmen and Route 

13, a distance of twenty-five miles, was the 

194th Tank Battalion (less Company C) 

which had reached the river at 1900 the 

previous night. Tank support on the right 

side of the line was provided by the 192d 

Tank Battalion, which covered the sixteen 

miles from Carmen to Tayug." 

", Prav Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 11 ; Miller, 

Bataan Uncensored , pp. 89-91 ; Engineers of the 

SouthweJI Pacific 1941--1945, Vol. I, Engineers in 

Theater Operations (Washington, 1947), p. 6 illustration, and p. 15 n. 24; NLF and I Corps Rpt of 

Opns, p. 8 ; 11 th Inf (PA) Beach Defense and 

Delaying Action, p. 19, OCMH; Ltr [CO, 21st Inf] 

to TAG PA, Opns 21st Inf (PA), p. 2. 
AGNO RIVER between Bayambang and Carmen. Bayambang, foreground, 

stretches along the southwestern bank of the Tlver. 
Cormen 

" 

, . 

.." / . -
174 

When the move was completed and all 

of the North Luzon Force had reached D-2, 

General MacArthur reported to Washington, "Our position now along the Agno 

River." 38 Thus far, the withdrawal had 

proceeded satisfactorily. The Japanese had 

attacked at only one point and had achieved 

their objective, but had not disrupted the 

American scheme of withdrawal. Already 

the important bridges across the Agno, at 

Bayambang and Villasis, were ready for 

destruction. 

Fight on the Agno 

The D-2 line, from three to twelve miles 

behind the D-1 line, depended primarily 

on the curving Agno River for its strength. 

Both flanks were guarded by high ground. 

The two critical points on the line were 

Tayug and Carmen, both important' road 

junctions. A break-through at Tayug would 

open the right of the North Luwn Force 

to a hostile flanking movement; a Japanese 

penetration at Carmen would split the defenses in the center. Failing to hold either 

of these vital points, the North Luzon Force 

would have to abandon its position and 

perhaps its plan of withdrawal. 

While Wainwright was pulling back to 

the Agno, the Japanese had not been idle. 

Shortly after noon on 25 December, an advance element of Lt. Col. Kuro Kitamura's 

48th Reconnaissance Regiment, moving 

east from Binalonan, met patrols of the 26th 

Cavalry at Asingan, across the river from 

Tayug. By 1900 Kitamura's troops had 

driven the Scouts back to the river where 

the 2d Squadron was already in position on 

the opposite shore. Only the soft mud of the 

riverbank had prevented the Japanese tanks 

31 Rad, CG USAFFE to TAG, 26 Dec 41, AG 381 

(11-27-41 Gen) Far East. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

from crossing immediately. The struggle 

continued into the night and at 0200 the 

next morning, when the Japanese finally 

reached the opposite shore, the Scouts broke 

off the action. By 0400 Tayug was in enemy 

hands. Since further opposition was futile, 

Colonel Pierce withdrew to the 91st Division line at Umingan, ten miles to the southeast. Blowing eight bridges between Tayug 

an San Quintin as it retiretl, the decimated 

26th Cavalry passed through General 

Stevens' line at 0545. Later in the day, under North Luwn Force orders, it continued 

south toward Bataan as force reserve.S9 The 

Scouts had fought with great effect in the 

five days since the Japanese landings and 

had contributed in a large degree to the 

enemy delay. Th~ir discipline and courageous stands at Damortis, Rosario, and 

Binalonan had shown that the Philippine 

soldier, properly trained, equipped, and led, 

was the equal of any. 

While the 48th Reconnaissance Regiment was attacking the 26th Cavalry at 

Tayug, the second of General Tsuchibashi's 

columns--consisting of the 2d Formosa, a 

battalion of the 1st Formosa, and the 4th 

Tank Regiment-was moving due south 

against Carmen. During the evening of 25 

December, this force entered unoccupied 

Villasis on Route 3, only a mile north of 

Carmen and the Agno River. After a preliminary air strike behind the lines by twelve 

planes of the 8th and 16th Light Bombardment Regiments, the Japanese opened the 

assault against Carmen, crossing the Agno 

near Villasis after sunset of the 26th. The 

2d Formosa and the 4th Tank Regiment, 

with artillery in support, met opposition 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 53; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to Glory," p. 12; ltr, M'aher to 

author, 11 Nov 49, OCMH; rads, Maj Lomuntod 

to USAFFE, Nos. 29 and 31, 26 Dec 41, AG 370.2 

(19 Dec 41) Phil Reds. 
T ARLAC RAILROAD STATION after Japanese bombing, above,· salvaging a 

carload of .30-caliber ammunition, below. 
176 

from the 37-mm. guns of the 194th Tank 

Battalion, which, having only armor-piercing shells, was unable to hold up the Japanese advance.40 

Late in the afternoon of the 26th, when 

news of the withdrawal of the 26th Cavalry 

on the right reached Wainwright, he ordered the 11 th Division to fall back through 

Carmen to Route 3, then south to the D-3 

line. Before the move could get under way, 

the Japanese shattered the 1st Battalion, 

21st Infantry, at Carmen, inflicting two 

hundred casualties and capturing Maj. 

Robert Besson, the battalion commander. 

By 1930 Carmen was in enemy hands. The 

Japanese pushed on vigorously, a battalion 

of the 1st Formosa striking the 92d Combat 

Team on the right of the 11 th Division line. 

Two hours later the enemy was in Rosales, 

three miles to the east of Carmen. 

With Route 3 in Japanese hands, the 11 th 

Division was forced to fall back via the 

Manila Railroad, which extended along the 

western (left) edge of its sector. There was 

no other route of retreat in this area. Behind 

the division front was a large, roadless area 

covered with rice fields. The only routes 

leading to the rear were on the division 

flanks-Route 3 on the east and the Manila 

Railroad on the west. Swift action on the 

part of General Brougher in commandeering and dispatching a locomotive and several freight cars from Tarlac that night 

made possible the escape of the troopS.41 

•• 14th Army Opns, I, 53; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 39; 

Statement of Gen Kawagoe, A'i'IS Doc 62707, 

Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, 

II, 128; Answers to Questionnaire on Phil Cam· 

paign, 5 Aug 49, ATIS Doc 49692; Miller, Bataan 

Uncensored, p. 95. 

"14th Army Opns, I, 53; 11th Inf (PA) Beach 

Defense and Delaying Action, pp. 19-20, OCMH; 

2d Lt Louis I. Bentz, Jr., 82d Inr (PA), p. 1, 

Chunn Notebooks; O'Day, 21st Div (PA), I, 4. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The Provisional Tank Group encountered greater difficulty in withdrawing than 

had the infantry. Col. Ernest B. Miller, the 

194th Tank Battalion commander, had told 

General Weaver at 1830 of the 26th that 

the enemy might soon cross the Agno and 

that there remained "nothing but the tanks 

to stop it." 42 Actually, the Japanese were 

already across the river. Weaver ordered 

Miller to hold at the D-2line until 0500 the 

following day. The 192d Tank Battalion to 

the east was also ordered to hold, but Colonel Miller as the senior tank officer was 

authorized to withdraw both battalions 

sooner if Japanese action threatened to cut 

their line of retreat.48 

In the 192d Tank Battalion area the tactical situation made compliance with General Weaver's order impossible. Around 

dusk on 26 December, Col. John H. Rodman, commanding the 92d Combat Team,. 

informed Col. Theodore Wickord, the 192d 

commander, that the infantry was pulling 

back on the right to form a line from Carmen to Umingan. When the 92d pulled 

back at about 2100, Wickord's battalion 

also moved out. It moved east past Carmeh, 

then south, before the Japanese could blockBrougher, Notes on Withdrawal of 11th Inf.antry 

from Agno River Position, pp. 1-2, copy in OCMH. 

" Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 97. 

.. Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 11; Miller, 

Bataan Uncensored, pp. 97-98; Itr, Miller to Ward, 

31 Dec 51, OCMH; Weaver, Comments on Draft 

MS, Comment 13, OCMH. Miller claims he was 

given no authority to withdraw earlier if necessary. 

He also claims that no holding orders were issued 

to the 192d. Weaver stated that his orders were 

given to both battalion commanders. The 192d 

has prepared no reports and efforts by the author 

to secure additional material on this question from 

the battalion commander have been unsuccessful. 

Colonel Miller intimates that General Weaver was 

keeping the tanks in a "rat trap." There is no 

direct evidence other than Colonel Miller's published statements to substantiate such a view. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

ade the route of escape, and reached the 

D-3 line without difficulty.44 

Meanwhile, the 194th Tank Battalion 

made its own way south as best it could. 

The tanks of Company A fought their way 

through a Japanese roadblock at the edge 

of Carmen and retreated down Route 3. 

Above San Manuel, about six miles south, 

Colonel Miller, the battalion commander, 

organized a roadblock with three tanks; all 

the others he sent to the rear. Shortly after, 

a single half-track with a 7S-mm. gun 

(SPM), commanded by Capt. Gordon H. 

Peck, came down the road after having cut 

its way through the cane fields. Placing himself under Colonel Miller's orders, Peck took 

his place at the roadblock. At about 2300, 

General Brougher, the 11 th Division commander, arrived at San Manuel. He explained that his division was moving back 

by rail and asked that the tanks cover the 

railroad until the Filipino troops could pass 

through to safety. It was finally agreed that 

the block would be held as long as possible 

before the tanks and the SPM fell back five 

miles to Moncada, where the railroad 

crossed Route 3. The troop trains carrying 

the 11 th Division were expected to pass 

through that town at 0400 on 27 December.45 

All was quiet at the roadblock until a few 

hours before dawn. At about 0245, after the 

last stragglers had cleared the block, a J apanese armored column, apparently advance 

elements of the 4th Tank Regiment, reached 

the spot. Fire from the American tanks and 

.. Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 12; Itr, Weaver 

to Wainwright, 20 Nov 45, OCMH; Miller, Bataan 

Uncensored, p. 98. 

., Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 97-102; GO 

10, Hq Prov Tank Gp in the Field, 14 Feb 42, copy 

given the author by General Weaver and on file in 

OCMH. Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 12; Itr, 

Miller to Ward, 31 Dec 51, OCMH; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 14, OCMH. 

177 

SPM's swept the highway and adjoining 

ditches. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise and after fifteen minutes 

pulled back. Fearing encirclement by Japanese infantry, Miller and Peck then struck 

out for Moncada!e 

The tanks and the SPM that had formed 

the roadblock moved slowly down Route 3 

in the dark hours before dawn. They 

reached the rail crossing in Moncada only 

a scant ten minutes before the 11 th Division 

troop trains entered the town. Once the 

trains had cleared the danger point, Colonel 

Miller continued his march south and 

reached the D-3 line at Gerona at. about 

0830 on the morning of 27 December. Here 

he was joined by the survivors of the battalion's Company D. Cut oft' from retreat, 

the company had come south along an old 

carabao cart trail, the Manila Railroad 

tracks, and Route 3. It found the bridge just 

below Moncada destroyed and was forced 

to leave its fifteen tanks north of the stream. 

This decision had been made in the hope 

that some of the men could return later with 

guides and bring the tanks south. This expectation could not be fulfilled and the 

tanks were lost for the rest of the 

campaign.47 

46 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 102-03; GO's 

5 and 10, Hq Prov Tank Gp in the Field, 13 Jan 

and 14 Feb 42. 

., Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 103-04, 108-

09; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 12; Capt Jack 

C. Altman, 194th Tank Bn, p. 3, Chunn Notebooks; 

Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 15, 

OCMH. During an interrogation at the end of the 

war General Homma stated that the 9th Infantry 

had reported the capture of twenty-three tanks 

stranded north of a river above Paniqui after the 

bridge had been blown. Interv, Col Walter E . 

Buchly with Homma, Manila, Mar 46, copy in 

OCMH. . 

There was an investigation of the blowing of the 

bridge and the loss of the tanks in prison camps in 

Formosa and Manchuria in 1944 and 1945. It was 
178 

The D-3 Line 

Approximately forty miles in length, the 

D-3 line stretched across the Luzon central 

plain midway between Lingayen Gulf and 

San Fernando, Pampanga, from a point just 

west of Santa Ignacia on Route 13 to San 

Jose in Nueva Ecija Province, at the junction of Routes 5 and 8. Deployed along this 

line were the 91st, 11th, and 21st Divisions 

(PA), supported by the Provisional Tank 

Group and the 75-mm. guns (SPM). 

The right (east) flank, resting on the 

foothills of the Sierra Madre, was held by 

the 91st Division which had taken up positions across Route 5 and on the south bank 

of a small river in the vicinity of San Jose.48 

Between Route 5 and Gerona on Route 3 

were the 11 th Division and the bulk of the 

Tank Group--the 194th at Gerona and the 

192d to its right. The 21st Division, whose 

two columns had reunited at Camiling, was 

in position between Gerona and Santa 

Ignacia at the edge of the Zambales 

Mountains.49 

Despite occasional alarms there was no 

action on the D-3 line on 27 December. 

That night the North Luzon Force made 

ready to fall back to the D-4 line. The 91st 

Division began pulling out at about 1730 

and by 0430 had reached the south bank 

then shown that Company D had reached the Moncada bridge fifteen hours after the last tanks of its 

battalion headquarters and fourteen hours after 

the last infantry elements had crossed. No tank 

guides from either Company A or Battalion Headquarters, 194th Tank Battalion, had been left behind 

to direct the withdrawal of Company D. Commenb 

of Col Skerry on Draft MS, Comment 4, OCMH. 

.. Bentz, 92d Inf (PA), pp. 1-2, Chunn Notebooks. 

"O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 12; Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 82; Miller, Bataa'll Uncensored, p. 

107; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 

16,OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

of the Pampanga a few thousand yards below Cabanatuan. Two hours later the entire 

unit was ordered into the line between 

Cabanatuan and Carmen, Nueva Ecija, a 

barrio on the road ten miles west of 

Cabanatuan and not to be confused with 

the village of the same name on the Agno. 

At Carmen the 91st Division tied in with 

units of the 11 th Infantry that had withdrawn from the D-3 line during the night 

and were deployed from Carmen west to 

La Paz. The 21st Division stood on the left 

of the 11 th Division, extending the line to 

Tarlac, where Route 13 joined Route 3 and 

the main track of the Manila Railroad. The 

tanks were in general support. 

On the Agno River the Japanese halted 

to consolidate their position and bring up 

more troops. During the 27th, artillery, 

armor, and service troops moved forward to 

join the 48th Division. The 47th Infantry 

and a battalion of artillery, in reserve near 

Pozorrubio since 24 December, together 

with the 7th Tank Regiment, were dispatched to Tayug. Infantry and artillery 

units occupied San Quintin to the south and 

patrols pushed forward into undefended 

Umingan. On the 48th Division right 

(west), the I st Formosa consolidated its 

hold on Rosales. One battalion of the regiment remained at U rdaneta, and another 

went on to Carmen to relieve Colonel Tano: 

aka's troops who then moved back across 

the Agno to Villasis for rest.so 

By 28 December the North Luzon Force 

was on the D-4 line. In the face of a welltrained and better equipped enemy, it had 

fulfilled its mission-to hold the Agno line 

until the night of 26-27 December and to 

withdraw to the Tarlac-Cabanatuan line. 

Now, from positions along this line, the 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 50, 53-54. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

troops in North Luzon awaited the next 

attack. 

Supply 

As the front-line units moved back, the 

troops to the rear began to carry out the 

supply plan. On 24 December General 

MacArthur's headquarters had ordered the 

evacuation of Fort Stotsenburg and the destruction of its 300,000 gallons of gasoline 

and large amounts of high octane fuel. Lt. 

Col. Wallace E. Durst, Post Quartermaster, 

was able to save about 50,000 gallons of gas 

by shipping some of it to the rear and issuing the rest to vehicles in the immediate 

area. "No material amount of gasoline," reported Durst's assistant, Lt. Col. Irvin 

Alexander, "was abandoned to the enemy." 51 In addition to gasoline, Stotsenburg stocks included 8,000 pounds of fresh 

beef, about 100,000 components of dry rations, large supplies of clothing, and air 

corps ammunition and equipment. When 

the post was finally abandoned, almost 

nothing of value was left, according to Colonel Alexander. All supplies, he said, had 

been shipped to Bataan or issued to troops 

in the Stotsenburg area.52 

The evacuation of Fort Stotsenburg long 

before the approach of enemy forces, 

aroused much criticism from officers who 

disagreed sharply with Colonel Alexander's 

optimistic statements on the amount of supplies saved. Colonel Collier exaggeratedly 

described the evacuation of Stotsenburg as a 

" Cal Alexander, Narrative Rpt of QM Activities 

at Fort Stotsenburg, pp. 1-2, App. A to QM Rpt 

of Opns. 

.. lbid., •. pp. 2-3; Col Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan and Later, pp. 48-50, copy in 

OCMH. 

179 

"frenzied departure" in which "warehouses 

filled with food, clothing, and other military 

supplies were left intact." Also left behind, 

he reported, were 250,000 gallons of gasoline and several obsolete but serviceable 

planes.53 General Drake, MacArthur's 

quartermaster, reported that only a portion of the reserve supplies stocked at 

Stotsenburg had been removed before its 

evacuation. 54 

On the afternoon of 25 December, as 

North Luzon Force fell back to the D-2Iine, 

Lt. Col. Charles S. Lawrence, commanding 

the Tarlac Depot, had informed Drake that 

evacuation of the depot would be necessary 

very soon. In' the absence of orders to the 

contrary, he said, he would issue all his supplies, mcluding five days' subsistence for the 

North Luzon Force, at one time and head 

for Bataan with his men.55 That night he 

learned from Lt. Col. Gyles Merrill, Wainwright's supply officer, that the line through 

Tarlac would be occupied on the night of 

27 December. Merrill suggested that Lawrence place his remaining rations in dumps 

at Tarlac, to be picked up by the troops as 

they withdrew. With Wainwright's approval Lawrence placed the supplies in separate dumps, one for each division or separate 

unit. Troops of the 21st Division Headquarters Company were posted as guards. 

., Collier, Notebooks, II, 84; III, 2. See also Itt, 

Lt Col John E. Olson to author, 10 Jan 52, OCMH. 

In his comments on this manuscript, Colonel Alexander insisted that the supplies had been evacuated 

and that nothing was left behind. Ltr, Alexander to 

Ward, 25 Dec 51, OCMH. 

"QM Rpt of Opns, p. 22; see also Mallonee, 

Bataan Diary, 1,108; O'Day, 21st Div, 1,12-13; 

Drake, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 8, 

OCMH . 

55 Col Lawrence, Tarlac Advance QM Depot Rpt 

of Opns, p. 6, App. A to QM Rpt of Opns. 
180 

This done, Lawrence and his men left for 

Bataan.s6 

The evacuation of Stotsenburg and 

Tarlac was typical of the hurried movement 

of supplies once the plan of withdrawal had 

gone into effect. "The troops withdrew so 

fast," reported General Drake, "that we 

could not put into operation any of our 

withdrawal plans to cover this movement." 57 There was scarcely time to remove "a few defense reserve supplies" from 

McKinley and Stotsenburg and no time to 

evacuate the depots established before the 

war at Tarlac and Los Banos. Fortunately, 

many of the supplies left behind were picked 

up by the units as they withdrew, and much 

of the remainder was destroyed. 

Closely related to the difficulty of supply 

and evacuation was the scarcity of motor 

vehicles on Luzon. Even the addition of 

civilian vehicles did not solve this problem. 

"The fact is," wrote Colonel Lawrence, 

"that there was not sufficient motor equipment in the Philippines to begin to meet 

fully all the requirements." &8 This shortage 

was made more serious by the failure of 

commanders to return the vehicles which 

brought their supplies. Even more reprehensible was the hijacking and commandeering of vehicles along the highways, often 

by commanders who feared that they would 

not have the transportation to move their 

troops and equipment in an emergency. 

These practices "resulted in confusion and 

caused a complete interruption in motor 

transport service during the period of 

evacuation of supplies to Bataan." 69 

50 Ibid. 

57 Qm Rpt of Opns, p. 22. 

"Lawrence, Tarlac Advance QM Depot Rpt of 

Opns, pp. 7-8, App. A to QM Rpt of Opns. 

" QM Rpt of Opns, p. 66. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The Tarlac-Cabanatuan Line 

The original plan of withdrawal called 

for only a brief halt at the D-4 line, just 

long enough to force the enemy to stop and 

prepare for a co-ordinated attack. A determined stand would be made on the D-5 line. 

On 27 December General Wainwright 

changed ~his plan. Fearing that a quick 

withdrawal from D-4 would leave too little 

margin for error between his last defensive 

line and the vital bridges across the 

Pampanga River at Calumpit, over which 

the South Luzon Force would have to pass, 

he decided to hold at Tarlac and Cabanatuan, the D-4 line. Late that night he 

issued new orders to his North Luzon Force 

abandoning D-5 as the final line of defense. 

"D-4 will be held at all costs until ordered 

withdrawn," he announced. "Maximum 

delay will be effected on each position. 

Withdrawal plan later." 60 

The final plan for holding the D-4 line 

and for the withdrawal to follow utilized the 

existing deployment of units already on the 

line. The 91st Division was assigned the 

eastern edge of the central plain, the zone 

between the Pampanga River, which paralleled Route 5, and the mountains to the 

east. The critical point in this sector was 

Cabanatuan, where the roads from the 

north converged into Route 5 which led 

south toward Manila. When ordered to 

withdraw, the division would move down 

Route 5 to Plaridel, a distance of forty-five 

miles, thence west to Calumpit where Route 

3 crossed the Pampanga River. 

.. This order is quoted in Ma\1onee, Bataan Diary, 

1,90. See also O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 12. The 

author has been unable to find the original of this 

order. It is entirely possible that the change in mission of North Luzon Force was initiated by MacArthur's headquarters. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

The 11 th Division was on the left of the 

91st, in the area between Carmen and 

Route 3. It was to retire along the secondary 

roads in its sector. The 21 st Division was on 

the western edge of the central plain, covering Tarlac and Route 3. Its line of retreat 

was along Route 3 to Angeles, thence to 

Bataan by Route 74.61 As a further protection to the Calumpit bridges and the South 

Luzon Force route of withdrawal, the 194th 

Tank Battalion, reduced to twenty tanks, 

was pulled out of the D-4 line by MacArthur's headquarters on the 29th and 

ordered back to Apalit, three miles northwest of Calumpit, to a position of readiness. 

The day before, Company A of the 192d 

had been shifted from the 91st Division 

sector to the area west of the Pampanga and 

now, with a platoon of the 194th, formed 

the only tank support between the Pampanga and Route 3. The rest of Colonel 

Wickord's battalion remained in position 

east of the Pampanga, in support of the 91st 

Division. 62 

When all units were on the line, General 

MacArthur reported to the War Department that he was "endeavoring to temporarily hold hard in the north" until the 

North and South Luzon Forces could join 

at San Fernando after which he would 

"pivot on my left into Bataan." American 

and Filipino troops were "tired but well in 

hand." In this report, MacArthur mistakenly estimated that his North Luzon Force 

alone was facing three Japanese divisions. 

These enemy troops, he pointed out, were 

excellent, and their equipment "modern 

and extensive." Although the Japanese were 

not then exerting heavy pressure against his 

line, MacArthur believed that this inactivity 

., NLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 12. 

6lI Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 13; Miller, 

Bataan Uncensored, p. 111. 

181 

would soon end. The enemy, he warned, 

was "undoubtedly setting up a powerful 

attack both north and south simultaneously 

designed to pin me down in place and 

crush me." 63 

General MacArthur's estimate of the 

enemy's intentions was correct. The arrival 

of the 48th Division at the Agno River had 

completed the landing phase of the operation. General Homma was now ready to 

drive on through Cabanatuan and Tarlac 

to Manila. 

As of noon, 27 December, the North 

Luzon Force position seemed to the Japanese to favor a rapid advance. American air 

power had been knocked out and the Philippine garrison was effectively cut off from 

reinforcement. Three of the divisions which 

had opposed their landings, the 11th, 71st, 

and 91st, as well as armor and cavalry, the 

Japanese believed, had suffered decisive 

defeats. The Japanese were also aware of 

General MacArthur's move to Corregidor 

and of the transfer of at least one divisionthe 31st-to Bataan. On the basis of his 

intelligence estimate General Homma reasoned correctly that MacArthur planned a 

delaying action "in one corner of Bataan" 

and on Corregidor.64 

Despite this correct evaluation of American intentions, the consensus in the 14th 

Army staff was for a continuation of the 

drive on Manila. The mission assigned by 

Imperial General Headquarters was to take 

Manila, and it is doubtful that Army had 

the authority to divert any of its forces from 

that mission. As Lt. Col. Yoshio Nakajima, 

14th Army intelligence officer, wrote: 

"Since the mission of the 14th Army was 

to occupy Manila, the main force proceeded 

.. Rad, CG USAFFE to TAG, 28 Dec 41, AG 

381 (11-27--41 Gen) Far East. 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 55-56. 
182 

to that city." 65 Some even felt that, since 

Manila was the main objective, the withdrawal to Bataan "expedited the completion of our mission." 66 

The plan finally adopted for the advance 

from the Agno River utilized one division, 

reinforced, supported by armor and aircraft. 

The main effort was to be made on the east, 

along Route 5, and the immediate objective 

was Cabanatuan. The 48th Division would 

jump off from the Agno River on the 28th 

and advance toward that town. Simultaneously, the Kamijima Detachment, consisting of elements of the 9th Infantry and 

supporting artillery, would move from its 

positions along the Lingayen coast to Carmen to protect the right flank of the 48th 

Division. From there it would presumably 

advance down Route 3 toward Tarlac. The 

only concession made to the obvious American withdrawal to Bataan was to order General Tsuchibashi to send an infantry regiment with heavy artillery support to Tarlac 

to assist the 9th Infantry in its effort to move 

speedily down the central plain and seize 

the road net leading into the peninsula. 

Supporting the 48th Division advance were 

the 4th and 7th Tank Regiments, 14th 

Army artillery, and the 5th Air Group.61 

Threat on the East 

The key to the right flank of the D-4 line 

was Cabanatuan. Situated on the banks of 

the Pampanga River, the town is an important road junction on Route 5. The 

river, about 100 yards wide at this point, 

and unfordable by motor vehicles, flows 

'" Interrog of Col Nakajima, 25 Apr 47, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, I, Mil Hist 

Div, GHQ FEC. 

.. Interrog of Col Motoo Nakayama, Apr 47, ibid. 

"Ibid.; 14th Army Opns, I, 56-57, 61-64. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

swiftly in its twisting and irregular course. 

Approaching Cabanatuan from the mountains to the northeast, the Pampanga passes 

the town about 3,000 yards to the north 

then turns sharply south to flow west of the 

town and continue its errant way in a southwesterly direction toward Manila Bay. At 

Cabanatuan two bridges span the swiftly 

flowing river: one to the north and another 

to the west. It was in the general vicinity of 

these bridges that the Japanese first attacked the D-4 line. 

The 14th Army advance from the Aguo 

began on schedule on the morning of 28 

December, at the same time that General 

Homma moved his command post to Binalonan. In the lead were the 4th and 7th 

Tank Regiments, a battalion of the 2d Formosa, and a battalion of the 48th Mountain 

Artillery which advanced through San 

Quintin to San Jose. From there, they struck 

southeast, crossed the Pampanga at Rizal, 

and by 29 December had reached Bongabon, in position to threaten the right flank 

of the D-4 line. 

The 48th Division followed in two columns. The west column, consisting of the 

1 st Formosa supported by a battalion of 

artillery, left Rosales before dawn of the 

29th and marched southeast through 

Guimba, then east to Baloc on Route 5, 

north of Cabanatuan. The east column, consisting of the 2d Formosa, 47th Infantry, 

48th Reconnaissance, and artillery and engineer units, followed behind the tank regiments to San Jose, where Route 5 intersected Route 8, and then followed the 

former toward Cabanatuan.68 

At Cabanatuan, the main strength of the 

91st Division, the 92d Combat Team, 

"14th Army Opns, I, 60-61, 83; Statement of 

Gen Kawagoe, ATIS Doc 62707, Statements of 

Japanese Officials on World War II, pp. 128-30. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

waited for the attack. In and around the 

town were the 2d and 3d Battalions, and 

to the left extending to the Pampanga, was 

the 1st Battalion. Both bridges had been 

blown and were considered impassable for 

wheeled traffic, but not for foot troops. 

Moreover, the river was fordable north of 

Cabanatuan.69 On the morning of 29 December, the left (east) column of the 48th 

Division reached the Pampanga northwest 

of Cabanatuan, but it was the tanks, driving 

down from Bongabon, that reached the 

town first. As the tankers approached, the 

47th Infantry, under cover of an artillery 

bombardment, began crossing the river. It 

was now late in the afternoon, and the 92d 

Combat Team, outflanked and faced by a 

superior enemy, fell back. That night the 

Japanese entered Cabanatuan.7o 

The Japanese did not stop at Cabanatuan. Led by Maj. Gen. Koichi Abe, 48th 

Division infantry group commander, they 

continued south along Route 5 on 30 December. Followed by two battalions of 

the 48th Mountain Artillery and a battalion of 150-mm. howitzers of the 1st 

Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, the 47th 

Infantry pursued the withdrawing 91st Division toward Gapan, about fourteen miles 

below Cabanatuan. Just north of that village the defenders crossed the Penaranda 

River, destroying the steel highway bridge 

over that stream. Urged on by Lt. Louis 1. 

... Bentz, 92d Inf (PA), p. 2, Chunn Notebooks; 

Skerry, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 6, 

OCMH. The 192d Tank Battalion was in the 

area, but there is no information on its position 

or employment at this time. 

'" The American sources for this action are sketchy 

and vague as to times and places. Where doubts 

exist or where the records are irreconcilable, the 

Japanese account of the action has been used. 14th 

Army Opns, I, 63, 83. Ltr, Luther R. Stevens to 

Capt Edwin B. Kerr, 30 Dec 52; ltr, Col John H. 

Rodman to Maj Cen Orlando Ward, 1 Feb 52, both 

inOCMH. 

183 

Bentz, Jr., about sixty-five Filipinos of the 

92d Infantry formed a line along the south 

bank of the river, while the remainder of 

regiment, bolstered by three hundred high 

school ROTC boys who had arrived that 

morning from Manila, occupied a milelong line from the village west to the Pampanga. The 47th Infantry hit this line late 

in the afternoon and broke through with 

little difficulty. By nightfall the enemy had 

entered the town. The remnants of the 91st 

Division withdrew toward Baliuag, twentyfive miles south on Route 5, where they 

planned to reorganize. 

The rapid advance of the Japanese along 

Route 5 jeopardized the American right and 

resulted in a shortening of the D-5 line. The 

North Luzon Force right flank would now 

have to be anchored on Mt. Arayat, west of 

Route 5, instead of Sibul Springs to the east. 

Route 5 lay open and the enemy was well 

on his way toward the Calumpit area. Unless he was held, the withdrawal of the 

South Luzon Force would be threatened. 

Advance in the Center 

The center of the D-4 line, from the 

Pampanga to Tarlac, was held by the 11th 

Division. Paralleling the front was an eastwest road. The critical points in the line were 

Zaragoza and La Paz, held by the 11 th Infantry. The 2d Battalion was in front of 

La Paz, the 3d Battalion to the east above 

Zaragoza, and the 1st Battalion in reserve 

about 5,000 yards to the south. Company 

A, 192d Tank Battalion, was in general 

support near Zaragoza. The only route of 

withdrawal was down a secondary road 

from La Paz to Concepcion, about thirteen 

miles, then west to Route 3. 

In the initial deployment of the 11 th Infantry no provision had been made for 
184 

guarding the eastern entrance to the critical 

east-west road which ran behind the line. 

The 92d Infantry on the right was supposed 

to protect that flank, but Maj. Russel W. 

Volckmann, acting 11th Infantry commander, was uneasy about this arrangement. Recognizing the importance of the 

road and the vulnerability of his position 

he shifted his line so that troops of his 3d 

Battalion were in position to guard the road. 

A roadblock was established on the west side 

of the bridge across the Dalagot River, leading into Zaragoza, and a platoon of tanks 

placed in position there. The bridge was 

prepared for demolition, but the river was 

easily fordable by foot troops. The organization of the roadblock was a wise precaution, 

for the Tarlac-Cabanatuan road had already been exposed on the east by the withdrawal of the 91st Division.71 

The assault against the 11 th Division was 

made by the Kanno Detachment, consisting of the 3d Battalion, 2d Formosa, supported by a battalion of the 48th Mountain 

Artillery, substantially the same force which 

had landed at Vigan on 10 December. This 

force was the one which General Tsuchibashi had assigned to assist the Kamijima 

Detachment in its drive toward San Fernando. Its mission was to move south along 

Route 5 to Cabanatuan, then push west to 

outflank Tarlac, which Colonel Kamijima 

was approaching from the north. This maneuver would cover the right flank of the 

48th Division and, if executed speedily and 

successfully, would turn the North Luzon 

n Interv, author with Col Volckmann, May 48; 

Maj W. J. Lage, Opns of 3d Bn, 11th Inf (PA) at 

Zaragoza, 28-29 Dec 41 (paper prepared for Ad· 

vanced Infantry Officers Course, 1947-48, The 

Infantry School) ; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, 

Comments 18 and 19, OCMH. Major Lage's account is one day off, and the author has made 

necessary corrections. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

line and cut off the retreat of the American 

troops in the center. 72 

The Kanno Detachment jumped off from 

Talevera, north of Cabanatuan, at 0100 on 

30 December. Preceded by bicycle-mounted 

infantry, the unit cleared Cabanatuan, already in Japanese hands, shortly after and 

pushed on along the Cabanatuan-Tarlac 

road, disregarding security measures. At 

0315 an alert tanker of the 192d Tank Battalion observed a large number of cyclists 

in column approaching Zaragoza. When 

the Japanese reached the American position 

they were greeted by point-blank fire from 

the alerted tanks. At the mercy of the tanks, 

the cyclists lost an estimated eighty-two men 

before they could make their escape. 

It was still dark when the action ended. 

The tank commander, fearing infiltration 

by enemy infantry, withdrew his platoon 

across the Zaragoza bridge, then insisted 

that the bridge be blown though the 11 th 

Infantry troDpS were still on the other side. 

The commander of the engineer detachment had no choice but to comply and lit 

the time fuses. So surprised was the troop 

commander when the bridge was blown 

that he ordered an investigation immedi,.. 

ately and incorrectly concluded 

... that the engineer lieutenant had left the 

destruction of the bridge to his platoon sergeant and departed for the rear. The platoon 

sergeant detailed a private and departed with 

the rest of the men. The private, not to be 

outdone, had found a civilian, instructed him 

how to light the dynamite, paid him one peso 

and then left to join his platoon. The civilian, 

after hearing the shooting, became excited 

and blew the bridge. 73 

" 14th Army Opns, I, 83. 

T3Lage, Opns of 3d Bn, 11th Inf (PA), p. 16. 

Another explanation of these events is to be found 

in the report of the 11 th Engineer Battalion, a por· 

tion of which is quoted in Skerry, Comments on 

Draft MS, Comment 10, OCMH. 
THE WITHDRA\VAL BEGIKS 185 

BICYCLE-MOUNTED JAPANESE TROOPS 

The premature destruction of the bridge 

took the tanks out of the action and left the 

infantry, still on the far side of the shallow 

river, without the support of the armor. 

When daylight came the Kanno Detachment struck the roadblock with heavy 

rifle and mortar fire. Part of the detachment 

had swung around to the north and now 

began to exert pressure from that direction. 

Fearing that his battalion might be outflanked, the commander pulled his men 

back across the river. By noon, they were 

established in positions along the west bank. 

Despite heavy casualties and the presence 

of a strong hostile patrol above La Paz, the 

battalion commander felt he could hold 

the enemy at the river line. 

Shortly after noon the Japanese artillery 

opened fire against the 3d Battalion, prepara tory to an infantry attack. After a 

twenty-minute barrage by 75-mm. guns of 

the 48th Mountain Artillery, the Kanno 

Detachment began to cross the river. Unable to halt the enemy, the 3d Battalion 

moved west along the Zaragoza- La Paz 

road. Colonel Kanno brought his men 

safely across, then halted the advance until 

he could get his heavier weapons across the 

river. The 3d Battalion, about 500 yards 

to the west and supported by tanks, awaited 

the attack. At 1415 a Japanese antitank 

gun moved into the Japanese line and directed its fire against the Americans. It was 

finally knocked out, but only after it had 

destroyed the lead American tank. 

With the lead tank gone and their location known to the enemy, the tanks began 

to pull back. Since they were not under 11 th 
186 

Infantry control, there was no way to keep 

them in position. The Japanese immediately unleashed a heavy barrage, threatening the American positions. Major Volekmann, who was on the scene, organized a 

counterattack with the battalion reserve. 

The counterattack opened at 1500 and, 

although no ground was gained, it evidently 

surprised the Japanese and led them to believe the defenders were stronger than they 

actually were. When the Japanese fire 

slackened, the 3d Battalion withdrew again, 

this time about 1,500 yards to the west 

along the La Paz road. By 1360 the men 

were in their new positions. 

No sooner had the 3d Battalion taken up 

its new position than it received orders to 

pull back. These orders originated in Wainwright's headquarters, where it had become 

apparent during the day that the entire line 

was threatened by the 48th Division's 

breakthrough at Cabanatuan. Division 

commanders were ordered to pull back to 

the D-5 line. General Brougher, accordingly, directed his men holding the center 

of the line to withdraw through La Paz to 

Concepcion. The 11 th Infantry immediately began to assemble at La Paz. By 1730 

the 3d Battalion had fallen back across the 

bridge just east of that point, the remainder 

of the regiment retiring before it. When all 

the troops were across, the bridge was destroyed. At this moment the Kanno Detachment appeared along the Zaragoza road 

and was met with machine gun fire. With 

its rear momentarily secure, the battalion 

retired toward the D-5 line. 

Of the 550 men of the 3d Battalion only 

156 remained. Many of these were 

wounded. But the Japanese had been 

stopped effectively. By delaying Kanno for 

twenty-four hours, the 3d Battalion had 

prevented him from reaching Tarlac on 30 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

December in time to join in the attack on 

that town. It had thus frustrated a maneuver which might well have turned the left 

anchor of the North Luzon Force line. 

Fight on the West 

At the western end of the D-4 line stood 

the ruined city of Tarlac, its streets a 

shambles from the repeated strikes of enemy 

bombers. Just south of the city, the 21st 

Division, as yet untried in battle, awaited 

the advance of the Japanese. On the gently 

sloping ground to the west was the 21st Infantry guarding the bridge where Route 13 

crossed the Tarlac River. The 22d Infantry, 

on its right, straddled Route 3. In reserve 

was the 23d Infantry, eight miles south of 

Tarlac at Santa Rosa. The terrain, except 

for the area in which the 21st was deployed. 

was low and level, consisting largely of rice 

fields and offering little opportunity for 

cover. The infantry derived what protection 

it could from dry cornstalks, bamboo trees, 

and swamps. The only consolation the 

rifleman could draw from his position was 

that he had a clear field of fire. 74 

The Kamijima Detachment, which was 

assigned the mission of assaulting Tarlac, 

had shown a curious reluctance to advance 

below the Agno River. Heavy casualties 

during the landings had made Colonel 

Kamijima, in the words of 14th Army 

Chief of Staff Maeda, "very cautious." 7~ 

Such reluctance might well expose the right 

"O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 12-13; ltr, [CO, 

21st In£] to TAG PA, Opns of 21st Inf (PA), p. 2; 

Brief Hist of 22d Inf (PA), p. 3; Hist of 21st Div 

(PA), pp. 18-19. This last document was obtained 

from General Capinpin and like the others is on 

file in OCMH, 

,. Interrog of Gen Maeda, 10 May 47, I.nterrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, 

GHQFEC,I. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

(west) flank of 48th Division, and General 

Maeda, whose interest in Bataan had led 

him to emphasize the importance of the advance on Tarlac, took steps to correct the 

situation. He reprimanded Kamijima for 

his excessive caution and ordered him to 

move across the Agno. 76 

By 29 December the Kamijima Detachment had apparently progressed to a point 

just north of Tarlac. On that day the 3d 

Battalion, 21st Infantry, reported that it had 

been fired on by Japanese patrols. The 23d 

Infantry was ordered to reconnoiter and organize a position along the high ground between Santa Rosa and San Miguel, east of 

Route 3. At the same time the rear of the 

22d Infantry was strengthened. That night 

the men of the 22d found occasion to open 

fire against Japanese patrols. Their fire was 

not returned, and it is possible that the imagination of the men in combat for the first 

time was responsible for the many Japanese 

patrols reported south of Tarlac. 77 

Shortly after noon of the 30th, advance 

elements of the 9th Infantry led by Colonel 

Kamijima himself entered Tarlac. With 

only two companies of infantry Kamijima 

refused to push on. At about 1500 the remainder of the 9th Infantry (less the 3d 

Battalion) and the two batteries of the 22d 

Field A rtillery reached the area. Thus reinforced, Colonel Kamijima felt strong 

enough to attack and sent his men against 

the 22d Infantry positions along Route 3. 

The defenders held firm, inflicting severe 

losses on the 9th Infantry and killing 

Colonel Kami jima himself.18 

"Ibid.; 14th Army Opns, I, 60-61. 

"O'Day, 21st Diy (PA), II, 13; Richards, Steps 

to a POW Camp, p. 6. 

" 14th Army Opns, 1,63; Interrog of Gen Maeda, 

10 May 47, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Diy, GHQ FEC, I; USA vs. Homma, 

p. 3055; Mallonee, Diary, I, 100; Brief Hist of 22d 

Inf (PA),p.3. 

187 

During the course of the action, the 22d 

Infantry noted a number of men advancing 

down the road from Tarlac. These men were 

first thought to be 13th Infantry troops retiring from positions east of the city, but 

just before they reached the stream in front 

of the American line they were identified as 

enemy troops and fired upon. A few minutes 

later, five American tanks and two SPM's 

broke out of Tarlac and fought their way 

down toward the stream. Their retreat had 

been cut oft' by Colonel Kanno's advance 

along the Cabanatuan-Tarlac road, and 

after much difficulty they had pushed their 

way through enemy-held Tarlac. The 21st 

Division troops recognized the tanks and 

half-track and furnished them with artillery 

support in their flight to the stream. But 

here they met an insuperable obstacle and 

the men had to abandon their vehicles. 

With the exception of one crew whose tank 

was hit, all the men reached the 21st Division lines safely. Attempts to rescue the vehicles were unsuccessful and the artillery 

was ordered to destroy them. 79 

Late in the afternoon the 21st Division 

received orders to withdraw under cover of 

darkness to the D-5 line. That evening units 

began moving out of their D--4 positions. 

Pressure on the 22d Infantry had died 

down, but now the 21st Infantry came under heavy attack. As the division pulled 

back, this regiment supported by the 3d 

Battalion, 21st Field Artillery, covered the 

withdrawal alone. During the fight the 21st 

Infantry received many casualties and was 

badly battered. Finally, still intact but 

greatly weakened, the regiment began to 

pull back. The artillery battalion remained 

,. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, 1,101-02; O'Day, 21st 

Diy (PA), II, 13-14; separate, unsigned one-page 

history, entitled 194th Tank Battalion, OCMH; 

Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 111. The identity of 

the tanks is not clear in the sources. 
188 

in position to cover the infantry's withdrawal. Long after its scheduled hour of 

retirement, the artillerymen, led by their 

American instructor, 1st Lt. Carl J. Savoie, 

continued to fire. 

To the rear the division covering force 

waited impatiently and anxiously for the 3d 

Battalion to pass through its line. When the 

trucks and guns of the battalion finally came 

down the road, Colonel Mallonee noted 

that the men "were tired, worn, hungrybut cocky, proud, aggressive." 80 They had 

good reason to feel cocky. The battalion, 

unaided, had held up the Japanese advance 

and made possible the successful withdrawal 

of the 21st Infantry. 

" ... every man of the 21st Infantry 

who came out of Tarlac ... alive should get 

down on his knees and thank God for that redheaded son of a bitch [Savoie]. He was everywhere he was needed at the right time. . . . 

He kept the guns in almost three hours after 

he could have withdrawn to give us a chance 

to break off. We were all out and the enemy 

back into Tarlac before he pulled up a gun." 81 

By dawn, 31 December, the 21st Division 

was on the D-5 line. The 21st Infantry at 

Bamban, fifteen miles south of Tarlac, was 

here joined by its 1st Battalion. This battalion had been detached and placed in 

North Luzon Force reserve earlier and had 

seen action on the Agno line in the fighting 

around Carmen. The Japanese 9th Infantry was also reinforced when its 3d Battalion 

caught up with the rest of the regiment. 

The enemy force at Tarlac was further 

strengthened on the 31st by the arrival of 

the Kanno Detachment and by Lt. Col. 

so Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 105; O'Day, 21st 

Div (PA), 11,14. 

81 Mallonee Bataan Diary, I, 105, quoting Lt Col 

William A. Wappenstein, CO, 21st Infantry. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Katsumi Takahashi's 8th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment. This greatly increased 

Japanese force spent the day preparing to 

push south along Route 3.82 

In the brief period of seven days, from 

Christmas Eve to the year's end, there had 

been a radical change in the situation in 

northern Luzon. The Japanese, who on 24 

December had just secured their beachhead, 

now threatened Manila and the road net 

into Bataan. The enemy had broken out of 

his initial lodgment and was now moving 

rapidly in two columns down the broad 

central plain of Luzon. 

The North Luzon Force had withdrawn 

approximately fifty miles from its first defense line to its D-5 positions at Bamban 

and Arayat. The left and center had retired with moderate success, but the right 

flank was in grave danger. On that flank, 

General Homma had placed the main 

strength of the 48th Division supported by 

two regiments of tanks and increasing 

amounts of artillery and other supporting 

arms. Should the right flank give way, the 

withdrawal of the South Luzon Force to 

Bataan might well be imperiled. 

The first part of the withdrawal had been 

completed. Although it had been successful, there had been difficult moments. Communications had broken down at times, supply had proved difficult, and some of the 

bridges had been blown too soon. The defense lines had sometimes been hastily and 

inadequately manned, or not occupied at 

all. "Not a single position," wrote the assistant G-3 of USAFFE, "was really occupied and organized for defense. Troops were 

barely stopped and assigned defensive sec82 14th Army Opns, I, 64. 
THE WITHDRAWAL BEGINS 

tors before they stampeded into farther 

withdrawal, in many instances without firing a shot." 83 This view portrays the withdrawal at its worst. Not all troops stam83 Collier, Notebooks, II, 83. 

189 

peded, and there were numerous instances 

of heroism under fire and determined stands. 

For the most part, the withdrawal was conducted as well as it could be with the untrained and ill-equipped Philippine Army 

troops. 
CHAPTER XI 

Withdra wal In the South 

The withdrawal of the American and 

Philippine troops south of Manila began at 

the same time that General Wainwright's 

forces evacuated the D-l line. At about 

1000, 24 December, General Parker had 

turned over command of the South Luzon 

Force to General Jones and left for Bataan. 

Jones, who retained command of the 51st 

Division (P A), inherited four American 

officers from Parker's staff. It was fortunate 

that he did, for there were none on his 

division staff.1 

Jones' orders when he assumed command 

of the South Luzon Force were to "block 

the enemy advance" and, "when forced to 

do so," withdraw past the open city of 

Manila and join Wainwright's forces north 

of the city.2 While USAFFE orders directed 

General Jones to "harass and delay to the 

utmost the advance of the enemy," they 

made clear that his primary mission was to 

get his troops out of south Luzon and into 

Bataan.3 

1 Interv, author with Jones, 25 Oct 49, OCMH; 

Jones, Diary, p. 10; Itr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, 

OCMH; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 33. 

• Opns Orders, USAFFEto CG 51st Div, 24 Dec 

41, AG 381, Phil Rcds. 

• Quoted in Diary of Lt Col Arthur L. Shreve, 

Arty Officer, SLF, p. 10, copy lent to author and 

on file in OCMH; interv, Stanley Falk, research 

asst to author, with Jones, 15 Dec 49. General 

R. J. Marshall, in a letter to the author, states 

that the "final evacuation of the headquarters in 

Manila and cessation of transfer of supplies was 

govcrncd by the length of time that the South Luzon 

Force was able to delay the approach of the Japanesc." Ltr, Marshall to author, 31 Oct 49, OCMH. 

The force under General Jones's command was much smaller than Wainwright's 

North Luzon Force. It consisted primarily 

of the 1st Infantry of the 1st Division (PA) 

and the inadequately trained and poorly 

equipped 51st Division (PA), which had 

for its artillery component only one battalion of eight British 75's. The 42d Infantry, 41st Division (PA), was assigned to 

beach defense on the west side of the island. 

The rest of the division had gone with General Parker to Bataan. Artillery support for 

the South Luzon Force was provided by the 

three batteries of IS5-mm. GPF's of the 

86th Field Artillery, defending the beaches 

in southwest Luzon, and three batteries of 

75-mm. guns (SPM) organized into the 2d 

Provisional Group.4 Armored support was 

limited to one company-Company C of 

the 194th Tank Battalion-detached from 

the parent organization with the North 

Luzon Force. 

The Japanese force in south Luzon was 

numerically smaller than the composite 

American and Philippine force defending 

the area. Drawn from the 16th Division and 

led by the division commander, Lt. Gen. 

Susumu Morioka, it consisted of the 20th 

Infantry, the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment, and supporting arms and services. 

• The ISS-mm. GPF batteries had two guns in 

each battery. The GPF (Grande Puissance Filloux) 

155-mm. gun is a weapon designed by a French officer, Col. L. J. F. Filloux, before the first World War 

and furnished to the American troops in France. 
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 

General Morioka's route to the Philippine 

capital was not as broad or as smooth as 

that followed by General Tsuchibashi in 

the north. The Japanese in northern Luzon 

had the wide central plain to traverse; the 

path of the 16th Division was blocked by 

mountains and broad lakes. (Map 7) Immediately after landing at Lamon Bay, 

Morioka had crossed the steep Tayabas 

Mountains with the major part of his force. 

Before him were the towering heights of 

Mt. Banahao. To reach Manila he would 

have to skirt the southern slopes of this obstacle and follow Route 1 westward. Once 

beyond Mt. Banahao he could turn north 

toward the huge inland lake called Laguna 

de Bay, follow Route 1 along its western 

shore, thence through the narrow corridor 

between the lake and Manila Bay into the 

city of Manila itself. The smaller force 

which had landed at Mauban would have 

to skirt the northern foothills of Mt. 

Banahao, move along the south shore of 

Laguna de Bay to Route 1, then northward 

to the capital city. The two enemy forces 

would have to act independently until they 

were halfway to Manila. 

If the Japanese advance westward in two 

columns made mutual support of the two 

columns impossible once Mt. Banahao was 

reached, it also presented General Jones 

with a serious problem: to maintain contact between his units in order' to avoid 

hostile flanking movements. He solved his 

problem by assigning a half-track patrol 

from Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, to 

patrol the north-south road in front (east) 

of Mt. Banahao. This patrol was charged 

with maintaining contact between the 1st 

Infantry to the north and the 52d and 53d 

Infantry on the south. 5 

• Interv, author with Jones, 25 Oct 49, OCMH; 

Jones, Diary, p. 11. 

191 

Withdrawal From Mauban 

Of the two Japanese columns moving 

west from Lamon Bay, the northernmost, 

which had landed at Mauban, was the 

weaker, its mission the less important. This 

force, led by Colonel Tsunehiro, was numerically small, about the size of a battalion 

combat team, and consisted of the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, supported by a battery 

of the 22d Field Artillery. Unless it was 

allowed to advance entirely unchecked, 

Tsunehiro's force could have no decisive 

effect on the outcome of the action. Its mission was merely to advance along the south 

shore of Laguna de Bay toward Manila. If 

necessary, Tsunehiro could turn south 

shortly after capturing Lucban to aid the 

main force of the 16th Division advancing 

from Atimonan. 6 

Opposing Colonel Tsunehiro was the 1st 

Infantry (less 3d Battalion) of the 1st Regular Division (PA), dug in near Sampaloc, 

seven miles west of Mauban. At 0300 on 

Christmas Day it began an unauthorized 

withdrawal toward Lucban, about eight 

miles to the west. General Jones did not 

learn of this move until noon when, as he 

was about to begin his Christmas dinner, 

a motorcycle messenger from the half-track 

patrol of Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, came in with the news. He immedi6 In addition to the sources cited below, the account of the withdrawal from south Luzon is based 

upon: Jones, Diary, pp. 11-16; MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, pp. 11-13; Shreve, Diary, 

pp. 9-18; Maj Alfredo M. Santos, CO 1st Inf, The 

1 st Regular Div (PA) in Battle of Phil (paper prepared for School of Logistics, Command and General Staff College, 7 Jun 47), pp. 32-34; Itr, Col 

Boatwright to Groce, research asst to author, 25 

Mar 49, OCMH; intcrvs, author and Falk with 

Jones, 25 Oct 49, 15 Dec 49, 15 Mar 50, 5 Apr 50, 

and on other occasions; 14th Army Opns, I, 54-55, 

69-70; II, 12; 16th Diu Opns, 24 Dec 41-3 Jan 42, 

ATIS Enemy Pub 355, pp. 4-9. 
MANILA 

BA "Y 

ilALA'IAN BA r 

MAP7 

WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 2S-31 Oecember 1941 

~ tM'N IIOUT( ~ U. S • • ,THOII •• AI. 

rmmnnm u s. 1'0''''011' 'a_'IIAT[I. DolT[ '_O.CAT[O 

£/,..",_ 1ft ,", 

LAM 0 N 

BAY 

TAYABAS BAY 
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 193 

MOTORCYCLE MESSENGER CATNAPPING 

ately went forward to stop the retreat. 

Meanwhile, the Japanese reached Sampaloc, which they took without opposition. 

From there they pushed on toward the 

barrio of Piis, four miles distant. 

General Jones located the headquarters 

of the 1st Infantry near Luisiana, about six 

miles northwest of Lucban on Route 23. 

Angered by the retreat, he demanded of 

Maj. Ralph E. Rumbold, the senior American instructor, "just what the devil" he 

meant by pulling back. Rumbold replied 

that he had been ordered to do so by the 

commander of the South Luzon Force, 

"General Parker." Jones thereupon informed him that he, Jones, now commanded the South Luzon Force, and that 

the 1st Infantry was to establish contact 

with the enemy immediately.7 With a halftrack from the tank company General Jones 

set out in his own vehicle ahead of the 1st Infantry to seek a suitable delaying position. 

At about 1900, near Piis, he met an enemy 

patrol. The Japanese, equipped with machine guns, opened fire on Jones's party and 

disabled the half-track. The patrol was 

finally dispersed and Jones returned to the 

1st Infantry, the half-track crew hiking back 

carrying its machine gun. By this time Rumbold had pushed forward toward Piis but 

'One possible explanation for the confusion was 

the fact that the 1st Infantry had been ordered to 

north Luzon on the night of 23-24 December by 

USAFFE, and then later, before it could move, the 

order had been rescinded. 
194 

had been halted by a combination of rain, 

darkness, and enemy fire. 8 

On his return to the 1 st Infantry lines 

late that night General Jones ordered Major 

Rumbold to fight a delaying action until he 

was forced to withdraw. He was to retire 

northwest along Route 23 to a point above 

Luisiana and hold there until further 

notice. 

The next morning, 26 December, Rumbold ordered the 2d Platoon, Company C, 

194th Tank Battalion, which General Jones 

had attached to the 1st Infantry the previous evening, to attack the Japanese in Piis. 

Lt. Robert F. Needham, the platoon leader, 

suggested a reconnaissance first, but was 

told that it would be unnecessary since the 

enemy was understood to have nothing 

larger than .sO-caliber machine guns. Advancing in column along the narrow road, 

the tanks ran into a strong Japanese roadblock consisting of antitank guns, 75-mm. 

guns, and several machine guns. The enemy block had been prepared the previous 

evening, after the fight with General Jones's 

half-track, in expectation of an American 

mechanized attack. During the action that 

followed, the platoon's lead and rear tanks 

were knocked out, immobilizing the others 

on the narrow road, and Lieutenant Needham and his crew in the lead tank killed. 

The surviving tankers managed to escape, 

to drift back finally into the American lines 

at the end of the month.9 

Deprived of tank support, the 1st Infantry fell back to the junction of the Mauban 

road and Route 23. Here it was joined 

shortly before noon by more than three hun-

• The general recommended decorations for all 

participants. Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 122; 

Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 13.< 

• Miller, Bataan Uncensored,pp. 117-21; Weaver, 

Comments on Draft MS, Comment 21, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

dred retired Philippine Scouts led by Maj. 

Montgomery McKee, a retired Scout officer. These grizzled veterans, trained and 

disciplined by a lifetime in the Scouts, had 

long since served their time. Called on to 

bolster the raw Filipino troops, they assembled hurriedly near Fort McKinley and, 

in a fleet of taxicabs, rushed to the front. 

General Jones immediately attached them 

to the 1st Infantry and replaced Major 

Rumbold with McKee, their commander. 

These "seasoned, trained men," wrote Col. 

Stuart C. MacDonald, South Luzon Force 

chief of staff, "definitely stiffened the green 

1st Infantry." 10 

Meanwhile, Colonel Tsunehiro had b~en 

advancing along the Mauban road. When 

he reached the road junction where the 1st 

Infantry and the Scouts were dug in, he 

was met by determined resistance. For several hours there was a hard fight; finally at 

about 1400 the defenders were forced to pull 

out and fall back along Route 23 toward 

Luisiana to the northwest. The Japanese 

did not follow immediately but continued 

southwest to Lucban, only a short distance 

away, which they reached at dusk. 

The next morning reports of Japanese 

troop movements northward began to reach 

the 1st Infantry. These reports were accurate. Minor elements of the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment, which had landed at 

Atimonan, had come west and north along 

Route 23 to join Tsunehiro in Lucban about 

noon. The 1st Infantry thereupon continued 

to withdraw that day and the next. Part of 

Tsunehiro's force was pushing northwest 

toward Luisiana along Route 23 and another column had struck out along an unimproved road west of Lucban. The first 

and stronger element entered Luisiana 

,. MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, p. 11. 
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 

about noon of the 28th while the column to 

the west occupied Majayjay at about the 

same time. 

The Japanese advance in two columns 

constituted a real threat to the 1st Infantry. 

If the element to the west pushed on rapidly 

it might reach the south shore of Laguna de 

Bay before the Philippine regulars and cut 

their line of retreat. The 1st Infantry, 

therefore, at 1000 on 28 December, began 

to fall back to Calauan on Route 2 which 

paralleled the south shore of Laguna de Bay. 

Withdrawal to Calauan meant a circuitous 

march of twenty-five miles, first north and 

northwest along Route 23 to Santa Cruz, 

then southwest along Route 21. The regiment began its march at 1000 on 28 December, but before it could reach its destination and set up defensive positions it was 

directed to proceed to Los Banos, seven 

miles farther along Route 21. From Los 

Banos it was a short distance to Route 1, 

the main road northward to Manila." The 

3d Battalion of the 1st Infantry, stationed 

originally to the north, pulled back at the 

same time to Pililla on the north shore of 

the lake, where it was in position to halt an 

enemy advance to Manila from that 

direction. 

By 29 December the 1st Infantry, forming the north flank of the South Luzon 

Force, had withdrawn successfully from 

Mauban on Lamon Bay to Los Banos along 

the south shore of Laguna de Bay, a distance of thirty-five miles. It was now in 

position to move quickly around the lake 

and northward past Manila through San 

F-ernando, thence to Bataan. 

11 Major Santos asserts that he was ordered to pro.-

ceed without delay to Bataan and that he did so. 

Other evidence indicates that the regiment was not 

ordered to Bataan immediately, but to Los Banos. 

Santos, 1st Reg Div (PA), p. 34. 

195 

Withdrawal From Atimonan 

The withdrawal from Atimonan had 

begun at the same time, on Christmas Day, 

as the 1st Infantry's withdrawal from Mauban and General 'Wainwright's stand at the 

Agno River. At Atimonan the Japanese had 

landed a force consisting of the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment) more than a battalion 

of the 20th Infantry) a comparable force 

from the 22d Field Artillery) almost all of 

the 16th Engineers, and other service units. 

To oppose this Japanese force, which by 

25 December had crossed the mountains 

west of Atimonan and was advancing along 

Route 1 toward Pagbilao, General Jones 

had initially the equivalent of a reinforced 

regiment of infantry. From Col. Virgil N. 

Cordero's 52d Infantry he had the 2d and 

3d Battalions (less one company); and 

from Col. John R. Boatwright's 53d Infantry, the 1st Battalion. A detachment from 

Lt. Col. David S. Babcock's 2d Provisional 

Group of SPM's was in support. Only 

Cordero's men were in contact with the 

enemy along Route 1.12 

Pagbilao, fifteen miles inland from Atimonan on Route 1 and the immediate J apanese objective, is an important road junction in south Luzon. From there a road leads 

northwest to Tayabas, about seven miles 

away, where it joins Route 23, along which 

the 1st Infantry, farther north, was withdrawing. Route 1 turns southwest at Pagbilao to join that village with Lucena. The 

road then changes direction sharply to 

travel northwest to meet the road linking 

Tayabas with Sariaya. Route 1 then continues west through Sariaya and Candelaria 

1lI Jones states in his diary, pages 11-12, that the 

155-mm. GPF's were in support here, but these guns 

were actually to. the west, acco.rding to. Co.lo.nel 

Shreve. Shreve, Diary, pp. 9-13, OCMH. 
196 

to Tiaong, where it turns north toward 

Manila. Tayabas and Lucena are linked 

by the southern portion of Route 23. The 

road net between Pagbilao and Sariaya is 

shaped like a kite, with its tail (Route 1) 

stretching eastward to Atimonan. Before 

Pagbilao, flowing due south, is the Palsabangon River, intersecting Route 1 about 

3,000 yards east of the village. 

On Christmas Day Colonel Cordero's 

52d Infantry was ordered to hold the 

Pagbilao-Tayabas road, and Colonel Boatwright's one battalion of the 53d was posted 

on the east shore of the Palsabangon River 

to cover the east-west road and Cordero's 

line of retreat. When the Japanese reached 

the river they were halted briefly by Boatwright's 53d Infantry troops to permit final 

preparations for the demolition of the bridge 

and the crossing of Cordero's men. The last 

52d Infantry troops crossed under enemy 

fire and the bridge was blown almost in the 

face of the pursuing Japanese. Colonel 

Cordero continued through the 53d Infantry lines to positions about 2,000 yards 

northwest of Pagbilao, along the Tayabas 

road. Boatwright remained at the river line 

to oppose the expected Japanese crossing. 

The Japanese were held up only briefly 

at the Palsabangon River. During the afternoon, they forced a crossing and established 

a bridgehead on the west bank of the river. 

Colonel Boatwright's battalion withdrew 

quickly along Route 1 through Pagbilao. 

The Japanese who had forced the crossing, 

the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment, reinforced, did not pursue Boatwright but 

turned northwest toward Tayabas instead to 

follow Cordero's 52d Infantry. The pursuit 

of the 53d Infantry along Route 1 fell to 

the 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry, which had 

crossed the Palsabangon behind the 16th 

Reconnaissance. By evening of the 25th the 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Japanese were in possession of Pagbilao and 

in full pursuit of the two American columns 

withdrawing rapidly toward Tayabas and 

Lucena. 

The] apanese were too close for comfort. 

To cover the retirement of the 52d and 53d 

Infantry, General Jones hurriedly made 

new dispositions the next day. He pulled 

back the 3d Battalion, 53d Infantry, from 

its position on beach defense along Tayabas 

Bay and attached it to the provisional infantry battalion formed earlier from the 51st 

Field Artillery (less two batteries). This 

unit, led by Col. Hamilton F. Searight, 

J ones further strengthened by attaching a 

platoon of Company C, 194th Tank Battalion. He then ordered Searight to dig in 

along Route 1 at the eastern edge of Sariaya 

and to hold there until the troops of the two 

infantry regiments moving back from Tayabas and Lucena passed through his lines. 

The two Japanese columns, meanwhile, 

were pushing forward determinedly. Along 

Route 1, the 3d Battalion, 20th I ntantry, 

followed Boatwright's battalion, which 

passed through Lucena early on the 26th 

to reach Sariaya about 1530 that afternoon. 

The Japanese battalion, which had had a 

late start, did not enter Lucena until 2100 

that night. To the northwest Colonel Cordero's 52d Infantry pulled back through 

Tayabas early in the morning, then turned 

southwest toward Sariaya, blowing bridges 

as it retired. The regiment passed through 

Searight's lines that evening, some hours 

after the 53d Infantry. The 16th Reconnaissance, delayed by obstacles and blown 

bridges, reached Tayabas at 1600. From 

there it sent forward a patrol northward 

along Route 23 to establish contact with 

Colonel Tsunehiro's force nearing Lucban. 

By nightfall of the 26th General Morioka 

held the entire area east of Sariaya, with its 
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 

important network of roads, and was in 

position to drive west along Route 1 or north 

on Route 23. 

General Jones's position, while far from 

desperate, waS not favorable. Unlike Wainwright in the north, who by evening of the 

26th was on the D-3 line, he had no phase 

lines or previously reconnoitered positions 

to fall back to. In the absence of these, he 

improvised a system of delaying positions. 

Along terrain favorable to defense, he set up 

his front lines. To the rear he established a 

secondary line, behind whatever obstacles 

the terrain offered. Since it was practically 

impossible, as one staff officer noted, "to 

rally our troops . . . without a considerable lapse of time" after a line had been hit 

hard, the stragglers from the front lines were 

collected at the secondary line, re-formed, 

and put into positiop along a third line.13 

To make matters more difficult and confusing, the units became so mixed during the 

withdrawal that it was practically impossible 

to call them by their proper designations. 

They were identified instead, in the Japanese manner, by their commander's name. 

"Our tactics," observed Colonel Shreve in 

his diary, "have been unique." 14 

The evacuation of supplies and equipment proved as difficult in south Luzon as it 

did in the north, and for the same reasonS. 

The quartermaster supply depot at Los 

Banos was never evacuated, probably because of the shortage of transportation. 

Eventually, division trains moving through 

Los Banos picked up all the supplies they 

could carry; the remainder was reported 

destroyed. The shipment to Bataan of the 

six 155-mm. GPF's, emplaced along the 

" Shreve, Diary, p. 15. ,. Ibid. 

197 

west coast, proved extremely difficult. 

USAFFE's order directing that the prime 

movers, 10-ton tractors, be sent to Bataan 

ldt the GPF's without transportation. 

Finally, by changes in orders and desperate 

improvisations, the ISS's were moved out 

of position. By the evening of the 26th, they 

were on their way to Bataan.15 

At 1900 on 26 December General Jones 

established his forward command post at 

Candelaria, seven miles west of Sariaya, on 

Route 1. Here he organized his first line of 

defense. Along the two rivers which bracketed the town on the east and west, Jones 

posted Colonel Boatwright's 53d Infantry 

(less 3d Battalion). The main line of resistance was established along the river west 

of the city, with an outpost line on the river 

to the east. The bridges over both rivers 

were prepared for destruction. At the same 

time, General Jones set up a secondary line 

six miles behind Candelaria, at Lusacan, 

with Colonel Cordero's 52d Infantry. 

Troops of the 53d Infantry would fall back 

through Cordero's line when they withdrew 

from Candelaria. 

With two lines across the enemy's route 

of advance, Jones pulled Searight back from 

Sariaya to Tiaong, about 3,000 yards west 

of Lusacan, where Route 1 turns north toward Laguna de Bay. Searight broke contact with the enemy at 0100 on the 27th, 

his troops moving to the rear in buses. 

General Morioka, meanwhile, had concentrated his forces at Lucena, sending the 

16th Reconnaissance Regiment in pursuit 

of the retreating South Luzon Force. The 

destruction of the four large bridges be-

,. QM Rpt of Opns, p. 22. Shreve's original orders had been to destroy the guns, but he was determined to get them out "by hook or crook." Shreve, 

Diary, p. 9. 
198 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

CAMOUFLAGED I55-MM. GUN MI917 (GPF), towed by a lO-ton tractor. 

tween Tayabas and Sariaya held up the 

vehicles, and the reconnaissance regiment 

was forced to advance toward Candelaria 

on foot. On the afternoon of the 27th the 

Japanese finally reached the town and broke 

through the outpost line. Passing through 

the town quickly, they hit the main line of 

resistance about dusk. The Filipinos, failing 

to recognize their own troops falling back 

before the advancing Japanese, opened fire 

on their comrades. Fortunately, little damage was done and few lives lost. Behind the 

retreating troops came the Japanese. Despite determined opposition, they forced a 

crossing of the river and by 2030 of the 27th 

the 53d Infantry (less 3d Battalion) was in 

full retreat. On General Jones's orders, 

Colonel Boatwright's troops continued on 

to the rear for much needed rest and reorganization, and the following day moved 

out of southern Luzon to Bataan.16 

The Japanese did not stop at Candelaria. 

Pushing ahead aggressively, they reached 

Lusacan, six miles away, on the morning of 

the 28th. Here they ran into Colonel Cordero's 52d Infantry, deployed along the 

secondary line of defense. The Japanese 

were able to outflank Cordero's position 

quickly and at 0915 the American commander abandoned his position and retired 

toward Tiaong. 

The American position at Tiaong, guarding the defile through which Route 1 led 

north, was a strong one. Protected on both 

flanks by high ground, it was ideal for a 

prolonged stand, and General Jones decided 

16 Capt William Cummings, 53d Infantry (PA), 

pp. 3-4, Chunn Notebooks. 
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 

that he would make a determined effort to 

hold here. In the line he placed about four 

battalions of infantry, a battery of field artillery, and all his tanks and self-propelled 

artillery. The SPM's were deployed so as to 

provide direct support for the infantry, and 

the eight guns of the 51st Artillery were 

placed on high ground to the left of the main 

defenses, enfilading the path of the Japanese 

advance. To secure the rear, Jones withdrew 

the Philippine Scout detachment under 

Major McKee from the 1st Infantry and 

placed it in position about eight miles north 

of Tiaong. The 51st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) was placed at Lipa, eleven miles to 

the west, in position to cover the approaches 

from that direction. The 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment, part of the 1st Constabulary Brigade, was in general reserve. From 

Santiago, about six miles southwest of Los 

Banos, it could support either the Tiaong 

position or the troops along the lake. 

Despite these elaborate preparations no 

stand was made at Tiaong. By the evening of 

the 28th General MacArthur had apparently become apprehensive about the right 

flank of Wainwright's North Luzon Force 

which was now on the D-4 line. He therefore ordeted General Jones to hurry his 

withdrawal and to get out of South Luzon in 

time to pass safely behind Wainwright's 

lines. The entire South Luzon Force was to 

be across the Calumpit bridges by 0600 of 

the first day of the new year. 

These orders meant the abandonment of 

the strong position at Tiaong, and it was 

with reluctance that Jones, shortly after 

,midnight, 28~29 December, ordered the 

troops there to fall back to Santiago. Colonel Cordero's 52d Infantry with a battery 

of the 51st Field Artillery left at 0200, and 

reached the bivouac area north of Santiago 

four hours later. By midnight Cordero was 

199 

on his way to Bataan. The 51st Infantry at 

Lipa also withdrew to Santiago on the 29th 

and then continued north along the lake 

to Alabang where it went into mobile reserve. Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus' 1st Constabulary Brigade (less the 2d Regiment), 

part of the 2d Division formed from the 

Constabulary on the outbreak of war, relieved the 42d Infantry, still on beach defense, and took up positions covering Routes 

17 and 25 leading into Manila. The 42d 

Infantry withdrew by bus to Bataan. That 

night South Luzon Force headquarters 

moved to Fort McKinley.17 

By evening of 29 December the South 

Luzon Force stood in position at Santiago, 

with flank guards at Los Banos and on 

Routes 17 and 25, and a mobile reserve at 

Alabang to the north. Approximately half 

of the 51 st Division was already on its way 

to Bataan. The rest of the South Luzon 

Force was ready to follow. To the south the 

van of the Japanese forces, the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment, was just entering 

Tiaong. 

Out of South Luzon 

Not long after the South Luzon Force 

had started hurriedly for Bataan, it was 

halted by orders from the rear echelon headquarters of USAFFE in Manila. About 

1030 of the 30th General Jones was notified 

by Lt. Col. Jesse Traywick, G-3 of that 

headquarters, that he was to withdraw no 

farther unless forced to do so by enemy 

pressure.18 Probably the change in orders 

was an attempt to delay the final evacuation 

of Manila, thus gaining time for the transfer 

17 The 1st Brigade (PC) consisted of the 1st and 

2d Philippine Constabulary Regiments. 

.. Ltr, Gen R. J. Marshall to author, 31 Oct 49, 

OCMH. 
200 

of additional equipment to Bataan and Corregidor. Jones, unaware of the situation to 

the north, was puzzled by the new order, 

coming as it did but thirty-six hours after 

the order calling for a top-speed withdrawal. 

But without question and happy for an 

opportunity to meet the enemy, he immediately made his plans. He went forward to 

Santiago where the bulk of his force was and 

arranged an ambush. The position was an 

excellent one, the force adequate, and time 

sufficient to prepare the trap. Except for a 

few patrols, the Japanese were still around 

Tiaong and Candelaria, consolidating and 

moving up equipment and supplies, the 

last of which had been landed about noon 

of the 28th. Those elements advancing were 

doing so slowly and cautiously. 

Again Jones was to be deprived of his 

chance to pick a fight with the Japanese. 

General Homma's main force of infantry, 

tanks, and artillery in northern Luzon had 

broken through at' Cabanatuan and was 

pressing down Route 5. With Wainwright's 

right flank exposed and the North Luzon 

Force "in a very precarious position" there 

was a real possibility that the Japanese 

would succeed in driving a wedge between 

the North and South Luzon Forces.19 General MacArthur on Corregidor immediately 

saw the danger to his scheme for withdrawal 

to Bataan and, through his deputy chief of 

staff in Manila, General Marshall, made 

plans to meet the emerg~ncy. On the evening 

of the 30th, Marshall telephoned the South 

Luzon Force command post at McKinley 

and spoke to Colonel MacDonald, the chief 

of staff, who took the call in General Jones's 

absence. Marshall directed MacDonald to 

return immediately to the original plan of 

withdrawal so as to clear the Calumpit 

bridges not later than 0600 of 1 January. He 

,. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opm, p. 37. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

stressed the importance of covering the 

bridges from the north and east by holding 

Plaridel seven miles to the east and made 

the South Luzon Force responsible for this 

task. When informed that the 51st Infantry 

was "ready to roll" Marshall "seemed quite 

relieved." "Very evidently," wrote MacDonald, "something very bad had happened in NLF, just what the situation is 

there, we still didn't know." 20 

Unable to reach General Jones at 

Santiago, MacDonald issued the necessary 

orders for the withdrawal. The 2d Philippine Constabulary was returned to General 

de Jesus, the brigade commander, who was 

ordered to relieve all other elements of the 

South Luzon Force and to cover their withdrawal. He placed one of his regiments in 

position to block Routes 17 and 25, and the 

other to cover Routes 1 and 21. The 1 st 

Infantry was now free to continue its withdrawal and moved around Manila to 

Bataan. The force at Santiago was ordered 

to fall back through the Constabulary and 

the mobile reserve-51st Infantry (less 1st 

Battalion) plus a battery of the 51st Field 

Artillery-to proceed immediatley to Plaridel to meet General Marshall's requirements 

for more troops in that area. When these 

units had cleared Manila, General de Jesus 

was to pull his brigade back first to Fort 

McKinley and then, on the night of 31 December-I January, to Bataan, clearing the 

Calumpit bridges by 0600 of New Year's 

Day.21 

20 MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, pp. 

13-14; Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against 

Japan, pp. 44-45. 

21 The Army Transport Service was prepared to 

ferry. the South Luzon Force headquarters from 

Manila or Cavitc if the situation demanded, but 

South Luzon Force headquarters was never informed of this possibility. QM Rpt of Opns, p. 23; 

interv, author with Jones, 5 Apr 50. 
WITHDRAWAL IN THE SOUTH 

General Jones returned to his command 

post from Santiago as the units began to 

move to their new locations. Unaware as 

yet of the change in orders, the general "was 

astonished to find that the greater part of 

the CP was already on the road to Plaridel," 

and hastened after it.22 Lt. Col. Arthur L. 

Shreve, the G-3 and artillery officer, and 

Capt. Arthur G. Christensen, intelligence officer, had left McKinley in an old taxi 

shortly before midnight. Stopping in Manila 

for sandwiches, beer, and ice cream, they 

arrived at Plaridel and opened the new command post in a schoolhouse at 0400, 31 December. Colonel Shreve noted in his diary 

that he telephoned Fort McKinley to report, 

"We are set up. Check in to USAFFE and 

wait." 23 

General Jones arrived in Plaridel a short 

time later. After a brief search he found his 

new command post just before daylight. 

He immediately phoned MacDonald and 

instructed him to close the command post 

at McKinley. Captain Christensen went 

forward with a North Luzon Force staff 

officer to learn the exact location of troops 

in the area. 

Many of the 51 st Division units cleared 

the Calumpit bridges before dawn of 31 

December, and other elements crossed during the day. The first battalion of the mobile 

reserve, the 51st Infantry, under Lt. Col. 

Loren P. Stewart, arrived at Plaridel at 

0600, and the other battalion came up three 

hours.1ater. During the morning these two 

51st Infantry battalions were placed in position astride Route 5, northeast of Plaridel. 

Colonel Babcock's 75-mm. SPM's were 

placed north of the town to oppose the Japanese tanks known to be approaching from 

22 MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, p. 14. 

"" Shreve, Diary, p. 17. 

201 

Cabanatuan. About twelve miles south of 

Plaridel, on Route 3, Company C of the 

194th Tank Battalion held the road against 

enemy pursuit from the south. Below Manila, at Fort McKinley, General de Jesus' 

1st Brigade (PC) was preparing to withdraw toward Bataan under cover of darkness. "Manila," reported General MacArthur to the War Department, "will be 

uncovered by nightfall." 2. 

The withdrawal of the South Luzon 

Force had been eminently successful. With 

little loss, the Filipino and American troops 

had retreated approximately 140 miles 

through rugged terrain from Lamon Bay 

to Plaridel. Most of the South Luzon Force 

had already gone to Bataan. Although Jones 

had inflicted no major damage on the 

enemy, he had shown great skill in hampering Mcrioka's pursuit. After the 28th of 

December the Japanese had been unable to 

maintain contact with the withdrawing 

South Luzon Force. Indeed, on New Year's 

Day, their advance elements were still near 

Santiago and in no position to influence the 

struggle for Luzon. So effective had been 

Jones's destruction of highway and railroad 

bridges that he thought "the South Luzon 

Force could have effectively delayed the 

enemy's advance on Manila for a considerably longer period had it been necessary." 25 

The correctness of this conclusion is amply 

confirmed by General Morioka, who complained frequently of his inability to bring 

up armored cars, artillery, and supplies because of the destruction of roads and bridges 

'<Rad, MacArthur to TAG, 31 Dec 41, AG 381 

(11-27-41) Far East; Prav Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, 

p. 14; ItT, Maj John Curtiss, Jr., To Whom It May 

Concern, 5 Jun 45, written in Manchukuo while 

Curtiss was a prisoner of war. A copy of this letter 

was obtained from General Jones. 

" Jones, Diary, pp. 17-18. 
202 

and the back-breaking task confronting his 

overworked engineers. 26 

By the last day of the year most of Luzon 

was in the hands of the enemy, but General 

MacArthur's forces were still intact. The 

first part of the double retrograde movement to Bataan had been successfully accomplished, and the USAFFE commander 

could report to Washington that "the South 

Luzon Force had made firm contact with 

the North Luzon Force in the San Fernando area." 21 AIl that now remained to 

2G Morioka reported Japanese casualties from 24 

December through 1 January as 128 killed and 260 

wounded in action. 16th Diu Opns, 24 Dec 41-3 

Jan 42, ATIS Enemy Pub 355, p. 11. 

27 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Jan 42, AG 381 

(11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

complete the withdrawal of the troops east 

of the Pampanga River was the difficult 

maneuver across that river and the movement north through San Fernando then 

south into Bataan, while the troops along 

the D-5 line fell back along the roads leading into Bataan. It would be a hazardous 

operation, for enemy air and ground forces 

were an ever-growing menace as the area 

of maneuver became smaller. But the greatest test, the complicated movement of 

thousands of men and tons of supplies from 

north and south Luzon toward San Fernando, had gone well. The success of the withdrawal would be decided during the next 

few days. 
CHAPTER XII 

Holding the Road to Bataan 

On 30 December 1941 the Philippine 

Commonwealth reaffirmed its faith in the 

future with the inauguration of Presidentelect Manuel Quezon at a brief ceremony 

on the island fortress of Corregidor. Across 

the bay, the American and Filipino troops 

were making ready for their last stand before withdrawing to Bataan. Despite Quezon's brave inaugural words, the future of 

the nascent republic never appeared darker. 1 

Almost all of the troops on Luzon were 

now north of Manila. The North Luzon 

Force stood on the D-5 line, from Bamban 

to Arayat, in front of San Fernando and the 

road leading into Bataan. (Map 8) Fifteen 

to twenty miles long, this line was the 

shortest of the five defensive lines used by 

General Wainwright's forces. Guarded on 

the left (west) by the steep heights of the 

Zambales Mountains and on the right by the 

rugged 3,367-foot high Mt. Arayat and the 

twenty-mile-long Candaba Swamp, it was 

susceptible only to frontal attack by the 

Japanese force moving south from Tarlac 

along Route 3. 

Ten miles south of Bamban, the west 

anchor of the D-5 line, an unimproved road, 

Route 74, branched off from Route 3 to the 

southwest to give a.::cess to Bataan. The 

main road into the peninsula, Route 7, began at San Fernando, ten miles farther 

1 Quezon, The Good Fight, pp. 227-35. General 

MacArthur and High Commissioner Sayre also 

spoke briefly and feelingly at the ceremony. MacArthur's speech is printed in Hunt, MacArthur and 

the War Against Japan, pp. 48-49. 

south. Troops north and south of San Fernando would have to pass through that town 

to get to Bataan j only the left elements of 

the troops on the D-5 line would be able 

to use Route 74. 

General Homma's main striking force 

was not aimed at the D-5 line, but at 

Manila. This force, which had broken 

through at Cabanatuan on the 30th, was 

moving rapidly down Route 5, east of the 

Candaba Swamp. Once it reached Plaridel, 

where a road led westward to Route 3, it 

would be only a short distance east of the 

two bridges at Calumpit. If the Japanese 

secured Plaridel and the bridges quickly 

enough, they would cut off the retreat of 

the troops still south of Calumpit and, by 

gaining a position west of the Pampanga 

River in the rear of the D-5 line, compromise the execution of the withdrawal 

into Bataan. 

General MacArthur had foreseen this 

contingency as soon as the Japanese had 

broken through at Cabanatuan and had 

quickly sent reinforcements from the North 

and South Luzon Forces to hold Plaridel 

and the road to the north as far as Baliuag. 

Defending Plaridel was as essential to 

his plan for withdrawal to Bataan as 

holding the D-5 line. Possession of this 

barrio meant that the Calumpit bridges 

over which the forces east of the Pampanga 

must pass to get to San Fernando were safe. 

The task of the forces on Luzon was, then, 

twofold: to hold in the north along the D-5 

line and on the east at Plaridel. Failure to 
BATAAN 

MAP 8 

" " " " " " 

HOLDING THE ROAD TO BATAAN 

Lo Poz 1/ 

" " " " " , 

" " 

" " 

" " c;:: ::,:n ,>.J 

" " " " " 

MANILA BAY 

3 1 December 1941 - I January 1942 

MIn/III//it//, u 5 POSITIONS !APPAOX.), MOAN ING 31 DEC 

Elevations in feel 

,0 

MILES 

--- 31 DEC 

MANI LA 
HOLDING THE ROAD TO BATAAN 205 

MOUNT ARA YAT, looking west. 

hold long enough at either point spelled 

the doom of the entire plan. 

The Defense of Calumpit 

For the defense of the Calumpit bridges 

MacArthur placed every unit that could be 

spared east of the Pampanga. From the 

South Luzon Force came the 51 st Infantry 

(less 1st Battalion) and the 75-mm. guns 

of Colonel Babcock's SPM provisional battalion, both stationed at Plaridel. The 

194th Tank Battalion (less Company C) 

was posted at Apalit, on the west bank of the 

Pampanga two miles above Calumpit, in 

position "to insure the exit" of those forces 

east of the river. If necessary, the tank 

battalion was to move to Bocaue, between 

Manila and Plaridel, to reinforce Company 

C, part of the South Luzon Force, which 

was to hold that barrio "until the extrication of North and South Luzon Forces was 

insured." 2 At least one company of the 

192d Tank Battalion was in the PlaridelBaliuag area. 

The 91st Division, retreating down 

Route 5 from Cabanatuan, reached Baliuag 

at daybreak of the 31st. It was joined 

shortly by elements of the 71st Division--

the 71st Field Artillery and the 71st and 

72d Infantry-which had been ordered 

there the night before by General Wainwright. The 71st Division units took up 

positions north of Baliuag and the 91st Division went into reserve south of the town. 

2 Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 14. 
206 

Before 1000 Wainwright's headquarters 

warned the two divisions that they would 

have to withdraw from Baliuag in time to 

clear the Calumpit bridges, nine miles 

away, by 0400 the next morning.3 

At approximately 1000 that morning, 

General Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of 

staff, telephoned Jones, commander of the 

South Luzon Force, and placed him in command of all forces east of the Pampanga. 

In effect, this made Jones commander of 

the troops holding the Calumpit bridges. 

Sutherland ordered Jones to hold the 

bridges until the 1 st Brigade (PC) had 

passed over and warned him that all troops 

would !;lave to be west of the Pampanga 

River by 0600 of 1 January, for at that 

time the bridges would be blown. Apparently General Wainwright was not informed of the change in command.4 

T he Fight for Plaridel 

The defense of the Baliuag-Plaridel area 

was of the greatest importance. Baliuag, 

a town of rambling houses and nipa huts 

scattered along Route 5 and the north 

bank of the Angat River, commands the 

approaches to Plaridel, six miles to the 

south. Plaridel is located at the intersection of Route 5 and several secondary 

roads, two of which extend along opposite 

banks of the Angat River to Route·3 and 

the Calumpit bridges, some eight miles to 

the northwest. The South Luzon Force 

3 NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 13; USAFFEUSFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 39; Itr, Selleck to Board 

of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: Reinstatement of Rank; 

Itr, Col Fowler, CO 71st FA, to author, 30 Apr 49, 

OCMH; Capt Albert W. Erickson, 7lst Inf (PA), 

pp. 2-3, and Bentz, 92d Inf (PA), pp. 1-2, both 

in Chunn Notebooks. 

• Jones, Diary, p. 16. These instructions were 

passed on to General de Jesus, commander of the 

1st Brigade (PC), for his was the only unit not yet 

in position to clear Calumpit rapidly. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

and those elements of the North Luzon 

Force in the area would have to pass 

through Plaridel and along these secondary 

roads to cross the Calumpit bridges. South 

of Plaridellay the invader's route to Manila. 

General Tsuchibashi, 48th Division commander, was fully aware of the importance 

of Calumpit and the Baliuag-Plaridel area. 

On the 30th he had ordered two tank regiments and a battalion of infantry to advance from Cabanatuan to the Angat River 

and cut the route from Manila to San Fernando. This force, led by Col. Seinosuke 

Sonoda, commander of the 7th Tank Regiment, and assisted by a company of engineers to repair roads and bridges, was 

marching unopposed down Route 5 toward 

Plaridel on the night of the 30th.5 

On the morning of 31 December an advance detachment of Colonel Sonoda's 

force reached the outskirts of Baliuag. The 

engineers, protected by tanks, attempted to 

repair the bridge across the' stream north of 

the town, but were met by fire from the 

71st Field Artillery. Shortly after, the enemy 

tanks were brought under fire by a platoon 

of Company C, 192d Tank Battalion, 

which lay in concealed positions below the 

stream. The Japanese broke off the action 

and withdrew to the east where they effected a crossing around noon. It was at 

this time that the 91st Division left its reserve position below Baliuag and started for 

Bataan, leaving the 71st Division elements 

alone in the town.6 

• 14th Army Opns, I, 84; statements of Col Moriji 

Kawagoe, CofS 48th Div, 9 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 

56354 and of Maj Makoto Nakahara, Opns Officer, 

48th Diu, 13 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56372, in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist 

Div, GHQ FEC, II. 

• USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 39; NLF and 

I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 13; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of 

Opns, p. 14; Itr, Fowler to author, 30 Apr 49, 

OCMH. 
HOLDING THE ROAD TO BATAAN 

By 1330 the Japanese tanks had reached 

the eastern outskirts of Baliuag and were 

awaiting infantry reinforcements before 

making an all out assault against the town. 

Meanwhile, the 71st Infantry prepared to 

pull out of Baliuag in accordance with 

orders. The two infantry regiments and the 

engineers left in buses around 1400, but the 

artillery regiment remained behind. 7 

At about this time General Wainwright 

arrived at Jones's command post in the 

Plaridel schoolhouse. The North Luzon 

Force commander, unaware of the fact that 

Jones now commanded all troops east of the 

Pampanga, ordered him to take up positions for a close-in, perimeter defense of the 

Calumpit bridge. Jones informed Wainwright of his orders from Sutherland and 

explained that he intended to hold the 

enemy at Baliuag rather than at the bridge. 

While Jones and Wainwright were talking, 

General Stevens, 91st Division commander, 

entered the command post, followed a short 

time later by a South Luzon Force staff 

officer who announced that the 71st Division had moved out of Baliuag. Jones then 

ordered Stevens to stop the 71st and put it 

in position west of Plaridel, along the road 

l~ading to Calumpit. Wainwright left soon 

afterfor his own command post.s 

Stevens' efforts to halt the withdrawal of 

the 71st Division infantry elements proved 

futile. By 1500 the main body of Sonoda's 

7 USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 39; Itr, 

Fowler to author, 30 Apr 49. Official reports do 

not record the fact that the 71st Field Artillery 

remained in Baliuag. This fact is established by the 

artillery commander, Colonel Fowler .. 

• General Jones was unaware that the 71 st Field 

Artillery was still at Baliuag. Interv, author and 

Falk with Jones, 1 Nov 49 and 6 May 50. See also, 

Jones, Diary, pp. 16-17; NLF and I Corps Rpt 

of Opns, pp. 13-14; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, 

p. 39; Itr, Fowler to author, 30 Apr 49, OCMH; 

MacDonald, Supplement to' Jones Diary, p. 15. 

207 

mechanized force was standing in front of 

Baliuag and it was perfectly evident that 

the Japanese were massing for an attack. 

Deeply concerned over the effect of an attack on the untried 51st Infantry, Jones 

ordered two platoons of Company C, 192d 

Tank Battalion, to cross the river and attack 

the enemy concentration at the east end of 

Baliuag. The tanks were to be supported 

by about a half dozen of Colonel Babcock's 

75-mm. SPM's which were to fire on 

Baliuag and its northern approaches when 

the tanks broke off the attack. After a 

hasty reconnaissance, Babcock placed his 

guns on the dry, baked fields a few thousand 

yards west of Baliuag arid sent a forward 

observer to a position 500 yards west of the 

town. For communications with the tanks 

Babcock had a radio-equipped scout car of 

Company C. 

At about 1700 the tanks of Company C, 

led by Lt. William Gentry, moved out to 

the attack. As the two platoons approached 

the enemy, the covering artillery fire, presumably supplied by the 71st Field Artillery, lifted. A bitter fight ensued. The 

American armor made a shambles of that 

part of Baliuag in Japanese hands. The 

tanks rolled through the streets, firing into 

bahays, smashing through the nip a huts as 

if they were so many toy houses, and scattering hostile infantry right and left. A brief 

but wild tank-versus-tank action followed. 

In the fading daylight American and Japanese tanks chased each other up and down 

the narrow streets, while enemy foot soldiers, in a futile gesture, fired small arms 

at the tankers. The SPM's and artillery remained idle, unable to fire for fear of hitting 

their own tanks. When Company C finally 

broke off the action, it had knocked out 

eight Japanese tanks with little loss to itself. 

As the tanks pulled back, the SPM's and 
208 

artillery opened up on Baliuag and continued to fire until 2200 when Fowler and 

Babcock pulled their men back to Plaridel 

and then west across the Pampanga. The 

last of the tanks crossed the Calumpit bridge 

at about 0230 on 1 J anuary.9 

Holding the unimproved road from Plaridel to Calumpit was the untried 51st Infantry. When at 0300 the 1st Brigade 

(PC) cleared the Calumpit bridge General 

Jones sent his chief of staff to Plaridel with 

orders for the 51st to withdraw immediately. 

The retirement began at 0400, 1 January. 

Meanwhile, the Japanese had entered Baliuag and were pushing cautiously toward 

Plaridel. At 0400 they were close enough 

to hear the sound of motors as the 51st 

Infantry began to pull out, and immediately 

rushed forward to attack. Firing into the 

truck column the Japanese hit the rearmost vehicles but inflicted no damage. 

Lacking motor transportation they were unable to follow. Colonel Stewart pushed 

ahead rapidly and crossed the Pampanga 

with his 51st Infantry at about 0500 on 

the morning of the 1 st, the last unit to cross 

the Calumpit bridge.IO 

• The account of this action is based on the following sources, many of them in conflict with each 

other: Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 14; Itr, 

Weaver to author, 30 Jan 50; Jones, Diary, p. 17; 

interv, author and Falk with Jones, 31 Oct and 

1 Nov 49, 24 Jan 50; itr, Maj Curtiss (forward 

observer for the 75-mm. SPM's), To Whom It 

May Concern, 5 Jun 45, copy in OCMH; Collier, 

Notebooks, II, 78-80; Lt Col Thomas Dooley, The 

First U.S. Tank Action in World War II (paper 

prepared for Advanced Officers Class No.1, The 

Armored Force School, 1 May 48), p. 12; Itr, 

Weaver to Wainwright, 20 Nov 45, copy in OCMH; 

14th Army Opns, I, 84. 

1. Jones, Diary, p. 17; 14th Army Opns, I, 84; 

Itr, Col Skerry, NLF Engineer, to Lt Col George A. 

Meidling, 4 Jun 49, Comment 9. Col Skerry's comments, altogether numbering twenty-one, pertain to 

Chapter II of Combat Engineer Operations, a 

projected volume in the series Engineers of the 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

aBlow the Bridges» 

What the Japanese could not accomplish on the ground they might have accomplishcd with their air force. On 31 December the highway and railroad bridges spanning the Pampanga at Calumpit presented 

to the Japanese air force the most inviting 

target since Clark Field. Heavily laden 

with dynamite charges for rapid demolition and protected by only two gun batteries of the 200th Coast Artillery (AA), the 

bridges were extremely vulnerable to air 

attack.ll Indeed, like marriage, in Shaw's 

classic definition, they combined the maximum of temptation with the maximum of 

opportunity. 

The Japanese failed to take advantage of 

this opportunity for a decisive blow from 

the air. The 48th Division urged that the 

Calumpit bridges be bombed and there 

were heated discussions over this question, 

but the view of Col. Mon jiro Akiyama, 14th 

Army air officer, that the destruction of the 

bridges would prove of little value, prevailed. The 14th Army's order of the 30th, 

therefore, directed the 5th Air Group simply 

to attack the retreating enemy and to make 

an effort to destroy the bridges west of Lubao, just above the base of the Bataan 

peninsula.12 

Even with this limited mission, the Japanese air forces made only a desultory effort. 

Col. Harry A. Skerry, the North Luzon 

Southwest Pacific 1941-1945. These comments 

were sent to the author by Colonel Skerry and are 

on file in OCMH. They are hereafter cited as 

Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, with appropriate number. 

11 Interv, author with Gen Sage, 28 Feb 51; 

USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 39. 

'" Statements of Cols Kawagoe, CofS, 48th Diu, 

and Akiyama, in Statements of Japanese Officials 

on World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, I, 

19, 11,134. 
HOLDING THE ROAD TO BATAAN 209 

CALUMPIT BRIDGES spanning the Pampanga River. 

Force engineer and the man directly responsible for blowing the bridges, later 

wrote that he was "amazed" by the "weak 

air efforts" the Japanese made and "the few 

planes seen in the sky, despite the previous 

almost total destruction of our air force and 

the resulting enemy air superiority." 13 

At about 0500 on New Year's Day, as 

the 51st Infantry cleared the Calumpit 

bridge, General Wainwright asked Generals 

Jones, Stevens, and Weaver if all their units 

were safely across. He received affirmative 

" Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No.9, p. 

5 ; interrog of Lt Co) Hikaru Haba, Intel Officer, 

14th Army, Apr 47, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I. 

The account of the blowing of the bridge is based 

on Colonel Skerry's Comment 9; Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 44; and interv, author 

with Jones and Sage, 28 Feb 51. 

replies from these three, but Colonel Skerry 

pointed out that a platoon of demolition engineers under Lt. Col. Narcisco L. Manzano (PS) was still on the road south of 

Calumpit. Nothing had been heard from 

Manzano since the previous noon, and 

Colonel Skerry requested that destruction 

of the bridges be delayed as long as the tactical situation permitted, to enable Manzano's group to escape. "Vainwright assented, but all final preparations for demolition were made and orders were issued to 

fire the charges at 0600. 

It was still dark. There was no Japanese 

air bombardment or artillery fire, but from 

the south came the sounds of rifle fire. The 

nervous Filipino troops fidgeted in their positions and stared apprehensively across the 

river. At 0545, when there was still no sign 
210 

of Manzano's detachment, Wainwright extended the time for blowing the bridges to 

0615. 

As dawn broke, the noise of enemy rifle 

fire from the south increased. General 

Wainwright, unaware that the main J apanese force was pushing toward Manila 

and that less than a regiment had been sent 

toward Calumpit, believed that this fire 

presaged a major Japanese effort to cross 

the Pampanga. Blowing the bridges would 

place the deep, unfordable river squarely in 

the path of the advancing enemy and give 

the Bataan forces time to prepare for defense. Wainwright then made his decision; 

Manzano and his men would have to reach 

Bataan by other routes. He turned to his 

engineer. "Skerry," he said, "we cannot 

wait any longer. Blow the bridges." 

The covering force withdrew to a safe 

distance, the explosives were checked, and 

at 0615 the charges were detonated. The 

air was filled with a roar and a rushing 

noise, a flash lit up the sky, and the Calumpit bridges disappeared in a mass of falling 

debris. In front of the defenders flowed the 

deep Pampanga; to their rear lay San Fernando, where the road to Bataan began. 

The D-5 Line: Bamban-Arayat 

By the first day of the new year the bulk 

of the American and Filipino forces had 

escaped from the enemy pincer movement 

designed to trap them on the plain before 

Manila. Calumpit had been passed successfully and the troops from the south had 

side-stepped the Japanese and withdrawn 

in good order across the Pampanga. MacArthur's men no longer faced the _main 

strength of Homma's 14th Army, which was 

pushing rapidly toward Manila. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

San Fernando, nine miles north of Calumpit, was as vital to the successful completion of the plan of withdrawal as Plaridel. 

Not only did the South Luzon Force have 

to pass through it before turning southwest 

to Bataan, but almost the entire North 

Luzon Force would funnel through that 

town also. 

Thirty-five miles northwest of Manila, 

and strategically second in importance only 

to the capital, San Fernando is an important 

road and rail junction. It is there that Route 

7, the main road to Bataan, joins Route 3. 

The troops from Calumpit would have to 

travel northward along Route 3 to reach 

San Fernando; those on the D-5 line would 

withdraw south along this road and Route 

10. At San Fernando both groups would 

pick up Route 7 for the final lap of their 

journey to Bataan. 

The 21st Division on the west flank of the 

0-5 line was the only unit which could escape into Bataan without going through San 

Fernando. At Angeles, midway between 

Bamban and San Fernando, it would leave 

Route 3 and follow Route 74 to Bataan. All 

other units north and south of San Fernando 

would reach Bataan via San Fernando and 

Route 7. 

Even if the enemy did not impede the 

march to Bataan, the roads over which 

the tired soldiers must travel to reach the 

peninsula would present many obstacles. 

From Calumpit north to San Fernando, 

and from there south to Bataan, the road 

was packed with a "solid stream of traffic," 

military and civilian.14 Vehicles of all 

types-cars, buses, trucks, artillery, and 

tanks-filled the center of the road. In some 

places, there were stretches of several miles 

U Collier, Notebooks, I, 73-74. 
HOLDING THE ROAD TO BATAAN 211 

SAN FERNANDO, looking northwest. Route 3 from Calumpit runs diagonally 

through the photograph,- Route 7 leading to Bataan is in upper left. Zambales 

Mountains are visible in background. 

where the vehicles were lined up almost 

bumper to bumper. On each side was an 

endless line of pedestrians, mostly civilians 

fleeing from the invading army. 

The enemy air force could hardly be expected to overlook so obvious and inviting 

a target on their way to other, more important military missions. The primary 

objective of the thirty-two light bombers of 

the 5th Air Group that day was ammunition dumps, but the Japanese pilots reported 

that they also dive-bombed American vehicles and "motorized units." 15 Colonel 

Collier noted that "hostile bombers, with 

the rising sun glistening on wing tips, flying 

at low and high altitudes, crossed and re15 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 43. 

crossed the road." 16 But he saw no divebombing or strafing attacks. "Had the 

bombers struck the jammed columns with 

bombs and strafing," he wrote, "our withdrawal into Bataan would certainly have 

been seriously crippled." 17 

Since 30 December General Homma had 

been strengthening his forces in front of the 

D-5 line. By New Year's Eve he had on 

Route 3, in and around Tarlac, the entire 

9th Infantry Regiment, the Kanno Detachment (3d Battalion, 2d Formosa), 8th Field 

Artillery (less one battalion), two batteries 

of the 22d Field Artillery, and a battalion 

of the 48th Mountain Artillery. The mis-

"Collier, Notebooks, I, 74. 

17 Ibid., 76. 
212 

sion of this force was to drive south toward 

Bataan.18 

Along the D-5 line stood two Philippine 

Army divisions, the 11 th on the right and 

the 21 st on the left. Between the high 

ground on each end of the line the terrain was flat, the vegetation consisting of 

cane fields and uncultivated grassland. As 

the troops reached this position they began 

to clear fields of fire and, when they could 

get the wire, erect barbed-wire entanglements!9 

The 21 st Division held the left ( west) 

portion of the flatlands along the south bank 

of the Bamban River from the MagalangConcepcion road to the Zambales Mountains.'On the right was the 22d Infantry; 

to its left was the 21st Infantry, with the 3d 

Battalion on the right and the 2d Battalion 

on the left. Along the front, between the 

two battalions, were two high muitiplespan steel bridges (one railroad and one 

highway) fording the Bamban River. The 

engineers had destroyed both bridges, but 

the river, practically dry at this season of 

the year, presented no obstacle to advancing 

infantry and only a slight one to vehicles. 

To strengthen the river line, therefore, 

Company C, 23d Infantry, was posted on 

the high ground north of the Bamban River 

and west of Route 3, in position to dominate the road and railroad south of the 

town. The 21 st Field Artillery was in general support.:!') 

The wisdom of placing Company C in 

this position was soon confirmed. At about 

18 14th Army Opns, I, 64,71-72. 

19 Mallonee, Comments on Draft MS, 8 Jan 52, 

OCMH; itr, Townsend to Ward, 8 Jan 52, OCMH; 

Central Luzon, Allied Geographical Sec (AGS) 

GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study 94, I, 48; Skerry, 

NLF Engineer Rpt of Opns, p. 9. 

"'Brief Hist of 22d Inf (PA), p. 2; Mallonee, 

Bataan Diary, I, 106; O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 14. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

0130 New Year's Day, a Japanese force 

mounted on bicycles and estimated as of 

company size was observed pedaling down 

the road from Bamban toward the destroyed bridge between the 2d and 3d Battalions, 21 st Infantry. The enemy troops 

were part of the Kanno Detachment, which 

had been caught in the open by American 

tanks at Zaragoza two days earlier. Their 

reception at Bamban was no less warm. 

As the Japanese cyclists advanced along the 

short stretch of road paralleling the river 

east of the bridge, Company C delivered a 

punishing fire in their midst. Mter some 

minutes of confusion and milling about, the 

surprised and badly hit Japanese force retreated, having suffered thirty-five casualties. Company C gained an assortment of 

bicycles, swords, and miscellaneous equipment, as well as a wounded Japanese noncom. Since he spoke no English and no one 

present understood Japanese, he proved 

useless as a source of information. By the 

time he had been evacuated to the rear he 

had died of his wounds. 21 

By 0900 the remainder of the Kanno 

Detachment had reached Bamban. The 

infantry soon began an attack against the 

river line and Company C; the artillery 

joined in the action about noon. That 

afternoon the fighting was brisk, with heavy 

shelling on both sides and with Japanese 

aircraft participating in the action. But 

all efforts by the Japanese to cross the river 

met with failure and Company C was still 

in position late in the day. 

At division headquarters reports of Japanese troop movements south from Tarlac 

21 The account of 21st Division operations at 

Bamban is based upon O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 

15; Brief Hist of 22d Inf (PA), p. 4; Opns of 21st 

In! (PA), p. 2; Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, 

pp. 7-8; 14th Army Opns, 1,65 84; ltr, O'Day to 

Ward, 14 Jan 52, OCMH. 
HOLDING THE ROAD TO BAT AAN 

to Bamban had been received earlier in the 

day, one scout noting "that one of our own 

tanks was being driven around Tarlac to 

the hilarity of the enemy troops." 22 These 

reports were accurate. The 9th Infantry 

and supporting troops were moving forward to reinforce the Kanno Detachment. 

As the Japanese came within artillery range 

they were brought under fire by guns of 

the 21st Field Artillery. Although suffering losses in personnel and equipment, the 

9th Infantry by 1600 had joined the Kanno 

Detachment on the north bank of the river. 

But the Japanese for some inexplicable 

reason failed to attempt a crossing. At 

nightfall the 21st Division began to move 

out, Company C wading the shallow Bamban to rejoin the division. The entire division withdrew down Route 3 to Angeles, 

then turned southwest along Route 74 to 

Porac. The enemy followed cautiously and 

it was not until 1130 of the 2d that the 

Kanno Detachment reached Angeles. The 

Japanese now had possession of the Clark 

Field area. 

It was now the turn of the 11 th Division 

to extricate itself and withdraw into Bataan. 

This division had recently been strengthened by the return from the Cagayan valley 

of about 1,000 of its men, drawn largely 

from the 12th and 13th Infantry Regiments. Its sector of the D-5 line extended 

from the Magalang-Concepcion road eastward to the Pampanga River. On the right 

( east) was the reorganized 12th Infantry, 

holding a front from Mt. Arayat to the 

Pam pang a River and the town of Arayat. 

It was in position to guard against an unexpected Japanese advance toward San 

"O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 15. 

213 

Fernando along Route 10, which connected 

Gapan on Route 5 with that town. 

The western portion of the 11 th Division 

line, from the Magalang road to Mt. Arayat, 

was held by the 11 th Infantry under the 

command of Col. Glen R. Townsend, who 

had led the Cagayan valley force. At Magalang a north-south road from Concepcion 

branched off, one section leading to Angeles on Route 3 and another to Mexico, 

a few miles northeast of San Fernando. 

The 2d Battalion, 11 th Infantry, was posted 

across the Magalang road, a few miles north 

of the town and directly in the path of a 

Japanese advance from Concepcion. The 

3d Battalion extended the line east to the 

mountains, and the 1st Battalion, recovering from its hard fight at Zaragoza on the 

30th, was in reserve. 23 

Early on 1 January General Brougher, 

the division commander, ordered Colonel 

Townsend to withdraw his 11 th Infantry, 

starting at 2000 that day. The regiment 

was to retire along the Magalang road 

through Mexico and San Fernando to 

Guagua, about fifteen miles from Bataan. 

While the 11 th Infantry was preparing to 

move, an enemy force estimated as a reinforced battalion of infantry with artillery 

support was pushing south along the Magalang road from Concepcion. At 1630 this 

Japanese force attacked Townsend's line. 

Maj. Helmert J. Duisterhof's 2d Battalion, 

composed of Igorot troops, bore the brunt 

of the assault. Despite repeated attacks, the 

Igorots, supported by two 75-mm. SPM 

., NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 12; Townsend, Defense of Phil, OCMH j 11th Inf (PA), 

Beach Defense and Delaying Action, pp. 21-22, 

OCMH; Capt Liles, 12th Inf (PA), p. 13, Chunn 

:\Iotebooks. 
214 

guns, held firm, inflicting heavy losses on 

the enemy. A Japanese attempt to outflank 

the 11 th Infantry line by pushing elements 

through dense fields of sugar cane met with 

failure. At 2000, the appointed hour, the 

1 ] th Infantry broke contact and began its 

withdrawal, passing through the 194th 

Tank Battalion in position east of San Fernando. By 0200 of the 2d the regiment had 

reached Guagua. During the night it was 

joined by the 12th Infantry and remaining 

elements of the 13th Infantry.24 With the 

successful withdrawal of the 11 th Division, 

the troops on the D-5 line had made good 

their escape through San Fernando. Meanwhile the remaining troops south of that 

town were doing the same. 

Escape Through San Fernando 

The blast that destroyed the Calumpit 

bridges in the early hours of 1 January 

signaled the end of the South Luzon Force. 

Its mission completed, the force moved on 

to Bataan where General Jones rejoined 

the 51st Division. At the same time General Stevens of the 91st Division and General Weaver, commander of the tank group, 

went on to San Fernando to join their 

units.25 

When the debris had stopped falling at 

the Pampanga crossing, the covering force 

of 71st and 91st Division elements, originally organized by Stevens; returned to 

its positions along the river bank. A second force, the 3d Battalion of the 23d In-

"Ltr, Townsend to Ward, 8 Jan 52, OCMH; 

O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 15. See also Itr, Col 

Miller to Ward, 31 Dec 51, OCMH. There is no 

Japanese confirmation of this action. 

.. Jones, Diary, p. 17; Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No.9, p. 10; Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 122-23. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

fantry, with a battery of the 21st Field 

Artillery, moved into position near Apalit, 

about 4,000 yards to the north on the west 

bank of the Pampanga. The mission of 

this battalion, led by Maj. Charles A. McLaughlin, was to "assist in delaying the 

enemy advance on San Fernando," by preventing a hostile crossing before 2000. In 

support of both forces was the tank group, 

posted just below San Fernando. 26 

Late on the morning of 1 January the 

Japanese reached Calumpit. The Tanaka 

Detachment (2d Formosa, less 3d Battalion, 

and a battalion of the 48th Mountain Artillery) had moved cautiously from Plaridel 

during the night and now faced the covering force across the wide, unfordahle Pampanga. The sight of the Japanese at such 

close proximity was extremely disconcerting 

to the poorly trained Filipino troops. Their 

nervousness was increased by the sight of 

the Japanese bombers which passed overhead that morning on their way to bomb 

installations on Bataan. 

During the day the Japanese made numerous attempts to push a force across the 

swiftly flowing Pampanga, but to no avaip7 

The covering force on the river line pulled 

out for San Fernando during the afternoon, 

followed that evening by McLaughlin's battalion. The remnants of the 71st and 91st 

Divisions which constituted the first of these 

forces were "so badly disorganized and in 

need of equipment" that they were sent directly to Bataan. McLaughlin's battalion 

.. NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p .. 14; Skerry, 

Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 9,-'p. 10; Itr, 

McLaughlin to author, 14 Jun 49, OCMH; 

Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 113; O'Day, 21st Div 

(PA), 11,6. 27 NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 14, 14th 

Army Opns, T, 65, 84; USA us. Homma, p. 3055, 

testimony of Homma. 
HOLDING THE ROAD TO BATAAN 

rejoined the 21st Division at Porac on the 

morning of 2 January. The last elements 

to pass through San" Fernando were the 

tanks. Reaching the town at 0200 on the 

2d, after all the others had left, they found 

it to be "truly a ghost town." The tankers 

gave the order to blow the bridge across the 

San Fernando River and in the darkness 

moved down Route 7 toward Guagua and 

the American line being formed there.2s 

The Japanese did not cross the Pampanga 

until the afternoon of 2 January when at 

1600 the Tanaka Detachment finally got 

its artillery over the swiftly flowing river. 

Once across, Colonel Tanaka moved forward rapidly and bj" 1830 had reached San 

Fernando. There he made contact with 

.. NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 14 ; 

Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 114; Miller, Bataan 

Uncensored, p. 124; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, 

p. 15; Dooley, First U. S. Tank Action in World 

War II, p. 13; Itr, Miller to Ward, 31 Dec 51, 

OCMH. 

215 

the Kanno Detachment which had pushed 

down Route 3 from Angeles. 29 

In the few days from 30 December 1941 

to 2 January 1942 the North and South Luzon Forces had completed successfully the 

most complicated and difficult maneuver 

of the campaign thus far. They had held 

at Plaridel and along the D-5 line. A part 

of the force had crossed the Calumpit 

bridge, marched through San Fernando, 

and down Route 7 toward Bataan. Another part had withdrawn from the D-5 

line, along the flat grassland west of Mt. 

Arayat to Mexico and San Fernando to 

join the others retreating down Route 7. 

The remainder had moved down Route 3 

to Angeles and then along Route 74 to 

Porac. Everywhere the enemy had been 

held and the route of escape kept open until the last unit was on its way into Bataan. 

2. 14th Army Opns, I, 84; USA vs. Homma, p. 

3055, testimony of Homma. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Into Bataan 

By the first week of January 1942 the 

American and Filipino troops withdrawing from both ends of Luzon had joined at 

San Fernando and begun the last lap of 

their journey to Bataan. In ten days they 

had retired from Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay to Guagua and Porac, on the 

two roads leading into Bataan. There they 

had halted and established a line only fifteen miles from the base of the peninsula. 

The longer they could hold, the more time 

would be available to prepare the final 

defenses in Bataan. 

The Guagua-Porac Line 

Along the ten-mile line from Guagua to 

Porac, paralleling the road between the two 

barrios, General Wainwright had placed 

the 11 th and 21st Divisions (PA), as well 

as armor and cavalry. (Map 9) On the 

left (west), around Porac, was the 21 s[ 

Division with the 26th Cavalry (PS) to its 

rear, in force reserve. On the east was the 

11 th Division, its right flank covered by 

almost impenetrable swamps crisscrossed by 

numerous streams. In support of both divisions was General Weaver's tank group. 

The troops along this line, the best in the 

North Luzon Force, though battle tested 

and protected by mountains on the west and 

swamps on the east, felt exposed and insecure. They were convinced that they 

were opposing the entire Japanese 14th 

Army, estimated, according to Colonel Mallonce, to number 120,000 men.' Actually, 

Japanese strength on Luzon was about half 

that size, and only two reinforced regiments 

with tanks and artillery faced the men on 

the Guagua-Porac line. 

From Cabanatuan, where Homma had 

moved his headquarters on New Year's 

Day, 14th Army issued orders to attack the 

line before Bataan. 2 A force, known as the 

Takahashi Detachment after its commander, Lt. Col. Katsumi Takahashi, and 

consisting of the 9th Infantry (less two 

companies), two batteries of the 22d Field 

Artillery, and the 8th Field Heavy Artillery 

Regiment (less one battalion), was to strike 

out from Angeles along Route 74, smash the 

American line at Porac, and go on to seize 

Dinalupihan, an important road junction at 

the entrance to Bataan. To support Takahashi's drive down Route 74, Homma ordered the 9th Independent Field Heavy 

Artillery Battalion, then approaching Tarlac, to push on to Porae. 

A second force, drawn largely from the 

48th Division, was organized for the drive 

down Route 7 through Guagua to Hermosa, a short distance southeast of Dinalupihan. This force, organized at San Fernando and led by Colonel Tanaka, was 

composed of the 2d Formosa and a battalion of the 47th Infantry supported by a 

company of tanks and three battalions of 

1 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 113. This estimate 

came from G-3 USAFFE. 

'14th Army Opns, I, 66. 
) 

THROUGH LAYAC JUNCTION 

2-6 January 1942 

""""""'" u. S . POSITIONS (.t, PPROX.I. DATE INDICATED 

__ + ROuTE FOlLOWfO BY 11TH IHF DIV , NIGHT 

4-5 JANUARY 

o 

B ~"' A AN 

-""' Vi 

MAP9 H Jolrtr~/OlJ.e 
218 

artillery. Both detachments were to receive 

support from the 5th Air Group, which was 

also to strike at targets on Bataan. The attack would begin at 0200 on 2 January.s 

The Japanese expected to smash the defenses before Bataan easily and to make 

quick work of the "defeated enemy," who, 

in General Morioka's striking phrase, was 

like "a cat entering a sack." 4 General Homrna fully intended to draw the strings tight 

once the Americans were in the sack, thereby bringing the campaign to an early and 

successful conclusion. He was due for a 

painful disappointment. 

The Left Flank 

In the 21st Division sector, just below 

Porac, two regiments stood on the line. On 

the west (left), from the mountains to 

Route 74, was the 21st Infantry, spread 

thin along the entire front. On the right, 

behind the Porac-Guagua road, was the 

22d Infantry. The 23d Infantry, organized at the start of hostilities, was in reserve 

about five miles to the rear. The division's 

artillery regiment was deployed with its 3d 

Battalion on the left, behind the 21st Infantry, and the 1st Battalion on the right. 

The 2d Battalion was in general support, 

but placed immediately behind the 3d Battalion which was short one battery. 5 

• Ibid., 64, 71-72,85; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 41. 

• Interrog of Lt Gen Susumu Morioka, 24 Apr 47, 

Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil 

Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I, 7l. 

• The account of action on the left flank is based 

upon NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 14-15; 

O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 15-20; Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 114-20, 123-25; Chandler, "26th 

Cavalry (PS) Battles to Glory," Part 2, Armored 

Cavalry Journal (May-June 1947), pp. 12-13; 

Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 15; Brief Hist of 

22d Inf CPA), p. 4; Richards, Steps to a POW 

Camp, pp. 9-12; 14th Army Opns, I, 73,85. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Seven miles south of Porac, at San Jose, 

was the force reserve, the 26th Cavalry, 

now partly rested and reorganized after its 

fight in the Lingayen area. Its mission was 

to cover the left flank of the 21st Division 

and extend it westward to the Zambales 

Mountains. Colonel Pierce, the cavalry 

commander, dispatched Troop G, equipped 

with pack radio, forward toward Porac, to 

the left of the 21st Infantry. The rest of 

the regiment he kept in readiness at San 

Jose. The 26th Cavalry was not the only 

unit in San Jose; also there were the 192d 

Tank Battalion and the headquarters of the 

21 st Division. The place was so crowded 

that Colonel Mallonee, who wanted to establish the command post of the 21st Field 

Artillery there, was forced to choose another location because "the town was as 

full as the county seat during fair week." 6 

The expected attack against the GuaguaPorac line came on the afternoon of 2 

January, when an advance detachment 

from the 9th Infantry corning down Route 

74 hit the 21st Infantry near Porac. 

Although the enemy detachment was small, 

it was able to force back the weakened and 

thinly spread defenders about 2,000 yards 

to the southwest, to the vicinity of Pio. 

Stiffened by the reserve, the regiment finally 

halted the Japanese advance just short of 

the regimental reserve line. Efforts to restore the original line failed, leaving the artillery exposed to the enemy infantry, who 

were "about as far from the muzzles as outfielders would play for Babe Ruth if there 

were no fences." 7 

Division headquarters in San Jose immediately made plans for a counterattack 

using a battalion of the reserve regiment, the 

• Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 115. 

7 Ibid., 116. 
INTO BATAAN 

23d Infantry. But darkness fell before the 

attack could be mounted and the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, the unit selected for the 

counterattack, was ordered to move up at 

dawn and restore the line on the left. When 

the 2d Battalion moved into the line, the 

21st Infantry would regroup to the right, 

thus shortening its front. 

That night the stillness was broken only 

by fire from the Philippine artillery which 

had pulled back about 600 yards. When 

morning came the enemy was gone. Reports from 21st Infantry patrols, which 

had moved forward unmolested at the first 

sign of light, encouraged division headquarters to believe that the original main line of 

resistance could be restored without a fight 

and orders were issued for a general advance when the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, 

tied in with the 21st Infantry. 

American plans for a counterattack 

were premature. The evening before, the 

main force Qf the Takahashi Detachment 

had left its assembly area midway between 

Bamban and Angeles and marched rapidly 

toward Porac. The 8th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (less one battalion), with 

its 105-mm. guns, had accompanied the 

force and by morning was in position to 

support the infantry attack. Thus, when 

the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, began to 

advance it was met first by punishing smallarms fire from the infantry, then by fire 

from the 105-mm. guns of the 8th Field Artillery. At the same time three Japanese aircraft swung low to strafe the road in support of the enemy attack. The momentum 

of the advance carried the Japanese below 

Pio, where they were finally stopped. 

When news of the attack reached General Wainwright's headquarters, the most 

alarming item in the report was the presence of Japanese medium artillery, thought 

219 

to be heavy guns, on the left of the American line. This artillery represented a serious threat, and the 21st Division was ordered to "hold the line or die where you 

are." 8 General Capinpin did his best, but 

he had only two battalions of the 23d Infantry, an unseasoned and untrained unit, 

left in reserve. One of these battalions was 

in North Luzon Force reserve and it was 

now ordered to move to the 11 th Division 

sector near Guagua where a heavy fight 

was in progress. 

Meanwhile, Colonel Takahashi had 

launched an assault against the 21 st Infantry. First the battalion on the left gave 

way and within an hour the reserve line also 

began to crumble. By noon the left flank of 

the 21 st Infantry was completely disorganized. The right battalion, though still intact, 

fell back also lest it be outflanked. This withdrawal exposed the left flank of the 22d 

Infantry on its right. 

Colonel Takahashi lost no time in taking advantage of the gap in the American 

line. Elements of the 9th Infantry drove in 

between the two regiments, hitting most 

heavily the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, on 

the regimental left. The action which followed was marked by confusion. The noise 

of artillery fire and the black smoke rising 

from the burning cane fields reduced the 

troops to bewildered and frightened men. 

At one time the 21st Infantry staff was 

nearly captured when the onrushing enemy 

broke through to the command post. A 

group of tanks from the 11 th Division sector, ordered to attack the Japanese line in 

front of the 21st Division, showed a marked 

disinclination to move into the adjoining 

sector without orders from the tank group 

commander. Before the ferocity of the Jap-

·O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 16. 
220 

anese attack the defending infantry line 

melted away.9 

Had it not been for the artillery the Japanese attack might well have resulted in a 

complete rout. Fortunately, the 21st Field 

Artillery acted in time to halt Takahashi's 

advance. The 1st Battalion en the right, 

behind the 22d Infantry, covered the gap 

between the two regiments and fired directly against the oncoming Japanese at a 

range of 600-800 yards. The 2d and 3d 

Battalions delivered direct fire up the draw 

leading through Pio. Notwithstanding the 

punishing artillery fire, the 9th Infantry continued to attack. For six hours, until darkness closed in, the left portion of the 21 st 

Division line was held by the guns of the 

21st Field Artillery alone, firing at close 

range across open fields. "As attack after 

attack came on, broke, and went back," 

wrote Colonel Mallonee, "I knew what 

Cushing's artillerymen must have felt with 

the muzzles of their guns in the front line 

as the Confederate wave came on and broke 

on the high water mark at Gettysburg." 10 

Quiet settled down on the 21 st Division 

front that night. The Takahashi Detachment, its attack halted by the effective fire 

of the artillery, paused to reorganize and 

take stock of the damage. The next day, 4 

January, there was no action at all on the 

left and only intermittent pressure on the 

right. The Japanese did manage to emplace one or two of their 105-mm. guns 

along the high ground to the west and dur-

"Lt. Grover C. Richards, 21st Infantry (PA), 

states that hc was sent to bring the tanks in and 

finally had to walk in front of the lead tank in order 

to get it to advance. Richards, Steps to a POW 

Camp, pp. 9-10. See also Weaver, Comments on 

Draft MS, Comment 22, OCMH. 

10 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 120. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ing the day fired on the rear areas. Fortunately, their marksmanship was poor and 

although they made life behind the front 

lines uncomfortable they inflicted no real 

damage. 

On the afternoon of the 4th, as a result of pressure on the 11 th Division to the 

east, General Wainwright ordered the 21 st 

Division to withdraw under cover of darkness to the line of the Gumain River, about 

eight miles south of Porac. That night the 

division began to move back after successfully breaking contact with the enemy. Despite the absence of enemy pressure there 

was considerable confusion during the withdrawal. By daylight of the 5th, however, the 

troops were across the Gumain where they 

began to prepare for their next stand. Division headquarters, the 23d Infantry, the 

division signal company, and other special 

units were at Dinalupihan, with the 21st 

Field Artillery located just east of the town. 

The Right Flank 

Along the east half of the GuaguaPorac line stood the 11 th Division (P A) . 

The 11 th Infantry was on the left, holding 

the Guagua-Porac road as far north as 

Santa Rita. The regiment, in contact with 

the 21 st Division on the left only through 

occasional patrols, had three battalions on 

the line. The 2d Battalion was on the left, 

the I st in the center, and the 3d on the right. 

Next to the 11 th was the 13th Infantry, 

which held Guagua and was in position 

across Route 7. Extending the line southeast from Guagua to Sexmoan were two 

companies of the 12th Infantry. The 11 th 

Field Artillery, for the first time since the 

start of the war, was in support of the di-
INTO BATAAN 

vision. Part of the 194th Tank Battalion 

and Company A of the 192d provided additional support.ll 

The Japanese attack on the right flank 

of ·the Guagua-Porac line came on 3 January. Leaving San Fernando at 0400 the 

reinforced Tanaka Detachment had advanced cautiously along Route 7. At about 

0930 the point of the Japanese column 

made contact with a platoon of tanks from 

Company C, 194th, posted about 1,000 

yards north of Guagua. Under tank fire 

and confined to the road because of the 

marshy terrain on both sides, the Japanese 

halted to await the arrival of the main 

force. About noon, when the force in front 

became too formidable, the American tanks 

fell back to Guagua. The Japanese continued to advance slowly. Forced by the 

nature of the terrain into a frontal assault 

along the main road and slowed down by 

the numerous villages along the line of advance, the attack, the Japanese admitted, 

"did not progress as planned." 12 Artillery 

was brought into support and, late in the 

afternoon, the 75-mm. guns opened fire, 

scoring at least one hit on the 11 th Infantry 

command post. The defending infantry 

were greatly cheered by the sound of their 

own artillery answering the Japanese guns. 

Organized after the start of the war and inadequately trained, the men of the 11 th 

Field Artillery, firing from positions at 

U The account of the action around Guagua is 

based on Townsend, Defense of Phil, p. 13; 2d Lt 

James, 11th Inf (PA), p. 8, and Liles, 12th Inf 

(PA), p. 13, both in Chunn Notebooks; 11th Inf 

(PA), Beach Defense and Delaying Action, pp. 22-

23; Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 124-32; Prov 

Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 15-16; Dooley, The 

First U.S. Tank Action in World War II, p. 13; 

Mal\onee, Bataan Diary, I, 124-25. 

12 14th Army Opns, I, 85. 

221 

Guagua and Santa Rita, made up in enthusiasm what they lacked in skill. 13 

The Japanese artillery fire continued during the night and increased in intensity 

the next morning, 4 January, when a battalion of 150-mm. howitzers joined in the 

fight. In the early afternoon an enemy 

column spearheaded by tanks of the 7th 

Tank Regiment broke through the 13th 

Infantry line along Route 7 and seized the 

northern portion of Guagua. Another column hit the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, 

to the left of the 13th, inflicting about 150 

casualties. The two units held on long 

enough, however, for the lst and 2d Battalions of the 11 th Infantry to pull out. 

They then broke contact and followed the 

two battalions in good order.u 

During this action Company A, 192d 

Tank Battalion, and elements of the 11 th 

Division attempted to counterattack by 

striking the flank of the Japanese line before Guagua. This move almost ended in 

disaster. The infantry on the line mistook 

the tanks for enemy armor and began dropping mortar shells on Company A, and General Weaver, who was in a jeep attempting 

to co-ordinate the tank-infantry attack, was 

almost hit. The mistake was discovered in 

time and no serious damage was done. 

13 11 th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying 

Action, pp. 22-23; Townsend, Defense of Phil, 

p. 13. 

14 The account of this action and those that follow 

are reconstructed from a large number of records 

which present at best a confusing picture. The main 

sources used in this reconstruction.are: NLF and I 

Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 14-15; 'Prov Tank Gp Rpt, 

p. 15-16; Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 126-32; 

Rpts of 5-2 and S-3, 194th Tank Bn in Diary of 

Col Miller, copy in OCMH; 14th Army Opns, I, 

86; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, CommenU 

22-25, OCMH. 
222 

When news of the Japanese breakthrough at Guagua reached General Wainwright on the afternoon of the 4th he decided it was time to fall back again. The 

next line was to be south of the Gumain 

River, and orders were issued to the 11 th, as 

well as the 21st Division, to withdraw to the 

new line that night. 

General Brougher's plan of withdrawal 

called for a retirement along Route 7 

through Guagua and Lubao to the new line. 

The rapid advance of the Tanaka Detachment through Guagua and down Route 7 

toward Lubao late that afternoon, however, 

cut off this route of retreat of the 11 th Infantry and other elements on the line. A 

hasty reconnaissance of the area near the 

highway failed to disclose any secondary 

roads or trails suitable for an orderly retirement. To withdraw cross-country was to invite wholesale confusion and a possible rout. 

The only course remaining to the cutoff 

units was to traverse a thirty-mile-Iong, circuitous route throu'gh San Jose, in the 21st 

Division sector, then down Route 74 to 

Dinalupihan. There the men would turn 

southeast as far as Layac Junction and then 

north along Route 7 to a point where they 

could form a line before the advancing 

Tanaka Detachment. 

That evening, 4 January, the long march 

began. Those elements of the 11 th Division 

cut off by the Japanese advance, and Company A, 192d Tank Battalion, reached San 

Jose without interference from the enemy 

but not without adding to the confusion 

already existing in the 21 st Division area. 

Meanwhile at San Jose, General 

Brougher, the 11th Division commander, 

had collected all the trucks and buses he 

could find and sent them forward to carry 

his men. With this motor transportation, 

the 11 th Infantry was able to take up a posiTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

tion along Route 7, between Santa Cruz and 

Lubao, by about 0600 of 5 January. This 

line was about one mile southwest of the 

Gumain River, the position which the division had originally been ordered to occupy. 

Troops arriving on this line found themselves under small-arms fire from the Tanaka Detachment, which had entered Lubao 

the previous evening. 

A short distance north of this line, an outpost line had already been established the 

previous afternoon by General Brougher 

with those troops who had been able to 

withdraw down Route 7. The infantry 

troops on this line were from the 12th In,.. 

[antry, part of which had pulled back along 

Route 7. Brougher had rounded up about 

two hundred men from the regiment, together with the ten guns of the 11 th Field 

Artillery and some 75-mm. SPM's, and 

formed a line on Route 7 between Lubao 

and Santa Cruz. For fourteen hours, from 

the afternoon of 4 January to the morning 

of 5 January, these troops under the com~ 

mand of Capt. John Primrose formed the 

only line between the enemy and Layac 

Junction, the entrance into Bataan. Early 

on 5 January when the new line was formed 

by the troops who had withdrawn through 

San Jose, Primrose and his men pulled back 

to join the main force of the division. 

The withdrawal of the 194th Tank Battalion from Guagua had been accomplished only after a fierce fight. Colonel 

Miller, the tank commander, had ordered 

the tanks to pull out on the morning of the 

4th. Under constant enemy pressure, the 

tanks began a slow withdrawal, peeling off 

one at a time. Guarding their flank was a 

force consisting of a few tanks of Company 

C, 194th, and some SPM's from Capt. Gordon H. Peck's provisional battalion posted 
INTO BATAAN 

at a block along the Sexmoan-Lubao road. 

At about 1600 Peck and Miller had observed a large enemy force approaching. 

This force, estimated as between 500 and 

800 men, supported by machine guns, mortars, and artillery, was led by three Filipinos carrying white flags, presumably under duress. The tanks and SPM's opened 

fire, cutting the Japanese column to pieces. 

The 194th Tank Battalion then left burning 

Guagua and Lubao and moved south to 

positions a mile or two above Santa Cruz. 

The tanks and SPM's at the block covered 

its withdrawal. 

Some time after midnight, between 0200 

and 0300 on 5 January, the covering force 

was hit again, this time by infantry and artillery of the Tanaka Detachment. Attacking in bright moonlight across an open field 

and along the road, the enemy came under 

direct fire from the American guns. Driven 

back with heavy casualties, he attacked 

again and again, and only broke off the 

action about 0500, at the approach of daylight. Later in the day the Tanaka Detachment, seriously depleted by casualties, was 

relieved by Col. Hifumi Imai's 1st Formosa Infantry (less one battalion) to 

which were attached Tanaka's tanks and 

artillery. 

By dawn of 5 January, after two days of 

heavy and confused fighting, the GuaguaPo rae line had been abandoned and the 

American and Filipino troops had pulled 

back to a new line south and west of the 

Gumain River. The 21st Division on the 

west had retired to a position about eight 

miles below Porae and was digging in along 

the bank of the river; to the east the 11 th 

Division had fallen back six miles and stood 

along a line about a mile south of the river. 

But the brief stand on the Guagua-Porac 

223 

line had earned large dividends. The J apanese had paid dearly for the ground gained 

and had been prevented from reaching their 

objective, the gateway to Bataan. More important was the time gained by the troops 

already in Bataan to prepare their positions. 

Behind the Gates 

The only troops remaining between the 

enemy and Bataan-the 11 th and 21 st 

Divisions, the 26th Cavalry, and the tank 

group--were now formed on their final 

line in front of the peninsula. This line, 

approximately eight miles in front of the 

access road to Bataan and generally along 

the Gumain River, blocked the approach 

to Bataan through Dinalupihan and Layac 

Junction. 

Both Di~alupihan and Layac Junction lie 

along Route 7. This road, the 11 th Division's route of withdrawal, extends southwest from San Fernando to Layac where it 

joins Route 110, the only road leading into 

Bataan. At Layac, Route 7 turns sharply 

northwest for 2,000 yards to Dinalupihan, 

the southern terminus of Route 74 along 

which the 21st Division was withdrawing. 

Route 7 then continues west across the base 

of the peninsula to Olangapo on Subic Bay, 

then north along the Zambales coast to Lingayen Gulf, a route of advance the J apanese had fortunately neglected in favor of 

the central plain which led most directly to 

their objective, Manila. 

Layac Junction, where all the roads to 

Bataan joined, was the key point along the 

route of withdrawal. Through it and over 

the single steel bridge across the Culo River 

just south of the town would have to pass 

the troops converging along Routes 7 and 

74. The successful completion of this move 
224 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES

would require the most precise timing, and,

if the enemy attacked, a high order of road

discipline.

Through the Layac Bottleneck

The withdrawal from the Gumain River

through Layac Junction, although made

without interference from the enemy, was

attended by the greatest confusion. On the

east, where the 11th Division was in position

astride Route 7, there were a few skirmishes

between patrols on 5 January but no serious

action. General Brougher had received a

battalion of the 71st Infantry to strengthen

his line but the battalion returned to its

parent unit at the end of the day without

ever having been engaged with the enemy.15

In the 21st Division area to the west there

was much milling about and confusion on

the 5th. Work on the Gumain River position progressed very slowly during the morning, and the troops showed little inclination

to extend the line eastward to make contact

with the 11th Division. During the day contradictory or misunderstood orders sent the

men forward and then pulled them back,

sometimes simultaneously. Shortly before

noon General Capinpin, needlessly alarmed

about the situation on the 11th Division

front and fearful for the safety of his right

(east) flank, ordered a withdrawal to a

point about a mile above Dinalupihan. The

movement was begun but halted early in

the afternoon by an order from General

Wainwright to hold the Gumain River line

until further orders.

By midafternoon the division had once

more formed a line south of the river.

Thinly manned in one place, congested in

another, the position was poorly organized

and incapable of withstanding a determined

assault. In one section, infantry, artillery,

and tanks were mixed together in complete

disorder. "Everyone," said Colonel Mallonee, "was in everyone else's lap and the

whole thing resembled nothing quite as

much as the first stages of an old fashioned

southern political mass meeting and free

barbecue."

 16

Fortunately for General Capinpin, the

Takahashi Detachment on Route 74 did

not advance below Pio. This failure to advance was due to an excess of caution on

the part of the colonel who, on the 4th,

had been placed under the 65th Brigade

for operations on Bataan.17 It is, entirely

possible that Japanese caution and lack of

vigor in pressing home the attack may have

been due to a mistaken notion of the strength

of the defending forces and a healthy respect for American-led Filipino troops. Had

Takahashi chosen this moment to launch a

determined attack against the 21st Division

he would almost certainly have succeeded

in trapping the forces before Bataan.

The troops had hardly taken up their

positions behind the Gumain River when

General Wainwright issued orders for the

withdrawal into Bataan through Layac

Junction, to begin at dark. First to cross

the bridge over the Culo River below Layac

would be the 11th Division, followed closely

by the 21st. To cover the withdrawal of

the 11th, one battalion of the 21st Division

was to sideslip over in front of the 11th

Division, while the 26th Cavalry would

protect the left flank of the 21st during its

withdrawal.18

15

 11th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying

Action, p. 24; ltr, Selleck to Board of Officers,

1 Feb 46, sub: Statement for Reinstatement of

Rank, p. 10, OCMH.

16

 Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 131. See also pp.

127-30, and O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 19. 17

 See below, Ch. XV, p. 21. 18

 O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 20.

224 

would require the most precise timing, and, 

if the enemy attacked, a high order of road 

discipline. 

Through the Layac Bottleneck 

The withdrawal from the Gumain River 

through Layac Junction, although made 

without interference from the enemy, was 

attended by the greatest confusion. On the 

east, where the 11 th Division was in position 

astride Route 7, there were a few skirmishes 

between patrols on 5 January but no serious 

action. General Brougher had received a 

battalion of the 71st Infantry to strengthen 

his line but the battalion returned to its 

parent unit at the end of the day without 

ever having been engaged with the enemy.16 

In the 21st Division area to the west there 

was much milling about and confusion on 

the 5th. Work on the Gumain River position progressed very slowly during the morning, and the troops showed little inclination 

to extend the line eastward to make contact 

with the 11 th Division. During the day contradictory or misunderstood orders sent the 

men forward and then pulled them back, 

sometimes simultaneously. Shortly before 

noon General Capinpin, needlessly alarmed 

about the situation on the 11 th Division 

front and fearful for the safety of his right 

( east) flank, ordered a withdrawal to a 

point about a mile above Dinalupihan. The 

movement was begun but halted early in 

the afternoon by an order from General 

Wainwright to hold the Gumain River line 

until further orders. 

By midafternoon the division had once 

more formed a line south of the river. 

IS 11 th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying 

Action, p. 24; Itr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 

1 Feb 46, sub: Statement for Reinstatement of 

Rank, p. 10, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Thinly manned in one place, congested in 

another, the position was poorly organized 

and incapable of withstanding a determined 

assault. In one section, infantry, artillery, 

and tanks were mixed together in complete 

disorder. "Everyone," said Colonel Mallonee, "was in everyone else's lap and the 

whole thing resembled nothing quite as 

much as the first stages of an 9ld fashioned 

southern political mass meeting and free 

barbecue." 16 

Fortunately for General Capinpin, the 

Takahashi Detachment on Route 74 did 

not .advance below Pio. This failure to advance was due to an excess of caution on 

the part of the colonel who, on the 4th, 

had been placed under the 65th Brigade 

for operations on Bataan.17 It is. entirely 

possible that Japanese caution and lack of 

vigor in pressing home the attack may have 

been due to a mistaken notion of the strength 

of the defending forces and a healthy respect for American-led Filipino troops. Had 

Takahashi chosen this moment to launch a 

determined attack against the 21 st Division 

he would almost certainly have succeeded 

in trapping the forces before Bataan. 

The troops had hardly taken up their 

positions behind the Gumain River when 

General Wainwright issued orders for the 

withdrawal into Bataan through Layac 

Junction, to begin at dark. First to cross 

the bridge ov~ the Culo River below Layac 

would be the 11 th Division, followed closely 

by the 21st. To cover the 'withdrawal of 

the 11 th, one battalion of the 21 st Division 

was to sideslip over in front of tht 11 th 

Division, while the 26th Cavalry would 

protect the left flank of the 21st during its 

withdrawaP8 

,. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 131. See also pp. 

127-30, and O'Day, 21st Div (PA), 11,19. 

17 See below, Ch. XV, p. 21. 

18 O'Day, 21st Div (PA), 11,20. 
INTO BATAAN 

The execution of such a maneuver seemed 

impossible under the conditions existing 

along the front. The 23d Infantry, in division reserve, was already at Dinalupihan 

and Colonel O'Day, senior American instructor in the 21st Division, proposed instead to place a battalion of this regiment 

astride Route 7 behind the 11 th Division. 

General Brougher's troops could then fall 

back through the covering battalion. This 

proposal was accepted, and after considerable difficulty "the equivalent of a battalion" was placed in position by dark.19 

When night fell the 11 th Division withdrew from its positions and moved southwest along Route 7 toward Layac Junction 

and the road to Bataan. Soon the town 

was crowded with men and vehicles and as 

the withdrawal continued became a scene 

of "terrible congestion," of marching men, 

trucks, buses, artillery, tanks, horses, and 

large numbers of staff and command cars. 

"It looked," remarked one observer, "like 

the parking lot of the Yale bowl." 20 

At about 2030 Col. John Moran, chief of 

staff of the 11 th Division, reported that his 

division had cleared Layac and was across 

the Culo bridge. The 21st Division was 

now ordered across. Observing the passage of men, Colonel O'Day wrote: "It was 

a painful and tragic sight-our soldiers 

trudging along, carrying inordinate loads of 

equipment and personal effects. Many had 

their loads slung on bamboo poles, a pole 

between two men. They had been marching almost since dark the night before, and 

much of the daylight hours had been spent 

in backing and filling .... " 21 

.. Ibid., pp. 18,20. 

m Mallonee, Bataan Diary, I, 138. See also O'Day, 

21st Div (PA), II, 20; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, 

p. 16; 11th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying 

Action, p. 24. 

.. O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 20. 

225 

By about midnight of the 5th, the last 

guns of the 21st Field Artillery had cleared 

the bridge, and within the next hour all of 

the foot troops, closely shepherded by the 

Scouts of the 26th Cavalry, were across. 

Last to cross were the tanks, which cleared 

the bridge shortly before 0200 of the 6th. 

General Wainwright then ordered Capt. 

A. P. Chanco, commanding the 91st Engineer Battalion, to blow the bridge. The 

charges were immediately detonated and 

the span demolished. All of the troops were 

no"Y on Bataan, and the last gate slammed 

shut. The Japanese had lost their opportunity again to cut off the retreat. Colonel 

Imai was still at Santa Cruz and Takahashi 

still hung back at Porac. 22 

Holding Action Below Layac Junction 

Already formed below Layac Junction 

when the Culo bridge was blown was another line designed to delay the enemy and 

gain more time fOf the Bataan Defense 

Force. The idea for a delaying action at 

Layac Junction was contained in WPO-3, 

the plan that went into effect on 23 December, and General Parker, commander 

of the Bataan Defense Force, had sent the 

31st Infantry (US) there on the 28th to 

cover the junction. 

The importance of this position was 

stressed by Col. Hugh J. Casey, MacArthur's engineer officer, who, on 2 January, pointed out to General Sutherland that 

the defense lines then being established on 

Bataan left to the enemy control of Route 

110 which led south from Layac into the 

peninsula. This road, he felt, should be de-

•• 14th Army Opns, I, 73,86; O'Day, 21st Div 

(PA), II, 21; Skerry, Comrrients on Engineer History, No.9, p. 11; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) 

Battles to Glory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry Journal 

(May-June 1947), p. 13. 
226 

nied the Japanese as long as possible. He 

recommended to General Sutherland, 

therefore, that a strong delaying action, or, 

failing that, "definite reference to preparing strong delaying positions . . . should 

be made." 23 

These recommendations were apparently 

accepted, for the same day General MacArthur ordered Wainwright to organize a 

delaying position south of Layac Junction 

along Route 110. On completion of this position, control would pass to General Parker, who was to hold until forced to withdraw by a co-ordinated enemy attack.24 

Responsibility for the establishment of 

the Layac Junction line was given to General Selleck who had just reached Bataan 

with his disorganized 71st Division (P A) . 

The troops assigned were the 71st and 72d 

23 Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 2 Jan 42, 

sub: Defense of Bataan, AG 381, Phil Reds; itr, 

Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, OCMH; itr, Col Olson 

to author, 10 Jan 52, OCMH. Colonel Maher, 

Wainwright's chief of staff, states that the Layac 

Junction position would have been occupied "as a 

matter of course," and that Colonel Casey had 

nothing to do with its use. Ltr, Maher to Ward, 

24 Dec 51, OCMH . 

.. Except where otherwise indicated this section 

is based upon: itr, Selleck to CG II Corps, 3 Feb 

43, sub: Action at Layac Junction, in Selleck, 

Notes on the 71st Div (PA), pp. 20-22. Attached 

to this letter are accounts of the 31 st Infantry (US) 

by Col. Charles L. Steel and of the 26th Cavalry 

(PS) at Layac Junction by Lt. Col. Lee C. Vance, 

and a memo, Weaver for Selleck, 1 Feb 43, sub: 

Action Prov Tank Gp in Connection with Layac 

Delaying Position; itr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 

1 Feb 46, sub: Statement for Reinstatement of 

Rank, OCMH; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, 

pp. 41-42; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 

22-27; and Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles 

to Glory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry Journal (MayJune 1947), pp. 13-14; Weaver, Comments on 

Draft MS, Comments 29 and 30, OCMH; hr, 

Miller to Ward, 31 Dec 51, OCMH; Skerry, Comments on Draft MS, Comment C, OCMH. 

Japanese sources for this action are scanty and 

the author had to rely on 14th Army Opns, I, 86, 

and the American sources cited. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Infantry from Selleck's 71st Division, totaling approximately 2,500 men; the 26th 

Cavalry, now numbering 657 men; and the 

31 st Infantry (US) of the Philippine Division, the only infantry regiment in the Philippines composed entirely of Americans. Of 

this force, the 31st was the only unit which 

had not yet been in action. Artillery support consisted of the 71st Field Artillery 

with two 75-mm. gun batteries and four 

2.95-inch guns; the 1st Battalion of the 23d 

Field Artillery (PS) with about ten 75's; 

and the 1st Battalion, 88th Field Artillery 

(PS) with two batteries of 75's. The tank 

group and two SPM battalions were also 

in support. 

On 3 and 4 January the 71st Division 

elements and the 31st Infantry moved into 

position and began stringing wire and digging in. General Selleck had been denied the 

use of the 71st Engineers by North Luzon 

Force, with the result that the construction 

of defenses progressed slowly. When Colonel 

Skerry inspected the line on the 4th and 5th 

he found that the tired and disorganized 

71st and 72d Infantry had made little progress in the organization of the ground and 

that their morale was low. In the 31st Infantry (US) sector, however, he found 

morale high and the organization of the 

ground much more effective. 

At that time Selleck's forces were spread 

thin along a line south of Layac Junction 

across Route 110, which ran southeast and 

east between Layac and Hermosa. On the 

right was the 71 st Infantry, holding a front 

along the south bank of Culis Creek-not 

to be confused with the Culo River immediately to the north. This line, parallel to 

and just north of Route 110, extended from 

Almacen, northeast of Hermosa, to a point 

northeast of Culis, where Culis Creek 

turned south to cross Route 110. The east-
INTO BATAAN 

ern extremity of the 71 st Infantry sector 

was protected by swamps and a wide river; 

on the west was the 72d Infantry, straddling Route 110. Its sector was about 

1,000 yards below Layac Junction and 

faced north and east. 

Next to the 72d Infantry was the 31st Infantry, with the 1st and 2d Battalions extending the line to the southwest, about 3,000 

yards from the nearest hill mass. This exposed left flank was to be covered by the 

26th Cavalry, then pulling back through 

Layac Junction with the 11 th and 21st Divisions. In reserve was the 3d Battalion, 31st 

Infantry, about 1,000 yards to the rear. Supporting the 31st was the 1st Battalion, 88th 

Field Artillery, on the west, and the 1st Battalion, 23d Field Artillery, to its right, west of 

Route 110. The 71 st Division infantry regiments each had a battalion of the 71st 

Field Artillery in support. 

At approximately 0330 of the 6th of 

January the 26th Cavalry reached the new 

line south of Layac Junction and fell in on 

the left of the 31st Infantry, to the foothills of the Zambales Mountains. It was followed across the bridge by the tanks, which 

took up supporting positions southwest of 

Hermosa-the 194th Battalion on the left 

(west) and the 192d on the right. The 

75-mm. SPM's, which withdrew with the 

tanks, were placed along the line to cover 

possible routes of advance of hostile tanks. 

The line when formed seemed a strong 

one. In Colonel Collier's opinion, it had 

"a fair sized force to hold it," and General 

Parker declared, referring probably to the 

31st Infantry sector, that it "lent itself to a 

good defense . . . was on high ground and 

had good fields of fire." 25 

.. Collier, Notebooks, III, 11; SLF and II Corps 

Rpt of Opns, p. 25; ltr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, 

OCMH. 

227 

General Selleck did not share this optimism about the strength of his position. To 

him the front occupied by his troops seemed 

exc..:ssive, with the result that "all units 

except the 26th Cavalry were over-extended." 2G Colonel Skerry's inspection on 

the 5th had led him to the conclusion that 

the length of the line held by the disorganized 71st and 7 2d Infantry was too extended 

for these units. Selleck thought that his line 

had another, eyen more serious weakness, in 

that part of the right portion faced northeast 

and the left portion northwest, thus exposing 

the first to enfilade from the north and the 

second to enfilade from the east. 

Admittedly the position chosen had weaknesses, but no more than a delaying action 

was ever contemplated along this line. As 

in the withdrawal of the North Luzon Force 

from Lingayen Gulf, all that was expected 

was that the enemy, faced by an organized 

line, would halt, wait for artillery and other 

supporting weapons, and plan an organized, 

co-ordinated attack. By that time the objective-delay-would have been gained, and 

the line could pull back. 

At 0600, 6 January, when all the troops 

were on the line, Wainwright released General Selleck from his command to Parker's 

control. After notifying MacArthur of his 

action he withdrew to Bataan, stopping 

briefly at Culis where Selleck had his command post. North Luzon Force had completed its mission. Like the South Luzon 

Force it was now in position behind the 

first line on Bataan. Only the covering force 

at Layac Junction denied the enemy free 

access to Bataan. 

Action along the Layac line began on 

the morning of 6 January with an artillery 

,. Ltr, Selleck to CG II Corps, 3 Feb 43, Action 

at Layac Junction, in Selleck, Notes on 71st Div 

(PA), p. 25. 
228 

barrage. At about 1000 forward observers 

reported that Japanese infantry and artillery were advancing down Route 7 toward Layac Junction. This column was 

part of the Imaz Detachment which consisted of the 1 st Formosa Infantry, one company of the 7th Tank Regiment, two battalions of the 48th Mountain Artillery 

armed with 75-mm. guns, and one battalion 

of the 1st Field Heavy Artillery Regiment 

with eight l50-mm. howitzers. By 1030 the 

Japanese column was within artillery range 

of the defenders and the 1st Battalions of the 

23d and 88th Field Artillery Regiments 

opened fire. The first salvo by the Philippine Scout gunners was directly on the target. Switching immediately to rapid volley 

fire, the two battalions, joined by the 71st 

Field Artillery, searched the road from front 

to rear, forcing the enemy to deploy about 

4,200 yards northeast of Layac.27 

The Japanese now moved their own 

artillery into position. The 75's of the 

48th Mountain Artillery and the 150-mm. 

howitzers of the 1st Field Artillery, directed 

by unmolested observation planes, began to 

drop concentrated and effective fire on the 

Americans and Filipinos. It was during 

this bombardment that Jose Calugas, the 

mess sergeant of Battery B, 88th Field Artillery, won the Medal of Honor. 

General Selleck, without antiaircraft protection, was unable to prevent aerial reconnaissance, with the result that the Japanese 

150's, out of range of the Americ~n guns, 

were able to place accurate and punishing 

fire upon the infantry positions and upon the 

artillery. Around noon, therefore, Selleck 

ordered his artillery to new positions, but the 

observation planes, flying as low as 2,000 

feet, reported the changed positions, and the 

"Collier, Notebooks, II, 12-14; Itr, Fowler to 

author, 30 Apr 49, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Japanese artillery shifted fire. It enfiladed 

the 31st Infantry and inflicted great damage on the 71st Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 23d Field Artillery, destroying all but 

one of the latter's guns. The 88th Field Artillery, in a more protected position, did not 

suffer as great a loss. That day General MacArthur informed the War Department that 

the enemy was using his "complete command of the air ... to full effect against 

our artillery." 28 

The intense Japanese artillery barrage 

was the prelude to an advance by the infantry. MacArthur had warned that the 

Japanese were "apparently setting up a 

prepared attack in great strength," and, except for his estimate of the strength of the 

enemy, his analysis was correct.2lJ At about 

1400 a Japanese force of several battalions 

of infantry crossed the Culo River below 

Layac Junction and pushed forward the 

American line. Another force turned north 

at Layac and moved toward Dinalupihan, 

entering that undefended town at 1500. An 

hour later the Japanese who had continued 

south on reaching Layac hit Selleck's line 

between the 31st Infantry and the 72d Infantry. Company B, on the right of the 

31st line, had been badly shaken by the 

artillery barrage and fell back in disorder to 

higher ground about 800 yards to the rear, 

leaving a gap between Company C on its 

left and the 72d Infantry on the right. Japanese troops promptly infiltrated. Attempts 

by the rest of the 1 st Battalion, 31 st Infantry, to fill the gap failed and Col. Charles 

1. Steel, the regimental commander, secured his 3d Battalion from Selleck's reserve 

and ordered it into the line. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 14, 6 Jan 42, 

AG381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

.. Ibid. 
INTO BATAAN 

The Japanese, supported by artillery fire, 

continued to push into the gap, hitting the 

right of Company C, 31st Infantry, and 

Company A of the 72d on the left. Lt. Col. 

Jasper E. Brady, Jr., the 3d Battalion commander, ordered Companies I and L, 31st 

Infantry, into the sector previously held by 

Company B. As Company I moved forward, 

it Was caught in the enemy's artillery fire, 

badly disorganized, and forced back to the 

rear. Company L, however, continued to 

press forward. Within thirty minutes from 

the time it had jumped off to the attack, it 

had succeeded in restoring the line.3o 

Outwardly the situation seemed well in 

hand. But General Selleck was in serious 

trouble. His overextended line had been 

partially penetrated, his reserves had been 

committed, and his artillery was practically out of action. The Japanese were continuing to press south across the Culo 

River. Should they attack successfully 

through the 72d Infantry line, they would 

gain control of the road and cut off Selleck's 

route of escape. Colonel Steel recommended 

withdrawal and General Selleck informed 

Parker that he would not be able to hold 

out without artillery and infantry reinforcements and that a daylight withdrawal 

might prove disastrous. At 2200 of the 6th, 

General Parker ordered a withdrawal under 

cover of darkness. 

_Although both the American and J apanese commanders had tanks at their disposal 

neither: had employed them that day. Possibly the Japanese had failed to use armor 

•• Maj Donald G. Thompson, Opns of Co L, 

31st Inf (US) in Battle of Layac Junction (paper 

prepared for Advanced Infantry Officers Course, 

1947-48, The Infantry School), pp. 10-14. Major 

Thompson commanded L Company during this 

action. 

229 

because there were no bridges over the Culo 

River. Some of the American tanks had been 

hit by the Japanese artillery, but not seriously enough to prevent their use. They had 

not been used to support the attack by the 

3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, General Selleck 

noted caustically, because "the terrain was 

not considered suitable by the tank commander." 31 At about 1830, when it appeared that the Japanese might cut off the 

route of escape, Colonel Miller, senior tank 

commander in the area, had moved the 

tanks toward the highway. They arrived 

there about 2100, and were met by General Weaver's executive with orders for a 

further withdrawal southward into Bataan. 32 

The tanks were already well on their 

way when the units on the line received 

orders to pull back. The 71st Division elements experienced no difficulty in withdrawing down the road. The 31st Infantry, 

leaving three companies on the line as a covering shell, pulled out about 0130 on the 

morning of the 7th. An hour later, as the 

shell began to move out, the Japanese 

launched an attack against Hermosa, cutting off Company E and almost destroying 

it. The Japanese reached their objective 

by 0500, but the survivors of Company E 

31 Ltr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: 

Statement for Reinstatement of Rank, p. 11, 

OCMH. General Weaver does not mention this 

matter in his memo to Sellec'k, cited above, or in 

his report. Colonel Miller speaks of the impossibility of tank action in this area in Bataan Uncensored, p. 139. In his comments on a draft of this 

manuscript, General Weaver states that no ,request 

for tanks was ever made to him. Comment 29, 

OCMH. 

32 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 140-41; Prov 

Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 16-17; itr, Miller to 

Ward, 31 Dec 51, OCMH; Weaver, Comments on 

Draft MS, Comments 29 and 30, OCMH. 
230 

did not rejoin the regiment until a few 

days later. 83 

The 26th Cavalry, which had not been 

under attack that day, had lost contact with 

the 31 st Infantry on its right. Radio com~ 

munication proved inadequate; messages 

were garbled and, in some cases, indeci~ 

pherable. The code had been changed during the night and no one had informed the 

26th Cavalry. Consequently the Scout regi~ 

ment was not aware of the order to withdraw during the night. It was not until 

the approach of daylight that the 26th 

learned of the withdrawal. It began to pull 

back at 0700 of the 7th. By this time the 

Japanese controlled the road as far south 

as Hermosa and the Scouts were compelled 

to move overland across the mountainous 

jungle to reach the American line. With 

the departure of the 26th Cavalry the Layac 

line disappeared. 

At Layac Junction the American and 

Philippine troops had paid dearly to secure 

one day of grace for the forces preparing 

to defend Bataan. Against the longer range 

Japanese guns the Americans had been defenseless. The line had been penetrated at 

the first blow, only to be restored and then 

abandoned. The Japanese had once more 

failed in their attempt to follow up their 

advantage. 

The withdrawal into Bataan was now 

complete. Under desperate circumstances 

and under constant pressure from the 

enemy, General MacArthur had brought 

his forces from the north and south to San 

Fernando and Calumpit. There, in a most 

.. Thompson, Opns of Co L, 31st Inf (US), p. 15; 

Maj Eugene B. Conrad, Opns of 31st Inf (US), 

pp. 10-11, and Maj Everett V. Mead, S-4 of 31st 

Inf (US), Opns and Mvmts of 31st Inf (US), 

p. 15. Both papers prepared for Advanced Officers 

Course in 1946-47 and 1947-48, respectively, at 

The Infantry School. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

difficult maneuver, he had joined the two 

forces and brought them safely into Bataan, 

fighting a delaying action all the way. All 

this had been accomplished in two weeks, 

during which time positions had been prepared on Bataan and supplies shipped there 

from Manila and elsewhere. Not a single 

major unit had been cut off or lost during 

the withdrawal, and only once, at Cabanatuan, had the American line failed to 

hold long eough to permit an orderly withdrawal. The success of this complicated and 

difficult movement, made with ill-equipped 

and inadequately trained Filipino troops, is 

a tribute to the generalship of MacArthur, 

Wainwright, and Jones and to American 

leadership on the field of battle. 

The withdrawal had been a costly one 

on both sides. General Wainwright's North 

Luzon Force of 28,000 men had been reduced to about 16,000 largely by the d~­

sertion of Filipino soldiers who returned to 

their homes. Only a small portion of the 

12,000 men lost were battIe casualties or 

captured by the enemy. General Jones's 

South Luzon Force fared much better. Of 

the 15,000 men in his force originally, General Jones had 14,000 left when he reached 

Bataan."4 The Japanese suffered close to 

2,000 casualties during the period since the 

first landing. This number included 627 

killed, 1,282 wounded, and 7 missing. 35 

The men who reached Bataan were tired 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

45, 48; interv, Falk with Jones, 2 Dec 49. The 

strengths as given are rough approximations at best. 

No official figures are available for the campaign 

or any part of it. 

"Comments of Former Japanese Officers Regarding The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 50, 124; 

USA vs. Homma, Defense Exhibit Y. See also the 

testimony of Colonel Nakajima, who said at the trial 

of General Homma that there were 4,500 casualties, including 1,300 wounded and 2,700 sick, in 

the 14th Army thus far. USA vs. Homma, p. 2573, 

testimony of Nakajima. 
INTO BATAAN 

and hungry. Before the fight began again 

they were accorded a brief rest while the 

enemy reorganized. To Colonel Collier this 

interlude seemed but an intermission between the acts of a great tragedy entitled 

"Defense of the Philippines." But before 

231 

the curtain could go up on the second act, 

certain off-stage arrangements had to be 

completed. While these did not directly affect the action on-stage, they exerted a powerful influence on the outcome of the 

drama. 
CHAPTER XIV 

The End of an Era 

On 26 December, Manila was declared 

an open city. All newspapers published the 

text of the proclamation and radio stations 

broadcast the news through the day. A 

huge banner bearing the words Open City 

and No Shooting was strung across the front 

of the city hall. That night the blackout 

ended and Manila was ablaze with lights.] 

With the evacuation of the government 

and the army, a feeling of foreboding and 

terror spread through the city, and the exodus, which had ceased after the first confusion of war, began again. "The roads 

back into the hills," noted one observer, 

"were black with people striving to reach 

their native villages . . . . The few trains 

still running into the provinces were literally jammed to the car tops." 2 The business 

district was deserted and there were few 

cars along Dewey Boulevard. 

Here and there a few shops made a brave 

attempt at a holiday spirit with displays of 

tinsel and brightly wrapped gifts. On the 

Escolta, two Santa Clauses with the traditional white beards and red costumes looked 

strangely out of place. One walked up and 

down as if dazed while the other, more practical, piled sandbags before the entrance to 

his shop. "No girls in slacks and shorts were 

bicycling along the water front," wrote Maj. 

Carlos Romulo reminiscently, "and there 

1 USA vs. Homma, pp. 271, 283, 291, testimony 

of Abelardo L. Valencia, correspondent, and Don 

Bell, news commentator; Lee, They Call It Pacific 

(Viking), p. 125. 

2 Lee, They Call It Pacific, pp. 126-27; USA vs. 

Homma, pp. 264-355. 

were no horseback riders on the bridle 

path . . . the Yacht Club, the night clubs 

and hotels . . . all looked like funeral parlors." 3 "Let it be known," reported NBC 

correspondent Bert Silen, "that our Christmas Eve was the darkest and gloomiest I 

ever hope to spend." 4 

Late on the night of 26 December Radio Tokyo acknowledged receipt of the 

Manila broadcasts declaring the capital 

an open city." Official notification to 14th 

Army came later, either on the 28th or after, 

when Imperial General Headquarters forwarded the information from Tokyo. Apparently MacArthur made no attempt to 

notify the Japanese forces in the Philippines of his intentions, but a mimeographed 

announcement of the open city declaration 

was in the hands of the Japanese troops by 

31 December.6 

3 Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, pp. 

73-74, 77. 

• John Hersey, Men on Bataan (New York, 

1942 ), p. 41. 

, USA vs. Homma, pp. 283-86, testimony of Don 

Bell. 

e Ibid., pp. 2573-74, testimony of Col Nakajima; 

p. 3067, testimony of Homma; pp. 357-58, testimony 

of Y oshiaki N akada, a chaplain on the 14 t hArm y 

staff; Defense Exhibits M and N, affidavits by the 

Spanish and Swiss Consuls; Statement of Nakajima, 

6 Feb 50, A TIS Doc 56349, Interrogations of 

Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, 

II,5. 

General Maeda commented later that "Imperial 

General Headquarters did not recognize the declaration of Manila as an open city. Manila had to be 

taken. Even if it were an open city, Japanese troops 

had to occupy it." Interrog of Maeda, 10 May 47, 

Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil 

Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I. 
OPEN 

CtTY 

THE OPEN CITY (japanese photograph). 
234 

Either the Japanese in the Philippines 

were unaware of the open city declaration 

or they chose to ignore it, for enemy aircraft 

were over the Manila area on 27 December. 

The Army's 5th Air Group sent 7 light and 

4 heavy bombers against Nichols Field, and 

at least 2 fighters over the port district that 

day.7 But the main bombing strikes, directed 

against the Manila Bay and Pasig River 

areas, were made by naval aircraft. For 

three hours at midday, successive waves of 

unopposed bombers over Manila wrought 

great destruction on port installations and 

buildings in the Intramuros, the ancient 

walled city of the Spaniards. The att<j.cks 

against shipping continued the next day, 

with additional damage to the port area.s 

By New Year's Eve the rear echelon of 

USAF FE headquarters under General 

Marshall had completed its work and was 

prepared to leave the "open city." The capital was subdued but ready to greet the New 

Year. Hotels, nightclubs, and cabarets were 

opened, a dance was held at the Fiesta Pavilion of the Manila Hotel, and many 

women donned evening gowns for the first 

time since the start of the war. But no sirens 

were sounded as in the past to herald the 

new year; there was no exploding of firecrackers, no tooting of horns, and no bright 

lights from naval ships in the bay lighting 

the sky. The only fireworks came from burning military installations. Along Manila 

streets the uncollected garbage of many 

days lay almost unnoticed.9 

, 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 39. 

• Ibid.; Sunday Tribune (Manila), December 28, 

1941, in USA vs. Homma, Prosecution Exhibit 20, 

and pp. 267-355, passim. 

• Philippines Herald (Manila),. December 31, 

1941; Manila Bulletin, January 1, 1942; Romulo, 

I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, pp. 85-89. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

While a few citizens drank and danced, 

most of the bars closed at 2100. A large 

number of bartenders, in what someone 

termed a "scotched-earth policy," smashed 

the remaining bottles to prevent their falling into Japanese hands.10 

The next morning the quartermaster 

stores in the port area were thrown open to 

the public and great crowds hurried towards 

the piers. About to be burned, the sheds 

yielded a wide assortment of booty to the delighted Filipinos. The ice plant, filled with 

frozen food, was also thrown open. Not all 

the residents were at the piers; many attended church services, for the Japanese 

were expected that afternoon.ll 

For almost forty years Manila had been 

the outpost of American civilization in the 

Orient. Now the badly mauled port area 

was quiet and dead as the old year. From 

the waters of Manila Bay rose the funnels 

of sunken ships and along the waterfront 

stood the blackened, empty walls and the 

battered piers, mute epitaph to one of the 

finest harbors in the Far East.12 

The city was surrounded by an inferno 

of flame, noise, and smoke. Fuel supplies 

at Fort McKinley to the southeast, installations that survived the bbmbing at Nichols 

Field to the south, and the ruins of Cavite 

across Manila Bay were demolished in great 

bursts of flame and explosion. The bewildered and frightened population was further panic-stricken by the soaring flames 

from the oil tanks at Pandacan, which ate 

up surrounding warehouses and buildings 

,. Hersey, Men on Bataan, p. 237. 

11 Van Landingham, "I Saw Manila Die," Saturday Evening Post, September 26, 1942, p. 70. 

12 Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, p. 

74; Philippines Herald (Manila), December 31, 

1941. 
THE END OF AN ERA 

and sent up black clouds of smoke. The 

flaming oil floated along the Pasig and set 

other fires along the banks. And from the 

air the enemy continued to drop bombs. 

adding even more fuel to the great conflagration which swept huge areas in and around 

the city. "To the native population of Manila," commented one observer, "it seemed 

like the end of the world." 13 

The Occupation of Manila 

On the first day of the New Year the 

Japanese 48th Division and the 4th and 7th 

Tank Regiments were twelve miles above 

the northern outskirts of Manila. To the 

south that night advance elements of General Morioka's 16th Division reached Manila Bay at a point less than ten miles from 

the capital city.H With two divisions "ready 

to go," Homma stopped the advance on 

the outskirts of the capital over the protests 

of both divisional commanders. "If those 

divisions went in together from south and 

north," he explained later, "anything might 

happen." 1~ 

Both divisions could have entered Manila 

on New Year's Day and expected to do so. 

When the order to advance did not come, 

Lt. Gen. Yuichi Tsuchibashi, 48th Division 

commander, sent Homma an urgent message at 1040, pointing out that the great 

fires had dissipated "the Army's hope of 

1J Van Landingham, "I Saw Manila Die," Satur. 

day Evening Post, September 26, 1942, p. 70. 

1< 14th Army Opns, I, 65. The 2d Formosa and 

two battalions of the 48th Mountain Artillery were 

not with the 48th Division at this time. 

15 USA vs. Homma, p. 3056, testimony of Homma 

General Maeda, Homma's chief of staff, declared 

that the 48th Division, for one, "was told to wait 

so that it could spruce up and reorganize." Interrog 

of Maeda, 10 May 47, Interrogations of Former 

Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEe, I. 

235 

preserving the city of Manila" and that "to 

rescue Manila from this conflagration" he 

planned to enter the capital in force. From 

Homma he requested approval for his 

plan.'6 This was followed by a plea from 

the division's chief of staff, who wrote: "I 

beseech you at the order of my superior to 

promptly approve the previously presented 

plan." 11 

Immediately after the 14th Army command post completed its movement from 

Binalonan to Cabanatuan, a staff conference was held at 1900 on New Year's Day 

to decide on the method of entry into Manila. Two plans were discussed: one to send 

a force into the city immediately, as proposed by the 48th Division commander; 

the other to dispatch a "military commission" to the capital to urge its surrender 

while the troops remained outside the city. 

The former plan was finally adopted, and 

at 2000 the 48th Division was ordered to 

seize Manila and prevent its destruction. 

Similar orders were given the 16th Division 

at 1000 on 2 January. General Morioka 

would also occupy Cavite and Batangas."8 

The line of the Pasig River, which flowed 

through the capital and into Manila Bay, 

was set as operational boundary between 

the two divisions. That night supplementary 

orders from General Homma fixed the size 

of the force entering Manila from the north 

at three infantry battalions of the 48th Division. The 16th Division was seemingly 

left free to determine the number of its 

troops entering Manila. Further orders apparently directed that the city was not to 

18 14th Army Opns, I, 67. The telegram was 

dated 1040, but it did not reach Homma until 

1710. The nearly five hours it required to reach 

Arney headquarters is unexplained. 

17 Ibid. 1. Ibid., 68--69. 
236 

be entered until the 2d, for no entry was 

made that night.19 

Inside the city a newspaper extra at noon 

on New Year's Day declared the enemy to 

be on the verge of entry and advised inhabitants to remain in their homes and await 

further orders from the Philippine authorities in control. Anticipating confinement in 

internment camps, American residents immediately packed toilet articles and a 

change of clothing.ro Word of the impending entry of the Japanese reached Corregidar quickly. MacArthur reported to the 

War Department on the morning of the 2d 

that Japanese troops would enter Manila 

that afternoon. His information was accurate enough to enable him to predict that 

the force would be small and that its duties 

would be limited to the maintenance of law 

and order, "which would indicate that 

there will be no violence." 21 That morning 

Japanese nationals were released from 

custody. The crowds, laden with stores from 

the quartermaster warehouses, began to 

break into business establishments and 

wholesale looting began.22 The once proud 

city, covered with the ashes and filth of destruction, was difficult to recognize as the 

beautiful and orderly metropolis it had been 

less than a month before. 

Finally, at 1745 on Friday, 2 January 

1942, the Japanese entered Manila. Maj. 

Gen. Koichi Abe, 48th Division infantry 

10 Ibid., 76. Homma later claimed that "arrangements were made to enter the city ... with only two 

battalions from each division, and the rest of the 

divisions must stay out of the city." Neither Generals Tsuchibashi nor Morioka limited the entering 

units to two battalions. USA vs. Homma, p. 3056, 

testimony of Homma. 

20 Van Landingham, "I Saw Manila Die," Saturday Evening Post, September 26, 1942, p. 70. 

21 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No.5, 2 Jan 42, 

AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

22 Manila Bulletin, January 3, 1942. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

group commander, led one battalion of the 

1st Formosa and two of the 47th Infantry 

into the northern sector of the capital. Simultaneously, from the south, the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment and a battalion of 

the 20th Infantry also entered. 23 Accompanied by released Japanese civilians, who 

acted as interpreters, the occupying troops 

posted guards at strategic points and set 

about securing the city.24 "The joyful voices 

of the Japanese residents," reported General Morioka, "were overwhelming." 25 

The voices of the other residents were 

not so joyful. Throughout the city at important intersections Japanese officers and 

interpreters set up card tables and checked 

pedestrians. All "enemy aliens," British and 

Americans, were ordered to remain at home 

until they could be registered and investigated. The only Caucasians who walked the 

streets unmolested were Germans, Italians, 

and Spaniards.26 

All that night Japanese trucks poured 

into the city, their occupants taking over 

private hotels and some public buildings as 

billets. Enemy troops moved into the University of the Philippines and other school 

buildings. The next morning the only cars 

on the street were those driven by Japanese 

officers and civilians. From their radiators 

flew the flag of the Rising Sun. Spanish, 

French, Italian, German, Portuguese, and 

Thai flags could also be seen. The vault of 

the national treasury at the Intendencia 

Building was sealed and a large placard announced the building and its contents to be 

the property of the Japanese Government. 

The banks remained closed and the doors 

" 14th Army Opns, I, 70,84. 

'" Manila Bulletin, January 3, 1942. 

20 16th Div Opns, 24 Dec 41-3 Jan 42, ATIS 

Enemy Pub 355, p. 9. 

" Margaret Utinsky, Miss U (San Antonio, Tex., 

1948), p. 1; Hersey, Men on Bataan, p. 154. 
rilE END OF AN ERA 237 

JAPANESE LI GHT TANKS moving toward Manila on the day the city was entered. 

of Manila restaurants were also shut. Newspaper publication was briefly suspended 

and then began again under Japanese controL The few stores that were open did a 

land-office business with Japanese officers 

who bought up brooches and watches with 

colorful occupation pesos.27 

Governmental departments of the Philip~ 

pine Commonwealth were placed under 

"protective custody." The courts were temporarily suspended, utilities were taken over 

by the Japanese, and a bewildering list of licenses and permits was issued to control the 

economic life of the Islands. Japanese sick 

and wounded were moved into the Chinese 

General Hospital and three wards of the 

2' The Sunday Tribune (Manila) l January 4, 

1942; Utinsky, Miss U, p. 4. 

Philippine General Hospital. All British and 

Americans were ordered to report for internment, and nearly 3,000 were herded together on the campus of Santo Tomas University. "Thereafter," reported the Japanese, "peace and order were gradually restored to Manila." 28 

The restoration of "peace and order" required the Japanese to place many restrictions on the civilian population. On 5 January a "warning" appeared in heavy black 

type across the top of the Manila Tribune. 

"Anyone who inflicts, or attempts to infEct, an injury upon Japanese soldiers or individuals," it read, "shall be shot to death" ; 

but "if the assailant, or attempted assailant, 

,. Hersey, Men on Bataan, pp, 152-54; 14th 

Army Opns, I, 77. 
238 

cannot be found, we will hold ten influential 

persons as hostages who live in and about 

the streets or municipalities where the event 

happened." The warning concluded with 

the admonition that "the Filipinos should 

understand our real intentions and should 

work together with us to maintain public 

peace and order in the Philippines." 21) 

With the occupation of Manila; General 

Homma had successfully accomplished the 

mission assigned by Imperial General Headquarters. But he could draw small comfort 

from his success, for MacArthur's forces 

were still intact. The newly formed Philippine Army, the Philippine Scouts, and the 

U.S. Army garrison had successfully escaped 

to Bataan and Corregidor. So long as they 

maintained their positions there, the J apanese would be unable to enter Manila Bay 

or use the Manila harbor. The Japanese had 

opened the back door to Manila Bay but 

the front door remained firmly closed. 

Strategic Views on the Philippines 

To the civilians who watched quietly 

from behind closed shutters as the Japanese 

entered their city it seemed incredible that 

the war was less than a month old. In that 

brief span of time, the enemy had made 

eight separate landings on widely dispersed 

beaches. He had driven out of the Philippines the Far East Air Force and the Asiatic 

Fleet. On Luzon he had marched north and 

south from each end of the island to join 

his forces before Manila. Casualties had 

been comparatively light and the main objective was now in his hands. 

In that same time the Japanese had secured a foothold in Mindanao to the south 

and had gained control of the important har-

... Sunday Tribune (Manila), January 5, 1942; 

see also USA vs. Homma, Prosecution Exhibit 16. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

bor at Davao. Brig. Gen. William F. Sharp's 

forces on that island were still intact, however, and held the airfield at Del Monte, 

the only field in the archipelago still capable 

of supporting heavy bombers. In the 

Visayas the Japanese had made no landings. There the scattered American and 

Philippine garrisons on Panay, Cebu, Bohol, 

Leyte, and other islands fortified their defenses and made plans for the day when 

the enemy would appear off their shores. 

Elsewhere, the Japanese forces had set 

about exploiting their initial gains. Hong 

Kong had fallen to the 23d Army on Christmas Day. General Yamashita's 25th Army, 

which had landed on the Malay Peninsula 

on the first day of war, was now pushing 

ever closer to Singapore. Japanese forces in 

the Sulu Archipelago and Borneo consolidated their positions and prepared to move 

into the Netherlands Indies. The South 

Seas Detachment, which had seized Guam, 

was now ready to move on to Rabaul, while 

other units staged for operations in the 

Celebes-Ambon area. Important Burmese 

airfields had been attacked on 25 December 

and at the year's end the 15th Army was 

concentrating in Thailand for its invasion 

of Burma. After the first rapid gains, the 

enemy was ready for further offensives. The 

Allies had little left to challenge the J apanese bid for supremacy in the Southwest 

Pacific and Southeast Asia. 

General MacArthur attributed the success of the Japanese to American weakness 

on the sea and in the air. The enemy, he 

pointed out, now had "utter freedom of 

naval and air movements" and could be 

expected to extend its conquests southwatd 

into the Netherlands Indies, using Mindanao as a base of operations. so If the Jap-

.. Rad, MacArthur to TAG, 27 Dec 41, AG 381 

(11-27-41) Far East. 
THE END OF AN ERA 

anese were able to seize the Netherlands 

Indies, he warned, the Allies would be 

forced to advance from Australia through 

the Dutch and British islands to regain the 

Philippines. He regarded it as essential, 

therefore, to halt the Japanese drive southward, and proposed that air forces should 

be rushed to the Southwest Pacific. Operating from advance bases, these planes could 

prevent the Japanese from developing airfields. Concurrently, with strong naval action to keep open the line of communication to Mindanao, Japanese air forces were 

to be neutralized by Allied air power, and 

then ground forces would be landed there. 

He had already done all he could to support such action, MacArthur told the War 

Department, by sending his air force to 

Australia and the Netherlands Indies and 

by supporting Mindanao with reinforcements and ammllnition. "I wish to emphasize," he concluded, "the necessity for naval 

action and for rapid execution by land, sea, 

and air." 31 

Receiving no reply to this message, General MacArthur took the occasion, on 1 

January, when asked about the evacuation 

of President Quezon, to emphasize his isolated position and to remind the Chief of 

Staff of his strategic concept for a combined 

effort by land, sea, and air forces through 

the N ethe~lands Indies to Mindanao. 

Quezon's departure, he warned, would undoubtedly be followed by the collapse of 

the will to fight on the part of the Filipinos, 

and he pointedly added that, aside from 

7,000 combat troops (exclusive of air 

corps), his army consisted of Filipinos. "In 

view of the Filipinos effort," he declared, 

"the United States must move strongly to 

31 Ibid. For the measures taken to strengthen 

Mindanao, see V-MF Rpt of Opns, Part I, passim, 

Annex XI, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns. 

239 

their support or withdraw in shame from 

the Orient." 32 

Just a week later, as his forces withdrew 

behind the first line of defenses on Bataan, 

MacArthur outlined for the Chief of Staff 

the preparations he was making for the arrival of an expeditionary force in Mindanao. 

These included transfer of equipment for 

one division, the movement of nine P--40's 

and 650 men of the 19th Bombardment 

Group to Del Monte, and plans to develop 

additional landing fields there. It was essential, he wrote, to inaugurate a system of 

blockade-running to Mindanao since supplies were low. 

Our air force bombardment missions from 

south should quickly eliminate hostile air from 

Davao and our pursuit should go into Del 

Monte without delay. Establishment of air 

force will permit immediate extension into 

Visayas and attacks on enemy forces in Luzon. . . . An Army Corps should be landed in 

Mindanao at the earliest possible date. . . . Enemy appears to have tendency to become 

overconfident and time is ripe for brilliant 

thrust with air carriers.33 

MacArthur's pleas for a majo:- Allied effort in the Southwest Pacific were re~dved 

with sympathy in Washington, where the 

first wartime United States-British conference on strategy was in session. The British 

recognized the importance of the threat in 

the Far East and agreed that munitions and 

supplies should go there, even though such 

shipments represented a diversion from the 

agreed strategy that the main effort should 

be made against Germany first. "The 

President and Prime Minister, Colonel 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 2 and 3, 1 

Jan 42, WPD 4639-2. Apparently MacArthur excluded from his estimate of combat strength the 

12,000 Philippine Scouts who, though Filipinos, 

were part of the U.S. Army . 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 20, 7 Jan 

42, AG 381 (11-27-41) Far East. 
240 

Stimson and Colonel Knox, the British 

Chiefs of Staff and our corresponding officials," General Marshall told MacArthur, 

"have been surveying every possibility looking toward the quick development of 

strength in the Far East so as to break the 

enemy's hold on the Philippines." 

Though all were agreed on the need for 

action in the Southwest Pacific, little could 

be done. The loss in capital ships, Marshall 

explained, prevented naval convoys for 

heavy reinforcements and the concentration of strong naval forces in the Southwest 

Pacific such as MacArthur was requesting. 

Heavy bombers were on the way, via Africa 

and Hawaii, and pursuit planes were being 

sent by every ship, so that the Allies should 

soon have aerial supremacy in the Southwest Pacific. "Our great hope," Marshall 

told MacArthur, "is that the rapid development of an overwhelming air power on the 

Malay Barrier will cut the Japanese communications south of Borneo and permit an 

assault in the southern Philippines." The 

naval carrier raids MacArthur was asking 

for were not ruled out entirely but little hope 

was offered for such an effort. Marshall 

closed his message on a note of encouragement for the future and the assurance that 

"every day of time you gain is vital to the 

concentration of overwhelming power necessary for our purpose." 34 

Actually, the American and British staffs 

in Washington had already agreed upon the 

strategy for the Far East: to hold the Malay 

Barrier from the Malay Peninsula through 

Sumatra and Java to Australia. This line 

was considered the basic Allied defensive 

position in the Far East, and the retention 

of its east and west anchors, Australia and 

Burma, was therefore regarded as essential. 

"Ibid. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The latter had additional strategic importance because it was essential to the support of China and the defense of India. 

The Allies were agreed that land, sea, and 

air forces should operate as far forward of 

the barrier as possible in order to halt the 

Japanese advance southward. The support 

of the Philippine garrison and the re-establishment of the line of communications 

through the Netherlands Indies to Luzon 

apparently came after the more important 

task of holding Australia and Burma.3l> 

During the first week in January the War 

Plans Division of the General Staff, which 

had been studying the possibility of sending an expedition to the relief of the 

Philippine garrison, came to the conclusion 

that the forces required could not be placed 

in the Far East in time. While this 

reason was probably the overriding consideration in its recommendation that operations to relieve the Philippines not be 

undertaken, the War Plans Division went 

on to point out that the dispatch of so large 

a force would constitute "an entirely unjustifiable diversion of forces from the principal theater-the Atlantic." The greatest 

effort which could be justified on strategic 

grounds was to hold the Malay Barrier 

while projecting operations as far north as 

possible to provide maximum defense in 

depth. This view was essentially that already agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. The War Plans Division therefore 

recommended that, "for the present," operations in the Far East should be limited to 

these objectives.a6 

.. Rpt of U.S.-British CsofS, 31 Dec 41, sub: 

Supporting Measures for SWPA (ABC 4/3), OPD 

Reg Doc. General MacArthur was informed of the 

substance of this report on 31 December 1941. 

.. Memo, Brig Gen L. T. Gerow for CofS, 3 Jan 

42, sub: Relief of Phil, WPD 4639-3. 
THE END OF AN ERA 

The War Plans Division study is of considerable interest, not only for the effect it 

may have had on MacArthur's requests for 

a joint advance through the Netherlands 

Indies to Mindanao, but also for its realistic 

appraisal of the strategic situation in the 

Far East and the importance of the Philippine Islands. Accepting General MacArthur's estimate of Japanese strength in the 

Philippines and of the length of time he 

could hold out against serious attack-three 

month-the Army planners agreed that the 

loss of the Philippines, "the key to the Far 

East position of the Associated Powers," 

would be a decisive blow, followed probably by the fall of the Netherlands Indies 

and Singapore. 8T Australian and British 

trade routes would then be seriously threatened, while Japan's strength would be increased by control of the raw materials in 

the Indies. The isolation of China was 

"almost certain to follow." 88 This analysis 

coincided with MacArthur's, as did the 

plan of operations outlined to recover the 

Philippines. 

It was when the planners considered the 

means necessary to carry out these operations that they found themselves in disagreement with General MacArthur. They estimated that 1,464 aircraft of various types, 

only about half of which were available, 

would be necessary to advance from Australia to Luzon. The difference would,have 

to come from other areas-Hawaii, Panama, and the United States-and from 

lend-lease aircraft already committed. Additional airfields would have to be built in 

If Ibid. MacArthur estimated that the Japanese 

had six divisions on Luzon, one at Davao, and a 

small force at Jolo. There were only two Japanese 

divisions in the Philippines. The planners, for lack 

of more definite information, accepted MacArthur's 

estimate. 

"Ibid. 

241 

Australia and along the line of advance. 

The line of communications to Australia 

would have to be made secure and a logistical organization developed to support the 

drive northward. Such an effort, the planners estimated, would require very large 

naval resources. With the vessels already in 

the area, the Allies would have to transfer 

7 to 9 capital ships, 5 to 7 carriers, about 

50 destroyers, 60 submarines, and the necessary auxiliary vessels from the Atlantic 

and Mediterranean to the Pacific and Far 

East. The diversion of naval forces might 

well result in the loss of the supply routes to 

Europe and the Middle East and would 

severely limit the defense of the Western 

Hemisphere. It was not surprising, therefore, that the War Plans Division concluded 

that the relief of the Philippine garrison 

could not be accomplished in the three 

months left, and that the allocation of such 

sizable forces to the project would represent a major and unjustifiable diversion 

from the main effort.s9 

There is no record of any formal approval 

of the conclusions of the War Plans Division. Both Secretary Stimson and General 

Marshall noted the study but made no comment. If there had ever been any serious 

consideration given to MacArthur's proposals to send an expedition to the relief 

of the beleaguered Philippine garrison, the 

War Plans study put an end to such hopes. 

But there was no relaxation of the determination to send General MacArthur whatever aid was within the means of the United 

States and its Allies. President Roosevelt 

had time and again stated his desire to do 

so and as late as 30 December had written 

Stimson that he wished the War Plans Division to explore every possible means of re-

"Ibid. 
242 

lieving the Philippines. "I realize great risks 

are involved," he said, "but the objective 

is important." 41, 

While the President's stated desire remained the official policy of the government 

and the hope of the American people, the 

strategy evolved by the Allies placed more 

realistic limits to the objectives they hoped 

to attain. The conference then meeting in 

Washington agreed that the Allies must 

hold the Malay Barrier and established a 

theater of operations known as the ABDA 

(American-British-Dutch-Australian) area, 

with Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell in command, to co-ordina.te the efforts of the various national forces in that region. This 

command, the first Allied command of the 

war, included the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Burma. Wavell's 

mission was to hold the Malay Barrier 

against the advancing Japanese, but he was 

also directed to re-establish communications 

through the Netherlands Indies with Luzon 

and to support the Philippine garrison. 

Thus, General MacArthur was placed under Wavell's command, but, explained General Marshall, "because of your present 

•• Quoted in Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and 

Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948), 

p.454. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

isolation this will have only nominal effect 

upon your command. . .. " 41 

Actually, the organization of the ABDA 

area had no effect on operations in the 

Philippines, and aside from a formal acknowledgement between the two commanders there was no communication between 

the two headquarters. Although General 

Marshall pointed out that the new arrangement offered "the only feasible method for 

the eventual relief of the Philippines,"I~ 

it was already clear to General MacArthur 

that the Allies were not going to make a 

determined effort to advance to his rescue. 

It was perhaps just as well that the 

Americans and Filipinos who crowded into 

Bataan and took their positions behind the 

lines already established did not know how 

serious was the Allied position in the Far 

East and how remote were their chances 

for relief. Ahead of them were long, dreary 

months of starvation and hard fighting before they would be herded into prison 

camps. At least they could hope that help 

was on the way. Only General MacArthur 

and his immediate staff knew the worst. 

., Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 93, 11 Jan 

42, WPD 4639-14. 

.. Ibid. 
PART FOUR 

THE SIEGE OF BATAAN 

CHAPTER XV 

Setting the Stage 

Formed by the southern heights of the 

Zambales Mountains, the Bataan peninsula 

juts out from the mainland of Luzon between Subic and Manila Bay like a huge 

thumb pointing at the shore of Cavite 

Province only twelve miles away. Between 

Bataan and the Cavite shore lie Corregidor 

and several smaller islands, guarding the 

entrance to Manila Bay. (Map 10) 

Only twenty-five miles long and twenty 

miles wide across its base, Bataan is ideally 

suited for defensive warfare. It is jungled 

and mountainous, cut by numerous streams 

and deep ravines, and has only two roads 

adequate for motor vehicles. Dom,inating 

the peninsula are two extinct volcanoes: the 

4,222-foot high Mt. Natib in the north and, 

to the south, the Mariveles Mountains 

whose highest peak, Mt. Bataan, towers to 

a height of 4,722 feet. Along the east coast, 

on the Manila Bay side, the peninsula is 

flat and swampy near its base but becomes 

hilly and rugged to the south. The coastal 

plain on the west is extremely narrow. Here 

the mountains extend almost to the sea; 

high cliffs guard the shore and toothlike 

promontories jut into the water. Radiating 

from the two volcanic masses flow many 

streams which wind their way th:'ough 

steep ravines and gullies toward the bay and 

the sea. 

Bataan is crisscrossed by a large number 

of trails, quickly overgrown by the tropical 

vegetation and rarely suitable for vehicular 

traffic. Across the base of the peninsula is 

Route 7, lost to the Americans by their 

withdrawal from Layac. South of Layac, 

paralleling the east coast down to Mariveles 

at the tip of the peninsula, then turning 

north to parallel the west coast as far as 

Moron, is Route 110. The east coast portion, called the East Road, is a single-lane, 

all-weather road; the stretch from Mariveles to Moron on the opposite coast, the 

West Road, is not as well surfaced. The 

only other road of importance is an eastwest road from Pilar to Bagac, midway 

down the peninsula and across the saddle 

between Mt. Natib and the Mariveles 

Mountains. This road, called the PilarBagac road and cutting Bataan like a waist 

belt, was the only vehicular road providing 

lateral communication for the forces divided by the rugged heights of central 

Bataan.1 

No better place than Bataan could have 

been chosen for a final stand. There were 

compensations for the inhospitable countryside. "Taking it all in all," noted Colonel 

Skerry, the North Luzon Force engineer, 

"the rugged terrain of the Bataan Peninsula, 

covered as it was by a thick jungle, concealed the works of the defender even when 

the enemy had constant air superiority and 

air observation." 2 And after two weeks of 

withdrawal the men were glad to reach a 

position that was not to be abandoned the 

next day. Morale was good. "The general 

feeling seemed to be," wrote Colonel Col1 Bataan-Zambales, AGS, GHQ SWPA, Terrain 

Handbook 42, pp. 23-39, 76. 

2 Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 10. 
BA Y 

SOUTH CHINA 

seA 

SITUATION ON BATAAN 

8 January 1942 

I111111T1T1T1T1 u. s. POS ITIONS, APPROX IMATE 

£leva/ions in leel 

~ ____ ~ __ ~ __________ . 

MI LES 

MAP 10 

~f;IJ1'T1I1i7i!r;;;;m~~ MAIN BATTLE I'I'l POSITION 

ofang 

BAY 

Corregidor I. 

I. dJ 
SETTING THE STAGE 

lier, the assistant operations officer of 

USAFFE, "we have run far enough; we'll 

stand now and take 'em on." 3 

The American Position 

The defense of Bataan began officially on 

7 January 1942. On that day Wainwright 

assumed command of the West Sector of 

the Bataan Defense Force, which became I 

Philippine Corps, and the East Sector, redesignated II Philippine Corps, came under 

General Parker, till then commander of the 

entire Bataan Defense Force. The boundary between the two corps bisected the 

length of the peninsula from Mt. Natib to 

the Mariveles Mountains. The tip of Bataan south of the Mariveles Mountains was 

designated the Service Command Area and 

responsibility for its defense given to Brig. 

Gen. Allen C. McBride, MacArthur's deputy for the Philippine Department. To 

Wainwright's corps was assigned the defense of the western half of Bataan; Parker's corps was on the Manila Bay side.' 

Both corps were under MacArthur's headquarters on Corregidor, which by 5 January had established a Bataan echelon under Brig. Gen. R. J. Marshall. Through 

Marshall's headquarters, consisting of officers from the general and special staff sections of USAFFE, it was possible for MacArthur to exercise close control over operations on Bataan. 5 "I am on my main battle 

line," MacArthur told the War Department 

on 7 January, "awaiting general attack." 6 

3 Collier, Notebooks, III, 10. 

• USAFFE FO 1, 6 Jan 42, AG 300.4 (28 Dec 

41) Phil Reds; Itr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jun 52, 

OCMH. 

• Interv, author with Marshall, 7 Apr 48; memo, 

Marshall for CofS USAFFE, 13 Jan 42, AG 370.2 

(19 Dee 41) Phil Reds. 

• Rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 20, 7 Jan 42, 

AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

247 

The defense of Bataan was conceived as 

a defense in depth. The first line, called the 

main battle position, extended from Mabatang, a short distance north of Abucay, on 

the east, across Mt. Natib to Mauban on the 

west coast, a distance of twenty miles. A 

strong outpost line of resistance was established in front of the main battle position and defenses to a depth of several miles 

were prepared to the rear. Along the beaches 

on both coasts troops were posted to guard 

against amphibious envelopment. 7 

In Wainwright's corps on the west were 

three Philippine Army divisions, the 1st, 

31st, and 91st, to which was attached the 

combat elements of the 71 st Division (P A) ; 

the 26th Cavalry (PS); a battery each of 

fidd artillery and 75-mm. guns (SPM), 

and miscellaneous troops-altogether about 

22,500 men. On the right (east), in Parker's 

corps, were four more Philippine Army divisions, the 11th, 21st, 41st, and 51st; supporting artillery; and the 57th Infantry 

(PS) from the Philippine Division. General 

Parker had about 25,000 men in his corps.s 

Eight miles behind the main battle position, paralleling the Pilar-Bagac road, was 

the rear battle position which in prewar 

plans had formed the main line of the 

Bataan defenses. On 7 January this line 

was not yet fully organized; while the forces 

along the main battle position held back the 

enemy, other troops would prepare this 

position. Posted along this line and assigned 

'USAFFE FO 1, 6 Jan 42, AG 300.4 (28 Dec 

41) Phil Reds. 

• Ibid.; USAFFE GO 3, 7 Jan 42, AG 320.2 

(6 Jan 42) Phil Reds. This general order was 

erroneously issued as GO 56, 6 January 1942, and 

was corrected by GO 4, 7 January 1942. 

Strengths given are estimates by the author, 

based on scattered strength figures. See especially 

those in Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, 12 Mar 42 to 

9 Apr 42, Annex VI, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of 

Opns. 
248 

the task of orgamzmg it for a last-ditch 

defense was the USAFFE reserve, the 

Philippine Division (less 57th Infantry), 

the tank group, and a group of 75-mm. 

SPM's. Corps and USAFFE artillery was 

emplaced to cover the front lines as well as 

the beach defenses in all sectors.9 

South of the rear battle position was the 

Service Command Area. Under McBride's 

command was a variety of troops: the 2d 

Division (PC), organized on 7 January 

and composed of Constabulary troops, the 

remaining elements of the 71 st Division 

(PA), including the division headquarters, 

provisional infantry units formed from air 

corps troops, and a provisional battalion of 

bluejackets and marines.1o 

The Mabatang-Mauban line, or Abucay-Mauban line, as it was more generally 

called, the main battle position, occupied 

on 7 January, was not a continuous line. 

Separating and forming an almost impenetrable barrier between the left portion held 

by I Corps and the right portion held by II 

Corps was the northernmost of the two extinct volcanoes, covering an area about 

fifteen by fifteen miles. Around the crater 

are steep and jagged peaks rising to a height 

of 3,000 to 4,000 feet. The northernmost 

peak, Mt. Santa Rosa, is 3,052 feet high. 

About three and a half miles southeast is 

the highest point on the crater's edge, Mt. 

Natib. In a distance of 2,000 yards this 

4,222-foot-high mountain drops to half its 

height. Mt. Silanganan, to the southwest, is 

3,620 feet high. On its west escarpment this 

land mass drops a thousand feet in as many 

• USAFFE FO 1, 6 Jan 42, AG 300.4 (28 Dee 

41) Phil Reds. 

,. USAFFE FO 2, 7 Jan 42, and amendment of 

10 Jan 42, AG 300.4 (28 Dee 41) Phil Reds; 

Collier, Notebooks, III, 6. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

yards. Though the military crests of these 

mountains provided ideal defensive positions-one officer called them "an infantryman's dream"-they made effective mutual 

support between the two corps impossible. 

The Mt. Natib position was selected, despite 

its known limitations, because strategy required that a stand be made here to gain 

time to prepare the rear battle position and 

to retain as long as possible the lateral communication provided by the Pilar-Bagac 

road. 

I Philippine Corps 

The sector defended by General Wainwright's I Philippine Corps 011 the west 

"was practically all wooded and almost 

wholly uninhabited." 11 The terrain was extremely rugged and a bolo was a necessity 

for a man on foot. From the South China 

Sea, wrote Colonel Skerry, Wainwright's 

engineer officer, after a reconnaissance, this 

side of the peninsula "presented a most 

formidable appearance of very high timbered banks with a solid mass of woods 

stretching east to a high mountain range, 

heavily timbered throughout, except for the 

break at Bagac and Moron." 12 

Communications in this area were poor. 

That portion of the West Road which 

stretched from Mariveles to Bagac was 

poorly surfaced. Northward from Bagac 

as far as Moron the road had been 

improved and had a crushed rock surface 

which made it passable in all weather. 

The only method of continuing northward 

from Moron where the West Road ended 

was by a series of roundabout trails. "By and 

11 Collier, Notebooks, III, 21. 

,. Skerry, Comments on Engineer Rist, No. 10. 
SETTING THE STAGE 

large," said Skerry, "this was an area where 

an American needed a map, compass and 

bolo even in the dry season.1

" 

The main line of resistance on this side 

of the peninsula followed Mauban Ridge 

from Mauban on the coast to Mt. Silanganan. Holding the western portion of this 

line was the 3d Infantry, 1st Division 

(PA); to its right was a battalion of the 31st 

Field Artillery of the 31 st Division (P A) , 

equipped and organized as an infantry 

unit. On the extreme right, on the slopes 

of Mt. Silanganan, was Company K, 1st 

Infantry. Its mission was to establish contact with the 51st Division on the left of 

II Corps-an apparently impossible task 

in that uncharted, mountainous country. 

Only that portion of the main line of resistance held by the 3d Infantry was reinforced; it had a double apron of barbed 

wire. The rest of the line "was unprotected 

by obstacles other than the natural jungle." 14 

The selection of Mauban as the western 

anchor of the main line of resistance had 

been debated before the war. In January 

1941, at General Grunert's direction, officers of the 26th Cavalry (PS) had made a 

reconnaissance of a proposed Mt. Natib13 Ibid. 

" NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 16-17; SLF 

and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 28; Santos, The 1st 

Reg Div (PA) in Battle of Phil, p. 36; ltr, Brig Gen 

Kearie L. Berry, ret., formerly CO 1st Inf (PA), 

to author, 9 Jun 49, OCMH. 

General Bluemel, who commanded the west sector 

before Wainwright's arrival, had ordered Brig. Gen. 

Fidel V. Segundo, the 1st Division (PA) commander, to establish contact with the left unit of the east 

sector. Segundo was unable to do so, and explained 

that there was no water on Mt. Natib and that he 

could not keep troops there. Bluemel finally sent a 

patrol led by his G-2 to establish contact with the 

troops to the east. The patrol was gone three days 

and failed to establish contact. Bluemel, Comments 

on Draft MS, Comment 15, OCMH. 

249 

Moron line. When their report was in, 

Grunert ordered Wainwright, then commanding the Philippine Division, to prepare plans for a line from Mt. Natib to the 

west coast of Bataan, in the vicinity of 

Moron or Mauban. Officers of the 45th Infantry (PS) had then visited the area and 

decided to place the western anchor of the 

line at Mauban, where a 50- to 75-foot 

ridge commanded the beach and offered a 

clear field of fire for several hundred yards. 

The line established when the troops moved 

into Bataan, therefore, utilized the plans developed before the war, and the first draft 

of the field order outlining positions on 

Bataan at the beginning of January 1942 

anchored the line at Mauban.15 

In commenting on the first draft of the 

field order establishing this line, Colonel 

Casey, MacArthur's engineer officer, urged 

that the main line be placed further north, 

at Moron. Noting the excellent beach between Moron and Mauban and recognizing the danger of envelopment at Moron, 

he pointed out that "if the rear position 

[Mauban] only is held, it permits the concentration of enemy on these beaches for 

attack on this flank." 16 He had recommended therefore that Moron be "organized and defended" and the Mauban line 

used as a switch position. 

Although Mauban remained the anchor 

of the main line of resistance when the final 

plan was drawn up, an effort was made to 

meet Casey's objections. Two units, Company I of the 1st Infantry and Troop G, 

26th Cavalry, were posted at Moron and 

along the stretch of sandy beach to the south 

,. Bluemel, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 

11, OCMH; interv, Groce with Lt Col Edgar 

Wright, Jr., formerly with 45th Inf (PS), 2 Feb 49, 

OCMH. 

"Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 2 Jan 42, 

sub: Defense of Bataan, AG 381, Phil Reds. 
250 

to prevent enemy landings and to deny the 

landing beaches at Moron to the enemy.17 

The outpost line of resistance in the I 

Corps sector extended from the barrio of 

Bayandati, a mile and a half northwest of 

Mauban, eastward to a point about halfway 

up the slopes of Mt. Silanganan. The 3d Infantry held this line, which paralleled its 

sector on the main line of resistance. To the 

rear, behind the main line, was the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, forming a regimental 

reserve line which stretched from the beach 

defense below Mauban across the West 

Road. ls 

Artillery support for Wainwright's corps 

was provided by the 71st Field Artillery 

(less 18t Battalion) , two batteries of the 91 st 

Field Artillery, one battery of the 23d Field 

Artillery, a battery of 75-mm. guns (SPM), 

and two I55-mm. guns. Colonel Fowler, 

who commanded this force, had altogether 

thirty-three pieces, all but two of which were 

75-mm. guns or 2.95-inch mountain howitzers. The 75's were emplaced along Mauban Ridge, just behind the main line of 

resistance, and along the high ground to the 

northeast. The SPM's were disposed along 

a ridge about 300 yards to the south, and 

the shorter range 2.95-inch guns placed farther forward. The two 155-mm. guns were 

emplaced along the high ground near Mauban Point to cover the sea approaches as 

well as those by land. Secondary positions 

for the artillery, located about 3,000 yards 

11 Santos, 1st Reg Div (PA), p. 36; Chandler, 

"26th Cavalry Battles to Glary," Part 2, Armored 

Cavalry Journal (May-June 1947), p. 15. 

11 NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 17; Santos, 

1st Reg Div (PA), p. 36; Chandler, "26th Cavalry 

(PS) Battles to Glory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry 

Journal (May-June 1947), p. 15; Col K. L. Berry, 

Hist of 3d Inf, 1st Reg Div (PA), 19 Dec 41-9 

Apr 42, p. 2, copy lent author by Gen Berry, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

to the rear, were selected, "but due to the 

excellent cover of the dense jungle around 

the primary positions," Colonel Fowler 

noted, "were not occupied until the last day 

and night." 19 

Defense of the beach south of the main 

battle position was assigned to Brig. Gen. 

Clifford Bluemel's 31st Division (PA). The 

division was responsible for a stretch of approximately ten miles, from the regimental 

reserve line on the north to Saysain Point, 

with one battalion of the 45th Infantry 

(PS) at Bagac Bay. Actually, Bluemel's 

southern flank was extended south of the 

assigned limit by one battalion of the 31 st 

Infantry (PA). In support of the 31st Division was a battery of the 92d Coast Artillery 

(PS), which had gone into Bataan with 

Bluemel and been assigned to cover Saysain Point with its two 155-mm. guns. Another battery of that regiment was located 

near Bagac.w 

For corps reserve General Wainwright 

had the remnants of Selleck's 71 st Division 

and Stevens' 91 st Division, both badly 

mauled by their fight in northern Luzon. In 

an effort to secure one effective unit from 

these two divisions, the combat troops of the 

7Ist were placed under Stevens' command 

and the entire force reorganized. 21 The 26th 

Cavalry (PS), which had joined the I 

Philippine Corps after a difficult overland 

march from Layac junction, was also tired 

,. Ltr, Fowler to author, 11 Mar 49, OCMH; 

NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 18. 

.. NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 18-19; 

Bluemel, 31st Div (PA), Rpt of Opns, pp. 7-8; 

Bluemel, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 13, 

OCMH; Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 18. 

21 NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 18-19; Selleck, Notes on 71st Div (PA), p. 55. The ?1st Division, although it remained a division on paper, 

ceased to function as one after 6 January. 
SETTING THE STAGE 

and disorganized. Since there were no replacements for its animals and only a limited supply of forage, it was shortly reorganized into a motorized squadron of riflemen 

and a mechanized unit equipped with scout 

cars and Bren carriers.22 

11 Philippine Corps 

Defending the eastern half of the Bataan 

peninsula was General Parker's II Philippine Corps, holding a line approximately 

15,000 yards in length from Manila Bay to 

the I Corps boundary at Mt. Natib!3 Unlike the western half of Bataan, the eastern 

coast was low and swampy and devoted 

largely to the growth of rice. Here the 

cleared ground provided good fields of fire, 

and when the troops reached their position the flat ground to the front, consisting 

mainly of rice paddies, was flooded. The 

East Road was an excellent highway compared to the West Road and passed through 

many small, thriving communities such as 

Cabcaben, Lamao, Orion, Pilar, and Abucay. Inland, the II Corps sector became 

more mountainous and rugged as it approached the high volcanic mass in the 

center of the peninsula.24 

The main battle position in the II Corps 

sector, as in the I Corps sector, consisted 

of a main line of resistance, with an outpost 

and a regimental reserve line. The main 

line extended westward from Mabatang on 

the coast to the heights of Mt. Natib. The 

right flank, including the coastal plain and 

the East Road, was considered the most 

., NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 19; Chandler, 

"26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to Glory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry Journal (May-June 1947), p. 15. 

23 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opm, p. 20 and map, 

App.5. 

2. Collier, Notebooks, III, 21, 23; Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 10. 

251 

critical portion of the line. The enemy, advancing unopposed down the East Road, 

was expected to make his first attempt to 

breach the main battle position at this point. 

In this sector, therefore, Parker placed the 

fresh, well-trained Scouts of the 57th Infantry. They were to hold a line from 

Manila Bay across the road and approximately 2,000 yards inland as well as a portion of the .beach as far south as Balanga.26 

Next to the 57th Infantry, extending the 

main line of resistance 6,500 yards to the 

west, was Brig. Gen. Vincente Lim's 41st 

Division (P A). One of the first units to 

reach Bataan, the division was as yet untried in battle. Its three infantry regiments 

were disposed abreast to give maximum 

protection to the division front, which extended along the precipitous heights of the 

gorge above the shallow Balantay River."6 

The rest of the II Corps main line, from the 

left of the 41st Division to the slopes of Mt. 

Natib, was held by Jones's 51st Division 

which had reached Bataan during the night 

of 3--4 January. The division, less its 52d 

Infantry, which was on beach defense until 

11 January, held a front of more than 5,000 

yards along the Balantay River. On the 

right was the 51st Infantry. On the west, 

holding down the corps left flank and trailing off into scattered foxholes, was the 53d 

.. USAF FE FO I, 6 Jan 42, AG 300.4 (28 Dec 

41) Phil Rcds; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 

23; Maj John E. Olson, Opm of 57th Inf (PS) at 

Abucay, 10-23 Jan 42, pp. 9, 11, and Maj Ernest 

L. Brown, Opns of 57th Inf (PS), Abucay, Jan 42, 

p.8 (papers prepared for Advanced Officers Course, 

in 1947-48 and 1946-47, respectively, The I~fantry 

School); Phil Div Rpt of Opns, pp. 10-11, Annex 

XII, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns . 

.. SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opm, p. 21 and map, 

App. 5; Itr, Col Malcolm V. Fortier to Hist Reds 

Sec Bd, Hq Fourth Army, 14 May 46, sub: Opm 

of 41st Div (PA), p. 1, copy sent to the author by 

Colonel Fortier, formerly senior instructor of the 

41st Division, OCMH. 
252 

Infantry. The 52d was placed in reserve 

when it rejoined the division. 2

' 

Fortifications along the II Corps line 

were far stronger than in \Vainwright's 

sector. At least as far west as the 51st Division there was a double apron of barbed 

wire. Working with only a small number 

of picks, shovels, and axes, and subs,tituting bayonets and the covers of mess kits 

for individual entrenching tools, the men 

were able to clear fields of fire, dig foxholes, 

trenches, and gun emplacements, and construct camouflage overhead. The Japanese 

later wrote that they found "the strongest 

sort of field fortifications on the II Corps 

line." "Covered rifle pits and machine gun 

emplacements had been constructed," they 

reported, "and these formed the main structure of the fire network; between them were 

placed foxholes. . . . The fields of fire had 

been cleared of cover; camouflage was 

thorough; the rear communications network had been carefully and thoroughly 

laid." 28 

Only in the 51st Division sector, on the 

corps left, were the fortifications inadequate. 

Here the establishment of a military line 

along the jungled slopes of Mt. Natib 

proved impossible in the time and with the 

tools available. No regular line was organized in this area where patrols operated with 

the greatest difficulty. Mt. Natib remained 

an insuperable barrier to the establishment 

of physical contact between the two 

corps.29 

21 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 21, 31; 

interv, Falk with Jones, 13 Jun 50; Jones, Chronological Order of Events, 51st Div (PA), 29 Dec 

41-26 Jan 42, pp. 1-2, copy lent the author by 

General Jones, OCMH. 

2·65th Brig, Combat in the Mt. Natib Area, 

Bataan 9-27 Jan 42, ATIS Enemy Pub 151, 13 Jul 

44, p. 1; SLF and II Corps .Rpt of Opns, p. 20. 

.. SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 20; Jones, 

51st Div (PA) Order of Events, p. 2. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Long-range artillery support in Parker'~ 

sector was provided by the 86th Field Artillery Battalion (PS), with twelve 155-mm. 

guns (GPF), and the 301st Field Artillery 

Regiment (PA), with sixteen guns of the 

same type and two 155-mm. howitzers. 

Emplaced west of Abucay, these pieces were 

in position to cover all of the main battle 

positions and the East Road. Providing 

direct support to the 57th Infantry along 

the coastal road and the beach was the 1 st 

Battalion, 24th Field Artillery (PS), with 

one battery on the main line of resistance 

and two more near Abucay. Additional 

support was furnished by a battery of the 

88th Field Artillery (eight 75-mm. guns) 

and the 2d Battalion of the 24th, which 

aiso supported the 41st Division from a 

position southeast of Abucay. Each of the 

divisions had its own divisional artillery in 

support as well, with the 2.95-inch howitzers of the 41st in position to back up the 

51st Division. That division had only eight 

75-mm. guns of a type unsuitable for use 

in the rugged country to which it was assigned. 30 

Defense of the Manila Bay coastline in 

the II Corps sector, from Balanga, where 

the 57th line ended, as far south as Limay, 

after 11 January was assigned to the 11th 

Division (P A). In addition to its own artillery regiment, it had the support of the 

.. SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, Pt'. 21-23, 

29 and App. 5; Shreve, Diary, pp. 21-22; Col 

Alexander S. Quintard, The 30lst FA (PA), p. 4, 

OCMH; ltr, Capt Willard A. Smith to author, 

23 May 49, OCMH; copy of parts of a narrative by 

Col Quintard, CO 30lst FA, p. 2; 2d Bn, 24th 

FA (PS), extract from Priestley Diary, Notebook 1, 

p. 15; Olson, 57th Inf (PS) Opns at Abucay, pp. 

11, 12; Brown, 57th Inf (PS) Opns at Abucay, 

p. 9; ltr, Lt Col Charles E. N. Howard, Jr., to 

TAG, n.d., sub: Unit Hist, 2d Bn, 88th FA (PS), 

7 Dec 41-9 Apr 48, pp. 2, 5-6, copy of this letter 

and a longer draft sent to author and on file in 

OCMH. 
FORTIFICATIONS ON BATAAN. Tank obstacles and double-apron fence 

entanglements, above; below, roadblock near the Mauban line. 
254 

21st Field Artillery, detached from its parent unit for beach defense. The rest of the 

21st Division was in corps reserve.31 

By the end of the first week in January 

the main battIe posi~ion on Bataan was organized and the troops in place. The Japanese, who on the 7th had taken Layac Junction, the gateway to Bataan, were alreadyin 

position to move against the American line. 

"It was felt," wrote Colonel Collier, "that 

the enemy would continue his close follow 

up of our troops and launch an early push 

against the right of the II Corps [along] 

the East Road." 32 Unlike the rest of Luzon, Bataan offered no room for maneuver 

and little space for withdrawal. The Japanese would have to be held as long as possible at each position. Except for the few 

who would be fortunate enough to reach 

Corregidor, there was no retreat from Bataan. 

The Status of Supply 

The supply situation on Bataan was serious from the start and became steadily 

worse through the campaign. Originally, 

under the ORANGE plan, supplies for 43,000 

men for a period of six months were to 

have been moved to the peninsula on the 

outbreak of war. MacArthur's order to 

fight it out on the beaches had invalidated 

this plan, and when war came supplies and 

equipment were moved forward to advance 

depots to support the troops on the front 

lines. At that time there were stored on 

Bataan 2,295,000 pounds of canned salmon, 152,000 pounds of fruits and vege11 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 18-20; SLF and 

II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 23. 

" Collier, Notebooks, III, 18. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

tables, 6,000 pounds of miscellaneous foods, 

and 400,000 gallons of gasoline.ss 

Full-scale movement of supplies to Bataan did not begin until the decision was 

made on 23 December to withdraw to Bataan. By that time the number of troops 

to be supplied during the siege of Bataan 

had increased from the planned 43,000 to 

almost 80,000, in addition to about 26,-

000 civilians who had fled to Bataan to 

escape the invading army. Moving to Bataan enough food and supplies to keep so 

large a force in action for a period of 180 

days would have been extremely difficult 

under the most favorable circumstances. To 

accomplish it in about one week, during the 

confusion of war and retreat, proved to be 

an impossible task. 

Some preparations had been made for the 

transfer of supplies to Bataan even before 

the orders for a general withdrawal had 

been issued on the evening of 23 December. 

Lt. Col. Otto Harwood, a quartermaster 

officer, had gone to Limay on Bataan on 

14 December to disperse the defense reserves stored there the previous summer, 

and Col. Alva E. McConnell of the Philippine Quartermaster Depot had begun to 

ship small quantities of food and petroleum 

products to Bataan some days before the 

23d. Altogether Harwood received from 

Manila for storage on Bataan approximately 750,000 pounds of canned milk, 

20,000 pounds of vegetables, 40,000 gallons 

.. Col OUo Harwood, Storage of Supplies on 

Bataan, p. 1, App. A, QM Rpt of Opns; Stauffer, 

Quartermaster Operations in the War Against 

Japan, Ch. I. Mr. Stauffer's chapter, plus the QM 

Rpt of Opns, Annex XIII, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of 

Opns, and the appendixes to this report, especially 

the narratives in Appendix A, have been used in the 

preparation of this section. 
SETTING THE STAGE 

of gasoline, and 60,000 gallons of lubricating oils and greases. The Si-Kiang, bound 

for Indochina with 5,000,000 pounds of 

flour and large quantities of petroleum, was 

seized and brought to Bataan, but unfortunately was bombed and sunk before the 

flour could be unloaded.~· 

The large-scale movement of supplies to 

Bataan and Corregidor began after 23 

December. First Corregidor was stocked 

with enough reserves to supply 10,000 men 

for six months. This task required only one 

day since the island already had rations 

for 7,000 men. The movement of supplies to 

Bataan was more difficult, largely because 

of transportation problems, the brief period 

of time in which to accomplish the task, 

and the size of the shipments. 

The only land route to Bataan was the 

one heing used by the retreating troops. 

Until 31 December the roads to San Fernando and into the peninsula could be 

used, but with difficulty. The shortage of 

motor vehicles further limited the quantities of supplies that could be dispatched by 

this means. After that date the land route 

from Manila to Bataan was closed. The rail 

net north of Manila, the best in the archipelago, proved of limited value because of 

the shortage of rolling stock and the desertion of train and engine crews. 

There was no time to evacuate the depots 

in northern Luzon and scarcely time to get 

out part of the reserves from Forts McKinley and Stotsenburg. Many of the troops 

became afflicted with "withdrawal fever" 

and left behind much that they could have 

taken. At Stotsenburg, long before the Japanese were within striking distance, the post 

was evacuated. Food, clothing, and other 

.. Harwood, Storage of Supplit's on Bataan, pp. 

1-3, and Lt Col Irvin Alexandt'r, Supply Probl{'ms, 

p. 2, both in App. A, QM Rpt of Opns. 

255 

supplies, it is reported; were left behind by 

post personnel, to be picked up later hy the 

withdrawing troops. The same thing is supposed to have happened at Clark Field, 

adjacent to Stotsenburg, where 250,000 

gallons of aviation gasoline and several 

obsolete but serviceable planes were left behind."" North and South Luzon Force commanders were instructed to pick up whatever food they could on their way to Bataan, 

and to turn their supplies in when they 

reached the peninsula. "Not an ounce" 

was turned in, noted the quartermaster, although the divisions brought in between ten 

and twenty-five days' supply of food."G 

Most of the supplies for Bataan came 

from Manila, where the port area with its 

large warehouses and loaded ships was filled 

with stores of all kinds. Bataan, only thirty 

miles away across the bay, could be reached 

easily by almost every type of vessel. With the 

shortage of motor and rail transportation, 

water transport become the chief means of 

getting supplies from the capital to Bataan. 

The quartermaster's Army Transport Service, led by Col. Frederick A. Ward and 

starred largely by civilian volunteers, took 

over all the available barges, tugs, and 

launches and used them for the journey. 

The first two were slow, but they had the 

advantage of being easily unloaded at the 

three piers on Bataan where dock facilities 

were primitive. 

At the Manila end loadings were hampered by the Japanese bomhings of the port 

area between the 27th and 30th and the 

shortage of stevedores. The latter was partially overcome by the use of some two 

hundred American and British civilians 

who volunteered to work as dock hands. Altogether, a total of approximately 30,000 

so See above, Ch. X, p. 18. 

3' QM Rpt of Opns, p. 23. 
256 

tons of supplies was shipped to Bataan and 

Corregidor by barge and unloaded by the 

time the Japanese occupied Manila on 2 

January. 

Also loaded, but still lying out in the bay 

at this time, were another 150 barges and 3 

freighters. These vessels were unloaded during the weeks that followed at times when 

they would be safe from Japanese attack, 

usually at night. But large quantities of food, 

supplies of all kinds, and gasoline were left 

behind on the docks and in commercial storage. What the civilians in Manila did not 

take away with them just before the Japanese entered the city, the conquerors appropriated.31 

At the time the decision was made to 

withdraw to Bataan, ammunition and food 

appeared to be the most critical items of 

supply and they were accorded first priority. Second priority went to defense materials and to gasoline. All other supplies were 

given third priority. When rations and ammunition had been shipped, medical supplies, demolitions, barbed wire, and gasoline moved to the top of the priority list. 

The movement of ammunition and ordnance supply to Bataan progressed swiftly. 

Before the war all units had been issued one 

unit of fire and a second was issued when 

units moved into defensive positions along 

the beach. Some ordnance materials had 

been stored at Forts Stotsenburg and McKinley, but two thirds of the ammunition 

reserves, about 15,000 tons, as well as six 

carloads of replacement parts for the tanks, 

were already in Bataan on 8 December. 

During the last week of the year another 

15,000 tons of ammunition and ordnance 

at Col Ward, ATS Activities, Lt Col Michael A. 

Quinn, Motor Transport Service Activities, and Lt 

Col Richard G. Rogers, Traffic Control Opns, Apps. 

B, C, and E, QM Rpt of Opns. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

supplies were shipped to Bataan. An inventory of 5 January revealed that the supply of ammunition was satisfactory and 

that the shortages anticipated would not 

develop.s8 

The shortage of rations proved to be even 

more serious than expected, and from the 

start the scarcity of food was the most 

alarming fact in the situation of the 80,000 

troops on Bataan. The transfer of rice to 

Bataan had proved difficult because of 

Commonwealth regulations which stipulated that neither rice nor sugar could be 

removed from one province to another. 

When the time came to move supplies to 

Bataan, authority was requested to take 

these commodities but permission was not 

received in time. In this way 10,000,000 

pounds of rice at the Government Rice 

Central at Cabanatuan was lost. 39 Even the 

seizure of Japanese-owned stocks was prohibited. At Tarlac Lt. Col. Charles S. Lawrence, commander of the depot there, 

planned to take over about 2,000 cases of 

canned food, mostly fish and corned beef, as 

well as a considerable quantity of clothing 

that belonged to Japanese firms. He was 

informed by MacArthur's headquarters 

that he had no right to do so and that he 

would be court-martialed if he did. These 

supplies were later destroyed during operations. 40 

On 3 January an inventory of the food 

in the hands of the quartermaster on 

.. Gen McBride, Notes on the Fall of Bataan; 

Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 34, 

OCMH. General McBride, Service Command 

Luzon Force commander, died in prison camp. A 

copy of this report was borrowed from Colonel 

Selleck and is on file in OCMH. It will be hereafter cited as McBride, Notes on Bataan Service 

Command. 

•• QM Rpt of Opns, pp. 19-23. 

.. Lawrence, Tarlac Advance QM Depot Rpt of 

Opns, pp. 4-5, App. A, QM Rpt of Opns. 
SETTING THE STAGE 

Bataan was prepared. This inventory revealed that there was only a 30-day supply 

of unbalanced field rations for 100,000 

men, including a SO-day supply of canned 

meats and fish, 40 days of canned milk, 30 

of flour and canned vegetables (string 

beans and tomatoes), and 20 of rice, the 

most important element of the Philippine 

diet. There were some staples such as sugar, 

salt, pepper, lard, and syrup, but almost no 

fresh meat or fruit and only limited quantities of canned fruits, coffee, potatoes, 

onions, and cereals.41 

The necessity for drastic action was apparent. On 5 January MacArthur approved 

the recommendation of his quartermaster, 

General Drake, that the troops and civilians 

on Bataan and Corregidor be placed on halfrations, and the necessary instructions were 

issued to the local commanders.42 

The half-ration, containing about 2,000 

calories, half the normal requirements of an 

active man, was obviously inadequate to 

the needs of fighting troops who had to work 

as much as twenty hours a day, under the 

most difficult conditions and in the worst 

kind of climate and terrain. Fortunately 

many of the men had accumulated food 

during the withdrawal and this supply was 

used to supplement the meager diet. Colonel 

Mallonee, instructor of the 21st Field Artillery (PA), for example, had a case and 

a half of mixed canned goods, forehandedly purchased before the withdrawal. On 

his way past Fort Stotsenburg he picked up 

another half case. Although he gave part of 

his private stock to some of his fellow officers, he kept a large portion of the two cases 

for himself. Yet, with this additional sup41 Inventory of Rations, 3 Jan 42, AG 430.2 (3 

Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to CG Bataan Service Command,5 Jan 42, AG 430 (25 Dee 41) Phil Reds. 

257 

ply of food, he wrote, "I had to do a tailoring job on my waistband twice .... " 4a 

Heroic measures to augment the food 

supply were obviously necessary if the 

troops on Bataan were to hold out for the 

required six-month period. No sooner had 

the withdrawal been completed than the 

quartermaster began to exploit every possible resource on the peninsula to increase 

his stores. Fortunately, it was the harvest 

season and the rice stood ripe in the fields. 

It was only necessary to bring it to the mills, 

which the engineers were ordered to build 

near Limay. Plans were made to secure 

fresh meat by slaughtering carabao, the 

Philippine draft animal, and a large abattoir was established by the veterinarians. 

In addition, the units in the field butchered 

whatever carabao or other animals they 

could capture. A fishery was established at 

Lamao, and plans were made to utilize the 

catch of the local fishermen who went out 

each night until prevented from doing so by 

Japanese fire. Salt was secured by boiling 

sea water in large iron cauldrons. Before the 

troops had been on Bataan long, no local 

resource that would yield any additional 

amount of food was being overlooked." 

So serious was the shortage of food after 

the first few weeks on Bataan that the search 

for food assumed more importance than the 

presence of the enemy to the front. Every 

man became a hunter, and rifle shots could 

be heard at all hours far from the Japanese 

lines. Lt. Col. Irvin Alexander, a quartermaster officer, wrote: 

Any carabao which was encountered in the 

jungle was classed as wild and neither his an-

.. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 12 . 

.. Frank Hewlett, "Quartermasters on Bataan," 

Quartermaster Review, XXI (May-June 1942), 

64; Capt Harold A. Arnold, "The Lesson of Bataan," Quartermaster Review, XXVI (NovemberDecember 1942),14. 
258 

ccstry nor his ownership was investigated. 

The wild game was not too numerous and it 

was very shy so that only the cunning and 

lucky hunters were successful in bringing in 

meat. Lack of success did not discourage the 

hunters. . . . One Filipino... caught a 

snake and ate it one day to die unpleasantly 

the next. There were always plenty of experimenters ready to try any kind of native flora 

or fauna which might prove edible ... although the experimenting individual frequently paid a high price.45 

The supply of clothing on Bataan, while 

not as alarming as the shortage of food, was 

just as limited. It had been scanty at the 

beginning of the war and was almost gone 

by the time the men reached Bataan. The 

regular garrison of U.S. Army troops and 

Philippine Scouts had been comparatively 

well clad when they took the field, but the 

Philippine Army had been only partially 

clothed and equipped. Those who had been 

inducted before the war were far more fortunate than the Filipinos mobilized after 

hostilities began. The uniforms and equipment of these men consisted of odds and 

ends, whatever was on hand for issue and 

whatever they could salvage or buy. Early 

in January the Quartermaster had only 

10,000 pairs of trousers and shorts and an 

equal number of shirts and blue denim 

suits. Obviously this amount of clothing was 

hardly enough for 80,000 men fighting in 

heavy jungle and mountains, in a wet climate where days were hot and nights cold, 

and where tangled vegetation quickly tore 

shirts and trousers. The army service shoe, of 

which there were 50,000 pairs on Bataan, 

was of little use to the Filipino soldier whose 

feet were too narrow for footgear built on 

American lasts. 

The absence· of mosquito netting, shelter 

halves, blankets, and sun helmets was as 

"Alexander, Supply Problems, p. 5, App. A, 

QM Rpt of Opns. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

serious as the shortage of clothing. The physical deterioration of the troops and the high 

incidence of malaria, hookworm, and other 

diseases were caused as much perhaps by 

the lack of proper protection against the 

weather and the jungle as the unbalanced 

and deficient diet. 

Provision had been made in war plans 

for a general hospital on Bataan. At Limay, 

where the defense reserves were stored, all 

supplies for the hospital were already assembled when the order to withdraw was 

given. General Hospital No.1 was established on 23 December and before the end 

of the month another general hospital was 

organized not far from Cabcaben. The 

medical depot in Manila, where supplies 

and equipment for a 1O,000-bed hospital 

center had been established at the start of 

the war, began to transfer this vast accumulation of. medical supplies to Bataan 

after the 23d. But only enough was brought 

in to assure an adequate supply of drugs 

and medical equipment for the first part of 

the siege of Bataan. By the end of February 

a critical shortage of several drugs, the most 

important of which was quinine, had already developed. 46 

The supply of petroleum products on Bataan was adequate for several months if 

strict economy was practiced. During the 

first week or two on Bataan there was no 

control over the use of gasoline. When it 

was discovered that stocks were being depleted at the rate of 14,000 gallons a day, 

the supply was closely rationed. Ultimately 

the consumption of gasoline was reduced to 

4,000, then 3,000 gallons daily. 

•• Col Wibb E. Cooper, Medical Dept Activities 

in Phil, pp. 54-56, 57, 78, Annex XIV, 

USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns; McBride, Notes on 

Bataan Service Command, pp. 113-14; ltr, Col 

Harold W. Glattly to Ward, 8 Jan 52, OCMH. 
SETTING THE STAGE 

Motor vehicles were much sought after 

on Bataan. The various services and units 

commandeered vehicles for their own use 

and hijacking of both vehicles and loads 

was common. The provost marshal did his 

best to stop this practice, with little success. 

Finally, all vehicles except those organic 

to units were ordered into motor pools. 

When the order failed to bring in the vehicles, a search and seizure system was inaugurated. The military police stopped vehicles and if the drivers could not prove that 

they were on a legitimate mission they were 

directed to one of the motor pools. But most 

of the vehicles had been well hidden and 

the most careful search failed to locate them. 

Only later, when gasoline was rationed and 

the units could not operate the vehicles, were 

they turned in.47 

Engineer supply, like that of the other 

services, was limited and carefully controlled. The engineers had managed to ship 

to Bataan and Corregidor more than 

10,000 tons of their supplies, in addition to 

organizational equipment, by the end of 

December.48 These included 350 tons of explosives, 800 tons of valuable barbed wire, 

200 tons of burlap bags for use as sandbags, 

and large quantities of lumber, construction 

material, and depot stocks. During the withdrawal, engineer supplies had been evacuated from advance depots along the route 

of retreat and moved to Lubao, a short distance north of Bataan. From there they 

were to be transferred to two locations on 

Bataan. Despite congestion along the roads, 

the shortage of transportation, and the confusion of retreat, the final evacuation of enOf McBride, Notes on Bataan Service Command, 

p. 113 . •• The material on engineer supply is derived from 

Engineers in the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945, Vol. 

I, Engineers in Theater Operations, p. 19, and 

Vol. III, Engineer Suppl'Y, pp. 6, 9, and 11. 

259 

gineer supplies from the Lubao depot was 

completed by 6 January. 

The first engineer troops to reach Bataan 

were put to work immediately on airfield 

construction to accommodate the few 

fighter craft still left and those which, it was 

hoped, might yet arrive from the United 

States, Work was also begun on access roads 

to the main highway along the east coast 

of Bataan and on a lateral road from east 

to west across the slopes of the Mariveles 

Mountains. 49 

The main work on fortifications along 

the front was performed by the infantry 

and artillery, but the engineers improved 

these positions, strung wire, and laid mines. 

They maintained roads and bridges and 

prepared demolition charges where necessary. In addition to serving the troops along 

the front, they built camps for the 26,000 

civilians who had taken refuge on Bataan, 

sawmills to provide lumber for buildings 

and bridges, and rice mills to feed the men. 

The greatest handicap to engineer activity 

was the lack of trained engineer troops. 

Civilian labor was used wherever possible, 

but there was no substitute for trained engineer officers. So small was their number that 

in one instance a civilian served for a time as 

the commander of an engineer battalion.50 

The shortage of supplies of all types, and 

especially of food, had a greater effect on 

the outcome of the siege of Bataan than any 

other single factor. "Each day's combat, 

each day's output of physical energy," 

wrote one officer in his diary, "took its toll 

of the human body-a toll which could not 

be repaired. ." 51 When this fact is 

understood, he added, the story of Bataan 

is told. 

.. Engineer Supp1'Y, p. 9, n. 6. 

.. Engineers in Theater Operations, p. 19. 

11 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 16. 
BRIDGES ON BATAAN. Top left, straw ready to be set on fire is piled over a 

wooden bridge; top right, remains of a steel bridge; bottom, foundation for a 

temporary bridge is prepared. 
SETIING THE STAGE 

The Enemy and His Plan 

While General MacArthur's force on 

Luzon was preparing the defenses of Bataan, the enemy 14th Army was being reorganized. Original Japanese plans had 

called for the reduction of Luzon fifty days 

after the start of war. At that time the 48th 

Division, Homma's best unit, and most of 

the 5th Air Group were to leave the Philippines for operations elsewhere. The mopup would be left to a garrison unit, the 65th 

Brigade, and the 16th Division. The brigade, with attached service and supply 

troops, was to reach Luzon on the forty-fifth 

day of operations, 22 January.52 

Sometime late in December, Gen. Count 

Hisaichi Terauchi, Southern Army commander, and Admiral Kondo, commanding 

the 2d Fleet, jointly recommended to Imperial General Headquarters that 16th 

Army's invasion of Java be advanced about 

one month ahead of schedule. This suggestion found willing listeners in Tokyo. Reasoning that such a move would result in 

the rapid occupation of the Southwest Pacific while the Allies were still off balance, 

and noting the success of Homma's forces 

in the Philippines, Imperial General Headquarters approved the Terauchi-Kondo 

proposal and ordered the transfer of the 

48th Division to 16th Army at a much 

earlier date than originally planned. On 2 

January, as 14th Army units entered Manila, General Homma received notice from 

Southern Army that the 48th Division 

would soon be transferred. Orders for the 

transfer of the division as well as the 5th 

Air Group reached Manila during the next 

few days, and on 5 January staff officers of 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 24-25. 

261 

Southern Army arrived in the Philippines 

to supervise the transfer. 58 

In the opinion of 14th Army the transfer 

of ground and air troops from the Philippines showed a lack of understanding of the 

situation by, higher headquarters. 54 Actually, both Southern Army and Imperial 

General Headquarters recognized that this 

early redeployment might jeopardize operations in the Philippines, but they were willing to take this risk in order to hasten the 

attack on Java and free themselves for any 

move by the Soviet Union. "Difficulties 

would undoubtedly arise in the future in 

the Philippines," the Japanese believed, 

"but the Southern Army thought that the 

Philippines could be taken care of after the 

conclusion of the campaign in Java." 55 

The removal of the 48th Division from 

Homma's command at a date earlier than 

originally planned might well have left him 

with only the 16th Division to open the attack against Bataan. Fortunately for the 

Japanese cause, Homma had ordered the 

65th Brigade to make ready for departure 

from Takao in Formosa only a week after 

the start of hostilities. This decision to embark the brigade somewhat sooner than 

scheduled was made without reference to 

the early departure of the 48th but was apparently based on the unexpected lack of 

American resistance to the initial landings 

•• 14th Army Opns, I, 73, 75, 77; Statement of 

Maeda,2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56234, Interrogations 

of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ 

FEC, II; USA vs. Homma, p. 3225, testimony of 

Homma; Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 40, 

41; Southern Army Opns, p. 16. 

M 14th Army Opns, I, 75; Interrog of Col Motoo 

Nakayama, 14th Army Senior Opns Officer, Apr 47, 

Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil 

Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I. 

U Southern Army Opns, p. 16 • 
262 

in northern Luzon.oo On 27 December, 

Homma ordered Lt. Gen. Akira Nara, the 

brigade commander, to sail from Takao 

with all the troops then scheduled to reinforce 14th Army. Delayed in his departure by a typhoon, N ara finally set sail with 

his convoy of fourteen ships and naval escort 

on 30 December. At 1400 on New Year's 

Day the troops began to debark at Lingayen 

Gulf.57 

The day the 65th Brigade landed in the 

Philippines it was ordered to move by foot 

to Tarlac. Within three days advance elements had entered the town. On the 6th 

the brigade reached Angeles and began to 

concentrate along Route 74, as far south as 

Porac. 58 "They had made their march," remarked General N ara proudly of his troops, 

"but were footsore and exhausted." 511 

Southern Army had stripped General 

Homma of some of his best ground and air 

units just before the start of the battle of 

Bataan. All he had left was the 16th Division, which "did not have a very good reputation" for its "fighting qualities," the 65th 

Brigade, the 7th Tank Regiment, supporting arms and services, and a small air unit 

of less than seventy fighters, bombers, and 

reconnaissance planes.6o Only in the air 

were the Japanese assured of superiority. 

The brigade which replaced the welltrained and equipped 48th Division was, in 

the words of its commander, "absolutely 

unfit for combat duty." 61 Organized in 

" 14th Army Opns, I, 39. 

or Ibid., 32, 60-61, 65. One regiment of the brigade landed at Laoag or Vigan. The rest of the 

force landed between San Fabian and Mabilao. 

'8 Ibid., 66, 73, 75-76, 91; 65th Brig Opns Rpt, 

Mt. Natib, pp. 2-3. 

59 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 2. .. The quotation is from USA VJ. Homma, p. 

3057, testimony of Homma. See also p. 3232; and 

5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 50-51. 

01 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 3. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

early 1941 as a garrison unit, it had a total 

strength of about 6,500 men. Its three infantry regiments, the 122d, 141st and 142d 

Infantry, consisted of but two battalions, 

each organized into three rifle compani.es 

and one machine gun company. The 

brigade had few vehicles and no artillery 

unit, but at least one of the regiments and 

possibly the others had a battery of field 

artillery. Organic to the brigade was a field 

hospital, an engineer unit, and a signal unit 

no larger than a "telegraph platoon." The 

majority of the enlisted men were conscripts 

and the month of training at Formosa was 

entirely inadequate. Unit training had progressed only as far as the company.62 

General Homma and the majority of the 

14th Army staff believed that American resistance on Bataan would be weak and that 

operations there would be quickly concluded. The plan for the attack, therefore, 

was conceived of as a pursuit rather than an 

assault against a strongly fortified position 

in depth.63 

This conception was confirmed by intelligence reports. The 14th Army staff estimated that MacArthur had 40,000 to 

45,000 men, about 40 tanks, and a few 

fighter planes on Bataan and Corregidor. 

On Bataan alone, Homma was told by his 

intelligence officer, there were only 25,000 

men. The American "regular" 31st Division and the "fortress unit" on Corregidor 

were believed to total 35,000 while the remnants of the Philippine Army units altogether comprised 5,000 to to,OOO more. Reports received from air reconnaissance gave 

.. Ibid.; 14th Army Opns, I, 66, 73, 97. 

"Statement of Maeda, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 

56234, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, 

Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEe, II. No orders dealing 

with the forthcoming operation were received from 

Southern Army or Imperial General HeadquarterJ 

at this time. 
SETTING THE STAGE 

no reason to believe that the Americans and 

Filipinos had constructed any strong installations on Bataan. 

The physical condition of the troops on 

Bataan was believed to be poor. All units 

in combat had been badly cut up, rations 

had been reduced by half, and the entire 

American-Filipino army was on a skimpy 

two-meals-a-day diet. Desertions by Filipino 

troops were believed to be heavy and the 

Japanese fully believed that the Americans 

had taken strong measures to halt these desertions and the surrender of individuals. In 

support of these conclusions they pointed 

out that the bodies of Philippine soldiers 

had been found tied to trees.64 

With this picture of the enemy, it is not 

surprising that General Homma believed 

the capture of the peninsula would be an 

easy task. His estimate of the American 

scheme of defense was that MacArthur's 

forces would make their strong stand 

around Mariveles and then withdraw to 

Corregidor. Seizure of the island fortress 

would not be easy and a "sea blockade" 

might be necessary before the island would 

be reduced. On the whole, "the threat of 

enemy resistance was taken lightly" by 14th 

Army.65 

On the theory that the campaign would 

be a light one, Homma assigned the seizure 

of Bataan to the inexperienced and untrained 65th Brigade. His plan was to have 

the brigade advance in two columns, one 

along the east coast through Abucay to 

Balanga and the other down the opposite 

shore through Moron to Bagac. Once these 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 87,89; USA vs. Homma, 

p. 3057, testimony of Homma. 

.. Interrog of Maeda, 10 May 47, Interrogations 

of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ 

FEe, I. "General Homma," remarked his chief of 

staff, "thought only in terms of continuing the 

pursuit." 

263 

objectives had been taken, Nara was to 

send the main force of his brigade south 

from Balanga, while a smaller force drove 

on from Bagac. Both were to push towards 

Mariveles, the 14th Army operation order 

read, "with the annihilation of the enemy 

on Bataan Peninsula as their objective." 66 

Attached to the 65th Brigade for the Bataan operation were infantry, artillery, armor, and service units of all types. From 

the 16th Division came the 9th Infantry, 

a battalion of field artillery (7S-mm. guns), 

an engineer regiment, and a medical unit. 

The 48th Division supplied two battalions 

of artillery (7S-mm. mountain guns), 

which were pulled out a short time later. 

Armored support consisted of the 7th Tank 

Regiment, and artillery support was furnished by Army: 1st Field Heavy Artillery 

Regiment (ISO-mm. howitzers), the 8th 

Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (lOS-mm. 

guns), and the 9th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion ( lSO-mm. howitzers) . 

Service and support units from Army completed the force available to General Nara 

for the forthcoming operation.o7 

Direct support for the 65th Brigade's operations on Bataan was to be provided by 

the air unit under Col. Komataro Hoshi.6

" 

This unit was made responsible for reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and support 

missions. Starting on 10 January it was to 

base at Clark Field and from that date 

through the 13th was to attack I Corps artillery positions, the airstrips on Bataan, and 

.. 14th Army Opns Order, Series A, No. 155, 

1200, 11 Jan 42, and 65th Brig Opns Order, Series 

A, No. 42, 1800, 8 Jan 42, both in 65th Brig Opns 

Rpt, Mt. Natib, Apps. 20 and 3, respectively. 

., Ibid., p. 7, and 14th Army Opns Order, Series 

A, No. 138,0800,7 Jan 42, App .. 1. 

.. 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 47-51. The air unit consisted of 11 fighters, 21 reconnaissance, liaison, and 

artillery observation planes, 36 light bombers, and 

a number of service units. 
264 

installations m the Mariveles area. 69 The 

16th Division was to "cooperate" with the 

65th Brigade by "sending a portion of the 

division to occupy the strategic ground in 

the vicinity of Ternate and Nasugbu." 70 

The occupation of Ternate, on the south 

shore of Manila Bay, and of Nasugbu to its 

south would have the effect of cutting communication between Corregidor and southern Luzon. 

At noon 4 January General Homma had 

ordered the 65th Brigade to move down 

Route 74 to the main battle position to relieve the 48th Division and take command 

of the Takahashi Detachment and the 9th 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 89. 

1°14th Army Opns Order, Series A. No. 155, 

1200,11 Jan 42. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion. 

Nara apparently understood then that his 

unit was to relieve the 48th Division, for his 

orders were to "destroy the enemy," send his 

main force toward Balanga, and make a 

secondary effort toward Olongapo.71 Final 

orders for the relief of the 48th Division 

were issued at 0800 of the 7th. At that time 

General N ara was again instructed to move 

toward Olongapo and Balanga. By 1800 of 

8 January the brigade had completed its 

relief of the 48th and was concentrated 

between Dinalupihan and Hermosa, preparing to attack.72 The next afternoon the 

assault would begin. 

" 14th Army Opns, 1,73-74 . 

10 65th Brig Opns Order, Series A, No. 42, and 

14th Army Opns Order, Series A, No. 138, both 

cited above; 14th Army Opns, I, 91. 
CHAPTER XVI 

The First Battle of Bataan 

The Japanese opened the battle for Bataan at 1500 on 9 January with a concentrated barrage directed against II Corps. 

As "the roar of artillery ... shook the northern portion of the Bataan peninsula," the 

Japanese infantry moved out to the attack.' 

General Nara's plan of attack, based on 

14th Army's order to make the main effort 

on the east, rested on two misconceptions: 

first, that the American and Filipino troops 

had been so weakened during the withdrawal that opposition would be light; and second, that the II Corps line was farther north 

than was actually the case. General N ara's 

misapprehension on the first point was 

quickly corrected when II Corps artillery 

replied, "particularly ferociously," to the 

opening barrage. Tons of explosive hurtling 

down on the advancing Japanese, ranged 

along the East Road and backed up four 

miles on Route 7, made abundantly clear 

the American determination to stand and 

fight. 2 

The initial Japanese error in locating the 

II Corps line was corrected only as the 

battle developed. In drawing up his plan of 

attack, General Nara had placed Parker's 

left flank in the vicinity of Mt. Santa Rosa, 

about three miles above its actual location. 

The American outpost line, he estimated, 

extended along the high ground immediately below Hermosa, an error of three to 

1 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 15. 

2 Quintard, 30lst FA (PA), p. 5; Quintard, CO 

30lst FA (PA), Diary p. 5; Shreve, Diary, pp. 

21-22. 

four miles. Thus, in making his plans for 

the major drive down the east side of the 

peninsula, N ara assumed he would meet the 

I [ Corps outposts soon after the attack 

opened. On these· assumptions he ordered 

his troops to advance to a line extending 

east and west of Album, with the main effort on the west to "overwhelm the enemy's 

left flank." At the same time, a part of the 

force was to swing wide in an encircling 

movement to take II Corps in the rear. Simultaneously, a secondary thrust by a 

smaller force would be made down the west 

side of the peninsula against I Corps.3 

F or the attack General N ara organized 

his reinforced brigade and attached units 

into three regimental combat teams and a 

reserve. Against II Corps he sent two regiments 'supported by tanks and artillery. 

Forming the brigade left (east) was Col. 

Takeo Imai's 1415t Infantry, supported by 

a battalion of mountain artillery, a battery 

of antitank guns, plus engineer and signal 

troops. Starting from positions near Hermosa, Colonel Imai's force was to advance 

southward down the East Road as far as the 

Calaguiman River. It would have strong 

support, if needed, from the 7th Tank Regiment which had spearheaded the attack 

against Baliuag and Plaridel at the end of 

December. In this first attack on Bataan, 

the tanks would remain in the rear until the 

• Description of the Japanese plan is based on 

65th Brig Opns Order, Series A, No. 42, 1800, 

8 Jan 42, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, App. 

3, pp. 44-48. 
266 

engineers had repaired the bridges and removed the roadblocks along the East Road. 

General Nara's hopes for a quick victory 

rested on the combat team that was sent 

against the western portion of the II Corps 

line. This force, under Col. Susumu Takechi, consisted of the experienced 9th Infantry, reinforced by a battalion of artillery, an antitank gun battery, plus service 

and support troops. Takechi's orders were 

to "overwhelm" Parker's left flank, take Album, then send an encircling force around 

the flank to join Colonel Imai's 141st Infantry coming down the East Road. To assure the success of this maneuver Nara 

placed his reserve, the 142d Infantry, behind the 9th along the narrow trail leading 

from Dinalupihan to Album, in position to 

exploit the expected breakthrough of Takechi's troops. 

Artillery support for the advance against 

I I Corps would be provided by Col. Gen 

!rie's Army artillery, attached to the brigade for the operation. 4 The guns were initially emplaced north of Hermosa, in position to fire direct support and counterbattery missions. As the battle progressed the 

artillery would be displaced forward to Orani. Additional support for the 9th Infantry 

would be furnished by a field artillery battalion advancing eastward from Olongapo 

along Route 7. 

Against I Corps on the western side of 

Bataan, General N ara sent his third regimental combat team, built around the 122d 

Infantry, and led by Col. Yunosuke Watanabe. \Vatanabe's mission was to advance 

west along Route 7 to Olongapo, then south 

to Moron. From there he would prepare 

to advance on Bagac, western terminus of 

the one lateral road across Bataan. Nara 

• The attached artillery consisted of the 1st and 

8th Field H eauy Artillery Regiments and the 9th 

Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion. Colonel 

Irie was commander of the first-named unit. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

apparently did not expect any resistance 

above Bagac and was not even certain that 

he would meet any there. 

By early afternoon of 9 January all troops 

were in position, tensely awaiting the zero 

hour. General N ara himself was at Dinalupihan. At 1500 the big guns opened up. 

Attack Against II Corps: The Abucay Line 

The II Corps line, called the Abucay 

line, extended from Mabatang on Manila 

Bay to the northeast slopes of M t. N atib. 

(M ap 11) On the east, guarding the East 

Road, stood the well-trained Scouts of the 

57th Infantry. To their left was the untried 

41 st Division (P A) , once briefly part of the 

South Luzon Force and now in position 

along the Mt. Natib trail and Balantay 

River, defending the center of the Abucay 

line. 5 Holding the western portion of the 

corps line was General Jones's 51 st Division (P A), weakened by the long withdrawal from south Luzon. With its left 

resting on the jungled slopes of Mt. Natib, 

the division held a line along the north bank 

of the Balantay River as far east as Abucay 

Hacienda, a raised clearing in the jungle 

about five miles west of the town of Abucay. 

At its western extremity the line consisted 

of little more than scattered foxholes. 

The Japanese attack began on schedule. 

At 1500 Colonel Imai's men started down 

the East Road but had not advanced far 

• The Mt. ~atib trail extended from Mabatang 

westward to the slopes of Mt. ~atib. The 57th Infantry and part of the 41 st Division had placed their 

main line of resistance along this trail. Farther 

west the trail ran below the main line of resistance. 

The Balantay River appears in many sources and 

on some maps as the Lavantan or Labangan River. 

A tributary of the Calaguiman River, it is formed 

by two streams joining about a mile west of Abucay 

Hacienda; it then flows northeast until it joins 

the Calaguiman. The Balantay is shallow and 

easily fordable; its virtue as a military obstacle was 

due to the fact that it flows through a deep gorge. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

THE ABUCAY LINE 9 -23 January 1942 

...... 

mmrmmmmm U S POSITIONS (APPROlC I. 9 JANUARY 

~ MAIN JAPANESE PENETRATION 

£ I, yqlions in ,", 

MAP 11 

before they were met by punishing fire from 

II Corps artillery which had the road under 

interdiction.

6 To the west the movement of 

the 9th Infantry was unopposed and 

Colonel Takechi reached the vicinity of Album without any difficulty or opposition. 

• Probably more has been written on the fight at 

Abucay than on any other episode in the Philippine 

campaign. T he sources for the action of each unit 

will be cited in the appropriate place but the fight 

as a whole can be reconstructed from 65th Brig 

...... . ' 

."f{#+ 

; .. ~ "" '. +:0 ......... -..... .. ...... -.a •• ",tI> u;'OI 

: .. Salonga 

~,.p > RE5[AV[ . Boni · : 

267 

The only infantry contact during the day 

came when a reconnaissance patrol of the 

57th Infantry met a Japanese patrol below 

Hermosa. After a brief fire fight the Scouts 

had withdrawn. 

Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 15- 30; 14th Army Opns, 

I, 88- 92 ; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 29-

'35 ; Lt Col Edmund J. Lilly, Jr., Rpt of Opns, 57th 

Inf (PS), 8 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, pp. 3-4, copy in 

OCMH ; Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events, 

pp. 2-4. 
268 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

INSPECTION. General MacArthur and Brig. Gen. Albert M. Jones with members 

of their staffs, 10 January 1942. 

General Nara, who had expected to hit 

the II Corps outpost line on the first day 

of the battle, was greatly encouraged 

by the progress of his units. Both the 

l4ist Infantry and the 9th Infantry sent 

back optimistic reports of their advances, 

and Nara incorrectly concluded that the 

Americans had "made a general withdrawal" and "fled into the jungle without 

putting up a fight." 7 

On the evening of the 9th Wainwright 

and Parker received orders from Corregidor to have all their general officers assembled to receive an important visitor the 

next morning.8 At the first light of dawn a 

PT boat carried General MacArthur and 

'65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 16. 

• Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 49. 

Only Wainwright mentions the order directing him 

to assemble the general officers. It is assumed that 

Parker received similar orders. 

his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Richard K. 

Sutherland, across the channel from Corregidor to Mariveles. From there they drove 

up the East Road to Parker's headquarters 

where they talked with II Corps officers and 

inspected positions in that sector. Moving 

west across the Pilar-Bagac road MacArthur met Wainwright and inspected 

I Corps installations. When Wainwright 

offered to show MacArthur his ISS-mm. 

guns, MacArthur replied, "I don't want to 

see them. I want to hear them." 9 

The Japanese unwittingly chose the day 

of MacArthur's visit to Bataan to make 

their first demand for surrender. In a mes-

"Ibid., p. 50; Hunt, MacArthur and the War 

Against Japan, pp. 52-53; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt 

of Opns, p. 45. Colonel Mallonee recalls MacArthur's answer to Wainwright as, "Don't need to 

see 'em. I hear 'em." Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 

S!. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BAT AAN 

sage addressed to the American commander 

and dropped from the air behind the American lines, General Homma told MacArthur that his men were doomed and the end 

near. "The question," he declared, "is how 

long you will be able to resist. You have 

already cut rations by half. . . . Your prestige and honor have been upheld. However, 

in order to avoid needless bloodshed and 

save your . . . troops you are advised to 

surrender. ... Failing that our offensive 

will be continued with inexorable 

force. . . ." 10 

The only answer the Japanese received to 

their request for surrender was an increase 

in the volume of artillery fire from II Corps. 

To avoid the interdiction fire on the 

East Road, Colonel Imai shifted the bulk of 

his 141st Infantry to the west on the 10th, 

with the result that his regiment split into 

two columns. The easternmost column, consisting of the 2d Battalion (less two companies), continued to advance down the 

East Road toward the 57th Infantry; the 

western column, containing the rest of the 

regiment, advanced against the 41st Division. Late on the afternoon of the 10th, 

the 2d Battalion struck the 57th Infantry 

outpost line just below Sarnal, and after a 

brief fire fight the Scouts fell back. Though 

unopposed by infantry, the 2d Battalion, 

hindered by artillery fire, was able to advance only as far as the narrow Calaguiman 

River, about 1,800 yards below Samal. To 

,. MacArthur quoted the Japanese message in a 

radio to the War Department, 27 Jan 42, WPD, 

Ready Reference File. On the reverse side of his 

meSS'lge to MacArthur, General Homma later wrote 

a separate warning for the Philippine troops. In it 

he advised the Filipinos to save their "dear lives" 

by throwing away their weapons and surrendering 

before it was too late. "MacArthur had stupidly 

refused our proposal," declared Homma, "and 

continues futile struggle at the cost of your precious 

lives." 

269 

the west the rest of the 14ist infantry, 

under less intense artillery fire but delayed 

by the rugged terrain, finally reached the 

41 st Division outpost line along the Calaguiman River four miles west of the East 

Road, sometime during the night of 10-11 

January.ll 

The 57th Infantry, under the comm2.nd 

of Col. George S. Clarke, was the first unit 

on the II Corps line to come under heavy 

infantry attack. Along the main line of resistance were the 1 st Battalion on the right 

and the 3d Battalion on the left. The 2d 

Battalion was in reserve. On 11 January 

a reinforced company of the reserve battalion, which had established an outpost 

line south of the Calaguiman, came under 

attack by the advance elements of Colonel 

Imai's eastern column, the 2d Battalion, 

141st Infantry. Soon the Japanese began to 

cross the Calaguiman, about one mile north 

of the main line of resistance. By 2300 the 

Japanese battalion had reached a cane field 

on the left front of the 57th's 3d Battalion, 

directly before Company 1. This cane field, 

about 150 yards in front of the main line 

of resistance, had not been cleared on the 

U The account of the action on the right of the 

II Corps line is based upon: Olson, Opns of the 

57th Inf (PS) at Abucay, pp. 10-17; Brown, Opns 

of 57th Inf (PS) at Abucay, pp. 9-12; Capt William C. Anderson, Hist of 57th Inf (PS), pp. 2-5, 

Chunn Notebooks; Capt Harry J. Stempin, Opns of 

Co G, 57th Inf (PS), 7 Dec 41-30 Jan 42, pp. 9-12, 

and Maj William E. Webb, Opns of 41st Inf (PA) 

in Defense of Abucay Line, 10-18 Jan 42, pp. 15-

21 (both are papers prepared for Advanced Officers Course in 1946-47 and 1949-50, respectively, 

The Infantry School) ; Lt Col Harold K. Johnson, 

"Defense Along the Abucay Line," Military Review 

(February 1949), pp. 50-51; Col Malcolm V. 

Fortier, Notes on 41st Div (PA), pp. 1-2; memo, 

Lt Col Frank F. Carpenter, Jr., Asst <1-4 USAFFE, 

for G-4 USAFFE, 14 Jan 42, sub: Rpt of Inspection Trip, 13 Jan 42, AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil 

Reds; unsigned account of the 41st Div (PA), 

pp.2-4. 
270 

assumption that artillery would effectively 

prevent its use by the enemy as a route of 

approach. 

That night the Japanese in the cane field 

moved out against the main line of lesistance. First came an artillery and mortar 

barrage, which was answered by concentrated fire from the 7S-mm. guns of the 24th 

Field Artillery (PS). Hardly had the 24th 

opened fire than the Japanese infantry 

jumped off in a banzai attack across the 

moonlit patch of ground in front of Company I. Wave after wave of screaming J apanese troops hurled themselves forward in 

the face of intense fire. Men in the leading 

wave threw themselves on the barbed wire 

entanglements, forming human bridges 

over which succeeding waves could pass. 

Despite the appalling effects of the pointblank fire from the 75's, the Japanese continued their ferocious attack until Company 

I, its commander seriously wounded and its 

executive officer killed, finally gave ground. 

Company K on the right immediately refused its flank and the battalion commander 

threw his reserve, Company L, into the 

fight. When this force failed to halt the 

Japanese, Colonel Clarke committed a 

company of the reserve battalion and the 

Japanese attack stalled. At the approach of 

dawn, the Scouts began a counterattack 

which took them almost to the original line. 

When the action was broken off on the 

morning of the 12th, there were an estimated 200 to 300 dead Japanese on the 

field of battle. 

During the night a number of Japanese 

had infiltrated into the 3d Battalion area, 

on the left of the regimental line. The 57th 

Infantry spent most of the next day routing 

out the infiltrators, man by man, in handto-hand combat. After a number of Scouts 

had been killed, a more efficient scheme for 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the elimination of the infiltrated Japanese 

was devised. Sniper parties consisting of 

riflemen assisted by demolition engineers 

were formed and these began to comb the 

3d Battalion area systematically. By the end 

of the day most of the Japanese had been 

found and killed. It was as a result of his 

action as the leader of one of these sniper 

parties that 2d Lt. Alexander R. Nininger, 

Jr., was posthumously awarded the Medal 

of Honor. His was the first of World War 

II, although Calugas received his award for 

heroism in the earlier fight at Layac 

Junction. 

The Japanese advance in other sectors 

had been even less successful than that of 

the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry. The remainder of Imai's regiment in front of the 

41 st Division had begun to exert pressure 

against the outpost line on the night of lOII January. Unable to make progress here, 

it had continued to move westward in search 

of a soft spot in the line. By late afternoon 

of the 11 th Colonel Imai stood before the 

43d Infantry on the left of the 41st Division 

line. 

The 9th Infantry had also drifted far 

from its original axis of advance. Despite 

the lack of opposition Takechi's advance 

through the jungle of central Bataan was 

slow. By the morning of the 11th his 2d 

Battalion had progressed only as far as the 

Orani River, two miles from the 51st Division line. The rest of the regiment had taken 

the wrong road and marched east until it 

was now only a few thousand yards northwest of Sarna!, almost behind the 141 st instead of to its right. 

It is not surprising that the Japanese had 

become lost during the advance. Not only 

were they hindered and confused by the 

difficult terrain, but they were further 

handicapped by the lack of adequate maps. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

"Imperfect maps," General Nara later 

wrote, "were the greatest drawback as far 

as directing the battle was concerned." He 

had difficulty also in maintaining communications with his forward units, largely because his signal unit was inexperienced and 

the men frequently became lost in the jungle. American artillery imposed further difficulties on communications and he complained that "an hour of [radio] conversation a day was considered good, but even 

this was not always possible." 12 

It was not until the evening of 11 J anuary that General N ara received enough 

information to form an approximately correct estimate of his position. It was clear by 

now that the Americans intended to resist 

his advance and that this resistance would 

be far stronger than he had expected. His 

units had strayed from their original paths, 

their gains had been small, and they were 

becoming disorganized. "Besides the fact 

that the front line force was hampered by 

the terrain and that the control of the heavy 

weapons and artillery forces was very poor," 

lamented Nara, "the line forces ... did not 

know each other's intentions and positions." 13 He decided, therefore, to revise his 

plans. Modifying an earlier plan he ordered 

the 141 st Infantry, Colonel Imai's regiment, to continue its westward movement 

until it became the brigade right flank 

instead of the left, which it had been originally. The 142d, formerly brigade reserve, 

was reinforced with artillery and ordered to 

advance down the east coast to become the 

brigade left flank. Colonel Takechi's 9th 

Infantry, less one battalion, was designated 

as the "encircling unit" and directed to 

strike at Parker's left flank and take the 

12 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 6, 26. 

" Ibid., p. 21. 

271 

corps line from the rear. The remammg 

battalion of the regiment was ordered into 

brigade reserve. To get his artillery forward 

Nara was forced to order the construction 

of a new road since II Corps artillery effectively denied him the use of the East Road. 

Zero hour for the attack was set for noon of 

the 13th, when the 9th Infantry, the "encircling unit," would jump off; the remainder of the brigade was to move out at 

dusk of the same day.a 

On the 12th, as the Japanese moved into 

position for the attack, all units on the II 

Corps line found themselves under increasingly heavy pressure. On the right, in front 

of the 57th Infantry, the Japanese succeeded in establishing themselves again on 

the south bank of the Calaguiman; in the 

center they pushed back the outpost line 

before the 43d Infantry.15 It was on the left 

of the corps line that the Japanese made 

their most important gains on 12 January, 

when they tore a gap in the 51st Infantry 

sector. A counterattack by a reserve battalion regained some of the lost ground but 

at a heavy cost. By nightfall it was evident 

that the Japanese, thwarted in their advance on the east, were shifting their effort 

westward. 

The threat to the eastern anchor of the 

line was still too serious to be ignored. 

Though the 57th Infantry had beaten back 

all attempts by the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry, to pierce the main line of resistance, 

it was still hard pressed on the left and was 

beginning to feel pressure on its right. Late 

on the evening of the 12th, therefore, General Parker released the two-battalion 21st 

,. 65th Brig Opns Orders, Series A, Nos. 49 and 

53, 11 and 12 Jan 42, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. 

Natib, Apps. 6 and 7. 

U Ltr, Col Loren A. Wetherby to author, 23 vet 

50,OCMH. 
272 

Infantry (PA) from corps reserve and gave 

it to Colonel Clarke. With these fresh troops 

Clarke made plans for an attack the next 

morning with the 21st Infantry'S 2d Battalion and the same numbered battalion of 

the 57th. That night the 2d Battalion, 21st 

Infantry, took over the left of the line and 

the 3d Battalion went into reserve to free the 

2d Battalion, 57th Infantry, for the counterattack.16 

At 0600, 13 January, on the heels of a 

rolling artillery barrage, the 2d Battalion, 

21st Infantry, jumped off in the counterattack. Its task was made more difficult 

by the fact that the Japanese had pushed a 

deep salient into the left of the 57th line 

during the night. The Filipinos advanced 

quickly and aggressively, pushing the Japanese back across the bloodied ground. It 

soon became evident to Capt. Philip A. 

Meier, the battalion's American instructor, 

that the gap was too large to be filled by his 

men alone and he moved east to tie in with 

the 1st Battalion, 57th Infantry, on his 

right, thus creating a hole between his 

men and the 41st Infantry on his left. Colonel Clarke, the 57th commander, thereupon ordered the 3d Battalion of the 21st 

Infantry from reserve to plug the gap. As 

the battalion began to move up at about 

1300 it came under Japanese artillery fire 

and was pinned down. When the artillery 

16 The date of the attachment of the 21st Division 

units to the 57th is variously given in the sources 

used. The weight of evidence as well as the sequence 

of events and Japanese sources point to the evening 

of the 12th as the most likely date. On this point as 

well as the action which follows, in addition to the 

sources already cited in note 11, see: O'Day, 21st 

Div (PA) I, Part 2, 1-2, II, 23-25; Itr [CO 21st 

Inf] to TAG (PA), Opns 21st Inf (PA), p. 4; Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 14-20; Capts Roy 

Oster and Grover C. Richards, 21 st Inf (P A) , p. 2, 

Capt John C. Ellis, 23d Inf (PA), p. 8, and Lt Col 

Eugene T. Lewis, 43d Inf (PA), p. 30, all in Chunn 

Notebooks. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

fire ceased three hours later, the 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry, counterattacked and 

advanced to within 150 yards of the originalline. By late afternoon the gap had been 

closed and the Japanese were left in possession of only a small salient on the left of 

the 57th Infantry line, a meager return indeed for four days of hard fighting. l7 

The counterattack by the 21st Infantry 

on the morning of the 13th had forestalled 

the Japanese offensive in that sector, leading General Nara to complain that "the 

battle did not develop according to plan." lR 

Elsewhere along the II Corps front he was 

more successful. His artillery and air attacks that morning had caused damage 

along the entire front and had caught a battalion of the 23d Infantry, moving from 

reserve into position behind the 43d Infantry, inflicting from sixty to seventy casualties. Farther west the 141st Infantry had 

begun to push against the right of General 

Jones's line, in the 51 st Infantry sector, 

during the morning, and had forced Jones 

back to his main line of resistance along 

the high ground on the north bank of the 

Balantay. The advance of the 9th Infantry 

down the center of the peninsula, "hampered by the terrain" and, Colonel Takechi 

reported, considerable resistance, had 

failed to reach the main line of resistance 

on the 13th.19 

Japanese pressure next day, the 14th, was 

heaviest on the left of the Abucay line. 

Here the 141st Infantry hit the 43d Infantry, forcing the outposts along the Balantay back across the river. The 51st Di-

"Brig Gen Arnold J. Funk, Comments on Draft 

MS, 12 Jan 52, p. 2, OCMH. For Clarke's views on 

this action, sec his interview with a G-2 WDGS officer on his return to the United States, 14-15 August 

1942. Mil Intel Library. 

18 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 22. 

1. Ibid. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BAT AAN 

vision to the left thereupon abandoned the 

main line of resistance and pulled back to 

positions on the south bank of the Balantay. Farther west the 9th Infantry continued 

its effort to encircle the corps left flank, 

but failed again to reach the main line of 

resistance. The reports reaching Nara that 

night were generally favorable, but they 

could not obscure the fact that the attack 

had failed or that "the enemy's established 

fire net was increasing in intensity . . . 

and enemy artillery was concentrating fire 

on [the east] front without a minute's 

respite." 2Q 

By 15 January the Japanese drive no 

longer constituted a serious threat to the 

eastern anchor of the Abucay line, and Col. 

Arnold J. Funk, who had relieved Clarke 

at about 1200 on the 13th, replaced the 

21st Infantry with the 22d, which had been 

made available by corps. But in the center, 

where the 43d Infantry had been reinforced 

by the 23d, the threat of a break-through 

became serious. It was here, at the boundary between the 41 st and 51 st Divisions, 

that the main enemy blow came on the 15th 

with a strong attack by Imai's 141st Infantry. The reinforced 43d, on the left of 

the 41 st Division, held firm, but General 

Jones had to commit his division reserve as 

well as his service troops to maintain his 

position on the Balantay. The fight continued throughout the day and at about 

1600 a small party of Japanese troops 

crossed the river in the face of heavy fire and 

occupied a hill between the 51st and the 

43d Infantry. The Filipino troops sought 

determinedly to drive the enemy back across 

the river, but, despite claims by Parker and 

Jones that. the 51st line was unbroken, the 

• 0 Ibid., p. 23; see also Apps. 8 and 9, pp. 53, 55. 

273 

Japanese, at the end of the day, still retained their foothold on the south bank of 

the Balantay. With the 9th Infantry in position about 1,000 yards to the west, the 

prospects for the next day were distinctly 

unfavorable.21 

General Jones was in a serious position. 

Although his division was still in place, his 

troops were "very perceptibly weakening." 22 Unless he received reinforcements, 

he told General Parker, he might have to 

fall back from the main line of resistance. 

To meet this demand for more men, the II 

Corps commander, who had already committed his reserve, was forced to request additional troops from MacArthur's headquarters. 

This request had apparently been 

anticipated. The center of the AbucayMauban line, where the fight was now becoming critical and where the terrain made 

physical contact between the two corps extremely difficult if not impossible, had been 

a matter of concern to high-ranking officers in MacArthur's headquarters from the 

very start. After his visit to Bataan with 

MacArthur on the 10th, General Sutherland 

had criticized the disposition of the troops 

and expressed the fear that the enemy 

"would attack down the center of the penin-

., The account of the action on the left of the 

II Corps line is reconstructed from: Jones, 51st 

Div (PA) Order of Events, pp. 1-4; Col Virgil 

N. Cordero, My Experiences During the War with 

Japan (Nuremburg, privately printed, n.d.), pp. 

20-23; MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, 

pp. 16, 17; 52d Inf (PA), p. 36; Bluemel, 31st Div 

(PA) Rpt of Opns, pp. 8-9; Phil Div Rpt of Opns, 

pp. 11-12; Maj William R. Nealson, Opns of a 

Prov Bn, 41st Div (PA) at Abucay, 15-25 Jan 42 

(paper prepared for Advanced Officers Course, 

1947-48, The Infantry School), pp. 9-11; Cummings, 53d Inf (PA), p. 4, Chunn Notebooks; 

Funk, Comments on Draft MS, p. 3, OCMH . 

.. MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, p. 16. 
274 

sui a over the roughest terrain and not along 

the coast where the roads were located." 23 

The bulk of the forces on Bataan, he noted, 

was not deployed to meet such an attack, 

and he had suggested to the two corps commanders that they shift their troops so as to 

strengthen their interior flanks. The following day, 11 January, the subject had been 

raised again in an order which directed that 

contact between the two corps "be actual 

and physical" and that all avenues of approach, including "the rough area in the 

center of the Bataan Peninsula," be covered.24 

After an inspection of the front line on 12 

January, General R. J. Marshall, USAF FE 

deputy chief of staff and commander of the 

Bataan echelon of that headquarters, also 

became concerned over the weakness of the 

center of the line. He discussed the problem 

with General Wainwright who, he wrote, 

"did not agree entirely, saying that he 

thought that the center'of our position was 

too difficult terrain for the major attack." 25 

Seriously disturbed, Marshall turned to 

Sutherland for aid. "I don't believe," he de-

.. Sutherland made this statement in an interview 

with the author on 14 November 1946, five years 

after the events. Contemporary sources support 

Sutherland's foresight in predicting Japanese 

intentions . 

.. Ltr Order, USAFFE, 11 Jan 42, sub: Plans 

for Counterattack, AG 381 (10 Nov 41) Phil Reds. 

General Parker did not recall later any discussion 

with Sutherland on this subject, but added that he, 

too, was greatly concerned at the time and never 

able to work out a satisfactory solution to the 

problem. "There were just not enough units . . . 

to cover the front effectively," he later wrote. 

Those in the line were already overextended and 

lacked sufficient deployment in depth. He felt then 

and still did after the war that it would have been 

unwise to weaken his line at any point to shift 

troops to the west, to the center of the penin5ula. 

Ltr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, OCMH. 

.. Memo, Marshall for CofS USAFFE, 13 Jan 42, 

AG 370.2 (19 Dec 42) Phil Rcds. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

elared, "we can over-estimate the importance of denying observation of both our 

battle positions, which would be available 

to the enemy were he in possession of M t. 

Natib." 26 

Parker's request for reinforcements, 

therefore, came as no surprise to Sutherland and Marshall who had already ordered 

various units into the II Corps area. From 

USAF FE reserve came the Philippine Division (less 57th Infantry) and from Wainwright's corps came the Philippine Army 

31st Division (less elements). When Parker 

learried of these reinforcements he made 

plans to use the former when it arrived for 

a counterattack to restore the line and the 

latter initially as corps reserve and later to 

relieve the Philippine Division after the 

counterattack. 

While the reserves were moving into 

position on the night of 15-16 January, 

General Parker decided to make an immediate effort to regain the ground lost on 

his critical left flank, and ordered the 51st 

Division to counterattack on the morning 

ot the 16th. To strengthen the division for 

this venture he gave General Jones the 3d 

Battalion, 2Et Infantry, which had already 

seen action in the fight along the East 

Road. 21 Jones vigorously protested the order 

to counterattack, pointing out to his corps 

•• Ibid. In this memorandum Marshall stated that 

he was sending Colonel Funk, who had not yet 

assumed command of the 57th Infantry, to See 

Wainwright again to find out what was being done 

to protect the right flank of I Corps. When Funk 

took command of the 57th, the visit was canceled. 

IT The battalion was to arrive at Abucay Hacienda 

at about 0400 of the 16th. There is a difference of 

opinion in the source as to the identity of the unit 

given Jones. Some claim it was the 21st Engineers; 

others, the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. This confusion may arise from the fact that the 21st 

Engineers got into the fight in this sector later, and 

that the battalion of the 21st was late in reaching 

the 51st Division. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

commander that his main line of resistance 

was tactically unsound and that "the weakened condition of his division from continuous combat and heavy losses during the past 

month" made the ordered counterattack 

"extremely hazardous." "Moreover," he asserted, "the present position was being held 

only with great difficulty." 28 His protests 

were unavailing and it was with little hope 

of success that he made his preparations. 

The 51 st Division attack began on schedule at dawn of the 16th and immediately 

ran into strong enemy resistance. The Japanese considered this area to be, in Nara's 

words, "the pivot point of the entire enemy 

position" and apparently expected the 

counterattack.29 Despite the heavy opposi~ 

tion the 51 st Infantry on the division right 

succeeded in beating back the Japanese in 

its sector. So successful was the regiment 

that it pushed ahead of the units on its right 

and left, thereby creating a dangerous 

salient in the line. 

The enemy was quick to take advantage 

of Jones's exposed position. About noon 

elements of the 141 st Infantry pressed in 

against the right (east) of the salient and 

began infiltrating between the 51st Infantry and the 43d Infantry to its right. At 

about the same time the 9th Infantry 

which had been approaching Parker's left 

flank from the north struck the left side of 

the salient and pressed in between the 51st 

and 53d Infantry. The 51st was thus 

threatened by a double envelopment. 

Under pressure from three directions, the 

entire 51st regimental line gave way and 

the Filipino troops fled to the rear in disorder, exposing the 43d to envelopment by 

the 141st Infantry. Colonel Imai recognized 

the danger as well as the advantage of his 

U Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events, p. 3. 

.. 6Sth Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 24. 

275 

own position immediately. Should he push 

ahead after the 51st he might well leave his 

own left flank exposed to attack by the 43d 

Infantry, whose strength he did not know. 

He decided against this risk and after a brief 

pause for reorganization sent the bulk of his 

regiment eastward against the 41st Division. 

The 43d Infantry, on the left, was now 

forced to refuse its flank back to the reserve 

line, where, under the calm guidance of Lt. 

Col. Eugene T. Lewis, regimental instructor, it held against the repeated onslaughts 

of Imai's men. Lewis was given additional 

men to hold the refused flank when a hastily organized provisional battalion, consisting of the 41st Engineer Battalion, signal 

and quartermaster troops, and stragglers, 

was thrown into the action. 

While a portion of the Hlst Infantry was 

pressing the attack against the 43d and 51st 

Infantry, other elements of Colonel Imai's 

regiment were pushing the 42d Infantry, on 

the east (right) of the 43d, threatening to 

drive between the two. To halt the Japanese 

here, a battalion of the 23d Infantry was attached to the 42d and the attackers were 

beaten off. Farther east elements of the 

142d Infantry joined with the 2d Battalion, 

141st Infantry, which had borne the brunt 

of the fighting in the 57th Infantry sector 

earlier, in an attack against the 41st Infantry, on the division right flank. Here the 

Japanese were repJllsed only after the 3d 

Battalion, 32d Infantry, the first element of 

the reserve 31st Division (PA) to reach II 

Corps, was sent into action. 

The disintegration of the 51st Infantry 

had exposed not only the left flank of the 

43d but also the right of the 53d Infantry, 

westernmost unit on the II Corps line. Colonel Boatwright, 53d Infantry commander, 

attempted to maintain contact with the 51st 

on his right by pulling back his regimen-
276 

tal flank to conform to that of the adjacent unit. This effort proved unsuccessful. 

Behind and to the left rear of the 51st 

Infantry was the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, in position to support the 53d and 

available for a counterattack if necessary. 

This battalion, which had been given General Jones by corps as division reserve before 

the counterattack, had arrived in the 51 st 

Division sector late on the morning of the 

16th, and without Jones's knowledge had 

taken up a position behind the critical portion of the line. Throughout the action of 

the 16th, Jones was unaware of its presence 

and firmly believed that he was operating 

without a reserve.so Consequently the 3d 

Battalion, 21 st, saw little action during the 

16th and withdrew later to Guitol. 

Though the situation in the 53d Infantry 

sector appeared desperate, it was not as dangerous as it seemed, partly because of the 

presence of the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 

and partly because of the Japanese dispositions. Neither Boatwright nor General Jones 

knew that Colonel Imai had decided to 

throw the bulk ofthe 141st Infantry against 

the 43d Infantry rather than against the 

53d. Nor did either know that the 9th Infantry, which was in front and to the right 

of the 53d, had halted at this critical moment to reorganize after its long march 

through the jungled heights of central BaaD There is a good deal of confusion and controversy in contemporary records and in diaries and 

interviews over the movements and action of the 

3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. Since it did not take 

an important part in the counterattack of the 16th, 

the activities of this battalion have not been covered 

in detail here. Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, 

pp. 17-19; Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events; 

O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 25; Oster and Richards, 

21st Inf (PA), p. 3, Chunn Notebooks; Itr, Jones 

to Ward, 3 Jan 52, OCMH; Itr, MacDonald to 

Jones, 21 Dec 51, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

taan. Instead, the 51st Division staff was 

convinced that disaster was imminent and 

the situation too precarious to permit the 

53d to remain in place": In Jones's absence 

at the front, the division chief of staff therefore ordered Boatwright to fall back to the 

southwest farther up the slopes of Mt. Natib 

and establish physical contact with I Corps, 

a task that thus far had proved impossible. 

The withdrawal of the 53d Infantry 

across the precipitous slopes of Mt. Natib 

was made under the most trying conditions 

and proved a harrowing experience. The 

men became separated in the jungle and 

along the winding trails and the regiment 

failed either to establish a position on Mt. 

Natib or to tie in with I Corps. The majority 

of the men finally reached Guitol, tired, hungry, and footsore; but others, after a march 

through some of the most difficult country 

in the Philippines during which they subsisted on leaves, shrub roots, and boiled 

snails, reached Bagac on the west coast.31 

With the troops that succeeded in making 

their way south General Jones organized 

a covering force late on the afternoon of the 

16th. This force he placed astride the Guitol 

trail, approximately 4,000 yards south of 

the Balantay River line from which he had 

launched his counterattack that morning. 

It was not this covering force that saved 

the II Corps line but the failure of the 

Japanese to exploit their advantage. The 

two Japanese units in position to envelop 

the left flank of the corps chose instead to 

"One officer in Boatwright's party states that 

all he ate for three days was a can of pineapple, 

which he shared with several other officers. 1st Lt 

Eugene Forquer, 53d Inf (PA), p. 42, Chunn Notebooks; Itr, Boatwright to George Groce, research 

asst, 22 Mar 49, OCMH; Itrs, Boatwright and MacDonald to Jones, 12 and 6 Nov 50, lent to author by 

General Jones. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

pursue other, less profitable objectives. The 

141st Infantry had flung itself against the 

left flank of the 41st Division instead of attempting to take it in the rear. With the 

51st Division in retreat, such a maneuver 

might well have been more rewarding than 

the attack against the 43d Infantry, which 

had successfully refused its left flank. The 

9th Infantry, Nara's "encircling unit," was 

under orders to move southeast down the 

Salian River valley, a short distance behind 

the II Corps line. Had Colonel Takechi 

moved through the gap between the 51st 

and 41st Divisions he could have reached 

the Salian River quickly and turned the 

corps left flank. Instead, misled by poor 

maps which confused the Abo-Abo and 

the Salian, he began a wide sweep around 

Parker's left in preparation for an advance 

south and southeast down the Abo-Abo 

River valley. At the critical moment, therefore, when he should have been pushing 

down the Salian River valley, Takechi was 

preparing for the march down the AboAbo, a course that would take him out of 

the action for the next few days. 

General Parker had recognized the gravity of his position almost as soon as the 51 st 

sector gave way. At about 1200 of the 16th 

he had ordered Brig. Gen. Maxon S. Lough 

to move his Philippine Division (less the 

57th Infantry) to the left of the 41st Division and to counterattack the next morning 

with two regiments abreast. The 31 st Infantry (US) -not to be confused with the 

31st Infantry (PA), a regiment of the 

Philippine Army's 31st Division which was 

also in the II Corps sector at this timemoved out early in the afternoon and about 

1900 reached its destination, approximately 

one mile east of Abucay Hacienda. The 

45th Infantry (PS) left its bivouac area at 

1700 of the 16th but lost its way and when 

277 

the counterattack began the next morning 

it was about 5,000 yards to the southeast.32 

By the evening of 16 January, just one 

week after he had opened his attack, General N ara was in position to turn the left 

flank of II Corps. Though forced to change 

his plans repeatedly and held up by unexpectedly strong resistance, he had made considerable progress. Repulsed on the east by 

the 57th and 21st Infantry and in the center 

by the 41 st Division, he had shifted the 

axis of attack to the west and concentrated 

his forces against the weakened 51 st Division whose 51 st Infantry had finally broken. 

This disaster had completely unhinged the 

II Corps line and left it open to a dangerous 

flanking attack. If N ara could press his advantage and push his men south and southeast quickly enough he would envelop the 

entire corps and push it against Manila 

Bay. He would also make Wainwright's 

position untenable and force him to withdraw. Already the Japanese had driven a 

wedge between the two corps. The fate of 

the entire line, from Mabatang to Mauban, 

depended on the counterattack of the 31st 

Infantry scheduled for the morning of 17 

January. If the regiment was successful II 

Corps might remain in position for some 

time; if it was routed the entire line would 

be forced to fall back in disorder. Should 

the 31st delay the Japanese temporarily, 

.. Ltr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, OCMH. For 

the movements of the 31st and 45th Infantry, see: 

Phil Div Rpt of Opns, p. 12; Conrad, 2d Bn, 31st 

Inf, Opns of 31st Inf (US), pp. 12-13; Maj John 

1. Pray, former CO Co G, Action of Co G, 31st 

Inf (US) Abucay Hacienda, 15-25 Jan 42, pp. 

6-7, Maj Louis B. Besbeck, Opns of 3d Bn, 45th 

Inf (PS) at Abucay Hacienda, 15-25 Jan 42, pp. 

10-12, and Maj Henry J. Pierce, Opns of Co L, 

45th Inf (PS) at Abucay Hacienda, p. 7. All three 

papers prepared for Advanced Officers Course, the 

first two in 1946-47 and the last in 1949-50, at 

The Infantry School. 
278 

THE MAUBAN LINE 

18 - 25 January 1942 

... AXIS OF JAPANESE ATTACK 

c::c> AXIS OF U. S. COUNTERATTACK 

* COUNTERATTACK BY 2~26PS.3~72 AND C§t94 

Note : The contoured outline of terroin confiqura'ion 

- is incomplete t because of inadequate mop 

coverage of this area. 

£I,,,olions in "61 

YAROS 1000 2MILES 

MAP 12 

then the corps might yet gain time for a 

planned and orderly withdrawal. 

Attack Against I Corps: The Mauban Line 

The Mauban line along which Wainwright's I Corps was posted extended from 

the slopes of Mt. Silanganan on the east, 

westward along Mauban Ridge, to the small 

coastal village which gave the line its name. 

(Map 12) Along the steep and rugged 

slopes of the mountain was Company K of 

the 1st Infantry (PA) which had been 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

\J 

II Da",,,,, 

ordered to establish contact with II Corps 

on the right. It was never successful in accomplishing its mission, an impossible one 

in the view of many officers. To its left was 

a battalion of the 31 st Field Artillery, 31 st 

Division (PA), organized and equipped as 

infantry. The rest of the line was held by the 

3d Infantry of Brig. Gen. Fidel V. Segundo's 1 st Division (PA). 

About three quarters of a mile in front 

of the main line of resistance, from Bayandati to a point about midway up the mountain, was the outpost line, manned by ele-
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

ments of the 3d Infantry. Defending 

Moron, two miles north of Bayandati, and 

the sandy stretch of beach between it and 

the outpost line was Company I, 1st Infantry, and Troop G, 26th Cavalry. In 

corps reserve was the 91 st Division (P A), 

with combat elements of the 71st Division 

attached; the 26th Cavalry; and the 1st 

Infantry (less detachments). 

In drawing up his plans for the conquest 

of Bataan, General Nara had correctly estimated that decisive results could be obtained most quickly in the II Corps sector 

and had sent the bulk of his troops down 

the eastern side of Bataan. Against Wainwright's I Corps he had sent a relatively 

weak force, consisting of a combat team 

composed of the 122d Infantry (less two 

companies); a battalion of field artillery, 

a platoon of engineers, and a squad of 

signalmen. This force, led by Colonel Watanabe, was under orders to advance westward from Dinalupihan to Olongapo, then 

south through Moron toward Bagac. 33 

Leaving Dinalupihan at 1900 of the 9th, 

Colonel Watanabe led his men along Route 

7 toward undefended Olongapo. Delayed 

only by destroyed bridges and demolitions 

planted earlier by the American engineers, 

he reached Olongapo at 1400 the next day. 

His field artillery was still at Dinalupihan 

where it was to remain until the road could 

be repaired. Two days later, on 12 January, 

under orders from 14th Army, the 122d Infantry embarked in native boats and 

quickly seized Grande Island, at the entrance to Subic Bay. 

13 As in the section preceding, the Japanese side 

of the story has been reconstructed from 65th Brig 

Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 2S-28 and 14th Army 

Opns, I, 92-97. The plan outlined above is derived from the 65th Brig Opns Order, Series A, No. 

42, 1800, 8 Jan 42, App. 3, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, 

Mt. Natib, p. 44. 

279 

In occupymg Grande Island the Japanese acquired possession of Fort Wint, the 

"little Corregidor" of Subic Bay. Strategically situated to guard the entrance to the 

bay and control the northwest shore of 

Bataan, this fort had been part of General 

Moore's Harbor Defenses and had been 

manned by coast artillery personnel under 

Col. Napoleon Boudreau. On 24 December 

Colonel Boudreau had been ordered to 

abandon the fort by the next day and join 

the troops then entering Bataan. He had 

completed the evacuation in time, but only 

at the expense of several thousand rounds of 

155-mm. ammunition, some mobile guns, 

and the fixed guns of larger caliber.;14 

While the support or retention of Fort 

Wint was probably impossible once the decision had been made to fall back on the 

Mabatang-Mauban line, its evacuation 

without a struggle gave the Japanese an important objective at no cost. An American 

garrison on Grande Island, even if it was 

ultimately lost, might well have paid substantial dividends and certainly would have 

given the Japanese many uncomfortable 

moments. From Fort Wint the Americans 

with their large guns could have disputed 

Japanese control of the bay and of Olongapo, which later became an important 

enemy supply base, and would have constituted a threat to the flank of any Japanese 

.. Collier, Notebooks, II, 48-49; Itr, Boudreau to 

author, 12 Dec 47, OCMH; Harbor Defenses Rpt 

of Opns, p. 23. Neither Boudreau nor General 

Moore mentions the loss of armament or ammunition but Colonel Collier states there was such II 

loss and the Japanese claim that they captured a 

number of guns and a large supply of ammunition 

when they seized the island. 14th Army Opns, I, 

88-92. General Bluemel states that four ISS·mm. 

guns were moved to Olongapo and from there 

moved by tractor into Bataan. Bluemel, Comment~ 

on Draft MS, Comments 14 and 16, OCMH. 
280 

force advancing down the west coast of 

Bataan. ' 

It was not until 14 January that Watanabe began his advance southward along 

the west coast of the peninsula. 35 Wainwright had dispatched a battalion of the 

1st Infantry to Moron at the first news of 

the occupation of Olongapo, but had withdrawn it two days later when the Japanese 

failed to advance. On the 14th, when the 

Japanese began to move toward Moron, the 

battalion was in corps reserve. Part of the 

122d Infantry came down the narrow trail 

between Olongapo and Moron; the rest of 

the regiment embarked in boats for Moron 

where the West Road began. Watanabe 

hoped in this way to advance more rapidly 

down the west coast toward Bagac and 

avoid the delay inevitable if the entire regiment followed the winding trail north of 

Moron. Unfamiliar with the coast line and 

handicapped by poor maps, the water-borne 

elements of the 122d came ashore at a small 

barrio midway between Olongapo and 

Moron and prepared to march the rest of 

the distance on foot. 

Wainwright received word of the J apanese advance almost as soon as the forward elements of the 122d Infantry 

landed. In an effort to contain the enemy 

.. In addition to the sources cited below, this 

account of the fight in I Corps is based upon: 

USAFFE·USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 48; NLF and 

I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 17-21; Berry, Hist of 

3d Inf, 1st Reg Div (PA), 19 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, 

pp. 2-5; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to 

Glory," Parts 2 and 3, Armored Cavalry Journal 

(May-June 1947), p. 15, (July-August 1947), pp. 

15-16; Col John H. Rodman, Engagement of gist 

Div (PA) on Moron-Bagac Road, p. 1, copy borrowed from Rodman, OCMH; itr, Col Fowler to 

author, 11 Mar 49, OCMH; Itr, Lt Col Houston 

P. Houser, Jr.., to author, 18 Mar 49, OCMH; itr, 

Rodman to author, 30 Mar 49, OCMH; Prov Tank 

Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 18; Itr, Berry to Ward, 11 Jan 

52,OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

he dispatched the entire 1 st Infantry, as well 

as the 1st Engineer Battalion and two battalions of artillery, to Moron. He also relieved Troop G of the 26th Cavalry, which 

had been on patrol since the 10th, and replaced it with the composite Troop E-F of 

the same regiment. In command of these 

forces was General Segundo, commander 

of the 1st Division. Major McCullom,"G 

commander of the 1st Infantry, exercised 

tactical control. 

On 15 January the two elements of the 

122d Infantry joined and by the following 

morning the regirrlent was within a mile of 

Moron. When it crossed the Batalan River, 

just north of the village, opposed only by 

fire from an American patrol, Wainwright 

hastened to Moron where he organized and 

directed an attack by the 1st Infantry and 

Troop E-F of the 26th Cavalry. In this 

first engagement in I Corps the honors 

went to the Filipinos who forced the Japanese back to the river line. Unfortunately, 

the cavalrymen suffered heavily in men and 

animals and had to be withdrawn. During 

the course of the action Major McCullom 

was wounded in the head and Col. Kearie 

L. Berry, commander of the 3d Infantry, 

on the main line of resistance, was placed 

in command of the 1st Infantry as well. 

The Japanese continued the attack 

against Moron during the 17th and by late 

afternoon penetrated the town in force. 

Wainwright's men thereupon withdrew to 

a ridge about a mile and a half to the south. 

It is possible that from this position they 

could have delayed the enemy advance but 

already strong Japanese reinforcements 

were moving against the Mauban line. 

The decision to commit additional troops 

to the attack against I Corps had been made 

by General Homma, the Army commander, 

a. First name unknown. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

not General N ara, who was responsible for 

the assault against the Abucay-Mauban 

line. Homma had made this decision on 13 

January, by which time he had correctly 

estimated that Nara's attack against II 

Corps "was not progressing favorably" and 

that the advance of Watanabe's force was 

meeting no resistance.37 By strengthening 

the force on the west coast Homma apparently hoped to overwhelm the two corps 

simultaneously. His revised plan called for 

a continuation of the drive against II Corps 

by the 65th Brigade and an increased effort 

on the west by a larger force than originally 

contemplated. This force would not only 

advance to Bagac but would also push east 

along the Pilar-Bagac road to take II Corps 

from the rear. 

To secure the troops for his revised plan 

of operations against I Corps, General 

Homma drew on the 16th Division. On the 

13th he ordered the division commander 

to send to Bataan two infantry battalions 

and as many regimental guns of 75-mm. 

caliber and rapid-fire 37-mm. guns as possible. This force, when finally organized, 

consisted of Headquarters, 16th Infantry 

Group, thr 20th Infantry (less one battalion), an antitank battery, and half the 

regimental gun battery of the 33d Infantry. Led by Maj. Gen. Naoki Kimura, 

16th Division infantry group commander, it 

left Manila for San Fernando on 15 January. Late that night General Homma 

created the Kimura Detachment and placed 

it directly under the control of 14th Army, 

thus relieving Nara of responsibility for 

operations against I Corps. In addition to 

the units he had brought with him, Kimura was also placed in command of the 

troops already operating along the west 

" 14th Army Opns, I, 92, 96. 

281 

coast of Bataan. Altogether he had a force 

of about 5,000 men.S8 

On the morning of 18 January General 

Kimura reached Moron and assumed control over operations. For the assault against 

Wainwright's line along the ridge south and 

southeast of the town he organized three 

forces. The 122d was to attack frontally 

down the West Road; the 3 d Bat talion, 20th 

Infantry, was to swing east of Moron in an 

attempt to take the ridge position on the 

flank. The third force, one company of the 

3d Battalion, was sent far up the mountain 

around the I Corps flank to cut the PilarBagac road and did not participate in the 

ensuing action. The 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, Kimura held in reserve. 

In the belief that his force was not strong 

enough for a successful stand along the 

ridge, Wainwright on the 18th directed a 

withdrawal. The 1st Infantry and the 1st 

Engineers fell back through the outpost line 

to take up a position along the main line 

of resistance between the 3d Infantry and 

the battalion of the 31 st Field Artillery on 

the slopes of Mt. Silanganan. The Japanese 

followed closely and that night drove in the 

corps outpost line "without much effort." 39 

A counterattack the next morning restored 

the line but another Japanese assault on the 

night of the 19th gave the Japanese final 

and permanent possession of the outpost line. 

As the 122d Infantry continued to push 

against the 1st Division troops on the left 

of the Mauban line, the 3d Battalion, 20th 

Infantry (less one company), which had 

been sent around the east flank of the ridge 

.. 14th Army Opns Order, Series A, No. 167, 

2200, 15 Jan 42, App. 21, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. 

Natib, p. 75. For a description of the regimental 

and rapid-fire guns, see Handbook of Japanese 

Military Forces, TM-E 30-480, 1 Oct 44, pp. 

217-18,220. 

39 Berry, Hist of 3d Inf, 1st Reg Div (PA), p. 3. 
282 

line on the 18th, swung back to the southwest into the I Corps area. Unopposed, the 

battalion, led by Lt. Col. Hiroshi Nakanishi, 

either infiltrated through the I Corps line 

along the slopes of Mt. Silanganan or advanced through a gap between the 1st Infantry and 31st Field Artillery. At about 

1000 of the 21 st it reached the West Road, 

three miles east of Mauban in the vicinity 

of Kilometer Post (KP) 167, and established a roadblock behind the 1 st Division:'" 

By this move the Japanese placed themselves squarely athwart the only major road 

suitable for transporting heavy equipment 

and supplies. Though the enemy force waS 

a small one, less than a battalion, the danger 

to Wainwright's position was a grave one.41 

To meet the threat Wainwright was 

obliged to shift units in his sector. The transfer five days before of the 31st Division (less 

31 st Field Artillery) to II Corps had left 

Wainwright with no reserves, and the commitment of the Philippine Division made it 

impossible to secure reinforcements from 

USAFFE. He would have to fight the battle 

with what he had. Most of the 91st Division, including the attached elements of the 

71 st, had replaced the 31 st on beach de-

.. Locations along the roads and trails on Bataan 

are frequently given in terms of the distance from 

Manila in kilometers. In the absence of towns' and 

villages on Bataan, this description sometimes is the 

only way to fix a point precisely on a map. These 

locations corresponded to road and trail markers 

which read simply "KP" and the number of kilometers from Manila. 

.1 There is some disagreement as to the date the 

road was cut. Some officers gave the date as 20 

January; Wainwright and other officers say the 

block was established on the 21st. The Japanese give 

the 21st as the date, and that date has been accepted in this account. The time is fixed by the 

evaluation of Japanese and American sources. See 

especially Rodman, Engagement of 91st Div (PA) 

on Moron-Bagac Road; Itr, Rodman to author, 30 

Mar 49, OCMH; Itr, Skerry to author, 15 Jul 52, 

with inds, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

fense when that division had gone to Parker. 

One battalion of the 92d Infantry had been 

attached to the 1 st Division and was in 

place along the reserve line, north of the 

roadblock. \Vhen, on the 19th, word 

reached General Segundo, the 1 st Division 

commander, that a Japanese force was infiltrating into the line from Mt. Silanganan, 

he sent three company-size patrols from the 

battalion of the 92d Infantry forward to 

block the trails. They quickly became involved in action along the slopes of M t. 

Silanganan and were not available to meet 

the threat behind the line. The remainder 

of Wainwright's force, the 26th Cavalry 

and elements of the 71 st Division, were 

already committed to the defense of the 

Pilar-Bagac road and could not be shifted 

without endangering the security of that 

vital highway. 

When the Japanese roadblock was first 

discovered, therefore, the only unit available to throw against it from the north was 

a reinforced platoon of the 92d Infantry. 

Col. John H. Rodman, the regimental commander, ordered 1st Lt. Beverly N. Skardon 

to lead the platoon into action. After an advance of a few hundred yards it came under 

fire and was forced to halt. Meanwhile, 

south of the roadblock, a provisional 

platoon was being readied for action. This 

platoon was organizt'd and led personally 

by General Wainwright who, on his way 

to the front that morning, had heard firing 

to the north and had hastily gathered ahout 

twenty men from the Headquarters Company, 92d Infantry, to meet this unexpected 

threat. With these men he attacked the block 

from the south, but after two hours, realizing he could make no progress with so 

few men, he left the platoon with another 

officer and continued forward by another 

route to organize a larger force. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

The initial Japanese block had been established by only a portion of the 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry. During the day the 

rest of the battalion picked its way along 

circuitous routes around blocked trails and 

down the steep slopes of Mt. Silanganan to 

join in the defense of the roadblock. Meanwhile, the build-up on the American side 

continued as additional forces from the 91st 

Division were released for the impending 

battle. Scouts of the 26th Cavalry and Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, were also 

ordered to the threatened area in an all-out 

effort to clear the road. Colonel Rodman, 

92d Infantry commander, was placed in 

command of the entire force. 

The attack opened on the morning of the 

22d with an attempt by a platoon of tanks 

to break through the block and establish 

contact with the 1st Division to the north. 

By this time the Japanese had constructed 

antitank obstacles and laid mines, which, 

with the fire from their 37-mm. antitank 

guns, effectively held up the tankers. When 

the two lead tanks of the 194th were disabled by mines, the remaining tanks of the 

platoon were held up and the attack stalled. 

N ext, Rodman sent an understrength 

motorized squadron of the 26th Cavalry 

and the 3d Battalion, 72d Infantry, against 

the roadblock. This attack was initially successful and the Filipinos reached a ridge 

near the roadblock. But all efforts to eliminate the block met with failure. Meanwhile, the 122d Infantry continued to engage Colonel Berry's 1st Division troops 

along the main line of resistance. 

During the next few days Rodman attempted again and again to drive out the 

Japanese, first by frontal assaults and then 

by flanking attacks. A general attack by all 

units in contact with the enc.ny was delivered at daylight of the 23d but failed to 

283 

gain any ground. Later in the day the 1st 

Battalion, 2d Constabulary, in an effort to 

outflank the enemy and establish contact 

with 1st Division units, slipped through the 

jungle south of the roadblock and at nightfall emerged in the vicinity of KP 172, from 

where it could attack the enemy from the 

west. Without explanation, however, the 

Constabulary withdrew during the night to 

its former position. The next morning, 24 

January, the 1st Battalion, 91st Infantry, 

and the 3d Battalion of the 72d attacked 

the roadblock from the east. Despite support from the Constabulary, which delivered a limited attack from the south, this 

effort to penetrate the block also proved unsuccessful. 

Rodman's inability to make progress 

against the roadblock could not have been 

due to a shortage of troops. By 24 January 

he had under his command the 2d Battalion, 92d Infantry; 1st Battalion, 91st Infantry; 3d Battalion, 72d Infantry; the 2d 

Squadron, 26th Cavalry; two battalions 

and a howitzer company from the 2d Constabulary, attached to I Corps on 22 January; as well as other mixed detachments. 

All of these units, it must be added, were 

understrength, tired, poorly fed, and, except for the 26th Cavalry squadron and 

the howitzer company, had no automatic 

weapons at all. 

Against this array of units Colonel Nakanishi had only a single battalion, less one 

company. Moreover, the Japanese probably 

suffered greater hardships than their opponents. It is extremely doubtful that Kim ura was ever able during this period to 

establish a supply route over the mountains 

and through the I Corps line to the men at 

the roadblock. Nor is there any definite evidence of enemy air drops to Naka!lishi's 

troops. His men probably had no supplies 
284 

other than those they had carried across the 

mountain. Their staunch defense of the 

roadblock in the face of such strong opposition was therefore the more remarkable, explainable only by the difficulty of the terrain, which favored the defender, by training, and by determination. 

While the fight for the roadblock was being fought to a standstill, the Japanese continued to push against the main line of resistance. Their advance was contested by 

Colonel Berry's 3d Infantry and elements 

of the 1st Infantry, but by evening of the 

24th the "situation was desperate and 

rapidly growing worse." 42 The line was 

under attack from the north, ammunition 

\vas short, and the supply route had been 

cut. The 1st Division troops, whose food 

stocks were low when the roadblock was 

established, were suffering from a real 

shortage of rations. Under the circumstances there was little for Colonel Berry, 

who for all practical purposes was now commanding the 1st Division, to do except to 

abandon the main line of resistance. His 

position was untenable, his supplies gone, 

his men exhausted and hungry. He could 

not even rely on continued artillery support since Colonel Fowler's ammunition 

was exhausted. On his own responsibility, 

after consultation with Colonel Fowler and 

Maj. A. L. Fitch and without permission 

from General Wainwright, Berry made the 

"inevitable" decision to withdraw.43 

"Berry, Hist of 3d Inf, 1st Reg Div (PA), p. 4. 

.. Ltr, Berry to Ward, 11 Jan 52, OCMH; Itr, 

Fowler to author, 11 Mar 49, OCMH. Wainwright 

confirms Berry's responsibility and the fact that he 

was acting without orders. Ltr, Wainwright to TAG, 

27 Jun 47, sub: Recommendation for DSC for Col 

Berry, copy in OCMH. 

Colonel Collier tells an entirely different story 

about the withdrawal of the 1st Division but 

this account has not been accepted in the absence 

of corroborating testimony. Collier, Notebooks, 

III, 36. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Having made his decision, Berry still had 

a difficult problem to face. By what route 

would his men withdraw and what equipment could he save? On his front was the 

122d Infantry; to his rear was the 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry, firmly in position 

along the roadblock. With the West Road 

blocked, Colonel Berry had only one route 

southward, the narrow beaches paralleling 

the South China Sea coast line. If he used 

this route, he would have to abandon his 

vehicles, Colonel Fowler's artillery, and all 

heavy equipment. Moreover, he would be 

without cover from air attack while he was 

on the exposed beaches. Knowing all this, 

Berry had no choice but to withdraw along 

this route. 

On the morning of the 25th the order to 

withdraw was issued. All guns, trucks, and 

equipment which could not be moved along 

the beaches were to be destroyed. "My 

officers and myself," wrote Colonel Fowler, 

the artillery commander, "destroyed the 

guns with tears in our eyes." 44 At 1030 the 

withdrawal began, with men bearing the 

wounded on improvised litters leading the 

way. Covering the withdrawal was the 1st 

Battalion, 3d Infantry, blocking the West 

Road along the slopes of Mauban Ridge. 

Colonel Rodman's men kept the beaches 

clear of Nakanishi's patrols by pressing in 

against the roadblock from the west. 

The withdrawal of the 1st Division from 

the main line of resistance was made by battalion, from east to west. The route of withdrawal ran westward through the battalion 

support area to the West Road and then 

along it to the 3d Infantry command post. 

From here the troops scrambled down trails 

to the water's edge, where a station was established to direct the men on their way 

toward Bagac. By noon of the 25th an esti-

.. Ltr, Fowler to author, 11 Mar 49, OCMH. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

mated 1,000 men had "infiltrated south"; 

of this number about one fourth were clad 

only in underwear, carried no arms, and 

passed as civilians.45 By nightfall the main 

force had reached the beach from where the 

men made their way south as best they 

could. The withdrawal continued during 

the night, the covering troops pulling back 

under cover of darkness to join their comrades in the flight to safety. 

The difficult task of disengaging the 

enemy and moving a large number of men 

to the rear along a dangerously exposed and 

inadequate route of withdrawal was accomplished with a minimum of loss and confusion. The maneuver had been well planned 

and executed. Only one tragic fact marred 

the success of the withdrawal-the loss of the 

artillery. Altogether, twenty-five pieces, of 

which fifteen were 2.95-inch mountain guns 

and the rest 75's, had to be left behind. 

These had been emplaced just behind the 

infantry when the line was set up. Their destruction by the retreating artillerymen left 

I Corps with but two ISS's and four 75-mm. 

guns (SPM) :'6 At least the destruction was 

accomplished with the greatest efficiency for 

the Japanese failed to report the capture of 

any large number of guns. 

Presumably when the 1st Division elements and the artillery withdrew from the 

Mauban line, the other units to its right, the 

31 st Field Artillery and Company K of the 

1st Infantry, also pulled back. There is no 

record of their movement beyond scattered 

4. USAFFE G-4 Journal, Bataan Echelon, 25-26 

Jan 42, Extract from G-2 Rpt of 1200, 25 Jan 42 

[erroneously written as 24 Jan], AG 461 (25 Dec 

41) Phil Rcds. 

4G There is some confusion as to the exact number 

of pieces lost as a result of the withdrawal and the 

figures given are the best that could be worked out 

from the conflicting sources. 

285 

references to Filipino troops infiltrating to 

the south. 47 

By evening of the 25th the Mauban line 

had been evacuated. That night MacArthur 

reported to the War Department that enemy 

pressure on the left had forced him "to give 

ground with some loss including guns of 

the obsolete 2.95 type." 48 The situation, he 

asserted, had been stabilized and "for the 

present the immediate danger is over." At 

the time he sent these reassurances to Washington' the enemy had already scored a 

great victory against II Corps and the withdrawal of both corps was in progress. 

The Abucay Line Is Turned 

A week before the withdrawal from the 

Mauban line, it will be recalled, the situation in the II Corps area on the east had 

already become serious. The disintegration 

of the 51st Infantry on the 16th had unhinged the left flank of Parker's corps and 

had left the line exposed. "Unless the 51 st 

Division sector could be regained," wrote 

General Parker later, "it was evident that 

my left flank would be enveloped and the 

position would be lost." 49 To recover the 

lost ground and fix firmly the western anchor of his main battle position, Parker had 

ordered the Philippine Division (less 57th 

Infantry) to counterattack at daylight of 

the 17th. The 31st Infantry (US) had 

" General Berrv stated in an interview that there 

was not a single American officer with the 31st Field 

Artillery and that it withdrew without orders from 

Mt. Silanganan. No light is cast on this subject by 

General Bluemel's report since the 31st Division at 

this time was in II Corps. Interv, author with Berry, 

Jan 48; Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, 

passim. 

4' Rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 119,25 Jan 42, 

AG 381 11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

"SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns. D. 32. 
286 

moved into position near Abucay Hacienda 

the evening before; the 45th Infantry (PS) 

was still moving up and was about 6,000 

yards southeast of that barrio when zero 

hour came. Thus, the attack, when it was 

made, was a piecemeal one. (Map 11) 

At 0815, 17 January, the American troops 

of the 31st Infantry, led by Col. Charles L. 

Steel, jumped off from the line of departure 

and advanced north along Trail 12, nearly 

a mile east of Abucay Hacienda. On the left 

was the 1 st Battalion; next to it, astride and 

to the right of the trail, was the 2d Battalion. 

The 3d Battalion was in reserve. The 1st 

Battalion on the left met little opposition and 

was able to reach the Balantay River by 

nightfall. The 2d Battalion on the right was 

not so fortunate. About 400 yards from the 

line of departure it encountered enemy resistance and, despite numerous attempts to 

break through, was unable to advance farther that day. To fill the gap between the 1st 

and 2d Battalions, which had developed as 

a result of the unimpeded advance on the 

left, Company K from the reserve battalion 

was sent into the line.50 

,. The account which follows is based on the 

following sources: On the Japanese side, 65th Brig 

Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 25-31; 14th Army Opns, 

I, 94-98. On the American side, SLF and II Corps 

Rpt of Opns, pp. 32-37; Phil Div Rpt of Opns, 

pp. 12-13; Lt Col Jasper E. Brady, Jr., Diary, pp. 

2-3, in Brady Papers, OCMH; Pray, Co G, 31st 

Inf (US) Abucay Hacienda, pp. 9-17; Besbeck, 

Opns 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS) at Abucay Hacienda, 

pp. 12-27; H. J. Pierce, Opns of Co L, 45th Inf 

(PS) at Abucay Hacienda, pp. 7-14; Conrad, Opns 

of 31st Inf (US) 8 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, pp. 14-15; 

Fortier, Notes on 41st Div (PA), p. 2; Bluemel, 

31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 10; O'Day, 21st 

Div (PA), II, 27-29; Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order 

of Events, 29 Dec 41-26 Jan 42, pp. 4-5; Richards, 

Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 20-21; Mead, Opns 

and M vmts of 31 st Inf (US), p. 21; Maj Clarence 

R. Bess, Opns of Service Co, 31st Inf (US), 5 Jan 

42-9 Apr 42, pp. 22-23, and Maj Kary C. Emerson, Opns of II Phil Corps on Bataan, 10 Jan-8 Apr 

42, pp. 18-19 (both papers prepared for Advanced 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Plans for the next day's action were 

drawn up at a predawn conference held at 

the 41 st Division command post. Present 

at the meeting were General Lough, Philippine Division commander; Col. Malcolm 

V. Fortier, 41st Division senior instructor; 

Col. Thomas W. Doyle, commander of the 

45th Infantry, which had finally reached the 

scene; and Colonel Steel of the 31st. After 

some discussion it was agreed that a co-ordinated attack by all present would be made 

that morning. The 31st Infantry was to attack north, and the 45th, echeloned by battalion to the right rear, would deliver the 

main assault between the 31st and 43d to 

the right. The 43d Infantry was to maintain its position along the regimental reserve 

line. Artillery support for the advance would 

be furnished by 41st Division artillery. 

As his 45th Infantry moved forward to 

the line of departure early on the morning 

of the 18th, Colonel Doyle learned that the 

1 st Battalion of the 31 st was under strong 

enemy pressure and in danger of being outflanked. A hurried conference between 

Doyle and Steel produced a revised plan of 

operations. The 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry, was now to move to the left of the 31 st 

Infantry, supporting the 1st Battalion of 

that regiment on the extreme left of the Abucay line. The rest of the units would continue 

the attack as planned. 

The 45th Infantry attack began later 

than planned, but proceeded without major 

mishap. The regiment-less the 3d Battalion, which had lost its way and overshot 

the mark-advanced between the 31st and 

43d but was unable to reach its objective, the 

Balantay River, before dark. The 3d BatOfficers Course in 1947-48 and 1949-50, respectively, The Infantry School) ; interv, Stanley Falk, 

research asst, with Col Wright, formerly S-3 45th 

Inf (PS), 5 Oct 50; Itr, Doyle to Ward, 8 Jan 52, 

OCMH. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

talion, after a false start which found it 

"climbing the backs" of the 31st Infantry's 

left company, finally reached the river by 

1630. There it settled down to hold a front 

of 1,400 yards, with no protection on its left 

except that offered by the jungle. The 1st 

Battalion, 31st Infantry, to its right was at 

the river line, but the 2d Battalion was still 

short of the river, as were the 45th Infantry 

elements to its right. Thus at the end of the 

second day of counterattack the Japanese 

still held the salient above Abucay Hacienda. 

The situation was still threatening. In addition to the danger presented by the westward movement of Imai's 141st Infantry, 

Parker was receiving reports from artillery 

spotters of Japanese, still out of range, moving down the Abo-Abo River valley in a 

southeasterly direction. These were the men 

of Takechi's 9th Infantry, sweeping wide 

around Parker's left end toward the positions now held by the remnants of Jones's 

51st Division and the reserve 31st Division 

near Guito!. 

On the 19th the American and Scout regiments resumed the attack. Starting just before noon the 31st Infantry hit the enemy 

salient only to be repulsed. Time after time 

the American infantrymen re-formed and 

attacked, but with no success. Efforts to 

bring tanks into the action failed when Parker's request for tank support was refused 

on the ground that the terrain was unsuitable for tank operations. Sending armor into 

such an engagement, wrote Weaver, would 

be "like sending an elephant to kill flies." 51 

On the west, the 3d Battalion, 45th Infan-

" Ltr, Weaver to Wainwright, 20 Nov 45. 

Weaver, in his comments on this manuscript, states 

that his remark was made with reference to the use 

of tanks in the earlier action in the 57th Infantry 

area and that no request for tanks was made by 

General Parker at this time. Comment 41, OCMH. 

287 

try, now attached to the 31st Infantry, was 

under fire throughout the day from troops 

of the 141 st Infantry who had infiltrated 

into the American line. Only on the right 

did the Philippine Division make progress 

that day. There, elements of the 1st and 2d 

Battalions, 45th Infantry, were able to reach 

the Balantay early in the afternoon. 

Despite this limited success the prospects 

for the Philippine Division counterattack 

were distinctly unfavorable on the evening 

of the 19th. Enemy pressure against the left 

flank had become extremely strong and the 

3d Battalion, 45th Infantry, was under fire 

from the enemy's automatic weapons. More 

ominous was the report from a 45th Infantry patrol that an enemy force-presumably 

the 9th Infantry-had already passed 

around the II Corps flank. But General Parker did not know that N ara, abandoning all 

hope for success along the coastal road, had 

ordered the 2 d Battalion, 14lst Infantry, to 

rejoin Colonel Imai at the opposite end of 

the line. N ara had further strengthened the 

1415t by attaching to it a company of the 

9th Infantry. These arrangements completed, Nara directed Colonel Imai to 

launch an all-out attac'k against Parker's 

left flank and rear "to drive the enemy 

southeastward and annihilate them." The 

attack was to open at noon of the 22d, by 

which time all the units would be in place 

and all preparations completed.52 

On 20 and 21 January the Americans 

and the Scouts again made numerous unsuccessful efforts to restore the original line. 

The terrain, dense vegetation, and the lack 

of accurate information about the enemy 

., 65th Brig Opns Order, Series A, No. 82, 1800, 

19 Jan 42, App. 11, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. 

Natib, pp. 58-60. The order gives the date 21 

January for the attack, but this is evidently a misprint since there is no indication of a delay. 
288 

prevented effective co-ordination and made 

contact between front-line units extremely 

difficult and sometimes impossible. During 

these two days the Japanese made their 

preparations for the scheduled offensive. 

Leaving enough men in position to contain 

the two Philippine Division regiments, Colonel Imai gradually shifted the bulk of his 

men westward to the extreme left of the II 

Corps line. At dawn of the 22d ~hese men began crossing the Balantay northwest of Abucay Hacienda, to the left of the 3d Battalion, 

45th Infantry. By 1000 enough men and 

heavy weapons had been put across to begin 

the attack. 

The offensive opened shortly before noon 

with an air attack and an artillery barrage, directed mainly against the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, immediately adjacent 

to the 45th Infantry's 3d Battalion on the 

corps left flank. Colonel Imai then sent 

his men into the attack. Whether by chance 

or design, the weight of the infantry attack 

fell upon the same battalion that had suffered most from the artillery preparation, 

and the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, began 

to fall back slowly. Under the threat of envelopment from the east and west, the 3d 

Battalion, 45th Infantry, broke contact with 

the enemy and also moved back. The 3d 

Battalion, 31st, was also exposed by the 

withdrawal, for on its right was the enemy 

salient and on its left was the gap left by 

the 1st Battalion. It, too, began to fall back, 

refusing its left flank. By late afternoon the 

31st Infantry and the attached 3d Battalion of the 45th had formed a new line 

east and south of Abucay Hacienda. The 

2d Battalion remained in place about 1,000 

yards east of the Hacienda, along the eastwest road leading to that barrio. To its left 

was the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, then 

the 1st Battalion with its flank sharply reTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

fused and facing almost due west. The 3d 

Battalion, 45th Infantry, was in support 

about 100 yards behind the 31 st Infantry 

line. 

By nightfall on the 22d, the 31st and 

45th Infantry were in approximately the 

same place they had been five days earlier 

when they began the counterattack. The 

physical condition of the men, however, had 

greatly deteriorated. They had been in action almost continuously during these five 

days and the strain of combat was clearly 

evident. The men on the front line had received little water or food and practically no 

hot meals during the battle. Many had been 

forced to rely on sugar cane to satisfy their 

thirst and hunger. All the men showed the 

effects of sleepless nights spent in beating 

off an enemy who preferred to attack during the hours of darkness. Casualties had 

been heavy, and the men were particularly 

bitter about Japanese air bombardment, 

against which the Americans had no 

weapon. 

The infiltration tactics of the Japanese, 

which carried them into and behind the 

American positions, also did much to wear 

down physical resistance and lower morale. 

Japanese artillery fire had been unopposed 

for the most part, largely because the terrain prevented close artillery support. 

When the guns to the rear had offered support, they had been quickly forced into 

silence by enemy dive bombers which 

buzzed around the offending weapons like 

bees around a hive. Against an enemy well 

equipped with mortars and grenade dischargers, and supported by artillery and aircraft, the Americans had only a limited 

number of improvised hand grenades and 

3-inch Stokes mortars with ammunition 

that contained a very high proportion of 

duds. "It was only through maximum ef-
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

fort and determination," wrote one company commander, "that we were able to 

attack, and later, defend as long as we 

did." 53 

General Nara .misread entirely the significance of the advance of his men on the 

22d. He felt that the action had not gone 

well and that progress had been slow. 

"Indignant in a towering rage," he could 

see no hope of victory in sight. 54 General 

Parker made a more accurate estimate of 

the situation. "It was now evident," he 

wrote, "that the MLR [main line of resistance] in the 51 st Division Sector could 

not be restored by the Philippine Division." 55 The counterattack of the Philippine Division, on which Parker had based 

his hopes for restoring the left portion of 

his line, had failed. 

Not only had the Japanese driven in the 

II Corps left flank but they now threatened 

to envelop the entire line and pin the corps 

against the sea. On the 17th, the 9th Infantry (less two companies) had entered 

the Abo-Abo River valley on its journey 

southeast toward Orion, far behind the line. 

Though handicapped by inadequate maps, 

lack of communications with brigade headquarters, shortage of rations, and the difficult terrain, Colonel Takechi's men had, 

by 19 January, reached a position on the 

flank and in the rear of the line. 56 Their 

advance, though observed, had been unchallenged. 

"Conrad, 31st Inf (US), p. 15. Conrad commanded Company F. 

M 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 29. 

.. SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 34. 

"The maps used were drawn to the scale 1 : 200,-

000. Takechi was not sure where he was ".nd may 

not even have known he was following the Abo-Abo 

River. General Nara was not even aware that 

Takechi had entered the Abo-Abo valley. 65th 

Brig Opns, Mt. Natib, pp. 26-31; 14th Army Opns, 

I,98. 

289 

All General Parker had to meet this new 

threat was Bluemel's 31 st Division (less 

elements), the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 

and the remnants of Jones's 51st Division. 

These units were in the vicinity of Guitol, 

about four miles south of Abucay Hacienda. 

Still in position astride the Guitol trail, which 

joined Guitol with Abucay Hacienda, was 

the covering force consisting of remnants 

of the 51st Infantry and most of the 21st 

Engineer Battalion. So weak was this covering force that it could do little more, in 

Jones's words, than hold the trail "with 

both flanks open." 37 

By the morning of 19 January the commanders at Guitol were receiving reports of 

the approaching enemy force. Patrols of 

the 21st Infantry attempted to hold up advance elements of the 9t.1 Infantry but were 

easily routed. During the middle of the 

afternoon the Japanese met and engaged 

elements of the 21 st and 31 st Divisions before Guitol. The former promptly withdrew, 

but the green untried 31 st Division troops 

remained in place to fire indiscriminately 

at friend and foe through the night. The 

small enemy force withdrew the next morning and was gone when General Bluemel 

finally quieted his hysterical troops and organized a counterattack with the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry."s 

On 21 January Takechi's men appeared 

behind the covering force along the Guitol 

trail and seized the high ground, from which 

they could dominate the Abo-Abo River 

" Jones, 51 st Div (PA) Order of Events, p. 4. 

58 The reasons for the withdrawal of the 21 at 

Division (PA) elements on the afternoon of the 

19th is not c1eaL One explanation given is that 

its task was to reorganize stragglers of the 51 st 

Division (PA). O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 28. 

This docs not seem a compelling enough reason 

for a withdrawal. Col Robert J. Hoffman, and 

Bluemel, Comments on Draft MS, Comments 9 

and 18, OCMH. 
290 

valley. An attempt, first by the 51 st Infantry 

on the north, and then from the south by 

General Jones, to recapture the hill proved 

unsuccessful. The covering force, cut off 

from direct access to Guitol via the trail, 

was forced to move north that night to Abucay Hacienda, then south by another route 

to rejoin the division near Guitol. The J apanese were now in position to make good 

their threat to envelop II Corps. With his 

left flank driven in and with the Japanese 

in possession of the high ground dominating 

the left and rear of his line, General Parker 

was in a most vulnerable position. 

The Withdrawal 

On Corregidor MacArthur and his staffhad been receiving full' and complete reports each day on the progress of the campaign from General Marshall and his assistants in the Bataan echelon of USAFFE. 

These reports had proved most disquieting, 

and on 22 January General Sutherland on 

MacArthur's orders went to Bataan himself 

to get "a clear picture of the situation." 51) 

His first stop was Limay, near where General Parker had his headquarters. There he 

discussp:d the situation with the II Corps 

commander before moving on to visit General Wainwright. Actually, Sutherland's 

trip to I Corps was unnecessary for, after 

his talk with General Parker, he had decided that "a withdrawal from the Abucay-Mt. Natib position was essentiaL" 60 

He gave both corps commanders verbal 

warning orders to prepare for a general 

withdrawal to the reserve battle position behind the Pilar-Bagac road and told them 

.. USAFFE-USFIP i~r t of Opns, p. 48. 

.0 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 37. See also 

General Parker's letter to author, 14 Feb 48, in 

OCMH, in which he states that Sutherland did 

not announce the decision to him at this time. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

they would receive written orders that 

night. 

Sutherland's decision, approved by MacArthur, was based on a clear and correct 

understanding of the tactical situation. The 

disintegration of the 51st Division, coupled 

with the failure of the Philippine Division 

to restore the main line of resistance, had 

opened a wide gap on the left flank of II 

Corps through which the enemy had pushed 

an unknown number of troops. The wedge 

that now existed between the two corps left 

both exposed to envelopment and made the 

entire line untenable. Moreover, the route 

of withdrawal in I Corps had been jeopardized by the enemy's establishment of a 

roadblock behind the line on the West 

Road. With USAFFE reserve and the reserves of the two corps committed, Sutherland realized that failure to withdraw at 

this time might well result in disaster. 

The decision made, General MacArthur 

alerted the War Department to the impeding move. "The enemy," he wrote, "seems 

to have finally adopted a policy of attrit10n 

as his unopposed command of the sea enables him to replace at will." He pointed 

out that his losses had been very heavy and 

"now approximate 35 percent of my entire 

force" with some divisions showing a loss 

"as high as sixty percent." His diminishing 

strength, he explained, would soon force 

him to fall back to a new line, where he 

planned to make his final stand. "I have 

personally selected and prepared this position," he told the Chief of Staff, "and it is 

strong." 61 

01 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 108, 23 Jan 

42, AG 381 (11-27-41 ~ec 1) Far East. Thelosses 

which MacArthur mentions in this message refer to 

the entire campaign since 8 December and not to 

the action on Bataan alone. Since there are no 

casualty tables for this campaign, it is not possible 

to state what the losses for the action along the 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

That General MacArthur viewed the 

situation on Bataan with the greatest concern is evident from the tone of the message 

and from his specific request to the Chief of 

Staff that the "fame and glory" of the men 

on Bataan "be duly recorded by their countrymen." While his army was still intact, 

MacArthur declared that .he wished to pay 

tribute "to the magnificent service it has 

rendered. No troops have ever done so much 

with so little." The final pessimistic note 

came when MacArthur raised the question 

of his successor "in case of my death." In 

such an event he recommended that his chief 

of staff, General Sutherland, be appointed 

to succeed him. "Of all my general officers," 

MacArthur declared, "he has the most 

comprehensive grasp of the situation." 62 

The order for the withdrawal, issued on 

on the night of 22 January, called for the 

progressive evacuation of the line, to be completed by daylight of the 26th. The troops 

would start to withdraw under cover of 

darkness the following day, 23 January, and 

would continue the withdrawal· on each 

succeeding night until all troops had reached 

the reserve battle position.63 The speed 

with which these detailed orders were issued 

indicates that they had already been prep.,.red, an assumption which is entirely reasonable in view of the fact that the AbucayMauban line was never intended as the 

place where the troops would make their last 

stand. It had been occupied primarily to 

keep the Pilar-Bagac road in American possession as long as possible and to allow time I 

Abucay-Mauban line were. It is extremely doubtful 

that they were serious enough to force a withdrawal, 

as implied in the message cited. The reasons for the 

withdrawal were tactical. 

.2 Ibid. The author has been unable to find in the 

records any response to this message. 

•• USAFFE FO 9, 22 Jan 42, AG 300 (28 Dec 

41) Phil Reds. 

291 

to prepare the final line to the rear.64 That 

line extended generally along the PilarBagac road, "a baked clay road with a 

double track," crossing it at various points 

to take advantage of favorable terrain.65 

Under the withdrawal plan, II Corps 

was to move first, on the night of the 23d24th, leaving only one night for the withdrawal of I Corps. As Wainwright's men 

had been moving back since the '22d, little 

difficulty was expected in this sector. The 

withdrawal of II Corps required a complicated plan, calling for the shift of the 45th 

Infantry and the 11 th Division (less artillery) from Parker's to Wainwright's sector. 

The first elements to abandon their position would be the heavy artillery and service installations which would begin to move 

out the first night, 23-24 January, and 

would arrive at their new positions by daylight of the 25th. A covering force, led by 

General Lough of the Philippine Division, 

was to protect the retirement of II Corps' 

combat elements from the main line of resistance by establishing a thin line extending from the vicinity of Balanga westward 

to Guitol. Along this line, from east to west, 

would be posted the remnants of the 51st 

Division, the 33d Infantry (P A), a battalion 

of the 31 8t Infantry (P A), one third of the 

57th Infantry (PS), and one third of the 

.. This supposition is supported by Colonel Collier, who, in his notebooks and in an interview 

with the author, declared that the orders had been 

prepared in advance. Collier, Notebooks, III, 37; 

interv, author with Collier, 20 Nov 46. 

.. The quotation is from a poem entitled "Abucay 

Withdrawal" in Henry G. Lee, Nothing But Praise 

(Culver City, Calif., 1948). Lieutenant Lee was in 

Headquarters Company, Philippine Division, and 

wrote the poems included in this small volume during the campaign and in prison camp. He was 

killed when the prison ship on which he was being 

transferred to Formosa was hit by an American 

bomb. The poems had been buried in the Philippines and were recovered after the war. 
BRIG. GEN. MAXON S. LOUGH, left, with Col. Harrison C. Browne (CofS Phil 

Div) and Capt. Joseph B. Sallee (ADC), near the front lines. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BAT AAN 

31st Infantry (US). General Lough would 

be supported by ''''eaver's tank group and 

the 7 5-mm. guns (SPM). 

From right to left, the front line units 

would begin to fall back through the covering force at 2300 of the 24th, leaving behind a shell to hold the original position. 

This shell, consisting of one rifle company 

and one machine gun platoon for each battalion, with the addition of a battery of 75-

mm. guns for each regiment-would start 

its own 'Nithdrawal at 0300 of the 25th. 

At 2330 on the 25th the covering force 

would fall back rapidly and by daylight of 

the 26th, if the movement was completed 

as planned, all units would be in position 

along the new line. 66 

During the night of 23-24 January the 

artillery and service clements withdrew successfully, while all other units made hurried preparations to follow the next night. 

The covering force took its position during 

the day, with the tanks, scheduled to be the 

last to pull out, deployed along the East 

Road and the so-called Back Road southeast of Abucay Hacienda. The night of 24-

25 January was one of confusion. On the 

extreme right of the line, troops of the 21st 

Division in the 57th Infantry sector began 

tn fall back from positions above Abucay 

along the East Road. In the center of the 

line the 41 st Division withdrew along the 

Back Road. 

The intersection of the Back Road with 

the east-west road connecting Abucay with 

Abucay Hacienda was the scene of the 

greatest confusion. Troops poured into the 

road leading south from all directions. Efforts to organize the men and keep the units 

intact were fruitless. There were no military 

police to regulate the traffic and it proved 

'"USAFFE FO 9, 22 Jan 42; SLF and II Corps 

Rpt of Opns, p. 30; Phil Div Rpt of Opns, p. 14. 

293 

impossible to maintain any semblance of 

order or organization. At times movement 

of vehicles and men stopped altogether, despite the best efforts of American and 

Philippine officers. "It was impossible," 

wrote Colonel Miller, commander of a tank 

battalion, "to do anything but keep the mass 

moving to the rear-praying-hopingtalking to yourself out loud-gesticulating-and trying to make yourself understood. It was a nightmare.67 Had the enemy 

chosen this moment to register artillery on 

the road junction, the cost in lives would 

have been shocking and the withdrawal 

might well have ended in a rouL GS 

On the left of the line the pressure which 

had been building up against the Philippine Division on the 23d and 24th reached 

its climax just as the Scouts and Americans 

began their withdrawal that night. As the 

men began to move out of the line, heading 

east toward Abucay and the East Road, the 

Japanese hit the thin covering shell. Against 

determined Japanese onslaughts the shell 

held long enough to permit the bulk of the 

men to withdraw. At about 0300 of the 25th 

the last of the Americans of the 31st Infantry, covered by heavy fire from the 194th 

Tank Battalion, staggered out of their positions, looking "like walking dead men." 

"They had a blank stare in their eyes," 

., Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 156. For the 

withdrawal of each unit the author used the sources 

relating to the various units already cited. See also 

Itr, Doyle to Ward, 8 Jan 52, OCMH, in which 

Colonel Doyle states that at about 0230 of the 25th 

he "took over this mess of men and trucks" and 

"cleared the congested area." 

68 In prison camp Maj. Kary C. Emerson of thc 

Philippine Division and II Corps staff talked with 

many small unit commanders and they all agreed 

that "coordination was poor, that all roads were 

clogged with troops and vehicles, and that had the 

Japanese artillery fired on the roads ... our losses 

would have been very severe ... in fact, mass 

slaughter." Emerson, Opns of II Phil Corps, p. 19. 
294 

wrote an officer of the regiment, "and their 

faces, covered with beards, lacked any semblance of expression." Unwashed and unshaven, their uniforms in shreds, "they 

looked like anything but an efficient fighting 

force .... " 00 

The withdrawal continued throughout 

the night of 24-25 January, all the 

next day and on through the night, with 

the Japanese in full pursuit. On the 25th 

Japanese aircraft were out in full force, 

bombing and strafing the retreating soldiers. 

From early morning until dusk, enemy 

planes buzzed unopposed over the long columns of men, dropping bombs and diving 

low to spray the road with machine gun 

bullets. The Philippine Army soldier, in 

dusty blue denims, coconut hat, and canvas 

shoes, watched "with apprehensive eyes" 

for the first far speck of approaching planes. 

When the attacks came and the road 

erupted "in a sheet of death," the "untrained 

denim men" milled "like sheep in a slaughter 

pen." 70 The reaction of the American infantryman, with his scarred and tilted helmet and shredded khaki trousers black with 

dirt, was more expressive. At the first alarm, 

he threw himself to the ground and "in a 

tone of hurt disgust" cursed 

... the noble Japanese 

With four letter Saxon obscenities. 71 

As the II Corps units moved into positions along the new line on the morning of 

26 January, they were covered by the two 

tank battalions. The tanks of the 194th were 

stretched out for nearly a mile along the 

north-south Back Road, near Bani, with instructions to hold until two disabled tanks 

along the narrow road could be moved back. 

.. Mead, Opns of 31st Inf (US), p. 21. 

TO Lee, "Abu cay Withdrawal," Nothing But 

Praise, p. 25. 

71 Ibid. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Atop a knoll at the southern end of the 

column were the 75-mm. guns (SPM), 

which, with the tanks, were designated as 

the last elements of the covering force to 

withdraw. Between 0930 and 1030 that 

morning the tankers came under attack 

from the 141st Infantry, which moved in on 

the column from the west. In the fight that 

followed, the SPM's added their accurate 

fire power to the armor-piercing 37-mm. 

shells of the 194th. Unable to advance, 

Colonel Imai called for artillery support and 

soon enemy shells were falling near the roadbound tanks. The enemy's mortars joined 

the battle and by noon shells were falling 

dangerously close to the Americans. Though 

the two disabled tanks had not yet been 

pulled out, the tank column was forced to 

fall back and leave the two behind. Pursued 

by low-flying aircraft, the SPM's and then 

the tanks withdrew to the safety of the new 

line. Though they had delayed the Japanese 

only a few hours, they had given the disordered units a chance to dig in for the expected onslaught. 12 

While II Corps was withdrawing under 

heavy pressure, I Corps fell back with little 

difficulty. Cut off from the corps commander, Colonel Berry, it will be recalled, 

had independently decided to withdraw 

from the Mauban line. Wainwright, in the 

meantime, had received instructions from 

General Sutherland to evacuate the 

Mauban position and fall back behind the 

Pilar-Bagac road. As he was going forward, 

he met Colonel Berry who, by his decision, 

had anticipated Sutherland's order for a 

general withdrawal. Wainwright thereupon 

"Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 161-70; Prov 

Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 21-22; USAFFE-USFIP 

Rpt of Opns, p. 50. General Nara claimed to have 

"routed the American tanks." 65th Brig Opns Rpt, 

Mt. Samat, 26 Jan-29 Feb 42, ATIS Enemy Pub 

289,19 Jan 45, p. 7. 
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BATAAN 

directed Berry to continue to withdraw but 

to take his men all the way back to the 

Pilar-Bagac road. By morning of the 26th, 

I Corps was in position along the new line 

to the left of II Corps.73 

Though they had finally been forced to 

give ground and abandon the first line of 

defense, the American and Filipino troops 

had inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. 

The 65th Brigade had entered combat on 

9 January with a strength of 6,651 officers 

and men. By 24 January it had suffered 

1,472 combat casualties, almost all of which 

were in the three infantry regiments. Attached units probably suffered proportionate losses and at the end of the Abucay fight 

General N ara wrote that his brigade had 

"reached the extreme stages of exhaustion." 74 

13 Ltr, Wainwright to TAG, 27 Jun 47, sub: Recommendation for DSC for Col Berry, copy in 

OCMH; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 48-49. 

11 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 33, 38. 

Each infantry regiment entered combat with 1,919 

mcn. The 122d Infantry, which fought on the west 

coast, suffered 108 casualties; the 141st, 700; and 

295 

When the troops of I and II Corps 

reached the reserve battle position, they 

were on the final line. Since 24 December, 

a month earlier, they had fallen back from 

position after position to reach the safety of 

Bataan. Here they had held off the overconfident enemy along a line which, because 

of the terrain in the center, was soon turned. 

After two weeks of hard fighting the American and Filipino troops had fallen back 

again. Bataan had been saved, 

..... saved for another day 

Saved for hunger and wounds and heat 

For slow exhaustion and grim retreat 

For a wasted hope and a sure defeat. 75 

There was no further retreat from the new 

line. "With its occupation," MacArthur 

wrote to the Chief of Staff, "all maneuvering possibilities will cease. I intend to fight 

it out to complete destruction." 16 

the 142d, 613. American and Filipino casualties 

for this same period are unknown. 

75 Lee, "Abucay Withdrawal," Nothing But 

Praise, p. 26. 

16 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 108, 23 Jan 

42, AG 3R1 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 
CHAPTER XVII 

The Battle of the Points 

On the same day that General MacArthur made his decision to withdraw from 

the Abucay-Mauban line, 22 January, the 

Japanese set in motion a new series of operations potentially as dangerous to the American position on Bataan as General N ara's 

assault against II Corps. Begun as a limited 

and local effort to exploit the break-through 

at Mauban, this fresh Japanese attack soon 

broadened into a major effort by 14th Army 

headquarters to outflank I Corps and cut 

the "Vest Road. It was to be an end run, 

amphibious style, with its objectives far to 

the south, in the Service Command Area. 

Altogether the Japanese landed at three 

separate places, each a finger of land-a 

point-jutting out from the rocky coast line 

of western Bataan into the South China 

Sea. The first landings came on 23 January, as the American and Filipino troops 

began to fall back to the reserve battle position; the last, on 1 February, four days after 

the new line along the Pilar-Bagac road 

had been established. Although the J apanese committed only two battalions to this 

amphibious venture, it posed a threat out of 

all proportion to the size of the forces engaged. (Map 13) 

The Service Command Area 

When the American line wa~ first established on Bataan on 7 January, defense of 

the southern tip of the peninsula, designated 

the Service Command Area, had been assigned to Brig. Gen. Allan C. McBride, 

MacArthur's deputy for the Philippine Department. McBride's command included, 

roughly, all of Bataan south of the Mariveles Mountains (the line Mamala RiverPaysawan River formed the northern 

boundary), and was divided into an East 

and West Sector by the Paniguian River 

which flows southward into Mariveles Bay. 

Excluded from his control was the naval 

reservation near the town of Mariveles 

which was under the control of the Navy 

and defended by naval troopS.' 

The Service Command Area covered 

over 100 square miles. The distance around 

the tip of Bataan along the East and West 

Roads, from Mamala River on the Manila 

Bay side to the Paysawan River on the South 

China Sea coast, is at least forty miles. Inland, the country is extremely rugged and 

hilly, with numerous streams and rivers 

flowing rapidly through steep gullies into 

the surrounding waters. The coast line facing Manila Bay is fairly regular but the west 

coast, where the Japanese landings came, is 

heavily indented with tiny bays and inlets. 

The ground on this side of the peninsula is 

thickly forested almost to the shore line 

where the foothills of the central range end 

in abrupt cliffs. Sharp points of land extend 

from the "solid curved dark shore line" to 

form small bays. A short distance inland, 

and connected with a few of the more prominent points by jungle trail, was the single1 USAFFE FO 2, 7 Jan 42, AG 300.4 (28 Dee 

41) Phil Reds; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 

44. 
MAP 13 

JAPANESE LANDINGS 

ON BATAAN 

23 January - I February 1942 

rrmmmmnn US. POSITIONS (APPROX '. 23 JANUARY 

~ JAPANESE PENETRATION UP TO 23 JAN 

E/el'ofions In feel 

o , 

MA NILA 

8A r 

P.Broo_s 
298 

lane, badly surfaced West Road, which 

wound its tortuous way northward from 

Mariveles.2 

An adequate defense of this long and 

ragged coast line would have been difficult 

under the best of circumstances. With the 

mis~ellany of troops assigned to him, the 

task was an almost impossible one for General McBride. Defe~ding the east coast was 

a small Filipino force under Maj. Gen. 

Guillermo B. Francisco, commander of the 

2d Division (P A). To accomplish his mission he had the 2d and 4th Constabulary 

Regiments, as well as other miscellaneous 

elements of his division, and one battery of 

75-mm. guns (SPM) . All that was available 

to guard the west coast against hostile landings was a mixed force of sailors, marines, 

airmen, Constabulary, and Philippine Army 

troops. Command of this sector was given 

to Brig. Gen. Clyde A. Selleck, 71st Division 

commander, on 8 January. Both sector commanders, Francisco and Selleck, had similar 

orders: to construct obstacles and station 

their troops along those beaches suitable for 

hostile landings, maintain observation posts 

on a 24-hour schedule, and make arrangements for a mobile reserve of battalion size, 

alerted and ready to move by bus on thirty 

minutes' notice.8 

General Selleck reported to McBride on 

the 9th and was told then "what I was to do 

and what I had to do it with." 4 His task was 

to defend ten miles of the western coast of 

Bataan from Caibobo Point southward to 

• Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 10; 

Collier, Notebooks, III, 21. 

'USAFFE FO 2, 7 Jan 42; memo, Funk for 

Asst G-3 USAFFE, 8 Jan 42, AG 300.6 (24 Dec 

41) Phil Rcds; McBride, Notes on Bataan Service 

Command, p. 106. 

• Ltr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: 

Statement on Reduction in Rank, p. 11, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Mariveles, where the Navy's responsibility 

began. The orders that had brought Selleck 

to the Service Command Area had also 

taken from him practically all of the combat 

elements of his 71st Division, leaving only 

the headquarters and service troops and one 

battalion of artillery (two 75-mm. guns plus 

one battery of 2.95-inch guns). In addition 

to these troops he had the 1st Constabulary 

Regiment from Francisco's division and five 

grounded Air Forces pursuit squadrons. 

From Comdr. Francis J. Bridget, commanding the naval battalion at Mariveles, he received the assurance that the bluejackets 

would move in the West Sector should its 

southern extremity be threatened.s 

The troops assigned to Selleck's command 

constituted a curious force indeed. Many of 

the men had no infantry training and some 

had never fired a rifle. They wore different 

uniforms and came from different services. 

Altogether, they formed a heterogeneous 

group which, even under peacetime conditions, would have given any commander 

nightmares. The planeless airmen had been 

issued rifles and machine guns when they 

reached Bataan and ordered to train as infantry. They had two weeks to make the 

transformation. During this time, to quote 

one of their number, they "charged up and 

down mountains and beat the bush for 

Japs" in an effort to master the rudiments 

of infantry tactics.6 Their attempts to acquire proficiency in the use of the strange 

assortment of weapons in their possession 

• Rpt, Comdr Bridget to Comdt, 16th Naval Dist, 

9 Feb 42, sub: Action at Longoskawayan Point~ 

p. 2, Off of Naval Rcds; memo, Selleck for McBride 

in McBride, Notes on Bataan Service Command, 

p. 131. The precise boundary between Selleck's 

sector and the Navy was at Apatot Bay. 

a The Dyess Story by Lt. Col. William E. Dyess, 

p.38. Copyright, 1944, by Marajen Stevick Dyess. 

Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons. Ind, Bataan, 

The Judgment Seat, p. 215. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

were hardly more successful. Some had the 

.30-caliber World War I Marlin machine 

gun; others, air corps .50-raliber guns on 

improvised mounts, Lewis .30-caliber machine guns, and Browning automatic rifles 

(BAR). In a group of 220 men there were 

only three bayonets, but, wrote one of their 

officers, "that was all right because only 

three . . . men knew anything about using 

them." 1 

The Constabulary had had little training 

as infantry, having served as a native police 

force prior to their induction into the Army 

in December. The naval battalion consisted of aviation ground crews left behind 

when Patrol Wing Ten flew south, sailors 

from the Canopus, men from the naval base 

at Mariveles, and from forty to sixty marines 

of an artillery unit. Of this group, only the 

marines had any knowledge of infp.ntry 

weapons and tactics.s 

With this force Selleck made his plans 

to resist invasion. He set up his command 

post along the West Road at KP 191, midway between the northern and southern extremities of his sector and about 5,000 

yards inland from Quinauan Point. After 

a reconnaissance, he set his men to work 

cutting trails through the jungle and forest 

to the tips of the more important promontories along the coast. Barbed wire was 

strung, machine guns emplaced, lookouts 

posted, and wire and radio communications 

established. Selleck had four 6-inch naval 

guns, but had time to place only two of 

them, manned by naval gun crews, into posi-

'Dyess, The Dyess Story, p. 39. 

B Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 200. 

Morison states there were one hundred marines but 

this number is too high. Lt. William F. Hogaboom, 

who commanded these marines, put the number at 

forty. Hogaboom, "Action Report: Bataan," Marine Corps Gazette (April 1946), p. 27. 

299 

tion. One was at the northern extremity of 

his sector; the other, in the south. The third 

was to have been put in at Quinauan Point 

but the cement base was still hardening 

when the Japanese attacked. The road cut 

through the jungle to bring the gun in, however, proved invaluable later. Selleck also 

planned to install searchlights atop prominent headlands to forestall a surprise night 

landing but never received the equipment.9 

On 22 January Selleck was still frantically 

seeking more men and more weapons for his 

sector, but the critical ten miles of beach, 

which had been practically undefended 

only two weeks before, was now manned by 

troops and organized into battalion sectors 

for defense. On the north was the 17th Pursuit Squadron, about two hundred men 

strong. Below it, down to the Anyasan River, 

was the 1st Battalion, 1st Constabulary 

Regiment. The 34th Pursuit Squadron, with 

16 officers and 220 men, occupied the next 

sector of the beach which included Quinau an Point. Following in order from north 

to south were the 2d Battalion of the Constabulary regiment, the 3d Pursuit Squadron, and then the naval battalion. In reserve 

Selleck had the 3d Battalion of the Constabulary regiment and the 20th and 21st 

Pursuit Squadron.10 There was little more 

he could do but wait and trust that his inexperienced and poorly equipped men would 

perform well if the Japanese should come 

ashore at any of the tiny inlets in the West 

Sector. 

• Memo, Selleck for McBride, in McBride, Notes 

on Bataan Service Command, p. 131; intervs, author with Selleck at various times in 1947 and 

1948; itr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, 

sub: Statement on Reduction in Rank; Col Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, pp. 52-53, 

copy in OCMH. 

10 Memo, Selleck for McBride in McBride, Notes 

on Bataan Service Command, p. 131. 
300 

Longoskawayan and Quinauan Points 

The Japanese scheme for a landing behind the American lines, a maneuver which 

General Yamashita was then employing 

with marked success in Malaya, originated 

with General Homma. On 14 January, 

when General Kimura, commander of the 

force driving down the West Road against 

Wainwright's I Corps, came to call on him, 

Homma had expressed his concern over the 

unexpected resistance along the east coast 

and the "stalemate" on the west coast. 

Though he did not apparently issue orders 

for an amphibious move, he pointed out to 

Kimura the advantages of a landing to the 

enemy's rear and told him that landing 

barges had already been ordered from Lingayen to Olongapo.ll With his detachment 

of about 5,000 men, induding most of the 

20th and 122d Infantry, Kimura had then 

advanced down the west coast and on 21 

January-when the 3d Battalion of the 20th 

Infantry established itself firmly on the West 

Road behind Wainwright's main line of resistance-appeared to be in an excellent position to reach Bagac from where he could 

move east to take II Corps from the rear.12 

That his drive on Bagac could be continued "without difficulty" seemed certain 

to Kimura. But to forestall a possible enemy 

reaction south of Bagac and to protect his 

right (south) flank once he started to move 

east along the Pilar-Bagac road, Kimura 

decided to follow Homma's suggestion and 

send a portion of his detachment by water 

from Moron to Caibobo Point, five air miles 

below Bagac. Selected to make this amphib11 Statement of Lt Col Shoji Ohta, Intel Officer, 

16th Div, in Comments of Japanese Officers Regarding The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 58, 130, 

cSlPY in OCMH. 

12 For a full discussion of this action, ,ee above, 

Ch. XVI, pp. 278-285. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ious hop was Colonel Tsunehiro's 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, then in reserve at 

Mayagao Point.13 This move, if properly reinforced and supported, might have had disastrous consequences for the American position on Bataan. It might well render Bagac, 

the western terminus of the Pilar-Bagac 

road, untenable for the Americans, cut off 

all of the American and Filipino forces nprth 

of Bagac, and present a serious threat to II 

Corps on the east and Mariveles to the 

south. 

That it did not was due to chance, poor 

seamanship, and the lack of adequate maps 

and charts. When the 2d Battalion embarked 

in barges at Moron on the night of 22 January, it was ill prepared for the journey. 

Lack of time ruled out preparations ordinarily required to insure the success of an 

amphibious operation. The only map available was scaled at 1 : 200,000, virtually useless for picking out a single point along the 

heavily indented coast line.14 So deceptively 

does the western shore of Bataan merge into 

the looming silhouette of the Mariveles 

Mountains that it is difficult even in daylight to distinguish one headland from another, or even headland from cove. At night 

it is impossible. 

Once afloat the Japanese found themselves in difficulty. The tides were treacherous and the voyage a rough one for the 

men crowded into the landing barges. Unexpected opposition developed when the U.S. 

Navy motor torpedo boat, PT 34, com~ 

manded by Lt. John D. Bulkeley and on a 

routine patrol mission, loomed up in the 

darkness. After a fifteen-minute fight, PT 

34 sank one of the Japanese vessels. Unaware of the presence of other enemy ves-

" 14th Army Opns, I, 97. 

14 USA vs. Homma, pp. 3060-61, testimony of 

Homma. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

sels in the area, the torpedo boat continued 

on its way. About an hour later Bulkeley 

encountered another of the Japanese landing craft and dealt it a fatal blow. Before it 

sank he managed to board and take two 

prisoners and a dispatch case with Japanese 

documents.

15 

By this time the Japanese invasion flotilla 

had not only lost its bearings but had split 

into two groups. Not a single Japanese 

soldier reached Caibobo Point. The first 

group, carrying about one third of the battalion, came ashore at Longoskawayan 

Point ten air miles southeast of the objective. The rest of the battalion, by now a 

meJange of "platoons, companies, and sections," landed seven miles up the coast, at 

Ouinauan Point. 16 At both places the Japa-

~se achieved complete tactical surprise, but 

only at the expense of their own utter, 

though temporary, bewilderment. 

The Landings 

Longoskawayan Point, a fingerlike promontory jutting out into the South China Sea 

and only 3,000 yards west of Mariveles Harbor is the southern coast of a small bay 

wh~se northern shore is formed by Lapiay 

Point. (Map 14) Four hundred yards wide 

at its tip and twice that at the base, Longoskawayan Point is only 700 yards long. Skirting its narrow coast are rocky cliffs about 

100 feet high, covered with tall hardwood 

trees and the lush vegetation of the jungle. 

"Rpt, Comdr, Torpedo Boat Sq Three, to Comdt, 

16th Naval Dist, 27 Feb 42, sub : Action of PT 34, 

22-23 Jan 42, Off of Naval Rcds; ltr, Comdr John 

D. Bulkeley to author, 5 Mar 48 OCMH ; White, 

Th ey Were Expendable, p. 11. 

10 USA vs. Homma, pp. 3060-61, testimony of 

Homma ; 14th Army Opns, I, 94, 97 ; Lt Col Irvin 

Alexander, Narrative of Quinauan Point Landing, 

p. I, App. A, QM Rpt of Opns. 

301 

LONGOSKAWAYAN POINT AREA 

1000 

Il JOhfl.J(Olle 

MAP14 

Visibility on the ground is limited by creepers, vines, and heavy undergrowth to a few 

yards; travel, to the narrow footpaths. The 

base of the point is less than 2,000 yards 

from Mariveles, the major port of entry for 

Bataan. 

Just inland from Lapiay Point is the 617-

foot high M t. Pucot, dominating the West 

Road and the harbor of Mariveles. Though 

within range of Corregidor's heavy guns, its 

possession by the enemy would enable h!m 

to control the southern tip of Bataan WIth 

light artillery. This fact had been recognized 

early by the Navy and Commander Bridg~t 

had posted a 24-hour lookout on the summIt 

of Mt. Pucot. He had, moreover, by agreement with General Selleck, promised to send 

his naval battalion into the area should the 

Japanese make an effort to seize the hill!7 

17 Bridget, Action at Longoskawaya.n Poin~, p . 2, 

Off of Naval Rcds; interv, Groce WIth MaJ John 

McM. Gulick, 20 Apr 48. 
302 

The presence of a Japanese force in the 

vicinity of Mt. Pucot was first reported by 

the naval lookout at 0840 of the 23d. The 

300 Japanese, first estimated as a force of 

200 by the Americans, had by this time 

moved inland from Longoskawayan and 

Lapiay Points and were approaching the 

slopes of the hill. Though Bridget had 600 

men at Mariveles, only a portion of this 

force was available initially to meet the 

Japanese threat. As soon as he had dispatched a small force of marines and sailors 

to the hill he therefore requested reinforcements from Selleck, who promptly dispatched one pursuit squadron and a 2.95-

inch mountain pack howitzer, with crew, 

from the 71st Division. Later in the day 

Bridget was further reinforced by a portion 

of the American 301st Chemical Company.IS 

When the first elements of Bridget's battalion reached Mt. Pucot they found an advance detachment of Japanese already in 

possession. Before the enemy could dig in, 

the marines and bluejackets cleared the 

summit, then mopped up the machine-gun 

nests along the slopes. The 3d Pursuit 

Squadron to the north suffered a few casualties the first day, when a squad, sent to 

investigate the firing, ran into a Japanese 

patrol. That night the men of the 301st 

Chemical Company took up a position 

along the nortn slope of Mt. Pucot and 

established contact with the 3d Pursuit. 

Marines and sailors were posted on Mt. Pucot and along the ridges to the south. The 

11 Bridget, Action at Longoskawayan Point, pp. 

2-3; Selleck, Comments on Draft MS, 8 Jan 52, 

OCMH. The number of men Bridget committed 

initially is not known but at the end of five days 

he had two hundred men from his naval battalion 

in action. The information on the number of Japanese in the area was secured from a prisoner of 

war and reported by Bridget, page 2. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

howitzer was emplaced on a saddle between 

the two ridges southeast of the hill.19 

When the sun rose the next morning, 24 

January, the Americans discovered that during the night the Japanese had reoccupied 

their former positions along the west and 

south slopes of Mt. Pucot. This was the 

sailors' and marines' first experience with 

the Japanese penchant for night attacks. 

The Americans normally halted their attack about an hour before sunset, for the 

light faded quickly in the thick jungle where 

even during midday the light was muted. 

As the troops along the Abucay line 

had discovered, the Japanese frequently 

launched a counterattack shortly after dark. 

Unless a strong defense had been established 

before darkness, t1?-ey were often able to 

regain the ground lost during the day. At 

the end of such a counterattack the Japanese usually settled down for the night and 

by daybreak were dug in along a new line. 

The Filipinos had displayed considerable 

nervousness during night attacks and had 

showed a tendency to fire intermittently 

through the night at the last known Japanese positions to their front. In their first 

encounter with the Japanese the men of 

Bridget's battalion reacted in the same manner. 

For the Japanese, this first encounter with 

the untrained bluejackets was a confusing 

and bewildering one. A Japanese soldier recorded in his diary that he had observed 

among the Americans a "new type of suicide 

squad" dressed in brightly colored uniforms. 

"Whenever these apparitions reached an 

open space," he wrote, "they would attempt 

'" Bridget, Action at Longoskawayan POint, pp. 

3--4; Hogaboom, "Action Report; Bataan," Marine 

Corps Gazette (April 1946), pp. 27-28; Lt Herb 

S. Ellis, Hist of 3d Pursuit Sq, p. 48, Chunn Notebooks. The action at Longoskawayan Point is based 

upon the first two sources. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

to draw Japanese fire by sitting down, talking loudly and lighting cigarettes." 20 The 

brightly colored uniforms the Japanese 

noted were the result of an effort by the 

sailors to dye their whites khaki, an effort 

which produced a uniform of a "sickly mustard yellow" color. 

During the 24th, in a day of vigorous 

patrol action, the marines and sailors succeeded in driving the Japanese back to 

Longoskawayan and Lapiay Points. By 

nightfall they were in control of Mt. Pucot 

and dug in along the ridges commanding 

the Japanese positions. But it was evident 

that the enemy force was too well entrenched and too strong to be expelled by 

less than a full battalion with supporting 

weapons. 

Quinauan Point, where the remaining 

600 men of Colonel Tsunehiro's 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, landed, is about midway between Mariveles and Bagac. Like 

Longoskawayan Point, it is a heavily timbered promontory with trees sixty to eighty 

feet high and with a thick jungle undergrowth. Two roads suitable for motor vehicles and tanks connected the points with 

the West Road. As in the landing to the 

south, the Japanese had by chance come 

ashore in an area where they could move 

inland rapidly, cut the I Corps line of communication, and threaten the southern tip of 

the peninsula. (Map 15) 

Guarding the beaches along which the 

bulk of the 2d Battalion landed was the 34th 

Pursuit Squadron. Some salvaged .50-caliber machine guns with improvised firing 

mechanism had been emplaced along Quinauan Point, but evidently the airmen had 

failed to make proper provision for security 

for there was no warning of the presence of 

'" Capt Earl L. Sackett, USN, Hist of USS 

Canopus, p. 14, Off of Naval Reds. 

303 

QUINAUAN POINT AREA 

MAP 15 

the enemy. The gun crews, awakened by the 

sound of the Japanese coming ashore in 

pitch blackness and unable to fire their .50-

caliber machine guns, put up no resistance. 

After giving the alarm, they "crept back to 

their CP." 21 By the time the squadron 

was alerted the enemy had completed the 

hazardous landing and was safely on shore. 

News of this landing reached General 

Selleck at his command post at KP 191 at 

0230, six hours before the Longoskawayan 

landing was reported. He immediately dispatched Colonel Alexander, recently assigned American instructor of the 1 st Philippine Constabulary, with the 3d Battalion of 

that regiment to drive the enemy back into 

"Lt Paulger (first name unknown), Hist of 34th 

Pursuit Sq, p. 52, Chunn Notebooks; Selleck, Com· 

ments on Draft MS, 8 Jan 52, OCMH. 
304 

the sea. 22 In the time it took the Constabulary to reach the scene of action, the J apanese dug in and constructed defensive positions near the base of the point. When the 

Constabulary attacked at about 1000 of the 

23d, therefore, it ran into strong opposition 

and was finally halted about 600'yards from 

the tip of the 1,000-yard-long peninsula. 

Alexander then tried to flank the Japanese 

position but that move, too, proved unsuccessful. Before the end of the day Alexander had reached the conclusion that he 

was facing a reinforced battalion, about 

seven hundred Japanese, and called on Selleck for tanks, artillery, and more infantry, 

preferably Americans or Scouts.23 

Back at Selleck's headquarters on the 

West Road, the 23d was a hectic day. McBride was there and so was General Marshall, MacArthur's deputy chief of staff. 

By that time news of the landing at Longoskawayan Point had been received and 

Sutherland had telephoned from Corregidar to say that the Japanese were landing 

at Caibobo Point. This last report, evidently based on the documents picked up by 

Lieutenant Bulkeley, was quickly proved erroneous. The three men were discussing 

plans for containing the Japanese at the 

two points and driving them back into the 

sea when Alexander's request for reinforcements was received. McBride turned to 

Marshall and asked for tanks to send to 

Quinauan Point, but the urgent need for 

.. Ltr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: 

Statement on Reduction in Rank, p. 12; Alexander, 

Quinauan Point Landings, pp. 1-2; Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, pp. 54-55; NLF and 

I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 24; Collier, Notebooks, 

111,43. 

23 Alexander, Quinauan Point Landings, p.. 2; 

Paulger, 34th Pursuit Sq, p. 52, Chunn Notebooks; 

Col Gilmer M. Bell, CofS South Sector, Opns in 

the South Subsector, p. 2, copy in OCMH; Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, p. 61. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

armor to cover the withdrawal from the 

Abucay line, scheduled to begin that night, 

made it impossible for Marshall to grant 

this request. The USAFFE deputy chief of 

staff left shortly for his own headquarters 

and late that night telephoned Selleck to 

relay MacArthur's orders that he, Selleck, 

was to take personal charge of the attack 

on Quinauan Point the next morning.24 

Meanwhile Colonel Alexander's force 

had been augmented by the addition of two 

Bren gun carriers, sent in lieu of the tanks, 

and by elements of the 21st Pursuit Squadron, a company of Constabulary troops, and 

a provisional company formed from Selleck's 71st Division headquarters company. 

Despite the.se reinforcements, attacks made 

during the 24th were unsuccessful and evening found the heterogeneous force in a 

holding position at the base of the peninsula. 25 Present during the day's action was 

Col. Charles A. Willoughby, intelligence 

officer on MacArthur's staff. When Colonel 

Alexander was hit in the hand at 1600 it was 

Willoughby who accompanied the wounded 

man off the fie1d. 26 

During the day there had been a change 

in command in the West Sector. General 

Marshall, who believed that only a small 

number of Japanese had come ashore at 

.. Ltr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, 

sub: Statement on Reduction in Rank, p. 13; 

Selleck, Comments on draft chapter prepared by 

author, OCMH; interv, author with Marshall, 

7 Apr 48. 

,.. Alexander, Quinauan Point Landings, p .. 2; 

Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, p. 62; 

Bell, Opns in South Subsector, p. 2; Dyess, The 

Dyess Story, p. 41. Dyess, then a captain, commanded the 21st Pursuit Squadron. 

'0 Melville Jacoby, "Corregidor Cable No. 79," 

Field Artillery Journal (April 1942), p. 267; hr, 

Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby to Ward, 17 May 

51, OCMH; Notebook of Col Alexander, copy in 

OCMH; Selleck, Comments on Draft MS, 8 Jan 52, 

OCMH. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

Quinauan Point, had come to the conclusion 

that the offensive was not being pushed aggressively enough. 27 He passed this estimate 

on to General Sutherland sometime during 

the night of 23-24 January, and, as a result, 

it was decided at USAF FE to relieve Selleck 

and send Col. Clinton A. Pierce to the West 

Sector to take over command. Pierce had 

earned high praise and an enviable reputation for his handling of the 26th Cavalry 

(PS) since the start of the campaign and he 

seemed the right man for the job. In the 

early morning hours of the 24th, Colonel 

Pierce, who was to be promoted to brigadier 

general in six days, appeared at Selleck's 

headquarters with the information that he 

had been ordered to assume command of the 

West Sector. This was the first intimation 

Selleck had that he was to be relieved. Later 

that day, after he received official notice of 

his relief from General McBride, Selleck 

took Pierce to Quinauan Point, turned over 

to him command of the sector, and left for 

the Service Command.28 

The change in command of the West Sector occurred almost simultaneously with a 

reorganization of the command on Bataan 

following the withdrawal to the reserve battle position. On 25 January McBride was 

relieved of responsibility for beach defense 

and that mission was assigned by USAFFE 

to the two corps commanders. Francisco's 

command along the east coast was merged 

with Parker's corps, and the West Sector 

was redesignated the South Sector of Wainwright'S corps on the west. Pierce, as com27 Interv, author with Marshall, 7 Apr 48. 

2' Ibid.; itr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, 

sub: Statement on Reduction in Rank, p. 13; Itr, 

Pierce to Ward, 5 Jan 52, OCMH; Bell, Opns in 

the South Subsector, p. 2. Selleck was reduced to 

colonel on 25 January. Official Army Register, 

1947. 

305 

mander of the South Sector, now came directly under Wainwright's command. 29 

Despite these administrative changes and 

the arrival of additional reinforcementsincluding the rest of the 21st Pursuit Squadron-the situation on Quinauan Point remained the same on the 25th and 26th. It 

was evident that trained infantry troops 

supported by artillery and tanks would be 

required to clear out the entrenched Japanese on both Quinauan and Longoskawayan Points. On the 26th USAFFE ordered the 2d Battalion, 88th Field Artillery 

(PS), which had withdrawn to I Corps 

from the Abucay line, to the west coast to 

support the troops on beach defense. One 

battery of the Scout battalion's 75-mm. 

guns went to Longoskawayan Point; another battery, to Quinauan Point.3Q 

The dispatch of trained infantry troops 

into the threatened area was hastened when, 

on 27 January, the Japanese attempted to 

reinforce their stranded men at Quinauan. 

MacArthur's headquarters quickly concluded that this move presaged a major 

enemy drive to cut the West Road and ordered Wainwright to clear the area as soon 

as possible. Wainwright thereupon ordered 

two Scout battalions, released from 

USAFFE reserve the day before, to move in 

and take over these sectors. The 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry, was to go to Longoskawayan Point; the 3d Battalion, 45th, to 

Quinauan Point.sl When the movement of 

.. USAFFE FO 10, 25 Jan 42, AG 300.4 (28 Dec 

41) Phil Reds. 

30 Ltr, Col Howard to TAG, sub: Unit Hist 2d Bn, 

88th FA (PS), p. 5. A copy of the letter, as well 

as a lengthier draft, is on file in OCMH. 

·'14th Army Opns, I, 107; ~lIier, Notebooks, 

III, 42; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 49; 

Capt Clifton A. Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS) 

8 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, p. 8, and Anderson, Hist of 

57th Inf (PS), p. 3, both in Chunn Notebooks. 

The Japanese attempt to reinforce on the 27th is 

described below, pp. 21-23. 
306 

these units was completed Wainwright 

hoped to wind up the action on both points 

in short order. 

The Fight for Longoskawayan Point 

The Americans on Longoskawayan Point 

had made little progress since 24 January. 

On that day Bridget had called up more of 

his men from Mariveles and had received 

from the 4th Marines on Corregidor two 

81-mm. mortars and a machine-gun platoon. By morning of the 25th the two guns 

were in position on a saddle northwest of 

Mt. PucoL Aided by an observation post on 

the hill, they had lobbed their shells accurately into the Japanese positions on both 

Longoskawayan and Lapiay Points. When 

the mortar fire lifted, patrols had moved in 

to seize both points. Lapiay had been abandoned and was occupied with no difficulty. 

But the men who attempted to reach Longoskawayan were driven back. There the 

Japanese were strongly entrenched and supported by machine guns and mortars. All 

efforts to drive them out that day failed and 

Bridget called for support from Corregidor .32 

Since the morning of the 25th the crew 

of Corregidor's Battery Geary (eight 12-

inch mortars) had been waiting eagerly for 

permission to open fire on the Japanese. At 

1000 this permission had been denied and 

Col. Paul D. Bunker, commander of the Seaward Defenses on Corregidor, had gone back 

to his quarters "inwardly raving with disappointment." 33 Finally, late that evening 

32 The account of the fight at .Longoskawayan 

Point to 28 January is based on Bridget, Action at 

Longoskawayan Point, pp. 3-5, and Hogaboom, 

"Action Report: Bataan," Marine Corps Gazette 

(April 1946), pp. 27-31. 

aa Diary of Col Bunker, entry of 25 Jan 42. Colonel Bunker died in prison camp and the diary was 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

word had come from Maj. Gen. Edward P. 

King, Jr., USAFFE artillery officer, that the 

battery could fire in support of the naval 

battalion. At about midnight the men began 

their "first real shoot of the war." 34 Using 

670-pound land-attack projectiles with superquick fuzes, "which worked beautifully," 

Battery Geary fired sixteen rounds at a range 

of 12,000 yards, only 2,000 short of extreme 

range. The results were most gratifying. 

After the fourth shot the forward observer 

on Mt. Pucot reported that such large fires 

had been started on Longoskawayan Point 

that he could no longer see the target. 35 

This bombardment, the first hostile heavy 

caliber American coast artillery fire since 

the Civil War, made a strong impression on 

the Japanese. One of them later declared: 

"We were terrified. \Ve could not see where 

the big shells or bombs were coming from; 

they seemed to be falling from the sky. Before I was wounded, my head was going 

round and round, and I did not know what 

to do. Some of my companions jumped off 

the cliff to escape the terrible fire." 36 

Even with the aid of the heavy guns from 

Corregidor, Bridget's battalion was unable 

to make any headway against the Japanese 

on the point. L nless reinforcements were received, not only was there little likelihood of 

an early end to the fight but there was a 

possibility that the enemy might even 

launch a counterattack. Fortunately, the 

reinforcements sent by Wainwright began 

to arrive. On the evening of the 26th the 

battery of 75-mm. guns from the 88th Field 

lent to the author before it was given to the U. S. 

Military Academy at West Point. A photostat copy 

is in OCMH. 

34 Ibid. 

'" Ibid. 

"USAFFE G-3 Info Bulletin, 3 Feb 42, quoted 

in Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 31. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

Artillery arrived and next morning the guns 

were in place, ready for action.a1 

At 0700, 27 January, all the guns that 

could be brought to bear on Longoskawayan Point-the 75-mm. battery of the 

88th Field Artillery, the two 8I-mm. mortars of the 4th Marines, the 2.95-inch pack 

howitzer from the 71st Field Artillery, and 

the 12-inch mortars of Battery Gearyopened fire with a deafening roar. The barrage lasted for more than an hour and when 

it lifted the infantry moved out to take the 

point. 

Though it seemed that nobody "could be 

left alive" after so heavy a shelling, the 

marines and sailors who attempted to 

occupy Longoskawayan found the J apanese active indeed.as Not only were all attempts to push ahead repulsed but, when a 

gap was inadvertently left open in the 

American line, the Japanese quickly infiltrated. For a time it appeared as though 

they would succeed in cutting off a portion 

of the naval battalion and only the hasty action of the 81-mm. mortars and the pack 

howitzer saved the situation. At the end of 

the day Bridget was no nearer success than 

he had been before the attack opened. 

Prospects for the next day were considerably improved when, at dusk, the 500 

Scouts of the 2d Battalion of the 57th Infantry, led by Lt. Col. Hal C. Granberry, 

reached Longoskawayan Point. That night 

they relieved the naval battalion and early 

the next morning moved out to the attack. 3D 

In the line were Companies E and G, with F 

in reserve. The Scouts advanced steadily 

., Ltr, Howard to TAG, sub: 2d Bn, 88th FA 

(PS), p. 5; Collier, Notebooks, III, 41-42; 

USAFFE·USFIP Rpt of Opns, p .. 49. 

as Bunker, Diary, entry of 27 Jan 42. 

"The account of the last days of fighting at 

Longoskawayan Point is based on Anderson, Hist of 

the 57th Inf (PS), pp. 3-4, Chunn Notebooks. 

307 

during the morning but halted when it became apparent that the artillery, its field of 

fire masked by Mt. Pucat, could not support 

the attack. A platoon of machine guns was 

set up on an adjoining promontory to the 

left to cover the tip of the point, and a platoon of the 88th Field Artillery moved to a 

new position from which it could fire on the 

Japanese. 40 By nightfall the Scouts had advanced about two thirds of the length of 

Longoskawayan Point. 

At dawn of the 29th, the Scouts moved 

back to their original line of departure to 

make way for a thirty-minute artillery preparation, to begin at 0700. Again the 12-inch 

mortars on Corregidor joined the guns off 

the point.41 A unique feature of this preparation was the participation by the minesweeper USS Quail which stood offshore 

and fired at specified targets on land. 42 Still 

supported by the Quail, which continued 

firing until 0855, the Scouts moved out 

again at 0730 only to discover that the J apanese had occupied the area won the day 

before. It was not until 1130 that the Scouts 

regained the line evacuated earlier in the 

morning. That afternoon Colonel Granberry put Company F into the line and 

within three hours the 2d Battalion was in 

possession of the tip of Longoskawayan 

Point. Except for mopping up, a job left 

largely to the naval battalion and to armored launches, the fight for Longoskawayan Point was over.43 Next day the Scout 

40 Ltr, Howard to TAG, sub: 2d Bn, 88th FA 

(PS), p. 5. 

41 Bunker, Diary, entry of 29 Jan 42; Harbor De· 

fenses Rpt of Opns, p. 31. 

42 Rockwell, Naval Activities in Luzon Area, p . 

14, and Itr, CO, USS Quail to Comdt, 16th Naval 

Dist, 30 Jan 42, sub: Action at Longoskawayan 

Point, 29 Jan 42, both in Off of Naval Reds. 

" For an account of the activities of the armored 

launches, see Sackett, Hist of USS Canopus, pp. 

16-17. 
308 

battalion rejoined its regiment at sector 

headquarters on the West Road, carrying 

with it a supply of canned salmon and rice, 

the gift of a grateful Commander Bridget.44 

The cost of the action had not been excessive. In wiping out a force of 300 Japanese 

the Americans had suffered less than 100 

casualties; 22 dead and 66 wounded. Half 

of the number killed and 40 of the wounded 

had been Scouts. Once again the Americans 

had learned the lesson, so often demonstrated during the campaign, that trained 

troops can accomplish easily and quickly 

what untrained soldiers find difficult and 

costly. But had it not been for the prompt 

action of the naval battalion, Mt. Pucot 

might well have been lost during the first 

day of action. 

Although the Americans had not known 

it, the Japanese on Longoskawayan had 

never had a chance to inflict permanent 

damage for their location was unknown to 

higher headquarters. Indeed, neither Kimura, who had sent them out, nor Tsunehiro, 

the battalion commander, seems to have 

been aware, or even to have suspected, that 

a portion of the 2d Battalion had landed so 

far south. Later, the Japanese expressed 

amazement and disbelief when they learned 

about this landing. One Japanese officer 

would not be convinced until he was shown 

the Japanese cemetery at Longoskawayan 

Point.45 Thus, even if they had succeeded in 

gaining Mt. Pucot, there was little likelihood that the small force of 300 Japanese 

.. Lt Col Harold K. Johnson, Anyasan and Silaiim 

Points (paper prepared for School of Combined 

Arms, 1946-47, Command and General Staff College), p. 12. 

"USA us. Homma, p. 3060, testimony of Horn· 

rna; Itr, Col Stuart Wood to author, 23 Mar 48, 

OCMH; interv, Groce with Selleck, 2 Apr 48. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

at Longoskawayan Point could have exploited their advantage and seriously threatened the American position in southern 

Bataan. 

The Fight for Quinauan Point 

While the Japanese were being pushed off 

Longoskawayan Point, the battle for Quinauan Point, seven miles to the north, continued. By 27 January the Japanese landing 

there had been contained but the fight had 

reached a stalemate. Against the 600 

Japanese of Colonel Tsunehiro's 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, Pierce had sent a miscellaneous and motley array of ill-assorted 

and ineffective troops numbering about 550 

men and drawn from a wide variety of organizations: the V Interceptor Command, 

the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, headquarters of the 71st Division (PA), the 3d 

Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary, and 

Company A, 803d Engineers (US) .46 It is 

not surprising, therefore, that little progress 

had been made in pushing the enemy into 

the sea. 

On 27 January, it will be recalled, Wainwright had been ordered to bring the fight 

on the beaches to a quick conclusion and had 

dispatched the 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry 

(PS), to Quinauan Point. By 0830 of the 

28th, the entire Scout battalion, numbering 

about 500 men and led by Maj. Dudley G. 

Strickler, was in position at the point ready 

to start the attack. All units except the V 

Interceptor Command (150 men), which 

" Bell, Opns in South Subsector, p. 2; Dyess, The 

Dyess Story, p. 42; 1st Lt John A. Goodpasture, V 

Interceptor Comd Combat Unit 1, p. 43, Paulger, 

Hist of 34th Pursuit Sq, p. 52, and 1st Lt Lawrence 

N. Parcher, Hist of 21st Pursuit Sq, p. 50, all three 

in Chunn Notebooks. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

remained to cover the beaches below the 

cliff line, were relieved." 

The Scouts advanced three companies 

abreast in a skirmish line about 900 yards 

long, their flanks protected by the grounded 

airmen. Attached to each of the rifle companies was a machine-gun platoon, placed 

along the line at points where it was thought 

enemy resistance would be stiffest. The line 

stretched through dense jungle where the 

visibility was poor and the enemy well concealed. "The enemy never made any movements or signs of attacking our force," wrote 

the Scout commander, "but just lay in wait 

for us to make a move and when we did 

casualties occured and we still could not see 

even one enemy." 48 

Under such conditions it is not surprising 

that the battalion was unable to make much 

progress during the day. Despite the fact 

that the machine guns were set up just to 

the rear of the front line and "shot-up" 

from top to bottom those trees that might 

conceal enemy riflemen, advances during 

the day were limited to ten and fifteen yards 

at some points. Progress along the flanks was 

somewhat better and in places the Scouts 

gained as much as 100 yards. By 1700, when 

the battalion halted to dig in for the night 

and have its evening meal of rice and canned 

salmon, Major Strickler had concluded that 

it would be impossible for his Scouts, aided 

only by the airmen, to take the point. He 

asked for reinforcements and that night 

Company B, 57th Infantry (PS), was attached to his battalion. 49 

., Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS), pp. 8-14, 

Chunn Notebooks; Bell Opns in South Subsector 

p. 3; Lilly, 57th Inf (PS) Opns Rpt, p. S. The ac~ count which follows is based on these sources. 

"Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th InC (PS), pp. 9-10, 

Chunn Notebooks. 

49 Lilly, 57th InC (PS) Opns Rpt, p. 5. 

309 

On the 29th, shortly after dawn, the attack was resumed. Two platoons of Company B, 57th Infantry, were in position on 

the battalion right flank; the rest of the reinforcing company was in reserve. Despite the 

strengthened line no more progress was 

made on this day than had been made the 

day before. Again casualties were heavy, 

especially in the center where resistance was 

strongest. 

The battle continued throughout the 30th 

and 31 st, with about the same results. The 

Japanese were being pushed slowly toward 

the sea, but only at very heavy cost. No 

headway could be made at all against the 

enemy positions along the cliff and on the 

high ground about 200 yards inland from 

the tip of the point. 

Hindering the advance as much as the 

enemy was the jungle. The entire area was 

covered with a dense forest and thick undergrowth that made all movement difficult 

and dangerous. Even without enemy opposition the troops could move through the 

jungle only with great difficulty, cutting 

away the vines and creepers that caught at 

their legs and stung their faces and bodies. 

The presence of concealed enemy riflemen 

and light machine-gun nests, invisible a few 

feet away, added immeasurably to the difficulty of the attacking troops. In such terrain, 

artillery, mortar, and armor could be of 

slight assistance and the advance had to be 

made by the rifleman almost unaided. It 

was a slow and costly process. 

At daylight, 1 February, in an effort to 

reduce the opposition in the center, the infantry attack was preceded by a heavy but 

ineffective mortar operation. When it lifted 

the two center companies moved in quickly 

but were able to advance only a short distance before they were halted. Major Strickler then went forward to the front lines to 
310 

make a personal reconnaissance. He was 

last seen in the vicinity of Company B, 57th 

Infantry. After an intensive search during 

the day battalion headquarters regretfully 

reported that its commander was missing, 

presumably killed in action. Capt. Clifton 

A. Croom, battalion adjutant, assumed 

command. 50 

By now the battalion was sadly reduced 

in strength, with casualties estimated as high 

as 50 percent. The men, "dead tired from 

loss of sleep and exposure," would need help 

soon if the attack was to be pushed aggressively.51 On the afternoon of the 2d Captain 

Croom asked Gener;tl Pierce for tanks, a 

request, happily, that Pierce was now in a 

position to grant, for on the night of 31 

January, on orders from MacArthur's headquarters, General Weaver had sent the 192d 

Tank Battalion (less one company) to the 

west coast. In less than two hours a platoon 

of three tanks from Company C was in 

position on the line.52 

Late on the afternoon of the 2d, with the 

aid of tanks, the attack was resumed. General Weaver, arriving as the tanks were 

making their third attack, was on hand to 

observe the action. This attack, like the 

otl;ters, failed to make any headway, and on 

Weaver's insistence two more attacks, preceded by artillery preparation, were made, 

with little success. Late in the afternoon Col. 

Donald B. Hilton, executive officer of the 

45th Infantry, arrived and assumed control of all troops on the point. 53 

.0 Strickler's body was recovered on the 7th. 

Memo, QM Hq Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, sub: 

Supply Situation, 7 Feb 42, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) 

Phil Reds. 

n Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS), p. 12, 

Chunn Notebooks. 

ISll Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 20-21; NLF and 

I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 24 . 

.. Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS), p. 12, 

Chunn Notebooks; Prev Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The next morning the Scouts and tankers 

resumed the attack, but with little success. 

Stumps and fallen trees impeded the advance of the tanks whose usefulness was 

further limited by the absence of proper coordination between infantry and armor, and 

faulty communication and control. When 

the battalion halted at 1700 it was not far 

from its original line of departure. That 

night it was joined by Captain Dyess and 

seventy men from the 21 st Pursuit Squadron which had been in the fight earlier but 

had been relieved when the Scouts had 

taken oVer the line on the 28th. "On our 

return," wrote Dyess, "we found that the 

Scouts had occupied fifty yards more of the 

high jungle above the bay-at terrible cost 

to themselves. Their casualties had run about 

fifty percent. The sight and stench of death 

were everywhere. The jungle, droning with 

insects, was almost unbearably hot." 54 

For the attack of the 4th Colonel Hilton 

received two additional tanks .. and a radio 

control car. Deploying his tanks across the 

narrow front and stationing men equipped 

with walkie-talkie sets with each tank, Hilton moved his reinforced battalion out early 

in the morning. The line moved forward 

steadily, the tanks, guided by directions 

from the radio control car, spraying the 

area to the front with their machine guns 

and knocking out strong points. 

Success crowned this co-ordinated infantry-tank attack. By the end of the day the 

Japanese had been crowded into an area 

100 yards wide and only 50 yards from the 

cliff at the edge of the point. Plainly visible to the Scouts were the Japanese soldiers 

and beyond them the blue water of the 

South China Sea. Suddenly the men witp. 21; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 

44,OCMH . 

•• Dyess, The Dyess Story, p. 43. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

nessed a remarkable sight. Screaming and 

yelling Japanese ripped off their uniforms 

and leaped off the cliff. Others scrambled 

over the edge and climbed down to prepared positions along the rock ledges. Down 

on the beach Japanese soldiers ran up and 

down wildly. "I'll never forget the little 

Filipino who had set up an air-cooled machine gun at the brink and was peppering 

the crowded beach far below," wrote one 

eyewitness. "At each burst he shrieked with 

laughter, beat his helmet against the 

ground, lay back to whoop with glee, then 

sat up to get in another burst." 55 

Though the Americans reached the edge 

of the cliff the next morning, the fight was 

not yet over. The Japanese had holed up 

in caves along the cliff and in the narrow 

ravines leading down to the beaches. Every 

effort to drive them out during the next few 

days failed. Patrols which went down the 

ravines or the longer way around the beach 

to polish off the enemy only incurred heavy 

casualties. Though their cause was hopeless 

the Japanese steadfastly refused to surrender. "The old rules of war," wrote General Wainwright, "began to undergo a swift 

change in me. What had at first seemed a 

barbarous thought in the back of my mind 

now became less unsavory. I thought of 

General U. S. Grant's land mine at Petersburg and made up my mind." 56 

First he made arrangements to bring a 

small gunboat close in to shore to shell the 

area. Then, at dawn of the 6th, he sent in a 

platoon of the 71st Engineer Battalion 

(P A) under the supervision of Colonel 

Skerry, the North Luzon Force engineer, to 

assist the attacking troops-the 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry, and Company B, 57th 

.. Ibid., pp. 43-44 . 

•• Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 57. 

311 

Infantry (PS )-in routing out the holed-up 

Japanese. Fifty-pound boxes of dynamite 

fired with time fuzes were lowered over the 

cliff to the mouth of the caves. After a Scout 

engineer sergeant was fatally wounded while 

lowering one of the boxes, this method was 

abandoned in favor of throwing dynamite 

hand grenades (four sticks of dynamite with 

a 30-second time fuze) along the length of 

the cliffs close to the bottom edges from 

where the Japanese fire had come. By this 

means most of the Japanese (about fifty) 

were forced into one large cave that was 

completely demolished by dynamite. All of 

the enemy had not yet been exterminated 

and when patrols entered the area, they encountered spasmodic fire. 57 

It was not unti18 February that the Japanese were finally exterminated. The job was 

done from the seaward side, as at Longoskawayan Point. Two armored naval motor 

l~unches armed with 37-mm. and machine 

guns, and two whaleboats, each with ten 

men from the 21st Pursuit Squadron on 

board, sailed from Mariveles at 0600 that 

morning. In command of the boats was Lt. 

Comdr. H. W. Goodall; Captain Dyess led 

the landing parties. At about 0800 the small 

flotilla arrived off Quinauan Point and the 

navy gunners took the beach under fire. 

Sheets lowered over the face of the cliff 

marked the Japanese positions. When the 

opposition on shore had been neutralized, 

the whaleboats, waiting a mile off the coast, 

came in to land the airmen. One group 

landed on the northern side of Quinauan 

Point, the other along the southern beaches. 

Both moved cautiously toward the tip of the 

peninsula while Scout patrols from the battalion on the cliffs above worked their way 

.... Skerry, Comments on Draft MS, Comment D, 

OCMH. 
312 

down through the ravines. Despite attacks 

by three enemy dive bombers which hit the 

small boats and the men on shore, the operation was successfully concluded during the 

morning.5P. 

The end of resistance on Quinauan Point 

marked the destruction of the 2d Battalion, 

20th Infantry. Three hundred of that battalion's number had been killed at Longoskawayan; another 600, at Quinauan. In 

the words of General Homma, the entire 

battalion had been "lost without a trace." 59 

But the cost had been heavy. The 82 casualties suffered at Longoskawayan were less 

than one fifth of the number lost at Quinau an. On 28 January when the 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry, took over that sector 

it had numbered about 500 men. It marched 

out with only 200; 74 men had been killed 

and another 234 wounded. The other Scout 

unit, Company B, 57th Infantry, left Quinauan Point with 40 men less than it had 

ha,d ten days earlier. Other units suffered 

correspondingly high losses. Total casualties 

for the Quinauan Point fight amounted to 

almost 500 men.'l<) It was a heavy price to 

pay for the security of the West Road, but 

there was still a payment due, for the Japanese, on 27 January, had landed at yet another point on the west coast behind Wainwright's front line. 

IS Ltr, Capt H. W. Goodall, USN, to George 

Groce, 17 Aug 48, OCMH; Dyess, The Dyess Story, 

p. 44; rad, Comdt, 16th Naval Dist, to OPNAV, 

8 Feb 42, War Diary, 16th Naval Dist, Off of Naval 

Reds. On the way back, the boats were attacked 

again by dive bombers. Among the casualties that 

day was Commander Goodall, seriously wQunded. 

.. USA vs. Homma, p. 3061, testimony of Homma; 

rpt, Graves Registration Unit. 7, 8, 9, and 11 Feb 

42, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

eo Bell, Opns in South Subseetor, p. 4; Paulger, 

34th Pursuit Sq, p. 52, Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th 

Inf (PS), p. 14, and Parcher, 21st Pursuit Sq, pp. 

50-51, all three in Chunn Notebooks. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Anyasan and Silaiim Points 

General Kimura's success against Wainwright's Mauban line between 20 and 23 

January had led 14th Army headquarters to 

revise its estimate of the situation and to 

prepare new plans for the occupation of 

Bataan. Originally, the main effort had been 

made against II Corps on the east. In view 

of Kimura's success, General Homma now 

decided to place additional forces on the 

west and increase pressure against I Corps 

in the hope that he might yet score a speedy 

victory. On the 25th, therefore, he directed 

Lt. Gen. Susumu Morioka, 16th Division 

commander, who had come up from southern Luzon and was now in Manila with a 

portion of his division, to proceed to western Bataan with two battalions of infantry 

and the headquarters of the 21st I ndependent Engineer Regiment and there assume command of the operations against I 

Corps.61 

The First Landing 

Homma's order of the 25th, though made 

two days after the landings at Longoskawayan and Quinauan, contained no reference to this effort to outflank I Corps by 

sea. Homma was not yet convinced that this 

amphibious venture should h~ve the full 

support of 14th Army. The decision to reinforce Tsunehiro's 2d Battalion at Quin61 Morioka's 16th Division was scattered at this 

time. The 9th Infantry was under General Nata's 

control on the east coast of Bataan; two battalions 

of the 20th Infantry were already in Bataan and 

operating under General Kimura, infantry group 

commander of the division. The third regiment of 

the division, the 33d Infantry, was split: one battalion was in Manila, one in southern Luzon, and 

the third was on Mindanao. 14th Army Opns, I, 

98-99. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

Canas 

MAP 16 

auan, the only landing of which the J apanese had knowledge, was made by General 

Morioka, Kimura's immediate superior. To 

him, as t'o Kimura, the landing held out the 

promise of large results. Even before he left 

Manila, he ordered one company of the 

small force at his disposal to go to the aid 

of the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry. The company selected was from the same regiment's 

1 st Battalion. It was to move with all speed 

from Manila to Olongapo and there pick up 

supplies for the trapped and hungry men 

"fighting a heroic battle" against a "superior enemy" on Quinauan Point.62 

The reinforcing company reached Olongapo at the head of Subic Bay on the night 

of 26 January. At midnight it embarked in 

.. Ibid., 107-D8. 

313 

ANYASAN AND SILAIIM POINTS 

AREA 

contour interval 100 feet 

1000 o 1000 , , YARDS 

landing craft loaded with ammunition, 

rations, and supplies, and set sail for Quinauan. Once more poor seamanship and the 

lack of navigation charts and large-scale 

maps led the Japanese astray. This time 

they landed about 2,000 yards short of the 

objective, between the Anyasan and Silaiim 

Rivers, in the sector guarded by the 1st Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary.63 (Map 

16) 

The beach on which the Japanese craft 

ran aground was little different from that 

at Longoskawayan and Quinauan. The 

coast line here presented the same irregular 

appearance as that to the south. Dense 

tropical forest and thick undergrowth extended almost to the shore line, and the footB3 Ibid.; Collier, Notebooks, III, 42. 
314 

hills of the Mariveles Mountains formed 

steep cliffs about 100 feet high just in front 

of the beach. The two rivers, Silaiim on the 

north and Anyasan about 1,000 yards to the 

south, emptied into shallow bays, each bearing the name of the river. Separating the 

two bays was Silaiim Point, a narrow headland which formed the upper shore of the 

southern bay. The lower coast of the bay 

received its name from the s')uthernmost of 

the two rivers. Thus, from north to south, 

presenting a confusion of identically named 

geographic features, were: Silaiim Bay, 

Silaiim River; Silaiim Point, Anyasan Bay, 

Anyasan River, and Anyasan Point. This 

confusion of points, when combined with 

those to the north and south, was as bewildering to the troops as it is, probably, to 

the reader. Their plight was most aptly expressed by one member of a wire crew, 

perched atop a telephone pole who, when 

asked where he was, replied, "For Christ's 

sake, sir, I don't know. I am somewhere between asinine and quinine points." 64 

Inland, the ground was even more difficult than at Longoskawayan and Quinauan. 

Small streams branched off from the two 

rivers, dry at this time of the year, to create 

additional hazards to troop movements and 

to provide cover for the enemy. With only 

one access trail from the West Road to the 

beach, the task of maintaining communications and supplying troops to the front 

would be a difficult one. The absence of 

roads would also limit the effective use of 

tanks in formation and require their employment singly or in small numbers at isolated points. Similarly, the dense forest, by 

restricting observation and increasing the 

.. Maj Achille C. Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 6 Feb 

42, copy in OCMH. Major Tisdelle was aide to 

General King, Chief of the Artillery Section, 

USAFFE. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

hazards of tree bursts, would limit the use of 

artillery and mortars. Like the fights then 

in progress at Longoskawayan and Quinauan, the struggle to drive off the Japanese 

between the Anyasan and Silaiim Rivers 

would be a job for the rifleman.fIII 

In MacArthur's headquarters, the new 

landing was regarded as the prelude to a 

major enemy offensive. Should this hostile 

force, thought to be of "considerable size," 

establish contact with the Japanese on 

Quinauan Point to the south or advance as 

far as the West Road, only 2,700 yards 

away, it would present "a threat of no mean 

importance." 66 

Coming ashore at about 0300 of the 27th, 

the confused and lost Japanese of the 1st 

Battalion, 20th Infantry, numbering about 

two hundred men, met no more resistance 

than had their fellows in the 2d Battalion. 

The Constabulary troops on beach defense 

promptly took flight at the first approach of 

the enemy and the entire Constabulary battalion was soon dispersed. At dawn, when 

General Pierce received news of the landing, 

he immediately dispatched the 17th Pursuit 

Squadron, then in sector reserve, to meet the 

invaders.67 

The grounded airmen moved out shortly 

after dawn. At the abandoned Constabulary 

command post, where breakfast still simmered in the pots, they discovered a smashed 

switchboard and an aid station complete 

with stretchers. After breakfasting on the 

food and reporting the situation to sector 

headquarters, the airmen set off jauntily for 

'" Johnson, Anyasan and Silaiim Points, pp. 2-3. 

Colonel Johnson states that the percentage of the 

tree bursts was as high as 50 percent . 

.. Collier, Notebooks, III, 42 . 

.. Bell, Opns in South Subsector, p. 5; 2d Lt 

Stephen H. Crosby, Hist of 17th Pursuit Sq, p. 48, 

Chunn Notebooks; NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, 

p.25. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

the coast. As they did so, some men were 

heard inquiring how to fire their rifles. 

More than a mile inland from the beach 

and about 400 yards distant from the vital 

West Road, the 17th Pursuit Squadron met 

the enemy's advance patrols. The Japanese 

pulled back without offering serious resistance and the squadron was able to advance 

along the path between the two rivers until 

it was about 1,000 yards from the shore line. 

The Japanese had apparently established 

their front line positions here and the Americans' easy march came to an abrupt halt. 

Joined at this point by the 2d Battalion, 2d 

Philippine Constabulary, which had just 

been in the fight against the Japanese roadblock to the north, the Americans dug in 

for the night. 68 This was to be the easiest advance by the troops in the Anyasan-Si1aiim 

sector. 

The next day, 28 January, the airmen and 

Constabulary attacked during the morning. 

Either because the Japanese had pulled 

back or shifted position during the night, the 

Constabulary battalion was able to advance 

almost to the coast at Anyasan Bay. That 

night, when the Japanese appeared ready to 

counterattack, the Constabulary pulled back 

leaving the 17th Pursuit to fend for itself. 

The threat to the West Road now seemed 

serious, for there was every indication that 

the Japanese force, whose size and precise 

location were still not known, might burst 

out of the beachhead and create havoc behind the American lines. 69 

The situation was saved the next day 

when the Scouts of the 2d Battalion, 45th 

Infantry, arrived on the scene, led by their 

executive officer, Capt. Arthur C. Biedenstein. General Pierce placed Biedenstein in 

os Crosby, 17th Pursuit Sq, pp. 48--49, Chunn 

Notebooks. 

.. Ibid.; Bell, Opns in South Subs ector, p. 5. 

315 

charge of the operation and gave him the 

1st Battalion, 1st Philippine Constabulary, 

and the 1 st Battalion, 12th Infantry 

(PA) -both of which had just been relieved at Quinauan Point-to clear out the 

Japanese. To guard the West Road and insure the safety of the line of communication, 

he placed Company A, 57th Infantry (PS), 

on patrol to the rear. 70 

On 30 January, after a personal reconnaissance to locate the Japanese, Captain 

Biedenstein opened the attack. Calling for 

support from the 75-mm. guns of the 88th 

Field Artillery, whose Battery D was in position to assist the men in both the Quinauan 

and Anyasan-SiIaiim sectors, he sent his 

Scouts out to regain the beach near the 

mouth of the SiIaiim River. Either the battalion's front line had been incorrectly reported to the artillery or plotted inaccurately, for the result of the preparation was 

almost disastrous. Without adequate communication between infantry and artillery 

and with high trees limiting observation and 

causing tree bursts, the Scouts soon found 

themselves under fire from their own guns. 

Before the artillery command post could be 

reached, four Scouts had been killed and 

sixteen more wounded. The offensive of the 

30th came to an end even before it had 

fairly begun. 71 

•• Ibid.; Capts Ralph Amato, Jr., and Louis Murphy, Hist of 2d Bn, 45th Inf (PS), 8 Dec 41-9 Apr 

42, p. 9, Chunn Notebooks; NLF and I Corps Rpt 

of Opns, p. 25; Lilly, 57th Inf (PS) Opns, p. 5; 

Maj Harold K. Johnson, 57th Inf (PS) Diary, pp. 

11-12, copy in OCMH. There is considerable disagreement among the sources on the dates for operations in this sector. The conflicting sources cannot 

be reconciled and the dates used in this account were 

determined after an evaluation of all the sources. 

" Amato and Murphy, 2d Bn, 45th Inf (PS), p. 

10, Chunn Notebooks; Johnson, 57th Inf (PS) 

Diary, pp. 11-17; Johnson, Anyasan and Silaiim, 

pp. 6-13; Itr, Howard to TAG, sub: 2d Bn, 88th 

FA (PS), p. 11; Lilly, 57th In! (PS) Opns, p. 5; 
316 

That night the 57th Infantry (less detachments) was moved to South Sector 

headquarters on the West Road with orders 

to prepare for operations in the AnyasanSilaiim sector. Hardly had the regiment arrived when General Pierce called for a volunteer-a lieutenant colonel or majorto co-ordinate the activities of the troops 

already engaged on that front. Maj. 

Harold K. Johnson, who had been relieved as S-3 of the regiment a week earlier 

and had "nothing else specific to do," volunteered for the job. "When I reported to 

General Pierce at 7: 30 P. M.," he wrote in 

his diary, "I found about as complete a lack 

of knowledge of conditions on the coast 

along which the Japanese had landed as 

could be imagined." 72 

A personal reconnaissance on the night of 

the 30th did not greatly increase his knowledge of the enemy but it did give him a 

clearer picture of the disposition of the units 

now under his control. On the north, between the Silaiim River and Canas Point, 

was the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (PA), 

facing almost due north and with its right 

flank on the sea. Facing west and holding a 

line from the Silaiim River to the trail leading from Silaiim Point to the West Road, 

was the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry. Below 

it, to the left of the trail and extending the 

line south as far as the Anyasan River, was 

the 1st Battalion, 1st Constabulary. To the 

rear, along the trail, was the 17th Pursuit. 

Since there were no troops south of the 

Anyasan River, Johnson asked for and received permission to relieve Company A of 

the 57th Infantry from its patrolling mission 

along the West Road and send it to Anyasan 

Bell, Opns in South Subsector. The present account is based on these sources in addition to those 

cited bel'iJw. 

,. Johnson, 57th Inf (PS) Diary, p. 11. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Point, the promontory south of the river 

bearing the same name. Its new mission was 

to establish contact with the enemy on the 

point in an effort to determine his strength 

and locate his positions. 

Johnson's efforts on the 31st were directed primarily toward securing information about the strength and disposition of 

the enemy. While Company A of the 57th 

Infantry reconnoitered Anyasan Point to 

the south, the 1 st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 

pivoted on its right (west) flank and swept 

in on the beaches of Silaiim Bay. At the 

same time the Scouts and Constabulary between the Anyasan and Silaiim Rivers 

pushed westward toward the sea. The 17th 

Pursuit remained in place, keeping open the 

line of supply and communications. Unopposed, the Scout and Philippine Army battalions cleared the area north of the Silaiim 

River during the morning, thus reducing 

the beachhead by about one third. The 

Constabulary troops, however, were stopped 

cold after an advance of about 100 yards. 

The Scout company moving out toward 

Anyasan Point failed to make any contact 

that day. Johnson now knew where the J apanese were dug in. But he still had no 

knowledge of their strength or defenses. 

With this scanty information, Major 

Johnson concluded that there was no hope 

of clearing the area with the force he had. 

His 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry, was in poor 

shape. It had reached the Anyasan-Silaiim 

sector after a grueling march from Abucay 

where it had been badly mauled. One of its 

companies had been hard hit and disorganized by fire from friendly artillery and casualties throughout the battalion had been 

heavy. The unopposed Scout company to 

the south could not be expected to make 

rapid progress through the jungle and it was 

too weak to attack alone if it should meet 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

an enemy force. Of the rest of his troops 

Johnson had no high opinion. He did not 

believe that the 17th Pursuit would be "particularly helpful in an assault," or that the 

Constabulary would contribute much in an 

offensive. On the evening of the 31st, therefore, he asked General Pierce for more 

troops, and asserted that in his opinion only 

his own regiment, the 57th Infantry, then 

at sector headquarters, would be able to 

clear the Japanese out of the area. "No 

other troops," he declared, "would make 

the necessary attacks." 73 That night the 

57th Infantry was released to General 

Pierce, who immediately ordered it into the 

Anyasan-Silaiim area. Next morning Lt. 

Col. Edmund J. Lilly, Jr., commander of 

the 57th Infantry, assumed control of operations there and Major Johnson resumed 

his former post as S-3. 

By the end of January the enemy had 

been isolated and contained. A strong force 

was assembling for a determined effort to 

root out the Japanese hiding in the canebrakes, thickets, and creek bottoms of the 

Anyasan and Silaiim Rivers. The Japanese 

at Longoskawayan Point had been killed or 

driven into the sea. At Quinauan Point the 

slow costly process of attrition was under 

way. To General Pierce the situation everywhere in the South Sector seemed generally 

favorable. But appearances were deceptive, 

for already the Japanese had launched a 

desperate and final effort to reinforce their 

beachheads on the west coast. 

The Second Landing 

At the time it was made, USAFFE's estimate that the first landing in the AnyasanSilaiim sector presaged a major enemy effort 

" Ibid., p. 13. 

317 

to cut the West Road was incorrect. Events 

soon proved it prophetic, however, for on 

the evening of 27 January General Homma 

had for the first time lent his support to the 

landings. That day, in an order to General 

Morioka, he had directed that the beachhead at Quinauan Point be reinforced and 

that the augmented force drive inland to 

seize the heights of Mariveles and then the 

town itself.14 

Morioka's first efforts to comply with 

Homma's orders were limited to attempts 

to drop rations, medicine, and supplies from 

the air to his beleaguered forces on the 

beaches. But the Japanese aircraft were unable to locate their own troops in the jungle. 

Supplies fell as often OIl Americans and Filipinos as they did on the starved Japanese. 

The Scouts of the 45th Infantry one day 

picked up twelve parachute packages containing food, medicine, ammunition, and 

maps. The rations consisted of a soluble 

pressed rice cake, sugar, a soy bean cake, a 

pink tablet with a strong salty taste, and 

"other ingredients [which J could not be 

determined." 75 

While these efforts to supply the troops by 

air were in progress, Morioka assembled the 

troops he would require to reinforce the 

beachhead and push on to Mariveles. On 31 

January he ordered the 1st Battalion, 20th 

Infantry, one company of which was already 

in the Anyasan-Silaiim area, to undertake 

this dangerous mission. Maj. Mitsuo Kimura, battalion commander, immediately 

"14th Army Opns Order, Series A, No. 220, 27 

Jan 42, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, ATIS 

Enemy Pub 289, Supp. 24. 

7' Memo, QM Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, sub: 

Status Rpt, 1 Feb 42, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) Phil 

Reds. See also, USA us. Homma, p. 3061, testimony of Homma; Itr, Col Wood to author, 23 Mar 

48, OCMH; Amato and Murphy, 2d Bn, 45th Inf 

(PS), pp. 10-11, Chunn Notebooks. 
318 

made his preparations to sail the next 

night. 76 

By this time Morioka had tipped his hand. 

First warning of the impending Japanese 

move had reached the Americans on the 

28th when a Filipino patrol on the opposite 

side of Bataan had found a mimeographed 

order on the body of a slain Japanese officer. 

When translated, it revealed the Japanese 

intention to reinforce the beachheads and 

drive toward Mariveles. Thus warned, 

USAFFE took measures to counter the expected landings. Observers on the west coast 

were alerted and General Weaver, the tank 

commander, was directed to send one of his 

two tank battalions (less one company) to 

the threatened area. The few remaining 

P-40's were gassed, loaded with 1 DO-pound 

antipersonnel bombs and .50-caliber ammunition, and ordered to stand by for a 

take-off at any time.71 

The night of 1-2 February was clear, 

with a full moon. As the enemy flotilla sailed 

south it was spotted by American observers 

and a warning was flashed to MacArthur's 

headquarters. The land, sea, and air forces 

so carefully prepared for just this moment, 

were immediately directed to meet and annihilate the enemy. The result was the first 

large co-ordinated joint attack of the campaign. While the motor torpedo boats sought 

targets offshore, the 26th Cavalry moved 

out from I Corps reserve to Caibobo Point 

to forestall a landing there. The four P-40's, 

all that remained of the Far East Air Force, 

took off from the strip near Cabcaben, 

cleared the Mariveles Mountains, and 

headed for the enemy flotilla of twelve or 

,. 14th Army Opns, I, 107-08. 

T7 Collier, Notebooks, III, 44; Bluemel, 31st Div 

(PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 15; ltr, Bluemel to Groce, 15 

Jun 48, OCMH; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 

20-21. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

more barges. Sighting the target, they 

swooped low to release their 1 DO-pound 

antipersonnel bombs, then turned for a 

strafing run over the landing boats. 

By now the Japanese were nearing Quinauan Point. Their reception from the men 

on shore, themselves under fire from a JapaneSe vessel thought to be a cruiser or destroyer, was a warm one. Artillery shell fragments churned the sea around the landing 

boats as Battery D of the 88th Field Artillery and Battery E of the 301st let go with 

their 75's and 155's. Together, the two batteries fired a total of 1,000 rounds that 

night. Fire from the heavy machine guns 

and small arms of the Scout battalion on 

the point peppered the sma1l boats and 

caused numerous casualties among the luckless men on board. 

While the landing boats were being attacked by air, artillery, and infantry weapons, PT 32 moved in to attack the Japanese warship, actually a minelayer, stationed 

off Quinauan Point to cover the landing 

of Major Kimura's battalion. The enemy 

vessel turned her searchlight full on the 

patrol boat and let go with four or five salvos 

from two guns, thought to be of 6-inch caliber. The PT hoat sought unsuccessfully to 

knock out the searchlight with machine gun 

fire, and then loosed two torpedoes. As she 

retired the men on board observed explosions on the enemy vessel, which later reported only slight damage from shore batteries. 78 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 52; ltr, Howard to TAG, Hist, 2d Bn, 88th FA (PS), p. 13; 

NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 25; Croom, Hist, 

3d Bn, 45th Inf ,(PS), pp. 12-12, Chunn Notebooks; Collier, Notebooks, III, 45-46; rad, 16th 

Naval Dist to OPNAV, 2 Feb 42, War Diary, 16th 

Naval Dist, Off of Naval Rcds; Rockwell, Naval 

Activities in Luzon Area, p. 15; ltr, Bulkeley to 

author, 5 Mar 48, OCMH; Chandler, "26th Cavalry 

(PS) Battles to Glory," Part 3, Armored Cavalry 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

For the Americans and Filipinos who witnessed the battle in the clear light of the 

full moon, it was a beautiful and heartening 

sight to see the remnants of the enemy 

flotilla, crippled and badly beaten, turn 

away and sail north shortly after midnight. 

Homma's plan to reinforce his troops on 

Quinauan Point had failed and in the first 

flush of victory the Americans believed the 

surviving Japanese had returned to Moron. 

But Major Kimura either had no intention 

of admitting defeat or was unable to make 

the return journey in his battered boats. 

With about half his original force he landed 

instead in the Anyasan-Silaiim area where 

he was joined by his battalion's advance 

company.79 Once more, against an alerted 

and prepared foe, the Japanese had landed 

behind Wainwright's line. All hope for an 

early end to the fight for Anyasan and 

Silaiim Points was now gone. 

Colonel Lilly, who had assumed command of operations in the Anyasan-Silaiim 

sector on 1 February, spent the day in a 

thorough reconnaissance of the area. On the 

evening of the 1 st he still had no knowledge 

of the strength of the Japanese, but he had 

concluded that he would be more likely to 

encounter the enemy in the jungle than 

along the river beds. The arrival of Japanese 

reinforcements apparently led to no change 

in plans formed the previous night, and on 

the morning of the 2d he launched an attack with three Scout battalions abreast. On 

Journal (July-August 1947), p. 17; Ind, Bataan, 

The Judgment Seat, pp. 278-79; USA vs. Homma, 

p. 3061, testimony of Homma; 14th Army Opns, 

I, 102-08, II, Maps 2 and 3; rpt, Com dr, Motor 

Torpedo Boat Div Nine, to Comdt, 16th Naval Dist, 

3 Feb 42, sub: Attack of PT 32 on Enemy Cruiser, 

Off of Naval Reds; White, They Were Expendable, 

pp. 77-82; Comments of Former Japanese Officers 

Regarding The Fall of the Philippines, p. 60, 

OCMH. 

79 14th Army Opns, I, 108. 

319 

the north, its right flank resting on the dry 

bed of the Silaiim River, was the 2d Bat, 

talion, 45th Infantry, now led by its commander, Lt. Col. Ross B. Smith. To its sout!'; 

(left) was the 3d Battalion, 57th, and next 

to it the 1st Battalion (less Company B, a1 

Quinauan) of the same regiment. The mission of the northernmost battalion was to 

seize the mouth of the river and the north 

side of Silaiim Point. The center unit, between the two rivers, would take the point 

itself while the 1st Battalion on the south 

was directed to take Anyasan Point. Guarding the north flank of the advance was the 

1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, assigned to 

beach defense above Silaiim River. The 

17th Pursuit Squadron remained astride the 

trail to the West Road to secure the line of 

communication. In reserve was the 2d Battalion of Colonel Lilly's 57th Infantry, recently arrived from Longoskawayan Point, 

and the Constabulary battalion. 

The attack jumped off at daybreak, as 

the first rays of light filtered through the 

leafy branches of the high hardwood trees. 

Advancing cautiously through the luxuriant 

undergrowth, the two right (northern) battalions met resistance almost immediately. 

The southernmost battalion, however, met 

no opposition that day or during the four 

days that followed. But its progress was slow 

for the ground before it was exceedingly 

rough and difficult. The battalions to the 

north, after small gains, concluded that the 

force opposing them was a strong one and 

spent the rest of the day developing the hostile position. 

On the 3d tanks joined in the action. In 

answer to a request of the day before, Company C, 192d Tank Battalion (less one platoon at Quinauan) , consisting of nine tanks, 

had been sent forward from sector headquarters. Colonel Lilly placed them between 
320 

the two rivers, the only area even remotely 

suitable for tank operations. Restricted to 

the narrow trail and hampered by heavy 

jungle, the tanks were forced to advance in 

column and were utilized essentially as moving pillboxes. 

At the outset tank-infantry co-ordination 

was poor, the foot soldiers having been directed to remain 100 to 150 yards behind 

the tanks. With their limited fields of fire 

and in column formation, the tanks were 

particularly vulnerable to enemy mine and 

grenade attack. It is not surprising, therefore, that on the first day the armor was used 

the results obtained were disappointing. In 

at least one case the result was tragic. The 

enemy, unimpeded by the Scouts who were 

well behind the tanks, disabled one of the 

tanks, set it on fire, then filled it with dirt. 

The crew never had a chance and was first 

cremated, then buried.so After this experience the riflemen were instructed to work 

closely with the armor and four infantrymen 

were assigned to follow each tank. When the 

Japanese dropped down into their foxholes 

now to allow the tanks to pass, the foot 

soldiers picked them off before they could 

get back on their feet. 

The greatest threat to the tanks came 

from enemy mines. The Japanese would 

dash from cover, fix a magnetic mine 

against the front of the tank and scurry for 

the trees. Or they would attach a mine to 

a string and drag it across the trail in front 

of an advancing tank. Had not the infantry 

provided close support, the tanks would not 

have lasted long in the Anyasan-Silaiim 

fight. 

The employment of artillery also presented a difficult problem, as Colonel Lilly 

quickly discovered. The ground sloped up 

from the beach and there were no com80 Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 21-22. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIpPINES 

manding heights along which to emplace 

the guns so that they could support the firstline troops. Tree bursts from the 75-mm. 

shells represented a real danger to friendly 

troops. The one battery of 155-mm. howitzers that was available had no fire direction equipment of any kind and could not 

be used for infantry support. In the absence 

of artillery forward observers, infantry rifle 

company commanders observed fire in front 

of their own lines and sent corrections to 

the artillery command post which had 

established communications directly with 

the assault companies. 

The 2d Battalion, 88th Field Artillery 

( PS ), which was assigned the task of providing support for all the troops in Pierce's 

South Sector, had to emplace its two fourgun batteries in pairs. To co-ordinate its 

fire the battalion had to lay thirty-eight 

miles of wire, in addition to utilizing the infantry communications net. The problem of 

firing from an altitude of 800 feet, through 

trees averaging 60 to 80 feet in height, at 

an enemy on an elevation of 100 feet or less 

and at a distance of about 4,000 yards, 

without hitting friendly front-line troops 

was a difficult one, and one that was never 

entirely solved. In the fight for Quinauan 

and Anyasan-Silaiim, the artillery battalion 

expended about 5,000 rounds, without appreciably affecting the course of the action.81 

Machine guns, though available, were not 

employed widely in the fight for Anyasan 

and Silaiim Points, first, because the undergrowth limited the field of fire, and second, 

because of the difficulty of ammunition resupply. There was no way of bringing up 

ammunition except by hand and it was hard 

enough to keep the riflemen supplied. Machine gunners, therefore, were employed as 

SlLtr, Howard to TAG, sub: 2d Bn, 88th FA 

(PS), p. 5. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

ammunition carriers for the riflemen. Their 

use thus, observed Major Johnson, "outweighed the advantages of their supporting 

fire." 82 

Although the Scout units had both 60-

and 81-mm. mortars, they had little or no 

ammunition for these weapons. They did 

use the 3-inch Stokes mortar ammunition 

in the 81-mm. weapon, but, in addition to 

the limitations imposed by the terrain, the 

efficiency of this weapon was severely curtailed by the abnormally high percentage 

of duds. To the end, the fight for Anyasan 

and Silaiim Points remained primarily a 

rifleman's fight. 

While infantry-tank and infantry-artillery co-ordination were worked out during 

the 3d and 4th of February, the advance of 

the two right battalions-the 2d Battalion, 

45th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 57th 

Infantry-proceeded slowly. Until the 

southern battalion fought its way through 

the jungle and established contact with the 

enemy on Anyasan Point, thus securing the 

left flank, the rest of the line had to proceed 

cautiously. Finally, on the 7th, this battalion 

reached the Japanese positions, but was 

roughly repulsed. American Air Corps 

troops and the Constabulary battalion were 

then sent in to join the fight. The Constabulary was placed on the right (north) of the 

1st Battalion, 57th, with orders to maintain 

contact with the 3d Battalion to the north. 

The Air Corps troops went in on the left 

and established contact with the Scouts on 

Quinauan Point, thus completing a continuous line from the northern edge of Silaiim 

Bay to the southern extremity of Quinauan 

Point, a distance of about 4,000 yards. 

The troops all along the front now began to advance more rapidly. Progress was 

facilitated when, on the 8th, a platoon of 

82 Johnson, Anyasan and Silaiim Points, p. 11. 

321 

37-mm. guns was released from Quinauan, 

where the fight ended that day. The guns 

were emplaced on a promontory overlooking Anyasan Point from where they would 

take the Japanese supply dumps under fire. 

The end of resistance at Quinauan also 

made possible the return of Company B, 

57th Infantry, to the heavily engaged 1st 

Battalion on Anyasan Point.s3 

By this time the debilitating effects of the 

half ration instituted a month earlier were 

becoming apparent. Some of the men grew 

listless and less eager to fight. Each day it 

became more difficult to push the front-line 

troops into aggressive action, and after the 

first five days it became necessary to rotate 

the assault battalions. Even the procurement of additional rations by the 57th Infantry, a Scout unit of high esprit de corpsJ 

did not improve matters much. 

The necessity of feeding the troops during the daylight hours imposed further restrictions on combat efficiency by shortening 

the fighting day. The two meals were served 

shortly after daybreak and just before dark 

so that the action was usually broken off in 

time to set up defensive positions against 

night attacks and eat the last meal of the 

day. Even when operations were proceeding 

favorably, it was necessary to follow this 

procedure for, with the meager ration, it 

was essential that every man get his full 

share to maintain his efficiency in combat. 

Fortunately, even with the half ration, 

the morale of the Scouts did not deteriorate. 

They understood, as many did not, that 

they were receiving all the food that a determined commander could get for them, 

and there was little looting or stealing from 

the kitchens. But the effect of the ration on 

the performance of troops in combat was 

"'Bell, Opns Rpt, 8-9 Feb 42, AG 370.2 (19 Dee 

41) Phil Reds. 
322 

undeniable. "A prolonged period of reduced rations," concluded Major Johnson, 

"destroys the will to fight almost entirely, 

and . . . may even dtstroy the will to 

survive." 84 

On 9 February, the 3d Battalion, 57th 

Infantry, in the center of the line, was replaced by the rested and refreshed 2d Bat-' 

talion, with the result that the attack that 

day was pushed more aggressively. One 

enemy strongpoint which had held up the 

3d Battalion was taken during the afternoon, but the Japanese counterattacked 

that night to recapture the position. The following day, 10 February, the 2d Battalion 

resumed its march, retook the strongpoint, 

and then continued to move forward steadily. By evening of the next day it had 

reached the mouth of the Anyasan River, 

squeezing out the Japanese and forcing 

them on to Silaiim Point, between the two 

rivers, and in front of the 45th Infantry 

Scouts who were advancing more slowly. 

The situation of Major Kimura's remaining 

troops was desperate and their defeat a 

certainty. 

As early as the 7th the Japanese had apparently realized that their forces on the 

west coast beachheads were doomed. From 

Major Kimura, commander of the troops 

at Silaiim, General Morioka received word 

that a "bitter battle" was in progress and 

that the enemy was attacking with tanks 

and artillery. "The battalion," wrote Kimura, "is about to die gloriously." 85 General Morioka responded to this message by 

ordering the 21st Engineer Regiment to 

rescue the trapped men. On the night of the 

"' Johnson, Anyasan and Silaiim Points, p. 12. 

so Tactical Situation Rpt, 14th Army, ATIS Doc 

56113, 3 Mar 50, p. 4, in Translation of Japanese 

Documents, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, 2 vols., II, 

No. 15. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

7th the engineers, in thirty boats of varying sizes, left Olongapo for the beachheads. 

As they came in to shore to search for their 

stranded fellows they were met by artillery 

and machine-gun fire, as well as bombs 

from two P--40's. In the face of this strong 

opposition they returned empty-handed to 

Olongapo. The next night they tried again 

and this time succeeded in evacuating 

thirty-four of their wounded comrades. 

This was their last trip.86 

Unable to evacuate his men, Morioka 

finally decided to relieve them from their 

assignment so that they could make a last 

desperate effort to save themselves. In orders sealed in bamboo tubes and dropped 

from the air, he instructed Major Kimura 

to bring his decimated battalion out by sea, 

on rafts or floats, and get them to Moron. 

1£ no other means were available the men 

would have to swim. Included in the orders 

was detailed information on tides, currents, 

the time of the rising and setting of the sun 

and moon, and directions for the construction of rafts. Unhappily for Kimura, copies 

of the orders fell into American hands, were 

quickly translated, and circulated to the 

troops on the front line. Thus alerted, riflemen along the beaches north of Silaiim got 

valuable target practice firing at Japanese 

swimmers and machine gunners were on the 

watch for rafts and floats. Only a few of the 

enemy were able to escape by sea. Most of 

those who were not shot or captured probably drowned. 87 

But before his final annihilation Major 

Kimura made one last effort to break out of 

"14th Army Opns, 1,102,108; Bell, Opns Rpt, 

8-9 Feb 42. The Japanese reported a PT attack 

but American records contain no mention of such 

an attack. 

•• Ltr, Col Wood to author, 23 Mar 48, OCMH. 
THE BATTLE OF THE POINTS 

the cordon which held him tight on Silaiim 

Point. At dawn, 12 February, with about 

two hundred men, he launched a counterattack against the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry. A gap about 100 yards wide had 

opened in that battalion's line, between 

Companies E and F, on the 9th, but this 

fact had never been reported to Colonel 

Lilly. An effort had been made to close it 

but when the Japanese counterattacked it 

was covered only by patrol. Driving in 

through the two companies, the Japanese 

met only scattered resistance in their pellmell rush to escape. The weight of the attack was met by a machine gun section 

which fought heroically but unavailingly to 

stop the Japanese. One gun crew made good 

its escape after all its ammunition was gone, 

but the other, except for one man who had 

left to get more ammunition, was killed. 

The two gun crews together accounted for 

thirty Japanese. 

Once they broke through the line the 

Japanese turned north toward the Silaiim 

River. At the mouth of the river were the 

command posts of the 17th Pursuit, which 

was patrolling the beach along Silaiim Bay, 

and of Company F, 45th Infantry. The 

Japanese attacked both command posts, 

wounding Capt. Raymond Sloan, commander of the 17th Pursuit, who died 

later.S8 

A hurried call for aid was sent to Colonel 

Lilly, and at about 1000, just as the 2d 

Battalion, 45th Infantry, command post 

came under heavy machine gun fire, the 

3d Battalion, 57th Infantry, reached the 

threatened area. Two of its companies 

formed a skirmish line to fill in the gap left 

88 Crosby, 17th Pursuit Sq, p. 48-49, Chunn Notebooks. 

323 

by the routed 17th Pursuit and finally tied 

in with the north company of the 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry. About noon the 

Scouts attacked the Japanese and during 

the afternoon advanced steadily against 

stiff but disorganized resistance. The next 

morning the attack was resumed and by 

1500 all units reached the beach, now littered with the equipment and clothing of 

those Japanese who had taken to the water 

to escape. The only enemy left were dead 

ones, and the beach was befouled with 

bloated and rotting bodies. 

Few of the Japanese had been taken 

prisoner. As at Longoskawayan and Quinauan they showed a reluctance to surrender 

though their cause was hopeless. MacArthur's headquarters, in its first effort to use 

psychological warfare, made available a 

sound truck and two nisei and urged 

Colonel Lilly to broadcast appeals to the 

Japanese to give themselves up. But the 

higher headquarters failed to provide a 

script for the nisei and placed on the regiment responsibility for the truck and the 

in terpreters. 

To the regiment'S reluctance to accept 

this responsibility was added its disinclination to take prisoners. The Scouts 

had found the bodies of their comrades behind Japanese lines so mutilated as to discourage any generous impulse toward those 

Japanese unfortunate enough to fall into 

their hands. Some of the bodies had been 

bayoneted in the back while the men had 

had their arms wired behind them. One 

rotting body had been found strung up by 

the thumbs with the toes just touching the 

ground, mute evidence of a slow and tortured end. Nor did the Japanese show any 

signs of gratitude when their lives were 
324 

spared. When one of them was brought to 

a battalion headquarters he had promptly 

attempted to destroy both himself .and the 

headquarters with a hand grenade. It is 

not surprising, therefore, that "a passive 

resistance to the use of the sound truck developed and there were sufficient delays so 

that it was not used." 89 

About eighty of the enemy had made good 

their escape from the beachhead during the 

counterattack of the 12th. Hiding out in the 

daytime and traveling only at night, they 

made their way northward by easy stages. 

Four days later they were discovered about 

seven miles from Silaiim Point and only one 

mile from the I Corps main line of resistance. Their undetected four-day march 

through the congested area behind I Corps 

can be attributed to the wildness of the 

country and to their skill in jungle warfare. 

Only the defensive barbed wire and cleared 

fields of fire along the front had prevented 

them from reaching their own lines. A 

squadron of the 26th Cavalry was sent from 

corps reserve on the 16th to root them out. 

It took two days and the help of troops from 

the 72d and 92d Infantry to do the job.90 

The three-week-Iong struggle to destroy 

the Japanese who had landed by accident at 

Anyasan and Silaiim Points was over. The 

cost on the American side was about 70 

killed and 100 wounded. The 2d Battalion, 

45th Infantry, which had been in action 

continuously since 29 January and had 

borne the brunt of the final counterattack, 

lost 68 men: 26 killed and 42 wounded. The 

.. Johnson, Anyasan and SHaiim Points, p. 14. 

.. Maj James C. Blanning, CO 2d Sq, 26th Cavalry (PS), War Diary, pp. 11-18, OCMH; Chandler, "26th' Cavalry (PS) Battles to Glory," Part 3, 

Armored Cavalry Journal (July-August 1947), pp. 

18-19. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

57th Infantry's 2d Battalion suffered fewer 

casualties; the remaining units even less. 91 

As at Longoskawayan and Quinauan 

Points the Americans and Filipinos had 

wiped out an entire enemy battalion, about 

900 men. A large percentage of these had 

been lost on the night of 1 February when 

they had tried to reinforce their fellows at 

Quinauan; almost 400 had been killed on 

the beachhead, 80 had been caught by the 

26th Cavalry, and an undetermined number 

had been drowned at sea trying to escape. 

Only 34 Japanese had been evacuated. 92 

Since 23 January, when General Kimura 

had launched his amphibious attack to cut 

the West Road and take I Corps from the 

rear, the 20th Infantry had lost two infantry 

battalions. Committed piecemeal, inadequately prepared, attacked during the approach and disorganized before the landing, 

the Japanese who finally came ashore had 

presented a real threat to the American positions on Bataan. Had it not been for the 

prompt action of all units involved, the 

Japanese, weak as they were, might well 

have succeeded in their design. Fortunately, 

they were contained at each threatened 

point, and by the time the beachheads had 

been consolidated USAFFE had concentrated enough troops to hold them in place, 

and finally to destroy them. By the middle 

of February the danger along the west coast 

was over. 

., For estimated casualties in each unit see the reports cited for each unit above. The totals given are 

estimates reached by the author . 

.. It is extremely difficult to establish the exact 

number of Japanese in the 15t Battalion, 20th infantry, or to account precisely for their fate. Various 

estimates are given in all the sources cited. The author has estimated the strength on the basis of all 

known factors plus the fact that the battalion had 

seen little action and had suffered few casualties. 
CHAPTER XVIII 

Trail 2 and the Pockets 

During the three weeks that the Battle 

of the Points raged along the west coast, 

another hard-fought battle was being waged 

along the front lines. No sooner had the 

troops completed their withdrawal from the 

Abucay-Mauban line to the reserve battle 

position then the Japanese struck again. In 

II Corps the Japanese blow came in the 

center where, in the confusion which accompanied the establishment of the new 

line, there was a dangerous gap during the 

critical hours before the attack. Fortunately 

it was closed before the Japanese could take 

advantage of the opening. I Corps, where a 

similar gap developed, was not so fortunate. 

Here the Japanese poured through the hole 

before it could be plugged and set up strong 

pockets of resistance behind the line. For the 

next three weeks, simultaneously with the 

Battle of the Points and the fight in II Corps, 

Wainwright's troops were engaged in a bitter struggle to contain and reduce these 

pockets. Thus, in the period from 23 January to 17 February, the American positions 

on Bataan were under strong attack in three 

places: along the west coast beaches and at 

two points along the reserve battle line, now 

the main line of resistance, in I and II 

Corps. 

The Orion-Bagac Line 

By the morning of 26 January most of 

the American and Filipino troops were in 

place along the reserve battle position, their 

final defense line on Bataan. The new line 

extended from Orion westward to Bagac, 

following a course generally parallel to and 

immediately south of the Pilar-Bagac road 

which it crossed in the center. (Map 17) 

Having left behind Mt. Natib, "that infernal mountain which separated our corps," 

the troops were able now for the first time 

to form a continuous line across Bataan and 

to establish physical contact between the two 

corps.l They were also able to tighten the 

defenses along the front and at the beaches, 

for the withdrawal had reduced the area in 

American hands by almost 50 percent. 

The area into which the 90,000 men on 

Bataan were now compressed covered about 

200 square miles. On the north, in the saddle between Mt. Natib and the Mariveles 

Mountains was the Pilar-Bagac road which 

extended across the peninsula like a waist 

belt. To the east, west, and south was the 

sea. As Mt. Natib had dominated the Abucay-Mauban line, so did the imposing mass 

of the Mariveles Mountains dominate 

southern Bataan. Except for the narrow 

coastal strip along Manila Bay, the entire 

region was rugged and mountainous, covered with forest and thick undergrowth. 

The temperature averaged about 95 degrees. Even in the shaded gloom of the jungle the heat during midday was intense. 

Any physical exertion left a man bathed in 

perspiration and parched from thirst. As it 

was the dry season there were no rainstorms 

to afford any relief. "The heat," complained 

1 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 52. 
326 

General N ara, "was extreme and the men 

experienced great difficulty in movement." 2 

When the sun set the temperature dropped 

sharply and those who had sweltered in the 

tropical heat during the day shivered with 

cold under their army blankets. 

Forming the boundary between the two 

corps was the Pantingan River which flowed 

generally northward from the Mariveles 

peaks. On the east side of the river, in the II 

Corps area, was 1,920-foot-high Mt. Samat, 

four miles from the coast and a short distance south of the Pilar-Bagac road. Along 

its slopes and on its summit were high hardwood trees, luxuriant crEepers, and thorny 

vines. Though movement through this jungled fastness was difficult, the heights of Mt. 

Samat afforded excellent observation of the 

entire battlefield below. 

North of Mt. Samat, as far as the PilarBagac road, the ground was similar to that 

on the slopes. Beyond, in the area held by 

the enemy, it was low and swampy. To the 

east of the mountain lay a plateau and along 

the coast were sugar-cane fields, thickets, 

and a plain. Flowing from the high ground 

in the center, through the coastal plain, 

were several large rivers and numerous 

small streams, many of them dry at this 

time of the year. But their steep, forested 

banks provided natural barriers to the advance of a military force. 

Wainwright's I Corps was west of the 

Pantingan River. Here there were no plains 

or sugar-cane fields. The ground sloped 

sharply from the Mariveles Mountains al265th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, ATIS Enemy 

Pub 289, p. ~. The description of the terrain and 

the line is based upon SLF and II Corps Rpt, pp. 

38-42; Collier, Notebooks, III, 37-39; BataanZambalcs, AGS, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Handbook 

42; Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 15; 

Trail Map, Bataan, 15 Feb 42, AG 400.41 (29 Dec 

41) Phil Rcds. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

most to the sea, and the undergrowth was 

even more luxuriant and forbidding than 

on the east coast. Nowhere on Bataan wa'> 

the terrain less suitable for military operations. 

In moving to the new line, the Americans 

had relinquished control of the Pilar-Bagac 

road, the one lateral highway across Bataan. 

However, they had denied the enemy complete use of that valuable road by selecting 

commanding positions from which it could 

be brought under fire, and by extending the 

main line of resistance across the road in the 

center of the peninsula. A four-mile-long 

brandl road, or cutoff, had been constructed 

from Orion to the Pilar-Bagac road, and 

the eastern portion of the II Corps line extended along this cutoff rather than along 

the road itself. To provide lateral communication behind the lines, the engineers were 

directed to link the cast-west trails, a task 

that was completed by mid-February. The 

Americans still had possession of the southern portions of the East and West Roads 

and continued to use them as the main arteries for vehicular traffic. All other movement behind the line was by footpath and 

pack trail. 

The organization of the new line differed 

in one important respect from that established for the Abucay-Mauban line. Because of the reduced size of units, the shortage of trained combat officers, and the difficulty of communications, the troops on the 

Orion-Bagac line were placed under sector 

commanders who reported directly to corps. 

Under this arrangement unit designations 

lost much of their validity and some divisions functioned only as headquarters for a 

sector. Thus, one sector might consist of 

three or more units, all under a division 

commander who retained only his division 

staff. This organization simplified control by 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

corps also, for divisions and lesser units reported now to the sector commanders. There 

was, it is true, a natural tendency toward 

building up a large staff in the sectors, but 

this inclination was quickly discouraged 

by MacArthur's headquarters, which explained that the sector organization had 

been adopted "for the purpose of decreasing 

rather than increasing overhead." 3 

General Parker's II Corps line stretched 

from Orion on the east coast westward for 

about 15,000 yards. Initially the corps was 

organized into four sectors, lettered alphabetic ally 'from A through D. Sector A on the 

right (east), which comprised the beach 

north of Limay to Orion and 2,500 yards 

of the front line, was assigned to the Philippine Division's 31st Infantry (US) which 

was then moving into the line. To its left and 

continuing the line another 2,000 yards was 

Sector B, manned by the Provisional Air 

Corps Regiment. This unit was composed of 

about 1,400 airmen equipped as infantry 

and led by Col. Irvin E. Doane, an experienced infantry officer from the American 

31st Infantry. Sector C was under the command of Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel and 

consisted of his 31 st Division (P A) , less elements, and the remnants of the 51 st Division (P A) , soon to be organized into a regimental combat team. Together, these units 

held a front of about 4,500 yards. The remaining 6,000 yards of the II Corps line 

in front of Mt. Samat and extending to the 

Pantingan River constituted Brig. Gen. 

Maxon S. Lough's Sector D. Lough, commander of the Philippine Division, had under him the 21st and 41st Divisions (PA) 

and the 57th Infantry (PS )-not yet in the 

3 Ltr, USAFFE to Corps Comdrs, etc., 3 Feb 42, 

sub: American Officers with Combat Troops Units, 

AG 210.31 (3 Feb 42) Phil Reds; Emerson, Opns 

of II Phil Corps, p. 19. 

327 

line--from his own division. Both Bluemel 

and Lough retained their division staffs for 

the sector headquarters. A final and fifth 

sector, E, was added on 26 January when 

General Francisco's beach defense troops 

were incorporated into II Corps and made a 

part of Parker's command. In reserve, Parker kept the 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry 

(PA), from Bluemel's 31st Division, and a 

regiment of Philippine Army combat engineers. 

The emplacement of artillery in II Corps 

was made with a full realization of the advantages offered by the commanding 

heights of Mt. Samat. On and around the 

mountain, in support of General Lough's 

scct~r, were the sixteen 75-mm. guns and 

eight 2.95-inch pack howitzers of the 41st 

Field Artillery (P A). Along the high 

ground east of the mountain, in support 

of the other sectors, were the artillery components of the 21st, 31st, and 51st Divisions 

( P A), with an aggregate of forty 7 S-mm. 

guns, and two Scout battalions equipped 

with 75's and 2.95's. The Constabulary 

troops on beach defense, in addition to the 

support furnished by the 21st Field Artillery, were backed up by about a dozen naval 

guns. Corps artillery consisted of the 301st 

Field Artillery (PA) and the 86th Field Artillery Battalion (PS), whose 155-mm. guns 

( G PIo') were em placed in the vicinity of 

Limay! 

General Wainwright's I Corps line, organized into a Right and Left Sector, extended for 13,000 yards from the Pantingan 

'SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 41, 44; 

Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, pp. 11-12; 

Collier, Notebooks, III, 39; Capt Robert N. Chapin, 

Hist of 33d Inf (PA), 3~9 Apr 42, p. 3, prepared at author's request, OCMH; Lt Sheldon H. 

Mendelson, Opns of Prov Air Corps Regt (paper 

prepared for Advanced Officers Course, 1946-47, 

The Infantry School); Quintard, 30lst FA (PA), 

OCMH. 
328 

River westward to the South China Sea. 

Separating the two sectors was the northsouth Trail 7. The Right Sector, with a 

front of about 5,000 yards to and including Trail 7, was held by the 11 th Division 

( P A) and the attached 2d Philippine Constabulary (less one battalion). Brig. Gen. 

William E. Brougher commanded both the 

11 th Division and the Right Sector. Between Trail 7 and the sea was the Left Sector, commanded by Brig. Gen. Albert M. 

Jones, who had led the South Luzon Force 

into Bataan. The eastern portion of his 

sector was held by the 45th Infantry (PS) ; 

the western by Brig. Gen. Luther Stevens' 

91st Division (PA). Like Parker, Wainwright was given responsibility for the 

beach defens~ in his area and on the 26th 

he established a South Sector under General 

Pierce. For corps reserve, Wainwright had 

the 26th Cavalry (PS) which had helped 

cover the withdrawal from the Mauban 

line. 

I Corps had considerably less artillery 

than the corps on the east. Corps artillery 

consisted of one Scout battalion, less a battery, equipped with 75-mm. guns. Jones had 

for his Left Sector the guns of the 91st Field 

Artillery and attached elements of the 71 st 

which had lost most of its weapons at Mauban. Supporting the Right Sector was the 

artillery component of the 11 th Division 

and one battery of Scouts. Only a few miscellaneous pieces had been assigned initially 

to beach defense but after the Japanese 

landings Pierce obtained additional guns 

and two 155-mm. howitzers.5 

When it established the Abucay-Mauban line early in January, USAFFE had 

• Phil Div Rpt of Opns, p. 16; Jones, 51st Div 

(PA) Order of Events, p. 6; Col Stuart C. MacDonald, Notes on Left Subsector, I Phil Corps, p. 2, 

OCMH; Itr, Howard to TAG, 2d Bn, 88th FA 

(PS), p. 5. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

kept in reserve the Philippine Division (less 

the 57th Combat Team). During the course 

of the battle on that line both the 31st Infantry (US) and the 45th Infantry (PS) 

had been assigned to II Corps and committed to action. When the withdrawal order 

was prepared, Col. Constant L. Irwin, 

USAFFE G-3, had placed the Philippine 

Division regiments in reserve since, he explained, "these were the only units that we 

had upon which we could depend and 

which were capable of maneuver, especially 

under fire." 6 This provision of the withdrawal plan was immediately changed by 

General Sutherland who believed that the 

corps commanderS "needed all available 

help in order to successfully occupy the new 

line and at the same time hold the attackers." 7 Both corps commanders therefore assigned their Philippine Division units to 

critical points along the new line, and 

USAFFE approved this assignment. It 

made no provision, however, for a reserve of 

its own, on the assumption that "after the 

withdrawal was accomplished an Army 

Reserve could be formed." S 

Sometime during the 25th of January 

USAFFE reversed its stand and decided 

that it would require a reserve after all. The 

unit selected was the Philippine Division 

with its one American and two Scout regiments. This action was based, apparently, 

on the danger arising from the Japanese 

landings at Longoskawayan and Quinauan 

Points. General Sutherland felt, Colonel 

Irwin later explained, that the three regiments might be needed to contain the Japanese at the beaches and push them back 

into the sea.9 When the corps commanders 

• Ltr, Irwin to Ward, 13 Jun 51, OCMH. 

'Ltr, Collier to author, 2 May 51, OCMH. See 

also Itr, Sutherland to author, 29 May 51, OCMH. 

• Ltr, Sutherland to author, 29 May 51, OCMH. 

• Ltr, Irwin to Ward, 13 Jun 51, OCMH. 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

received the orders to send the three regiments to an assembly area to the rear, they 

were thrown "into somewhat of a tailspin." 10 The new line was already being 

formed and the departure of the three regiments or their failure to take up their assigned positions would leave large gaps in 

the line. Corps plans, so carefully prepared, 

would have to be hastilv changed and shifts 

accomplished within twenty-four hours." 

The shifting of units which followed 

USAFFE's order was as confusing as it was 

dangerous. In II Corps, where the 57th Infantry (PS) had been assigned the extreme 

left and the 31 st Infantry (US) the right 

flank of the line, General Parker sought to 

fill the gaps by sending elements of General 

Bluemel's 31st Division (PA) to both ends 

of the line. The Philippine Army 31 st Infantry (less 1 st Battalion) was fortunately 

on the east coast in the vicinity of Orion, and 

it was ordered to take over Sector A in the 

place of the American 31 st Infantry. The 

33d Infantry (PA), assigned to Sector C but 

not yet in position, was sent to the left of 

the line being formed to replace the 57th 

Infantry. In the confusion no one remembered to inform General Bluemel of these 

changes, although the 31st and 33d Infantry 

were a part of his division and assigned to 

his sector. 

In I Corps, where the 45th Infantry had 

been assigned to the important area between 

the Camilew River and Trail 7 in General 

Jones's Left Sector, Wainwright was forced 

to fill the gap with elements of the reduced 

and disorganized 1 st Division (P A). Two 

hastily reorganized battalions of the 1st Infantry were ordered into the line on the 26th 

as a stopgap until the rest of the division 

,. Collier, Notebooks, III, 38. 

11 Ltr, Collier to author, 2 May 51, OCMH. 

329 

could be brought in, but it was not until the 

next day that the troops actually occupied 

their positions. 

When these shifts were completed the 

line-up along the main battle position was 

as follows: In II Corps, from right to left: 

Sector A, 31st Infantry (PA); Sector B, 

Provisional Air Corps Regiment; Sector C, 

unsettled but temporarily held by the 32d 

Infantry, one battalion of the 31st, and the 

51st Combat Team; Sector D, 21st and 41st 

Divisions (P A) and the 33d Infantry (less 

1st Battalion). In I Corps: Right Sector, 

2d Philippine Constabulary and 11 th Division (P A) ; Left Sector, elements of the 1 st 

Division (P A) and the 91 st Division. The 

reserve of the two corps remained unchanged but was backed up now by the 

Philippine Division in USAFFE reserve. 

The American 31st Infantry was located 

just north of Limay on the east coast, from 

where it could support II Corps should the 

need arise. The 45th Infantry was in bivouac 

near the West Road, about three miles south 

of Bagac, in position to aid I Corps. The 

57th Infantry was near Mariveles, ready fOJ 

a quick move to either corps.12 

Opposing the Filipino troops-the entire 

line, except for Sector B, was now held by 

the Philippine Army-were the same J apanese who had successfully breached the 

Abucay-Mauban line in the first battle of 

Bataan. On the east, before Parker's II 

Corps, was General N ara's 65th Brigade and 

attached 9th Infantry; facing Wainwright 

was the Kimura Detachment. While General Kimura's force of approximately 5,000 

men was comparatively fresh, Nara's troops 

12 Collier, Notebooks, III, 39; Phil Div Rpt of 

Opns, p. 16; Col Thomas W. Doyle, CO 45th Inf 

(PS), copy of lecture delivered at Army War College, 30 Jul 42, p. 6, OCMH. 
330 

had been hard hit during the Abucay fight. 

By 25 January, with reinforcements, he had 

built up his two regiments, the 141 sf and 

142d, to a strength of about 1,200 men 

each. 13 

Flushed with victory and anxious to end 

the campaign quickly, the Japanese hardly 

paused before attacking the Orion-Bagac 

line. Some time earlier they had found a 

map purportedly showing the American 

scheme of defense. On it, marked in red, 

were lines denoting the positions occupied 

by the American and Philippine troops. The 

main line of resistance was shown some miles 

south of its actual location, extending from 

Limay westward to the Mariveles Mountains. The positions from Orion westward, 

shown on the map and corresponding to the 

line actually occupied, were sketchy and the 

Japanese concluded that they were merely 

outposts. On the basis of this map General 

Homma made his plans. He would push his 

troops through the outpost line-actually 

the main line of resistance-and strike for 

Limay, where he conceived the main line to 

be and where he expected the main battle 

for Bataan would be fought. 

At 1600, 26 January, General Homma 

issued his orders for the attack. The 65th 

Brigade was to sweep the supposed outpost 

line into Manila Bay, then proceed south to 

the presumed main line of resistance. General Kimura was ordered to drive down the 

west coast as far as the Binuangan River, 

which Homma apparently believed to be 

an extension of the Limay line. No difficulty 

was expected until this line was reached. 

So confident was Homma that his estimate 

was correct and so anxious was he to strike 

before the Americans could establish strong 

positions near Limay that he decided against 

13 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, pp. 6, 34. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

waiting for the artillery to move into position to support the attack.14 

Unfortunately for the Japanese their captured map was incorrect or they read it incorrectly. The first line they met was not the 

outpost at all but the main line of resistance. 

The Japanese did have the good fortune, 

however, to hit the line where it was weakest and at a time when the disorganization 

resulting from the withdrawal of the Philippine Division was greatest. 

The Fight for Tr-ail 2 

It was General Bluemel's Sector C which 

.bore the brunt of the 65th Brigade attack 

against II Corps. For three quarters of its 

total length of 4,500 yards, the front line 

of this sector followed roughly the Orion 

cutoff to its intersection with the Pilar River 

and at that point straddled the north end of 

Trail 2 which led southward along the east 

slopes of Mt. Samat through the American 

lines. With the exception of the East Road 

this trail offered the easiest route of advance 

to the Japanese. 

Bluemel had organized the defense of his 

sector on the assumption that he would have 

most of his 31 st Division and what was left 

of the 51 st to put into the line. Accordingly, 

he had assigned the right (east) portion of 

the line, from Sector B to Trail 2, to his own 

division; the left to the 1,500 men of the 

51st Division. On each side of Trail 2, for 

a distance of about 600 yards, foxholes had 

been dug and wire had been strung.15 

14 USA vs. Homma, p. 3059, testimony of 

Homma; 14th Army Opns Order, Series A, No. 

212, 26 Jan 42, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, 

p. 83; 14th Army Opns, I, 100. 

15 Unless otherwise noted, the account which follows is based on Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of 

Opns, pp. 11-17, and two of its appendixes: Col 

Loren A. Wetherby, Activities of 41st Inf (PA), 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

On the morning of 26 January General 

Bluemel set out to inspect his front lines. On 

the way he met the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, heading east away from its assigned 

positions. With understandable heat, and 

some profanity, he demanded an explanation from the battalion commander, who replied that he had received orders from his 

regimental commander to move the battalion to Sector A to join the rest of the 

regiment. This was apparently the first time 

the general learned that his 31st Infantry 

had another assignment. Bluemel peremptorily ordered the battalion commander 

back into line and told him to remain there 

until relieved by his, Bluemel's, orders.16 

The general had another unpleasant surprise in store that morning. He had hardly 

resumed his tour of inspection when, at 

about 1000, he discovered that the 33d Infantry was not in its assigned place on the 

right of Trail 2 and that this vital area was 

entirely undefended. For four hours Bluemel sought to locate the missing regiment 

and finally, at 1400, learned that this regiment also had been taken from him and was 

now assigned to the left flank of the corps 

line instead of the 57th Infantry. There was 

nothing else for him to do then but spread 

his troops even thinner and he immediately 

ordered the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, and 

the sixty men of the headquarters battery 

1-9 Apr 42, pp. 1-4, and Col Adlai C. Young, Red 

of Events 51st Div (PA), 25 Jan-9 Apr 42, p. 1; Itr, 

Bluemel to Groce, 18 Feb 49, OCMH; Maj Brice J. 

Martin, Regtl Hist, 51 st Inf (PA), p. 5; Cordero, 

My Experiences During the War with Japan, pp. 

23-24; O'Day, 21st Div (PA), I, Part 2, p. 3 and 

II, 31; SLF and II Corps Rpt, pp. 39-44. 

For Japanese plans and operations the following 

sources were used: 14th Army Opns, I, 109-16; 

65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, pp. 7-15, 20, and 

the appendixes and supplements consisting of the 

orders issued by 14th Army and 65th Brigade. 

"Interv, author with Bluemel, 14 Apr 48, 

OCMH. 

331 

of the 31st Field Artillery, acting as infantry 

and armed only with Enfields, into the unoccupied area. It was not until 1730, however, that these units were able to complete 

their move. Thus, for a period of almost ten 

hours on the 26th, there had been no troops 

cast of the important Trail 2. Only good 

fortune and the action of the tanks of the 

covering force averted disaster. Had General N ara pushed his men down the trail 

during these hours he might have accomplished his mission and reached Limay even 

more rapidly than the misinformed Army 

commander expected him to. 

Bluemel's troubles were not yet over. Only 

thirty minutes after he had closed the gap 

left by the transfer of the 33d Infantry, he 

received orders at 1800 from General 

Parker to transfer the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry (PA), which he had sent back into 

the line early that morning, to Sector A. 

Bluemel had no choice now but to allow the 

battalion to leave. Parker promised him the 

41st Infantry (less 1st Battalion) from the 

adjoining sector, but that unit would not 

reach him until late the next day. In the 

meantime he would have to fill the new gap 

with one of his own units. He finally decided 

to use the reserve battalion of the already 

overextended 32d Infantry. Thus, on the 

night of 26 January, the entire 31st Division 

area was held by only the three battalions 

of the 32d Infantry and the artillery headquarters battery. In reserve was the 31st Engineer Battalion with 450 men whose armament consisted exclusively of rifles. 

The shifts in the line had been completed 

none too soon, for by 1900 of the 26th advance patrols of the 65th Brigade had penetrated down the Orion cutoff to Trail 2, 

almost to the main line of resistance. 

General Nara received Homma's orders 

for the attack on the mornin~ of the 27th, 
332 

too late to take advantage of the confusion 

in the American line. At that time the bulk 

of his force was concentrated in front of 

Sector C. Colonel Takechi's 9th Infantry, 

the "encircling unit" of the Abucay fight, 

was in position to advance down Trail 2, 

and the 141 st Infantry was bivouacked 

about one mile to the east. Above Orion 

probing Parker's right flank was the 1st 

Battalion, 142d Infantry. The remainder of 

the regiment was south of Pilar, along the 

Pilar-Bagac road. Too far to the rear to 

support the attack was the artillery. 

At 1100, 27 January, N ara issued his own 

orders for the forthcoming attack. These 

were based on 14th Army's erroneous assumption that the American positions in 

front of him constituted an outpost line and 

that the main objective was a line at Limay. 

Nara's plan was to make the main effort in 

the area held by Bluemel's men. The center 

of the attack was to be Capot, a small barrio 

near Trail 2 in front of the main line of 

resistance. Making the attack would be two 

regiments, the 9th on the right (west) and 

the 141 st on the left. They were to advance 

as far as the Pandan River where they 

would make ready for the assault against 

the supposed main line of resistance near 

Limay. The advance of these two regiments 

would be supported by Col. Masataro Yoshizawa's 142d Infantry (less 1st Battalion) on 

the brigade right, which was to drive southeast across the slopes of Mt. Samat to the 

Pandan River. Having reached the river, 

Yoshizawa was to shift the direction of his 

attack and advance down the river in a 

northeasterly direction to take the defenders 

in the rear. The regiment's initial advance 

would bring it to the American main line of 

resistance at the junction of Sectors C and D. 

The attack jumped off at 1500, 27 January, with a feint by Maj. Tadaji Tanabe's 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

1st Battalion, 142d Infantry, down the East 

Road. Although the Japanese claimed to 

have met "fierce" fire from the Filipinos in 

this sector, the 31 st Infantry (P A) was not 

even aware that an attack was being made. 

At 1600 the rest of Colonel Yoshizawa's 

regiment attacked in the area between Sectors C and D, where the 51st Combat Team 

and 21st Division were posted. Without any 

difficulty the regiment occupied the outpost 

line, but was stopped cold at the main line 

of resistance. (Map 18) 

The main attack by the 9th and 141 st 

Infantry against Capot began as darkness 

settled over the battlefield. With the exception of a single battalion of Takechi's 9th 

Infantry, which managed to cross the Pilar 

River and entrench itself in a bamboo 

thicket about seventy-five yards north of the 

main line, this attack, like that of the 142d, 

failed to achieve its objective. General Nara 

was forced to conclude after the returns 

were in that a stronger effort would be required to drive the enemy into Manila Bay. 

But he still believed that the line he had 

unsuccessfully attacked on the night of the 

27th was an advanced position or outpost 

line. 17 

Meanwhile the 41st Infantry, promised to 

General Bluemel on the 26th, had begun to 

arrive in Sector C. Advance elements of the 

regiment reported in on the evening of the 

27th and by the following morning, after a 

twenty-four-hour march over steep trails 

carrying its own arms, equipment, and rations, the regiment, less its 1st Battalion, was 

on the line. The 3d Battalion took over a 

front of about 1,200 yards east of Trail 2, 

relieving the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry. 

Since it had no machine guns, it was reinforced by Company H of the 32d, and the 

17 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, p. 10. 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

MAP 18 

headquarters battery of the 31 st Field Artillery (P A). One company of the 41 st, Company F, was placed on Trail 2, well behind 

the main line of resistance, in position to 

support the troops on either side of the trail. 

The 2d Battalion (less Company F) went 

into regimental reserve. 

When all units were in place, Bluemel's 

sector was organized from right to left (east 

to west), as follows: 32d Infantry (less 

333 

FIGHT FOR TRAIL 2 

27 January - 2 February 1942 

~ u. s. FRONT LINE (APPROX.l . 27 JANUARY 

-.. Ax IS OF JAPANESE ATTACK. 27 JANUARY 

c:::=:> AXIS OF U. S. COUNTERATTACK. 2 FEBRUARY 

Contour interval 20 feet 

500 0 500 

YAROS 

W. 

~141 

I 

H D amo-n 

Company H) ; 41st Infantry reinforced by 

Company H, 32d Infantry, and Headquarters Battery, 31 st Field Artillery; and the 

remnants of the 51st Division. To the rear, 

on Trail 2, was Company F, 41st Infantry. 

On the afternoon of the 28th General 

Nara ordered his troops to continue the attack. This time, however, he placed more 

emphasis on the northeast slopes of Mt. 

Samat where he conceived the enemy strong-
334 

points to be, and requested support from the 

artillery. The 141st Infantry, which was 

east of the 9th, was directed to move west of 

that regiment, between it and the 142d, thus 

shifting the weight of the attack westward. 

Tanabe's battalion remained on the East 

Road. 

As before, the attack began at dusk. At 

1830 of the 29th the 142d Infantry on the 

brigade right waded the Tiawir River, in 

front of the 22d Infantry (Sector D), but 

was stopped there. The 141st, which was to 

attack on the left (east) ofthe 142d, failed to 

reach its new position until midnight, too 

late to participate in the action that night. 

Oolonel Takechi's 9th Infantry was 

hardly more successful than the 142d in its 

advance down Trail 2. Most of the regiment had crossed the Pilar River during 

the day to join the battalion in the bamboo 

thickets just in front of Bluemel's sector. 

From there the regiment had advanced by 

sapping operations as far as the wire entanglements on the front line. Thus, when 

Takechi's men moved out for the attack, 

after an hour-long preparation by the artillery, they were already at the main line 

of resistance. 

The fight which followed was brisk 

and at close quarters. Tne 41 st Infantry 

east of Trail 2, supported by machine 

gun fire from Company H, 32d Infantry, 

held its line against every onslaught, with 

Company K, on the trail, meeting the 

enemy at bayonet point. West of the trail, 

elements of the 51st Combat Team were 

hard hit and in danger of being routed. 

Fortunately, reinforcements arrived in time 

to bolster the extreme right of its line, closest 

to the trail, and the enemy was repulsed. 

Next morning when a count was made the 

Filipinos found about one hundred dead 

Japanese within 150 yards of the main line 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

of resistance. Some of the bodies were no 

more than a few yards from the foxholes 

occupied by the Filipinos, who suffered only 

light casualties. Again General N ara's attempt to pierce what he thought was an outpost line had failed. 

Action during the two days that followed 

was confusing and indecisive. The Japanese, after nearly a month of continuous 

combat, were discouraged and battle weary. 

Losses, especially among the officers, had 

been high. "The front line units," complained General N ara, "notwithstanding repeated fierce attacks ... still did not make 

progress .... Battle strength rapidly declined 

and the difficulties of officers and men became extreme." When "the greater part of 

the Brigade'S fighting strength," the 9th 

Infantry, was ordered by General Homma 

to join its parent unit, the 16th Division, 

General Nara's situation became even more 

discouraging. 18 With commendable tenacity, 

however, he persisted in his efforts to break 

through the remarkably strong "outpost 

line," and on 31 January ordered his troops 

to attack again that night. This time he 

made provision for air and artillery support. The 9th Infantry, scheduled to move 

out that night, Nara replaced by Major 

Tanabe's battalion. 

At 1700, 31 January, the assault opened 

with an air attack against II Corps artillery 

below the Pandan River. An hour later the 

artillery preparation began, and "Bataan 

Peninsula," in General Nara's favorite 

phrase, "shook with the thunderous din of 

guns." The Japanese laid fire systematically 

on both sides of Trail 2 and down the trail 

as far back as the regimental reserve line. 

At about 1930 the barrage lifted and the infantry made ready to attack. At just this 

moment the artillery in Bluemel's sector 

18 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

opened fire on the ford over the Pilar River 

and the area to the north in what the Japanese described as "a fierce bombardment." 

Simultaneously, according to the same 

source, "a tornado of machine gun fire" 

swept across the right portion of the J apanese infantry line assembling for the attack, effectively ending Japanese plans for 

an offensive that night. The careful preparation by aircraft and artillery had been 

wasted and the attack, mourned General 

Nara, "was frustrated." 19 

That night Colonel Takechi began to 

withdraw his 9th Infantry from the bamboo 

thicket ·in front of the main line of resistance near Trail 2. Casualties in the regiment had been severe and the withdrawal 

was delayed while the wounded were evacuated. By daybreak, 1 February, only one of 

the battalions had been able to pull out of 

its position. The rest of the regiment, unable to move during the hours of daylight, 

remained concealed in the thicket until 

darkness. Then a second battalion began to 

pull back, completing the move that night. 

On the morning of the 2d, only one battalion of the 9th Infantry remained in the 

thicket. 

Meanwhile General Nara had been receiving disquieting reports of heavy troops 

movements behind the American line. His 

information was correct. General Bluemel 

was making preparations for a counterattack. His first effort on the 30th to drive the 

Japanese from the bamboo thicket had 

failed because the artillery had been unable 

to place its shells on the target. What he 

needed to hit the thicket was high-angle fire, 

but he had had no light mortars and the 

JO Ibid., p. 14, contains the quotations in this 

paragraph. Bluemel's account of the artillery fire 

by his guns is from his letter to Groce, 18 Feb 49, 

OCMH. 

335 

ammunition of the 3-inch Stokes mortar had 

proved "so unreliable as to be practically 

worthless." 20 Since then General Parker 

had given Bluemel a battery of 2.95-inch 

mountain pack howitzers and ordered him 

to attack again. By the morning of the 2d he 

was ready. The 2.95's, 300 to 400 yards 

from the thicket, were in position to deliver 

direct fire and the 31st Engineer Battalion 

(PA), drawn from reserve to make the attack, was in readiness behind the main line 

of resistance. 

At 0800 the counterattack opened. While 

the pack howitzers laid direct fire on the 

target, the 31 st Engineer Battalion crossed 

the main line of resistance and headed toward the enemy concealed in the thicket. 

They were supported in their advance by 

rifle and machine gun fire from the frontline units near Trail 2. The engineers had 

not gone far before they encountered stiff 

resistance from the single battalion of the 

9th Infantry still in position. After a small 

gain the attack stalled altogether, and elements of the 41st Infantry were sent into the 

fight. The advance then continued slowly 

and by dusk the Filipinos, at a cost of twenty 

casualties, had reached the thicket. There 

they halted for the night. 

Next morning, 3 February, when the 

engineers and infantry, expecting to fight 

hard for every yard, resumed the attack, 

they found their advance entirely unopposed. During the night the last of the 

9th Infantry had slipped out of the thicket 

and across the Pilar River. Bluemel's troops 

thereupon promptly moved the outpost line 

forward to a ditch about 150 yards below 

the Pilar-Bagac road. The danger of a 

break-through along Trail 2 was over. 

General N ara's ill fortune was matched 

only by his persistence. Although he had 

.. Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 15. 
336 

been repulsed with very heavy casualties 

three times and had lost his strongest regiment, he was still determined to push the 

"outpost line" into the bay. During the next 

few days, while activities along the front 

were limited to patrol and harassing action 

by both sides, he reorganized his brigade, 

replenished his supplies, and sent out reconnaissance parties. By 8 February he was 

ready to resume the offensive and that afternoon told his unit commanders to stand by 

for orders. Before they could be issued, however, he received a telephone call from 14th 

4rmy headquarters at San Fernando suslending the attack. Late that night, at 2330, 

he received another call from San Fernando 

canceling his plans altogether and directing 

him to withdraw the brigade to a position 

north of the Pilar-Bagac road and there 

await further instructions. 

General Homma's orders were based only 

partially on Nara's inability to reach Limay. 

Everywhere on Bataan the Japanese offensive had stalled. The landings along the west 

coast had by this time proved disastrous and 

had resulted in the destruction of two infantry battalions Homma could ill afford to 

lose. But even more serious was the situation 

along the I Corps line in western Bataan 

where General Kimura had launched an 

offensive on 26 January. 

The Pocket Fights 

In western Bataan, as in the east, the Japanese had followed closely on the heels of 

MacArthur's retreating troops. General 

Homma's orders on 26 January had directed Kimura, as well as Nara, to push 

ahead rapidly without giving the enemy an 

opportunity to dig in. Nara, it will be recalled, had been ordered to drive toward 

Limay, where, according to the captured 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

THE POCKETS 

All poslhons opproximate 

contour mterval/OO 16el 

MAP 19 

map, the new American line was located. 

Homma's orders to Kimura called for an 

advance as far as the Binuangan River, 

along which Homma believed Wainwright 

had established his main line as an extension 

of the Limay line to the east. (Map 19) 

To make the attack General Kimura had 

the 122d Infantry (less two companies) of 

the 65th Brigade and Col. Yorimasa 

Yoshioka's 20th Infantry, 16th Division. 

Actually, all Yoshioka had for the fight to 

follow was the regimental headquarters, 

service elements, and the 3d Battalion (less 

one company) -altogether about 1,000 

men. The rest of the regiment was already 

committed or stationed elsewhere. 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

Even before he issued orders for the attack, General Homma had made arrangements on 25 January to increase the size of 

the force arrayed against I Corps. Hoping 

to take advantage of Kimura's easy victory 

on the Mauban line, he had directed General Morioka in Manila to hasten to Olongapo and assume command of operations 

in western Bataan. Morioka, 16th Division 

commander, was to take with him two battalions of infantry-one of which was the 

1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, later lost in the 

Battle of the Points-and the 21st I ndependent Engineer Regiment headquarters. 

This move, Homma directed, was to be 

completed on 27 January. Thus, in the attack against I Corps that followed, command quickly passed from Kimura, who 

initiated the fight, to General Morioka. 

Wainwright's main line of resistance, it 

will be recalled, was organized into two sectors, a Right Sector under General Brougher 

and a Left Sector commanded by General 

Jones. Brougher's line extended from the 

Pantingan River to Trail 7, which led southward from the Pilar-Bagac road through 

the American positions to join the intricate 

network of trails to the rear. Responsible 

for both the river and the trail on his flanks, 

Brougher placed the Constabulary on the 

right to guard the approach by way of the 

river and to tie in with the left flank of II 

Corps. Next to it was the 13th Infantry 

(P A) of the 11 th Division and on the left 

of Brougher's sector, defending Trail 7, was 

the 11 th Infantry led by Col. Glen R. 

Townsend. 

Responsibility for the area west of Trail 

7 rested with General Jones. On the left he 

placed General Stevens' 91st Division. The 

eastern portion of the sector, from the Cami337 

lew River to but not including Trail 7, was 

initially assigned to the 45th Infantry (PS), 

but when that regiment was withdrawn on 

26 January, on orders from USAFFE, Wainwright assigned the area to General Segundo's 1 st Division (P A) . Although two hastily organized battalions of the 1st Infantry 

and one of the 3d Infantry moved into the 

line vacated by the 45th, a gap still remained in the center. The next afternoon, 

27 January, the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 

was withdrawn from its position on beach 

defense near Bagac and sent in to fill the 

gap.21 

Wainwright's new main line of resistance 

ran through a thick jungle where it was extremely difficult for units to establish physical contact. Flowing in every direction 

through this area was a confusing network 

of streams. The Gogo River flowed into the 

Bagac River to form one continuous stream 

along the Left Sector main line of resistance. 

South of this east-west water line were three 

tributaries of the Gogo-the Tuol, Cotar, 

and Camilew Rivers. Behind the line was an 

equally confusing network of trails, intersecting each other as well as the main trails 

running south from the Pilar-Bagac road. 

New Trail 5 paralleled the main line of resistance and connected the West Road with 

21 In addition to the sources cited below, this section is based on two reports by General Jones: The 

Pocket Fights, pp. 1-3, and Pocket Battles, pp. 1-4; 

Townsend, lith Inf (PA), pp. 2-4, and Part II, 

The Tuol Pocket, pp. 6-16, copy in OCMH; MacDonald, Notes on Left Subsector, I Phil Corps, pp. 

1-6; Berry, Hist of 3d Inf (PA), pp. 5-6; Lt Col 

Adrianus Van Oosten, Opns of 1st Bn, 45th InI 

(PS) in Battle of Tuol Pocket (paper prepared for 

Advanced Officers Course, 1947-48, The Infantry 

School), pp. 8-18; Lt Col Leslie T. Lathrop, Notes 

on Tuol Pocket, copy in OCMH; Collier, Notebooks, III, 51-52; 14th Army Opns, I, 100-102, 

107-15; 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, Opns 

Orders in Supps. 23 and 27; intervs, author with 

Gens Jones and Berry at various times. 
338 

Trail 7. Below it and generally parallel to 

it was another trail, called Old Trail 5. So 

bewildering was the river and trail system, 

especially in the 1st Division area, that few 

of the troops knew precisely where they were 

at any given moment. It was in this area that 

the Japanese penetration came. 

Establishment of the Pockets 

The Japanese opened the offensive against 

I Corps on 26 January. Anxious to capitalize on his successful drive down the west 

coast, General Kimura sent his troops along 

the West Road against the 91 st Division, on 

the extreme left of the line in the vicinity of 

Bagac. For two days, on the 26th and 27th, 

the Japanese sought to break through the 

new main line of resistance along the coast 

but the 91st held ground firmly. Repelled 

on the west, the Japanese, as they had done 

at Abucay, then began to probe the line in 

search of a soft spot. On the night of 28-29 

January they found one in the 1st Division 

area. 

The 1 st Division had been badly disorganized and had lost much of its equipment 

in the first battle of Bataan and during the 

withdrawal along the beach. First sent to 

the rear for reorganization and a much 

needed rest, the division had then been hurriedly sent to the front on 26 and 27 January 

to replace the 45th Infantry. Since then the 

men had worked frantically to make ready 

for an attack. They dug trenches and cleared 

fields of fire but the work progressed slowly. 

Lacking entrenching tools and axes, many 

of the men had been forced to dig holes with 

their mess kits and clear the underbrush with 

their bayonets. 

Before the men of the 1st Division could 

complete their preparations and while they 

were still stringing wire, they were hit by 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Colonel Yoshioka's 20th Infantry troops. 

The 1,000 men of the 20th Infantry first 

seized the high ground before the still unwired 1st Infantry sector. From this vantage 

point they pushed in the outpost line late on 

the 28th, drove back one company on the 

main line of resistance, and during the night 

moved rapidly through the gap up the valleys of the Cotar and Tuol Rivers, throwing 

out patrols as they advanced. 

It is hard to imagine heavier, more nearly 

impenetrable or bewildering jungle than 

that in which Colonel Yoshioka's men 

found themselves. It is covered with tall, 

dense cane and bamboo. On hummocks and 

knolls are huge hardwood trees, sixty to seventy feet in height, from which trail luxuriant tropical vines and creepers. Visibility 

throughout the area is limited, often to ten 

or fifteen yards. There were no reliable 

maps for this region and none of the sketches 

then in existence or made later agreed. Major terrain features were so hazily identified 

that General Jones asserts that to this day 

no one knows which was the Tuol and 

which the Cotar River.22 

Under such conditions it was virtually 

impossible for either side to maintain contact or to know exactly where they were. 

The Japanese moved freely, if blindly, 

in the rear of the 1st Division line, cutting wire communications and establishing strong points from which to harass the 

Filipinos. Segundo'S men were almost as 

confused as the Japanese. They believed 

that only small enemy patrols had penetrated the line and sought blindly to find 

these patrols, sometimes mistaking friend 

for foe. 

Before long, Colonel Yoshioka found his 

force split in two groups. One of these, less 

than a company, was discovered by 1st Divi-

.. Interv, author with Jones. 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

sion patrols in a defensive position atop a 

hill just southeast of the junction of the 

Cotar and Gogo Rivers in the middle of the 

1 st Division area. This position, which became known as the Little Pocket, was about 

400 yards below the main line of resistance 

and about 1,000 yards west of Trail 7.23 

The bulk of Yoshioka's force continued 

to move east and soon was established along 

Trail 7 in the area held by Colonel Townsend's 11 th Infantry. Its presence there was 

discovered on the morning of the 29th when 

the Provisional Battalion of the 51 st Division led by Capt. Gordon R. Myers, moving 

north along Trail 7 to the aid of the 1st 

Division, met a Japanese force moving 

south. After a brief exchange of fire followed by a bayonet fight the Japanese broke 

off the action and withdrew. Not long after, 

11 th Infantry troops moving south from 

the front line along the same trail were fired 

on and killed. An American sergeant, sent 

forward from Colonel Townsend's 11 th Infantry headquarters to investigate, met the 

same fate and his body was discovered about 

200 yards north of the junction of Trails 5 

and 7. It was clear now that an enemy force 

had established itself across the trail and the 

junction, nearly a mile behind the main line 

of resistance. From this position, which 

later came to be called the Big Pocket, the 

Japanese could block north-south traffic 

along Trail 7 and hinder the movement of 

troops westward along Trail 5. 

There was as yet no indication of the size 

of the Japanese force in the pocket. Under 

the impression that only a strong patrol was 

blocking the trail, Colonel Townsend, on 

the afternoon of the 29th, ordered two reserve companies of the 11 th Infantry to 

clear the area. The reaction of the Japanese 

to the attack quickly corrected Townsend's 

o. Santos, 1st Regular Div (PA), pp. 39-40. 

339 

impression and a hasty call was put in for 

additional troops. USAFFE made available to corps the 1st Battalion of the 45th 

Infantry (PS) and by 2000 that night advance elements of the Scout battalion had 

reached the trail junction, ready to join in 

the fight the next day. 

Attacks against the Big Pocket during 

the next few days by the Scouts on the 

South and the 11 th Infantry troops on the 

north made little progress aQd only confirmed the fact that the enemy was strong 

and well entrenched. Yoshioka's troops had 

by now dug their foxholes and trenches and 

connected them with tunnels so that they 

could move freely without fear of observation. They had skillfully emplaced their machine guns behind fallen trees and had 

taken every advantage of the jungle to 

strengthen and conceal their defenses. They 

had even taken the precaution to dispose 

of the earth from the foxhole so as to leave 

no telltale signs of their position. 

Artillery availed the Americans as little 

here as it had in the Battle of the Points. 

Poor visibility, inadequate maps, and the 

lack of high trajectory weapons resulted in 

shorts, overs, and tree bursts, some of which 

caused casualties among friendly troops. So 

dense was the jungle that one 75-mm. gun, 

originally emplaced to provide antitank defense at the trail junction, was unable to 

achieve any observable results though it 

poured direct fire on the enemy at a range 

of 200 yards. The value of the mortars was 

limited by the high percentage of duds as 

well as the thick jungle. Again, as on the 

beaches, the fight was to be a rifleman's 

fight backed up by BAR's and machine 

guns whenever they could be used. 

The location of the Big Pocket created 

difficulties of an administrative nature. Although the pocket blocked the trail in the 
340 

11 th Infantry area, on the internal flank of 

Brougher's Right Sector, it extended over 

into Jones's Left Sector, where the 1st Division was having difficulties of its own with 

the Japanese in the Little Pocket. Moreover, 

the pockets were not entirely surrounded 

and Yoshioka's men moved at will from one 

to the other. Just where the Big Pocket 

ended and the Little Pocket began was not 

yet clear and the 1st Division was as much 

engaged against the former as was the 11 th 

Infantry. To clarify this situation, General 

Wainwright, who was present almost daily 

at the scene of the fighting, placed General 

Brougher, Right Sector commander, in 

charge of all troops operating against the Big 

Pocket. Colonel Townsend was given command of the forces immediately engaged. 

The position of the Japanese in the two 

pockets was not an enviable one. Since 31 

January, when 1st Division troops had shut 

the gate behind them, Colonel Yoshioka's 

men had been cut off from their source of 

supply. Though they had successfully resisted every effort thus far to drive them out, 

and had even expanded the original Big 

Pocket westward, their plight was serious. 

Without food and ammunition they were 

doomed. General Morioka attempted to 

drop supplies to them,· but, as had happened during the Battle of the Points, most 

of the parachute packs fell into the hands 

of the Filipinos and Americans, who were 

grateful for the unexpected addition to their 

slim rations. 

Only one course remained to Morioka if 

he was to save the remnants of Yoshioka's 

regiment. He must break through the main 

line of resistance again and open the way 

for a retreat-or further advance. All efforts by the 122d Infantry, which had been 

pushing against the 1 st and 11 th Divisions 

since the start of the attack, had thus far 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

proved unavailing. But by 6 February 

Morioka had received reinforcements. One 

of the two battalions he had brought with 

him from Manila, the 2d Battalion of his 

own division's 33d Infantry, was now in 

position before the I Corps line, and the 

remnants of Colonel Takechi's 9th Infantry 

(less 3d Battalion) had reached western 

Bataan, after its fight on the east with 

N ara's brigade, to join its parent unit, the 

16th Division, for the first time in the campaign. 

With these forces Morioka launched a 

determined effort to relieve and reinforce 

the men in the pockets. The 2d Battalion, 

33d Infantry, he sent down Trail 7. The 

122d Infantry he strengthened by attaching 

two battalions of the 9th Infantry so that it 

could increase its pressure against the two 

Philippine divisions in the center of the line. 

The attack began late on the 6th, and 

shortly after midnight those Japanese advancing down Trail 7 overran a platoon of 

Company F, 11 th Infantry, which was holding the critical sector across the trail. 

Eighteen of the twenty-nine men in the 

platoon were killed in their foxholes. For 

the moment it seemed as though the Japanese would be able to advance unhindered 

down Trail 7 to take the Filipinos on the 

north side of the Big Pocket in the rear. 

Only the quick action of Maj. Helmert J. 

Duisterhof, commanding the 2d Battalion, 

11 th Infantry, prevented this catastrophe. 

Organizing a containing force from the men 

in headquarters and from stragglers, he 

kept the Japanese to a gain of 600 yards, 

800 short of the Big Pocket. The troops on 

each side of the penetration held firm so 

that what had promised to be another 

break-through became a fingerlike salient, 

referred to as the Upper Pocket. 

Morioka had failed to reach Yoshioka but 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

he had broken the main line of resistance at 

still another point and attained a position 

which posed a real threat to the security of 

Wainwright's I Corps. The formation of the 

pockets-one of them actually a salient, for 

the main line of resistance was not restored-was now complete. 

Reduction of the Pockets 

While Morioka had been making preparations for the attack which gained for him 

the Upper Pocket, Wainwright had been 

laying his own plans to reduce the pockets. 

Thus far all attacks against them had failed. 

Though General Segundo had sent in all the 

troops he could spare to destroy the Little 

Pocket in the middle of the I st Division area, 

he had been unable to wipe out the small 

force of Japanese entrenched there. Against 

the larger force in the Big Pocket Brougher 

had pressed more vigorously but with as 

little success. On the north and northeast he 

had placed two companies, G and C, of the 

11 th Infantry; on the south the 1 st Battalion, 45th Infantry. Guarding Trail 5, 

south and west of the pocket, was the Provisional Battalion, 51st Division, which had 

made the initial contact with Yoshioka's 

men on Trail 7. 

On 2 February Brougher had tried to reduce the pocket with tanks. After a reconnaissance had revealed that the jungle would 

not permit an unsupported armored attack, 

a co-ordinated infantry-tank attack was 

. made with a platoon of four tanks from 

Company A, 192d Tank Battalion, closely 

supported by a platoon from the 1 st Battalion, 45th Infantry. The armored platoon 

ran the enemy gantlet along Trail 7 and 

emerged on the north side of the pocket 

after losing one tank. The infantry, however, made only slight gains. An attack the 

341 

next day brought similar results and the loss 

of another tank. 

It was during that day's action that Lt. 

Willibald C. Bianchi won the Medal of 

Honor. Though assigned to another unit he 

had volunteered to accompany the supporting platoon sent out to destroy two machine 

gun positions. Leading part of the platoon 

forward he was wounded in the left hand. 

Refusing. to halt for first aid he continued 

on, firing with his pistol. One of the enemy 

machine guns he knocked out with grenades. 

Meanwhile the tank, unable to lower the 

muzzle of its 37-mm. gun sufficiently, had 

been having difficulty reducing the other 

machine gun near by. Bianchi, who now 

had two more bullets in his chest, clambered 

to the top of the tank and fired its antiaircraft gun into the enemy position until the 

impact of a third bullet fired at close range 

knocked him off the tank. He was evacuated 

successfully and after a month in the hospital was back with his unit.24 

By 4 February three of the four tanks of 

the Company A platoon had been destroyed 

and it was necessary to assign to Brougher'S 

force another platoon from Company B of 

the 192d Tank Battalion. The attack was 

continued that day with as little success as 

before, and on the night of the 4th the 

Japanese were still in firm possession of the 

pockets. It was evident that a co-ordinated 

and stronger offensive than any yet made 

would be required for victory and General 

Wainwright called a meeting of the major 

commanders concerned to discuss plans for 

such an offensive. 

The conference opened at about 1000 of 

the 5th at the command post of the 1st Divi-

'" Lt Arthur A. Holland, 192d Bn, pp. 44-45, 

Chunn Notebooks; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, 

p. 22; Van Oosten, Opns of 1st Bn, 45th Inf (PS) 

in Battle of Tuol Pocket, p. 2. 
342 

sion. Present were Generals Jones, Brougher, and Segundo, Col. William F. Maher, 

Wainright's chief of staff, and Col. Stuart 

C. MacDonald, Jones's chief of staff. First 

Wainwright made the point that though the 

pockets overlapped sector boundaries the 

forces engaged would have to be placed under one commander and be treated as a single operation. All available forces, including 

the reserves, he asserted, would have to be 

thrown into the fight. Brougher was to be 

relieved and Jones would take command 

of all troops already engaged against the 

pockets. This decision gave the new commander the following force: 1 st Battalion, 

45th Infantry; the Provisional Battalion, 

51st Division; Companies C and G, 11th 

Infantry; the 1st and 2d Battalions, 92d 

Infantry; the 1st Division; and the remaining tanks. 

General Jones had a plan ready. First he 

would isolate the pockets and then throw a 

cordon of troops around each. The main attack against the Little Pocket would follow, 

and after it had been reduced he would 

throw all his troops against the Big Pocket. 

The entire operation would be a co-ordinated one with the main attacks against 

each pocket delivered along a single axis of 

advance. Wainwright approved the plan 

and directed that it be put into effect not 

later than 7 February. 

Jones immediately made preparations for 

the reduction of the two pockets. All 1 st 

Division troops who could be released from 

their posts along the main line of resistance 

were given to Colonel Berry, commander of 

the 1st Infantry, who was directed to make 

his own plans to take the Little Pocket. Lt. 

Col. Leslie T. Lathrop, commander of the 

1st Battalion, 45th Infantry, was given tactical command of the troops for the assault 

against the Big Pocket. Jones himself worked 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

out the plan for that attack. The main effort 

was to be made by the 1st Battalion, 92d 

Infantry, from the west. To its south would 

be the Provisional Battalion, 51 st Division; 

to its north Company G, 11 th Infantry. 

Company C, 11 th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry, were to remain northeast and east of the pocket to prevent a 

breakout in that direction. The offensive 

against the two pockets would begin at 

0900, 7 February. 

The night before the attack Morioka 

opened his own offensive which by morning 

of the 7th had resulted in the salient called 

the Upper Pocket. Brougher, fearing a Japanese break-through at the salient, took 

from the forces jones had gathered for the 

attack Company A, 92d Infantry, the reserve company of the battalion which was 

to make the main effort against the Big 

Pocket, and the tank platoon. At 0730, 

when Jones learned of the unauthorized 

transfer of his troops, he was forced to delay the hour of the attack against the Big 

Pocket to bring in more troops. It was not 

until 1500 that the replacement, Maj. Judson B. Crow's 2d Battalion, 92d Infantry, 

arrived.25 

The attack against the Big Pocket began as soon as Major Crow's battalion was 

in place. By that time only a few hours of 

daylight remained and few gains were 

made. Moreover it was discovered late in 

the day that the 92d Infantry troops on the 

west had failed to establish contact with 

Company G, 11th Infantry, to its left 

( north) and that the pocket was not surrounded. Next morning the cordon around 

the Big Pocket was completed when these 

units tied in their flanks. Jones now waited 

.. Maj Beverly ~. Skardon, Opns of Co A, 92d 

Inf (PA), paper prepared for Advanced Officers 

Course, 1946-47, The Infantry School, p. 10. 
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

for the completion of the action against the 

Little Pocket before beginning his final assault against Yoshioka's men on Trail 7. 

The attack against the Little Pocket had 

begun on schedule at 0900 of the 7th. Colonel Berry organized his 1 st Division troops 

so that they approached the pocket from all 

sides, and then began to draw the noose 

tight. Evening of the first day found the 

Little Pocket only partially surrounded and 

it was not until nightfall of the 8th that 

Berry was ready to make the final attack 

from the southeast. Even then the pocket 

was not entirely enclosed, for a small gap 

remained on the east. The attack next 

morning was anticlimactic. When Berry 

reached the area that the Japanese had so 

stoutly defended for ten days he found only 

the bodies of the slain and discarded equipment. The enemy had escaped during the 

night by way of the one opening in the 

otherwise tight cordon of Filipino troops. 

The Little Pocket had been reduced but 

now there were Japanese loose somewhere 

behind the lst Division line. 

The small Japanese force which had escaped from the pocket was soon discovered 

near the main line of resistance on the west 

of Trail 7, evidently seeking to make its way 

back into the Japanese line. By accident it 

had stumbled into a trap, for in holding firm 

the west shoulder of the salient created by 

the Japanese attack of the 7th, the troops 

had so sharply refused their flank that the 

line resembled a horseshoe with the opening facing west. It was into this horseshoe 

that the Japanese from the Little Pocket 

stumbled on the morning of the 9th. Offered an opportunity to surrender, they replied with gunfire and in the brief fight 

which followed were entirely annihilated. 

With the reduction of the Little Pocket 

and the destruction of the escaping Japa343 

nese on the morning of the 9th, General 

Jones was free to concentrate his entire force 

on the Big Pocket. But the situation had 

changed radically for earlier that morning 

General Morioka had received orders to 

pull back his troops to the heights north of 

Bagac. 26 Immediately he directed Colonel 

Yoshioka to discontinue his efforts to hold 

the pocket and to fight his way back through 

the American lines. To cover the retreat, 

the2d Battalion, 33d Infantry, in the Upper 

Pocket was to redouble its efforts to break 

through the holding force and join Y oshioka's men. Thus, as General Jones was making ready for the final attack against the Big 

Pocket, Yoshioka was hurriedly making his 

own preparations for a withdrawal. 

On the American side the 9th and 10th 

were busy days. Colonel Berry, who now 

commanded the 1st Division, brought· his 

force from the Little Pocket into the fight 

against the Big Pocket. On Jones's orders 

he placed his men in position to prevent a 

juncture between the enemy in the Upper 

Pocket and Yoshioka's troops. The rest of 

the 1st Division spent these days selecting 

and preparing a more favorable line along 

the south bank of the Gogo River. Meanwhile units surrounding the Big Pocket kept 

pressing in until they were so close that fire 

from one side of the pocket became dangerous to friendly units on the other side. Pushing in from the west were the two battalions 

of the 92d Infantry; on the opposite side 

of the pocket were the Scouts and Company 

C of the 11th Infantry. The Provisional 

Battalion, 51 st Division, was pressing northward along Trail 7, while Company G, 

11 th Infantry, pushed south down the trail. 

The weakest link in the chain encircling the 

,. The decision was made at 14th Army headquarters on the 8th and is discussed below in 

Chapter XIX. 
344 

pocket was on the north and northeast 

where the almost impenetrable jungle prevented close contact between the two 11 th 

Infantry companies and the adjoining flank 

of the 45th Infantry. It was against this 

link, where a break was already evident, that 

Yoshioka's men would have to push if they 

hoped to escape. 

Yoshioka's position was critical. A withdrawal in the face of these converging attacks would be a difficult and dangerous 

maneuver under the most favorable circumstances. With his exhausted troops the 

task would be even more hazardous. His 

men, who had been living on a diet of horseflesh and tree sap for days, were half starved, 

sick, and utterly worn out by two weeks of 

continuous fighting in the jungle. Until the 

10th Yoshioka had been able to draw a 

plentiful supply of water from the Tuol 

River, but the advance of the 92d Infantry 

had closed off this source to him and he was 

feeling the effects of the shortage. Over one 

hundred of his men were wounded and 

would have to be carried or helped out during the withdrawal. Many of his officers had 

been killed and the maintenance of march 

discipline in the thick jungle promised to be 

a difficult task. 

On 11 February the Filipinos were remarkably successful in pushing in the 

pocket. By 1000 that day all of Trail 7 

had fallen to the Scouts. On the south the 

Provisional Battalion made excellent progress during the day while the two battalions 

of the 92d continued to push eastward 

against light opposition. By evening, wrote 

Jones's chief of staff, "it was quite obvious 

that the end was in sight." 21 The attackers, 

unaware that Yoshioka had begun his 

weary trek northward, attributed their sucT1 MacDonald, Notes on Left Subsector, I Phil 

Corps, p. 6. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

cess to the enemy's lack of water and to the 

steady pressure exerted by the troops. 

Only on the north had the Filipinos failed 

to register any great successes on the 11 tho 

Here the two companies of the 11 th Infantry and the northernmost element of the 

45th Infantry, converging toward Trail 7, 

had failed to establish physical contact and 

one of them had lost its bearings and become dispersed. It was through these units 

that Yoshioka took his men.28 

Command of the forces engaged in the 

Big Pocket fight changed again on 11 February. General Jones had come down with 

acute dysentery on the afternoon of the 11 th 

and had been evacuated to the rear on a 

stretcher. Colonel MacDonald, his chief of 

staff, assumed command temporarily until 

General Wainwright placed Brougher in 

command the next day, 12 February. 

By this time the fight for the pocket was 

almost over. On the afternoon of the 12th 

the unopposed Filipinos reached the junction of Trails 5 and 7 and on the following 

day moved through the entire area systematically to mop up whatever opposition they 

could find. There was none. The only living 

beings in the pocket were a number of 

horses and mules which the Japanese had 

captured earlier in the campaign. Three 

hundred of the enemy's dead and 150 

graves were counted, and a large quantity 

of equipment, weapons, and ammunitionsome of it buried-found.29 The Japanese 

II Ltr, Berry to Jones, with note by Jones to 

author, 11 Jan 52, OCMH; interv, author with 

Lt Col Russell Volckmann, formerly Exec Officer, 

11 th Inf (PA) ; Maj Archie L. McMasters, Memoirs 

of Tuol Pocket, pp. 5-6, copy was borrowed from 

Col Van Oosten, OCMH. 

.. The sources do not agree on the number of 

enemy dead and the figure given is an estimate by 

the author. The estimates of the number of Americans and Filipinos killed and wounded vary so 

widely that it is impossible to arrive at any reason-
TRAIL 2 AND THE POCKETS 

made good their escape but they were 

traveling light. 

The exhausted remnants of the 20th 

Infantry worked their way north slowly, 

pausing frequently to rest and to bring up 

the wounded. In the dense foliage and heavy 

bamboo thickets, the withdrawing elements 

often lost contact and were forced to halt 

until the column was formed again. Passing 

"many enemy positions" in their march 

north through the American lines, the Japanese on the morning of 15 February finally 

sighted a friendly patrol. 30 About noon Colonel Yoshioka with 377 of his men, all that 

remained of the 1,000 who had broken 

through the American line on 29 January, 

reached the 9th Infantry lines and safety, 

after a march of four days. 

Colonel Yoshioka's 20th Infantry had 

now ceased to exist as an effective fighting 

force. Landing in southern Luzon with 

2,881 men, the regiment had entered the 

Bataan campaign with a strength of 2,690. 

Comparatively few casualties had been suffered in the fighting along the Mauban line. 

The amphibious operations that followed 

on 23 January, however, had proved disastrous for Yoshioka. First his 2d Battalion had 

been "lost without a trace" at Longoskawayan and Quinauan, then the 1st Battalion, sent to its rescue, had been almost entirely destroyed at Anyasan and Silaiim 

Points. The pocket fights had completed 

the destruction of the regiment. It is doubtful if the ill-fated 20th Infantry by the middle of February numbered more than 650 

men, the majority of whom were sick or 

wounded.a1 

able estimate. For a list of the captured equipment, 

see Supp. Rpt to G-2 Rpt, 11th Diy (PA), 19 

Feb 42, copy in OCMH. 

.0 14th Army Opns, I, 115. 

81 Ltr, Chief, Hist Diy, SSUSA, to G-2 GHQ 

FEe, 9 Noy 48, 3d Ind, 16 Aug 49, 16th Div 

345 

With the fight for the Big Pocket at an 

end, General Brougher turned his attention 

to the Upper Pocket, the enemy salient at 

the western extremity of the 11 th Division 

line. All efforts to pinch out the Japanese 

and restore the main line of resistance had 

failed. Since its formation on 7 February 

the salient had been contained by a miscellaneous assortment of troops. On the west 

were three companies of the 3d Infantry, 

one from the 1st Infantry, and the remnants 

of the platoon from Company F, 11 th Infantry, which had been overrun in the initial 

attack. Holding the east side of the 'penetration was Company A, 92d Infantry, which 

Brougher had taken from Jones on the 

morning of the 7th, and five platoons from 

the disorganized 12th Infantry. The 2d Ba ttalion, 2d Constabulary, was south of the 

salient. Not only had this conglomerate 

force held the Japanese in check, but it 

had pushed them back about fifty yards 

before the fight for the Big Pocket ended. 

On 13 February Brougher sent forward 

a portion of the force that had participated 

in the fight against Yoshioka to join the 

troops holding back the Japanese in the salient. The 1st Battalion, 45th Infantry, took 

up a position to the south while the Provisional Battalion, 51 st Division, and troops 

from the 92d Infantry attacked on its left in 

a northeasterly direction. At the same time, 

11 th Infantry units and the Constabulary 

pushed in from the east. By evening of the 

14th, despite stubborn resistance and the 

difficulties presented by the jungle, the salient had been reduced by half and was only 

350 yards long and 200 yards wide. An attack from the South the next day cut that 

area in half. 

Opn, ATIS Enemy Pub 355, p. 11. This figure 

includes the detached company of the 3d Battalion 

which did not engage in the pocket fights. 
346 

The infantry was aided here, as in the 

Big Pocket fight, by tanks of the 192d Tank 

Battalion. Hampered by the dense undergrowth and lost in the confusing maze of 

bamboo thickets, vines, and creepers, the 

tankers would have been impotent had it 

not been for the aid of the Igorot troops of 

Major Duisterhof's 2d Battalion, 11 th Infantry. Hoisted to the top of the tanks where 

they were exposed to the fire of the enemy, 

these courageous tribesmen from north 

Luzon chopped away the entangling foliage 

with their bolos and served as eyes for the 

American tankers. From their position atop 

the tanks they fired at the enemy with pistols 

while guiding the drivers with sticks.32 

As a result of these tactics combined with 

.. New York Times, February 23, 1942. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

steady pressure from the troops to the southwest and west, the Japanese were slowly 

pushed back. At least that was what the 

Americans and Filipinos believed. Actually, 

it is more likely that the Japanese in the 

salient were withdrawing to their own lines 

now that the necessity of providing a diversion for Yoshioka's retreat from the Big 

Pocket had ended. Once the 20th Infantry 

survivors had escaped it was no longer necessary for the men in the salient to hold their 

position. They had accomplished their mission and could now fall back, in accordance 

with Morioka's orders of the 9th. By the 

16th the salient measured only 75 by 100 

yards. An unopposed attack the next morning restored the main line of resistance and 

ended the fight which had begun on 26 

January. The fight for the pockets was over . 
CHAPTER XIX 

The Japanese Withdrawal 

At the end of January, the time by which, 

according to the prewar plans of Imperial 

General Headquarters, the conquest of Luzon was to have been completed, Homma 

had to face the bitter realization that he was 

still far from his objective. The Batde of the 

Points and the pocket fights were still in 

progress, but it was already clear that the 

offensive begun on 26 January had failed 

miserably. General Nara's efforts to advance against II Corps on the east had been 

unsuccessful and expensive for the 65th 

Brigade and the attached 9th Infantry of 

the 16th Division. One battalion of the 20th 

infantry had already been lost in the abortive landings along the west coast; another 

was trapped at Anyasan and Silaiim Points. 

The remainder of the regiment was cut off 

behind Wainwright's line and encircled in 

the pockets. Finally, the attacks against I 

Corps by elements of the 122d, 33d, and 

9th Infantry--the last of which had rejoined 

the 16th Division during the first week of 

February-were producing no results. Reluctant as he was to call off the offensive, 

Homma realized that to continue with it 

might well lead to disaster. The time for a 

decision had come. 

The crucial question was debated heatedly by the 14th Army staff at San Fernando on 8 February. During the discussions two points of view emerged. The first, 

presented by Col. Motoo Nakayama, senior 

operations officer of Homma's staff, held 

that the offensive should be pushed aggressively. The main effort, he argued, should 

be made along the east coast rather than the 

west and should be closely controlled by 

14th Army. Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, Homrna's chief of staff, spoke for those who believed that offensive operations on Bataan 

should be discontinued, and that the blockade should be tightened while the remainder 

of the Philippines were occupied. By the 

time this was accomplished, the Americans 

and Filipinos would have been starved into 

submission. Thus the victory would be 

gained at little cost. 

Homma listened carefuly to both views 

and then made his decision. Forced by necessity to accept Maeda's argument for the 

cessation of operations on Bataan, he agreed 

to break off the action and withdraw his 

troops to a more secure position. But he did 

not agree to wait for famine and hunger to 

bring him victory. Instead he decided to call 

on Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo 

for reinforcements with which to launch a 

final offensive to capture Bataan. Meanwhile, he would rest his men, reorganize the 

Army, and tighten the blockade. That night 

he issued orders for a general withdrawaP 

Homma's order of the 8th was the one 

which halted Nara's operations against Sector C in II Corps and prompted Morioka 

to order the troops at Anyasan and Silaiim 

1 Interrog of Maeda, 10 May 47, and Statement 

of Maeda, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56234, both in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist 

Div, GHQ FEC, I and II; interv, Col Walter E. 

Buchly with Homma, Manila, Mar 46, notes in 

OCMH; USA vs. Homma, p. 3062, testimony of 

Homma. 
348 

Points and those in the pockets to escape as 

best they could. General N ara was directed 

to withdraw his brigade to the area above 

the Tiawir and Talisay Rivers; Morioka, to 

the high ground north of the Bagac and 

Gogo Rivers. There they would establish 

defensive positions, reorganize, and prepare 

for the next offensive. 2 

Nara experienced little difficulty in carrying out his orders, but Morioka's troops were 

too closely engaged to withdraw easily. 

Moreover, the entire 20th Infantry was behind the American line, either at the points 

or in the pockets. On about 13 February, 

therefore, Homma ordered the 65th Brigade 

and the Army reserve unit to launch a diversionary attack against II Corps to relieve 

pressure on the 16th Division. At the same 

time Army artillery and supporting aircraft 

would open an attack of their own to cover 

Morioh.'s withdrawal. As soon as Morioka 

had extricated his troops, General N ara 

would break off the diversionary attack and 

fall back again, this time to a line near 

Balanga, a short distance south of the old 

Abucay line. 

The attack opened on 15 February after a 

careful preparation by the artillery and bombardment from the air. To create the impression of heavy troop movements, vehicles 

of all types were sent along the road between Abucay and Dinalupihan to the 

north. While the artillery and aircraft continued their activity, the ground troops 

moved out. Skeleton units less than a battalion in size advanced toward the American lines, reconnoitered, deployed as though 

for attack, opened fire, but made no effort 

to advance farther. The Americans, who 

• 14th Army Opns Order, Series A, No. 273, 14 

Feb 42, Supp. 29, and Plans for Feint Mvrnts by 

Nara Inf Gp, 14 Feb 42, App. 31, both in 65th Brig 

Opns Rpt, Mt. Sarnat; 14th Army Opns, I, 115, 

117. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

reported this activity as heavy patrol action, 

were not deceived and made no disposition 

to meet a general offensive against II Corps. 

Homma, however, believed that troops had 

been moved from I to II Corps and that the 

diversion was successful. On 2 February, 

after Morioka had completed his withdrawal, Nara was ordered to pull back also 

and occupy the line near Balanga. 3 

Thus, less than one month after the start 

of the offensive, 14th Army had been halted 

and forced back to a defensive line to await 

reinforcements. "The enemy has definitely 

recoiled," wrote General MacArthur. "He 

has refused his flank in front of my right 

six to ten kilometers and in other sectors by 

varying distances. His attitude is so passive 

as to discount any immediate threat of 

attack." 4 

While these operations were in progress 

on Bataan Homma put into effect his plan 

to tighten the blockade. Col. Tatsunosuke 

Suzuki, whose 33d Infantry (less 1st and 

2d Battalions) occupied all of Luzon south 

of Manila, was given the 16th Reconnaissance Regiment (less one company) and 

ordered to guard the southern coast of Manila Bay to prevent friendly Filipinos from 

sending food to Corregidor and Bataan. 

At the same time the four I05-mm. guns 

and two 150-mm. cannons stationed earlier 

in the same area were ordered to intensify 

their bombardment of the fortified islands 

at the entrance to the bay.5 

• USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 54; Bluemel, 

31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 17; 65th Brig Opns 

Rpt, Mt. Samat, pp. 28-29; 14th Army Opns, I, 

116. 

'Rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 371, 26 Feb 42, 

AG381 (11-27-41 Sec2C) Far East. 

• 14th Army Opns, I, 96, 104, 113-15; 14th Army 

Opns Order, Series A, No. 270, 13 Feb 42, Supp. 28, 

65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat. For a day-by-day 

account of this bombardment see Harbor Defenses 

Rpt of Opns, pp. 34 II; Bunker, Diary, daily entries 

after 6 Feb 42. 
THE JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL 349 

TABLE 7-WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED BY 14th Army, AS OF 20 FEBRUARY 

1942 

Item 

Vehicles: Tank __________________ _ 

Motor trucL ___________ _ 

Passenger car ___________ _ Other __ ~ ______________ _ 

Anus: Rifle __________________ _ 

PistoL _________________ _ 

Machine gun, lighL _____ _ 

Machine gun, heavy _____ _ 

Rifle, automatic ________ _ 

Artillery, heavy _________ _ 

Artillery, field __________ _ 

Artillery, pacL _________ _ 

Mortar, trench __________ _ Mortar ________________ _ 

Grenade,hand __________ _ Bayonet _______________ _ 

Quantity 

31 

844 

1, 132 

340 

27,412 

1, 161 

42 

176 

68 

5 

37 

32 

35 

8 

2,071 

9,371 

Item 

Fuel (in litres) : 

Motor car fueL _________ _ 

Mobile gas- _____________ . 

Aviation gas _____________ . 

Tank oil, lighL __________ . 

Heavy oiL _____________ _ 

Petroleum ______________ _ 

Ammunition (in rounds) : Rifle ___________________ _ 

PistoL _________________ _ 

Machine gun, heavy _____ _ 

Artillery, field ____________ . 

Artillery, pack __________ _ 

Mortar, trench _________ _ 

Mortar ________________ _ 

Quantity 

1,402,954 

837,994 

107,964 

396,800 

7,900,000 

4,776,000 

6,627,599 

132,318 

72,496 

426,669 

714 

1,067 

1,055 

SOUTce: Tactical Situation 14th Army, ATIS Doc 56113, App. II, in translation of Japanese Doc II, 

No. 15, GHQ FEe, Mil Intel Sec. 

To seal off the approaches to Manila Bay 

from the inland seas Homma decided also to 

occupy the island of Mindoro, off the southwest coast of Luzon, just below Batangas 

Province. On the 15th he directed Colonel 

Suzuki to prepare for an amphibious operation and on the 22d issued final orders for 

the landing. Four days later, Suzuki, with a 

force called the Suzuki Detachment and 

consisting of the 3d Battalion, 33d Infantry, plus a battery of the 22d Field Artillery, 

left Olongapo under naval escort. On the 

morning of the 27th, the detachment landed 

on the northeast tip of the island and occupied a town and near-by airfield without 

any opposition. No effort was made to occupy the south end of the island where there 

was an airstrip and a small garrison of fifty 

men.6 

• Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, pp. 148, 273, 

329, 343-44; rad, Beebe (Fort Mills) to MacThis local success against an undefended 

island and the seizure of much booty could 

not disguise the fact that Homma's fortune 

had by the end of February reached its 

nadir. (Table 7) From 6 January to 1 

March 14th Army casualties had totaled almost 7,000 men. Twenty-seven hundred 

men had been killed and over 4,000 

wounded. Between 10,000 and 12,000 more 

were down with malaria, beriberi, dysentery, 

and tropical diseases. Literally, 14th Army 

had ceased to exist as an effective force, and 

its two combat elements, the 16th Division 

and 65th Brigade, had been reduced to impotence. Of the three infantry regiments in 

Morioka's division, one, the 20th, had been 

Arthur (Melbourne), 18 Mar 42, USFIP G-3 

Journal. On 8 March a Japanese destroyer appeared 

offshore and the Mindoro garrison of fifty men set 

fire to 50,000 gallons of aviation gasoline before 

taking to the hills. A week later the Japanese landed 

there. 
350 

virtually destroyed. The single battalion of 

the 33d Infantry that participated in the 

offensive had lost 125 men in the Upper 

Pocket. The 9th Infantry had seen action 

on both sides of the peninsula and had suffered about 700 casualties. By 24 February 

the effective infantry strength of the 16th 

Division on Bataan did not exceed 712 

men. 7 

The 65th Brigade had not fared much 

better than the 16th Division. Entering 

Bataan early in January with about 5,000 

infantrymen, its three two-battalion regiments, the 122d, 141st, and 142d, had been 

in continuous combat until the last week 

of February. The brigade had borne the 

brunt of the fighting in the first battle of 

Bataan and had lost a large number of 

men before 26 January. Between 25 January and 15 February, the 122d Infantry 

had been attached to Morioka's force and 

had sustained over 300 casualties. During 

the same period the 141 sf Infantry lost 80 

killed and 253 wounded. Casualties in the 

142d were somewhat lighter. By the middle 

of February the brigade and its attachments had lost altogether over 4,000 men: 

1,142 killed and 3,110 wounded. Many of 

those who survived were exhausted and sick 

and could hardly be considered effective 

troops.s 

The 14th Army was indeed, as Homma 

remarked at his trial in Manila four years 

later, "in very bad shape." Altogether Homrna had in his army at that time, he estimated, only three infantry battalions capable of effective action. Had MacArthur 

chosen that moment to launch a large-scale 

counterattack, Homma told the Military 

'14th Army Opns, 1,116; USA vs. Homma, Defense Exhibit Y. 

865th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. Ill; 65th 

Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, p. 114. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Tribunal which sentenced him to death, 

the American and Filipino troops could 

have walked to Manila "without encountering much resistance on our part." 9 

The Japanese failure in the offensive 

against the Orion-Bagac line raised American morale and led to an upsurge of optimism. So jubilant were the troops that they 

accepted unquestioningly, as did MacArthur's headquarters, the report that General 

Homma had committed suicide because of 

hIS failure to take Bataan. To heighten the 

dramatic effect, or for some obscure reason 

attributable to Oriental psychology, Homrna was thought to have selected General 

MacArthur's apartment in the Manila 

Hotel for the act. The fictious funeral rites 

were reported to have been held there also.lO 

Officers were unanimous in their judgment that morale was never higher and the 

troops never imbued with a more aggressive 

spirit. "The morale of our front line troops," 

wrote Lt. Col. Nicoll F. Galbraith to his 

chief, Col. Lewis C. Beebe, G--4 on MacArthur's staff, "appears very high and they 

want to take the offensive. At the moment 

there appears to be nothing on our right 

except dead Japs and tons of abandoned 

equipment, which is being collected .... 

Prisoners give the impression that J ap morale is away down." 11 Wainwright, too, 

• USA vs. Homma, pp. 3062-63, testimony of 

Homma; pp. 2450, 2457, testimony of Lt Gen 

Takaji Wachi, fonnerly Chief of Staff, 14th Army. 

Col. Yoshio Nakajima estimated that as of 1 March 

there were 3,000 effectives in 14th Army, USA liS. 

Homma, p. 2576. 

10 Ibid., p. 3063, testimony of Homma; rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 438, 7 Mar 42, AG 381 (11-

27-41 Sec 3) Far East; Bunker, Diary, entry of 

10 Mar 42. General Yamashita, conqueror of 

Singapore, was reported as the new Japanese commander in the Philippines, a command he did not 

assume until October 1944. 

ULtr, Galbraith to Beebe, 5 Feb 42, AG 319.1 

(8 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 
THE JAPANESE WITHDRAWAL 351 

USAFFE HEADQUARTERS ON BATAAN, FEBRUARY 1942. Left to right: 

Brig. Gen. Spencer B. Akin, Maj. Paul R. Wing (photographic officer), Lt. Col. 

Nicoll F. Galbraith, and Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall. 

thought that the morale of his men reached 

its highest point after the Battle of the 

Points and the pocket fights.12 A naval intelligence officer, whose opinion of the 

Philippine army was not high, wrote to his 

superior in Washington on 11 February: 

Army morale on Bataan is higher in the 

past ten days than at any time since the beginning of the war. . . . The opinion here is 

that the army has improved by many discharges and thousands of desertions, by the 

realization that it has to fight its own battle 

with little if any substantial aid. . . . Lastly, 

fighting qualities have improved by experience. 13 

,. NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 27. 

11 Rad, Intel Officer, 16th Naval Dist, to Chief of 

Naval Intel, 11 Feb 42, AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil 

Reds. 

The victories of February had made 

hardened veterans of the front-line troops 

on Bataan and they were eager to pursue 

the enemy. Men on patrol moved forward 

aggressively and Colonel Galbraith wrote 

that he expected at any moment to hear that 

"they were in San Fernando next." 14 One 

patrol from General Bluemel's sector in II 

Corps actually pushed as far forward as the 

former Abucay line whereupon the general 

proposed to Parker that a reconnaissance 

in force be made to that line preparatory to 

a restoration of the first main line of resistance. He was not alone in urging a general counteroffensive; many officers favored 

.. Ltr, Galbraith to Beebe, 5 Feb 42, AG 319.1 

(8 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 
352 

a return to the Abucay position and some 

wished to go even further, to Layac Junction at the base of the peninsula.15 

Bluemel's proposal met with a flat rejection at corps headquarters, and undoubtedly 

would have received even less consideration 

from MacArthur's staff. What the proponents of a general counteroffensive failed 

to consider was the fact that a local victory 

could not change the strategic situation in 

the Philippines. So long as the Japanese 

controlled the sea and air MacArthur's 

forces would be unable to gain a decisive 

victory. Even if they fought their way back 

to Abucay, Layac, or Manila, they would 

ultimately have .to retire to Bataan again, 

for the Japanese could reinforce at will. 

The effort required for a general offensive 

might well have jeopardized the primary 

mission of the Philippine garrison-to hold 

Manila Bay as long as possible. To accomplish this task it was necessary to conserve 

carefully all human and material resources. 

Troops on the defensive in a static situation 

11 Ltr, Bluemel to Groce, 18 Feb 49, OCMH; 

Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 54. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

required less food, less gasoline, less ammunition, and less of all other supplies than 

those who chose to attack. Moreover, the 

advance, if it proved successful, would 

bring additional problems: it would 

lengthen the front line, increase the area to 

be defended and the line of communication, 

leave exposed beaches to the rear, and 

greatly complicate an already difficult supply situation. It was for these reasons that 

all proposals for an offensive, while feasible 

tactically and desirable for reasons of morale, were strategically unsound. The proper 

task for the front-line troops was to 

strengthen their defenses in the hope that 

when the next Japanese attack came it 

could be turned back as had the last.16 

Thus, by the end of February, the Americans and Japanese were dug in behind their 

defensive positions on Bataan. Separating 

the two lines was a no man's land, the exclusive hunting preserve for the opposing 

patrols. Over the entire peninsula settled a 

lull as both sides prepared for the final 

assault. 

U Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 54-58. 
CHAPTER XX

Command

While the situation on Bataan was never

more favorable to the Allied cause than it

was in mid-February, there was little hope

in Washington that the Philippine garrison

could withstand the Japanese assault for

more than a few months. What would happen to General MacArthur then? Was he to

be allowed to fall into Japanese hands or

should he be saved for the Allied war effort

still to come? The decision reached in

Washington, presumably early in February,

was that the general's services were too valuable to be sacrificed in a hopeless cause, that

he must be rescued to lead other forces in

the war against Japan.

But there were difficulties to this solution.

MacArthur would undoubtedly raise objections to any orders which might affect

his reputation. And he might show an understandable reluctance to desert his troops

in the midst of battle. Brig. Gen. Patrick J.

Hurley, former Secretary of War and an

old friend of MacArthur's, summarized

these difficulties when he told General

Wavell during a trip to the Indies that MacArthur would not leave the Philippines until "both the public and the troops were

assured that command had passed to competent leadership." He explained also "that

it would be necessary for the President to

definitely order MacArthur to relinquish

command and proceed elsewhere, and that

even if such orders were issued MacArthur

might feel that he had destroyed himself by

leaving his beleaguered command." MacArthur's departure from the Philippines,

Hurley concluded, would have to be arranged in such a way that "his honor and his

record as a soldier" would not be compromised.1

 The settlement of these delicate

questions formed the substance of the

lengthy negotiations which preceded General MacArthur's departure from Corregidor on 12 March 1942.

The Evacuation of MacArthur

The subject of MacArthur's evacuation

from the Philippines and his future role in

the war against Japan was first raised by the

Chief of Staff in an oblique fashion on 2

February. The occasion was an inquiry

about MacArthur's plans for his wife and

young son who were on Corregidor with

him.2 General Marshall followed up this

inquiry two days later with the statement

that "continuous consideration" was being

given to the evacuation of officials from the

Philippines. For the first time mention was

made of the possibility of MacArthur's

transfer to another command should Bataan

fall, leaving only "the fortress defense of

Corregidor" in American hands. "Under

these conditions," Marshall explained, "the

need for your services there might well be

1

 Memo, Hurley for Marshall, Melbourne, 21 Feb

42, OPD 381 SWPA, Sec 1, Case 21. 2

 Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 187, 2 Feb

42, and Marshall to MacArthur, 2 Feb 42, both in

WPD 3251-74.

CHAPTER XX 

Command 

While the situation on Bataan was never 

more favorable to the Allied cause than it 

was in mid-February, there was little hope 

in Washington that the Philippine garrison 

could withstand the Japanese assault for 

more than a few months. What would happen to General MacArthur then? Was he to 

be allowed to fall into Japanese hands or 

should he be saved for the Allied war effort 

still to come? The decision reached in 

Washington, presumably early in February, 

was that the general's services were too valuable to be sacrificed in a hopeless cause, that 

he must be rescued to lead other forces in 

the war against Japan. 

But there were difficulties to this solution. 

MacArthur would undoubtedly raise objections to any orders which might affect 

his reputation. And he might show an understandable reluctance to desert his troops 

in the midst of battle. Brig. Gen. Patrick J. 

Hurley, fonner Secretary of War and an 

old friend of MacArthur's, summarized 

these difficulties when he told General 

Wavell during a trip to the Indies that MacArthur would not leave the Philippines until "both the public and the troops were 

assured that command had passed to competent leadership." He explained also "that 

it would be necessary for the President to 

definitely order MacArthur to relinquish 

command and proceed elsewhere, and that 

even if such orders were issued MacArthur 

might feel that he had destroyed himself by 

leaving his beleaguered command." MacArthur's departure from the Philippines, 

Hurley concluded, would have to be arranged in such a way that "his honor and his 

record as a soldier" would not be compromised.! The settlement of these delicate 

questions fonned the substance of the 

lengthy negotiations which preceded General MacArthur's departure from Corregidor on 12 March 1942. 

The Evacuation of MacArthur 

The subject of MacArthur's evacuation 

from the Philippines and his future role in 

the war against Japan was first raist:d by the 

Chief of Staff in an oblique fashion on 2 

February. The occasion was an inquiry 

about MacArthur's plans for his wife and 

young son who were on Corregidor with 

him.2 General Marshall followed up this 

inquiry two days later with the statement 

that "continuous consideration" was being 

given to the evacuation of officials from the 

Philippines. For the first time mention was 

made of the possibility of MacArthur's 

transfer to another command should Bataan 

fall, leaving only "the fortress defense of 

Corregidor" in American hands. "Under 

these conditions," Marshall explained, "the 

need for your services there might well be 

1 Memo, Hurley for Marshall, Melbourne, 21 Feb 

42, OPD 381 SWPA, Sec 1, Case 21. 

• Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 187, 2 Feb 

42, and Marshall to MacArthur, 2 Feb 42, both in 

WPD 3251-74. 
354 

less pressing than at other points in the Far 

East." 3 

Marshall outlined two possibilities for 

MacArthur's future employment. The first 

was his transfer to Mindanao. The length of 

his stay there would depend on the success 

of guerilla operations and the effectiveness 

of the program to bring in supplies from 

Australia. The second alternative was for 

MacArthu~ to go directly to Australia and 

there resume command of all Army forces 

in the Far East. After describing the situation in Australia and outlining what was 

being done to establish a strong base in that 

area, Marshall went on to say that his purpose in raising the question of MacArthur's 

evacuation from the Philippines was to secure from him a "highly confidential statement" of his views before a decision was 

made. "It is to be understood," he concluded, "that in case your withdrawal from 

immediate leadership of your beleaguered 

forces is to be carried out it will be by direct 

order of the President to you." 

This request for MacArthur's views was 

not answered immediately, and when it did 

come was made in connection with an entirely different matter. On 8 February, four 

days after Marshall's inquiry, the War Department received a message for President 

Roosevelt from Manuel Quezon. In this 

message Quezon proposed that the United 

States immediately grant the Philippines 

their independence; that the Islands be neutralized; that American and Japanese forces 

be withdrawn by mutual consent; and that 

the Philippine Army be disbanded. 

Quezon's disquieting proposal was accompanied by a supporting message from 

General MacArthur, couched in the form 

• Rad, Marsha]! to MacArthur, 4 Feb 42, 

WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

of a military estimate of the situation. 4 From 

this estimate the War Department learned 

for the first time that the Philippine garrison 

had sustained a casualty rate of 50 percent, 

and that divisions were reduced to the size 

of regiments and regiments to battalions. 

Although morale was good the men were 

"badly battle worn" and "desperately in 

need of rest." "There is no denying the 

fact," MacArthur told Marshall, "that we 

are near done," and warned him to be prepared for "the complete destruction of this 

command" at any time. It was up to the 

United States to decide whether the time 

the Allies so badly needed could be attained 

better through Quezon's plan or by continuing the hopeless battle. After summarizing 

the attitude of the Filipinos as one of "almost violent resentment against the United 

States," MacArthur stated that, from the 

military point of view, "the problem presents itself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer the best possible 

solution of what is about to be a disastrous 

debacle." If the plan was accepted, he 

pointed out, "we lose no military advantage 

because we would still secure at least equal 

delay." 

The reaction from Washington was 

prompt and emphatic. On 9 February, one 

day later, President Roosevelt in a personal 

message to Quezon repudiated the scheme 

and declared that the United States Government would never agree to such a solution to the war in the Philippines.5 At the 

• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 226 and 227, 

CofS Phil Situation File. The first part of the message was addressed to Roosevelt and signed Quezon: 

the second portion was addressed to MarshaII and 

signed by MacArthur. 

• Rad, Roosevelt to MacArthur, No. 1029,9 Feb 

42, CofS Phil Situation File. The message was 

addressed to MacArthur alone because it went 

through Army channe1~. 
COMMAND 

same time he expressed his sympathy for 

Quezon and the Philippine people and 

pledged American support "whatever happens to the present American garrison." 

"So long as the flag of the United States 

flies on Filipino soil," Roosevelt assured 

Quezon, " ... it will be defended by our 

own men to the death . . . we shall not 

relax our efforts until the forces which are 

now marshalling outside the Philippine Islands return to the Philippines and drive 

the last remnant of the invaders from your 

soil." To General MacArthur, Roosevelt 

sent a personal message authorizing the surrender of the Filipino troops if necessary, 

but forbidding the surrender of American 

troops, "so long as there remains any possibility of resistance." 6 The President then 

went on to express his belief in the importance of the fight in the Philippines and the 

role of that garrison in the war against the 

Axis. 

I have made these decisions [he wrote] in 

complete understanding of your military estimate that accompanied President Quezon's 

message to me. The duty and the necessity 

of resisting Japanese aggression to the last 

transcends in importance any other obligation 

now facing us in the Philippines. 

There has been gradually welded into a 

common front a globe-encircling opposition 

to the predatory powers that are seeking the 

destruction of individual liberty and freedom 

of .government. We cannot afford to have this 

line broken in any particular theater. 

As the most powerful member of this 

coalition we cannot display weakness in fact 

or in spirit anywhere. It is mandatory that 

there be established once and for all in the 

minds of all peoples complete evidence that 

the American determination and indomitable 

will to win carries on down to the last unit. 

I therefore give you this most difficult 

mission in full understanding of the desperate 

situation to which you may shortly be re-

• Ibid. 

355 

duced. The service that you and the American members of your command can render 

to your country in the titanic struggle now 

developing is beyond all possibility of appraisement. I particularly request that you proceed 

rapidly to the organization of your forces and 

your defenses so as to make your resistance as 

effective as circumstances will permit and as 

prolonged as humanly possible. 

Both Quezon and MacArthur accepted 

the President's decision without question. 

Quezon wrote that he fully appreciated the 

reasons upon which the decision was based 

and that he was "abiding by it." 1 It was in 

his reply to the President's "no surrender" 

order that MacArthur answered Marshall's 

inquiry of a week earlier for his confidential 

views about evacuation. He and his familv 

MacArthur declared, had decided to r~~ main in the Philippines and "share the fate 

of the garrison." 8 He planned, he said, to 

fight "to destruction" on Bataan and then 

do the same of Corregidor. "I have not the 

slightest intention in the world," he told the 

President, "of surrendering or capitulating 

the Filipino element of my command .... 

There has never been the slightest wavering among the troops." 

General Marshall immediately expressed 

personal concern over MacArthur's decision to "share the fate of the garrison." He 

urged the former Chief of Staff to consider 

the possibility of an assignment that would 

force him to become separated from his 

family "under circumstances of greatly increased peril" and "poignant embarrassment." 9 In the same message Marshall 

made an official inquiry about antiaircraft 

ammunition. The reply from Corregidor 

, Rad, Quezon to Roosevelt, No. 262, 12 Feb 42, 

OPD Exec O. 

• Rad, MacArthur to Roosevdt, No. 252, 11 Feb 

42, OPD Exec O. 

• Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 14 Feb 42, 

WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. 
356 

answered the inquiry about the ammunition 

but pointedly omitted any reference to the 

personal aspects of Marshall's message.10 

MacArthur's message was penned on 15 

February, the same day that the supposedly 

impregnable fortress at Singapore, key to 

the British position in the Far East, surrendered. Already the Japanese had taken 

Malaya, Borneo, and the Celebes. The early 

loss of Sumatra and Java and the split of 

the ABDA area was virtually certain. Again 

MacArthur called for an attack against the 

Japanese line of communications, declaring 

with characteristic optimism that "the opportunities still exist for a complete reversal 

of the situation." 11 

To the United States and British planners 

in Washington the possibility of successful flank attack against the Japanese 

positions appeared even more remote than 

before. ABDA Command was clearly 

doomed, and there were numerous meetings 

held in Washington during the two weeks 

following the fall of Singapore to consider 

the effects on Allied strategy of the new 

Japanese victories and the imminent collapse of Wavell's command. Gradually there 

emerged a scheme by which the United 

States would accept responsibility for the 

eastern portion of the ABDA area, including Australia and the Netherlands Indies; 

the British, the western portion. It was evident by the last week in February that the 

broad outlines of such an agreement were 

mutually satisfactory and that only the details-important as they were-remained 

to be worked out. The American planners 

considered it a wise precaution, then, to select in advance a senior officer qualified to 

'" Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 15 Feb 42, 

WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) PhiL 

uRad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 297, 16 Feb 

42, WDCSA 381 (3-17-42) PhiL 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

command a large Allied headquarters in 

the Southwest Pacific. Inevitably the choice 

fell upon MacArthur.12 On 27 February the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff finally ordered 

Wavell to dissolve his headquarters and turn 

command of operations in the area over to 

the Netherlands authorities before leaving for India. This move placed MacArthur 

technically under the Dutch, but he had already been told that "because of your special situation all procedures in your case remain as heretofore. You will continue to 

communicate directly with the War Department." 13 

Such reassurances were by now entirely 

unnecessary for on 22 February the President had directed MacArthur to leave the 

Philippines. His intention to do so had been 

made clear on the 21st when the Chief of 

Staff had told the Far East commander that 

the President was considering the advisability of ordering him to Mindanao to conduct 

the defense of the Philippines from there.14 

There were numerous advantages to such 

a move. MacArthur himself had repeatedly 

pointed out the possibility of continuing resistance from Mindanao by means of guerrilla warfare and had already taken measures to strengthen Brig. Gen. William F. 

Sharp's command. If the Allies mounted an 

U For an account of the reorganization of the 

ABDA area and the establishment of the Southwest Pacific Area, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic 

Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942, and 

Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, a volume in 

preparation for the series UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

•• Rad, TAG to MacArthur, No. 1083,24 Feb 42, 

WPD 4639-54. 

.. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 42, 

WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. General Eisenhower, who was handling the dispatches to MacArthur during this period from his post as Chief 

of the War Plans Division, makes it clear that the 

impetus to get MacAr.thur out of the Philippines 

came from the White House. Eisenhower, Personal 

Notebook, entry of 23 Feb 42_ 
COMMAND 

air and naval counterattack through the 

Netherlands Indies, as MacArthur had 

urged, Mindanao would be the first objective in the Philippines and the base for an 

invasion of Luzon. Communication with 

other areas in the Far East would also be 

more practical from Mindanao than Corregidor. "The foregoing considerations underlie the tentative decision of the President," Marshall told MacArthur, "but we 

are not sufficiently informed as to the situation and circumstances to be certain that the 

proposal meets the actual situation." 

The next day, without waiting for a reply 

from Corregidor, the President made up his 

mind about MacArthur's evacuation. The 

USAFFE commander was to leave Fort 

Mills as quickly as possible and proceed to 

Mindanao where he would remain long 

enough "to insure a prolonged defense." 15 

From there he was to go on to Australia. In 

this message MacArthur was told definitely 

for the first time of the President's plans for 

his future role in the war and of arrangements then in progress to secure Australian 

and British acceptance of his command in 

the southwest Pacific. He was urged to make 

all haste in his preparations, "because of the 

vital importance of your assuming command 

in Australia at an early date," and directed 

not to "delay in Mindanao" longer than one 

week and to leave sooner if transportation 

became available. Obviously, by this time, 

his movement to Mindanao was secondary 

to his assumption of command in Australia. 

Air and submarine transportation from Cor-

"Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1078, 22 

Feb 42, CofS Supersecret File entitled MacArthur's 

Move to Australia. Eisenhower wrote on 22 February that he had prepared the draft of a message to 

MacArthur telling him to start south. The next 

day he noted that the message had been approved 

b}' the Pr~sident and sent. Eisenhower, Personal 

Notebook. 

357 

regidor would be provided by Washington 

and he was authorized to take with him his 

chief of staff. 

The message reached Corregidor' at noon 

on the 23d. According to Frazier Hunt, one 

of General MacArthur's biographers, MacArthur first decided to refuse to leave and 

actually drafted a blunt refusal note. When 

he called in the senior members of his staff 

to tell them of the President's orders and 

his decision, they all argued that he would 

have to obey the orders ultimately and that 

he ought not to send the message already 

drafted. If he persisted in his refusal, they 

pointed out, he would face court-martial 

charges. He had been selected to lead a 

rescue force back to the Philippines and he 

owed it fo his men to accept the assignment. 

There was enough food and ammunition, 

they declared, to last into June and the 

Bataan force might well hold out until his 

return.16 

Thus advised, says Frazier Hunt, MacArthur tore up his first message and accepted 

his orders, with reservations. In his reply, 

dated 24 February, he expressed his appreciation of the confidence "implied" in the 

President's orders and agreement with the 

objectives desired. Pointing out that the failure to send support to the Philippines had 

"created a very difficult situation which I 

have been able to meet only through the peculiar confidence placed in me by the Filipino people and Army," and that his abrupt 

departure might result "in collapse in the 

Philippine area," he asked for permission to 

delay his departure until the "psychological 

time." "Please be guided by me in this matter," he urged the Chief of Staff. "I know the 

'"Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against Japan, 

p. 64. The writer has been unable to find confirmation of this conference in the official records or 

in interviews. 
358 

situation here in the Philippines and unless 

the right moment is chosen for this delicate 

operation, a sudden collapse might occur. . . . These people are depending upon 

me now . . . and any idea that might develop in their minds that I was being with-' 

drawn for any other purpose than to bring 

them immediate relief could not be explained. . . ." 17 

Authority to leave at a time he considered 

appropriate was received immediately. 

. 'Your No. 358, " Marshall told him the next 

day, "has been carefully considered by the 

President. He has directed that full decision 

as to timing of your departure and details of method be left in your hands." 18 

Since his datc of departure was indefinite, 

he was given authority to call on the Army 

and Navy commands in Australia for a 

submarine to take him to Mindanao and 

B-I7's for the trip to Australia. 

These arrangements, MacArthur told 

:\farshall, were entirely satisfactory, and he 

added that he expected to leave about 15 

March.'9 Lt. Gen. George H. Brett and Rear 

Adm. William A. Glassford, the Army and 

Navy commanders in Australia, though not 

given the reason, were directed to place 

three heavy bombers and a submarine at 

MacArthur's disposal. The submarine was 

to move to Corregidor, the planes to Mindanao. Brett and Glassford were also told to 

expect such a call about 15 March and enjoined to keep the entire matter "highly 

sccret." 20 The only urging MacArthur received from Washington to hasten his de17 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 358, 24 Feb 

42, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. 

,. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1087, 25 Feb 

42, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. 

19 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 373, 26 Feb 

42, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. 

2. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 28 Feb 42, Supersecret Msgs to Gen MacArthur, OPD Exec O. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

parture came on 6 March when Marshall 

told him, at the end of a message dealing 

with other matters, that the situation in 

Australia "indicates desirability of your 

early arrival there." 21 

The "psychological time" for MacArthur's departure came six days later. On 24 

February, when he had asked permission to 

delay his departure, he had pointed out that 

he wished to remain in the Philippines until 

such time as the situation on Bataan became stabilized. The enemy's intentions 

were not then clear, he had said, and it was 

entirely possible that he might soon make a 

major effort. MacArthur was confident that 

he could defeat the Japanese and "restabilize the situation." If such an attack did not 

materialize, his estimate was that "we may 

be approaching the stalemate of positional 

warfare." 22 By 10 March MacArthur evidently felt such a condition had been 

reached and that his departure would not 

result in a collapse. 23 Arrangements for 

transportation were quickly made by Rear 

2l Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 6 Mar 42, 

WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. Frazier Hunt 

states that on 10 March MacArthur received "another peremptory order" to leave. Hunt, MacArthur 

and the War Against Japan, p. 64. No such order 

has been found in the records. 

22 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 358, 24 Feb 

42, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. 

,. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

1-5. The account given by Wainwright of the 

reasons for MacArthur's departure, as given him 

by General Sutherland, is not supported by official 

records. Sutherland told Wainwright, who came 

to Corregidor on the 10th, that "the President has 

been trying to get him [MacArthur] to leave Corregidor for days, but until yesterday the general 

kept refusing." (p. 2) MacArthur told Wainwright 

that same morning that he was leaving on orders 

from the President and that "things have gotten to 

such a point that I must comply with these orders 

or get out of the Army. I want you to make it 

known ... that I'm leaving over my repeated protests." (p. 5) MacArthur also told General Moore 

that he had been ordered to leave over his protest. 

Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 42. 
COMMAND 

Adm. Francis W. Rockwell and General 

Sutherland, and the officers to accompany 

him carefully selected. Instead of waiting 

for the submarine which the Navy had 

placed at his disposal and which could not 

reach Corregidor until 15 March-by which 

time the Japanese might have established 

an effective blockade-MacArthur decided 

to go to Mindanao by PT boat. Rockwell 

assigned four of these small craft to the operation and rushed preparations for the 

journey. Lieutenant Bulkeley, aboard the 

boat carrying the general, was in tactical 

command of the group, but Rockwell assumed personal command of the operation.24 

During the negotiations leading to MacArthur's reassignment no mention had been 

made of the size or character of the staff he 

would take with him. It was assumed that 

his family would go, and Marshall had inquired specifically about them. Only two 

officers had been mentioned by name as being included in the official transfer: General Sutherland and General George, the 

latter asked for specifically by the Air Forces 

who were "anxious to profit by [his] experience.;' 25 The group finally selected to 

make the trip from Corregidor to Australia 

via Mindanao numbered twenty-one persons. In addition to his wife, young son, 

and the nurSe for the child, MacArthur 

selected from his staff seventeen officers to 

accompany him. They included hi~ chief 

and deputy chief of staff, the G-l and G-2, 

the signal, engineer, antiaircraft artillery, 

and air officers, a public relations officer, 

"Ltr, Rockwell to Ward, 18 Jan 52, OCMH; 

Rockwell, Supp. to Narrative of Naval Activities in 

Luzon Area, Folder IV (Evacuation of Gen MacArthur), Off of Naval ReGS. The orders and plans 

for the voyage to Mindanao are included in this 

report. 

"Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 6 Mar 42, 

WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. 

359 

Sutherland's assistant, an aide, a medical 

officer, and a secretary. In addition to 

Admiral Rockwell one other naval officer 

accompanied the general. 26 

On 12 March, as darkness settled down 

over Manila Bay, the party embarked from 

Corregidor. Two hours later, at 2115, the 

four PT boats cleared the mine fields and 

sped south. Sailing all that night, they put 

in next morning at a small uninhabited 

island in the Cuyo group in the central 

Philippines. The small craft had broken formation during the night and become separated, one of them dumping its spare fuel 

when it mistook Bulkeley's boat for an 

enemy vessel. The passengers on this boat 

were taken aboard the others and the group 

continued south through the Mindanao Sea 

the next night, reaching the north central 

shore of Mindanao at daybreak of the 14th. 

" Ibid.; rad, Brett to Marshall, No. 760, 19 Mar 

42, AG 371 (3-19-42). The group was organized 

as follows: 

PT 41 (Ltj. D. Bulkeley) 

General MacArthur 

Mrs. MacArthur 

Arthur MacArthur, son 

Chinese nurse 

General Sutherland, CofS 

Capt Harold G. Ray, USN 

Lt Col Sidney L. Huff, Aide 

Maj C. H. Morehouse, Med 0 

PT 34 (Lt R. G. Kelly) 

Admiral Rockwell 

General Marshall, DCofS 

Col Charles P. Stivers, G-l 

Capt Joseph McMicking (PA), Asst G-2 

PT 35 (Ens A. B. Akers) 

Col Charles A. Willoughhy, G-2 

Lt Col LeGrande A. Diller, Aide (PRO) 

Lt Col Francis H. Wilson, Aide to Sutherland 

M Sgt Paul P. Rogers, Secy 

PT 32 (Lt (jg) V. S. Schumacker) 

Brig Gen Spencer B. Akin, Sig 0 

Brig Gen Hugh J. Casey, Engr 0 

Brig Gen William F. Marquat, AA 0 

Brig Gen Harold H. George, Air 0 

Lt Col Joe R. Sherr, Asst Sig 0 
360 

They were met by General Sharp and taken 

to Del Monte airfield where MacArthur 

found. only one of the B-I7'8 Brett had 

sent up from Australia. Two had failed to 

arrive and the third had crashed. The remaining bomber MacArthur considered 

unfit to carry passengers. Incensed, he requested Brett to send other planes and 

asked Marshall to make suitable planes 

available if Brett did not have them. "The 

best three planes in the United States or 

Hawaii should be made available," he radioed the Chief of Staff, "with completely 

adequate and experienced crews. To attempt such a desperate and important trip 

with inadequate equipment would amount 

to consigning the whole party to death and 

I could not accept such a responsibility." 27 

Three B-17's were dispatched from Australia immediately, two of them reaching 

Del Monte safely by midnight of the 16th. 

The entire group took off shortly after and 

arrived at Darwin at 0900 the next morning. "This hazardous trip by a commanding 

general and key members of his staff 

through enemy controlled territory undoubtedly is unique in military annals," 

MacArthur reported to the Chief of Staff 

on his arrival. "I wish to commend the 

courage and coolness of the officers and 

men ... who were engaged in this hazardous enterprise. It was due entirely to 

their invincible resolution and determination that the mission was successfully 

accomplished." 28 

27 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 482, 14 Mar 

42, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil. For an account 

of the journey, see W. L. White, They Were Expendable, pp. 113-43. The author has also interviewed several of the men who made the trip. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No.5, 21 Mar 

42, Msgs from Cen MacArthur, OPD Exec O. All 

the officers and men of the four PT boats received 

the Silver Star by order of General MacArthur. 

USAFFE CO 43, 15 Mar 42. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Wainwright Assumes Command 

As early as 4 March, a week before his 

departure, General MacArthur had begun 

to formulate a plan for the organization 

and command of the forces remaining behind. On that day the composite VisayanMindanao Force under General Sharp was 

split and the islands in the Visayas transferred to the command of Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth. Sharp continued on as 

commander of the forces on Mindanao, the 

only island south of Luzon on which a 

major Japanese force had landed. 29 This 

move was probably designed to permit General Sharp to devote all his energies to the 

defense of Mindanao, the base from which 

MacArthur still hoped to mount a counteroffensive against the Japanese. 

The reorganization of the VisayanMindanao Force was only a part of General MacArthur's plan. He intended also, as 

he told General Moore at that time, to make 

some changes in command on Bataan and 

Corregidor. 80 These intentions were a 

closely guarded secret and the news only 

began to leak out to the general staff on 

the lOth. 31 General Wainwright was the 

first to learn of it officially. On the evening 

of the 9th he received a telephone call from 

Sutherland to come to Corregidor the next 

morning to see General MacArthur on a 

matter of importance. When he arrived the 

USAFFE chief of staff told him that MacArthur was leaving for Mindanao and 

Australia the next day. "The general," 

Sutherland explained, "plans a number of 

"USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 55; Cen 

Chynoweth, 61st Div (PA) and Visayan Force, pp . 

10-11. The latter report was prepared at the request of the author and is on file in OCMH. 

8. Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 42. 

81 Collier, Notebooks, III, 55. 
COMMAND 

changes." 32 These changes, it appeared, did 

not include the appointment of another 

commander for the forces in the Philippines. MacArthur would continue to exercise this control from Australia through 

his G-4, Colonel Beebe, who would be 

given a star and designated deputy chief 

of staff of USAFFE. 

The entire force, Sutherland told Wainwright, would be organized into four commands. In addition to the two already 

created in the south and General Moore's 

Harbor Defenses, a new command would be 

established for the troops on Bataan and 

those still holding out in the mountains of 

Luzon. This command, to be known as Luzon Force, would be led by General Wainwright. General Jones, who had demonstrated his ability in guiding the South 

Luzon Force during its withdrawal to 

Bataan and in the pocket fight, was to be 

promoted and given \Vainwright's old command, I Corps.33 These arrangements, 

Sutherland concluded, would become effective the day after MacArthur's departure. 

The briefing completed, Sutherland 

took Wainwright in to see General MacArthur. After outlining the organization to 

be established on his departure and asserting his determination to "come back as 

soon as I can with as much as I can," MacArthur cautioned Wainwright to defend 

Bataan "in as great depth as you can." 

"You're an old cavalryman, Jonathan," he 

said, "and your training has been along 

thin, light, quick hitting lines. The defense of Bataan must be deep." "And be 

sure," he continued, "to give them everything you've got with your artillery. That's 

the best arm you have." Before the cav-

.2 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 2. 

•• Ibid.; rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No.3, 21 

Mar 42, Msgs from Gen MacArthur, OPD Exec O. 

361 

alryman returned to Bataan, MacArthur 

promised him his third star "if you're still 

on Bataan." "I'll be on Bataan," .... Vainwright pledged, "if I'm alive." 34 It was 

a promise that he would be unable to keep. 

In his instructions to General Moore, 

MacArthur explained more fully the purpose behind the reorganization. The principal function of the staff he was leaving with Colonel Beebe, he declared, would 

be "to try to get supplies into Corregidor 

and Bataan," 35 The advance command 

post of USAFFE at Corregidor, therefore, 

would be a supply not a tactical headquarters. MacArthur apparently intended to 

retain control of operations in the Philippines in his own headquarters in Australia. 

Moore, as commander of the Corregidor 

garrison, was specifically en joined to defend that island to the last. Some time 

earlier MacArthur had ordered Moore to 

set aside enough food to last 20,000 men on 

half rations until 30 June 1942, in the expectation that if Bataan fell the Philippine 

Division would be brought to Corregidor 

for its final stand. Moore had made preparations for such a move and MacArthur's final warning to him was to maintain this level of supply against encroachment by the commanders of his other 

forces. His "last instructions to me before 

departing," Moore wrote, "were to hold 

Corregidor until he returned." If that 

prosed impossible, "I was to make sure 

that the armament was destroyed to such 

an extent that it could not be used against 

an American effort to recapture the Philippines." 36 

Promptly on the morning after the four 

PT boats sped out of Manila Bay, General 

'0 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 4 . 

.. Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 42. 

.. Ibid., pp. 42-43, 33. 
362 

Wainwright "lined up" the general officers 

in his I Corps and told them what MacArthur had said to him. "They realized 

as well as I," he noted, "what the score 

was." 37 He then turned over command 

of the corps to General Jones and left for 

his new headquarters which would control 

both the corps on Bataan. Two days later 

a general order announced the creation of 

Luzon Force, General Wainwright commanding.3s 

Although the War Department was 

fully informed about MacArthur's moveme~ts from 12 March on, it was completely 

ignorant of the command arrangements 

which went into effect on his departure. 

Whatever the reason, MacArthur neglected 

to inform the War Department of his plans 

to control operations in the Philippines 

from Australia. It was therefore assumed 

in Washington that Wainwright, the 

senior officer in the islands, was now in 

command. All correspondence was addressed to him as commander and dispatches spoke of him as the successor to 

MacArthur.s9 

The War Department's ignorance of the 

organization of forces in the Philippines 

placed Colonel Beebe, promoted to brigadier 

general on 17 March, in a difficult situation. 

His own orders from General MacArthur 

made Wainwright a subordinate commander to USAFFE. As deputy chief of 

staff of USAFF,E and MacArthur's representative on Corregidor he was superior to 

Wainwright. But higher headquarters was 

now directing its correspondence and orders 

to Wainwright as commander. His position 

aT Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 67. 

as Ibid.; USAFFE GO 42, 14 Mar 42. The Luzon 

Force was "constituted effective 11 March." 

so See AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42), GHQ SWPA. This 

file contains a number of messages from Beebe to 

General MacArthur complaining of this situation. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

was an embarrassing one. Belatedly, on the 

16th, a general order was published announcing his appointment as deputy chief of 

staff, USAFFE.40 This did not solve the difficulty for the War Department was still 

unaware of the situation. Beebe thereupon 

told MacArthur that it was imperative the 

War Department be informed of the change 

in order to preserve morale.41 

Events soon overwhelmed General Beebe. 

On the 18th (Washington time) he received 

a message from the Chief of Staff addressed 

to the commanding general of USAF FE at 

Fort Mills but obviously meant for Wainwright. In it General Marshall defined MacArthur's new area of responsibility as including the Philippines and explained that "he 

[MacArthur] retains supervisory control of 

you and your forces." The "CG USAFFE" 

was instructed to communicate directly with 

the War Department and to submit daily 

reports. "Nothing in these instructions," the 

message concluded, "will be construed as 

altering in any way your subordination to 

MacArthur." 42 

General Beebe was in a quandary. 

The m e s sag e was addressed to "CG 

USAFFE," who he knew was MacArthur, but it was evidently meant for W ainwright. Was he authorized to deliver it to 

him? On his own initiative he decided to 

withhold the message from Wainwright and 

to acknowledge its receipt himself in a message to the '''' ar Department sent in MacArthur's name. To his chief he explained what 

he had done, declaring, "It is not clear to me 

who the Chief of Staff had in mind when 

'" USAFFE GO 44, 16 Mar 42. The order was 

effective 11 March. 

41 Rad, Beebe to MacArthur, n.d., AG 311.23 (4 

Feb 42) GHQ SWPA. 

.2 Rad, Marshall to USAF lA, No. 740, 18 Mar 42, 

OPD 381 Phil, Sec 1, Case 13. This is a paraphrase 

of the original message that went to Corregidor. 
COMMAND 

the message was written." Again he urged 

that General Marshall be informed of the 

command in the Philippines and asked for 

instructions on what to do about the Chief 

of Staff's order for a daily report!3 

The next day the situation became even 

more confused. First came a message from 

President Roosevelt for General Wainwright. The President was obviously addressing Wainwright as commander of the 

forces in the Philippines. He told him that 

he had been nominated for appointment to 

the rank of lieutenant general "because of 

the confidence I have in your leadership and 

in the superb gallantry of the devoted band 

of American and Filipino soldiers under 

your command." There was no mistaking 

the President's belief that he was addressing 

MacArthur's successor when he told Wainwright that the whole nation realized the 

"extreme difficulty" and "vast importance" 

of his task and pledged "every possible 

means and method" to send him help.44 

Later in the day Beebe received two messages from the Chief of Staff for "CG 

USAFFE" but clearly intended for Wainwright. In the first, Marshall told Wainwright that the Senate had confirmed his 

nomination to lieutenant general. 45 The 

second message made it clear that the W' ar 

Department considered Wainwright the 

successor to MacArthur. No confusion was 

possible in the wording of this message. 

"Upon the departure of General MacAr-

.. Rad, Beebe to MacArthur, 19 Mar 42, AG 

311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA. 

.. Rad, Roosevelt to CG USAFFE, No. 1198, 19 

Mar 42, Msgs to Wainwright, OPD Exec O. The 

message was sent on the recommendation of General 

Marshall. 

.., Rad, Marshall to Wainwright, No. 1204, 19 

Mar 42, OPD 381 PI, Sec 1, Case 14. In tracing 

this correspondence, the reader must keep in mind 

the 13 hours' difference between Washington and 

Manila time. 

363 

thur," Marshall wrote, "you became commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines. 

You are to communicate directly with '(he 

War Department in rendering daily operational reports." These reports, he told 

Wainwright, "are to be dispatched over your 

name." 46 

Beebe had no choice now but to turn 

over command to Wainwright. 47 Late on the 

night of the 20th he telephoned the Luzon 

Force commander at his headquarters on 

Bataan and informed him of his promotion 

and designation as commander of U.S. 

forces in the Philippines. The next morning 

Wainwright pinned the third star on his 

shoulders and moved to Corregidor where 

Beebe turned over to him the messages from 

General Marshall and the President!S 

Wainwright's first official act was to assume command of U.S. Forces in the 

Philippines (USFIP), the name of his new 

headquarters, and to make Beebe his chief 

of staff!~ His command, like MacArthur's, 

included Navy as well as Army elements. 

Under Admiral Hart and for a time under 

his successor, Admiral Rockwell, naval 

forces in the Philippines had been organized as an independent command, not subject to orders from USAFFE. Joint operations had been conducted on the basis of 

co-ordination between the two headquarters. At the end of January General Mac-

.. Rad, Marshall to Wainwright, No. 1203, 20 

Mar 42, OPD 381 PI, Sec 1, Case 15. 

~ The author has been unable to find MacArthur's 

replies to Beebe. Internal evidence of the radios 

cited makes it clear that throughout he was acting 

under instructions from MacArthur. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

68--69. 

<ORad, Wainwright to AGWAR, No. 538, 21 Mar 

42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 3) Far East. The message was sent at 0620. At the same time he accepted 

his appointment as lieutenant general. A similar 

message went to General MacArthur in Australia. 
364 

Arthur had asked that naval forces, including the marines, be placed under his 

command "due to restricted area of combat 

and the intimacy of liaison that is required." Army and Navy authorities in 

Washington quickly agreed to this request 

and on 30 January all naval forces in the 

Philippines had been put under MacArthur's control. Unity of command had 

thus been established for the first time in 

the campaign.50 Wainwright inherited this 

arrangement, with Capt. Kenneth M. 

Hoeffel as naval commander. 

Wainwright's assumption of command 

brought from General MacArthur an inquiry for the basis of the action. Wainwright explained that he had received a 

message from the President and instructions 

from the Chief of Staff, and had had no 

choice but to assume command. "I trust 

you will understand and appreciate my position in this matter," he wrote. "The appointment came as a surprise to me without 

any previous intimation that I was to be 

selected for this command." 51 

Now, on 21 March, General MacArthur 

for the first time informed General Marshall about his own arrangements for four 

separate commands and his intention to 

control operations in the Philippines from 

his headquarters in Australia through a 

deputy chief of staff on Corregidor.52 This 

arrangement, he explained, was based upon 

"special problems" and "deemed most advantageous" because of "the intangibles of 

the situation in Philippines." As Sutherland 

later explained, it was never MacArthur's 

50 Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 156, 30 Jan 

42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East, and Marshall to MacArthur, 30 Jan 42, WPD 3251-75. 

51 Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, 19 Mar 42,. 

AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA . 

., Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No.3, 21 Mar 

42, AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

intention that Wainwright should command 

all the forces in the Philippines.53 

General Marshall's comments on MacArthur's plan were made to the President 

on 22 March. The four separate commands, 

Marshall pointed out, would have to report 

to MacArthur in Melbourne, 4,000 miles 

away. In the Manila Bay area alone there 

would be two separate commanders, and 

it was Marshall's opinion that MacArthur 

would have to arbitrate matters between 

these two from Australia.54 Although the 

Chief of Staff did not know it, the disadvantages of the arrangements had already 

been noted by Wainwright, who, on the 

15th, had gone to Corregidor to try to get 

more supplies for his Luzon Force. In this 

effort he had been unsuccessful. "I had no 

control over it [supplies]," he noted, 

"which irked me a bit. MacArthur had left 

the matter of Bataan supplies in the hands 

of ... Beebe, over on Corregidor." r,r, 

General Marshall found MacArthur's arrangements for command in the Philippines 

unsatisfactory and told the President so. He 

was "fearful," he said, that they would have 

"a very depressing effect" on General Wainwright, "on whom we must now depend for 

the successful continuance of the fight on 

Bataan." 56 These arrangements, Marshall 

observed, were also contrary to the principle 

.. Interv, author with Sutherland, 12 Nov 46. 

Wainwright's appointment, Sutherland said, had 

been made by the War Department "after MacArthur left and without his knowledge." Actually, 

MacArthur seems to have been informed of the 

War Department's intentions before Wainwright 

through the messages he received from Beebe . 

.. Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 22 Mar 42, 

sub: Comd in Phil, Msgs from Gen MacArthur, 

OPD Exec 0; interv, author with Collier, 20 Nov 

46. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 67 . 

•• Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 22 Mar 42, sub: 

Comd in Phil, Msgs from Gen MacArthur, OPD 

Exec O. 
COMMAND 

of combined command. As a supreme commander of Allied forces in Australia, MacArthur was no longer eligible to command 

directly U.S. forces any more than he could 

command those of other nations. Such command would properly be exercised through 

a U.S. Army headquarters.57 Marshall therefore recommended to the President that 

MacArthur be informed that his plan was 

unsatisfactory and that Wainwright should 

continue in command of the Philippines. 

The President agreed and that day, 22 

March, a conciliatory message went out to 

Melbourne. Refraining from specific criticism of the earlier arrangements, the message nevertheless made it dear that unless 

there were strenuous objections Wainwright 

would remain in command. 58 

MacArthur expressed no objections. He 

replied that he understood thoroughly the 

difficulties of the Chief of Staff and would 

accommodate himself to the arrangements 

already made. "Heartily in accord with 

Wainwright's promotion to lieutenant general," he said. "His assignment to Philippine command is appropriate." 59 Thus 

ended the uncertainty and confusion. General Wainwright was now confirmed as the 

commander of all forces in the Philippine 

Islands, with the large authority and heavy 

responsibilities formerly possessed by General MacArthur. He remained in a subordinate position to MacArthur, however, 

whose new command, officially sanctioned 

on 18 April, included the Philippine Islands 

'" This principle was well established and was incorporated in the doctrine for joint operations, Joint. 

Action of the Army and Navy, 1927. 

.s Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 810, 22 Mar 

42, Msgs from Gen MacArthur, OPD Exec O. The 

President's agreement is assumed from the fact that 

the text of the message formed part of Marshall's 

memorandum to the President. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 19, 24 Mar 

42, AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA. 

365 

as well as Australia, New Guinea, and most 

of the Solomon Islands and the Netherlands 

Indies. 60 

Wainwright's elevation to the highest 

command in the Philippines left vacant the 

post of commander of the Luzon Force, 

created only ten days earlier. To fill this vacancy Wainwright selected Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr. 61 He could instead have 

left the post vacant and dissolved Luzon 

Force altogether. Such a step could easily 

have been justified after the creation of 

USFIP. No such organization had existed 

on Bataan during MacArthur's regime and 

no headquarters had ever been interposed 

between the high command on Corregidor 

and the combat forces on Bataan. Instead, 

MacArthur had established an echelon of 

USAFFE on Bataan and through the officers assigned had exercised close supervision over combat elements. 

Wainwright's decision to retain Luzon 

Force created what was in effect an Army 

headquarters controlling the two corps on 

the peninsula. This decision, MacArthur's 

chief of staff thought, was a serious mistake 

because it removed Wainwright from direct 

contact with the forces in front of the 

enemy. "ActuaIly, there was no necessity 

for King's headquarters," Sutherland declared. "That headquarters had been established by MacArthur to compensate for the 

absence of a commander on Corregidor and 

to leave Wainwright free to conduct operations on Bataan. When the War Department created a command on Corregidor, 

.. For a detailed description of MacArthur's 

command in Australia see Milner, Victory in 

Papua, Ch. II. Unlike most subordinate commanders, Wainwright was authorized to communicate directly with the War Department. 

61 King assumed command 21 March 1942 on the 

basis of oral instructions from Wainwright. A general order followed later. Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, 

p. 1. 
366 

that headquarters [Luzon Force] should 

have been dissolved." 62 

The man chosen to lead Luzon Force, 

General King, was an artilleryman of wide 

experience with a distinguished career in 

the Army. After receiving a law degree 

from the University of Georgia he had entered the service through the N ationa! 

Guard in 1908. In addition to tours of 

duty with troops, he had been assigned to 

the Artillery School as student and instructor, served in the Office of the Chief of Field 

Artillery at three separate times, attended 

the Command and General Staff School, 

where he later taught, and the Army War 

College. After attendance at the Naval 

War College he was appointed director of 

the War Plans Section of the Army War 

College, a post he held for three years. On 

14 September 1940 he was ordered to the 

Philippine Islands, where he had served 

from 1915 to 1917, to command Fort 

.. Interv, author with Sutherland, 12 Nov 46. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Stotsenburg. Appointed brigadier general 

on his arrival, he later supervised the artillery training of the Philippine Army, commanded the North Luzon Force for a short 

time before the war, and served as MacArthur's artillery officer with the rank of 

major general. When Luzon Force was 

first created he had been assigned artillery 

officer of that command. 

Soft-spoken, modest, innately courteous 

to all ranks, King had achieved a reputation as an extremely able soldier of high 

intellectual caliber. His assignment to command the Luzon Force, while a recognition 

of his ability and reputation, was destined to 

end tragically. On him fell the terrible responsibility for making the hard decision less 

than three weeks later to surrender his 

starved and defeated troops to the enemy.63 

63 The material on General King's career is drawn 

from the Official Army Register, the standard public relations releases, and interviews with a large 

number of officers on his staff, including Maj . 

Achille C. Tisdelle, his aide. 
CHAPTER XXI 

The Battling Bastards 

We're the battling bastards of Bataan; 

No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam; 

No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, na nieces; 

No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces . 

. . . And nobody gives a damn. 

The lot of the individual soldier on 

Bataan was hardly affected by changes in 

command. The search for food was his 

Constant pursuit; hunger and disease his 

deadliest enemies. Literally, he faced starvation. When measured against this terrible and inescapable fact all else was of 

secondary importance. 

Food and Clothing 

Since 6 January, when the ration had 

been cut in half, the 80,000 soldiers and 

~6,000 civilians on Bataan had received a 

steadily diminishing and unbalanced allowance of food. Theoretically, the half 

ration supplied the American soldier with 

6 ounces each of flour and canned or fresh 

meat daily; the Filipino with 10 ounces of 

rice and 4 of meat or fish. In actual fact 

the ration varied with time and circumstances and never on Bataan did it equal a 

full half ration. From January through 

February, the daily issue averaged less than 

30 ounces, as compared to the peacetime 

garrison ration of 71 ounces for Americans 

and 64 for Filipinos! 

From the start it proved impossible to 

establish any theoretical basis for the issue 

1 AR 30-2210. 

of rations. The issue varied from day to 

day and was based not on the number of 

calories required or the vitamins necessary 

to maintain the health and efficiency of the 

command, but solely on the amount of food 

on hand. Since rice was most plentiful it 

became the basic element in the diet and all 

other foods were rationed to last as long 

as it did. 

As the supply of food dwindled the 

amount issued was steadily reduced. The inventory of 5 January had disclosed that 

there was only enough canned meat and fish 

to last 50 days, canned milk for 20, flour 

and canned vegetables for 30, and small 

amounts of sugar, lard substitutes, coffee, 

and fruits.2 By the end of the month this 

supply had diminished to an II-day supply 

of meat and fish, 6 days of flour, 5 of fruit, 

and 4 of vegetables.s On 23 February the 

Philippine Department quartermaster, Col. 

Frank Brezina, reported that he had on 

hand only a 2Y2-day supply of meat and 

fish, enough flour to last 4Y2 days, and only 

228 cans of tomatoes, 48 cans of fruit, 30 

pounds of coffee, 1,100 pounds of raisins, 

2 QM Rpt of Opns, p. 31. Rice was not includcd 

in the inventorv. 

3 Memo, Ge~ Drake for Gen R. J. Marshall, 2 

Feb 42, sub: Rations, copy in OCMH. 
368 

27,736 cans of milk, and 21,700 pounds of 

sugar.4 A few days later he told Brig. Gen. 

Charles C. Drake, the USAFFE quartermaster, that there was no corned beef, 

corned beef hash, or bacon left on Bataan. 

"Weare entirely dependent upon the shipments of salmon from Fort Mills," he declared, "as it is impossible to slaughter sufficient carabao to make an issue to all 

units." 5 Before the end of the campaign the 

amount of canned meat, usually corned 

beef, issued to the troops had been reduced 

from 6 ounces to 1.2 ounces. 

The Filipinos, whose ration, except for 

flour, was the same as the American ration, 

did not suffer as much, for the allowance of 

rice rarely dropped below 8 ounces. The 

stock of canned vegetables, limited in quantity and variety from the very start, shrank 

steadily until its issue was virtually discontinued. Within a month after the troops 

reached Bataan, butter, coffee, and tea had 

practically disappeared from the menu. 

Sugar and canned milk were extremely 

scarce and were doled out in the most 

minute quantities. 

By the middle of February the ration had 

already dropped far below the standard half 

ration. On the 17th of the month the men 

on Bataan received only 27.7 ounces, consisting of 9 ounces of rice, 4 of meat, 5 of 

bread, plus a small allowance of sugar, coffee, bacon, juice, and canned tomatoes and 

fruit, amounting altogether to 10 ounces.6 

• Rpt, QM Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, 24 Feb 

42, sub: Class I Supplies, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) 

Phil Reds. Other reports in this file provide detailed information on the quantity and type of food 

in Bataan stocks. 

• Rpt, QM Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, 27 Feb 

42, sub: Class I Supplies, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) 

Phil Reds. 

• Rpt, QM Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, 17 Feb 

42, sub: Class I Supplies, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) 

Phil Reds. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

As the days went by the ration was cut again 

and again. By the end of March it had been 

so reduced and the fare offered had become 

so monotonous as to amount to little more 

than a token diet barely sufficient to sustain 

life. The bareness and inadequacy of this 

diet is revealed strikingly in the ration for 25 

March, shown in Table 8. At that time the 

men were receiving less than one quarter 

the amount of food allotted soldiers in 

peacetime. 

TABLE 8-RATION, 25 MARCH 1942 

[Ounces] 

Component Americans Filipinos 

-

Rice •••••...••.•..••..••• 8.5 10.00 

Flour ...•.•..•..•......... 1.44 0 

Canned Meat •••••.•....•• 1.22 1.22 

or 

Fresh Meat .•••.••.••.•••• 6.00 6.00 

Milk ..................... 1.30 1.30 

Salt ••••.•..•.•••..••.•••. 1.60 1.60 

Sugar ••••....•.•..•...••• .48 .48 

Totals with canned 

meat •...•.•••.•.. 14.54 14.60 

Totals with fresh 

meat •..•..•...•.. 19.32 19.38 

Based on memo. Gen Funk for CG USFIP, 25 Mar 42, sub: 

Status of Rations, AG 430.2 (3 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

Hospital patients, though allotted a 

double ration, ate none too well. Rice was 

the chief component of their diet and it was 

extremely difficult to provide the special 

foods required for postoperative and intestinal cases. "It was quite a sight," wrote one 

doctor, "to see ... those who should have 

received adequate soft and liquid diet trying 

to eat a gob of sticky, gummy, half-cooked 

rice." 1 

'Lt Col Walter H. Waterous, Statement of Experiences and Observations concerning the Bataan 

Campaign ... , p. 51, copy in OCMH. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

Every effort was made to exploit the slender food resources of Bataan. The two rice 

mills constructed by the engineers began operations in mid-January. Under the supervision of the quartermaster foraging parties 

gathered the palay (unhusked rice), which 

stood ripe in the narrow rice belt along Manila Bay, and brought it to the mills for 

threshing. Before the supply was exhausted 

sometime in March a total of 250 tons of 

palay had been collected. Since the rate of 

consumption was fifteen tons a day, this impressive total amounted to only a seventeenday supply. Had modern farm machinery 

been available the quantity of palay recovered, one officer estimated, would have been 

ten times greater.8 

Since it was the most abundant food on 

Bataan rice ultimately replaced wheat in 

the diet of the American soldiers. Accustomed to potatoes and bread they found rice 

a most unsatisfactory substitute. Consisting 

mostly of starch and with scarcely any vitamins it possessed little nutritive value. Without seasoning or other foods it had little 

flavor of its own and tasted like "wall-paper 

paste." As one wit remarked, "Rice is the 

greatest food there is-anything you add to 

it improves it." 9 But it had one virtue none 

could deny; it filled empty stomachs, and on 

Bataan that was a most important consideration. 

While it lasted fresh meat was issued to 

the troops at regular intervals, usually every 

third day. This meat was obtained principally from the carabao slaughtered at the 

recently established abattoir near Lamao 

and at scattered, small slaughterhouses cona Class I Supplies, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) Phil 

Reds; Capt Harold A. Arnold, "The Lessons of 

Bataan," Quartermaster Review, XXVI (November-December 1946), 14. 

• Maj. Calvin E. Chunn, ed., Of Rice and Men 

(Los Angeles: Veterans Publishing Co., 1946). p. ii. 

369 

sisting of little more than platforms over 

rapidly running fresh-water streams. In the 

absence of refrigeration the carabao were 

kept in enclosures until a fresh meat issue 

was due, then quickly slaughtered and issued 

to the troops. Toward the end of the campaign about 600 of the butchered carabao 

were sent to Corregidor for storage in the 

refrigeration plant and later returned to 

Bataan for issue. When forage for animals 

was exhausted, the 250 horses of the 26th 

Cavalry and 48 pack mules were regretfully 

slaughtered also. Maj. Achille C. Tisdelle, 

a cavalry officer and General King's aide, 

wrote on 15 March that the 26th Cavalry 

and other units had that day finished the last 

of their horses.10 Altogether the amount of 

fresh meat slaughtered on Bataan totaled 

approximately 1,300 tons.l1 

For a time the meat component was supplemented by fresh fish caught by local fishermen. At one period of the campaign the 

daily catch reached as high as 12,000 

pounds. This supply ended when Japanese 

and indiscriminate American gunfire discouraged the nightly fishing trips.Ill 

To these sources of food must be added 

the amounts procured by the individual 

soldier. The Filipino was most adept at 

fending for himself in the jungle. In various 

localities he could secure chickens, pigs, 

camotes (sweet potatoes), bamboo shoots, 

mangoes, and bananas. He could supplement his diet with dog and monkey meat; 

with the chickenlike meat of the iguana 

lizard, so relished by the natives; and with 

10 Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 15 Mar 42. This diary 

has been published under the title, "Bataan Diary 

of Maj A. C. Tisdelle," edited by present author, in 

Military Affairs, XI (Fall 1947). 

11 QM Rpt of Opns, p. 35; Luzon Force Rpt of 

Opns, G-4 Annex, p. 1. 

,. QM Rpt of Opns, p. 35; Tisdelle, Diary, entry 

of 15 Mar 42. 
370 

the meat of the large python snake whose 

eggs the Filipinos considered a great delicacy. On his own initiative he picked rice 

in the fields near him and threshed it in 

his foxhole. Those in the front lines could 

make their way through the outposts to 

near-by barrios and at exorbitant prices 

purchase food not obtainable by the quartermaster. Ofttimes patrols would return 

with sacks of milled rice.1s 

The Americans soon learned that hunger 

is a great leveler and sought the meat of 

dogs-which tasted like lamb-iguanas, 

and monkeys as avidly as their native 

comrades-in-arms. "Monkeys and iguanas 

are quite scarce," wrote one officer regretfully, "and about all we have is rice." 14 

Colonel Mallonee's experience was wider. 

After a varied diet on Bataan, the 195-

pound six-footer offered this advice to epicures: "1 can recommend mule. It is tasty, 

succulent and tender-all being phrases of 

comparison, of course. There is little to 

choose between calesa pony and carabao. 

The pony is tougher but better flavor than 

carabao. Iguana is fair. Monkey 1 do not 

recommend. 1 never had snake," 15 To supplement this report there is the judgment of 

another gourmet who declared "that 

monkey meat is all right until the animal's 

hands turn up on a plate." 16 

The search for food sometimes had tragic 

results for those who could not distinguish 

13 Memo, Lt Col James O. Gillespie for Surgeon, 

USAFFE, 27 Feb 42, sub: Diet of American Soldiers, AG 430.2 (11 Sep 41) Phil Rcds; memo, Asst 

G-4 for G-4 USAFFE, 3 Feb 42, with ind by Gen 

Drake,9 Feb 42, AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil Reds; 

Cooper, Med Dept Activities, pp. 98-99; Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, p. 102 ; 

intenTs, author with numerous officers who served 

on Bataan, at various dates during the preparation 

of this volume. 

1. Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 15 Mar 42. 

,. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 11. 

16 Chunn, Of Rice and Men, p. 34. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the edible from the inedible. The wild 

carrot, highly toxic in its native form, 

caused numerous violent intestinal disturbances and frequent deaths. Some types of 

berry were also poisonous and resulted in 

illness or death. But the troops continued to 

eat every berry and root they could find 

and by April the peninsula "had been 

broken dry of all edible vegetation . . . 

which anyone thought he could eat." 17 

In addition to the food obtained from 

the quartermaster and that secured by individuals through their own initiative and 

ingenuity, men soon found other ways to 

supplement their ration. A large amount of 

fresh meat was procured by units which 

seized any livestock unlucky enough to come 

within their reach. There was always the 

possibility that the animals might be diseased, but men were willing to take that 

chance. Headquarters frowned upon this 

practice for reasons of health and because it 

curtailed the supply of fresh meat for regular issue, and early in February prohibited 

the slaughter of carabao "by any individual, 

unit, or organization ... except at the 

Field Abattoir under the direct supervision 

of the Department Veterinarian." 18 Despite these orders about 1,000 carabao were 

butchered privately during the campaign.19 

Many units had their own private reserves of food, secured in various ways, regular and irregular. The chief source of 

these caches was the supplies picked up at 

depots during the withdrawal and never 

turned in. One unit, investigation disclosed, 

had "a considerable cache of subsistence 

. . . well guarded behind barbed wire" j 

another had 8,500 C Rations in its private 

11 Waterous, Statement of Experiences, p. 53. 

18 Ltr Order, USAFFE, 12 Feb 42, sub: Slaughter 

of Carabao, AG 431 (17 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

,. Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, G--4 Annex, p. 1. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

dump.20 In one case the driver of a ration 

truck had accumulated 520 cans of tomatoes, 111 cans of evaporated milk, 297 cans 

of tomato sauce, 114 cans of tomato juice, 6 

cans of oleomargarine, 12 sacks of rice, and 

three fourths of a sack of wheat.21 So large 

was the private supply of one unit that MacArthur's chief of staff ordered an investigation which revealed a situation even worse 

than had been thought.22 Orders had been 

issued at the start of the campaign directing 

the return of these supplies to the quartermaster, but few units obeyed. Even the requirement of a detailed, certified report of 

stocks from all unit commanders failed to 

bring in the private caches.23 

One of the most persistent irregularities 

in the issue of rations was the padding of 

strength reports by units so that they could 

draw more than their share. At one time, 

122,000 rations were being issued daily. "It 

appears," wrote Lt. Col. Frank F. Carpenter, Jr., of the Bataan echelon of 

USAFFE, "that many units are doubling 

up." 24 A warning from MacArthur brought 

the figure down to 94,000 for military personnel alone, which was still considerably 

higher than it should have been. 25 One 

flagrant example of padding that came to 

the attention of USAFFE was that of the 

division, with two regiments detached, 

which drew 11,000 rations on 6 February. 

20 Memos, Asst G-4 for G--4 USAF FE, 8 Jan, 

9 Feb 42, AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

21 Ibid. 

"Ibid.; memo, G--4 for Asst G--4 USAFFE, 5 

Feb 42, AG 430.2 (11 Sep 41) Phil Reds. 

23 Ibid.; intervs, author with Drake at various 

times. 

.. Memo, Asst G-4 for G-4 USAFFE, 16 Jan 42, 

AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

2!1 Memo, CG USAFFE for Corps and Div 

Comdrs, 17 Jan 42, sub: Noncompliance with 

Orders, AG 430 (8 Dee 41) Phil Rcds; memo, 

Asst G-4 for G-4 USAFFE, 19 Jan 42, AG 319.1 

(8 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

371 

At full strength this division did not have 

more than 6,500 men. 26 But despite the 

strictest orders and the most careful procedures, the number of rations issued continued to exceed the troop strength. 

Even within units rations were sometimes 

distributed unequally. Reports that complete ration components were not being 

}Jushed forward from division quartermaster dumps to the front-line troops reached 

USAFFE and on 17 January commanders 

were told that "in some cases subsistence 

has been forcibly diverted from the units 

for which it was intended." 27 This reminder, like most dealing with the ration, 

was ignored when it was safe to do so. 

While such practices existed the fare of 

units was uneven. Some ate well, others 

poorly, and it is a truism of warfare that the 

units to the rear always live best. "There is 

nothing quite so controversial as the Bataan 

ration," wrote one reflective officer. "Some 

units got corned beef, others none. Some had 

corned beef hash in lieu of fish. Some got 

eight ounces of rice, others 3.7. Some got 

flour in place of bread, some hard tack. But 

there is nothing controversial about the fact 

that the ration was grossly inadequate." 28 

Even when no irregularity interrupted 

the normal distribution of rations, the confusion and hazards of war often robbed men 

of their food. General Stevens justly complained that his 91st Division was receiving 

an unbalanced ration when, by some misadventure, the quartermaster issued for his 

5,600 men 19 sacks of rice, 12 cases of sal· 

2. Memo, Asst G-4 for G-4 USAFFE, 10 Feb 42, 

AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil Reds . 

21 Memo, CG USAF FE for Corps and Div 

Comdrs, 17 Jan 42, sub: Noncompliance with 

Orders, AG 430 (8 Dec 41) Phil Reds; memo, 

Asst G--4 for G-4 USAFFE, 15 Jan 42, AG 319.1 

(8 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

2S Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 11. 
372 

mon, 3 Y; sacks of sugar, 4 carabao quarters, 

plus a few miscellaneous items. That same 

day another division received nothing but 

canned goods.29 Sometimes a change in assignment would leave one unit without a 

ration for one day while another received a 

double issue. The movement of units from 

one sector to another, usually made at night 

when the rations were issued, resulted as 

frequently in a double issue as in none at all. 

The long and difficult supply lines on 

Bataan often slowed up the delivery of food, 

and vehicles carrying supplies broke down 

on the mountain trails. The distribution of 

fresh meat was extremely difficult under 

these conditions. Since refrigeration and an 

adequate road net were lacking, the meat 

had to be transported in open trucks during 

the heat of the tropical day on hauls lasting 

as long as twelve hours. It is not surprising 

that the meat which reached the front-line 

troops was not always fresh. 

Sometimes an accident could have tragic 

results for the starved garrison. A lucky hit 

by a Japanese bomber knocked out a freezing unit in the Corregidor cold-storage 

plant, and 194 carabao quarters-about 

24,000 pounds, almost one day's supplywas thereupon sent to Bataan for immediate issue. Five successive air raids delayed 

the loading of the meat which did not reach 

Bataan until the next morning. Since it 

could not be unloaded during daylight the 

meat remained on the barge the entire day. 

By evening it was unfit for distribution.30 

The difficult supply routes and the everpresent threat of starvation were responsible 

for large-scale pilferage, looting, and hijack-

.. Memo, Asst G-4 for G-4 USAFFE, 13 Jan 42. 

AG319.1 (8Jan42) Phil Reds. 

so Memo, CG USFIP for G-4, 29 Mar 42, with 

ind, AG 431 (17 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ing by civilians and troops alike. Supply 

trucks moving slowly along the narrow, tortuous trails of Bataan were ideal targets for 

hungry men with guns. Guards were posted 

but even they were not above temptation. 

Philippine Army military police placed 

along the supply routes helped themselves 

generously from the vehicles they halted. 

Officers also sought to secure food and 

supplies in this way, and on one occasion 

two officers, an American and a Filipino, 

were caught red-handed looting a quartermaster dump. So serious was the situation 

that it was proposed that guards be instructed to shoot anyone caught looting. A 

similar fate was proposed for those in the 

vicinity of a supply dump without "proper 

reason or authority." 31 Despite threats of 

dire consequences, looting and hijacking 

continued. It was comparatively easy to toss 

off a sack of rice to a waiting friend as ; 

truck moved forward, and the closer th 

ration trucks came to the front lines the Ie! 

food they contained.32 

One item of issue that created serious di 

ficulty was cigarettes. Never present in su 

ficient quantity for general distribution, thl 

were doled out to the front-line troops fro 

time to time. No item disappeared so quick 

between the point of supply and destinatic 

The loss was a heavy one. In mid-January 

an officer of the Bataan echelon of USAFFE 

urgently recommended that cigarettes be 

sent from Corregidor to the men at the front, 

and a month later Colonel Beebe told the 

chief of staff that the demand for cigarettes 

81 Memo, Asst G-4 for G-4 USAFFE, 15 Jan 42, 

AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil Reds, also draft orders 

atehd as Inel I. 

.. Rpt, QM Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, 2 Mar 42, 

sub: Class I Supplies, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) Phil 

Reds .. All survivors interviewed agreed that these 

practices continued until the end of the campaign. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

was rapidly creating "a real morale problem." 33 Finally, early in March, USAFFE 

authorized the issue of five cigarettes daily 

to men in front-line units, and 104 casesless than one pack a man-were sh~pped to 

Bataan.34 

This issue did not even begin to satisfy 

the need for cigarettes. While inspecting 

a battalion position, Brig. Gen. Hugh J. 

Casey, USAFFE engineer, took out a pack 

of cigarettes. He was immediately mobbed. 

Every Filipino within fifty yards left his 

foxhole and rushed to get one.a5 Rumors 

began to reach Corregidor that cigarettes 

sent from there had been hijacked, that they 

had been held back by rear echelons, and 

that favored treatment had been accorded 

higher headquarters. An investigation disclosed 

. . . a dire lack of cigarettes among the front 

line units. Soldiers will pounce on any discarded cigarette stub for a single puff. There 

is in time of war no difference between the 

needs of smokers as between front and rear 

echelon unit, unless the need at the front is 

greater. It would appear only just to make 

an equal allocation between ,all officers and 

men, at the front, in rear echelons, and at Ft. 

Mills. Troops should not be in a position of 

paying 2 Pesos [$1.00] on the black market 

for a package of cigarettes and even then 

being unable to get them when those in the 

rear can secure them in plenty at ten centavos 

[5 cents].36 

A visitor from Corregidor who had heard 

that cigarettes would bring a fantastically 

.. Memo, G-4 for CofS USAFFE, 28 Feb 42, 

AG 430 (25 Dee 41) Phil Reds; memo, Asst G-4 

for G-4 USAFFE, 13 Jan 42, AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) 

Phil Reds . 

.. Ltr Order, USAFFE, 3 Mar 42, sub: Issue of 

Cigs, AG 435.8 (3 Mar 42) Phil Reds; rpt, QM 

Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, 2 Mar 42, sub: Class I 

Supplies, AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

.. Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 18. 

•• Memo, Engineer for CofS USAFFE, 8 Mar 42, 

AG 319.1 (5 Jan 41) Phil Reds. 

373 

high price on Bataan decided to test the 

validity of the rumor on his Philippine 

Scout driver. He was able to get ten pesos 

($5.00) for a single pack and the thanks 

of the driver as well. "I gave the soldier 

back his ten pesos," he wrote, "and told 

him that if anyone ever wanted to charge 

him more than twenty centavos a package 

for cigarettes he should shoot them." 31 

Altogether, it is estimated, only 400 

cases, each consisting of fifty 200-cigarette 

cartons, were sent from Corregidor to 

Bataan between 6 January and 2 April. 

In concrete terms this meant that each 

front-line soldier received less than one cigarette a day.as Deprived of the solace of 

tobacco and coffee, the soldier living on 17 

ounces of food a day could be very miserable indeed. 

To the lack of food and tobacco must 

be added the shortage of clothing, as well 

as personal and organizational equipment 

of every kind. General Wainwright tells 

how, at the beginning of January, his exhausted and unshod troops stumbled into 

the thorny jungles of Bataan after their 

long withdrawal from Lingayen.39 Regular Army units were comparatively well 

off at the start of the campaign, but the 

Philippine Army had reached Bataan with 

the scantiest supplies. A large percentage 

of the Filipinos had no raincoats, blankets, 

or shelter halves, and there were almost 

none for issue. General Stevens reported 

on 13 January that his men had only wellworn denims and were badly in need of 

underclothes and shoes. The 11 th Division 

was in a similar plight. Its need was par-

., S Sgt Bernard O. Hopkins, Personal and Official Notes of Btry C, 60th CA (AA), p. IS, eopy in 

OCMH. The writer was probably the battery 

commander, Capt. Roland G. Ames . 

.. QM Rpt of Opns, p. 42. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 46. 
374 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

STANDING FORMATIOK, 10 January 1942. 

tially met by a shipment of 10,000 pairs of 

socks, 3,000 leggings, and 10,000 pairs of 

drawers. This issue, it must be noted, was 

for the entire force, not for the two divisions alone.4<1 

As time passed, uniforms became more 

ragged and threadbare, offering little protection against the cold nights and the cruel 

thorns so abundant on Bataan. Unit commanders were instructed to limit their clothing requisitions "to minimum replacement 

requirements" without regard to normal 

army standards. Most did not secure even 

this minimum. In one unit, comparatively 

well clad, the uniforms were considered 90 

'0 Memos, Asst G-4 for G-4 USAFFE, 13 and 16 

Jan 42, AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil Reds; Luzon 

Force Rpt of Opns, G-4 Annex, p. 1; memo, QM 

Phil Dept for QM USAFFE, 16 Jan 42, Incl 2, 

AG430.2 (3Jan42) Phil Reds. 

percent unserviceable. Less than 25 percent 

of the enlisted men in this unit had blankets, 

shelter halves, or raincoats. Fully one quarter of the command was without shoes; the 

rest went about in shoes so badly worn that 

under normal conditions they would have 

been considered unfit for use!" For a time 

the most desperate needs were met by a 

salvage unit which "renovated, repaired, 

washed, and ironed" the clothing taken 

from patients in hospitals.42 Such a measure 

merely robbed Peter to pay Paul. 

The inequities in the issue of supplies 

favored the troops to the rear. "Morale on 

the front is high," wrote a visitor from Corregidor, "though the supply situation is 

enough to justify dissatisfaction." Many of 

H Skerry, Comments on Engineer Rist, No. 20. 

" Rpts, QM Phil Dept to QM USAFFE, 10 and 

18 Mar 42, AG 319 (29 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

the men, he noted, were without underwear and shoes and most had only one uniform-blue denims. The meals, too, he 

noticed, became progressively worse as one 

neared the front. "Supply and service 

troops," he concluded, "eat better than the 

line troops." 43 

Late in March one last effort was made 

to provide clothing, blankets, raincoats, and 

shoes for the tatterdemalion soldiers on Bataan. On the 29th Beebe, now a brigadier 

and Wainwright's chief of staff, asked his 

G-4 whether there were any supplies on 

Corregidor which could be released to units 

along the front. Since the reserve of uniforms and blankets was under the control of 

the Harbor Defenses commander, General 

Moore, the request was passed on to him. 

F our days later came the reply: no blankets 

or uniforms were available, but there were 

10,000 pairs of shoes-originally sent from 

Bataan for safekeeping-in odd lot sizes 

that could be spared. On 4 April, at the 

height of the final Japanese attack, General 

King was asked whether he desired this heterogeneous mass of footgear. To this inquiry 

there is no recorded answer.'4 

While the men on the line believed that 

their comrades to the rear dined more fully 

and richly than they, all were convinced 

that those on Corregidor ate best of all. Actually such distinctions were purely relative 

and no one lived well. But there was enough 

truth in these generalizations to create a 

strong feeling of dissatisfaction and a serious 

morale problem. General Wainwright discovered this when he moved to Corregidor. 

.. Hopkins, Btry C, 60th CA (AA), p. 13 . 

.. Memo, CofS to G-4 USFIP, G-4 USFIP to 

CG Harbor Defenses, with five inds, and memo, 

QM USFIP to G-4 USFIP, both dated 29 Mar 42, 

in AG 431 (8 Oet 42) and AG 420 (2 Jan 42) 

Phil Reds. 

375 

Accustomed to the omnipresent and ominous shortages of Bataan, he found Corregidor relatively a land of plenty. The troops 

there, it is true, ate two meals a day and subsisted on half rations, but it was a full half 

ration and its components provided a wellbalanced diet. It included such "luxury 

items" as bacon, ham, fresh vegetables, and 

occasionally coffee, milk, and jam-foods 

which had long since disappeared from the 

Bataan diet. 45 

The disparity between the Corregidor 

and Bataan rations was sharply raised when 

the Bataan military police halted a supply 

truck and confiscated its waybill. This truck 

was delivering food to three antiaircraft 

batteries stationed on Bataan but receiving a 

Corregidor ration, to which they were entitled as organic elements of the harbor defense. What they were not entitled to was 

the Bataan ration, which they were also 

drawing. Such an irregularity would not 

have been surprising but when the waybill 

was examined it revealed a scandalous situation. The items listed in the shipment would 

make any Bataan soldier envious. They included a case each of ham and bacon, 24 

cans of Vi~nna sausage, one sack of cracked 

wheat, 25 pounds of raisins, 33 pounds of 

lard substitute, 24 cans each of peas, com, 

tomatoes, and peaches, 6 cans of potatoes, 

24 bottles of catsup, 50 cartons of cigarettes, 

and even 600 pounds of ice. 

The news of this sumptuous fare, so 

unlike the Bataan ration, spread rapidly to 

the front-line troops, adding fuel to their 

smoldering resentment. The incident was 

noted by all headquarters and the matter 

'" Col Chester H. Elmes, QM Opns, Fort Mills, 

pp. 4-5, App. F, QM Rpt of Opns; memo, CG 

USAFFE for CG Harbor Defenses, 13 Mar 42, sub: 

Field Rations, Inc! I, AG 430.2 (3 Jan 42) Phil 

Reds. 
376 

quickly closed with a promise for remedial 

action. 46 The postscript was written by Colonel Carpenter in a personal note to General Becbe: 

Bataan troops feel they are discriminated 

against. There is no way of preve.nting this 

sort of thing getting to the front lme troops 

and you can appreciate the effect on morale. 

The clandestine manner of getting the socalled luxury items to the Harbor Defense 

troops on Bataan ... does.not seem et?ical. 

Realize there are not suffiCIent luxury Items 

for general issue but General Wainwright was 

assured troops assigned to Harbor Defense on 

Bataan received approximately the same 

ration components. However, such is war.41 

Despite the admitted superiority of the 

Corregidor ration, no one could contend 

that the men on Corregidor had an adequate diet. They did not. And it is doubtful that the reduction of their ration would 

have materially altered the situation. The 

equal distribution of food between the 100,-

000 men on Bataan and the 10,000 on CQrregidor could not have saved Bataan and 

might have led to the weakening of the 

harbor defenses. 

Health 

In the wake of starvation and want came 

dread disease. Malaria, dengue, and the 

evil consequences of avitaminosis (vitamin 

deficiency) -scurvy, beriberi, and amoebic 

dysentery-made their appearance soon 

after the troops reached Bataan. On 10 

January General King's aide wrote prematurely in his diary that the effects of the 

enforced diet of half rations was already 

becoming evident in the condition of the 

.. Memo, Provost Marshal for G-4 Service Comd, 

19 Mar 42, with ind and inc1s, AG 430.2 (11 Sep 

41) Phil Reds. 

~ tbid. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

men. Two weeks later he thought he saw 

signs of emaciation and nerve fatigue. The 

ration, he believed, had so reduced the 

stamina of the men that they were "being 

incapacitated by minor sickness they [formerly] had been able to throw off without 

medication." 4S Another layman described 

the symptoms of malnutrition he had 

noticed about the middle of February. In 

the morning, he observed, men's legs "feel 

watery and, at intervals, pump with pains 

that swell and go away again." Rapid 

movement brought an attack of vertigo and 

a thumping of the heart "like a tractor 

engine bogged in a swamp." For an hour 

after breakfast a feeling of normality was 

restored, followed by lassitude. The hour 

after noon, when men doubled up with 

intestinal pains, was the worst of the day.49 

Unknowingly, this officer was describing 

incipient beriberi resulting from the absence 

of fresh meat, vegetables, and dairy products-all rich in Vitamin B--from the diet. 

Medical men began to warn commanders of the effects of the inadequate diet at 

the end of January. The caloric content 

of the ration then being issued, one medical officer reported, was "well under the 

requirements for the physical work demanded," and was resulting in serious loss 

of weight. In one unit, composed of Americans, the men had lost 15 to 25 pounds 

since the start of the campaign. The absence of fats and juices, as well as Vitamins 

A, B, and C, was evident, this medical officer 

declared, in "varying degrees of apathy, 

depression, lack of aggressiveness and 

irritability. " 50 

.. Tisdel\e, Diary, entries of 10 and 22 Jan and 

IS Mar 42 . 

•• Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat, p. 296. 

" Memo, CO Far East Air Service Comd for Med 

Officer, Far East Air Service Comd, 2 Feb 42, sub: 

Ration Deficiency, AG 430 (25 Dec 41) Phil Reds. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

The alarm of medical and combat officers became so great during the next few 

weeks that Lt. Col. James O. Gillespie, the 

medical officer in the Bataan echelon of 

USAFFE, told his chief on Corregidor, Col. 

Wibb E. Cooper, that "it appears to be the 

consensus of surgeons attached to American front line troops that the diet provided 

is inadequate for the maintenance of health 

and combat efficiency." The lack of protein, fat, minerals, and certain vitamins, he 

pointed out, was resulting in common diarrhea and dysentery. The effects of the unbalanced diet on the Filipino, accustomed 

to the food and climate, were not as pronounced. Colonel Gillespie's recommendations included an increase in the allowance of beef, vegetables, and fruit, the issue 

of four ounces of evaporated milk daily, and 

the procurement of native fruits and vegetables. If these foods could not be secured 

in adequate amounts, he urged strongly 

that vitamin concentrates should be secured 

for the American troops at least.fi1 

General Wainwright lent his support to 

these recommendations in a separate communication to General MacArthur in which 

he declared that if the campaign lasted two 

to six months longer "it is certain that a 

fairly high percentage of the troops will suffer from varying degrees of malnutrition .... " S2 By the end of February, the 

effects of the food shortage were clearly 

evident and well understood. Already 

MacArthur was sending urgent and eloquent pleas for aid to Washington and Australia, and efforts were being made to 

break through the Japanese blockade.&B 

It Memo, Surg Bataan Eeh for Surg USAFFE, 27 

Feb 42, sub: Diet of American Soldiers, AG 430.2 

(11 Sep 41) Phil Reds. 

n Ltr, Wainwright to CG USAFFE, 26 Feb 42, 

sub: Rations, AG 430.2 (11 Sep 41) Phil Reds. 

.. For an account of these efforts, see Chapter 

XXII below. 

377 

The number of men brought down by 

malnutrition and vitamin deficiency diseases increased in geometric proportion 

with the passage of time and the successive 

cuts in the ration. During January, the 

ration had provided, in terms of energy, approximately 2,000 calories a day. The 

next month the figure declined to 1,500 and 

during March it was only 1,000 calories 

daily. Defense of the line on Bataan, Lt. Col. 

Harold W. Glattly, the Luzon force surgeon 

estimated, required an expenditure of energy of at least 3,500 to 4,000 calories a day 

for each man. He found the results of this 

caloric deficit alarming in the extreme. 

Serious muscle waste and depletion of fat 

reserve were evident everywhere and beriberi in its incipient stages had become almost universal throughout the command. 

Moreover, malnutrition had so weakened 

the troops that they were particularly vulnerable to even the most minor ailment. 

The spread of any disease, he warned, 

would be of epidemic proportions. Men's 

physical reserves had disappeared by early 

March; at the end of the month the men 

were deteriorating rapidly.54 

Even more serious than malnutrition and 

avitaminosis was the spread of malaria. 

This disease had made its appearance 

shortly after the troops reached Bataan, but 

was kept under control by prophylactic 

doses of quinine. There was a small supply 

of atabrine but it was quickly exhausted. A 

malaria control program such as existed 

later in the war was not possible on Bataan. 

Most of the Filipino troops were never issued 

mosquito nets, and those who had them left 

them behind during the withdrawal for they 

were of a bulky and heavy type. The area 

•• Luzon Force Rpt of Opm, pp. 1-2; memo, Surg 

LF to CG LF, 28 Mar 42, sub: Vitamin Deficiencies, OCMH. 
378 

occupied by the troops contained native villages where mosquitoes could breed freely, 

and there were always large numbers of Filipino civilians behind the lines. These civilians were "a reservoir for malaria," and 

nullified the effect of any limited control 

program adopted by the troops. 55 

Malaria did not affect the efficiency of the 

troops until the beginning of March, but at 

the end of January most of the men were 

already infested with malarial parasites. 

Medical officers made gloomy predictions 

for the future, when the supply of quinine 

would give out. "If all troops take the prescribed 5 grams prophylactic dose," wrote 

a medical officer to General R. J. Marshall 

on 26 January, "the supply will be exhausted 

in a month." 56 As early as the beginning of 

February there were signs that the disease 

would soon increase at an alarming rate. 

Only the regular dosage of quinine kept the 

disease in check that month, but the supply 

of this drug dwindled rapidly. During the 

first week of March, its use as a prophylactic 

in most units was discontinued. Thereafter 

the drug was administered only to those actually ill with the disease. 

The consequences were frightful. The 

number of daily admissions to the hospitals 

for malaria alone jumped to 500 during the 

first week in March.57 After an inspection of 

fortifications on Bataan, General Casey reported that the incidence of malaria was -as 

os Lt Col William J. Kennard, Observations on 

Bataan, notes taken at conf held by Lt Col Roger 

G. Prentiss, Jr., 22 Aug 42, pp. 5-6, copy in 

OCMH. 

.. Memo, Gillespie for Marshall, 26 Jan 42, sub: 

Med Supplies, AG 440 (26 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

.T Kennard, Observations on Bataan, p. 5; Luzon 

Force Rpt of Opns, pp. 1-2. There is a good deal 

of disagreement on the number of hospital admissions for malaria. The author has accepted the figures given in the report just cited. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

high as 35 percent among front-line units. 58 

Two weeks later Colonel Cooper declared 

that already there were 3,000 active cases of 

malaria among the troops on Bataan and 

that the disease was spreading with appalling rapidity.59 Colonel Glattly took an even 

more pessimistic view of the situation. The 

relapse rate, he noted, was high and since no 

quinine was available for any but active 

cases, the command could expect a frightful 

increase in the morbidity rate.60 By the end 

of the month the number of daily admissions to the hospitals was approaching the 

fantastic figure of 1,000, and 75 to 80 percent of the men in front-line units had the 

disease. 61 

Every effort was made to secure quinine 

as well as vitamin concentrates and other 

medical supplies from sources outside the 

Philippines. Some quinine was brought to 

Corregidor by plane from Australia via 

Mindanao, and an effort was made to manufacture a drug from the bark of a tree native 

to the Islands that was thought to have the 

properties of quinine. Despite every expedient there was never a large enough supply of the drug after 1 March to permit its 

usc as a prophylaxis. On 23 March, when 

the malarial rate was 750 cases daily, there 

was only enough quinine in the medical 

depot to provide inadequate treatment for 

about 10,000 men. "When the present stock 

is gone," Colonel Glattly warned General 

King, "a mortality rate in untreated cases 

•• Memo, Casey for CG USAFFE, B Mar 42, AG 

319.1 (5 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

•• Memo, Surg USFIP for CG USFIP, 22 Mar 

42, AG 440 (26 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

.. Memo, Surg LF for CG LF, 22 Mar 42, AG 

440 (26 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

61 Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 1; memo, Funk 

to Beebe, 31 Mar 42, AG 710 (24 Mar 42) Phil 

Reds; Kennard, Observations on Bataan, p. 5. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

of 7 to 10 percent can be expected." 62 A 

week later Wainwright's surgeon reported 

that approximately 758,000 quinine tablets 

had been received by air and that the medical depot had only 600,000 left. The inadequacy of this supply can be measured against 

the 3,000,000 tablets which Colonel Cooper 

estimated as the minimum necessary each 

month to prevent the wholesale spread of 

malaria. 63 

The rapid spread of the disease can be 

attributed not only to the lack of quinine 

but also to the area in which the troops were 

stationed. The withdrawal from the Abucay-Mauban line late in January had placed 

the men in a low, malaria-infested valley 

between the high ground formed by Mt. 

N atib on the north and the Mariveles Mountains to the south. Even under the most 

favorable circumstances, it is probable that 

a large part of the command would have 

ultimately been debilitated by the disease 

endemic in this valley. 

A notable disregard for sanitary precautions, combined with the natural unhealthfulness of the battle position, added greatly 

to the spread of malaria, as well as other 

diseases. Lack of training in the elementals 

of military hygiene was universal in the 

Philippine Army. Many of the Filipinos 

drank unboiled water from streams and 

pools and failed to sterilize their mess gear. 

Latrines were neither well constructed nor 

properly used. Kitchens were dirty and garbage buried near the surface. Huge flies, 

attracted by these malodorous dumps, 

swarmed everywhere. "The fly menace," 

wrote a medical officer, "spread beyond 

., Memo, Surg LF for CG LF, 23 Mar 42, sub: 

Present Malarial Rate, borrowed from Col Glattly, 

copy in OCMH. 

.. Memo, Surg USFIP for G-4 USFIP, 2 Apr 

42, AG 7iO (24 Mar 42) Phil Reds. 

379 

comprehension." 64 "Sanitation," remarked 

another officer, on duty with Filipino troops, 

"was ghastly. Straddle trenches-when 

built-adjoined kitchens .... The calls of 

nature were responded to when and where 

heard." 6S 

Even in the hospitals sanitation was far 

from ideal. There were no screens and the 

supply of lysol was limited. The hospital 

waste was emptied into latrine pits and the 

stench at times was so offensive that men relieved themselves elsewhere. Despite the 

desperate efforts of the nurses to keep the 

hospital areas sanitary, there were, one doctor thought, "undoubtedly many cross inf ections." 66 

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that common diarrhea and various 

forms of dysentery appeared soon after the 

troops fell back to fixed positions. While 

never as serious as malnutrition or malaria, 

the incidence of both ailments was high and 

their treatment limited by the shortage of 

drugs. Filipino troops, often barefoot, frequently developed hookworm also. Carbon 

tetrachloride for treatment was available 

only in limited quantities, the medical depot 

reporting fifty-one bottles on hand at the 

end of March.sT 

As the men on Bataan grew more gaunt 

and disease-ridden it became increasingly 

difficult to isolate the specific causes which 

rendered men ineffective for combat. One 

surgeon believed that the high malarial rate 

was "covering up" the prevailing "mental 

and physical exhaustion" caused by a pro-

... Waterous, Statement of Experiences, p. 52. 

See also memo, Surg 21 st Div (PA) for Surg Subsector D, 3 Mar 42, OCMH . 

.. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 10. 

.6 Waterous, Statement of Experiences, p. 52. 

., Cooper, Med Dept Activities, p. 36; memo, 

CO Phil Med Depot for Surg USFIP, 2 Apr 42, AG 

710 (24 Mar 42) Phil Reds. 
380 

tracted starvation diet.6s It was Colonel 

Cooper's judgment that "the basic cause of 

all the trouble was the lack of food, of 

proper food." 69 At the time he wrote, 2 

April, there were no vitamin concentrates 

on hand in the medical depot. 

Less tangible but fully as serious as any 

of the diseases prevalent on Bataan was 

nerve fatigue. The majority of the combat 

, troops had received no rest in a rear area 

since the first Japanese attack on 8 December. Even reserve units behind the line had 

been subjected to daily air and artillery bombardment. In the opinion of Colonel GlattIy, "The fatigue resulting from constant 

nervous tension definitely decreased the ability of these troops to endure heavy bombardment." 70 The physical signs of this 

ailment were observed toward the end of 

the campaign when many of the men proved 

unable to stand the nervous strain of combat. At an earlier period stragglers had been 

rallied and sent back into battle. Later in 

the campaign stragglers discarded arms and 

equipment and could not be returned to the 

front except by force. "They were surly and 

physically exhausted as well as mentally unequal to further combat duty," said one 

medical officer. n 

The number of men hospitalized for 

psychotic disorders was remarkably small 

and presented no serious problem to the 

medical authorities.T2 This may have been 

due to the fact that there was "no possible 

.. Ltr, Bill Ruth to Col Glattly, 20 Mar 42, copy 

lent to author by Col GlattIy, OCMH. 

,. Memo, Surg USFIP for G-4 USFIP, 2 Apr 42, 

AG 710 (24 Mar 42) Phil Reds . 

.,. Rpt, Surg LF, 30 Jun 42, sub: Med Aspects of 

the Surrender. Written in prison camp, this report 

was lent to the author by Colonel Glattly and a copy 

is on file in OCMH. 

n Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 2. 

ft Codper, Med Dept Activities, p. 18. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

retreat from reality," as the medical officer 

of USAFFE believed, or to the failure to 

evacuate such cases to the hospitals. Facilities for the isolation and treatment of 

mental patients were limited. One ward in 

General Hospital No.2 was set aside for 

these patients, but they could not be confined and seem to have been allowed to 

roam the hospital area.fa 

With the exception of quinine, dysentery 

serum, gas antitoxin, and some sulfa drugs, 

the supply of medicine held out to the end 

of the campaign. Large amounts of blood 

plasma were used. The marines had brought 

twenty-five cases from Shanghai' and these 

were placed in the common pool. The shortage of antitoxin led to an abnormally large 

number of gas gangrene cases. Wounds 

which ordinarily would have presented no 

difficulty failed to respond to treatment and 

became infected. If the wound did not heal 

after it was opened and drained, then amputation followed. n 

There were two general hospitals on 

Bataan. Until the end of January one of 

these, General Hospital No.1, was located 

at Limay and because of its proximity to 

the front lines took all battle casualties requiring surgery. Its eight operating tables 

were housed in a building 14 by 40 feet. In 

a period of one month more than 1,200 

battle casualties requiring major surgery 

were admitted to the hospital, the larger 

number being received on 16 January when 

the staff performed 182 major surgical operations. Usually all the operating tables were 

occupied and other patients lay on litters 

close by awaiting surgery. "It was necesTI Waterous, Statement of Experiences, p. 100; 

Lt Col Stephen C. Sitter, Psychiatric Reactions Observed on Corregidor and Bataan and in Japanese 

Captivity, pp. 5-6, copy lent to author, OCMH. 

•• Kennard, Observations on Bataan, p. 4. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

sary," one medical officer recalled, "for the 

nurses to walk around patients when assisting in the operations." 75 After the withdrawal, the hospital was moved back to 

Little Baguio, on the slopes of the Marive1es, 

near the ammunition and quartermaster depots. When these installations were bombed, 

the hospital area, though clearly marked by 

a large cross, was vulnerable to air attack. 

Twice toward the close of the campaign it 

was hit. 

General Hospital No.2 was located about 

three miles south of Cabcaben, in the bamboo thickets and jungle along the Real 

River. Close by was the medical supply 

depot. The thicket and jungle provided concealment from air observation and the river 

a fresh-water supply which was filtered and 

chlorinated, then stored in a 3,000-gallon 

storage tank.76 

Evacuation of the sick and wounded was 

accomplished in two ways-by ambulance 

directly from the aid and clearing stations 

and by shuttle buses. There were only a few 

ambulances and these were sent out on special cases. The shuttle buses had about fifteen litters instead of seats and made regular trips along designated routes on schedule. Most of the wounded were brought in 

at night to avoid the daytime traffic and 

reduce the possibility of enemy air attack. 

Normally it took about eight hours to get a 

casualty from the battlefield to the hospital, 

but in some Philippine Army units this 

period was as long as thirty-six hours.77 

The majority of the wounds treated in the 

hospitals were from shell fragments and 

small-arms fire; relatively few were from 

bombs. The small caliber Japanese rifle did 

'"Ibid.; Cooper, Med Dept Activities, p. 55. I' Cooper, Med Dept Activities, pp: 57-61. 

.... Kenllard, Observations on Bataan, p. 3. 

381 

not inflict as serious a wound as the American .30-caliber rifle. It was one doctor's 

opinion, after examining men with eight 

and ten wounds in their arms, shoulders, 

and chest, that these men would have been 

killed if similarly wounded by .30-caliber 

bullets.?8 

Abdominal wounds were the most common. There was no established method of 

treatment; each surgeon used his own judgment. But there was an adequate supply of 

sulfa drugs for external use and no necessity 

for unusual methods. It was only when gas 

gangrene set in that difficulties arose because 

of the lack of antitoxin. Wounds healed 

slowly because of the weakened condition of 

the men, and the period of hospitalization 

was normally longer than might otherwise 

have been the case if there had been enough 

food for a proper diet.79 

The large and ever-increasing number of 

sick and wounded strained all medical installations to the utmost. Fortunately, the 

number of battle casualties in the period between 15 February and 3 April was small 

and the beds ordinarily used by the wounded 

could be given to the starved and malariaridden soldiers. The capacity of the two general hospitals, designed to accommodate 

1,000 patients each, was steadily increased 

until it reached a figure three times that 

number. 

The sick rate continued to outstrip even 

this notable expansion. This fact, combined 

with the shortage of gasoline, made it necessary at the beginning of March to limit 

evacuation to the general hospitals to two 

types of cases: first, those requiring medicalor surgical treatment not available at 

the clearing stations; and, second, those in 

'"Ibid. 

.. Waterous, Statement of Experiences, pp. 83-84 . 
MEDICAL CARE ON BAT AAN. Filipino soldiers waiting for treatment outs-ide 

an aid station, above; interior of hospital, below. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

which the period of disability was expected 

to exceed twenty-one days.so To care for all 

other patients the clearing station of each 

medical battalion was converted into a 

hospital with 300 or more beds. Under ideal 

circumstances the clearing station was 

neither organized nor equipped to provide 

hospitalization. On Bataan, where conditions were far from ideal and where the 

Philippine Army medical units lacked much 

of the standard equipment normal in such 

elements, clearing stations were even less 

qualified to handle patients. 

As the volume of patients increased, 

downward echelonment of hospitalization 

continued. Soon the collecting companies, 

designed to provide only emergency treatment to casualties, were converted into hospitals with 100 to 150 beds. Even with the 

addition of these units, hospital facilities 

had become so inadequate by the end of 

March that patients with minor ailments 

were treated in battalion and regimental 

aid stations. All medical installations on 

Bataan were bursting with patients and still 

they were not able to care for all the sick 

and wounded. The two general hospitals 

had about 7,000 patients; another 4,000 

were being treated in a provisional hospital 

established by I Corps. Undetermined numbers were ill in division clearing and collecting companies. The 91st Clearing Company, 4,000 yards behind the front lines, 

had 900 beds; the 11 th was handling 600 

patients. And the number was growing 

daily. Everyone recognized that the hospitalization provided was "in direct conflict 

with the recognized principles of division 

medical service" and "a violation of all 

standard medical tactics," but, wrote the 

80 Memo, Surg Subsector D for Surgs 21st Div 

(PA) and 41st Div (PA), 6 Mar 42, copy in 

OCMH; Cooper, Med Dept Activities, p. 32. 

383 

surgeon, the main objective, the saving of 

lives and the relief of suffering, was 

achieved.81 

The health of the command had a disastrous effect upon combat efficiency. 

This fact was noted first early in February 

and Wainwright had expressed his concern 

to MacArthur on the 26th of the month. 

The next month the situation grew more 

alarming. "The doctors say," wrote King's 

aide on 14 March, "that our combat efficiency is' a litde below 45 percent." 82 When 

Col. Harry A. Skerry inspected I Corps 

positions with General Casey early in 

March he found that in the sector held 

by a battalion of the 71st infantry the 

commander was so sick with dengue 

fever he could hardly accompany them. 

Of the 426 men in the battalion 126 were 

"clear off their feet." "From the standpoint of trained, well-fed troops. .," 

wrote Skerry, "it was an utter nightmare." S3 In another unit, the 21st Division in II Corps, the men were so weak that 

many "were just able to fire a rifle out of 

the trench, and no more." 84 

These conditions were not confined to 

Philippine Army units; Americans and 

Philippine Scouts were equally debilitated 

by malnutrition and malaria. At a medical 

inspection of the 45th Infantry (PS), almost 20 percent of the command showed 

the physical effects of vitamin deficiency 

diseases, and over 50 percent complained 

of the symptoms of these diseases. Nutritional edema (swellings) and night blindness were the commonest symptoms. "Men 

were becoming so weak from starvation," 

81 Cooper, Med Dept Activities, pp. 32-33. See 

also Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, Annex II, p. 1. 

"Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 14 Mar 42. 

.. Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 18. 

B< O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II. 39. 
384 

wrote the regimental surgeon, "that they 

could hardly carry the packs and in our last 

move I saw more Scouts fall out of the line 

of march than I had ever seen fall out any 

march before." 85 

The 31st Infantry, composed entirely of 

Americans, was as badly off as most other 

units. Though it had been in the fron( 

lines for only short periods during the campaign, and from 8 February to 3 April had 

been in a rest area to the rear, the regiment 

was hardly more effective than Philippine 

Army units which had been in the line since 

8 December. The constant preoccupation 

of the American infantryman was food. 

"We were existing," wrote one of the officers, "on the little we received from quartermaster and what edible plants, roots, 

snails, snakes, wild chickens, bananas, wild 

pigs and anything else that we could find 

to eat." 86 Disease was taking a heavy toll 

and approximately 50 percent of the regiment was sick with malaria or dysentery. 

By 3 April "what had once been an effective fighting unit was only a pitiful remains." 87 When the 31st Infantry, in 

Luzon Force reserve, was ordered into the 

line on 4 April, it was necessary to leave 

behind for evacuation to the hospital more 

than one third of the men. Some left sick 

beds to join their outfits. The efficiency of 

those who moved out was estimated at less 

than 50 percent. Along the line of march, 

many dropped out. "Hunger and disease," 

wrote the service company commander, 

"were greater enemies than the Japanese 

soldiers." 88 

.. Rpt of 45th Inf (PS) Med Det in Cooper, Med 

Dept Activities, p. 44 . 

.. Conrad, Opns of 31st Inf (US), p. 20. 

.... Ibid. 

.. Ibid., p. 21; Bess, Opns of Service Co, 31st Inf 

(US), 5 Jan 42-9 Apr 42, p. 40; Mead, Opns of 

31st Inf (US), pp. 24-25. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Estimates of combat efficiency by division 

and corps commanders on Bataan bore out 

fully the tragic picture painted by junior officers. By the middle of March General Parker, II Corps commander, placed the combat efficiency of the troops in his corps at 

only 20 percent, adding that it was becoming less with the passing of each day. He 

attributed the deterioration of his men to the 

starvation diet of 1,000 calories daily, the 

rapid spread of malaria, the high incidence 

of dysentery, diarrhea, and beriberi, nerve 

fatigue, and the shortage of clothing and 

equipment.89 The situation in I Corps was 

no better. Fully 75 percent of the men, 

wrote Wainwright, were unfit for action by 

12 March, the date he relinquished command to General Jones. The reasons he gave 

were similar to those presented by Parker, 

with the addition of hookworm and the lack 

of shelter halves, blankets, and raincoats.9o 

Morale 

The ability of the men on Bataan to fight 

could not be measured by physical standards 

alone. Where all men bore the signs of enforced privation and suffering, there was no 

question of separating the fit from the unfit. 

Only necessity and the will to fight could 

give meaning to the tactical dispositions 

assumed by the troops. 

The Japanese knew this and made crude 

attempts to corrupt the spirit of resistance. 

Flying low over Bataan, their aircraft often 

dropped propaganda leaflets instead of 

bombs on the Americans and Filipinos below. These leaflets appealed to the basest 

emotions: race prejUdice, jealousy, hate, 

.. SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 48, Annex 

V, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns . 

00 NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 28, Annex 

IV, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns. 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

avarice, and deceit. Some were designed to 

induce the desertion of the Filipinos; others 

pointed out that the pay of the Philippine 

Army troops would be worthless in the 

future. "Take my word you are exposing 

your life in danger without any remuneration," declared one handbill. "There is 

nothing so pointless." 91 The life of the Filipino under the Japanese occupation was 

painted in glowing colors. "I am enjoying 

life as a Filipino of the New Philippines;' 

said a former Philippine soldier in one of 

the leaflets. "Throwaway your arms and 

surrender yourself to the Japanese Army," 

proclaimed another handbill, "in order to 

save your lives and enrich your beautiful 

future and the welfare of your children." 92 

MacArthur's departure was also exploited by the Japanese in their effort to 

create dissatisfaction. Some leaflets exploited the theme of starvation, and one 

pictured Corregidor entirely surrounded by 

heaping plates of turkey, meat, fruit, cake, 

and bottles of whiskey and wine. Other 

illustrated leaflets dwelt on the theme of sex 

and crudely pictured the soldier's wife in the 

arms of a war profiteer. 

So far as is known the effect of these 

propaganda sheets was negligible. Some 

men made a hobby of collecting them, and 

exchanged duplicates to fill out their collections. "Majors Poole, Crane, and Holmes 

got me some," exulted Col. Ray M. O'Day, 

"including the red and white ribbon streamers attached to the beer cans and addressed 

to General Wainwright." 93 This acquisition was particularly prized for it contained 

a demand for Wainwright's surrender. 

111 Rad, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 387, 3 Feb 

42, WPD Ready Ref File, Phil. 

.. Copies of these and other Japanese propaganda 

leaflets are on file in Mil Intel Library. 

.. O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 36. 

385 

Japanese radio propaganda was more 

effective than the leaflets. The J apanesecontrolled Station KZRH in Manila broadcast a special program for American soldiers 

every night at 2145. The program was much 

like that presented by Tokyo Rose, to whom 

so many American soldiers listened at a 

later period of the war. The theme song of 

the program was "Ships That Never Come 

In," followed by popular recordings calculated to make the men homesick. "The 

damned Nips," wrote Major Tisdelle, 

"have got a new propaganda program that 

does not help our morale any. The men 

joke happily, but underneath they are 

disquieted." 94 

The Americans had their own radio station on Corregidor, "The Voice of Freedom," which broadcast three times a day. 

Records, evidently collected at Corregidor, 

were played during these programs, which 

also consisted of news commentaries and 

items of local interest. At least one officer 

had a low opinion of the program, describing its offerings as propaganda "so thick 

that it served no purpose except to disgust 

us and incite mistrust of all hopes." 95 Station KGEI in San Francisco also broadcast 

a "Freedom for the Philippines" program 

each night to which most of the men 

listened. The reaction to these programs 

was mixed. 

During the early part of the campaign, 

most officers are agreed, morale was high 

despite the shortages of food and equipment. The victories of early February raised 

the spirit of the troops and confirmed them 

in the belief that they could hold out until 

reinforcements arrived. Aid had been promised time and again, and officers and men 

alike placed all their hopes for the future 

.. Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 16 Feb 42 . 

.. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 63 . 
ore the 1)<,· I fal " 

.: ,"our har and I.: y ur 

II ch ')..5 • 1 murmu r 

Hd re th 

Lt!l m • \\ hlle Ih r,' 

and pl .. , F,,~I 

~ 'illm.t l11e and It 

"Jrm hand or. r 1)' breast ... 

JAPANESE PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

on the fulfillment of this pledge. Without it 

there was nothing left but defeat and 

disaster. 

While much of the faith in the timely arrival of reinforcements was based only on 

the desperate desire to believe it to be so, 

there was at least one tangible assurance to 

which men could point. On 15 January, a 

week after the troops had reached Bataan, 

General MacArthur had addressed a message to the entire command. Every unit 

commander was made personally responsible for reading and explaining the message, 

and all headquarters were directed to be 

sure that these instructions were carried out. 

MacArthur's message to the troops was a 

promise of aid and a call to valor. "Help is 

on the way from the United States," he had 

said. "Thousands of troops and hundreds of 

planes are being dispatched. The exact time 

of arrival of reinforcements is unknown as 

they will have to fight their way through. 

... " Declaring that no further retreat 

was possible, he asserted that "our supplies 

are ample" and that it was imperative to 

hold until aid arrived. 96 Though the message carefully stated that the date of arrival 

was not known, the hungry men, grasping 

eagerly at every straw, assumed that it 

would come soon. A soldier-poet expressed 

the mood of the men when he wrote: 

. . . MacArthur's promise in every mind. 

"The time is secret but I can say 

That swift relief ships are on the way 

Thousands of men and hundreds of planesBack in Manila before the rains! 

With decorations and honors, too." 

MacArthur said it, it must be true.97 

.. Ltr Order, USAFFE to All Unit Comdrs, 15 

Jan 42, sub: Msg from Gen MacArthur, copy in 

OCMH. 

'" Lee, "Abucay Withdrawal," Nothing But Praise, 

p.22. 

387 

Disillusionment came hard. The weeks 

went by, January gave way to February, 

and still no large reinforcements had come. 

Many men began to doubt that aid would 

arrive at all. Only a few men had definite 

knowledge of what was on the way and 

they confided in no one. When Colonel 

Mallonee jokingly asked Colonel Brezina 

about the relief expedition, Brezina's "eyes 

went poker-blank" and "his teeth bit his 

lips into a grim thin line." 9S Most regular 

officers had made their own estimate of the 

situation and had reached the conclusion 

that time was against them. They could 

see their men growing weaker every day, 

the hospitals fuller, and the supplies smaller. 

But they continued to hope for the relief 

expedition, the TNT (Terrible 'N' Terrific) force, which would arrive in storybook fashion before the end. 

These hopes received a rude blow on 

Washington's Birthday, 22 February, in 

President Roosevelt's fireside chat on the 

progress of the war. Inviting his listeners 

to look at their maps, the President emphasized the global nature of the struggle, the 

vast distances to be spanned, the large areas 

to be held, and the desperate situation of 

the United Nations. As he spoke of the 

tremendous tasks facing the American people and the sacrifices that must be made, it 

became clear to his listeners on Bataan that 

he was placing the Philippines in their 

proper perspective "in the big picture· of 

the war." 99 No prospect of the arrival of 

relief could be found in the President's message. One officer wrote in his diary that 

though "the President means to cheer us 

up," his talk "tends to weaken morale." 

"Weare not interested in what the production will be in 1943-44 and 1945," he said. 

.. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 55. 

.. Ibid., 69. 
388 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

"VOICE OF FREEDOM" broadcasts to the men on Bataan. 

"All we want are two things, but we need 

them right now." 100 Others took a more 

peSSimistIc view. "Plain for all to see," 

wrote Colonel Mallonee, "was the handwriting on the wall, at the end of which the 

President had placed a large and emphatic 

period. The President had-with regretwiped us off the page and closed the 

book." 101 

Despite the explanations of the "Voice 

of Freedom," MacArthur's departure for 

Australia on 12 March struck another blow 

at morale. A large part of the faith in the 

timely arrival of reinforcements had been 

based on the presence of General MacAr-

"00 Tisdellc, Diary, entry of 23 Feb 42. 

101 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 69. See also Samuel 1. Rosenman, compiler, The Public Papers and 

Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Humanity on 

the Defensive, 1942 (New York, 1950), pp. 105-16. 

thur. His prestige among the Filipinos can 

hardly be exaggerated. Among American 

officers, to many of whom he was already a 

legend, his reputation placed him on a lofty 

eminence with the great captains of history. 

Mallonee undoubtedly expressed the feelings of many when he affirmed his belief 

that MacArthur "would reach down and 

pull the rabbit out of the hat." 102 With 

MacArthur gone, those who refused to give 

up hope argued that if anybody could bring 

supplies to the Philippines it was MacArthur. His presence in Australia, they declared, was the best guarantee that help 

was coming. As proof they could repeat 

the assertions broadcast so often over the 

"Voice of Freedom," or cite MacArthur's 

'02 Manonee, Bataan Diary, II, 67. See also 

Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, p. 104 
THE BATTLING BASTARDS 

first public statement on reaching Australia. 

At that time he had said that the relief of 

the Philippines was his primary purpose. "I 

came through and I shall return," he had 

pledged.loa 

There were others, however, including 

the old-timers of World War I, who reasoned that the best place from which to 

direct the organization of the relief expedition was Corregidor. MacArthur's departure, they asserted, was proof that the promised reinforcements would never arrive.104 

When, by the end of March, no rabbits 

had been pulled out of the hat, most Americans realized that the end was near. There 

was nothing left but to wait for the inevitable defeat and prison camp, or death. 

'oa New York Times, March 21,1942. 

'04 This paragraph and those immediately preceding are based on a large number of interviews and 

informal conversations with survivors of the campaign. For a printed reaction to MacArthur's departure, see Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 191-92. 

389 

The Filipino could expect ultimately to be 

returned to his home. For the American 

there was no such bright prospect. Death 

or capture was his certain fate. Strangely 

enough, he did not become despondent or 

bitter. He knew the worst now and there 

was little he could do other than to make 

the enemy pay dearly for victory. Meanwhile he made the best of his bad fortune, 

joked grimly about his fate, and hid his 

feelings under a cloak of irony.1<l5 It was 

in this vein that Lt. Henry G. Lee of the 

Philippine Division wrote the poem, 

"Fighting On." 

I see no gleam of victory alluring 

No chance of splendid booty or of gain 

If I endure-I must go on enduring 

And my reward for bearing pain-is pain 

Yet, though the thrill, the zest, the hope are 

gone 

Something within me keeps me fighting on.1°6 

100 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 69-70. 

106 Lee, Nothing But Praise, p. 33. 
CHAPTER XXII 

• "Help IS on the Way)) 

Since early January strenuous attempts 

had been made to get food and medical supplies to the men on Bataan and Corregidor. 

General MacArthur, and later General 

Wainwright, urged constantly and persistently, in the strongest terms, that the Japanese blockade must be broken, that greater 

efforts must be made and more drastic measures taken to relieve the Philippine garrison. 

These requests were received in Washington with the greatest sympathy. Despite the 

fact that Allied strategy called for the defeat 

of Germany first, the bulk of the troops and 

supplies sent overseas during the early part 

of 1942 went to the Pacific. A blockaderunning program was organized, first in 

Australia and the Netherlands Indies, and 

then in the United States. Surface vessels, 

combat aircraft, and even submarines were 

dispatched to the Philippines in the hope 

that some would get through with supplies 

for the weary and hungry men. No expense 

was too high, no effort too great to relieve 

the embattled garrison. 

The total result of these activities was 

negligible. The Japanese hold on the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia was too firm, 

their victories too rapid to allow the poorly 

prepared Allies time to organize the resources necessary to come to the aid of the 

Philippine garrison. The story of the attempt 

to break through the Japanese blockade, like 

the entire story of the campaign in the 

Philippines, is one of heroic efforts and final 

failure. 

Running the Blockade 

On 4 January, unaware that the War 

Plans Division of the General Staff had concluded only a day earlier that relief of the 

Philippines would require so large a force as 

to constitute "an entirely unjus~ified diversion," General MacArthur had suggested to 

the Chief of Staff that a plan for blockaderunning be developed and put into effect 

immediately. "Some relief," he had added, 

"might be obtained on use of submarine 

transportation." 1 The suggestion to initiate 

blockade-running was not acted upon immediately, but the funds to organize such a 

program had already been allotted to two 

officers on their way to Australia. 2 

The proposal to send supplies by submarine did not secure such ready acceptance. 

Admiral Hart, when asked to send antiaircraft ammunition to MacArthur by submarine, replied that no underwater craft 

were available for such a mission.3 MacAr1 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No.9, 4 Jan 42, 

AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. See Chapter 

XIV above for a discussion of the WPD study of 

3 January. 

2Ltr, Moore, DCofS to Brett, 19 Dec 41, G-4 

33861. The two officers were Col. Stephen J. 

Chamberlin and Lt.- Col. Lester J. Whitlock, later 

MacArthur's G-3 and 0--4. 

8 MacArthur's radio had been forwarded to the 

commander in Australia with instructions from 

Marshall to consider all means of getting supplies 

through to the Philippines. Rad, Marshall to Brett, 

No. 671, 5 Jan 42, WPD Ready Ref File, Phil. 

Admiral Ernest J. King also instructed Hart to 

assist in this effort, Rad, COM INCH to CINCAF, 
"HELP IS ON THE WAY" 

thur's message to the Chief of Staff on this 

subject was a strong one. Hart's attitude, he 

declared for the second time in a month, 

was a defeatist one. "He accepts complete 

blockade which probably does not exist 

without effort to penetrate," he declared, 

and cited the case of two destroyers and a 

cargo vessel which had successfully made 

their way south from Manila Bay during the 

last ten days. "1 urge," he wrote Marshall, 

"steps be taken to obtain a more aggressive 

and resourceful handling of naval forces in 

this area." 4 

Concrete plans to run supplies into the 

Philippines through the Japanese blockade 

began to take shape about the middle of 

January. The impetus was provided by 

MacArthur, who, on the 17th, after his 

failure to secure any strong support from 

Australia or the Netherlands Indies, recounted his difficulties in a long message to 

the Chief of Staff.5 He reminded General 

Marshall that his men had been on half 

rations for some time and that "the food 

situation here is becoming serious." Measured in ship capacity his needs were not 

large and could easily be met by small or 

medium-sized vessels, which he recommended be dispatched to the Philippines 

along various routes. It seemed "incredible" 

to him that such an attempt had never been 

made. He had no doubt that if it were, "unquestionably" the ships would get through. 

Warning that the Filipinos would experi5 Jan 42, WPD Msg File. At the time all submarines but one, "which was lost about then," were 

to the north on other missions. Ltr, Hart to Ward, 

19 Dec 51, OCMH. 

• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 26, 9 Jan 42, 

WPD Ready Ref File, Phil. Admiral Hart points 

out that he never accepted "complete blockade" 

with regard to submarines. Ltr, Hart to Ward, 19 

Dec 51, OCMH. 

• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall No. 72, 17 Jan 42, 

AG 381 (11-27--41 Sec 1) Far East. 

391 

ence a "revulsion of feeling" if something 

was not done to send help quickly and that 

"hungry men are hard to handle," he asked 

that simultaneous efforts to send food be 

made from the United States and the Netherlands Indies. "I am professionally certain," he declared, "that his [the enemy's] 

so-called blockade can easily be pierced. 

The only thing that can make it really effective is our passive acceptance of it as a 

fact." 

Actually, every effort was being made in 

Washington to send aid to the beleaguered 

garrison. But these efforts were not enough, 

nor were they being pushed, General Marshall believed, with the vigor and singlemindedness required to break the blockade. 

The command in Australia had no organizatIon capable of quickly executing such a 

mission and no such sense of urgency as 

impelled MacArthur to insist that "the disastrous results" of the failure to provide aid 

"will be monumental." 6 

General Marshall himself undertook to 

impart this sense of urgency to his subordinates. To the commande.r in Australia he 

wrote that the situation in the Philippines 

was most serious and that "comprehensive 

efforts" to run the blockade must be organized. His directions were concise and clear 

Use your funds without stint. Call for more 

if required. Colonel Chamberlin has a credit 

of ten million dollars of Chief of Staff's fund 

which can be spent in whatever manner latter 

deems advisable. I direct its use for this purpose. Arrange for advance payments, partial 

payments for unsuccessful efforts, and large 

bonus for actual delivery. Your judgement 

must get results. Organize groups of bold and 

resourceful men, dispatch them with funds by 

planes to islands in possession of our associates, there to buy food and charter vessels 

for service. Rewards for actual delivery 

• Ibid. 
392 

Bataan or Corregidor must be fixed at level 

to insure utmost energy and daring on part 

of masters. At same time dispatch blockade 

runners from Australia with standard rations 

and small amounts of ammunition on each. 

Movement must be made on broad front 

over many routes. . . . Only indomitable 

determination and pertinacity will succeed 

and success must be ours. Risks will be great. 

~~~a~ds must be proportional. Report 

mltlatlOn of plan.7 

Similar instructions were sent to General 

Brett, General Wavell's deputy in the recently established ABDA Command. "The 

results of even partial success in this effort " 

Marshall told him, "would be incalculabie 

and it is my purpose to spare no effort 0; 

expense to achieve results." 8 That same 

day in Washington, Marshall selected General Hurley, former Secretary of War, to 

lend his "energetic support" to the scheme 

of blockade-running, and made available to 

MacArthur one million dollars, to be used 

as rewards to ship masters in the Islands. 

Less than twenty-four hours after receiving MacArthur's message urging that the 

blockade be pierced, Marshall was able to 

inform the VSAFFE commander that two 

offi~e~ from Washington with "practically 

unhmited funds" and with instructions to 

organize blockade-running "on a broad 

front" had already reached Australia; that 

he had one million dollars at his disposal 

to reward those who broke through the 

blockade; and that Hurley was leaving for 

Australia the next day.9 

. Vnd~r the impetus of Marshall's urgent 

mstructIons for a comprehensive program 

and the use of "bold and resourceful men" , 

T Rad, Marshall to CG USAFIA, 17 Jan 42, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

S Rad, Marshall to Brett 17 Jan 42 WPD 

4560-9. " 

• Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 949, 17 

Jan 42, OCS 18136-196; Marshall to Brett, 19 Jan 

42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the headquarters in Australia prepared an 

ambitious schedule for the shipment to the 

Indies, and then the transshipment from 

there, of 3;000,000 rations-a sixty-day 

s~pply for 50,000 men-and a large quantIty of ammunition.lo Col. John A. Robenson, with six assistants and large funds, was 

sent from Darwin to Java with instructions 

to comb the Indies for food and small ships. 

These plans apparently were not enough 

for General Marshall and he told General 

~rere~on, then commanding in Australia, so 

m pi am terms. Time did not permit the shipment of food to the Indies for transshipment, 

the Chief of Staff declared. Local resources 

in every port should be exploited by purchase, and agents with hard cash should be 

flown to every Dutch and British island in 

the area to collect food and ships. "V rgency 

of my instructions not fully appreciated," 

Marshall told Brereton, and closed with the 

injunction that "action and results are 

imperative." 11 

The difficulties which faced the men responsible for procuring supplies, ships, and 

crews were formidable. There were few vessels in Australia fast enough to run the blockade and large enough to carry sufficient 

cargo and fuel to make the round trip profitable. The assignment of a ship to such a mission was regarded by most as tantamount 

to its permanent loss. Finally, if a ship was 

chartered, it was exceedingly difficult to find 

the crew willing to embark on so perilous a 

voyage, no matter how high the reward. Altogether, about ten old coastal vessels of 

Philippine and Chinese registry were procured in Australia. In an effort to protect 

these vessels from hostile attack, they were 

,. Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes, Rpt of Orgn of 

U~AFIA, 7 Dec 41-30 Jun 42, AG Opns Rpt F-17. 

Rads, Brereton to TAG, and Marshall to Brereton, 19 Jan 42, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) 

Far East. 
"HELP IS ON THE WAY" 

provided with guns, dummy stacks, neutral 

or Axis flags, and "all imaginable types of 

deceit." 12 

Colonel Robenson's difficulties in Java 

were fully as great as those encountered in 

Australia. Imbued with the importance of 

his mission, he was quickly disillusioned 

when he found that the British and the 

Dutch would not release ships for the hazardous run to the Philippines. Robenson had 

more success in securing rations and ammunition, but at the end of January still had 

no vessel on which to load the cargo.1S 

Despite these difficulties surprising progress was made in the plan to run the blockade. By 22 January, three days after his 

rebuke from Washington, Brereton reported 

to the Chief of Staff that the Don Isidro, a 

small Philippine freighter, had been chartered and was then being loaded with rations 

and ammunition at Brisbane. It would sail 

directly for Corregidor. The M ormacsun, 

with a larger capacity, was also loading at 

Brisbane. Sil1ce this vessel was under orders 

from Washington not to go farther north 

than the Netherlands Indies, it would sail 

to a Dutch port and there transfer its cargo 

to smaller vessels for the last leg of the journey. Additional rations and ammunition, 

Brereton told Marshall, were being assembled in Australia for shipment to the Indies. 

There they would be placed aboard small 

blockade-runners and sent to the Philippines.14 He neglected to mention that he had 

had no success as yet in securing these small 

vessels. 

U Ltr, CG USAFIA to CO Base 3, 20 Jan 42, 

Material on USAFIA Hist in AG Opns Rpt; Itr, 

CofS USAFIA to CO Base 1, 21 Jan 42, sub: Philippine Relief, AG, Effort to Supply Phil. 

1.1 Barnes, Rpt of Orgn of USAFIA, AG Opns 

Rpt F-17 . 

.. Rad, Brereton to Marshall, No. 88, 22 Jan 42, 

AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. 

393 

Within two weeks the number of ships en 

route or scheduled to sail for the Philippines 

had grown to five. The Don Isidro, Maj. 

Gen. Julian F. Barnes reported from Australia, had already departed with 700 tons 

of rations. The Coast Farmer, an Army 

freighter with a speed of 10 knots, was loading at Brisbane and would sail immediately. 

The Dona N ati, with a capacity of over 

6,000 tons, was also loading in Australia and 

was scheduled to depart within the week. 

Finally, the Anhui, a vessel of Chinese registry with a capacity of 2,500 tons, had been 

chartered and was then loading. It would 

follow the Dona N ati. The M ormacsun, 

Barnes told Marshall, was already loaded 

with 6,000 tons of balanced rations and ammunition, but was being held in port pending the completion of arrangements to 

charter two smaller vessels to carry its cargo 

northward from the Indies.15 

General MacArthur was kept fully informed of the plans to break the Japanese 

blockade, but still felt that stronger measures were required. On 4 February, in a 

message to General Marshall, he called for 

a more aggressive strategy in the Far East 

and expressed the hope that his views 

would be presented "to the highest authority." 16 The message opened with the 

startling statement that Allied strategy, 

aimed at building up forces before the J apanese advance, was "a fatal mistake on the 

part of the Democratic Allies." He urged 

that the Japanese line of communications, 

"stretched over 2,000 miles of sea," be attacked instead. To counter the argument 

that naval forces for such attacks were not 

available, he pointed out that a great naval 

,. Rad, Barnes to TAG, No. 154, 2 Feb 42, AG 

381 (11-27-41 Sec 2A) Far East. 

"Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 201, 4 Feb 

42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil. 
394 

victory was not necessary; "the threat alone 

would go far toward the desired end." He 

predicted that the _plan to build a base and 

acquire supremacy in the Southwest Pacific 

would fail and that the war would be indefinitely prolonged. The only way to defeat 

the enemy was to seek combat with him. 

"Counsels of timidity," he warned, "based 

upon theories of safety first will not win 

against such an aggressive and' audacious 

adversary as Japan." 

This was bold counsel indeed and was 

caref ully considered in Washington from 

where the effort to send MacArthur the 

supplies he needed was being pushed with 

vigor and determination. General Marshall replied that he welcomed and appreciated MacArthur's views and "invariably" 

submitted them to the President.l1 

Summarizing the considerations which 

had determined Allied strategy, Marshall 

went on to explain that everyone recognized 

the advantages of an attack against Japan's 

line of communications. Two grim disasters 

had prevented the adoption of such a course. 

First, the Japanese had achieved flank security at the start of the war by seizing 

Wake and Guam and additional protection by their control of the Marshall and 

Gilbert Islands. At all these places they 

had strong air protection. Secondly, by 

their initial attack on Pearl Harbor, the 

Japanese had virtually eliminated the Battle Force of the Pacific Fleet. Much of the 

remaining naval strength of the Pacific 

Fleet was required to keep open the Allied 

line of communications to Australia and to 

assist in the establishment of bases in the 

South Pacific. 

11 Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42, 

WDCSA381 (2-17-42) Phil. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

But rather than do nothing at all, the 

Allies had decided to oppose Japanese 

expansion along the Malay Barrier simply 

because that was the only area in which 

they possessed the necessary bases from 

which to launch an attack. "The basis 

of all current effort," the Chief of Staff 

went on, "is to accumulate through every 

possible means sufficient strength to initiate operations along the lines you suggest. . . . In the meanwhile we are endeavoring to limit the hostile advance so 

as to deny him free access to land and sea 

areas that will immeasurably strengthen his 

war making powers or which will be valuable to us as jump off positions when we 

can start a general offensive." 

Not only was MacArthur's efforts to secure a reorientation of Allied strategy in the 

Far East unsuccessful, but his doubts about 

the value of the help from Australia soon 

proved to be well founded. In spite of elaborate preparatibns and the expenditure of 

large funds, on)y three of the vessels which 

set out for the Philippines were successful in 

piercing the blockade. The Don Isidro and 

Coast Farmer left Australia on the same 

day,. 4 February. The first went from Fremantle to Java to take on ammunition. 

There she was joined by the Florence D., a 

Philippine freighter under U.S. naval control. To get the ship Colonel Robenson had 

had to offer the Filipino crew handsome 

bonuses ranging from more than $10,000 

for the master to lesser amounts for other 

ranks, and life insurance in values of $500 

to $5,000. On 14 February the Don Isidro 

and Florence D. set sail. Both vessels sailed 

eastward through the Timor Sea to Bathurst 

Island, then north. Five days after the start 

of the voyage they were discovered by J apanese planes and bombed. The first was left 
"HELP IS ON THE WAY" 

a disabled hulk and had to be beached; the 

Florence D. was sunk.1s 

The voyage of the Coast Farmer was 

more successful. She finally put in at a Mindanao port fifteen days after leaving Brisbane. The Dona Nati and the Anhui also 

made the trip successfully, arriving at Cebu 

in mid-March. These were the only vessels 

to reach the Philippines; they brought in 

more than 10,000 tons of rations, 4,000,000 

rounds of small-arms ammunition, 8,000 

rounds of 81-mm ammunition, and miscellaneous medical, signal, and engineer supplies.10 The two Chinese ships of British 

registry chartered to carry the M ormacsun 

cargo left Fremantle in February, but the 

crews mutinied when dangerous waters 

were reached and brought the two vessels 

back to Darwin where they were unloaded. 

On 14 February the Dutch released four old 

freighters to Colonel Robenson for use on 

the Philippine run. By offering large bonuses 

and other financial inducements, he persuaded the Chinese crew of one of these vessels to make the voyage. It finally left on 26 

February with a cargo of 720,000 rations, 

but was never heard from again. The others 

never left port.2il 

The unloading of the three ships that successfully completed the voyage to southern 

Philippine ports left their cargoes far from 

the battlefield. From Mindanao and Cebu 

the supplies still had to be transported northward through the inland seas to Manila Bay. 

For this leg of the journey fast interisland 

,. Barnes, Rpt of Orgn of USAFIA, AG Opns 

Rpt F-17; rad, TAG to CG USAFFE, 15 Feb 42, 

WPD 4560-2l. 

19 Development of the U.S. Supply Base in Australia, a monograph prepared in 1949 by Maj. 

Richard M. Leighton and Mrs. Elizabeth Bingham, 

Control Div, ASF, copy in OCMH. 

20 Ibid.; rad, Brett to TAG, No. 1058, 25 Mar 42, 

WPD Msg File. 

395 

motor ships were used. The need for such 

a transport system had been recognized early 

in the campaign and General Sharp, commander of the Visayan-Mindanao Force, 

had requisitioned the best of the small boats. 

Altogether, about twenty-five boats, ranging in capacity from 300 to 1,000 tons, were 

chartered.21 

The plan for running the blockade 

through the inland seas provided for the 

transfer of the cargo brought in from Australia and the Netherlands Indies to the 

smaller interisland craft. This would be 

done at night, at places rarely visited by the 

Japanese air and surface patrols. Th~ small 

boats would then move northward in easy 

stages, traveling during the hours of darkness only. American officers would be placed 

aboard each vessel with orders to make certain that a real effort was made to run the 

blockade and to scuttle the ship rather than 

let it fall into enemy hands. 22 

The plan called also for the transportation to Corregidor of such food as could be 

procured locally-rice, sugar, fruits, coffee, 

and meat. In Manila Bay, for example, two 

400-ton motor ships picked up the food collected by agents in southern Luzon and ran 

it across the bay to Corregidor. These two 

vessels were able to make several round 

trips, raising the total quantity of rice stocks 

by 1,600 tons.23 But the bulk of the ships 

and supplies came from Cebu where the 

Army Transport Service and the Cebu Advance Depot were located. Originally estab21 V -MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 23, 35; QM Rpt of 

Opns, p. 39. 

22 V-MF Rpt of Opns, p. 36. The boats were first 

under the control of Sharp's headquarters, but on 8 

February were placed under a branch of the Army 

Transport Service established in Cebu. Rad, 

USAFFE to Sharp, 8 Feb 42, Sharp Papers, 

OCMH. 

23 QM Rpt of Opns, pp. 39-40. 
396 

lished to issue supplies received from Luzon, 

the Cebu depot became the central collection point for supplies to be shipped to Bataan and Corregidor. Procurement offices 

were set up in the Visayas and in Mindanao 

and vast quantities of material were gathered. To these were added the food and 

equipment from Australia. By 10 April, 

when the Japanese occupied Cebu City, the 

depot had on hand a twelve-month food 

supply for the troops on Cebu and Panay 

and at least a six-month supply for the men 

on the other islands. In the hills and in scattered warehouses were another 12,000 tons 

of food, medicine, gasoline, and other supplies.24 

Only a very small portion of the supplies 

gathered so painfully and hoarded so carefully in the south ever reached Manila Bay. 

The total could not have been more than a 

few thousand tons. The Legaspi, with a capacityof 1,000 tons, was the first of the interisland steamers to make the journey 

safely. On 22 January she brought a cargo 

of rice and other food from Panay to Corregidor, and in February completed another 

trip. On 1 March, while she was on her 

third trip, she was sunk by a Japanese gunboat off the north coast of Mindoro and her 

crew captured. 

Late in February the Princessa made the 

run from Cebu to Corregidor with a cargo 

of 700 tons of food. At Mindanao the 2,500 

tons of rations and 2,000 rounds of 81-mm. 

ammunition from the Coast Farmer were 

transferred to the Elcano and Lepus. The 

first got through to Manila Bay, but the 

Lepus was captured off Palawan on 28 

February. The cargoes of the Dona Nati 

.. Col John D. Cook, Cebu Depot QM Opns, pp. 

1-5, App. A, QM Rpt of Opns; Col Melville S. 

Creusere, QM Supply, V-MF, V-MF Rpt of Opns, 

pp.526-32. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

and Anhui were loaded for transshipment at 

Cebu, but the ships failed to break through 

the tightening Japanese blockade. Ten of 

the interisland steamers were sunk by the 

enemy or scuttled by their crews to avoid 

capture, resulting in the loss of 7,000 tons 

of food, petroleum, and other miscellaneous 

supplies.25 

In terms of supplies delivered to the 

battlefield, the blockade-running program 

from Australia and the Netherland Indies 

was a dismal failure. Of the 10,000 tons of 

rations which reached Mindanao and Cebu 

only about 1,000 tons-a four-day supply 

for the 100,000 soldiers and civilians on 

Bataan-reached Manila Bay. Even more 

distressing was the conaition of the food 

when it finally reached the men. The containers in which the food was packed had 

broken open and the holds of the ships 

contained a miscellaneous pile of canned 

goods. All of it had to be sorted and repacked before it could be issued to the 

troops. Practically all the paper labels on 

the cans were destroyed so that they could 

not be identified without opening them. 

Flour and sugar sacks had broken open and 

the contents were spread loosely among the 

cans. Shovels had to be used to get these 

precious commodities back into new sacks. 

Onions and potatoes, piled on the decks 

during the voyage through tropical waters, 

were rotted and had to be destroyed almost 

before the eyes of the starving men. These 

"heart-breaking" conditions resulted in delays in unloading and, what was much 

worse, considerable loss of food to the 

weakened and hungry garrison.28 

.. V-MF Rpt of Opns, p. 49; QM Rpt of Opns, 

pp. 59-60; Cook, Cebu Depot QM Opns, App. A, 

QM Rpt of Opns; Drake, Comments on Draft MS, 

Comment 14, OCMH. 

.. QM Rpt of Opns, pp. 69-70. 
"HELP IS ON THE WAY" 

The Japanese invasion of the Netherlands Indies and the Allied naval defeats 

in the waters of the Dutch archipelago in 

late February and early March released 

Japanese naval and air forces for patrol of 

the seas just north of Australia. With that 

continent now under direct attack and in 

danger of invasion all plans to run the 

blockade from Australia came to an end. 

Ships and cargoes were desperately needed 

in Australia itself to meet the threat of 

hostile landings. This possibility had been 

foreseen earlier, and General Hurley, when 

he reached Java on 17 February, had told 

the Chief of Staff that the sea routes north 

of Australia were becoming increasingly 

hazardous. On his return to Melbourne a 

few days later he again made this point in 

a message to Marshall and referred to the 

"almost insuperable difficulties" in getting 

supplies to MacArthur.27 

On 2 March Batavia in Java fell to the 

Japanese and the Dutch Government 

moved to the mountains. Clearly the end 

of resistance in the Netherlands Indies was 

in sight, and both Brett and Hurley agreed 

that it was no longer possible to continue 

the blockade-running program. This view, 

they told the Chid of Staff in a joint 

message, was shared by the officers directly 

responsible for running the blockade. In 

their opinion, 

Routes to Philippines from Australia and 

vicinity are becoming increasingly hazatdous 

and risking of ships and cargoes that cannot 

well be spared here appears no longer justified. 

Routes to avoid the areas controlled by the 

enemy are as long as from Hawaii to 

Philippines. 

.., Rad, Hurley for Marshall, ABDACOM No.2, 

17 Jan 42, ABDACOM Msgs, SWPA Collection, 

OPD; memo, Hurley for Marshall, 21 Feb 42, OPD 

381 PI, Sec 1, Case 21. 

397 

Recommend therefore that Philippines be 

supplied from the United States via Hawaii 

through open sea areas in which the chance 

of reaching destination is much greater than 

through narrow channels between island and 

blockade areas of the southwest Pacific.28 

Already the possibility of sending blockade-runners from the United States 

through Hawaii was under study in the 

War Department. This study had been requested by the President as a result of a 

strong message from MacArthur on 22 February.29 The Coast Farmer, MacArthur had 

pointed out, had had no difficulty in penetrating the Japanese blockade, thus proving 

what he had been asserting all the time: 

that the blockade was ineffective. He suggested, therefore, that in view of the "thinness of the enemy's coverage" other routes 

including that across the central Pacific 

from Hawaii be utilized. The entire program to send him supplies, he declared 

bluntly, should be controlled from Washington rather than Australia where the commanders, "however able they may be, have 

neither the resources nor the means . . . to 

accomplish this mission." Nor did he believe 

it possible for commanders in Australia, 

"the actual zone of immediate or threatened conflict," to devote all their energies 

to the task of sending him supplies when 

their own problems seemed so urgent to 

them. 

The size of the problem [he said] is greater 

than the means now being used to solve it. 

The prime requisite is the making available 

in the United States of the necessary ships and 

material, especially the former, and their continuous dispatch to destination. Nowhere is 

the situation more desperate and dangerous 

2. Rad, Hurley and Brett for Marshall, No. 483, 

4 Mar 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 3) Far East. 

29 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 344, 22 Feb 

42, WPD Ready Ref File, Phil. 
398 

than here. . . . The quantities involved are 

not great but it is imperative that they be 

made instantly available in the United States 

and that the entire impulse and organization 

be reenergized and controlled directly by you. 

If it is left as a subsidiary effort it will never 

be accomplished.30 

On the receipt of this message, the supply 

experts in the War Department began a 

quick survey of the problem. Maj. Gen. 

Brehon B. Somervell, then G--4, summed 

up their findings in a series of recommendations to the Chief of Staff on the 22d. 31 Declaring that direct supply of the Philippines 

from Honolulu was "practical and desirable," he recommended that three World 

War I destroyers, converted to cargo vessels with a capacity of 1,500 tons each, be 

assigned this mission. One of these could be 

sent immediately from New Orleans to Mindanao, and the others could follow in early 

March. He recommended also that three 

additional converted destroyers then in the 

Caribbean should be procured by the Army 

and placed on this run. Arrangements were 

quickly made to send supplies to New Orleans and to procure the additional vessels. 

Marshall then reported these arrangements 

to the President and notified MacArthur of 

the new efforts being made to send supplies 

across the Pacific directly to the Philippines. 32 

The schedule for shipments from the 

United States called for six sailings, the first 

vessel to leave New Orleans on 28 February, 

the last on 22 March. But numerous difficulties arose to upset the schedule. There 

3. Ibid. 

31 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 22 Feb 42, sub: 

Supply of U.S. Forces in Phil, OCS 18136-258. 

32 Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 24 Feb 42, 

WPD 4560-26; memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 28 

Feb 42, sub: Blockade-Runners via Hawaii, OCS 

10136-268. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

were delays in assembling the cargoes and in 

selecting the best routes for the ships to follow. The Navy had no gun crews to put on 

the ships and there was further delay till 

they could be secured. Finally, the first vessel, originally scheduled to leave on 28 February, sailed from New Orleans on 2 March. 

Two others followed during the month. 

Routed through the Panama Canal to Los 

Angeles and then to Honolulu, these ships 

were still in Hawaiian waters when the 

campaign in the Philippines ended. Three 

other converted destroyers left the west coast 

between 16 March and 11 April but before 

they were long at sea it was clear they could 

not reach the Philippines before the campaign ended and they were diverted to other 

areas. 33 Thus ended the effort to run supplies through the blockade by surface ships. 

Submarines and aircraft as well as surface 

vessels were utilized in the desperate attempt 

to bring aid to the Philippine garrison. The 

use of submarines for this purpose, as has 

been noted, was opposed most strongly by 

Admiral Hart, commander of naval forces 

in Wavell's headquarters. 34 General Wavell 

supported this view and when he assumed 

command declared that with his present 

resources he could see no possibility of "affording General MacArthur support he appears to expect." 35 When, on 17 January, 

Marshall sent strong messages to Australia 

and Java calling for an all-out effort to 

break the Japanese blockade, Wavell had 

replied that the diversion of submarines to 

33 Messages' dealing with these vessels can be 

found in AG 384.3 GHQ SWPA, and in Hist 

Branch, Off of Chief of Trans, SWPA files, Phil 

Shipping. 

.. Rads, COMINCH to CINCAF, and Brett to 

Marshall, 9 Jan 42, both in WPD Msg File. 

.. Rad, Wavell to Marshall, ABDACOM No. 53, 

15 Jan 42, WPD SWPA Collection. 
"HELP IS ON THE WAY" 

transport duty would reduce the opposition 

he could bring to bear against the enemy.36 

General Marshall granted the validity of 

Wavell's and Hart's objections and admitted they were correct in principle. But he 

also pointed out that Wavell had overlooked 

the moral effect of receiving even occasional 

small shipments. MacArthur, he reasoned, 

was containing a large number of Japanese, 

planes, and ship'>, and the longer he held out 

the more chance there was that the Japanese would be unable to put all their forces 

in the ABDA area. This consideration, he 

declared, justified the use of submarines to 

carry small quantities of critical items to 

Corregidor. 37 "As you know," he wrote Admiral King, "we are making strenuous efforts to organize blockade running on an 

extensive scale. . .' . However, under present conditions, I think it is important that 

small shipments of supplies reach MacArthur by submarine or otherwise every ten 

days or two weeks." 38 King agreed with this 

view and Wavell's orders to send aid to 

MacArthur, by submarine if necessary, remained unchanged. 

Altogether, ten submarines made the effort to reach the Philippines. One, loaded 

with ammunition, had been sent out by 

Hart on King's instructions. Another, with 

a cargo of 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition, 

had left Hawaii on 12 January. MacArthur reported the safe arrival of these two 

submarines in February, the last one reaching the Islands from Hawaii on 3 FebruM Rad, Wavell to Combined CsofS, 24 Jan 42, 

WPD Ready Ref File, Australia. Marshall's message 

of the 17th is discussed on page 3, above. 

3'1 Memo, Marshall for King, 29 Jan 42, sub: 

Atchd Msg from Wavell ... on use of Submarines. 

WPD 4560-9. 

as Ibid. 

399 

ary.an During that month three more submarines made the voyage to the Philippines: Swordfish arrived on the 19th and 

evacuated President Quezon; Sargo 

brought one million rounds of .30-caliber 

ammunition to Mindanao; and Permit, 

sent to evacuate General MacArthur, took 

on instead torpedoes and naval personnel. 

The next month only two submarines 

reached the Islands. Seadragon, en route 

to patrol off the Indochina coast, was ordered to Cebu to carry a load of rations to 

Corregidor. Though she picked up 34 tons 

of rations and almost 12,000 gallons of 

petroleum, she was able to unload only one 

fifth of her cargo before being ordered out. 

Snapper, assigned the same mission, succeeded in unloading 46 tons of food and 

29,000 gallons of diesel oil before leaving. 

The Swordfish made one more trip. 

Leaving Fremantle in Australia on 1 April 

with a cargo of 40 tons of food, she was 

diverted en route and after a short patrol 

returned to port and unloaded her cargo. 

Searaven left the same port a day after the 

Swordfish with 1,500 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition, but was also diverted and failed to deliver any of the shells 

to Corregidor. The final trip was made at 

the beginning of May, when the Spearfish, 

on patrol off Lingayen 'Gulf, picked up 

twenty-five men and women, including 

twelve nurses, just before the surrender.40 

One other submarine from Hawaii attempted to reach Corregidor with a cargo 

.. Combined CsofS, 1st Mtg, 23 Jan 42, ABC 381 

Phil, OPD Reg Doc; rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 

No. 274, 13 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil. 

.. Rpt, COM TF 51 to COM SWPA, 15 May 42, 

sub: Submarine Relief Activities, Phil, Serial FF6·4, 

A16-3, copy in OCMH. This document lists all the 

submarines and their cargo. 
400 

of 100 tons of medical supplies but turned 

back when Bataan fell. 

The total effort by the submarines added 

only 53 tons of food to MacArthur's storesenough for only one meal for two thirds of 

the men on Bataan-3,500 rounds of 3-inch 

antiaircraft ammunition, 37 tons of .50-caliber and 1,000,000 rounds of .30-caliber 

ammunition, and about 30,000 gallons of 

diesel oil. In terms of results the effort 

seemed hardly worthwhile. 

The amount of supplies brought into the 

Philippines by aircraft from Australia and 

the Netherlands Indies was more substantial but limited to items which weighed little and were small in size. Obviously rations, which were most desperately needed, 

could not be sent in sufficient quantity to 

make any difference to the garrison on 

Bataan and Corregidor. Altogether, there 

were ten air shipments, starting on 26 J anuary and continuing through 3 May. The 

first consisted of two planes, an LB-30 and 

a B-24, which carried 10,000 morphine 

tablets, other medical supplies, and ammunition. MacArthur reported their safe arrival 

at Del Monte Airfield in Mindanao to the 

Chief of Staff early in February.41 There 

was time for only one more shipment, including 50,000 quinine tablets, before the 

Japanese destroyed the hangar at Darwin, 

where the supplies destined for the Philippines were stored. As a result air transport 

operations were delayed until other supplies 

could be gathered at Batchelor Field near 

Darwin.42 

41 Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 177 and 

188, 1 and 2 Feb 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 2 A) 

Far East . 

.. Ltr, CINC SWPA to CG U.S. Army Air Services, 14 May 42, sub: Phil Relief Shipments, with 

incIs, AG 384. 3M. The inclosures provide a detailed 

breakdown of each shipment by type of supply and 

quantity, the plane, and the name of the pilot. A 

consolidated report is included among the inclosures. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

During the month of March three shipments by air were made to Mindanao--on 

the 11 th, 16th, and 26th. These flights were 

more notable perhaps for what the planes 

brought out than for what they took in. Of 

the four B-I7's that left on the 11 th, only 

one reached Mindanao with a cargo of 1,600 

pounds of medical supplies, ~ome signal 

equipment, and antiaircraft spare parts. 

The group of B-17's that made the flight 

on the 16th and 17th brought back to Australia General MacArthur, his family, and 

his staff. The final March flight took in 

5,000 pounds of critical signal equipment 

and 1,160 pounds of medical supplies (including 1,000,000 quinine tablets). On the 

return journey the planes carried President 

Quezon, who had gone only as far as Panay 

by submarine, and his staff. The largest 

number of shipments was made in April, 

and a respectable quantity of medical, signal, and ordnance equipment reached 

Mindanao during that month. The pilot of 

the last flight, made on 3 May, found the 

airdrome occupied by the Japanese and 

hastily turned around.'s 

The total air effort from Australia resulted in the accumulation of a large quantity of critically needed supplies on Mindanao. Some reached Corregidor by air, in 

small aircraft which flew in at night to land 

on the navy strip on the tail of the island. 

But the bulk of the supplies could not be 

moved northward where they were desperately needed. Like the rations brought in 

by the blockade-runners, only a very small 

amount of the precious air cargo ever 

reached the battlefield. 

By mid-March the opportunity to bring 

supplies to Bataan and Corregidor had been 

lost. During the first month and a half of 

the campaign such an effort might well have 

.. Ibid. 
"HELP IS ON THE WAY" 

been successful. But time was required to 

gather vessels and cargoes and to organize 

the men and resources. The Japanese did 

not give the Allies the time so badly needed. 

They advanced so rapidly in the Netherlands Indies that they closed the routes between Australia and the Philippines before 

the blockade-running program was well 

under way. The route northward from Mindanao and the Visayas to Manila Bay was 

blocked not long after. Thereafter, no matter 

how many tons reached the depot at Cebu 

or the airfield at Del Monte, they would be 

of little use to the men on Bataan. 

While the effort to run the blockade may 

not have paid dividends in terms of tonnages 

delivered to the troops, it was nevertheless 

one that could be amply justified on military 

and political grounds. The effort had to be 

made, no matter what the cost. The American people demanded that much at least. 

Strategically, any measure that might upset 

the Japanese timetable and contain a large 

number of Japanese troops was worth trying. Nor could the moral eff crt on the troops 

in contact with the enemy be overlooked. 

No one could be sure in January and February that the blockade would prove unbreakable; politically, strategically, and morally 

it was necessary to make the attempt. The 

gallant stand of the Philippine garrison required it; MacArthur demanded it; and the 

American people supported it. 

Last Efforts 

Toward the end of March, with Wainwright's assumption of command, a final and 

frantic effort was made to get food, vitamin 

concentrates, and medicine. In the messages 

to Washington a new and desperate note of 

urgency became evident. For the first time 

401 

the War Department received concrete 

figures on the number of troops in the Philippines when Wainwright reported that he 

had 90,000 men on Bataan alone. This fact 

could hardly be believed in Washington and 

Marshall asked for specific figures, declaring 

that 90,000 "is greatly in excess of what we 

understood was there." 44 When Wainwright's reply arrived it proved even more 

startling than his first statement. On Bataan 

and Corregidor alone, the strength of the 

command, including naval elements and 

civilians subsisted by the Army, was 

110,000.45 

There was not the slightest possibility that 

sufficient food for even a fraction of this 

force could be sent, but Marshall told 'Vainwright not to hesitate to ask for any assistance that was practicable. "It is a matter of 

continuing concern to me," he assured the 

recently appointed USFIP commander, "as 

to what additional measures the War Department might take to strengthen and sustain your gallant defense .... Your recommendations always receive my immediate 

personal attention." 4{; Similar assurances 

had already been given by the President. 

Following a lengthy, eleven-page requisition to the War Department, which could 

not possibly have been filled even under 

more favorable circumstances, Wainwright 

reviewed for General Somervell the supplies 

received from outside sources since the start 

of the campaign and explained his present 

situation. "Our desperate needs at the mo-

<ORad, Marshall to Wainwright, No. 1280, 31 

Mar 42, OPD 320.2 Phil (3-31-42). 

.. Memo, Actg CofS President, 8 Apr 42, sub: 

Food Situation in Phil, CofS File, Bataan-Corregidor; rad, Wainwright to WD, 2 Apr 42, OPD 381 

PI (3-1-42). 

4. Rad, Marshall to Wainwright, 26 Mar 42, Msgs 

to Gen Wainwright, OPD Exec O. 
402 

ment," he told the War Department G-4, 

"are subsistence and limited medical supplies, particularly quinine sulphate." 47 

The urgency of the request was emphasized in a separate message to the War Department in which he spoke of the high 

incidence of malaria and other diseases on 

Bataan and asked for a one-month supply of 

various drugs essential to the health of his 

command.48 Two days later he bluntly 

warned the Chief of Staff that disaster was 

imminent unless supplies arrived soon. 

There was only enough food on Bataan, he 

stated, to last until 15 April "at one-third 

ration, poorly balanced and very deficient 

in vitamins." If, by that time, supplies did 

not reach him, "the troops there will be 

starved into submission." 49 

To this estimate, MacArthur, who received a copy of the message, took sharp exception. Without minimizing the critical 

conditions on Bataan he maintained that 

there had been enough food there before he 

left to last until 1 May. "It is of course possible," he told the Chief of Staff, "that with 

my departure the vigor of application of 

conservation may have been relaxed." 50 To 

Wainwright he expressed his confidence that 

the efforts then being made to break the 

blockade would bring in enough food to last 

for an indefinite period and categorically 

repudiated any idea of surrender. "I am utterly opposed," he asserted, "under any 

circumstances or conditions to the ultimate 

capitulation of this command. If food fails," 

#1 Rad, Wainwright to Spmervell, No. 600, 26 

Mar 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 3) Far East. 

.. Rad, Wainwright to TAG, No. 605, 26 Mar 42, 

WPD Ready Ref File, Phil. 

•• Rad, Wainwright to Marshall, No. 625, 26 Mar 

42, Msgs from Gen Wainwright, OPD Exec O. 

'" Rad, MacArthur to Matshall, No. 56, 1 Apr 42, 

WPD Ready Ref File, Phil. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

he directed Wainwright, "you will prepare 

and execute an attack upon the enemy." ~l 

But the chief problem, to reach Wainwright with supplies, still remained unsolved. From Washington General Marshall 

used all his authority to send Wainwright 

the things he so desperately needed. In messages to Australia and Hawaii he ordered 

that every means at hand be utilized to send 

aid; all supply agencies in the War Department . were impressed with the urgency of 

the situation; and the Navy was asked to 

make submarines available. Lt. Gen. Delos 

C. Emmons, Hawaiian Department commander, was directed to send a vessel loaded 

with 3,600 tons of concentrated food to 

Manila Bay immediately. "Spare no effort 

to push this movement," the Chief of Staff 

ordered. "You are authorized to pay crew 

liberal bonus." 52 Within the week a vessel 

manned by a Navy crew and loaded with 

1,000,000 rations, 340 tons of meat, 20 tons 

of cigarettes, 158 tons of milk, 200 tons of 

rice, and 548 tons of ammunition had left 

Honolulu. The journey would take twentytwo days, sixteen more than the Japanese 

were to allow the Bataan garrison.53 

MacArthur was asked to intensify his efforts from Australia to relieve Wainwright 

and to send small boats capable of running 

the Japanese blockade between Mindanao 

and Corregidor. The need for quinine was 

so pressing, Marshall told MacArthur, that 

he was to send all he could collect by air 

immediately to Mindanao. Submarines 

" Ibid.; rad, MacArthur to Wainwright, No. 68, 

4 Apr 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

.2 Rads, Marshall to Emmons, No. 2030, 29 Mar 

42, Emmons to Marshall, No. 3088, 31 Mar 42, 

and Wainwright to Marshall, No. 632, 31 Mar 42, 

all in WPD 400 Phil (2-27-42) . 

.. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 885, 4 Apr 

42, WPD 400 Phil (2-27-42). 
"HELP IS ON THE WAY" 

furnished by the Navy would carry other 

supplies. "Report date of initial shipment by 

plane, type, and quantity of items," the 

Chief of Staff directed.54 In reply MacArthur asserted that he had already, at 

Wainwright's request, sent all the quinine 

and vitamin concentrates he had been able 

to gather on short notice. In addition he was 

planning to send another load by air soon 

and would station the plane in Mindanao 

to fly supplies northward.55 

Marshall even sought to get Wainwright 

help from China. On 30 March he asked 

Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell to look into the 

possibilities of sending food to the Philippines by ship. Stilwell replied that there was 

no chance of getting blockade-runners, but 

that he would try to secure planes and food 

for such a venture. While he was still trying, Bataan fell.56 

As each expedient failed to bring in supplies, more and more desperate and extreme 

measures were proposed in a vain attempt 

to break through the blockade. When Wainwright requested three submarines to transport supplies from Cebu, they were quickly 

made available although their transfer seriously limited naval operations. Two underwater craft on patrol west of the Philippines 

were ordered to Cebu to load supplies for 

Corregidor, and two others were readied at 

Fremantle for the trip north. The meager 

results of this mission have already been 

recounted.51 

.. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 91, 27 Mar 

42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 3) Far East. 

.. The file marked Messages from General MacArthur in Operations Division, 'Executive Office 

Files, contains a series of messages detailing MacArtl).ur's efforts to send critically needed items to 

Wainwright. 

50 WPD 400 Phil (2-27-42), Cases 9 and 10. 

n Rad, Wainwright to Marshall through COMINCH, 300940 Mar 42, Msgs 'to MacArthur, OPD 

Exec 0, Other messages dealing with this matter can 

403 

Wainwright proposed, on 27 March, still 

another scheme to break through the blockade. This proposal, first made to MacArthur, called for a surprise attack against 

Japanese naval forces in Visayan waters 

and in Subic Bay by medium or heavy 

bombers sent from Australia to Mindanao. 

Such an attack would have a fair chance, 

Wainwright thought, of temporarily disrupting the blockade so that some of the 

food tied up in Cebu could be brought in. 

As a last resort, he suggested that ten BI7's be stationed at Del Monte and, "by 

making a round trip each day, deliver a few 

days reduced ration for Bataan troops." 

Where these heavy bombers would land was 

never made clear.58 

MacArthur agreed to send the bombers 

at some indefinite date in the future and 

Wainwright completed his arrangements. 

Within a few days all was in readiness. Two 

ships of 500 tons each, one loaded with 

food and the other with gasoline, were waiting at Cebu and Iloilo. Others were standing by and would be loaded and ready to 

sail when the first bombers attacked. During 

the voyage to Corregidor, the vessels would 

be covered by three P-40's then being assembled in Mindanao. Wainwright had 

convinced himself by this time that the air 

attacks would disrupt the blockade "for a 

considerable period of time," and that he 

would be able to move all the supplies on 

Cebu, an amount sufficient to subsist the 

be found in the same file and in WPD Ready Ref 

File, Phil. Col. Stuart Wood, G-2, USFIP, prepared 

a staff study on the use of submarines to bring in 

supplies on 20 March 1942, a copy of which is in 

OCMH. 

'8 Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 154, 27 

Mar 42, AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA, This 

scheme seems to have originated with Colonel Wood, 

G-2, USFIP, who, on 25 March, submitted a staff 

study proposing that heavy bombers be used to disrupt the blockade. A copy of this study is in OCMH. 
404 

Bataan garrison for one month, to Corregidor. All he needed to carry out this ambitious plan, he told MacArthur, was heavy 

bombers.59 On the 4th MacArthur told him 

that the planes were being prepared and 

would "be available sometime the following week." 60 

Days passed but no planes came. At Cebu 

and Iloilo eight ships, fully loaded with 

rations and medicine, lay at anchor. They 

were still there when the Japanese occupied 

Cebu on the morning of 10 April. The 

bombers finally reached Mindanao the next 

day, too late to help the men on Bataan.61 

.. Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 154, 4 

Apr 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

eo Rad, MacArthur to Wainwright, No. 25,4 Apr 

42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

01 The ships, fortunately, had been scuttled before 

the Japanese arrived. Cook, Cebu Depot QM Opns, 

p. 3, App. A, QM Rpt of Opns; QM Rpt of Opns, 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Despite every effort it had proved impossible to relieve the men on Bataan. The 

beginning of April found them at their 

weakest-their fighting edge blunted and 

their capacity to resist at the lowest ebb. 

The effects of a three-month-long starvation diet, incessant air and artillery bombardment, and the ravages of disease could 

be seen in the gaunt bodies and sunken eyes 

of Americans and Filipinos alike. The loss 

of hope and the psychological impact of 

war are recorded only in the diaries and 

speech of those fortunate enough to survive. 

By 1 April, wrote General King's surgeon, 

the combat efficiency of the troops in Luzon 

Force "was rapidly approaching the zero 

point." 62 

pp. 43, 50, 54; Craven and Cate, The Army Air 

Forces in World War II, I, 417-18 . 

., Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 1. 
CHAPTER XXIII 

Preparations for Battle 

During the lull which settled over the 

battlefield on Bataan after the middle of 

February, both sides completed their 

preparations for the coming offensive. 

Throughout March General Homma 

trained and organized the fresh troops 

which poured into the Philippines from all 

parts of the rapidly expanding empire, and 

made careful and elaborate plans for a 

fresh assault against the stubborn American-Filipino line. The defenders, dug in 

along the line occupied late in January, used 

the interlude in battle to train and to improve their positions. What they needed 

most to strengthen their capacity to resist 

was food and medicine, but none was 

forthcoming. At the end of March, when 

the combat efficiency of the defenders was 

lowest, the Japanese moved into position 

for what Homma fully intended would be 

the final attack. 

The American Line 

With the exception of a few scattered 

detachments hiding out in the mountains 

of Luzon, all of the troops of General King's 

Luzon Force were crowded into the southern tip of Bataan. In this area, less than 200 

square miles, were I and II Corps, force 

reserve, the Service Command, two coast 

artillery (antiaircraft) regiments, the Provisional Tank Group, two battalions of 75-

mm. guns (SPM), plus engineer and signal 

troops. So crowded was Bataan that enemy 

aircraft "could drop their pay loads at almost any point or place and hit something 

of military value." 1 

The total strength of the units in the 

Luzon Force was 79,500. Fully three quarters of that total were Philippine Army 

troops; the rest were Philippine Scouts 

(8,000) and Americans (12,500). In addition, Luzon Force employed approximately 6,000 civilians and fed another 20,-

000 Filipino refugees. 2 A detailed breakdown of the strength of the combat elements 

is revealing. Not one of the eight Philippine 

Army divisions had its authorized strength 

of 7,500. General Bluemel's 31st Division 

was numerically the strongest, with 6,400 

men; the 71st, whose combat elements had 

been absorbed by General Stevens' 91st Division, had only 2,500. The others-the 1st, 

2d, 11 th, 21 st, 41 st, and 51 st-had less than 

6,000 men each.3 

The organization and deployment of the 

forces on Bataan at the end of March did 

not differ much from what they had been 

during the preceding two months. (Map 

17) The front line still stretched across the 

peninsula, behind the Pilar-Bagac road, 

from Orion on the east to Bagac on the west, 

a distance of thirteen miles. The right half 

of the line was held by Parker's II Corps; 

the left, now commanded by General Jones, 

by I Corps. The corps boundary roughly 

bisected the southern portion of the peninsula, extending southward along the Pantin1 Collier, Notebooks, III, 39. 

2 Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, G-l Annex, p. 1. 

, Ibid., table in G-l Annex. 
406 

gan River across the heights of the Mariveles 

and thence to Mariveles Bay via the Pan ikian River. 4 

Parker's corps on the Manila Bay side of 

the peninsula consisted in mid-March of 

approximately 28,000 men. The eastern 

anchor of the line was still held by Col. 

John W. Irwin's 31st Infantry (PA), which 

was stretched along the coast from Limay 

northward to Orion. To its left was the provisional regiment composed of Air Corps 

troops and led by Col. Irvin E. Doane. The 

31st Division (less most of two regiments) 

extended the line about a mile westward 

where the remnants of the 51st Division, 

organized as a combat team, tied in with it. 

The left anchor of II Corps was formed by 

the 21st and 41st Divisions (PA) deployed 

in front of Mt. Samat. Guarding the beaches 

from Limay southward to the corps boundary were the 2d Division (less the 1st and 

2d Philippine Constabulary Regiments), a 

company of tanks, and a battery of SPM's. 

In corps reserve Parker had the 33d Infantry (P A), less its 1 st Battalion, and two 

engineer battalions. 

In the I Corps sector, from east to west, 

were the 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment, the 11th, 1st, and 91st Divisions 

(PA), the last with the 71 st and 72d Infantry attached. The 2d Constabulary held 

the important position on the right flank, 

tying in with II Corps in the Pantingan 

River valley, a potentially dangerous corridor leading deep to the rear of the OrionBagac line. On the I Corps left, the 91 st 

Division was responsible not only for that 

portion of the line which included the West 

Road but for the coast as far south as the 

'The description of the line is from Luzon Force 

Rpt of Opm, G-3 Annex, pp. 1-3; NLF and I 

Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 22 ff; SLF and II Corps 

Rpt of Opns, pp. 37-46, 50. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Binuangan River. Defense of the beaches 

below this river was assigned to the 1st Constabulary, a battalion of the 88th Field 

Artillery (PS ) , and miscellaneous Air 

Corps units. Jones's reserve consisted of the 

45th Infantry (PS) and the horseless 26th 

Cavalry. Total strength of the corps was 

32,600 men. 

Elements of the Philippine Division, 

which never saw action as a unit during 

the campaign, were retained by General 

King in Luzon Force reserve. Numbering 

over 5,000 men, this reserve force was composed of the American 31st Infantry, the 

57th Infantry (PS), and the Provisional 

Tank Group. During the first days of April 

two engineer battalions were taken off construction work on the trails and road and 

brought into reserve as combat troops. One 

of these was the 14th Engineer Battalion 

(PS) of the Philippine Division; the other, 

the American 803d Engineer Battalion. 

The inadequacy of communications and 

the large number of separate units on the 

line made it necessary to continue the sector 

organization established late in January. In 

II Corps these sectors were designated as 

before, alphabetically from A to E. Sectors 

A and B consisted of the two right elements 

of the line. In each the unit commander was 

also the sector commander. General Bluemel 

commanded Sector C, which included his 

31st Division elements as well as the 51st 

Combat Team. Sector D coincided with the 

front held by the 21 st and 41 st Divisions 

and was commanded by General Lough 

who used his Philippine Division staff as 

the sector staff. The beach defenses were 

organized as Sector E under General Francisco, commander of the 2d Division. 

The sector organization in I Corps differed from that of the corps to the right. 

Here only three sectors were established. On 
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 

the east of the line, from the corps boundary 

midway to the coast, was the Right Sector, 

commanded by General Brougher. Next to 

it was the Left Sector which included the 

1st and 91st Divisions. General Stevens had 

assumed command of this sector when Jones 

took over command of the corps. Corresponding to Sector E in II Corps was the 

South Sector under General Pierce, responsible for defense of the beaches. Thus, Jones 

dealt with only three subordinate commanders for his entire force, and Parker 

with five. 

The large number of artillery pieces concentrated in the small area held by Luzon 

Force represented the main support of the 

infantry. In I Corps there were SO pieces, 

most of which were of 7S-mm. caliber. 

There were no lOS's, and of the 16 ISS-mm. 

pieces only 2 were howitzers. The artillery 

on Parker's side, where the danger was considered greatest, numbered twice as many 

pieces. Seventy-two of these were 7S-mm. 

guns, 12 were 2.9S-inch mountain guns, and 

the remainder were GPF's of ISS-mm. caliber. In addition, 31 naval guns, ranging in 

size from one-pounders to 3-inchers, had 

been allotted the two corps for use in beach 

defense. Army artillery consisted of 27 7Smm. guns (SPM); two antiaircraft regiments, the 200th and Sl5th, in position to 

cover the airfields and rear installations, 

with one battery of 3-inch guns and two batteries of 37 -mm. guns in support of the forward area; and one seacoast gun. Despite 

this imposing array of artillery, the effectiveness of its support was limited by the 

terrain, the absence of air observation, and 

the lack of lOS-mm. howitzers, fire control, 

and communications equipment, as well as 

motor transportation.5 

'Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 7; Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 80. 

407 

Dominating the battlefield and offering 

excellent observation over a large portion of 

the front was Mt. Samat, on the left of II 

Corps. From the coastal plain on the east 

the ground rises gently at first, then more 

precipitately, to a height of almost 2,000 

feet at the peak of Samat. The mountain 

and the surrounding country is covered with 

heavy, hardwood timber. Huge trees, six 

feet in diameter, rise to a height of 80 to 100 

feet. Beneath, the foliage is dense, much of 

it covered with large thorns to impede the 

soldier and tear his clothing to shreds. Numerous streams and rivers drain the northern slopes of the Mariveles Mountains, cutting across the Orion-Bagac line and 

forming river valleys which provided pathways to the south. Heavy forests line the 

steep banks of the rivers and the undergrowth makes movement difficult even 

along the narrow trails. Only on the east 

coast, with its swamps and cane fields, is 

the ground flat and clear enough to offer 

fields of fire. 

Movement throughout this forbidding 

area was limited to pack trails and the 

coastal road. In front and paralleling the 

line was the Pilar-Bagac road, to which the 

engineers had constructed a cutoff from KP 

136 in front of the Slst Combat Team to 

Orion on the coast. From the Pilar-Bagac 

road a number of trails led south. In the II 

Corps sector, the main north-south trails 

were 2 and 4 on the east slopes of Mt. 

Samat and 6 and 29 on the west. Connecting 4 and 29 was Trail 429. In I Corps 

Trails IS and 7 offered the enemy a choice 

of routes into the American position. Lateral communication behind the lines was provided by a series of east-west trails which 

the engineers had connected during January 

and February. In general, this road linked 

Trails 7 and 9 on the west with Trail 8 on 
408 

the east and intersected the north-south 

trail system. But all movement, though free 

from observation, would be closely restricted by the nature of the roads.6 

Radiating in all directions from the Mariveles Mountains are a large number of 

rivers and streams which trace their way, 

like the veins on the back of a man's hand, 

across the southern portion of Bataan. The 

Pantingan, which formed the corps boundary, flows north from the Mariveles Mountains to meet the Tiawir River near the 

Pilar-Bagac road. The Tiawir flows east, 

changes its name to Talisay, then continues 

on to Manila Bay. Parallel to the Pantingan 

and only a short distance to the east is the 

Catmon which also flows north from the 

Mariveles Mountains to join the TiawirTalisay River. Flowing northeast and east 

from Mt. Bataan and Mt. Limay to Manila 

Bay are numerous rivers, the largest of 

which are the San Vicente, Mamala, Alangan, and Lamao. These rivers derived their 

military importance from the fact that they 

lay across the axis of an enemy advance 

from the north. Only the southernmost of 

these rivers, however, the Lamao, which 

flows between steep, heavily wooded banks, 

presented a serious obstacle. The others, 

reduced to a trickle during the dry season, 

could only delay an enemy momentarily. 

Since the middle of February, when the 

pocket fights had ended, there had been 

little action on Bataan. During this lull 

every effort had been made to improve the 

battle line and to train the Philippine Army 

soldier. Schools were established and a 

training program organized which utilized 

fully the knowledge of the enemy acquired 

through bitter experience during the preceding months. Success in jungle warfare, 

6 Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, Nos. 10 

and 15; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 37. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

it was now clear, depended upon the ability 

of the individual soldier to a larger degree 

than in any other type of warfare. One of 

the first lessons learned was that no soldier 

should carry more than the absolute minimum required in combat, an old lesson that 

had to be learned time and again. All the 

soldier needed was his primary weapon, 

ammunition, hand grenades, entrenching 

tools, which few had, and first-aid packet. 

Everything else should be left behind, for it 

would only impede his progress through the 

dense undergrowth and limit his efficiency 

when he finally met the enemy. 

To prepare the soldier for combat, commanders were enjoined to impress upon 

him the necessity for keeping under cover 

at all times. This elementary precaution was 

especially necessary for the Philippine 

Army troops whose knowledge of military 

matters was often limited to close order 

drill and the elements of military courtesy. 

"We are gradually getting the Philippine 

Army personnel to lay flat on the ground 

instead of cowering under trees ... ," remarked one officer, "and we are suffering 

fewer casualties." 7 Americans and Filipinos 

alike were cautioned to be on the alert for 

the many tricks used by the Japanese 

soldier. One favorite Japanese ruse, the 

men were told, was to demoralize the 

enemy by creating the impression that he 

was being fired on by his own artillery. 

This effect the Japanese easily produced by 

timing their own artillery and mortar fire to 

that of the Americans. In particular, the 

men were warned against stopping to examine dead Japanese or abandoned equipment. Even at this early stage of the war 

the Japanese ruse of shamming death until 

the enemy was near enough for attack had 

already been observed. "The only safe 

, Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 6 Feb 42. 
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 

solution," it was concluded, "is to consider 

each Japanese as potentially dangerous unless he has surrendered or is dead." 8 

The validity of the tactical doctrines 

summarized in the manuals and taught in 

the schools of the Army was proved sound 

on the battlefield of Bataan. Unit commanders were reminded to pay close heed to 

first principles. Thorough and careful 

reconnaissance, experience had shown, 

should precede the selection and establishment of a position. Stress was placed on the 

necessity for a clear understanding of responsibility for maintaining contact between adjacent units. At all times units 

would have to patrol vigorously to the front 

and flanks, in recognition of the Japanese 

skill in finding gaps in the line and unprotected flanks. In an effort to train the Filipino a school for scouting and patrolling 

was established. Instruction was provided 

by selected officers and men from the Philippine Division who went forward to the 

front-line units to conduct the schoo1.9 

"Constant and aggressive patrolling between strong points and centers of resistance" was recommended as the most effective method of combating infiltration. 

Strong points were to be made mutually 

supporting, with an all-around defense, and 

organized in checkerboard manner for a 

defense in depth. If a small enemy force 

should succeed in infiltrating to the rear, a 

USAF FE training memorandum advised, 

front-line units should remain in place 

and not be stampeded. The reserve would 

be used to drive out the Japanese while 

front-line units provided supporting fire. iO 

• Tng Memo 5, USAFFE, 26 Feb 42, AG 353 

(10 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

• SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p_ 46; Bluemel, 

31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 17. 

10 Tng Memo 4, USAFFE, 12 Jan 42, AG 353 

(10 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

409 

In attacking through the jungle the 

troops were taught to advance slowly. J apanese foxholes and machine gun nests, it 

was pointed out, would have to be reduced 

one by one, usually by individuals armed 

with hand grenades. These men would have 

to be supported by continuous fire from the 

squad or platoon. The necessity for halting 

the advance one to two hours before darkness was stressed in all training. At that 

time defensive perimeters would be established to prepare for the customary Japanese night attack. The period before nightfall, it was noted, was the best time to serve 

the one cooked meal of the day. 

During the advance the infantry was advised it could not expect close support from 

the artillery. To provide this support an 

elaborate wire communications system extending to each assault company would be 

required, an obvious impossibility on 

Bataan where wire was in short supply. 

Battalion commanders were told that artillery units would be placed in direct support and that they could call for fire as 

needed. Unlike the artillery, mortars could 

be used with effect in close combat in the 

jungle when ammunition was available. 

One of the most valuable lessons learned 

during the early days of the fighting was 

that the light tanks of the Provisional Tank 

Group could be extremely useful in jungle 

warfare. Many infantry commanders had 

expressed dissatisfaction with the support 

received from the tanks, while the tankers 

felt that their arm was not understood by 

the others. Part of the difficulty undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that the tanks 

were under the control of the group commander who was himself subordinate only 

to MacArthur's headquarters. Contributing 

to the misunderstanding was the relative 

newness of armor and the lack of apprecia-
410 

tion by infantry commanders of the potentialities and proper use of tanks. 

USAFFE headquarters attempted to 

remedy this shortcoming. Tanks and infantry, it taught, should operate as a team, 

with the foot soldier following close behind 

the tank. This advice was based upon the 

observation that the Japanese usually remained in concealed positions until the 

tanks had passed and then opened up on the 

infantry at a moment when it was deprived 

of armored support. Experience had shown 

that, except under unusual circumstances, 

armor was most effective in attacks against 

limited objectives where it could be supported by infantry fire. Although a co-ordinated infantry-tank attack would of necessity be slow, the advantage gained by the 

tank's ability to destroy the enemy's prepared positions, it was believed, would more 

than compensate for the loss of speed. 

Under no circumstances, warned USAFFE 

in a training memorandum, were the tanks 

to be employed as pillboxes or left forward 

without infantry protection. 

The Americans learned valuable lessons 

from the Japanese landings behind I Corps 

late in January. The best defense against 

these landings, it had been observed, was the 

occupation of all bays and beaches with 

"vigilant and aggressive" troops armed with 

machine guns.ll Since there were not enough 

men to cover all possible landing sites, only 

the most likely could be covered in this 

manner. Mobile reserves could be used in 

the event of a landing at an unguarded 

beach. As the enemy approached close to 

shore he would be extremely vulnerable to 

automatic weapons fire. "Get the Japanese 

before he lands," advised USAFFE. "Ten 

minutes of accurate fire placed on the Japa11 Tng Memo 10, USAF FE, 1 Feb 42, AG 353 

(10 .Tan 42) Phil Reds. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

nese just prior to and during the period of 

attempted landing may save three or four 

days necessary to hunt him in the brush 

and woods." 12 

While these lessons were of undoubted 

importance in the training of the troops during the lull in battle, of more immediate importance was the improvement of fortifications and the strengthening of the OrionBagac line. Staff officers from Corregidor as 

well as from headquarters on Bataan made 

frequent inspections of the front lines and 

pointed out deficiencies in the defenses. 

Among the faults noted were the failure to 

dear fields of fire, the improper placement 

and camouflage of foxholes, and the location of wire entanglements without regard 

for tactical dispositions. These faults were 

summarized by USAFFE late in February 

and instructions issued for strengthening the 

line. "Organization of positions must be 

continued beyond the foxhole stage," it directed; "reserve and support positions prepared; trenches dug; drainage arranged 

for; camouflage improved; clearing of fields 

of fire extended to the front to include all 

foliage and cover afforded the enemy within 

small arms range." 13 Commanders and 

their staffs were enjoined to supervise and 

check the positions established, suggest improvements, and correct errors. Particular 

attention was to be given to sanitation 

which, USAFFE noted, had been neglected 

by front-line units. "The health of the command," it warned, "may be seriously endangered by neglect of these measures." 14 

The improvement of the defenses along 

the main line of resistance and the beaches 

circling the southern tip of Bataan contin12 Ibid. 

'" Tng Memo 14, USAFFE, 25 Feb 42, AG 353 

(10 Jan 42) Phil Reds. 

" Ibid. 
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 

ued throughout March. Trained technicians of the 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) 

visited all units on the line and gave instruction and assistance in fortifications.15 

Though limited by shortages of equipment 

and defense materials, the men along the 

front strung barbed wire and constructed 

tank traps and obstacles. In I Corps the 

engineers planted three large mine fields 

along the most probable routes of hostile advance and laid about 1,400 improvised 

box mines and thirty-five submarine depth 

charges, secured from Corregidor. In the 

11 th Division (P A) sector, by the end of 

March, the entire front was covered by a 

wall or palisade of bamboo poles twelve 

feet high. Though it had little value as protection against enemy attack, this wall did 

provide concealment and bolster morale.16 

While much work remained, the main 

line of resistance and the beach defenses had 

been considerably improved by the end of 

the month. In the opinion of General Casey, 

defensive positions on Bataan were well conceived and constructed, deriving their 

strength from cleared fields of fire and "suitably emplaced" automatic weapons with 

"both grazing and enfilade fire." 17 

Anticipating the possibility that all combat troops would be needed to halt a breakthrough, General King ordered all II Corps 

service units to be ready to take over defense 

of the beaches to release the 2d Division for 

counterattack. Service unit commanders 

were required to reconnoiter the trails leading to their assigned sectors to determine the 

quickest route to the beach and a trial run 

15 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 46. 

1G Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No_ 19; 

NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p_ 29; Note by Gen 

Brougher on 11 th Div Tng Memo, 4 Mar 42, copy 

in OCMH. 

,7 Memo, Chief Engineer, GHQ SWPA for CofS 

GHQ, AG 307_24 (10-25-42E) GHQ SWPA. 

411 

was made on 28 March under cover of darkness.1S In I Corps General Jones ordered 

the establishment of four switch positions 

in the Pantingan River valley, on his right 

flank, on the assumption that the main effort, as before, would be made between the 

two corps.19 

Luzon Force made its own preparations. 

These included the pooling of buses :md 

trucks, gassed and ready for immediate 

movement, in the reserve area. In this way 

the 31st Infantry (US) and the 57th Infantry (PS), in force reserve, could be 

moved quickly to any threatened portion of 

the line. Fearful also of the "pitifully thin" 

beach defenses, Luzon Force organized a 

battery of 75-mm. guns (SPM) and a company of tanks into a mobile reserve and 

ordered them "to reconnoiter roads and 

avenues of approach." 20 By the end of 

March the half-starved and poorly equipped 

Americans and Filipinos had done all they 

could to prepare for attack. The signs that 

such an attack would soon come were clear; 

"the handwriting was vivid on the wall." 21 

Japanese Preparations 

During. March General Homma completed his own plans and preparations. He 

had every reason to believe that this time 

his efforts would be crowned with success. 

Since 8 February, when he had abandoned 

his fruitless efforts to reduce Bataan, 

Homma had received large reinforceme~ts. 

Like the Americans he had utilized the lUll 

in battle to reorganize his force and to train 

and rest his weakened troops. They were 

now ready, he thought, for the final effort 

to bring the campaign to a quick close. 

18 Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 3. 

). NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p_ 29_ 

20 Collier, Notebooks, III, 60_ 

"' Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 76. 
412 

At the end of February the Japanese had 

been in desperate straits. At that time their 

infantry strength on Bataan had been reduced to approximately 3,000 effectives. 

Both the 65th Brigade and the 16th Division 

had been so sadly depleted that the 14th 

Army chief of staff described them as "a 

very weak force." 22 These heavy losses had 

been due only in part to battle casualties; 

disease and shortages of food and medicine 

had also taken their toll. 

Even by Japanese standards the lot of 

the soldier on Bataan was not an enviable 

one. Certainly he was not well fed. During 

January 14th Army's supply of rice had run 

low and efforts to procure more from Tokyo 

and from local sources in the Philippines 

had proved unavailing. As a result the ration had been drastically reduced in midFebruary. Instead of the 62 ounces normally 

issued the troops of Japan, the men on 

Bataan received only about 23 ounces, plus 

small amounts of vegetables, meat, and fish 

which were distributed from time to time. 

To this they added whatever they could 

buy, steal, or force from an unwilling civilian populace. 23 

Severe shortages of medical supplies and 

equipment had further limited the effectiveness of Japanese operations on Bataan. 

The 14th Army had begun the campaign 

'" USA vs. Homma, p. 2457, testimony of Gen 

Wachi. See also ibid., Homma's testimony on p. 

3062, Nakajima's on p. 2575, and Defense Exhibit 

Y, a casualty chart prepared by the 14th Army surgeon. 65th Brig Opns Rpt, p. 34; 14th Army Opns, 

I, 116, 231. 

"USA vs. Homma, pp. 2536, 2876-79, 2848, 

3122, testimony of Homma and of Col Shusuke 

Horiguchi, 14th Army surgeon. 

The normal Japanese field ration consisted of 

rice, fish, vegetables, soup, and pickled plums or 

radishes. Other items, such as meat, sweets, and 

fruits, were issued on special occasions. Handbook 

of Japanese Military Forces, TM-E 30-480, 15 

Sept 44, pp. 177-79. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

with but one month's supply of quinine and 

in January its use as a prophylaxis for all 

but front-line troops had been discontinued. 

After 10 March even troops in combat were 

denied the drug which was thereafter reserved for those hospitalized with malaria. 

Those sick with diphtheria received no medication and the treatment of actual or potential tetanus, gangrene, and dysentery 

cases was limited by the very small amount 

of the drugs on hand. Between 1 January 

and 31 March approximately 13,000 Japanese soldiers were hospitalized as nonbattle 

casualties alone. Since the military hospitals could accommodate only 5,000 patients 

in the period when battle casualties were 

greatest, it was impossible to provide adequate medical treatment for the sick and 

wounded.24 

The condition of his men, therefore, as 

well as the unexpectedly strong resistance 

from the American and Filipino troops, had 

forced Homma to discontinue offensive operations in February. Imperial General 

Headquarters in Tokyo, which had earlier 

taken from Homma the 48th Division and 

most of his air force, now became concerned 

over the failure to bring the campaign to an 

end. 25 Elsewhere Japanese armies had met 

with spectacular success and General H eadquarters felt that it could now spare the 

forces necessary to complete the conquest of 

the Philippines. 

This decision was in no sense an indication that the Army high command 

was satisfied with the performance of 

14th Army. It was not and soon made its 

displeasure evident by shifts in Homma's 

staff. Inspecting officers from Tokyo visiting 

"USA vs. Homma, pp. 2831-50, testimony of 

Horiguchi. See also testimony on pp. 2680-83, 2792, 

2799, and Defense Exhibit Y. 

.. Hist, Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, p. 42. 
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 

Manila had found many 14th Army officers 

comfortably settled in the capital while the 

battle for Bataan was at its height. "If the 

tactical situation went well," General Homrna later commented wryly, "that would 

have been all right for everybody." 26 Unfortunately for these officers the battle did 

not go well and on 23 February General 

Headquarters relieved General Maeda, 

Homma's chief of staff, as well as the operations and training officer and the supply officer of 14th Army headquarters. Maeda's 

place was taken by Maj. Gen. Takaji Wachi 

who arrived in the Philippines about 1 

March!' 

During the latter part of February and 

throughout the month of March Japanese 

reinforcements poured into the Philippines. 

With the individual replacements received 

during this period both the badly hit 65th 

Brigade and 16th Division were strengthened and revitalized. In February General 

N ara received about sixty officer replacements and, the following month, 3,500 men 

to take the place of the troops he had lost 

during the January attack against II Corps. 

The 16th Division received a similar number of men about the same time. 28 

The largest single addition to Homma's 

14th Army came when the 4th Division, led 

by Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano, arrived from 

Shanghai. Kitano had learned "unofficially" 

that his division was to be transferred on 4 

February but it was not until a week later 

26 USA vs. Homma, p. 3228, testimony of Homma. 

27 Ibid., and Defense Exhibit A; Southern Army 

Opns, p. 19. General Maeda gives his own reasons 

for his relief in Interrog of Maeda, 10 May 47, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist 

Diy, GHQ FEC, I. 

28 14th Army Opns, I, 123; 65th Brig Opns Rpt, 

Mt. Samat, p. 34; Itr, Chief, Hist Diy, SSUSA, to 

G-2, GHQ FEC, 9 Noy 48, 3d Ind, 16 Aug 49. 

413 

that he received orders to move out. By the 

27th of the month the first convoy, comprising division and infantry group headquarters, one infantry regiment, plus artillery 

and service troops, had reached Lingayen 

Gulf. The remainder of the division followed 

in successive convoys and by 15 March 

almost the entire 4th Division was on Luzon. 

The arrival of the 4th Division did not 

produce any great enthusiasm at 14th Army 

headquarten;-the division was poorly 

equipped and numbered only 11,000 men; 

its infantry battalions had three instead of 

four rifle companies; it lacked antitank guns 

and two of'its four field hospita1s. 29 In General Homma's opinion, Kitano's division 

was the "worst equipped" division in the 

entire Japanese Army, and, he later noted, 

had he been forced to rely on it alone to 

begin his offensive he would not have been 

"competent to attack." 30 

On 26 February, the day before Kitano's 

first group landed, a strong detachment 

from the 21st Division arrived in the Philippines. This force, led by Maj. Gen. Kameichiro Nagano, 21st Infantry group commander, and called the Nagano Detachment, numbered about 4,000 men and was 

composed of the group headquarters, the 

62d Infantry, a battalion of mountain artillery, and a company of engineers. Nagano 

had been en route from China to French 

Indochina with the rest of the 21 st Division 

when he had received the orders from 

.. USA vs. Homma, pp. 2841-42, testimony of 

Horiguchi; Interrog of Gen Kitano, 1 May 47, 

Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil 

Hist Diy, GHQ FEC, I; 14th Army Opns, 1,119; 

Itr, Chief, Hist Div, SSUSA, to G-2 GHQ FEC, 

9 Noy 48, 3d Ind, 16 Aug 49. 

30 USA vs. Homma, p. 3063, testimony of Homma. 

Ki tano had served under Homma in 1935-36 as 

a regimental commander when the latter commanded a brigade of the 4th Division. 
414 

Southern Army that sent him to the Philippines. 31 Arriving too late to participate in 

the final offensive was the 10th Independent 

Garrison which landed at Lingayen Gulf 

on 2 April. Intended as an occupation 

force, this organization consisted of five 

independent battalions of infantry but 

lacked supporting arms and services.32 

Artillery reinforcements began to reach 

the Philippines in the middle of February 

and continued to arrive in increasing numbers until the first week in April. Included 

among these units were a balloon company 

and an artillery intelligence regiment. To 

control the large number of artillery units, 

Homma was also given the 1st Artillery 

Headquarters, led by Lt. Gen. Kishio Kitajima, which was shipped from Hong Kong 

late in March. 31 Imperial General Head31 Hist of Indo-China Opns, 1941-45, Japanese 

Studies in World War II, No. 24, pp. 12-13, 

OCMH; Southern Army Opns, pp. 4-5, 19. 

3' 14th Army Opns, 1,119. The unit was led by 

Col. Torao Ikuta and is referred to in some sources 

as the !kuta Detachment. 

In addition to the strong reinforcements sent to 

Luzon, Imperial General Headquarters dispatched 

units to other portions of the Philippine Archipelago to hasten the occupation of the Visayas and 

Mindanao. Thus far only Mindoro, a portion of 

Mindanao, and a few small islands seized at the 

start of the war were in Japanese hands. On 10 

March elements of the 5th and 18th Divisions from 

Malaya and Borneo were assigned the tas'k of occupying the central and southern Philippines. In 

early April these units arrived in Lingayen Gulf, 

were augmented by 14th Army supporting and service troops and organized into two detachments for 

operations in the south. See below, Ch. XXVIII. 

33 14th Army Opns, I, 119-20; USA vs. Homma, 

p. 2635, testimony of Kitajima. The artillery reinforcemen ts consisted of the following units: 

1st Arty Hq 

1st Field Heavy Arty Regt (240-mm. howitzers) 

2d Independent Heavy Arty Btry (240-mm. 

howitzers) 

3d Independent Mountain Arty Regt (75-mm. 

mountain guns) 

3d Mortar Bn 

14th Independent Mortar Bn (300-mm. mortars) 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

quarters also provided air reinforcements 

for the coming offensive by giving Homma 

two heavy bombardment regiments consisting of a total of sixty twin-engine bombers. 

The two regiments flew in from Malaya 

and landed at Clark Field on 16 March. 

Naval air units were also dispatched to 

Luzon to assist 14th Army air elements 

which were reorganized into the 22d Air 

Brigade under Maj. Gen. Kizo Mikami. By 

the beginning of April, therefore, Homma 

had a sizable air force to throw against the 

defenders of Bataan.34 

While recently arrived and veteran units 

alike were put through a rigorous training 

program, 14th Army staff officers made 

preparations for the coming offensive. The 

final plan, completed on 22 March, was 

based on the incorrect assumption that the 

defenders numbered 40,000 men and were 

deployed along three lines: the first along 

Mt. Samat, the second along Mt. Limay, 

and the final line near Mariveles at the tip 

of the peninsula. 35 (Map 20) To break 

through this defense in depth, 14th Army 

proposed to make a co-ordinated infantry2d Independent Mortar Bn (150-mm. mortars) 

20th Independent Mountain Arty Bn (75-mm. 

mountain guns) 

One Co, 21st Field Heavy Arty Bn (150-mm. 

howitzers) 

5th Arty Intel Regt 

3d Tractor Unit 

1 st Balloon Co 

34 14th Army Opns, I, 156; 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 

58, 70-71; ltr, Chief, Hist Div, SSUSA, to G-2 

GHQ FEC, 9 Nov 48, 3d Ind, 16 Aug 49. 

'" USA us. Homma, pp. 2457, 2576. At his trial 

General Homma explained that his intelligence 

officer had estimated enemy strength on Bataan as 

25,000 men, but that he, Homma, believed this 

figure to be too low. He had told his intelligence 

officer so and had directed him to "go back and 

estimate again." The next estimate was 40,000. 

"So," explained Homma at his trial, "in my estimation, I told him it must be 60,000, but I have no 

data to contradict you, so I accept your estimation." 

Ibid., pp. 3064-65. 
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 

JAPANESE PLAN OF ATTACK 

3 April 1942 

'ITTTTTrTTTTTTT u. S. MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE --0-- TRAIL AND TRAIL NUMBER 

FLOOOEO AREA 

Elevations in {S8t 

o 

MAP 20 

artillery-air assault along a narrow front, 

with Mt. Samat as the initial objective. 

From here the Japanese would push on to 

the Mt. Limay line, supported, if necessary, 

by an advance along the East Road. Once 

this line was gained, 14th Army would 

bring the campaign to an end by seizing 

Mariveles. Preparations for the assault 

against Corregidor would begin immediately thereafter. 36 

3. The description of the Japanese plan is based 

upon: 14th Army Opns, I, 128-42, 146-56, II, 

17-42; 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 54-63; Interrog of 

Kitano, 1 May 47, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I; 

Statements of Lt Col Hiromi Oishi, 4th Div staff, 

2 Oct 50, ATIS Doc 62639, and Col Motohiko 

Yoshida, CofS 4th Diu, 28 Jul 49, ATIS Doc 

62642, both in Statements of Japanese Officials on 

World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, III, 

113, IV, 548. 

415 

MANILA 

BA Y 

In contrast to his expectations for a 

speedy victory in January, Homma, who 

had by this time acquired a healthy respect 

for his opponent, now believed that it 

would take about a month to complete the 

conquest of Bataan: one week to seize Mt. 

Samat, two weeks to crack the Limay line, 

and one more week to mop up. "I do not 

know," Homma wrote, "whether the enemy 

on Bataan will try to fight to the end at 

their first and second line, whether they will 

retreat back to Corregidor and fight, escape 

to Australia, the Visayas or Mindanao, or 

give up at the right time, but I still propose 

to prepare for the worst." 37 

37 14th Army Opns, II, 16, Homma Notes, and I, 

129; USA vs. Homma, p. 3065, testimony of 

Homma. 
416 

Instructions for the coming offensive 

were issued to all major commanders on 23 

March at a meeting in San Fernando. General Kitano, commander of the 4th Division, was told that his division would carry 

the burden of the main assault in front of 

Mt. Samat and that he would receive close 

support from General Nara's 65th Brigade. 

Protection of the left (east) flank of the 

advance was assigned to General Nagano's 

21 st Division detachment, and the 16th Division commander, General Morioka, was 

given the mission of making a feint attack 

in front of I Corps. Beginning the next day, 

24 March, General Mikami's 22d Air Brigade, aided by naval aircraft, would begin 

an intensive air assault against the American line, and just before the ground assault 

opened General Kitajima's artillery would 

join in the attack to soften up the opposition. 

There was no disagreement over the selection of 3 April as D Day. But zero hour was 

not fixed without a good deal of discussion. 

General Kitano and his 4th Division staff 

urged that the ground assault begin at.noon. 

To delay until later in the day, they argued, 

would needlessly expose the troops to enemy 

artillery fire before the attack. The 65th Brigade commander, General Nara, with three 

months' experience on Bataan, felt that the 

Americans would take advantage of the 

daylight hours to mass their extremely effective artillery fire against the advancing 

infantry if the attack jumped off too early. 

He preferred to delay zero hour until dusk 

and move forward under cover of darkness. 

Since no agreement could be reached, 

Colonel Nakayama, 14th Army operations 

officer, presented a compromise plan fixing 

the time of the infantry attack at 1500. A 

disagreement over the objectives of the first 

day's attack was also settled by compromise; 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

thereafter the detailed planning proceeded 

with few interruptions. 

The plans finally drawn up for the 3 

April offensive provided for a heavy air and 

artillery bombardment on the morning of 

D Day. After a five-hour preparation the assaulting infantry would move out to the 

attack, the 65th Brigade on the right (west), 

the 4th Division on the left. The first objective, Mt. Samat, was to be taken at the end 

of the first week of operations. 

The Japanese would advance in three 

columns. The right (west) column would 

consist of General Nara's 65th Brigade 

whose main force would march up the Pantingan River valley, along Trail 29, on the 

extreme left of the II Corps line. One element of the brigade was to remain west of 

the Pantingan River, in I Corps, to maintain contact with the 16th Division. Nara's 

objective was control of the area west of 

Mt. Samat. When he had gained this objective, he was to halt his troops, reorganize, 

and prepare to seize the commanding 

heights of the Mariveles Mountains. 

The 4th Division was to advance in two 

columns. On the right, next to the 65th 

Brigade and making the main effort, was 

Maj. Gen. Kureo Taniguchi's Right Wing, 

consisting of the 61 st Infantry, one battalion 

of the 8th Infantry, the 7th Tank Regiment 

(less two companies), and artillery and service units. Taniguchi, the infantry group 

commander of the 4th Division, was to take 

his men across the Tiawir River and down 

along the Catmon River, in the center of 

Sector D, toward Mt. Samat. The 4th Division's Left Wing, organized around the 8th 

Infantry and led by Col. Haruji Morita, the 

regimental commander, was to form the 

easternmost column of the Japanese drive. 

It was to advance down Trail 4, against the 
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 

Philippine Army's 21st Division on the right 

of Sector D, directly toward the first objective, Mt. Samat. 

Supporting the advance of the 4th Division and the 65th Brigade would be the 

16th Division and the Nagano Detachment, 

initially in Army reserve. The former, with 

attached artillery and tanks, was to protect 

the right (west) flank of the assault. On 31 

March, three days before the main effort 

began, Morioka would begin a feint attack 

against I Corps, and thereafter maintain 

constant pressure against that corps to pin 

down General Jones's troops. By 8 April 

Morioka was to be ready to move the bulk 

of his division eastward to support the advance of the 4th Division. An element of 

the Nagano Detachment was to protect the 

4th Division's east flank and later the entire 

detachment was to divert the enemy and 

pin down his beach defense troops by feinting landings along the east coast of Bataan, 

between Orion and Limay. 

By the end of the first week of operations, 

General Homma estimated, the 4th Division 

would be approaching the Mamala River, 

and the 65th Brigade, the foothills of the 

Mariveles. Along the river Homma expected 

to encounter the strong defenses of the 

Limay line, a line which existed only in 

Japanese estimates and plans. With the 16th 

Division ready to move east to the support 

of the 4th Division and with the Nagano 

Detachment poised to advance down the 

East Road, Homma hoped to be able to 

pierce the defenses of this line and defeat 

the American and Filipino force in two 

weeks. After that, operations would consist 

largely of mopping up. Homma's estimates 

in this case, unlike those he had made earlier 

in the campaign, were extremely conservative. General Kitano, who had not yet been 

in combat on Bataan, was far more sanguine 

417 

about the results of the initial attack. Once 

Mt. Samat had been taken and the II Corps 

front rolled back, he believed, only "a pursuit of the Americans" would be required.3s 

For once the more optimistic of the Japanese estimates proved correct. 

Prelude to Attack 

During the second week of March the 

month-long lull which had followed the 

Japanese withdrawal from the OrionBagac line came to an end. American and 

Philippine patrols now began to meet opposition from a counterreconnaissance s~reen 

which Homma had thrown forward to mask 

preparations for the coming offensive. As 

the days passed Japanese patrols became 

more active, and troops along the outpost 

line reported skirmishes with the enemy who 

was already moving out to the line of departure. By the last week of March the 

Japanese had pushed forward their screen 

to within 1,000 yards of the American line.39 

There were other equally obvious signs 

after the middle of March that the Japanese would soon renew the attack. Observers reported that they were moving supplies and troops into Bataan and building 

roads. Enemy aircraft, rarely seen in the 

month following the Japanese withdrawal, 

now began to appear in increasingly large 

numbers, attacking front-line troops, artillery positions, and supply areas to the rear. 

88 Interrog of Kitano, 1 May 47, Interrogations of 

Former Japanese Officer, Mil Hist Div, GHQ 

FEC,!. 

.. Collier, Notebooks, 111,52,59; O'Day, 21st Div 

(PA), II, 35-36; 14th Army Opns, 1,122-23; Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, G-2 Annex. A daily report 

on the enemy build-up is contained in the messages 

of General Beebe to MacArthur, and Wainwright to 

the War Department in G-3 USFIP Journal, 19 

Mar-19 Apr 42, AG 461 (1 Apr 42) Phil Reds. 
418 

The presence of many small boats and native craft at the mouth of the Pampanga 

River on the north shore of Manila Bay 

hinted at the possibility of amphibious attacks along the east coast of Bataan, similar 

to those made earlier against I Corps. 

Through the month the Japanese shelled 

the American positions intermittently with 

75-mm. guns mounted on the largest of 

these boats. Though their marksmanship 

was poor, their fire increased apprehension 

of a landing behind the lines.40 

Japanese artillery activities increased 

also. The Japanese guns which had been 

silent for several weeks began to sound 

again and an observation balloon floating 

over the high ground west of Abucay gave 

notice of the arrival of larger Japanese 

pieces than the Americans had yet encountered.41 

To these portents of a new Japanese offensive General Homma added a direct 

warning of dire consequences if the Bataan 

defenders did not surrender. In a message 

to General Wainwright, copies of which 

were dropped over Bataan in beer cans, 

Homma praised the valiant stand made by 

the Americans and Filipinos but declared 

that he now had large enough forces and 

supplies "either to attack and put to rout 

your forces or to wait for the inevitable starvation of your troops. . . ." He urged 

Wainwright to be sensible and follow "the 

defenders of Hongkong, Singapore and the 

Netherlands East Indies in the acceptance 

of an honorable defeat." To do otherwise, 

he pointed out, would be disastrous. The 

.. Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p .. 2 and G-2 Annex; 

Collier, Notebooks, III, 52, 58-59; Mallonee, 

Bataan Diary, II, 79-80. 

U Quin tard, Diary, en tries of 19 Mar-l Apr 42; 

Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 7; Collier, Notebooks, 

111,59, 62. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

message closed with the ominous warning 

that if Wainwright did not reply by 

noon of the 22d, Homma would consider 

himself "at liberty to take any action 

whatsoever." 42 

More specific information about Homrna's intentions came on the night of 24 

March when some Filipino troops found on 

the body of a Japanese officer a detailed 

order for a reconnaissance in force of the 

Mt. Samat area. The order specified that 

information was to be obtained about 

routes of advance for tanks, favorable points 

for river crossings, and American artillery 

positions around Mt. Samat. The document 

further revealed that, following the reconnaissance, some time after 26 March the 

Japanese would attack in the Mt. Samat 

region and even indicated "with considerable exactitude" the plan of the attack.43 

By now the Japanese air and artillery 

bombardment had made life for the sick 

and hungry men on Bataan a living hell. 

Enemy planes, unopposed except for a few 

antiaircraft guns, were over the American 

lines at all hours of the day, bombing and 

strafing at will. "Every few minutes," wrote 

an American officer, "one plane would drop 

down, lift up the tree branches and lay one 

or two eggs. Every vehicle that tried to 

move, every wire-laying detail, infantry 

patrols, even individuals moving in the open 

were subject to these spot bombings." 44 

Japanese artillery concentrated on frontline positions and on the Americans' larger 

.. The text of the surrender message is in the exhibits of the trial of General Homma, Prosecution 

Exhibit 421. 

4' Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, G-2 Annex; SLF 

and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 47; Emerson, Opns of 

II Phil Corps, 10 Jan-8 Apr 42, pp. 21-22; Fortier, 

Notes on 41st Div (PA), p. 5; itr, Fowler to author. 

22 Mar 49, OCMH. 

.. Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 80. 
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE 419 

SEEKING COVER IN A TRENCH NEAR LAMAO during an air attack. 

guns, co-ordinating with the air forces in 

an effort to knock out the American artillery. Though the effort was unsuccessful, by 

destroying communications and shelling 

observation posts and battery positions, the 

] apanese lowered the efficiency of the artillery "to a considerable extent." 45 

While the materiel losses from the bombings were not very great, the effect of the 

air-artillery attack, which increased in 

severity daily, on the efficiency of the troops 

was pronounced. The men were under 

shelter a good part of the time and many 

began to show a marked reluctance to move 

far from cover. The alert might sound in the 

midst of a meal or while the men were at 

rest, and everyone would dash for shelter. 

Rank made no difference; the men headed 

.. Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 7. 

for the nearest foxhole and remained there 

until the attack was over. One Filipino 

officer, three times wounded and returned 

to duty each time, strangely enough usually 

found himself in sole possession of any foxhole he selected. The men estimated that 

his luck had run out and when he hopped 

into a foxhole they promptly jumped out 

and ran for another. 46 Work was constantly 

being interrupted by the bombardment, and 

officers inspecting the defenses spent fully 

half their time in a ditch. "These high 

bombers get my goat," wrote Colonel 

Quintard in his diary. "You never know 

when they are going to unload, and the 

waiting get~ hard; when they do unload any 

"Capt Andrew D. Shoemake, 41st FA (PA), 

p. 32, Chunn Notebooks. Shoemake was instructor 

of the 2d Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (PA) . 
420 

place near, it sounds like an express train 

bearing down on you for a few seconds before they hit." 47 

On 28 March, 14th Army issued final 

orders for the offensive, and all troops began to move forward to the line of departure. The 65th Brigade, with elements on 

both sides of the Pantingan River, pushed 

in the outpost line of the 21st and 41st Divisions and took up a favorable position for 

the attack, To its east, the 4th Division advanced from the assembly area to the front 

and by 2 April both wings of the division 

were posted along the north shore- of the 

Tiawir-Talisay River. The Nagano Detachment, the easternmost unit of the Japanese 

advance, was already in position to carry 

out its mission. Far to the west, in front of 

I Corps, the 16th Division had already tied 

4f Quintard, Diary, entry of 28 Mar 42. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

in with the 65th Brigade and begun to make 

feint attacks against General Jones's line.48 

By.2 April all preparations had been completed and the Japanese could announce 

publicly over the radio that they were ready 

to begin "an all out offensive in Bataan." 49 

"Our four groups [the 4th and 16th Divisions, the Nagano Detachment, and the 

65th Brigade] have been brought into line 

and on a front of 2S kilometers ten flags are 

lined up," wrote General Homma on the 

eve of the attack. "Artillery is plentiful. 

There are also enough special guns, and 

supply arrangements have been completely 

prepared . . .. There is no reason why this 

attack should not succeed." 00 

.. 14th Army Opns, I, 143-44; Luzon Force Rpt 

of Opns, p. 2; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 

49; Oster and Richards, 21st Inf (PA), p. 10, 

Chunn Notebooks . 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 47. 

.0 14th Army Opns, II, 17, Homma notes. 
CHAPTER XXIV 

The Final Japanese Offensive 

Friday, 3 April, was not only the day 

Homma had selected to open the offensive; 

it was also a religious and national holiday 

for the soldiers on both sides of the battle 

line. For the Christian defenders it was the 

Friday of Holy Week, and the more devout 

observed the anniversary of the Crucifixion 

with prayers and fasting. For the Japanese, 

the 3d of April marked the anniversary of 

the death of the legendary Emperor Jimmu, 

the first ruler to sit on the imperial throne. 

In Japan there would be religious ceremonies and feasting; on Bataan the soldiers of 

. Hirohito, a direct descendant of the Emperor Jimmu, would celebrate the day in 

more warlike manner. If all went well, they 

might gain victory in time to make the emperor's birthday, 29 April, a day of special 

rejoicing.1 

1 Japanese sources used in the preparation of this 

chapter include: 14th Army Opns, I, 147-50, 156-

63, II, Maps 12 and 13; 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 72-

74; USA vs. Homma, p. 2651, testimony of Kitajima; Statements of Col Oishi, 2 Oct 50, ATIS Doc 

62639, and Col Yoshida, 28 Jul 49, ATIS Doc 

62642, both in Statements of Japanese Officials on 

World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, III, 

113-15, IV, 548-51. 

American sources of a general nature include: 

USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 57-59; Luzon 

Force Rpt of Opns, pp. 3-4; SLF and II Corps Rpt 

of Opns, pp. 50-56; Collier, Notebooks, III, 71-74; 

Quintard, Diary, entries of 3-6 Apr 42; Phil Div 

Rpt of Opns, pp. 24-27; Mallonee, Bataan Diary, 

II, 81, 90-91. References to the detailed accounts 

of operations are cited below. 

Capture of Mt. Samat 

On Good Friday the sun rose in a cloudless sky and gave promise of another hot, 

dry day so like those which had preceded 

it with endless monotony. From the top of 

Mt. Samat two American officers serving as 

artillery observers could plainly see the 

heavy Japanese guns, two to three miles 

behind the line, making ready to fire. Before their view was obscured they counted 

nineteen batteries of artillery and eight to 

ten mortar batteries. Observers to their east 

reported many more batteries of light artillery massed in close support of the infantry.2 

At 0900 this large array of guns, howitzers, 

and mortars, altogether almost 150 pieces, 

began to register on their targets. 

The Japanese began firing for effect at 

1000 and continued to fire with only one 

half-hour pause until 1500, in what was undoubtedly the most devastating barrage of 

the campaign, equal in intensity, many 

thought, to those of the first World War. 3 

Simultaneously, the bombers of the 22d 

Air Brigade came out in force to add the 

'Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 81; Shoemake, 41st 

FA (PA), p. 32, Chunn Notebooks; interv, author 

with Maj Winston A. Jones, 41st FA (PA), 8 May 

49. Shoemake and Jones were the two American 

observers. 

3 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 81; Ellis, 23d Inf 

(PA), p. 14, Chunn Notebooks; ltr, Col Wetherby 

to author, 22 May 51, OCMH. 
422 

weight of their bombs to the constant stream 

of shell~ falling upon the defenders huddled 

in their foxholes. In the 150 sorties flown 

that day, General Mikami's air force 

dropped more than sixty tons of bombs. 

Smaller aircraft swooped low over the front 

lines, strafing troops and vehicles at will, 

while far above them observation planes 

guided the bombers toward those batteries 

brave enough to reply to the Japanese 

barrage. "It was agonizing," wrote the 

commander of an antiaircraft battery, "to 

watch the heavies sail serenely over us, 

1,000 yards beyond our maximum range." 4 

The effect of the air-artillery bombardment was devastating. So violent and continuous were the explosions, so thunderous 

the din that it seemed as though "all hell" 

had broken 100se.5 Many of the defenses so 

carefully constructed during the weeks preceding the attack "were churned into a 

worthless and useless mess." 8 Telephone 

lines and artillery positions were knocked 

out. Fire spread rapidly when the cane fields 

and bamboo thickets were set ablaze and 

the smoke and dust lay so thick over the 

battlefield that observers atop Mt. Samat 

were unable to direct fire. By 1500 the 

artillery and aircraft had done their work. 

At that time the infantry and armor moved 

out to the attack. 

Penetration 

The air and artillery preparation which 

had begun at 1000 that morning had been 

concentrated against the comparatively 

narrow front on the extreme left of II Corps, 

• Maj John McM. Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 

91st CA (PS), p. 106, copy lent to author by Major 

Gulick, OCMH. 

• Quintard, Diary, entry for 3 Apr 42. 

• Collier, Notebooks, III, 71. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

held by the troops of Sector D. It was in 

this sector, commanded by General Lough, 

that the American line was stretched thinnest, and it was in this sector that the Japanese first came. 

Sector D extended from KP 136 on the 

Pilar-Bagac road westward for about 5,000 

yards to the corps boundary along the Pantingan River. Bisecting the sector front was 

the Catmon River, which, with the Pantingan, offered a natural route of advance 

southward. ( Map 21) In addition to these 

two river valleys, Sector D contained three 

excellent north-south trails, two of which 

connected with the main east-west trail system. The westernmost of these was Trail 29, 

between the Pantingan and the Catmon. 

About five miles in length, this trail ran from 

the Pilar-Bagac road along the western 

foothills of Mt. Samat to Trail 8, the main 

east-west line of communication in II Corps. 

Along the east bank of the Catmon was 

Trail 6, which also began at the Pilar-Bagac 

road and ran to Trail 8. East of Mt. Samat 

was the third of the north-south trails in 

Sector D, Trail 4. In addition to Trail 8, 

lateral communication in Sector D was 

provided by Trail 429. This trail ran due 

east from Trail 29 to Trail 6 which it joined 

until it cleared the western foothills of Mt. 

Samat. At that point it branched east again, 

skirting the southern edge of the mountain 

to meet Trail 4 near the boundary of 

Sectors D and C. 

Sector D was held by two Philippine 

Army divisions. On the right (east), in front 

of Mt. Samat, was the 21st Division, led 

by Brig. Gen. Mateo Capinpin, and next to 

it, on the extreme left of the II Corps line, 

was General Lim's 41st. Both divisions had 

their three infantry regiments posted along 

the main line of resistance which generally 

paralleled the Pilar-Bagac road just south 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

MAP 21 

of the Tiawir-Talisay River. About 1,500 

yards to the rear was the regimental reserve 

line. With their three regiments on the line 

and with the few remaining elements deployed elsewhere, both divisions would be 

hard pressed if the need for reserves should 

anse. 

In the 21st Division area General Capinpin had placed two of his regiments, the 

22d and 23d, east of the Catmon River, 

423 

JAPANESE PENETRATION 3-6 April 1942 

.""""""" u, S. MAIN LINE OF RESISTAHCE , :3 APR 

---+- AXIS OF' JAPANESE ATTACK 

--..... MOVEMENT OF U. S. RESERVE UNITS 

T'TTTTTn U.S. POSITIONS (APPRoxJ. NIGHT 6-7 APR 

Elel'ofions in feel 

MitES 

with the former holding the division right 

flank and tying in with Sector C to the right. 

The 21st Infantry on the division left flank 

held both banks of the Catmon as well as 

Trail 6, which cut diagonally across the 

regimental area from the right front to the 

left rear. General Lim's regiments were 

posted in order, with the 43d on the right, 

tying in with the 21st Infantry, the 42d in 

the center, and the 41st holding down the 
424 

division and sector flank along the Pantingan. Across the river, on the extreme 

right of the I Corps line, was the 2d Philippine Constabulary. 

Against this front the Japanese had 

massed the entire force committed to the 

assault, the 65th Brigade and the 4th Division both heavily reinforced. With the exception of one battalion west of the Pantingan, all of General Nara's reinforced 

brigade was concentrated before the 42d 

Infantry where Trail 29 joined the PilarBagac road. The Right Wing of the 4th 

Division, led by General Taniguchi and 

consisting of tanks, the 61st Infantry, a 

battalion of the 8th Infantry, plus supporting and service elements, had taken up a 

position north of the Tiawir, opposite the 

center of Sector D, and was poised to strike 

down Route 6 and the Catmon River valley. 

The division's Left Wing (8th Infantry), 

which was not scheduled to attack until the 

5th, was farther to the east and north, 

facing the two right regiments of the 21st 

Division. 

At 1500, when the air and artillery 

bombardment shifted south, the 65th 

Brigade and Taniguchi's Right Wing 

moved out to the assault. Nara's troops on 

the left (west) bank of the north-flowing 

Pantingan, supported by heavy mortar fire, 

pushed hard against the 2d Philippine Constabulary to reach the I Corps main line 

of resistance. Though it was unable to penetrate the I Corps line, this force, a reinforced battalion, presented a real threat to 

Jones's right flank and prevented him from 

coming to the aid of the adjacent units in 

Parker's corps. N ara's main effort, however, 

was made against II Corps. Here, the bulk 

of his brigade, led by tanks, pushed down 

against the center of the 41st Division and 

by late afternoon reached the 42d Infantry 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

main line of resistance, where, according to 

plans, it should have halted. The Japanese 

had expected to meet opposition there, but 

the line was not occupied, whereupon Nara 

ordered his men to continue southward 

along Trail 29. By nightfall the brigade had 

scored an advance of about 1,000 yards. 

Taniguchi's force to the left (east), led 

by tanks of the 7th Tank Regiment, crossed 

the Tiawir just north of the boundary between, the 43d and 21st Infantry, in the 

center of Sector D. Two 37-mm. antitank 

guns had been emplaced here to oppose a 

crossing, but they had been put out of action by the heavy bombardment earlier in 

the day. Once across the river Taniguchi 

led his men against the main line of resistance. After desultory fire the Filipinos scattered and Taniguchi advanced without 

difficulty. Before halting for the night he 

had taken his men about 1,000 yards down 

Trail 6. The Japanese advance for the first 

day of the attack exceeded even their most 

optimistic estimates.7 

The lack of opposition to the Japanese 

advance on the afternoon of 3 April was 

due entirely to the effects of the air and artillery bombardment earlier that day on the 

hungry and weakened troops of the 41st 

Division. It was upon this division that the 

weight of the shells and bombs had fallen 

and in its area that the damage had been 

greatest. Dazed and demoralized by the in-

• The account of action in the 41st Division sector is based on the American and Japanese sources 

cited at the beginning of the section and upon the 

following records of the 41st Division: Fortier, 41st 

Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, pp. 5-6, copy in OCMH; 

Fortier, Notes on 41st Div (PA), pp. 12-14,91; 

Shoemake, 41st FA (PA), pp. 32-33, and Lt Max 

Kissel, Hist of 42d lnf (PA), 3-9 Apr 42, p. 29, 

both in Chunn Notebooks; Wetherby, Opns of 41st 

lnf (PA), 2-10 Apr 42, in Fortier, Notes on 41st 

Div (PA), pp. 164-69; ltr, Wetherby to author, 22 

May 51, OCMH; interv, author with Maj Jones, 

41st FA (PA), 8 May 49. 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

tensity of the five-hour-Iong artillery concentration and the ferocity of the strafing 

and bombing attacks, choked and blinded 

by the smoke and dust, literally burned out 

of their positions by the brush fires which 

sprang up everywhere along the front lines, 

the Filipinos had fled south in disorganized 

and unruly mobs. Nothing and no one could 

stop them. When one officer ordered some 

of his men back into the line, they "stared 

dumbly" at him and continued on their way 

to the rear.8 Even before the Japanese tankinfantry attack had begun to roll, the 41st 

Division had ceased to exist as an effective 

military organization. 

The units most affected by the bombardment and the assault were the 42d and 43d 

Infantry. The first, in the center of the division front where bamboo fires burned 

fiercely, had retreated in a disorderly fashion, some of the men following Trail 29 into 

the 41st Infantry area, and others drifting 

eastward to join the retreating 43d on the 

western slopes of Mt. Samat. Only the 41st 

Infantry on the extreme left of the line, 

which had escaped the full weight of the 

preliminary bombardment, had withdrawn 

in an orderly fashion. Augmented by a continuous stream of stragglers from the 42d, 

the regiment had fallen back to its regimental reserve line near the junction of 

Routes 29 and 429 and held firmly there all 

afternoon. Early in the evening, on the basis 

of misunderstood or garbled orders, the regiment began to move south toward Trail B. 

The 21st Division had also suffered heavily from the day's bombardment, but only 

its westernmost element, the left battalion 

of the two-battalion 21 st Infantry, had 

broken. Posted in front of the Pilar-Bagac 

road, on the west bank of the Catmon River, 

8Lt Henry Harris, Hist, 41st Engineer Bn (PA), 

p. 34, Chunn Notebooks. 

425 

this battalion stood in the path of Taniguchi's powerful Right Wing, and when the 

enemy tanks appeared the Filipinos, "shattered by incessant shelling and bombing, 

weak from dysentery, malaria, and malnutrition," fled to the rear. 9 The right battalion 

of the regiment, however, held firm. Hurriedly organizing the scattered elements of 

the left battalion, the regimental commander, Lt. Col. William A. Wappenstein, 

was able by nightfall to re-establish his line 

with a refused left flank along the east bank 

of the Catmon. 

News of the rout of the 41st Division and 

the disintegration of the corps left flank 

reached General Parker, the corps commander, late in the afternoon of Good Friday. The danger was immediate and compelling and he quickly released the only unit 

he had in reserve, the 33d Infantry (P A) , 

less the 1st Battalion, to General Lough, 

commander of Sector D. The regiment, led 

by Maj. Stanley Holmes, moved out at dusk, 

under orders to establish a defensive position 

across Trail 6 between Mt. Samat and the 

Catmon River by morning of the 4th. 

Sector D headquarters, too, took prompt 

measures to stem the rout of the 41 st Division and set up a line in front of the advancing Japanese. The 42d Infantry, hopelessly 

disorganized and scattered, it apparently 

wrote off as a total loss, but General Lough 

thought there was still a chance to salvage 

the shattered 43d and use it against the J apanese. On the evening of the 3d he sent Col. 

Malcolm V. Fortier, senior instructor of the 

41st Division, northward to help reorganize 

the regiment and lead it back up the Catmon valley to a position west of the 33d 

Infantry. Later that night, the sector G-3, 

Col. Robert J. Hoffman, learning that the 

41st Infantry had retreated to the junction 

'O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 5. 
426 

of Trails 29 and 8, sent the regiment back 

along Trail 29 with orders to occupy the 

regimental reserve line. Thus, by the morning of the 4th, if all went well, there would 

be three regiments, the 41st, 43d, and 33d, 

in position to oppose a Japanese advance 

south along the Pantingan and Catmon 

valleys. 

Homma's original plan had been a cautious one, calling for a limited advance on 

4 April to gain positions from which to 

launch the drive on Mt. Samat. But the 

unexpected success of the first day's action 

justified a bolder course and on the evening 

of the 3d he ordered the 4th Division 

and the 65th Brigade to disregard earlier 

orders and to continue their advance toward Mt. Samat next day. Their attack 

would be preceded by a co-ordinated air 

and artillery bombardment almost equal in 

intensity to that which had preceded the 

Good Friday attack. 

When Homma's orders reached them, 

both commanders quickly revised their 

plans and prepared to attack the next morning. The 65th Brigade on the west would 

continue its drive south up the Pantingan 

valley, on both sides of the river. The 4th 

Division's Right Wing would advance along 

the line of the Catmon River, and the 7th 

Tank Regiment east along the Pilar-Bagac 

road. Colonel Morita's Left Wing, which 

had not been in action on the first day of 

the offensive, would cross the Tiawir-Talisay River in front of the right half of Sector 

D, the area held by the 22d and 23d Infantry, during the morning. Once across the 

river it would pause to reorganize, then attack in force at about noon, at the same 

time that Taniguchi's infantry moved out 

to the assault. 

American plans to place three infantry 

regiments in the path of the Japanese adTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

vance were only partially successful. When 

Colonel Fortier reached the 43d and the 

remnants of the 42d Infantry on the western slopes of Mt. Samat on the night of 

the 3d, he found the men still bewildered 

and demoralized. American officers had 

sought vainly to calm them and restore some 

semblance of order, and Fortier was able to 

round up only several hundred men from 

the two regiments. After the men had been 

served hot coffee, they started advancing 

along the trail in the darkness toward their 

new position west of the Catmon River. 

There was no difficulty with the 41st Infantry. This regiment, which Colonel Hoffman had ordered forward on the night of 

3-4 April, reached its former regimental 

reserve line between Trail 29 and the Pantingan River without incident by 0930 of 

the 4th. 

Major Holmes's 33d Infantry, numbering about 600 men, had begun its march 

west along the section of Trail 429 which 

extended south of Mt. Samat early on the 

evening of the 3d.10 The men, many of 

whom had just risen from sick beds, moved 

slowly in the darkness, passing large numbers of stragglers pouring back to the rear. 

"Few had arms of any kind .... Few even 

had packs ... ," wrote Capt. Robert M. 

Chapin, 3d Battalion commander. "I asked 

sever~l what unit they were from but they 

just looked at me blankly and wandered 

on." 11 When the regiment turned north on 

Trail 6, the stream of stragglers ended and 

the advance was more rapid. At a zigzag 

about a mile north of the intersection Major 

1. In addition to the general sources cited, the 

account of the 33d Infantry (PA) is based upon: 

Maj Holmes, Hist, 33d Inf (PA), p. 27A, and 

Harris, 41st Engineer Bn (PA), p. 34, both in 

Chunn Notebooks; Chapin, Hist of 33d Inf (PA), 

3-9 Apr 42, pp. 1-4,9, OCMH. 

11 Chapin, Hist of 33d Inf (PA), p. 3. 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

Holmes found a platoon of the 418t Engineer Battalion busily constructing tank obstacles and decided to set up his line there, 

in position to block the Japanese advance in 

the Catmon valley. By dawn the regiment 

was deployed in depth across the trail with 

flank guards out to warn of an unexpected 

attack. 

The Disintegration at Sector D 

The Japanese resumed the offensive on 

the morning of 4 April with another heavy 

artillery preparation, co-ordinated with 

bombing and strafing attacks by the 22d Air 

Brigade. The first salvos passed over the 33d 

Infantry astride Trail 6 to fall on the luckless men of the 42d and 43d Infantry about 

a mile to the south. Again they stampeded, 

heading back along Trail 6 "for all they 

were worth." Until they reached the junction of Trails 6 and 8, about 4,500 yards to 

the south, that evening, wrote Colonel Fortier, "we could do nothing to stop them." 12 

Thus, even before the Japanese infantry 

had moved out, one third of the force expected to hold the Pantingan and Catmon 

valleys had given way. 

The advance of the 65th Brigade in the 

Pantingan valley met with little serious opposition. Only the 41st Infantry, now back 

on its original reserve line between Trail 29 

and the Pantingan River, stood in its way. 

Shortly after 0930, after Japanese planes 

had strafed the trail to clear the way for the 

infantry advance, Nara's men hit the front 

and right of the 41st Infantry line. Unable 

to stand against the weight of the assault 

and in danger of being outflanked, the 

12 Fortier, 41st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 6. 

The Japanese that day flew 133 sorties and dropped 

a total of 87 tons of bombs on II Corps alone. 5th 

Air Gp Opns, p. 73. 

427 

Filipinos withdrew to a new line about 600 

yards to the rear. Here they held until 1700 

when the 65th Brigade moved around their 

unprotected right flank, threatening to take 

them from the rear. For the second time 

that day the 41st withdrew, this time to a 

point about 1,000 yards farther south, 

where it established a semicircular position 

on the Pantingan River with the arc facing 

east, just short of Trail 29. Though its own 

position was more secure, the regiment 

could no longer block General Nara's route 

south along Trail 29. 

The advance of the 4th Division against 

the center and right elements of Sector D 

met with the same success that attended 

Nara's efforts that day. Arrayed against the 

center of the line was General Taniguchi's 

Right Wing, strongly supported by the 

armor of the 7th Tank Regiment. This force 

opened its attack at about 0830 of the 4th 

with an armored thrust across the Tiawir 

River to the Pilar-Bagac road. Having 

gained the road, the tanks moved eastward 

to strike the refused left flank of the 21 st 

Infantry. The main line of resistance in this 

area ran in front of the Pilar-Bagac road, 

with the result that the advancing armor 

turned the defender's line and penetrated 

to the rear of his positions. 

The 21st Division, hurt badly by the 

morning's bombardment, was ill prepared 

to meet the attack. On the left the 21st Infantry fell back in disorder before the crushing attack of the Japanese tanks. The 23d 

on the right bent back its exposed flank, offering protection to the retreating men of 

the 21st. The entire attack lasted for only 

a short time and at its conclusion, even 

before his infantry had moved into action, 

Taniguchi was in control of both banks of 

the Catmon River and the area formerly 

occupied by the 43d and 21st Infantry. 
428 

General Lough's troops now held only about 

one-third of the original main line of resistance in Sector D.13 

That same morning the third column of 

the Japanese assaulting force, the Left 

Wing of the 4th Division, composed of 

Colonel Morita's reinforced 8th Infantry 

(less one battalion), entered the action for 

the first time. Jumping off from the north 

bank of the Tiawir-Talisay, opposite the 23d 

and 22d Infantry (the only two units in 

Sector D still on the main line of resistance) , 

Morita's men crossed the river under cover 

of artillery and air support at about 0900, 

occupied the line of departure, and prepared to attack south later in the day. The 

23d Infantry, already under pressure from 

the tank column to the west, and now threatened by a strong force on its front, began to 

fall back at about 1000. The 22d, on the 

division and sector right flank, followed 

suit soon after, thus completing the withdrawal of the last unit from the sector main 

line of resistance. 

Though the Japanese had already scored 

important gains, neither of the 4th Division's two columns had yet begun the day's 

offensive. The advance of the Right Wing's 

tanks along the Pilar-Bagac road and the 

Left Wing's main force across the Tiawir 

had been designed to secure positions from 

which the infantry would jump off at noon. 

At 1100 General Taniguchi asked for an 

hour's grace, explaining that he needed 

more time to prepare after the rapid advance of the day before. This request was 

readily granted. 

13 This account of action in the 21st Division area 

is based upon the general sources cited in note 1 

and upon the following records dealing with the 

21st Division (PA): O'Day, 21st Div (PA), I, 

Part 2, 4-6, II, 40-42; Capt J. C. Ellis, 23d Inf 

(PA), p. 14, and Oster and Richards, 21st Inf 

(PA), p. to, both in Chunn Notebooks. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Colonel Morita, too, was directed to hold 

up his attack for an hour so that both wings 

would move out simultaneously. These new 

instructions never reached Morita, however, 

for the American artillery had cut his telephone lines, and promptly at noon he began 

the attack. Japanese artillery, unaware of 

Morita's assault, laid down a barrage in the 

area into which the Left Wing was moving, 

firing "at both friendly and enemy units 

simultaneously." 14 Fortunately for the Japanese cause, Morita's men suffered few casualties and a disaster was narrowly averted. 

Aside from this misadventure, the advance 

of the Left Wing was uneventful. The 22d 

and 23d Infantry had already abandoned 

the main line of resistance and Morita's 8th 

Infantry continued south for about one mile 

before halting for the night. 

At 1300 the Right Wing moved out, 

crossing the Catmon and pushing southeast 

through the area abandoned by the 21st 

Infantry earlier in the day. By nightfall it 

had reached the northern foothills of Mt. 

Samat. 

Untouched by the Japanese attack of the 

4th was the 33d Infantry at the zigzag on 

Trail 6, west of Mt. Samat. What artillery 

fire it received during the day was not directed at it specifically but was intended to 

neutralize the area on Taniguchi's right 

flank. The Japanese seemed to be unaware 

of the regiment's existence, and Holmes, 

though he sent out patrols to the north, east, 

and west, had little knowledge of the situation along the front. Aside from the few 

stragglers who came down the road and a 

battalion of the 41st Field Artillery some 

distance to his right rear, on the south slopes 

,. Statement of Col Oishi, 2 Oct 50, ATIS Doc 

62639, Statements of Japanese Officials on World 

War II, GHQ FEe, Mil Intel Sec, III, 114. 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

of Mt. Samat near Trail 6, the regiment 

was alone. 

At the end of the day's action, the Japanese were in possession of the entire main 

line of resistance in Sector D. The 41st Division had been routed and the 21st forced 

back to the reserve line in front of Mt. 

Samat, its left flank hanging in the air. The 

65th Brigade had pushed south up the Pantingan valley, twice outflanked the 41st Infantry, and now stood ready to march unimpeded down Trail 29. The 4th Division had 

taken the 21st Division on its left flank, 

forced it off the main line of resistance, and 

then launched a co-ordinated flank and 

frontal assault to gain control of the Catmon valley. The Japanese were now one 

day ahead of schedule and in position to 

storm the heights of Mt. Samat, the first 

objective of the offensive begun on the 

morning of Good Friday. 

Easter Sunday 

Homma's original plan for the seizure of 

Mt. Samat had called for a regrouping of 

the 4th Division's two columns once the 

northern foothills of the mountain had been 

reached, shifting the strength of the division 

from the right to the left wing, then attacking in force along the east slopes down Trail 

4. At the same time the 65th Brigade was to 

continue its drive west of Mt. Samat toward 

Mariveles, while the 16th Division and the 

Nagano Detachment prepared to join in the 

attack against the Limay line. The only 

change made in this plan as a result of the 

unexpected gains won on 3 and 4 April was 

to move the schedule ahead. Anticipating 

an earlier attack against the Limay line 

than originally planned, Homma, on the 

night of the 4th, ordered the 16th Division 

to move east "as soon as possible" and the 

429 

Nagano Detachment to prepare for an attack against Orion.15 

The regrouping of the 4th Division for 

the attack against Mt. Samat was accomplished with little difficulty on the night of 

4-5 April. General Taniguchi, taking his 

tanks and one battalion of the 61 st Infantry, 

moved over to the Left Wing. Reorganized 

and strengthened, this wing became the 

main striking force of the 4th Division. 

Command of the Right Wing, reduced to 

less than one regiment, the 61 st, plus attached troops, passed to Col. Gempachi 

Sato. Division artillery moved south of the 

Talisay to provide the necessary support for 

the infantry advance, and the 37th Infantry, in division reserve, took up a position 

behind the Left Wing. It was the Left Wing 

under Taniguchi which was to make the 

main effort down Trail 4 next morning. 

Sato's wing was to seize the heights of Mt. 

Samat then continue down the south side 

of the mountain to the line of the Tala 

River, the jumping-off point for the next 

attack. 

At dawn, 5 April, the Japanese resumed 

their devastating air and artillery bombardment. It was Easter Sunday and many of 

the Americans and Filipinos were attending 

dawn services "in the fastness of the jungle" 

when the shells and bombs began to falp6 

For them the day of the Resurrection was 

not the joyous occasion it had been in peacetime. The services, wrote one officer, had "a 

serious atmosphere for us," and chaplains, 

invoking divine guidance, did not fail to 

ask as well for "deliverance from the power 

of the enemy." 17 

'" 14th Army Opns, I, 158. 

16 O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 4. 

11 Ibid.; INS Summary 101,5 Apr 42, AG 000.75 

(4-13-42) MB. The sermon cited was delivered by 

Chaplain J. K. Borneman, a Protestant. 
430 

The attack began at 1000 when both 

columns of the 4th Division moved out. The 

strengthened Left Wing, making the main 

attack against the right flank of the 21st 

Division, soon ran into unexpectedly stubborn resistance. The Filipinos, supported by 

two battalions of the 41st Field Artillery on 

the south slope of Mt. Samat and by artillery 

from the adjoining sectors, put up so stiff 

a fight that one Japanese officer described 

it as "the fiercest combat in the second Bataan campaign." 18 Against this determined 

opposition, Taniguchi's men made little 

headway and by early afternoon were still 

pinned down on Trail 4, far short of their 

objective. 

The Right Wing under Colonel Sato had 

meanwhile been pushing ahead unopposed 

on the exposed left flank of the 21st Division, up the northwest slopes of Mt. 

Samat. Near the summit it met a single 

platoon of the 21st Infantry which it easily 

routed and at 1250 secured possession of 

the mountain top. The position of the 41st 

Field Artillery, whose fire was so effectively 

pinning down General Taniguchi's Left 

Wing on Trail 4, was now untenable, and 

the artillerymen were forced to evacuate. 

Before they did, they destroyed their equipment and rolled their guns over the cliffs. 

No longer pinned down by the artillery 

General Taniguchi promptly resumed the 

offensive. At 1400 he sent one of his battalions across the northeast slopes of the 

mountain in a flanking movement while increasing pressure on the d.efenders to his 

front. The disorganized but hard-fighting 

21 st Division troops, deprived of their artillery support, were in no condition to stand 

against the powerful Left Wing alone and 

18 Statement of Col Oishi, 2 Oct 50, ATIS Doc 

62639, Statements of Japanese Officials on World 

War II, GHO FEC, Mil Intel Sec, III, 114. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

shortly before 1530 began to fall back. Only 

scattered elements along Trail 4 barred 

Taniguchi's way south and he and his men 

easily pushed toward the line of the Tala 

River, below Mt. Samat. 

That same afternoon Sato's Right Wing 

made its way unopposed down the southern 

slopes of Mt. Samat. At 1630 advance elements of this force reached the command 

post of the 21st Division near the junction 

of Trails 4 and 429. Taken by surprise, officers and men of the headquarters took 

flight, the majority moving west along Trail 

429 to set up a new command post a mile 

away, at the junction of that trail and Trail 

6. General Capinpin, the division commander, was not among those who reached 

safety; he had become separated from his 

staff during the disorganized flight and been 

captured by the Japanese. 

Hardly had the new command post been 

established when it had to be abandoned 

because of the appearance at 1700 of Japanese troops near the trail junction. These 

troops were a part of Sato's force which 

had come down the west side of Mt. Samat 

during the afternoon. After routing the 21st 

Division headquarters, the Japanese hit the 

remaining battalion of the 41st Field Artillery still in position west of Mt. Samat. The 

artillerymen fled to the rear, leaving their 

guns behind. "No Americans killed, 

wounded or decorated," wrote an officer of 

the battalion at the conclusion of the action.19 That night Taniguchi and Sato 

joined forces at the old 21st Division command post near Trail Junction 4-429. 

Between dawn of Good Friday and nightfall of Easter Sunday, in three days of infantry and tank assaults accompanied by 

the largest artillery and air bombardments 

,. Shoemake, 41st FA (PA), p. 33, Chunn Notebooks. 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

of the campaign, the Japanese had gained 

the first objective in their final drive to end 

the siege of Bataan. They had broken 

through the American line, swept aside the 

troops of Sector D, virtually destroyed two 

Philippine Army divisions, and seized Mt. 

Samat. Homma's hopes, twice frustrated, 

of turning General Parker's flank and driving II Corps into Manila Bay, thus ending 

the campaign, were near realization. Only 

a successful counterattack, or an unexpectedly strong stand by a foe already reduced 

to near impotence by starvation and disease, could deprive him of the long-delayed 

victory. 

6 April: The Day of Decision 

The events of 6 April determined the fate 

of the Bataan garrison. On that day the 

weary American and Philippine troops 

made a desperate effort to drive back the 

enemy and regain the main line of resiStance. At the same time the Japanese 

launched a fresh offensive to the south and 

east. The two forces met head on and by 

evening the issue had been decided. 

Plans and Preparations 

Since the Japanese penetration on the 

afternoon of Good Friday, the Americans 

had been laying plans for a counterattack 

while seeking vainly to halt the enemy advance. The means with which to launch 

such an attack were extremely limited. 

Corps reserve, consisting of less than one 

regiment, had been committed on the first 

day of the offensive without any visible 

effect on the enemy's operations. Most of 

the troops in Sector D had been routed and 

could not be relied upon for a counterattack. By the second day of the offensive 

431 

it had become evident that, if the Japanese 

were to be stopped and the main line of 

resistance regained, fresh troops would have 

to be thrown into the battle. 

At the start of the attack Luzon Force had 

in reserve the American 31st Infantry, the 

Scouts of the 57th Infantry-both a part of 

the Philippine Division-the Provisional 

Tank Group, and two battalions of combat 

engineers. The third regiment of the Philippine Division, the 45th Infantry (PS), was 

in I Corps reserve. Only a few days before, 

General King, the Luzon Force commander, 

had ordered the 31 st to Lamao, behind 

II Corps, and the 45th Infantry to the junction of Trails 7 and 9, behind I Corps. The 

57th remained farther south, in position to 

move to the support of either corps. 

When news of the Japanese attack first 

reached General King on 3 April he ordered 

the 31 st Infantry to move under cover of 

darkness to "a position of readiness" near 

the junction of Trails 10 and 2.20 From there 

it could move north on Trail 2 or west on 

Trail 10 to almost any point along the front. 

At the same time King ordered the Provisional Tank Group (less two companies) to 

move to the direct support of Parker's imperiled corps. There was nothing more that 

General King could do that day. Parker had 

already released his reserve to the Sector D 

commander and every effort was being 

made to re-form the shattered 418t Division and to establish a line in front of the 

advancing Japanese. 

When, on the morning of 4 April, the 21 st 

Division fell back from the main line of resistance, General King took prompt measures to avert the threatened disaster in II 

Corps. He gave to Parker, who already had 

the support of the Provisional Tank Group, 

the American 31st Infantry, possibly the 

2. Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 4. 
432 

most carefully hoarded unit of the Philippine campaign, and ordered the battletested 45th Infantry (PS), less the 1st 

Battalion, east across the Panting an to 

the junction of Trails 29 and 8 in the II 

Corps area. The 57th Infantry King retained in force reserve, but ordered it to 

move forward that night to the bivouac area 

vacated by the 31st Infantry. The 14th Engineer Battalion (PS), part of the Philippine Division, and the Americans of the 

803d Engineer Battalion (US) were ordered to discontinue all engineering activities and to assemble immediately in preparation for combat. Thus, at the end of the 

second day's attack, Luzon Force had given 

General Parker two regiments of the Philippine Division, placed the third in "a position of readiness" behind his line, and ordered the tanks to give him direct support. 

With these forces the corps and sector 

commanders made their plans for a counterattack. 21 On the 4th, before the reinforcing 

units had reached their designated assembly 

21 In addition to the sources cited below for 

specific or controversial points, this section is based 

upon the following: Ltr, Doyle to Ward, 8 Jan 52, 

OCMH; Diary, Col Brady, CO 31st Inf (PA), 

filed in a separate folder entitled Brady Papers, 

OCMH; Capt William E. W. Farrell, 31st Inf S-2, 

Notes for Regtl Hist, in Brady Papers, pp. 20-21, 

OCMH. Another version of the same source entitled 

Farrell Diary is filed in Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) 

Rpt of Opns, p. 70. Three studies prepared by students at The Infantry School were also used for 

31st Infantry (US) operations: Conrad, Opns of 

31st Inf (US), pp. 20-21, 24; Mead, Opns and 

Mvmts of 31st Inf (US), pp. 25-26; Bess, Opns of 

Service Co, 31st Inf (US), p. 29. 

For armored operations, the following were used: 

Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 23; Miller, Bataan 

Uncensored, pp. 196-202. 

Many of the sources for the counterattack disagree on times and places, and the author has 

often had to adopt a reconstruction at variance with 

the majority of the sources, but one which seemed 

most reasonable and was in accord with those facts 

which were not in dispute. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

areas, Parker released to General Lough the 

31st Infantry, the 45th Infantry (less the 1st 

Battalion) , and one company of tanks. With 

these troops, and those already in his sector, 

Lough was to launch a counterattack on the 

morning of the 6th to regain first the reserve 

line and finally the main line of resistance. 

At 1600 of the 4th the 45th Infantry began its march east toward II Corps. By dawn 

the next morning it had crossed the Pantingan and reached Trail Junction 8-29. The 

31st Infantry and Company C, 194th Tank 

Battalion, began their march north along 

Trail 2 toward the battle area at 2000 of the 

4th. They found the road almost completely 

blocked by retreating Filipinos and took 

three hours to reach the San Vicente River, 

where, at an abandoned bivouac area, the 

31st Infantry halted for the night. The tankers presumably camped near by and next 

day marched west to join the 45th Infantry. 

Easter Sunday was a hectic day at Sector 

D headquarters. Between frantic phone calls 

to and from units in front of the advancing 

Japanese the staff prepared its plan for the 

counterattack. This plan, completed late on 

the afternoon of the 5th, provided for a 

co-ordinated drive, starting at 0600 on the 

6th, north on the three trails in Sector D 

toward the reserve line. On the right, east 

of Mt. Samat, the 31st Infantry would attack north on Trail 4. The remnants of the 

21 st Division, the extent of whose disastrous 

rout that afternoon was still not fully 

known at Sector D headquarters, would 

advance up the slopes of Mt. Samat. The 

33d Infantry, in position at the zigzag on 

Trail 6, was to advance along that trail, 

between the Catmon River and the western 

slopes of Mt. Samat. The remnants of the 

42d and 43d Infantry, about four hundred 

men, were to push north from Trail Junction 6-8 along Trail 6 behind the 33d In-
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

fantry. If they could not advance they were 

to hold Trail Junction 6-8, near which 

Sector D headquarters was located. Farther 

west, the Scouts of the 45th Infantry, supported by a company of tanks, would advance north on Trail 29 to the reserve line 

formerly held by the 41st Infantry. That 

regiment, which had crossed the Pantingan 

to the safety of I Corps area during the day, 

was directed in separate orders to recross the 

river that night and establish a line across 

Trail 29.22 

For the counterattack General Lough 

would have the support of the troops in 

Sector C to his right. The 51st Combat 

Team, on that sector's left flank, would 

launch its own attack when the 31st Infantry reached its line. General Bluemel, 

the Sector C commander, also promised 

artillery support in addition to the scheduled 3D-minute artillery barrage preceding 

the counterattack.23 In sector reserve GeDeral Lough had the 57th Infantry (PS), 

recently released by Luzon Force. Elements 

of that regiment were already moving toward the San Vicente River, behind the 

31st Infantry. 

General Homma had no intention of waiting passively for an American counterattack. 

He had the initiative and had scored a victory which he intended to exploit fully. His 

plans for 6 April called for an attack against 

Sector C, which now formed the left flank 

of II Corps line, and a continuation of the 

drive southward toward the Limay River. 

.. For the movements and preparations of the 41st 

Diy (PA) and 33d Inf (PA), see: Fortier, 41st Div 

(PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 6; Fortier, Notes on 41st 

Diy (PA), pp. 14, 15, 170-71; ltr, Wetherby to 

author, 22 May 51, OCMH: Holmes, 33d Inf 

(PA), p. 27A, Chunn Notebooks; Chapin, Hist of 

33d Inf (PA), p. 10. 

23 Bluemel, 31st Diy (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 21. 

433 

The main effort that day would be made by 

the 4th Division, one portion of which would 

strike east to seize the Capot area in Sector 

C while the bulk of the division pushed 

southeast toward the Limay River. The 

right (west) flank of the Japanese advance 

would be guarded by the 65th Brigade on 

Trail 29. Elements of the brigade had already moved overland toward Trail Junction 6-8, and N ara was directed to continue 

his efforts to seize that important road junction while protecting the 4th Division's 

right flank. The division's east flank would 

be protected by the Nagano Detachment. 

Reinforced with a company of tanks, Nagano was to send one column forward to 

the Talisay River in position to join later in 

the attack against the Limay line, while the 

remainder of his detachment maintained 

pressure against the enemy line across the 

East Road. As before, 14th Army artillery 

would fire a preliminary bombardment 

while the 22d Air Brigade would strike at 

enemy artillery positions, vehicles, and troop 

concentrations. 24 

Under cover of darkness, Easter Sunday, 

both sides prepared for the next day's attack. The Japanese were confident and the 

odds were in their favor. For the Americans 

it was a gamble, but one that had to be 

taken. To it they had committed most of 

their reserves. If the counterattack failed 

they would be hard pressed to prevent the 

enemy from rolling up the rest of the line 

and driving the corps into Manila Bay. 

All hopes for success rested on the comparatively fresh troops of the Philippine 

Division, two of whose regiments were in the 

line and one in reserve. Understrength, 

weakened by disease and starvation, these 

regiments were hardly a match for the Japa2. 14th Army Opns, I, 161-63. 
434 

nese. The 31st Infantry, when it moved out 

from its bivouac area at Lamao on 3 April, 

had to leave behind about one third of the 

men for evacuation to the hospital. Many 

who should have remained behind rose from 

their sick beds to join their comrades. Along 

the line of march, men fell out of rank, too 

exhausted to continue. The efficiency of 

those who reached the front line could not 

have been more than 50 percent. 25 It is not 

surprising, therefore, that General Wainwright, when he visited Bataan on the 5th, 

approved the plans for the morrow's 

counterattack "with misgivings as to the 

outcome." 26 

The American Counterattack 

The mission of the 31st Infantry in the 

counterattack of the 6th was to advance 

north on Trail 4, east of Mt. Samat, to the 

reserve line of the 21st Division. The regiment, in position at the intersection of the 

San Vicente River and Trail 2 when it received its orders, was to move to Trail Junction 4-429, the designated jump-off point, 

sometime during the evening of the 5th and 

move out from there at 0600 the next 

morning. 

Almost immediately this plan miscarried. 

Late on the afternoon of the 5th General 

Taniguchi's powerful Left Wing, advancing 

south on Trail 4, had routed the 21st Division elements along the trail and Colonel 

Sato's Right Wing had hit the division command post on Trail Junction 4-429. When 

informed of these events, sector headquarters changed the 31st Infantry's jump-off 

point to Trail Junction 44-429, about 1,300 

.. Mead, Opns and Mvmts of 31st Inf (US), pp. 

25-26; Conrad, Opns of 31 st Inf (US), pp. 20-21 ; 

Bess, Opns of Service Co, 31st Inf (US), p. 29. 

2. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 78. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

yards east of the original starting position. 27 

The regiment now would have to recapture 

Trail Junction 4-429 before it could even 

begin its counterattack along Trail 4. 

On the evening of the 5th the regiment 

moved out from its bivouac near the San 

Vicente River toward its new assembly area, 

with the 1st Battalion in the lead. The battalion's mission was to secure Trail 44 from 

its starting point on Trail 2 to its junction 

with Trail 429, a distance of about 1,300 

yards. The remaining battalions were to 

pass through the 1st, the 2d taking position 

west of the trail junction and the 3d to the 

south. As it passed through the 1st Battalion 

shortly after midnight, the 2d Battalion 

came under fire from the Japanese who had 

secured Trail Junction 4-429 and were advancing along Trail 429 toward the 31st 

Infantry's new assembly area. If unchecked 

they might seize Trail Junction 44-429 

too, depriving the Americans of even this 

jump-off point. Lt. Col. Jasper E. Brady, 

Jr., now commander of the 31st Infantry, 

ordered his 2d Battalion to press forward 

quickly to occupy this last trail junction before the Japanese. The battalion accomplished its mission, but only with difficulty 

and after a fight lasting several hours.28 

27 Trail 44 extended from the intersection of 

Route 2 and the San Vicente River southward along 

the west bank of the river to Trail 8. 

28 In addition to the sources cited in the preceding section, this account is based upon: Amato 

and Murphy, 2d Bn, 45th Inf (PS), pp. 14-15, 

Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS), pp. 15-16, and 

Anderson, 57th Inf (PS) Opns, p. 6, all three in 

Chunn Notebooks; Lt Col Joaquin Esperitu, Brief 

Hist of 22d Inf (PA), p. 8; Itr, C. A. McLaughlin 

to author, 14 Jun 49, OCMH; Col Young, CO 51st 

Combat Team, Opns of 51st Combat Team, in 

Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 23; Capt 

Robert A. Barker, Opns of Antitank Co, 31st Inf 

(PA), Brady Papers, pp. 13-14, OCMH; Itr, 

[CO 21st Inf] to TAG PA, 30 Dec 45, sub: Opns 

of 21st Inf (PA), copy in OCMH; Mallonee, 

Bataan Diary, II, 90. 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

While this action was in progress, the 

main body of Taniguchi's Left Wing was 

attacking the remnants of the 21st Division 

on Trail 4. Encircled and isolated, the Filipinos sought desperately to break through 

the Japanese ring and make their way back 

to safety. Most were killed or captured, but 

some escaped. Of these a small number 

reached the American lines. The news they 

brought of the disintegration of the 21st 

Division and the strength of the Japanese 

on Trail 4 was disquieting. On the basis of 

these reports Colonel Brady concluded that 

his regiment of about 800 men, most of 

them in poor condition, was faced by a 

much stronger force than had been thought. 

Even if he could launch a successful counterattack he doubted that he could hold any 

gains made with the few men he had. He 

therefore halted his men until he had presented his conclusions to General Lough. 

Unable to reach Sector D headquarters by 

telephone, he sent Lt. Col. Peter D. Calyer, 

his operations officer, together with some of 

the 21st Division men, in a jeep to General 

Lough's command post to present these new 

facts and to get further instructions.2\} 

Not long after Calyer had left, the main 

force of Taniguchi's Left Wing approached 

the 31st Infantry outposts on Trail 429. The 

situation was urgent and Brady again 

sought to reach sector headquarters by telephone. This time he was successful and soon 

had General Lough's G--3 on the line. Informed of the situation, the G-3 changed 

Brady's orders and assigned the 31st Infantry a defensive mission. Instead of attacking, 

the regiment was to hold Trail Junction 44-

429 at all costs. A short time later Colonel 

20 Brady, Diary, entry of 6 Apr 42, and Farrell, 

Notes for Regtl Hist, pp. 20-21, both in Brady 

Papers, OCMH. 

435 

Calyer returned from sector headquarters 

with written confirmation of the new orders. 

On receipt of these orders Brady pulled 

back the tired men, who had been trying 

all night to advance west along Trail 429 

toward the original jump-off point, and issued new orders for the establishment of a 

defensive line facing west across the trail 

junction. The 1st Battalion would take up a 

position on the right (north) and the 2d on 

the left. Contact by patrol would be maintained with the 51st Combat Team to the 

north, on the refused left flank of Sector C. 

Regimental headquarters and the reserve 3d 

Battalion would take up a position about a 

mile to the east near the former bivouac 

area at the intersection of Trail 2 and the 

San Vicente River. By morning these moves 

had been completed and the men of the 31st 

Infantry settled down to hold the trail junction. 

On the west, along the line of the Pantingan, the counterattack of 6 April got off 

to a good start. Shortly after midnight, 5 

April, the 300 men of the 41st Infantry 

moved out from their position on the west 

bank of the Pantingan, climbed the 300-foot 

bluffs of the river and struck east toward 

Trail 29. Their aim was to establish a 

line across the trail, about 200 yards 

below Trail Junction 29-429, to which 

the Scouts of the 45th Infantry could 

advance the next morning. At about 0200 

the 41st Infantry reached its former bivouac 

area, occupied by a small number of men 

from the 65th Brigade, and succeeded in 

routing the surprised Japanese, bayoneting 

those who lay asleep. The regiment then 

pushed ahead and reached the trail by daybreak. There it was met and halted by a 

65th Brigade counterattack. The Japanese, 

whose strength finally reached that of a re-
436 

inforced battalion, hit the Filipinos on three 

sides and by noon had forced them back to 

a defensive line along the river. Here the 

41st Infantry held, hoping that the 45th 

Infantry, attacking north along Trail 29, 

would soon arrive.30 

The counterattack of the 45th Infantry 

(less 1 st Battalion) had begun at 0200 of 

the 6th. At that time the regiment, with the 

3d Battalion in the lead, had moved out to 

the line of departure. From there, the Scouts 

had advanced cautiously along Trail 29 in 

the dark. Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, supporting the attack, did not catch 

up with the Scouts until daylight, after an 

all-night march over the mountains from the 

east. It was not until midmorning that the 

regiment made contact with the enemy 

when it pushed aside the 65th Brigade outposts. Resistance thereafter was stronger and 

early in the afternoon the Scouts had to beat 

off a flanking attack. The tanks, held to the 

trail by the dense undergrowth on each side, 

could be of little assistance. At about 1500, 

after an advance of approximately 2,500 

yards, the regiment came to a halt before 

a strong Japanese position astride the trail. 

The 45th Infantry had been under heavy 

enemy mortar fire all day but, with a limited 

supply of shells, had refrained from returning fire. At this point the Scout commander, 

Colonel Doyle, decided to use half of the 

3d Battalion's ten 81-mm. shells to open a 

hole in the Japanese line through which the 

tanks could thrust. The tank commander 

agreed to this plan and later in the afternoon 

the mortars opened fire. The few shots 

proved surprisingly effective. The Japanese 

"'Wetherby, Opns of 41st Inf (PA), in Fortier, 

Notes on 41st Div (PA), pp. 171-72; itr, Wetherby 

to author, 22 May 51, OCMH. Japanese sour"es 

do not mention the action of the 41st Infantry 

(PA). 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

on the trail fell back so quickly that the 

Scouts pushed into the breach before the 

tanks could move up. It was fortunate that 

they did for the trail had been heavily mined 

and a tank advance might have proved 

disastrous. 

Despite his success, Colonel Doyle was 

uneasy. Patrols sent out to establish contact 

with I Corps to the west and the 33d Infantry to the east had either failed to return 

or reported they had met only enemy units. 

It was now late afternoon and Colonel Doyle 

decided that it was too risky to continue the 

advance as long as his flanks were unprotected. He therefore halted his men and 

ordered them to dig in for the night. With 

his executive officer and the tank commander, he went back to his command post 

in the rear to report to General Lough and 

ask for instructions. When reached on the 

telephone, Lough confirmed Doyle's decision and ordered him to consolidate his 

gains that evening in preparation for a fresh 

attack the next morning. Several thousand 

yards to the north, in position along the high 

bluffs of the Pantingan, the men of the 41 st 

Infantry were still waiting for the Scouts to 

reach them. 

It was in the center, along the line of the 

Catmon River and Trail 6, that the counterattack of 6 April ended disastrously. There 

the plan called for an advance by the 33d 

Infantry, backed up by the remnants of the 

42d and 43d Infantry. But the Japanese had 

begun moving into this area the day before, 

and on the 5th General Nara had sent the 

bulk of his brigade overland in two columns 

to seize Trail Junction 6-8. A portion of 

this force had struck the "hungry, spiritless" 

stragglers of the 42d and 43d as they were 

moving north on Trail 6 to join in the counterattack. At the first sign of the enemy, the 

men had broken and fled. All efforts to put 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

them back in place were fruitless; they 

simply disappeared into the jungle, leaving 

the vital Trail Junction 6-8 open to the advancing Japanese. The 33d Infantry, like 

the 41st, waited in vain for the counterattacking troops to reach it. During the afternoon the 33d, too, came under attack and 

its last communications to the rear were destroyed. Presumed lost, the regiment spent 

the night in fearful apprehension of an enemy attack the next morning. 

Before the day was over it was already 

evident that the carefully planned counterattack was a failure. On the east the 31st 

Infantry had not even been able to reach 

the line of departure. The 21st Division, 

routed on the night of 5-6 April, made no 

effort to. carry out its part of the plan to restore the line. In the center the 42d and 43d 

had again been routed and the 33d Infantry 

surrounded. Only on the west, along Trail 

29, had the Americans met with any success 

that day. But the victory was a hollow one, 

for the 41st Infantry was still cut off and the 

Japanese were threatening a move which 

would isolate the 45th from the rest of the 

troops in Sector D. 

The Japanese Attack 

The Japanese attack on 6 April, which 

began simultaneously with the American 

counterattack, accomplished decisive results. 

This attack, made by the 4th Division and 

65th Brigade, had a double objective: to 

seize the high ground in Sector C, near Capot, and to push forward to the line of the 

Limay River. The task of the 65th Brigade 

was a subordinate one. It was to protect the 

right flank of the 4th Division drive while 

seizing the high ground near Trail Junction 6-8. 

437 

N ara's advance on the 6th, though not 

a part of the main drive planned for that 

day, proved far more decisive than the 

Japanese had thought. His two columns 

advancing overland in a southeasterly direction from Trail 29 hit and routed the 

42d and 43d Infantry with no difficulty. 

The Japanese kept going down Trail 6 and 

shortly after noon advance elements of the 

brigade reached and seized Trail Junction 

6-8 where General Lough had his headquarters. By this move the Japanese bisected Sector D and cut General Lough off 

from his forces to the east. 

Just east of the trail junction was a portion of t~e 57th Infantry (PS). This regiment, sector reserve for the counterattack, 

was in the process of moving up to the front 

line when its 1st Battalion met General 

Nara's forward elements around noon. The 

arrival of the 2d Battalion later in the day 

coincided with the arrival of additional 

troops from the 65th Brigade. Any chance 

of regaining the trail junction was now 

gone; the Scouts were finding it difficult 

even to maintain their position east of the 

trail junction. The situation was extremely 

serious and at 1600 General Lough, who 

had moved his command post west to the 

vicinity of Trail Junction 8-29, ordered 

Colonel Doyle to withdraw his 45th Infantry along Trail 29 and establish contact 

with the 57th Infantry. 

Colonel Doyle, whose men had made the 

only gains of the day, had only a short time 

before halted his men and ordered them to 

dig in for the night. He now had to move 

the tired Scouts out of their position, turn 

them around, and march them back to the 

point from which they had started at 0200 

the night before. That prospect alone was 

discouraging enough but at the conclusion 
438 

of the march they were expected to continue east along Trail 8, then fight their 

way through the roadblock at Trail Junction 6-8 to re-establish contact with the 

57th Infantry. Until they did, General 

Lough and his forces west of the block 

would be separated from the rest of Sector 

D and from II Corps. 

The attack of the 4th Division against 

Sector C, the main Japanese effort of the 

6th, was equally disastrous to the American 

cause. This sector, whose main line of resistance at the start of the Japanese offensive 

had extended for 4,500 yards eastward from 

Sector D, had by 6 April given way on the 

left. On the 4th, on orders from corps, General Bluemel had pulled back his outpost 

line to the Pilar-Bagac road and prepared 

for an attack against his left flank. This 

attack had not materialized, but when the 

21st Division had fallen back before Taniguchi's Left Wing on the 5th, leaving the 

left flank of Sector C exposed, General Bluemel had requested permission to fall behind 

the San Vicente River. Plans for the counterattack had already been made and corps 

turned down Bluemel's request, ordering 

him instead to bring his left flank unit, the 

51st Combat Team, back to the Pilar River, 

thus refusing his line sharply. 

Bluemel's desire to fall back to the San 

Vicente River was an understandable one. 

That river formed a natural obstacle to the 

advance of an enemy moving, as the Japanese were, in a southeasterly direction. It 

cut diagonally across the rear of Sector C to 

the right of the sector main line of resistance, 

then turned east to Orion and the bay. Behind its banks a line could be formed which 

would protect the most vital portion of the 

corps main line of resistance covering the 

East Road, as. well as Trails 8 and 2. If it 

should prove necessary to fall back, there 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

were other rivers, the Mamala, the AIangan, 

and the Lamao, which would provide natural defensive positions for a planned withdrawal. 

The abortive counterattack by the 31st 

Infantry had begun in Sector C, at the intersection of the San Vicente River and Trail 2. 

By morning of the 6th that regiment had 

established a line facing north and west 

across Trail Junction 44-429, maintaining 

contact by patrol with the refused left flank 

of the 51st Combat Team to the north. It 

was in this area that the Japanese attack 

came. 

When he received his orders on the night 

of the 5th to seize the area around Capot, 

General Kitano, the 4th Division commander, was already convinced that his 

troops had scored a major success. He decided therefore to commit his reserve, the 

37th Infantry (less one battalion), to this 

new enterprise rather than weaken his main 

force on Trail 4. Convinced also, by the experience of the 65th Brigade in its attacks 

against Sector C in late January and early 

February, that a frontal assault would be 

hazardous, he decided upon a flanking attack. Orders to Col. Jiro Koura, therefore, 

specified that the 37th Infantry, reinforced 

with tanks, artillery, and engineers, would 

step off from the northeast foothills of Mt. 

Samat and strike the sharply refused left 

flank of Sector C in an effort to take the 

objective from the rear. 

At 1030 of the 6th Colonel Koura's force, 

led by six or seven tanks of the 7th Tank 

Regiment, jumped off. The tanks hit the 

main line of resistance from the north, just 

above Trail 2 where a portion of the Antitank Company of the 31st Infantry (US) 

was posted. Heavy fire from two 37-mm. 

guns halted the tank attack, but the guns, 

lacking armor-piercing shells, were unable 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

to knock out the enemy tanks. But this was 

not the main Japanese effort. The bulk of 

Koura's infantry had struck from the west 

against the 51st Combat Team in place behind the Pilar River. Before the morning 

was over, they had overrun the 51st Engineers and forced the entire line back. Trail 

2 now lay open to the advancing Japanese 

and the entire left of Sector C was imperiled. 

The main force of the 4th Division, meanwhile, had been increasing its pressure 

against the 31st Infantry (US) guarding 

Trail Junction 44--429 to the south. Here 

Taniguchi's men, advancing east along 

Trail 429, had been pushing strongly against 

the 2d Battalion on the left (south) in an 

effort to turn the American flank and get 

behind Sector C. By 1400 the pressure had 

become so great that Colonel Brady had to 

commit Companies Land K from his reserve battalion to the threatened flank. 

Enemy planes, which had been overhead 

all day, now intensified their attacks while 

the Japanese infantry pushed ever harder. 

Finally, at 1500, when he had lost all contact with the withdrawing 51st Combat 

Team to the north, Colonel Brady gave the 

order to withdraw. 

The possibility of a withdrawal had been 

foreseen by sector headquarters. Brady's 

first orders had been to hold the trail junction at all costs. Around noon General 

Lough had modified these orders to allow 

Brady to withdraw if necessary to the San 

Vicente. At 1500, therefore, the regiment 

began to move to its new position behind 

the river, with the two reserve companies 

covering the withdrawal. The maneuver 

was a difficult one for the tired men, many 

of whom were too weak to carry their machine guns through the jungle and up the 

steep ravines. Companies Land K, using 

to good advantage their small supply of 

439 

81-mm. mortar shells, succeeded in disengaging the enemy and rejoined the regiment which by nightfall was in its new 

position. There was nothing now to prevent 

a juncture between Taniguchi's men and the 

37th Infantry advancing south on Trail 2. 

By 1600 of the 6th it was evident that a 

line in front of the San Vicente could not 

be held and at that time General Parker 

directed a general withdrawal to the river. 

Bluemel, who had three times before. requested permission to pull back to the San 

Vicente, was given command of the 31st 

Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 57th, and 

directed to establish his line along the river's 

east bank. 

From the main line of resistance in 

Sector B, the new line would extend in 

a southwesterly direction through Sector C 

to link up with the 57th Infantry troops 

facing the Japanese on Trail Junction 6-8. 

On the north, to the left of Sector B, was 

the 32d Infantry (PA). Next to it, across 

Trail 2, were the remaining elements of the 

51st Combat Team and some 31st Division 

(PA) troops. Below the trail was the 

American 31st Infantry with the 31st Engineer Battalion (P A) to its left. The 3d 

Battalion, 57th Infantry, under Major 

Johnson, which moved up to the San 

Vicente on the night of the 6th, took up a 

position on the left of the engineers, on the 

south flank. 

Southwest of this line, east of Trail Junction 6-8, was the rest of the 57th Infantry. 

In the same order which established the San 

Vicente line, Parker placed all the Sector D 

troops east of Trail 6 under Col. Edmund J. 

Lilly, Jr., the 57th commander, and gave 

him the 201st and 202d Engineer Battalions 

(P A) from corps reserve. Lilly's mission was 

to recapture the trail junction and establish 

contact with the 45th Infantry to the west. 
440 

The two engineer battalions were to move 

up that night and take a position on the 

right of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 

57th, to tie in Lilly's force with the 3d Battalion of the regiment on the south flank of 

the San Vicente line. When this move was 

completed, the II Corps line would extend 

west from Orion along the Orion cutoff, 

then southwest behind the San Vicente 

River across Trail 2 to Trail 8 east of the 

trail junction. 

When the action of the 6th was over the 

Americans and Filipinos found themselves 

in a desperate situation. The carefully prepared counterattack launched that morning 

had failed dismally and the enemy had 

quickly seized the initiative to score decisive 

gains. He had secured the vital Trail Junction 6-8 to cut off General Lough, with the 

45th and 41st Infantry, from II Corps. All 

of the important north-south trails in Sector 

D-29, 6, and 4-as well as Trail 44 and a 

portion of Trail 2, were now in his hands. 

He had driven in the left half of the II 

Corps line, split the two corps, occupied 

Mt. Samat, and threatened to turn the unhinged II Corps flank and push on to the 

bay. 

To forestall this move the Americans had 

established a sharply bent and shortened 

line behind the San Vicente River. The men 

on this line were already weakened and 

partially disorganized. Two entire divisions 

and a regiment had been lost. Another two 

regiments and a sector headquarters had 

been cut off. The remaining troops, in poor 

condition at the start, were hardly fit for 

combat. Most of the reserves had been committed, and additional forces would have to 

come largely from Jones's intact I Corps. 

The outlook was bleak. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

For the men on Bataan there was only 

one bright spot in an otherwise gloomy picture. At the start of the offensive General 

Wainwright had ordered an increase in the 

rice ration, to be taken from the Corregidor 

reserves, and had sent to General King all 

but 5,000 cases of C rations of the supplies in 

the Bataan reserve held on the island. By 

the 5th the ration issue had been increased 

to 27 ounces, still far below the minimum 

required but double the daily issue since 22 

March. The allotment of flour to American 

troops was increased from 1.44 to 2.88 

ounces; the rice ration went up from 8.5 

to 17 ounces and canned meat from 1.22 to 

2.44 ounces. The Filipinos, instead of wheat, 

received an additional allowance of rice and 

canned fish.Hi An antiaircraft battery commander was surprised one morning when he 

received more rations than he expected. 

"There were," he noted, "a few cans of 

Abalone, which defied preparation; a little 

more salmon and tomatoes and some type C 

[rations], and wonder of wonders, some 

cigarettes." 82 

In an Army Day broadcast General Wainwright spoke bravely of those who were 

"privileged to be charged with the defetyle 

of this distant bastion." 99 But his official dispatches show a clear appreciation of the 

catastrophic events of the past twenty-four 

hours. To Washington he reported that the 

enemy had driven a wedge into the right 

center of his front, that the air and artillery 

11 QM Rpt of Opns, p. 51; Luzon Force Rpt of 

Opns, G-4 Annex, p. 3. It is entirely possible that 

many of the units did not receive the increase. Ltr, 

Doyle to Ward, 8 Jan 52, OCMH . 

.. Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, gIst CA, p. 108, 

OCMH. 

.. INS Summary 102, 6 Apr 42, AG 000 . .75 

(4-13-42) MB. 
THE FINAL JAPANESE OFFENSIVE 

bombardment begun on the 3d had continued without letup, and that fresh enemy 

troops had been thrown into the battle and 

were gaining ground slowly.34 

In his message to General MacArthur, 

Wainwright added the significant details 

which would enable the commander of 

USAFFE to form his own estimate. The 

enemy, Wainwright explained, had penetrated to Trail 8, 7,000 yards south of the 

main line of resistance, seized M t. Samat, 

.. Rad, Wainwright to AGW AR, 7 Apr 42, USFIP 

0-3 Journal, 19 Mar-19 Apr 42, AG 461 (1 Apr 

42) Phil Reds. 

441 

and routed three Philippine Army divisions. 

To MacArthur these events signified imminent disaster. "It is apparent to me," he 

told the Chief of Staff, "that the enemy has 

driven a wedge between I and II Corps and 

is still advancing." 36 By the time this estimate reached Washington, disaster had 

already overtaken the luckless men on 

Bataan. 

.. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 116, 8 Apr 

42, Msgs from Gen MacArthur, OPD Exec 0; 

Wainwright to MacArthur, 7 Apr 42, USFIP G-3 

Journal, 19 Mar-19 Apr 42, AG 461 (1 Apr 42) 

Phil Reds. 
CHAPTER XXV 

The Disintegration of II Corps 

The story of the last two days of the 

defense of Bataan is one of progressive disintegration and final collapse. Lines were 

formed and abandoned before they could 

be fully occupied. Communications broke 

down and higher headquarters often did not 

know the situation on the front lines. Orders 

were issued and revoked because they were 

impossible of execution. Stragglers poured 

to the rear in increasingly large numbers 

until they clogged all roads and disrupted 

all movement forward. Units disappeared 

into the jungle never to be heard from again. 

In two days an army evaporated into thin 

air. (Map 22) 

7 April: Disintegration 

Action on the 7th opened with an attempt 

to wrest from the Japanese control of Trail 

Junction 6-8. This was to be accomplished 

by simultaneous attacks against the junction 

from the east and west, along Trail 8. The 

attack from the east was to be made by a 

force led by Colonel Lilly and consisting of 

two battalions of the 57th Infantry, plus the 

201st and 202d Engineer Battalions (PA) 

from corps reserve. The 45th Infantry and 

Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, were 

to drive east from Trail Junction 8-29 to 

meet Colonel Lilly. When contact was established between the two forces, the II 

Corps line would extend from the San 

Vicente River westward along Trail 8 to 

the Pantingan and tie in with I Corps, thus 

presenting a bent but unbroken line to the 

advancing Japanese. 

The 45th Infantry's plan for the attack 

against the trail junction was a cautious one. 

Of the regiment's two battalions only one, 

the 2d, reinforced with a platoon of two 

tanks, was to attack. The 3d Battalion and 

the rest of the tank company would remain 

at Trail Junction 8-28, where General 

Lough had his command post, to prevent 

the Japanese on Trail 29 from cutting off 

the route of withdrawal. If the 2d Battalion's attack proved successful, the 3d Battalion would move forward later. 1 

General N ara's troops at the trail junction were well prepared for the 45th Infantry's attack. Just west of the junction they 

had established a strong defensive position, 

ideal for an ambush. South of the trail was 

a steep, thickly forested hill; to the north th'e 

ground dropped sharply to a deep, rocky 

ravine. The trail itself bent sharply at this 

point so that advancing troops, limited to 

the trail by the terrain on both sides. would 

have no warning of an attack. 

At about 0100, 7 April, the reinforced 2d 

Battalion moved out in column of com1 The account of the fight for the trail junction is 

based upon: Amato and Murphy, 2d Bn, 45th Inf 

(PS), pp. 15-16, and Croom, Hist, 3d Bn, 45th Inf 

(PS ), pp. 16-17, both in Chunn Notebooks; Miller, 

Bataan Uncensored, pp. 202-05; Wetherby, Opns 

of 41st Inf (PA), in Fortier, Notes on 41st Div 

(PA), pp. 172-73; Lilly, 57th Inf (PS) Opns Rpt, 

p. 6, OCMH; Phil Div Rpt of Opns, pp. 27-28; 

Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 4; 14th Army Opns, 

I, 164, II, Map 12. 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF II CORPS 443 

panies, with battalion and regimental headquarters bringing up the rear. In the van 

were the two tanks and a platoon of Company F. The Scouts and tankers, in almost 

continuous action since the night of the 5th, 

trudged along uncomplainingly in the darkness. An hour and a half after the first elements moved out, the point of the column 

reached the bend in the trail and marched 

unsuspectingly into the ambush. At almost 

the same moment that the Scouts sighted the 

roadblock, the Japanese opened fire and 

knocked out the lead tank. The second tank 

escaped with slight damage, but a jeep carrying six officers was destroyed, the driver 

and two riders killed, and three others 

wounded. Within a short time the infantry 

had formed a line and were laying down a 

heavy concentration of fire on the Japanese 

roadblock. 

At the first burst of fire Colonel Doyle 

had gone forward to the head of the column 

to take command. The situation was confused and the units disorganized, but Doyle 

kept his men in action until the coming of 

daylight, when it became evident that there 

was no possibility of breaking through to 

the trail junction. At that time he ordered 

his troops to withdraw to the Pantingan 

River. Under cover of heavy machine gun 

fire, the battalion and the remaining tank 

turned around and began their weary 

march back along Trail 8, past their starting 

point, Trail Junction 8-29, and on to the 

Pantingan River. By about 1000 the withdrawal of the 2d Battalion was completed. 

The 3d Battalion and the remainder of the 

tanks, which had been under pressure from 

the Japanese advancing down Trai129, had 

to fight their way out. Enemy infantrymen 

tried to cut off their retreat, but the tankers 

fought a successful delaying action and at 

1800 the last of the 3d Battalion reached 

the river. 

The inability of the 45th Infantry to 

break the Japanese hold on Trail Junction 

6-8 ended all hopes of uniting the separated 

elements of Sector D and General King attached General Lough's headquarters, the 

45th Infantry, and the remaining troops of 

Sector D still west of the trail junction to 

I Corps. These troops thereupon crossed the 

Pantingan and established a defensive line 

along its west bank. The 41st Infantry to 

the north was also ordered across the river 

that day and completed the maneuver 

without interference. 

The scheduled attack of the 1st and 2d 

Battalions, 57th Infantry, was never made. 

The Japanese maintained steady pressure 

against these battalions whose left ( west) 

flank was unprotected and before the day 

was far advanced had worked around that 

flank. At the same time another Japanese 

force, consisting of elements of Colonel 

Sato's 61st Infantry, moved into the gap 

between the southern extremity of the San 

Vicente line and the 57th Infantry. This 

space was to have been filled by the 201st 

and 202d Engineer Battalions who were 

just moving in when the Japanese struck. 

The Filipinos promptly turned and fled into 

the jungle when they found themselves in 

the midst of the Japanese. With both flanks 

in danger of envelopment, the Scouts, at 

1700, were forced to pull back to the east. 

The use of Trail 8 was now lost to the 

Americans. 

The 33d Infantry (PA), the only unit remaining west of Mt. Samat, met a disastrous 

end on the 7th. Isolated by the tide of battle 

and presumed lost, the regiment had spent 

the night of 6-7 April preparing for an attack that was inevitable now that its position 
444 

had been discovered by the enemy. At 0600, 

after an hour-long mortar preparation, the 

Japanese infantry began the assault. The 

Filipinos held up well at first but by midafternoon began to break. Once the reaction had set in, the regiment quickly became 

demoralized. The men, overwrought and 

jumpy after five days of intense mental 

strain and physical hardship, became panic 

stricken and fled into the jungle. Major 

Holmes, their commander, reluctantly issued orders for a withdrawal. The wounded 

remained in place with the medical officers 

to surrender. The rest of the men, singly and 

in small groups, slipped into the jungle to 

try to make their way back to safety. Few 

succeeded. 2 

While the 65th Brigade and the 61st Infantry were consolidating their hold on the 

area formerly occupied by Sector D, the 

4th Division and the Nagano Detachment, 

aided by artillery and air power, were reducing the recently established San Vicente 

River line. Signs of the disintegration of the 

units posted along the river were apparent 

almost as soon as the demoralized troops 

took their new positions. During the night 

of 6-7 April, even before the Japanese artillery had opened fire, large groups of soldiers began to move back to the rear. Some 

were stopped and put back into the line, but 

panic was spreading and the ominous signs 

of demoralization were too clear to be ignored. 

At dawn the Japanese artillery opened up 

with a repetition of the terrific bombardment that had preceded every attack since 

the 3d, and Japanese aircraft appeared overhead. During the day the bombers flew 169 

sorties and dropped approximately 100 tons 

'Chapin, Hist of 33d Inf (PA), pp. 16-21, 

OCMH; Holmes, 33d Inf (PA), p. 27A, Chunn 

Notebooks. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

of explosives on II Corps installations alone. 

At least ten bombs fell on General Hospital 

No. 2 at Little Baguio which had been hit 

a week earlier. One ward was demolished, 

extensive damage caused to other buildings, 

and 73 men killed. Of the 117 injured, 16 

died later. When the attack was over, the 

hospital area was covered with debris and 

fallen trees. The pharmacy was hit- and most 

of the drugs destroyed. Kitchen utensils were 

strewn over the grounds and the hospital 

records blew about like confetti. Under the 

wreckage were the mangled bodies of 

patients, and "the air was rent by the awful 

screams of the newly wounded and the 

dying." 3 

The Japanese infantry and armor moved 

out on the heels of the artillery preparation, 

hitting the Filipino troops before they could 

recover from the effect of the shelling. First 

to cross the San Vicente was the Nagano 

Detachment which, at 0730, struck the 32d 

Infantry on the right of Sector C, then 

turned east along the Orion cutoff to strike 

the Provisional Air Corps Regiment in Sector B. Supported by tanks, Nagano's men 

advanced rapidly into the area held by the 

grounded airmen who, lacking antitank 

weapons to oppose the armored point of the 

attack, fell back without a fight. The 31st 

Infantry (P A) in Sector A-not to be confused with the American 31st Infantry on 

the left of the San Vicente line-withdrew 

in disorder after a heavy air and artillery 

attack, leaving to the Japanese the last remaining portion of II Corps' original main 

line of resistance. 4 

• Juanita Redmond, I Served on Bataan (New 

York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943), p. 111. See 

also Cooper, Med Dept Activities, pp. 56-57. The 

Japanese later apologized for the bombing. 

• 14th Army Opns, I, 164-65, II, Maps 12 and 

13; 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 74-75. The account of 

the loss of the San Vicente line is based upon: 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF II CORPS 445 

Even before the Japanese ground forces 

attacked, the Sector C line had begun to 

crumble. The first unit to break under the 

impact of the air·artillery bombardment was 

the 51st Combat Team. It was followed 

soon by the 32d Infantry (PA) and other 

elements of General Bluemel's 31st Division 

which had fled at the appearance of Nagano's troops. Soon a disorganized mass of 

Filipino troops, many without arms, uniforms, or equipment, began to stream to the 

rear. When General Bluemel, rifle in hand, 

attempted to place some stragglers in the 

line, they bolted at the first sign of an enemy 

air-artillery attack. "It seemed," wrote Colo· 

nel Young, the 51st Combat Team commander, "that whenever a stand of any kind 

was made, low flying airplanes bombed or 

fired on the troops." 5 

The American and Scout units holding 

the left (south) half of the San Vicente line 

fared little better than the Philippine Army 

troops. They held firm under the heavy bombardment which began at 0700, but at 

about 1030, when Colonel Morita's 8th Infantry, 4th Division, crossed the San Vi· 

cente, they, too, began to fall back. By noon 

Colonel Brady had ordered his 31st InfanBluemel, 31st Diy (PA) Rpt of Opns, pp. 24-25; 

Young, 51st Combat Team, p. 3, in Bluemel, 31st 

Diy (PA) Rpt of Opns; Bess, Opns of Service Co, 

31st Inf (US), pp. 32-33; Mead, Opns and 

Mvmts of 31st Inf (PA), pp. 26-27; Mendelson, 

Opns of Prov Air Corps Regt, pp. 21-22; Blanning, 

CO 2d Sq, 26th Cay (PS), War Diary, p. 4, 

OCMH; Johnson, 57th Inf (PS) Diary, pp. 18-19; 

Maj Karol Bauer and Lt Gregory Williams, 31st 

Inf (PA), pp. 20-21, Lt Harold A. Morey, 32d Inf 

(PA), p. 23, and Lt Walter S. Strong, Hist, 31st 

Inf (US), p. 3, all three in Chunn Noteboo'ks; 

Brady, Diary, p. 5, Brady Papers, OCMH; Farrell, 

Diary, in Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, 

p. 71; Farrell, Notes for RegtI. Hist, Brady Papers, 

pp. 21-22, OCMH. 

• Young, 51st Combat Team, in Bluemel, 31st 

Diy (PA) Rpt of Opns, p .. 3. 

try (US) to withdraw by battalions and to 

reassemble near the intersection of Trails 2 

and 46, about 2,000 yards to the southeast. 6 

Though the 3d Battalion, 57th Infantry, on 

the left of the line, had not yet come under 

attack, its position was now untenable and 

it began to withdraw. Its orders were to fall 

back to Trail 46 and to take up a position 

on the left of the 31st Infantry. By early 

afternoon the San Vicente line had evaporated. 

The withdrawal of the 31st and 3d Battalion, 57th, was a difficult one. With the 

Japanese in control of Trail 44 and a portion of Trail 2, the men had to travel crosscountry to reach their new position. Many 

were wounded and all were weak from lack 

of food and sleep. Units, already partially 

disorganized, became further disorganized 

so that it was almost impossible to maintain 

contact. Before long, the line of march became a line of stragglers in which "it was 

almost every man for himself." 7 

Late on the afternoon of the 6th General 

King had taken the 26th Cavalry (P A) 

from I Corps reserve and ordered it to 

Trail Junction 2-10. By morning of the 7th 

the horseless cavalrymen were in position 

at that trail junction, only a short distance 

in front of the Mamala River and about 

one mile behind Trail 46, the destination 

of the last two elements to evacuate the San 

Vicente line. During the morning, when the 

disintegration of that line had already become evident, General King released the 

cavalry regiment, together with the 803d 

Engineer Battalion (US) and the 14th 

6 Trail 46 extended about five miles in a northeasterly direction from Trail Junction 8-44, across 

Trails 2 and 38, to join the E?st Road about a 

half mile south of Orion. 

'Conrad, Opns of 31st Inf (PA), p. 25. See 

also Johnson, 57th Inf (PS) Diary, p. 18. 
446 

Engineer Battalion (PS), to the II Corps 

commander, who by now had decided to 

establish the next line at the Mamala 

River.8 Parker thereupon directed the 26th 

Cavalry commander, Col. Lee C. Vance, 

to report to General Bluemel, who was now 

the only general officer on the front line.9 

While the cavalrymen moved up to Trail 

Junction 2-46, Maj. William E. Chandler, 

the regimental S-2 and S-3, walked ahead 

to find General Bluemel whose exact whereabouts was unknown. About 1,000 yards 

north of the junction he met the general, 

who "cheered up a bit" on learning ·of the 

presence of the 26th Cavalry.lO Bluemel 

and Chandler then traveled together to the 

cavalry command post where the general 

ordered the regiment to establish a holding 

position behind which he could form a line 

along the Mamala. 

Colonel Vance quickly deployed his men 

in two lines. In front, on a hill at Trail Junction 2-46, was the 2d Squadron; the 1st 

held a delaying position some distance to the 

rear, just north of Trail Junction 2-10. During the afternoon elements of the 31st Infantry (US) and the 3d Battalion, 57th 

Infantry (PS), straggled through the cav-

• The Mamala River flows east from Mt. Limay, 

parallel to and south of Trail 10, across Trail 2, 

to empty into Manila Bay at Limay. 

• The account of the effort to establish a line at 

the Mamala River is based upon: Luzon Force 

Rpt of Opns, p. 5; itr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, 

OCMH; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to 

Glory," Part 3, Armored Cavalry Journal (JulyAugust 1947), pp. 20-21; Chandler, Outline Hist 

of 26th Cavalry (PS), p. 12; Blanning, War Diary, 

pp. 4-6; Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, 

pp. 26-28; Collier, Notebooks, III, 75-77; Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 95-96; Farrell, Notes for 

Regtl Hist, Brady Papers, p. 21, OCMH; Farrell, 

Diary, in Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, 

p. 71; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 57. 

,. Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to 

Glory," Part 3, Armored Cavalry Journal (JulyAugust 1947), p. 20. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

aIry line and were directed to an assembly 

area on the south bank of the Mamala River, 

at Trail 2. Not long after, the 2d Squadron 

of the 26th Cavalry, at Trail Junction 2-46, 

was hit by Colonel Morita's 8th Infantry 

which was moving rapidly along Trail 2. 

Unable to rout the cavalrymen by a frontal 

assault, Morita sent his men around the 

flanks, forcing the Filipinos back through 

the 1st Squadron to Trail Junction 2-10. 

As soon as this maneuver was completed, 

the 1st Squadron began to fall back, past the 

trail junction, toward the Mamala River. 

At that moment the Japanese artillery 

opened up and "a storm of interdiction fire 

fell on the junction." 11 Simultaneously, 

planes of the 16th Light Bombardment Regiment dive-bombed the men and vehicles on 

the trail. Losses, especially in the 1st Squadron, were heavy, and it was late afternoon 

before the decimated regiment crossed the 

Mamala River. 

General Bluemel had spent the afternoon 

assembling his forces along the south bank 

of the river. In addition to the cavalry regiment he now had the remnants of 31st and 

57th Infantry, and the 14th and 803d Engineer Battalions. None of his men had eaten 

since breakfast, and many of them had had 

their last meal on the morning of the 6th. 

He had few vehicles and almost no heavy 

weapons. The prospects of holding off a 

determined Japanese attack with these 

troops were not bright. 

Around dusk, when he began to receive 

artillery fire and when Japanese troops 

were observed working their way forward, 

firing sporadically, General Bluemel decided "that the Mamala River line could 

not be held." 12 Actually, the Japanese had 

not yet crossed the river. Forward elements 

11 Ibid., p. 21. 

11 Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 28. 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF II CORPS 447 

of the 4th Division had reached the north 

bank, but the Nagano Detachment was still 

north of Trail 46. Since the high bluffs on 

the north bank "completely commanded" 

the line on the south shore, it is doubtful if 

the position would have been tenable in any 

event.13 Hoping to gain twenty-four hours 

to rest and feed his men and prepare a 

stronger position, Bluemel ordered a withdrawal to the Alangan River, 4,000 yards 

to the south. The men were to break off all 

contact with the enemy, withdraw under 

cover of darkness, and be in position by 

dawn of 8 April. There he hoped to have 

time to prepare for a fresh Japanese attack. 

Corps headquarters approved this plan and 

at Bluemel's request ordered the retreating 

troops of Sectors A and B to fall in on 

Bluemel's right the next morning. 

During the day both Wainwright and 

King had sought desperately to find some 

way to stem the Japanese advance. 'While 

Bluemel was striving to establish a line at 

the Mamala, General King had decided 

"to place everything possible" there.14 

Since all his reserves as well as the reserves 

of both corps had already been committed, 

he took a desperate chance that the J apanese would not attempt to land behind the 

lines and ordered Jones and Parker to withdraw the troops on beach defense-the 1st 

and 4th Philippine Constabulary Regiments-and throw them into the line then 

forming. To General Wainwright he sent 

word by his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Arnold 

J. Funk, that the situation on Bataan was 

critical. 

Wainwright's scheme for retrieving the 

situation was to launch an attack eastward 

from I Corps along the general line of Trail 

8. He hoped in this way to tie in I Corps 

13 Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 92. 

,. Collier, Notebooks, III, 76. 

with the troops along the Mamala River and 

again form an unbroken line across the peninsula. Unaware that the Mamala line was 

already being evacuated and that II Corps 

had so far deteriorated that even if the 

attack succeeded the I Corps troops would 

find no line to tie into, General Wainwright 

ordered the attack at 1600. The 11 th Division (PA) would make the assault.15 

On receipt of this order, General King 

sent his G-3, Col. James V. Collier, to I 

Corps headquarters to transmit the order 

orany. When General Jones received the 

order he expressed his belief that it was 

impossible of execution. In his opinion the 

men of the 11 th Division were too weak to 

cross the Pantingan gorge even if unopposed; certainly they would be unable to 

drag any heavy equipment or artillery with 

them. Furthermore, Jones told Collier, at 

least eighteen hours would be required to 

get the division out of the line and in position to attack. After telephone conversations 

between Wainwright, King, and Jones, the 

USFIP commander decided to leave the 

execution of his order to General King's 

discretion. 

The decision was now King's. On the 

basis of Jones's estimate, he withheld the 

order to attack. Instead, he directed Jones 

to pull back to the line of the Binuangan 

River, about five miles south of the main line 

of resistance, in four phases. This move 

would place I Corps' right flank, exposed by 

the withdrawal of II Corps, on the slopes 

of the Mariveles Mountains, and reduce 

substantially the lightly defended beach line. 

" The account of this order is based upon the following conflicting sources: Luzon Force Rpt of 

Opns, p. 5; USAF FE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 60; 

Collier, Notebooks, III, 77; intervs, author with 

Cen King, 12 Feb 47, Cen Jones, and Col Collier, 

20 Nov 46, OCMH; Brougher, 11th Div (PA) Surrender, p. 1, copy in OCMH. 
448 

That night General Wainwright could report to Washington only a succession of retreats. 

Continued heavy enemy pressure, constant 

bombing, strafing, and shelling of front line 

units [he wrote] forced all elements of the right 

half of our line in Bataan to fall back. A new 

defensive position is forming on the high 

ground south of the Alangan River. . . . The 

left half of our line, due to an exposed flank, 

withdrew on orders and is taking up a defense position south of the Binuangan River. 

Fighting is intense, casualties on both sides 

heavy.16 

For the Japanese, the offensive which 

General Homma had expected to last a 

month was all but won by the night of the 

7th. They had gained possession of the entire main line of resistance in II Corps, and 

forced the evacuation of the Mamala River 

line where they had supposed the Americans 

and Filipinos had their main defenses. 

"That," remarked General Homma, "was 

beyond our expectation." 17 

The cost had been light. The 4th Division, 

the spearhead of the assault, had lost 150 

men killed and 250 wounded during a rapid 

advance which had netted about 1,000 

prisoners and a large number of small caliber weapons. Losses in the 65th Brigade, 

which captured over 100 prisoners and considerable equipment, totaled 77 dead and 

152 wounded. The Nagano Detachment 

had suffered no casualties.18 

"Rad, Wainwright to AGWAR, 8 Apr 42, and 

notes of telephone conversation between G-3 

USFIP, and CofS Luzon Force, made at 1745, 7 

Apr 42, both in USFIP G-3 Journal, 19 Mar-19 

Apr 42, AG 461 (1 Apr 42) Phil Reds. 

17 USA vs. Homma, p. 3065, testimony of Homma. 

'"14th Army Opns, I, 165. Colonel Yoshida, 

4th Division ehief of staff, confirmed these figures 

and stated that casualties for the 4th Division on 

Bataan totaled 400 killed and wounded. Statement 

of Yoshida, ATIS Doc 62642, 28 Jul 49, Statements 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

With the Americans and Filipinos in full 

retreat, General Homma decided to push 

on "without delay" instead of pausing at the 

Mamala River as he had originally planned. 

His next objective, he decided, would be 

Cabcaben on the southeast tip of the peninsula, and at 2300 he issued orders for the 

next day's attack. The 4th Division would 

strike for the Real River west of Cabcaben. 

The 65th Brigade to its west would occupy 

Mt. Limay and the heights of Mariveles, 

and the Nagano Detac hment would advance 

down the East Road on the left (east) of 

the division toward Cabcaben itself. The 

16th Division, then assembling near Balanga 

where Homma had his headquarters, was 

to advance behind Nagano's troops and prepare for the final thrust toward Mariveles. 

As before, the attacking units would have 

the support of 14th Army artillery and the 

22d Air Brigade. 19 For the first time the 

artillery commander received orders to open 

fire on Corregidor when he got within range 

of the island fortress. 

8 April: Chaos 

Orders for the establishment of a line 

along the south bank of the Alangan River 

called for a withdrawal during the night 

of 7-8 April by the forces under General 

Bluemel and Col. John W. Irwin, and the 

occupation of the new position by dawn of 

the 8th. The units under Bluemel-the 31 st 

Infantry (US), the57th Infantry (PS), the 

26th Cavalry (PS), the 803d Engineer 

Battalion (US), and the 14th Engineer 

Battalion (PS ) -were to hold the left (west) 

of the line, from Trail 20 to the confluence 

of the Alangan and the Paalungan River, 

of Japanese Officials on World War II, GHQ FEC, 

Mil Intel Sec, IV, 548. 

,. 14th Army Opns, I, 166-67. 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF II CORPS 449 

a distance of about 2,500 yards.20 Colonel 

Irwin's force, consisting of the 31st Infantry 

(P A) and Constabulary troops taken from 

beach defense; was to hold the right portion 

of-the line and block the East Road. Artillery support would be provided by the intact 

21 st Field Artillery ( P A), a Provisional 

Field Artillery Brigade formed from three 

battalions of Scouts, a few fixed naval guns, 

and the three remaining 155-mm. guns of 

Col. Alexander S. Quintard's 30lst Field 

Artillery (P A) .21 

The positions taken by the troops on the 

morning of the 8th did not conform to plan. 

In the confusion of the withdrawal, units 

crossed and took up positions some distance 

from those assigned. The American 31st 

and the Scout 57th Infantry, for example, 

had to exchange positions. The 803d Engineer Battalion did not occupy its position 

at all but continued south after it crossed 

the river. Only the 14th Engineers and the 

26th Cavalry went into their assigned positions. The engineers took over the left of the 

line astride Trail 20, and -the cavalrymen 

fell in on their right (east). From there·eastward there were large gaps in the line. Between the cavalry regiment and the 31st 

20 Trail 20 extended for about eight miles in an 

arc from Limay southward to Lamao. It crossed 

the Alangan, which is midway between the two 

villages, about two and a half miles from the coast. 

The Paalungan River joins the Alangan about one 

and a half miles east of Trail 2 and the two then 

£low east as one stream to empty into Manila Bay. 

21 The account of operations on 8 April is based 

upon: Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 5; SLF and II 

Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 58; Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) 

Rpt of Opns, pp. 29-32; Quintard, Diary, entry of 

7-8 April 42; Chandler, "26th Cavalry Battles to 

Glory," Part 3, Armored Cavalry Journal, (JulyAugust 1947), pp. 21-22; Lilly, 57th Inf (PS) 

Opns Rpt, pp. 6-7; Brady, Diary, pp. 5-6, Brady 

Papers, OCMH; Farrell, Diary, in Bluemel, 31st 

Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 71; Farrell, Kates for 

Regtl Hist, in Brady Papers, p. 22, OCMH; Mallonee, Bataan Diary, II, 99-103. 

Infantry (US) was an open space of over 

1,000 yards. To the right of the Americans 

was another gap, and the 57th Infantry, 

Bluemel's right flank unit, had both its 

flanks exposed. The unauthorized withdrawal of the 803d Engineers had made the 

establishment of contact between Bluemel 

and Irwin a physical impossibility. 

All units on the line were so decimated as 

to make their designations meaningless. The 

31st Infantry (US) had but 160 men; the 

26th Cavalry, 300; the 57th Infantry, 500. 

Altogether Bluemel had 1,360 men in the 

three regiments and one battalion under 

his command. Irwin's force of two regiments 

numbered but 1,200 men. All the troops 

were half starved and exhausted. "We were 

all so tired," wrote one officer, "that the only 

way to stay awake was to remain standing. 

As soon as a man sat or laid down he would 

go to sleep." 22 After five days under intense 

air and artillery bombardment and successive defeats, it was doubtful if the men 

"cared very much what happened." 23 

Even before the Japanese infantry struck 

the· Alangan line it was already crumbling 

under heavy and sustained air bombardment lasting most of the morning. Japanese 

observation planes had spotted the troops 

hastily organizing their positions and at 

about 1100 fighters and light bombers appeared over the Alangan. Flying low, they 

dropped incendiary bombs on the area held 

by the 31st Infantry (US) and the 57th Infantry, setting fire to the dry cogon grass 

and bamboo thickets. The infantrymen 

turned fire fighters to avoid being burned 

out of their positions. 

Farther east Colonel Irwin's 31st Infantry 

(P A) along the East Road came under 

heavy air attack about the same time. The 

.. Blanning, War Diary, p. 5. 

.. Quintard, Diary, entry of 7-8 Apr 42. 
450 

Filipinos, who were digging their foxholes 

when the planes came over, fled for cover 

and had to be rounded up after the planes 

had passed. When the bombers came back 

again, the men again threw down their entrenching tools and fled, and again they had 

to be brought back. With each successive attack, the number of men on the line, some 

of them forced into position at pistol point, 

became fewer. The Constabulary troops east 

of the 31st Infantry also fled, and by about 

1500, before a single Japanese soldier had 

appeared, Colonel Irwin's portion of the 

line was entirely deserted. 

Enemy planes did not limit their attacks 

that morning to the men along the Alangan 

River. They struck at artillery positions, 

supply points, troops, and vehicles. The most 

profitable targets were the trails, clogged 

with dazed and weakened men stumbling 

to the rear. A Japanese pilot could hardly 

miss on a strafing run over this uninterrupted line of disorganized troops, and the 

ditches along the trails were lined with the 

dead and wounded.24 

The Japanese infantry reached the Alangan River at about 1400, when advance 

patrols appeared in front of the 57th Infantry. Before long the enemy infantrymen 

found the exposed right flank and began to 

filter to the rear of the Scouts. At about the 

same time other small groups of Japanese 

struck the 31st Infantry (US) to the west. 

The Americans, reduced to less than company strength, were forced to fall back at 

1700, and the 57th, with both its flanks 

exposed, followed suit. 

The main Japanese effort that afternoon 

was made against the 14th Engineer Battalion and the 26th Cavalry by a force 

consisting of the 8th Infantry and the 7th 

.. TisdelIe, Diary, entry of 8 Apr 42; Mallonee, 

Bataan Diary, II, 100. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Tank Regiment. The tanks, advancing 

along Trail 20, reached the engineers shortly 

after 1600, but were stopped in their tracks 

at the block the Scouts had established. 

The tanks could not turn on the narrow 

trail, and the crewmen were kept inside by 

small-arms fire from the engineers. Without 

the help of infantry, the Japanese tanks 

became, in effect, pillboxes from which the 

tankers fired their small arms, machine guns, 

and 47-mm. guns without visible effect on 

the block. The engineers, though they had 

the tanks at their mercy, lacked the antitank 

guns to knock them out. 

To the right (east) of the roadblock, the 

26th Cavalry had come under attack from 

the 8th Infantry whose advance elements 

had forced back the 31st and 57th. The 

Japanese worked their way around the 

hastily refused right flank of the cavalrymen, threatening to take them from the 

rear. By late afternoon it appeared doubtful 

if the 26th Cavalry, which was now under 

fire from the tanks at the block, would be 

able to maintain its position.l!l; 

About this time, General Bluemel, whose 

only communication with the front-line 

units was by runner, learned that the 31st 

and 57th Infantry were falling back. "To 

hold the Alangan River line," he concluded, 

"was now an impossibility." 26 Reluctantly 

he gave the order for the 14th Engineer Battalion and the 26th Cavalry to. withdraw, 

and at 1830, as darkness settled over the battlefield, the men began to fall back again. 

That evening, the main force of the 4th Division crossed the river and pushed on 

toward Cabcaben. 

The advance of the Nagano Detachment 

along the East Road met with little re-

.. Blanning, War Diary, p. 6; 14th Army Opns, II, 

Map 12. 

,. Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 32. 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF II CORPS 451 

sistance. By 1700 Nagano's troops were on 

the river line and ready to move on behind 

the rapidly retreating Philippine Army and 

Constabulary troops. Only the tanks and the 

remaining 75-mm. guns (SPM) stood in the 

way of the advancing Japanese. But the effectiveness of the armor and self-propelled 

75's was severely limited by the absence of 

infantry support and their inability to move 

freely along the crowded trails. Though they 

made every effort to organize a holding position they, too, were forced to pull back.21 

The East Road, which the Japanese had 

carefully avoided since their disastrous assault early in January, now lay open. 

The situation everywhere along the front 

was obscure. With troops jamming all roads 

and with communications so uncertain as to 

be nonexistent, even front-line commanders 

did not know where their units were at any 

given moment. Higher headquarters, forced 

to rely on runners and the armored group 

radio net for information, were even less informed than the unit commanders. It was 

not until 1800, for example, that General 

King learned that the Alangan line had 

been penetrated on the east. By that time 

the two Japanese columns-the Nagano 

Detachment and the 4th Division-were 

already south of the river and pushing forward rapidly along the East Road and 

Trail 20. 

To Luzon Force headquarters, the chief 

threat seemed to be developing along the 

East Road, which provided the enemy clear 

Of Material on the action of the tanks and SPM's 

during the last days of the campaign is scanty and 

vague. This account is based upon: Capt L. E. 

Johnson, 194th Tank Bn, 5-3 Rpt, 14 Sep 43, in 

Diary of Lt Col E. B. Miller, CO 194th Tank Bn; 

Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 24; Bluemel, 31st 

Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, pp. 30-31. The Japanese 

aircraft were under orders to pay particular attention to vehicular movements. 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 

74-75. 

passage to Mariveles. With the tanks and 

75-mm. guns (SPM) in retreat and already 

nearing Cabcaben and with his last reserves 

committed, General King attempted to 

form a line with the only organized unit 

remaining, the Provisional Coast Artillery 

Brigade (AA). 28 At about 1900 he directed 

Col. Charles G. Sage, the brigade commander, to destroy all his antiaircraft 

weapons except those which could be used 

by infantry and to form his men along the 

high ground just north of Cabcaben. At 

the same time he released the 1 st Philippine 

Constabulary, then in transit from I Corps, 

to II Corps and ordered it into position on 

the left of the brigade. 29 

While the artillerymen were attempting 

to establish a line at Cabcaben, Bluemel's 

scattered force was nearing the Lamao 

River. The retreat from the Alangan had 

been a difficult one. The men of the 31st Infantry (US) and the 57th Infantry had 

been forced to fall back through the jungle 

and by now were in the last stages of exhaustion. The 14th Engineer Battalion and 

the 26th Cavalry, which had withdrawn 

along Route 20, had found the march less 

trying, but had suffered other mishaps, and 

one element of the 26th Cavalry, covering 

the withdrawal, had been lost in the jungle 

and never again joined the regiment. 

It was about 2130 when General Bluemel 

and the last of the covering force reached the 

Lamao. At that time he received telephone 

.. The brigade had been formed on 7 April from 

Groupment A and consisted of the 200th Coast 

Artillery (AA) and the 515th Coast Artillery (AA), 

both composed of Americans. The former was a 

New Mexico National Guard unit and had provided 

the personnel for the latter when it was organized 

just after the start of war. Prov CA Brig (AA) Rpt 

of Opns, Annex IX, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns. 

•• Collier, Notebooks, III, 79-80; Luzon Force 

Rpt of Opns, p. 6; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, 

p.69. 
452 

orders from General Parker to form a line 

along the Lamao River and within the hour 

he had his men across the river and in an 

assembly area. 30 But the establishment of a 

line was not so easily accomplished. None 

of the officers knew the area and the moonless night made it difficult to find defensible 

positions along which to deploy the troops. 

After a discouraging reconnaissance in the 

darkness Bluemel, who by now was using the 

26th Cavalry staff as his own, concluded 

that a line behind the Lamao "was not feasible." 51 Unable to reach either corps or 

Luzon Force headquarters, he finally turned 

for aid to General Wainwright, who could 

only advise him to use his own judgment.32 

Even without precise information on 

Bluemel's situation it was already evident to 

General King that II Corps had disintegrated. Reports from officer patrols and 

from the tanks and the self-propelled 75's 

clearly reflected the chaotic state of the command. There was no chance that the 1st 

Philippine Constabulary would reach C91-

onel Sage before daylight, and little possibility that any of the retreating troops 

could be organized in time to be placed on 

the line Sage was trying to establish near 

Cabcaben. Nevertheless orders were issued 

directing the 26th Cavalry to fall in on the 

right of Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade. 

The cavalrymen evidently did not receive 

these orders and when the artillerymen, a 

half hour before midnight, occupied the last 

remaining line, they stood alone.33 

•• Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 32; 

Luzon Force Rpt of Opns, p. 6. 

81 Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 32. 

.. Ibid.; Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 

p. 81. 

.. Collier, Notebooks, IV, 2; Prov CA Brig (AA) 

Rpt of Opns, p. 8; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) 

Battles to Glory," Part 3, Armorer! Cavalry Journal 

(July-August 1947), p. 22; Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) 

Rpt of Opns, p. 34. The G--3 Annex of the Luzon 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

At 2330, when his position was already 

hopeless, General King received fresh orders 

from Corregidor directing him to launch an 

offensive with I Corps northward toward 

Olongapo, the Japanese base at the head of 

Subic Bay. In issuing these orders Wainwright was merely carrying out his own orders from General MacArthur, who, on 4 

April, had instructed him to "prepare and 

execute an attack upon the enemy along the 

following general lines," when the situation 

became desperate. 

1. A feint by I Corps in the form of an "ostentatious" artillery preparation. 

Z. A "sudden surprise attack" by Il Corps 

toward the Dinalupihan-Olongapo Road at 

the base of the peninsula, made with "full 

tank strength" and "maximum artillery concentration." 

3. Seizure of OIongapo by simultaneous 

action of both corps, I Corps making a frontal 

attack and II Corps taking the enemy "in reverse" by an attack from the west, along the 

Dinalupihan-Olongapo Road. 

"If successful," MacArthur explained, "the 

supplies seized at this base might well rectify 

the situation. This would permit operation 

in central Luzon where food supplies could 

be obtained and where Bataan and the 

northern approaches to Corregidor could be 

protected." Even if the attack did not succeed, many of the men would be able to 

escape from Bataan and continue to fight 

as guerrillas.54 

Even before he issued the orders for an 

attack, Wainwright already knew it was 

impossible of execution. Earlier that day he 

had notified the War Department that the 

Force Report of Operations states that the 26th 

Cavalry (PS) did go into the line as ordered, but 

other records do not confirm this view. Colonel 

Vance states that the orders were not received, 

and even if they had been could not have been 

executed. Ltr, Vance to Ward, 18 Dec 51, OCMH. 

.. Rad, MacArthur to Wainwright, No. 68, 4 

Apr 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF II CORPS 453 

withdrawal of both corps had become necessary because of the weaknes~ of the troops 

who had subsisted for so long on one-half 

to one-third rations. Even the best of his 

regiments, he said, "were capable of only a 

short advance before they were completely 

exhausted." 3~ 

In his message to MacArthur he had 

given clear warning that the end was near. 

The tactical situation, he explained, was 

fast deteriorating and the men were so 

weakened by hunger and disease that they 

had "no power of resistance" left. "It is 

with deep regret," he had written, "that I 

am forced to report that the troops on 

Bataan are fast folding up." 86 When he received no change in orders, he had no 

recourse but to direct General King to 

launch the attack toward Olongapo. 

The attack order was received at Luzon 

Force headquarters during the height of 

confusion and chaos caused by the disintegration of II Corps. Except for a single issue 

of half rations, the food stocks on Bataan 

had been exhausted. Already the depot commanders were standing by for orders to destroy their equipment and the Chemical 

Warfare Service was dumping its chemicals 

into Manila Bay. At Mariveles the Navy 

had begun demolitions an hour before and 

the flames were already lighting up the sky. 

Nevertheless General King put in a call to 

the I Corps commander and explained that 

he had received orders to launch an attack 

immediately. General Jones replied that his 

corps was in the midst of a withdrawal to the 

Binuangan River, ordered the night before. Moreover, he declared, the physical 

"Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 197, 8 

Apr 42, USFIP G-3 Journal, 19 Mar-19 Apr 42, 

AG 461 (1 Apr 42) Phil Reds. This message is a 

paraphrase of the one sent to Washington. 

.. Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 199, 8 

Apr 42, USFIP G-3 Journal, 19 Mar-19 Apr 42, 

AG 461 (1 Apr 42) Phil Reds. 

condition of his troops was such that an attack under any condition was impossible. 

General King accepted this estimate without question and with it the responsibility 

for refusing to transmit to Jones an order 

which he knew could not be executed.31 

Apparently he did not inform General 

Wainwright of this decision. 

As the precious hours went by and no 

word reached Corregidor about the attack, 

General Wainwright had his chief of staff, 

General Beebe, telephone directly to General Jones to ask if he had received the order. 

When Jones replied that the order had not 

been transmitted, Beebe told him that he 

would probably receive instructions to attack shortly. General King soon learned of 

Beebe's call and at three o'clock in the morning, 9 April, he telephoned USFIP at Corregidor to inquire if I Corps had been removed from his command. Through his 

chief of staff who took the call, Wainwright 

assured the Luzon Force commander that 

he was still in command of all the forces on 

Bataan. There was no further discussion of 

the attack order, but Wainwright apparently still believed that an effort would be 

made to carry it out.sa This telephone call at 

0300 of the 9th was the last conversation 

Wainwright had with King. Already two 

emissaries had gone forward with a white 

flag to meet the Japanese commander. 

"Cooper, Med Dept Activities, p. 35; Luzon 

Force Rpt of Opns, p. 6; Collier, Notebooks, IV, 2; 

intervs, author with Gen King, 12 Feb 47, Gen 

Jones, and Col Collier, 20 Nov 46, OCMH; 

Brougher, 11th Div (PA) Surrender, p. 1; Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, p. 122 . 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

81-82; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 61. Colonel Alexander, who was in King's command post 

that night, confirms this telephone conversation. 

King, he says, declared, "I want a definite answer 

as to whether or not General Jones will be left in 

my command regardless of what action I may take." 

Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, pp. 

123-24. 
CHAPTER XXVI 

Surrender 

When, late in the evening of 8 April, 

General Wainwright ordered a counterattack by I Corps in the direction of Olongapo, General King had already reached 

the conclusion that he had no alternative 

but to surrender. By that time all chance 

of halting the Japanese advance, much less 

launching a successful counterattack, was 

gone. The last of his reserves as well as those 

of the two corps had been committed. On 

the left, I Corps was still intact but was in 

the process of withdrawal in an effort to tie 

in its right flank with the rapidly crumbling 

II Corps. General Parker's corps on the right 

had completely disintegrated and no longer 

existed as a fighting force. Efforts to hold at 

the Alangan River had failed and General 

Bluemel had reported soon after dark that 

his small force of 1,300 Scouts and Americans was in retreat. The Provisional Coast 

Artillery Brigade (AA) had been ordered 

to destroy its antiaircraft equipment and 

form as infantry along the high ground just 

south of the Cabcaben airfield, near the 

southern tip of the peninsula. On the night 

of 8 April this unit formed the only line between the enemy and the supply and service 

elements around Cabcaben and Mariveles. 

"II Corps as a tactical unit," wrote King's 

G-3, "no longer existed." 1 

The deterioration of the line in the II 

Corps sector gave the enemy free passage 

to the south where the hospitals with their 

1 Collier, Diary, III, 80. 

12,000 defenseless patients, already within 

reach of Japanese light artillery, were located. Philippine Army troops were in complete rout and units were melting away 

"lock, stock, and barrel." Headquarters had 

lost contact with the front-line troops and 

could no longer control the action except 

through runners or the armored vehicles of 

the SPM battalion. The roads were jammed 

with soldiers who had abandoned arms and 

equipment in their frantic haste to escape 

from the advancing Japanese infantry and 

armored columns and the strafing planes 

overhead. "Thousands poured out of the 

jungle," wrote one observer, "like small 

spring freshets pouring into creeks which in 

turn poured into a river." 2 

Even if General King had been able at 

the last moment to muster enough arms and 

men to oppose the Japanese advance it is 

extremely doubtful that he could have 

averted or even delayed the final disaster. 

The men on Bataan were already defeated 

and had been for almost a week. Disease 

and starvation rather than military conditions had created the situation in which 

General King now found himself. The men 

who threw away their arms and equipment 

and jammed the roads and trails leading 

south were beaten men. Three months of 

malnutrition, malaria, and intestinal infections had left them weak and diseaseridden, totally incapable of the sustained 

, Ibid., IV, 2. 
SURRENDER 

physical effort necessary for a successful 

defense. 

General Wainwright was well aware of 

the disintegration of the Luzon Force. His 

messages to Marshall and MacArthur on 

the 8th gave a clear picture of impending 

doom. Late that night he had told MacArthur, "with deep regret," that the troops 

on Bataan were "fast folding up," and that 

the men were so weak from malnutrition 

"that they have no power of resistance." 3 

MacArthur, in turn, had alerted Washington to the danger. "In view of my intimate 

knowledge of the situation there," he 

warned the Chief of Staff, "I regard the 

situation as extremely critical and feel you 

should anticipate the possibility of disaster 

there very shortly." 4 By the time this warning reached Washington silence had fallen 

on Bataan. 

If the situation appeared critical to those 

on Corregidor and in Australia, how much 

blacker was the future to General King on 

whom rested the responsibility for the fate of 

the 78,000 men on Bataan. As early as the 

afternoon of 7 April, when the last of the 

Luzon Force and I Corps reserves had been 

committed without appreciably delaying 

the enemy, he had realized that his position 

was critical. It was then that he sent his 

chief of staff, General Funk, to Corregidor 

to inform Wainwright that the fall of Bataan was imminent and that he might have 

to surrender. Funk's face when he told 

Wainwright about the physical condition of 

the troops and the disintegration of the line, 

"was a map of the hopelessness of the Ba-

• Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 199,8 Apr 

42, USFIP G-3 Journal, AG 461 (1 Apr 42) Phil 

Reds. 

4 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 116, 8 Apr 42, 

Msgs from Gen MacArthur, OPD Exec O. A note on 

this copy states that only one copy of the radio 

exists, in the Chief of Staff files. 

455 

taan situation." 5 While he never actually 

stated during the course of his conversation 

with Wainwright that General Kin g 

thought he might have to surrender, Funk 

left the USFIP commander with the impression that the visit was made "apparently with a view to obtaining my consent 

to capitulate." 6 

Though Wainwright shared King's feelings about the plight of the men on Bataan, 

his answer to Funk was of necessity based 

upon his own orders. On his desk was a message from MacArthur which prohibited surrender under any conditions. When Wainwright had written ten days earlier that if 

supplies did not reach him soon the troops 

on Bataan would be starved into submission, MacArthur had denied his authority 

to surrender and directed him "if food fail" 

to "prepare and execute an attack upon the 

enemy." 7 To the Chief of Staff he had written that he was "utterly opposed, under any 

circumstances or conditions to the ultimate 

capitulation of this command .... If it is 

to be destroyed it should be upon the actual 

field of battle taking full toll from the 

enemy." 8 

• Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 79. 

See also Funk, Comments on Draft MS, p. 16, 

OCMH. 

• Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 398,4 May 

42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. This message was written almost a month after the surrender in answer to 

MacArthur's request for a complete explanation of 

King's action. 

'Rad, MacArthur to Wainwright, No. 68, 4 Apr 

42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA; Wainwright, General 

Wainwright's Story, p. 79. 

BRad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 56, 1 Apr 42, 

AG 384.3, GHQ SWPA. In this message MacArthur 

had explained that he had "long ago" prepared a 

"comprehensive plan," and that he had not told 

Wainwright about it "as I feared it might tend to 

shake his morale and determination." He offered 

also to attempt to return to the Philippines "to rejoin 

this command temporarily and take charge of this 

movement." General Marshall's reply was noncom-
456 

Wainwright was further limited in his 

reply to Funk by President Roosevelt's "no 

surrender" message of 9 February. This 

message, it will be recalled, had becn given 

MacArthur at the time Quezon had made 

his proposal to neutralize the Philippines. 

On Wainwright's assumption of command 

a copy of the original text had been sent to 

him, with the statement that "the foregoing 

instructions from the President remain unchanged." 9 In his reply to the President, 

Wainwright had promised "to keep our flag 

flying in the Philippines as long as an American soldier or an ounce of food and a round 

of ammunition remains." 10 

Under direct orders from the President 

and MacArthur "to continue the fight as 

long as there remains any possibility of resistance," Wainwright, therefore, had no recourse but to tell General Funk on the 7th 

that Bataan must be held. In the presence of 

his chief of staff he gave Funk two direct 

orders for General King: first, that under 

no circumstances would the Luzon Force 

surrender; and second, that General King 

was to counterattack in an effort to regain 

the main line of resistance from Bagac to 

Orion. "I had no discussion with General 

King," Wainwright later explained to MacArthur, "which might in any way have led 

mittal. He stated that "we were interested to learn 

of your intentions in the event that efforts to supply 

the Philippines should prove inadequate," and 

agreed that any action was preferable to surrender. 

In answer to MacArthur's offer to lead the last desperate attack himself, Marshall wrote: "Should it 

become necessary for you to direct a last resort 

attack with the objectives you outline, we feel sure 

that Wainw.right and his forces will give a good account of themselves." Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 

No. 1087,4 Apr 42, AG 384.3, GHQ SWPA. 

• Rad, Marshall to Wainwright, No. 1234,24 Mar 

42, Msgs to Gen Wainwright, OPD Exec O. 

10 Rad, Wainwright to Marshall for the President, 

No. 598, 26 Mar 42, Msgs from Gen Wainwright, 

OPD Exec O. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

him to believe, either that capitulation was 

contemplated, or that he had authority to 

send a flag of truce. On the contrary I had 

expressly forbidden such action. General 

King did not personally broach the subject 

of capitulation to me." 11 When Funk left 

Wainwright's office with the orders to attack there were tears in his eyes. Both he 

and Wainwright knew what the outcome 

would be.12 

While Wainwright's orders are understandable in terms of his own instructions, 

they placed General King in an impossible 

position. He was now under orders to 

launch a counterattack which .he knew 

could not be carried out. If he could hold 

his position he might avert the necessity of 

surrender but even this proved impossible, 

as the events of the 7th and 8th showed. 

The only alternative remaining to King if 

he followed Wainwright's orders was to accept the wholesale slaughter of his men 

without achieving any military advantage. 

Under the circumstances, it was almost inevitable that he would disobey his orders. 

Wainwright evidently appreciated King's 

position, and even expected him to surrender. Some years later, after his return 

from prison camp, he wrote: "I had my 

orders from MacArthur not to surrender on 

Bataan, and therefore I could not authorize 

King to do it." But General King, he added, 

"was on the ground and confronted by a 

situation in which he had either to surrender 

or have his people killed piecemeal. This 

would most certainly have happened to him 

within two or three days." 18 

n Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 398, 4 

May 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

U Wainwright, General Wainwright'S Story, p. 

79; Intel Rpt, Lt Comdr Denys W. Knoll, Intel 

Officer, 16th Naval Dist, to Director of Naval Intel, 

p. 12, Off of Naval Reds. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 83. 
SURRENDER 

At just what point in the last hectic days 

of the battle of Bataan General King made 

his decision is not clear. He may already 

have decided to surrender on the 7th when 

he sent Funk to Corregidor, for even at that 

time it was evident that defeat was inevitable. The next day, sometime during the 

afternoon, King instructed his senior commanders to make preparations for the destruction of all weapons and equipment, 

except motor vehicles and gasoline, but to 

wait for further orders before starting the 

actual destruction. At the same time he 

told General Wainwright that if he expected 

to move any troops from Bataan to Corregidor, he would have to do it that night 

"as it would be too late thereafter." 14 When 

Colonels Constant Irwin and Carpenter 

came to Bataan to discuss the withdrawal 

of the 45th Infantry (PS) with the Luzon 

Force staff they "gained the impression" 

after a conversation with King that he felt 

the decision to surrender "might be forced 

upon" him.15 

The inability of General Bluemel's force 

to hold the line at the Alangan River on the 

8th must have been the deciding factor in 

General King's decision to surrender. He 

learned of Bluemel's predicament after dark 

when General Parker reported that the 

u. Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 398, 4 

May 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA; interv, Lt J. C. 

Bateman with Maj Tisdelle, aide to Gen King, 22 

Jan 46, copy in OCMH; Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 

8 Apr 42. 

uRad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 398, 4 

May 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. Colonel Irwin 

states that he made only one trip to Bataan during 

the last days before its surrender and that was on 

7 April to request General King to release the 31 st 

Infantry (US) for movement to Corregidor. At that 

time, he asserts, General King told him that it might 

be necessary to surrender. Wainwright, when informed of this, "was not surprised or interested." 

Irwin, Comments on Draft MS, p. 6, OCMH. 

457 

Alangan River pOSItIOn had been turned 

from the west and that all units were withdrawing. As a last desperate measure he 

ordered Colonel Sage's antiaircraft brigade 

to establish a line south of the Cabcaben airfield. By 2300 it was evident that it would 

be impossible to reinforce the last thin line, 

which was still forming, and that there was 

nothing to prevent the enemy from reaching 

the congested area to the south. It was at this 

time that General King held "a weighty, 

never to be forgotten conference" with his 

chief of staff and his operations officer.is 

At this meeting General King reviewed 

the tactical situation very carefully with his 

two staff officers and considered all possible 

lines of action. Always the three men came 

back to the same problem: would the Japanese be able to reach the high ground north 

of Mariveles, from which they could dominate the southern tip of Bataan as well as 

Corregidor, as rapidly if the Luzon Force 

opposed them as they would if their advance 

was unopposed. The three men finally 

agreed that the Japanese would reach Mariveles by the evening of the next day, 9 April, 

no matter what course was followed. With 

no relief in sight and with no possible 

chance to delay the enemy, General King 

then decided to open negotiations with the 

Japanese for the conclusion of hostilities on 

Bataan. He made this decision entirely on 

his own responsibility and with the full 

1. Collier, Notebooks, IV, 2; Luzon Force Rpt of 

Opns, p. 6; intervs, author with Gen King, 12 Feb 

47, and Col Collier, 20 Nov 46, OCMH. Colonel 

Alexander, who was in King's command post that 

night, states that as soon as General King finished 

his telephone conversation with Jones, presumably 

in connection with Wainwright's order to counterattack, he sent for General Parker and his chief of 

staff. Parker, therefore, may have been present at the 

conference. Alexander, Personal Recollections of 

Bataan, p. 122. 
458 

knowledge that he was acting contrary to 

orders.17 

Having made his decision, General King 

called his staff to his tent at midnight to tell 

them what he had determined to do and 

why. At the outset he made it clear that he 

had not called the meeting to ask for the 

advice or opinion of his assistants. The "ignominious decision," he explained, was entirely his and he did not wish anyone else to 

be "saddled with any part of the responsibility." "I have not communicated with 

General Wainwright," he declared, "because I do not want him to be compelled to 

assume any part of the responsibility." Further resistance, he felt, would only be an unnecessary and useless waste of life. "Already 

our hospital, which is filled to capacity and 

directly in the line of hostile approach, is 

within range of enemy light artillery. We 

have no further means of organized resistance." 18 

17 Interva, author with Gen King, 12 Feb 47, Col 

Collier, 20 Nov 46, and Maj Tisdelle, OCMH. Times 

differ in all accounts and no participant presents 

exactly the same version as the others. Under tremendous emotional strain men's memories are not 

too reliable. King, for example, did not mention the 

meeting with Funk and Collier but spoke of a staff 

meeting; Collier did not mention what had happened at the meeting but fixed the time and circumstances. The account of this meeting, as well as of 

the negotiations for the surrender which follows, is 

based on these interviews and on numerous informal 

conversations, diaries, and scattered accounts. Differences in time and in substance have been adjusted 

on the basis of internal evidence. 

18 Collier, Notebooks, IV, 3-4. There is no copy 

of King's remarks in existence and the present version is taken from Collier's notes. The substance is 

corroborated by General King and other officers. 

Colonel Alexander states that when King made 

his decision to surrender he telephoned Corregidor 

and spoke to General Beebe, Wainwright not being 

available. "Tell General Wainwright," Alexander 

reports King as saying, "that I have decided to surrender Bataan. . . . This decision is solely my own, 

no member of my staff nor of my command has 

helped me to arrive at this decision. In my opinion, 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Though the decision to surrender could 

not have surprised the staff, it "hit with an 

awful bang and a terrible wallop." Everyone had hoped for a happier ending to the 

grim tragedy of Bataan, and when General 

King walked out of the meeting "there was 

not a dry eye present." 19 

There was much to do in the next few 

hours to accomplish the orderly surrender 

of so large and disorganized a force: all 

units had to be notified of the decision and 

given precise instructions; selected individuals and units had to be sent to Corregidor; 

and everything of military value had to be 

destroyed. The first task was to establish 

contact with the Japanese and reach agreement on the terms of the surrender. Col. 

E. C. Williams and Maj. Marshall H. Hurt, 

Jr., both bachelors, volunteered to go forward under a white flag to request an interview for General King with the Japanese 

commander. Arrangements for their departure were quickly made. They would time 

their journey so as to arrive at the front lines 

at daylight, just as the destruction of equipment was being completed. 

In the event the Japanese commander 

refused to meet General King, Williams was 

authorized to discuss surrender terms himself. These terms were outlined in a letter of 

instructions King prepared for Williams. 

The basic concession Williams was to seek 

from the Japanese was that Luzon Force 

headquarters be allowed to control the 

movement of its troops to prison camp. Williams was also instructed to mention speif I do not surrender to the Japanese, Bataan will be 

known as the greatest slaughter in history." Alexander, Personal Recollections of Bataan, p. 123. This 

statement conflicts with the statements of the principals that the decision to surrender was not communicated to Wainwright. 

10 Collier, Notebooks, IV, 4. 
SURRENDER 

cifically the following points if he discussed 

terms with the Japanese: 

a. The large number of sick and wounded 

in the two General hospitals, particularly Hospital # 1 which is dangerously close to the area 

wherein artillery projectiles may be expected 

to fall if hostilities continue. 

b. The fact that our forces are somewhat 

disorganized and that it will be quite difficult 

to assemble them. This assembling and organizing of our own forces, necessary prior to their 

being delivered as prisoners of war, will necessarily take some time and can be accomplished 

by my own staff and under my direction. 

c. The physical condition of the command 

due to long siege, during which they have been 

on short rations, which will make it very difficult to move them a great distance on foot. 

d .... 

e. Request consideration for the vast number of civilians present at this time in Bataan, 

most of whom have simply drifted in and 

whom we have to feed and care for. These 

people are in no way connected with the 

American or Filipino forces and their presence 

is simply incidental due to circumstances under 

which the Bataan phase of hostilities was 

precipitated.20 

While Williams and Hurt were making 

preparations to leave, every effort was made 

to warn all unit commanders of the decision to surrender. There was no difficulty 

in alerting II Corps since Parker's command 

post was now adjacent to King's; General 

Jones was notified by telephone. The two 

corps commanders in turn informed the 

units under their control. Bluemel, whose 

troops had reached the Lamao River, was 

instructed by Parker to hold his line only 

until daylight. When he asked what would 

happen at that time he was told that "a car 

carrying a white flag would go through the 

lines on the east road . . . and that there 

must be no firing after the car passed." 21 

.. Memo, King for Williams, 8 Apr 42, sub: Instructions for Col E. C. Williams, copy in OCMH. 

.. Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 33. 

459 

Bluemel told his regimental commanders 

and directed them to alert their own officers 

immediately. Not all units were informed 

so promptly, and it was only by a narrow 

margin that these units escaped disaster the 

next morning. 

When Colonel Williams and Major Hurt 

finally started toward' the front lines about 

0330 of the 9th, the destruction of equipment was already under way.22 Depot and 

warehouse commanders had been alerted 

about noon of the 8th to prepare for demolitions and about midnight the order to 

begin the destruction was given by Luzon 

Force headquarters. Some commanders 

anticipated the order and destruction of 

equipment began somewhat earlier than 

midnight. The Chemical Warfare depot began to dump chemicals into the bay during 

the afternoon and completed the task during 

the night.28 

As though nature had conspired to add 

to the confusion, an earthquake of serious 

proportions shook the peninsula "like a leaf" 

at about 2130.24 About an hour later the 

Navy started to destroy its installations at 

Mariveles. "Pursuant to orders from General Wainwright," Captain Hoeffel informed the Navy Department, "am destroying and sinking Dewey Drydock, Canopus, 

Napa, Bittern tonight." 20 Soon the rumble 

of explosions could be heard from Mariveles 

•• Extract from the Diary of Major Hurt, copy in 

OCMH. The section of the diary dealing with 

Hurt's experiences on 9 April has been published in 

Chunn, Of Rice and Men, pp. 5-9. Major Tisdelle 

states the two men started forward at 0200. USA vs. 

Homma, p. 2302, testimony of Tisdelle. 

O. Activities of the Chemical Warfare Service in 

the Philippines, Sec C, CWS Hist Sec, p. 57; Luzon 

Force Rpt of Opns, p. 7; USFIP G-4 Journal, 8-9 

Apr 42, AG 461 (25 Dec 41) Phil Reds . 

.. Collier, Notebooks, IV, 2 . 

.. Rad, Com 16 to COMINCH, 8 Apr 42,081430, 

Off of Naval Reds . 
460 

while flames shot high above the town, 

lighting up the sky for miles around. The 

climax came when the Can opus blew up 

with a tremendous roar: "She seemed," 

wrote an observer, "to leap out of the water 

in a sheet of flame and then drop back down 

heavily like something with all the life gone 

out of it." 26 

The Navy's fireworks were but the prelude to the larger demolitions that were to 

follow when the Army's ammunition was 

destroyed. Though stored in the congested 

area adjacent to General Hospital No.1, 

the engineer and quartermaster depots, and 

Luzon Force and II Corps headquarters, 

the TNT and ammunition had to be destroyed where they were. There was no 

time to move them to a safer place and 

hardly time to transfer the hospital patients 

away from the danger area. In the dumps 

were hundreds of thousands of rounds of 

small-arms ammunition and artillery shells 

of all calibers. Powder trains were laid to the 

separate piles of ammunition, and shells of 

larger caliber were set off by rifle fire. 

Destruction began shortly after 2100 and 

at 0200 the first TNT warehouses went up 

with an explosion that fairly rocked the area. 

Then followed a most magnificent display of 

fireworks. Several million dollars worth of 

explosives and ammunition filled the sky 

"with bursting shells, colored lights, and 

sprays of rainbow colors .... Never did a 

4th of July display equal it in noise, lights, 

colors or cost." 21 After the explosion shell 

fragments of all sizes fell like hail and men 

in the vicinity took refuge in their foxholes. 

The headquarters building at King's command post, a flimsy structure about 200 by 

II Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, gIst CA (PS), p. 

115 . 

.. Collier, Notebooks, IV, 6. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

20 feet, was knocked over by the blast and 

the furniture was scattered in all directions. 

When morning came the men were surprised to note that all overhead cover was 

gone. "It is miraculous," wrote one officer, 

"that we came through this." 28 

In the confusion and disorganization of 

the last night of the battle, the evacuation of 

personnel to Corregidor proved difficult and 

sometimes impossible. The 45th Infantry 

(PS), which Wainwright had requested, 

never reached Mariveles where the barges 

waited. The regiment was in the I Corps 

area in the Pantingan valley when it received the orders to move, but it was unable 

to make the journey in time and was caught 

on Bataan.29 

The nurses were more fortunate. Most of 

them did escape but only after harrowing 

experiences. Given thirty minutes to make 

ready for the journey, the nurses were cautioned to take with them bnly what they 

could carry. They boarded trucks in the 

dark~ess and made their way south at a 

snail's pace along the congested East Road. 

The group from General Hospital No.2 was 

held up by the explosions from the ammunition dump which went up just as the convoy reached the road adjacent to the storage 

area. These nurses almost failed to get 

through. The barge left without them 

shortly before daylight and it was only 

through the "vim, vigor, and swearing" of 

General Funk that a motor boat was sent 

from Corregidor to carry them across the 

North Channel. They left the Mariveles 

dock after daylight and despite the bombs 

'8 Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 8 Apr 42. 

• NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, p .. 30; intervs, 

author with Gen King, 12 Feb 47, and Col Collier, 

20 Nov 46, OCMH; memo, QM USFIP to CofS 

USFIP, 8 Apr 42, sub: QM Plan, Evacuation of 

Bataan, AG 401 (2 Jan 42) Phil Rcds. 
SURRENDER 

and bullets from a lone Japanese plane 

reached Corregidor in safety.ao 

Altogether about 2,000 persons, including 

300 survivors of the 31st Infantry (US), 

Navy personnel, some Scouts from the 26th 

Cavalry, and Philippine Army troops, escaped from Bataan in small boats and barges 

that night. The remainder of General King's 

force of 78,000 was left behind to the tender 

mercy of the Japanese.81 

Meanwhile, Colonel Williams and Major 

Hurt had gone forward to meet the J apanese commander. They began their journey 

in a reconnaissance car with motorcycle 

escort, but, unable to make progress against 

the heavy traffic moving away from the 

front lines, were soon forced to abandon the 

car. Williams climbed on the back of the 

motorcycle and continued forward, leaving 

Hurt to make his way as best he could on 

foot. "After talking to myself," wrote the 

major in his diary, "saying a few prayers, 

wondering what is in store for me in the 

future, bumming rides and a lot of walking" 

against the tide of "crouching, demoralized, 

beaten foot soldiers," he met Williams again 

on the East Road, two miles south of the 

front lines.82 By this time the Colonel had 

acquired a jeep and driver and the two men 

started forward again. Except for the faraway explosions and "the chattering teeth 

of our driver," all was quiet. 

Williams and Hurt reached the front line 

without further incident. There they found 

•• Collier, Notebooks, IV, 7; Funk, Comments on 

Draft MS, p. 17, OCMH; Wainwright, General 

Wainwright's Story, p. 81; Redmond, I Served· on 

Bataan, pp. 123-28. 

11 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

86-87. 

.. Hurt, Diary, in Chunn, Of Rice and Men, p. 6. 

The present account is based largely on this source. 

Colonel Williams did not prepare any notes of his 

experience and efforts to secure additional information from him have not been successful. 

461 

Lt. Col. Joseph Ganahl with some tanks, 

two 75-mm. guns (SPM), and a few troops. 

At 0530 Ganahl and his men withdrew, 

leaving Williams, Hurt, and the driver 

alone. An hour later, as the sky was turning 

light, they drove forward into Japanese-held 

territory. Soon after about thirty "screaming" Japanese with "bayonets flashing" 

rushed at· them.ss Waving a bedsheet, their 

improvised white flag, both men descended 

from the jeep with raised hands. For the 

moment the entire mission was in jeopardy 

but fortunately a Japanese officer arrived 

and Williams was able to make him understand by signs and by waving his instructions in the officer's face that he wished to 

see the commanding officer. The Japanese 

got into his car, motioning for Williams and 

Hurt to follow. With a sigh of relief they 

drove on, past American prisoners with 

wri&ts tied behind them and Japanese 

soldiers making ready for the day's tasks. 

After a three-mile ride, their jeep was halted 

and the two Americans were taken to meet 

General Nagano whose detachment was 

moving down the East Road. An interpreter 

read Williams' letter of instructions, and, 

following a brief discussion, Nagano agreed 

to meet General King at the Experimental 

Farm Station near Lamao, close to the front 

lines.u 

Hurt was sent back to get the general and 

Williams was kept at Japanese headquarters. Escorted to the front lines by 

Japanese tanks, Major Hurt made his way 

down the East Road, "past blown-up tanks, 

burning trucks, broken guns," and reached 

Luzon Force headquarters at 0900.8l! Within a few minutes General King was ready 

to go forward . 

II Ibid., p. 7. 

.. Ibid., pp. 7-8; Collier, Notebooks, IV, 7-8. 

II Hurt, Diary, in Chunn, Of Rice and Men, p. 8. 
462 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

SURRENDER ON BATAAN 

On Corregidor General Wainwright 

spent the night in ignorance of these events. 

At 0300 he spoke to King on the telephone 

but King did not mention his decision to 

surrender.J6 It was only three hours later, at 

36 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

81. General King's aide states that King spoke to 

General Beebe, not Wainwright, at this time. This 

is borne out by Wainwright, who explained in a 

message to General MacArthur that he could not 

hear well because of a poor connection and had 

given the phone to Beebe. Rad, Wainwright to 

MacArthur, No. 398,4 May 42, AG 384.1, GHQ 

SWPA; interv, Bateman with Tisdelle, 22 Jan 46. 

Colonel Alexander reports that after this telephone conversation King told his staff that Wainwright would not agree to the surrender of Bataan 

but that he would not interfere. King then went on 

to say, Colonel Alexander recollects, that if he 

survived he expected to be court-martialed, and he 

was certain that history would not deal kindly with 

0600, that General Wainwright learned 

from his assistant operations officer, Lt. Col. 

Jesse T. Traywick, Jr., that General King 

had sent an officer to the Japanese to arrange terms for the cessation of hostilities. 

Shocked, he shouted to Traywick, "Go back 

and tell him not to do it." 37 

But it was too late. Williams and Hurt 

were alr~ady on their way to meet Nagano 

and General King could not be reached by 

telephone or radio.as Regretfully General 

Wainwright wrote to MacArthur: 

a commander who would be remembered for having 

surrendered the largest force the United States had 

ever lost. Alexander, Personal Recollections of 

Bataan, p. 124. 

"Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 82. 

"' In his message No. 398 of 4 May 1942 to 

MacArthur, cited above, Wainwright explained, 
SCRRENDER 463 

SURRENDER ON BATAAN 

At 6 o'clock this morning General 

King . without my knowledge or approval sent a flag of truce to the Japanese 

commander. The minute I heard of it I disapproved of his action and directed that there 

would be no surrender. I was informed it 

was too late to make any change, that the 

action had already been taken .... Physical 

exhaustion and sickness due to a long period 

of insufficient food is the real cause of this 

terrible disaster. When I get word what terms 

have been arranged I will advise you."" 

"We had direct communication with General King 

by telephone and radio up to the time of initiation 

of move to surrender." There is some disagreement 

over this point, and many of the officers claim that 

communications with Bataan were not interrupted 

until later in the day and that they talked with 

other officers on Bataan after 0600. 

30 Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 200, 9 

Apr 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

For General King, Wainwright had no 

criticism. "It has never been and is not my 

intention to reflect upon General King," 

he later told MacArthur, "as the decision 

which he was forced to make required unusual courage and strength of character." 40 

Soon he would be forced to make the same 

decision. 

It was about 0900 when King, in his last 

clean uniform, went forward to meet General Kagano. He felt, he said later, like 

General Lee who on the same day seventyseven years earlier, just before his meeting 

with Grant at Appomatox, had remarked: 

"Then there is nothing left to do but to go 

40 Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 398, 4 

May 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA; Wainwright, 

General Wainwright's Stor)', p. 83. 
464 

and see General Grant, and I would rather 

die a thousand deaths." 41 With King when 

he left his command post were his two aides, 

Majors Wade Cothran and Tisdelle; his 

operations officer, Colonel Collier; and 

Major Hurt, who was to guide them to the 

meeting place. General Funk remained behind to supervise the completion .of the 

demolitions and the arrangements for the 

surrender of the Luzon Force. 

The group left in two jeeps. In the first 

were Collier and Hurt; 150 yards to the 

rear in the second jeep were the general and 

his aides. Despite the white flags prominently displayed on both vehicles and wildly 

waved by Collier and Tisdelle, they were 

immediately bombed and strafed by lowflying Japanese aircraft. Fortunately the 

road was a winding one and offered ample 

protection on each side. The planes came 

in at very low altitude, sprayed the road 

with their machine guns or dropped a string 

of small bombs, made a wide circle, then 

banked and came in again for another try. 

"One smart boy," wrote Colonel Collier, 

"dropped out of formation and . . . cut 

loose with his machine guns just in front of 

a curve." 42 Only the whine of the ricocheting bullets warned the driver of the first jeep 

in time to avert disaster by jamming on his 

brakes and piling into the embankment. 

"The attack passed like a Texas whirlwind" 

and the men stopped with relief and "took 

U This remark is attributed to King by the 

authors of a manuscript history of the Philippine 

Campaign entitled Triumph in the Philippines and 

prepared by the Combat History Division, G-l, 

U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, page 203. 

General King did not repeat it in his conversations 

with the present author. The quotation can be 

found in Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee, a Biography (New York and London, 1934-1935), IV, 

120. 

.. Collier, Notebooks, IV, 10. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

a full breath of good fresh air." 48 The attacks were almost continuous and at least 

once in every 200 yards the entire group was 

forced to jump hastily from the vehicles 

and seek cover in a ditch or behind a tree. 

Nter more than an hour of this game of 

hare and hounds, when the general's uniform was as disheveled as those he had left 

behind, a Japanese reconnaissance plane appeared over the road and the pilot dipped 

his wings and waved in recognition. Apparently this was the signal to the attacking 

planes to keep away and the rest of the journey was uneventful. At the bridge over the 

Lamao River the group passed Japanese 

soldiers with fixed bayonets but were allowed 

to proceed without interference. Waiting for 

them was the Japanese soldier who had 

guided Major Hurt to the front lines earlier. 

He greeted them courteously and escorted 

them to a house near by in front of which 

General Nagano was seated with Colonel 

Williams. It was now 1100; the general and 

his party had spent two hours traveling a 

distance of about three miles.44 

General Nagano, who spoke no English, 

opened the meeting by explaining through 

an interpreter that he was not authorized to 

make any arrangements himself ·but that he 

had notified General Homma an American 

officer was seeking a meeting to discuss terms 

for the c~ssation of hostilities. A representative from 14th Army headquarters, he told 

King, would arrive very soon. A few minutes 

later a shiny Cadillac drew up at the building before which the envoys were waiting 

.. Ibid. 

.. Collier, Notebooks, IV, 8-12; Hurt, Diary, in 

Chunn, Of Rice and Men, p. 8. This volume also 

contains an account by Major Tisdelle, pages 

10-13, presumably written after the war. The 

present author has preferred to use Major Tisdelle's 

Diary, entry of 9 Apri11942 . 
SURRENDER 465 

DISCUSSING SURRENDER TERMS with Colonel Nakayama. Facing forward, 

left to right, Col. Everett C. Williams, Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr., Maj. Wade 

Cothran, and Maj. Achille C. Tisdelle. 

and Colonel Nakayama, the 14th Army 

senior operations officer, emerged, accompanied by an interpreter:" General King 

rose to greet him, but Nakayama ignored 

him and took a seat at the head of the table. 

King resumed his seat at the opposite end, 

erect with his hands forward in front of 

him. "I never saw him look more like a soldier," wrote his aide, "than in this hour of 

defeat." 4fl 

Nakayama had come to the meeting without any specific instructions about accepting a surrender or the terms under which a 

surrender would be acceptable. Apparently 

4' Interv, Bateman with Tisdelle, 22 Jan 46; Col 

Nakayama, Negotiations with Gen King, 26 Aug 49, 

A TIS Doc 50246. 

.. TisdelIe, Diary, entry of 9 Apr 42. 

there was no thought in Homma's mind of 

a negotiated settlement. He believed that 

the American envoy was a representative 

from General Wainwright and had sent 

Nakayama to represent him since he was 

unwilling to meet with any person of lesser 

rank. 47 

The discussion got off to a bad start when 

Colonel Nakayama, fixing his glance on 

General King, asked : "You are General 

Wainwright?" When King said he was not 

and identified himself, Nakayama asked 

where Wainwright was and why he had not 

<7 The account of the negotiations is based upon: 

Nakayama, Negotiations with King, 26 Aug 49, 

A TIS Doc 50246; USA vs. Homma, pp. 2305, 3143, 

testimony of Homma; Prosecution Exhibit 425, 

deposition of King; interv, author with Gen King, 

12 Feb 47; TisdelIe, Diary, entry of 9 Apr 42. 
466 

come. The general replied that he did not 

speak for the commander of all forces in the 

Philippines but for his own command alone. 

He was then told that he would have to get 

Wainwright and that the Japanese could 

not accept any surrender without him. 

Again King declared that he represented 

only the forces on Bataan and that he could 

not get Wainwright. The Japanese were 

apparently insisting on a clarification of 

King's relation to Wainwright in order to 

avoid having to accept the piecemeal surrender of Wainwright's forces. 

General King finally persuaded N akayama to consider his terms. He explained 

that his forces were no longer fighting units 

and that he was seeking an arrangement to 

prevent further bloodshed. He asked for an 

armistice and requested that air bombardment be stopped at once. Nakayama rejected 

both the request for an immediate armistice 

and the cessation of air bombardment, explaining that the pilots had missions until 

noon and that the bombardment could not 

be halted until then. King then asked that 

his troops be permitted to march out of 

Bataan under their own officers and that 

the sick, wounded, and exhausted men be 

allowed to ride in the vehicles he had saved 

for this purpose. He promised to deliver his 

men at any time to any place designated by 

General Homma. Repeatedly he asked for 

assurance that the American and Filipino 

troops would be treated as prisoners of war 

under the provisions of the Geneva 

Convention. 

To all these proposals Nakayama turned 

a deaf ear. The only basis on which he 

would consider negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, he asserted, was one 

which included the surrender of all forces in 

the Philippines. "It is absolutely impossible 

for me," he told King flatly, "to consider 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

negotiations . . . in any limited area." 48 If 

the forces on Bataan wished to surrender 

they would have to do so by unit, "voluntarily and unconditionally." Apparently 

General King understood this to mean that 

Nakayama would accept his unconditional 

surrender. Realizing that his position was 

hopeless and that every minute delayed 

meant the death of more of his men, General 

King finally agreed at about 1230 to surrender unconditionally. Nakayama then 

asked for the general's saber, but King explained he had left it behind in Manila at 

the outbreak of war. After a brief flurry of 

excitement, Nakayama agreed to accept a 

pistol instead and the general laid it on the 

table. His fellow officers did the same, and 

the group passed into captivity. 

No effort was made by either side to make 

the surrender a matter of record with a 

signed statement. General King believed 

then and later that though he had not secured agreement to any of the terms he 

had requested he had formally surrendered 

his entire force to Homma's representative. 

The Japanese view did not grant even that 

much. As Nakayama later explained: "The 

surrender ... was accomplished by the voluntary and unconditional surrender of each 

individual or each unit. The negotiations 

for the cessation of hostilities failed." 49 

King's surrender, therefore, was interpreted 

as the surrender of a single individual to the 

Japanese commander in the area, General 

Nagano, and not the surrender of an organized military force to the supreme enemy 

commander. He, Colonel Williams, and the 

two aides were kept in custody by the Japanese as a guarantee that there would be no 

further resistance. Though they were not 

.. Nakayama, Negotiations with King, 26 Aug 

49, ATIS Doc 50246. 

"'Ibid. 
SURRENDER 

so informed, they were, in fact, hostages and 

not prisoners of war. 

Colonel Collier and Major Hurt, accompanied by a Japanese officer, were sent back 

to headquarters to pass on the news of the 

surrender to General Funk. On the way, 

they were to inform all troops along the 

road and along the adjoining trails to march 

to the East Road, stack arms, and await 

further instructions. Orders for the final 

disposition of the troops would come from 

Homma. Meanwhile, by agreement with 

Nagano, the Japanese forces along the east 

coast would advance only as far as the 

Cabcaben airfield. 50 

The battle for Bataan was ended; the 

fighting was over. The men who had survived the long ordeal could feel justly proud 

of their accomplishment. For three months 

they had held off the Japanese, only to be 

overwhelmed finally by disease and starvation. In a very real sense theirs had been 

"a true medical defeat," the inevitable outcome of a campaign of attrition, of "consumption without replenishment." 51 Each 

man had done his best and none need feel 

shame. 

.0 Interv, author with Collier, 20 Nov 46, OCMH; 

Collier, Notebooks, IV, 12-13; Funk, Comments on 

Draft MS, p. 11, OCMH; USA us. Homma, Prosecution Exhibit 425, testimony of King. 

"Rpt, Surg LF to CG LF, 30 Jun 42, sub: 

Med Aspects of the Surrender, prepared in prison 

camp and lent to the author. A copy is on file in 

OCMH. 

467 

The events that followed General King's 

surrender present a confused and chaotic 

story of the disintegration and dissolution of 

a starved, diseased, and beaten army. This 

story reached its tragic climax with the 

horrors and atrocities of the 65-mile "death 

march" from Mariveles to San Fernando.52 

Denied food and water, robbed of their personal possessions and equipment, forced to 

march under the hot sun and halt in areas 

where even the most primitive sanitary 

facilities were lacking, clubbed, beaten, and 

bayoneted by their Japanese conquerors, 

General King's men made their way into 

captivity. Gallant foes and brave soldiers, 

the battling bastards had earned the right 

to be treated with consideration and decency, but their enemies had reserved for 

them even greater privations and deeper 

humiliation than any they had yet suffered 

on Bataan. How hard their lot was to be 

none knew but already many faced the future with heavy heart and "feelings of 

doubt, foreboding, and dark uncertainty." S3 

"" The individual surrender of units and the death 

march are not treated in this volume since they did 

not affect the course of military operations on 

Bataan. The documents dealing with the march 

can be found among the prosecution exhibits and 

in the testimony of the trial of General Homma. 

The death march has been covered in an M. A. 

thesis prepared by the author's research assistant, 

Stanley L. Falk, at Georgetown University, entitled 

"The Bataan Death March." 

., Collier, Notebooks, IV, 18. 

PART FIVE 

CORREGIDOR AND THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

CHAPTER XXVII 

The Siege of Corregidor 

Though the fall of Bataan ended all organized opposition on Luzon, it did not give 

the Japanese the most valuable prize of all, 

Manila Bay. So long as Corregidor and its 

sister forts across the entrance to the bay 

remained in American hands, the use of the 

finest natural harbor in the Orient was denied them. And before General Homma 

could report to his already impatient superiors in Tokyo that he had accomplished 

his mission, he would also have to occupy 

Mindanao to the south as well as the more 

important islands in the Visayan group in 

the central Philippines. 

The campaign for the Philippine Islands 

was not yet over. Though he had won the 

most decisive battle of that campaign, 

Homma still had to take Corregidor and 

the islands south of Luzon before the J apanese could integrate the archipelago into 

the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 

The Harbor Defenses of Manila Bay 

Since the days of the Spaniards, Corregidor had been used as an outpost for the 

defense of Manila. (Map 23) By a system 

of semaphore signals from the island the 

Spaniards were able to receive warning of 

the approach of any hostile force in time 

to alert the forts in and around the capital. 

Later, they constructed minor fortifications 

on the island as an outer line of defense 

and as a screen for the larger guns emplaced 

along the Cavite shore south of Manila Bay, 

and at Fort Santiago in Manila. By 1898, 

when Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila 

Bay, the Spaniards had on Corregidor three 

large cannons, each with a range of about 

one mile. Two of these faced Cavitej the 

other pointed north toward Bataan. In addition the Spaniards had twelve other 

coastal guns to defend the approaches to 

the capital city: on EI Fraile and Caballo 

Islands, which, like Corregidor, lay acros):! 

the entrance to the bay; along the southern 

tip of Bataan; and along the Cavite shore. 

After the cession of the Philippines to 

the United States, a vast construction program designed to defend Manila by sealing 

off' the entrance to Manila Bay was begun. 

During the years before the first World 

War, forts were built on Corregidor and 

the adjoining islands in the bay. By 1914 

the task was completed. The Americans 

could now boast of an elaborate defense 

system in Manila Bay, so strong as to justify 

the name Gibraltar of the East. Reflecting 

the doctrine of the era in which they were 

built, the forts were designed to withstand 

attack from the sea by the heaviest surface 

vessels then known.1 

The development of military aviation in 

1 The description of the fortifications in Manila 

Bay is based on the following sources: Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, pp. 1-16, Exhibits C, K, and 

M; American Fixed Coast Defenses in the Philippine Islands, Mil Rpts, No. 23, Nov 44, MID WD, p. 

30; Lt Col Gwinn V. Porter, AA Defense of Corregidor, (paper prepared for Command and General 

Staff School, 1946-1947), pp. 1-10; Itr, Admiral 

Rockwell to Gen Ward, 18 Jan 52, OCMH. 
472 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

CORREGIDOR. Tip of Bataan, upper left. 

the decade of the 1920's struck a sharp blow 

at the effectiveness of this carefully wrought 

and vastly expensive system of defenses. 

Nothing could be done to remedy the weakness of the forts, however, for by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 the construction of additional fortifications as well as the 

modernization of those already built was 

prohibited. Major construction after 1922, 

therefore, was limited to antiaircraft positions and to the tunnels dug into the solid 

rock of Malinta Hill on Corregidor, presumably as a storage area for supplies. When 

the Japanese attacked in December 1941, 

the defenses of Corregidor and the ad joining islands were little different from what 

they had been twenty-five years earlier. 

Of the four fortified islands in Manila 

Bay, Corregidor, the site of Fort Mills, was 

the largest, measuring three and a half miles 

in length and one and a half miles at its 

widest point. With its bulbous head pointed 

toward the west and its tail stretching eastward, this tadpole-shaped island separated 

the bay entrance into a north and south 

channel. Corregidor had narrowly missed 

being two islands, for at the junction of the 

head and tail it narrowed to 600 yards and 

dropped to a height only slightly above sea 

leveL This low area was known as Bottomside and contained two docks, the barrio of 

San Jose, shops, warehouses, a power plant, 

and cold-storage units. Directly to the east 

of Bottomside was Malinta Hill with its 

labyrinth of tunnels. Beyond, stretched the 

tail of the island, where a small airfield and 

a navy radio intercept station were located. 

West of the narrow neck which connected 

the tail with the head of the tadpole was a 

small plateau known as Middleside. Here 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 471 

MALINTA HILL, looking south. Low area, center, is Bottomside. 

were located the hospital, quarters for commissioned and noncommissioned officers, a 

service club, and two schools for the children of the island. Beyond, lay the heavy 

head of the tadpole, rising 500 feet above 

the sea. Called Topside, this area contained 

the headquarters, barracks, and officers 

quarters, grouped around the traditional parade grounds. The ground was high almost 

to the beach line where it dropped precipitously to the water's edge. Cutting into the 

cliffs were two ravines, James and Cheney, 

which gave access from the beaches to the 

crowded area above. These ravines, together 

with Ramsey Ravine which led to Middleside, were the critical points in the defense 

of Corregidor against hostile landings. 

Critical also to the defense of Corregidor 

and the ability of its garrison to hold out 

against a sustained attack was the safety of 

its power plant. Fresh water for the island 

had to be brought by barge from Mariveles 

or pumped from the twenty-one deep wells 

on the island. Perishable food could be kept 

in that tropical climate only by powerdriven cold-storage plants. The large seacoast gun batteries, though equipped with 

emergency power sets, relied on the power 

plant, and ventilation for the vast underground tunnels depended on electrically 

operated blowers. Although there were sixty-five miles of roads and trails on the island, 

much of the heavy equipment was moved 

over an electric railroad with thirteen and 

a half miles of track which led to all important military installations. The garrison, 

therefore, was dependent in a very real 

sense on the island's power plant, and it was 

natural that those concerned with planning 

the defense should make every provision to 
474 

guard against its destruction by bombardment. 

The most extensive construction on Corregidor was the tunnel system under Malinta Hill. Consisting of a main east-west 

passage 1,400 feet long and 30 feet wide, 

the tunnel had 25 laterals, each about 400 

feet long, branching out at regular intervals from each side of the main passage. 

The underground hospital was housed in a 

separate system of tunnels north of the main 

tunnel and had 12 laterals of its own. It 

could be reached either through the main 

tunnel or by a separate outside entrance on 

the north side of Malinta Hill. Opposite the 

hospital, under the south side of Malinta, 

was the Navy tunnel system, connected to 

the main tunnel by a partially completed 

low passageway through the quartermaster 

storage lateral. Reinforced with concrete 

walls, floors, and overhead arches, blowers 

to furnish fresh air, and a double-track electric car line along the east-west passage, the 

Malinta Tunnel furnished bombproof shelter for the hospital, headquarters, and shops, 

as well as a vast labyrinthine underground 

storehouse. 

The armament of Corregidor was formidable. Its seacoast defense alone consisted 

of 23 batteries, many with their own names 

and traditions. Altogether, Corregidor had 

a total of 56 coastal guns and mortars, all 

of W orId War I vintage, ranging in caliber 

from 3 to 12 inches. (Table 9) The longest 

range cannon were the two 12-inch guns of 

Batteries Smith and Hearn, with a horizontal range of 29,000 yards and all-around 

traverse. In addition, there were six 12-inch 

guns with a range of 17,000 yards, and ten 

mortars of the same caliber. Nineteen of 

Corregidor's guns were the 155-mm. GPF's, 

capable of a range of 17,000 yards. The ten 

3-inchers had the shortest range. The supTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

TABLE 9-ARMAMENT ON CORREGIDOR 

Number of 

batteries 

2 

5 

1 

1 

2 

8 

4 

23 

Caliber 

Seacoast Artillery 

12-inch mortars ....•.. 

12-inch guns ...•...••• 

10-inch ....•.•.•••.•.• 

8-inch ........••...••• 

6-inch ............••.. 

I55-mm. GPF •........ 

3-inch ••....••....•... 

Total .............. 

I 

Number Of" 

guns 

10 

8 

2 

2 

5 

19 

10 

56 

Antiaircraft Artillery (Incillding SOllthern Bataan) 

2 SL Sperry 60-inch· •.. 10 

7 3-inch............... 28 

4 .50-caliber........... 48 

13 Total......... .. ... (guns) 76 

(SL) 10 

• Searchllllht. 

SOllrce: Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, Annex C. 

ply of seacoast amm\lnition was ample but 

there was little of the type suitable for attacking land targets and no star shells to 

provide illumination for night fire. North 

and south of the island were extensive mine 

fields planted by the Army and Navy. 

Antiaircraft equipment consisted of 3-

inch guns with a vertical range of 27,000 

and 32,000 feet (depending on the type of 

ammunition used) , .50-caliber machine 

guns, and 60-inch Sperry searchlights. Defending Corregidor from air attack were 24 

of these 3-inch guns, 48 machine guns and 

5 searchlights. Another battery of 3-inchers 

was emplaced on the southern tip of Bataan 

to tie in with these on Corregidor. Ammunition for the antiaircraft weapons was less 

plentiful than that for the seacoast guns, and 

there was a critical shortage of mechanically 

fuzed 3-inch high explosive shells. 
MALINTA TUNNEL 

wtST (NfkANCl 

)CI 100 .,0 , fEn' , 
476 

Before the war, the Corregidor garrison 

consisted principally of headquarters, artillery, and service troops. The combined 

strength of the four fortified islands in 

Manila Bay at that time did not exceed 

6,000 men, most of whom were stationed 

on Corregidor. After 8 December the population of these garrisons swelled rapidly. 

First came the survivors of the Cavite naval 

base, then the headquarters and service 

troops from Manila. MacArthur's headquarters was established on Corregidor on 

25 December and with it came the 809th 

Military Police Company, two ordnance 

companies, an engineer company, and service detachments. When Olongapo was 

evacuated on 26 December, the 4th Marines 

were also transferred to Corregidor, swelling its population by over 1,000 men. Before the first blow hit that island, it was 

already crowded with the men of all ~ervices and a dizzying pyramid of headquarters. 

The defenses of the three other islands in 

the entrance to Manila Bay were hardly less 

formidable, proportionately, than those of 

Corregidor. Caballo (Fort Hughes), just 

south of Corregidor, was the next largest 

in size. Only about one quarter of a square 

mile in area, this island rose abruptly from 

the bay to a height of 380 feet on its western 

side. The east coast, which was lower than 

the rest of the island, was vulnerable to amphibious attack and a marine detachment of 

about 100 men was sent there to augment 

the garrison. Later, 200 sailors from Corregidar were added to the marine detachment 

and Comdr. Francis J. Bridget, who had 

commanded the naval battalion in the Battle of the Points, assumed command of the 

beach defenses. His force was almost doubled 

when the crews of four gunboats, about 225 

men, were sent to the island. By the end of 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPI:NES 

April the garrison of Fort Hughes numbered 

about 800 men of whom 93 were marines 

and 443 belonged to the Navy. The antiaircraft defenses of the island were tied in 

with those of Corregidor and consisted of 

four 3-inch guns. Seacoast artillery numbered thirteen pieces: two 14-inch guns, 

four 12-inch mortars, two 6-inch guns, three 

155-mm. GPF's, and two 3-inchers. (Table 

10) 

TABLE lO-ARMAMENT ON FORTS HUGHES, 

Number of 

balteries 

2 

2 

2 

3 

11 

2 

2 

2 

2 

8 

2 

2 

8 

I 

I 

I 

I 

! 

I 

DRUM, AND FRANK 

Caliber ·-I---~'::er of 

guns 

Fort Hltghes (Caballo) ------------_ .. -

14-inch .......... , ... 2 

12-inch mortar •..... ' 4 

6-inch ..•......•..... 1 2 

155-mm. GPF ....... I 3 

3-inch ........... , ... 1 (4 AA) 6 

SL •.•...•....•..•.•. 1 3 

TotaL ............. , (guns) 17 

I (SL) 3 

Fort Drltm (EI FraNe) 

14-inch .............. 1 4 

6-~nch .•............. 1 4 

3-1nch ............... 1 (2 AA) 3 

SL ...••.......•.•.•.. ' 2 

TotaL ....•........ (guns) 11 

(SL) 2 

Fort Frank (Carab~o) 

14-inch ............. 2 

12-inch mortar ...... : 8 

3-inch ............... I (AA) 4 

155-GPF ............ I 4 

7S-mm. (beach defense) .....•...... 3 

SL .•..•• '" ., .••.••• 2 

1 TotaL •.......•.... 1 (guns) 21 

(SL) 2 

Source: Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, Annex C; Brig Gen 

Samuel L. Howard. Rpt on 4th Marines. p. 18. USMC Hist Sec. 
FORT DRUM. El Fraile Island before the concrete battle.fhip was constructed, above; 

and after, below. 
478 

About four miles south of Fort Hughes 

lay Fort Drum, the most unusual of the 

harbor defenses. Cutting away the entire 

top of El Fraile Island down to the water 

line and using the island as a foundation, 

the engineers had built a reinforced concrete battleship, 350 feet long and 144 feet 

wide, with exterior walls of concrete and 

steel 25 to 36 feet thick. The top deck of 

this concrete battleship was 40 feet above 

the low-water mark and had 20-foot-thick 

walls. Equipped with four I4-inch guns in 

armored turrets facing seaward, a secondary 

battery of four casemated 6-inch guns, and 

antiaircraft defense, the fort with its 200-

man garrison was considered, even in 1941, 

impregnable to attack. 

The southernmost of the fortified islands 

was Carabao, only 500 yards from the 

shores of Cavite Province. Except at one 

point along its eastern shore, the island rises 

precipitously from the sea in cliffs more than 

100 feet high. On this uninviting island the 

Americans had placed Fort Frank, which 

late in 1941 had a military garrison of about 

400 men, mostly Philippine Scouts. Its armament consisted of two 14-inch guns, 

eight 12-inch mortars, four 155-mm. G PF's, 

as well as antiaircraft and beach defense 

weapons. 

All four forts in Manila Bay, as well as 

Fort Wint in Subic Bay, had been formed 

before the war into an organization called 

the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic 

Bays which, in August 1941, became a part 

of the Philippine Coast Artillery Command. 

Both were commanded by Maj. Gen. 

George F. Moore who also commanded the 

Corregidor garrison. The 5,700 men assigned to the Harbor Defenses were organized into three seacoast and one antiaircraft 

artillery regiments, headquarters, and service troops. The three seacoast units included 

the American 59th and the Philippine Scout 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

91st and 92d. The 60th, the antiaircraft 

regiment, was composed of Americans. 

About 600 Philippine Army soldiers in 

training were organized into the 1st and 2d 

Coast Artillery Regiments (P A), but operated under the control of the two Scout 

regiments." 

General Moore commanded not only the 

seacoast and antiaircraft artillery but the 

beach defenses and inshore patrol as well. 

To exercise tactical control over all elements 

of his force, he had four major commands. 

Seaward defense he placed under Col. Paul 

D. Bunker who, in turn, commanded four 

groups, two of which covered North Channel and two South Channel. All antiaircraft units were under Col. Theodore M. 

Chase, commander of the 60th Coast Artillery. In addition to the normal mission 

of providing defense against air attack, 

Chase also maintained an air warning service for the fortified islands and for vessels 

in the bay. Though each fort commander 

was responsible for local defense, General 

Moore had an executive for beach defense 

who co-ordinated the plans for each of the 

islands. The inshore patrol remained a 

naval function, but under the principle of 

unity of command, Capt. Kenneth M. 

Hoeffel , , USN was under Moore's tactical 

control. 

By the end of 1941 all that could be done 

in the limited time since funds had been 

made available in midyear to improve the 

defenses of Corregidor and the adjoining 

2 Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, Exhibit K. The 

strf'ngth of the major units was as follows: 

Unit Officer Enlisted Civilian 

HD Hq Btry______ _____________ 30 255 

59th CA_ ___________________ 64 1,264 

60th CA_______________________ i~ 1, ~~~ 9Ist CA ______________________ _ 

92d CA_______________________ 37 458 1st CA ________ .___ _____________ 50 428 

2d CA________________________ 2 74 

Mine PlantcL__________________ 7 32 

290 

55 

65 

28 

20 

12 

3 

3 
THE' SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

islands had been acoomplished.3 But the 

basic weakness of the harbor defensestheir vulnerability to attack from the air 

and from their landward flanks-was never 

corrected. They accomplished their mission, 

the denial of Manila Bay to the enemy, 

without firing a single round at a hostile 

warship; Japanese cruisers and destroyers 

blockading the bay stayed well out of range 

of Moore's heavy guns. But when Bataan 

fell the flank protection of Corregidor disappeared and the fortress was left exposed 

to destruction by air and artillery attacks 

and to landings by hostile forces. 

The First Aerial and Artillery Attacks 

First word of the Japanese attack against 

Pearl Harbor reached General Moore from 

the Navy radio intercept station on Corregidor at 0340, 8 December, about the 

same time that General Sutherland relayed 

the news to the commander in chief. The 

garrisons of the four fortified islands had 

been on the alert for eight days and all 

battle stations were manned. There was 

little Moore could do except notify his commanders and instruct the sea, antiaircraft, 

and beach defense commanders to double 

their precautions against a surprise dawn 

attack. At 0620 official notification that a 

state of war existed between the United 

States and Japan came from MacArthur's 

headquarters, and the Navy temporarily 

closed Manila Bay to outbound traffic. 

About four hours later the first air-raid 

alarm sounded over Corregidor.4 

• For a detailed account of the measures taken 

during the last six months of 1941, see Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, pp. 10-16, and Exhibit E. 

• The account which follows is based upon the 

following sources: Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns. 

pp. 16-79, and Exhibits E through M; The Siege 

of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on the United Nations, 

479 

This first alarm and those that followed 

during the next three weeks proved groundless. The Japanese did not attack Corregidor 

on 8 Decembe-r and had no plan to do so 

at the start of war. But they had -ftO intention either of bypassing the island fortress. 

They fully appreciated its strategic significance and its importance in the scheme of 

defense, but their first task was to seize 

Manila and defeat MacArthur's army. The 

conquest of Corregidor would follow "as 

soon as possible." 5 

The Aerial Attacks 

Hardly had news of the evacuation of 

Manila and the transfer of MacArthur's 

headquarters to Corregidor reached Homrna on 28 December when he ordered the 

5th Air Group to begin operations against 

the island. Manila would soon be his and 

though MacArthur's army had not yet been 

defeated, Homma may have believed that 

he could soon move against Corregidor. 

Homma's plans, by agreement with the 

Navy, provided for a joint attack in which 

Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata's 5th Air Group 

(Army) would be supplemented by the 

planes of the 11th Air Fleet (Navy). The 

No. 12, 15 Nov 43, MID WD, pp. 37-52; Porter, 

AA Defense of Corregidor, pp. 10-17; Rockwell, 

Narrative of Naval Activities in Luzon Area, pp. 

8-22, Off of Naval Rcds; Gen Marquat, USAFFE 

AA Officer, Rpt of Performance of U.S. CA in 

Manila-Bataan Campaign, copy in OCMH; Gulick, 

Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS); diaries of Col 

Bunker, Maj Tisdelle, and Capt Roland G. Ames 

(including letters to his wife), all in OCMH. 

The basic Japanese sources are: 14th Army Opns, 

I, pp. 13-14,25,96,115,124-36; 5th Air Gp Opns, 

passim; Japanese Naval Opns in Phil Invasion, 

Japanese Studies in WW II, No. 13, pp. 17-18, 

OCMH. 

• 14th Army Opns, I, 25. Presumably this would 

be some time in January or early February since 

the defeat of MacArthur's army was to be accomplished forty-five days after the landing. 
480 

Army air force would strike first, at noon of 

29 December, "with its whole strength." An 

hour later the Navy bomuers were to take 

over. The bombardment would continue for 

two and a half hours, until 1430, and would, 

General Obata hoped, "destroy the center 

of the American Far East Command." 6 

Almost exactly on schedule, at 1154 of 

the 29th, the first flight of 18 twin-engine 

bombers of the 14th Heavy Bombardment 

Regiment, covered by 19 fighters, approached Corregidor at a height of 15,000 

feet and in regular V formation. The flight 

broke into smaller flights, of 9 and 3 planes, 

which passed lengthwise over the island, 

then back, dropping 225- and 550-pound 

bombs on the headquarters buildings and 

barracks. For the half hour they were over 

the target, the planes of the 14th Heavy 

Bombardment dropped almost fifty bombs. 

At 1230, 22 bombers of the 8th Light 

Bombardment Regiment, accompanied by 

18 dive bombers of the 16th Light Bombardment Regiment, had their tum. The 

light bombers followed the same pattern as 

the first flight, dropping their sixty-six 225-

pound bombs on installations and buildings 

on Bottomside and Topside. The dive bombers, loaded with 35-pounders, attacked from 

an altitude of 3,000 feet, though to the men 

on the ground the planes appeared to be 

at treetop level. 

When the dive bombers left at 1300, the 

Navy bombers came in. Numbering about 

60 planes, the naval formation continued 

the attack against the island and shipping 

in the bay for another hour. Altogether, the 

Americans estimated, the Japanese used 

about 81 mediums and 10 dive bombers 

and dropped about 60 tons of bombs during 

these two hours. None of the few remaining 

• 5th Air Gp Opns Order A, No. 171, 5th Air Gp 

Opns, p. 40. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

American aircraft rose from the recently 

established fighter base on Bataan to dispute 

their supremacy of the air on this occasion 

or during any of the attacks that followed. 

In this first attack the antiaircraft defenses at Fort Mills, Fort Hughes, and southern Bataan gave a good account of themselves, firing a total of 1,200 rounds of 3-

inch ammunition. Score for the 3-inchers 

was thirteen medium bombers. It was with 

considerable satisfaction that Capt. Roland 

G. Ames, commander of Battery C (Chi~ 

cago) , 60th Coast Artillery (AA), wrote 

after the attack that his men "had performed 

wonderfully" in their first encounter with 

the enemy and had brought down at least 

three Japanese planes.1 

The dive bombers, too, were met by 

strong and effective opposition. The .50-

caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft 

command downed four of the planes in their 

first low-level strafing attack. Thereafter, 

according to American sources, the J apanese did not again attempt to dive-bomb 

targets on Corregidor until the end of April. 

The men had paid little heed to the alarm 

when it first sounded, since none of the 

previous air warnings had been followed by 

attack. Some of those who had recently arrived on the island with the transfer of headquarters from Manila to Corregidor casually 

took up a better position to watch the large 

enemy formation. One officer in the concrete building on Topside which housed 

USAFFE headquarters mounted to the second floor for a clearer view of the proceedings. Hardly had he arrived there when he 

heard "an ominous, whirring whistle, which 

rapidly increased in crescendo." He made 

a wild jump for the stairway, later claiming 

• Ltr, Ames to his wife, 30 Dec 41, in Ames, 

Diary. Captain Ames copied in his diary the letters 

he wrote to his wife and which he sent out whenever he had the opportunity. 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

that "the whistle of my descent must have 

rivalled that of the falling bomb." 8 Others 

were equally surprised and displayed a tendency to head for the corners of the rooms 

where they fancied they were safer than 

elsewhere. Fortunately windows and entrances had been sandbagged and broken 

glass caused few casualties. 

The first bombs hit the vacated station 

hospital and many of the wooden structures 

on Topside and Middleside. One bomb 

struck the post exchange, went through the 

roof and three concrete floors, buried itself 

in eight feet of earth, and left a crater about 

twenty feet in diameter. Fully half the barracks and headquarters buildings were demolished and only a part of the foundation 

of the officers' club remained after the 

bombing. Many of the structures were of 

corrugated iron, and the danger from flying 

bits of metal was often as great as that from 

the bombs. Bottomside, after the bombing, 

appeared to be "one huge mass of jagged 

and bent sheet iron." 9 Fire sprang up at 

many points so that to an observer on Bataan the island appeared to be enveloped 

"in clouds of dust and black smoke." 10 Altogether about 60 percent of all wooden 

buildings on Corregidor were destroyed during the first bombings. Headquarters, 

USAFFE, promptly moved into Malinta 

Tunnel the next day. 

Fortunately, damage to military installations, the major target of the Japanese aircraft, was comparatively slight. Two of the 

gun batteries suffered minor damage which 

was repaired within twenty-four hours. Several of the small vessels docked at Bottomside and at anchor near the island were hit, 

and two Philippine Army planes at Kindley 

• Collier, Notebooks, II, 53. 

9 Tisdelle, Diary, entry of 29 Dec 41. 

"Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), p. 40. 

481 

Field on the tail of the tadpole were destroyed. Power, communication, and water 

lines were temporarily disrupted but little 

permanent damage was wrought. Casual~ 

ties for the day were twenty killed and eighty 

wounded. 

After the first bombings there was a 

marked change in the reaction of the men. 

Before the 29th, despite warning, they had 

crowded the doorways and windows to 

watch the planes and speculate about probable targets, safe in the knowledge that Corregidor would not be hit. "All of us," wrote 

Captain Ames, "were too careless of bombs 

and bullets at first." 11 But that attitude 

quickly changed. "Now," noted Colonel 

Bunker, commander of the Seaward Defenses, "they all stampede for the nearest 

cover and get as far under it as possible." 12 

As a matter of fact, it soon became difficult 

to get some of the men out of their shelters, 

even when there were no planes overhead. 

There was a marked change, too, in the 

attitude toward the weather after the first 

attack from the air. Bright moonlight, "by 

which we had wooed our sweethearts and 

wives," carried the threat of night attack. 

It gave away the position of vessels and 

made the large searchlights of the harbor 

defenses nearly useless. The beautiful sunrise and sunset of the tropics lost their attractiveness when enemy planes chose that 

time for attack. In the muted light of dawn 

and dusk it was difficult to pick out the attacking aircraft. Clouds, unless they were 

high and solid, were considered "a curse" 

by the antiaircraft gunners, and cloud formations through which enemy aircraft could 

drop for a bombing run were a "pet hate." 

The feared typhoons, on the other hand, 

were eagerly awaited. "We prayed for them 

11 Ames, Diary, entry of 29 Dec 41. 

,. Bunker, Diary, entry of 4 Jan 42. 
482 

. . .," wrote Captain Ames, "to break up 

and destroy Jap planes and ships." 13 

For the next eight days, until 6 January, 

the Japanese continued to bomb Corregidor 

intermittently, with less and less effect and 

at greater cost to themselves. There were no 

enemy aircraft over the island on the 30th, 

when President Quezon was inaugurated 

for the second time, or on the 31st. There 

is some indication of air action on the first 

day of the New Year, but it was on the 2d, 

the date Manila was occupied, that the 

Japanese came back in force. 

The day was overcast, with a low ceiling 

of shifting clouds. Shortly after the noon 

hour the first enemy bombers burst through 

a hole in the low-hanging clouds, released 

their bombs, then flew up into the safety 

of the clouds. Altogether fifty-four enemy 

aircraft participated in the attack that day. 

They left behind, in Colonel Bunker's 

words, "a scene of destruction." On a tour of 

inspection, he saw huge sections of corrugated iron "scattered in painfully distorted 

shapes" all over the parade ground, and 

"gaping, square, empty openings" in the 

barracks.14 

The bombardment of the 2d was the beginning of a five-day assault during which 

hardly a yard of the island did not feel the 

effects of the enemy bombs. Except for the 

attacks on the 2d and the 5th, the sole 

enemy target was Corregidor. On the 2d, 

Fort Drum, and on the 5th, Fort Frank 

came in for their share of the bombs but 

were never the primary targets. 

The pattern of the daily Japanese attacks 

was usually the same. During the morning 

11 Ames, Diary, undated "Sidelights," following 

letter of 6 January 1942 to his wife. 

1< Bunker, Diary, entry of 3 Jan 42. Japanese records make no mention oJ the attacks after 29 December. Information about these attacks is derived 

entirely from the American sources cited. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

a lone photo reconnaissance plane, whose 

pilot the Americans referred to familiarly 

as Photo Joe or The Lone Ranger, would 

circle Corregidor and the other fortified 

islands for a time and then return to base. 

About 1230 the bombers would come in, 

flying at an altitude well above 20,000 feet 

and at a speed of about 160 miles an hour, 

bomb the island for about two hours, then 

fly off. Until the last day, they approached 

the target from the same direction in a 

large V formation, then broke up into 

smaller formations for the run over the 

island. Only at the end did the Japanese 

abandon this regular formation and approach the target from different directions 

in scattered formations and at varying 

altitudes. 

Total damages for the six days' bombing 

were extensive. On the 2d and 3d the buildings on Topside and Middleside were hit 

again and two of the island's precious water 

tanks destroyed. On the 4th the principal 

target was the wharves, shops, and warehouses on Bottomside. The next day a barge 

was bombed and set afire. It drifted into 

shore and set fire to a diesel oil dump near 

the power plant. On the 6th there was a 

tragic accident when thirty-four men took 

cover in an incomplete bomb shelter. A 

large bomb fell near the structure, which 

collapsed and killed thirty-one of the men. 

By the 7th practically all unprotected surface installations had disappeared or were 

in ruins. Bomb craters were uniformly 

scattered over the island and one could 

hardly walk more than twenty-five yards 

in any direction without stumbling into 

one. 

The worst destruction was caused by fire. 

Barely adequate during peacetime, the Fort 

Mills fire department proved unable to cope 

with the conditions created by the hail of 
GUN EMPLACEMENTS ON CORREGIDOR. Coastal defense gun at Cheney 

Battery, above; below, 3-inch antiaircraft gun M3. 
484 

bombs. Much material, such as lumber, 

hardware, mattresses, and medical and 

chemical warfare supplies, which had been 

stored on the surface in wooden buildings, 

was burned. Concrete structures suffered 

less from the bombings and from fire, and 

the supplies stored in them were salvaged. 

After the first attack no effort was made 

to keep the electric railroad line on the island 

in operation. It had been hit in so many 

places and was so exposed that it was fruitless to attempt its repair. Almost daily the 

main telephone cables were cut by bombs. 

Crews worked at night to repair them, but 

the next day the lines would be cut again. 

The maintenance of communications was a 

never-ending task, and there was never time 

to bury the cables deep enough to place 

them out of reach of the bombs. 

The armament of the island suffered comparatively slight damage. The coastal batteries with their magazines and power 

plants had been bombproofed before the 

war and escaped almost unscathed. The 

more exposed antiaircraft units suffered 

more from the bombings than the seacoast 

batteries, but such damage as was caused 

was repaired quickly, usually within twelve 

hours. There were some casualties among 

the gun crews, but they were not serious 

enough to interfere with operations. The 

largest number of casualties came to those 

who failed to take shelter or were careless. 

There is no record of the total casualties for 

the period from 29 December to 7 January, 

but at least 36 men were killed and another 

140 wounded during the first, second, and 

last days of the attack alone. 

The air attacks against Corregidor ended 

on 6 January, the day the Bataan campaign 

opened. They had proved costly to the Japanese and had produced no decisive military 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

results. But even if they had and if Homma 

had wished to continue to bomb the island 

after 6 January, he would have been unable 

to do so. By that time the 5th Air Group was 

preparing to move to Thailand, and Homrna was left with only a small air force which 

he could ill spare for attacks against Corregidor. Except for sporadic raids by three or 

four planes and occasional dive bombing 

and strafing, the first aerial bombardment 

was over. 

The Artillery Bombardment 

Events thus far had not worked out as the 

Japanese had planned. The occupation of 

Manila had not given them the use of its 

fine harbor or the large military stores they 

had expected to find there. MacArthur had 

refused battle on the plains of Manila, and 

drawn his forces back into the Bataan peninsula intact. The occupation of Corregidor, 

which was next on the Japanese timetable, 

now had to be deferred for the lengthy and 

expensive campaign on Bataan. If the first 

air attacks against the island fortress had 

been intended as the prelude for a landing, 

they had been wasted. 

To have attempted the investment of the 

Gibraltar of the East while the Bataan peninsula was in American hands would have 

been disastrous and foolhardy. The heights 

of the Mariveles Mountains dominated the 

small island only two miles offshore and 

were vital to its control. Even before the war 

the Japanese had recognized the intimate 

relationship between Bataan and Corregidor and in their prewar estimates had noted 

the flank protection Bataan offered to the 

island. "Mt. Mariveles in southern Bataan 

forms the left wall of the bay entrance," one 

Japanese estimate concluded, "and because 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

it is covered with dense forests, use of siege 

guns and heavy equipment to attack this 

fortress is impossible." l~ 

The southern shore of Manila Bay offered 

only partial protection to the islands lying 

at the bay entrance. Here the ground was 

less mountainous and overgrown than on 

Bataan, and in the vicinity of Ternate, opposite the tip of Bataan, there were few 

obstacles to military movement. Into this 

area could be brought heavy equipment and 

siege guns. Once emplaced, these guns could 

bring the southernmost of the islands, Forts 

Frank and Drum, under assault. It was from 

here that the next attack against the harbor 

defenses came. 

Toward the end of January reports began 

to reach Corregidor of the movement of 

Japanese artillery into Cavite Province. By 

the 25th, according to observers on the 

mainland, the Japanese had emplaced their 

guns in defiladed positions near Ternate, 

only about six air miles from Fort Drum on 

El Fraile Island and eight miles from the 

neighboring Fort Frank on Carabao Island. 

The reports were correct. A Japanese artillery unit called the Kondo Detachment 

was indeed moving into position along the 

southern shore of Manila Bay. Formed by 

14th Army on 24 January, this unit was 

under the command of Maj. Toshinori 

Kondo and consisted initially of four 105-

mm. guns and two l50-mm. cannons. 

Kondo's orders were "to secretly deploy" 

near Ternate and "prepare for fire missions" 

against Corregidor, El FraiIe, and Carabao 

Islands and against shipping in Manila 

Bay.16 By the first week of February, despite 

interdiction fire from Fort Frank, Kondo 

had completed his preparations and was 

awaiting further orders. 

,. 14th Army Opns, I, 13-14. 

,. Ibid., 96. 

485 

He did not have long to wait. On 5 February, his orders arrived and next morning 

at 0800 the Kondo Detachment opened fire 

against the fortified islands. Fort Drum was 

the principal target that day and the Japanese guns hit it almost one hundred times 

during the three-hour attack. By accident or 

design, the choice of the early morning hours 

for the attack placed the sun behind the 

Japanese and made observation by the 

Americans difficult. They replied as best 

they could with their 14- and 6-inch guns, 

and Fort Frank assisted with its 12-inch 

mortars, but scored no hits. Thus began an 

artillery duel that was to continue inter~ 

mittently for almost two months. 

Until the middle of February the daily 

attacks followed much the same pattern. 

Major Kondo's 105's and l50's usually 

opened fire in the morning, to be answered 

by counterbattery fire from the large guns 

of the harbor defenses. Later the Japanese 

fired at odd intervals during the day. Forts 

Frank and Drum, closest to Ternate, received the heaviest weight of shells and the 

greatest damage but their guns were never 

put out of commission and their effectiveness never seriously impaired. Damage to 

Corregidor was limited to occasional hits 

on buildings and vehicles. 

During the course of the bombardment 

the Japanese hit upon a scheme to strike a 

vital blow at Fort Frank without firing a 

single shot. Learning from the natives that 

the fort received its supply of fresh water 

from a dam near Calumpan on the Cavite 

shore, they dispatched a demolition squad 

to locate and destroy the pipeline. On 16 

February, the Japanese found the line and 

pulled up the section just below the dam. 

Fort Frank, fortunately, had its own distillation plant and Colonel Boudreau, who 

had assumed command of the fort after the 
486 

evacuation of Fort Wint in December, directed that it be placed in operation at once. 

But its use required valuable fuel and Boudreau was understandably reluctant to expend the gasoline he needed for his guns to 

distill sea water. On the 19th, therefore, he 

made an effort to repair the pipeline and 

sent a group of fifteen volunteers to the 

mainland for that purpose. Before the men 

could restore the line they were attacked by 

a Japanese patrol of about thirty men. In 

the fight that followed, the Americans and 

Filipinos, with the support of 75-mm. guns 

from Fort Frank, destroyed the entire patrol, 

suffering only one casualty.17 The fifteen 

men then returned to Fort Frank safely but 

without having accomplished their mission. 

That night the Japanese retaliated by burning the barrio of Calumpan. It was not until 

9 March that Colonel Boudreau was able to 

repair the broken water pipe. 

The intensity of the Japanese attacks increased after the middle of February, when 

Major Kondo received two additional 150-

mm. howitzers. With these reinforcements 

came instructions from Homma "to demoralize the enemy." 18 The daily bombardments thereafter became more severe and 

reached their height on 20 February. Starting at 0930 that morning the guns of the 

reinforced Kondo Detachment fired steadily 

at one-minute intervals until late afternoon. 

The only serious damage was to the power 

plant on Corregidor and to several observation posts at Fort Hughes. After that date 

the Japanese fire diminished until, by the 

beginning of March, it presented no real 

threat to the harbor defenses. "In general," 

wrote the commander of the Seaward De17 Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 37. The claims 

made by the volunteers were accepted by General 

Moore and have been used by the author in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 

18 14th Arm.Y Opns, I, 115. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

fenses, "the J aps are resorting to nuisance 

firing daily and usually from a single 

gun." 19 

The slackening of enemy fire at the end 

of February did not mean that the attack 

was over. On the basis of intelligence reports, General Moore concluded that the 

Japanese were merely "marking time waiting for reinforcements." 20 This view was 

confirmed when native informants reported 

that the Japanese were selecting new gun 

positions in the Pico de Loro hills southwest 

of Ternate and improving the trails leading 

into the interior. In an effort to hinder this 

move, General Moore orderecl his seacoast 

batteries to place interdiction fire on roads 

and bridges in the vicinity of Ternate, but 

without observable effect. The Japanese 

continued to make their preparation for a 

fresh attack without serious interference 

from the coastal batteries in the bay. 

The Japanese force which assembled in 

the Pica de Lora hills during the first two 

weeks of March was considerably stronger 

than the Kondo Detachment. To that unit 

had been added the I st Heavy Artillery 

Regiment, the 2d Independent Heavy Artillery Battery, both equipped with 240-

mm. howitzers, and the 3d Tractor Unit 

with prime movers for the heavy guns. The 

Kondo Detachment had been dissolved and 

a new organization, the Hayakawa Detachment, formed. Col. Masayoshi Hayakawa, 

commander of the 1st Heavy Artillery, led 

the reorganized force, and, according to the 

usual Japanese practice, gave it his name. 

By 15 March all preparations for the 

stepped-up artillery bombardment of the 

harbor defenses had been completed. 

The attack opened at 0730 of the 15th 

with a volley from the 240-mm. howitzers 

19 Bunker, Diary, entry of 19 Feb 42. 

20 Harbor Ddf'nses Rpt of Opns, p. 38. 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

and continued throughout the day. Although all four islands came under fire, 

Forts Frank and Drum bore the brunt of 

the bombardment. Approximately 500 

shells fell on Fort Frank alone; another 100 

on Fort Drum. Two of Frank's batteries, 

one of 1SS-mm. guns and the other of 3-inch 

antiaircraft guns, were almost entirely destroyed, and two other batteries were put 

out of commission temporarily. Fort Drum 

escaped more lightly. Its only damage came 

when a shell penetrated the armor of the 6-

inch battery on the south side and burst inside the casemate, filling the concrete battleship with flames, smoke, and fumes. Fortunately, there were no casualties. Despite 

every effort during the day to neutralize the 

enemy fire, the bombardment continued 

until afternoon. "It hurt me like blazes," 

wrote Colonel Bunker on Corregidor, "to 

see my friends under fire and be so powerless to help them." 21 

The attack continued with unabated 

vigor the next day and with varying intensity for five days thereafter. As on the 15th, 

all four forts came under fire, but the weight 

of the attack was again directed against the 

two southernmost islands. The heaviest 

bombardments came on the 16th and 21st. 

On both days the concrete battleship fairly 

shook under the impact of the large shells. 

Every time one of them hit the casemate of 

the 6-inch guns a flash of fire was observed, 

and during the height of the attack there 

were fire alarms as often as every five minutes. Fortunately there was no general conflagration and no serious damage. 

Fort Frank was not so fortunate. On the 

16th a 240-mm. shell penetrated eighteen 

inches of concrete around one of its 12-inch 

batteries, passed under a six-foot concrete 

21 Bunker, Diary, entry of 15 Mar 42. 

487 

wall and exploded below the powder room. 

The floor of the battery was shattered and 

sixty cans of mortar powder overturned, 

but, miraculously, none exploded. It was on 

the morning of the 21st that Fort Frank 

suffered its "greatest loss" of the war when 

a 240-mm. shell penetrated the 18-inch concrete roof of one of its tunnels and struck 

in the midst of a line of men waiting for 

yellow fever shots. Twenty-eight of the men 

were killed and another forty-six wounded. 22 

The damage wrought by the artillery attacks between 15 and 21 March was considerably greater than any inflicted by the 

105's and ISO's of the Kondo Detachment. 

Fort Frank, the larger target and the one 

closest to the enemy, was the most vulnerable of the forts and "got a fearful workingover." 23 All of its surface guns-four 3-inch 

antiaircraft and four lS5-mm. GPF gunswere visible to the enemy and were badly 

damaged. The depressed 12-inch mortar 

battery and two 14-inch disappearing guns 

were also hit, but were quickly repaired 

and put back in action. Fort Drum, the concrete battleship, came under as severe a 

bombardment as Frank, but was better able 

to withstand the battering. Every square 

foot of the interior surface of the casemates 

was deeply dented and torn by fragmentation, and between eight and fifteen feet of 

its reinforced concrete deck was whittled 

away. But though its two antiaircraft guns 

were ruined beyond repair, the principal 

target of the Japanese, the 14-inch turret 

guns, were never put out of action. 

So heavy were the attacks against Frank 

and Drum that the commanders of both 

forts, fearing a hostile landing, had doubled 

their beach defenses immediately. This pre-

"Maj Joe C. East, March 21st Fort Frank Shelling, a 2-page typescript in OCMH. 

"Bunker, Diary, entry of 15 Mar 42. 
488 

caution was a wise one, for the Japanese 

did actually plan to capture both Forts 

Frank and Drum, and had even designated 

the unit which was to make the assault. 

General Homma canceled this plan, however, in order to strengthen the force he 

was assembling late in March for the final 

attack against Bataan. The landing craft 

which had been collected for the attack, 

about forty-five bancas, were later destroyed 

by 75-mm. gunfire from Fort Frank. 

Throughout the long-range artillery duel 

the effectivene~s of American counterbattery fire was limited by the difficulty of 

locating the Japanese guns. There was no 

flash during daylight, and both Kondo and 

Hayakawa were careful to take every precaution to avoid giving away their position. 

They camouflaged their guns skillfully, 

moved them when necessary, and even sent 

up false smoke rings when their batteries 

were in action. The American and Filipino 

artillerymen tried to fix the enemy's position by the use of sound waves, but this 

method proved too delicate and complicated. Another method, admittedly less accurate but easier to use, was to compute the 

enemy's position by the line of falling duds. 

The results could rarely be checked, but the 

batteries of all four forts fired daily, hopeful that they might knock out some of the 

Japanese guns with a lucky hit. 

For a time firing data was received from 

a small group of volunteers on the mainland 

led by Capt. Richard G. !vey of the 60th 

Coast Artillery (AA). I vey had established 

an observation post on high ground along 

the south coast of the bay and, until he was 

driven out on 15 February, served as a 

spotter, sending his information by walkietalkie radio. Even this observed fire proved 

of doubtful effectiveness. During one 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

bombardment, when !vey's reports appeared inconsistent, the fire control center 

asked him how he knew there was a J apanese gun in the position. "He replied," 

wrote Colonel Bunker, "that he couldn't 

see it, but judged by the sound that it was 

there." 24 When fire was shifted to another 

target, the observer's instructions, which 

failed to distinguish between deflection and 

range, were just as confusing and the fire 

was discontinued. 

Rarely was General Moore able to secure 

the services of the few remaining aircraft to 

fly reconnaissance. When he did the results 

were most gratifying. One such occasion 

came on 9 February, when Capt. Jesus A. 

Vil1amor, in an obsolete Philippine Army 

training plane equipped with a camera, set 

out to take photographs of the Ternate area. 

Protecting his slow and unarmed biplane 

were six P-40's. Villamor completed his 

mission, but on the way back the formation 

was attacked by six enemy fighters. While 

Villamor Came in with his precious photographs, the P-40's engaged the enemy in a 

spectacular fight over Bataan. In the space 

of a few minutes the American pilots 

brought down four of the enemy fighters 

and fatally damaged the remaining two. 

Only one P-40 was 105t.25 Meanwhile the 

photographs taken by Villamor were printed 

and rushed to Corregidor where they were 

collated with reports from observers on the 

ground. The counterbattery fire that followed proved remarkably accurate and several direct hits were scored. 

The difficulties of counterbattery fire 

were further increased when the Japanese 

moved their guns to the Pico de Loro hills 

24 Ibid., entry of 15 Feb 42. The italics are Colonel Bunker's. 

25 Ind. Bataan: The Judgment Seat, pp. 288-92. 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

where they could be reached only by high 

trajectory fire. Few of the coastal guns in 

the harbor defenses, which had been designed for use against warships, had sufficient elevation to clear the high ground before the enemy positions. Their difficulty is 

illustrated by the experience of the men of 

Battery Hearn on 21 March, who, "in a 

desperate effort to silence the Japs," opened 

fire with their 12-inch guns. "We wound 

up," Colonel Bunker wrote, "with our guns 

elevated against the elevation stops-and 

that wasn't any too much." 26 

The only weapon in the armament of the 

harbor defenses with the high trajectory required to deliver effective counterbattery 

fire under these circumstances was the 12-

inch mortar. There were twenty-two of 

these pieces on the four islands, but their 

usefulness against land targets was limited 

by the lack of sound ranging equipment and 

the shortage of ammunition with instantaneous fuzes. There was an ample supply 

of armor-piercing, fixed, delay fuze ammunition with a small bursting charge. This 

type was designed for use by coast artillery 

against warships but was of little use in the 

situation the Seaward Defenses then faced. 

These shells buried themselves deep in the 

earth before exploding and caused little 

damage to men and installations near by. 

The. ideal ammunition against the targets 

presented by the Japanese guns on the Cavite shore was the personnel type with instantaneous point detonating fuze. There 

were about 1,000 such shells, of 12-inch 

caliber and weighing 670 pounds, but even 

this small amount could not be used freely, 

for it would be desperately needed when 

Bataan fell and the enemy placed his heavy 

guns on the slopes of the Marivc1es Mountains. 

'" Bunker, Diary, entry of 21 Mar 42. 

489 

A small quantity of additional instantaneous fuze ammunition was obtained as a 

result of experiments made by Colonel Bunker. He modified the fuze of the 1,070-

pound shells used in the 12-inch guns by removing the .05-second delay pellet, thus 

detonating the shell more quickly. When he 

test-fired two such shells he got "beautiful 

results, up to my wildest hopes." The effect, 

he noted, was equal to that of a personnel 

shell, "both in dirt thrown up and in noise 

made." 27 But though the modified projectile exploded on impact, it had only a small 

bursting charge and a limited effect. Thus, 

despite every effort to secure effective counterbattery fire, the Americans were never 

able to prevent the Japanese from firing almost at will. 

The artillery dud which had begun early 

in February came to an end on 22 March. 

Though the Americans reported artillery 

fire from the Cavite shore until early in 

April, it could not have come from the 

Hayakawa Detachment. That force had 

been disbanded on the 22d and its elements 

ordered to rejoin their parent units for the 

final attack against Bataan, then about to 

open. Whatever guns remained behind 

were of smaller caliber and were intended 

only to annoy the defenders. 

Life Under Siege 

Since the first air attacks at the end of 

December the garrisons of the four fortified 

islands had worked steadily to repair the 

damages and improve their positions. On 

Corregidor a tunnel, begun in 1921 but discontinued because of treaty agreements, 

was rapidly pushed to completion to serve 

as a command post for the Seaward Defenses. The island's defenses were further 

27 Ibid., entry of 5 Mar 42. 
490 

strengthened by the addition of an 8-inch 

gun with a range of 24,000 yards and a 360-

degree traverse. This gun was brought over 

from Bataan and mounted on a prepared 

concrete base near Malinta. Though it was 

tested and ready for use by 4 March, no 

crew was available and the gun never fired 

a shot at the enemy. At Fort Hughes, one 

155-mm. gun facing the sea was dismounted, moved through the tunnel, and 

emplaced on the opposite side of the island, 

pointing toward Bataan. 

Vital installations were strengthened in 

various ways. Around the large well at the 

west end of Malinta Tunnel the engineers 

placed a circular parapet of sandbags, and 

over the gasoline storage area on Morrison 

Hill they placed two feet of heavily reinforced concrete, which they then camouflaged. Similar protection was given the 

Harbor Defenses telephone exchange at 

Topside. Near the entrance to Malinta 

Tunnel and in the port area at Bottomside, 

the engineers constructed tank obstacles 

consisting of square concrete posts reinforced with steel rails. About the same time, 

they placed roofs over the 75-mm. guns 

supporting the bcach defense troops to give 

them protection against dive bombers. 

Shortcomings in the design and location 

of various installations had become apparent by this time and these were corrected 

when the intensity of the enemy fire declined. Early plans had not taken into consideration the possibility of artillery fire from 

the Cavite shore and some of the tunnel 

entrances now faced the oncoming shells. 

After one attack Colonel Bunker checked 

his firing data and concluded that the main 

entrance to the Seaward Defenses command 

post "now points exactly along the J ap 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

trajectory." 28 Where possible, other openings were constructed, but in most cases protection was provided by baffle walls. 

With the technical advice of the engineers 

practically all the batteries began to build 

their own tunnels. Some dug tunnels where 

there was no apparent reason for one. "\Ve 

have to be at our gun practically all the 

time," observed one battery commander, 

whose men were hard at work on a tunnel, 

"so we may not be able to spend too much 

time, if any at all, in a tunnel." 29 Even the 

troops on beach defense caught the fever 

and, with whatever materials they could beg 

or borrow, dug tunnels and constructed 

overhead protection. "It is safe to venture a 

guess," wrote the engineer cautiously, "that 

if all the tunnels constructed on Corregidor 

after hostilities commenced were connected 

end to end the resultant summation would 

not be less than two miles." 30 

Life on the four fortified islands in Manila 

Bay settled into a dreary routine. When the 

men were not building fortifications or going 

about their daily chores, they had little to do. 

Complaints were frequent and often dealt 

with the subject of food. The ration had 

been cut in half on 5 January, at the same 

time it had been cut on Bataan. The more 

enterprising of the men found ways of their 

own to increase the amount and vary the 

monotony of the ration, but the opportunities were fewer than on Bataan. Sunken or 

damaged barges washed close to shore offered a profitable field for exploitation during the early days of the campaign. One unit 

filled its trucks with a cargo of dried fruits 

salvaged from one such barge and stored it 

" Ibid., entry of 25 Mar 42. 

2' Ames, Diary, note to Itr of 24 Jan 42. 

80 Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, Exhibit E, p. 4. 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

away for future use. "Now," wrote Colonel 

Bunker, "if they'll only drink a lot of water, 

they'll be fixed fine." 31 

Some even managed to procure liquor in 

this way. One of the barges sent out from 

Manila just before the Japanese occupation 

had been loaded with whiskey from the 

Army and Navy Club. It was sunk in shallow 

water and many of the men spent their offduty hours diving in the oil-coated waters in 

the hope of bringing up a bottle. Before the 

military police took over to relieve the lucky 

divers of their catch as they reached the 

shore, a large number of soldiers had laid in 

a stock of the precious commodity.32 President Quezon's yacht is also said to have supplied at least one unit with a. store of fine 

wine. When it was being unloaded one dark 

night, it is reported that an officer directed 

the dock hands to load two trucks simultaneously. When the job was finished, one of 

the trucks silently disappeared into the night 

with its valuable cargo, never to be seen 

again.ss 

Life everywhere on the islands went underground and the symbol of the new molelike existence was Malinta Tunnel. "Everyone who doesn't need to be elsewhere," 

observed Captain Ames, "was in a tunnelchiefly Malinta." 34 During the bombings 

it was always jammed with Americans and 

Filipinos who huddled back against the 

boxes of food and ammunition stacked 

along the sides to a height of six feet. 

Crowded into the tunnel were the highest 

., Bunker, Diary, entry of 9 Jan 42. Captain Ames 

also mentioned the shipment of dried fruit in his 

diary on 6 January. 

32 Ames, Diary, 6 Jan 42. 

sa This story was picked up from several participants and cannot be supported by direct references to sources or interviews. 

.. Ltr, Ames to his wife, 12 Jan 42, in Ames, 

Diary. 

491 

headquarters in the Philippines, the lawful 

government of the Commonwealth, the 

1,000-bed hospital, vast quantities of supplies, power plants, machinery, and other 

vital installations. One lateral alone was 

taken over by uSAFFE. Here General MacArthur had a desk, before which were lined 

up his staff officers' desks. To the rear were 

the double-decker beds where the staff slept. 

Malinta also housed those dignitaries who 

had been evacuated from Manila. The civilians followed the routine of the military garrison, but an exception was made for the 

women, who were assigned special facilities 

in an area known as the "ladies' lateral." 35 

For the men outside, a trip through the 

tunnel was an interesting experience and 

never failed to rouse wonder. Milling about 

were Philippine and American government 

officials, officers of all services and all ranks, 

nurses in white starched uniforms, war correspondents, laborers, repair and construction crews, barbers, convalescents, and 

frightened soldiers in search of safety. "It is 

a revelation to walk through these tunnels," 

wrote Captain Ames to his wife. "At one 

time you are rubbing elbows with the 

daughter of some P.1. [Philippine] official, 

dodging a lady war correspondent, talking 

to a naval officer, being jostled by a 

plumber, ... and having your shoes 

mopped by some Filipino janitor." 36 

Outside the tunnel the men encountered 

unusual and sometimes strange sights. President Quezon, ill with tuberculosis and confined to a wheel chair, spent as much time 

as he could outside the dust-laden tunnel, as 

did the U.S. High Commissioner Francis B. 

Sayre. On 30 December a small group wit-

.. Amea Willoughby, I Was on COTregidoT, pp. 

103-04, 134-40 . 

.. Ltr, Ames to his wife, 12 Jan 42, in Ames, 

Diary. 
492 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

USAFFE HEADQUARTERS IN MALINTA TUNNEL. Gene ral MacArthur with 

General Sutherland, Mar ch 1942. 

nessed Quezon's second inauguration in an 

impressive ceremony at the mouth of the 

tunnel and listened to speeches by the President, the High Commissioner, and General 

11acArthur. Some saw, too, larger sums of 

money and more gold than they had ever 

imagined in their youthful dreams of pirate 

treasure chests. But values change in war 

and they watched without visible emotion 

the unloading of the gold, silver, and securities of the Philippine treasury on the Corregidor docks and their removal to a strong 

room deep in the tunnel. 

Life on the islands had its seamier side. 

Not all men were brave and each ga rrison 

had its share of "tunnel rats," the taunt reserved for those who never left the safety of 

·lalint a Tunnel. Such men were said to 

have "tunnelitis," a disease characterized by 

a furtive manner and the sallow complexion 

associated with those who live underground. 

For these men, those outside the tunnel had 

only contempt, tinged perhaps with envy. 

"\Ve say of them," wrote one of those on the 

outside, " that they will lose tunnel-credit if 

they are seen outside the tunnel. And we 

josh them ahout the DTS medal (Distinguished Tunnel Service) . . . if they 

gather plenty of tunnel credits. As opposed 

to shell-shocked, we say of confirmed 'tunneleers' that they are shelter-shocked.":<7 

Such unfair judgments were perhaps inevitable where some men were exposed to 

danger and others, by reason of their assignment, enjoyed the safet y-and discomfortof Malinta Tunnel. Nerves wore thin during 

the enforced intimacy of the prolonged 

'" Ibid., 6 ~b 42. See also Hanson Baldwin, 

"The Fourth M arines at Corregidor," Part 2, 

Marine Corps Gazette (December 1946), pp. 27- 28. 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

siege, and there were few opportunities for 

recreation. During their idle moments men 

discussed the most fantastic rumors, deplored the lack of support from the United 

States, and commented smugly about the invariably misinformed "brass hats in Malinta Tunnel." And always the men exercised the immemorial right of the soldier to 

"gripe." The days passed thus with monotonous and dreary regularity, filled with work, 

idle conversation, and speculation about the 

future. 

The Second Aerial Bombardment 

Early in January, it will be recalled, Imperial General Headquarters had transferred the bulk of the 5th Air Group out of 

the Philippines, leaving General Homma 

with only a small air force whose major 

mission was to support ground operations 

on Bataan. A month later, after 14th Army 

had been badly beaten in its efforts to gain 

a quick victory on the Orion-Bagac line, 

Homma had received large reinforcements, 

including Army and Navy air units. From 

Malaya had come two heavy bombardment 

regiments, the 60th and 62d, with a total of 

sixty twin-engine bombers. This single accretion alone tripled Homma's air strength. 

In addition, the Navy had sent two squadrons of Bettys (land-based, twin-engine 

bombers) , one squadron of Zekes (fighters), 

and one squadron of carrier-based bombers 

to the Philippines, thus making available 

for the offensive of late March and early 

April a considerably augmented air force. 3s 

Homma's plan for the final assault against 

the defenders of Bataan had provided for a 

"This account of Japanese air plans and operations is based upon 5th Gp Opns, pp. 59-76; 14th 

Army Opns, I, 129-36; Comments of Former Japanese Officers Regarding The Fall of the Philippines, 

p. 74, OCMH. 

493 

heavy artillery and aerial preparation, starting on 24 March and continuing until victory was achieved. To the air forces he had 

assigned a threefold mission: to support the 

advance of ground units, bomb forward and 

rear installations, and cut the line of supply 

between Bataan and Corregidor. All aircraft were given targets on Bataan; but the 

60th and 62d Heavy Bombardment Regiments and the Navy were directed to bomb 

Corregidor as well. Careful plans were made 

for the period from 24 to 28 March and an 

agreement was concluded between the Army 

and Navy which made possible a unified 

plan of air action and the joint bombardment of targets by the aircraft of both services. After the 28th the bulk of the heavy 

bombers were to concentrate on Bataan, 

but, "in order to demoralize the enemy and 

to boost the fighting spirit of our army," a 

small number of planes would continue to 

bomb Corregidor every few hours around 

the clock.39 

The aerial attack opened on schedule 

simultaneously with the artillery preparation on Bataan, at dawn of the 24th, when 

the first of the Army's six bomber squadrons 

rose from Clark Field and headed toward 

Corregidor. At the same time two navy 

squadrons (twenty-four Bettys) stood by to 

take off from their base at Clark near Manila to join in the attack. At 0924 the airraid alarm, the seventy-seventh of the campaign, sounded on Corregidor. One minute 

later, the first enemy flight of nine Army 

bombers came over the island to drop their 

550- and 1,1 OO-bombs. They were followed 

by the remaining Army squadrons which, in 

turn, gave way to the Navy's planes. The 

attack continued during the day and 

that night, when three more planes made 

a nuisance raid against the island. Alto-

,. 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 60. 
494 

gether, forty-five of the sixty twin-engine 

bombers of the 60th and 62d Heavy 

Bombardment Regiments and the two 

squadrons of naval land-based bombers 

participated in the first day's attack to drop 

a total of seventy-one tons of bombs. 

The next day the Japanese sent only three 

Army squadrons, twenty-seven planes, 

against Corregidor; the Navy, a similar 

number. This pattern continued until the 

29th, the Navy planes alternating with the 

Army bombers. In addition small groups of 

planes came in over Corregidor every two 

or three hours "to carry out the psychological warfare and destroy the strong points, 

without failure." 40 The routine bombings 

continued steadily until 1 April, with at least 

one Army squadron attacking du~ing the 

day and another at night. The Navy planes, 

which had no missions on Bataan, continued 

their bombardment of the island fortress in 

undiminished strength. 

F or the men on Corregidor it seemed as 

though they were living "in the center of a 

bull's-eye." 41 During the last week of March 

there were about sixty air-raid alarms lasting for a total of seventy-four hours. Bombings begun in the morning were usually resumed in the afternoon and again at night. 

Since the Japanese planes were now based 

on Clark Field or near Manila, they were 

able to remain over the target for longer 

periods than they had during the first bombardment in December. A graphic picture 

of the intensity of the bombardment can be 

gained from General Moore's summary of 

the first day's action. 

24 March: 

0707-Batteries Woodruff [Ft. Hughes, 

14-inch guns], Marshall [Ft. Drum, 14-inch 

40 Ibid., p. 65 . 

.. TisdeJle, Diary, entry of 3 Jan 42. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

guns], and Koehler [Ft. Frank, 12-inch mortars] opened fire on Cavite targets. 

0924-Air Raid Alarm No. 77 sounded. 

0925-Nine heavy bombers, a new type 

in the area, bombed Middleside and Morrison 

Hill. 

0945-Twenty-seven heavy bombers 

came in over tail of Corregidor and bombed 

Middleside, closely followed by 17 heavies 

bombing Topside. 

0950-Twenty-five planes followed by 9 

more made another attack. Meanwhile, artillery shells from enemy batteries in Cavite were 

bursting on Corregidor. 

Several fires were started, communication 

cable and water mains cut, and an ammunition dump of 75-mm. shells on Morrison 

Hill was set off. These shells were exploding 

for hours. Battery Wheeler [12-inch guns] had 

a direct bomb hit on the racer of No.1 gun 

putting it out of action temporarily. 

111O-AII clear sounded. 

1435-Air Raid Alarm No. 78. Nine 

heavy bombers approached Corregidor from 

the southeast. Bombs dropped on Kindley 

Field. 

1438-Seven more planes from southeast 

with more bombs. Shelling from mainland 

also. 

1529-All Clear. 

1552-Air Raid Alarm No. 79. Nine 

heavy bombers hit Kindley Field again. 

1620-All Clear. 

1640-Air.Raid Alarm No. 80. Mariveles 

and Cabcaben areas [Bataan] hit by 9 heavies. 

1703-All Clear. 

2053--Air Raid Alarm No. 81. 

2115-First night air raid. Two medi\lm 

bombers dropped incendiary bombs in Cheney 

Ravine, Corregidor. Later returned and 

bombed Bottomside. No damage reported. 

2234-All Clear.42 

The effect of so heavy a bombardment 

over the period of seven days might well 

have been disastrous had not the men 

profited from the earlier air attacks and 

built underground shelters. They had also 

learned how effectively sand could cushion 

.. Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, pp. 46-47. 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

the blow from a bomb and had made liberal 

use of sandbags. "It used to be hard to get 

the men to fill sandbags," wrote one officer. 

"Now it is hard to keep them from laying 

hands on all the sandbags available and 

filling them when those to whom they are 

allotted aren't looking." 43 The small number of casualties is ample evidence of the 

thoroughn·ess with which the Corregidor 

garrison had dug in since the first attack on 

29 December. 

Installations of all kinds and critical supplies had also been placed under bombproof protection, and these suffered little 

damage during the bombardment. The few 

remaining surface installations, however, 

and supplies in open storage did not fare 

so well. On Bottomside, the theater, post 

exchange, and bakery were leveled to the 

ground and the Navy's radio station 

damaged. Wainwright's house, inherited 

from MacArthur, was destroyed on the first 

day of the attack. "I picked up the light 

walking stick which MacArthur had left for 

me," wrote Wainwright, "and walked down 

to Malinta Tunnel to live there the rest of 

my time on Corregidor." 44 Several ammunition dumps were hit, exploding the 

shells in storage, and a quantity of TNT 

blown up. But losses, on the whole, were 

small and were quickly repaired by crews 

which cleared the roads and cleaned out 

the debris left by exploding bombs. 

The Japanese, too, seemed to have 

profited by their earlier experience and had 

"learned," Captain Ames observed, "to 

dodge AA fire." 45 They came in at higher 

altitudes than before, between 22,000 and 

28,000 feet, in formations of nine planes or 

less. During daylight they made their bomb-

" Ames, Diary, entry of 26 Mar 42, and Itr to his 

wife, 8 Jan 42. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 74. 

.. Ames, Diary, entry of 24 Mar 42. 

495 

ing runs out of the sun, changing course and 

altitude immediately after the moment of 

release. Earlier the antiaircraft gun batteries had been able to get in about ten 

salvos before the Japanese flew out of range, 

usually bringing down the lead plane of the 

formation. ·When the enemy changed his 

tactics, the antiaircraft guns could get in 

fewer salvos and could no longer count on 

the lead plane maintaining the same course. 

D nder ideal conditions antiaircraft guns 

form a ring around the defended area, or a 

line in front of it, from where they can 

strike enemy aircraft before they reach the 

objective. On Corregidor it was not possible, for obvious reasons, "to follow the 

book." The antiaircraft guns could not 

engage the enemy until he was almost over 

the island. Moreover, by being located on 

the target, they became "part of what is 

being bombed," with the result that their 

efficiency and freedom of fire was limited 

most at the moment of greatest need. 

"N aturally our job is to fire on the bombers," wrote Captain Ames, " ... and if 

possible prevent the bombing. Fire we do, 

but prevent the bombing we cannot." In a 

letter which never reached his wife he 

graphically explained the difficulty which 

beset all the antiaircraft men. 

The bombers come over; we see them drop 

their bombs-all the while we are tracking 

them with our instruments--our guns point 

upward more and more steeply; the bombs 

continue downward on their way towards us. 

Then our indicators show that the bombers 

are "in range". We open fire. In about 15 seconds our guns are pointing as nearly straight 

up as they can, and hit the mechanical stop. 

We cease firing. The bombs whistle; we duck 

for a few seconds while the bombs burst, and 

pop up again to engage the next flight. When 

fighters come in one after another we stay up 

while the bombs hit all around us .... 

Some of the bombers come in higher than 

we can shoot. In such cases we vainly wait for 
496 

our indicators to show "in range", and take 

cover (duck behind our splinterproofs) just 

as the bombs begin to whistle.46 

The most serious limitations on the effectiveness of the 3-inch guns arose from the 

shortage of mechanically fuzed ammunition, 

which could reach to a height of 30,000 

feet. There was an adequate supply of ammunition with the powder train fuze, effective to a height of about 24,000 feet, but 

only enough of the longer range type for 

one of the ten antiaircraft batteries. On 3 

February a submarine had brought in 2,750 

more rounds of mechanically fuzed ammunition, and it became possible to supply an 

additional battery. Thus, when the enemy 

planes came in at an altitude of more than 

24,000 feet, only two batteries could reach 

them. The remaining batteries of the antiaircraft command, equipped with powder 

train fuzes, could only watch idly while the 

Japanese leisurely dropped their bombs. 

Nonetheless, the contribution of these batteries, though negative, was a valuable one. 

By forcing the enemy to remain at extremely 

high altitude, they decreased his accuracy 

and diminished the effectiveness of the bombardment. 

From the outset it had been necessary to 

conserve even the powder train fuzed shells, 

30 percent of which were duds. This had 

been accomplished by limiting each gun to 

six rounds for any single target on any given 

course. The opening weeks of the war 

proved the most expensive in terms of 

rounds fired to planes destroyed, 500 rounds 

being required for each plane. This inaccurate fire was due to inexperience, the irregular functioning of powder train fuzes, and 

variation in the muzzle velocity. Between 8 

December and 11 March the 3-inch gun 

batteries in the harbor defenses expended 

.. Ltr, Ames to his wife, 20 Jan 42, Ames, Diary. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

over 6,000 rounds for a total of 52 aircraft 

knocked down, or about 120 rounds per 

plane. With increased experience of both 

fire control crews and gunners and improved 

fire discipline, this average was steadily bettered until, by the beginning of April, the 

e~penditure rate went under 100 rounds per 

plane, an excellent score even under the 

most favorable conditions. 

In February an effort was made to use 

the 12-inch mortars for antiaircraft fire in 

the hope that a salvo from these pieces, 

bursting in the midst of the enemy formation, would discourage mass bombing. The 

670-pound shells were first fitted with the 

powder train fuze but the shell would not 

explode. Next, the 155-mm. shrapnel and 

the mechanical antiaircraft fuze were tried, 

but they failed also to detonate the charge. 

"If it can be made to work," thought Colonel Bunker, "it will sure jolt the Japs." 47 

But the problem was never solved, and at the 

end of the campaign Ordnance still did not 

know whether the 12-inch shell would not 

explode because of the low rotational velocity or the size of booster charge in the fuze. 

With the second aerial bombardment of 

Corregidor the Japanese for the first time 

resorted to night bombing. During this period they made twenty-three such attacks, 

delivered by small groups of bombers from 

an altitude of 24,000 to 27,000 feet. In 

almost every case the searchlight batteries 

illuminated the planes before they reached 

the bomb rdease line. Many of the pilots 

seemed to be confused by the lights and 

turned away to approach from another 

direction; others jettisoned their bombs or 

.7 Bunker, Diary, entry of 20 Mar 42. This scheme 

and the efforts to p~t it into effect were neither supported nor indorsed by Colonel Chase, the antiaircraft commander, who regarded the entire project 

as, "to say the least, fantastic." Chase, Comments 

on Draft MS, pp. 23-24, OCMH . 
THE SIEGE OF CORREGIDOR 

abandoned the attack altogether. Those that 

got through were apparently too nervous 

and too anxious to get back to bomb with 

any accuracy. On the whole, the night attacks proved ineffective and after 6 April 

were discontinued. 

By the beginning of April, the aerial 

bombardment was virtually over. Little additional damage had been received and 

comparatively few casualties had been suf497 

fered by the men who had had two months 

to prepare. All eyes were now turned to 

Bataan, upon which the Japanese had concentrated their entire air and artillery 

strength in preparation for the final assault. 

For the next ten days, while the fight for 

Bataan ran its grim course to a bloody and 

tragic end, the men on Corregidor and its 

sister fortresses were granted a brief respite. 

Their turn, they knew, would come soon. 
CHAPTER XXVIII 

The Southern Islands 

As long as the decisive struggle for control of the Philippines was being fought on 

Luzon, the islands to the south were safe 

from invasion. At no time during the first 

four months of the war did General Homma 

have sufficient troops to conduct operations 

simultaneously in both areas. Having established a foothold on Mindanao, at Davao, 

late in December, he had been forced to 

limit operations in the south to air and naval 

reconnaissance. It was not until April, as 

the Bataan campaign was drawing to a 

close, that Homma had a large enough force 

to embark on the conquest of the southern 

islands. The opening gun of this campaign 

sounded on 10 April, one day after the 

Bataan campaign ended. 

The Islands and Their Defense 

Mindanao, the southernmost island in the 

Philippine Archipelago, has an area of more 

than 36,000 square miles and is second in 

size to Luzon. Its coast line is irregular and 

its bays afford shelter at many places for a 

hostile fleet. Much of the beach line is flat 

and two large river valleys offer easy routes 

of advance into the interior. The Zamboanga Peninsula jutting westward from the 

center of the island into the Sulu Sea is virtually indefensible and easily cut off at its 

narrow neck from the rest of Mindanao. 

Along the northeast coast is the Diuata 

Mountain range; in the wild and largely unexplored interior extinct volcanoes rise to 

formidable heights.1 

Transportation and communications on 

Mindanao were greatly inferior to those on 

Luzon. There were no railroads on the 

island and only two highways. The longest 

of these, Route 1, followed a circuitous 

route from Digos on the east coast across 

the narrow waist of Mindanao to Cotabato 

then northward to the northeast tip of the 

island. The stretch of road between that 

point and Davao was still under construction in 1941. Route 3, named the 

Sayre Highway in honor of the Philippine 

High Commissioner, extended southward 

through central Mindanao for a distance of 

about 100 miles, linking the northern and 

southern arms of Route 1. The northern 

stretch of the road was well surfaced and 

usable in all weather, but the southern portion had a clay surface which, after a rain, 

"reminded one of the glutinous stuff found 

near the Black Hills in South Dakota." 2 

Additional means of transportation on 

Mindanao were provided by small vessels, 

1 The physical description of the islands south of 

Luzon is based upon Civil Affairs Handbook: Philippine Islands, Vols. I-XII, ASF Manual M 365-1 

to 12. 

• Col William H. Braddock, Rpt of Force Surgeon, Visayan-Mindanao Force, in V-MF Rpt of 

Opns, p. 550, Annex XI, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of 

Opns. The Vi sayan-Mindanao Force Report contains, in addition to General Sharp's report, the reports of unit and sector commanders, listed as appendixes but numbered seriatim. 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

which moved freely along the coast and up 

the island's two large navigable rivers, the 

Agusan and Rio Grande de Mindanao. The 

first flows north through a wide and marshy 

valley on the inland side of the Diuata 

Mountains on the east coast to empty into 

the Mindanao Sea. The second, called 

simply the Mindanao River, flows south 

and west through central Mindanao, parallel to the Sayre Highway and Route 1, to 

empty into Moro Gulf at Cotabato. 

Between Mindanao and Luzon lie the 

islands of the Visayan group, the most important of which are Cebu, Panay, Negros, 

Leyte, and Samar. Most of these islands 

consist of a central mountain area surrounded by coastal plains. Panay, split 

north and south by a comparatively large 

central plain between two mountain ranges, 

has the largest level area of the group. Cebu, 

the most mountainous, has the least. 

The road net throughout the Visayas is 

generally the same: a primary coastal road 

all or part way around each island, with 

auxiliary roads linking important points in 

the interior to the ports along the coast. 

None of these roads, in 1941, had more 

than two lanes, and most were poorly surfaced and winding. On the most highly developed of the islands-Cebu, N egros, and 

Panay-there were short stretches of railroad. Coastal shipping supplemented the 

road and rail system in the islands and 

linked the islands of the Visayan group with 

each other and with Mindanao. 

The defense of Mindanao and the Visayas-comprising a land area half again as 

large as Luzon-rested with the VisayanMindanao Force, commanded by Brig. 

Gen. William F. Sharp, who had his headquarters initially on Cebu. This force was 

composed almost entirely of Philippine 

499 

Army troops. Of the five divisions mobilized, in the south, only three, the 61st, 81st, 

and 101st, remained in the area. The other 

two divisions, the 71 st and 91 st, moved to 

Luzon, leaving behind their last mobilized 

regiments, the 73d and 93d. In addition, 

a large number of provisional units and 

some Constabulary units were formed on 

the outbreak of the war. 

General Sharp's problems were similar to 

those faced by the commanders on Luzon. 

His untrained men lacked personal and organizational equipment of all types. There 

were not enough uniforms, blankets, or 

mosquito bars to go around, and though 

each man had a rifle-the Enfield '17-

not all understood its use. Moreover, many 

of the rifles were defective and quickly 

broke down. Machine guns of .30- and .50-

caliber were issued, but many of these were 

defective also and had to be discarded. 

Spare parts for all weapons were lacking 

and guns that ordinarily would have been 

easily repaired had to be abandoned. There 

were no antitank guns, grenades, gas masks, 

or steel helmets for issue, and the supply of 

ammunition was extremely limited.3 

General Sharp's most serious shortage 

was in artillery weapons. At the start of the 

war he had not a single piece in his entire 

command and as a result organized the artillery components of his divisions as infantry. On 12 December he received from 

Manila eight 0Id2.95-inch mountain guns, 

three of which were lost two weeks later at 

• The account of shortages in the Visayan-Mindanao Force is based on V -MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 

16-26, 41-42, 47-48, 68-71; Gen Chynoweth, 

61st Div (PA) and Visayan Force Rpt, pp. 1-7, 

OCMH; Col Hiram W. Tarkington, There Were 

Others, Chs. I-II. The last is a manuscript volume 

which Colonel Tarkington has made available to 

the author. 
500 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. SHARP AND HIS STAFF, 1942. Back row, standing 

left to right: Maj. Paul D. Phillips (ADC) and Capt. W. F. O'Brien (ADC). 

Front row, sitting left to right: Lt. Col. W. S. Robinson (G-3), Lt. Col. Robert D. 

Johnston (G-4), Col. John W. Thompson (CofS), General Sharp (CG), Col. 

Archibald M. Mixson (DCofS) , Lt. Col. Howard R. Perry, Jr. (G-l), Lt. Col. 

Charles I. Humber (G-2), and Maj. Max Weil (Hq Comdt and PM). 

Davao. The remaining five pieces constituted Sharp's entire artillery support 

throughout the campaign. 

To alleviate the shortages in clothing, 

spare parts for weapons, and other equipment, factories, staffed and operated by 

Filipinos, were established. They were able 

to turn out such diverse items as shoes, hand 

grenades, underwear, and extractors for the 

Enfield. Unfortunately there was no way to 

manufacture small-arms ammunition or artillery pieces, and thcse remained critical 

items until the end. 

General Sharp's mission, initially, was to 

defend the entire area south of Luzon. 

When organized resistance was no longer 

practicable, he was to split his force into 

small groups and conduct guerilla warfare 

from hidden bases in the interior of each 

island. Food, ammunition, fuel, and equipment, were to be moved inland, out of reach 

of the enemy, in preparation for such a contingency. Those supplies that could not be 

moved were to be destroyed. 4 

At the end of December, after he had 

made his decision to withdraw to Bataan, 

General MacArthur informed the VisayanMindanao Force commander that he could 

expect no further aid from Luzon and instructed him to transfer the bulk of his 

4 V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 26-28. 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

troops to Mindanao for the defense of that 

island and its important airfield at Del 

Monte.5 The move to Mindanao began immediately and was completed early in January. With Sharp's headquarters and most 

of the troops on Mindanao, the Visayas assumed a secondary importance in the defense of the south. In the event of attack it 

would be virtually impossible to reinforce 

any of the islands in that group from Mindanao. Each of the six defended islandsCebu, Panay, Negros, Leyte, Samar, and 

Bohol-was now dependent upon its own 

garrison and resources to meet a Japanese 

invasion.u 

The organization of the Visayan-Mindanao Force established early in January 

lasted only about one month. On 4 February, in an effort to facilitate the delivery of 

supplies expected shortly from Australia, 

USAFFE assumed direct control of the garrisons on Panay and Mindoro, both a part 

of General Sharp's command. A month 

later, a week before MacArthur's departure 

for Australia, the remaining Visayan garrisons were separated from General Sharp's 

command which was then redesignated the 

Mindanao Force. The five garrisons in the 

Visayas were then organized into the Visayan Force and placed under Brig. Gen. 

Bradford G. Chynoweth, who had commanded on Panay. As coequal commanders, 

Sharp and Chynoweth reported directly to 

higher headquarters on Corregidor.' This 

separation of the Visayan-Mindanao Force 

clearly reflected MacArthur's desire to insure the most effective defense of Mindanao, 

• For MacArthur's views on the importance of 

Mindanao, see above, Chapter XIV. 

• V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 62-63. 

, Ibid., pp. 6-7, 29-33, 44--45; ltr, Sutherland to 

Chynoweth, 3 Feb 42, sub: Instructions, AG 430 

(25 Dec 41) Phil Reds. 

501 

which he hoped to use as a base for his 

promised return to the Philippines. 

Japanese planning for operations in the 

south did not begin until late in the campaign. The initial 14th Army plan for the 

conquest of the Philippines contained only 

brief references to Mindanao and the Visayas, which were expected to fall quickly 

once Manila was taken. During the months 

that followed the first landing, Homma 

showed little interest in the islands south of 

Luzon. But even had he desired to move 

into that area, he would have been unable 

to do so. In February the campaign on 

Bataan had reached a stalemate. Imperial 

General Headquarters, informed of Homrna's situation and worried over his slow 

progress, pressed for an early end to the 

Philippine campaign and finally, early in 

March, sent the needed reinforcements. 

With them came orders to begin operations 

in the south concurrently with those against 

Bataan and Corregidor.s 

It was several weeks before the troops 

scheduled for use in the south reached the 

Philippines. The first contingent came from 

Borneo and arrived at Lingayen Gulf on 1 

April. It consisted of Headquarters, 35th 

Brigade, and the 124th Infantry, both from 

the 18th Division. Led by Maj. Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi, the brigade commander, 

this force, with the addition of 14th Army 

supporting and service troops, was organized into a separate detachment known 

as the Kawaguchi Detachment. Four days 

later elements of the 5th Division from Malaya, consisting of the headquarters of Maj. 

Gen. Saburo Kawamura's 9th Infantry 

Brigade and the 41st Infantry, reached Lin-

• Statement of Col Takushiro Hattori, in Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, I, 

316; Southern Army Hist, pp. 14, 17; Hist, Army 

Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 42-43. 
502 

gayen. With these troops, augmented by 

service and supporting troops, Homma 

formed the Kawamura Detachment. These 

two detachments, plus the Miura Detachment already at Davao, constituted the entire force assigned the conquest of the southern Philippines.9 

The Virayas 

The creation of the Visayan Force on 4 

March had brought a change in commanders and a renewed vigor to the preparations 

for a prolonged defense of the islands in the 

Visayan group. In the force were about 

20,000 men organized into five separate 

garrisons, each with its own commander. 

The largest of these was Col. Albert F. 

Christie's Panay Force which consisted of 

the 61 st Division (P A), less the 61 st and 

62d Infantry, and the 61st Field Artillery 

which Sharp had taken to Mindanao. To 

replace these units, the island commander 

had organized the 64th and 65th Provisional Infantry Regiments. The addition of 

miscellaneous Constabulary troops brought 

the total of Christie's garrison to about 7,000 

men. 

Col. Irvine C. Scudder, commander of 

the troops on Cebu, where Visayan Force 

headquarters was located, had about 6,500 

troops, including the 82d and 83d Infantry 

( P A), the Cebu Military Police Regiment, 

a Philippine Army Air Corps detachment, 

and miscellaneous units. On N egros were 

about 3,000 troops under the command of 

Col. Roger B. Hilsman, who had led the 

force opposing the Japanese landing at 

Davao. Leyte and Samar were held by a 

hastily improvised force of 2,500 men led by 

Col. Theodore M. Cornell, and Bohol by 

"14th Army Opns, 1,214-15. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

about 1,000 men under Lt. Col. Arthur J. 

Grimes.1o 

General Homma's preoccupation with 

Bataan gave General Chynoweth, the Visayan Force commander, an additional month 

in which to make his preparations. Much 

had already been accomplished when he 

assumed command, and under his direction 

the defenses were rapidly brought to completion. On Cebu and Panay, where the defenses were most elaborate, the men had 

constructed tank obstacles, trenches, and 

gun emplacements, strung wire, and prepared demolitions. Airfield construction was 

pushed rapidly on all the islands. Panay 

alone had eight. Negros had an air and sea 

warning system and was able to alert the 

other garrisons of the approach of enemy 

planes and ships. Most of the work on these 

and other defenses was done by civilians, 

thus leaving the troops free to continue their 

training.n 

Perhaps the most interesting feature of 

the preparations for the defense of the 

Visayas was the program known as Operation Baus Au, Visayan for "Get it Back." 

Initiated by General Chynoweth during his 

tenure as the commander of the Panay garrison and then adopted on Cebu, Operation 

Baus A u was the large-scale movement of 

goods, supplies, and weapons into the interior for use later in guerrilla warfare. Secret 

caches were established in remote and inaccessible places, and at mountain hideouts 

which could be reached only by steep, narrow trails barely passable for a man on foot. 

10 V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 32-33,79-81. 

11 Col Scudder, Rpt of Mil Activities in Cebu, 2 

Dec 41-4 Mar 42, Col CorneIl, Narrative of Events, 

Hq Samar-Leyte Sector, and Col Hilsman, Hist of 

the Ncgros Sector, all in V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 

96, 397-98, 484, 490-92; Chynoweth, 61st Div 

(PA) and Vi sayan Force Rpt pp. 7, 11. 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

The 63d Infantry, which did most of the 

cargador work on Panay, adopted as its insignia a carabao sled loaded with a sack of 

rice and bearing the inscription Baus Au.12 

The effect on the civilian population of 

Operation Baus Au and other measures for 

a prolonged defense in the interior was unfortunate. The Filipinos felt that they were 

being abandoned and their faith in the 

American protector was badly shaken. 

What they expected was a pitched battle 

at the beaches ending in the rout of the 

enemy. "They took great pride in their 

Army," noted Colonel Tarkington, "and 

having been indoctrinated for years with 

the idea of American invincibility, were all 

for falling on the enemy tooth and nail and 

hurling him back into the sea." 13 

Japanese knowledge of conditions in the 

Visayas was accurate and fairly complete. 

Though they did not know the exact disposition of the troops in the area, they knew 

which islands were defended and the approximate size of the defending force. 

Homma was confident that with the reinforcements from Malaya and Borneo he 

could seize the key islands in the group. His 

plan was to take Cebu with the Kawaguchi 

Detachment and Panay with the Kawamura 

Detachment. These two forces, in co-operation with the Miura Detachment at Davao, 

would then move on to take Mindanao. 

That island conquered, the remaining garrisons in the Philippines could be reduced 

at leisure if they did not surrender of their 

own accord. 

No time was wasted in putting this plan 

into effect. On 5 April, four days after the 

Kawaguchi Detachment reached Lingayen 

,. Chynoweth, 61st Div (PA) and Visayan Force 

Rpt, pp. 7, 12-15; Tarkington, There Were Others, 

pp.47-49. 

13 Tarkington, There Were Others, p. 48. 

503 

Gulf, it was aboard ship once more, headed 

for Cebu. With 4,852 trained and battletested troops, General Kawaguchi had little 

reason to fear the outcome. 

The Cebu Landings 

First word of the approach of the Japanese reached General Chynoweth on the 

afternoon of 9 April, during a meeting with 

his staff and unit commanders. Three Japanese cruisers and eleven transports, it was 

reported, were steaming for Cebu from the 

south. All troops were alerted and a close 

watch kept on the enemy flotilla. That night 

further news was received that the Japanese 

force had split in two, one, sailing along the 

west coast, the other along the east. By 

daylight the enemy vessels were plainly 

visible, with the larger of the convoys 

already close to the island's capital, Cebu 

City, midway up the east coast. Shortly 

after dawn the Japanese in this convoy 

landed at Cebu City; at about the same 

time the men in the other convoy came 

ashore in the vicinity of Toledo, on the opposite side of the island.14 

Defending the capital, where Kawaguchi 

had landed the bulk of his troops, was the 

Cebu Military Police Regiment of about 

1,100 men under the command of Lt. Col. 

,. The account of operations on Cebu is based 

upon: Chynoweth, 6Ist Div (PAl and Visayan 

Force Rpt, pp. 13, 16-24, 33; Tarkington, There 

Were Others, pp. 265-81; Scudder, Rpt of Mil 

Activities in Cebu, and Lt Col Howard J. Edmands, 

Rpt of Invasion of Cebu, last two in V-MF Rpt af 

Opns, pp. 401, 436-51. 

The Japanese apparently made more than two 

landings but their exact number and location cannot be fixed with certainty. American sources list 

as many as seven landings along both coasts. The 

only available Japanese source simply states that the 

Kawaguchi Detachment landed "on the east coast 

of Cebu." 14th Army Opns, 1,214. 
r 

BOHOl 

o 

, , , ., 

MILES 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

Howard J. Edmands. Edmands' mISSIOn, 

like that of other unit commanders on the 

island, was to hold only long enough to 

allow the demolition teams to complete 

their work, then fall back into the hills. "I 

had no idea of being able to stop the J aps," 

explained General Chynoweth, "but I 

thought we could spend two or three days 

in withdrawal." 15 

The fight for Cebu City lasted only one 

day. Faced by a foe superior in numbers 

and weapons, the defenders fell back slowly, fighting for the time needed to block 

the roads and destroy the bridges leading 

into the interior. By the afternoon the fight 

had reached the outskirts of the city and 

at 1700 the Japanese broke off the action. 

Under cover of darkness Edmands pulled 

his men back to previously selected positions 

about ten miles inland, along a ridge which 

commanded the approaches from Cebu 

City to the central mountain area. Though 

the Japanese were in undisputed control of 

the capital at the end of the day, Edmands 

had achieved his purpose. He had gained 

the time needed by the demolition teams, 

and his regiment was still intact and withdrawing in good order. 

The Japanese enjoyed equal success that 

day on the west side of the island, in the 

neighborhood of Toledo. Western terminus 

of the cross-island highway, that town was 

an important military objective. But, on 

the assumption that the narrow channel 

along the west would discourage an enemy 

from landing there, only a small force, the 

3d Battalion, 82d Infantry (P A), had been 

placed in that area. The Philippine Army 

battalion opposed the enemy landing vigorously but without success and finally fell 

back along the cross-island highway toward 

"Chynoweth, 61st Div (PA) and Visayan Force 

Rpt, p. 17. 

505 

the town of Cantabaco, leaving the J apanese in possession of Toledo. 

At Cantabaco, midway across the island, 

the highway split in two. One branch 

turned northeast to pass close to Camp X, 

where General Chynoweth had his headquarters, then southeast to Talisay. The 

southern branch led into K aga. At both 

places there was a defending force of 

Filipinos whose route of withdrawal depended upon the security of Cantabaco. 

Should the Japanese pursuing the 3d Battalion, 82d Infantry, gain control of that 

town, the defenders would be cut off. 

General Chynoweth appreciated fully the 

importance of Cantabaco to the defense of 

Cebu. Even before the Japanese landings, in 

anticipation of difficulty there, he had 

brought Colonel Grimes and his 3d Battalion, 83d Infantry, from Bohol to support the 

defenses of western Cebu. Now, on the afternoon of the 10th, he ordered Grimes to 

cover Cantabaco, and as an added precaution sent a messenger with orders to his reserve battalion in the north to move down 

to the threatened area. Grimes, "eager to 

get into the fray ... started out with a 

gleam in his eye," and Chynoweth, confident that he had things reasonably well in 

hand, settled down for a good night's sleep.16 

He got little rest that night. Time and 

again he was awakened by anxious staff 

officers who reported that the enemy was 

approaching from the direction of Cantabaco. Despite these reports Chynoweth remained confident. He had received no message from Grimes, and he felt sure that if 

the enemy had broken through at Cantabaco, Grimes would have sent word. Moreover, there had been no explosions to indicate that the demolition teams along the 

road were doing their work. He had in16 Ibid. 
506 

spected these demolitions himself and felt 

sure that if the enemy had passed Cantabaco, the charges would have been set off. 

But at 0330, when the sounds of battle became louder, Chynoweth's confidence began 

to wane. The enemy was undoubtedly nearing Camp X. A half hour later all doubts 

vanished when large groups of Filipinos, the 

outposts of Camp X, appeared in camp. 

They seemed hypnotized, fired in the air, 

and refused to obey commands in their haste 

to flee. After a brief conference with his 

staff, Chynoweth decided to pull back to an 

alternate command post on a ridge a half 

mile to the north and await developments 

there. 

The collapse of the Cantabaco position 

had been the result of an unfortunate and 

unforeseen combination of ev~nts. The demolition teams in which Chynoweth had 

placed so much faith had waited too long 

and when the enemy appeared, led by tanks 

or armored cars, they had fled. Like his commander, Colonel Grimes believed that the 

enemy would be halted by blown bridges 

and obstacles along the road. Not hearing 

the sound of explosions, he, too, concluded 

that the Japanese were still at a safe distance. 

In his confidence he drove forward to familiarize himself with the terrain and was captured by an enemy patrol. Deprived of their 

commander, his men "stayed quite well 

hidden." 17 So well were they hidden that 

even the Japanese were unaware of their 

presence. 

The reserve battalion had never even 

started south. The messengers sent to that 

battalion failed to return, and if the battalion commander did receive Chynoweth's 

order to move to Cantabaco, he never complied with it. Instead, the battalion moved 

17 Ibid., p. 23. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

farther north, well out of reach of the 

enemy. 

Opposed only by the retreating 3d Battalion, 82d Infantry, which was quickly dispersed, the Japanese had advanced swiftly 

from Toledo through Cantabaco and then 

along the Talisay and Naga roads. It was 

the Japanese force along the Talisay road 

that had scattered the Camp X outposts and 

forced upon Chynoweth the realization that 

his plans for the defenses of Cantabaco had 

miscarried. 

With the enemy in possession of the crossisland highway, the fight for Cebu was over. 

Nothing more could be accomplished in 

central Cebu and on the night of the 12th, 

Chynoweth, with about 200 men, started 

north to his retreat in the mountains. From 

there he hoped to organize the few units still 

remaining on the island into an efficient 

guerrilla force. The Japanese did not claim 

the complete subjugation of the island until 

19 April, but Wainwright had already conceded the loss of Cebu three days earlier 

when he ordered General Sharp to re-establish the Visayan-Mindanao Force and take 

command of the remaining garrisons in the 

Visayas. 18 

The Seizure of Panay 

When General Chynoweth, the first commander of the Panay garrison, assumed 

command of the Visa yan Force and moved 

to Cebu in mid-March, he had named as 

successor Colonel Christie, his chief of staff. 

Under Christie's leadership work on the 

island's defenses continued and by mid-

"Rads, Wainwright to Sharp, Sharp to Wainwright, No. A-43, and Wainwright to Christie, all 

dated 16 Apr 42, USFIP G-3 Journal, 19 Mar19 Apr 42, AG 461 (1 Apr 42) Phil Reds. 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

April preparations for the expected Japanese attack had been virtually completed. 19 

As on Cebu the plan of defense provided 

only for delaying action to allow the demolition teams to complete their work. The 

61st Division (PA) and other troops on the 

islands, altogether 7,000 men, were to fall 

back to previously selected positions until 

they reached the mountains to the north. 

From there, well provided with the food and 

supplies gathered as a result of Operation 

Baus Au, Christie would wage guerrilla warfare against the enemy until such time as 

reinforcements arrived. 

The enemy landing came at dawn, 16 

April, and was made by the Kawamura Detachment of 4,160 men. The bulk of General Kawamura's troops came ashore at 

Iloilo, at the southeast corner of Panay, and 

a smaller force landed at Capiz to the 

north. Two days later a third landing was 

made at San Jose, along the southwest 

coast.20 None of the landings was opposed. 

By 20 April General Kawamura had occupied the strategic points of the island, and 

so far as he was concerned the campaign 

was over. 

For Colonel Christie, safe in his wellstocked mountain retreat, the campaign had 

just begun. Wild game was plentiful; he had 

ample fresh water, 500 head of cattle, 

15,000 bags of rice, hundreds of cases of 

canned goods, and an adequate supply of 

fuel. Machine shops had been constructed 

,. The account of operations on Panay is based 

on Tarkington, There Were Others, pp. 297-306. 

The Visayan-Mindanao Force Report of Operations 

contains no report of activities on Panay after 

Chynoweth's departure, and none was prepared by 

Colonel Christie. Interv, author with Christie, 6 

May 47. The only Japanese account is in 14th 

Army Opns, I, 215. 

,. Rads, Wainwright to AGWAR, 16 Apr 42, and 

Del Monte, no sig, to Ft Mills, 20 Apr 42, both in 

USFIP G-3 Journal, 19 Mar-19 Apr 42, AG 461 

(I Apr 42) Phil Reds. 

507 

in the mountains, and when his supply of 

rice gave out there was a mill to thresh more. 

Almost immediately he began to send his 

men out on hit-and-run raids. These so 

aroused the Japanese that they organized a 

punitive expedition at San Jose to capture 

Christie and destroy his headquarters. A 

Filipino agent sent warning of the Japanese 

plans and an ambush was prepared by a 

company of men armed only with bows and 

arrows, spears and bolos. Hidden along the 

sides of the pass leading to Christie's hideout, the Filipinos with their primitive weapons took the Japanese completely by surprise, killed many, and sent the rest posthaste back to San Jose. But the successes of 

guerrilla warfare could not disguise the fact 

that, with the principal towns and road net 

in their hands, the Japanese controlled the 

island. 

By the seizure of Cebu and Panay, the 

Japanese had secured a firm grip on the 

most important islands in the Visayas. The 

forces still holding out on Negros, Samar, 

Leyte, and Bohol were considerably smaller 

than those already defeated and driven 

back into the hills, and the Japanese were 

confident that these islands could be 

occupied at will. By 20 April the campaign 

for the Visayas was, for all practical purposes, at an end, and General Homma was 

free to send the Kawaguchi and Kawamura Detachments against Mindanao. 

Mindanao 

The Japanese force that landed at Davao 

on 20 December had been a small one. It 

had consisted of two groups, one of which, 

the Sakaguchi Detachment, left soon after 

for Jolo Island and the Netherlands Indies. 

The other group, led by Lt. Col. Toshio 

Miura and consisting of the 1st Battalion, 
508 

33d Infantry, plus miscellaneous troops, 

had remained on Mindanao.21 Time and 

again Colonel Miura had attempted to extend his control into the interior but without success. Indeed, had he not had air and 

artillery support and had his men not been 

equipped with automatic weapons, it is 

doubtful if he could have remained on the 

island. 

Since General Sharp's arrival on Mindanao early in January much had been 

done to prepare the island's defenses. With 

the additional troops transferred from the 

Visayas, Sharp had organized the island 

into five defensive sectors: the Zamboanga 

Sector; the Lanao Sector, in the northwest; 

the Cagayan Sector, in the north-central 

portion of the island; the Agusan Sector, in 

the east; and the Cotabato-Davao Sector 

in the central and south portion of the 

island. The last was the largest of the 

sectors and was divided into three subsectors: Digos, Cotabato, and Carmen 

Ferry. To each sector was assigned a force 

of appropriate size whose commander reported directly to Mindanao Force headquarters at Del Monte, ten miles inland 

from the northern terminus of the Sayre 

Highway and adjacent to the Del Monte 

Airfield. (Map 24) 

Despite occasional flurries along the 

Digos and Agusan fronts and, in March, 

some action in Zamboanga, which the Japanese occupied early that month, the troops 

on Mindanao continued their training. Z2 

21 The landing at Davao is described above, in 

Chapter VI. 

Z) The landing at Zamboanga was made by about 

220 Japanese of the 32d Naval Base Force on 2 

March 1942 after a brief fight with Lt. Col. Albert 

T. Wilson's troops of the Zamboanga Sector. On 

6 March Sharp ordered Wilson to withdraw to the 

mountains and conduct guerrilla operations. The 

Japanese, having secured the town of Zamboanga 

and established a seaplane base there, made no 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Individual and unit training continued at 

a steady pace and was supplemented by 

special instruction at a school in infantry 

tactics in central Mindanao. The school was 

staffed by Philippine Scouts of the 43d 

Infantry.23 

The greatest drawback to the training 

program was the shortage of ammunition. 

The supply was so limited that its expenditure on the firing range was prohibited. 

Instead, the men spent long hours in simulated fire, with doubtful results. "A few 

rounds fired by the soldier," observed 

Colonel Tarkington, "would have demon3trated to him the capability of his weapon, 

acquainted him with its recoil, and paid 

dividends in steadier marksmanship." 24 

Most of the men who fought on Mindanao 

never fired a live round before they went 

into battle. 

While General Sharp sought to strengthen the defenses of Mindanao, the Japanese 

completed their plans for the seizure of the 

island. The plan finally adopted provided 

for a co-ordinated attack from three directions by separate forces toward a common 

center, followed by a quick mop-up of the 

troops in the outlying portions of the island. 

One of these forces, the Miura Detachment, 

was already on the island, on garrison duty 

at Davao and Digos, a short distance to the 

south. It was to be relieved by a battalion of 

the 10th Independent Garrison and then 

strike out from Digos toward the Sayre 

Highway. Its route of advance would be 

northwest along Route 1, which intersected 

effort to expand their control. Wilson, The Defense 

of Zamboanga, in V -MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 484-86; 

Japanese Landing at Zamboanga, ATIS Doc 62680, 

20 Jul 51, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, pp. 1-5. 

"Inactive for many years, the 43d Infantry (PS) 

was reactivated with two companies, C and E, at 

the start of the war with Scouts from the 45th 

Infantry (PS) on duty at Zamboanga. 

'" Tarkington, There Were Others, p. 345. 
\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

+1>" \ .' \ ". .. ~'fi \ 

. \ 

\ 

MORO 

KAWAGUCHI--~~~ DET 

2' .Plt 

G U L F 

THE FIGHT FOR MINDANAO 29 Ap,.il- 9 Moy 1942 

D{HNU SECTOl! .OUNOU, I.PUO." 

---.. Ax,s OF J .... NfSE _DV.Nt~ 

MAP 24 

I02D]D40~ 

" 'LU 

D A VAO 

6 VL F 

I? .JoI.,,,/,,, .. , 
510 

the Sayre Highway about midway across the 

island. 

The other two forces committed to the 

Mindanao operation, the Kawaguchi and 

Kawamura Detachments, would have to 

make amphibious assaults. Each would be 

relieved of responsibility for the security of 

the island it had occupied, embark in the 

waiting transports, and sail under naval 

escort by divergent routes to its designated 

target. General Kawaguchi was to take his 

men ashore at Cotabato midway along the 

west coast, at the mouth of the Mindanao 

River. From Cotabato, which was joined 

to Route 1 by a five-mile stretch of highway, 

he would send part of his force east toward 

the Sayre Highway to meet Colonel Miura's 

troops marching west. The rest of the detachment was to land at Parang, about 

twelve miles north of Cotabato, and push 

north along Route 1, past Lake Lanao, then 

east along the island's north shore to join 

with the Kawamura Detachment. 

Kawamura was to come ashore in northern Mindanao at the head of Macajalar 

Bay, the starting point of the Sayre Highway. While a small portion of his force 

struck out to the west to meet Kawaguchi's 

men, the bulk of the detachment would 

march south through central Mindanao, 

along the Sayre Highway. Ultimately, elements of the three detachments-one 

marching east, another west, and the third 

south-would join along the Digos-Cotabato stretch of Route 1 across the narrow 

waist of the island.25 

Late in April three battalions of the 10th 

Independent Garrison took over garrison 

duty on Mindanao, Cebu, and Panay. Colonel Miura immediately moved south from 

Davao to Digos to prepare for his advance 

along Route 1, while Kawamura and Kato 14th Army Opns, I, 214-15. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

waguchi began to embark their troops for 

the coming invasion. First to sail was the 

Kawaguchi Detachment which left Cebu 

on 26 April in six transports escorted by two 

destroyers. Kawamura's departure from Panay came five days later and brought him 

to Macajalar Bay as Kawaguchi's troops 

were fighting their way northward to greet 

him. Wainwright's order to Sharp on 30 

April, to hold all or as much of Mindanao 

as possible with the forces he had, found that 

commander already engaged with the enemy on two fronts.26 

The Cotabato-Davao Sector 

Early on the morning of 29 April, the 

emperor's birthday, the Kawaguchi Detachment began to land at Cotabato and 

Parang, midway up the west coast of Mindanao. 27 The seizure- of both towns was vital 

to Kawaguchi's plan. From Cotabato he 

could advance inland to the Sayre Highway 

by way of Route 1 or in small boats by way 

of the Mindanao River. From Parang he 

could send his men north toward Lake Lanao and the north coast of the island, or 

southeast to join the rest of the detachment 

heading toward the Sayre Highway. 

Defending Cotabato and the surrounding 

area were troops of the 101st Division 

(PA)-101st Infantry (less 1st and 3d 

Battalions), the 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry, and a battalion of the 101st Field Artillery, organized and equipped as infantrystrengthened by Constabulary troops and 

•• Rads, Sharp to Wainwright, No. F-317, 27 

Apr 42, No. F-144, 28 Apr 42, and Wainwright to 

Sharp, 30 Apr 42, and USFIP Combined G-2 and 

G-3 Rpts, 36-38, 26-28 Apr 42, all in USFIP 

G-3 Journal, 20 Apr-3 May 42, AG 461 (1 Apr 

42) Phil Reds; 14th Army Opns, I, 215. 

27 Rad, Del Monte, no sig, to CG USFIP (20X), 

30 Apr 42, USFIP G-3 Journal, AG 461 (1 Apr 

42) Phil Reds; 14th Army Opns, I, 215. 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

service units. This entire force wa'l under Lt. 

Col. Russell J. Nelson, the Cotabato subsector commander. Half of his men he had 

placed in and around the town; the rest 

were posted farther inland covering Route 1 

and the Mindanao River. 

The men of the Kawaguchi Detachment 

encountered little resistance getting ashore 

at Cotabato, where the demolition teams 

had already completed their work. Their 

advance through the town, however, 

proved more difficult. There they were opposed by the 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry, 

which put up a stubborn resistance until 

enemy aircraft, presumably from Zamboanga, entered the fight. The battalion 

then pulled back to a previously prepared 

position on the outskirts of Cotabato where 

it prepared for an extended stand.28 Events 

beyond its control made this impossible. 

Earlier in the day a portion of the J apanese force which had landed near Parang 

began to push southeast toward the junction of Route 1 and the Cotabato road. At 

about 1530 these Japanese made contact 

with the 3d Battalion, 102d Infantry, which 

was defending the north flank of the Cotabato force. In the engagement that followed, the Filipinos held firm for more than 

three hours, but finally, at 1900, broke contact and withdrew along Route 1, leaving 

the road to Cotabato open. The position of 

.. The account of operations in the CotabatoDavao area is based upon the following reports in 

the Visayan-Mindanao Force Report of Operations: 

Brig Gen Joseph P. Vachon, Cotabato-Davao Force 

Summary of Events, 29 Apr-l0 May 42, pp. 

301-15; Col Nelson, Rpt of Events and Opns, pp. 

318-28; Lt Col Reed Graves, Opns Rpt Digos Sector, 28 Apr-l0 May 42, pp. 343-45; Col Ben-Hur 

Chastaine, Rpt of Opns in Samar-Leyte and 

Agusan Sectors, pp. 163-67; Lt Col John H. McGee, Diary of 10Ist Inf (PA), 30 Apr-II May 42, 

pp. 331-34. The author also used the basic report 

itself, pp. 51-54, and Tarkington, There Were 

Others, pp. 314-419. 

511 

the 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry, which 

had resisted the Japanese advance through 

the town earlier in the day, was now untenable. In danger of being cut off and 

taken from the rear, the battalion reluctantly abandoned its position on the outskirts of Cotabato and pulled back through 

the road junction to Route 1. 

The next day, 30 April, General Kawaguchi began his advance eastward 

toward t1:Ie Sayre Highway and a meeting 

with Colonel Miura's troops. Most of his 

troops moved overland by way of Route 1, 

but Kawaguchi did not neglect the water 

route offered by the Mindanao River. 

Three hundred of his men in armored 

barges took this route, which paralleled 

Route 1 and from which the water-borne 

troops could easily reach that road by trail. 

Both advances were supported by aircraft. 

There was little action during the day. 

Colonel Nelson, the sector commander, received reports on the progress of the two 

Japanese columns but was most concerned 

about the troops sailing up the river. There 

was nothing to prevent this force from disembarking along the river bank and moving 

up one or more of the numerous trails to 

Route 1 to establish a roadblock behind 

Nelson's retreating men. Before the day was 

over, Nelson was receiving reports of just 

such movements, as well as the presence of 

Japanese troops in Pikit, where the Mindanao River crossed Route 1 at a point only 

about eight miles from the Sayre Highway. 

The report that Japanese troops were in 

Pi kit was even more disquieting to Colonel 

Nelson than the reports of hostile landings 

along the banks of the Mindanao River. 

If true, his force was already cut off. He 

decided therefore to move his men away 

from the road and onto the trails leading 

north. By doing so he left himself free to 
512 

accomplish his principal mission, which was 

to protect the routes north of Route 1. The 

decision made, he ordered the destruction 

of roads and bridges and placed small covering forces along the main trails to cover 

his withdrawal. There was nothing to prevent Kawaguchi now from consolidating 

his control of the entire stretch of Route 1 

from Cotabato to Pikit. 

Kawaguchi's rapid advance eastward toward the Sayre Highway, which intersected 

Route 1 at Kabacan, eight miles east of 

Pikit, placed him in an excellent position 

to cut off the escape route of the troops in 

the Digos subs ector. These troops, who were 

retreating westward along Route 1 before 

the Miura Detachment, would have to pass 

through Kabacan before they could make 

their way north along the Sayre Highway. 

If Kawaguchi could reach Kabacan ahead 

of the Filipinos, he might not only cut them 

off but take them from the rear. Indeed, 

the Japanese appear to have anticipated 

this possibility and Colonel Miura's orders 

were to keep the Digos force engaged long 

enough to allow Kawaguchi to reach 

Kabacan.29 

The Digos force had been under pressure 

since the middle of April. Led by Lt. Col. 

Reed Graves, this force consisted of the 101 st 

Field Artillery (P A) , less one battalion, and 

the 2d Battalion, 102d Infantry (P A). By 

the 28th of the month, after a particularly 

heavy attack, it was clear to Colonel Graves 

that the Japanese on his front were about 

to make a major effort. The next morning, 

simultaneously with the landing of the 

Kawaguchi Detachment at Cotabato, Colonel Miura began his advance westward to-

.. This reconstruction of the Japanese plan is 

based upon a statement made by Colonel Miura to 

General Vachon after the surrender. Vachon, 

Cotabato-Davao Force, Summary of Events, in 

V-MF Rpt of Opns, p. 315. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

ward the Sayre Highway, supported by lowflying aircraft from Davao. Graves's troops 

opposed the Japanese advance stubbornly, 

and effectively broke up the initial assault 

with mortar fire. 

Action during the next two days was 

indecisive, and consisted largely of air attacks and patrol actions. On 2 May, Colonel 

Miura again launched a full-scale attack. 

This time he opened with a four-hour artillery and mortar preparation supplemented 

by the strafing attacks of seven dive bombers. When the infantry moved out at 1300 

it had the support of three tanks. Again the 

Japanese were halted and the fight ended 

at 1700 with a victory for the Filipinos. 

Graves's brave stand proved a fruitless 

gesture, for two hours later, at 1900 of the 

2d, he was ordered to withdraw immediately toward the Sayre Highway. The order 

came from the commander of the Cotabato-Davao Sector, Brig. Gen. Joseph P. 

Vachon, who had sent a small force to 

Kabacan to delay the Japanese approaching 

from the west. The Digos force would have 

to make good its escape while there was 

still time. Further resistance, no matter how 

successful, would only increase the peril to 

Colonel Graves and his men. That night 

they began to evacuate the position they had 

held so stubbornly since 28 April. Next day, 

with the 2d Battalion, 102d Infantry, acting as rear guard, the Digos force began 

to march toward Kabacan and the Sayre 

Highway. 

Kabacan now became the focal point of 

the fight in the Cotabato-Davao Sector. 

General Vachon was determined to hold the 

southern terminus of the Sayre Highway as 

long as possible and placed all the troops 

he could muster there. In addition to the 

force he had already sent to delay Kawaguchi's march eastward from Pikit, he di-
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

rected Colonel Graves and the troops of the 

Carmen Ferry subsector to hold the Sayre 

Highway. The Kawaguchi Detachment successfully fought its way to Kabacan, but arrived too late to close the trap on the Digos 

force. All Kawaguchi's efforts to clear the 

Sayre Highway and make his way northward failed. Vachon's troops held firm until 

the end of the campaign a week later. 

Those of General Kawaguchi's men who 

came ashore at Parang on the morning of 

29 April met an entirely different reception 

from that which greeted the men landing at 

Cotabato. Here they were met at the 

beaches by the regulars of the 2d Infantry, 

1 st Division (P A) .30 Under the leadership 

of Col. Calixto Duque, the Filipinos had established strong defensive positions on the 

beach and when the first hostile landing 

parties made their appearance at 0400 of 

the 29th they ran into heavy and effective 

fire from machine guns. 

For more than six hours, until 1100, the 

2d Infantry held its ground. Finally, in danger of being outflanked by a Japanese force 

that had landed a short distance to the 

south, the regiment fell back to a previously 

prepared position about two miles inland. 31 

After sending a small detachment southward to establish contact with the force 

landing at Cotabato, Kawaguchi's men 

moved into the town. By late afternoon they 

had established contact with the southern 

" The 1 st Division (PA) was a part of the regular 

establishment of the Philippine Army. Division 

headquarters and the other two regiments, the 1st 

and 3d, fought on Luzon. The 2d Infantry was 

stationed in the south before the war. Its strength 

was 880 men, but approximately 300 of these were 

sick with malaria when the Japanese attacked. 

31 This aCCount of operations in the Lanao Sector 

is based upon: Tarkington, There Were Others, pp. 

333-40; Col Eugene H. Mitchell, Hist of 61st Inf 

(PA), and Brig Cen Cuy O. Fort, Hist of 81st Division (PA), last two in V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 185-

93,272-85. 

513 

force and were in firm possession of Parang. 

Their next objective was the coastal town 

of Malabang, twenty-two miles to the 

northwest. 

Guarding Malabang was the 61st Infantry (PA), led by Col. Eugene H. Mitchell. 

Alerted by the landings to the south, 

Mitchell had ordered his demolition teams 

to stand by and sent his men into their previously prepared positions along the west 

bank of the Mataling River, just above the 

town. In Malabang, guarding the trail 

which led northwest out of the town past 

the right flank of the Mataling line, was the 

3d Battalion's Company K. To the rear 

were two 2.95-inch mountain guns, manned 

by men of the 81st Field Artillery (PA). 

Rather than march his men along the 

twenty-two mile stretch of Route 1 which 

separated Parang and Malabang, General 

Kawaguchi apparently decided to utilize the 

transports which had brought them to Mindanao. Leaving a small detachment to guard 

the town, he sent his troops back to the 

ships late on the night of the 29th and set 

sail for Malabang. At about 0300 of the 

30th, at a point a few miles south of the 

objective, the Japanese began to land.32 

A half hour later Company K, 61st Infantry, reported that enemy light tanks had 

passed its position. 

Action along the Mataling line opened 

at dawn. Within a few hours, after suffering 

heavy casualties, the Filipinos were forced 

to give way on the left. In danger of having 

his flank turned, Colonel Mitchell reinforced 

the left but was unable to regain the ground 

lost. Finally, at 1400, he ordered the right 

battalion to attack in the hope that he could 

iI2 Japanese sources state that a landing was made 

at 0300 at a point south of Malabang. 14th Army 

Opns, I, 215. The author has made the most reasonable reconstruction possible with the few facts 

available. 
514 

thus relieve the pressure on the left. The attack, though it gained some ground, failed 

in its objective, for the Japanese had brought 

more troops as well as artillery into position 

before the Mataling line. 

The diversionary attack having failed, 

Colonel Mitchell decided to place his entire 

force in the threatened area. To do this he 

had to abandon the right portion of the line 

and call in his reserve. It was a gamble but 

his only alternative was to give up the Mataling line entirely. Orders for the attack 

went out late on the afternoon of the 30th, 

just before the Japanese attacked again. Advance elements of the reserve battalion arrived in time to participate in the fight that 

followed, but the right battalion never received its orders, and at 2000 Colonel 

Mitchell was forced to abandon the Mataling line. 

The route of withdrawal was along Route 

1. With one company as rear guard, the 

right and reserve battalions withdrew in an 

orderly fashion to a new position four miles 

to the north. The left battalion, unable to 

use Route 1, withdrew by a circuitous route 

along a back trail and did not join the rest 

of the regiment until the next afternoon. 

Save for patrol and rear guard action there 

was no fighting that night. 

The Japanese attacked Colonel Mitchell's 

new position at 0730 the next day, 1 May. 

Again they struck at the flank of the Filipino line and at 1030 Mitchell was forced 

to order a second withdrawal. This time he 

fell back five miles. In the confusion one 

company was cut off, but Colonel Mitchell 

was compensated for this loss by the addition of two companies of the 1st Battalion 

of the 84th Provisional Infantry Regiment, 

which joined him when he reached his new 

position. Later in the day the 120 survivors 

of the battalion which had withdrawn from 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

the Mataling line along a back trail straggled into camp, and with this force Colonel 

Mitchell began to prepare for the next attack. His orders from the sector commander, 

Brig. Gen. Guy O. Fort, were to hold his 

position at all cost. 

The Japanese, who had lost contact with 

the retreating Filipinos during the morning, 

reached the new line at about 1300. While 

their infantry prepared for the attack, they 

kept the Filipinos pinned down with artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. At 

dusk, the volume of Japanese fire increased 

and, shortly after, the infantry moved out 

in a full-scale attack. Within a short time 

they had overrun Colonel Mitchell's defenses and were threatening his command 

post. By 2300, when the Japanese called off 

the attack, the defending force had practically disappeared. 

Rounding up all the men he could find, 

altogether about thirty, Mitchell made his 

way to the rear. At about 0230 he encountered a detachment of sixty men from the 

81st Division (PA) on the road and began 

to establish a holding position. The men had 

just set to work when they were struck by a 

Japanese motorized column which scattered 

the tired and dispirited men. Colonel 

Mitchell's luck had run out. Twice he had 

escaped the Japanese, but this time he was 

captured. With the rout of the 61st Infantry 

and the capture of its commander, the J apanese gained control of all of Route 1 as far 

north as Lake Lanao. 

Only one regiment of the Lanao force, 

Lt. Col. Robert H. Vesey's 73d Infantry 

(P A), was still intact. With two battalions 

in the vicinity of Lake Lanao and the third 

on beach defense to the north, this regiment 

stood directly in the path of Kawaguchi's 

advance. At the first news that the enemy 

was approaching, Colonel Vesey set out for 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

Ganassi at the southwest corner of the lake 

to meet him. Here a secondary road 

branched off to circle the east shore while 

Route 1 continued northward along the 

west side of the lake. By holding this town, 

Vesey believed, he could prevent the J apanese from gaining access to either road. A 

preliminary skirmish at Ganassi on the 

morning of 2 May convinced him that the 

town was not defensible and that afternoon he withdrew to Bacolod on the west 

shore of Lake Lanao to make his stand. The 

Japanese promptly sent a small force along 

the east road, but it presented no immediate 

threat to the defenders at Bacolod. 

The line finally established at Bacolod 

by Colonel Vesey extended from Lake 

Lanao across Route 1 and was held by the 

two battalions of the 73d Infantry reinforced with stragglers from the 61st Infantry. Along the front was a narrow stream 

which flowed under a bridge across Route 

1 to empty into the lake. As an added precaution, the bridge was destroyed as soon 

as the troops were in position. Additional 

protection was afforded the troops on the 

far side of the stream, opposite the demolished bridge, by a 2.95-inch mountain 

gun. 

The Japanese who had reached Ganassi 

early on the morning of 2 May had halted 

to await the arrival of the rest of the force 

which moved up during the day. Early the 

next morning the entire force, with light 

tanks in the lead, advanced north along 

Route 1. By 0800 the tanks had reached 

the destroyed bridge in front of the 73d Infantry line and halted. One tank sought to 

cross the shallow stream but was hit by a 

shell from the 2.95-inch mountain gun and 

knocked out. The others made no further 

effort to cross. With Route 1 blocked, the 

5-15 

rest of the Japanese column came to an 

abrupt halt and the troops poured out of the 

trucks. Before they could deploy and take 

cover, they were hit by withering fire from 

the far side of the stream, "which made up 

in its concentration at point-blank range 

what it lacked in accuracy." 33 The toll on 

the Japanese side was heavy. 

Despite this first setback the men of the 

Kawaguchi Detachment continued to press 

forward. Soon they had the support of artillery and a single plane, which alternately 

attacked and observed the 73d Infantry position. Unable to make any headway by 

frontal assault, the Japanese sought to turn 

the enemy's flanks. Their efforts proved successful before the morning was out and 

shortly after noon Colonel Vesey gave the 

order to withdraw. 

The record of the 73d Infantry for the 

rest of that day, 3 May, is one of successive 

withdrawals. Each time Colonel Vesey put 

his two battalions into position, the Japanese 

broke through. So closely did the enemy 

motorized column pursue the Filipinos that 

they scarcely had time to organize their defenses. By midnight Vesey had taken his 

men back in the hills north of Lake Lanao, 

where he paused to reorganize his scattered 

forces. The Japanese made no effort to follow. The victory was theirs and the road 

along the north shore lay open. 

Between 29 April and 3 May, General 

Kawaguchi with a force of 4,852 men and 

some assistance from the Miura Detachment had gained control of southern and 

western Mindanao. Only in the north, in 

the Cagayan Sector, were the Filipinos still 

strong enough to offer organized resistance. 

But already on the morning of 3 May, the 

third of the forces General Homma had as-

.. Tarkington, There Were Others, p. 338. 
516 

signed to the Mindanao operation, the 

Kawamura Detachment, had begun to land 

along the shore of Macajalar Bay. 

The Cagayan Sector 

In the critical Cagayan Sector, which included the northern terminus of the Sayre 

Highway and the vital Del Monte Airfield, 

General Sharp had the Mindanao Force 

reserve, none of which had yet been committed, and the 102d Division (P A). This 

division, formed from existing and provisional units after the outbreak of war, consisted of the 61st and 81st Field Artillery, 

organized and equipped as infantry, and the 

103d Infantry. Col. William P. Morse, the 

division and sector commander, believing 

that an attack in his sector would most likely 

come from the sea and have for its objective the seizure of the Sayre Highway, had 

posted his troops along Macajalar Bay, between the Tagoloan and Cagayan Rivers. 

Holding the four miles of coast line from 

the Tagoloan west to the Sayre Highway 

was Lt. Col. John P. Woodbridge'S 81st 

Field Artillery and a 65-man detachment 

from the 30th Bomb Squadron (US). The 

stretch of coast line from the highway to the 

Cugman River, equal in length to that held 

by Colonel Woodbridge, was defended by 

the 61 st Field Artillery under Col. Hiram 

W. Tarkington. On the left (west), extending the line to the Cagayan River, was Maj. 

Joseph R. Webb's 103d Infantry.34 

.. The account of operations in the Cagayan Sector is based upon: V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 54-61; 

Col Morse, Rcd of Action and Events, in V-MF Rpt 

of Opns, pp. 349-54; Tarkington, There Were 

Others, Ch. XV. Detailed accounts of the action of 

specific units in V-MF Rpt of Opns are as follows: 

Maj Paul D. PhiIIips, Hist of 2.95 Gun Det, pp. 

176-84; Woodbridge, Narrative Activities of 81 st 

FA, 3-10 May 42, pp. 229-34; Tarkington, Narrative of Action of 61st FA, 3-10 May 42, pp. 235-

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

First warning of the approach of the 

enemy reached General Sharp's headquarters on the afternoon of 2 May when a 

reconnaissance plane sighted the convoy 

carrying the Kawamura Detachment north 

of Macajalar Bay. The troops on beach defense were immediately alerted, and that 

night, after the convoy had entered the bay, 

the demolition plan was put into effect. 

Shortly after, about 0100 of the 3d, the 

Japanese troops began coming ashore at 

both extremities of the line, at Cagayan and 

at the mouth of the Tagoloan River. Supported by fire from two destroyers offshore, 

the Japanese by dawn had secured a firm 

hold of the beach line between the T agoloan 

and the Sayre Highway. 

Those of Kawamura's men who came 

ashore in the vicinity of Cagayan met a 

warm reception. Unable to prevent the 

enemy from landing, Major Webb attacked 

the beachhead with two companies. So successful was the attack that only the withdrawal of the 61st Field Artillery on his 

right prevented him, Webb believed, from 

driving the enemy back into the sea. With 

his right flank exposed, Webb was forced 

to break off the engagement and pull his 

men back. 

Meanwhile General Sharp had sent additional troops to hold the Sayre Highway. 

Up until now he had refused to commit his 

reserve. But with half of Mindanao in enemy 

hands and with the Japanese landing more 

troops within a dozen miles of his headquarters, he decided that the time had come to 

throw all available troops into the fight. 

Closest to the scene of action was a detach42; Lt Col AIIen Thayer, 62d Inf (PA), pp. 248-

51; Maj John C. Goldtrap, Narrative of Events 

93d Inf, pp. 252-66; Webb, Mindanao Campaign 

of 103d Inf, pp. 287-94; Maj AIIen L. Peck, initialed memo dealing with opns of Cos C and E, 

43d Inf (PS), 29 Apr-9 May 42, pp. 381-87. 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

ment under Maj. Paul D. Phillips, armed 

with three 2.95-inch guns, all that remained 

of the artillery in the Mindanao Force. Farther to the rear were the 62d and 93d Infantry (P A). Sharp ordered all three units 

to move up to the line. Pending the arrival 

of the two regiments, Phillips' detachment 

was to take up a position behind a deep 

crater on the Sayre Highway and block any 

Japanese attempt to advance south. When 

it was joined later in the day by the 62d 

and 93d Infantry Sharp would have a 

strong line, supported by artillery, in the 

path of the Japanese. 

Major Phillips' detachment had hardly 

set up its guns when, at 0730, it came under 

fire from the Japanese advancing along the 

Sayre Highway. In the initial attack the detachment was forced back about 700 yards. 

Fortunately, the Japanese failed to press 

their advantage and Phillips was able to organize another holding position at his new 

location. He was joined here early in the 

afternoon by advance elements of the 93d 

Infantry; the rest of that regiment when it 

reached the area prepared a second position 

a short distance to the south. The 62d Infantry, whose assembly area was farther 

south on the Sayre Highway, failed to join 

the other two units that day. 

To General Sharp "events seemed to be 

moving satisfactorily." 85 Although the enemy controlled the beaches and the northern terminus of the Sayre Highway, his own 

troops had disengaged without loss and were 

in position along a secondary line of defense. Already part of his reserves were 

blocking the highway and other troops were 

moving up to their support. So optimistic 

was the general that he set his staff to work 

on a plan to counterattack north along the 

highway next morning. 

so V-MF Rpt of Opns, p. 56. 

517 

The optimism at force headquarters was 

quickly dissipated when reports of Japanese 

progress during the day began to come in. 

The enemy, it was learned, had pushed 

back the 61st and 81st Field Artillery. The 

103d Infantry had resisted more stoutly but 

was also falling back and in danger of being 

outflanked. General Sharp'S hopes for a 

counterattack were dealt the final blow 

when, at 1600, Colonel Morse ordered a 

general withdrawal to defensive positions 

astride the Sayre Highway, about six miles 

south of the beach. The move was to be 

made that night under cover of darkness. 

Before this plan could be put into effect 

it was changed by General Sharp, who, 

after a conference with Morse, Woodbridge, 

and Webb, decided to establish his next line 

even farther south than the line already 

selected. The position selected paralleled 

the Mangima Canyon, a formidable natural 

barrier east of the town of Tankulan, and 

the Mangima River. At Tankulan the Sayre 

Highway splits, one branch continuing 

south then east, the other east then south. 

Before the two join, eight air miles east of 

Tankulan, they form a rough circle bisected 

from north to south by the Mangima 

Canyon and River. East of the junction of 

the canyon and the upper road lies the town 

of Dalirig; to the south the river cuts across 

the lower road before Puntian. Possession 

of these two towns would enable the defenders to block all movement down the 

Sayre Highway to central Mindanao. 

At 2300, 3 May, General Sharp issued 

orders for the withdrawal to the Mangima 

line. The right (north) half of the line, the 

Dalirig Sector, was to be held by the 102d 

Division which had been reorganized and 

now consisted of the 62d Infantry, the 81st 

Field Artillery, the 2.95-inch gun detachment, and the two Philippine Scout com-
518 

panies of the 43d Infantry from force 

reserve. The Puntian Sector would be held 

by the 61st Field Artillery and the 93d 

Infantry. Colonel Morse would command 

the troops in Dalirigj Col. William F. 

Dalton, those before Puntian. The 103d 

Infantry, cut off by the Japanese advance 

was made a separate force and assigned the 

mission of defending the Cagayan River 

valley. 

The withdrawal was completed on the 

morning of 4 May when all units reached 

their designated positions. The remainder 

of that day as well as the next, during which 

time the Japanese limited themselves to 

aerial reconnaissance and bombardment, 

was spent in organizing the line. In the 

Dalirig Sector, Lt. Col. Allen Thayer's 62d 

Infantry, closely supported by the 2.95-inch 

gun detachment, occupied the main line of 

resistance along the east wall of Mangima 

Canyon. Companies C and E, 43d Infantry 

(PS), Colonel Morse's reserve, were stationed in Dalirig, and in a draw 500 yards 

behind the town were the 200 men of the 

81st Field Artillery, which had had a 

strength of 1,000 when the Japanese landed. 

Colonel Dalton, with two regiments, used 

the lull in battle similarly to dig in before 

Puntian. 

On the morning of 6 May the Japanese 

resumed the attack. Their approach toward 

Tankulan was reported by patrols of the 62d 

Infantry which for the past two days had 

moved freely in and around the town. During the morning advance elements of the 

Kawamura Detachment passed through 

Tankulan and began to advance along the 

upper road toward Dalirig. Late that afternoon the Japanese moved into Tankulan in 

force and began to register their artillery 

on Dalirig. 

There was little action the next day. JapTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

anese artillery, well out of range of Major 

Phillips' 2.95-inch guns, dropped their 

shells accurately into the 62d Infantry line 

while their aircraft bombed and strafed gun 

positions and troops. The left battalion suffered most from the bombardment and Colonel Thayer finally had to send in his reserve battalion to bolster the line. 

The artillery and air attacks continued 

until the evening of the 8th when, at 1900, 

General Kawamura sent his infantry into 

action. In the darkness many of the Japanese were able to infiltrate the Filipino line 

where they created considerable confusion. 

During the height of the confusion two platoons mysteriously received orders to withdraw and promptly pulled out of the line. 

Their march to the rear came as a complete 

surprise to company, battalion, and regimental headquarters, none of which had 

issued the order. The two platoons were 

quickly halted, but before they could return 

to the front they were attacked by a small 

force of Japanese infiltrators. Other 62d Infantry troops joined the fight but in the 

darkness it was impossible to distinguish between friend and foe. It was only after the 

personal intervention of Colonel Thayer 

that the Filipinos, whose fire was doing more 

to panic the men on the line than the efforts 

of the enemy, were persuaded to cease fire. 

The action continued through the night 

of 8-9 May. The 62d Infantry held on as 

long as possible but by morning the tired 

and disorganized Filipinos had been pushed 

off the main line of resistance and were falling back on Dalirig. Already the 2.95-inch 

gun detachment had pulled out, leaving 

only the two Scout companies of the 43d 

Infantry to face the enemy. 

In the Puntian Sector the Japanese were 

content to keep Colonel Dalton's troops in 

place by artillery fire. Until the night of 8-9 
THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 

May, Dalton had been able to maintain contact with the 62d Infantry on his right 

(north) but during the confusion which 

marked the fighting that night he lost contact. In an effort to relieve the pressure on 

Thayer's regiment he launched his own attack the next morning. Though the attack 

was successful it failed to achieve its pur-' 

pose, for the disorganized 62d Infantry was 

already in full retreat. 

Undeterred by Colonel Dalton's gains in 

front of Puntian, General Kawamura continued to press his advantage in the north. 

At about 1130 of the 9th, as the 62d Infantry began to withdraw through Dalirig, 

his men entered the town from three sides 

and struck the retreating Filipinos. Already 

disorganized, the troops of the 62d Infantry 

scattered in all directions. The two Scout 

companies in the town, under the leadership 

of Maj. Allen L. Peck, made a brave stand 

but finally withdrew just before their positions were encircled. 

The escape route of the fleeing troops lay 

oVer flat, open country, devoid of cover. 

Pursued by small-arms and artillery fire and 

strafed by low-flying aircraft, the retreating 

units lost all semblance of organization. 

Each man sought whatever protection he 

could find, discarding his equipment when it 

impeded his progress. What had begun as a 

withdrawal ended in a complete rout, and 

by the end of the day the Dalirig force had 

519 

virtually ceased to exist. Except for 150 survivors of the 2.95-inch gun detachment in 

position five miles east of Dalirig, the upper 

branch of the Sayre Highway lay open to 

the invaders. 

Along the southern branch of the highway Colonel Dalton and his two regiments 

still held firm at Puntian. But already Kawamura was sending additional troops to this 

sector and increasing the pressure against 

the Puntian force. Whether Dalton would 

be able to hold was doubtful, but even if he 

did his position was untenable. The enemy 

could sweep around his north flank from the 

direction of Dalirig or take him from the 

rear by continuing along the upper road to 

its junction with the lower road, then turning back toward Puntian. There was no 

way out. 

Whatever consolation General Sharp derived from the fact that the Puntian force 

was still intact was tempered by the bitter 

realization that the Mangima line had been 

breached and the bulk of his force destroyed. 

"North front in full retreat," he radioed 

General MacArthur. "Enemy comes 

through right flank. Nothing further can be 

done. May sign off any time now." 36 Except for the resistance of scattered units, the 

Japanese campaign in Mindanao was over. 

36 Rad, Sharp to MacArthur, 9 May 42, GHQ 

SWPA G-3 Journal, P.1. Opns Rpts. 
CHAPTER XXIX 

Japanese Plans and American 

Defenses 

While the Japanese were extending their 

control over Mindanao and the islands of 

the Visayas they were making final preparations to take Corregidor and bring to an end 

the long campaign in the Philippines. With 

the southern tip of Bataan in their possession 

they could no'w emplace artillery on the 

heights of the Mariveles Mountains and 

along the shore near Cabcaben, only two 

miles across the channel from Corregidor. 

Once the antiaircraft batteries had been 

knocked out by the artillery, their aircraft 

would be able to fly low over the island and 

drop their bombs with greater accuracy than 

had been possible before, Such an aerialartillery bombardment, the Japanese beCovolry Pt. Jom.s Rovlne 

! Infonlry PI 

REA VY CLOUDS OVER CORREGIDOR. "With the southern tip of Bataan in 

their possession they could now emplace artillery on the heights of the M ariveles 

1\.1ountains and alan!!, the shore near C abcahen, onlV two miles across the channel 

from Corregidor." Arrows indicate planned Japanese landings. 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 521 

lieved, would result in the destruction of the 

formidable defenses of the Gibraltar of the 

East and prepare the way for a landing. 

The most optimistic American estimates, 

once Bataan had fallen, did not give Corregidor much chance of holding out long 

against a determined Japanese effort to take 

the island. There was only enough food to 

last the Americans and Filipinos from six to 

eight weeks at most. At the end of that time, 

even if the Japanese did not attack, the 

garrison would have to surrender. Despite 

General Wainwright's brave pledge "to hold 

my present position with God's help until a 

major diversion releases the pressure on us 

here," it was clear that Corregidor was 

doomed. 1 "The life of this fortress," predicted MacArthur after the fall of Bataan, 

"is definitely limited and its destruction certain unless sea communication can be restored." If this could not be accomplished, 

he told the Chief of Staff, "you must be prepared for the fall of the harbor defenses." 2 

The] apanese Plan 

General MacArthur's view was fully 

shared by General Homma. With the surrender of Bataan he was free to begin the 

final phase of his four-month-Iong campaign 

to defeat the combined American and Philippine army. That such an offensive would 

have to be made was evident almost immediately. The Americans and Filipinos on 

Corregidor showed no disposition to surrender with the Bataan garrison; indeed, they 

continued to resist with grim tenacity. 

"Though almost all enemy resistance on Ba1 Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 218, 13 

Apr 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 228, 13 Apr 

42, AG 384.3, GHQ SWPA. 

taan peninsula collapsed by April 9th," the 

Japanese reported regretfully, "the enemy 

in the Corregidor Fortress did not abandon 

its will to fight. Therefore the Army decided 

to attack .... " 3 

Preliminary Plans and Preparations 

Plans for the assault against Corregidor 

began to take shape on 9 April, but it was 

not until the end of the month that these 

plans assumed final form. Troops, landing 

boats, and equipment had to be assembled. 

Provision had to be made for the administration of the area already occupied and for 

the mop-up of isolated centers of resistance. 

The men who had fought on Bataan had to 

be rested, re-equipped, and trained for amphibious operations. But General Homma 

did not intend to waste any time. While 

these necessary measures were being taken, 

the air and artillery attacks against Corregidor would be intensified, and its defenses 

knocked out to prepare the way for the 

landing to come. 4 

The first major question to be decided 

was the selection of the unit to make the 

assault. Before 9 April it had been generally 

understood by the 14th Army staff and by 

some of the senior commanders on Bataan 

that, if operations against Corregidor proved 

necessary, the Nagano Detachment would 

make the attack. "Lt. Gen. Homma, though 

informally, often declared this," wrote Col. 

Motohiko Yoshida, 4th Division chief of 

staff, "even before the commencement of 

3 14th Army Opns, I, 174. 

4 This description of Japanese plans and preparations is based upon: 14th Army Opns, 1,173-210; 

II, Annexes 7-12; 5th Air Gp Opns, pp. 78-84; 

USA vs. Homma, pp. 3089-94, 3178-79, testimony 

of Homma, p. 2635-63, testimony of Gen Kitajima, 

Arty Officer, 14th Army. 
522 

the attack on Bataan." 5 It was with considerable surprise, therefore, that the 4th 

Division staff learned unofficially from Col. 

Motoo Nakayama, Homma's senior operations officer, on 9 April, that their division 

had been chosen instead. That day 14th 

Army orders directed the 4th Division to 

advance toward Mariveles and, after routing the enemy to its front, "make preparations to land on Corregidor Island." 6 This 

was the first time, asserted Yoshida, that 

the division staff "began to deliberate on 

the matter." 7 

While the 4th Division staff was deliberating "on the matter," 14th Army, in a 

series of orders issued between 9 and 13 

April, outlined the basic plan and defined 

for its major elements their role in the forthcoming campaign. The 4th Division was 

officially designated as the assault unit and 

was reinforced with the 7 th Tank Regiment 

and additional artillery taken from the 16th 

Division. It was ordered to assemble its main 

force in the area north of Cabcaben and 

there make preparations for the coming attack while taking all precautions to insure 

secrecy and provide defense against artillery 

fire from Corregidor. The division was to 

send patrols to Cabcaben and along the 

coast to the south to reconnoiter "the enemy 

situation and topography," and to train for 

landing operations, removal of beach obstacles, and climbing cliffs such as would be 

found at the target. 8 

• Statement of Col Yoshida, 28 J ul 49, A TIS Doc 

62642, Statements of Japanese Officials on World 

War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 55!. 

6 14th Army Opns, I, 170. 

7 Statement of Yoshida, 28 Jul 49, ATIS Doc 

62642, Statements of Japanesc Officials on World 

War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 55!. 

• Statement of Lt Col Hiromi Oishi, 4th Div 

Staff,2 Oct 50, A TIS Doc 62639, ibid., III, 115. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

To the 16th Division Homma assigned 

the mission of executing a feint attack 

against El Fraile and Carabao Islands from 

the Cavite shore. Before leaving for southern Luzon, General Morioka was to turn 

over to the 4th Division one attached battalion of mountain artillery; to Army artillery one attached battery of 150-mm. howitzers and the 22d Field Artillery Regiment, 

less elements; and to Army one regiment to 

guard the west coast of Bataan. The 65th 

Brigade and the Nagano Detachment were 

ordered to north and central Luzon for garrison duty; they would have no part in the 

operations against Corregidor. 

The air force and the Army artillery were 

given a major role in the preliminary stages 

of the projected campaign. The 22d Air 

Brigade was to suspend large-scale bombing 

operations for a two-week period in order to 

repair its planes and make ready for the intensive bombardment which would precede 

the landings. Army air operations during 

these weeks would consist of daily reconnaissance missions over Corregidor and the adjoining islands and harassing raids to "demoralize enemy troop on Corregidor Island 

and shell warships and ships in the area." 9 

Navy land-based, twin-engine bombers 

would continue to bomb Corregidor during 

this period. 

General Kitajima's 14th Army artillery 

had perhaps the most important task, after 

the infantry, in the reduction of Corregidor. 

It was to neutralize the enemy's guns, destroy the installations on the island, sink 

vessels in the bay, and "simultaneously cooperate in the landing operations." 10 The 

first objectives were to be the antiaircraft 

9 14th Army Opns, I, 174. 

10 Ibid., 170. 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 523 

guns, short-range batteries, and the "flank 

defenses" at each end of the island. Kitajima was to bring all his guns to southern 

Bataan, to the vicinity of Cabcaben and the 

high ground just north of Mariveles, with 

the greatest secrecy. There the guns were to 

be dispersed and placed under the ample 

concealment provided by the jungle for protection against counterbattery fire. Provision 

would also be made, 14th Army directed, 

for diversionary fire to deceive the enemy as 

to the time and place of landing. To support the 16th Division in its feint attack 

against El Fraile and Carabao, one battery 

of heavy guns located near Ternate was ordered to cooperate with the division and 

shell these islands to heighten the impression 

of an attack from the Cavite shore. 

Kitajima received strong reinforcements 

for the operation. Between 9 and 13 April 

14th Army assigned to him additional batteries of 150- and lO5-mm. howitzers, most 

of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment, and, 

somewhat later, the 4th Division's artillery 

regiment. When the full-scale bombardment 

of Corregidor began, Kita jima had under 

his command eighteen batteries, a balloon 

company, an artillery intelligence regiment, 

and a company of prime movers." The 

eighteen batteries consisted of 116 field 

pieces, ranging in size from 75-mm. guns to 

240-mm. howitzers. In detail, this armament included: 12 

11 Ibid., 178. A balloon company consisted of about 

ISO men, 25 vehicles, and 1 observation balloon. 

The artillery intelligence .regiment was a sound and 

flash unit, consisting of a headquarters group, a survey unit, a plotting unit with nine plotting stations 

and a sound detector unit with six listening posts. 

The regiment was commanded by a lieutenant 

colonel and had about 675 men. Handbook of 

Japanese Military Forces, TM-E-30-480, IS Sep 

44, p. 47. 

12 USA us. Homma, p. 2651, testimony of 

Kitajima. 

240-mm. howitzerL_______________ 10 

l50-mm. guns-___________________ 10 

howitzerL_______________ 36 

105-mm.guns____________________ 16 

howitzers-_______________ 12 

75-mm. guns-___________________ 32 

Total_____________________ 116 

In drawing up final plans for the assault, 

General Homma encountered two serious 

problems, neither of which had apparently 

been anticipated. The first of these was to 

bring into Manila Bay the landing craft 

required to transport the 4th Division to 

Corregidor and to protect the invasion force 

during the shore-to-shore movement. The 

bulk of 14th Army's craft was located in 

Lingayen Gulf or at Olongapo on the Subic 

Bay (west) side of Bataan. "I had to bring 

down the landing boats from Lingayen," 

Homma later explained, "but it could not 

be done by land, so they must come by 

sea." 13 To get them into Manila Bay would 

require a hazardous journey through the 

North Channel under the guns of Corregidor and within striking distance of the 

PT boats. During daylight boats in the 

channel could be plainly seen from Corregidor; at night, if there were many boats, 

the noise of their engines would be sure to 

be heard. 

While 14th Army was studying the problem of assembling its landing craft in Manila 

Bay, the Navy undertook to send two of its 

small boats through the North Channel between Corregidor and Mariveles in broad 

daylight. They got as far as Mariveles when 

the guns on Corregidor opened fire. Badly 

damaged, they fled to safer waters. The 

Navy's effort, which Homma called "very 

indiscreet," alerted the Americans to the 

Japanese plan and forced the Japanese to 

,.. Ibid., p. 3089, testimony of Homma. 
524 

be very cautious about bringing the Army's 

landing boats through the channel.14 

On 14 April the Army conducted its own 

test to determine whether small boats could 

enter Manila Bay through North Channel. 

The trial run was made at night with about 

a half -dozen vessels and was accompanied 

by air and artillery attacks to drown out the 

noise of the engines and divert the attention 

of the Corregidor garrison. The test proved 

successful and Homma decided to bring the 

bulk of the small craft at Lingayen, Nasugbu, and Olongapo into Manila Bay and 

thence to Cavite to be outfitted and trained. 

The next day he ordered the 21 st I ndependent Engineer Regiment, based at Manila 

and Olongapo, to supervise the transfer of 

the landing boats into the bay. The 4th 

Division, Arm;, artillery, and the 22d Air 

Brigade were to cover the movement. 

Starting on the night of the 15th, the 

small boats began to enter Manila Bay. 

During the next week about forty landing 

barges came in by sea and twenty more of 

a smaller type were transported overland 

from Olongapo to Orani on the Manila 

Bay side of Bataan. Armored boats, gunboats, and fishing boats also slipped through 

the channel and made their way to Cavite. 

But the operation was a slow one since only 

a small number of boats could get through 

each night, and it was not until early May 

that all the craft needed had been assembled. 

The second major problem that faced the 

planners-and for a time placed the entire 

operation in jeopardy-was the outbreak of 

malaria in the 4th Division. The shortage of 

medical supplies and food had plagued General Homma throughout the campaign, and 

even before the 3 April attack he had had 

15,500 men in the hospitals. After the fall 

'" Ibid., p. 3090, testimony of Homma. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

of Bataan, when the troops entered the low, 

malaria-infested river valleys in the southern part of the peninsula, the sick rate rose 

sharply. Of the 30,600 patients in Japanese 

hospitals during the month of April, 28,000 

were malaria victims.15 The 4th Division 

was hardest hit, and when, about the middle 

of April, one of its regiments reported for 

training in amphibious operations it numbered only 250 men. At one time the strength 

of the division dropped to one third of normal. General Homma importuned his superiors for quinine and additional hospital 

facilities and finally received 300,000 quinine tablets by air at the end of the month. 

With this supply the malaria epidemic was 

brought under control just in time to meet 

the scheduled date for the assault. 

The Plan 

By 17 April the preliminary phase of the 

planning had been completed, ten days later 

the plan itself was ready, and on 28 Aprii 

14th Army published the field order for the 

attack. It was not until 2 May that the date 

for the assault was finally released to the 

troops. 

The delay in releasing the date of the 

attack was due in part to security. But even 

if Homma had wished, he could not have 

fixed the time much earlier. First, there had 

been difficulty in assembling the landing 

craft, and then had come the outbreak of 

malaria in the 4th Division. Despite pressure from Imperial General Headquarters in 

Tokyo and despite his own desire for an 

early end to the campaign, Homma had 

been forced to defer the attack several times. 

On 9 April he had been optimistic and 

boasted to Colonel Collier, the only Ameri15 Ibid., pp. 2845--47, testimony of Col Shusuke 

Horiguchi, Med Officer, 14th Army. 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 525 

can officer to whom he spoke after the surrender, that he would have Corregidor 

"within a week." 16 He soon revised this estimate and set his sights first on 25 and then 

27 April. But it was not until the malaria 

epidemic had been checked and the required 

number of landing craft assembled in Manila Bay that Homma could fix with confidence the date for the start of operations. 

That time did not come until the beginning 

of May and it was then that 14th Army 

designated 5 Mayas the X Day of the plans 

published earlier.l1 

In planning for the assault against Corregidor, the Japanese had the advantage of 

a precise and detailed knowledge of the target, gained possibly from prisoners of war. 

They knew the designation and strength of 

the four artillery regiments in the harbor defense, the position and armament of all but 

two of the major seacoast batteries, as well 

as the location of most of the smaller guns 

and of all important installations. They had 

considerable information on the island's 

water supply, communications system, road 

and rail nets, power plants, storage areas, 

and barracks. Their maps were almost as 

detailed as those llsed by the Americans. 

Information on the infantry defenses of 

the island was not as detailed and accurate 

as that on the artillery. In their estimates 

,. Collier, Notebooks, IV, 20. Collier, who had 

gone forward with a Japanese officer on 9 April to 

carry the news of the surrender to General Funk, 

had been taken to 14th Army headquarters later 

and there met General Homma. 

17 USA vs. Homma, pp. 2465-67, 3081-82, testimony of Homma; interv, Col Walter E. Buchly 

with Homma, Manila, Mar 46; Drake, Comments 

on Draft MS, Comment 17, OCMH; Statement of 

Maj Kiyoshi Onuma, 4th Div Staff, 8 Aug 49, 

ATIS Doc 62640, Statements of Japanese Officials 

on World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, III, 

157. "I remember," said Onuma, "that it took 

until about 1 or 2 May to bring landing craft to 

Manila Bay." 

the Japanese assumed the existence of an 

infantry defense in depth. In front of the 

beach obstacles they believed they would 

encounter the first line, protected on the 

flanks by light artillery. The main line they 

placed behind the obstacles, with a third 

line, heavily protected with artillery and 

machine guns "to the rear." This last line, 

the Japanese noted, would be defended "at 

all cost." 18 

Though their intelligence about Corregidor was amazingly full and correct, the 

Japanese had little information about 

Malinta Tunnel. They knew of its existence, 

and during the campaign acquired much 

vague information about it. The more they 

heard about it, the more obsessed they became with the entire subject of tunnels. 

Before the Bataan campaign was over, many 

Japanese seem to have become convinced 

that the Americans had constructed a tunnel 

from Corregidor to Bataan. They questioned officers captured on Bataan in an 

effort to find the secret entrance on the 

Bataan side and refused to believe their 

captives, who insistently denied the existence of such a tunnel. It was with reluctance 

that they abandoned the notion of a secret 

tunneP~ 

The plan finally evolved for the landings 

called for a closely co-ordinated artillery-air 

preparation, followed by "a sudden blow" 

consisting of two separate amphibious infantry-tank assaults made on successive 

nights at opposite ends of the island by the 

4th Division. Both forces would drive inland 

until they joined at a point just west of the 

,. 14th Army Opns, II, 72. 

,. Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 26; interv, Col 

Buchly with Homma, Manila, Mar 46. General 

Drake states that even after they took Corregidor, 

the Japanese were seeking the entrance on the 

Corregidor side of the tunnel. Drake, Comments 

on Draft MS, Comment 18, OCMH. 
526 

narrow neck of the tadpole. If all went well, 

Corregidor would be in Japanese hands on 

the second day of the attack, after which 

the 4th Division would occupy Caballo. EI 

Fraile and Carabao Islands would be seized 

next, if necessary by elements of the 16th 

Division from Cavite. 

The tactical scheme had not been settled 

without debate. The 14th Army planners 

had first contemplated only one landing on 

Corregidor, on the head of the tadpole, and 

had relayed this decision to the 4th Division 

staff. Reconnaissance by the division soon 

disclosed that the area selected faced the 

precipitous cliffs which dropped from Topside to the water's edge. A landing here 

would be difficult and dangerous, and the 

division staff argued that the initial landing 

should be made by a small force along the 

tail of the island where the ground was low 

and flat. Once a foothold was secured, then 

the main force could land on the head. 

Though two landings would create difficulties, the division staff felt that these would 

be offset by the early seizure of a beachhead 

and the support the main force would have 

from the initial landing party. The army 

planners finally agreed to this solution, and 

it became a part of the final plan. 20 

For the operation 14th Army attached to 

Kitano's 4th Division two sea operation 

units, each consisting of an independent engineer regiment with attached elements. 

The 1st Sea Operation Unit (23d Independent Engineer Regiment) was to transport the assault force and to assist in the 

landing. It numbered about 110 small boats 

of various types, equipped with heavy machine guns. The 2d Sea Operation Unit, 

2. Statement of Oishi, 2 Oct 50, A TIS Doc 

62639, Statements of Japanese Officials on World 

War II, GHQ FEe, Mil Intel Sec, III, 115. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

whose mission was to protect the amphibious force during the shore-to-shore movement and during the landing, was composed 

of most of the 21st Independent Engineer 

Regiment, elements of the 3d Sea Operation Unit, almost two battalions of light artillery, an antitank company and an antiaircraft artillery section. It was organized 

into eleven gunboat units, each consisting 

of two to four gunboats or fishing boats 

equipped with machine guns, automatic 

guns, and light artillery. 

While the 4th Division and its attached 

elements were preparing for the assault, the 

artillery would continue the bombardment 

begun on 10 April. Except for counterbattery fire and "inevitable operations," artillery action during the month of April was 

to be kept at a minimum in order to conserve ammunition. Thereafter, until the 

landings, all the guns in 14th Army artillery 

would be brought to bear against Corregidor. The seacoast batteries still in operation 

on Corregidor would be "annihilated," antiaircraft guns and searchlights knocked out, 

and defensive installations, short-range 

cannons, and beach obstacles in the landing 

areas demolished. 

Throughout the entire period of preparation the fire of the artillery was to be coordinated with air operations. During April 

only one squadron of Army bombers and 

some Navy land-based bombers would attack Corregidor, concentrating on key objectives such as antiaircraft and artillery 

positions. Other aircraft would fly reconnaissance missions over Manila Bay and the 

fortified islands during this period to secure 

information about the enemy and to gather 

target data for the artillery. After 29 April 

the rest of the 22d Air Brigade would join in 

the attack against the island and enemy 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 527 

shipping, giving special attention to targets 

on the north shore, from Cavalry to Morrison Points. 

In the belief that the Corregidor garrison 

might surrender during the course of the 

operation, 14th Army issued detailed instructions "for the reception of truce-flag 

bearers." No unit was to receive the bearer 

of a flag of truce unless he represented the 

commander of the American and Filipino 

forces. If that officer "has already escaped," 

then the bearer must represent the senior 

commander on Corregidor. The appearance 

of an emissary carrying a white flag was to 

be reported immediately to 14th Army, 

which would conduct the negotiation for 

surrender. All units were cautioned that the 

arrival of an emissary from the American 

commander with a flag of truce would not 

in itself mean the termination of hostilities. 

"U ntil a definite order is issued," 14th 

Army declared, "the attack will be continued." 21 

14th Army also took every precaution to 

conceal its intentions from the Americans 

on Corregidor. All units were enjoined time 

and again to observe the greatest secrecy, 

and the 4th Division and Army artillery 

were ordered to "strictly avoid the main 

road" on Bataan during the hours of daylight. To prevent leaks through the Filipino 

population, 14th Army forbade communication between civilians and military personnel and in those areas where the assault 

troops were most active moved the inhabitants out altogether. 

For a time 14th Army attempted to 

create the impression that the attack on 

Corregidor had been abandoned. The 16th 

Division was ordered to suspend its open 

preparations for the feint landing, but "to 

" 14th Army Opns, I, 198. 

continue secretly to prepare for the attack." 

Artillery operations were limited to occasional shelling, and propaganda issued by 

the Army headquarters avoided mention of 

an attack and stressed the point that the 

problem of Corregidor would be solved in 

time by "nothing more than blockade." 

Meanwhile, the Japanese "pretended to devote" themselves to military administration 

and mopping-up operations. To strengthen 

this impression, Homma made a grand 

entry into Manila to celebrate the emperor's 

birthday on 29 April "as gayly and grandly 

as possible." After the ceremonies he left the 

capital announcing that he was going to 

Mindanao to assume command of operations there. In r~ality he and his staff returned to 14th Army headquarters at Balanga where final preparations for the invasion of Corregidor were being made.22 

The American Defenses 

When Bataan fell the men on Corregidor 

knew that their days were numbered. With 

the Japanese artillery literally aiming down 

their throats, they could have no illusions 

about the future. But there was no noticeable decline of morale once it was made 

clear that the island would not be surrendered without a fight. One battery commander called his men together and talked 

with them realistically about their situation 

and their prospects. "The men all swore," 

wrote a staff sergeant, "that the enemy 

would have to come and take Morrison 

Hill [the battery location] if they wanted 

it." 23 This feeling seems to have been general throughout the command and was 

expressed by Wainwright when he wrote to 

22 Ibid., 195. 

23 Hopkins, Personal and Official Notes of Btry C, 

60th CA (AA), entry of 9 ADr 42. CODY in OCMH. 
528 

President Roosevelt, "Our flag still flies on 

this beleaguered island fortress." "I meant 

to see," he added later, "that it kept flying." 24 All that he or anyone else could do 

was to prepare for the inevitable attack 

with the determination to make it as costly 

as possible to the enemy. 

Beach Defense 

Until the evacuation of Manila at the 

end of December, local defense of the island 

had been provided by a small number of 

artillerymen, who performed this task in 

addition to their other duties. Such an arrangement had not permitted an effective 

defense or left time for the construction of 

strongly fortified positions. This deficiency 

had been recognized but it was not until 

Admiral Hart made the 4th Marine Regiment available on 24 December that steps 

were taken to correct the weaknesses of 

Corregidor's defenses.2/; 

By chance, Col. Samuel L. Howard, commander of the 4th Marines, was in Manila 

when Hart turned the regiment over to the 

Army "for tactical employment." He reported immediately to General MacArthur 

and then to General Sutherland who gave 

him his orders. They were brief and to the 

point: "Proceed to Corregidor and take 

over the beach defenses of that island." 26 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 85 .. 

.. This account of the beach defenses of Corregidor is based upon: Howard, 4th Marines Rpt of 

Opns, pp. 10-19, USMC Hist Sec; Baldwin, "The 

Fourth Marines at Corregidor," Part 1, Marine 

Corps Gazette (November 1946), pp. 13-18, Part 2 

(December 1946), p. 30; Maj Harold E. Dalness, 

Opns of the Prov Bn, 4th Marines (paper prepared 

for the Advanced Officers Course, 1949-50, The 

Infantry School), pp. 4-7; Beach Defense Arty 

Tabulation, Exhibit G of Harbor Defenses Rpt of 

Opns. 

.. Howard, 4th Marines Rpt of Opns, p. 10, 

USMC Hist Sec. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Howard thereupon returned to his regiment 

at Olongapo to prepare for the move. 

Within a week the entire regiment had 

reached Corregidor and on 29 December 

Colonel Howard was designated commanding officer of the beach defenses. 

The 4th Marine Regiment, which had 

arrived from Shanghai only a month earlier, 

had been considerably reinforced since the 

start of the war. The 766 marines who had 

escaped from China had been organized 

into a two-battalion regiment in which each 

battalion consisted of only one machine gun 

company and two rifle companies. The companies, moreover, had only two of their 

platoons. When war came, the regiment had 

absorbed the Marine detachment of the 

Olongapo naval station and had organized 

a third platoon in the rifle companies as well 

as two additional companies from other Marine detachments in the Islands. On reaching Corregidor the regiment gained enough 

men to form a 3d Battalion by absorbing 

the marines who had formerly been stationed at Cavite. The strength of the regiment (less detachments) now totaled 66 

officers and 1,365 enlisted men, substantially 

the same strength it had at the end of the 

campaign. It carried with it when it moved 

to Corregidor a 6-month supply of rations 

for 2,000 men, more than ten units of fire 

for all weapons, a two-year supply of clothing, and sufficient medicine and equipment 

for a 100-bed hospital. 

The arrival of the marines filled a serious 

gap in Corregidor's defenses. There had 

never been enough men on the island to 

man the large seacoast guns, the antiaircraft defenses, and the beaches as well. Before the war barbed wire had stretched 

along those beaches which offered possible 

landing sites, and pillboxes had been erected 

deep in the ravines leading to Topside and 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 529 

TABLE 11-STRENGTH, HARBOR AND BEACH DEFENSES, ABOUT 15 APRIL 1942 a 

Army ! Navy i 

Civilian 

Marines Total 

U.S. P.S. P.A. ~I Phil. ~I Other b 

------------- --------

F ort Mills •...•..••.•...•.... 

F 

F 

F 

4,492 1,028 1,742 1,514 1,715 400 315 1,987 13,19 3 

9 

5 

ort Hughes ....•••••..••.••• 276 0 0 93 443 0 27 40 87 

ort Drum .••.•...•.••..•.•.• 189 0 0 10 0 0 0 6 20 

ort Frank •.••.••..••..••.•• 55 270 76 0 0 0 1 49 45 

--------------------------

TotaL ••••.....•.....• 5,012 1,298 1,818 1,617 2,158 400 343 2,082 14,72 8 

• This tabulation is probably not entirely correct, but it represents a summary of the best data available. 

b Mosdy Filipinos. but including Chinese and perhaps others. 

SQllrce: Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, Exhibit K, p. 13. 

Middleside.27 But, as Colonel Howard observed in his initial reconnaissance, much 

remained to be done to guard against an 

enemy landing. 

When Howard assumed command of 

Corregidor's beach defense the island was 

already organized into three sectors, and he 

deployed his regiment accordingly. In the 

East Sector, which stretched from the tip 

of the tail to the narrow neck and included 

Malinta Tunnel, he placed his 1st Battalion. 

The 3d Battalion took over responsibility 

for the area to the west, the Middle Sector, 

which included most of the barracks and installations on Topside and Middleside. The 

western end of the island was designated the 

West Sector and its defense assigned to the 

2d Battalion. In reserve Howard kept the 

headquarters and service company. 

As soon as the marines reached their assigned positions at the end of December 

they began to improve existing defenses and 

to prepare new ones. Some work had already 

been done in the West and Middle Sectors, 

... Lt. Comdr. T. C. Parker, "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 

LXIX, No.1 (January 1943), 12. 

but, except for a final defense line on the 

east side of Malinta Hill, there were no defenses east of Malinta Tunnel. The marines 

turned to with vigor and in the next three 

months laid miles of barbed wire-twentyone miles of wire were laid in the East Sector 

alone-planted land mines, dug tank traps, 

trenches, and tunnels, cleared fields of fire, 

built gun emplacements, set up interior and 

switch positions, and established final defense lines in each sector. 

As more men reached the island they 

were assigned to Colonel Howard's beach 

defenses and by the middle of April, after 

the influx from Bataan, he had under his 

command about 4,000 men of whom only 

1,352 were marines. (Table 11) The rest 

came from the Navy which contributed 895 

men, the Philippine Army (929) men, and 

the U.S. Army. This group constituted a 

heterogeneous force of doubtful strength. 

It included Filipino messboys, ground crews 

of the Philippine Army Air Force, survivors 

of the submarine tender Canopus, and Scout 

artillerymen. Few of these men had had any 

infantry training. Those who had come 

from Bataan had to be completely outfitted 
530 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

MARINE SERGEANT TEACHING FILIPINOS the operation of a machine gun. 

and equipped and were in such "deplorable" physical condition as to be "unfit for 

combat duty." 28 

With the ragged and weakened refugees 

from Bataan Colonel Howard fleshed out 

the Marine force in each sector. The East 

Sector, which had consisted of less than 400 

men from the 1 st Battalion, 4th Marines, 

was brought up to a strength of 1,115. 

Strength of the Middle Sector where the 

500 men of the 3d Battalion were stationed, 

was brought up to the same total by the 

addition of Army and Navy personnel. The 

2d Battalion in the 'Vest Sector was reinforced with almost 600 men, for a total of 

915. No provision was made to shift any 

of the troops to a threatened area, so that 

if a landing came at one point it would 

"Howard, 4th Marines Rpt of Opns, p. 16, 

USMC Hist. Sec. 

have to be met by the troops in that sector. 

The reserve, which had formerly consisted of the Headquarters and Service 

Company (300 men), was considerably 

strengthened by the addition of a provisional 

4th Battalion in the Marine regiment. This 

battalion, organized on 10 April with lettered companies Q, R, S, and T, was composed largely of Navy enlisted men with a 

sprinkling of soldiers from Bataan. The 

commander was a Marine rna jar and the 

officers were drawn from both services. 

:'vIost of the 500 sailors in the battalion had 

special skills, years of service and high ratings, but none knew even the fundamentals 

of infantry fighting. They were mature and 

serious, however, and learned quickly. 

Training facilities were limited and equipment meager but the incentive was great. 

The men spent their days training; their 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 531 

nights attending lectures. "The chips were 

down," wrote one of their officers, "and 

there was no horseplay." 29 

In addition to the 4,000 men assigned 

to beach defense, Colonel Howard could 

count on the use of practically all troops on 

the island in the event of an emergency. A 

plan was prepared and approved which provided for the fonnation of two reduced battalions manned by personnel from the seacoast defenses, and for the utilization of 

quartennaster, engineer, military police, 

and "all other available personnel" when 

the "beach defense situation" became serious. ao Even civilians were assigned to defense 

sectors. 

Artillery support for the men on beach defense was provided by one 155-mm., twenty-three 75-mm., and two naval guns of 3-

inch caliber. For use against night landings 

Howard had eleven searchlights, six of 

which were placed in the East Sector, 

guarding Malinta Tunnel and the approaches from Bataan. To that sector he 

also assigned ten of the 75-mm. guns, some 

of them old British models. The men in the 

Middle Sector, which included the docks 

and the installations on Topside and Middleside, had the support of the single 155-

mm. gun, seven of the 75's, one 3-incher, 

and three searchlights. The West Sector was 

less heavily defended than the others and 

had only four 75's and one naval gun. 

Seacoast and antiaircraft defenses on 

Corregidor were still intact. Though the enemy air attacks during the past three months 

had destroyed most of the wooden buildings 

and left deep scars everywhere on the island, 

they had not wrought serious damage to the 

coastal batteries or to the 3-inch antiaircraft 

.. Dalness, Opns of Proy Bn, 4th Marines, p. 7 . 

•• Howard, 4th Marines Rpt of Opns, p. 16, 

USMC Hist Sec. 

guns. Ordnance magazines with four feet of 

reinforced concrete had withstood even direct hits; lighter concrete structures had 

been damaged but rarely demolished. "After 

the fall of Bataan," wrote one officer, "we 

had more artillery in operation than we had 

had at the start of the war." 31 Forts Drum 

and Frank, which had been subjected to 

frequent artillery bombardment by the J apanese along the Cavite shore, had not fared 

as well. Corregidor, too, would soon feel the 

destructive effects of massed artillery fire 

which in one day could inflict more damage 

than three months of air attacks. 

The Condition of the Troops 

The condition of the troops was not yet 

desperate. Morale was still high and most 

men thought they could give a good account 

of themselves if the Japanese should attempt 

to take the island by assault. Some even believed they had an excellent chance to beat 

off an attack. "The marines can't see how 

the Japs can take Corregidor," wrote an 

artilleryman. "I hardly can either!" 82 The 

men talked about the possibility of reinforcement, about food, liquor, and women-

"the things that soldiers have always talked 

about-but never," wrote a marine, "about 

the hopelessness of our position. Never once 

did I hear anybody despair." 33 

The health of the command was generally 

good. The casualties from the bombings had 

not been severe and the effects of a limited 

diet were not yet apparent. Mild respiratory 

31 The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 

12,15 Noy 43, p. 50, MID WD . 

.. Hopkins, Personal and Official Notes of Btry C, 

60th CA (AA), entry of 19 Mar 42, p. 185. The 

diary notation was probably made by the battery 

commander, Captain Ames . 

.. Quoted in Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at 

Corregidor," Part 2, Marine Corps Gazette (December 1946), p. 33. 
532 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

LIFE IN MALINTA TUNNEL 

diseases caused by confinement in the damp, 

dust-laden tunnel were the most frequent 

reasons for hospitalization. Diarrhea and 

food poisoning were fairly common, but 

dysentery and malaria, the twin scourges of 

Bataan, were rare on Corregidor. Hospital 

facilities in the tunnel, though not ideal, 

were far superior to those on Bataan and 

there was an ample supply of drugs for the 

small number of patients."~ 

Malinta Tunnel was still the focus of all 

activity on Corregidor and became after 

9 April even more crowded and hectic than 

before. A newcomer from Bataan, Capt. 

John ~1cM. Gulick, described it as "a gigantic beehive" over which neon lights 

"cast their bluish glow." Along its sides the 

crates were piled higher than ever and the 

3' Cooper, Med Dept Activities, p. 83. 

double and triple deck bunks were more 

numerous; overhead was a maze of wires, 

pipes, and ducts. The number of men in the 

tunnel had increased and a steady stream, 

which Captain Gulick described as "dense 

crowds," moved up and down the main axis 

and into the many laterals on various 

errands. The dust was thicker than ever, the 

odors more pronounced and disagreeable, 

the vermin more numerous, and the hum 

of the auxiliary diesel power plants and 

ventilators more penetrating. Everywhere 

were "cryptic initial signs" describing the 

activity of each cluster of desks. The ambulance siren sounded more often now but 

a hush still fell over the tunnel when a jeep 

carrying a wounded man drove through.:J5 

36 Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91 st CA (PS), p. 

122, copy in OCMH. 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 533 

LIFE IN MALINTA TUNNEL 

The power plant on the island had been 

hit occasionally during the aerial bombardment but the japanese had not made any 

systematic effort to destroy the plant itself 

or the power lines that led to the cold-storage plant and the water pumps that kept 

the reservoir filled. There had been some 

damage, and the danger of a complete 

breakdown in the power system v,,·as a source 

of constant concern. But there was still 

enough fuel for the portable diesel engines 

in the tunnel to last at least until the end of 

june.:"; 

Corregidor's water supply, because it was 

dependent upon the power plant, was perhaps the most vulnerable point of Corregidor's defense. Even before the surrender of 

." The Siege of Corrcgidor, Mil Rpls on UN, No. 

12, 15 Nov ..J.3, pp. 43,50, MID WD. 

Bataan there had been frequent periods 

when water was not available because of 

power failures or damage to the pumps. 

When the water lines were damaged, water 

was distributed at various points on the 

island and each unit sent its own trucks for 

the day's supply. The water was carried in 

12-inch powder cans, two by five and a half 

feet, ideal for storage but heavy when full 

and difficult to handle. The water crews 

normally made the trip at night over the 

crater-filled roads to the distribution points. 

There they might have to wait for hours to 

draw their supply. "It was a ticklish job." '" 

By the beginning of April the supply of 

water had become a real problem. On the 

'" Lt Col Earl L. Barr, Hist of Btry M, 60th CA 

(AA), p. 8, copy in OCMH. See also Gulick M rmoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), p. 155. 
534 

2d of the month Colonel Bunker noted in 

his diary that "our water situation is getting 

critical," 88 and on the 3d, in anticipation of 

the fall of Bataan, all units were directed 

to lay in a reserve supply. At that time there 

was in the reservoirs a total of 3,000,000 gallons, but that would not last long if the 

pumps or power plant failed. 39 

The men on Corregidor ate two meals a 

day. The morning meal, prepared the night 

before and served before daylight, usually 

consisted of toast and coffee, when there was 

coffee, and occasionally a piece of bacon or 

sausage. Supper was served after dark, about 

2000, and consisted of salmon, canned vegetables, and rice pudding. Sometimes there 

was fresh beef or stew. Most units were able 

to serve half a sandwich and a cup of hot 

beverage or soup during the noon hour, but 

many men kept pieces of bread in their 

pocket to gnaw on during the long interval 

between meals.40 

The ration, though adequate to maintain 

health, did not provide sufficient bulk to 

satisfy the appetite. Men no longer had the 

"comfortably full" feeling provided by the 

peacetime ration, and missed certain foods 

such as sugar, canned milk, coffee, and 

canned or dried fruits, which were by now 

extremely scarce.41 Rice had become an increasingly important part of the ration and, 

though it was not favored by the Americans, 

it did provide bulk in the diet. Fortunately 

there were always enough other foods on 

hand to add flavor and variety to the rice 

dishes. But the American soldiers never became fond of rice and complained fre-

.1 Bunker, Diary, entry of 2 Apr 42. 

.. The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 

12,15 Nov 43, pp. 42, 45, MID WD. 

co Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," 

Part 2, Marine Corps Gazette (December 1946), p. 

32; Barr, Hist of Btry M, 60th CA (AA), p. 4. 

.. Barr, Btry M, 60th CA (AA), p. 4. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

quently. "This rice diet fills you up temporarily," wrote Colonel Bunker, "but it 

doesn't stick to your ribs." 42 

The air attacks during the preceding three 

months had disrupted the normal distribution of rations from time to time and occasionally a bomb had hit a kitchen, with 

tragic loss for the men who had to miss a 

meal or lose a particularly prized item on 

the menu. One battery lost its fruit jello in 

this way. "The fruit in the dessert," mourned 

the battery commander, "represented the 

saving of canned fruit for a couple of weeks 

and it was the pride of the mess sergeant." 43 

The cold-storage plant was damaged during 

the air attack of 28 March and the next day 

all units received unexpectedly large issues 

of fresh meat and then none at all until the 

refrigerators were repaired. Finally, about 3 

April, in expectation of heavier air and artillery attacks, all units received additional allowances of food, to be stored in their kitchens.44 But even during the heaviest bombardments there was no loss of food, which 

was safely stored under guard in Malinta 

Tunnel and in the cold-storage plant. 

As on Bataan, there was a strong feeling 

among the troops on beach defense and at 

gun positions that those close to the source 

of supply in the tunnel enjoyed better meals 

than they. This belief was probably unfounded but it was true that until the end 

of March naval personnel received foods 

which were not available to Army troops. 

The Navy, though it had cut the ration and 

limited its men to two meals a day, maintained its own separate food stores and issued a larger and more varied ration than 

that provided by the Army. Long after cof-

.. Bunker, Diary, entry of 28 Apr 42 . 

.. Barr, Btry M, 60th CA (AA), p. 6. 

.. The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No . 

12,15 Nov 43, p. 43, MID WD. 
JAPANESE PLANS AND AMERICAN DEFENSES 535 

fee, sugar, jam, and canned fruit had disappeared from the Army menu they were still 

available in the Navy messes. When General 

Wainwright arrived on Corregidor to assume command on 21 March he ordered 

the Navy to place its stores in the common 

pool, and thereafter the "sailors received the 

same ration as the soldiers. 45 

Despite the shortages there was never any 

real danger of starvation on Corregidor. 

The quantity of food on hand when Bataan 

fell was sufficient to last about ten weeks 

more. This food had been forehandedly laid 

aside early in the campaign in the expectation that if and when Bataan was lost the 

Philippine Division would make its final 

stand on Corregidor. To provide for this 

contingency MacArthur, on 24 January, 

had ordered General Moore, the Harbor Defenses commander, to maintain a reserve 

large enough to feed 20,000 men-twice the 

.. Knoll, Intel Rpt, 16th Naval Dist, 12 Mar-3 

May 42, p. 10; Drake, Comments on Draft MS, 

Comment 22, OCMH; ltr, Rockwell to Ward, 18 

Jan 52, OCMH. Admiral Rockwell states that to 

the best of his recollection Army and Navy food had 

been pooled long before the end of the campaign, 

but he does not give the date. 

number then on the island-on half rations 

until 30 June. Before he left for Australia, 

he cautioned Moore not to permit "any encroachments" against this reserve:6 

When Wainwright came to Corregidor 

on 21 March to assume command of USFIP 

he found that food was more plentiful and 

the men better fed than on Bataan. With 

the plight of the emaciated troops there still 

fresh in his mind, he requested permission 

from MacArthur to reduce the carefully 

hoarded reserves by an amount equal to a 

month's half rations for the planned garrison of 20,000 men. Approval was granted 

at the beginning of April and Wainwright 

was able to send additional food to Bataan 

during the last days of the battle. It was 

"little more than a crumb," he wrote later, 

but it reduced Corregidor reserves "to a 

point where I figured . . . that our 11,000 

defenders would consume it all by June 20, 

1942, on less than half rations." 47 It was 

to be more than enough. 

.. Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 42; Col Chester H. Elmes, QM Opns, Fort Mills, pp. 2-3, App. 

F of QM Rpt of Opns. 

"Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

72; Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 50. 
CHAPTER XXX 

The Last Twenty-Seven Days 

Hardly had the Bataan garrison surrendered than those Japanese batteries that 

had reached Cabcaben opened fire on Corregidor to begin the final twenty-seven-day 

siege of the island. The intermittent air attacks of the preceding three months paled 

into insignificance beside the massed artillery from Bataan. "One day's shelling," remarked one officer, "did more damage than 

all the bombing put together." 1 Areas that 

had been heavily wooded were entirely denuded. In some places not "a stick, not a 

leaf" was left. Trees, "once so dense . . . 

that they shut out the sun," were shot away 

or burned, leaving only charred stumps.2 

Deep craters, empty shell cases, and huge 

fragments of concrete pockmarked the landscape. The beach defenses were demolished, 

the huge seacoast guns silenced, and the 

antiaircraft batteries reduced to impotence 

during these twenty-seven days. At the end 

of the bombardment the island was literally 

a shambles, a "moving picture version of 

No Man's Land in World War I." g 

The Preiimina-ny Bombardment 

On 9 April the first Japanese artillery, a 

75-mm. gun battery, reached Cabcaben. In 

1 The Siege of Corregidor, 'Mil Rpts on UN, No. 

12,15 Nov 43, p. 50, MID WD. 

2 Quoted in Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at 

Corregidor," Part 2, Marine Corps Gazette (December 1946), p. 35. 

3 The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 

12,15Nov43,p.50,MIDWD. 

plain sight of the Americans on Corregidor, 

the battery opened fire, marking what Colonel Bunker, commander of the Seaward 

Defenses, called "a crucial point in our operations-a milestone." 4 This first attack was 

promptly answered by the 155-mm. guns of 

Battery Kysor located on the north shore of 

Corregidor. Thereafter, on orders from General Wainwright who feared American 

shells would fall on the hospitals, civilian 

camps, and friendly troops in southern 

Bataan, the Corregidor batteries were prohibited from firing on the peninsula. This 

order remained in effect until 12 April when 

counterbattery fire against located enemy 

targets was authorized.s 

Japanese aircraft, lacking targets on 

Bataan, also turned their attention to Corregidor on the 9th. At about the same time 

that the 75-mm. guns opened up from 

Cabcaben, high-flying bombers made their 

first attack on the island since the end of 

March. Between 1630 and 2030, the 22d 

Air Brigade sent 44 light and 35 heavy 

bombers plus 20 Navy twin-engine bombers 

against Corregidor, with results which the 

Japanese described as "very successful and 

effective." 6 Actually this bombardment 

was no more effective than earlier bombings, but one lucky hit landed among the 

'Bunker, Diary, entry of 9 Apr 42; 14th Army 

Opns, I, 169. 

, Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, pp. 52-53, 55; 

Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 92-

93. 

• 14th Army Opns, I, 178. 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 

cables controlling the mine field in the bay. 

Until the cables were repaired "practically 

the whole mine field [was] out." 7 Fortunately the Japanese were not aware of the 

damage they had wrought. 

During the days that followed the Japanese brought up their heavier guns in 

preparation for the more intense bombardment to follow. General Kitajima, 14th 

Army artillery officer, took every precaution 

to insure the most effective use of the 

eighteen batteries under his command. He 

divided the target area into three zones, 

corresponding roughly to the beach defense 

sectors, and assigned a specific zone to each 

battery. Careful tests were made to insure 

the accuracy of each piece and all targets 

were inclosed by bracket fire. The balloon 

company moved from Abucay to the heights 

of Mariveles where it could observe fire on 

Corregidor. At the first sight of the balloon 

the Americans christened it Peeping Tom. 

The intelligence regiment was also brought 

south and by the 13th had set up its flash 

and sound equipment. For the Japanese 

artillery the conditions were almost ideal,8 

By 12 April many of the Japanese batteries were in position and at 0600 that day 

the bombardment of Corregidor began in 

earnest. Most of the fire came from 75-mm. 

and 105-mm. guns; the 150-mm. guns did 

not get into action on a large scale until a 

few days later. On the 12th, also, the batteries on Cavite opened fire on Corregidor, 

while Japanese aircraft made nine separate 

attacks against the island. Counterbattery 

fire, the prohibition against which had been 

partially lifted that day, only brought down 

an answering barrage from the enemy. It 

1 Bunker, Diary, entry of 9 Apr 42. 

• 14th Army Opns, II, App. VIII, pp. 37-45. 

537 

was, wrote Colonel Bunker, "a rough day 

all day." 9 

During the next week, when the 1S0-mm. 

howitzers joined the attack, the tempo of the 

Japanese bombardment increased steadily. 

For the first time the armament of the 

island received heavy damage. The first 

guns to be put out of action were the seacoast guns on the north shore facing Bataan 

and visible to the Japanese. By the 14th 

three ISS-mm. gun batteries, each with two 

guns, and one 3-inch battery of four guns 

had been destroyed. The vulnerable directors and height finders on Topside were 

badly damaged, too, but the operators were 

able to keep at least one in operation at all 

times. 

The Japanese did not neglect the searchlights. Whenever one showed its light, they 

quickly "shot hell out of it." 10 Apparently 

they had their guns registered on the fixed 

seacoast searchlights. To test this theory 

Colonel Bunker ordered one light to be 

turned on for fifteen seconds, scarcely 

enough time for the enemy to register, load, 

and fire. After that time a man turned off 

the light and ran. He was scarcely twenty 

yards away when Japanese shells fell on the 

searchlight. "Which proved," noted Colo~ 

nel Bunker, "that the Japs had their guns 

• Bunker, Diary, entry of 12 Apr 42. In addition 

to the sources cited below, this section is based 

upon: Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, pp. 53-72; 

The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 12, 

15 Nov 43, pp. 43-50, MID WD; Baldwin, "The 

Fourth Marines at Corregidor," Part 2, Marine 

Corps Gazette (December 1946), pp. 32-35; Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 86-114: 

Col Chase, AA Defense Comd Rpt of Opns, pp. 16-

17, Exhibit F, Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns: 

intervs, author with Col Stephen M. Mellnik, Gen 

Drake, Col Chase and Lt Col John McM. Gulick, 

at various times. 

10 Bunker, Diary, entry of 14 Apr 42. 
538 

loaded, laid, and men at the lanyards with 

orders to shoot instantly when the light 

showed." 11 

Casualties during the first days of the 

bombardment were low. At the first sign of 

an air attack or artillery bombardment those 

men whose batteries were not in action 

would take shelter in one of the numerous 

tunnels that had been and were still being 

built. But only the thick reinforced concrete 

shelters could provide protection against a 

direct hit. On the 15th seventy Filipinos 

died a terrible death when they took shelter 

in excavations behind their battery on Morrison Hill. So intense was the enemy fire that 

the overhanging cliffs collapsed and sealed 

the entrances to the shelters, burying the 

Filipinos alive. 

There were moments of heroism as well 

as tragedy. On the 16th, four men of Battery 

B, 60th Coast Artillery (AA) -Capt. Arthur E. Huff and three volunteers-earned 

Silver Stars when they left shelter during an 

intense bombardment to raise the American 

flag. A shell fragment had struck the 100-

foot flagpole on the Topside parade ground 

and severed the halyard. "Slowly, terribly, 

the flag began to descend," but before it 

reached the ground the four men gathered 

it into their arms. Quickly repairing the 

broken halyard, they raised the flag and ran 

back to shelter.12 

The intensity of the air and artillery attacks increased during the latter part of 

April. After the 18th the 240-mm. howitzers 

which had been moved from Cavite added 

their weight to the bombardment. With 

n Ibid. 

12 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

90-91. Wainwright's account is incorrect as to the 

date and men involved. He does give credit later to 

these men for a somewhat similar occurrence on 3 

May. Ibid., pp. 109-10. An account of the 16 April 

incident is included in Chase, Comments on Draft 

MS, pp. 33-34, OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

high-angle fire and heavy charges they were 

able to hit targets which the flat trajectory 

weapons had been unable to reach, and to 

blast the heavily reinforced concrete protecting the large-caliber coastal guns. On 

the 24th they put Battery Crockett, with 

two 12-inch guns, out of commission, demolished the protective barricades, ruined 

the shot hoists, and started fires which 

fortunately were brought under control before they reached the powder room. The 

next evening, a 240-mm. shell exploded 

outside the west entrance of Malinta Tunnel 

where a large group of men had gathered 

for a breath of fresh air and a smoke before 

turning in. "There was a panic-stricken 

rush for the gate, but the concussion had 

closed it and it could not be opened from 

the outside." Then another shell landed. 

"We worked all that night," wrote a nurse, 

"and I wish I could forget those endless, 

harrowing hours." 13 At least thirteen were 

killed outright; more died later, and the 

number of wounded was estimated as high 

as fifty. 

The shelling never really stopped. With 

over one hundred pieces ranging in size from 

75-mm. guns to the giant 240-mm. howitzers, the Japanese were able to fire almost 

steadily. They destroyed gun emplacements, 

shelters, beach defenses, buildings-almost 

everything on the surface-at a rate that 

made repair or replacement impossible. 

First they concentrated on the north shore 

batteries and, when most of these were destroyed or neutralized, adjusted fire on the 

batteries on the opposite shore. They fired at 

regular periods, starting just before dawn 

and continuing until about noon. There was 

a lull during the early afternoon-Colonel 

Bunker called it a Japanese siesta-after 

which the fire would begin again about 

10 Redmond, I Served on Bataan, pp. 144-45. 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 539 

BATTERY CROCKETT 

1500 to continue with varying intensity 

almost until midnight. Usually by 1000 

most telephone communications had been 

knocked out. Crews repaired the lines during the night but the next morning they 

would be cut again. 

Air attacks usually accompanied the 

shelling from Bataan and followed the same 

schedule. Between 9 April and the end of 

the month there were 108 air alarms, totaling almost eighty hours. Practically all of 

the attacks were directed against Corregidar. At first the planes came in at high altitude, over 20,000 feet and beyond the range 

of all but two of the antiaircraft batteries. 

But as the days passed and damage to equipment and installations mounted, the Japanese pilots became bolder. They came in at 

lower altitudes and bombed more accurately. It became more and more difficult for 

the defenders to keep their guns and height 

finders serviceable. During some periods 

there was but one height finder in operation and the altitude of attacking planes had 

to be sent by telephone to all antiaircraft 

batteries. 

The air and artillery attacks of April 

reached their height on the 29th of the 

month, Emperor Hirohito's birthday. The 

day began with an air alarm, the 260th of 

the campaign, at 0730, when two flights of 

bombers came over Fort Hughes and three 

dive bombers hit the South Dock on Corregidor and the Malinta Tunnel entrances. 

At the same time Peeping Tom, the observation balloon, rose over Cabcaben and the 

Japanese batteries on Bataan opened up on 

Bottomside targets. About a half hour later 

six more planes dropped their loads on M alinta Hill and the artillery loosed concen-
540 

trated fire against both portals of the tunnel and on the North Dock. While an 

observation plane hovered overhead, the 

Japanese artillery shifted fire to Topside at 

0820. After a brief lull Japanese aircraft 

came over the island again, and the artillery 

registered hits on targets on Middleside. At 

1000 Japanese shells reached two ammunition dumps which blew up with a tremendous explosion. 

The attacks continued without letup 

through the afternoon, and by evening large 

sections of Corregidor lay shrouded under a 

dense cloud of smoke or dust. Grass fires 

were burning everywhere and ammunition 

from the two dumps was still exploding. Installations on Malinta Hill were a shambles. 

Observation stations had been destroyed; 

the power plant for the large seacoast 

searchlight was burned out; and three of 

the 75-mm. beach defense guns, as well as 

a I. I-inch quadruple mount, were demolished. That night two Navy PBY's brought 

in some medicine and 740 mechanical fuzes 

from Australia, an empty gesture for a garrison which was reeling under the effects of 

the heaviest bombardment of the war. 

Brave efforts were made to deliver counterbattery and antiaircraft fire. About 18 

April the 155-mm. gun batteries were taken 

out of their exposed positions, organized 

into one-gun mobile units, and placed in 

defiladed positions. Called "roving guns," 

each was equipped with a prime mover. 

After firing from one location until the enemy discovered their presence and had time 

to mass his own fire, the roving guns would 

move out. They were, in General Moore's 

opinion, "our main dependence for counterbattery fire . . .," and were supplemented 

after 20 April by "roving lights"-two 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

searchlights which moved from one position 

to another.!4 

Forts Frank and Drum also fired counterbattery. Both had 14-inch guns which could 

be used against Bataan but the two at Fort 

Frank were of the open, disappearing-carriage type, easily blanketed by fire from 

Cavite, and could fire only sporadically. The 

14-inch guns at Fort Drum were of the turret type and fired steadily. They were still 

firing at 5-minute intervals at the time of the 

surrender, when every other gun on the 

fortified islands had been silenced. 

The most effective counterbattery fire was 

delivered by Corregidor's Batteries Geary 

and Way, both with 12-inch mortars.!6 The 

former consisted of two pits, each with four 

pieces. Battery Way, with only one pit of 

three mortars, had been out of service for 

several years, and it was not until Battery 

E of the 60th Coast Artillery (AA) from 

Bataan became available that these mortars 

were reconditioned for use. On 28 April the 

weapons were test-fired and reported ready 

for action. 

Both 12-inch mortar batteries had an 

ample supply of the standard armor-piercing 

shells with the .05-second delay fuze. But 

these shells could do little damage to the 

Japanese artillery. For that, the instantaneous fuze 670-pound personnel shell was required, and there were only 400 rounds on 

Corregidor. Ordnance could modify the delay fuze of the armor-piercing shell so that 

it would explode on impact, but the process 

was a slow one. All the men that could be 

spared were put on the job, but the output 

for a single day never exceeded twenty-five 

shells. 

it Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 58. 

15 Bunker, Diary, passim. 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 541 

BATTERY WAY, 12-inch mortar pit. (Photograph taken in 1945.) 

With their excellent observation posts and 

air reconnaissance, the Japanese soon had all 

the fixed installations pinpointed and could 

loose accura te and adjusted concentrations 

of fire on them at the first sign of activity. 

Most of their attention, however, was given 

to Batteries Geary and Way which, with 

their high-angle fire and G70-pound personnel shells, represented the greatest threat. 

Battery 'Vay was soon reduced to two guns, 

and on 2 ~1ay Japanese 240-mm. shells 

penetrated Geary's magazine, which blew 

up with an explosion that rocked the island 

and hurled the 1 D-ton barrels of the 12-inch 

mortars about like match sticks. One was 

found 150 yards from its mount, on the 

island's cratered golf course. Another was 

blown through three feet of reinforced concrete into an adjoining powder magazine. 

A reinforced concrete slab weighing about 

six tons Aew a thousand yards, cut through 

a tree trunk about four feet in diameter, and 

came to rest in a ravine. Estimates of the 

casualties varied from eight to twenty-seven 

men killed, with many more injured. Four 

men were buried under the debris. There 

was no difference of opinion on the damage. 

The eight guns were ruined, the shells destroyed, and the entire battery reduced to 

rubble. Hi 

H ealth and Food 

No one on Corregidor was free from the 

constant bombardment except those in the 

"'Gulick, moirs of Btry C, gIst CA (PS), p. 

181; Sta tf'ment of Lt Murray Glussman, USNR, in 

Hayes, Rpt on M ed Tactics, Off of Naval Reds. 
542 

tunnels under Malinta Hill, and the garrison could not, as General Wainwright observed, fight back from there.'7 By now life 

in Malinta Tunnel had become almost intolerable. Dust, dirt, great black flies, and 

vermin were everywhere, and over everything hung the odor of the hospital and 

men's bodies. During an air attack, when 

the large blowers were shut off, the air, 

offensive at best, became foul and the heat 

almost unbearable. Sometimes the lights 

failed and the gloom of the tunnel flickered 

into darkness. Under such conditions, "sun 

snatching" became a necessity. Between 

raids men would crowd the entrances to 

breathe deeply the gasoline fumes and dust 

which passed for fresh air. 

Crowded into enforced intimacy, on short 

rations, and under constant strain, men 

grew tense and irritable. Many lost their 

temper over minor incidents; conflicts long 

hidden rose to the surface. Values changed 

and men's virtues and defects were magnified. The mood of life in the tunnel impressed itself indelibly on Mrs. Maude R. 

Williams, a hospital assistant who had come 

over from Bataan. With eloquence and deep 

feeling she recorded these impressions in her 

diary. 

Under the deepening shadow of death life 

on Corregidor took on a faster, more intense 

tempo. The smallest and most simple pleasures became sought after and treasured as 

they became increasingly rare and dangerous-an uninterrupted cigarette, a cold 

shower, a stolen biscuit, a good night's sleep 

in the open air. 

There was a heightened feeling that life 

was to be lived from day to day, without 

illusions of an ultimate victory. Many sought 

forgetfulness in gambling. There was no other 

way to spend the accumulated pay that bulged 

11 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story. p. 92. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

in their pockets and they rattled the dice or 

played endless bridge, rummy and poker. 

J am sessions attracted great crowds which 

gathered in the dark and hummed softly or 

tapped feet to the nostalgic swing of the organ, a haunting guitar, or a low moaning 

trombone. Sometimes a nurse and her boy 

friend of the evening would melt into a 

dancf'. . . . The eyes of the onlookers would 

grow soft and thoughtful, while other couples 

would steal out into the perilous night. . . . 

Still others sought the consolations of religion and the symbols of another world, a 

better world of sweet and eternal peace. The 

Catholics gathered at dawn in the officers 

mess of Malinta Tunnel where one of the 

tables was converted into a simple altar, and 

kneeling on the bare cement under the high 

white washed vault they listened devoutly and 

a little desperately to the same hushed phrases 

that had been whispered in thf' CatacombsY 

Life outside the tunnel was less uncomfortable but more precarious. Those on 

beach defense or in gun positions could, if 

they wished, sleep in the fresh air and escape 

the dust occasionally. They were less crowded and had more freedom of movement. 

But the strain on them was great, too. When 

the shells came over or the bombs dropped 

they took cover and hoped for the best. All 

movement on the island became hazardous 

and uncertain. The roads, which at one time 

had been effectively camouflaged by trees, 

"were now bare and clearly visible shelves 

along the steep side of the island." 19 At any 

moment artillery fire might fall on men and 

vehicles. Captain Gulick, commander of 

Battery C, 91st Coast Artillery, was caught 

in such a barrage with his Filipino driver. 

18 Leon M. Guerrero, "The Last Days of 

Corregidor," The Philippine Review (May 1943). 

19 Hopkins, Personal and Official Notes of Btry 

C, 60th CA (AA), entry of 2 May 42, Ceil Info, 

copy in OCMH. 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 

To my terror [he wrote 1 it began to move 

toward us. There was a high rocky hill to my 

right and another to my left. Neither afforded 

any shelter whatsoever. We began to run 

hoping to get around the side of the hill. The 

barrage walked after us at about a pace equal 

to our own. We rounded the hill and saw in 

front of us the ruins of the Ordnance warehouses blown up by bombs in December. The 

ground was heap after heap of concrete 

chunks and exploded 75 shells and casings. 

Suddenly the barrage behind us lifted and 

came down about 400 yds in front of us 

slightly to our left. We ran to the right. The 

curtain of fire lifted again and came down 

on our right moving towards us. Terror and 

desperation seized us. We were panting, 

sweating, and scared. It seemed as if the Jap 

artillery was playing cat and mouse with 

us .... 

We ran down the old trolley tracks with 

barrages or concentrations 'behind and on 

both sides of us. Suddenly again up ahead 

shells began to land .... We reached a 

drainage ditch and threw ourselves in it. 

Dead leaves had cloaked its depth so that we 

sank down about 3 feet. It was hot, dirty, and 

almost smothering. But we were so exhausted 

by terror and by running that we could only 

lie there panting and perspiring.20 

As the days passed, life on Corregidor 

became more uncomfortable. Kitchens were 

hit and meals had to be cooked and distributed in the dark. The concentration of a 

group of men was sure to bring down artillery fire from Bataan. Meals became haphazard; men ate when and where they 

could. By the beginning of May the enemy 

attacks had become so frequent that the 

proper preparation of meals was impossible; 

feeding the troops, "a catch-as-catch can 

proposition." "It became martyrdom," 

wrote a naval officer, "to expose one's self 

for messing." 21 

,. Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), pp. 

137-39. 

"Statement of Lt Comdr Ernest Marion, in 

Hayes, Rpt on Med Tactics. Off t.f Naval Reds. 

543 

At the start of the bombardment, on 14 

April, Colonel Constant Irwin, General 

Wainwright's operations officer, had urged 

an increase in the ration. The shelling and 

bombing, he had pointed out, would probably become more severe during the next 

few weeks, and men on half rations could 

not be expected to stand the strain without 

a marked decrease in their combat efficiency. By the time the Japanese were ready 

to take the island by assault, Irwin believed, 

the defenders would be too weak to fend off 

an attack. He recommended, therefore, that 

the food reserves set aside at the start of the 

campaign be used to supplement the half 

ration and keep the men strong, "physically 

and mentally." 22 

Before making a decision on Irwin's recommendation, General \Vainwright ordered 

his chief of staff to make a study of the total 

amount of food on hand, including the stock 

of the Navy and the Marine unit. The result showed that there was only enough food 

to carry the garrison through the month of 

June on half rations. If the issue was 

doubled, the supply would be exhausted 

within a month. Wainwright could not 

gamble on a landing before that time. Even 

if he did and if he successfully fought off an 

~nemy attempt to take the island, he would 

have to surrender ultimately for lack of food. 

For these reasons he vetoed Colonel Irwin's 

proposal and ordered the half ration continued "until more food is in sight." 2~ 

The garrison, therefore, continued to subsist on half rations or less while the meals, 

because of the bombardment and the destruction of kitchens, became less appetizing 

and nourishing than ever. "For supper," one 

" Carrier note, 0-3 to CofS USFIP, 14 Apr 42, 

no sub, AG 430.2 Phil Reds. 

23 Ibid., with attached pencil notes initialed 

W [Wainwright] and LB [Lewis Beebe]. 
544 

Marine wrote, "we had a sort of stew which 

consisted mainly of rice and a couple of 

pieces of bread, and maybe a little jam." 24 

Col. Carlos Romulo, newscaster for Corregidor's "Voice of Freedom," noted that 

"sometimes we had a soggy slice [of bread] 

with our breakfast and sometimes we did 

not." He could tell in this way whether the 

bakery had been hit during the .last raid. 

A piece of cheese he had acquired as a gift 

before Quezon's departure "moved between 

my fingers," when he decided to eat it 

almost two months later. "So un fastidious 

can hunger make one," he observed, "I ate 

the cheese after removing its small inhabitants." 25 

By now the private caches of food and 

whiskey were gone. Only those few who had 

hoarded their supplies still h<l:d any left. 

What they had, they saved for special occasions. When Captain Gulick reached Corregidor after the fall of Bataan, he visited an 

old friend and was received "with open 

arms" and a bottle of "President Quezon's 

champagne." "We swilled the warm champagne in the sunlight," he reminisced, "ate 

peanut butter sandwiches, and swapped 

stories .... Truly war has its moments 

greater than those of peace." 26 Some of 

those who had no whiskey used the methods 

of manufacture adopted later in the war by 

troops stationed on dry Pacific Islands. 

Cleaning up a battery position, Captain 

Gulick was surprised to find that one of the 

swabbing tubs "was being illegally employed to hold a mash of dried raisins and 

.. Quoted in Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at 

Corregidor," Part 2, Marine Corps Gazette (December 1946), p. 32 . 

.. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, pp. 

245,246 .. 

•• Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), 

p. 131. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

prunes." ~7 The result, his men could have 

told him, was a satisfying and intoxicating 

beverage variously called raisinjack and 

jungle juice. 

By the end of April the first signs of malnutrition had made their appearance. Beriberi and scurvy were observed at about this 

time and the symptoms of avitaminosis were 

noted by unit commanders whose men 

showed a decrease in combat efficiency. In 

one antiaircraft battery Vitamin A deficiency had already affected the vision of the 

gun crews. "The BC [battery commander] 

got cod liver oil and boric acid solution from 

the hospital," wrote one of the men, "to try 

to comhat this." 28 

With the increased intensity of the Japanese bombardment at the end of April 

came a sharp increase in the number of 

casualties. "Every day it seemed that the 

line of stretchers grew longer. The narrow 

hospital corridors were crammed with the 

wounded, the sick, and the dying; the convalescents were hurried out to make room 

for fresh casualties." The hospital staff, overworked and under an intolerable strain, became short-tempered. Nurses snapped at 

one another, at the male attendants, and at 

the patients. "And every day when the red 

light in front of the Harbor Defense headquarters went out and the air raid was over', 

the grimy unwashed bodies would come in 

on their stained stretchers, carried on a wave 

of silence and spreading fear." 

With the influx of patients the hospital 

expanded into three more laterals until by 

25 April it had a capacity of 1,000 beds . 

Double and triple deck bunks were used for 

patients and hospital attendants alike. Linen 

21 Ibid:, p. 142. 

,. Hopkins, Personal and Official Notes of Btry C, 

60th CA (AA), entry of 27 Apr 42, Gen Info. 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 

was scarce and its use avoided, since "to go 

outside to hang out the laundry is a needless 

risk of life." Space, as everywhere in the 

tunnel, was at a premium; water was scarce 

and the power system uncertain. During a 

bombardment the concussion could be· felt 

even in the hospital laterals deep in the tunnel. Bottles, dishes, and loose objects rattled 

on the shelves and tables; the lights flickered 

and sometimes failed. "My hands tremble," 

wrote an aide on duty in the operating room. 

"when I'm giving anesthetics." 29 

Some units had their own medical facilities, and some, like the 4th Marines, had a 

comparatively well-equipped hospital with 

a complete medical staff. One unit recently 

arrived from Bataan soon acquired a dispensary, a medical officer, and a hospital of 

sorts. Such facilities were acquired by various means and, when requisitions failed to 

bring the needed supplies, sometimes "an 

old friend and drinking companion" could 

be found in the tunnel hospital. 

None of these units was able to treat serious injuries or ailments; only the Malinta 

Hospital could provide treatment for such 

cases. And it was, in the view of some, reluctant to do so unless the patient was 

brought in-not an easy task during the 

bombardment. "Our malaria cases had increased," wrote Captain Gulick, whose battery had come from Bataan, ". . . yet the 

hospital refused to send an ambulance." 

When informed that the men had a temperature of 1 04 degrees, Gulick wrote wrathfully, the hospital authorities suggested that 

"the men walk to the tunnel." 30 

'9 Quotes in this and the preceding paragraphs 

are from Guerrero, "The Last Days of Corregidor," The Philippine Review (May 1943). See also 

Redmond, I Served on Bataan, p. 149. 

30 Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), pp. 

145, 153-54. 

545 

The task of bringing the sick and 

wounded to the Malinta Hospital had 

always been a difficult one. Now it became 

hazardous as well. There had been onIy two 

ambulances at the start of the campaign, 

and one of these had been quickly destroyed. 

The other, "in some mysterious way," had 

escaped destruction and was still in operation. 31 Its services had to be supplemented 

by the vehicles of those units whose men 

required hospitalization, a fact which the 

men did not always appreciate. 

The effects of the continuous bombardment could be seen not only in the mounting 

toll of wounded but in the haggard faces of 

the men. Shelling robbed men of sleep; short 

rations, of needed vitamins and energy. 

"The strain," wrote an officer, "is beginning to tell. The men looked and acted 

weary." S2 For the first time cases of battle 

fatigue were reported to the hospital. Some 

men, such as the one whose friend's "shelltorn head flew past his face," went out of 

their minds.ss But the number of mental 

cases reported was surprisingly small. The 

Corregidor surgeon noted only "six to eight" 

throughout the campaign. He could not account for the low rate of psychotic and neurotic disorders but offered the theory that it 

was due to the fact that there was no rear 

area to send the men for rest, no letup in 

the bombardment. "Here the war was 

always with us," he explained, "and once 

the adjustment was made, there were no 

new adjustments to be made." S4 

31 Cooper, Med Dept Activities, p. 11, Annex 

XIV, USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns. 

"Barr, Btry M, 60th CA (AA), p. 17, copy in 

OCMH. 

"Redmond, I Served on Bataan, p. 142. 

" Cooper, Med Dept Activities, pp. 18,84. In this 

connection see the report by Sitter, Psychiatric Reactions Observed on Corregidor and Bataan and in 

Japanese Captivity, copy in OCMH. 
546 

Perhaps the most alarming consequence 

of the Japanese bombardment was the damage to the power plant which operated the 

water pumps and searchlights, raised and 

lowered the big guns, and supplied Malinta 

Tunnel with fresh air and light. The main 

power plant at Bottomside had been damaged repeatedly but never so seriously that 

it could not be repaired. The large seacoast 

batteries had their own emergency generators but their use required fuel "and the 

Staff," as Colonel Bunker observed, "won't 

give us enough gas for that." 3~ There was a 

reserve dynamo in the tunnel and another 

smaller engine for emergency use in the hospital, but even these sometimes would fail 

and more than once surgery was performed 

by flashlight. By the end of April the main 

power plant was operating at only a fraction 

of its capacity and General Moore estimated 

that Corregidor would be without power in 

another month. 

The suppiy of water, already critical, became the most important single problem for 

the men on Corregidor. It was the dry season and there had been no rain for months. 

The level of the reservoirs on the islands 

dropped rapidly and there was no way to 

replenish the supply. Enemy shells were constantly striking the pumps, puncturing the 

water pipes, or damaging the power plant. 

So frequently did this occur that it was possible to pump water into the reservoirs only 

one day during the month of April. The rest 

of the time either the pumps or the power 

plant were out of commission. 

So serious had the shortage of water become by the end of the month that the daily 

allowance for personal use had been reduced 

to one canteen. For men who had to do 

heavy physical work in the open on a sun3. Bunker, Diary, entry of 12 Apr 42. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

baked tropical island where the temperature 

soared up to 100 degrees during midday and 

where the dust from explosions lay heavy, 

the lack of water was not only a major in~, 

convenience but a serious threat to health. 

Men used their slim ration of water with 

the greatest care, took "handerchief baths" 

and devised ingenious methods to make a 

canteen last through the day. "Many a 

night," wrote Captain Gulick, "I washed 

myself with a cup of water and by standing 

in a basin saved the water to use over again 

on, first, my underwear, and then my socks. 

Order of laundering was very important. 

The dirtiest item always came last. . . !' 36 

Showers became a rare luxury and men 

spoke of them with as much longing as they 

did of steaks smothered in mushrooms, 

French fried potatoes, crisp salads, and ice 

cream. 

The Preassault Bombardment 

At the beginning of May, Japanese artillery and aircraft opened the final phase of 

the bombardment, the phase in which, 

Homma's orders read, they would "overwhelmingly crush" the island's defenses and 

"exterminate" its defenders, "especially the 

ones concealed in wooded areas." 37 By that 

time all forces were ready and began to 

move into position for the assault. As soon 

as the remaining guns, searchlights, and 

pillboxes had been destroyed and the beach 

obstacles blasted out of the way, the troops 

of the 4th Division would embark for 

Corregidor. 

The Americans received their first hint 

of the Japanese landing plan on 1 May 

when artillery fire from Bataan was con-

'" Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), p. 

156, 

.. 14th Army Opns, II, 53. 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 

centrated on the narrow tail of the island 

and on the area around James Ravine, 

which provided a pathway from the beach 

to Topside. The intensity of the attack was 

hardly justified by the installations remaining in either area. Observers could only 

conclude that the enemy was concentrating 

his fire in preparation for the landing.38 

The attack on 1 May was discouraging to 

those who believed that the bombardment 

of 29 April represented the enemy's maximum effort. The first shells began dropping 

before dawn and continued until midnight. 

At 1515 the 27 4th air alarm of the war was 

sounded and eight bombers dropped their 

loads before the entrances to Malinta Tunnel. "Much mess equipment, motor transportation and communications destroyed," 

General Moore noted in his report. 39 A half 

hour later, then twice more before dark, air 

alarms sounded and bombs dropped on the 

island. That night, when Lt. CoL Earl L. 

Barr, executive officer of the 60th Coast 

Artillery (AA), returned to Malinta Tunnel 

from a visit to the antiaircraft battery at 

Kindley Field, he encountered a "morguelike gloom.'" 40 

The next day was even worse. The artillery from Bataan opened up at 0730, then 

the planes came in. It was not until three 

hours later that the all clear sounded. The 

respite lasted only thirty minutes, after 

which the Japanese guns opened fire again. 

Until 1945, except for two lulls of one and 

two hours' duration, the attacks were continuous. During a five-hour period of the 

day, 3,600 shells of 240-mm. caliber, in 

addition to shells of other sizes, fell in the 

vicinity of Batteries Geary and Crockett on 

IS The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 

12, 15 Nov 43, p. 46, MID WD. 

.. Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 64. 

•• Barr, Btry M, 60th CA (AA), p. 15. 

547 

Topside. The rate of fire of the 240-mm. 

howitzers alone was twelve shells per minute. "Moore and I," wrote General Wainwright, "delving further into the mathematics of the fury, estimated . . . that the 

Japs had hit the rock with 1,800,000 pounds 

of shells," in addition to the bombs dropped 

by Japanese aircraft during thirteen air 

raids.41 It was the heaviest concentration of 

fire yet experienced on Corregidor. 

As on the day before, th~ attacks of the 

2d were directed at the north shore in those 

areas where the landing would be made. 

It was on this day that the Battery Geary 

magazine was hit and the entire battery 

destroyed with a "shock like that of an 

earthquake." 42 The entire shore line facing 

Bataan was heavily worked over and Bottomside, "except for the Power Plant and 

Cold Storage Plant which had an almost 

charmed life," was thoroughly saturated 

with shells of all calibers. "It was a nasty 

place to cross ... ," wrote one man. "One 

felt positively in the spotlight for artillery 

batteries on Bataan as he walked from the 

Power Plant to the tunnel." 43 

Malinta Hill and the area to the east 

received a heavy shellacking also on the 2d. 

At the end of the day the whole tail of the 

island was covered by a cloud of dust and 

small fires were burning everywhere, "in 

the shell-scarred tree trunks and stumps," 

and in the woods. Fanned by a brisk west 

wind, the fires spread rapidly and were 

brought under control only after all the men 

in the area had turned fire fighters. 44 

U Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

110-12. Wainwright states that this weight of shells 

fell on 4 May, not the 2d, but he attributes his 

figures to General Moore who places the attacks on 

the 2d. Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 65. 

.. Hopkins, Personal and Official Notes of Btry C, 

60th CA (AA), entry of 2 May 42, Gen Info . •• Ibid . 

.. Barr, Btry M, 60th CA (AA), p. 15 . 
548 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

• 

JAPANESE BOMBERS OVER CORREGIDOR 

Sunday, 3 May, was a repetition of the 

day before. There were five air-raid alarms 

during the day, with the planes again concentrating on James Ravine and Kindley 

Field. The enemy aircraft over the field met 

no fire from the antiaircraft batteries, whose 

guns and height finders had already been 

damaged or destroyed. Artillery fire during 

the day was so heavy that the dust blinded 

the spotters observing counterbattery fire. 

"Situation here is fast becoming desperate," 

Wainwright reported to General MacArthur at the end of the day's action. 

"With artillery that outranges anything we 

have except two guns, he [the-enemy] keeps 

up a terrific bombardment as well as aerial 

bombing."l., 

That night an American submarine on 

patrol in the South China Sea stopped out-

"Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 392, 3 

May 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

side the mine channel for an hour before 

returning to Australia for torpedoes. It took 

out 25 passengers, all that could be crowded 

into its tight interior. Among the passengers 

'were Colonel Constant Irwin, who carried 

a complete roster of all Army, Navy, and 

~larine personnel still alive; Col. Royal G. 

Jenks, a finance officer, with financial accounts; Col. Milton A. Hill, the inspector 

general, 3 other Army and 6 Navy officers, 

and abou t 13 nurses. Included in the cargo 

sent from Corregidor were several bags of 

mail, the last to go out of the Philippines, 

and "many USAFFE and USFIP records 

and orders." 4" 

"Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, pp. 67-68. All 

or part of these records ultimately reached The 

Adjutant General and are on file in the Historical 

Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, 

AGO. They were used in the preparation of this 

volume and arc cited by their appropriate AG 

number, followed by the symbol Phil Reds. Other 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 

The intensity of the air and artillery bombardment reached a new peak on 4 May, 

despite Wainwright's belief that "the tempo 

of the Jap shelling" could not "possibly be 

increased." 47 Japanese fire from Bataan 

that day was the heaviest of the campaign 

and totaled 16,000 shells of all calibers in a 

period of 24 hours. So intense was the bombardment, so continuous the "drum-fire of 

bursting shells," that it resembled machine 

gun fire in its staccato regularity!8 As before, the chief targets were the beach defenses along the north shore at James Ravine and between North and Cavalry Points. 

Observation planes overhead adjusted artillery fire while bombers, in six separate attacks, concentrated on the east end of the 

island and on the few remaining vessels of 

the inshore patrol. 

During the day observers on Topside had 

sighted fifteen landing barges off the southeast coast of Bataan, moving north. The observers thought the enemy vessels were trying to get out of range of American counterbattery fire; more probably they were 

headed toward Lamao to pick up the assault troops. There was little doubt by now 

that a Japanese landing would soon come. 

The ability of the Corregidor garrison to 

withstand a Japanese assault after the conrecords had been sent to Australia by air, directed 

to General Sutherland. So far as is known this latter 

group of records has never reached the files of The 

Adjutant General. Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, 

No. 261, 13 Apr 42, AG 370.05 GHQ SWPA. A 

partial list of the contents of this shipment, which 

included the general staff journals and supporting 

documents, is contained in hr, Irwin to TAG, 12 

Apr 42, sub: Transmittal of Docs, USFIP G-3 

Journa1. 

4. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

110. 

"Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 69. The 

number of shells is estimated in The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 12, 15 Nov 43, p. 

46, MID WD. 

549 

tinuous shelling of the past three weeks was 

doubtful. There had been six hundred casualties since 9 April and those who had escaped injury were in poor physical condition. Most of the coastal guns and searchlights had been destroyed and the beach defenses had suffered extensive damage. The 

sandbagged machine gun positions had been 

so battered that they presented "a topsyturvy appearance." 49 "Considering the present level of morale," Wainwright informed 

General Marshall on the 4th in response to 

a request for his frank opinion, "I estimate 

that we have something less than an even 

chance to beat off an assault." 50 

But the Japanese were not yet ready for 

the assault. They needed one more day to 

complete the destruction of Corregidor's defenses and on the morning of the 5th opened 

up with everything they had. While the batteries on Cavite laid down a barrage on the 

southern shore of the island, the Bataan batteries gave the north shore the most terrific 

pounding of the war. "There was a steady 

roar from Bataan," wrote Captain Gulick, 

"and a mightier volume on Corregidor. A 

continuous pall of dust and debris hung over 

everything. There was a feeling of doom 

mingled with wonder. . . ." ~l 

.. The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 

12, 15 Nov 43, p. 50, MID WD. In a message to 

General MacArthur on the 3d, Wainwright summarized his losses to date. He had left at that time four 

12-inch guns; one 12-inch mortar; sixteen 155-mm. 

guns, only nine of which bore on Bataan; and seven 

3-inch guns, of which four bore on Bataan. "Serious 

losses in AA fire control equipment and searchlights," he went on, "renders AA ineffective, except 

one battery. Great toll has been taken of machine 

guns both ground and AA, as well as automatic 

weapons of all types." Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 392, 3 May 42, AG 384.1, GHQ 

SWPA. 

•• The message is reproduced in full in Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 112-13. 

U Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), p. 

184. 
550 

From Corregidor there was little answering fire. Only three ISS-mm. guns remained 

in operation; practically all the other seacoast artillery, the famous batteries of Corregidor-the I2-inch mortars and rifles, the 

6-, 8-, and 10-inch disappearing gunswere silent. The I4-inch guns of Forts Drum 

and Frank were still able to fire, but targets 

on Bataan were at extreme range and, except for the guns on Fort Drum, their fire 

was sporadic. 

The bombardment of the 5th destroyed 

the little that was left to stop a Japanese assault. Those beach defense guns along the 

north shore which had given away their 

positions were knocked out, searchlights 

were put out of action, land mines detonated, barbed wire entanglements torn up, 

and machine gun emplacements caved in. 

By the end of the day, wrote General Moore, 

the beach defenses on the north side of the 

island "were practically non-existent." 52 

All wire communication was gone by late 

afternoon. Telephone lines were torn up by 

the exploding shells and all efforts to repair 

them were unavailing. One battery commander repaired the line to his battalion 

headquarters, but "three minutes after the 

job was done the line was out again." "This 

time," he wrote despairingly, "we couldn't 

even locate the broken ends." 53 "Command," observed General Moore, "could 

be exercised and intelligence obtained only 

by use of foot messengers," a means of communication, he added, which was "uncertain under the heavy and continuous artillery and air action." 54 

When the bombardment let up momentarily late in the afternoon the dust lay so 

.. Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 71. 

... Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91st CA (PS), p. 

187. 

50 Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 72. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

heavy over the island that the men on Topside could hardly make out the features of 

Bottomside below them. Beyond that they 

could not see. Even the topography of the 

island had changed. Where there had been 

thick woods and dense vegetation only 

charred stumps remained. The rocky 

ground had been pulverized into a fine dust 

and the road along the shore had been 

literally blown into the bay. Portions of the 

cliff had fallen in and debris covered the 

entire island. The Corregidor of peacetime, 

with its broad lawns and luxuriant vegetation, impressive parade ground, spacious 

barracks, pleasant shaded clubs and bungalows, its large warehouses and concrete 

repair shops, Waf, gone. The island lay 

"scorched, gaunt, and leafless, covered with 

the chocolate dust of countless explosions 

and pitted with shellholes." 55 

Men were living on nerve alone, and 

morale was dropping rapicily. All hope of 

reinforcement had long since disappeared. 

There was only enough water to last four 

more days at most and no prospect that the 

pipes and pumps could be repaired. In any 

event the power plant would not last more 

than a few weeks. There was a limit to 

human endurance and that limit, General 

Wainwright told the President, "has long 

since been passed." 56 

So intense a bombardment in so concentrated an area could only mean that the 

Japanese had completed their preparations 

for the assault. "It took no mental giant," 

wrote Wainwright, "to figure out, by May 5, 

1942, that the enemy was ready to come 

against Corregidor." 57 He already knew 

"Guerrero, "The Last Days of Corregidor." 

06 The full text of the message, sent on 6 May 

1942, is in Wainwright, General Wainwright's 

Story, pp. 122-23. 

57 Ibid., p. 114. 
THE LAST TWENTY-SEVEN DAYS 

from agents in Manila that the Japanese 

4th Division had completed landing maneuvers and that thousands of bamboo 

ladders, to be used presumably to scale the 

cliffs of Corregidor, had been built. The 

moon would be full that night. 

At 2100, just after a particularly intense 

concentration on the eastern end of the 

island the sound locators of the antiaircraft 

command picked up the noise of the motors 

of a large number of landing barges in the 

vicinity of Limay. The information was relayed to H Station, General Moore's command post in Malinta Tunnel, which alerted 

all units and ordered beach defense troops 

to their stations. About an hour later barges 

551 

were observed approaching the tail of the 

island and at 2230 the order went out to 

"prepare for probable landing attack.":;' 

The full moon, "veiled by streaks of heavy 

black clouds," was just rising when, shortly 

before midnight, the Japanese artillery fire 

suddenly ceased and "its bass roar was replaced by the treble chattering of many 

small arms." 3:1 A few minutes later a runner from the beach defense command post 

arrived at H Station with the news that thc 

Japanese had landed at North Point. 

"" Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 71. 

,. Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 91 st CA (PS), 

p. 188. 
CHAPTER XXXI 

The Fall of Corregidor 

For almost a month the Japanese had 

been preparing for this moment. Every prt"-

caution had been taken to insure the success 

of the assault and so bring to an end the 

six-month-Iong campaign to take the Philippines. Yet General Homma watched the 

troops embark for the shores of Corregidor 

with trepidation. Of the three critical moments of the campaign, he told the military 

commission at his trial, "this was the 

third." 1 

The troops in the assault craft that approached the north shore of Corregidor on 

the night of 5 May were from General 

Kitano's 4th Division. Homma's plan, it 

will be recalled, had provided for two landings, to be made on successive nights at 

opposite ends of the island, and Kitano had 

accordingly organized his reinforced division into two forces: a left (east) wing and 

a right (west) wing. The first, which was 

landing on Corregidor on the night of the 

5th, consisted of the 61st Infantry, reinforced with tanks from the 7th Tank Regiment, and artillery and service elements. It 

was led by Col. Gempachi Sato, commander 

of the 61 st. The right wing, under the 4th 

Division infantry group commander, Maj. 

Gen. Kureo Taniguchi, was the stronger of 

the two forces and was composed of the 

37th Infantry, one battalion of the 8th In1 USA vs. Homma, p. 3095, testimony of Homma. 

The other two critical moments came during the 

Lingayen landing and after the abortive effort in 

late January and early February to break through 

the Orion-Bagac line on Bataan. 

fantry, an element of the 7th Tank Regiment, several artillery units, and service elements. It was to land the following night on 

the beach below Topside, near James 

Ravine." (Map 23) 

14th Army had completed its preparations for the coming assault during the latter part of April. Ammunition, heavy equipment, and landing boats had been brought 

to the assembly area, working parties organized to handle the supplies, and combat 

troops put through the final stages of training. When the landing boats of the 1st Sea 

OPeration Unit had been assembled and 

equipped, the 4th Division began amphibious training along the east coast of Bataan, 

north of Limay, and the 16th Division did 

the same in the Cavite area. Rehearsals had 

been held and equipment tested at the end 

of the month to put everything in order for 

the final test. 

The Japanese fully expected the fight to 

be a hard one. The troops making the landing had been carefully trained in landing 

operations and close-in fighting. Special attention had been given to methods of removing beach obstacles and reducing strongly 

fortified positions, and provision was made 

for the use of smoke screens. Enough rations, 

• This account of Japanese plans and preparations 

is based upon: 14th Army Opns, I, 173-207, II, 

Annexes 7-12; 5th Air GP Opns, pp. 78-84; USA 

vs. Homma, pp. 3089-94, testimony of Homma; 

Statement of Col Yoshida, 9 Feb 50, ATIS Doc 

62644, Statements of Japanese Officials on World 

War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 553-57. 
THE FALL OF CORREGIDOR 

fuel, and ammunition to last one week had 

been issued to the troops. In anticipation of 

a water shortage, extra canteens had been 

distributed and provision made for an additional supply of fresh water at the target. 

On 27 April-at a conference attended by 

representatives of the 4th Division, 14th 

Army artillery, the 22d Air Brigade, and the 

Navy-liaison and co-operation between the 

assault units, the artillery, and the air forces 

had been arranged. Two days later the air 

force had begun the final phase of its operations and for a week concentrated on targets 

along the north shore of Corregidor and on 

enemy shipping in the bay. On 5 May Maj. 

Gen. Kizo Mikami, commanding the 22d 

Air Brigade, had had reconnaissance and 

bombardment aircraft over Corregidor constantly to report on the movement of troops 

on the island and to soften up the enemy 

defenses. 

The artillery had begun its preparatory 

fire on 1 May and by the evening of the 5th 

had laid waste the entire north shore of 

Corregidor. That night, after the first troops 

had embarked at Lamao, the artillery concentrated first on the remaining mobile 

guns and searchlights on the island and then 

on the stretch of beach between Infantry 

and Cavalry Points. Just before the landing, 

the artillery had shifted its fire westward, to 

Malinta Hill. To assist in artillery fire that 

night and next day, General Kitajima had 

placed a liaison group of sixty men in the 

assault boats. They would go ashore with 

the first waves and establish artillery observation posts on Malinta Hill as soon as it 

was taken. 

By the time the artillery and air forces 

had opened the final phase of the bombardment, the 4th Division had won its fight 

against malaria and was ready to move into 

the assembly area. On 4 May, X minus 1, 

553 

Colonel Sato had assembled his left wing 

units in the Lamao River valley, near Cabcaben, and the next day marched them to 

Lamao where, at dusk, they began to embark for Corregidor. The run to the island 

was made in darkness, the troops expecting 

to land about 2300, an hour before moonrise. Earlier that day, after Sato moved out, 

General Taniguchi's right wing assembled 

near Cabcaben in preparation for their assault the next night, 6 May. 

Colonel Sato's plan was to land the first 

waves at high tide near Cavalry Point, on 

the north shore of the narrow tip of the 

island. Later waves were to come in shortly 

after and land to the right (west), between 

Cavalry and Infantry Points. As soon as the 

beachhead was secure, the troops in the first 

wave, about a battalion in size, would drive 

south toward Kindley Field. The rest of 

Sato's force would push west toward Malinta Hill which was to be occupied by daybreak, 6 May. (Map 25) 

On the night of 6 May, General Taniguchi's right wing would embark at Lamao 

and head for the north shore of Corregidor, 

between Battery and Morrison Points. If all 

went well the men would land a half hour 

before midnight and move inland, presumably through James Ravine. One portion of the force was to strike across the 

island to the south shore; the rest eastward 

toward Malinta Hill. Meanwhile, Colonel 

Sato's men were to resume their advance 

westward from Malinta Hill to join the 

right wing. When the two groups met, they 

would combine, under Taniguchi's command, to mop up any remaining enemy 

resistance. By X plus 2, 7 May, if all went 

well, the battle for Corregidor would be 

over. 

The plan miscarried almost immediately. 

At the time the men embarked, the tide on 
554 

JAPANESE LANDINGS 

ON CORREGIDOR 

5-6 May 1942 

All positions or, oPP,olimote 

EI.~a';Dns in I •• , 

MAP 25 

the Bataan shore was flowing west, out of 

Manila Bay. The Japanese took it for 

granted that the current off Corregidor 

would be flowing west also. Contrary to expectation, the current at the target flowed 

in the opposite direction and the landing 

force "was naturally swept away." , Instead 

of arriving off Corregidor between Infantry 

and Cavalry Points, the selected landing site, 

it approached the island at a point about 

1,000 yards to the east, near North Point. 

Most of the officers who had planned the 

landing had not "dreamed that there would 

be any slip-ups." They thought the peculiar 

shape of the island would forestall any 

errors. But, as one Japanese officer later 

wrote, "the island lost its odd shape as it 

3 Statement of Yoshida, 9 Feb 50, A TIS Doc 

62644, Statements of Japanese Officials on World 

War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 554. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

North Pt. 

U Brooles 

was approached and it did not serve as a 

particular landmark." 4 

Most of the 4th Division staff attributed 

their difficulty in part to the 1st Sea 0 peration Unit. They felt that the boats were 

handled inefficiently and that the commander did not have the unit under control 

during the embarkation and the journey to 

the target. Because the men of the 1st Sea 

Operation U nit had had experience in 

shore-to-shore operations in the Singapore 

campaign, and were "high-spirited," 4th 

Division officers felt they had "made light" 

of the Corregidor assault and failed to train 

adequately. "The unit later discovered," 

wrote Colonel Yoshida, "that it had paid 

dearly for this lack." 5 

4 Ibid. 

, Ibid. See also Statement of Col Oishi, 2 Oct 50, 

A TIS Doc 62639, ibid., III, 116. 
THE FALL OF CORREGIDOR 

Not only did the Japanese come in east 

of the designated beaches, but they became 

separated during the approach and landed 

at different times and at some distance 

from each other. The landing plan had provided that the two battalions of the 61st 

Infantry land abreast, with the 1st Battalion 

on the right (west). Off Cabcaben, in the 

assembly area, Colonel Sato, who was with 

the 1st Battalion, discovered that the 2d 

Battalion, which should have been on his 

left, had "strayed" and was now on his right 

flank. Charitably attributing this error "to 

the mental strain" and the "distractions" 

of the commander of the landing craft, Sato 

ordered the 1st Battalion to go ahead. The 

2d Battalion was to follow and to change 

course so that it would reach the beach in 

its proper place on the left of the formation. 

It was never able to do so or to catch up 

with the 1st Battalion. 

Colonel Sato might have corrected the 

formation by sending the 1st Battalion westward so that it would once again become 

the right element. Actually such a course 

would have compensated partially for the 

eastward drift of the entire flotilla, but he 

had no way of knowing this. What he feared 

most was his own artillery fire. The landing 

plan provided for the bombardment on the 

right ( west) of the landing beaches "to 

cover its right flank," and if the landing craft 

veered too far to the right, they would come 

under friendly fire. It was for this reason, 

explained one officer, that "the unit kept 

on drifting to the left without even knowing the exact location of the landing point." 6 

This confusion during the approach, plus 

the failure to make proper allowance for 

• Statement of Yoshida, ibid., IV, 554, 555. See 

also USA vs. Homma, pp. 3091-92, testimony of 

Homma. 

555 

current and tide, brought the Japanese to 

the wrong beaches and in the wrong order. 

The 2d Battalion, which had "strayed" to 

the right, never recovered from its initial 

error and came in late. The 1st Battalion arrived somewhat east of the place designated 

for the 2d Battalion, which found itself 

coming in toward a strange shore near the 

tail of the island and far from the area upon 

which the artillery had laid down its preparatory fire. Mutual support of the two 

battalions, which had been provided for in 

this plan, was impossible. "Thus," explained 

Colonel Yoshida, "the Division was forced 

to start fighting under disadvantageous conditions. . . . A long, desperate struggle and 

heavy sacrifices were required to break the 

situation." 7 

The Americans and Filipinos on shore, 

unaware of the confusion in the Japanese 

r~nks and still reeling under the effects of 

the bombardment, met the enemy with 

every weapon they could muster. One 2-gun 

75-mm. battery near the tail of the island, 

just east of North Point, had never disclosed 

its position and it opened fire, together with 

some 37-mm. guns, at a range of about 300 

yards, on the incoming landing craft. The 

few remaining searchlights were turned on 

but were quickly shot out by artillery fire 

from Bataan. But there was enough light for 

the guns on shore from the tracers which 

"like a 4th of July display danced and 

sparkled pinkly from Kindley Field to Monkey Point." 8 At point-blank range they 

struck the surprised and confused Japanese, 

sank a number of the boats, and caused 

many casualties. "Beach defense officers at 

, Statement of Yoshida, IV, 553. 

• Gulick, Memoirs of Btry C, 9Ist CA (PS), p. 

188, copy in OCMH. See also Harbor Defenses Rpt 

of Opns,.p. 73. 
556 

SEARCHLIGHT ON CORREGIDOR 

the scene," wrote an observer, "reported that 

the slaughter of the Japanese in their barges 

was sickening." n 

By this time the moon had risen and the 

clouds had drifted away. Thus, when the 

2d Battalion of Colonel Sato's 6151 Infantry 

approached the shore shortly before midnight, it was clearly visible to the men on the 

beach. There was now enough light for artillery fire, and the Americans opened up with 

everything they had. The remaining I2-inch 

mortar of Battery Way went into action with 

a boom, followed by the shriek of the rotating bands. From nearby Fort Hughes came 

fire from the mortars of Battery Craighill 

while the remaining smaller guns at both 

forts, the 3-inchers and the 75's, dropped 

their shells on the landing barges nearing the 

shore. To the Japanese in the smaIl boats it 

"The Siege of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 

12, 15 Nov 43, p. 48, MID WD. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

seemed as though "a hundred guns rained 

red-hot steel on them.'· Eyewitnesses at 

Cabcaben described the scene as "a spectacle that confounded the imagination, surpassing in grim horror anything we had ever 

seen before." '" 

The Japanese, who had believed they 

could come ashore "without shedding 

blood, " lost heavily during the landing. 

Although the 1st Battalion reached the 

beach on schedule under supporting fire 

from 14th Army artillery, it was hard hit. 

Estimates of its casualties varied from 50 to 

75 percent.lJ Casualties in the battalion 

which came in late exceeded those of the 

first landing, one Japanese officer placing 

the number of drowned alone in his own 

unit at 50 percent. Total casualties for both 

landings were estimated at several hundred, 

and one Japanese officer claimed that only 

800 men of the 2,000 who made the attempt 

reached the shore."" 

Though the J a panese attempted no further landing that night the Americans believed that they had and that it had been 

frustrated. At about 0440, as dawn was 

breaking, small boats believed to be landing 

barges were seen approaching the Bottomside area of Corregidor. All remaining guns 

were directed to fire on these craft and on 

Cabcaben where other boats could be seen. 

Battery Stockade, with two ISS-mm. fixed 

10 Kazumaro Uno, Corregidor: Isle of Delusion 

(Press Bureau, Imperial Japanese Army, GHQ, 

China, September 1942), p. 19. This is a wartime 

propaganda book written in English by a press corT('-

spondent who was an eyewitness to the landing and 

interviewed pa rticipants. 

11 I bid., p. 17. Uno states that "less than 30 perc('nt of the" men reached the shore." Colonel Yoshida 

states that losses in this wave were slight, but does 

not indicat~ their exten t. Statement of Yoshida, p. 

556. 

12 Harbor Defenses Rpt of OPl1S, p. 73; The Siege 

of Corregidor, Mil Rpts on UN, No. 12, 15 Nov 43, 

p. 49, MID WD. 
THE FALL OF CORREGIDOR 

guns and two more roving batteries, hit the 

approaching formation with damaging 

effect. Fort Drum opened fire at a range of 

20,000 yards and dropped over 100 founds 

on the vessels. Ordered to shift fire to the 

North Channel, the commander at Drum 

replied that he could not see any targets because of the dense cloud of smoke and dust 

over Corregidor. "Just fire in the smoke, 

anywhere between you and Cabcaben," he 

was told, "and you can't miss them." 13 

Though the Americans were mistaken in 

their belief that they had driven off a third 

assault, they had succeeded in sinking and 

damaging many more of the enemy's fleet 

of small boats. Between half and two thirds 

of the landing craft leaving Bataan that 

night had been put out of action. When 

Homma received the report of "the disastrous state" of his troops and the loss in 

landing craft he was thrown into an "agony 

of mind." 14 

The situation was not as bad as Homma 

believed. Troops of the 1st Battalion, 61 sf 

Infantry, had come ashore near North Point 

at about 2310, and, after a brief fight with 

the men of Company A, 4th Marines, stationed along the north shore from Malinta 

Hill to the east tip of the island, had established a beachhead on the island. One portion of the battalion advanced south across 

the tail to the south shore and by 0100 had 

reached Monkey Point and cut off those 

troops on the eastern tip. The rest of the battalion had turned west and advanced along 

the axis of the island toward Malinta Hill, 

the main objective of the landing. By 0130 

this force had taken the position formerly 

occupied by Battery Denver on a ridge in 

'" Fort Drum Annex, p. 10, Exhibit M, Harbor 

Defenses Rpt of Opns. 

,. USA vs. Homma, pp. 3093-94, testimony of 

Homma. 

557 

the narrow neck between Infantry and Cavalry Points. There the Japanese established 

a north-south line across the island. I" Already the tanks and artillery were coming 

ashore. 

Thus far, the fighting had been confused 

and un-co-ordinated. The 1st Battalion, 4th 

Marines, holding the East Sector and a 

shore line about 10,000 yards long, had only 

one company on the north shore, with one 

platoon posted in the area where the Japanese landed. Opposition at the beaches, 

therefore, had been slight and the Japanese 

had been able to advance swiftly. It was 

only when he heard voices "not American" 

that a marine on Denver Hill realized the 

enemy had reached that point. "The place," 

he wrote, "seemed to have Japs all over 

it." 10 Not until 0200, when the situation 

had clarified, was it discovered that only 

two platoons stood between the enemy and 

Malinta Tunnel. At that time the first elements of the reserve, two companies, were 

committed. 

Meanwhile General Moore had stripped 

his seacoast batteries to provide additional 

troops for the beach defenses. At the first 

news of the landing, men from the 59th 

Coast Artillery (Batteries Cheney, Wheeler, 

and Crockett) were made available to Colonel Howard. Later other coast and antiaircraft artillerymen were released from 

their assignments and formed as infantry 

troops. 

" The action on the island is reconstructed from: 

Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," 

Part 3, Marine Corps Gazette (January 1947), pp. 

23-29; Howard, 4th Marines Rpt of Opns, pp. 19-

21, USMC Hist Sec; Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, 

pp. 72-75; Dalness, Opns of the Prov Bn, 4th 

Marines, pp. 10-18; Statement of Yoshida, pp. 

555-56. 

" Quoted in Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at 

Corregidor," Part 3, Marine Corps Gazette (January 1947), p. 24. 
558 

Placing these men in position east of Malinta Hill proved a most difficult task. They 

had to move from their battery positions, 

across Bottomside which was under intermittent but intense enemy artillery fire, into 

Malinta Tunnel via the west entrance, 

through the tunnel, then out by way of the 

east entrance. By this time the Japanese 

were concentrating artillery fire on this entrance, the only avenue of approach to the 

thin line in front of the Japanese. One enemy barrage caught Battery C of the 59th 

Coast Artillery on its way across Bottomside, 

killing one officer and wounding a number 

of men. 

Between 0200 and 0400 the Japanese 

made no advances but threw back three 

counterattacks against their Denver Battery 

line. While their artillery continued to 

pound away at Malinta Hill and the area 

to the west, pinning the Americans and 

Filipinos to the ground, the men of the 2d 

Battalion, 61 st Infantry, joined their comrades in the 1st Battalion. With these reinforcements, Colonel Sato was able to increase the pressure on the Marine line in 

front of him. 

At 0430 Colonel Howard decided to send 

in the last of his reserves. The danger of a 

break-through was too serious to delay any 

longer. With the 2d and 3d Battalions, 4th 

Marines, held in place in the Middle and 

West Sectors by the threat of additional 

landings, he had only the untrained men of 

the 4th Provisional Battalion and the artillerymen. These he sent into the line with 

orders to counterattack and regain control 

of the east end of the island. 

It was an impossible assignment. The 4th 

Provisional Battalion, led by Maj. Francis 

Williams, USMC, was not a battalion at all. 

Many of its officers and most of its men 

were neither qualified nor trained as infanTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

trymen; it was not organized as a battalion 

of infantry and did not have the equipment 

and weapons normal in an infantry battalion. It was, one of the officers remarked, 

simply "a group of 500 sailors with 500 

rifles-nothing more." 17 

The 4th Provisional Battalion had moved 

into Malinta- Tunnel earlier that morning 

and had been waiting at the east entrance 

for several hours when it received orders to 

counterattack. During that time the men 

had suffered acute discomfort from the heat 

and dust and from the concussion of shells 

falling just outside the entrance. They had 

witnessed also a steady stream of wounded 

marines brought into the tunnel past their 

position, a sight that "did little to boost the 

morale of the men about to move into the 

battle area." 18 

At 0430 Major Williams moved his battalion out in a column of companies. Before the last company cleared the tunnel, 

the company at the head of the column 

had already suffered casualties from artillery fire. All along the avenue of approach 

the battalion ran into interdiction fire and 

it had gone only 500 yards before it was 

dispersed by a heavy concentration. With 

much difficulty the column was formed 

again and managed to move forward to 

within 200 yards of the front. There Major 

Williams formed a skirmish line, and the 

battalion completed its journey in this formation. 

The sector assigned the provisional battalion comprised the left (north) portion 

of the thinly held line facing the Japanese 

dug in on both sides of Denver Hill. The 

right side of the line was taken over by the 

Headquarters and Service COIl1pany, 4th 

.. Dalness, Opns of the Prov Bn, 4th Marines, 

p.20. 

:IJ Ibid., p. 13. 
THE FALL OF CORREGIDOR 

Marines, plus miscellaneous Anny and Navy 

troops. In reserve were sixty men of the 59th 

Coast Artillery led by Capt. Herman H. 

Hauck. 

Preparations for the counterattack were 

completed by 0600 and fifteen minutes later 

the men moved out. The Japanese, surprised by this "obstinate and bold counterattack," 19 fell back, and the Americans 

made gains along both flanks. In the center, 

where the Japanese had emplaced a heavy 

machine gun in one of Denver Battery's gun 

pits, the counterattack stalled. Other means 

failing, Lt. Bethel B. Otter, USN, commander of Company T, 4th Provisional 

Battalion, and five volunteers set out "with 

the strong determination to get the gun that 

dealt so much misery to Company T and the 

rest of the Battalion." 20 Armed with hand 

grenades the six men crawled to within 

thirty yards of the gun pit, then hurled the 

grenades. Their aim was accurate and the 

machine gun was put out of action, but 

other Japanese troops moved in and opened 

fire on the Americans, killing Otter and four 

of the men. 

On the north end of the line, the advancing men of Company Q discovered two 

assault boats, loaded with Japanese troops, 

hung up on the rocks. A small group of 

men was sent down to the beach to pick off 

the helpless enemy. It took thirty minutes 

and the expenditure of several thousand 

rounds of ammunition for the untrained 

sailors to complete the job. 

To the Japanese the situation on Corregidor seemed desperate. They were still 

some distance from Malinta Hill, which was 

to have been occupied by dawn. Without 

10 Statement of Oishi, 2 Oct 50, ATIS Doc 62639, 

Statements of Japanese Officials on World War 11, 

GHQ FEe, Mil Intel Sec, 111, 116. 

>0 Dalness, Opns of the Prov Bn, 4th Marines, 

p. 16. 

559 

control of this hill, the landing of the 4th 

Division's right wing, scheduled for 2330 of 

the 6th, would be a risky undertaking. The 

problem was discussed at 4th Division headquarters early that morning and some members of the staff argued strongly for a 

one-day postponement of the attack scheduled for that night. The proposal was seriously considered but final decision deferred, 

pending the outcome of the day's action. 

Nothing more was done than to urge "the 

left flank unit to keep on attacking." 21 

The Japanese were worried, too, about 

their supply of ammunition, which was dangerously low. The amount originally allotted 

for the assault was adequate but the small 

boats which were to have brought ammunition ashore after the landings were in such 

haste to get out of range of American fire 

that they "threw the ammunition into the 

nearby waters and returned to Bataan." By 

1100, it was estimated, the Japanese on 

shore would have been out of ammunition. 

"When 1 recall all this," wrote Colonel 

Yoshida, "1 cannot but break into a cold 

sweat." 22 

Back at 14th Army headquarters on 

Bataan, General Homma spent a sleepless 

night waiting for the news that Malinta Hill 

had been taken. Repeatedly he sent his aide 

to 4th Division headquarters to ask about 

the progress of operations on Corregidor 

and "every time 1 was disappointed." Even 

division headquarters had no clear picture 

of the situation "because the lines of the 

hostile troops got mixed up." With the 

2,000 men he believed had been put ashore 

facing a force estimated at 14,000 men, 

there was a real danger, Homma felt, that 

his troops might be driven back into the sea. 

"I had plenty of troops on this side of the 

21 Statement of Oishi, III, 116. 

22 Statement of Yoshida, IV, 556. 
560 

sea," he explained later. "[But] I could not 

send reinforcements with the 21 boats 

which were left." The news that the Americans were counterattacking, therefore, 

threw him into a panic. "My God," he exclaimed, "I have failed miserably OIl the 

assault." 23 

Homma need not have been so concerned. Actually, the assault had not failed 

and the counterattackers had already run 

into serious trouble. Small detachments of 

Japanese had infiltrated the left of the 

American line and were firing at the rear 

of the advancing troops. The Japanese had 

also set up their light artillery and were now 

using it with devastating effect against the 

American troops on the line. Finally, at 

0800 Colonel Howard had decided to commit the last of his reserves, Captain Hauck 

and the sixty men of the 59th Coast Artillery. By this time the counterattack, though 

netting the Americans about 300 yards in 

some sectors, had bogged down for lack of 

supporting weapons and reinforcements. 

The final blow came shortly before 1000 

when the Japanese sent the three tanks they 

had brought ashore into action. The tanks 

advanced to the ridge line and, according 

to Colonel Yoshida, "annihilated the powerful enemy in the vicinity." "This action," 

he went on to explain, "not only made it 

possible for the two battalions to establish 

liaison with each other but also caused the 

enemy commander to . . . report this fact 

to the United States." 24 Though this sweeping claim for the tanks is not borne out by 

the facts, it is true that the first appearance 

of armor on the front panicked the troops 

and caused some to bolt to the rear. It took 

the combined efforts of commissioned and 

,. USA vs. Homma, pp. 3093-94, testimony of 

Homma. 

24 Statement of Yoshida, IV, 555. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

noncommissioned officers to calm the troops 

and prevent a rout. 25 "The effect of the 

tanks," concluded the Japanese, "was more 

than had been anticipated." 26 

By 1000 the situation of the Americans 

was critical. The troops on the front line 

were pinned down securely. Attempts to 

move forward were discouraged by the enemy's heavy machine guns and light artillery; movement to the rear only brought 

the men under fire from the heavier guns on 

Bataan and strafing aircraft. The tanks were 

in action and there were no weapons with 

which to stop them. Casualties had been 

heavy and the wounded men were still in 

the line. There were no litter bearers, and 

if there had been, the injured could not 

have been evacuated. The walking wounded 

were allowed to go to the rear, but most of 

those who availed themselves of this opportunity became "litter or Graves Registration 

cases." 27 Already between 600 and 800 men 

had been killed and about 1,000 more 

wounded. To continue the fight when there 

was no hope of being able to hold out longer 

than a few more hours would be a needless 

sacrifice of lives. 

Perhaps the deciding factor in the decision 

to lay down arms was the fear of what might 

happen that night. It was apparent from the 

artillery fire on James and Cheney Ravines, 

where only two companies were posted, that 

a landing would soon be made there. All reserves had been committed and practically 

all guns had been destroyed. Even if the 

Japanese did not make another landing it 

was virtually certain that the enemy on the 

east end of the island would reach the tunnel, with its 1,000 wounded men, in a few 

"Dalncss, Opns of 4th Prov Bn, 4th Marines, 

p. 17. 

,. Statement of Yoshida, IV, 555. 

"Dalness, Opns of the Prov Bn, 4th Marines, 

p. 17. 
THE FALL OF CORREGIDOR 

hours. The result would be wholesale 

slaughter.28 

On the basis of this estimate of the situation, General Wainwright at 1000 decided 

to surrender, to sacrifice one day of freedom 

in exchange for several thousand lives. Like 

General King, who had surrendered Bataan 

four weeks earlier, Wainwright had made 

his estimate and concluded there was nothing to be gained by further resistance. 

Having made his decision, Wainwright 

ordered Beebe to broadcast a surrender message to General Homma. General Moore 

was to put into effect the previously prepared plan for the destruction of all arms 

larger than .45-caliber, to be accomplished 

by noon. At that time the American flag on 

,. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 

185-86. 

561 

Corregidor would be lowered and burned 

and the white flag hoisted. These arrangements made, 'Vainwright announced his decision to President Roosevelt and General 

MacArthur. 

With broken heart and head bowed in sadness but not in shame [he told the President], 

I report ... that today I must arrange terms 

for the surrender of the fortified islands of 

Manila Bay .... Please say to the nation that 

IlW troops and I have accomplished all that is 

humanly possible and that we have upheld 

the best traditions of the United States and 

its Army .... With profound regret and with 

continued pride in my gallant troops, I go to 

meet the Japanese commander.29 

"Rad, Wainwright to Roo~evelt, 6 May 42. A 

copy of this message as well as the one to General 

MacArthur is reproduced in Wainwright, General 

Wainwright's Story, pp. 122-23. 
CHAPTER XXXII 

The End of Resistance 

General Wainwright's decision on the 

morning of 6 May to surrender to the enemy 

was the beginning of a strange series of 

events. Considerable difficulty was encountered in arranging a meeting with General 

Homma and the conference that followed 

took an entirely unexpected turn. It was not 

until midnight of the 6th, fourteen hours 

after the men on Corregidor had destroyed 

their weapons, that the Japanese agreed to 

a cessation of hostilities. 

The surrender of scattered detachments 

hiding out in the mountains of north Luzon 

and of General Sharp's Visayan-Mindanao 

Force presented even greater difficulties. 

There the last of the troops did not lay 

down their arms until almost a month later: 

Only then did the Japanese admit that organized resistance in the Philippines had 

ended and accord to their captives the status 

of prisoners of war. 

General Wainwright's Orders 

Unlike General King, who had been 

forced to violate his instructions and keep 

from his superior any knowledge of his decision to surrender the Luzon Force, Wainwright was able to make his decision 

unhindered by restrictions from higher 

headquarters. He had not always had this 

freedom of action. Until 9 April he had 

been bound, as had General MacArthur 

before him, by President Roosevelt's order 

"to fight as long as there remains any possibility of resistance." 1 On that day, the day 

of General King's surrender, the President 

modified this order and gave General Wainwright full authority to act on his own 

judgment. 

The decision to change Wainwright's instructions had been initiated in Washington 

just before the surrender of Bataan. Alerted 

by reports from MacArthur and Wainwright, Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNamey, 

acting in Marshall's absence, had informed 

the President on 8 April (Washington time) 

that the situation on Bataan was extremely 

serious and the collapse of its defense imminent. Reminding President Roosevelt of his 

instructions to MacArthur, "issued at a time 

when it appeared necessary to make very 

clear . . . the nature of the defense expected," McNamey suggested that the 

President might wish now to modify these 

instructions. "It is possible," he wrote, "that 

in the literal execution of these orders General Wainwright may be tempted to carry 

them through to an illogical extreme. I think 

there should be no doubt that his resolution 

and sense of duty will preclude any untoward or precipitous action, but on the 

other hand, it is possible that greater lati1 Rads, Roosevelt to MacArthur, No. 1029,9 Feb 

42, CofS Phil Situation File; Marshall to Wainwright, No. 1234, 24 Mar 42, Msgs to Gen Wainwright, OPD Exec O. See Chapter XX, above, for 

the relevant portions of the text of the President's 

message to MacArthur. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

tude in the final decision should be allowed 

him." 2 

President Roosevelt accepted McNamey's 

suggestion readily, and that same day, 8 

April-the 9th, Philippine time-approved 

the text of a message for Wainwright modifying his earlier instructions. Explaining that 

he was changing his orders "because of the 

state to which your forces have been reduced 

by circumstances over which you have had 

no control," the President told Wainwright 

that he was free to make "any decision affecting the future of the Bataan garrison." 

"I ... have every confidence," the President wrote, "that whatever decision you 

may sooner or later be forced to make will 

be dictated only by the best interests of your 

country and your magnificent troops." 3 

Roosevelt's message to Wainwright was 

not sent directly to Corregidor but went instead to General MacArthur in Australia 

with instructions that it be forwarded to 

Corregidor if he, MacArthur, concurred 

"both as to substance and timing." 4 The 

message reached MacArthur at about the 

same time as Wainwright's dispatch carrying the news that Bataan had surrendered. 

Since, in his view, "the action taken on 

Bataan anticipated the authority conveyed 

in the message," he saw no need to change 

2 Memo, Actg CofS for the President, 8 Apr 42, 

sub: Bataan Situation, CofS Bataan-Corregidor 

File. Washington time is thirteen hours earlier than 

Manila time. 

• Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1158, 8 Apr 

42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. Reproduced in Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 83-84. 

• The published version of the message in General 

Wainwright's Story, pages 83-84, does not contain 

the instructions to MacArthur. Apparently Wainwright received a copy of the message at the same 

time as MacArthur, but whether it was an information copy addressed to him or was piCked up unofficially by the radio operator is not known. 

563 

'Vainwright's instructions." -In effect, this 

was a "non-concurrence" of the President's 

message to Wainwright, which remained on 

his desk. 

But the progress of events had already 

invalidated MacArthur's decision. The 

President, on hearing news of the surrender 

of Bataan and before receiving MacArthur's 

reply, apparently decided that Wainwright 

needed assurance of support immediately 

and he sent him the text of his message, including the instructions given MacArthur, 

from whom, he explained, no reply had yet 

been received. "Whatever decision you have 

made," Roosevelt told Wainwright, "has 

been dictated by the best interests of your 

troops and of the country." He then wem 011 

to express the hope that Wainwright would 

be able to hold Corregidor, but assured him 

"of complete freedom of action" and "full 

confidence" in any decision he might be 

forced to make.s 

General Wainwright received the message 

on 10 April and sent an immediate acknowledgment expressing his understanding of 

the change in instructions as well as "heartfelt gratitude" for the President's confidence 

in his judgment. At the same time, he informed MacArthur of the President's message to him and of his reply. 7 

Wainwright waited in vain for a response 

from MacArthur. Although his new orders 

• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 83, 9 Apr 42, 

Msgs from Gen MacArthur, OPD Exec O. 

• Rad, Roosevelt to Wainwright, No. 1329,9 Apr 

.42, CofS Supersecret File, Bataan-Corregidor. 

MacArthur was informed of the President's action 

at the same time. Rad, McNarney to MacArthur, 

No. 1173, 8 Apr 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

7 Rads, Wainwright to Roosevelt, No. 749, 10 Apr 

42, OPD 381 P.r., Sec 1, Case 41; Wainwright to 

MacArthur, No. 204, 10 Apr 42, AG 384.1 GHQ 

SWPA. 
564 

had come directly from the President, he 

was aware that initially they had been sent 

to his immediate superior for approval. 

That approval had never been given, and 

Wainwright was understandably anxious to 

have it. On 13 April, therefore, he raised 

the subject again in a message to MacArthur. The President, he reminded MaoArthur, had stated in his original dispatch that 

it was to be forwarded if he, MacArthur, 

concurred. Since he had not yet heard from 

MacArthur on the subject, Wainwright 

wrote, he could not avoid the conclusion 

that MacArthur did not approve of the new 

orders. The President, Wainwright asserted, 

"appears to leave to my discretion the decision which 1 must ultimately make .... If 

I am not correct in this assumption I hope 

you will so advise me." 8 

General MacArthur's reply left no doubt 

that he considered Wainwright free now to 

make his own decisions. He explained why 

he had not transmitted the original dispatch, 

and then went on to say that the President's 

later message "came direct to you ... and 

now gives you complete authority to use 

your own judgment." 9 MacArthur's reply 

put an end to the correspondence on Wainwright's instructions. The final decision was 

his, and three weeks later, when he decided 

to surrender, he did so entirely on his own 

responsibility. 

The Surrender of Corregidor 

At 1030 on the morning of 6 May General Beebe stepped up to the microphone of 

the "Voice of Freedom" and in tired but 

clear tones read a message addressed to Gen8 Rad, Wainwright to MacArthur, No. 218, 13 

Apr 42, AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

• Rad, MacArthur to Wainwright, 14 Apr 42, AG 

241, GHQ SWPA. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

eral Homma "or the present commander in 

chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces on 

Luzon." The message was from General 

Wainwright and it contained his offer to 

surrender .10 

At about the same time that Beebe was 

reading Wainwright's message to Homma, 

the radio operator was flashing a message 

in code to General Sharp on Mindanao. 

This message represented Wainwright's last 

desperate effort to salvage what he could 

from defeat. In it he released to General 

Sharp's command all forces in the Philippines, except those on the four fortified 

islands in Manila Bay, and instructed Sharp 

to report to General MacArthur immediately for orders. "I believe," he told Sharp, 

"you will understand the motive behind this 

order." 11 

Wainwright's motive was clear; it was 

simply an effort to surrender as few men as 

possible. By relinquishing command of all 

troops except those in the Harbor Defenses, 

Wainwright hoped to persuade General 

Homma to accept the view that since the 

troops in the south were not under his control he could not properly be held responsible for their surrender. Had he known of 

General King's failure to persuade the J apanese to accept the surrender of the Luzon 

Force, Wainwright might well have hesitated before risking the success of the surrender negotiations by so transparent a ruse. 

The message Beebe read that morning, 

therefore, offered the surrender only of the 

four islands in Manila Bay, "together with 

all military and naval personnel and all 

" The message is printed in its entirety in Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 121. 

uRad, Wainwright to Sharp, 6 May 42, Sharp 

Papers. The Sharp Papers consist of two envelopes 

of messages and miscellaneous records belonging to 

the general and turned over to the author by Mrs. 

Sharp on Sharp's death. They are on file in OCMH. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

existing stores and equipment," by noon of 

the 6th. At that time the white flag would 

be run up over Corregidor and its garrison 

as well as those of the other island~ would 

cease fire, unless the Japanese attempted a 

landing in force. The message also covered 

in detail arrangements for a meeting between Wainwright and the Japanese commander. At noon, "if all of your firing and 

aerial bombardment has ceased," Beebe 

told the Japanese, Wainwright would send 

two staff officers by boat to Cabcaben to 

meet Homma's representative. This Japanese officer should be empowered to name 

the time and place of meeting of the two 

commanders. When these details had been 

settled and the American officer had returned to Corregidor, Wainwright would 

proceed to the designated point and there 

make the formal surrender to General 

Homma.12 

When General Beebe completed the reading of the surrender message, it was broadcast in Japanese. No reply was received and 

the Japanese gave no indication that they 

had heard either broadcast. Shells from 

Bataan continued to fall on Corregidor and 

the Japanese troops on the island, who had 

been instructed to disregard a flag of truce 

and to attack until directed otherwise by 

14th Army headquarters, continued their 

advance toward the east entrance of Malin-

'" Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

121. The account of the surrender is based upon the 

following sources: Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, pp. 119-40; USA vs. Homma, Prosecution Exhibits 418 and 419 for Depositions of 

Gens Wainwright and Moore, pp. 2364-2409 for 

testimony of Lt Col John R. Pugh, pp. 3082-88, 

3094-95, 3173-86, 3214-20 for testimony of 

Homma, pp. 2468-73 for testimony of Gen Wachi, 

p. 2590 for testimony of Nakajima; Questionnaire 

Dealing with Phil Opns, 5 Aug 49, ATIS Doc 

49692; Statement of Col Motoo Nakayama, 26 Aug 

49, ATIS Doc 50246; Leon M. Guerrero, "The Fall 

of Corregidor," Philippine Review (July 1943). 

565 

ta Tunnel. At 1100 and again at 1145 the 

message was rebroadcast, in English and 

Japanese, but still there was no reply. 

Promptly at noon, the white flag was hoisted 

over the highest point of the island and the 

troops on the four islands ceased fire. 13 

During the morning all arms larger than 

.45-caliber had been destroyed. The marines, misreading the order, had begun to 

smash their small arms as well, and others 

had followed suit until an officer had halted 

the destruction. All classified papers and 

maps had been torn or burned and lay in 

shreds and ashes on the floor of the tunnel. 

The codes and radio equipment had been 

smashed beyond recognition and the treasury of the Commonwealth Government reduced to trash. It took Col. John R. Vance, 

the finance officer, and his assistants several 

hours to cut up with scissors more than two 

million pesos. By noon, when the destruction 

was completed, Malinta Tunnel presented 

a scene of "unbelievable disorder, congestion, and confusion." 14 

The men in the tunnel had reached the 

end of their physical and mental resources. 

They were dirty, hungry, and completely 

exhausted. Some reacted violently to the 

order to destroy their arms and swore with 

bitter vehemence, but most were too tired 

to have any feelings at all. The quartermaster lateral had been thrown open and 

each man took what he wanted and went 

off to a quiet corner to eat his last meal 

before the Japanese moved in. Some lay 

,. Other flags were raised at the entrances to 

Malinta Tunnel. USA vs. Homma, Prosecution Exhibit 418, Deposition of Gen Moore. In international 

law, the white flag indicates only a desire to communicate with the enemy; it does not require the 

enemy to cease fire. FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, p. 62. 

" Col William C. Braly, The Hard Way Home 

(Washington, 1947), p. 5. See also Wainwright, 

General Wainwright's Story, p. 120. 
566 

down and went to sleep; others stared vacantly into space. "Such a sad, sad 

day ... ," wrote Mrs. Williams. "I .can't 

tell you just how terrible this is." 16 

When the Japanese failed to reply to the 

noon broadcast or to honor the flag of truce, 

Wainwright was faced with the terrible 

threat of the total destruction of his now defenseless force. He made one last effort at 

1230 to reach the Japanese commander by 

radio, but the result was the same as before. 

There was only one method left by which 

he could establish contact with General 

Homma-to send an officer forward under 

a white flag to the enemy lines to make arrangements with the local enemy commander. For this difficult and dangerous 

assignment Wainwright selected a Marine 

officer, Capt. Golland L. Clark, Jr. With a 

flag bearer, a musician, and an interpreter, 

Captain Clark set out shortly before 1300, 

during a lull in the battle. As the group 

passed through the American lines, the 

music sounded out and the flag bearer 

waved his white standard, a sheet tied to a 

pole. The Japanese allowed them to march 

through no man's land without interference, 

and in due time Captain Clark was taken to 

a colonel he believed to be the troop commander on Corregidor. To him he explained 

that General Wainwright was seeking a 

truce and wished to discuss the terms of surrender with General Homma. The Japanese 

officer, after consulting his superiors on 

Bataan, told Captain Clark that if Wainwright would coine to his headquarters he 

would make arrangements to send him to 

Bataan.16 

'" Williams, The Last Days of Corregidor, Supp., 

p.2. 

to Baldwin, 'The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," 

Part 4, Marine Corps Gazette (February 1942), p. 

43; Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

124. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Within an hour after his departure Clark 

was back in Malinta Tunnel with the Japanese message. Immediately, General Wainwright, accompanied by General Moore and 

his aides, with Clark acting as guide, went 

forward toward the enemy lines. It was now 

1400.17 The party rode in a sedan as far as 

Denver Hill, then ascended the ridge on 

foot. Near the summit they were met by an 

English-speaking Japanese lieutenant and a 

colonel, who, Wainwright correctly guessed, 

was a staff officer. 

What the Americans did not know was 

that the Japanese colonel was Nakayama, 

General Homma's senior operations officer 

and the man who had accepted General 

King's surrender. Homma had sent him to 

Corregidor the night before with orders to 

bring General Wainwright to him only if 

the American was ready to surrender all his 

troops.lS It is not surprising therefore that 

when Wainwright explained that he wished 

to surrender only the four islands in Manila 

Bay, Nakayama replied with "an angry 

torrent of Japanese," the gist of which was 

that any surrender would have to include 

all forces in the Philippines. "In that case," 

replied Wainwright, "I will deal only with 

General Homma and with no one of less 

rank." 19 Nakayama thereupon agreed to 

take him to Bataan. 

Nakayama's ready agreement to Wainwright's request for a conference with Gen11 There is little agreement on time in the sources. 

The discrepancies cannot be settled by personal 

interviews, since the participants, under the stress 

of the moment, had no clear conception of when 

things happened. The author has reconciled as far 

as possible the time given by the Americans with 

that of the Japanese to account for the known 

sequence of events. 

18 USA vs. Homma, pp. 3173-79, testimony of 

Homma, and p. 2529, testimony of Wachi. 

UI Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

125. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

eral Homma was based on fresh instructions 

from 14th Army headquarters. The news 

that a white flag had been raised over Corregidor had reached Homma about 1230. 

Apparently he had not heard the Beebe 

broadcasts, and this was the first intimation 

he had of Wainwright's desire to surrender .20 

Not long after, Nakayama, who was probably the officer Captain Clark talked with, 

had reported that Wainwright wished to 

see General Homma to arrange for the surrender of his force. At that time he was 

instructed to bring the American commander to Bataan.21 When he met Wainwright 

shortly after 1400, therefore, the question 

of whether Homma would talk to the 

American had already been settled. Nakayama's only task was to make arrangements 

for the journey. 

At the outset, Nakayama agreed to follow 

the arrangements made by the Americans. 

The boat set aside to take Wainwright to 

Bataan was docked on the south side of the 

island, and Lt. Col. John R. Pugh, the general's senior aide, went back to bring the 

boat around to the north dock. Wainwright 

also sent General Moore back to the tunnel 

"to look after things in his absence," and 

with him went his aide and Captain Clark. 

With his remaining aide, Maj. Thomas 

Dooley, Wainwright set out with Nakayama 

and the interpreter along the rqad to the 

north dock to meet Colonel Pugh. They had 

not gone far when they came under fire from 

Japanese artillery. Nakayama refused to go 

any further and insisted that they turn back. 

Wainwright had no choice but to agree and 

Nakayama led the group to Cavalry Point 

where Japanese troops were still debarking 

and sent out a call to Bataan for a boat. An 

.. USA us. Homma, pp. 3173, 317~77, testimony 

of Homma, and p. 2468, testimony of Wachi. 

21 Statement of Nakayama, 26 Aug 49, ATIS Doc 

50246. 

567 

armored barge finally arrived and, after 

some difficulty in embarking, the group 

reached Cabcaben at about 1600. 

On the dock when Wainwright stepped 

out was Maj. William Lawrence, his administrative assistant. He had made the journey 

to Bataan with General Beebe, Colonel 

Pugh, and Sgt. Hubert Carroll, Wainwright's orderly, in the boat originally selected for the trip. The others had gone forward to find Wainwright, but Lawrence 

had remained behind with the boat and now 

accompanied the general and Dooley to the 

meeting place, a house about three quarters 

of a mile to the north. There they were 

joined by Beebe, Pugh, and Carrolp2 

For almost a half hour the six Americans 

waited tensely on the open porch of the 

house, facing Manila Bay, a short distance 

away. It was a windy day and from the 

beach rose a dense cloud of sand and dust. 

The only Japanese who approached was an 

orderly who brought cold water, which they 

accepted gratefully. Finally a group of photographers arrived and the Americans were 

ordered to line up on the lawn to have their 

pictures taken. They were still there at 1700 

when General Homma drove up in a Cadillac, saluted with a vague flourish of the 

hand, and strode up to the porch. Behind 

him were his principal staff officers, correspondents, and more photographers. The 

Americans followed silently. 

The contrast between the two rival commanders on the porch was striking. Unlike 

most Japanese, General Homma was a large 

man, about five feet ten inches in height, 

barrel-chested and heavy-set, weighing close 

to two hundred pounds. His manner was assured and his bearing erect. His regulation 

olive drab uniform, with white shirt open 

.. USA vs. Homma, Prosecution Exhibits 418 and 

419, Depositions of Moore and Wainwright. 
568 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

THE MEETING OF WAINWRIGHT AND HOMMA 

at the collar, was fresh and crisp. Pinned to 

his chest were several rows of brightly colored decorations and ribbons, and at his side 

hung a sword. General Wainwright, who 

had earned the nickname "Skinny" long before he had undergone the privations of 

Bataan and Corregidor, was over six feet 

tall, but weighed only about 160 pounds. 

H e was "thin as a crane," observed one of 

the Japanese correspondents, and "made a 

pathetic figure against the massive form of 

General Homma." 2:< His uniform, the best 

he had, consisted of khaki shirt and trousers; 

he wore no decorations and carried only a 

bamboo cane to support a trick knee. In his 

eyes and in the deep lines etched in his face 

could be read the story of the withdrawal 

from Lingayen Gulf, the long, drawn-out 

" The source of this quotation is unknown. It appears in a J apanese propaganda book and was copied 

by a colleague who neglected to note the title and 

h as since forgotten the location. 

siege of Bataan, and the terrific bombardment of Corregidor. 

On the porch was a long table around 

which chairs had been placed. Homma took 

a seat in the center, facing the open side, 

and motioned his officers to sit down. General Wachi, 14th Army chief of staff, took 

the seat on Homma's right, Nakayama the 

one on his left; the others filling in the 

spaces beyond. To the rear, between H omrna and N akayama, stood the interpreter. 

On the American side of the table were 

five officers, with Wainwright in the center, 

opposite Homma. To his left were General 

Beebe and Major Dooley; to his right Colonel Pugh and Major Lawrence. Behind 

the Japanese were their war correspondents, 

photographers, and newsreel camera men. 

The meeting opened as soon as everyone 

was seated, without any exchange of courtesies. Wainwright made the first move by 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

reaching into his pocket for his formal 

signed surrender note which he tendered to 

the Japanese commander.24 Although General Homma could read and speak English, 

he did not look at the paper but turned it 

over to his interpreter to be read aloud in 

Japanese for the benefit of the other J apanese officers present. After it was read, 

Homma stated through the interpreter that 

the surrender would not be accepted unless 

it included all American and Philippine 

troops in the Islands. To this Wainwright 

replied that he commanded only the harbor 

defense troops. "Tell him," he said to the 

interpreter, "that the troops in the Visayan 

Islands and on Mindanao are no longer under my command. They are commanded by 

General Sharp, who in turn is under General 

MacArthur's high command." 25 

Homma refused to believe Wainwright's 

explanation. Repeatedly, he pointed out, the 

American radio had named Wainwright as 

commander of all troops in the Philippines. 

He had even seen, he said, the general order 

announcing Wainwright's assumption of 

command. Wainwright stubbornly insisted 

that the Visayan-Mindanao Force was no 

longer under his control. Shrewdly, Homma 

asked when he had released Sharp from 

his command. "Several days ago," Wainwright answered, adding that even if he did 

command the troops in the south he had no 

way of communicating with them. Homma 

brushed this argument aside easily. "Send a 

.. General Homma denied at his trial, and he was 

supported by his chief of staff, that the document 

was handed to him or read. USA vs. Homma, p. 

3181. Wainwright's version is in General Wainwright's Story, pages 130-32, and in USA vs. 

Homma, Prosecution Exhibit 419, Deposition of 

General Wainwright. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

131. 

569 

staff officer to Sharp," he replied. "I will 

furnish a plane." 26 

The argument over command continued 

several minutes more but Wainwright would 

not budge from his position, asserting repeatedly that he did not have the authority 

to surrender the Visayan-Mindanao Force. 

Finally Homma rose, looked down at Wainwright, and said, "At the time of General 

King's surrender in Bataan I did not see 

him. Neither have I any reason to see you 

if you are only the commander of a 

unit . . . I wish only to negotiate with my 

equal. ... " 27 He seemed ready to leave. 

Wainwright was in no position to bargain. Uppermost in his mind was the 

thought that the troops on Corregidor were 

disarmed and helpless. If Homma refused 

now to accept his surrender, these men faced 

certain death. After a hurried conference 

with Beebe and Pugh, he agreed to surrender the entire Philippine garrison. 28 

General Homma now refused to accept the 

surrender. "You have denied your authority . . .," he told \Vainwright, "I advise 

you to return to Corregidor and think the 

matter over. If you see fit to surrender, then 

surrender to the commanding officer of the 

division on Corregidor. He in turn will bring 

you to me in Manila." 29 With these words 

Homma left the meeting. 

•• Ibid. 

sri Uno, Corregidor.' Isle of Delusion, p. 25. Uno 

was present at the meeting. His account does not 

agree with Wainwright's at this point, but it is supported by Lt. Col. Yoshio Nakajima, an operations 

officer on the 14th Army staff. USA vs. Homma, p. 

2590, testimony of Nakayima. 

28 Uno, Corregidor.' Isle of Delusion, p. 25. 

Neither Wainwright nor Homma agree on this point. 

The author has accepted Uno's version because he 

was a bilingual observer and was not under the same 

strain as the participants. His account is not unsympathetic to the American cause . 

.. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
570 

After General Homma's departure, 

Wainwright offered his unconditional surrender to Colonel Nakayama, who had remained behind to take the Americans back 

to Corregidor. He agreed also to send one 

of his officers to Mindanao in a Japanese 

plane to persuade Sharp to surrender. "But 

in the back of my mind," he explained later, 

"was the strong hope that some way would 

still be found to avert the surrender of all 

forces." 30 

Colonel Nakayama refused to accept 

Wainwright's proposal and told him he 

would have to wait until he reached Corregidor. Homma's instructions, he explained, authorized only the commander of 

the Japanese forces on Corregidor to accept 

the surrender.31 He then took the Americans 

back to Cabcaben by car and thence by boat 

to Corregidor, where they arrived late in the 

evening of 6 May. 

The trip across the channel had been a 

long and stormy one, but not long enough 

for Wainwright to find a way out of his 

dilemma. MacArthur, he knew, expected 

Sharp'S force to continue the fight as guerrillas and to keep alive resistance on Mindanao. He had done his best to achieve this 

aim, and Sharp was now free to conduct 

guerrilla operations. "But each time I 

thought of continued organized resistance 

on Mindanao," Wainwright recalled, "I 

thought, too, of the perilous position of close 

to 11,000 men and the wounded and nurses 

and civilians on Corregidor." 32 The lives of 

these men and women might well be the 

price of Sharp'S freedom. 

The dilemma in which Wainwright 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

133. 

III Uno, Corregidor: Isle of Delusion, p. 26. Uno 

acted as interpreter on this occasion. 

8. W ainwrigh t, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

133. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

found himself might perhaps have been 

avoided had the organization which MacArthur established for the Philippines before his departure from Corregidor been retained. At that time, it will be remembered, 

he had established four forces: the Visayan 

Force, the Mindanao Force, the Luzon 

Force, and the Harbor Defenses. It was his 

intention then to exercise command over 

these forces from his headquarters in Australia through his deputy, General Beebe, 

on Corregidor. The War Department had 

changed this arrangement, and placed 

Wainwright in command of all forces in the 

Philippines. 

At the time this decision was made, the 

reasons for overruling MacArthur and establishing the directing headquarters for 

operations in the Philippines on Corregidor 

had seemed compelling in Washington.S3 

But if there had been no such headquarters, 

the Japanese would have had no alternative 

but to accept the surrender of each force 

when it was defeated on the field of battle. 

It is difficult to imagine on what basis they 

could have insisted that General MacArthur in Australia surrender all four forces 

in the Philippines. Nor was there any means, 

short of a direct threat of reprisals, by which 

they could force MacArthur to consider 

such a proposal. Even if they had followed 

the same procedure as on Bataan, where 

General King was told that he had not 

surrendered but had been captured, the 

effect would have been the same as the 

separate surrender of all four forces. 

Wainwright could not consistently maintain his right to surrender only a portion of 

his force on the pretext that the remainder 

was no longer under his command. His 

presence on Corregidor and his well-recog-

.. See above, Chapter XX, for a discussion of this 

decision. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

nized position as commander of all forces 

in the Philippines made him especially 

vulnerable to pressure from the Japanese. 

Perhaps it was to avoid just such a situation 

that MacArthur established the organization he did, and in this desire may lie the 

true meaning of his cryptic explanations at 

the time to General Marshall that he had 

made these arrangements because of "the 

special problems involved," and the "intangibles of the situation in the Philippines." 34 

In the time between General Wainwright's departure from Corregidor and his 

return late that night, much had happened 

on the island. The Japanese had filtered 

around Malinta Hill, cutting it off from the 

rest of the island, and entered the tunnel 

by way of the east entrance. By about 1600 

they had cleared out all Americans and 

Filipinos, except the hospital patients and 

staff officers, and were in complete possession of the tunne1.8Il Later that night, in 

accordance with their original plan, the 

Japanese had landed additional troops on 

the island. 

The task of clearing the tunnel had not 

been an easy one. In the absence of Moore 

and Wainwright, General Drake, the 

USFIP quartermaster, had sent his assistant, Lt. Col. Theodore Kalakuka, who 

spoke Russian, to contact the commander 

of the approaching enemy force at about 

1400. Ten minutes later Kalakuka had returned with a Japanese major and a Russian-speaking lieutenant. The major's response to Drake's request for an arrange-

•• Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No.3, 21 Mar 

42, WDCSA 320 (3-21-42) Phil. 

.. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, "I Surrendered 

Corregidor," Collier's, January 8, 1949, p. 12; 

interv, author with Drake, 11 Mar 48. Drake's account is contradicted at some points by other senior 

officers. Ltr, Moore to author, 19 May 49, OCMH. 

571 

ment to avoid the useless slaughter of the 

already defeated Americans and Filipinos 

was a demand that the tunnel be cleared 

in ten minutes, an obvious impossibility. 

After some bickering, during which the 

principals' words had to be translated first 

into Russian and then English or Japanese, 

it was agreed that the men could remain 

in the tunnel but that a lane would be 

cleared down the center. 

When the two Japanese officers left, 

Drake ordered the men against the walls 

and into the laterals, leaving as wide an 

open space as possible along the main tunnel. A short time later, the Japanese returned with about twenty men, equipped 

with flame throwers, demolition charges, 

and rifles. After a quick inspection, the two 

officers went through to the west entrance 

to stop the firing there. Other Japanese 

troops then entered and at bayonet point 

marched the docile Americans and Filipinos out of the tunnel,86 

There was little Wainwright could do on 

his return to Corregidor late on the night of 

the 6th but surrender under the terms dictated by the Japanese. He could see the 

enemy's campfires allover the island and 

as he approached the tunnel he saw that it 

was already in enemy hands. There was no 

point in further delay and without waiting to 

complete the journey he asked Nakayama 

to take him to the local Japanese commander. His guides led him around Malinta 

Hill to the barrio of San Jose, and there, 

in the ruined market place, he met his opponent, Colonel Sato, commander of the 61 st 

lnfantry . 

.. Drake, "I Surrendered Corregidor," Collier's, 

January. 8, 1949, p. 12; interv, author with Drake, 

11 Mar 48. A longer manuscript version of General 

Drake's article, prepared at the request of the 

author, is in OCMH. 
572 

There was no discussion of terms. The 

surrender was unconditional and the document drawn up by the two men contained 

all the provisions Homma had insisted upon. 

Wainwright agreed to surrender all forces in 

the Philippines, including those in the Visayas and on Mindanao, within four days. All 

local commanders were to assemble their 

troops in designated areas and then report to 

the nearest Japanese commander. Nothing 

was to be destroyed and heavy arms and 

equipment were to be kept intact. "Japanese 

Army and Navy," read the closing paragraphs, "will not cease their operations until 

they recognize faithfulness in executing the 

above-mentioned orders. If and when such 

faithfulness is recognized, the commander in 

chief of Japanese forces in the Philippines 

will order 'cease fire' after taking all circumstances into consideration." 37 

It was midnight by the time the job was 

finished and the surrender document signed. 

Wainwright was then taken, under guard 

and through groups of captured Americans 

and Filipinos, to Malinta Tunnel, which by 

now was full of Japanese troops. After a 

brief conversation with General Moore, to 

whom he explained the reasons for his decision, he went to the small whitewashed 

room he had inherited from General MacArthur. With him was his aide and outside 

a Japanese sentry. Exhausted and humiliated, he threw himself down on his narrow 

cot. He had not slept and had hardly eaten 

since the terrible Japanese bombardment of 

the 5th. But sleep would not come easily. 

Though he had done all that he could, the 

forced surrender lay heavily on his mind. No 

man could be expected to endure more than 

he and his men had. This the President had 

17 The surrender document is printed in its entirety in Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, 

p. 135-36. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

told him in the message received only a few 

hours before he had gone forward to surrender. Now, in the bitterest moment of his 

life, he could turn to the consolation of that 

message from his Commander in Chief : 

In spite of all the handicaps of complete 

isolation, lack of food and ammunition you 

have given the world a shining example of 

patriotic fortitude and self-sacrifice. 

The American people ask no finer example 

of tenacity, resourcefulness, and steadfast 

courage. The calm determination of your personalleadership in a desperate situation sets a 

standard of duty for our soldiers throughout 

the world. S8 

Promptly on the morning of 7 May Homma's intelligence officer, Lt. Col. Hikaru 

Haba, called on General Wainwright to discuss measures required to fulfill the terms of 

the surrender agreement. The most important step toward carrying out these terms 

was for Wainwright to reassume command 

of the Visayan-Mindanao Force and order 

General Sharp to surrender. Since he could 

not be sure that a direct order would accomplish this purpose, Wainwright decided to 

send Col. Jesse T. Traywick, his operations 

officer, to Mindanao with a letter explaining 

what had happened. In it he directed General Sharp to surrender the troops under his 

command and to pass on to General MacArthur the text of the letter and any other 

instructions given him by Colonel Traywick. 

"However, let me re-emphasize," he 

warned, "that there must be on your part 

no thought of disregarding these instructions. Failure to fully and honestly carry 

them out can have only the most disastrous 

results." 89 

The Japanese had still one more humiliation in store for General Wainwright. When 

.. Quoted in full, ibid., p. 118. 

.. This letter is published in its entirety, ibid., 

p. 140. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 573 

GENERAL WAINWRIGHT BROADCASTING surrender instructions over 

Station KZRH, 7 May 1942. 

the letter was completed, Colonel Haba announced that the general would go to Manila that afternoon to broadcast the surrender instructions. General Wainwright objected strenuously, but finally gave in when 

he realized that it would give Sharp an additional twenty-four hours to make his preparations and to inform General MacArthur 

of the situation!O At 1700, when Haba 

called for him, he was ready. Accompanied 

by five of his staff officers he left for Manila, 

arriving, after many delays, shortly before 

" Ibid., p. 140. 

midnight. He was then taken directly to 

Radio Station KZRH where, in a voice 

husky with suppressed emotion, he broadcast the terms of the surrender to General 

Sharp, Col. John P. Horan, and Col. Guillermo Nakar, the last of whom commanded 

small detachments in northern Luzon."' 

The next morning, 8 May, Colonel Traywick, accompanied by Haba, left by plane 

H The text of this broadcast can be found in 

Visayan-~indanao Force Report of Operations, 

pages 87-91. It was received in San Francisco by 

commercial radio and relayed to the War Department. 
574 

for Mindanao. Col. Nicoll F. Galbraith, 

Wainwright's supply officer, carried the 

same message for Horan, and Kalakuka 

went in search of Nakar. 

Colonel Galbraith achieved a limited success in his mission. Horan had heard Wainwright's broadcast and had immediately 

sent one of his officers to confer with the 

Japanese commander in the area. This officer returned with the information that Colonel Galbraith was in Bontoc with surrender 

orders. On the 14th Horan surrendered personally and ordered his troops to assemble 

in preparation for surrender. But the men 

came in slowly, and Galbraith, with another 

American and a few Japanese officers, went 

into the mountains to try to round them up. 

Only a small portion of the troops surrendered. The rest remained in hiding, to become later the nucleus of one of the guerrilla forces in northern Luzon.42 

Colonel Kalakuka's mission was even less 

successful in securing the surrender of 

Nakar's force, whose actual commander was 

Lt. Col. Everett L. Warner. General Wainwright had addressed his message to Nakar, 

the executive officer, rather than to Warner 

whose whereabout he did not know. The 

command arrangement in this group was 

extremely confused and apparently there 

was jealousy between the two men. Thus, 

when Kalakuka appeared on the scene he 

heard conflicting stories. N akar refused to 

surrender, but Warner, with a small group 

of American officers, followed General 

Wainwright's orders. The bulk of the force 

remained in the mountains, and those who 

evaded the Japanese were organized into the 

14th Infantry (PA) under Colonel Nakar, 

.. Ltr, Horan to Wainwright, 24 Jun 42, copy in 

OCMH. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

which continued in existence as a guerrilla 

force. 4a 

Meanwhile the Japanese had been having 

difficulty in other areas. On Palawan and 

in southern Luzon small detachments still 

persisted in offering resistance. The J apanese came to General Wainwright on 12 

May and asked him why these forces had 

not surrendered, and why Colonels Horan 

and N akar had not been heard from. He 

and his men, he was told, could not be considered prisoners of war until all opposition 

had ceased. 44 Nothing further could be done 

about the forces in northern Luzon, but to 

end the resistance jn southern Luzon General Wainwright sent Colonel Pugh and two 

Filipino officers to Legaspi. They succeeded 

in halting hostilities there, and the Constabulary on Palawan surrendered without 

further difficulty. 46 

Surrender in the South 

The story of the surrender of the VisayanMindanao Force is an even stranger one 

than that which preceded it. In the south 

few of the commanders were so hard pressed 

as to be incapable of further resistance and 

none had any desire to surrender. The Japanese had landed on only three islands. On 

two of these, Cebu and Panay, the local commanders had pulled back to well-stocked 

.. Hist of the Guerrilla Resistance Movement in 

P.I., Mji. Intel Sec, GHQ SWPA, Ch. VI; Affidavit 

of Capt Warren A. Minton, copy in Chunn Notebooks. Colonel Nakar was captured on 29 September 1942. Colonel Kalakuka died of malaria on 

30 October, while he was still working with the 

Japanese to secure the surrender of the guerrillas. 

Drake, Comments on Draft MS, Comment 28, 

OCMH . 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 91-92 . 

.. Ibid.; General Wainwright's Story, p. 147. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

and comparatively safe retreats in the mountains, from where they hoped to wage guerrilla warfare for an indefinite period. Any 

effort to drive them from these strongholds 

would involve the Japanese in a long and 

expensive campaign. On Mindanao, where 

the Japanese had committed larger forces 

and scored more important gains than elsewhere in the south, General Sharp's troops 

had been defeated, but elements of his force 

were still intact and capable of continuing 

organized resistance. Plans for their withdrawal to the more remote portions of the 

island, out of reach of the enemy, had already been made and the sector commanders were ready to put these plans into execution on orders from General Sharp. 

On the morning of 6 May General Sharp 

received two messages. The first was the one 

in which Wainwright relinquished command of the Visayan-Mindanao Force and 

directed Sharp to report to MacArthur for 

orders. The second was from General MacArthur who, on learning of the surrender 

of Corregidor and without knowledge of 

Wainwright's instructions to Sharp, immediately ordered the commander of the 

Visayan-Mindanao Force to "communicate 

all matters direct to me." 46 With this dispatch MacArthur assumed command of the 

Visayan-Mindanao Force. 

The first intimation Sharp had of Wainwright's intention to reassume command 

came from the latter's radio broadcast on 

midnight of the 7th. He immediately repeated the gist of the broadcast, which directed him in unmistakable terms to surrender, to MacArthur and asked for further in-

•• Rads, MacArthur to Sharp, No. 167, 6 May 42, 

and Sharp to MacArthur, 0415/Z/7, 7 May 42, 

both in AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

575 

-structions. The reply from Melbourne came 

promptly: "Orders emanating from General Wainwright have no validity. If possible separate your force into small elements 

and initiate guerrilla operations. You, of 

course, have full authority to make any decision that immediate emergency may demand." 47 At the same time, MacArthur informed the Chief of Staff of Wainwright's 

broadcast and of his own orders to Sharp. 

"I believe Wainwright has temporarily become unbalanced," he concluded, "and his 

condition renders him susceptible of enemy 

use." 48 

When General MacArthur made this 

judgment he was probably unaware of the 

circumstances which had dictated Wainwright's course of action during and after 

the surrender of Corregidor. He could not 

have realized that it was the fear of what 

would happen to the 11,000 men on Corregidor which had forced Wainwright to accept Homma's terms. Wainwright believed, 

as did many of the American officers on his 

staff, that the Japanese would kill their prisoners in cold blood if the commanders in the 

south did not surrender.49 

There is no direct evidence that the Japanese actually made such a threat. In 1946, 

during the course of the Homma trial, 

Colonel Pugh stated that he had no personal 

knowledge that a threat had been madp.. 

But he added that General Wainwright 

certainly believed his men would be killed 

'7 Rad, MacArthur to Sharp, No. 676, 9 May 42, 

AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. '8 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 677, 9 May 

AG 384.1, GHQ SWPA. 

4. The Japanese were not a signatory to the 

Geneva Convention, but in February 1942, through 

the Swiss Government, they had agreed to adhere 

to the provisions relating to prisoners of war, reserving the right to make changes when necessary. 
576 

if Sharp did not surrender.50 On the same 

occasion Wainwright testified that the Japanese told him they did not regard the 

Americans as prisoners of war but as hostages, "held to insure the success of the 

negotiations with forces in the south. . . ." 

"My principal concern," he said then, "was 

for fear that they would do what they said 

they would do; that is, slaughter all those 

people in the fortified islands unless the 

troops all over the Archipelago surrendered." 51 

Added to the threat, real or imagined, 

of what might happen to these men, practically all of whom were concentrated in a 

small area on the beach at Corregidor, was 

the threat reported to have been made to 

the men on Corregidor. For every day that 

the surrender was delayed, they were told, 

ten American officers would be executed. 

Wainwright admits he did not know of this 

threat at the time, and if made it was 

certainly never carried OUt.62 

General Sharp's position on 8 May was 

not an enviable one. First Wainwright had 

released him and now sought to reassert his 

control. He had reported to MacArthur 

and from him had received complete authority to act on his own judgment. His 

legal right to ignore Wainwright's reassumpo<J USA vs. Homma, p. 2386, testimony of Pugh. 

General Drake states that he never heard such a 

threat made and never had the impression that the 

Japanese would kill their prisoners if Sharp did not 

surrender. "There was no cause to give me such an 

impression," he states. "Also, I never heard it 

voiced by anyone." Drake, Comments on Draft MS, 

Comment 28, OCMH. 

"' USA vs. Homma, Prosecution Exhibit 419, Deposition of Wainwright. Homma denied this in his 

testimony, and Wachi stated that the Americans 

were treated as captives rather than as prisoners of 

war until an order came from Imperial General 

Headquarters in August 1942. Ibid., pp. 2529,3189. 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 92; Wainwright, General Wainwright'S Story, pp. 145-48. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

tion of command and order to surrender 

was undeniable. But from the Manila 

broadcast he had received some intimation 

of the possible consequences of such a 

course. He decided, therefore, to await the 

promised arrival of Wainwright's emissary, 

Colonel Traywick, before making his decision. In the meantime, in accordance with 

MacArthur's instructions, he released from 

his control the island commanders in his 

force and directed them to prepare for 

guerrilla operations. 

Colonel Traywick and Colonel Haba 

reached Mindanao by plane on the 9th and 

arranged a meeting with Sharp for the following day. At daybreak of the 10th hostilities were suspended temporarily, and 

during the afternoon Colonel Traywick, 

with Haha and several other Japanese officers, met General Sharp at his headquarters 

at Malaybalay on the Sayre Highway.53 

Traywick delivered Wainwright's letter and 

told Sharp the circumstances which had led 

to its preparation. He made clear that if the 

Visayan-Mindanao Force was not surrendered, the Japanese would probably reject the terms already agreed upon and 

would open fire on the prisoners on Corregidor. It was this threat that forced General Sharp to capitulate.54 

General Sharp's decision to surrender 

placed him in exactly the same position 

.. V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 61, 92; Tarkington, 

There Were Others, pp. 390-96. 

... Interv, author with Col Robert D. Johnston, 

G-4 V-MF, 15 Apr 47, OCMH. Although Colonel 

Johnston was not prcsent at the meeting between 

Sharp and Traywick, he was told about it many 

times by Sharp, while in prison camp. General 

Sharp, now deceased, never expressed officially the 

view that the threat was the reason for his decision 

to surrender. General Wainwright, in a letter to 

the author, stated that Sharp's position was hopeless and that he would have had to surrender very 

shortly in any case. Ltr, Wainwright to author, 

14 Jan 49, OCMH. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

Wainwright had been in on 7 May. He now 

had to reassume command of the officers 

he had released for guerrilla operations the 

day before. This he did on 10 May in a clear 

text message-he had destroyed his codesrescinding his earlier instructions and directing his subordinate commanders to cease 

all operations at once, stack arms, and raise 

the white flag. One of his staff officers, he 

told them, would soon arrive with written 

orders and with detailed instructions. These 

orders, he concluded, were "imperative and 

must be carried out in order to save further 

bloodshed." 55 Later that night, at 1915, he 

announced his decision to General MacArthur. "I have seen Wainwright's staff 

officer," he explained, "and have withdrawn my order releasing commanders on 

other islands and directed complete surrender. Dire necessity alone has prompted 

this action." 56 

It was with great relief that General 

Wainwright heard from Colonel Traywick 

when that officer returned to Manila on 11 

May that General Sharp had decided to 

place his forces again under Wainwright's 

command and to accept the order to surrender. This decision, he believed, averted a 

massacre and saved the Corregidor garrison.57 

Wainwright's relief was premature. General Sharp'S surrender orders proved far 

more difficult to enforce than had been anticipated. His troops were scattered among 

many islands; most of them were untrained 

;Filipinos; and those who were safe in their 

'mountain hide-outs showed no disposition 

.. Rad, Sharp to Chynoweth, Hitsman, Cornell, 

Chastaine, Blancas, 10 May 42, Sharp Papers, 

OCMH. 

.. Rad, Sharp to MacArthur, No.1, 10 May 42, 

Sharp Papers. 

.., Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

145. 

577 

to give up their freedom. Communication 

between the islands was poor and it would 

be some time before the last troops laid 

down their arms. Until then the fate of the 

Corregidor garrison hung in the balance. 

The detailed instructions to each commander were sent by courier on the 11 tho 

In each case the commander was directed 

to assemble his men at a designated point 

and at a certain time. General Chynoweth, 

for example, was to bring his men to the 

northern outskirts of Cebu City; Christie to 

Iloilo City, and Colonel Cornell, commander of the Leyte-Samar Fotce, to Tacloban and Catbalogan. Land mines and other 

explosives that might cause injury or damage to the Japanese were to be removed 

within twenty-four hours, and those that 

could not be removed were to be plainly 

marked. All commanders were warned 

against the destruction of military or civilian 

property and urged to accord the Japanese 

"courteous and prompt obedience." 58 

The surrender on Mindanao was generally without incident, although here, as 

elsewhere, a large number of troops preferred to leave their units rather than become prisoners. Colonel Chastaine, unable 

to get his regiment to the appointed place in 

time, requested, and presumably secured, 

permission to arrive at a later date. Others 

may have had similar difficulties. 59 The most 

striking commentary on the enforced surrender came from General Fort, commander 

of the 81 st Division (P A), who wrote to 

General Sharp: "Many of my officers encouraged me to disobey orders and continue-and strange to relate, Filipino and 

.. V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 99-103. Copy of the 

document of surrender is in Sharp Papers. Rad, 

Sharp to Chynoweth, Hilsman, Christie, Cornell, 

Blancas, 11 May 42, Sharp Papers. 

,. Rad, Chastaine to Sharp, No.1, 13 May 42, 

Sharp Papers. 
578 

Moro officers-which I'll admit was a temptation as my own small force was undefeated and was growing stronger with the 

reorganization which I had undertaken .... 

I had difficulty in holding some of them true 

to discipline." 60 

The surrender of Chynoweth's troops on 

Cebu was not accomplished as easily as the 

surrender of those on Mindanao. Chynoweth had heard Wainwright's surrender 

broadcast on 6 May and received General 

Sharp's clear text message to surrender four 

days later. Reasoning that this order was 

either an enemy ruse or that it had been 

given at bayonet point, he decided to ignore 

it and instructed his communications officer 

not to acknowledge this or any further messages.61 He next received a letter from the 

commander of the Japanese forces on Cebu 

urging immediate surrender to save lives. 

Chynoweth acknowledged receipt of the letter but made no move to surrender his force. 

During the next two days the two commanders exchanged polite notes without 

reaching agreement. The correspondence 

came to an end when General Chynoweth 

asserted that he did not consider the order 

to surrender, "legally binding" since it had 

been given under duress. "We do not feel," 

he wrote, "that we can honorably surrender." 62 Copies of the correspondence were 

sent to the various units on Cebu, and the 

men were told that they could surrender individually if they wished to do so. Only two 

Filipinos and two Americans took advantage of this opportunity. General Chyno-

•• Ltr, Fort to Sharp, no date, V-MF Rpt of Opns, 

pp. 285-86. General Fort was"later executed by the 

Japanese. 

n The account of the surrender on Cebu is based 

upon Chynoweth, 61stDiv (PAl and Visayan Force 

Rpt, pp. 33-37, OCMH. 

.. Ibid., p. 34. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

weth then made plans to move to Panay to 

join forces with Colonel Christie.63 

On 13 May, while he was making preparations to leave the island, Chynoweth received a written message from Colonel Hilsman, commander on Negros. The message 

stated that a courier from General Sharp 

was on his way to Cebu to explain the situation to him and to negotiate the surrender. 

"That," wrote Chynoweth, "knocked us 

into a tail-spin." 64 Knowing that Sharp was 

in communication with General MacArthur, he believed that the order to surrender 

had been made with MacArthur's consent. 

But in the hope that MacArthur might intervene at the last moment and order him to 

continue the fight he instructed one of his 

men to "freeze on the radio." 

Chynoweth could no longer put off the 

difficult decision. He did not wish nor did 

his situation require him to surrender. But 

both Generals Wainwright and Sharp had 

directed him to do so. "If MacArthur," he 

hoped desperately, "would only tell us now 

to hang on." 65 The only word received was 

that MacArthur had announced that he no 

longer had communications with the Philippines. That night Chynoweth sent word to 

the Japanese that he was awaiting a staff 

officer from General Sharp's headquarters 

and that no action would be taken until his 

arrival. He next notified the units under his 

command to assemble at a central point, 

prepared to surrender. 

On 15 May General Sharp's courier arrived in Cebu. He gave Chynoweth the 

written terms of surrender, Sharp'S order 

63 Ltr, Chynoweth to author, 19 Feb 49, OCMH. 

"Chynoweth, 61st Div (PAl and Visayan Force 

Rpt, p. 35, OCMH. 

.. Ibid., p. 36. Up until February 1949 General 

Chynoweth believed that Sharp's instructions to 

surrender had MacArthur's support . 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

directing surrender, and a letter from Wainwright stating that "on no account were any 

commanders to make any attempts to evade 

the terms of surrender." The courier also 

told Chynoweth that the Japanese had concentrated the Americans on Corregidor 

under their guns and would kill them "if 

the surrender were not faithfully executed." 66 Chynoweth thereupon decided to 

surrender and immediately notified the 

Japanese commander of his decision. The 

next day he assembled the organized elements of his force and marched down out 

of the hills. 

Of all the island commanders none was 

better prepared for guerrilla operations than 

the Panay commander, Colonel Christie. 

His forces were comparatively well trained 

and organized, his supplies ample, and his 

position secure. The Japanese had control 

of the road network on the island but 

showed little disposition to embark on operations in the interior. Already Christie had 

had some success in hit-and-run raids, and 

the one attempt at retaliation had ended in 

disaster for the Japanese. He had every reason to believe, therefore, that he could hold 

out indefinitely.6T 

Sharp's clear text message of 10 May 

directing him to surrender came as a shock 

to Colonel Christie. He acknowledged receipt of the order promptly, but expressed 

his opposition to it in very strong terms and 

questioned General Sharp's authority to 

issue such an order. He did not see "even one 

small reason" why he should surrender his 

force, because "some other unit has gone 

to hell or some Corregidor shell-shocked 

terms" had been made. "To satisfy me," he 

wrote, "I must have MacArthur's okay; 

.. Ibid., p. 37. 

8'1Interv, author with Col Christie, 6 May 47, 

OCMH. 

579 

otherwise it may be treason." He closed his 

message with an appeal to General Sharp 

to give him a free hand in dealing with the 

enemy on Panay.68 

General Sharp refused to accept Christie's 

answer and directed him to hoist the white 

flag and cease all operations at once. "Your 

failure to comply," he warned, "will produce disastrous results." Neither Wainwright's nor his surrender, he explained, had 

yet been accepted, and unless all the island 

commanders capitulated the Japanese 

would resume offensive operations. MacArthur, he told Christie, had been informed 

of his actions, and an officer, Colonel 

Thayer, was leaving by plane for Panay with 

written instructions and a personal message. 

He concluded his message with instructions 

for an immediate reply "indicating your 

compliance and actions." 611 

Colonel Christie persisted in refusing to 

accept Sharp's order, arguing, first, that it 

was unnecessary, second, that it would have 

an adverse effect on the civil population, 

and third, that he doubted the authority of 

either General Wainwright or General 

Sharp to order his surrender. He felt that to 

comply with Sharp's directions would "tend 

toward treason," and questioned whether 

the surrender of one island meant the automatic surrender of others. "I strongly urge 

you," he told General Sharp, "to have the 

approval of the War Department through 

MacArthur," adding that he intended to 

consult his immediate commander, General 

Chynoweth. He closed his message with a 

plea. "In this delicate situation please do 

not issue me any peremptory orders that will 

embarrass or get us into mutual. conflict. 

•• Rad, Christie to Sharp, No.1, 10 May 42, 

Sharp Papers . 

.. Rad, Sharp to Christie, 11 Ma.y 42, Sharp 

Papers. 
580 

Rather do I want a free hand in carrying 

out my mission uninfluenced by any hysteria 

inherent in local action. No army surrenders 

portions still free, intact, and having a good 

chance of helping the general mission. Make 

me independent. Do not put me on the sacrifice block." 70 

General Sharp did not answer this message. His courier, Colonel Thayer, had already left for Panay to explain the situation 

to Colonel Christie. With him, Thayer carried a copy of Wainwright's letter to Sharp 

as well as one from Sharp himself. The last 

was moderate in tone and reflected a sympathetic understanding of the predicament in 

which Christie found himself. "Be it understood," Sharp wrote, "that I have the highest regard for your courageous and resolute 

stand .... However, developments of the 

war make such action utterly impractical 

regardless of the capabilities of your forces. 

If any other course were open to me I would 

most assuredly have taken it." Again he explained that neither Wainwright nor he 

were prisoners of war, but both had pledged 

the surrender of their forces. Christie was 

expected to do the same. That was the only 

course of action to take "in the name of 

humanity." 71 

Before Thayer's arrival with the letter, 

Christie sent Sharp another message asking 

what General MacArthur had said in response to Sharp's surrender message. As a 

matter of fact, MacArthur had not replied 

to this message at all. By this time Sharp had 

lost all patience with Christie. His reply was 

a curt order to surrender as directed. "No 

further comments from you are desired," 

'" Rad, Christie to Sharp, 12 May 42, Sharp 

Papers. 

n Ltr, Sharp to Christie, 12 May 42, V-MF Rpt 

of Opns, pp. 108-09. Italics are General Sharp's. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

he told Christie. "Acknowledge this message and state actions taken at once." 72 

Colonel Thayer finally reached Panay on 

18 May. He explained to Christie that acceptance of Wain wright's surrender of 

Corregidor was conditional on the surrender 

of all forces in the Philippines, and that 

Christie's refusal to comply with orders was 

jeopardizing the success of the negotiations 

and the lives of the 11,000 men on Corregidor. The question Christie had to answer, therefore, was the same one the other 

island commanders had to answer: Was the 

holding of Panay, or any other island, important enough to justify the death of the 

Corregidor prisoners? He decided that it 

was not, and made arrangements to 

surrender.r3 

Before he assembled his men, Christie 

made one more effort to satisfy himself on 

the legality of his course. To each of his 

fellow commanders he sent a message explaining what he was doing and why, and 

asked each what action he had taken. 

Chynoweth had already surrendered, but 

Colonel Hilsman, who was having troubles 

of his own on N egros, wrote that "we must 

surrender or be classed as deserters by our 

own country and as outlaws by international 

law." 74 That night Colonel Christie informed General Sharp that he had talked 

with Thayer and had decided "to comply 

faithfully with your orders for the surrender 

of my division." 75 Two days later he 

72 Rads, Christie to Sharp and Sharp to Christie, 

18 May 42, Sharp Papers. 

73 Interv, author with Christie, 6 May 47, 

OCMH . 

.. Rad, Hilsman to Christie, 19 May 42. See also 

rad, Christie to CO, Negros, Samar, Leyte, Bohol, 

19 May 42, Sharp Papers. 

75 Rad, Christie to Sharp, 19 May 42, Sharp 

Papers. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 

marched his troops to the Japanese lines. 

By that time approximately 90 percent of 

his men had vanished into the hills or gone 

back to their homes.76 

On Leyte and Samar, where there were 

no Japanese, Colonel Cornell also refused to 

accept General Sharp's message of 10 May 

directing the surrender, on the ground that 

it had been sent in clear text. He continued 

with his plans to break up his force of about 

2,500 men to carry on guerrilla operations. 

About 20 May General Sharp'S courier arrived with written instructions for the surrender, and Colonel Cornell issued orders 

to his troops to comply. The Japanese arrived in Tacloban on 24 May and the surrender was effected two days later. Only 11 

American officers, 40 Philippine officers, 

and 20 Philippine enlisted men surrendered; the rest disappeared into the hills." 

On Negros, where Colonel Hilsman commanded, trouble of a different sort developed. The Japanese had not landed on that 

island, and the troops were scattered. Under 

the leadership of Col. Carter R. McLennan, 

formerly commander on the island and now 

executive officer, Negros had been divided 

into five sectors and a battalion assigned to 

each. Food and ammunition had been distributed equally among the five sectors, and 

the battalion commanders had been released 

from regimental control to enable them to 

operate independently as guerrillas. When 

Hilsman received Sharp's radio instructing 

him to surrender, he informed the battalion 

commanders and civil authorities, but took 

no active steps, deciding to wait until he 

had received written instructions. On 18 

"Interv, author with Christie, 6 May 47; rpt of 

interv with Maj Cledonia Ancheta, CO 2d Bn, 64th 

Inf (PA), OCMH. 

7l Cornell, Narrative of Events, Hq, Samar-Leyte 

Sector, V -MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 498-500. 

581 

May, Sharp's courier, Lt. Col. Charles 1. 

Humber, Jr., arrived on Negros with these 

instructions. Immediately, the sector commanders were called into conference by 

Hilsman and told that if all troops in the 

Philippines did not surrender within a specified time, a certain number of the men captured on Corregidor would be executed 

each day that the surrender was delayed.78 

Although Sharp'S instructions required 

the commanding officer to go to Iloilo to 

arrange for the surrender, Colonel Hilsman 

accepted Colonel McLennan's offer to go in 

his stead. Accompanied by Humber, McLennan left on the morning of 20 May and 

reached Iloilo that night. He was received 

aboard a Japanese freighter, loaded with 

troops and ready to sail, by Col. Kumataro 

Ota, and the next day returned to Negros 

with the Japanese. The Japanese ran into 

scattered fire when they landed, but had no 

difficulty occupying the western coast.79 

Meanwhile, Colonel Hilsman had made 

every effort to assemble his troops in a central area, but the sector commanders, with 

the support of civil authorities, refused to 

comply. The situation became more serious 

when civilians, as well as some of the troops, 

began to loot Japanese and Chinese commercial establishments. News of these events 

soon reached Mindanao, and General 

Sharp became alarmed. Pointedly, he reminded Hilsman that as local military commander he "must control all civilians and 

insure that no incidents of violence or bloodshed occur." 80 

T. Rpt of Col McLennan, prepared at request of 

author, 19 Apr 49, in OCMH; interv, author with 

McLennan, 9 Feb 49, OCMH; Hilsman, Hist of 

Negros Sector, V-MF Rpt of Opns, pp. 487-88. 

T. McLennan Rpt, OCMH. 

•• Rad, Sharp to Hilsman, 16 May 42, Sharp 

Papers; interv, author with McLennan, 9 Feb 49, 

OCMH. 
582 

Despite his best efforts, Hilsman was unable to restore order or compel the Filipino 

troops to accept the surrender. Sharp'S 

courier, Colonel Humber, finally had to ask 

that Brig. Gen. Manuel A. Roxas, Quezon's 

deputy in the Philippines, be sent to Negros 

to prevent an uprising "due to feeling and 

sentiment among civilian population . . . 

and the fear of Filipino troops and officers 

of being placed in concentration camps." 81 

In his reply General Sharp did his best to 

allay the fear of the Filipinos. He pointed 

out that the Japanese on Mindanao had 

been "most lenient" in their treatment of 

civilians, and had asked civilian officials to 

remain at their posts. "Treatment of military forces," he added, "had been strictly 

in accordance with the Geneva Convention 

as indicated in our rules of land warfare." 82 

To this Hilsman replied that he was doing 

everything in his power to follow the instructions he was receiving from General Sharp 

and from the Japanese.80 

General Wainwright, too, was greatly 

concerned over the situation in Negros. 

There were approximately 200 Japanese internees on the island and the fear that they 

might be harmed by the rebellious troops 

was Wainwright's chief worry. "It was a 

fantastically ticklish situation," he recalled 

later, "with the lives of countless Americans 

and Filipinos hanging by the thread of the 

mutineers' unpredictability." 84 Momentarily he expected the Japanese to turn their 

guns on the Corregidor prisoners. 

81 Rad, Humber to Sharp, No.2, 19 May 42, 

Sharp Papers. 

82 Rad, Sharp to Hilsman, 19 May 42, Sharp 

Papers. 

83 Rad, Hilsman to Sharp, 20 May 42, Sharp 

Papers. 

.. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 

148. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

The date set for the surrender came and 

passed with no sign that the Filipinos would 

obey orders. Twice Hilsman persuaded 

Colonel Ota to grant an extension of time. 

When the second extension expired on 3 

June, the Japanese agreed to accept Hilsman's surrender with the troops he had by 

then persuaded to come down out of the 

hills, about 95 percent of one battalion and 

30 percent of two others. Two battalions 

never surrendered at all.85 

During the next week the troops on outlying islands submitted to the Japanese, and 

by 9 June all forces in the Philippines, with 

the exception of certain small detachments 

in isolated areas, had surrendered. On that 

day General Wainwright was notified that 

all organized resistance had ended. "Your 

high command," the Japanese told him 

then, "ceases and you are now a prisoner of 

war." 8C The six-month-long struggle for 

control of the Philippine Archipelago was 

over. The victory which Homma had hoped 

to win by the middle of February was finally 

his on 9 June, four months later. Each day's 

delay had meant a loss of face for the Japanese, and General Homma paid the price. 

The campaign was hardly over when Imperial General Headquarters relieved him 

of command and brought him back to 

Tokyo, where he spent the rest of the war 

on the sidelines, as a reserve officer. 

With the conquest of the Philippines, the 

Japanese gained the best harbor in the Orient, excellent bases from which to stage and 

supply their garrisons to the south and east, 

as well as a large population to contribute 

to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 

81 Hilsman, Hist of Negros Sector, V-MF Rpt of 

Opns, pp. 487-88; rpt of interv with Lt Col E. R. 

Montilla, ACofS, G-3, Negros, OCMH; interv, 

author with McLennan, 9 Feb 49, OCMH . 

.. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 92. 
THE END OF RESISTANCE 583 

AMERICAN GENERALS IN CAPTIVITY, July 1942. Seated, left to right: 

Generals Moore, King, and Wainwright; two J ajJanese officers; Generals Parker and 

Jones. Standing, left to right: Japanese messenger; Generals Lough, Funk, Weaver, 

Brougher, Beebe, Bluemel, Drake, McBride, and Pierce; Colonel Hoffman (interpreter),- and two Japanese soldiers. 

Sphere. They had driven the United States 

from its stronghold in the Far East, destroyed a combined American and Philippine Army of 140,000 men, and forced the 

Far East Air Force and the Asiatic Fleet 

back to the line of the Malay Barrier. In 

their possession, the Philippine Islands, extending 1,150 miles southward along the 

South China Sea from Formosa to Borneo 

and the Moluccas, constituted a formidable 

barrier to an Allied thrust from the east to 

cut the line of communication between Japan and the wealth of the Indies. 

Though the Japanese had won an important victory, the American and Filipino 

troops had not given their lives and their 

freedom in vain. For six months they had 

kept alive resistance in the Philippines, exacting heavy casualties from the enemy and 

immobilizing his forces. Not until Imperial 

General Headquarters, which had relegated 

the Philippines to a secondary place in the 

Japanese plan of conquest, had committed 

more men and planes than it had ever intended to the struggle was the campaign 

brought to an end. During the six months 

required to accomplish this task, the American and Filipino troops had retained their 

tenacious hold on Manila Bay and denied 

its usc to the enemy. This was their mission, and it had been accomplished. But the 

Pacific Fleet, which was to have fought its 

way through to them by that time, never 

arrived. The fate of the Philippine garrison 

had been decided on the opening day of the 

war, at Pearl Harbor. 
584 

In the context of global war, the Philippines did not in 1942 possess great strategic 

significance. The Japanese tide had already 

swept around the Islands and over southeast Asia and the Indies, through the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomons to 

Guadalcanal, and eastward across the Pacific as far as the Gilbert Islands. At the 

beginning of June the Japanese stood ready 

to move on Port Moresby, Midway, and the 

Aleutians, and to sever the line of communication between Australia and the United 

States. Everywhere, they had achieved 

phenomenal success, sweeping all resistance 

before them. Only in the Philippines had 

they been halted, and in this successful, 

though hopeless, resistance lay the real importance of the campaign. It demonstrated 

that the Japanese were not invincible, that 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

they could be stopped by determined men, 

ably led, even when the odds were heavily 

in their favor. For an Allied world surfeited 

on gloom, defeat, and despair, the epic of 

Bataan and Corregidor was a symbol of 

hope and a beacon of success for the future. 

It was in this vein that President Roosevelt 

wrote to General Wainwright on the eve of 

his surrender: 

"In every camp and on every naval vessel, 

soldiers, sailors, and Marines are inspired by 

the gallant struggle 'of their comrades in the 

Philippines. The workmen in our shipyards 

and munitions plants redouble their efforts 

because of your example. You and your devoted followers have become the living symbols of our war aims and the guarantee of 

victory." 87 

IT Quoted in full in Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story. p. 118. 
The Sources 

Few military disasters of modem times 

are as sparsely documented or inadequately 

recorded in the official records as the defeat 

of America's forces in the Philippines in the 

first six months of World War II. Cut off 

from the United States almost immediately 

and encircled by a tightening blockade, the 

Philippine garrison soon became the only 

island of resistance in the rising tide of Japanese victory. Its sole remaining means of 

comm~nication with the outside world was 

by radio. Occasionally an airplane or submarine reached Manila Bay with vitally 

needed supplies, carrying back on the outward voyage to Australia and Hawaii small 

and selected cargoes. Space was at a premium and there was room only for the 

nurses, correspondents, officials and their 

families, selected officers and enlisted men, 

and precious commodities such as the gold 

of the Philippine Commonwealth. Under 

the circumstances, records did not enjoy a 

high priority, and only a small number of 

official documents survived the campaign. 

Unofficial records and Japanese documents 

are far more numerous, and, with published 

works, constitute the main sources on which 

this volume is based. 

Official Records 

Among senior commanders in the Philippines there was a strong desire to justify their 

conduct of the campaign to their countrymen. This, they realized, could be done only 

if the record was preserved, and on at least 

three occasions during the course of the battle precious air and submarine space was set 

aside so that the most important records 

might be sent back to the United States. 

The first of these occasions was in February 

1942 when General MacArthur sent out by 

submarine, in the custody of Francis B. 

Sayre, the High Commissioner, a footlocker 

filled with personal and official papers. This 

footlocker reached the United States safely 

and was stored in a bank in Washington for 

the duration of the war. It was then returned, by officer courier, to General MacArthur and has remained in his possession 

since. Though its contents are not known, 

there is reason to believe that the footlocker 

contains material of value on the early part 

of the campaign. 

The second shipment of records came in 

April 1942 when General Wainwright took 

advantage of the presence of two small aircraft on Corregidor to send to General 

Sharp on Mindanao fifteen packages of 

records, of undetermined bulk, to be delivered "in person to General Sutherland for 

forwarding to the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C."* Included in this shipment 

were General Wainwright's diaries and the 

general staff journals, with supporting documents. Only the five packages of G-3 records were inventoried and these consisted of 

ten journal files covering the period from 

28 November to 10 April and twenty supporting documents including G-3 periodic 

reports, general and field orders, training 

memoranda, and the journals or reports of 

all the major commands in the Philippines. 

*Ltr, Wainwright to Sharp, 12 Apr 42, Sub: 

Transmittal of USFIP Docs; rad, Wainwright to 

CG USAFFE, No. 261, 13 Apr 42, AG 370.05, 

GHQ SWPA; ltr, Irwin to TAG, 12 Apr 42, Sub: 

Transmittal of Docs. 
586 

The evidence that these records were received in Melbourne and placed in a vault 

in General Sutherland's office is indisputable. Their dispositioll thereafter is not 

known. The seven packages of G-4 records 

may have reached Washington, for there 

exist in the files of The Adjutant General, 

eight feet (one file cabinet) of records sent 

from Corregidor. These records, which deal 

largely with supply matters, have been used 

extensively in the preparation of this volume 

and were especially valuable in the study 

of shortages in food and medicine. When 

used, they were physically located in the 

Departmental Records Branch, AGO (Accession No. A51-75 ) , and designated 

USAFFE-USFIP Records.* They have 

been cited throughout this volume by title 

and AG number, followed by the abbreviation Phil Rcds. 

Assuming that the USAFFE-USFIP 

Records are a part of those sent from Corregidor in April 1942, the disposition of the 

remainder of the fifteen packages-the G-2 

and G-3 journals, General Wainwright's 

diaries, and supporting papers (altogether 

eight packages)-remains a mystery. A 

careful search of the files of The Adjutant 

General in Washington and of GHQ, Far 

East Command (FEC) in Tokyo, successor to the 1942 headquarters in Australia, 

has failed to produce them, and the principals, Generals Wainwright and Sutherland, assert they have no knowledge of their 

whereabouts. 

The third shipment of records from Corregidor was by submarine on 3 May, just 

* A detailed compilation of these records has been 

made by Dennis W. Ladd, entitled Inventory of 

Certain Records of United States Army Forces in 

the Far East and United States Army Forces in 

the Philippines, July 1941-May 1942, Finding Aid 

No. 31, DRB AGO. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

before the fall of the harbor defenses. There 

is no description of these records other than 

the statement that they included "records 

and orders," but many, if not most of them, 

were probably finance and personnel records. Their final disposition is unknown, but 

it is entirely possible that the eight feet of 

USAFFE-USFIP records described above 

came from this shipment rather than the 

earlier one which went to General Sutherland in Australia. If that is so, then all fifteen packages of the second shipment have 

been lost. 

Though there was little prospect that their 

records would survive, most of the units in 

the Philippines did their best nevertheless 

to maintain proper records in accordance 

with existing army practice. The quality of 

these records apparently varied considerably, depending on the unit's proximity to 

the enemy and on the interest and ability of 

commanders and clerks. Higher headquarters, which usually had the necessary personnel and equipment, kept the most complete records. Those of combat units, however, were sketchy. These units, composed 

largely of Filipinos, hastily mobilized and 

inadequately trained, had little opportunity 

to keep records. Some, even if they had 

wished to do so, could not have complied 

with regulations. They lacked clerical personnel and, in some instances, had first sergeants who could neither read nor write. To 

these difficulties was soon added another, 

the shortage of paper. The men had not 

been on Bataan long when paper became so 

scarce that orders had to be issued on the 

reverse side of prewar mimeographed regulations and administrative memoranda. 

On Corregidor and the adjoining islands 

of the harbor defenses more careful records 

were kept. The units there were composed 
THE SOURCES 

of regulars-Americans and Philippine 

Scouts-trained and disciplined and accustomed to maintain records. Though subjected to air and artillery bombardment, 

they were in fixed positions and had ample 

opportunity to continue to keep accurate 

administrative and operational records. 

These, like the records on Bataan, were 

destroyed when the order was given to 

surrender. 

With the capitulation of Corregidor and 

of the islands to the south, all communication with the Philippines came to an end. 

The entire garrison, an army of 140,000 

men, passed into captivity and, except for 

the handful who escaped, no word of their 

fate reached the United States. Though 

most of the Filipinos were ultimatdy released from prison camp, there was no way 

by which they could communicate with the 

Allies except through the clandestine intelligence organization kept alive by funds and 

equipment from Australia. Nominally free, 

the former Filipino troops of MacArthur's 

and Wainwright's army were as effectively 

prisoners of the Japanese as if they had remained in prison camp. 

It was only at the end of the war, with 

the return of the thin, emaciated American 

prisoners from Japanese camps in the Philippines, Japan, and Manchuria, that the War 

Department received an official report of 

the campaign. During their years in prison 

camp, higher commanders and their staff 

officers, on orders from General Wainwright 

and under the eyes of the Japanese, had begun the preparation of an operations report 

in anticipation of the day when they could 

present their own account of the disaster 

that had befallen American arms. These 

preliminary reports, written from memory, 

587 

were ultimately collated into a single report 

by General Wainwright and a group of his 

former staff officers at Fort Sam Houston in 

1946. 

Entitled Report of Operations of 

USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine 

Islands, 1941-1942, Wainwright's report 

covers the period of prewar preparations as 

well as the entire period of the campaign. 

It includes, therefore, the activities not only 

of his own command, USFIP, from 21 

March to 6 May, but also those of MacArthur's earlier command, USAFFE, which 

was transferred with the general to Australia in March 1942. Since neither General 

MacArthur nor any members of his staff 

had assisted Wainwright in the preparation 

of his report, that report cannot be considered an authoritative statement of decisions made by USAFFE or of the operations conducted by that headquarters. But 

in the absence of a report from General 

MacArthur, it is the only account by a 

senior American commander, and the author has been obliged to rdy upon it, despite 

its shortcomings on the levd of command 

and detision. One copy is located in the 

Departmental Records Branch, AGO, and 

another is on file in the Office of the Chief 

of Military History. All references in this 

volume are to the latter. 

The report is an ambitious and large 

work, with little form. Actually, it is a collection of separate reports, each organized 

and prepared differently, and attached to 

the basic report as an annex. There are 

eighteen such annexes, eight of which deal 

with the operations of major tactical commands, four with the activities of certain 

special staff sections, and six with miscellaneous matters, such as citations, lists of 
588 

units, and the organization of various headquarters.* Unfortunately, it contains the 

report of only one of the divisions, the 

Philippine Division, which fought on Luzon, and none of any unit smaller than a 

division. Missing also are the reports of the 

ordnance and artillery officers, and of 

many of the service and administrative 

headquarters. 

*ANNEX I: USAFFE Staff 

ANNEX II: Plan of Induction of Philippine 

Artily; Arrival of Units from the United States 

ANNEX III: Headquarters Philippine DepartIllf'nt Staff 

ANNEX IV: Report of Operations of North Luzon Force and I Philippine Corps in the Defense 

of Luzon and Bataan, 8 December 1941-9 April 

1942 

ANNEX V: Report of Operations of South Luzon Force, Bataan Defense Force and II Philippine Corps in the Defense of South Luzon and Bataan from 8 December 1941-9 April 1942 

ANNEX VI: Report of Operations of Luzon 

Force, 12 March 1942 to 9 April 1942 

ANNEX VII: USFIP Staff 

ANNEX VIII: Report of Philippine Coast Artillery Command and the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, 14 February 1941-6 May 1942 

ANNEX IX: Report of Operations of Provisional 

Coast Artillery Brigade in the Philippine Campaign 

ANNEX X: Report of Operations of the Provisional Tank Group, 1941-1942 

ANNEX XI: Historical Report, Visayan-Mindanao Force, Defense of the Philippines, 1 September 1941-10 May 1942 

ANNEX XII: Report of Operations of the 

Philippine Division 

ANNEX XIII: Report of Operations Quartermaster Corps, United States Army in the Philippine Campaign, 1941-1942 

ANNEX XIV: Medical Department Activities 

in the Philippines, 1941-6 May 1942, and Including Medical Activities in Japanese Prisoner of War 

Camps 

ANNEX XV: Report of Operations, Finance 

Officer, USFIP, 8 December 1941--6 May 1942 

ANNEX XVI: United States Forces Stationed 

in the Philippines, 7 December 1941 

ANNEX XVII: Report of Operations, Signal 

Corps, United States Army, 8 December 1941-6 

May 1942 

ANNEX XVIII: Citations 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Despite its deficiencies and its uneven nature Wainwright's report contains much of 

value. Some of the annexes are ambitious 

reports in their own right with numerous 

appendixes of their own. Annex XI, Maj. 

Gen. William F. Sharp's report on the 

Visayan-Mindanao Force, for example, contains thirty-seven appendixes and fills more 

than seven hundred pages. Comparable reports are those by Maj. Gen. George F. 

Moore, commander of the Harbor Defenses 

of Manila and Subic Bays, Brig. Gen. 

Charles C. Drake, the quartermaster; and 

Col. Wibb E. Cooper, medical officer on 

MacArthur's and later Wainwright'S staff. 

Unfortunately, not all the annexes are as 

adequate, the most deficient being those of 

the tactical commands. The report of the 

Luzon Force, for example, which covers the 

critical period of the fighting on Bataan between 12 March and 9 April, is only eight 

pages long, and the supporting reports of the 

general staff fill only ten more pages. 

Official records on the prewar period, and 

on the place of the Philippines in the strategy of the war are far more plentiful than 

those dealing with the campaign itself. Most 

of these are in the custody of The Adjutant 

General, filed at this writing in the Departmental Records Branch. The most useful 

for this volume were those numbered: 320.2 

(7 -28-41 ), which deals with the organization and reinforcement of USAFFE; 381 

(11-27-41) Far East, which consists of 

seven separate bulky folders and contains 

most of the messages sent to the Philippines; 

and 400 (8-12-41), which contains material on the supplies sent to the Islands. 

The organizational records of GHQ, 

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), MacArthur's headquarters during the war, also 

contain some material of value, especially 

those files numbered 370.05, 384.1, and 
THE SOURCES 

384.3, Philippine Islands. When used they 

were physically located in the Kansas City 

Records Center, AGO. Wherever cited in 

the text, these files have been indicated by 

the symbol GHQ SWPA. 

Most of the strategy and policy papers relating to the Philippines were filed originally 

in the War Plans Division (WPD), or its 

wartime successor, the Operations Division 

(OPD, now G-3) of the General Staff. 

These files when used were located in the 

Operations Division, but, with certain exceptions, have now been transferred to the 

Departmental Records Branch, AGO. 

Their integrity has been maintained, however, and they still bear the original WPD 

and 0 PD file numbers, which have been 

used throughout this volume. Included in 

this collection is the WPD Message File, the 

WPD Ready Reference File (Philippines), 

and the OPD 381 Philippine Islands File, 

all of which were particularly useful. The 

Chief of Staff files were handled in the same 

manner and are now also located in the Departmental Records Branch, AGO. Those 

files prepared before March 1942 are identified by the symbol OCS preceding the 

number; thereafter, by the symbol WDCSA. 

Most valuable for this volume are those 

designated OCS 18136, WDCSA 370.05 

(3-17-42) Philippines, and WDCSA 381 

( 3-1 7-42 ) Philippines. 

Though most of the WPD and OPD records of the 1941-1942 period have been 

turned over to The Adjutant General, G-3 

still retains possession of certain files dealing 

with strategy and policy. Those used in the 

preparation of this volume are the former 

executive office files and the highly confidential strategy papers of the Registered 

Documents Collection of the Operations Division. The former contains about a halfdozen folders relating to the Philippine 

589 

campaign, the most useful of which are the 

messages between General Marshall and 

Generals MacArthur and Wainwright. Materials from these files are identified in the 

notes by the abbreviations 0 PD Exec 0 

and OPD Reg Docs. 

Many relevant documents are inclUded 

in the forty volumes produced as a result of 

the hearings of the Joint Committee (79th 

Congress) which investigated the attack on 

Pearl Harbor. Eleven of the volumes consist of hearings, eighteen of exhibits presented during the course of the hearings, and 

one of the majority and minority reports of 

the committee. 

For air operations the author has relied 

largely on secondary accounts, but where 

necessary has extended his research into the 

files. In the case of the attack on Clark Field, 

the author has gone beyond the official Air 

Forces account, and has used all available 

files as well as interview material. Particularly valuable were the author's interviews 

with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, the 

notes on which are filed in the Office of the 

Chief of Military History.· 

The Office of Naval Records also contains some material of value for this campaign. The reports of Admiral Thomas H. 

Hart and Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, 

the former as commander of the Asiatic 

Fleet and the latter as 16th Naval District 

commander, were especially useful. Rockwell's report, which covers the period from 

1 December 1941 to 19 March 1942, contains a number of supplementary reports as 

well as a portion of the War Diary of the 

16th Naval District. 

The operations of the 4th Marines are 

covered briefly in the postwar report of its 

commander, Col. Samuel L. Howard, filed 

in the Historical Division, USMC. Its regimental records, like those of Army units, 
590 

were destroyed when Corregidor surrendered, and the story of the 4th Marines must 

be reconstructed from memoirs and interviews. Fortunately, this task had been accomplished in part for the author by Hanson 

W. Baldwin in a four-part article entitled 

"The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," published in the Manne Corps Gazette (N ovember 1946-February 1947). 

Unofficial Records 

The inadequacy of the records dealing 

with operations, and the absence of journals, 

message files, map overlays, and after action 

reports from units lower than corps, would 

have made it impossible to write a detailed 

account of the Philippine campaign had it 

not been possible to supplement the official files with a wide variety of unofficial 

records. During the period in which this 

volume was in preparation, a total of approximately six feet of records of this type 

has been accumulated. These are filed in the 

Office of the Chief of Military History, and 

are so located when first cited in the footnotes. 

Perhaps the least satisfying aspect of the 

USAFFE-USFIP Report of Operations 

was the absence of supporting reports by 

division and regimental commanders. Except for the report of the Philippine Division and the elements of the VisayanMindanao Force, Wainwright's report and 

accompanying annexes describe the campaign from the viewpoint of corps headquarters or higher. To have relied on it for 

combat operations, therefore, would have 

been most unsatisfactory and every effort 

was made to secure material on the operations of units smaller than corps. Fortunately, many American officers who commanded such units felt as strongly as their 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

superiors the compulsion to leave a record 

of their experiences. During their years in 

prison these men had discussed and compared their operations endlessly with their 

fellow prisoners and jotted down in cheap 

Japanese notebooks or on scraps of paper 

all they could remember and had learned. 

So scarce was writing material that the men 

covered every inch of space in the notebooks 

and wrote in characters so small as' t6, be 

scarcely legible. These notebooks, hidd~n 

most ingeniously from the Japanese guar4s 

and brought back after the war, form the 

basis for the most important single collection of records dealing with combat operations of American and Filipino units in the 

Philippine campaign. 

To secure this material the author embarked on an ambitious letter-writing program, made trips to various parts of the 

country, and induced many officers to support his requests by letters of their own. It 

was obviously impossible to reach every 

officer who had served as a unit commander 

or staff officer during the campaign, and no 

effort was made to do so. But letters were 

written to every division and regimental 

commander, the senior American instructors 

in Philippine Army units, and the most 

important staff officers. Only in exceptional 

cases were letters sent to battalion and 

company commanders. 

The response to this campaign for material entirely justified the time and effort 

spent. Only in rare cases did officers refuse 

categorically to make their notebooks, 

diaries, and personal papers available. Some 

who had no records in their possession even 

volunteered to prepare reports for the author, offers which were gratefully accepted. 

As this material reached the author it was 

reproduced, usually by photostat and with 

the permission of the donor, a copy retained 
THE SOURCES 

in the files of the Office of the Chief of Military History, and the original returned to 

the owner. Where the owner had carbon 

copies there was no necessity for reproduction. In rare instances, the originals were 

presented to the author as representative of 

the Office of the Chief of Military History. 

One such gift came from the widow of General Sharp who turned her husband's papers 

over to the author on that officer's death 

from a heart attack in 1947.* 

The nature of this collection almost defies 

description. Included in it are letters written 

over a three-year period in prison camp but 

.'lever sent, diaries, notes, poems, unit histories, reports, memoranda, accounts of 

single incidents or battles, memoirs, and preliminary narratives intended as the basis for 

a later, larger work which the writer hoped 

would be published. They vary widely in 

size and quality. Some are only one page 

long and others are ambitious works numbering several hundred pages. Some are 

written in the dullest prose imaginable; 

others have real literary merit. Some are accurate and detailed; others replete with loose 

generalizations. Common to all is the note 

of bitterness at what they believed to be their 

abandonment by their government and the 

desire to justify themselves to the future. 

Among the records thus secured were accounts, written in prison camp, of the operations of most of the divisions and a large 

number of the regiments that fought on 

Luzon. Brig. Gen. Kearie L. Berry lent the 

author his account of the operations of 3d 

Inf antry, 1 st Regular Division (P A) , which 

is actually a history of that division. From 

Col. Ray M. O'Day, senior instructor of the 

*Mrs. Sharp later gave additional papers to The 

Adjutant General's Office. These are located in 

Departmental Records Branch, Accession No. 

A51·229, RG 499. 

591 

21st Division (PA), came a history of that 

division in two thin typescript volumes. 

Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel's report on the 

operations of the 31 st Division (P A ), with 

its supporting documents, proved extremely 

useful, as did Col. Malcolm V. Fortier's 

notebook and notes on the 41st Division 

(PA). Maj. Gen. Albert M. Jones, who 

commanded in turn the 51 st Division (P A) , 

the South Luzon Force, and I Corps, has 

perhaps left a more complete record of his 

experience than any other commander, and 

his accounts, supported by those of his chief 

of staff, Col. Stuart C. MacDonald, form 

one of the basic sources for a history of the 

campaign. Completing the roster of division 

histories for operations on Luzon is Col. 

Clyde A. Selleck's Notes on the 71st Division 

(P A) which covers the activities of that 

division as long as it remained under his 

command. The operations of the divisions 

south of Luzon are described in the VisayanMindanao .Force Report, which includes 

among its appendixes accounts by each of 

the division and sector commanders. Brig. 

Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth prepared a 

separate account of the 61st Division (P A) , 

at this author's request, and it has been used 

in preference to other reports. 

It has not been possible to obtain accounts 

from three of the division commanders. 

Missing from the records, therefore, are the 

histories of the 2d Division (PC), composed of Constabulary troops, and two Philippine Army divisions, the 11 th and 91 st. 

Of these, the absence of a report from Brig. 

Gen. Luther Stevens on the 91st Division is 

the most serious, for it was that division 

which failed to hold at Cabanatuan, thereby 

permitting the Japanese to break through 

and imperil the withdrawal to Bataan. The 

lack of reports from the other two commanders is not as serious, and is compen-
592 

sated for, in the case of Brig. Gen. William 

E. Brougher's 11 th Division, by regimental 

reports as well as excellent accounts of the 

division's most important engagement on 

Bataan, the Pocket Fights. 

Supporting these unofficial division histories, as well as the official history of the 

Philippine Division, are unofficial accounts 

of the operations of many of the regiments 

and battalions. Perhaps the best are those of 

the 31st (US), 45th (PS), and 57th Infantry (PS), Philippine Division. In the case 

of the 45th-which figured largely in the 

Abucay fight, the Battle of the Points, the 

Pocket Fights, and the counterattack of 6 

April-there is an account for each of the 

battalions. The operations of the 11 th Infantry, 11th Division, are well covered in 

three separate reports, two of which were 

written by Col. Glen R. Townsend, the regimental commander. Operations of its sister 

regiments, however, are only sketchily covered in brief accounts. Reports from the regiments of other divisions are similar to those 

already noted, the weakest usually being just 

those where the division report itself is inadequate. There are accounts also of the operations of nondivisional units, such as the 

26th Cavalry (PS), including a separate report by the commander of the 2d Squadron; 

the 192d and 194th Tank Battalions (US); 

and the 86th, 88th, and 301st Field Artillery. Unfortunately, the commander of the 

Provisional Air Corps Regiment, which for 

more than two months held a sector of the 

second line on Bataan, never prepared a report but the operations of other Air Corps 

units serving as infantry-the 17th, 21st, 

and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, which fought 

in the Battle of the Points-are briefly covered in separate accounts. 

The most valuable single collection of 

small unit histories-including some of those 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

already mentioned-are those which were 

gathered in prison camp by Capt. Calvin E. 

Chunn, 45th Infantry (PS). Resolved to 

write a history of the campaign if he survived the ordeal, Chunn began to collect 

material shortly after he reached Cabanatuan. He spoke with officers from almost 

every unit and secured from them information for an account of their operations. This 

information, together with other material, 

such as maps, diaries, statistics, orders, affidavits, he transcribed into his notebooks. 

Before he was transferred by the Japanese 

from Cabanatuan to a camp in Japan, he 

buried his voluminous notes in the prison 

compound at Cabanatuan where they were 

found after the war. Copies of the material 

in the notebooks were made and the originals returned to Captain Chunn, who by 

this time had reached the United States. 

One set of the copies was obtained by the 

author of this volume and is on file in the 

Office of the Chief of Military History. 

When used in this volume it is identified as 

Chunn Notebooks; the individual accounts 

are credited to the officer who supplied Captain Chunn with the information contained 

in the notebooks. Chunn, since separated 

from the service, is, at this writing, still at 

work on his history of the Philippine campaign. 

The diaries, memoirs, and notebooks prepared in prison camp were often as useful 

in the preparation of this volume as the unofficial unit histories. Col. James V. Collier's four notebooks, which were written as 

a letter to his sons and cover the entire period of the campaignl were of particular 

value, since the writer was successively Assistant G-3 of USAFFE and G-3 of Luzon 

Force. The Bataan Diary (two volumes) of 

Col. Richard C. Mallonee, senior instructor 

of the 21st Field Artillery (P A), is a 
THE SOl!RCES 

thoughtful and accurate account which 

deals with many more matters than one 

would expect from an officer who saw the 

war from a regimental headquarters. 

Though called a diary, it is actually a sustained narrative. Col. Paul D. Bunker's 190-

page diary, closely written on sheets measuring 12 by 16 inches, is a true diary and consists of daily entries. Colonel Bunker was 

commander of the Seaward Defenses of 

Corregidor and his diary was especially valuable for those chapters dealing with operations there. Unfortunately, it contains no 

entries for the critical period between 29 

April and 17 May 1942, when the Japanese 

landed and took the island. 

The diary of Maj. William J. Priestley is 

unlike either Mallonee's or Bunker's. It is a 

compilation of the activities of various units, 

written by Priestley in prison camp on the 

basis of information supplied by other officers. Organized in a haphazard manner, it 

contains all sorts of miscellaneous information difficult to obtain elsewhere. Other 

diaries useful for a study of the campaign 

are those of Col. Alexander Quintard, commander of the 301st Field Artillery; Lt. Col. 

Arthur L. Shreve, artillery officer of the 

South Luzon Force; Maj. Achille C. Tisdelle, General King's aide; Maj. John 

McM. Gulick, commander of Battery C, 

91 st Coast Artillery (PS) -a work of genuine literary merit; and Capt. Roland G. 

Ames, commander of Battery Chicago, 60th 

Coast Artillery (AA). 

After the reconq uest of the Philippines 

and the release of the prisoners of war, a 

section was formed in MacArthur's headquarters for the processing of the survivors. 

This section, called the Recovered Personnel 

Section, G -·1, soon began to receive finance, 

personnel, hospital, and prison records, as 

well as diaries and notebooks, prepared in 

the same way a~ those mentioned above, all 

of which had been carefully wrapped and 

buried on Bataan, Corregidor, and the 

prison grounds to keep them out of Japanese 

hands. Before these records were sent to 

Washington or, in those cases where the 

papers were of no official value, returned to 

their owners or heirs, they were carefully 

screened for any information of value they 

might contain about the enemy. The entire 

collection was then microfilmed and deposited in the Records Administration 

Center, AGO. The author, however, ha~ 

avoided references to thl.' microfilm file and 

has used the originals, or photostat and 

typed copies, which, together with an 80-

page index to the entire collection, is available in the OfficI.' of the Chief of Military 

Historv. 

Despite the large amount of material thus 

collected, there was still little information 

on the operations of small units, of company 

and battalion size. In some cases the action 

of these units had heen decisive and an 

accurate account was essential. Thi~ gap 

was filled largely with no effort on the 

author's part. On their return from prison 

camp, many of the survivors had been assigned as students at various schools of the 

Army---at The Infantry School, The Armored Force School, and at the Command 

and General Staff College. Required to 

write a term paper before completion of the 

course, most of these officers had naturally 

found a subject in the only campaign of 

W orId War II they had knowledge of. 

Since most of them had served as company 

and battalion commanders. it was natural 

also that they should write about the 

operation~ of smalllloits. 

To date about twenty such papers have 

been prepared. More than half of this number deal with clements of the Philippine Di-
594 

V1SlOn, which was officered by Americans. 

The rest cover operations of elements of the 

I st, I I th, 41 st, and 91 st Divisions, and miscellaneous units. Among this group is the 

only report of the Provisional Air Corps 

Regiment, prepared by Lt. Sheldon H. Mendelson while he was a student at The Infantry School, as well as an account entitled 

The First V.S. Tank Action in World War 

II, prepared by Lt. Col. Thomas Dooley, 

General Wainwright's aide, during his assignment to The Armored Force School. 

All of these papers were borrowed from 

those schools where they were prepared and 

returned there after they were used. Their 

location is indicated in the footnotes. 

Though the unofficial unit histories, diaries, notebooks, and term papers made possible for the first time a reasonable reconstruction of the Philippine campaign, there 

were still many gaps which needed to be 

filled before a complete and authentic account could be written. Only the officers 

who had participated in the actions for 

which the accounts were incomplete or 

nonexistent, or who had been present when 

an important decision was made, could provide the missing information. This information the author secured in two ways, by letter and by interview. The letter-writing 

method was used when information of an 

operational nature was required, or when 

the distance was too great to permit personal conversation. Interviews were conducted with those officers who were readily 

available, or where the information needed 

could not easily be put in writing. The response to both methods was very gratifying 

and yielded an important body of records 

dealing with the campaign. 

The correspondence file is of especial 

value, and the author has relied on it more 

heavily than on the interview. Those asked 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

to supply information in writing usuall~ 

produced more complete and accurate answers than those who gave their information 

orally. Often they drew sketches to illustrate their answers, and drew upon personal 

papers of whose existence the author had 

been unaware. Many officers asked to answer one or two questions wrote lenRthv 

accounts of actions which had been imperfectly described in existing reports, thus 

creating an additional important sOllfce. 

Moreover, the signed letters constituted an 

important addition to the written record of 

the campaign. 

Altogether the author has collected thn'c 

thick folders of such material representin); 

the replies of over one hundred ofTicers. 

which are on file in the Office of thc Chid 

of Military History. To these must be added 

the comments of those officers who rcad I hi~ 

volume, in whole or in part, while it W;]~ 

still in manuscript. These comments and 

additional information were carefullv considered and are cited in the notes where 

applicable. 

V nlike the correspondence carried on by 

the author, the interviews did not add 

greatly to the written record, although they 

were of great value during the preparation 

of the volume. To have made them a part 

of the record would have required the 311-

thor to take copious notes during the interview, write up a report of the meeting. and 

then submit it to the officer interviewed for 

comment and signature. Without this hst 

step, the notes would represent only the 

author's recollection and interpretation of 

the conversation. Such a procedure was not 

considered practical, although the author in 

many cases made his own notes of the interview to remind him of the more important 

points. It was felt that the presence of a 

secretary or the taking of notes would inhibit 
THE SOURCES 

the conversation and destroy the chief value 

of the interview-the free expression of 

opinion. They were conducted therefore on 

a most informal basis, in home and office, in 

hotel lobby and restaurant, and, when the 

officers could be reached, by telephone or by 

walking along the lengthy passages of the 

Pentagon-almost daily during the preparation of the volume. The information 

thus secured was incorporated directly into 

the text and credited in the footnotes. 

] apanese Records 

The enemy records for the Philippine 

campaign fall into three major categories. 

The first and most important of these is composed of a group of histories or reports, part 

of a collection written by Japanese Army 

and Navy officers at the direction of G-2, 

Far East Command (FEC). These officers, 

working as civilians in the 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, the former Army and 

Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters, prepared a large number of reports collectively titled Japanese Studies in 

World War II. The total number already 

completed and translated is well over one 

hundred and more are in preparation. 

Though the series contains large gaps and 

the individual studies vary widely in quality, 

it constitutes the most important single Japanese source on Japanese operations in the 

Pacific and in Asia during W orId War II. 

Of this large collection, the author used 

three reports extensively. On the whole, 

these are more accurate and complete than 

those for later operations. The Japanese won 

this campaign and their records therefore 

were more complete. They did not have to 

rely, as they did for histories of later operations, on memory. Indeed, there is reason to 

believe that one of the six studies used was 

595 

written during the war by 14th Army officers in the Philippines. 

For this volume the most valuable Japanese source was the two-volume history 

entitled 14th Army Operations. In a sense, 

all other Japanese documents are supplementary to it. It is detailed, reasonably accurate, and as complete as the after action 

reports of most units of comparable size. 

The first volume consists of the basic report, 

in narrative form, of 14th Army's operations 

on a day to day basis and includes the text 

or paraphrase of many important orders. In 

the second volume are the supporting documents: maps, intelligence reports, terrain 

studies, plans, as well as some brief but 

informative notes written by General 

Homma shortly before the opening of the 

final offensive on Bataan. 

N either the air nor naval accounts of Japanese operations in the Philippines are on 

the same scale as the 14th Army history. 

The air force report, entitled 5th Air Group 

Operations, contains a brief history of that 

headquarters as well as the. history of its 

successor commands. It is extremely detailed 

in operational matters, providing in many 

instances the number and weight of bombs 

dropped on a single target, but somewhat 

vague in matters of decision and command. 

The naval history, Naval Operations in the 

Invasion of the Philippines, is the briefest 

and least satisfying of the reports on the 

Philippines, and contains hardly more than 

a brief account of naval surface and air 

activities in the opening days of the war. 

Two other histories in the Japanese 

Studies in World War II, those of the Army 

Section, Imperial General Headquarters 

and of Southern Army, contain material of 

value on the Philippine campaign. Translated copies of these, as well as of the other 

histories, are on file in the Office of the 
596 

Chief of Military History, together with 

copies of the Japanese originals which were 

checked in every important casco 

The second major category of Japanese 

source material for the campaign is the collection of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (A TIS) of General MacArthur's headquarters. During the war this 

section screened all enemy documents taken 

on the field of battle, translating and publishing those of immediate value. At the 

conclusion of hostilities, ATIS turned its attention to records of a historical nature and 

interrogated a large number of Japanese officers about their part in the war. These, 

like the wattime translations, were published in the ATIS series and distributed to 

interested agencies and commands. A complete set of these publications is on file in 

the Office of the Chief of Military History, 

as well as in the Military Intelligence Library, Department of the Army. 

Those ATIS documents most useful in 

the preparation of this volume were the after 

action reports of the 65th Brigade and 16th 

Division. For the brigade there are two reports, one for the period 9-27 January 

1942, when it fought in the Mt. Natib area, 

and another for the period 26 J anuary-29 

February 1942, covering operations in the 

vicinity of Mt. Samat (ATIS Enemy Publications 151 and 289). Together they provide a complete account of the brigade's 

operations during the first part of the siege 

of Bataan, as well as casualty figures, operations orders, maps, and similar material. 

The report of the 16th Division (ATIS 

Enemy Publication 355) covers the period 

24 December 1941 to 3 January 1942 and 

was issued two days after the conclusion of 

the operations it describes-the Japanese 

landings at Lamon Bay and the advance 

through south Luzon to Manila. UnfortuTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

nately, it lacks supporting documents and 

maps and is therefore of limited value. 

Other ATIS documents of value are the 

postwar interrogations, statements of Japanese officers, and the answers to questionnaires sent to key officers by the author. 

Many of the interrogations were made specifically for historical purposes, either at the 

request of the G-2 Historical Section of 

MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo or of 

the Office of the Chief of Military History. 

These, together with the statements secured 

from Japanese officers in response to specific 

queries, are available in the Office of the 

Chief of Military History and form an important supplement to the Japanese accounts already described. 

Except for General Homma, who was 

executed in Manila in April 19:46, almost 

every Japanese officer who had held an 

important post during the Philippine campaign has contributed to this volume. The 

Army headquarters was represented by Lt. 

Gen. Masami Maeda, Homma's first chief 

of staff; Col. Motoo Nakayama, senior 

operations officer; Lt. Col. Yoshio Nakajima, intelligence, then later, operations 

officer; Lt. Col. Monjiro Akiyama, air officer; and other lesser figures. 

On the division level, information about 

the 48th Division was secured from Col. 

Moriji Kawagoe, division chief of staff, and 

Maj. Makoto Nakahara, operations officer. 

Lt. Gen. Susumu Morioka was questioned 

about the activities of his 16th Division, 

while Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano supplied information about his own division, the 4th. 

Both interrogations were supplemented by 

statements from staff officers of the two 

divisions. Among these the most useful, perhaps, were those of Col. Motohiko Yoshida, 

4th Division chief of staff, and Lt. Col. 

Hiromi Oishi, operations officer. Interroga-
THE SOURCES 

tion of 65th Brigade officers was inadequate, 

but this deficiency was no handicap to the 

historian who had the two excellent after 

action reports of that brigade. 

The third major Japanese source consists of the transcript and exhibits of the 

trial of General Homma by an American 

military tribunal held at Manila in January 

and February of 1946. The thirty voltnnes 

of testimony and more than four hundred 

exhibits constitute a storehouse of information on the campaign--on plans, operations, 

the condition of Japanese troops, the "death 

march," the occupation of Manila, and the 

American surrender. Its chief value, however, lies in the fact that Homma's testimony 

constitutes a statement by the enemy commander of his conduct of the campaign, 

together with an explanation of the factors 

which influenced his most important decisions. In this respect, the enemy sources 

are more rewarding than the American. 

The records of the trial when used were in 

the custody of The Judge Advocate General but have recently been transferred to 

the Departmental Records Branch, AGO. 

Citations of the testimony at the trial and 

to interviews and statements retain the rank 

of the officers at the time of the action described in the text. In almost all cases, however, these officers had been demobilized 

and had no military status. 

In addition to these three categories of 

Japanese material, the author has used a 

number of other enemy sources in the preparation of this volume. These include the 

numerous postwar interrogations and reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), which conducted a 

detailed study of many facets of the Japanese war effort. The published work of the 

survey consists of a summary report, two 

volumes of naval interrogations, and a large 

597 

number of volumes on the Japanese war 

effort. There are also many unpublished 

interrogations in the USSBS files, copies of 

which are available in the Office of the 

Chief of Military History. 

In The National Archives of the United 

States is a large collection of untranslated 

Japanese military and naval documents obtained at the end of the war and returned to 

this country. These consist mainly of war 

diaries, usually of small units, and in some 

cases of collections of orders. The systematic 

use of these records would have required the 

services of a staff of translators for several 

years, a project which was neither practical 

nor profitable. Little use was made of this 

collection, therefore, except to scan it for 

the most relevant and useful documents. 

Maps 

To the difficulties of securing material on 

the tactical level must be added the lack of 

the type of maps and overlays required by 

the military historian. At the start of the war 

there were only four militarily significant 

maps of the Philippines in existence. Two of 

these were U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey 

maps: one for the entire archipelago at the 

scale of 1 : 600,000; and the other, a topographic map consisting of seventeen sheets 

and covering the major islands, scaled at 

1 : 200,000. The other two maps had been 

prepared by the Army engineers. The first of 

these was a topographic map and was based 

on a military survey made between 1911 and 

1914. It covered only a portion of Luzon 

and was scaled at 1 : 63,360. The other, also 

a topographic map, was based on a more 

recent survey made in 1934 and 1935. 

Scaled at 1 : 31,680, it covered an even more 

restricted area than the 1: 63,360, being 

limited to certain sectors of Luzon consid-
598 

ered most critical for defense. There were 

enough copies of the first three of these maps 

for ordinary needs, but the last was available 

only in blueprint and in limited quantities. 

The disadvantages of so inadequate a 

map coverage were perhaps not as serious 

as might be supposed. Many of the troops 

were fighting on their home islands in country they knew well. The Americans and 

Scouts had been over the ground many times 

before and had maneuvered on Bataan as 

late as January 1941. Those Filipinos who 

came from islands other than Luzon found 

the terrain little different from their own. 

Maps in the quantities needed by American 

forces in the Pacific later in the war were 

therefore not required in this campaign. 

Facilities for map reproduction in the 

Philippines were excellent. The plants of the 

V.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey and of the 

Commonwealth Bureau of Public Works 

were both available to the military and operated until the evacuation of Manila, though 

the first was bombed on 23 December. Part 

of the equipment was then moved, with 

much difficulty, to Corregidor where the 

printing of maps on a limited basis was continued several months longer. 

Facilities for the making of maps were not 

nearly as satisfactory. There was no headquarters base map plant, such as existed 

later in the war, in the Philippines at that 

time, no aerial photography, and only a few 

small mapping detachments in the field. 

Men trained to make maps were scarce, and 

in those days the making of maps was a long 

and arduous task. Little had been done during the years of peace to remedy these deficiencies. Like other military activities, map 

making had been severely curtailed for 

reasons of economy. It was fortunate indeed 

that the few areas mapped were those where 

most of the action took place and where 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

most Americans had maneuvered time and 

again. 

During the first part of the campaign, the 

withdrawal to Bataan, the two maps most 

in demand were the 1: 200,000 V.S. Coast 

and Geodetic Survey, and a road map of the 

island. The engineers had little difficulty 

meeting this demand, but when the troops 

moved back into the Bataan peninsula, having lost most of the maps distributed earlier, 

there were few up-to-date, large-scale maps 

available for distribution. By utilizing every 

field expedient the engineers were able to 

reproduce enough copies of the 1: 63,360 

and 1 :31,680 maps, both of which, fortunately, included the peninsula, for general 

distribution to the ":roops. But both maps 

were hopelessly out of date and had to be 

supplemented by schematic sketches and 

overlays which were not based on any actual 

survey. As new road and trail information 

became available the sketches were revised 

and corrected prints in limited editions circulated to the units most directly concerned. 

Like the records, the maps in the hands of 

the troops were destroyed just before the surrender. Those that were not, were appropriated by the Japanese as souvenirs and 

have since been lost without a trace. A few 

reached Australia, probably among the possessions taken out by Brig. Gen. Hugh J. 

Casey, the engineer officer of VSAFFE, 

when he left with General MacArthur. But 

so scarce are these maps that General Wainwright could find only one-the 1: 63,360 

trail map of Bataan corrected in prison 

camp by an engineer officer-to include in 

his report. The rest of the maps in the report are of a later period. 

The author has sought in vain for copies 

of the maps used by the troops in the Philippines, and for accompanying overlays, to secure exact information on troop disposi-
THE SOURCES 

tions, the location of gun emplacements, 

fields of fire, wire entanglements, demolitions, and the like. If the maps have survived, their owners treasure them too highly 

to allow their use by others. The author has 

found copies of the 1 : 63,360 and 1 : 31 ,680 

engineer maps, but these lacked the information needed. Moreover, the latest maps 

of Bataan found are dated February 1942 

and do not show the trails built between that 

time and the end of the campaign. Two of 

the engineer sketches showing the location 

of gun emplacements, demolitions, and similar installations, have been found, but these 

lack exact terrain information and troop 

dispositions. 

To secure the information required in a 

tactical account the author has utilized 

every source open to him. Officers interviewed were asked to place their units on a 

map and to make whatever corrections or 

additions they could. With the numerous 

letters requesting material went maps and 

an added request to supplement and correct the information shown. Sketches drawn 

by others and data from later maps were 

also used. All this information was collated, 

but the result was not entirely satisfactory. 

Terrain descriptions varied; trails were differently numbered or named; the same 

name or number was applied to different 

trails; rivers were named and located differently on various maps and by different officers; boundaries between units could not be 

exactly fixed; and even the front lines described in the various accounts could not be 

reconciled. No final resolution of these and 

other discrepancies is possible since the 

original map and overlays have been lost. 

The Japanese had difficulties of their own 

with maps, and for the invasion probably 

used a road map of the Philippines and 

hydrographic charts of their own. This lack 

599 

was filled soon after the occupation of Manila when they captured a detailed U.S. 

Coast and Geodetic Survey photostat map 

of Bataan. This they lithographed and 

printed, then distributed to their own troops. 

A copy of this map, with Japanese troop dispositions and place names marked on it, 

was introduced as evidence in the trial of 

General Homma. It proved invaluable for 

fixing enemy positions and following enemy 

movements; without it the account of Japanese operations would have been less exact 

in many places. 

Published Works 

The number of books and articles dealing 

with the Philippine campaign and its aftermath is especially large, but of limited use. 

The dramatic defense by the Philippine garrison captured the imagination of the American public immediately, and articles began 

to appear early in 1942 as officers, public 

officials, and correspondents made their way 

by submarine and aircraft through the Japanese blockade. Throughout the year articles 

on the Philippines continued to appear in 

service journals and elsewhere, but in 

steadily diminishing numbers as American 

forces embarked on new ventures in North 

Africa, in the Solomons, and in New Guinea. 

Thereafter until the end of war, a period 

when those who could have written authoritatively about the Philippine campaign 

were in prison camp, there were few published works on the Philippines. To this 

early period belong such works as Lt. Col. 

William E. Dyess, The Dyess Story (New 

York, 1944) ; John Hersey, Men on Bataan 

(New York, 1942); Lt. Col. Allison Ind, 

Bataan, The Judgment Seat (New York, 

1944); and Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the 

Fall of the Philippines (New York, 1942). 
600 

The release of the prisoners, first those in 

the Philippines and then, after the surrender 

of Japan, those in Formosa, Japan, and 

Manchuria, was the prelude to a second 

large outpouring of books and articles about 

the campaign and about life in a Japanese 

prison camp. Like the first group, few of 

these are of real value for the student of 

military operations. The most significant is 

General Wainwright's Story, written with 

the aid of Robert Considine and published 

in 1946. Though it left much to be desired 

as a definitive account, General Wainwright's Story very possibly forestalled the 

publication by other commanders and staff 

officers of their own version of the campaign. Reluctant to engage in public controversy or disagree with their chief, they 

remained silent. Only Col. Ernest B. Miller, 

a National Guard officer and formerly commander of a tank battalion, has chosen to 

express his opposition to General Wainwright's views publicly in a volume entitled 

Bataan Uncensored (Long Prairie, Minn., 

1949) . 

Other postwar volumes and articles by 

survivors deal mostly with prison camp, or 

with the isolated actions and operations of 

specific units. In the latter category are Lt. 

Col. William E. Chandler's three-part history of the 26th Cavalry (PS) in the Armored Cavalry Journal (March~August 

1947) ; Lt. William F. Hogaboom's account 

of the action of the marines on Bataan in 

the Marine Corps Gazette (April 1946); 

Lt. Col. Harold K. Johnson's "Defense 

Along the Abucay Line" in the February 

1949 issue of Military Review; Col. William C. Braly, "Corregidor-A Name, A 

Symbol, A Tradition," Coast Artillery 

Journal, LXXX, No. 4 (July~August 

1947), pp. 2~9, 36-44, which is based on 

the official report of the commander of HarTHE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

bor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays; 

the story of the naval battalion in the Battle 

of the Points, written by William F. Prickett 

and published in the Marine Corps Gazette 

(July 1950); and Lt. Col. Bruce Palmer, 

Jr., "Covering the Withdrawal into Bataan," in the July 1950 issue of the Infantry 

School Quarterly. 

At about the time these books and articles 

were published, the memoirs and histories 

of the war began to appear. Many of the 

former, written by men who had occupied 

high political and military posts during the 

war, touched briefly on the Philippines and 

cast additional light on obscure points. The 

most useful of these are: Manuel L. Quezon, 

The Good Fight (New York, 1946); Lt. 

Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton 

Diaries (New York, 1946); Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 

1948); and Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace 

and War (New York, 1948). 

Histories of the period first appeared in 

print in 1948, and, like the memoirs, were 

still coming out at the time this volume was 

completed. Most of these were and still are 

being prepared under the sponsorship of the 

armed forces, each of which maintains its 

own historical program. The Army's program, under which this volume was prepared, contains several volumes which deal 

with this period. Three of these, Mark 

Skinner Watson's Chief of Staff: Prewar 

Plans and Preparations, Ray S. Cline's 

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, and Maurice Matloff's and 

Edwin M. Snell's Strategic Planning for 

Coalition Warfare, 1941~1942, have already been published in this series. Others 

which were used in manuscript and which 

are scheduled for early publication are 

Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coak-
THE SOURCES 

ley, The Logistics of Global Warfare, 1941-

1943, and Rudolph A. Winnacker, The 

Secretaries. 

In the Air Forces series, nominally part of 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II but prepared separately and published by the University of Chicago Press, 

the first volume, Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942 

( Chicago, 1948) , edited by Wesley F. 

Craven and James L. Cate, was especially 

useful. Though not a part of the official 

history, Walter D. Edmonds' They Fought 

With What They Had (Boston, 1951) belongs, in a sense, to this category since the 

author, a well-known novelist, secured much 

of his material during the war on a special 

mission for the Air Forces. The 14-volume 

history of naval operations, written by 

Samuel Eliot Morison and published by 

Little, Brown & Company, includes eight 

volumes on the Pacific. The first of these 

(Volume III of the series), The Rising Sun 

in the Pacific, covers the first four months of 

the war and includes naval operations in 

the Philippine campaign. 

In addition to these service histories, each 

of which presents a segment of the same war 

from a different point of view, there are 

other histories which provide valuable material and fresh points of view. These include 

J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War, 

1939-45 (London, 1948) ; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate 

History (New York, 1948); Hanson W. 

Baldwin, The Great Mistakes of the War 

601 

(New York, 1950); and Herbert Feis, The 

Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, 1950). 

It is impossible to write about the Philippine campaign without dealing with the 

controversial figure of General MacArthur. 

Even before his relief from the Far East 

command in April 1951 he had already become the subject of numerous books and 

articles, few of which were objective in tone. 

His relief was the signal for a fresh flurry of 

books and articles dealing with his career, 

and some of these reviewed his conduct of 

the Philippine campaign. Like the earlier 

works, almost all of these were by stanch 

champions or violent critics. None contained 

any significant new material on the campaign. At the time this volume was completed at least two more books about MacArthur were scheduled for early publication 

and there was every indication that others 

would appear in the near future. 

In this connection, one final note must be 

added. The manuscript and published 

sources here described represent the best 

material available at the time of writing. 

Undoubtedly additional material will appear. Some of the missing records may turn 

up in private collections or be found in some 

obscure corner of The Adjutant General's 

files. Still to be heard from are General MacArthur and his principal staff officers, most 

of whom are now retired; General King; 

and the men who commanded corps and 

some of the divisions on Bataan. Only then, 

when the full story of these men is known, 

will it be possible to fill in the gaps and 

round out the tactical detail of this volume. 

Basic Military Map Symbols* 

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within a 

triangle an observation ·post, and within a circle a suppl v point. 

Military Units-Identification 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Armored CoJTImand 

Army Air Forces 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery 

Cavalry, Horse 

Cavalry, Mechanized 

Chemical Warfare Service 

Coast Artillery 

Engineers 

Infantry 

Medical CAlrps 

Ordnance Department 

Quartermaster Corps 

Signal Corps 

Tank Destroyer 

Transportation Corps 

Veterinary Corps 

~ 

IC)I 

1

001 

8 

[Z] 

~ 

m 

rn 

IT] 

~ 

EE 

[[J 

m 

m 

ITol 

OOJ 

rs21 

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing symbol 

with the arm or service symbol: 

Airborne Artillery 

Airborne Infantry 

*For complete listing of symbols see FM 21-30, from which these are taken. 
604 THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Size Symbols 

The following symbols placed either in houndary lines or above 

the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying arm or service 

symbol indicate the size of military organizaiion: 

Squ~ • 

Section •• 

Platoon. • •• 

Company, troop, hattery, Air Force flight I 

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron I I 

Regiment or group; combat team (with ahhreviation CT following 

identifying numeral) I I I 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force Wing X 

Division or Command of an Air Force XX 

Corps or Air Force XXX 

Army XXXX 

Group of Armies XXXXX 

EXAMPLES 

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the unit 

designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent unit to which 

it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below boundary lines designate 

the units separated by the lines: 

Company A, 137th Infantry 

8th Field Artillery Battalion 

Combat Command A, 1 st Armored Division 

Observation Post, 23d Infantry 

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division 

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry 

Weapons 

Machine gun 

Gun 

Gun battery 

Howitzer or Mortar 

Tank 

Self-propelled gun 

A~137 

8 8 

Albll 

1)..1 

~23 

~5 137 

-111-

138 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The following volumes have been published or are in press: 

The War Department 

Chief of Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations 

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 

Strategic Planningfor Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 

The Army and Economic Mobilization 

The Army and Industrial Manpower 

The Army Ground Forces 

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops 

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops 

The Army Service Forces 

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces 

The Western Hemisphere 

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts 

The War in the Pacific 

The Fall of the Philippines 

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive 

Victory in Papua 

CARTVVHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul 

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshall5 

Campaign in the Marianas 

The Approach to the Philippines 

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines 

Triumph in the Philippines 

Okinawa: The /,ast Battle 

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West 

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy 

Salerno to Cassino 

Cassino to the Alps 

The European Theater of Operations 

Cross-Channel Attack 

Breakout and Pursuit 

The Lorraine Campaign 

The Siegfried Line Campaign 

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge 

The Last Offensive 

The Supreme Command 
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II 

The Middle East Theater 

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia 

The China-Burma-India Theater 

Stilwell's Mission to China 

Stilwell's Command Problems 

Time Runs Out in CBI 

The Technical Services 

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizingfor War 

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field 

The Chemical Warfare Service: ChemicaL5 in Combat 

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment 

The Corps of Engineers: The War AgainstJapan 

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany 

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States 

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior 

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor 

Theaters 

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations 

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War 

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply 

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront 

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I 

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II 

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan 

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany 

The Signal Corps: The Emergency 

The Signal Corps: The Test 

The Signal Corps: The Outcome 

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations 

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply 

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas 

Special Studies 

Chronology: 1941-1945 

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945 

Rearming the French 

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt 

The Women's Army Corps 

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors 

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces 

The Employment of Negro Troops 

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb 

Pictorial Record 

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against Japan 
INDEX 

ABDA Theater of Operations: 242, 356, 392, 399 

Abe, Maj. Gen. Koichi: 183,236 

Abo-Abo River: 277, 287, 289, 289n 

Abucay: 252, 263, 293, 316, 352, 418. See also 

Abucay-Mauban line. 

Abucay Hacienda: 266, 266n, 274, 277,286,287,288, 

289,290,293 

Abucay Line. See Abucay-Mauban line. 

Abucay-Maubanline: 247-48, 266-78,278-85,285-

290,291,294,296,304,305,312,325,326,328, 

329,337,345,348,351-52,379. 

Agno River: 107, 128, 133, 137-38, 144, 163, 169, 

170-77,178,182,186,187,195 

Agno River line. See Agno River. 

Agoo: 127,128,129,132,134,136 

Aguilar: 166,169,170 

Agusan River: 596 

Agusan Sector: 606, 607 

Air force strength 

American: 23-24, 38n, 42-43, 49n, 95-96 

japanese: 59 

Philippine Army: 26 

Air Forces: 37-45. See also Far East Air Force; Philippine Army Air Force. 

Air Forces units 

Commands 

V Bomber: 42 

V Interceptor: 42-43, 81, 85, 87, 94,153,156, 

308 

Groups 

4th Composite: 23, 23n, 24, 50, 62 

5th Air Base: 50 

7th Bombardment: 38, 48, 97, 146n 

19th Bombardment (H): 38, 42, 50, 156,239 

20th Air Base: 23, 24, 50 

24th Bombardment: 156 

27th Bombardment (L): 38-39,42,48,50,72, 

115, 145, 156 

Squadrons 

2d Observation: 50 

3d Pursuit: 42,84,85,87,299,302 

14th Bombardment: 38,42 

17th Pursuit: 42, 84-87,299 

19th Air Base: 23 

20th Pursuit: 42, 84-87, 117, 299 

21st Pursuit: 87, 107, 299, 305, 308, 310, 311 

27th Materiel: 23 

28th Bombardment: 42 

28th Materiel: 23 

30th Bombardment: 38,42 

34th Pursuit: 43, 84, 87, 107,299,303,308 

48th Materiel: 50 

93d Bombardment: 38,42 

Air Forces units-Continued 

Detachments 

Tow Target: 24,50 

Weather: 24, 50 

Air operations 

American: 62, 80-84, 89, 92, 105, 106-07, 113, 129, 

142n,15In,403-04,488 

japanese: 57, 59-60, 78-90, 92-97, 103, 108, 136-

37,272,288,294,312,334,418,421-22,424-25, 

427,427n,433, 444,446, 449-50,464,479-84, 

493-97,518,526-27,536,539,547-49 

Air photo and reconnaissance 

American: 82-83, 83n, 92, 96, 106,488 

japanese: 59, 228, 262-63, 451n, 526 

Air transport operations: 400 

Aircraft carriers 

Allied: 46, 78 

japanese: 60, 60n, 78,112-13 

Aircraft losses 

American: 88, 88n, 95-96, 488 

japanese: 88n, 480, 488 

Aircraft reinforcements 

American: 37-45, 146n 

japanese.: 414, 493 

Aircraft tender: 91 

Aircraft types 

fighters: 38, 39, 42, 43, 48, 85-88, 88n, 92, 95-96, 

10~ 142n, 146n,318,322,488 

heavy bombers: 31, 38, 38n, 39, 42-43, 48, 64, 80-

81, 81n, 82-86, 88-90, 92, 92n, 97, 97n, 105, 106, 

111, 113, 155-5~35~ 36~400,403-04 

light bombers: 42, 115, 145-46, 146n, 147,400 

naval: 46,48,91, 92, 94,129,156,540 

Airfields 

Batchelor Field: 97,113,129, 156,400 

Clark Field: 23, 38,43,44,48,58,59,79-90,92, 

92n,96,97, 100,105,107,117,118,208,213, 

255,263,414,493,494 

Del Carmen Field: 94 

Del Monte: 43, 70, 88, 92n, 96, 97, 111, 238, 239, 360, 

400,401,403,501,508,516 

Hickam Field: 38, 78 

Iba Field: 96 

Kindley Field: 481, 494, 547, 548, 553, 555 

Naguilian: 128, 132 

Nichols: 23, 43, 58, 84, 92, 94, 96, 107, 117, 234 

Wheeler Field: 78 

Akin, Brig. Gen. Spencer B.: 359n 

Akiyama, Lt. Col. Monjiro: 58n, 208 

Alangan River: 408, 438, 447, 448, 449-50, 449n, 451, 

454,457 

Alangan River line. See Alangan River 

Alexander, Lt. Col. Irvin: 179, 257,303-04 
608 

Amami Oshima: 61, 123, 138, 140 

Ames, Capt. Roland G.: 373n, 480, 481-82, 491, 

491n,495 

Ammunition 

American: 48, 146n, 162, 279, 318, 320-21, 393, 

395,396-97,399-400,495,499-500,508,526, 

528,559 

Japanese: 422, 427n, 444,480,487, 541, 547, 549, 

553, 559 

Angeles: 181,210,213,215,216,219,262 

Anhui: 393, 396 

Antiaircraft artillery defense: 43-45, 45n, 48, 85, 89-

90,92-94,228,474-75,476,478,481,494-96, 

539-40,548 

ammunition: 86, 146n, 480, 496 

guns: 35,45,48,94, 146n, 474, 475, 480, 487-88 

strength of: 474, 475, 476, 495, 531,548 

warning service: 43-44, 48, 84-85, 89-90 

557th Air Warning Battalion: 44 

Antiaircraft artillery units 

Brigade, Provisional Coast Artillery (AA) (PA): 

451,452 

Regiments 

60th Coast Artillery (AA) (US): 37 

200th Coast Artillery (AA) (US): 32, 33,45, 

45n, 50, 70,86,92,120,208, 451n 

51 5th Coast Artillery (AA) (US): 45n, 92, 451n 

Antitank guns, 

American: 33, 35, 36, 138, 176,321,341,407,424, 

438,450 

Japanese: 185, 194,281,283 

Anyasan Bay: 314, 315 

Anyasan Point: 312-24, 345, 347-48. See also Battle 

of the Points. 

Anyasan River: 299, 313, 314, 316, 317 

Apalit: 205, 214 

Aparri: 3, 57, 60, 98,100,102, 103, 104-06, 108,117, 

122, 126 

Arayat: 188, 203, 210, 213 

Aringay: 127-28, 129, 132 

Aringay River: 128, 134 

Armor. See Tanks. 

Army Air Forces. See Air Forces. 

Army Transport Service: 200n, 255, 395, 395n 

Arnold, Maj, Gen. Henry H. 

on air reinforcement to Philippine Islands: 37-38, 

39,43 

and Japanese air attacks on Philippine airfields: 72, 

81,87,90 

Artillery, American. See also Antiaircraft artillery defense; Antitank guns; Coast artillery guns; Field 

artillery, American; Mortars. 

ammunition: 279, 284, 314n, 320 

counterbattery fire: 488-89, 523, 537, 540, 541, 548 

emplacement: 207,250,285,299,306-07,320, 

327-28, 339, 424 

equipment: 29, 320 

interdiction fire: 267 

jungle warfare: 339 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Artillery, American -Continued 

lack of: 141,284 

losses: 28, 285, 487, 537, 538, 540, 541, 549-50, 

549n 

observation: 306, 320, 549 

strength: 119-20,226,250,252,327-28,407,474, 

475, 476, 478n, 499, 531 

support: 190, 199,250,252-54,267,272,284,286, 

288,306-07,320,327-28,334-35,430,433,449 

tree burst: 314n, 320, 339 

withdrawal operations: 136, 168-69, 187-88, 199, 

220-21,227-28,269 

Artillery, Japanese: 185-86,219,221,227-29,263-64, 

265-66, 271, 272, 279, 288, 294, 334-35, 416, 

418,421-22,424-25,428,429,433,444,445, 

446,484-85,518,522-23,526,536-41,546-51, 

553, 558. See also Antitank guns; Field artillery, 

Japanese; Mortars. 

camouflage: 488 

emplacements: 265-66,485, 520, 523 

reinforcements: 414 

strength: 126,228,263,421,485,486,523,538 

Ashigara: 103, 10.'), 129 

Asiatic }<'leet (US): 45-46, 48-49,78-79,90-92,95, 

96,97, 149, 155, 157,583. See also Pacific Fleet; 

U. S. ]','avy. 

Inshore Patrol: 478 

Off Shore Patrol: II 

Patrol VYing 10: 46, 91,92,96, 299 

Submarine Squadron 20: 46 

4th Provisional Battalion: 558 

16th Naval District: 46, 91, 130 

Atimonan: 109, 112, 139, 140, 142, /43, 164, 191, 

195-199 

Atimonan-Padre Burgos line: 109 

Australia: 116,149,150,239,377,378,4.').'),501, .')35, 

563, 570, 584 

bombers from Philippines removed: 97 

efforts to supply Philippines from: 152-57,390-404, 

501,540 

Japanese threat to: 145 

MacArthur's evacuation to: 353-54,356-60, 388-

89 

MacArthur retains USAFFE command from: 361, 

362, 364, 365 

strategic role in Far East: 149, 240-41 

Babcock, Lt. Col. David S.: 195,201,205,207,208 

Bagac: 245, 248, 263, 266, 276, 279, 280, 281, 284, 

300,303,325,329,338,343,456. See OrionBagac line. 

Baguio: 10, 21n, 27, 28, 84, 96,128,132,134 

Balanga: 251, 252, 263, 264, 291, 348, 448, 527 

Balantay: 272 

Balantay River: 2.') 1, 266, 266n, 272-73, 276, 286, 287 

Balantay River line. See Balantay River. 

Balete Pass: 102, 105 

Balikpapan: 91, 91 n 

Baliuag: 183, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 265 
INDEX 

Bamban: 166,188,203,210,212,213,219 

Bamban River: 212 

Barbed wire: 212, 226, 249, 252, 259, 270, 299, 324, 

528, 529 

Barnes, Maj. Gen.Ju1ian F.: 146-47, 153, 154,393 

Barr, Lt. Col. Earl L.: 547 

BAR's. See Browning automatic rifles. 

Bataan. See Terrain and geography. 

Bataan Defense Force: 63, 225, 247 

Bataan Service Area: 63 

Bataan Service Command Area: 247, 248, 296-99, 

305, 405. See also McBride, Brig. Gen. Allan C. 

East Sector: 296 

South Sector: 305, 316, 317, 320 

West Sector: 296,298,299,304, 305 

Batan Island: 57, 98,100,104 

Batangas: 96, 235 

Batangas Bay: 139, 141 

Battle of the Points: 325, 337, 339, 340, 347, 351, 476. 

See also Bataan Service Command Area; Anyasan 

Point; Longoskawayan Point; Quinauan Point; 

Silaiim Point. 

Battleships: 46, 60, 78, 126 

Bauang: 125,127,128,129,131,132, 132n, 136, 144 

Baus Au. See Operation Baus Au. 

Bayandati: 250,279 

Beach defense: 104-14, 131-32,252,298-324,410, 

411,476,478,513,528-31,550,555-56,557 

Beebe, Brig. Gen. Lewis C.: 164,350,361,362,363, 

363n, 364n, 372, 375, 376, 453, 462n, 561,564, 

565,567,568,569,570 

Bentz, Lt. Louis I.: 183 

Berry, Brig. Gen. Keari(' L.: 280, 283, 284, 284n. 

285n, 294, 295, 342, 343 

Besson, Maj. Robert: 176 

Bianchi, Lt. Willi bald C.: 341 

Bicol Peninsula: 109, Ill, 142 

Biedenstein, Capt. Arthur C.: 315 

Big Pocket. See Pocket Fights. 

Binalonan: 137, 138, 169, 170, 174, 182,235 

BinuanganRiver: 330, 336,406,447,448,453 

Bismarck Archipelago: 52, 54, 584 

Bittern: 459 

Blockade-running: 348, 390-401, 402-03. See also 

Pensacola convoy, 

Bloemfontein: 146n, 154 

Bluemel, Brig. Gen. Clifford: 28, 29, 166, 285n, 289, 

329,405. See also Divisions (PA), 31st. 

and collapse of II Corps: 445-47, 448-50, 451-52, 

454,459 

commander of Sector C: 327, 329, 330-35, 351, 

406,433,438,439 

commander of 31st Division (PA): 28 

and surrender of Bataan: 457,459 

Boatwright, Col. John R.: 195, 196,197,198,275,276 

Bohol: 11,238,501,502,507 

Boise: 91 

Bonnett, Lt. Col. Donald Van :"<.: 130, 134, 135 

609 

Borneo: 47, 90, 91, 91n, 112, 114, 154, 156,238,240, 

356,414n, 501,503,583 

Bottomside: 472, 480, 490, 494, 539, 547. See also 

Corregidor. 

Boudreau, Col. Napoleon: 279, 279n, 485, 486 

Brady, Lt. Col. Jasper E.: 229,434,435,439,445 

Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H.: 39,45,72,73,79,80, 

92n, 97, 147, 156, 392, 393. See also Far East Air 

Force. 

and Clark Field attack: 87-88, 89 

Far East Air Force commander: 39, 42 

and Formosa attack plan: 81-84,89 

Brett, Lt. Gen. George H.: 153, 154, 156-57,358,360, 

392, 397 

Bridget, Comdr. F. J.: 298, 301-02, 302n, 306, 307, 

308 

Brisbane: 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 154,395 

British Borneo: 145 

British Malaya: 52, 56, 77 

Brougher, Brig Gen. William E.: 102, 132, 169, 176, 

186, 213, 222, 224, 225, 342, 344, 345. See also 

Divisions (PA), 11 tho 

commander of Right Sector: 328,337,340, 342 

Browning automatic rifles: 29, 299, 339 

Bulkeley, LLJohn D.: 300, 301, 304, 359, 359n 

Bunker, Col. Paul D.: 306, 306n, 478, 481, 482, 487, 

48~ 489, 490, 491, 534, 536, 537, 538, 541, 546 

Burma: 4, 52, 238, 240, 242 

Caba: 127, 128, 129 

Caballo Island. See Forts. Hughes. 

Cabanatuan: 96, 136. 137, 166, 169-89, :?OO, 201, 

203, 20,), 206, 216, 230, 23), 256 

Cabcaben: 251, 258,318,381,448,451,452,467, 

494, 520, 522, 523, .~36, 539, 553. 556, 565, 567 

Cagayan Sector: 508,515,516-19 

Cagayan valley: 84, 102, 104-0.), 106, 135,213,518 

Caibobo Point: 298, 300, 30 I, 304, 318 

Calaguiman River: 265, 266n, 269, 271 

Calugas, Sgt. Jose: 228 

Calumpan: 485, 486 

Calumpit: 180, 181, 183,203,205, 206n, 208, 209, 

210,214,230 

Calumpit bridges: 200,201,203-10,214,215 

Calyer, Lt. Col. Peter D.: 435 

Camiguin Island: 100, 123 

Camilew River: 329, 337 

Camp John Hay: 21n, 135 

Camp X: 505, 506 

Campbell, Col. Alexander H.: 85, 89 

Candaba Swamp: 166,203 

Candelaria: 195, 197, 198,200 

Canopus: 299, 460, 529 

Cantabaco: 505, 506 

Capinpin, Brig. Gcn. Mateo: 107, J69, 219, 224, 422, 

423, 430. See also Divisions (PA), 21st. 

Capot: 332,433, 437,438 

Carabao Island. See Forts, Frank. 

Carmen: 169, 171, 174, 176, 178, 182 
610 

Carmen Ferry subsector: 508, 513 

Caroline Islands: 4, 79 

Carpenter, Lt. Col. Frank F.,Jr.: 117,371,376,457 

Carroll, Sgt. Hubert: 567 

Casey, Brig. Gen. Hugh J.: 10, 225, 249, 359n, 373, 

378, 383, 411 

Casualties. See also Medical problems. 

American: 78, 79n, 94, 186,221,230,270,272,288, 

290,308,310,312,315,324,334,335,354,481, 

484, 487, 538, 541, 549, 558, 560 

Japanese: 186, 202n, 212-13, 314, 230, 230n, 270, 

295, 295n, 308, 312, 324, 334, 336, 344-45, 

349-50, 412, 448, 448n, 556, 559 

Catmon River: 408, 416, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 

429,436 

Cavalry, 26th Regiment 

and Japanese landings: 104,131,133-34,135,136, 

137, 138 

siege of Bataan: 247,250, 279, 282, 283, 305, 318, 

324,328,406,445,446,448,449,450,451,452, 

452n,461 

strength and organization: 22, 24,50, 69, 70 

withdrawal into Bataan: 169, 170, 171, 174, 176, 

216,218,223,224,225,226,227,230 

Cavite Naval Base: 7,46,58, 59, 91,94, 96, 107, 117, 

139,149,155, 194n, 234, 235, 245, 476, 524, 526, 

528,540,541,549,552 

Cavite Province: 8, 471, 478, 485, 489, 494, 522, 523, 

531 

Cebu: 6, 11,91,238,499,501,506,507,510,574. See 

also Chynoweth, Brig. Gen. Bradford G. 

and attempts to supply Philippines: 395, 396, 399, 

401,403,404 

geography and terrain: 5-6, 499 

Japanese landings: 503-06, 507 

surrender: 578-79 

units on: 502 

Cebu Advance Depot: 395-96 

Cebu City: 396, 503, 505, 577 

Cebu Military Police Regiment: 502, 503, 505 

Celebes: 238,356 

Chamberlin, Col. StephenJ.: 153, 390n, 391 

Chanco, Capt. A. P.: 225 

Chandler, Maj. William E.: 446 

Chapin, Capt. Robert N.: 426 

Chase, Col. Theodore M.: 478 

Chaumont: 146n 

Chemical Warfare Service: 24,50,453,459 

Cheney Ravine: 473,494,560 

China: 4,14,29,46,47,51,54,91,138,150,240,241, 

403,413,528 

China Sea: 5, 87 

Chitose: 113 

Christensen, Capt. Arthur G.: 201 

Christie, Col. Albert F.: 502,506,507,577,578,579, 

580-81 

Chungking: 153, 156 

Chynoweth, Brig. Gen. Bradford G.: 360, 501, 502, 

503,505-06,577,578,579,580 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Claggett, Brig. Gen. Henry B.: 42,153,154 

Clark Field. See Airfields. 

Clark, Capt. Golland L.,Jr.: 566,567 

Clarke, Col. George S.: 269, 270, 272, 273 

Clement, Lt. Col. William T.: 79 

Coast artillery guns 

3-inch: 33,45,407,474,475,476,496,531,537, 

549n 

6-inch: 299,474,476,478,485,487,550 

8-inch: 474, 490, 550 

IO-inch: 474 

12-inch: 474, 475, 487, 489, 538, 549n 

14-inch: 476, 478, 487, 494, 540, 541, 550 

Coast artillery units 

Regiment (PA) 

1st: 119,478,478n 

2d: 478, 478n 

Regiment (PS) 

9lst: 24, 34, 45n, 50, 70, 478, 478n 

92d: 24, 34,50, 70, 478,478n 

Regiment (US) 

59th: 24,45n, 50, 70,478,478n, 558, 560 

60th: 24,50,70 

Coast Farmer: 393, 395,396,397 

Collier, Col. James V.: 85, 104, 117, 163, 179, 179n, 

211,227,231,245,247,254, 279n, 284n, 447, 

458n,464,467,524,525n 

Combat teams 

51st (PA): 406, 407, 433, 435,438,439,445 

91st (PA): 136, 137 

92d(PA): 170, 171, 176, 182, 183 

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 240, 356, 399 

Combined Fleet, Japanese: 46, 54, 56,64 

Communications: 85,169-70,188,207,230,248,271, 

289,299,310,315,320,326,338,428,435,442, 

450,451,484,498,550 

Constabulary. See Philippine Army. 

Convoys: 36-37, 103-04, 110, 126, 127, 128, 129, 

145-48, 149-50,503 

Coolidge: 148 

Cooper, Col. Wibb E.: 377, 378, 379, 380 

Cordero, Col. Virgil N.: 111,142, 195, 196, 197,198, 

199 

Cordillera Mountains: 102, 127 

Cornell, Col. Therodore M.: 502, 577, 581 

Corps, I Philippine: 263, 268, 274n, 276, 296, 347, 

348, 383,384,436,440,443.SeeauoJones,M~. 

Gen. Albert M.; Wainwright, Lt. Gen.Jonathan M. 

and Battle of the Points: 300, 303, 305, 312, 318, 

324 

deployment and preparation for attack: 248-51, 

405-08,410,411,431,433,442,445,447,451-52 

Japanese attack Mauban line: 278-85 

Japanese deployment and attack plans: 261-64, 

281,413-17,418-19 

Jones assumes command: 361-62 

Left Sector: 328, 329, 337, 340,407 

MacArthur's attack order: 452-53 
INDEX 

Corps, I Philippine-Continued 

organization: 247 

and Pocket Fights: 325, 328, 329, 336-46 

Right Sector: 328, 329, 337, 340 

second Japanese attack: 424, 441 

South Sector: 305, 316, 317, 320, 328, 407 

withdrawal: 290-95,454 

Corps, II Philippine: 296, 312, 325, 326, 337, 383, 

384, 452. See also Parker, Maj. Gen. George 

M.,Jr. 

Bataan Defense Force redesignated: 247 

counterattack failure: 434-37 

deployment and preparation for attack: 249, 

251-54, 282, 328-29, 351, 405-07, 410-11, 

431-32,434,442,451-52 

disintegration and collapse: 444-47,452,454 

failure of Japanese operation: 347-48, 350 

Japanese attack Abucay line: 265, 266-77, 279, 

281,285-90 

Japanese deployment and attack plans: 261-64, 

265-66,281,300,329-30,348-49,413-17,433 

Japanese penetration: 422-30, 437 -41 

new defense line: 326, 327 

organization: 247 

Parker in command: 247 

Sector A: 327, 329, 331, 406, 444, 447 

Sector B: 327, 329, 330, 406, 439, 444, 447 

Sector C: 327, 329,330,332,347,406,423,433, 

435,437,438,439,444,445 

Sector D: 327, 329, 332, 334, 406, 416, 417, 422, 

424,426,428,429,431,433,435,437,438,439, 

443,444 

Sector E: 327,406,407 

Corregidor: 12, 22, 27,45, 58, 63, 91,92, 247, 254, 

262,263,268,290,301,304,348,377,385,389, 

401,410,452,453,455,462,584. See also Forts, 

Mills; MacArthur, Gen. Douglas; Malinta Hill; 

Malinta Tunnel; Moore, :v1aj. Gen. George F.; 

Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. 

aid to Bataan: 306-07, 369,372,373,375,411,440 

Bottomside: 472,480,490, 494, 547 

command: 361-66 

defenses: 45, 119-20,473-76,478-79,527-31 

East Sector: 529, 530, 531, 557 

evacuation to: 161, 162, 164, 165,238,457,458, 

460-61 

Japanese air attacks: 479-84, 493-97, 539-40, 

546-51 

Japanese artillery bombardment: 448, 484-89, 

536-41,546-51 

Japanese assault plans: 58, 415-16, 493,521-27, 

552-53 

Japanese landings: 553-60 

MacArthur's evacuation: 353-54, 355-56, 357-60 

Middle Sector: 529, 530, 558 

Middleside: 472, 473, 481, 482, 494, 529, 531, 540 

problems of surrender threaten garrison: 575-76, 

577,579,580 

rations: 257,369,375-76,534-35,543-44 

611 

Corregidor -Con tin ued 

shipment of supplies: 95, 155, 164-65, 199-200, 

255,255-56,259,378,390,391-92,393,395-96, 

399-400,402,403-04 

surrender: 564-74 

terrain and geography: 245,472-73 

Topside: 473, 480, 481, 482, 490, 494, 528, 529, 

531,538,540,547,549 

West Sector: 529,530,558 

Cothran, Maj. Wade: 464 

Cotabato: 498, 499, 510, 511, 512 

Cotabato-Davao Sector: 508, 510-16 

Cotar River: 337, 338, 339 

Croom, Capt. Clifton A.: 310 

Crow, Maj. Judson B.: 342 

Cruisers 

Allied: 45, 48, 91, 145-46 

Japanese: 60,103,107,110,112,126-27,318,503 

Culis: 227 

Culis Creek: 226 

Culo River: 2::!3, 224, 226, 228, 229 

Dagupan: 130 

Dalirig: 517, 518 

Dalirig Sector: 517-18 

Dalton, Col. William F.: 518, 519 

Damortis: 127, 128, 132, 133-36, 174 

Darwin: 38,97, 97n, 113, 154, 157,360,392,400 

Davao: 57, 60, 89, 91, 98,110,112,113,114,145,238, 

239, 241n, 498,500, 502,503, 508 

Defense lines, D-I, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5. See Task 

forces, North Luzon Force. 

Defense plan. See War Plan ORANGE-3. 

Del Carmen: 84, 85, 87, 96 

Denver Hill: 558, 566 

Destroyers 

Allied: 46, 48, 90, 91, 91n, 95, 97,155 

Japanese: 60,100,103,110,112,113,126,127,141, 

318n, 349n,516 

Devereux, Maj. James P.S.: 77 

Dewey: 47,90,459 

Digos: 498, 508 

Digos subsector: 508, 512 

Diller, Lt. Col. LeGrande A.: 359n 

Dinalupihan: 216, 220, 222, 223, 224, 228, 279, 348, 

452 

Dinalupihan-Hermosa line: 264 

Disease. See Medical problems. 

Diuata Mountains: 498, 499 

Divisions (PA) 

1st Regular: 27,119,141, 166, 191,247,280,281, 

282,283,284, 284n, 285, 329, 337, 338, 339, 340, 

341,342,343,405,406,407,513n 

2d Regular: 119, 298, 405, 406, 411 

11th: 69, 70,102,104,108,131,132,169,170,171, 

176,177,178,181,183,212,213,214,216,219, 

220,221,222,223,224,225.227.247,252,291, 

328,329,345,373-74,405,406,447 
612 

Divisions (PA)-Continued 

21st: 69, 70,104,131,169,171,178,181,186,187, 

188,210,212,213,215,216,218,219,220,222, 

223,224,225,227,247,254, 272n, 289, 289n, 

293,327,329,332,383,405,406,417,420,422, 

423,424,425,429,430,431,434,435,438 

31st: 28,29,69,70,165, 166, 181,247,249,250, 

274,275,277,282, 285n, 287, 289,327,329,330, 

331,405,406,439,445 

41st: 69, 70,109,141,165,166,247,251,252,266, 

266n, 269, 270, 275, 277, 286, 293, 327,329,405, 

406,420,422,423-24,425,426,429,431 

51st: 69, 70,109, Ill, 112, 166, 190,201,214,247, 

24~ 251,252, 266, 270, 272-73, 274,274n, 275, 

276,277,285,287,289, 289n, 290, 327, 330,405, 

406 

61st: 70,499,502,507 

71st: 69, 70,134,136,137,138,170,181,205,206, 

207,214,226,227,229,247,248,250, 250n, 279, 

282,298,308,405,499 

81st: 70,499,514,577 

91st: 70, 136, 168, 169, 170, 174, 178, 180, 181, 182, 

183, 184, 205, 206, 214, 247, 250, 279, 282, 283, 

328,329,337,338,371,406,407,499 

IOlst: 70,499,510 

102d: 516, 517 

Di visions (PC) 

2d: 199,248 

Divisions (US) 

Philippine: 21-22, 27, 32, 34, 50, 62, 69n, 70,118, 

133,138,166,226,247,248,274,282,291,293, 

293n, 327, 328, 329, 330, 361, 389, 406,409,431, 

432, 433, 535 

41st National Guard: 32 

Doane, Col. Irvin E.; 327,406 

Dobrinic, 1st Lt. Matt: 112 

Don Esteban: 164 

Don Isidro: 393, 394 

Don Jose: 121 

Dona Nati: 393, 396 

Dooley, Lt. Col. Thomas: 567,568 

Doyle, Col. Thomas W.: 286,436,437,443 

Drake, Brig. Gen. Charles c.: 164, 179, 180, 257,368, 

571 

Duisterhof, Maj. HelmertJ.: 213, 340,346 

Dunckel, Maj. Gen. William C.: lin 

Duque, Col. Calixto: 513 

Durst, Lt. Col. Wallace E.: 174 

Dutch Borneo: 91, 112 

Dyess, Capt. William.: 310,311 

East Sector. See Bataan Service Command Area; Corregidor. 

Edmands, Lt. Col. HowardJ.: 503,505 

Edmonds, Walter D.: 42n 

Eisenhower, Brig. Gen. Dwight D.: 9, 10, 13, 152, 

153, 356n 

EI Fraile. See Forts, Drum. 

Elcano: 396 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Emerson, Maj. Kary c.: 293n 

Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos c.: 402 

Engineer battalions 

1st (1st Division, PAl: 280, 281 

14th (Philippine Division, PS): 406, 411, 432,445-

46,448,449,450,451 

21st (21st Division, PAl: 274n, 289 

31st (31st Division, PAl: 331, 335 

41st (41st Division, PAl: 275,427 

51st (51st Division, PA): 111,439 

71st (7lst Division, PAl: 136, 169,226 

91st (9lst Division, PAl: 171,225 

201st (PA): 439, 442, 443 

202d (PA): 439, 442, 443 

803d (US): 406, 432, 445, 446, 448. 449 

Engineer Regiment, 14th (PS): 22, 27, 166 

Eubank, Lt. Col. Eugene L.: 42,79,89,90 

Far East Air Force: 39,42,62, 70, 71,80,95,98, 100, 

121, 238, 318, 583. See also Air Forces units. 

action at Vigan landing: 106-07 

Japanese attack on airfields: 84-88 

new air organization: 39, 42 

post-mortem: 88-90 

proposal to attack Formosa: 80-84 

removal to Australia: 97, 156-57 

Field artillery, American 

2.95-inch mountain gun (pack howitzer): 69, 113, 

226,250,252,285,298,302,307,327,335,407, 

499,513,515,517,518,519 

75-mm.: 29, 30, 35, 36,48,141, 146n, 226,252,270, 

285,298,305,306,307,315, 318, 32~327,328, 

339,407,476,486,488,490,531,540,555,556 

75-mm. pack howitzers: 36 

75-mm. (SPM): 33,120,131,133,177,178,187, 

190, 195, 199,201,205,207,222,223,226,227, 

247,248,250,285,293,294,407,451,461 

105-mm. howitzers: 35,407 

155-mm. GPF: 190, 195n, 197,252,327,407,474, 

475,476,478,487 

155-mm. guns: 33, 48, 120, 129, 133, 141, 250, 268, 

285,318,449,487,490,531,536,537,540,541, 

549n,556-57 

155-mm. howitzers: 48,120,252,320,328,407 

Field artillery, Japanese 

75-mm.: 126,185,194,221,228,263,418,523,536, 

537, 538 

75-mm. mountain gun: 125,263 

105-mm. gun: 126,219,220,263,348,485,487 

105-mm. howitzers: 523 

150-mm. howitzers: 126, 183, 221, 228, 263,486, 

522, 523, 537 

240-mm. howitzers: 486, 523, 538, 541, 547 

Field artillery units, American 

Group, 2d Provisional: 190, 195 

Regiments (PA) 

11th FA: 220,221,222 

21st FA: 107, 136,161,170,187,212,213, 

214,218,220,225,252-53,257,327,449 
INDEX 

Field artillery units, American-Continued 

Regiments (PA)-Continued 

31st FA: :28, :2Y, 249, 27!l, 2!l1, 282, 285, 285n, 

331,332-33 

41st FA: 327, 428, 430 

51st FA: 196, 199,200 

61st FA: 502, 516, 517, 518 

71st FA: 134, 136, 205, 206, 207, 207n, 226, 

227,228,250 

81st FA: 513, 516, 517, 518 

91st FA: 250,328 

JOIst FA: 510,512 

301st FA: 120,252,327,449 

Regiments (PS) 

23d FA: 21, 22, 226, 227, 228, 250 

24th FA: 21, 22, 252, 270 

26th FA: 21 

86th FA: 22, 24, 50, 70,129,141,190,252,327 

88th FA: 22, 24, 50, 226, 227, 228, 252, 305, 

307,320,406 

Field artillery units, Japanese 

Regiments 

1st Field Heavy Artillery: 126, 183, 227, 263, 

266n,414,414n,486 

3d Independent .Mountain Artillery: 414n 

8th Field Heavy Artillery: 126,188,211,216, 

219,263,266n 

22dFieidArtillery: 109, 126, 139, 140, 187, 191, 

195,216,349,522,523 

48th il-{ountain Artillery: 125, 129, 132, 134, 135, 

182,183,184,185,211,214,228,235n 

Battalions 

9th Independent Field Heavy Artillery: 126, 216, 

263,264,266n,486 

20th Independent Mountain Artillery: 414n 

21st Field Heavy Artillery: 414n 

Fifth column: 117-19 

Florence D.: 465 

Food. See Rations. 

Formosa: 4, 55, 58, 60, 100, 291 n, 583 

as Japanese base of operations: 60, 80, 84, 92, 94, 

95,96,98,100,118,123,126,138-39,140,261, 

262 

plans for American air attack: 69, 80-84, 89, 94 

Fitch, Maj. A. L.: 284 

Fort, Brig. Gen. Guy 0.: 514, 577 

Fort Santiago: 121,471 

Fort Stotsenburg: 12,21,22,27,34,45,63,72,73,85, 

179, 180,255,256,257,366 

Fort William McKinley: 12,21,27,30,34,63,156, 

180, 194, 199,200,201,234, 255,256 . 

Forts. See also Corregidor; Harbor Defenses of Mamla 

and Subic Bays; Moore, Maj. Gcn. George F. 

Drum: 22,47,476,478,482,485,487,488,494, 

522,526,529,531,540,550,557 

Frank: 22,45,476,478,482,485,486487,488, 

494,522,523,526,529,531,540,541,550 

Hughes: 22,476, 478,480, 490,494, 529, 539,541, 

556 

613 

Forts~Continued 

Mills: 22, 24, 27, 50,119,357,362,368,472,480, 

529 

Wint: 12,22,27,45,120,128,279,478,486 

Fortier, CoL Malcolm V.: 286,425,426,427 

Fowler, LL CoL Halstead C.: 134, 136, 207n, 208, 

250,284 

Francisco, Maj. Gen. Guillermo B.: 298, 305, 327, 

406. See also Divisions (PA), 2d Regular. 

Fremantle: 394, 395, 399 

French Indochina: 4, 14, 15, 17, 52, 56, 77, 128, 255, 

399,413 

Funk, CoL ArnoldJ.: 273, 274n, 455, 456, 457, 460, 

525n 

Galbraith, CoL Nicoll F.: 350, 351,460,574 

Ganahl, Lt. CoL Joseph: 461 

Gapan: 183,213 

Gcneva Convention: 466, 575n, 582 

Gentry, Lt. William: 207 

Geography. See Terrain and geography. 

George, Brig. Gen. Harold H.: 42, 85, 85n, 156,359, 

359n 

Germany: 14,67,119,145,152 

Gerona: 166, 178 

Gerow, Brig. Gen. Leonard T.: 15n, 16, 17,32,37, 

146,147,148 

Gillespie, Lt. CoL Jarnes 0.: 377 

Glassford, Rear Adm. William A.: 91, 358 

Glattly, Col. Harold W.: 377, 378, 380 

Gogo River: 337, 343, 348 

Gonzaga: 104-06 

Goodall, Lt. Comdr. H. W.: 311, 312n 

GPF (Grande Puissance Filloux) 155-mm. gun: 190n. 

See also Field Artillery, American. 

Granberry, Lt. CoL Hal G: 307 

Grande Island. See Forts, Wint 

Graves, LL CoL Reed: 512,513 

Great Britain: 14,33,51,54,65 

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: 471, 582-83 

Green, Maj. Gen. Joseph A: 45 

Grimes, Lt. Col. Arthur J.: 502, 505, 506 

Grunert, Maj. Gen. George: 15,23,69 

Guagua: 213,214, 215, 21~ 219,220, 221, 22~223 

Guagua-Porac line: 216-23 

Guam: 7,52,65,71,77,145,238,394 

Guerrilla operations: 502-03, 506, 579, 581 

Guimba: 166, 182 

Guitol: 276. 289, 290, 291 

Gulick, CapLJohn McM.: 542, 544,545,546 

Gumain River: 220, 222, 223, 224 

Gunboats 

American: 48, 91, 95, 97,155 

Japanese: 60 

Guns. See Field artillery, American, Japanese. 

Haba, Lt. Col. Hikaru: 58n, 572, 573, 576 

Hadley, Lt. Alvin C.: 105, 105n 
614 

Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays: 22, 24, 

. 50,58,62,63,70,71,279,376,474,476,478, 

478n, 544, 570. See also Corregidor; Forts; Moore, 

Maj. Gen. George F. 

Haruna: 105, 129 

Harwood, Lt. Col. Otto: 254 

Hart, Admiral Thomas C.: 72, 73, 79, 91, 92, 363, 

528. See also Asiatic Fleet (US). 

Asiatic Fleet commander: 46-47 

on Philippine reinforcements: 96,147,151,154, 

390-91,390n, 398-99 

on withdrawing fleet from Philippines: 95, 95n, 

96-97, 149, 150, 155-56, 155n 

Hauck, Capt. Herman H.: 560 

Hawaii: 14,36,37,38, 39, 42,48, 71, 71n, 77, 78, 146, 

149, 240, 241, 360, 397, 399, 402 

Hayakawa, Col. Masayoshi: 486 

Hayo Maru: 129 

Health. See Medical Problems. 

Hermosa: 216, 223, 226, 227, 229, 230, 265,266,267 

Hill, Col. Milton A.: 548 

Hilsman, Col. Roger B.: 113,578,580,581,582 

Hilton, Col. Donald B.: 310 

Hoeffel, Capt. Kenneth M.: 364,459,478 

Hoffman, Col. RobertJ.: 425-26 

Holbrook: 146n, 154 

Holbrook, Maj. Gen. Lucius R.: 9 

Holland: 47 

Holmes, Maj. Stanley: 425, 426-27, 444 

Homma, Lt. Gen. Masaharu: 57, 177n, 413, 414, 415, 

471, 493, 502, 582. See also Japanese ground 

units, 14th Army. 

Bataan plans and operations: 261-64, 280-81, 330, 

332,334,337,405,411,413,417,418,420,421, 

426,429,431,433,448 

and Bataan surrender: 464,465,466,467 

commands 14th Army: 57 

Corregidor plans and operations: 479-80, 484, 486, 

488,493,521-25,527,552,557,559-60 

demands American surrender: 268-69,418 

discontinues Bataan offensive: 347-48, 349-50, 

412-13 

Luzon plans and operations: 57-58, 59, 60-61,98-

100,103,109,125,130,139,144,162, 177n, 181, 

182, 188,200, 203,210, 211,216, 218, 230n 

and occupation of Manila: 235, 238 

and Philippine surrender: 561, 564, 565, 566-67, 

567-70, 575,576n 

relieved of command: 582 

role in Battle of the Points: 312, 317, 319 

southern Philippines plans and operations: 498, 

501-02, 503, 507 

war crime charge: 165n 

Hong Kong: 4,7,54,77,121,145,238,414,418 

Honolulu: 4, 36, 398 

Horan, Col. John P.: 135,573,574 

Hoshi, Col. Komataro: 263 

Hospitals: 36, 50, 444, 454, 475, 491, 528, 532, 544-

45. See also Medical problems. 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Hospitals-Cqntinued 

Chinese General Hospital: 237 

General Hospital No.1: 258, 380,459, 460 

General Hospital No.2: 380,381,444,460 

Malinta: 545 

Philippine General Hospital: 237 

Houston: 46, 91 

Howard, Col. Samuel L.: 91,528,529,530,531,557, 

558, 560 

Howitzers. See Field artillery, American, Japanese. 

Huff, Capt. Arthur E.: 538 

Huff, Lt. Col. Sidney L.: 10, 161n, 359n 

Hull, Cordell: 78 

Humber, Lt. Col. Charles I.,Jr.: 581 

Hunt, Frazier: 357, 358n 

Hurley, Brig. Gen. PatrickJ.: 353,392,397 

Hurt, Maj. Marshall H. Jr.: 458, 459, 461,462,464, 

467 

Iba:43,44,84,85,88,86n 

Ikuta, Col. Torao: 414n 

Iloilo: 91, 404, 507, 581 

Imai, Col. Hifumi: 132, 223, 225 

Imai, Col. Takeo: 265,267,269,270,271,273,275, 

276,287,288,294. See also Japanese ground units, 

Regiments, 141st infantry. 

Ind, Capt. Allison: 80, 90 

Indochina. See French Indochina. 

Infantry Point: 553, 554, 557 

Infantry units. See also Divisions. 

Brigade, 1st Philippine Constabulary: 199, 199n, 

201,206, 206n, 208 

Regiments, Philippine Army 

Provisional Air Corps: 327, 329, 444 

1st (1st DivisionPA): 119, 141, 142, 190, 191, 

193, 194, 195, 199, 200, 250, 278, 279, 280, 

281,284, 329,337, 338,345, 513n 

2d (1st Division PAl: 513, 513n 

3d (1st Division, PAl: 249, 250, 278, 279, 281, 

284,337,345 

11th (11th Division, PA): 171, 178, 183, 184, 

185-86,213,214,220,221,222,337,339, 

340,341,343,344,345,346 

12th (11th Division, PAl: 102, 105, 106, 131, 

134,213,214,220,222,315,316,319 

13th (11 th Division, PAl: 170, 171, 187,213, 

214,220,221,337 

14th (11th Division, PAl: 574 

21st (21st Division, PAl: 170,171, 176, 186, 

187,188,212,218,219, 220n, 271-72, 273, 

274, 274n, 276, 276n, 277, 289, 423, 424, 

425,427,430 

22d (21st Division, PAl: 170, 186, 187,212, 

218,219,220,273,334,423,426,428 

23d (21st Division, PAl: 186, 187,214,218-19, 

220,225,272,275,423,426,427,428 

31st (31st Division, PAl: 28, 29, 225, 226,227, 

277,291,329,331,332,446,449,450 
INDEX 

Infantry units-Continued 

Regiments, Philippine Army-Continued 

32d (31st Division, PAl: 28,275,329,331,332, 

333,439,444,445 

33d (31st Division, PAl: 28, 291, 329, 331, 

406,425,426,427,432,436,437,443. 

41st (41st Division, PAl: 272, 275, 331, 333, 

335,423,425,426,427,429,433,435,436, 

437,440,443 

42d (41st Division, PAl: 166, 190, 199,275, 

423,424,425,426,427,436,437 

51st (51st Division, PAl: 199,200,201,205, 

207,208,209,251,272,275,276,289,290 

52d (51st Division, PAl: 109, III, 112, 141, 

142,143,191,195,196,197,198,199,251 

53d (51st Division, PAl: 143, 191, 195, 196, 

197, 198,251-52,275,276 

61st (6lst Division, PAl: 502, 513, 514, 515 

62d (6lst Division, PAl: 502, 517,518,519 

63d (6lst Division, PAl: 503 

64th Provisional (6lst Division, PA): 502 

65th Provisional (6lst Division, PAl: 502 

71st (7lst Division, PAl: 131, 132, 134,205, 

207,224,226,227,383,406 

72d (7lst Division, PAl: 134, 136,205,226, 

227,406 

73d (7lst Division, PAl: 499, 514,515 

82d (8lst Division, PAl: 502, 505, 506 

83d (8lst Division, PAl: 502 

84th Provisional (8lst Division, PAl: 514 

91st (9lst Division, PAl: 283 

92d (9lst Division, PAl: 119, 184,282,283, 

324, 342, 343, 344, 345 

93d (9lst Division, PAJ: 499, 517, 518 

IOlst (1Olst Division, PAl: 113,510 

102d (1Olst Division, PAl: 511, 512 

103d (1Olst Division. PAl: 516, 517 

104th (lOlst Division, PAl: 510, 511 

Regiments, Philippine Constabulary 

1st (2d Division, Pal: 119, 199n, 298, 299, 303-

04,308,313,315,316,406,447,451,452 

2d (2d Division, PAl: 119, 199, 199n, 200, 283, 

298,315,328,329,345,424 

4th (2d Division, PA): 119,298,447 

Regiments, Philippine Scouts 

43d (102d Division, PAl: 21n, 24, 50, 271,272, 

273, 275, 276, 286,423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 

436,437,508,518 

45th (Philippine Division): 21, 21n, 22, 28,69, 

70,249,277,286,287,288,291,305,308, 

310,315,316,317,319,321,322,323,324, 

328,329,337,338,339,341,342,344,345, 

383,406,431,432,433,435,436,437,442, 

443,457,460 

57th (Philippine Division): 21, 22, 247, 251, 

252, 266, 266n, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 

274n, 275, 277,291,293, 305, 307,315,316, 

317,319,321,322,323,324,327,329,406, 

411,431,432,433,437,438,439,440,442, 

Infantry units-Continued 

Regiments, Philippine Scouts-Continued 

57th (Philippine Division)-Continued 

443,445,446,448,449,450,451 

Regiments, United States 

615 

4th Marine: 29,46,47,91, 306, 476,528,530, 

545,557,558 

31st (Philippine Division): 21, 22, 34, 226, 227, 

228,229,277,285,286,287,288,293,327, 

328,329,331,384,406,411,431,432,433, 

434,435,437,438,439,444,445,446,448, 

449,450,451,461 

Initial Protective Force: 62 

Inland seas: 33,65, 70, 120, 349, 395 

Irie, Col. Gen: 266, 266n 

Irwin, Col. Constant L.: 161, 162, 162n, 328 

Irwin, Col. John W.: 448,449,457,460,543,548 

Ivey, Capt. Richard G.: 488 

James Ravine: 473, 547, 548, 549, 552, 553, 560 

Japanese air units 

Brigade, 22d Air: 414, 416, 421, 427, 433, 448, 522, 

524, 526, 536, 553 

Fleet, llth Air: 57, 59, 60, 60n, 84, 479 

Groups 

5th Air: 55,56,57,59,60,103, 108, 108n, 123, 

134, IB2, 20B, 211, 218, 234, 261, 479, 4B4, 

493 

7th Heavy Bombardment: 146n 

Regiments 

8th Air: 143 

8th Light Bombardment: 174,480 

14th Heavy Bombardment: 4BO 

16th Light Bombardment: 106, 174,446 

24th Air: 59 

24th FIghter: 100, 103, 107, 12B, 129 

50th FIghter: 100,103,106,128,129 

60th Heavy Bombardment: 493, 494 

62d Heav)! Bombardment: 493. 494 

Japanese amphibious forces 

Atimonan Force: 139 

Batan Island Attack Force: 100, 103, 126 

Lamon Bay Attack Group: 60 

Lamon Bay Force: 138, 139, 144 

Legaspi Attack Force: 110 

Lingayen Force: 125, 126, 127, 12B, 132, 13B, 139, 

141,144 

South Philippines Support Force: 60 

Surprise Attack Force, First: 60 

Surprise Attack Force, Se~ond: 60 

Surprise Attack Force, Third: 60 

SurpriseAttack Force, Fourth: 60 

Vigan Attack Foret: 106, 107, 126 

Japanese Army Air Force: 54n, 56n, 125n 

Japanese Combined Fleet: 46,54, 56, 64. See also Japanese naval forces. 

Japanese ground units 

Southem Ar~y: 55, 56, 57,59,61, 124, 261, 262, 

262n,414 
616 

Japanese ground units-Continued 

14th Army 

dispositions and place in organization: 55, 

56-57 

drives on Manila: 181, 182, 186,208,210,214, 

216,230n 

landings of: 103, 104n, 108, 112, 122,123,125, 

125n, 127, 131, 132, 133, 144, 162 

occupation of Manila: 232,235 

plans to seize the Philippines: 58,60, SOl 

in siege of Bataan: 261, 262, 263, 265, 279, 

281,296,312,332,336, 343n, 347, 348, 349, 

350, 350n, 412, 413, 414, 414n, 415, 416, 

420,433,448,464,465 

in siege of Corregidor: 485, 493, 521-27, 525n, 

537,553,556,559,567,568 

in southern Philippines: 50 I 

staff: 58n 

strength on Luzon: 216 

strength in landing: 125-26, 125n 

15th Army: 55, 56, 238 

16th Army: 55, 56, 112, 261 

23d Army: 55, 238 

25th Amry: 55, 56, 77, 145, 238 

Divisions 

4th: 55, 413, 413n, 416, 417, 420, 424, 426, 

427,428,429,430,433,437,438,439,444, 

447, 448, 448n, 450,451, 521, 522, 523, 524, 

525,526,527,546,551,552,553,554,559 

5th: 501 

16th: 55, 56, 59,61,109,112,123,138,139, 

140,144,190,191, 235,261,262,263,264, 

281,312, 312n, 334,336,337, 340, 347,348, 

349,350,412,413,416,417,420,429,448, 

522, 523, 526, 527, 552 

48th: 55, 56, 58, 59, 61,103,123,125,126,170, 

178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188,208, 

235, 235n, 236, 261, 262, 263, 264 

Brigades 

9th: 501 

35th: 501 

65th: 56,59, 224,261,262,263,264,281,295, 

329, 33~ 331, 33~ 347, 348, 34~ 35~ 412, 

413, 415, 41~ 417, 42~ 42~ 42~ 427,429, 

433,435,436,437,438,444,448,522 

Regiments 

Ist Formosa Infantry: 125, 127, 129, 132, 134, 

135, 170, 174, 176, 178, 182,223,228,236 

2d Formosa Infantry: 103, 108, 125, 131, 138, 

170,174,182,184,211,214,216,235n 

4th Tank: 126, 126n, 127, 132, 134, 136,138, 

170,174,177,182,235 

7th Tank: 126, 127, 182,206,221,228,235, 

262,263,265,416,424,426,427,438,450, 

522, 552 

8th Infantry: 416, 424, 428, 445, 446,450 

9th Infantry: 126, 127, 182, I B 7, 18B, 211, 213, 

216, 21B, 219, 263, 266, 267, 270,271,272, 

273,275,276,277,287,289, 312n, 329, 332, 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Japanese ground units-Continued 

Regiments -Continued 

9th Infantry-Continued 

334, 335, 340, 345, 347, 350 

10th Independent: 136-37 

16th Engineer: 140, 195 

16th Reconnaissance: 140, 142, 143, 144, 190, 

194, 195, 196, 197, 199,236,348 

20th Infantry: 139, 140,142,190,191,195,196, 

236, 281, 283, 284, 300, 303, 308, 312-13, 

312n, 314, 317, 324, 324n, 336, 337, 338, 

345, 346, 347, 348, 349 

21 st Engineer: 322 

21st Independent EngIneer: 524, 526 

23d Independent Engineer: 526 

33d Infantry: 109,281, 312n, 340, 343, 347, 34B, 

349,350 

37th Infantry: 429, 43B, 439, 552 

41st hifantry: 50 I 

47th Infantry: 125,127,129,132,134,135,136, 

182,183,216,236 

48th Reconnaissance: 132, 134, 135, 174, 182 

61st Infantry: 416, 424,429,443,444,552,553, 

556,557,558,571 

62d Infantry: 413 

122d Infantry: 262, 266, 279, 280, 281, 283,284, 

295n,300, 336, 340, 347,350 

124th Infantry: 501 

141st Infantry: 262, 265, 266, 267, 269,270,271, 

272,273,275,276,277,287,294,330,332, 

334, 350 

142dlnfantry: 262, 266, 271, 275, 330, 332, 334, 

350 

146t" Infantry: 112 

Battalions 

2d Independent ;HaTtaT: 41 'In 

3d Mortar: 414n 

14th Independent /v/ortar: 414n 

Detachments 

Hayakawa: 486, 489 

Ikuta: 414n 

Imai: 228 

Kam1iima: 127,128, 129,131,182,184,186, 

187 

Kanno: 104,106,107,108,125,184, 18.'i, 186, 

188,211,212,213,215 

Kawaguchi: 501,503, 503n, 510,511,512,513, 

515 

Kawamura: 502, 503, 507, 510, 516, 518 

Kimura: 109, 110, III, 112, 141, 142,281,329 

Kondo: 485, 486, 487 

Miura: 112, 113,502,503, 508, 512, 515 

Nagano: 417, 420, 429, 433, 444, 447, 448, 450, 

451,521,522 

Sakaguchi: 112, 113, 507 

South Seas: 77, 238 

Takahashi: 216, 219, 220, 224, 264 

Tanaka: 103, 104, lOS, 106, 125,214,215, 22L 

222, 223 
[NDEX 

Japanese ground units--Continued 

Forces 

Left W'lng.· 416, 424, 426, 428, 429, 430, 434, 

435,438 

Right M'lng: 416,424,425, 426, 427,428,429, 

430, 434 

3d Trador enit: 414n, 486 

10lh IndepP11dfrlt Garrison: 414, 508, 510 

16th hifant~) Group: 109,281 

21 sl Irui:mtry Group: 413 

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters: .'11, 54, 55, 56, 

98,123,125,181. 232. 232n. 238, 261, 262n, 3-1-7, 

-1-12, -1-13, 414, 414n, 493, 501, 524, 576n, 582. 

583 

Japanese naval forces 

Close COl'er Force: 60 

I,me 1st Special Ka1"al Land Force: 109 

Kure 2d Special Nal'al Land Force: 112, 113 

Pearl Harhor Striking Force: 78 

Japanese naval units 

1st Sea Opnatlml ell/t: 526, 552, 554 

2d Fleel: 60, 126, 261 

2d Sea Operation C'lI1t: 526 

3d Fleft: 60, 60n, 126 

3d Gunboat Dle-Islan: 100 

3d Sea Operatioll Unit: 526 

41h Carrier Dln-sion: 59, 60 

171h Aflnelayer Dll'lslon: 110 

32d Xa"a/ Base Force: S08n 

Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact: 51 

Jolo Force: 113 

Jolo Island: 98,112.113,145, 241n. 507 

Joncs, Maj. Gen. Albert \1.: 338,406,407. Ser also 

Corps, I Philippine: Divisions: PA), 51 sl. 

Bataan defense: 251. 266. 272, 273, 27+, 214n, 275, 

276 

commands Left Sector. I Corps: 328,329,337 

commands South Luzon Force: 165 66, 190 

commands I Corps: 361. 362,405 

commands 51st Divi,ion: 10c), 214 

illness, relieved of command: 3"4 

Pocket Fights plans and operations: 340, 342,343 

South Luzon defense and \\ithdrawal: 10'l, Ill. 

112, HI. H2, 191. 193.19,1. 195. 195n., 196. 1'l7, 

198, 199,199-201. 206. 207. 208,209 

success of South Luzon Force withdrawal: 201-02, 

230 

surrender: 459 

views on counterattack orders: 274- 7 5.447, 4.'i:l 

Kabacan: 512 

Kalakuka, LI. Col. Theodore: J 71. 514,5 Hn 

Kamijima.Col.: 127n, 131. 132, 184, 186, 187_ S',-ealso 

Japancse ground units, J),tachments. 

Kanno, Lt. Col.: 103n, 108, 185, 186. 187 SPI- a/so 

Japanese ground units, Detachments. 

Kawaguchi. 'vlaj_ Gen. Kivotake: SO 1. 503. j I 0.511. 

512,513,514, SIS. S'ee also Japatwsr ground 

units, Drt(lchmmts. 

617 

Kawamura, .\1aj. Gen. Saburo: 501, 507, S10, 519. 

See also Japanese "round units, Detachments. 

Kelly, Capt. Colin P .. Jr.: 105 

Kelly, Lt. R. G.: 359n 

Kenney, Gen. George C.: 19 

Kimmel, Admiral Hushand E.: 46, 78n 

Kimura . .\"laj. Mitsuo: 317, 318, 319, 322, 322-23 

Kimura, '\1aj. Gen. Naoki: 109, 110, 1-1-2.281. 283, 

300,308,312, 312n, 31:1. 324, 329, 3:l0, 336,337. 

See al50 Japanese ground units. Detachments. 

Kindley Field. See Airfields. 

King, Maj. Gen. Edward P .. Jr. See also Task forces, 

Luzon Force, North Luzon Force. 

Bataan defense: 306,365, 365n, 366, 375, 376, 378, 

404,405,406,411,431,432,440,443,445,447, 

451,452,453 

and Bataan surrender: 454, 455, 455n, 456, 457, 

457n, 458, 458n, 459, 461, 462, 462n, 463, 464, 

464n, 465, 46(j, 467 

commands Luzon Force: 365-66 

commands North Luzon Force: 69 

comparison with Wainwright's surrender problem: 

561,562,564,569 

USAFFE artillery officer: 120, 306 

King, Admiral Ernest].: 151n, 390n, 399 

Kirun: 61,123,126,140 

Kitajima, Lt. Gen. Kishio: 414, 416, 522, 523, 553 

Kitamura, Lt. Col. Kuro: 174 

Kitano, Lt. Gen. Kenzo: 413, 413n, 416, 417. 438, 

526, 552 

Kondo, Vice Adm. Nobutake: 60, 126, 261 

Kondo, Maj. Toshinori: 485. 486, 488. See also Japanese ground units, Detachments. 

Koura, Col. JifO: 438 

Kubo, Rear Adm. Kyuji: 141 

La Paz: 178, 183, 185, 186 

Laguna de Bay: 109, 139, 140, 191. 195,197 

Lake Lanao: 510, 514, 515 

Lamao River: 408,451,452,459,464 

Lamao River Valley: 553 

Lamon Bay: 57,112,119,123,138-44,161, I'll, 195, 

~()l. 216 

Lanao Sector: 508 

Landing- craft: 126, 127. '188, 523, 524,549,557 

Langle): 91 

Laoag: 60,107,108,128 

Lapiav Point: 301. 302, 303, 306. See also Battle of the 

Points. 

Lathrup, LI. Col. Leslie T.: 342 

Lavantan River: 266n 

Lawrence, LI. Col. Charles S.: 179, 180. 256 

Lawrence, Maj. \A/illiam: 567, 568 

Lavac: 223.224.225, :126. 227, ~2B. 3.'12 

Layac Junction: 222, 223, 224. 225. 225-31. 250, 254. 

3.i2 

Layac line: n7, no 

Lee, LI. Henrv G.: 291 n. 389 

Left Sector. S~f Corps, I Philippine. 
618 

Legaspi: 57, 60, 98,109,110, III, 112, 122, 123, 141, 

574 

Legaspi: 396 

Lepus: 396 

Lewis, Lt. Col. Eugene T.: 275 

Leyte: 5,11,238,499,501,502,507,581 

Leyte-Samar Force: 577 

Lilly, CoL EdmundJ.Jr.: 317, 319, 320, 323, 439, 442. 

See also Infantry units, Regiments (PS), 57th. 

Lim, Brig. Gen. Vincente: 109,251,422,423. Set also 

Divisions (PA), 41st. 

Limay: 254, 257, 258, 290, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 

336, 380,406, 417, 446n, 449n, 551,552 

Limay line: 415, 417, 429, 433 

Limay River: 433, 437 

Lingayen: 59, 107, 107n, 125,130,131,132,133,138, 

139, 162n, 218, 373, 501-02, 523, 552n 

Lingayen Gulf: 7, 57, 69, 84, 91,100,102, 102n, 104, 

107,108,123,125,126,127,128,129,130,131, 

132,144,154,161,162,166,178,216,223,227, 

262, 399,414,414n,501,503, 523, 568 

Lipa: 199 

Little Baguio: 381,444 

J..ittle Pocket. See Pocket Fights. 

Logistics. See Rations; Shipping; Supplies. 

Longoskawayan Point: 300-08, 314, 317, 319, 323, 

324,328,345. See also Battle of the Points. 

Los Banos: 180,195, 195n, 197, 199 

Lough, Brig. Gen. Maxon S.: 69n, 286, 291, 292,327, 

406,422,425,428,432,433,435,436,437,438, 

439, 440, 442, 443. See also Divisions (US), 

Philippine. 

Lubao: 208,222,223,259 

Lucban: 139, 191, 193, 196 

Lucena: 195, 196 

Luisiana: 194 

Lusacen: 197,198 

Luzon: 3,21, 21n, 27, 37, 216, 360. See also Task 

forces, Luzon Force, North Luzon Force, South 

Luzon Force; Terrain and geography. 

American defense plans and deployment: 10, 11, 

21,33,43,47,6~63,65,9~97 

Japanese air attacks: 84, 85, 89, 90, 95, 96 

Japanese estimates of strength: 57-58 

Japanese invasion plans and deployment: 57,59, 

60,72,98,103,123-28, 139-41 

Japanese landings: 100, 103, 104-06, 106-08, 109-

12,128-38,141-44 

resistance after surrender instructions: 562, 574 

and southern islands defense: 499, 500, 50 I 

strength offorces: 22, 23, 24,48,49, 70, 71,90-91 

withdrawal plans: 161-66, 166-69 

Luzon Strait: 100 

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 

assumes USAF FE command: 16-18 

and attacks on Far East Air Force: 87-88, 96 

biographical sketch: 17-19 

declaration of Manila as Open City: 232 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas~Continued 

defense of Bataan: 247, 254, 256, 261, 268, 269n, 

285, 290, 290n, 291, 295, 296, 304, 348, 350, 352, 

371, 377,387,441,452,453,45~ 

defense ofCorregidor: 361, 362, 491, 521, 528, 535 

evacuation of: 353-60, 359n, 388-89 

and Far East Air Force organization: 39-43 

and Formosa attack plan: 81-84, 82n, 89, 92 

interns aliens: 119 

and Japanese landings: 100, 104, 121,122,133,161 

Luzon defense: 135-36, 138, 141 

as Military Advisor to Philippines: 9, II, 15, 16 

organization of command after departure: 360-65 

organizes USAFFE staff: 19,23 

and Philippine Army development and mobilization: 12,16-17,23-26,119 

and Philippine defense plans: 61,64-71 

pleads for reversal of strategy: 151-52 

recalled to active duty: 15, 15-16 

reinforcements and supplies: 31, 32-37, 37-45, 

48-49,120,121,153,154,154-55,155,156,157, 

239,240,241,242,387,390, 390n, 391, 392,397, 

398,399,400,401,402,403,404 

surrender in the Philippines: 561, 562, 563, 564, 

569,570,571,572,573,575,576,577,578,579, 

580 

surrender on Bataan: 455, 455n, 456, 462-63 

Symbol of resistance: 145 

under ABDA command: 242 

warned of Japanese attack: 71-73, 79-80 

withdrawal to Bataan: 161,162-63, 162n, 164,168, 

174, 179, 181, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 226, 227, 

228, 230 

MacDonald, Col. Stuart G: 194,200,201,342,344 

McBride, Brig. Gen. Allan C.: 247, 248, 256n, 296, 

298, 304, 305. See also Bataan Service Command 

Area. 

McConnell, Col. Alva E.: 254 

McKee, Maj. Montgomery: 194, 199 

:v1cLaughlin, Maj. Charles A.: 214 

McLennan, Col. Carter H.: 581 

McMicking, Capt. Joseph: 359n 

McNarney, Maj. Gen. Joseph T.: 562, 563 

Mabatang: 247, 251, 266, 266n, 277 

Mabatang-Mauban line. See Abucay-Mauban line. 

Macajalar Bay: 510, 516 

Machine guns: 29, 35, 36,45,131,194,223,303,307, 

309,320,322,323,332,334,335,339,341,409, 

475,480,499,516,559 

Maeda Lt. Gen. Masami: 58,108, 232n, 235n, 347, 

413 

Magalang-Concepcion road: 212, 213 

Maher. Col. William F.: 166,342 

Main battk positions: 247,248, 250, 251, 254, 285 

Main lines of resistance: 197, 198,518 

on Bataan: 249, 251, 252, 266n, 269, 270, 272,273, 

275,278,280,281,282,284,289,290,300,325, 

330, 332, 334, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 
INDEX 

Main lines of resistance-Continued 

on Bataan-Continued 

346,411,424,427,428,429,431,432,438,444, 

448 

Mako: 60, 61,103,123,126 

Malay Barrier: 96, 147, 157,240,242,583 

Malay Peninsula: 54, 145, 238, 240 

Malaya: 4, 52, 54, 56, 59, 72, 242, 300, 356, 414, 

414n, 493, 501, 503 

Malinta Hill: 472, 474, 475, 490, 539, 540, 547, 553, 

557, 558, 559, 571. See also Corregidor. 

Malinta Hospital: 545 

:Malinta Tunnel: 475,481,490,491,492,493,495, 

525,529,531,532,534,538,539,546,547,551, 

557,558,565, 565n, 566, 572. See also Corregidor. 

Mallonee, Col. Richard c.: 26n, 107, 136, 162, 162n, 

188,216,218,220,224,257, 269n, 370, 387, 388 

Mamala River: 296, 417, 438, 445, 446, 446n, 447, 

448 

Manchuria: 56, 60 

Mangima Canyon: 517, 518, 519 

Manila: 120, 121, 363n, 385, 413, 569,573,576,577 

as communication center: 5, 7, 255 

evacuation of: 161, 165, 199, 200, 200n, 201, 255, 

256, 258 

and impact of war: 115-22 

Japanese drive on: 102,128,130,132,133,138, 

139, 140, 141, 157, 166, 181, 182, 188, 191,195, 

199,203,206,210,223 

as military and naval installation: 18, 19, 22, 23, 

33,34,42,43,44, 45n, 57, 58,59, 60n, 61, 63, 

69,70, 71, 85, 92, 94, 95,97, 104, 104n, 128, 149, 

163,471 

occupation by Japanese: 232-38, 261, 385,412-13, 

484 

open city: 161, 162, 163, 164, 190 

Manila Bay: 163,263,348,349, 446n, 449n, 525n. See 

also Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays. 

blockade-running: 348,395,396,397,401,402 

defenses deny Japanese use of: 22, 32,45,47,62,65, 

71,166,238,352,471-79,583 

description of: 6, 7 

Japanese air strikes: 234-35 

Japanese invasion plans: 57, 58 

naval base: 46, 90-91,155-56 

tides upset Japanese landings on Corregidor: 553-

54 

l\:fanilaRailroad: 109,110, III, 142, 176, 177, 178 

Manzano, Lt. Col. Narcisco L.: 209,210 

MaP$, need and use: 270, 271, 277, 280, 289, 289n, 

gao, 313, 330, 338, 339, 525 

Marblehell,d: 91 

Marett, 1st Lt. Samuel H.: 106n 

Marines, 4th Regiment. See Infantry units, Regiments, 

United States. 

Mariveles: 7,47,91,95, 155, 263,300,301,302,306, 

311,317,318,329,414,415,429,453,454,457, 

459,460,473,494,523, 537 

Mariveles Bay: 296, 406 

619 

Mariveles Mountains: 245, 247, 259, 296, 300, 318, 

330,379,381,406,407,408,416,417,447,448, 

484, 489, 520 

Marquat, Brig. Gen. William F.: 10, 359n 

Marshall Islands: 4, 52, 79, 394 

Marshall, Gen. George C.: 15, 16, 17,39,43, 65n, 

72,88, 145, 162, 163, 164,295,354,360,441, 

455, 455n, 521, 549, 562, 575 

names Wainwright as USAFFE commander: 362, 

363, 363n, 364, 365n 

RAINBOW revisions: 65, 67 

role in Philippine reinforcements: 14, 31, 32, 33, 

34,35,36,37,38,39,43-44,48, 147-48, 150, 

151,153,155,239-40,241,242,390, 390n, 391, 

391-92,393,394,397,398,398-99,400,401, 

402, 402-03 

views on MacArthur's evacuation: 353-54, 355, 

356,357,358,359 

Marshall, Brig. Gen. Richard J.: 10, 19, 164, 165, 

190n, 200, 234, 247,274, 274n, 290, 304, 304-05, 

359n, 378 

Mataling line: 513, 514 

Mauban: 119, 139, 141, 142, 142n, 164, 191, 195,247, 

249, 296. See also Abucay-Mauban line. 

Mauban line. See Abucay-:Mauban line. 

Mauban Ridge: 249, 278, 284 

Maya: 103, 105 

Mayan: 164 

Medal of Honor: 270, 341 

Medical Corps: 120 

Medical Department: 50 

Medical depot: 120 

Medical problems: 376-84, 400, 401-02, 403, 404, 

410,412,433-34,444,454-55,524,525,531-32, 

544-46 

Medical Regiment, 12th: 22 

Meier, Capt. Philip A.: 272 

Meigs: 146n 

Melbourne: 146,364,397,575 

Merle-Smith, Col. Van S.: 146, 154 

Merrill, Col. Gyles: 179 

Middle Sector: 529, 530, 531, 558. See also Corregidor. 

Middleside: 472-73, 481, 482, 494, 529, 531, 540. See 

also Corregidor. 

Midway: 38, 77-78, 584 

Mikami, :Maj. Gen. Kizo: 414, 416, 422, 553 

Military Advisor. See MacArthur, Gen. Douglas. 

Miller, Col. Ernest B.: 176, 176n, 177, 222, 223, 229, 

293 

Mindanao: 358, 359,520 

conquest of: 507-19 

landings on: 98, 112, 123, 145,238 

plans to occupy: 57, 59, 98, 122, 414n, 471,503 

plans to use as base of operations: 239, 354, 356-57, 

360,500-01, 502 

as supply collection base: 378, 395, 396, 398, 399, 

400,401,402,403 

surrender of: 570, 572, 573, 574, 577, 578 

terrain: 6, 498-99 
620 

Mindanao-Continued 

use as military base: 10,11,43,70,88,92, 92n, 97, 

97n, 119, 156, 239, 360 

Mindanao Force. See Task forces. 

Mindanao River: 51 I 

Mindanao Sea: 359, 499 

Mindoro: 10,349, 414n 

Minelayers: 110, 126 

Mines: 95,283,320,411,436,537,550 

Minesweepers: 46,91,95,126,141,150,155,307 

Mitchell, Col. Eugene H.: 513, 514 

Miura, Lt. CoL Toshio: 112,507,508,510,511,512 

Mi<:uho: 142 

Moncada: 177 

Monkey Point: 555, 557 

Moore, Maj. Gen. George F.: 22, 44-45, 71, 279, 

279n, 360, 361, 375,478,479,486, 486n, 488, 

494,535,540,546,547, 547n, 550, 551, 557,561, 

567,571 

Moore, Col. Joseph H.: 87n, 117 

Morale: 245,247,293-94,321-22,350-51,354,384-

89, 419, 424-25, 436, 444, 445, 449, 454-55, 

527-28, 531, 547, 549, 550, 558 

Moran, CoL John: 225 

Morehouse, Maj. C. H.: 359n 

Morioka, Lt. Gen. Sasumu: 138-39, 139, 140, 142, 

190,191,196-97,201-02, 202n, 218, 235, 236, 

236n, 312-13, 312n, 317, 322, 337, 340, 340-41, 

341,342,343,347-48, 348, 349-5~417, 522 

Morita, CoL Haruji: 416,426,428,445,446 

Mormacsum: 393, 395 

Moron: 245, 248, 249, 250, 263, 266,279,281,300 

Morrison Hill: 494,527,538 

Morrison Point: 527 

Morse, CoL William P.: 516, 517, 518 

Mortars: 221,223, 288, 294,335, 339,436,444,475 

ammunition: 321,335,339,496,540 

3-inch Stokes: 288, 321,335 

3-inch trench: 29 

12-inch: 306, 307, 474, 476, 478, 487, 489, 494, 496, 

540, 541,549n, 550, 556 

60-mm.: 321 

81-mm.: 35,306,307,321,436,439 

Motor torpedo boats: 9, II, 12, 13,47,48,60,91,97, 

100,126,155,300-01,318, 322n, 359, 359n, 361 

Mount Arayat: 166,203,213,215 

Mount Banahao: 191 

Mount Bataan: 245 

Mount Limay: 446n, 448 

Mount Natib: 245, 247, 248, 251, 252, 266, 266n, 274, 

276,325,379 

Mount Natib trail: 266, 266n 

MountPucot: 301,302, 303, 306, 307, 308 

Mount Samat: 326, 327,330,332, 333, 406, 407,414, 

415,416,417,418,432,434,438,440,441,443 

capture of: 421-31 

Mount Santa Rosa: 248, 265 

Mount Silanganan: 248, 249, 250, 278, 281, 282, 283, 

285n 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Murasame: 107 

Myers, Capt. Gordon R.: 339 

Naga: 111,505,506 

Nagano, Maj. Gen. Kameichiro: 413,416,433,444, 

461,462,463,464,466,467 

Nagumo, Vice Adm. C.: 78 

Naka: 107 

Nakajima, Lt. Col. Yoshio: 58n, 181, 230n, 350n, 

569n 

Nakanishi, CoL: 283, 284 

Nakar, Col. Guillermo: 573,574, 574n 

Nakayama, Col. Motoo: 347,416,464-66,566-67, 

568, 570 

Napa: 459 

Nara, Lt. Gen. Akira: 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267-68, 

271,272,273,275,277,279,280-81,287,289n, 

294n, 295, 29~ 312n, 325-26,329-3~ 331,332, 

333,334,335,336,340,347,348,416,424,427, 

437,442 

Nasugbu: 164n, 264, 524 

Nasugbu Bay: 141 

National Defense Act (1935): 10-11 

Naval losses: 105, 106, 107, 129 

Naval strength 

Allied: 46, 47, 90-91 

Japanese: 103,110,112,126-27 

Naval Task Force 5: 91, 91-92, 91n, 95 

Naval units. See Asiatic Fleet (US). 

Navy Basic War Plan. See RAINBOW 5. 

Navy Department, U. S.: 47,73, 95n, 149,459 

Needham, Lt. Robert F.: 194 

Negros: 5, 7,11,499,502,507,578,581,582 

Nelson, Lt. CoL R.j.: 511 

Netherlands Indies: 4, 52, 54,56,59,98, 145, 150, 

152, 155,156,238,239,240,241,242,356,357, 

365,390,391,392,393,395,396,397,400,401, 

507 

Niagara: 145 

Nichols Field. See Airfields. 

Nieto, CoL Manuel: 161n 

Nininger, 2d Lt. Alexander R.,jr.: 270 

Nishimura, Rear Adm. Shoji: 122 

Nomura, Kichisaburo: 78 

North Channel: 8, 523 

North Dock: 540 

North Luzon Force. See Task forces. 

North Point: 549, 551, 554, 555, 557 

Nueva Eeija Province: 178 

Obata, Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi: 57, 479, 480 

Observation: 228, 274, 306, 315, 326, 407~418, 421, 

422,488,540,548,549,553 , 

aircraft: 228422,449,540,541,549 

balloon: 523n, 537, 539 

post: 298, 306, 541 

visibility: 113,301,309,314,315,338,339 

O'Day, CoL Ray M.: 162n, 170,225,385 

O'Donnell, Maj. Emmett, j r. : 38 
INDEX 

Office of Military Advisor: 9, 11, 19. See also MacArthur, Gen. Douglas. 

Oigawa Maru: 107 

0longapo: 29,47,58,91, 96, 223, 264, 266, 279,280, 

313,322,337,349,452,453,454,476,523,524, 

528 

Olongapo Naval Station: 29 

Onuma, Maj. Kiyoshi: 525n 

Operation Baus Au: 502, 503, 507. See also Visayan 

Islands. 

ORANGE Plan. See War Plan Orange-3. 

Orani: 266, 524 

Orani River: 270 

Ord, Lt. Col. James B.: 9, 10 

Ordnance 

Philippine Ordnance Depot: 92 

17th Ordnance Battalion: 32 

Ordnance Department: 24, 50 

Orion: 251, 289, 325, 326, 327, 329,332,405,406, 

407,417,429,440,445n,456 

Orion-Bagac line: 325-30, 350, 406, 410, 417,493, 

552n 

Orion cutoff: 330, 331,440,444 

Ota, Col. Kumataro: 581 

Otter, Lt. Bethel B.: 559 

Outpost lines: 137, 197, 198,247,250,251,265,269, 

272,278,279,281,332,334,338,417,438 

Paalungan River: 448, 449n 

Pacific Fleet: 46, 45n, 47, 51, 52, 54, 56, 64, 78, 79, 

91, 149, 152, 155,394. See also Asiatic Fleet (CS); 

U. S. Kavy. 

Padre Burgos: 109,142 

Pagbilao: 144, 195,196 

Palau: 59, 60, 61, 98, 109, 110, 112 

Palawan: 10,91,574 

Palsabangon River: 196 

Pampanga River: 166, 180, 181, 182, 183,202,203, 

205,206,207,208,210,213,214,215,418 

Pan American Airways: 147, 148 

Panama: 14, 36,48, 71 n, 241, 398 

Panay: 5, 6, 7, 11, 238, 396, 499, 501, 502, 503, 

506-07,510,574,579,580. See also Christie, Col. 

Albert F. 

Panay Force: 502 

Pandacan: 234 

Pandan River: 332, 334 

Paniquian River: 296,406 

Pantingan River: 326, 327, 327-28, 337, 405-06,408, 

416,420,422,424,426,427,432,433,435,436, 

442,443,447 

Pantingan River Valley: 406,411,416,426,427,429, 

460 

Parang: 510,511, 513 

Parker, Maj. Gen. George M.,Jr.: 109, 141, 165, 166, 

190, 193,225,227,229,252,265,266,271,275, 

282, 289,290,291,305,327,332,405,406,424, 

431, 432, 454. See also Bataan Defense Force; 

621 

Parker, Maj. Gcn. George M., Jr.-Continued 

Task forces, South Luzon Force; Corps, II Philippine. 

Commander, Bataan Defense Force: 165 

Commander, South Luzon Force: 69 

Commander, II Philippine Corps: 247 

directs II Corps operations: 251,268, 268n, 271-72, 

273,274-75,277,285,287,289,290, 290n, 328, 

331,335,384,425,439,446,447,451-52 

surrender: 459 

Pasig River: 115, 121, 234, 235 

Paysawan River: 296 

Pearl Harbor: 46, 52,54, 78, 78n, 79, 80, 81,82,86, 

88,89,90,145,149,152,394,479,583 

Peck, :\1aj. Allen L.: 519 

Peck, Capt. Gordon H.: 177,222-23 

Penaranda River: 183 

Pensacola convoy: 145-48, 150, 151, 152, 153, 153-54, 

154, 157 

Permit: 399 

Pescadores: 60, 123, 126 

Philippine Army. See also Divisions; Infantry units; 

Philippine Constabulary; and appropriate ami 

or service. 16, 17, 18, 19,23,32,34,35,36,47, 

48,49,58,62, 63,64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 102, 109, 

113,115,119,120,131,132,136,142,143,157, 

162n, 163, 165, 166, 189,212,238,258,262,294, 

298,351,354,366,372,373,381,383,385,405, 

408,430,441,445,451,454,461,478,481,499, 

529, 583 

mobilization and training: 25-30 

organization and development: 8-13 

Philipp;ne Army A;r Force: 13, 25, 26, 62, 502, 529. 

See also Air Forces units; Far East Air Force. 

Philippine Coast Artillery Command: 44-45, 65, 71, 

478. See also Harbor Defenses of Manila and 

Subic Bays. 

Philippine Coastal Frontier: 65, 67 

Philippine Constabulary: 9, 10, lOn, 12,26,27,58, 

114,118-19,119,199,200,298 

Philipp;ne Department: 9,10,12,16,18,21,22,23, 

61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 121, 163, 247, 296 

Philippine Division. See Divisions. 

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company: 7, 15 

Philippine Scouts: 21, 26, 27,28,34,49,70,71,102, 

120, 162n, 238, 239n, 258,383,384,405,478, 

529. See also Divisions; Infantry units; and appropnate arm or sermce. 

organization and strength: 9,12,21, 21n, 22, 24 

Phill;ps, Maj. Paul D.: 517, 518 

Phillips, Vice Adm. Sir Thomas: 72 

Pico de Loro hills: 486, 488 

Pierce, Brig. Gen. Clinton A.: 131,133,134,135,138, 

171,174.218,305,310,314,315.316,317,320, 

328,407. See also Cavalry. 26th Regiment. 

Piis: 1 Y", 1 94 

Pilar: 245, 251, 332 

Pilar River: 332, 334, 335, 438, 439 

Pio: 218, 219,220,224 
622 

Plaridel: 180,200,201,203,205,206-08,214,215, 

265 

Pocket Fights: 336-38, 341-46 

Big Pocket: 339-41, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346 

establishment of pockets: 338-39 

Little Pocket: 339, 341, 342, 343 

Upper Pocket: 340, 341, 342, 343, 345 

Polk: 148 

Porac: 213,215,216,218,219,220,223,225,262. See 

also Guagua-Porac line. 

Port Darwin: 149, 150, 156 

Port Moresby: 38,584 

Post ofLimay: 21 

Post of Manila: 21 

Pozorrubio: 131,134,136,137 

President Harrison: 47 

Preston: 91, I 10 

Primrose, Capt. John: 222 

Prince oJ Wales: 72 

Princessa: 396 

Provisional Air Corps Regiment. See Infantry Units, 

Regiments (PA). 

Provisional Battalion, 51 st Division: 339, 341, 342, 

343, 345 

Provisional Field Artillery Brigade: 449 

Psychological warfare: 268-69, 269n, 323,418,494, 

527 

PT's. See Motor torpedo boats. 

Pugh, Lt. Col. John R.: 567,568,569,574,575 

Puntian: 517, 518, 519 

Puntian Sector: 518 

Purnell, Rear Adm. William R.: 72-73, 73 

Quartermaster: 21, 22, 50, 62, 70, 120, 121, 255, 

256-57,258, 370 

Quezon, Manuel: 4,9,10,13,72,84,116,161,164, 

203, 239,354, 355,399,400,456,48~491,492, 

544 

Quinauan Point: 299, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 

308-12,314,317,318,320,323,324,328,345 

Quintard, Col. Alexander S.: 120,419,449 

Qyail: 307 

Radar: 43 

Radio Tokyo: 232 

Railroads: 109, 176, 177,473,484 

RAINBOW 5: 46n, 65, 67, 71, 79, 82, 83,148,149 

Rations: 63, 179, 276, 288, 289, 309, 31 i, 321, 322, 

340,344,391,392,393,395,396,399,400,401, 

402, 412,412n, 440, 452,453, 490,491, 507,528, 

534-35, 543-44,552-53. See also Supply; Medical 

problems. 

Ray, Capt. Harold G.: 359n 

Real River: 381, 448 

Rear battle positions: 247, 248, 251, 290, 295, 325 

Reconnaissance: 315,316, 319,409,482,541 

coun terreconnaissanee: 41 7-18 

reconnaissance in force: 351,418 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Reinforcements 

American: 31, 32-37, 273, 274,282,305,306-07, 

309. See also Pensacola convoy; Blockade-running. 

Japanese: 317, 318,413,413-\4, 414n, 501-02,523 

Republic: 146n 

Repulse: 72 

Reserve area: 70-71 

Reserve Force: 70 

Richards, Lt. Grover C.: 220n 

Ri["ht Sector. See Corps, I Philippine. 

Roadblocks: 177, 183-85, 194, 282-84, 282n, 290, 

437-38,443,450,511 

Roads and trails 

Bauang-Baguio Road: 128, 132 

Cabanatuan-Tarlac Road: 184, 187 

East Road: 245, 251, 254, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 

271, 274, 293, 326, 330, 332, 334,415, 417,433, 

438,445n, 448, 449,451,460,461,467 

Guitol trail: 276, 289 

Junction 2-10: 445, 446 

Junction 2-46: 446 

Junction 4-429: 434 

Junction 6-8: 432, 433, 436, 437,438,439,442,443 

Junction 8-29: 432, 437, 442, 443 

Junction 8-44: 445n 

Junction 29-429: 435 

Junction 44-429: 435,438,439 

Pilar-Bagac road: 245, 247, 248, 268, 281, 282, 291, 

294,295,296,300,325,326,332,335,336,337, 

405,407,408,422,424,425,426,427,428,438 

Route I: 7, 111, 139, 140, 142, 144, 191, 195, 196, 

197,200,498,499,508,510,511,512,513,514, 

515 

Route 2: 434n 

Route 3: 7, 102, 107, 108, 127, 128, 131, 136,166, 

168,170,174,176,177,178,180,181,182,186, 

187,188,201,203,206,210,211,212,213,215, 

498 

Route 5: 7, 102, 105, 106, 166, 178, 180, 182,183, 

184,200,201,203,206,213 

Route 6: 424 

Route 7: 165,203,210,215,216,220,221,222,223, 

224, 225, 228, 245, 265, 266, 279 

Route 8: 178 

Route 10: 210,213 

Route 13: 166,170,178,186 

Route 17: 199,200 

Route 20: 451 

Route 21: 195,200 

Route 23: 193, 194, 195, 196, 197 

Route 25: 199,200 

Route 29: 425 

Route 67: 180 

Route 74: 181,203,210,213,216,218,222,223, 

262, 264 

Route 110: 223, 225, 226, 227,245 

Trail 2: 325, 330~36, 431, 434, 435, 438, 439, 440, 

445,445n,446,446n,449n 

Trail 4: 407, 416, 422, 429, 430, 432, 434, 435,438 
INDEX 

Roads and trails-Continued 

Trait 5: 337, 338, 341, 344 

Trail 6: 407, 424, 425, 426, 427, 430, 432, 437, 439, 

440 

Trail 7: 328, 329, 337, 339, 340, 341, 343, 344, 407, 

431 

Trail 8: 407, 422,427,432, 441,442, 443,447 

Trail 9: 407, 431 

Trail 10: 431, 446n 

Trail 12: 286 

Trail 15: 407 

Trail 20: 448,449, 449n, 450,451 

Trail 29: 407, 416, 422, 424, 425, 426, 427, 432, 

433,436,437,440,442 

Trail 38: 445n 

Trail 44: 434, 434n, 440, 445 

Trail 46: 445, 445n, 447 

Trail 429: 407, 422, 430, 434, 435 

Robenson, CoL John A.: 392, 393, 394, 395 

Rockwell, Rear Adm. Francis W.: 91, 94, 95, 155, 

359n,363 

Rodman, CoL John H.: 176,282,283,284 

Rogers, M Sgt. Paul P.: 359n 

Romulo, CoL Carlos: 234, 544 

Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: 71,394,550 

decision to base fleet at Pearl Harbor: 46 

and MacArthur's appointment as Miliary Advisor: 

9, 16-17 

and MacArthur's evacuation: 353, 354, 355, 356, 

357-58 

message to Wainwright: 572, 574 

"no surrender" order: 354-55, 355, 456 

obligation to aid Philippines: 145, 146, 148, 150, 

151,153,154,239-40,241,242,397 

promises aid to Wainwright: 401 

rejects Quezon's independence proposal: 354-55 

and USAFFE command: 18,363,364-65 

and Wainwright's surrender decision: 561,562-64 

Rosales: 131, 178 

Rosario: 127, 128, 131,132,133-36,136,163,174 

Rosario-Infanta line: 109 

Roxas, Brig. Gen. Manuel A.: 582 

Rumbold, Maj. Ralph E.: 193, 194 

Russia. See Soviet Lnion. 

Ryujo: 97,110,113 

Ryukyus: 61,123,138,140 

S-38: 129 

S-39: 110 

Sage, Col. Charles G.: 451, 457 

Sakaguchi, Maj. Gen. Shizuo: 112 

Samal: 269, 270 

Samar: 5,98,499, 501, 502,507, 581 

Sampaloc: 193 

San Bernardino Strait: 98, 110 

San Carlos: 166, 169, 170 

San Fabian: 129, 133, 135, 144 

San Fernando, La Union: 102, 102n, 108, 122, 128, 

131,165n 

623 

San Fernando, Pampanga: 63, 102n, 104, 165, 165n, 

168,170,178,184,195,202,203,206,210,213, 

214,214-15,216,221,223,230,255,281,336, 

347,351,416,467 

San Francisco: 4, 32, 33, 38, 39, 44, 148, 3115 

SanJose: 166, 178, 182,218,222,472,507,571 

San ,\1arcelino: 28, 92 

San Quintin: 174, 182 

San Vicente line. See San Vicente River. 

San Vicente River: 408, 432, 434, 434n, 435, 438, 

439,440,442,443,444,445 

Sangley Point: 7,91,95,155 

Santa Cruz: 195,222,223,225 

Santa Ignacia: 166, 178 

Santa Rosa: 186, 187 

Santiago: 129, 199,200,201 

Santo Thomas: 128 

Sanyo MaTu: 103n 

Sorgo: 399 

Sariaya: 195,196,197,198 

Sato, CoL Gempachi: 429, 430, 434, 443, 553, 556, 

558,571 

Savoie, Lt. CarlJ.: 188 

Sayre, High Commissioner Francis B.: 72, 164, 203n, 

491 

Sayre Highway: 498, 508, 510, 511, 512, 513, 516, 

517,519,576 

Schumacher, Lt. (jg) V. S.: 359n 

Scudder, Col. Irvine C.: 502 

Sculpin: 141 

Seacoast Artillery. See Coast Artillery guns. 

Seacoast defenses. See Corregidor. 

Seadragon: 94, 399 

Sealion: 94 

Seaplane carriers: 60, 126-27 

Seaplane tender: 103, 103n 

Searaven: 399 

Searchlights: 33,45,299,318,474,475,476,481,531, 

537-38,540,555 

Searight, Col. Hamilton F.: 196, 197 

Seaward Defenses: 306,481,489,490 

Segundo, Brig. Gen. Fidel V.: 278, 280,337,338,341, 

342. See also Divisions (PA), 1st Regular. 

Selleck, Brig. Gen. Clyde A.: 134, 135, 136, 226, 227, 

228,229,250, 298,299,302, 303, 304, 305,305n. 

See also Divisions (PA), 71 st. 

Service Command Area. See Bataan Service Command Area. 

Sexmoan: 220, 223 

Shanghai: 7, 19,46,47,77,380,413,528 

Shark: 155 

Sharp, Brig. Gen. William F.: 69, 70, 238, 356, 360, 

395, 395n, 499, 500, SOl, 502, 508,510, 516, 517, 

519,562,564,569,570,572,573,575,576,577, 

578,579,580,581,582 

Commander, Visayan-Mindanao Force: 69, 506 

Sherr, Lt. CoL Joe R.: 359n 

Shipping: 36-37, 47, 48, 95, 125n, 390-01, 401-04. 

See also Pensnrnln convoy. 
624 

Shoemake, Capt. Andrew D.: 419n 

Short, Lt. Gen. Walter c.: 71 

Shortages: 28-30, 134, 180,284,321,367-76,376-84, 

401-02,489,496,499-500,508,526,559. See also 

Ammunition; Rations; Supply. 

Shreve, Lt. Col. Arthur L.: 195n, 197,201 

Siain: 139, 142 

Sierra Madre: 178 

Signal Corps: 22, 50, 120 

12th Signal Regiment: 22 

Si-Kiang: 255 

Silaiim Bay: 314, 316, 323 

Silaiim Point: 312-24, 345, 347,347-48 

Silaiim River: 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319, 323 

Silen, Bert: 232 

Silver Star awards: 361n 

Singapore: 4, 56,72,77, 91n, 145, 147, 150, 152,238, 

241,350n,356,418 

Singora: 77 

Sipoco: 111 

Sison: 136,137,138 

Skardon, 1st Lt. Beverly N.: 282 

Skerry, Col. Harry A.: 208-09, 209, 210, 226, 227, 

245, 248, 248-49, 383 

Sloan, Capt. Raymond: 323 

Smith, Ll. Col. Ross B.: 319 

Snapper: 399 

Solomon Islands: 365, 584 

Somervell, Maj. Gen. Brehon B.: 398, 401 

Sonoda, Col. Seinosuke: 206, 207 

Sorsogon Bay: 91 

South Channel: 8 

South China Sea: 4, 7, 64, 85,100,128,248,296,310, 

328,548,583 

South Dock: 539 

South Luzon Force. See Task forces. 

South Sector. See Corps, I Philippine. 

Southeast Pacific Force: 46n 

Soviet Union: 14,33,67, 150 

Spaatz, Brig. Gen. Carl A.: 37 

Speatjish: 399 

Stark, Admiral Harold R.: 36, 46, 94, 148, 149, 150, 

151, 155 

Station Hospital: 24, 50 

Steel, Col. Charles L.: 228, 229, 286 

Stevenot,Joseph: 15, 120 

Stevens, Brig. Gen. Luther: 170, 174,207,209,214, 

250, 328,337, 371-72, 373,405, 407. See also Divisions (PA), 91st. 

Stewart, Lt. Col. Loren P.: 201, 208 

Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W.: 403 

Stimson, Henry L.: 15, 16,17, 17n, 31, 31-32, 39,145, 

148, 150,239-40,241 

Stingray: 131 

Stivers, Col. Charles P.: 359n 

Strafing: 86, 87, 94, 106, 129, 294, 318, 425, 427,450, 

480,512,519 

Strategy 

American: 61-64, 64-71,145-57,238-42,353-66, 

390,393-94,401 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Strategy -Con tin ued 

Japanese: 51-61, 347 

Strickler, Maj. Dudley G.: 308, 309 

Subic Bay: 12, 22, 45, 47,62,65, 71, 91,96, 120, 128, 

278,279,313,403,452,478,523 

Submarine tenders: 95 

Submarines 

American: 46, 47, 49, 90-91, 91, 94,95,97,110, 

129,130,131,141,155,156,358,390,398,399, 

402,403,548 

Japanese: 59, 78 

Sulu Archipelago: 6, 10, 112,238 

Sumatra: 52,54, 240, 356 

Supply: 36, 63,152,164-65,179-80,197,254-59, 

317,340,·352,361,485,486,528,533, 533-34, 

546, 552-53. See also Blockade-running; Pensacola 

convoy; Rations; Shipping; Shortages. 

Surabaja: 154; 157 

Sutherland, Maj. Gen. Richard K.: 10,67,73,79,81, 

82, 82n, 83, 88, 88n, 89, 90,115,121,164,206, 

207,225,226,268,273-74,290, 290n, 291, 294, 

304,305,328, 358n, 359, 359n, 360, 361, 364, 

364n, 365, 479,528 

Army background: 19 

Chief of Staff, USAFFE: 19 

Suzuki, Col. Tatsunosuke: 348, 349 

Swor4fish: 399 

Tacloban: 577 

Takagi, Rear Adm. Takeo: 109,110,112 

Takahashi, Vice Adm. Ibo: 57,60,103,105,126,129 

Takahashi, Lt. Col. Katsumi: 188,216,219,220,224, 

225 

Takao: 60, 61, 100, 123,261,262 

Takao Maru: 107 

Takechi, Col. Susumu: 266, 267, 270, 271, 272,277, 

287,289, 289n, 332, 334, 335, 340 

Tala River: 429, 430 

Talisay River: 348, 408, 420, 429, 433 

Tanabe, Maj. Tadaji: 332, 334 

Tanaka, Col. Toru: 103, 108, 128, 131,178,215,216 

Taniguchi, Maj. Gen. Kureo: 416, 424, 425, 426, 427, 

429,430,434,435,438,439,552,553 

Tank action 

American: 33, 58, 134-35, 168, 176, 176n, 177, 

l77n, 178, 184~85, 185-86, 187, 194,207-08, 

219, 220n, 221, 222-23, 223, 225, 227,229,247-

48,283,287,293,294,310,314,318,319-20, 

341,346,409-10,418,433,436,451 

Japanese: 126, 126n, 135, 138,207,221,229,424, 

427,433,438-39,444,450,512,515,560 

Tank units 

Provisional Tank Group: 33, 121, 168, 176, 178, 

405,406,409,431 

192d: 33, 50,134,135,169,171,176,178, 183n, 

184,205,218,227,319,346 

194th: 32, 33, 50,73,169,171,176,177,178, 178n, 

181,205,214,221,222,223,227,283,293,294 

Tank-infantry co-operation: 310, 320, 321,341, 346, 

410 
INDEX 

Tankulan: 517, 518 

Tarkington, Col. Hiram W.: 503,508,516 

Tarlac: 63,96, 166, 176, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 

187,188,203,211,212,216,262 

Tarlac-Cabanatuan Line: 169-89 

Tarlac Depot: 179 

Task forces 

Initial Protective Force: 62 

Lanao force: 5 14-15 

Leyte-Samar Force: 577 

Luzon Force: 361, 362, 362n, 363, 364, 365, 366, 

384,404,405,406,407,411,431,432,451,452, 

453,455,456,457,458,459,460,562,564,570 

Mindanao Force: 508, 516, 517, 570 

North Luzon Force: 50, 67, 69, 69n, 70, 72, 102, 

120,122,131,133,165,166,168,169,170,174, 

178,179,180, 180n, 181, 183, 186, 188, 190, 199, 

200,201,202,203,205,206,207,208-09,210, 

215, 21~219, 226,227, 230,366 

Defense line D-1: 166, 168, 170, 190 

Defense line D-2: 166,171,174,176,179 

DefenselineD-3: 166,176,177,178 

DefenselineD-4: 166, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 

186,187 

Defense line D-5: 166, 180, 183, 186, 187, 

188,202,203,210-14, 215 

Panay Force: 502 

South Luzon Force: 50, 67, 69, 70, 109n, 110, 119, 

120,141,165,166,168,180,181,183,188,190, 

190n, 193, 194, 195, 197, 199, 200, 200n, 202, 

205, 20~ 207, 21~ 214, 215, 227, 23~ 266, 32~ 

361 

Visayan Force: 501, 502, 506 

Visayan-Mindanao Force: 49, 67, 69, 70, 113,360, 

395,499,500,506,562,569,572,574,575 

Tayabas: 195, 196 

Tayabas Bay: 100, 142, 196 

Tayabas Mountains: 139, 144, 191 

Tayug: 138, 169, 170, 171,174 

Terauchi, Gen, Count Hisaichi: 56,261 

Ternate: 264,485,486,488, 523 

Terrain and geography 

Bataan: 8, 245, 248, 251, 266n, 273-74, 276, 296, 

300,301,303,309,313-14,325-26,337-38,338, 

339,346,407-08,442,445n,446n,449n,484-85 

Caballo Island: 476 

Carabao Island: 478 

Corregidor: 245472-73 

Luzon: 5-7,100-02,109,127-28,132,166,186, 

191,195-96,203,212,216,221,226-27 

Mindanao: 4-6,498-99,519 

Philippine Islands: 4-8 

Visayan group: 499 

Thailand:4,54,56,72,77,238,484 

Thayer, Lt. CoL Allen: 518, 519, 579, 580 

Thompson, Maj, Donald G.: 229n 

Tiaong: 19~ 197, 198, 199, 200 

Tiawir River: 334,348,408,424,427 

Tiawir-Talisay River: 408, 423, 426, 428 

Tisdelle, Maj. Achille C.: 369, 385,464, 464n 

625 

Toledo: 503, 505, 506 

Topside: 473, 480, 481, 482, 490, 494,528,529,531, 

537,540,547,549. See also Corregidor. 

Torres Strait: 154, 155 

Trails. See Roads and trails. 

Townsend, CoL Glen R.: 105n, 213, 337, 339, 340 

Training: 12-13,16,27,28,29-30,102,109,131,262, 

298-99,308,408-11,508,522,529,530,552, 

558 

Transportation: 29,63, 197, 255,498-99 

Trapnell, Maj. Thomas]. H.: 135 

Traywick, CoL Jesse T,JL: 199,462,572,573,576, 

577 

Tree bursts: 314, 314n, 320, 339 

Troop dispositions, American 

Bataan: 247-48, 248-54, 278-79, 285-86,299,308-

09,316,319,327-28,329,330-31,337,342,345, 

405,405-07,422-24,431-32,439-40,448-49 

Corregidor: 529 

Luzon: 196,218,220-21,226-27 

Mindanao: 510-11,512-13, 516,516-17 

Visayas: 502 

Troop dispositions, Japanese: 216, 228, 265-66, 276, 

312n, 329, 332, 336-37, 340, 414-15, 416-17, 

420,424,426,429,433,522,552 

Troop strengths, American: 299, 302, 308, 435,449, 

454,461,476,478,502,507,518 

Bataan: 247,401,455 

Corregidor: 401, 475, 476, 535 

Harbor Defenses and Beach Defenses: 70, 529, 530, 

531 

Luzon: 22, 162, 162n, 239, 239n 

Luzon Force: 405, 406 

Marines: 47, 299n, 476, 528,529,530 

North Luzon Force: 70 

Philippine Army: 26-27,49,65, 70 

Reserve Force: 70 

South Luzon Force: 70 

U.S. Army in Philippines: 21-23,49,50,58,65,70, 

71 

Visayas: 502, 507 

Visayan-Mindanao Force: 70 

11th Division (PA): 102 

51st Division (PA): 330 

71st Division (PA): 226 

Troop strengths, Japanese: 54, 54n, 55,103, 112, 

125n, 216, 262, 281, 295n, 300, 302, 303, 314, 

329-30,336-37,338,345,349-50, 350n, 412, 

413,503,507,508n,515,559 

Troops, condition of: 288,531-35,542-46. See also 

Morale; Medical problems. 

Truk: 4, 79 

Tsuchibashi, Lt. Gen. Yuichi: 125, 133, 170, 174, 182, 

184,191,206,235,236n 

Tsukahara, Vice Adm, Nishizo: 57 

Tsunehiro, Lt. Col. Nariyoshi: 139, 142, 191, 194, 196, 

300,303,308,312 

Tuguegarao: 84, 102, 105, 106 

Tuol River: 337, 338, 344 

Turner. Rear Arlm. Richmonrl K.: 146 
626 

Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934): 4,13,61 

Uegima. See Kamijima, Col. 

Umingan: 174, 176 

Upper Pocket. See Pocket Fights. 

Urdaneta: 134, 166, 169, 170,178 

U. S. Army: 9, 12, 15,26,35,36,48,49,50,58,62,64, 

70, 71,238,239n,258,529 

U. S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE): 34,44,48, 

50, 70, 71, 80n, 81, 85, 100, 104, 110, 116, 118, 

120,121,130,133,136,138,153,163,164,190, 

193n, 197, 199,234,247,248,274,282,290,305, 

317,318,324,328,329,339,360,361,362,363, 

365,371,373,409,410,480,481,501,548 

Bataan echelon of: 290, 371, 372, 377 

organization and strength: 14-30 

U. S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP): 365,453, 

535, 548 

organization: 363 

U. S. Navy: 13, 36, 37, 148, 298, 529. See also Asiatic 

Fleet (US); Pacific Fleet. 

USSR. See Soviet Union. 

Vachon, Brig. Gen. Joseph P.: 512-13 

Vance, Col. John R.: 565 

Vance, Col. Lee G: 446 

Vesey, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 514, 515 

Vigan: 57,60,98, 102, 103, 104, 106-08, 122, 128 

Villamor, Capt. Jesus A.: 488 

Villasis: 174, 178 

Visayan Force. See Task forces. 

Visayan Islands: 5, 6,10,27,43,57,59,69,88,91,95, 

119, 238,239,36~39~401,403,414,414n,471, 

499, 50 I, 520, 569 

Japanese seizure: 502-07 

surrender: 572 

Visayan-Mindanao Force. See Task forces. 

Visayan-Mindanao Sector: 70 

"Voice of Freedom": 385, 388, 544, 563 

Volckman, Maj. Russell W.: 184, 186 

Wachi, Maj. Gen. Takaji: 413, 568, 576n 

Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M.: 65, 65n, 72, 195, 

197,252,336,375,418,561 

assumes command in Philippines: 360-66 

Commander, Philippine Division: 21 

Commander, North Luzon Forcc: 69, 69n 

Commander, I Philippine Corps: 247 

andJapanese landings on Luzon: 102, 104, 108, 

122,133-34,134,135,137-38,138 

mission in the defense of north Luzon: 69, 122 

part in the defense of Bataan: 248, 250, 268, 269n, 

274, 277, 279, 280, 281, 282, 282n, 284, 284n, 

290,291,300,305,305-06,306-07,308,311, 

312,319,325,327-28,329,337,340,341,342, 

344,347,350-51,373,375,377,383,434,440, 

441,447,448,452,452-53 

part in the defense ofCorregidor: 495, 527-28, 535, 

536, 541-42, 543, 547, 547n, 549, 549n, 550, 

550n,550-51 

THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES 

Wainwright, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M.-Continued 

part in the defense of the Southern .Islands: 506, 510 

part in withdrawal to Bataan: 162, 163, 165, 168, 

174,176,180,190,199,200,203,205,206,207, 

209,210,216,219,222,224,225,226,227,230 

surrender of Bataan: 452, 453, 454, 455, 455n, 456, 

457, 457n,458, 458n,459, 460, 462, 462n,462-

63,465-66 

surrenderofCorregidor: 560-61, 562, 562-64, 564-

74,584 

surrender in the Southern Islands: 572,573,574, 

575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 582 

views on reinforcements: 390,401-02,403 

Wake: 47 

Wake Island: 38,52,54,65,77, 145,394 

Wappenstein, Lt. Col. William A.: 425 

War Plan ORANGE-3:61-64, 65n, 69,161-66 

War Plans Division: 15n, 16,31,32,153,240,241, 

390 

Warner, Lt. Col. Everett L.: 574 

Watanabe, Col. Yunosuke: 266,279,280,281 

Wavell, Gen. Sir Archibald P.: 242,353,356,398,399 

Weaver, Brig. Gen. James R. N.: 33,121,134,135, 

168,176, 176n, 209, 214, 216, 221, 229, 287, 293, 

310,318 

Webb, Maj. Joseph R.: 516 

West Road: 245, 248, 250, 280, 281, 284, 290, 298, 

299,301,303,304,305,308,314,315,316,317, 

319,324,326,329,337,338,406 

West Sector. See Bataan Service Command Area; 

Corregidor. 

Wheeler Field: 78 

Whitlock, Lt. Col. Lester J.: 390n 

Wickord, Col. Theodore: 176, 181 

Williams, Col. Everett C.: 458, 459, 461, 462, 464, 466 

Williams, Maj. Francis: 558 

Williams, Mrs. Maude R.: 542 

Willoughby, Col. Charles A.: 122,304, 359n 

Wilson, Lt. Col. Albert T.: 508n 

Wilson, Lt. Col. Francis H.: 359n 

Wood, Col. Stuart: 403n 

Woodbridge, Lt. Col. John P.: 516 

Yamashita, Gen. Tomoyuki: 145, 163,238,300, 350n 

Yanagi, Col. Isamu: 132, 134, 135 

Yoshida, Col. Motohiko: 448n, 521, 522, 554, 555, 

556n,559,560 

Yoshioka, Col. Yorimasa: 336,338,339,340,343,344, 

345, 346 

Yoshizawa, Col. Masataro: 332 

Zambales Mountain range: 8,100,169,178,203,212, 

218,227,245 

Zambales Province: 28, 29, 69, 166,223 

Zamboanga: 21n, 22, 508, 508n, 511 

Zamboanga Peninsula: 498, 510 

Zamboanga Sector: 508, 508n 

Zaragoza: 183,184,185,186,212,213 

1:l u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1900 333-159 
CHINA SEA 

THE ORION-BAGAC LINE 

nmmnmml1l u. S. POSITIONS (APPROX.l 27 JANUARY 1942 

SURFACED. ALL WEATHER ROAD 

PARTLY SURFACED, SEASONAL ROAO 

------- TRAIL 

ELEVATIONS IN FEET 

o 2 

, 

MILES 

MAP 77 

MANILA 

BA Y 

Lamao 

'\ 

CORREGIDOR I. 

cabal ~ 

1-1 Damon 
H. Damon 

CHINA SEA 

JAPANESE ADVANCE 

7-9 April 1942 

U. S. POSITIONS, NIGHT 6 - 7 APRIL 

U. S. POSITIONS, DATE INDICATED 

All posilions approximate 

Longoskowoyan p t. 

100 500 tODD 2000 3000 AND ABOVE. 

o , 

MIL ES 

MANILA 

BA Y 

Lamoo 

GORREGIDOR I. 

CObOII~ 

MAP 22 
Pt. 

Morrison Pt. ry Pt. 

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CORREGIDOR ISLAND C> 

Geary Pt. 

,... GUN BATTERY •• _ BARRACKS AND Q.UARTERS 

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ill 12" IoIORTAR BTR.Y ., WATER RESERVOIR -Z- EI Frode I. lFort Drum) 

0 AA BATTERY os COLO STORAGE "V 

--- ROAD " POWER PLANT 

ELEVATIONS IN FEET 

t;:;;;~.'M o 100 2S0 SOD AND ABOVE 

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MAP 23 R Johnsto"",,,