Indone

a country stu

Federal Research 

Library of C

E

William H. F

and Robert L
 

 

On the cover: A two-masted pinisi—a modern adaptati

traditional Indonesian watercraft. Based on photograph

Tim Hornby and with permission of Explore Worldw

Farnborough, Hampshire, United Kingdom. This art

and the images used on the chapter title pages were chos

represent the diversity of watercraft used in the archipe

waters of Indonesia. 

Sixth Edition, First Printing, 2011. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Indonesia: a country study / edited by William H. Frederick and Rob

Worden. -- 6th ed. 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

ISBN 978-0-8444-0790-6 (alk. paper) -- ISBN (invalid) 978-0-8444-9

(alk. paper) 1. Indonesia. I. Frederick, William H. II. Worden, Robert L

Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. 

DS615.I518 2011 

959.8--dc23 

2011038834 

Use of ISBN 

This is the Official U.S. Government edition 

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for U.S. Government Printing Office Official E

only. The Superintendent of Documents of th

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edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the au

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ISBN 978-0-8444-0790-6
 
 

 

 

Fore

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepar

Federal Research Divison of the Library of Congress under the 

Studies/Area Handbook Program, formerly sponsored by the 

ment of the Army and revived in FY 2004 with congressiona

dated funding under the sponsorship of the Joint Chiefs 

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5). 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign 

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelati

those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cu

tors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 

The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the obser

ety, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particu

tion is devoted to the people who make up the society, thei

dominant beliefts and values, their common interests and the 

which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvem

national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other an

their social system and political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and shou

construed as an expression of an official U.S. government posi

icy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted 

of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and sugges

changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editio

David L. Osborne 

Chief 

Federal Research Di

Library of Congress 

Washington, DC 205

E-mail: frds@loc.go

Acknowledg

This edition supercedes Indonesia: A Country Study, pub

1993. The authors wish to acknowledge their use of portion

edition in the preparation of the current book. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Di

the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the boo

W. Meditz made many helpful suggestions during her revi

parts of the book and managed the editing and production of 

Catherine Schwartzstein edited the manuscript, made many ve

suggestions, and helped clarify obscure points. She also perfo

final prepublication editorial review and compiled the index

Ercolano also edited parts of the manuscript in its early stag

Ji-Young Kim provided valuable assistance in checking facts

ing and revising maps and figures, collecting illustrations, and 

with updating the Country Profile and revising the Bibliograp

L. Gilchrist performed word processing and formatting of tex

The authors also are grateful to other individuals in the L

Congress who contributed to the book. Kathryn Wellen, forme

sia Reference Specialist in the Asian Division, provided advice 

ifications on many points. William Tuchrello, director of the 

Overseas Office, Jakarta, and his staff assisted in providing pho

and published information from Indonesia. 

Jennifer Foley compiled draft editions of the maps and i

many of the photographs used in the book. Graphics support 

vided by Christopher Robinson, who prepared the book’s grap

also performed the photocomposition and preparation of the f

tal manuscript for the printer. Both he and Katarina David of 

eral Research Division performed digital conversion of pho

and illustrations used in the study. 

Thanks go to Harris Iskandar, education and cultural attac

Embassy of Indonesia in Washington, DC, for providing usefu

information on his country. Finally, the authors acknowledge t

osity of individuals and public and private organizations who 

their photographs to be used in this study; they have been ackno

in the illustration captions. 

Con

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Table C. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors . . . . 

Country Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions. . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

William H. Frederick 

ORIGINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Early Inhabitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Social and Cultural Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Expanding Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

EARLY HEGEMONIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Earliest Historical Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Srivijaya and Mataram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE RISE AND FALL OF MAJAPAHIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Successor Kingdoms of Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Founding and Growth of Majapahit, 1268–1389 . . . . 

Outside Influences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE EARLY MODERN ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Commercial Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Westerners and Indigenous Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Role of the Dutch United East Indies Company, 
 

1602–19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Javanese and the VOC, 1619–1749 . . . . . . . . . . . 

Decline of the VOC, 1749–1816 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL RULE . 

End of the Ancien Régime in Java, 1816–34 . . . . . . . 

Establishment of the Colonial State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Cultivation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MODERNISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE 
 

The Rise of Education and Student Associations, 
 

The Ethical Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Racial Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

COLONIAL AGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1900–1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Formation of Political Parties, 1911–27. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Rise of Sukarno, 1921–26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Colonial Government Reactions, 1927–40. . . . . . . . . . . 

WAR AND EARLY INDEPENDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Japanese Occupation, 1942–45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The National Revolution, 1945–49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Road to Guided Democracy, 1950–65 . . . . . . . . . . 

The “Coup” and Its Aftermath, 1965–66 . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rise of the New Order, 1966–85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Decline and Fall of the New Order, 1985–98. . . . . . . . . 

Reformasi and the Post–New Order Era, 1998–2009. . . 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Joel C. Kuipers 

THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National Territory: Rights, Responsibilities, and 
 

EMERGING DYNAMICS OF INDONESIAN 
 

Geographic Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Volcanoes and Earthquakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Environmental Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

COMMUNITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Family. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

National, Religious, and Local Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . 

Urbanization and Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Social Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Violence, Vengeance, and Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

RELIGION AND WORLDVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

viii 
Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Christianity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Hinduism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Buddhism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Confucianism and Daoism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE EMERGING NATIONAL CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . 

Living Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Food, Clothing, and Popular Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SOURCES OF LOCAL IDENTIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tradition and Multiethnicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Javanese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Balinese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Peoples of Sumatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Ethnic Minorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Primary and Secondary Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Islamic Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Higher Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HEALTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Services and Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Government Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Traditional and Modern Health Practices . . . . . . . . . . 

Major Health Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Pharmaceuticals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Public Sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SOCIETY’S PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 3. The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

J. Thomas Lindblad 

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Political Economy of Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Financial Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Industrial and Trade Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Postcrisis Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

GOVERNMENT FINANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Central Government Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Decentralization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
INDONESIA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Changing Nature of Trade and Aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Principal Trade Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

AGRICULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Food Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Export Crops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Fishing and Forestry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreign Inputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Small-Scale Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MINERALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Petroleum and Natural Gas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Other Minerals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Post and Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Electric Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Blair A. King 

THE POLITICAL DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Legislative Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Executive. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Judiciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Independent Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Local Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

POLITICAL CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Inclusionary Coalitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Consensus-Based Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Traditional Political Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Islamic Political Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Pancasila: The State Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE POLITICAL PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Multiparty System: Significant Pluralism. . . . . . . . 

Secular Nationalist Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

x 
 

Muslim Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Islamist Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Political Dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE MEDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Political Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Participation in ASEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Relations with Neighboring Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Relations with East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Relations with the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY, CONTRIBUTING TO 

GLOBAL PEACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 5. National Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

John B. Haseman 

HISTORICAL CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Independence and the Sukarno Period, 1945–65. . . . . 

Suharto’s New Order, 1966–98. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

POST-SUHARTO REFORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

East Timor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Separatist Rebellions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Ethnic and Religious Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL LIFE . . . . . . . . . 

Political and Administrative Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Participation in the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Total People’s Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense Spending and the Defense Industry. . . . . . . . 

Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE 
 

ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Administrative and Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . 

Military Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Branches of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conditions of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Women in the Armed Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES . . . . . . . 
 

THE NATIONAL POLICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Crime and Political Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Criminal Law and Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Administration of Criminal Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Penal System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Narcotics and Counternarcotics Operations . . . . . . . . . . 

NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
 

ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Published Country Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Indonesia, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . x

2 Sumatra and Java from the Seventh Century to the 
 

Eleventh Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 The Eastern Archipelago in the Seventeenth and 
 

Eighteenth Centuries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 Dutch Expansion in Java, 1619–1830 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 Sulawesi in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. . . . 

6 Topography and Drainage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7 Age-Sex Ratio, 2009, and Projected Ratio, 2029 . . . . . . . 

8 Major Crop Production, 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9 Selected Industrial Activity, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10 Major Transportation Facilities, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

11 Structure of the Government, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

12 Organization of the Department of Defense, 2009. . . . . . 

13 Organization of the Armed Forces, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

14 Army Territorial Structure, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

15 Navy Fleet Commands, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

16 Air Force Operations Commands, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

17 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

18 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

xii 
 

 

P

This edition of Indonesia: A Country Study replaces the 

edition, published in 1993. Like its predecessor, this study at

review the history and treat in a concise manner the domina

political, economic, and military aspects of contemporary In

Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, fo

domestic newspapers, official reports of governments and 

tional organizations, and numerous periodicals and Web sites 

nesian and Southeast Asian affairs. 

To avoid confusion over the spelling and pronunciation of In

names and terms, the so-called new spelling (ejaan yang dis

kan—EYD—perfected spelling) of 1972, which replaced an e

tem based in part on pre–World War II Dutch spellings, has b

throughout, even when it differs from the personal preference of 

als. The usage and alphabetization of Indonesian names may 

problems for those familiar with Indonesian cultures as well as t

ences of individuals and fashions of any given period. The proc

lowed in this volume is to alphabetize according to the last na

individual when two or more names exist. Thus, works by the 

Sartono Kartodirjo are listed under “Kartodirjo, Sartono.” The m

ure Sarwo Edhie Wibowo is alphabetized under “Wibowo.” Th

dure is at odds with some earlier Indonesian practices, but i

advantage of being easily understood internationally and is 

more common in Indonesia itself. Some individuals are generall

to using the first element(s) of their name—such as “Sarwo Edh

than Wibowo—and others by the last element, such as Ibnu Sut

is referred to as “Sutowo” or “Colonel Sutowo” or “Colonel Ibnu 

but not as “Ibnu.” Some individuals, such as former presidents 

and Suharto, used only one name, and former president Megaw

noputri is always referred to as Megawati and not Sukarnoputri, w

contrived surname. Thus, the late President Abdurrahman 

referred to as President Wahid and President Susilo Bambang Yu

as President Yudhoyono. In this regard, this book follows the 

observed in contemporary Indonesian discourse and print medi

these themselves are, in a few instances, inconsistent. Some Islam

familiar to readers in transliteration from Arabic are spelled here i

eration according to EYD. 

The spelling of contemporary place-names conforms in mos

the system approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Name
spellings of some names, however, cannot be verified, as the BGN 

notes. Indonesian spellings are given for all modern province n

such as Jawa Tengah (Central Java). Similarly, the names Sum

Utara (North Sumatra) and Papua Barat (West Papua) are used to r

provinces on the islands of Sumatra and Papua, respectively. Co

tional spellings of names referring more generally to portions of Ja

example, are given in lower case and the form “eastern Java,” “so

Sumatra,” and so on. 

Because of the widespread use of acronyms and contractio

Indonesia, the ones used in this edition are listed in a table along 

an English translation at the front of the book (see table A). A ch

ogy of major historical events also is provided (see table B). Me

ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provi

assist readers wanting to convert metric measurements (see table 

Readers are encouraged to consult the chapter bibliographies 

end of the book, which include a number of general and specia

primarily English-language-source bibliographies that will lead 

ers to further resources on Indonesia. Also, brief comments on 

of the more valuable and enduring sources recommended for f

reading appear at the end of each chapter. A glossary also is incl

The body of the text reflects information available as of July 

Certain other parts of the text, however, have been updated: the 

nology and Introduction discuss significant events that have occ

since the completion of research, and the Country Profile and po

of some chapters include updated information as available. Indo

completed its decennial census in May 2010, but the full results 

not available for inclusion in the main text of this book. 

xiv 
 

Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions 

Acronym or Full Name Contraction 

ABRI	 Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic o

used from 1962 to 1999 and included the National Police; thereafter TNI (q

used. 

AEC	 ASEAN (q.v.) Economic Community 

AFTA	 ASEAN (q.v.) Free Trade Area 

AIDS	 acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

AJI	 Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists) 

Akmil	 Akademi Militer (Military Academy) 

Apodeti	 Associação Popular Democrática Timorense (Timorese Popular Democrat

tion) 

APRI	 Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of In

successor to APRIS (q.v.) in August 1950, used until 1962; APRI was iden

(q.v.), which was the more commonly used term. 

APRIS	 Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat (Armed Forces of the Federa

Indonesia [RIS, q.v.]); used in 1949 and early 1950, when APRIS merged 

(q.v.). 

ARF	 ASEAN (q.v.) Regional Forum 

ASA	 Aksi Stop AIDS (Stop AIDS [q.v.] Action) 

ASEAN	 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see Glossary) 

ASNLF	 Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front 

Babinsa	 Bintara Desa (village NCO, q.v.) 

Bais	 Badan Intelijens Stratejis (Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Body) 

Bakin	 Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Coordinating 

BAN–PT	 Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi (National Accreditation Age

Higher Education) 

Bappenas	 Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Plann

Bareskrim	 Badan Reserse Kriminal (Crime Investigation Agency); also see Kabaresk

Bimas	 Bimbingan Massal (Mass Guidance System) 

BIN	 Badan Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Agency) 

BKKBN	 Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (National Family Plannin

ing Agency) 

BKPM	 Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (Capital Investment Coordinating B

BKR	 Badam Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Forces); used August 22–Oc

1945, when it was succeeded by the TKR (q.v.). 

BPK	 Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (Finance Audit Board) 

BPPN	 Badan Penyehatan Perbanken Nasional (Indonesian Bank Restructuring A

abbreviated as IBRA, q.v.) 

BPPT	 Badan Pusat Pengembangan Teknologi (Agency for the Study and Applica

nology) 

BPS	 Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Statistical Office; also referred to as Centra

Statistics and Statistics Indonesia) 

BPTRI	 Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Institu

Education) 

BPUPK	 Badan Penyelidik Usaha–Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Commission to 

Preparatory Measures for Independence) 
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued

Acronym or Full Name Contraction 

BRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Bank) 

BRR Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agen

Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik (National Logistical Supply Organization) 

Caltex California Texas Oil Company 

CEMEX formerly Cementos Mexicanos 

CGI Consultative Group on Indonesia 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) 

CMI Crisis Management Initiative 

COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 

DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik (Democratic Republic of Germany—or Eas

Germany) 

Depdiknas Departmen Pendidikan Nasional (Department of National Education) 

Dephan Departmen Pertahanan (Department of Defense; since 1999) 

DPD Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council) 

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council) 

DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People’s Representative Council) 

EU European Union 

EYD ejaan yang disempurnakan (perfected, or new, spelling of Bahasa Indonesia lan

adopted in 1972) 

FDI foreign direct investment 

FMF Foreign Military Financing (U.S.) 

FMS Foreign Military Sales (U.S.) 

FNC Fabrique Nationale Carabine (National Factory Carbine, a carbine made by Fa

Nationale de Herstel, Belgium) 

FPI Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders’ Front) 

FSPSI Federation Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesian Workers’ Union 

tion) 

Fretilin Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for 

pendent East Timor—see Glossary) 

FY fiscal year (see Glossary) 

GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) 

GDP gross domestic product (see Glossary) 

Gerindra Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Movement, as in Partai Gerindra or G

Party) 

Gestapu Gerakan September Tiga Puluh (September 30 Movement, also G30S) 

GMT Greenwich Mean Time 

Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups—see Glossary) 

GPK Gerakan Pengacauan Keamanan (Security Disturbance Movement) 

Hankam Departmen Pertahanan dan Keamanan (Department of Defense and Security; p

1999) 

Hankamrata Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Total (Total People’s Defense) 

Hanura Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Conscience Party, as in Partai Hanura or Hanura 

HIS Hollands–Inlandsche School (Dutch–Native Schools) 

xvi 
 

Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Contin

Acronym or 

Contraction Full Name 

HIV human immunodeficiency virus 

HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic University Student Association) 

IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negara (State Institute for Islamic Religion) 

IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (also BPPN, q.v.) 

ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ 

IGGI Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 

ILO International Labour Organisation 

IMET International Military Education and Training (U.S.) 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

Indra Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (Badan Restrukturalisasi Utang Lu

Perusahaan Indonesia, which in full translates as Agency for Structuring t

Debt of Indonesian Industries) 

INTERFET International Force in East Timor 

Interpol International Criminal Police Organization 

IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of the Supporters of I

Independence) 

IPTN Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (Archipelago Aircraft Industry) 

ISDV Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (Indies Social-Democratic A

IVS Indonesische Verbond van Studerenden (Indonesian Student Association ) 

Jabodetabek Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi 

Jabotabek Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi 

JIL Jaringan Islam Liberal (Network for Liberal Islam) 

Kabareskrim Kepala Badan Reserse Kriminal (head of Crime Investigation Agency); al

Bareskrim 

Kasum Kepala Staff Umum (Chief of the General Staff) 

KNIL Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) 

KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National Committee) 

Kodam Komando Daerah Militer (Military Regional Command) 

Kodim Komando Distrik Militer (Military District Command) 

Kohanudnas Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional (National Air Defense Command) 

Komnas Komite Nasional Pengendalian Flu Burung Kesiapsiagaan Menghadapi Pa

FBPI enza (National Committee for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Infl

paredness) 

Ko–Op Komando Operasi (Operations Command) 

Kopassandha Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha (Army Special Forces Command); also s

Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces Command) 

Kopkamtib Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Com

the Restoration of Security and Order) 

Koramil Komando Rayon Militer (Military Subdistrict Command) 

Korem Komando Resor Militer (Military Resort, or Garrison, Command) 

Kostrad Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve C

KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission) 
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued

Acronym or 

Contraction Full Name 

KPPU Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (Commission for the Oversight of Busine

petition) 

KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Commission) 

LatGap Latihan Gabungan (Joint Exercise) 

Lemhanas Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional (National Resiliency Institute) 

LNG liquefied natural gas 

LSM lembaga swadaya masyarakat (nongovernmental organizations), also sometime

(q.v.) 

Lusi Lumpur Sidoarjo (Sidoarjo mud volcano) 

Manipol Manifes Politik (Political Manifesto) 

Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslim

MDMA methylenedioxymethamphetamine (Ecstasy) 

MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) 

MPR(S) Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Sementara) (Provisional People’s Consultat

Assembly) 

MRP Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Council) 

NAD Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (State of Aceh, Abode of Peace, a name used from 

2009) 

Nasakom Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme (Nationalism, Religion, Communism) 

NCO noncommissioned officer 

NGO nongovernmental organization; also see LSM and ornop 

NHM Nederlandsche Handel–Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Association) 

NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 

NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) 

NMDP national medium-term development plan 

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 

OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference 

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (see Glossary) 

OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization) 

ornop organisasi nonpemerintah (nongovernmental organizations); also sometimes L

(q.v.) 

OSVIA Opleidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (School for Training Native Gov

ment Officials) 

P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guide to Realizing and Exp

ing the Pancasila) 

PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 

panja panitia kerja (working committee) 

pansus panitia khusus (special committee) 

Panwaslu Panitia Pengawas Pemilu (Election Oversight Committee) 

Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party) 

Partindo Partai Indonesia (Indonesian Party) 

PasMar Pasukan Marinir (Marine Corps Group) 

xviii 
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Contin

Acronym or Full Name Contraction 

PBB	 Partai Bulan Bintang (Star and Moon Party); also used for Perserikata Ban

(United Nations) 

PBR	 Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party) 

PD	 Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party) 

PDI	 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party) 

PDI–P	 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan (Indonesian Democracy Party–St

PDP	 Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan (Democracy Renewal Party) 

PDS	 Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party) 

Pelni	 Perusahaan Layaran Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Shipping C

Permesta	 Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Universal Struggle); also Piagam Perjuangan S

Alam (Universal Struggle Charter) 

Pertamina	 Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (State Oil and N

Mining Company, but translated as State Oil Company by Pertamina itself

Perti	 Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Educational Movement) 

Peta	 Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland) 

Petrus	 penembakan misterius (mysterious shootings) or pembunuhan misterius (m

killings)—Both terms have been used in the Indonesian press. 

PID	 Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst (Political Intelligence Service) 

PIR	 Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (Nucleus People’s Estate) 

PK	 Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) 

PKB	 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) 

PKH	 Perserikatan Komunis di Hindia (Communist Association of the Indies) 

PKI	 Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party; see Glossary) 

PKPI	 Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Pa

PKS	 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) 

PLN	 Perusahaan Listrik Nasional (National Electric Company) 

PMI	 Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Muslim Party of Indonesia) 

PNI	 Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) 

PNI–M	 Partai Nasional Indonesia–Marhaenisme (Indonesian Nationalist Party–M

Polda	 Polisi Daerah (Regional Police) 

Polri	 Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (National Police of Indonesia) 

PP	 Partai Pelopor (Pioneer Party) 

PPKI	 Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Indonesian Independence Prep

Committee) 

PPP	 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity Party) 

PRD	 Partai Rakyat Demokratik (Democratic People’s Party) 

PRRI	 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Governmen

Republic of Indonesia) 

PSII	 Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia) 

pungli	 pungutan liar (illegal levies, that is, kickbacks) 

Putera	 Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Center of the People’s Power) 

RCTI	 Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (Hawk Television Indonesia) 
 

Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued

Acronym or 

Contraction Full Name 

Repelita Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (five-year economic development plan; se

sary) 

RIS Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia) 

RMS Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Maluku) 

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (U.S.) 

Rp rupiah (see Glossary) 

Satelindo Satelit Palapa Indonesia 

SBI Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia Certificate) 

SBSI Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Indonesian Prosperous Workers’ Union) 

SBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 

SCTV Surya Citra Televisi (Sun Television) 

Sesko TNI Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI (TNI [q.v.] Command and Staff College) 

SIJORI Singapore, Johor, and Riau 

SIRA Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (Aceh Referendum Information Center) 

SPSI Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesian Workers’ Union) 

Stanvac Standard-Vacuum Oil Company 

STOVIA School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (School for Training Indigenous D

Supersemar Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Letter of Instruction of March 11) 

TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 

TII Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army of Indonesia) 

Timtas Tim Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Coordinating Team for Eliminatin

Tipikor Crimes of Corruption) 

Tipikor Court Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Corruption Crimes Court) 

TKR Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Army); used as of October 5, 194

successor to BKR (q.v.); also Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat (People’s Security A

of January 1, 1946. 

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army); from 1947 to 1962 an

starting in April 1999 but now usually translated as Indonesian National Armed 

also see ABRI, APRI, and APRIS. 

TNI–AD Tentara Nasional Indonesia–Angkatan Darat (Army of the Republic of Indones

TNI–AL Tentara Nasional Indonesia–Angkatan Laut (Navy of the Republic of Indonesi

TNI–AU Tentara Nasional Indonesia–Angkatan Udara (Air Force of the Republic of Ind

TPI Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (Indonesian Educational Television) 

TPN Timor Putra Nasional (National Son Timor) 

TRI Tentara Republik Indonesia (National Army of the Republic of Indonesia); use

January 24, 1946, as successor to TKR (q.v.). 

TVRI Televisi Republik Indonesia (Television of the Republic of Indonesia) 

UIN Universitas Islam Negara (State Muslim University) 

UN United Nations 

UNDP United Nations Development Programme 

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 

xx 
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Contin

Acronym or Full Name Contraction 

UNTAET	 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 

USDEK	 Undang–undang Dasar ‘45, Socialisme à la Indonesia, Demokrasi Perpimp

Terpimpin, Kepribadian Indonesia (1945 Constitution, Indonesian Sociali

Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity, usually paired wit

[q.v.] to read Manipol–USDEK) 

USINDO	 United States–Indonesia Society 

UVI	 Universiteit van Indonesië (University of Indonesia; later changed to Univ

nesia [University of Indonesia]) 

VAT	 value-added tax 

VCI	 Véhicule de Combat d’Infanterie (Combat Infantry Vehicle [France]) 

VOC	 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (United East Indies Company) 

YKP	 Yayasan Kesehatan Perempuan (Foundation for Women’s Health) 

ZOPFAN	 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 

 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events 

By ca. 1.8 million B.C.
 

By ca. 600,000 B.C.
 

Ca. 40,000 B.C.
 

Ca. 3,000 B.C.
 

Beginning ca. 400 B.C.
 

Ca. A.D. 375
 

Mid-sixth century 

Ca. 732 

Ca. 770–820 

Ca. 820–50 

929–1292 

1211 

1294 

Mid-14th century 

1364 

1405–33 

1511 

1527 

1595–1601 

1602 

1607–36 

1610–80 

1613–46 

1619–21 

1704–55 

1723 

1755 

1799–1800 

1808–16 

1816 

1821–37 

Homo erectus, an early hominid, living in Java.
 

Fairly sophisticated hominid cultures scattered throughout t

ago.
 

Earliest verifiable modern human (Homo sapiens) remains (

and Java).
 

Austronesians begin voyaging from the Philippines into Ind

archipelago.
 

Development of regional trade linking present-day China, V

India, the Mediterranean, and other points to the archipelago

Kutai (eastern Kalimantan) and Taruma (Java) rise as Indian

kingdoms.
 

Kingdom of Srivijaya rises in southern Sumatra, in later cen

spreads to western Java and the Malay Peninsula.
 

Rise of Mataram (central Java) under Sanjaya.
 

Construction of the Buddhist temple Borobudur (central Jav

Construction of the Hindu temple complex at Prambanan (c

Rise of Mataram in eastern Java, followed by Kediri and Sin

conflict with Bali and Srivijaya.
 

Death of Sultan Sulaiman of Lamreh, northern Sumatra, firs

Muslim ruler in the archipelago.
 

Rise of Majapahit (eastern Java) in wake of Mongol incursi

Golden age of expanded Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit kingdom 

Hayam Wuruk (Rajasanagara, r. 1350–89) and Prime Minis

Mada (in office 1331–64).
 

Gajah Mada dies; architect of an expanded Majapahit empire 

much of archipelago.
 

Seven Chinese maritime expeditions led by Zheng He, some 

land in Java, Sumatra, and points as distant as East Africa.
 

Portuguese occupy Melaka, on Malay Peninsula, and arrive 

in Ternate, Maluku, where they build a fort in 1522.
 

Final days of Majapahit as the small Muslim port state of De

Majapahit capital at Kediri, eastern Java.
 

First Dutch ships in archipelago.
 

United East Indies Company (VOC—see table A) establishe

Rule of Iskandar Muda, sultanate of Aceh, northern Sumatr

VOC gradually extends dominance over eastern archipelago

ple in Ternate, Hitu, and southern Sulawesi.
 

Sultan Agung rules in an expanding Mataram, central Java.
 

VOC establishes control over Jayakerta (present-day Jakarta

Javanese wars of succession, in which the VOC becomes em

Coffee becomes a VOC monopoly in a forced-delivery syste

gan, western Java.
 

Treaty of Giyanti (Java).
 

VOC charter lapses following bankruptcy; holdings taken o

erlands state.
 

Rule of Java and other Dutch territories in the archipelago b

(under Herman Willem Daendals, 1808–11) and British (un

Stamford Raffles, 1811–16).
 

Dutch control of Java and other territories reestablished.
 

Padri Wars in Minangkabau region of western Sumatra.
 
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 

1824 

1825–30 

1830 

1870 

1873 

1873–1903 

1890 

1901 

1902 

1907 

1908 

1909 

1911 

1912 

1914 

1926 

July 1927 

February 1933 

July 1936 

March 1942 

October 1943 

September 1944 

June 1, 1945 

August 15, 1945 

August 17, 1945 

August 18, 1945 

September 29, 1945 

November 10, 1945 

November 12, 1946 

July 21, 1947 

January 19, 1948 

Anglo–Dutch treaty recognizes spheres of influence in Malay Pe

and Sumatra, respectively.
 

Java War; last Javanese aristocratic resistance to Dutch rule; Prin

Diponegoro central figure.
 

Introduction of the Cultivation System by Johannes van den Bos

Sugar Act and Agrarian Act enacted, end of the Cultivation Syst

First state-sponsored railroad in archipelago, central Java.
 

Aceh War.
 

Royal Dutch Company for Exploration of Petroleum Sources in 

Netherlands Indies established.
 

Ethical Policy inaugurated.
 

Inauguration of Transmigration Program, in which Javanese mov

Outer Islands (see Glossary).
 

Royal Dutch Shell established through merger of Dutch and Brit

companies.
 

First modern political organization—Budi Utomo (Noble Endeav

established.
 

Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association) founded in Sur

central Java; becomes Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) in 191

Indies Party (Indische Partij) founded.
 

Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad) established in Yogy

Indies Social-Democratic Association (ISDV) founded, forerunn

the Communist Association of the Indies (PKH, 1920) and Indon

Communist Party (PKI, 1924).
 

Nahdlatul Ulama (literally, revival of the religious teachers, som

referred to as Council of Scholars) founded in eastern Java.
 

Sukarno and others establish the Indonesian Nationalist Union (P

western Java; becomes Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in 192

Mutiny on Dutch warship De Zeven Provinciën begins a period o

greater political pressure.
 

Sutarjo Petition, calling for a conference on the possibility of Ind

autonomy within the constitution of the Netherlands, accepted by 

raad, later rejected by Dutch government.
 

Dutch surrender control of Indies to Japanese military forces, Ka

western Java.
 

Beginning of Peta (Java) and Giyugun (Sumatra), Japanese-desig

defense force.
 

Japan promises independence.
 

Sukarno announces the Pancasila (see Glossary).
 

Japan surrenders.
 

Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaim independent Republic o

nesia.
 

Constitution promulgated.
 

First Allied troops (British and British Indian) land at Jakarta.
 

Battle of Surabaya, eastern Java.
 

Linggajati Agreement initialed; recognizes Republican rule on Ja

Sumatra and the Netherlands–Indonesian Union under the Dutch 

Indonesia ratifies May 25, 1947.
 

First Dutch “police action” begins (ends August 4, 1947).
 

Renville Agreement signed.
 

xxiv 
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued

September 18, 1948 

December 19, 1948 

January 1949 

August 23–November 2, 

1949 

December 27, 1949 

January–April 1950 

August 17, 1950 

April 18–24, 1955 

September 29, 1955 

May 8, 1956 

December 1, 1956 

February 21, 1957 

March 14, 1957 

December 1957 

February–May 1958 

July 5, 1959 

August 17, 1959 

March 1960 

May 1963 

September 23, 1963 

October 1964 

January 1, 1965 

September 30– October 1, 

1965 

October 1965–March 1966 

March 11, 1966 

March 12, 1966 

August 11, 1966 

September 23, 1966 

March 12, 1967 

August 8, 1967 

October 1967 

March 27, 1968 

Madiun Affair erupts in eastern Java, pitching the PKI again

Republic.
 

Second Dutch “police action” begins (ends January 5, 1949

United Nations (UN) Security Council demands reinstateme

Republican rule.
 

Round Table Conference held at The Hague prepares for for

of sovereignty.
 

Dutch recognize sovereignty of Federal Republic of Indone

Separatist revolts begin in western Java and Maluku Islands

RIS and other states form new unitary Republic of Indonesi

amendment to RIS constitution; Sukarno confirmed as presi

Asia–Africa Conference held in Bandung, Jawa Barat Provi

First national elections.
 

Indonesia leaves Netherlands–Indonesian Union.
 

Hatta resigns as vice president in protest against Sukarno’s g

authoritarianism; office remains vacant until 1973.
 

Sukarno proposes Guided Democracy concept.
 

Sukarno declares martial law.
 

Dutch nationals expelled; private companies nationalized; a

take greater role in economic affairs.
 

Anti-Sukarno revolts in Sumatra and Sulawesi; Sukarno acc

States of complicity.
 

1945 constitution restored.
 

Political Manifesto (Manipol) announced, gives ideological 

Guided Democracy.
 

New legislature organized with control given to functional g

including the military; PKI emerges stronger.
 

Indonesian authority established in West New Guinea (renam

Barat).
 

Sukarno issues statements threatening independence of new 

Malaysia; three-year Confrontation (see Glossary) begins.
 

Golongan Karya (Golkar—see Glossary) formed by army le

Sukarno withdraws Indonesia from the UN.
 

Abortive, communist-inspired coup launched.
 

Decline of Sukarno, rise of Suharto; Guided Democracy ecl

killings of PKI members and suspected affiliates; tens of tho

jailed.
 

Sukarno transfers authority to Suharto (Supersemar—see G

marks rise of New Order.
 

PKI formally banned.
 

Confrontation with Malaysia ends.
 

Indonesia rejoins UN.
 

Suharto appointed acting president by Provisional People’s C

Assembly (MPR(S)); New Order era officially acknowledge

with China “frozen.”
 

Indonesia joins four other countries in founding new Associ

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary).
 

Demonstrators attack Chinese Embassy in Jakarta, diplomat

severed.
 

Suharto elected president by MPR(S).
 
 

 

 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 

September 1969 

July 3, 1971 

January 1973 

March 12, 1973 

January 15, 1974 

December 7, 1975 

July 15, 1976 

May 2, 1977 

March 22, 1978 

May 5, 1980 

May 4, 1982 

March 11, 1983 

April 1983 

April 23, 1987 

March 10, 1988 

July 1990–October 1991 

August 8, 1990 

November 12, 1991 

March 1992 

June 9, 1992 

September 1992 

March 10, 1993 

June 21, 1994 

December 18, 1995 

July 27, 1996 

May 29, 1997 

October 27, 1997 

March 3, 1998 

March 21, 1998 

Irian Barat (Indonesian New Guinea) becomes Indonesia’s twent

province following Act of Free Choice among tribal leaders; nam

changed to Irian Jaya in 1972; in 2001 renamed Papua, and in 20

divided into three separate provinces (only two of which had bee

lished as of 2010).
 

Golkar wins majority of popular vote in second general elections

Development Unity Party (PPP) and Indonesian Democracy Party 

formed.
 

Suharto reelected to second term as president, and Hamengkubuw

IX elected vice president by People’s Consultative Assembly (M

Malari Affair, Jakarta.
 

Indonesian armed forces invade East Timor.
 

East Timor becomes Timor Timur, Indonesia’s twenty-seventh pr

Third general elections; Golkar majority confirmed.
 

Suharto reelected to third term as president, Adam Malik elected 

president by MPR.
 

Petition of 50 accuses Suharto of one-man, antidemocratic rule; g

suppressed.
 

Fourth general elections; Golkar majority maintained.
 

Suharto reelected to fourth term as president, Umar Wirahadikus

elected vice president, by MPR.
 

Beginning of anonymous “mysterious killings” (petrus) of crimin

others in many large cities, especially on Java.
 

Fifth general elections; Golkar majority increases.
 

Suharto reelected to fifth term as president, Sudharmono elected 

president, by MPR.
 

Paris International Conference on Cambodia, co-chaired by Indo

and France, features Jakarta's role as peacemaker in Cambodia.
 

Indonesia and China reestablish diplomatic relations.
 

Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) troops fire o

funeral at Santa Cruz Cemetery, Dili, East Timur, killing 50–250

Dutch-chaired Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI—

Glossary) disbanded at Indonesia’s insistence, replaced with Con

tive Group on Indonesia (CGI—see Glossary) without Dutch par

tion.
 

Sixth general elections confirm Golkar majority.
 

Indonesia assumes chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement d

Jakarta Summit.
 

Suharto reelected to sixth term as president, General Try Sutrisno 

elected as vice president, by MPR.
 

Governments bans Tempo and other prominent news magazines.
 

Indonesia and Australia sign security cooperation agreement.
 

Government closes ousted opposition leader Megawati Sukarnop

PDI headquarters in Jakarta; widespread rioting, looting, and ars

ensue in capital and later spread across Java and elsewhere.
 

Seventh general elections confirm Golkar majority.
 

Amidst stock market panic, Indonesia–International Monetary Fu

(IMF) agreement leads to closure of 16 Indonesian banks and res

of credit.
 

Economic crisis deepens as foreign reserves dramatically shrink.

Suharto reelected to seventh term as president, Bacharuddin J. (B

Habibie elected as vice president, by MPR.
 

xxvi 
 

 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued

May 12–14, 1998 

May 21, 1998 

January 28, 1999 

June 7, 1999 

August 30, 1999 

September 16, 1999 

October 20, 1999 

February 1, 2001 

July 23, 2001 

May 20, 2002 

August 3, 2002 

October 12, 2002 

August 5, 2003 

April 5, 2004 

July 5, 2004 

September 9, 2004 

September 20, 2004 

October 20, 2004 

December 26, 2004 

March 28, 2005 

October 1, 2005 

November 13, 2006 

September 6, 2007 

December 3–14, 2007 

January 27, 2008 

July 8, 2009 

Following shooting of Trisakti University students by secur

rioting in Jakarta leads to mob-led destruction in Chinese In

community, closure of foreign embassies, and more than 1,0

Suharto resigns from presidency; succeeded by Vice Preside

Habibie. 

People’s Representative Council (DPR) approves major cha

tion laws, sets scene for June 7 national legislative elections

First democratic parliamentary elections since 1955 held; M

PDI–P wins 34 percent, Golkar 22 percent. 

78.5 percent of Timor Timur voters in UN-supervised refere

broad autonomy from Indonesia, allowing province to becom

dent. 

Indonesia abrogates 1995 security cooperation agreement wi

over latter’s involvement in East Timor. 

Abdurrahman Wahid elected to presidency and Megawati S

to vice presidency by MPR. 

Wahid censured by DPR for involvement in financial scanda

again April 30. 

Wahid resigns amidst MPR impeachment proceedings; Meg

in as fifth president. 

Timor Timur Province (East Timor) becomes independent n

Timor-Leste. 

MPR amends constitution to allow direct election of preside

president; provides for new legislative body, the Regional R

tive Council (DPD). 

202 die, more than 300 injured in terrorist bombings in Kuta 

trict in Bali. 

14 killed, 149 injured in terrorist car bombing at JW Marrio

Jakarta. 

Elections held for DPD, DPR, and representatives for all pro

regency, and municipality-level legislatures; Golkar wins 21 

PDI–P 18 percent. 

Initial round of Indonesia’s first direct popular election for p

vice president held; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins 33 pe

votes to Megawati’s 26 percent. 

Terrorist suicide car bombing at Australian Embassy in Jaka

wounds 180. 

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono receives 60.9 percent of popul

presidential runoff election. 

Yudhoyono sworn in as sixth president of Indonesia, Muham

Kalla sworn in as vice president. 

Tsunamis devastate coastal areas throughout the Indian Oce

166,561 persons and displacing 203,817 in northern and wes

areas of Sumatra. 

Earthquake strikes Nias and other nearby islands, Sumatera 

ince, killing 1,300 and displacing 40,000. 

26 die, 129 injured by suicide attacks in Jimbara and Kuta, B

Indonesia and Australia sign security agreements. 

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin signs arms agreement wit

Bambang Yudhoyono while visiting Jakarta. 

UN Climate Change Conference held in Bali. 

Former President Suharto dies in Jakarta hospital. 

Yudhoyono reelected for second term as president with 60.8 

the first-round vote. 
 

Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued) 

July 17, 2009	 Two suicide bombers kill 7, injure 53 at Ritz-Carlton and JW Ma

hotels in Jakarta. 

September 30, 2009	 7.6-magnitude earthquake strikes Padang, Sumatera Barat Provin

December 30, 2009	 Former President Wahid dies in Jakarta hospital. 

May 2010	 Indonesia conducts national census. 

August 2010	 According to preliminary census data, population of Jakarta calc

at 9.58 million or nearly 4 percent of the national population of 2

million, surpassing all forecasts. Authorities discuss eventually m

government to new satellite town. 

October–November 2010	 Eruptions of Mount Merapi, Jawa Tengah Province, kill more tha

and displace more than 135,000. Underwater earthquake of 7.7 m

tude and tsunami near Mentawai Islands, Sumatera Barat Provin

more than 300 and displace 16,000. 

April 15, 2011	 Suicide bombing of a mosque inside a police compound in Cireb

Jawa Tengah, during Friday prayers. 

July 2011	 Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations—Nahdlatul Ulama 

Muhammadiyah—with combined memberships of 110 million, p

cally condemn Islamic radicalism and use of violence. 

August 2011	 Following August 2 rallies in Jayapura, Papua Province, and oth

tions, condemning 1969 Act of Free Choice and calling for refer

on independence from Indonesia, Free Papua Organization (OPM

attacks Indonesian armed forces troops. 

xxviii 
Table C. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factor

When you know Multiply by To find 

Millimeters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.04 inches 

Centimeters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 inches 

Meters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 feet 

Kilometers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.62 miles 

Hectares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.98 long tons

 1.1 short tons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2,204 pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 degrees Fahr

and add 32 

Country P

1,000 

2,000 

3,000 Na

Jakarta 

ASIA 

Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia; 

Indonesia was coined from the Greek indos—for India—and 

for island). 

Short Form: Indonesia. 

Term for Citizen(s): Indonesian(s). 

Capital: Jakarta 

Date of Independence: Proclaimed August 17, 1945, from t

erlands. The Hague recognized Indonesian sovereignty on D

27, 1949. 
 

Geography 

Size: Total area 1,904,569 square kilometers, of which land a

1,811,569 square kilometers and water area 93,000 square kilom

Indonesia claims total sea area of 7.9 million square kilom

including an exclusive economic zone. 

Topography: Largest archipelagic nation in world, Indonesia en

passes 17,508 islands, five main islands, two major archipelagoe

about 60 smaller archipelagoes. Larger islands are mountainous

some peaks reaching 3,800 meters above sea level on western i

and more than 5,000 meters on Papua. Highest point is Puncak 

(5,030 meters) on Papua. The region is tectonically unstable, with 

400 volcanoes, 100 of which are active. 

Climate: Maritime equatorial climate with high, even temper

and heavy rainfall; temperatures and rainfall vary across the arc

ago because of elevation and monsoon patterns. Average temper

at or near sea level range from about 23° C to 31° C. 

Society 

Population: 245,613,043 estimated by U.S. government in July 

(237.6 million according to preliminary 2010 census figures relea

August 2010); annual growth rate of 1.1 percent. In 2011 birthrat

mated at 18.1 births per 1,000, death rate 6.2 per 1,000, sex ra

birth 1.05 males to each female. Approximately 52 percent of p

tion living in urban areas, about 4 percent in Jakarta. Average p

tion density 135 per square kilometer, with wide regional variatio

Ethnic Groups: About 350 recognized ethnolinguistic groups

located in Papua; 13 languages have more than 1 million spe

Javanese 41 percent of population, Sundanese 15 percent, c

Malays 3.4 percent, Madurese 3.3 percent, and others 37.3 percen

Languages: Official national language Bahasa Indonesia (or In

sian), a modified form of Malay, with estimated 17 million to 30 m

mother-tongue speakers and more than 140 million second-lan

speakers or readers. At least 731 other languages and dialects als

ken, some by large numbers: Javanese (83 million), Sundanese (3

lion), Malay/Indonesian (17 million), and Madurese (nearly 6.7 mi

Other languages with more than 1 million speakers each are Ace

Balinese, Banjarese, Batak (including Toba), Batawi, Buginese, M

xxxii 
kabau, and Sasak; also various Chinese dialects. English widel

government and business circles. 

Religion: Indonesia largest Islamic population in world; per 2

sus most Indonesians (86.1 percent) Muslims (mostly Su

Glossary) and observe Islamic practices to varying degrees; an

percent Protestant, 3 percent Roman Catholic, 1.8 percent H

other, including Buddhist, and unspecified religions. Animi

ticed in some remote areas. 

Health: Life expectancy estimated in 2011 at 71.3 years ove

years for males, 73.9 for females). Infant mortality 27.9 p

Recent data unavailable, but figures estimate 0.1 physicians, 0

or midwives, and 0.6 hospital beds for every 1,000 inhabita

capita health expenditure in 2006 was 2.2 percent of gross 

product (GDP—see Glossary), lowest among members of As

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary). 

Education and Literacy: Twelve-year public and private pri

secondary education system; the first nine years mandatory

primary and secondary education, both private and public, 

63,444 kindergartens, 144,228 six-year primary schools, 28,7

secondary schools, 10,762 general senior secondary schools, a

vocational senior secondary schools, enrolling total of 45.4 m

dents taught by 2.9 million teachers. Special education schoo

physically and mentally disabled, numbered 1,686, with 73

dents and 18,047 teachers. Higher education offered in 2,975 

universities, and other tertiary institutions, with more than 4.

students. Adult literacy rate 90.4 percent in 2009. 

Economy 

Major Features: Following fast-paced growth during mo

New Order period (1966–98) and decline during and followi

98 Asian financial crisis, Indonesian economy characte

decade of reform aimed at the financial sector and corrupt p

and managers. Recent improvements in international trade, 

payments; in employment and income development; plus c

reorientation from agriculture to industry; and within the 

sector itself, from oil and gas production to other manu

branches. Services, transportation, and communication sector

greater contributions to economic growth. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 2010 estimated at US$1.0

 

lion; per-capita income based on GDP estimated in 2010 at US$

GDP by sector, based on 2010 U.S. Government estimates, agric

15.3 percent, industry 47.1 percent, and services 37.6 percent. 

Agriculture: Principal crops: cassava, cocoa, coconuts, coffee b

corn, palm oil, rice, rubber, tea, and tobacco. Livestock: buffalo, 

goats, horses, pigs, poultry, and sheep. Inland and marine fishing 

able sources of domestic protein and export. Forestry also impor

Industry and Manufacturing: Oil and gas, food production, te

automobiles and other transportation equipment, electrical appli

and chemical products. 

Natural Resources: Bauxite, coal, copper, gold, natural gas, n

petroleum, and tin. 

Exports: US$158.2 billion free on board estimated 2010. Major 

modities (in order of importance): oil and gas, electrical appli

plywood, textiles, rubber. Japan, China, United States, Sing

South Korea, India, and Malaysia largest trading partners. 

Imports: Totaled US$127.1 billion (cost, insurance, and freight

mated 2010. Major imports (in order of importance): machiner

equipment, chemicals, fuels, foodstuffs. Singapore, China, Japan, U

States, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand main trading partners

Exchange Rate: US$1=8,481.76 rupiah at the end of July 2011. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Prior to 2001, the fiscal year ran 

April 1 to March 31. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Inland and Coastal Waterways and Ports: 21,579 kilometers of 

gable rivers, canals, and inland waterways. Extensive interislan

coastal maritime routes. Total 379 ports and harbors: deep-sea p

Tanjung Priok (Jakarta), Tanjung Perak (Surabaya, Jawa Timur 

ince), Belawan (Medan, Sumatera Utara Province), and Ma

(Sulawesi Selatan Province); other major ports at Cilacap, Cirebo

Semarang (all on Java), Dumai (Riau), Balikpapan (Kalimantan T

Kupang (Nusa Tenggara Timur Province), and Palembang (Sum

Selatan Province); 127 ports capable of handling international ship

xxxiv 
 

 

Roads: In 2008 total road network estimated at 437,760 ki

59 percent paved, about 32 percent classified as highways. 

Railroads: In 2010 some 5,042 kilometers railroad track, al

ment owned and operated; about 75 percent of railroad track l

Java, a minimal portion electrified. In 2007 some 175 millio

gers carried, 17.3 million tons of freight transported in 2005. 

Civil Aviation: 684 airports, 171 of which had paved runway

heliports in 2010. In 2004 more than 263 million kilomete

26.7 million passengers carried (increased to 31 million in 20

2.9 trillion tons-kilometers transported. State-owned dom

international carrier Garuda Indonesia; subsidiary, Merpati N

Airlines. Twenty-seven privately owned companies. 

Pipelines: In 2010 Indonesia had pipelines as follows: 12 k

oil/gas/water, 44 kilometers water, 73 kilometers condensate

kilometers condensate, 1,370 kilometers refined products, 5,

meters oil, and 7,165 kilometers gas. 

Telecommunications: Some 7,000 local and regional radio 

only 6 broadcast nationally; 11 national television channe

state-owned; 100 local television stations (2008). More than 2

Internet users (2009). 

Print Media: More than 50 principal daily newspapers p

throughout archipelago, majority in Java; largest readership 

(Jakarta), circulation of 523,000; largest English-language 

both published in Jakarta, Jakarta Post and Jakarta Globe, b

print runs of 40,000. 

Government and Politics 

Party and Government: Republic based on separation o

among executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Consti

1945 in force but amended in 1999–2002 to make once powerf

centered presidency subject to popular election and limited to 

year terms. President and vice president elected on single ticke

representing coalition of parties; winning ticket must gain mor

percent of popular vote in the first round of voting and at lea

cent of vote in half of provinces. If percentages not met, seco

runoff election held. President both chief of state and head o

ment. Legislative power vested in People’s Representative 

(DPR) and less-powerful upper house, Regional Representativ
(DPD). People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which formerly e

the president and vice president, now joint sitting of the DPR and 

but retains separate powers restricted to swearing in president an

president, amending constitution, and having final say in impeac

process. Newly decentralized power of subnational authoritie

shrined and delineated in amended constitution. Numerous politic

ties; Democrat Party (PD), Partai Golkar (Golkar Party), and Indo

Democracy Party–Struggle (PDI–P) gained largest number of 

seats in 2009 election. 

Administrative Divisions: Thirty-three provincial-level unit

provinces (propinsi), two special regions (daerah istimewa; Ace

Yogyakarta), and one special capital city region (daerah kh

Jakarta). Provinces subdivided into districts, called municip

(kota) in urban areas and regencies (kabupaten) in rural areas; 

are subdistricts (kecamatan), with village (desa) at lowest tier. In

sia in 2009 had 348 regencies, 91 municipalities, 5,263 subdis

and 66,979 villages. 

Judicial System: Complex system with three inherited sources o

customary or adat law, Islamic law (sharia), and Dutch colonia

Judicial branch independent and coequal with executive and legi

branches, with Supreme Court and Constitutional Court at apex o

cial system. Four different court systems below Supreme Court: 

of general civil and criminal jurisdiction, religious courts, state a

istrative courts, and military courts. 

Foreign Relations: Founding member of ASEAN in 1967, encou

regional solidarity among members while expanding relations 

other regional and global powers. Tenuous but slowly improving 

tions with immediate non-ASEAN neighbors (Papua New Guine

Timor-Leste) and working interdependencies with Malaysia and S

pore. Mutual suspicions color relations with Australia. Relation

China, once poor, warmer in recent years; trade important, as it 

with Japan and South Korea. Relations with United States warm 

trade important. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Na

Indonesia—TNI) had about 302,000 active-duty personnel in 

with army (TNI—Angkatan Darat), 233,000; navy (TNI—Ang

Laut), 45,000, of which 20,000 marines and 1,000 part of naval 

xxxvi 
tion; and air force (TNI—Angkatan Udara), 24,000, of whi

“quick-action” paratroopers. 

Military Budget: US$3.4 billion, just over 1 percent of b

2009. 

Military Units: Army—12 military regional commands (K

each with one or more battalions, one of which is quick-reac

talion; and two centrally controlled army strike force com

Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) with two divis

Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus), with three op

groups. Navy—two fleet commands (Eastern Fleet at Sura

Western Fleet at Jakarta), marine corps, air arm, and milita

command. Air Force—three operational commands (Ko-O

Ko-Op II/East, and National Air Defense Command) and tw

commands (Air Matériel Command and Air Training Comma

battalions of “quick-action” paratroopers. 

Military Equipment: Army—light tanks, armored reconn

vehicles, armored personnel carriers (APCs), towed and self-

artillery, air defense guns, surface-to-air missiles, fixed-wing 

helicopters. Navy—submarines, frigates, patrol and coastal 

ants, mine warfare ships, amphibious forces ships, non-c

fixed-wing aircraft, armed helicopters, transport helicopters

have light tanks, anti-infantry fighting vehicles, APCs, towed 

pieces, air defense guns. Air Force—combat aircraft, maritim

naissance aircraft, tankers, transports, trainers, helicopters. 

Auxiliary Forces: Many former official and unofficial par

forces disbanded or integrated with TNI since 1999. National 

Indonesia (Polri), since 1999 independent of TNI, numbered 

in 2009. 
Sunda Strait 

S

33 

32 

30 28 27 

26 

25

24 

23 

22 

21 

20 

5 

9 

8 7 

6 

4 

3 

2 

1 

10 

12 

13 14 

15 

17 

18 

19 

16 

11 

31 

29 

�

MALAYSIA 

BRUNEI 

SINGAPORE 

TIMOR-LESTE 

MALAYSIA 

PHILIPPINES 

AUSTRALIA 

PAPUA

NEW

GUINEA 

THAILAND 

SULAWESI 

MALUKU 

JAVA 

KALIMANTAN 

NEW GUINEA 

GREATER SUNDA ISLANDS 

NUSA TENGGARA

(Lesser Sunda Islands) 

SUMATRA 

BANGKA

BELITUNG 

MADURA 

SUMBAWA

SUMBA 

FLORES 

BURU 

ARUISLANDS

KAIISLANDS

TANIMBARISLANDS 

SERAM

HALMAHERA 

NATUNA

ISLANDS 

Java Sea 

South China Sea 

Sulawesi Sea 

Banda Sea

Timor Sea 

Makassar Strait 

Strait of Malacca 

Arafura Sea 

Pacific

Ocean 

Indian

Ocean 

Lombok Strait 

ape Strait 

1. Aceh Banda Aceh2. Sumatera Utara

Medan

3. Sumatera Barat Pedang 4. Riau

6. Jambi

Jambi

7. Bengkulu

Bengkulu

8. Sumatera Selatan Palembang9. Bangka-Belitung

11. Jakarta Raya Jakarta12. Banten

Serang

13. Jawa Barat

Bandung

14. Jawa Tengah

16. Jawa Timur Surabaya 17. Bali Denpasar18. Nusa Tenggara Barat

Mataram

19. Nusa Tenggara Timur

21. Kalimantan Tengah Palangkaraya22. Kalimantan Selatan

Banjarmasin

23. Kalimantan Timur

Samarinda

24. Sulawesi Barat

26. Sulawesi Tengah Palu27. Gorontalo Gorontalo28. Sulawesi Utara

Manado

29. Sulawesi Tenggara

31. Maluku

Ambon

32. Papua Barat

Manokwari

33. Papua Jayapura 

Provinces, special regions, and their capitals: 

200 400 Kilometers

400 Miles 200

0

0

Aceh and Yogyakarta are special regions.Jakarta Raya is a special capital city region. 

International boundaryProvince or special regionboundaryNational capitalProvince or special regioncapital 

�

Boundary representationnot necessarily authoritative

100 110 120 130 140 

100 110 120 130 140 

10

0 0

10

 

xxxviii
 
 

Introdu

ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 18, 2009, tens of millions o

sians settled in front of their televisions to watch three candida

mer Vice President and President Megawati Sukarnoputri, in

Vice President Muhammad Yusuf Kalla, and incumbent 

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—debate major issues prior to t

dential election to be held on July 8. By all accounts, the audi

largely disappointed. Megawati, daughter of Sukarno, the ofte

nationalist and fiery orator who was Indonesia’s first leader, 

the national challenges of getting motorcyclists to wear hel

government offices to issue identification cards in a timely 

Yusuf Kalla, whose background is in business, spoke about t

sity of setting goals and deadlines but mentioned no specifics 

ties. President Yudhoyono, a former army general, empha

need for the rule of law, lest Indonesia be compared unfav

countries with better legal systems, and he proposed more on

tems for identification cards and drivers’ licences so that 

could be checked and “people can see what is normal and wh

Many ordinary people who watched said they were simply bor

ing real clashes of opinion and discussion of large issues su

economy and human rights. Some, while not especially excite

the debates changed how they would vote, while others adm

as a result of watching the debates, they had decided to abs

voting altogether. 

The next day, however, popular columnist and media figu

Witular noted that while he agreed the debate had been “neith

ing nor exciting,” that was not the important point. “Eleven ye

he wrote, “it would have been a Star Trek–like fantasy [to th

presidential candidates would someday engage in an open d

national television.” However “boring” or overcautious, and d

failure of the candidates to engage each other on large and su

matters, it had been a historic event. In contrast to a politic

dominated by commanding, larger-than-life figures like Suk

Suharto, Indonesian political decisions were now in the ha

broad electorate, voting for presidential candidates who wer

ably “ordinary” people. This was an impressive step in the nati

ney from authoritarianism to democracy, and should not be for

It is not entirely clear whom Wimar Witular was intent on re

since his article appeared in Indonesia’s foremost English-
 

newspaper, The Jakarta Post, and the foreign community, cur

enough, has generally marveled over the changes of the past d

more than Indonesians themselves. Whatever the case, his poin

well taken. Since the late 1990s, Indonesia has shifted politically 

being the world’s largest military-dominated authoritarian state to 

the world’s third-largest civilian democracy (after India and the U

States) and the largest Muslim-majority democracy, holding the w

largest direct presidential elections. It has gone economically fro

heights of the “Asian miracle” of the 1960s to the 1990s to the dep

the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98—in which the national cu

lost as much as 70 percent of its value, and income per capita f

estimated 40 percent—and back, by mid-2009, to heights of gro

which it was deemed the best-performing Asian market for the ye

third-fastest-growing economy, placed by some analysts in the 

pany of the “emerging giants” of Brazil, China, India, and R

Administratively, Indonesia has moved from being one of the w

most centrally controlled regimes to being one of the most dece

ized. Finally, contrary to the expectations of many careful obse

both foreign and domestic, Indonesia has succeeded in the past d

in preserving the territorial state virtually intact against the consid

forces of separatist movements. The exception is East Timor—no

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste—acquired by force in 197

relinquished under pressure in 1999. Indonesia has also faced 

ethnic and religious violence, growing internationally influ

Islamic terrorism, tension over—and within—the armed services, 

series of natural disasters of which the most devastating was the 

tsunami that killed more than 166,500 Indonesians, mostly in the 

bled region of Aceh, in northern Sumatra. 

Trying to account for these enormous accomplishments h

some time occupied Indonesia watchers ranging from serious

demic specialists to commentators with varied and compara

casual interests in the country and its people, to say nothing of In

sians themselves. One result has been a wave of academic and jo

istic writing, much of it sharply divided ideologically and theoret

Indonesians from the political elite to ordinary citizens have 

plunged into a period of unprecedented—and unprecedentedly o

introspection, raising a vibrant public discourse. There is no broa

sensus, but the principal analyses tend to fall into four main type

The first takes a long-term view. According to this explanation, 

nesia’s dramatic shift to a successful democratic political proces

firms what some had argued all along: democracy began to take r

the years immediately following the National Revolution (1945–4

this natural, often disorderly development was nipped in the bud 

xl 
imposition of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957–65) and fu

pressed by Suharto’s military-backed New Order (1966–98). Pr

of this view dismiss arguments that newly independent Indon

the early 1950s were not “ready” for representative democrac

democracy along Western lines (what Sukarno called “free-fig

ism” and “50 percent + 1 democracy”) is somehow antithetic

Indonesia’s needs and its traditions. They also suggest that prev

ernments’ attempts to deal with the specter of ethnic and relig

flict by smothering the expression and discussion of differenc

than channeling and protecting them only made matters worse

of the New Order, and with it the fall from favor of the old pol

and the military, made possible what was in fact a kind of “ba

future” movement: returning to what began so promisingly n

generations earlier, and this time doing it right. Indonesia’s ach

since 1998, then, was as possible 40 years ago as it has now pro

A second explanation looks at matters from a mid-range 

tive, focusing on the previous 20 years or so. The success o

sia’s transformation thus appears due largely to the infl

internal dissidents and progressives—particularly educated yo

ple—during the last half of the New Order and the subseque

of reformasi (reform—see Glossary), coupled with pressure f

a general globalization and specific outside sources. Advoca

this combination of forces not only with weakening and e

bringing an end to Suharto’s rule, but also, even more impor

persisting during the subsequent period of upheaval in cham

and providing the ideas and manpower necessary for genuine

cratic reforms. Seen in this way, Indonesia’s post–New Order 

ment is to a very large degree a generational one, which, 

reformers are quick to point out, is very much in the tradition 

nesia’s original struggle for independence. 

A still shorter field of vision defines a third perspectiv

focuses for the most part on the past decade. This view emph

importance of the political and military leadership after the re

of Suharto in May 1998, arguing that without it Indonesia mig

have continued as previously, under the sway of an authoritari

Instead, as it happened, the individuals who followed the Ne

president had neither the inclination nor the opportunity to a

reassemble the strongman pattern. Military leaders made c

decisions to forego any thoughts of reinstating—by force 

means—the armed forces’ self-declared dual responsibilitie

governors and enforcers. However great a role the architects 

may have played, according to this argument, their efforts co

been derailed by powerful civilians and soldiers if they had 
 

inclined. But they were not derailed, and it is therefore to curren

tary and political leaders, with all their strengths and weaknesse

the success of the past decade must ultimately be attributed. 

A final theory suggests that the great transformation at issue h

(or at least not yet) taken place, and that the changes that have oc

are in many respects superficial. For example, a prominent anal

Indonesian affairs examined the three pairs of candidates in the 

presidential election and found they were all “creatures of Indon

past.” Yusuf Kalla, a “classic Suharto-esque businessman” and c

vative political supporter, was allied with Wiranto, a retired genera

was Suharto’s former adjutant and was indicted by the United N

for crimes against humanity in East Timor. Megawati, a “woman 

ing for a return to the glory days of her father,” had as a running 

Prabowo Subianto, another general (and former son-in-law of Suh

who was dismissed by the military for brutal treatment of political 

ists. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, yet another former general, alt

one with a reputation for liberal tendencies and indecisiveness, ch

his vice presidential candidate a career government economist—

ono—who had most recently headed Bank Indonesia. All of thi

gests that at best modest and largely cosmetic change has taken 

since 1998, and that, furthermore, the prospects for deep, mean

reforms in the immediate future are perhaps considerably dimme

most enthusiasts are willing to admit. 

Each of these sorts of explanations has strengths as well as ob

weak points, and none can stand entirely on its own. Beyond the 

pieces and academic studies, in their everyday thinking most In

sians probably borrow from all of them in assembling their own 

clusions. Even taken together, however, it is startling that in 

combined field of vision, the 32 years of New Order gover

scarcely figure except as a source of obstacles to political mode

tion, a decidedly negative force in any effort to explain the advan

the past decade. Recently, however, a handful of commentators 

quietly begun to raise the possibility that a powerful explanation 

undeniably rapid, and apparently successful, transformation 

1998 may lie precisely where least suspected: in the policies and 

ties of the New Order itself. 

A full consideration of this fifth theory would require a tho

reexamination of Indonesia’s history in the last half of the twe

century, which has yet to be undertaken. For the present, how

some principal points of the argument seem clear enough. The 

notion is that the “amazing” transformation after 1998 is not qu

amazing as has generally been suggested because the New 

regime was never as powerful and monolithic, in some views 

xlii 
 

 

 

totalitarian, as many believed, and that its ability to control 

people thought and behaved was overestimated. (In the same 

military was never as unified or free to assert its will as most a

From this perspective, for example, the New Order censorsh

which critics constantly complained was on the whole muc

than portrayed, and at best erratic and incomplete; it certainl

entirely smother public debate or expressions of discontent. S

the regime’s signature efforts to inculcate the ideology of Panc

Glossary), which critics decried as so much self-interested, st

pagandizing, were surprisingly ineffective, producing more 

and questioning than acquiescence, and certainly not blind ad

Individuals’ ability to think or act independently in politica

although indeed limited under the New Order regime, was 

severely damaged than imagined, and did not require a m

revive. 

This explanation also suggests that the New Order may h

tributed to the post-1998 transformation in a more positive m

is not, for example, quite so astonishing that Indonesia wa

hold complex and reasonably peaceful elections in 1999, 2

2009 if we recall that, in fact, the nation had practice doing 

quarter of a century under New Order auspices in 1971, 197

1987, 1992, and 1997. This notion may be repellent to cri

spent years pointing out how the New Order political process 

thing but free, manipulated as it was by numerous means, 

dishonest management of elections, curtailment of party 

dence, manipulation of parliament through large appointed 

ships, and the like. Nevertheless, elections were routinely 

order maintained until the process became familiar, even 

granted; it was by no means new in 1999, even though the a

tant political context had changed. Furthermore, it seems li

the millions of Indonesians who participated in those New Or

tions came to understand that process’s shortcomings and to 

ideas about how it could be improved. There was no dearth 

when the time came to make changes, and the journey to de

required modest hops rather than great leaps. 

The larger implication of this fifth sort of explanation is 

took place between roughly 1998 and 2004 in Indonesia w

one hand not the revolution or near-revolution some saw o

for, and on the other hand not the ephemeral, surface phenom

ers feared. There was neither miracle nor mirage but rather a 

transition in which continuity figured as importantly as cha

the two were often very closely intertwined. This insight is 

understanding other aspects of contemporary Indonesia bey

tions and democratic procedure. 
 

 

One illustration concerns the promotion of Pancasila ideol

widely criticized hallmark of the New Order that appeared to 

been summarily abandoned in 1998. Beginning in about 2002, 

ever, there was a revival of interest in Pancasila and in honoring 

kind of national creed and summation of national identity. Even 

inent intellectuals who had considered New Order leaders’ intere

national ideology an anathema, and the Pancasila itself as shallo

outdated, appeared at symposia and on op-ed pages as advocate

“revitalization,” emphasizing the ways in which the message 

Pancasila is not only appropriate for post–New Order Indonesi

indeed even necessary. In 2006 President Yudhoyono made a po

giving a major national speech on the then-neglected Birth of 

casila Day (June 1), recommending that politicized niggling ov

historical origins and other details surrounding the Pancasila—

he described as the “state ideology”—cease and that greater att

be paid to its precepts. There were numerous calls for making Ju

national holiday, and the minister of education said that the Pan

would remain part of the curriculum. It looked very much as if 

element of the New Order was about to be reinstated. 

The president made a special effort, however, to emphasize t

did not intend to return to the past. The authoritarian Suharto go

ment had, he said, “twisted the ideology to promote conformit

stifle dissent” with what he termed “Pancasila brainwashing,” 

caused the populace to turn against it and its sponsors. But in r

he said, the Pancasila is “not an absolute doctrine but a compr

reached by the nation’s founding fathers,” and it should be accep

such, not as a sacred document used to enforce uniformity. It is a 

promise that sees all Indonesians as equal and protects pluralism 

tolerance; it supports democratic reform and human rights, at the 

time as it promotes a sense of unity under a common sense of 

justice. This is precisely what is needed, Yudhoyono argued, at 

when rapid political decentralization and vigorously competing 

and religious identities threaten national unity. Whatever the de

of public trust in Yudhoyono’s message, it will, of course, be 

time before it is clear where it will lead. Nevertheless, makin

effort to see elements of change where continuity is most appar

least brings observers closer to the realization that an easy, eit

reading is inadequate. 

A second illustration concerns contemporary Indonesian publ

ture. By mid-2009, after a comparatively short period of g

beginning around 2006, by far the most popular television genre 

nation was the reality show—dating shows, talent contests, ex

home makeovers, and the like—which are widely seen as being A

xliv 
ican in origin (although in fact British and Dutch producers 

true pioneers); nearly 80 different shows of this type were b

duced by local companies. To both outsiders and many Ind

this seemed to be a sign of an abrupt change. The Indonesia

and public intellectual Ariel Heryanto, for example, suggeste

pendulum had swung away from a post-1998 interest in Islam

lar culture, and he talked about American culture being sudd

among Indonesians at all economic and social levels. On

show producer even suggested that what viewers consider A

values are in fact universal ones, and that Indonesians are no

a world in which everyone shares “the same dream, no ma

you are and what nationality you are.” Not surprisingly, some 

commentators took this as another confirmation that Indon

moved definitively into the liberal democratic camp. 

There is an important “continuity” side to this story as well

thing, as New York Times reporter Norimitsu Onishi pointed 

reality show is not the first American genre to attract attention

can sitcoms ranging from “I Love Lucy” to “The Golden G

well as series such as “McGyver,” filled Indonesian televisio

ules beginning in the mid-1970s but then lost ground to sh

Islamic themes and to telenovelas from Latin America a

operas from Asia; the current fascination with televised reali

is thus part of a longer evolution and should be interpreted in t

The careful foreign viewer might also notice that a number of 

popular Indonesian reality shows focus on themes markedly n

in America—for example, transplanting wealthy or uppe

class Indonesians into poor, rural settings, and vice versa, foc

the tribulations each group faces in making adjustments and 

ing to understand an altogether different way of life. These 

tions tend to validate the values of modern, urban mid

Indonesians at the same time as they highlight the impo

empathy for others, reflecting in part a longstanding ma

nationalist populism and in part a Muslim morality and sens

the plight of the poor. The analysis that the popularity of su

shows is evidence of a recent and dramatic social change—

canization,” even—is neither as accurate nor, truth be told, as 

ing as the more complicated view that notices a more comple

adaptation. 

Since the previous edition of this volume in the Count

Series appeared in 1993, Indonesia has experienced enormous 

of great significance. The purpose of this revised version is no

to point them out but also to attempt to show them in their pr

spective, in which changes are never without roots and co
 

never untouched by innovation. Particularly for a country as 

diverse, and historically intricate as Indonesia, this approach 

both necessary and sensible. 

September 16, 2009 

* * * 

As the manuscript for this book was being completed, a num

significant events occurred in or concerning Indonesia, most n

Indonesia’s third post-Suharto presidential election, which was h

July 8, 2009. Fifteen days later, the General Elections Comm

(KPU; for this and other abbreviations and contractions, see tab

declared the Democrat Party (PD) coalition candidates, incu

president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and former Bank Indonesi

Budiono, the official winners as president and vice president, r

tively, for the 2009–14 term. They garnered 60.9 percent of the 

The election itself was largely peaceful, but not without grumbl

some quarters about how the KPU had managed the process. 

were challenges to the results, particularly of massive fraud inv

voter rosters. Megawati Sukarnoputri and her running mate, f

army general Prabowo Subianto, who placed second with 26.8 p

of the vote, pressed the issue particularly hard, claiming that 28.

lion of her opponent’s votes had been rendered invalid. On Augu

however, the Constitutional Court declared that the claims of 

Megawati and the Golkar (see Glossary) candidate, Yusuf 

“lacked legal basis,” as the court found “no systematic, structura

massive violations on the KPU’s part.” Although some obs

expected further difficulties, such as violence or new procedural 

lenges, the court’s ruling appeared to have defused a potentially 

troublesome issue. 

Another development was the ongoing anticorruption campaig

the time of Yudhoyono’s official inauguration on October 20, 200

second administration was already darkened by a storm of contr

that had been gathering since well before the election. The centra

was corruption, long considered by Indonesians and foreign obs

alike as the nation’s most serious problem, and one Yudhoyon

widely seen as having had some success combating by establish

2002 the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and Corr

Crimes Court (Tipikor Court). The KPK, which had been given 

ordinary powers of investigation (for example, into warrantless w

ping) and prosecution, earned public respect for achieving a conv

rate of 100 percent in 86 graft cases involving mostly mid- and lowe

xlvi 
 

 

 

bureaucrats and civilians. But by early 2009, the KPK had begu

aim at more important targets, especially in the higher rank

National Police of Indonesia (Polri) and the Attorney General

The KPK also became increasingly involved in investigation o

troversial US$700 million bailout in 2008 of the nation’s thirteen

bank—Bank Century—to which the new Yudhoyono gov

finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, and vice president, 

were connected. 

These initiatives appear to have persuaded many promin

viduals, perhaps because they themselves were potential tar

the KPK was too powerful. Representatives of Polri and the 

General’s Office and groups of legislators launched a seemin

certed effort to deflate the KPK. The first important victim 

KPK head himself, Antasari Azhar, who in May 2010 was ac

masterminding a bizarre love-triangle murder plot, for whic

later convicted and sentenced to 18 years in prison. (As of 

2010, the case was still under appeal.) The next major erstwhi

were two KPK commissioners, Bibit Samad Riyanto and 

Hamzah, arrested in October 2009 on accusations of accepti

in what by that time had become a bitter feud between the 

Polri. (That case, after an even more tortuous journey thr

courts, was in limbo more than eight months later.) In add

Bank Century case brought accusations of wrongdoing and, i

corruption on the part of a range of principals involved, some 

were connected to KPK and Polri scandals. In all of these ca

was widespread public suspicion that many of the targets 

framed by police, as indeed several police officers publicly te

The long-term significance of these scandals is still unce

there is general agreement about several consequences. First, 

Yudhoyono’s standing in many circles was at least temporar

ened, as he appeared to vacillate in the face of the legal disp

interdepartmental dissension. Forced by public pressure to tak

he was unable to fully fend off legislators’ attacks on the au

the KBK and Tipikor, which, despite the retention of wiretap

prosecution rights, was in other ways diluted. Yudhoyono als

political battle to keep reform-minded Minister of Finance 

yani, who resigned in May 2010. (She soon accepted a high 

the World Bank and has been mentioned as a likely future pre

candidate.) The president had repeatedly complained that the 

were being used to discredit him personally and remove h

office (impeachment was indeed being discussed in the leg

however, the broad public did not appear to share this conclus

Second, and probably of more lasting importance, is the 

dented degree to which high-level corruption and the struggle 
 

were opened to public scrutiny. Ordinary Indonesians devoured 

lished accounts and watched televised news programs offerin

example, coverage of court proceedings and sensational whistle-b

testimonies, for up to three hours a day by January 2010, comma

more than four times the earlier viewer share of broadcast news. 

did not escape the notice of government bureaucrats and politician

the Internet was quickly and skillfully used to mobilize public op

generally against government authorities. The most impressive m

zation arose in July 2009 when Polri commissioner general and h

the Crime Investigation Agency (Kabareskrim) Susno Duaji 

mented derisively to a journalist that the KPK trying to stand up 

police and Attorney General’s Office was like a tiny house 

(cicak) confronting a crocodile (buaya): opposition was foolis

doomed. Published by Tempo, the nation’s foremost news mag

and online news source, the remark was endlessly repeated and 

triggered an enormous public reaction. The Internet, Facebook

Twitter were used to gather hundreds of thousands of supporters 

KPK, while T-shirts and demonstrators’ banners appeared with sl

such as “I’m a cicak!” and “Say no to the crocodile!” The police 

especially humiliated, but public officials everywhere took u

notice of a newly powerful public that seemed to know what corr

was when they saw it and that vigorously supported efforts to c

both corruption and the types of authority that allowed it to exist

sational turns in the case by mid-2010 led to Susno, recently jaile

military facility, now being praised as a heroic whistle-blower by 

and even suggested as the next head of the KPK. Some people, 

ever, accused him of being deeply involved in graft and other c

practices. 

How did these developments affect public attitudes gene

According to one respected polling source, in the last quarter of 

public distrust of the government was lower overall (28 percent

it had been in the past five years but higher (33 percent) in the 

The poll also found that confidence that “democracy is working

nearly as high as it had ever been (78 percent), but that such 

dence suffered slightly more in the cities. The conclusion that c

tion was the major problem facing the nation was reached by nea

many people as ever (86 percent). Polling for the first quarter of 

seemed likely to show slippage, which many in the business co

nity feared would, in turn, have unwelcome economic effects. 

The power of the Internet was demonstrated not only in the c

tion scandals but also in the case of Prita Mulyasari, a young m

whose e-mailed complaints about a large Jakarta hospital’s se

circulated online beginning in mid-2009. Sued for defamation b

xlviii 
 

hospital, she was also taken to court in civil and criminal su

the 2008 antipornography law. Public outcry, organized via F

Twitter, and various blogs and glogs, resulted in her being f

guilty in the criminal suit, but Prita refused to settle the civil s

court because she felt that doing so was an admission of guilt

the case in December 2009 and was fined more than US$20

online campaign raised several times that amount in donated 

pay her expenses and fines. The case underscored in several 

enormous potential power of social networking in Indonesi

the number of Facebook users is said to have increased fro

than 1 million to more than 21 million (compared with Bri

million) between early 2009 and mid-2010. 

One government response came from the conservative m

communication and information, Tifatul Sembiring, who, in 

2010, drafted regulations widely seen as limiting freedom o

sion; public outcry was so immediate and forceful that Presid

hoyono felt compelled to warn his minister to tone down the 

regulations. Some legislators agreed with Tifatul, however, c

strengthened limitations in laws governing multimedia use, v

of which are already subject to greater penalties than those 

media. There has been considerable pushback on the issue fro

ety of groups, among them the Alliance of Independent Jo

and the debate gathered momentum in May 2010. During th

ing month, a sensational case developed around an explicit

video allegedly showing the male pop singer Nazril (Ariel) I

two female media celebrities (they claimed that the in

depicted simply looked like them), which was widely circulat

Internet. Police scrambled to find out who uploaded the 

whether the photos were indeed of the people everyone thou

were. (In late June, Ariel was arrested and charged with viol

2008 antipornography law.) Tifatul commented that the publ

over these “sex tapes” was like the dispute between Musli

believe that Jesus Christ was not crucified but rather that 

resembling him was, and Christians, who believe that Jesus C

crucified. He was immediately engulfed by a barrage of 

from angry Twitterers suggesting, for example, that he had be

when he made the comment; Tifatul’s response (via his ow

account) was that his accuser himself must have been drunk. 

troversy escalated so rapidly and in such dangerous direct

President Yudhoyono felt constrained to offer an opinion. In 

2010, he appeared to back Tifatul’s call for, among other t

Internet “black list” and general regulation of Internet use, le

and the nation be damaged. 
The threat of terrorist attacks against Indonesia continues, bu

ernment forces appear to have successfully disrupted some sign

sources of terror activity. On “Black Friday,” July 17, 2009, a little 

than a week after the presidential election, explosions were detona

suicide bombers at two American-owned hotels in Jakarta, the JW 

riott and the Ritz-Carlton, killing seven (one of whom was Indon

and wounding 53. The bombings were widely condemned intern

ally and within Indonesia itself, where tolerance for terrorism 

already been dropping noticeably. President Yudhoyono suggeste

the terrorist acts were somehow connected to the election and dire

him, an idea discounted by most analysts. (However, the police d

ery in May 2010 of a plot to assassinate Yudhoyono on the coming 

pendence Day, August 17, lent the earlier suggestion some retrosp

credence.) Heightened police efforts in succeeding months aft

hotel bombings paid off. In September 2009, commandos killed 

din Muhammad Top, the Malaysian-born Islamist militant thoug

police to have been responsible for major bombings in Indonesia 

2002, including the recent JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton explosio

March 2010, counterterrorism forces killed Dulmatin, a Javanese b

ing mastermind who played a prominent role in the militant Je

Islamiyah and was also connected to the Abu Sayyaf group in the 

ippines. The police received widespread approval for these effor

opposed to their involvement in various corruption scandals—and 

clear that the militants and their followers attracted little sympathy

Javanese villages, whose native sons were followers of Noordi

were also killed, refused to have them buried on village land. Fina

June 2010 police killed former Indonesian soldier Yuli Harsono

pected of planning, among other things, an attack on the D

Embassy in Jakarta, and arrested Abdullah Sunata, wanted for esta

ing a terrorist training camp in Aceh and suspected of planning to 

sinate President Yudhoyono. 

Issues having to do with the public practice of Islam continue 

ture in national news, especially in the Special Region of Aceh, 

implementation of sharia (syariah in Bahasa Indonesia—see Glo

began in 2000 and has caused intense debate since then. Durin

2009 elections, Golkar Party candidates attempted to make the w

of the jilbab (Muslim woman’s head covering) a political iss

which the vast majority of Indonesians seemed to show no real in

Polri announced a plan on August 21, 2009, to monitor sermons 

at mosques and public gatherings, presumably for their poten

incite hatred or violence. There was, however, a strong public o

and the order was quickly rescinded. 

The most sensational development occurred in mid-Sept

2009, when the Aceh legislative council introduced new Islamic 

l 
nal bylaws (qanun jinayat), calling for, among other things, a

(both Muslim and non-Muslim) to be stoned to death. The 

introduced before the recently elected, more moderate legislat

officially be seated, drew condemnation from many sources, i

in early October, a council of 80 Muslim clerics, who said s

were foreign and called for a presidential review. Other lega

suggested, however, that the bylaws were reasonable, in 

reflected Indonesia’s effort to recognize diversity in legal s

Under pressure from civil society and both foreign and in

human-rights groups, the provisions had not yet been fully en

signed by the provincial governor as of mid-2010. The Depa

Home Affairs announced its intention of requesting a Suprem

review of Aceh’s Islamic criminal code but had not yet don

the law remained officially in a suspended state. In the meanti

ever, Aceh’s syariah police appear to have been emboldened

ing conservative standards of women’s dress and, in several i

carrying out public and brutal punishments for suspected mor

such as having premarital sex, intrusions the majority of A

appear to resent. The struggle between religious conserva

more moderate ideas and the search for a less-tense rel

between Aceh’s autonomy—extended in 2006 as part of the s

of the armed conflict there—and the requirements of the In

state and constitution seem likely to continue for some time. 

Another controversial legal issue also attracted widespread 

The controversy concerned Indonesia’s 1965 Blasphemy Law, 

of the Criminal Code that prohibits both expression of hostili

or contempt of the recognized religions and the advocacy of un

interpretations of those religions. The law can be used to ha

sentences of up to five years’ imprisonment, and to disband a

deemed unorthodox or heretical. In October 2009, a group of p

Muslim intellectuals (including former President Abdurrahman 

human-rights activists, and civic leaders requested that the 

tional Court review the Blasphemy Law, suggesting that i

guarantees of freedom of religion and threatens the tolerance an

ism fundamental to maintaining a democratic Indonesia. In Ap

after several months of public debate and demonstrations, 

refused to conduct a full judicial review of the law, thereby uph

An eight-to-one decision by the court argued that, without an

immediately replace it, the law is necessary in order to maint

order and prevent religious conflicts. Conservative Musli

feared among other things that more liberal interpretations 

might be encouraged, were heartened by the decision, but an 

opponents feared that religious freedom, especially of minorit
 

would be further threatened. While the Constitutional Court’s 

suggests that legislative review and modification of the law mi

pertinent, it seems unlikely that lawmakers will accept such a sen

undertaking anytime in the near future. 

Eastern and western Indonesia have continued to expe

repeated earthquakes. The largest of these occurred in western J

early September 2009 (7.0 magnitude and at least 72 deaths), in S

era Barat later the same month (7.6 magnitude with at least 

deaths and more than 2,180 injured), and offshore from Sumatera 

in April 2010 (7.8 magnitude, no deaths). In Jawa Timur, the not

Lumpur Sidoarjo (Lusi) mud volcano, which in 2006 killed 1

destroyed the homes of tens of thousands of residents, was still o

in 2010. International researchers argued in February that new 

confirmed the disaster was man-made and not caused by an earth

as the gas-exploration company Brantas Lapindo claimed. Pre

Yudhoyono reiterated in March 2010 that he expected Lapindo t

quately reimburse all victims (the government itself had allocated 

than US$210 million for the purpose in 2008 and 2009), but th

has been increasingly embroiled in legal and political controvers

protests by the victims continued. 

In May 2010, scientists announced the discovery of prev

unknown species of gecko, pigeon, and bat in the remote Foja M

tains in Papua Province, described as “perhaps the least disturb

tropical forest block on earth.” On the same day, the governm

Norway announced a US$1 billion grant to the Indonesian go

ment to reduce deforestation through a series of ongoing, veri

projects. Days later, President Yudhoyono issued a moratoriu

new forest and peatland concessions, considered an encouragin

step in an aggressive, long-term campaign. 

Despite the many political and social problems its people 

Indonesia’s economy appeared to perform remarkably well in 

and early 2010. In May 2010, the International Institute for Ma

ment Development in Zürich placed Indonesia thirty-fifth on its a

list of the most competitive economies, jumping it ahead of 

other nations (the Philippines was listed thirty-ninth, and Malays

listed tenth). The economy grew a respectable 4.5 percent in 200

it was estimated to achieve 5.8 to 6 percent growth in 2010. Con

expenditures were growing, but even the top strata were spendin

tiously; government spending was strong, offsetting declining ex

Average per-capita income rose from US$1,180 in 2004 to US$

in 2010. Most important, statistics indicated that poverty was d

ing: the nation’s poorest stratum, earning US$65 or less a m

declined during roughly the same period, from about 40 perc

lii 
 

society to slightly more than 20 percent. According to the la

index (see Glossary), which measures inequality of wealth, I

enjoyed considerably more equitable income distribution (0

neighboring Thailand (0.42), Singapore (0.43), or Malaysi

although the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) in 

countries was higher. As had been the case two decades ear

figures did not go entirely unchallenged but were widely 

among economists. 

“Culture wars” also were underway. In a series of disp

neighboring Malaysia over traditional cultural heritage, public 

many on the Internet—became surprisingly shrill, including c

izations of Malaysia as “a nation of thieves,” and threats of wa

2009, a Malaysian Ministry of Tourism advertisement aired int

ally on the Discovery Channel portrayed a Balinese dance a

Malaysia’s cultural heritage; the government subsequently 

the advertisement and apologized for what it said had been a p

error. But the uproar nevertheless gathered steam, and by Se

despite some Indonesian commentators’ dismissal of the issue 

and an indication of Indonesian feelings of inferiority, it had b

cause célèbre threatening diplomatic relations. Some of the sh

ings on the Indonesian side were apparently assuaged in Octo

the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Org

(UNESCO) declared batik to be part of Indonesia’s intangibl

heritage, adding to a similar declaration in 2008 for shadow pu

ater (wayang kulit) and the keris, an asymmetrical dagger, wh

Malaysians had felt were at least equally theirs. 

There also were some prominent deaths. W. S. Rendra, m

and playwright who achieved fame during the New Order f

stands against the government, died at age 74 on August 6, 2

mer president of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid, who serv

1999 to 2001, died at age 69 on December 30, 2009. Gesang, c

of many keroncong (songs), among them the world-famo

gawan Solo,” died at the age of 92 on May 20, 2010. Hasan 

best known for founding the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), t

2006 movement aimed at achieving Acehnese independence

age 84 on June 3, 2010, one day after being officially reinsta

Indonesian citizen. 

July 1, 2010 

* * *
 
 

After the manuscript for this book was completed in the summ

2010, a number of important events took place. One of the most sign

was the ongoing struggle against corruption, particularly that involvin

iticians and government bureaucrats. Public opinion appeared to stiff

ther against corruption. In August 2010, not long before the traditiona

of forgiveness at the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, 

dent Yudhoyono issued pardons and remissions of sentences for a n

of individuals convicted of graft, most of whom had served 75 perc

more of their sentences. Although such pardons are generally seen a

tomary, in this instance Yudhoyono was strongly criticized, and the 

tion was asked more sharply than in the recent past whether he was 

committed to the struggle against corruption. The Corruption Eradi

Commission (KPK), which had been viewed by many as seriously 

ened in early 2010 by legislative efforts to rein in its powers, appeare

holding its own. Despite a call in July 2011 by People’s Represen

Council (DPR) speaker Marzuki Alie (from President Yudhoyono

Democrat Party) for the dismantling of the agency, the People’s Con

tive Assembly (MPR) moved to establish the KPK more firmly with 

stitutional amendment. 

Meanwhile, the KPK itself continued to pursue suspects and at

to bring them to justice. The case of former police commissioner 

Duaji, the self-proclaimed whistle-blower suspected of widesprea

rupt practices, proceeded with many sensational twists. For

charged in late September 2010 as the ringleader in a number of i

tant graft cases, Duaji’s trials were just beginning 10 months la

mid-2011. The most important new case was that of Gayus Halo

Tambunan, a midlevel tax official who said he was a witness wh

been prepared to testify against corrupt officials but was betray

the KPK. He claimed he altered the tax forms of 149 corpora

including Chevron and Ford, and received Guyanese passports f

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent working for the 

Gayus was sentenced to seven years in prison in one case, but, as 

July 2011, three other cases against him were still pending. A

major suspect in multiple corruption charges was former Dem

Party treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin, who had spectactularly e

arrest and even had the entire country scanning television comm

jingles for clues as to his whereabouts. 

The legal troubles of male pop singer Nazril (Ariel) Irham, wh

charged with violating the 2008 Information and Electronic Trans

Law for appearing in sexually explicit videos that were widely circ

online, held the attention of many Indonesians in late 2010 and 

The reason for the high degree of interest was that it revealed man

els of hypocrisy in society’s views of sex and morality, and more b

liv 
 

 

 

because it tested the limits of openness and personal freedoms i

democracy. Arrested in mid-2010, Ariel was tried in January 

Bandung court, where 1,000 police officers were deployed to 

security and order. He was sentenced to three and a half years 

and a fine equivalent to US$27,500; an appeal was rejected in A

case was used by the conservative minister of the Department 

munications and Information, Tifatul Sembiring, to garner su

his efforts to force Internet providers to filter out pornographic 

Providers complained that filtering would cost them more than 

million to implement and was, in any case, ineffective techno

Nevertheless, the government persisted, even pressing the 

company, Research in Motion, to block porn from its Blackb

vice. The government also attempted to enforce more widely a 

that criminalizes viewing, owning, downloading, and distribu

nography, with sentences of up to six years in jail and fines 

US$115,000. 

But, by April 2011, it was unclear whether Indonesia’s 

control Internet usage and public morality in this way coul

tained. The government’s attempts—not least those by Minist

himself—were widely ridiculed, and the department was 

admit publicly both that filters did not work very well and th

only 40 staff available to monitor the issue—a clearly inadequ

ber. Respected lawmaker Arifinto of the Prosperous Just

(PKS), which had strongly supported the 2008 antipornogra

was caught watching pornography during a legislative se

promptly resigned, but columnists and others wondered alou

entertainer had gone to jail but a legislator had not been cha

they mused that a high percentage of the Indonesian popula

now in danger of being declared criminals. 

In early 2011, the aforementioned Jakarta housewife, Prit

sari, was partially vindicated by the Supreme Court, which ov

a 2010 ruling that, although she was declared not guilty in a 

suit, she was liable in a civil suit that fined her more than US

In 2009 the Supreme Court had also denied the hospital’s libel 

ing US$250,000 in damages, but in July 2011 it granted a pro

request for an appeal and reversed its opinion, finding Prita g

sentencing her to six months in prison. Prita immediately fi

case review, but there was such widespread condemnation of 

sion and of the judicial system as a whole that some editorial

that the case might eventually force both abandonment of the 

and broad judicial reform. 

There is evidence that views of the Suharto era are being 

in public memory and thinking about contemporary society. 

the promotion of Pancasila, which had become a hated featu
 

 

 

 

Suharto era, continue to surface, and the government has anno

its intention to revitalize the philosophy, but without saying h

would do so. The humanist thinker Radhar Panca Dahara ack

edged that most Indonesians still do not understand Pancasila, b

cautioned that interpretation has to be individual rather than co

to be effective. A member of the government commission over

culture and education initiatives suggested that Pancasila could b

revived by encouraging exemplary behavior rather than endles

cussion. Youth activist Melki Lakalena proposed that, rather tha

sort of rigid indoctrination, popular music and other forms of 

culture could be used as vehicles for reawakening interest in 

casila. He said his suggested approach was a more “relaxed” w

recognizing “the political role of culture in disseminating the va

the state ideology,” a statement with an oddly back-to-the-future 

Another feature of both the Old Order and the New Order that

a brief eclipse, showed signs of returning was the government’s 

book banning as a tool of social control. Between 1998 and 20

books had been banned, although the Sukarno-era law sancti

such action remained in force. But after 2006 the practice saw 

revival. In December 2009, the attorney general invoked a 200

(which had replaced a 1969 law based on a 1963 presidential d

that did not address “banning books” but rather “supervising the 

lation of printed materials” to ban five books. Among them w

Indonesian translation of John Roosa’s Pretext for Mass Murde

September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indone

publication that the Attorney General’s Office deemed disturb

public order, even though it had already been in circulation in In

sia for nearly two years. By mid-2010, the Department of Justic

Human Rights was reviewing about 200 books considered po

“threats to the country’s unity,” 20 of them seriously. On Octob

2010, however, in a case brought by a group of prominent autho

Constitutional Court ruled against the original 1963 decree tha

the Attorney General’s Office the authority to place bans on sp

titles or on an author’s entire oeuvre, declaring instead that any 

for bans had to be made through the court system. The gover

can still proscribe certain works under a 1966 anticommunist law

under the 2008 antipornography law, but the practice of book ba

now is far more limited than in most of the past half-century. 

All of these developments suggest that Indonesians are busy a

ing—and often moderating—their views of the pre-1998 p

reconsidering some aspects and rejecting others. Perhaps the mo

prising evidence of this process was the nomination, in mid-O

2011, of former President Suharto as a “national hero,” one of 1

lvi 
sons put forward by local officials. This suggestion, which 

made by a Jawa Tengah district head on the 1,000-day anniv

Suharto’s death, elicited a vigorous debate in which there w

pectedly strong support for Suharto’s rehabilitation and rec

Public-opinion polls noted that, although the approval rating 

nesia’s new democracy had grown from 42 percent in 1999 t

cent by late 2010, and few expressed any desire to return to 

Order, Suharto now seemed to command growing respect. I

2011 survey, 41 percent named him “Indonesia’s Best Presid

government finessed the national-hero issue by choosing 

minority candidates connected in some way with Indonesia’s 

for independence, former cabinet minister Johannes Leimena

tian from Maluku, and military officer Johannes Abraham D

Christian from Papua. 

The struggle against terrorism continues to occupy the gov

both within the country and in cooperation with Asian neig

March 2011, for example, Indonesian police representatives tr

Pakistan with fingerprints and DNA samples to identify the 

arrested Umar Patek, a Jemaah Islamiyah member thought to 

the masterminds behind the 2002 Bali bombings and suspecte

nections to many other incidents, including an explosion in a

boarding school in Bima, Nusa Tenggara Barat, on July 11, 20

that date, however, Indonesia was still one of three countries 

extradite him. The radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (also k

Abu Bakar Bashir), who was accused of intellectual lead

Jemaah Islamiyah, charged in the Bali bombings, and served t

in prison before his conviction was overturned by the Suprem

was again arrested in August 2010 and later charged with fun

coordinating a training program for a militant jihadist group in 

was tried in June 2011 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. An

forces maintained pressure on other suspected networks and ind

but were unable to prevent several local attacks, the most dist

which probably was the April 2011 suicide bombing in Cireb

Tengah Province, where a young man purportedly angry at kar

and unregistered places of Christian worship blew himsel

wounded many others in a mosque located in a police station. B

occurred in a place of Muslim worship and during Friday pra

event is said to have particularly shocked public opinion. 

News commentators and columnists agree that intolerance 

rise. The hardline group Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) 

increasingly in reports of intimidation and often violent vig

Its members have involved themselves in local efforts to clo

“immoral” businesses, enforce fasting during Ramadan, an
against or close down political meetings and other activitie

pected—often wildly erroneously—of being communist. Appa

spontaneous outbreaks of violence also have occurred, such as a 

ruary 2011 incident in Banten, Jawa Barat Province, in which a 

of 1,500 people attacked and killed three members of the unort

Muslim group Ahmadiyah while police stood by. In the eventua

prosecutors charged 11 participants jointly with inciting violenc

committing assault leading to death, but no individuals were ch

with the actual killings. Such events pose a dilemma for both 

enforcement and justice officials, not only because, as Muslims

often find it difficult to act against “protectors of Islam,” bu

because it is often difficult, in Indonesia’s still relatively re

democratized society, to determine the proper boundary between 

dom of expression and intolerance. 

Public reaction to violent and oppressive behavior by religiou

ots appears to be increasingly negative. Growing disapproval is 

notable where efforts to implement sharia are concerned. In 

where in 2010 more than 800 detentions were carried out by the 

police and men were forced to marry and women to have vir

tests, public dissatisfaction arose, and activists complained of 

tions of human rights. In the Bekasi area near Jakarta, polls 

between April 2009 and March 2010 showed that individuals in 

of the local government implementing sharia dropped from 43 p

to 36 percent, and those who believed that thieves should have 

hands cut off declined from 38 percent to 32 percent. This and 

pieces of evidence may have encouraged police in some areas t

stronger stances with regard to civilian organizations such as th

In July 2011, for example, the Jakarta police announced they 

take firm steps to prevent such groups from attacking businesse

individuals who failed to observe government regulations on c

kinds of entertainment during Ramadan, emphasizing that on

police are permitted to take such action when warranted. 

Concerns over rising intolerance and the violence it generate

brought Indonesia’s most important Muslim associations to stren

and better publicize their stands against radicalism. In its cent

year and with a membership of 29 million, Muhammadiyah (Foll

of Muhammad) strongly affirmed the ideas of former leader A

Syafii Maarif, who now promotes tolerance. Five years e

Muhammadiyah appeared to be turning in a more uncomprom

direction. In July 2011, Muhammadiyah announced that it “conv

Islam that says no to conflicts between civilizations, an Islam th

ters cooperation, dialog, a cosmopolitan Islam [that is] a golden b

for a dialog between East and West.” Barely a week later, Nah

lviii 
Ulama (Council of Scholars), Indonesia’s largest Muslim orga

with 80 million followers, celebrated its eighty-fifth annive

announcing that it would begin a campaign for a peaceful

Islam, and argued that “Democracy is the best tool to improve 

welfare and to keep the nation united.” Nahdlatul Ulama’s yo

nization—Ansor (Helpers of Muhammad)—also announced 

response to the Cirebon mosque bombing, it was forming 

antiterrorist unit called Detachment 99, after the antiterrorism 

of the national police, Detachment 88. 

Neither unresolved social problems nor threats of turbulenc

have affected economic performance. In 2010 Indonesia’s 

grew 6.1 percent, foreign investment rose 52 percent to US$16

the stock market rose 20 percent in the first half of the year

rupiah (Rp—see Glossary) appreciated nearly 5 percent agains

dollar. In the first quarter of 2011, Moody’s and Standard an

raised the nation’s sovereign debt rating to BB+, or just one lev

investment grade. Strength within the Asian sphere was pa

marked. For example, the largest share of foreign investment c

member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 

(ASEAN—see Glossary), and, as of late 2010, Indonesia was 

become the world’s largest manufacturer of footwear, as more c

from Taiwan and South Korea relocated there. 

Still, 15 percent of Indonesia’s population lives below the 

line of US$1 per day. In recognition of this disparity, Presid

hoyono began 2011 by outlining the government’s “growth wit

philosophy of planning. Then, in a powerful and well-receive

address entitled “The Big Shift and the Imperative of 21st Cen

balism,” delivered at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 

land, on January 27, 2011, he called for a new sense of globali

“open-minded, pragmatic, adaptive and innovative,” a glob

which regional groupings play a crucial role in supplying bo

mism and restraint. The world economy, he stated, should be 

“so that it functions to meet our needs rather than satisfying ou

and he repeated Indonesia’s own national goal of “growth with 

implying that the world community could well aim for someth

lar. Indonesia took up the chair of ASEAN in 2011, and it wa

the eve of the organization’s annual meeting in late July 2011 t

nesia would use that opportunity to emphasize the same the

enhance its growing international reputation as a political and e

power to be reckoned with. 

The United States has recognized the growing importance o

sia, as well as a deepening rivalry with China for influence 

November 2010, the U.S. president, Barack Obama, visited Ind
 

underscore the significance of improved relations between the two 

tries, and to launch what was termed a U.S.–Indonesian Compreh

Partnership, which, it was emphasized, should be a partnership of e

covering, among other things, a much-expanded program of educa

exchange, expanded cooperation in security issues, and effo

improve trade. President Obama’s twice-postponed visit, although 

was special because he was returning to the place he had lived fo

years as a boy. His speech at Universitas Indonesia included lofty 

on development, democracy, and religious tolerance and was q

compared to his inspiring “New Beginning” speech in Cairo in 200

what the majority of Indonesians seemed to notice and appreciate 

was that when Obama spoke about the changes that had taken pl

Indonesia since the late 1960s, he did so first-hand and in colorful 

Above all, perhaps, it was noticed that he appeared to have a ge

attachment to the country and its people; when he said simply, “Ind

is a part of me,” a great many Indonesians, including press and tele

pundits, responded emotionally. 

Indonesia continued to experience a high level of volcanic ac

In late August 2010, Mount Sinabung, near Karo, Sumatera 

Province, erupted for the first time in 410 years, and in 2011 not

thy eruptions occurred in Java and Sulawesi. The extended ser

eruptions at Mount Merapi in late 2010 caused evacuations of 

than 135,000 people and more than 300 deaths near Yogyaka

addition, there were earthquakes, the largest of which occurred in 

ber 2010, when an underwater quake off the Mentawai Islands, S

tera Barat Province, registered a magnitude of 7.7 and produced 

nami estimated to have killed more than 300 people. 

Finally, several important personalities who helped define m

Indonesia passed from the scene. Akhdiat Miharja, a key figure in 

ature during the 1940s and 1950s, died at age 99 on July 8, 2010

Tirta (also known as Nusyirwan Tirtaamijaya), who had revit

batik design and brought Indonesia batik international recognition

at the age of 75 on July 31, 2010. Des Alwi, one of the last figu

the revolutionary period (he was the adopted son of Mohammad 

and a close associate of Sutan Syahrir), and later diplomat and w

died just before his eighty-third birthday on November 13, 2010. 

han Anwar, legendary reporter, columnist, and public intellectua

88 when he died on April 14, 2011. And Franky Sahilatua, who p

an important role in popularizing voguish music of social criticism 

ing the Suharto era, died at 57 on April 20, 2011. 

August 2, 2011 William H. Fred

lx 
Chapter 1. Historical S
Relief panel at Borobudur showing a trading ship, ca. AD 800 
 

 

DEBATE ABOUT THE NATURE of Indonesia’s past and 

tionship to a national identity preceded by many decades th

lic’s proclamation of independence in 1945, and it has con

different forms and with varying degrees of intensity ever s

beginning in the late 1990s, the polemic intensified, becom

polarized and entangled in political conflict. Historical iss

on an immediacy and a moral character they had not ear

sessed, and historical answers to the questions, “What is Ind

and “Who is an Indonesian?” became, for the first time, 

period of widespread public introspection. Notably, too, th

discussion in which foreign observers of Indonesian affair

important voice. 

There are two main views in this debate. In one of them, 

porary Indonesia, both as an idea and as a reality, appears 

degree misconceived, and contemporary “official” readings o

tory fundamentally wrong. In large part, this is a perspective 

ing with the political left, which seeks, among other things, t

its brutal eclipse from national life since 1965. But it also h

often for rather different reasons, a dominant perspectiv

Muslim intellectuals and foreign observers disenchanted 

military-dominated government of Suharto’s New Order (

or disappointed with the perceived failures of Indonesian na

in general. The foreign observers, for example, increasingly 

sized to their audiences that “in the beginning there was no 

sia,” portraying it as “an unlikely nation,” a “nation in waitin

“unfinished nation,” suggesting that contemporary national u

a unidimensional, neocolonial, New Order construction too 

long survive the fall of that government. 

An alternative view, reflecting government-guided textb

sions of the national past, defines Indonesia primarily by 

anticolonial struggle and focuses on integrative, secular, a

scendent “mainstream” nationalist perspectives. In this epi

and often hyperpatriotic conception of the past, Indonesia is 

come of a singular, inevitable, and more or less self-eviden

cal process, into which internal difference and conflict h

absorbed, and on which the national character and unity 

Some foreign writers, often without fully realizing it, are in

accept, without much questioning, the essentials of this sto

development of the nation and its historical identity. 

Both of these views came into question in the first deca

twenty-first century. On the one hand, Indonesia’s persis
more than 60 years as a unitary nation-state, and its ability to su

both the political, social, and economic upheavals and the n

disasters that followed the New Order, have driven many fo

specialists to try to account for this outcome. Both they and In

sians themselves found reason to attempt a more nuanced reev

tion of such topics as the role of violence and the various for

nationalism in contemporary society. On the other hand, a g

recognition took hold that monolithic readings of Indon

(national) historical identity fit neither past facts nor contemp

sensibilities. In particular, Indonesian intellectuals’ penchan

attempting to “straighten out history” (menyelusuri sejarah) 

to be recognized largely as an exercise in replacing one singula

spective with another. Some younger historians have begun to 

tion the nature and purpose of a unitary “national” history, a

search for ways to incorporate more diverse views into 

approaches. Although it is still too early to determine where 

realignments and efforts at reinterpretation will lead, it is clea

in contemporary Indonesia, history is recognized as a key to u

standing the present and future nation, but it can no long

approached in the monolithic and often ideological terms so 

mon in the past. 

Origins 

Early Inhabitation 

Indonesia consists of parts of the Sunda Shelf, extending 

mainland Asia and forming the world’s largest submerged con

tal shelf; a deep-water channel charting what is known as Wal

Line roughly running between the islands of Kalimantan 

Sulawesi, and between the islands of Bali and Lombok; and pa

the Sahul Shelf, an extension of Australia (see The Geographic 

text, ch. 2). Despite arcs of frequent volcanic activity and patte

rising and falling sea levels, this has been a favored region for 

ern humans and their hominid predecessors for nearly 2 m

years. Today Indonesia is of crucial importance to the stu

human origins and evolution. Sites in central Java, such as San

and Ngandong, now account for about 75 percent of the w

examples of homo erectus, an early hominid type. Most recent

2004 announcement of discoveries on the island of Flores (be

Bali and Timor) created international controversy because they 

gested an entirely new, locally evolved, and distinctively sm

hominid form overlapping chronologically with both homo e

and modern humans. 

4 
 

 

About 800,000 years ago, some early hominids of the arc

made stone tools, constructed water craft sophisticated e

cross 25 kilometers of rough sea channel, and may have 

and language. About 600,000 years ago, a fairly sophistica

inid culture was widely distributed throughout what is now 

sia. The earliest modern humans cannot currently be firm

before about 40,000 years ago, but some specialists argue e

they appeared much earlier (as much as 90,000 years ago) i

dispersal from Africa, or that they evolved independently i

Southeast Asia from existing hominid stock. Whatever 

Indonesia’s earliest modern humans did not immediately o

where displace their hominid relatives but coexisted with 

tens of thousands of years. The earliest modes of their e

show little evidence of having deviated markedly from thos

predecessors. A pattern evolved of small hunting-fishing

communities depending on tools made of shell, wood, bam

stone, adapting to a wide variety of ecological niches and re

in contact with neighboring peoples over land and sea. 

One center of these societies was in the northern Ma

Papua region, where between 20,000 and about 9,000 y

there is evidence of long-distance trade (for example, in 

used for making cutting tools), deliberate horticulture, and t

port of plants (bananas, taro, palms) and animals (wallabie

squirrels) used as food sources. Possibly these communi

used sails and outriggers on their boats. 

Social and Cultural Developments 

About 10,000 years ago, the last ice age began to recede 

rose, eventually creating from the Sunda Shelf the archip

know today. The next six or seven millennia saw the develo

cultural and social characteristics that have been of lasting sig

down to the present. Examples include the use throughout t

pelago of languages belonging to the same family (Austrone

spread of rice agriculture and sedentary life, and of ceramic a

metal technologies; the expansion of long-distance seaborne t

trade; and the persistence of diverse but interacting socie

widely varying levels of technological and cultural complexit

There is no entirely secure understanding of how and w

changes took place. The most widely held view, based he

historical linguistics, argues that about 6,500 years ago 

whom scholars identify linguistically and culturally as “A

sians” dispersed out of present-day southern China and Taiw

fairly rapid process, they spread throughout the archipelago 
Philippines (which they reached by 3,000 BC) to Indonesia (2

500 BC), and then farther west as far as Madagascar and farthe

throughout the Pacific Ocean. Prehistory expert Peter Bellwoo

characterized this dispersal as “one of the most astonishing bo

colonization ... in early human history.” Recent genetic and p

ecological research has raised a number of challenges to this m

however, among them counterindicative DNA configuratio

archipelagic and Pacific populations of both humans and pig

indications of forest clearing in Sumatra as early as 5,000 year

These challenges suggest a more “entangled” and complicate

cess of change in which old and new populations, as well as the

ditions and technologies, interacted in many different ways o

long period of time. 

Evidence regarding social transformations during this perio

best indirect (and for Java and Sumatra, virtually absent), but 

ative models from European and continental Asian prehistory 

rarely to apply to the archipelago. Neither knowledge of agric

nor contact with outsiders always resulted in technological re

tion, for example, or rapid alteration in patterns of settlement. 

cal and economic changes occurred unevenly, and societies—

likelihood small, animist chieftainships—underwent no fundam

transformation. Thus the archipelago came to be marked by a p

of broad linguistic and cultural affinities but, at the same time

cate diversity. Virtually all of Indonesia’s subsequent history ha

played out against the background of this remarkable human we

Expanding Networks 

Many parts of the archipelago played a role in local and 

trading networks from early times, and some were further conn

to interregional routes reaching much farther corners of the 

Nearly 4,000 years ago, cloves—which until the seventeenth ce

grew nowhere else in the world except five small islan

Maluku—had made their way to kitchens in present-day Syri

about the same time, items such as shells, pottery, marble, and 

stones; ingots of tin, copper, and gold; and quantities of many 

goods were traded over a wide area in Southeast Asia. As early 

fourth century BC, materials from South Asia, the Mediterr

world, and China—ceramics, glass and stone beads, and co

began to show up in the archipelago. In the already well-deve

regional trade, bronze vessels and other objects, such as the spe

lar kettledrums produced first in Dong Son (northern Vietnam), 

lated in the island world, appearing after the second century BC 

Sumatra to Bali and from Kalimantan and Sulawesi to the easter

6 
of Maluku. Around 2,000 years ago, Javanese and Balin

themselves producing elegant bronze ware, which was trade

and has been found in Sumatra, Madura, and Maluku. In a

trade, including that with the furthest destinations, people

archipelago appear to have dominated, not only as producers 

sumers or sellers and buyers, but as shipbuilders and owners

tors, and crew. The principal dynamic originated in the arc

This is an important point, for historians have often mistake

both the trade itself and the changes that stemmed from it 

quent centuries as primarily the work of outsiders, leaving 

sians with little historical agency, an error often repeated in 

the origins and flow of change in more recent times as well. 

By the middle of the first millennium BC, the expansion of 

agriculture and, apparently more importantly, certain require

trade such as the control of local commodities, suggested ne

and political possibilities, which were seized by some com

For reasons not well understood, most—and all of th

endured—were located in the western archipelago. Already ac

with a wider world, these Indonesians were open to, an

actively sought out, new ideas of political legitimation, socia

and religious and artistic expression. Their principal sources 

China, with which ancient Indonesians were certainly acquai

in South Asia, in present-day India and Sri Lanka, whose 

appear to have more nearly reflected their own. This process 

tion and adaptation, which scholars have somewhat mis

referred to as a rather singular “Hinduization” or “Indianiz

perhaps better understood as one of localization or “Indonesia

of multiple South Asian traditions. It involved much local 

and accommodation (there were no Indian colonizations

undoubtedly began many centuries before its first fruits are cl

ible through the archaeological record. Early Indonesia did no

a mini-India. Artistic and religious borrowings were never ex

cations, and many key Indic concepts, such as those of cast

subordinate social position of women were not accepted. 

ideas filled particular needs or appealed to particular sensibi

at the same time they were anything but superficial; the rem

their further elaboration are still very much in evidence today

Early Hegemonies 

The Earliest Historical Records 

Although some Indonesian peoples probably began writing o

able materials at an earlier date, the first stone inscriptions (in 
 

 

using an early Pallava script from southern India) date from the 

the fourth century AD (in the eastern Kalimantan locale of Kuta

from the early or mid-fifth century AD (in the western Java 

known as Taruma). These inscriptions offer a glimpse of leaders 

envisioning themselves not as mere chiefs (datu) but as kings or 

lords (raja, maharaja), taking Indic names and employing first 

manical Hindu, then Buddhist, concepts and rituals to inven

traditions justifying their rule over newly conceived social and po

hierarchies. In addition, Chinese records from about the same tim

vide scattered, although not always reliable, information about a n

of other “kingdoms” on Sumatra, Java, southwestern Kalimanta

southern Sulawesi, which, in the expanding trade opportunities 

early fifth century, had begun to compete with each other for adva

but we know little else about them. Historians have commonly 

stood these very limited data to indicate the beginnings of the form

of “states,” and later “empires” in the archipelago, but use of such 

is problematic. We understand that small and loosely organized co

nities consolidated and expanded their reach, some a great deal 

successfully than others, but even in the best-known cases we d

have sufficient specific knowledge of how these entities actually w

to compare them confidently with, for example, the states and emp

the Mediterranean region during the same period or earlier. More 

alized terms, such as “polities” or “hegemonies,” are suggestive of 

and political models that are more applicable. 

Srivijaya and Mataram 

Srivijaya 

Two great hegemonies dominate the period from about the 

sixth to eleventh centuries. The first is known as Srivijaya, a 

dhist trading kingship centered on the region of today’s c

Palembang, on the Musi River in present-day Sumatera S

Province. At its zenith in the ninth and tenth centuries, Sri

extended its commercial sway from approximately the souther

of Sumatra and the Strait of Malacca to western Java and sou

Kalimantan, and its influence as far away as locations on the M

Peninsula, present-day southern Thailand, eastern Kalimantan

southern Sulawesi (see fig. 2). It probably arose out of polic

war and alliance applied, perhaps rather suddenly, by one local 

to a number of trading partners and competitors. The proc

thought to have coincided with newly important direct sea trad

China in the sixth century, and by the second half of the sevent

tury Srivijaya had become a wealthy and culturally important 

8 
 

 

power. The Chinese pilgrim Yijing (635–713), who briefl

Srivijaya in 671 and 687 and then lived there from 687 to 

ommended it as a world-class center of Buddhist studies

tions from the 680s, written in Pallava script and the indige

Malay language (forerunner of contemporary Bahasa Ind

see Glossary), identified the realm and its ruler by n

demanded the loyalty of allies by pronouncing elaborate th

curses. 

Srivijaya’s preeminence depended in part on exercising 

of control over the burgeoning commerce moving through 

of Malacca. This it accomplished by mobilizing the policing 

ities of small communities of seafaring orang laut (Malay 

people), providing facilities and protection in exchange fo

able tax rates on maritime traders, and maintaining favora

tions with inland peoples who were the source of food and 

the trade goods on which commerce of the day was built. B

jaya also promoted itself as a commanding cultural center 

ideas from all over Buddhist Asia circulated and were redi

as far as away Vietnam, Tibet, and Japan. 

Mataram 

The second great hegemony, known as Mataram, arose 

jaya began to flourish in the early eighth century, in sout

Java on the Kedu Plain and southern slopes of Mount 

(Gunung Merapi). Mataram’s early formation is obscure and 

cated by the rivalry of two interrelated lines of aspiring pa

rulers, one supporting Shivaist Hinduism (the Sanjaya) and 

supporting Mahayana Buddhism (the Sailendra, who had 

cial and family connections with Srivijaya). At some point 

824 and 856, these lines were joined by marriage, probably 

a process by which the leaders of local communities (

rakryan) were incorporated into larger hierarchies with ru

aces, and court structures. In this process, the construction 

rately carved stone structures (candi) connecting local pow

Buddhist or Hindu worldviews played an important role. 

known and most impressive of these are the Borobudur, th

Buddhist edifice in the ancient world (constructed betwe

770 and 820 and located northwest of present-day Yogyak

the magnificent complex of Hindu structures at Prambanan

east of Yogyakarta and completed a quarter-century later. T

hundreds of other monuments built over a comparative

stretch of time in the eighth and ninth centuries suggest that 

and Indic (Buddhist and Hindu) ideas about power and sp
 

 

S

U

M A

T R A

M A L AY

P E N I N S U L A

Srivijaya

Palembang

Srivijaya 

Palembang 

Borobudur 

Prambanan Kediri 

Kahur

991–92

927 

767

774 

787 

KHMER 

KINGDOMS 

C

H

A M PA 

EAST JAVANESE KIN

(after 929) 

South 

China 

Sea 

Andaman 

Sea 

Strait of Malacca 

Sunda Strait 

J A V A 

KALIMAN

BANGKA 

S

U

M

A

T

R

A 

M A L AY 

P E N I N S U L A 

Mt. Merapi 

150 300 Kilometers 

0 150 300 Miles

0 

Mataram, 8th and 9th

 centuries 

Srivijaya Empire, ca. 1000 

Area dominated by

 Srivijayan fleets 

Partial Mataram control 

Partial Srivijaya control 

Sumatran military fleets 

Javanese military fleets 

Source: Based on information from Jan M. Pluvier, Historical Atlas of South-East Asi

York, 1995), Map 5; and Robert B. Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (Hon

2000), Map 3.5. 

Figure 2. Sumatra and Java from the Seventh Century to the Elevent

Century 

both competed and intermingled in a dynamic political and rel

atmosphere. 

Scholars have generally identified a highly productive irr

rice agriculture as the principal source of Mataram’s power, see

as a kind of inland, inward-looking antithesis to an outward-ori

maritime Srivijaya, but such a distinction is overdrawn. Centra

10 
 

 

 

was linked from a very early date to a larger world of comm

culture, through connections with ports not far away on Jav

coast. Like Srivijaya, Chinese, Indian, and other students of 

and Hindu thought visited Mataram, and Javanese ships tr

made war against competitors in the archipelago (including S

and as far away as present-day Cambodia, Vietnam, and pro

Philippines. Mataram was certainly not isolated from th

world, and in some respects its commercial life may have b

sophisticated than that of its Sumatran contemporary, as it m

mon use of gold and silver monetary units by the mid-ninth 

some 200 years earlier than Srivijaya. Politically, the two heg

were probably more alike than different. The rulers of both s

selves and their courts (kedatuan, keratuan, or kraton) as ce

land or realm (bhumi), which, in turn, formed the core of 

borderless, but concentric and hierarchically organized arra

of authority. In this greater mandala, an Indic-influenced re

tion of a sort of idealized, “galactic” order, a ruler emerged f

stellations of local powers and ruled by virtue of neither in

nor divine descent, but rather through a combination of 

(semangat), strategic family relationships, calculated manipu

order and disorder, and the invocation of spiritual ideas and 

ural forces. The exercise of power was never absolute, and w

rulers and (if they were to command loyalty) their supporte

take seriously both the distribution of benefits (rather than m

application of force or fear) and the provision of an “exemp

ter” enhancing cultural and intellectual life. In Mataram, o

and their courts do not, for example, appear to have controll

irrigation systems or the system of weekly markets, which 

the purview of those who dominated local regions (watak) 

populations. This sort of political arrangement was at once fr

remarkably supple, depending on the ruler and a host of sur

circumstances. 

Very little is known about social realities in Srivijaya and M

and most of what is written is based on conjecture. With the e

of the religious structures on Java, these societies were const

perishable materials that have not survived the centuries of 

tive climate and insects. There are no remains of either p

ordinary houses, for example, and we must rely on rare find

elry and other fine metalworking (such as the famous W

hoard, found near Prambanan in 1991), and on the stone relie

Borobudur and a handful of other structures, to attempt to gu

these societies may have been like. (The vast majority 

remains are Javanese.) A striking characteristic of both Sriv

Mataram in this period is that neither—and none of thei
 

 

rivals—appear to have developed settlements recognizable as 

from either Western or Asian traditions. On the whole, despit

dence of socioeconomic well-being and cultural sophistication, 

tutionally Srivijaya and Mataram remained essentially we

clanship and patronage, chieftainships carried to their highes

most expansive level. 

The Rise and Fall of Majapahit 

Successor Kingdoms of Java 

During the first decades of the tenth century, Java’s cen

political gravity shifted decisively from the island’s south-c

portion to the lower valley and delta regions of eastern Java’s 

tas River. The move reflected the Sanjaya line’s long-term inter

eastward expansion, a reaction to increasingly frequent vo

activity in central Java between the 880s and 920s, and econ

rivalry with Srivijaya. Eastern Java was a rich rice-growing r

and was also closer to the source of Malukan spices, whic

become trade items of growing importance. By the early ele

century, Srivijaya had been weakened by decades of warfare 

Java and a devastating defeat in 1025 at the hands of the C

Tamil (south Indian) maritime power. As Srivijaya’s hege

ebbed, a tide of Javanese paramountcy rose on the strength 

series of eastern Java kingdoms beginning with that of Airlang

1010–42), with its kraton at Kahuripan, not far from presen

Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province. A number of smaller realm

lowed, the best-known of which are Kediri (mid-eleventh to 

thirteenth centuries) and Singhasari (thirteenth century), with 

centers on the upper reaches of the Brantas River, on the we

east of the slopes of Mount Kawi (Gunung Kawi), respectively

In this region, continued population growth, political and m

rivalries, and economic expansion produced important chang

Javanese society. Taken together, these changes laid the ground

for what has often been identified as Java’s—and Indones

“golden age” in the fourteenth century. In Kediri, for example, 

developed a multilayered bureaucracy and a professional army

ruler extended control over transportation and irrigation and 

vated the arts in order to enhance his own reputation and that 

court as a brilliant and unifying cultural hub. The Old Javanese 

ary tradition of the kakawin (long narrative poem) rapidly d

oped, moving away from the Sanskrit models of the previous e

producing many key works in the classical canon. Kediri’s m

and economic influence spread to parts of Kalimantan and Sula

12 
Buddhist stupas on upper terrace of Borobudur, built c

Dieng Hindu temple complex, seventh and eighth cen

Jawa Tengah 

Courtesy Jenn
In Singhasari, which defeated Kediri in 1222, there arose an ag

sive system of state control, moving in new ways to incorp

local lords’ rights and lands under royal control and fosterin

growth of mystical Hindu-Buddhist state cults devoted to the p

of the ruler, who came to be accorded divine status. 

Founding and Growth of Majapahit, 1268–1389 

The greatest and most controversial of these kings was Kertan

(r. 1268–92), the first Javanese ruler to be accorded the title of 

prabu (literally, god-king). Largely by force or threat, Kertan

brought most of eastern Java under his control and then carri

military campaigns overseas, notably to Srivijaya’s successor, M

(then also known as Jambi), with a huge naval expedition in 12

Bali in 1282, and to areas in western Java, Madura, and the M

Peninsula. These imperial ambitions proved difficult and expe

however: the realm was perennially troubled by dissent at cou

rebellion both at home and in the subjugated territories. Much f

afield, Kertanagara had provoked the new Mongol rulers of 

Dynasty (1279–1368) China to attempt to check his expansion, 

they considered a threat to the region. But before their fleet of 

edly 1,000 ships and 100,000 men could land on Java, Kertan

had been assassinated by a vengeful descendent of the Kediri 

and in the convoluted events that followed, Kertanagara’s son-i

Raden Wijaya, succeeded in defeating both his father-in-law’s p

pal rival and the Mongol forces. In 1294 Wijaya ascended the t

as Kertarajasa, ruler of the new kingdom of Majapahit. 

Majapahit is generally regarded as having been the larges

modern state in the archipelago, and perhaps the most extensive 

of Southeast Asia. At its zenith under the fourth ruler, Hayam W

(known posthumously as Rajasanagara, r. 1350–89), and his 

minister, the former military officer Gajah Mada (in office 133

Majapahit’s authority appears to have extended over 20 eastern 

polities as direct royal domain; tributaries extending beyond 

claimed by Singhasari on Java, Bali, Sumatra, Kalimantan, an

Malay Peninsula; and trading partners or allies in Maluku 

Sulawesi, as well as present-day Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam

China. Majapahit’s power was built in part on military might, 

Gajah Mada used, for example, in campaigns against Melayu in 

and Bali in 1343. Its reach by force was limited, as in the failed 

paign in 1357 against Sunda in western Java, however, makin

kingdom’s economic and cultural vigor perhaps more importan

tors. Majapahit’s ships carried bulk goods, spices, and other 

commodities throughout the region (cargoes of rice from eastern 

14 
 

 

significantly altered the diet of Maluku at this time), spread t

Malay (not Javanese) as a lingua franca, and brought new

kingdom’s urban center at Trowulan, which covered appro

100 square kilometers and offered its inhabitants a remarka

standard of living. Majapahit’s writers continued the develop

literature and wayang (see Glossary) begun in the Kediri pe

best-known work today is Mpu Prapañca’s Desawarnañ

referred to as Nāgarakertāgama, composed in 1365, which 

us with an unusually detailed view of daily life in the kingdo

tral provinces. Many other classic works also date from thi

including the famous Panji tales, popular romances based on 

tory of eastern Java that were loved and borrowed by story

far away as Thailand and Cambodia. Many of Majapahit’s ad

tive practices and laws governing trade were admired and l

tated elsewhere, even by fledgling powers seeking independe

Javanese imperial control. 

The image of Majapahit as a glorious empire united unde

erful ruler has captured the imagination of many Indonesia

alists since the 1920s. The modern national motto Bhinneka 

Ika (roughly, “Unity in Diversity”) was drawn from Mpu T

poem “Sutasoma,” written during Hayam Wuruk’s reign; 

dent Indonesia’s first university took Gajah Mada’s name

contemporary nation’s communication satellites are named 

after the oath of abstinence Gajah Mada is said to have taken 

to achieve unity throughout the archipelago (nusantara). C

tion of a “Majapahit Park” (Taman Majapahit) on the Trow

began in 2008, with the purpose of raising pride in the natio

(Some Indonesians interpret things rather differently and 

park as an unwelcome reminder of Javanese dominance ove

of the archipelago, historically as well as in more recent tim

Majapahit did not unify the archipelago in any modern sen

ever, and its hegemony proved in practice to be fragile a

lived. Beginning shortly after Hayam Wuruk’s death, an ag

crisis; civil wars of succession; the appearance of strong 

rivals, such as Pasai (in northern Sumatra) and Melaka (on th

Peninsula); and restive vassal rulers eager for independence 

lenged the political-economic order from which Majapahit h

much of its legitimacy. Internally, the ideological order also 

falter as courtiers and others among the elite, perhaps follow

ular trends, abandoned Hindu-Buddhist cults centered on a 

kingship in favor of ancestral cults and practices focused on 

of the soul. In addition, new and often intertwined extern

also brought significant changes, some of which may have 

uted to the dissolution of Majapahit’s paramountcy. 
 

 

Outside Influences 

China 

One of these external forces was the growing influence of C

After the Mongol incursions, the early Majapahitan state di

have official relations with China for a generation, but it did 

Chinese copper and lead coins (pisis or picis) as official cur

which rapidly replaced local gold and silver coinage and pla

role in the expansion of both internal and external trade. By th

ond half of the fourteenth century, Majapahit’s growing appet

Chinese luxury goods such as silk and ceramics, and C

demand for such items as pepper, nutmeg, cloves, and aro

woods, fueled a burgeoning trade. China also became polit

involved in Majapahit’s relations with restless vassal p

(Palembang in 1377) and, before long, even internal dispute

Paregreg War, 1401–5). At the time of the celebrated state-spon

voyages of Chinese Grand Eunuch Zheng He between 140

1433, there were large communities of Chinese traders in majo

ing ports on Java and Sumatra; their leaders, some appointed b

Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) court, often married into the local 

lation and came to play key roles in its affairs. 

Islam 

Another external force of great importance was Islam, whic

been known in the archipelago since the eighth century but do

appear to have begun to take hold until the beginning of the thir

century at the earliest. The first Indonesian Islamic ruler in the 

pelago for whom we now have clear evidence was Sultan Sul

of Lamreh (northern Sumatra), who died in 1211; several 

Sumatran kings, probably influenced by traders and intelle

arriving from Gujarat and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, be

Muslims later in the thirteenth century. Javanese do not app

have begun conversion until well into the fifteenth century, d

several centuries’ presence there of foreign Muslims. Much o

story may not yet be clear to historians, however, for grav

Trowulan and Tralaya near the eastern Java heart of Hindu-Bu

Majapahit strongly suggest that some members of that state’s 

perhaps even of the court, had converted to Islam as early as 1

time when Majapahit and its state orthodoxies were still very m

the ascendent. The small trading port states on the Pasisir—

north coast—many of which later broke away from Majapahit’

trol, do not appear to have begun to convert to Islam until at lea

mid-fifteenth century. This probably developed from the influe

16 
 

 

Engraving from François Valentyn, Oud en nieuw O

(Old and New East Indies), Dordrecht, J. Van Braam, 

showing the volcano and harbor at Ternate in the Maluk

with an inset outline view of the D

Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 

LC–USZ262–64526, digital ID cph 

Chinese, Cham, and Chinese-Javanese Muslim merchants an

a result of the efforts of the so-called Nine Saints (wali song

of whom were probably Chinese-Javanese and others conne

Indian and Persian Islam. The conversion of the eastern arc

began with the king of Ternate in 1460, but that region 

widely Islamized until the sixteenth and seventeenth centurie

The spread of Islam in the archipelago is not well unders

torically, and, especially regarding this early period, scho

tinue to disagree on many fundamental points, such as th

sources and nature of Muslim influence and the attractions 

religion held for those who eventually adopted it. It is not 

example, whether individuals—rulers, elites, or commone

verted for essentially practical considerations (such as the o

real economic and political advantages of joining the um
community of believers), because of alienation from existing 

and political values (in the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, for exam

or out of an intrinsic interest in the new spiritual and cultural 

Islam brought with it. Nor is it always obvious why some co

sions appear to have been peaceful and others coercive and eve

lent, or why some indigenous histories emphasize “miraculou

magical elements in conversions and others do not. Whatev

case, Islamization was not an event, or even a series of event

rather a long, variegated, and evolutionary process best under

in terms of local, rather than universal, patterns. 

Portugal 

A third external force came into play with the arrival of the 

guese in the archipelago. They reached the rich and expa

Melaka, on the Malay Peninsula, in 1509 and sought trading 

there. Some in Melaka’s cosmopolitan trading community wan

accept them (perhaps as a counterweight against Sultan Mah

controversial imperial policies), but others did not, heightening 

ing political tensions. When the Portuguese returned in 1511 

manded by the more demanding Alfonso de Albuquerque

defeated Melaka militarily, soon establishing themselves in the 

ing ports of Banten (western Java) and Ternate (Maluku), and 

tacting the much reduced Majapahit kingdom at Kediri in e

Java. These events do not, as is sometimes suggested, mark the b

ning of Western colonial rule, or even European primacy, in In

sia; that lay far in the future. Rather, the “Western intrusion” w

this stage merely one dynamic bound up, in often unpredictable 

with many others. Thus, the final days of Majapahit, weaken

internal division, were determined by Trenggana, the half-Ch

Muslim ruler of its former vassal port Demak, who in 1527 

quered Kediri for reasons that had as much to do with econom

political rivalry (with Banten, the Portuguese, and Majapahit’s 

nants) as they did with religious struggle (with both Christianit

Hindu-Buddhist ideology). 

The Early Modern Era 

Commercial Developments 

The period between the mid-fifteenth century and the end 

eighteenth century was a time of turbulence and profound chan

the archipelago. Java lost much of its commanding position a

states, some great and some small, also raced to acquire wealt

exercise power. Urban populations grew rapidly, and with the

18 
 

 

 

influence of expanding commercial elites. New technolo

example in weaponry and ship design, changed the face 

And Islam extended its reach at the same time as a wide v

influences diversified and secularized culture. It was also 

which Europeans began to play a direct role in the arch

affairs, although they did not rule it, and Chinese merch

laborers became more important. All of this took place in th

of a commercial boom that greatly expanded prosperity 

greatly heightened competition and exposed Indonesia direc

swift and often dangerous currents of what might justif

called the “first globalization” (see fig. 3). 

This early modern age of commerce was initially fuele

buying and selling of Indonesian spices, the production of w

limited and the sources often remote. Nutmeg (and mace) co

the nut of the tree Myristica fragrans, which, until the late ei

century, grew almost exclusively on six tiny islands in th

Archipelago, some 300 kilometers west of the Papua coas

are the dried flower buds of the tree Syzygium aromaticum, 

vation of which until the mid-seventeenth century was larg

ited to a handful of small islands off the west coast of Halm

the Maluku Islands. These spices had long been distributed 

est quantities via the trade networks of the archipelago. Af

1450, however, demand and the ability to pay for them clim

idly in both China and Europe. In the century between the 1

the 1490s, for example, European imports of cloves ros

1,000 percent, and of nutmeg nearly 2,000 percent, and con

rise for the next 120 years. Another product, black peppe

nigrum), was grown more easily and widely (on Java, Sum

Kalimantan), but it too became an object of steeply rising w

demand. These changing global market conditions lay at th

of fundamental developments, not only in systems of supply 

tribution but in virtually all aspects of life in the archipelago

Westerners and Indigenous Powers 

Until the challenge of direct traders from Europe (first th

guese and Spanish at the beginning of the sixteenth century

Dutch, English, and others at the end of it) and renewed inte

the Chinese (after the Ming government relaxed prohibition

vate overseas trade in the mid-sixteenth century), Indones

virtually exclusive control of the spice trade, and decisive 

the extensive exchange of luxury and bulk goods that acco

it. Over a period of about 250 years, however, they gradu

their commercial primacy and, in some cases, much of their 
 

Luwu 1667 BURU

1657

SERAM

S U L A

W E S I

Makassar 

Luwu

1667 

Gowa

1667 

Dili 

Piru

1647 

Ternate

1607,1683

Tidore

1657,1667 

Ambon1605 

Bone

1667 

Sulawesi Sea

Flores Sea

Sawu Sea 

a M kas as r Str ait 

Seram 

Sea 

B

a

n d a 

S e a 

Ma ul ku 

e S a 

SUMBAWA

1673–74 

SERAM

HALMAHERA

1669 

BURU

1657 

1658 

1669 

BANDA

ARCHIPELAGO

1609–21 

SULA

1652 

OBI

1682 

O R 

SUM

MALUKU 

F L O R 

E

S

1653 

S

U

L

A

W

E

S I 

BUTUNG

1613,1667

(sovereignty renounced byGowa 1667, by Ternate 1683) 

(seceded from Terna et 1683) 

(Spanish occupation

1606–63) (ceded to Dutch by Ternate 1677) 

Sultanate of Ternate until 1677Sultanate of Tidore

Makassar (Gowa) kingdom and

dependencies recognizingits suzerainty until 1667

Portuguese and territories

 claimed by Portugal

Area under Dutch control

before 1803

Dates refer to Dutch influence,

 occupation, establishment of

effective control, or formal

 suzerainty 

1605

20 
 

independence. This crucial process was far too complex to b

stood simply as a struggle between East and West, or Ch

and Islam, or “modern” and “traditional” technology. Europ

only warred vigorously among themselves, but they routine

themselves with local powers, many of them Muslim, and 

participants in local rivalries; they also frequently found t

weaponry did not give them obvious superiority over in

powers, who purchased both light and heavy firearms an

times, as in Java well into the eighteenth century, were able 

facture serviceable copies of European models. Europea

their position fluctuated as a result of a multitude of factors

them well beyond their control. 

Some of these complexities can be glimpsed in a brief h

Ternate, Maluku, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth cen

1512 seven Portuguese arrived in Ternate as the guests o

Abu Lais (r. ?–1522), having been rescued by fishermen fro

wreck of their locally built vessel (their original ship had be

unreliable to continue in service) loaded with spices purc

Banda. The sultan sought an alliance with the Portuguese, 

he had already heard, and was eager to exchange cloves f

tance against the rival sultanate of Tidore. When Spani

arrived in Maluku in 1521, Sultan Mansur of Tidore sealed 

agreement with them, to which the Portuguese soon respo

building a large stone fortress on Ternate. This act tou

decades of warfare among Europeans and their local allies, 

political control, economic ascendancy, and religious ide

were contested. But it also brought change in Ternate itsel

ruler there became essentially a prisoner of the Portugues

increasingly arbitrary and oppressive interference in loca

including spice production and harvesting, eventually tur

former allies against them. Under the leadership of Sultan 

(r. 1570–83), Islam became a powerful tool with which to cr

ances and gather widespread opposition to the Portuguese

siege in 1575 against the Ternate fort, he ousted the Po

forces. Babullah allowed a limited contingent of Portugu

chants to continue trading in Ternate, but the fort became 

residence, and the sultanate rapidly expanded its reach to ke

ports as far away as northern and southern Sulawesi until th

of the Dutch touched off new and even more complex strug

Elsewhere in the archipelago over the course of the sev

century, indigenous and outside powers engaged in a mul

struggle for control of maritime trade. Rapidly rising pro

this trade fueled the growth of ambitious states, the most i

of which were Aceh (northern Sumatra), Banten (weste
 

 

 

Makassar (southern Sulawesi), and Mataram (central and e

Java). The most important outside power was the Dutch-run U

East Indies Company (VOC; for this and other acronyms, see 

A). Each of the indigenous states experienced a slightly differe

jectory during this period, but the essential contest was betw

pattern of heavily state-controlled trade on the one hand and, o

other, a still tentatively oligarchical pattern, in which the so-

orang kaya or merchant elite, and often allied religious and 

tional elites, played significant political and economic roles. 

The best-known example is Aceh, which arose in the mid

the sixteenth century, partly as an effort to control dissension a

northern Sumatran and Malay polities and partly to contro

Malay trade, which had dispersed after 1511. (Although Aceh

ers were often serious about promoting Islam, their major m

efforts were over commercial rather than religious affairs, and 

directed against Muslim as well as Christian rivals.) Aceh reach

apogee under Sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–36). He pursu

aggressive military policy against neighboring powers, incl

Portuguese Melaka; he presided over a centralized and increa

authoritarian state; he exercised arbitrary power, including att

ing to establish royal monopolies, over the trading activitie

even the private property of the orang kaya. He invested in 

heavily armed seagoing ships—one, called Terror of the Uni

was more than 90 meters long and carried more than 700 me

new design to compete with European and Chinese vessels. Th

tan also practiced an assertive foreign policy, playing Europea

Asian powers against each other. 

The ruthlessness of Iskandar Muda’s regime made many ene

however, and nearly caused a civil war. Its economic gains, 

than bringing about a permanent transformation of the politic

economic structure of Aceh, proved ephemeral. The orang 

reasserted themselves and sought ways to restrict royal power. 

the end of the seventeenth century, for example, they succes

sponsored a succession of female rulers, perhaps because they 

sidered women to be either more moderate or more easily ma

lated than men. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

their influence and that of the court declined as that of hereditar

trict chiefs (uleëbalang) and Muslim leaders rose. The Ace

state thus lost its imperial authority and much of its political c

ence. Nevertheless—and unlike most of its contemporary reg

states—Aceh remained an important local power and continu

be an economic force to be reckoned with, for example prod

more than half the world’s pepper supply as late as about 1820. 

did not hesitate to ally itself with Dutch forces in an attack on P

22 
 

guese Melaka in 1641, but in subsequent years it alone am

great nascent states of the early modern archipelago ma

avoid entanglement with the VOC, retaining its independe

the late nineteenth century. 

The Role of the Dutch United East Indies Company

1602–19 

A common historical perspective on the seventeenth a

teenth centuries is to portray the VOC as a uniquely powerfu

and economic juggernaut that steadily and deliberately co

the empire that came to be known as the Netherlands East I

the twentieth century, such a view was frequently shared b

colonial officials and Indonesian nationalists, who spoke 

years of Dutch rule” in the archipelago. The truth, however, w

modest. The VOC was neither the “first (modern) multinati

poration,” as has sometimes been claimed, nor the instrum

state policy of colonial expansion. It was founded in the Ne

in 1602 as an effort to manage the competition and risk of the 

number of Dutch expeditions to the Indonesian archipelago 

panies, 10 voyages, and 65 ships between 1595 and 1601

compete with the East India Company, formed by the Eng

years earlier, for control of the Asian trade. The VOC’s initi

established its sole right among Dutch enterprises to do bu

Asia and gave it exceptional powers, such as those of ke

army and using military force, making treaties with local rule

ing fortifications, and issuing coinage. In addition, it called 

government oversight and did not require the new compan

dividends to investors at the end of each voyage (as had been 

tice), allowing it to amass large sums of money over longer p

time. The purpose of this state-supported enterprise was pri

make a profit. At home the directors, known as the Heer

(Seventeen Gentlemen), recognized that fighting wars, est

colonies (rather than simple trading posts and fortificatio

becoming involved in local disputes diminished profits, and 

erally warned against such activities. 

Far away in the archipelago, VOC representatives, appoin

1610 as governors general, tended to see the warring and 

involvement as necessary and pursued them anyway, ofte

ously. Even the more ambitious of their efforts, howev

restrained by certain realities. Above all, the VOC was n

enough or strong enough to dominate the entire archipelag

people, and indeed the company found it impossible to en

will in local affairs without Indonesian allies, who frequently 
 

a high price for their assistance and whose loyalty could nev

taken for granted. It was also the case that even when it had its w

for example, by gaining control of specific trading ports or rou

of the main areas in which particular spices were produced—

ventions by the VOC often had unintended short- and long-term 

sequences that it could do little to control. Finally, of cours

VOC’s fortunes were subject to the vagaries of a trading system 

stretched far beyond the archipelago, including the rise and 

world demand for spices and, later, for other products on wh

came to depend, such as coffee. In the course of nearly two cen

the company failed to control the spice trade and establish the 

conditions necessary for mercantile growth, and came to rule 

only minute patches of territory, except for small areas in Malu

the seventeenth century and Java in the eighteenth. 

Nevertheless, the VOC had a shaping influence in the archip

In what today is eastern Indonesia, the company—with, it is imp

to reiterate, the help of indigenous allies—between 1610 and 

fundamentally altered the terms of the traditional spice trade by 

bly limiting the number of nutmeg and clove trees, ruthlessly co

ling the populations that grew and prepared the spices for the m

and aggressively using treaties and military means to establish 

hegemony in the trade. One result of these policies, exacerbat

the late-seventeenth-century fall in the global demand for spice

an overall decline in regional trade, an economic weakenin

affected the VOC itself as well as indigenous states, and in 

areas occasioned a withdrawal from commercial activity. Others 

the rise of authoritarian rulers dependent on VOC support and 

among groups—traditional leaders, merchants, religious and m

figures—who opposed one or the other or both. Among the 

prominent examples are those found in the histories of Ternate 

time of Sultan Mandar (r. 1648–75) and the wars against Hit

Hoamoal (1638–56), and of southern Sulawesi in the era of the 

tious Buginese (Bone) prince Arung Palakka (1634–96) and the 

against the Makassarese (Gowa) and others. By the end of the s

teenth century, the glories of the spice trade had faded, and the v

of the large and small states of the post-Majapahit era had 

sapped; the weight of affairs had again begun to shift west, to Ja

The Javanese and the VOC, 1619–1749 

In 1619 the VOC had seized Jayakerta (Sunda Kelapa), a sm

well-protected west Javanese port it had originally contracted f

disgruntled vassal of the sultanate of Banten, renaming it Ba

forerunner of today’s Jakarta. The resolute Governor Gener

24 
 

Copper coins used in Indonesian colonial trade: A Netherlands E

(VOC) one duit has on the obverse the crowned arms of Utrecht

was minted; the reverse shows the VOC monogram and the date 

Chinese one cash reads Qianlong Tongbao (Qianlong [the 

general treasury)—which dates the coin between 1736 and 179

obverse, and the reverse has the Manchu-language inscription chu

the Board of Revenue Mint 

Courtesy Robert 

Pieterszoon Coen (in office 1619–23 and 1627–29) had con

this port as a kind of fulcrum of the company’s far-flung Asi

prise, and he defended it vigorously against both Bante

briefly with England’s East India Company) and, in 1628

powerful land and sea forces of the expanding central Javan

that had taken the name of Mataram, after the ninth-century k

Mataram’s ruler, Sultan Agung (r. 1613–46), was Java’s grea

rior king since Kertanagara nearly four centuries earlier. U

force and a keen sense of traditional diplomatic opportunitie

Agung assembled a realm that consisted of all of Java and 

(including the powerful kingdom of Surabaya) except Bant

far west and the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Blambangan 

east. Sukadana and Banjarmasin on Kalimantan also fell u
 

 

 

 

sway. He was not, however, able to dislodge the VOC, and aft

failed campaign of 1628–29 he appears to have accepted the 

presence as a minor irritant. Contemporaneous Javanese hist

works treated the company more as a potential ally than as a s

threat, a view that persisted among many in court circles for an

century or more. And, indeed, at the time the VOC was neither 

ested in nor capable of tackling the full force of Mataram, 

despite the destruction and political tensions wrought by near

years of expansion remained a formidable military power. The 

pany saw itself as a maritime power, a rival for the control of pr

and trade rather than territory, and it sought stable conditions 

activities rather than upheaval (see fig. 4). 

Conditions began to change, however, during the disastrous 

of Sultan Agung’s son, Amangkurat I (r. 1646–77), who lack

father’s talents but sought to further strengthen the realm by ce

izing authority, monopolizing control of resources, and destr

all real or imagined opposition. His misguided efforts to c

trade revenues by twice closing the ports of the Pasisir, and 

destroying Javanese trading vessels and forbidding Javanese 

overseas, had the opposite effect, in addition to alienating the 

mercial community and damaging the wider economy of prod

His obsessive fear of opposition led him to kill more than 

Muslim leaders and their families in a single, well-planned m

cre, and to murder hundreds of court officials and members 

aristocracy, including his own family, actions that of course 

increased the hatred and intrigues aimed at removing him. Hi

tude toward the VOC was ambivalent, for, on the one han

admired its apparent wealth and power and considered it a pot

ally and protector, yet on the other hand he sought to bend it 

will and to extract all he could from its representatives in Ba

Beginning in the early 1670s, rebellions began to rise, the most 

erful of which was led by Raden Trunajaya (ca. 1649–8

Madurese aristocrat conspiring with a disaffected son of Ama

rat I and allied with Makassarese and other forces. Truna

armies won a decisive victory in 1676 and looted the capital th

lowing year. Mataram was disintegrating. 

In the course of this conflict, both sides requested assistance 

the VOC, which now faced a momentous decision. The com

sought political stability and a reliable supply of such key pro

as rice and teak, and it determined for the first time in more t

half-century that, in order to obtain them, intervention in Mata

internal affairs was necessary. Company officials viewed Jav

kingship through a European lens as a relatively absolutist, ce

ized form of rule that legitimated succession by, if not strict p

26 
 

 

geniture, then something very close to it. This was a misre

Javanese (and, indeed, other Indonesian) cultural custom, b

theless the VOC gradually came to see itself as the upholder 

(tradition) and to justify its actions in terms of favoring c

rather than change. It made its choices accordingly, often 

ironic result of creating rather than solving discord and of w

rather than strengthening the sorts of order it hoped to ac

any case, the VOC decided in 1676 to back the forces of A

rat I, who died soon after having fled to VOC-controlled ter

the Pasisir, and then to support his rebellious son as suc

project requiring five more years of warfare to complete. T

pany gained treaties promising, among other things, acce

products and trading rights it sought, as well as repayment 

military costs. That these treaty obligations proved difficult 

did not negate the fact that the VOC had now embarked on 

that slowly and expensively intertwined its own fate wit

Mataram. The dark legacy of Amangkurat’s tyrannical mis

lay not only in 80 years of turbulence in Javanese life, punct

three destructive wars of succession, but also in the establis

patterns of Dutch entanglement in indigenous affairs that 

outlive the VOC itself. 

Decline of the VOC, 1749–1816 

By the mid-eighteenth century, the VOC and the court of M

at the same time rivals and allies, were exhausted by war. T

ruler, Pakubuwana II (r. 1726–49), with his kingdom still th

by rebellion from within and his court deeply divided over th

course for the future, ceded Mataram to the company, perha

ing in this way to save it. The treaty was of little importance 

it could not be enforced and the VOC was incapable of rul

but it was followed in 1755 by the Treaty of Giyanti, which im

different solution. Mataram was to be ruled by two royal co

at Surakarta (also known as Solo) and one at Yogyakart

which the junior courts of Mangkunegaran (1757) and Pak

(1812), respectively, later evolved by apportioning appana

among them. This division produced an extended period 

lasting well into the nineteenth century, from which the Javan

ulace benefited economically. The courts, particularly that o

karta, made use of their considerable autonomy and 

prosperity and power, while the VOC consolidated its contro

Pasisir and pursued its commercial ventures. Although clear

nized (and often resented) as the paramount power, the 

interested itself in the courts’ affairs and played a role in 
 SUMATRA 

Java Sea Banten Jayakerta 1611–18/Batavia 1619 1619
 Banten


1678–1743 

Rembang 

Tuban 1743 1705 

Gresik

Northeast Coastal

Districts 1743 

Jepara

Cirebon 1610–1708

Demak MADURA 

1684–1809 

Priangan Region Cirebon Pekalongan Semarang 1677 1681–1705 

Mancanegara 1602–15 Surabaya Sampang (Outer Districts) Madiun Surakarta 1830 

100 200 Kilometers 

200 Miles 100

0 0

Populated placeUnder nominally independent rulersDate refers to Dutch establishment of trading posts and territories ceded to Dutch control

1619

Date refers to division of Mataram (1755–57)

Yogyakarta BALI (1755–57) (1755–57) Kediri Pasuruan

Yogyakarta Blambangan Surakarta Malang 1743 1667–68, 1777 

1768 

Indian Ocean

Source: Based on information from Robert B. Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (Honolulu, 2000), Maps 3.21, 3.25, 3.26, and 3.50; Jan M. Pluvier, Historical 

Atlas of South-East Asia (New York, 1995), Maps 22 and 23; and D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (New York, 1981), 351. 

28 
 

who reigned but refrained from meddling too deeply. It was 

conquest. 

The peace was in many respects also strange, for rather 

tling Java into a calm “traditional” existence, it provided th

for ongoing social and cultural ferment as Javanese reasse

only their past but also their present. The literary reflection

crisis have been insufficiently studied, but works ascribed to 

karta court poets Yasadipura I (1729–1803) and his son Yasa

(? –1844), for example, suggest that efforts to reexamine an

ize old histories failed, not least because the ability to read th

rately had been lost, and that attempts to understand the Ja

we might say, “Javaneseness”—of their own day led freq

searing critiques of their own social hierarchy and customs, a

those of foreigners and Islam. This sort of questioning and 

ness was not necessarily fatal, however, and might under diff

cumstances have permitted a continuation of the equilibrium 

achieved or even conceivably have led to a kind of Javanes

sance and a different, more advantageous relationship with th

But changes in the larger world determined otherwise. 

In the early 1780s, the last in a series of wars with the Br

the Netherlands, including the VOC and its far-flung 

dearly. Nearly half the company’s ships were lost, and muc

valuable cargoes; enormous debts accumulated, which, des

loans, could not be repaid. While the company certainly 

dened with other fiscal and administrative problems, amon

high level of corruption among its employees, the British w

to have been the critical factor in its fiscal collapse. In 1796 

was placed under the direction of a national committee unti

of 1799, when it was liquidated, its debts and possessions 

by the Dutch government. 

By this time, however, the Napoleonic wars had brought t

erlands under French control, and in rapid succession th

VOC territories fell under the direction of leaders appo

France—the military officer Herman Willem Daendels from 

1811—and, after Napoleon’s defeat, by Britain, which appo

East India Company official, Thomas Stamford Raffles

period 1811–16. Daendels and Raffles saw themselves a

reformers, enemies of feudal privilege and practices such 

labor and delivery of produce, proponents of the welfare of 

mon folk, and opponents of corruption and inefficiency

sought to “free” Javanese laborers by instituting a system 

rent, in which farmers grew cash crops and sold them in ord

the government for the use of the land. But the sharpest br

VOC practice lay in the assumption by the new powers of s
 

 

rights over the Javanese courts, treating rulers and courtiers 

allies but as clear subordinates, and their representatives not as 

lords but as mere bureaucratic officeholders. Both men inte

directly in court affairs. Daendels replaced Yogyakarta’s rule

suspicion of rebellion) and annexed territory by force of arms

fles actually bombarded and looted the Yogyakarta court (f

same reason), establishing the Pakualaman from some of its 

nage lands, and exiled an unruly Surakarta prince. These act

the attitudes behind them, foreshadowed nothing less than a ne

for the archipelago, an age of Dutch colonial rule. 

Development of European Colonial Rule 

End of the Ancien Régime in Java, 1816–34 

In 1816 the Netherlands regained responsibility for the 

Indies—actually a welter of mostly coastal territories, some 

trolled directly and many others engaged through varying trea

but the way forward was uncertain (see, for example, fig. 5)

growth of trade with Sulawesi and the establishment of plan

economies, especially those producing sugar (eastern and c

Java) and coffee (western Java and western Sumatra) had beg

loosen customary ties and introduce elites to new sources of 

riches and indebtedness. In Java, the general population incr

and grew more prosperous but, on the other hand, fell vict

increasing crime, heavier taxation, and exploitation by local 

nese, especially in their roles of tax farmers, tollkeepers, and l

of plantation lands. The legitimacy of ruling elites was quest

more widely. Both traditionalists and Muslims felt their ways 

threatened by changes they tended to identify with growing 

pean influence. A Dutch decision in 1823 to end what it view

the abusive leasing of land and labor among central Java’s ar

racy alienated many who had begun to adjust to the new ci

stances and pushed them to support rebellion. The g

atmosphere of restlessness in a time of change that few under

also became charged with superstition and millennial expectati

reaction to crop failures, outbreaks of disease, and, near Yogya

a destructive eruption of the Mount Merapi volcano. 

The struggle known as the Java War (1825–30) was led by a 

fected prince of the Yogyakarta court, Diponegoro (1785–1855

was a complex figure who opposed rule by both the Dutch an

complicit Javanese ruler and aristocracy, and whose rebellion 

therefore be seen as a Javanese civil war—although not one pr

ily concerned with questions of succession, as in the eighteenth 

30 
 

 

 

 

 

tury—at least as much as an anticolonial one. Despite his 

Indonesian status as a national hero, Diponegoro appears 

sought merely to have relations with the Dutch return to 

they had assumed in late VOC times, and certainly had no 

tion of a broader Indonesian nation. 

Diponegoro was able to attract, for a time, the loyalty 

who felt the crumbling of the previous order in different w

had a variety of social and moral expectations. He was s

ously as a protector of the general populace, as both a Musl

traditionalist messianic figure, a Ratu Adil (just king), a

upholder of social hierarchy under a reformed or purified 

racy. These alliances proved fragile, however. There were 

internal tensions, for example, disagreements between th

had fought for religious reasons (responding to Diponegoro

ration of a Muslim holy war, or jihad) and those, especiall

the court elite, who had done so for essentially secular reas

difficulty of the war itself, for which the Dutch devised new 

strategies and which spread destruction on a scale unseen in 

tions, was extreme: about two-thirds of Java was affected, 

of its cultivated land was laid waste; and approximately 

Javanese and 15,000 government troops (8,000 of whom we

peans) were killed. Backed initially by about half of Yog

ruling elite, by early 1830 Diponegoro had lost most of their 

as well as that of both his chief military commander and 

influential Muslim patron and his followers. Abandoned by 

few loyal comrades, he attended a peace discussion with th

commander of government forces at which he was arrested 

into exile. He died imprisoned in the government fort in Ma

The conclusion of the Java War marked the end of Java’s o

and political order. The government in Batavia sharply red

lands under the courts’ control, and the fiction of Mataram fin

way to what were now termed merely the vorstenlanden (princ

and seen as comparatively minor vestigial powers. The Javan

acquiesced, although not without some resentment, in part 

another war was inconceivable and in part because they calcu

acquiescence was necessary if they were to retain anything 

their privileged socioeconomic status. At the same time, the e

war made equally clear that a new era had begun—not only 

but for the broader archipelago—an era in which the governm

Netherlands assumed full sovereignty. It began to oversee its t

through the new Ministry of Colonies (established in 1834), a

strikingly different attitude toward indigenous peoples. As J. 

(1789–1859), the first governor general of the Netherlands E

with full executive authority (1834–36), stated succinctly, “W
Under Dutch direct rule in 1816 

Part of Ternate Sultanate until 1907 

State of Luwu 

Claimed by Luwu until 1905 

In treaty relations with Dutch as of 1824 

Region boundaries 

Date refers to Dutch occupation 

Date refers to direct Dutch control 

Populated place 

(1905) 

1860 

Sulawesi Sea 

LUWU 

LAIWUI 

B A N G G A I

B U T U N G

MANDAR

FEDERATION

CLAIMED

BY LUWU

(1905)

Makassar 

LUWU 

CLAIMED 

BY LUWU 

(1905) 

1889 

1860 

(1905) 

(1906) LAIWUI 

GOWA 

1911 

BONE 

ADJATAPPARANG 

FEDERATION 

MASENREMPULU 

FEDERATION 

SOPENG 

WAJO 

D 

O

N

G

G A L A 

B A N G G A I 

B U T U N G 

(1905–6) 

MANDAR

FEDERATION 

(1906–7) 

Gulf of Tomini 

Gulf of 

Bone 

Gulf of 

Tolo 

Maluku S

Banda Sea 

Makassar Strait 

Source: Based on information from Jan M. Pluvier, Historical Atlas of South-East Asia 

York, 1995), Map 40. 

Figure 5. Sulawesi in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 

rulers and they are the ruled.” The resulting colonial state did not 

suddenly into existence, however, but developed in stages, from h

arrangements of convenience to a modernizing administrative 

ture, over the course of more than a century. 

32 
 

Establishment of the Colonial State 

The Dutch colonial state had its foundation in conquest. U

violence used earlier by the VOC, the military expansion of 

teenth century was deliberately territorial and penetrated fa

the coastal areas. It generally had as its goal fundamenta

change and—although in truth this was often beyond Batavi

bility—the establishment of control by a centralized author

different from the eighteenth century, too, colonial forces e

degree of technological superiority over most of their adve

result of the industrial revolution. And, whereas the VOC ha

with an assortment of indigenous allies, now the colonial sta

for its own interests, engaging indigenous men as soldiers. T

nial government’s separate fighting force, known as the Roya

lands Indies Army (KNIL), was founded only a few week

Diponegoro’s surrender in 1830. Although assigned the task 

taining rust en orde (tranquillity and order) throughout the 

state’s territories, the KNIL became best known for its role in 

nial wars of expansion. Dominated by ethnic Dutch, and later 

officers, in the mid-nineteenth century about two-thirds 

troops were Indonesians, predominantly Javanese and Ambo

the rest “European,” a confusing category that included not o

Europeans but also a small number of black Africans and othe

Modern military intrusions began at about the same tim

Java War and lasted into the early twentieth century. Their 

stances varied. In some instances, such as that of the Pa

(1821–37) in Minangkabau in western Sumatra, the milita

tance of the colonial government was sought by indigenous 

in this case members of the aristocracy and some village cla

beleaguered by Wahhabi-influenced Muslim reformers. The r

were defeated, but the aristocracy and clan leaders eventuall

dered their powers to the colonial state. In other examples

those of Banjarmasin (southern Kalimantan, 1857–59) and 

bang (southern Sumatra, 1823–49), the government imposed 

deposed rulers without invitation, but with similar results. 

against the great power of Aceh (northern Sumatra, 1873–1

the most extensive and costly of all these conflicts. The Dutch 

it because of the imperial designs of other Western powers, 

cial and military competition from the Acehnese, and the spr

Aceh of anti-Western, anticolonial Muslim movements. Fo

Batavia appeared to take up the cause of the uleëbalang, or tr

and more secular elite, as had been the case in Minangkabau

was a temporary tactic, and in any case the uleëbalang too 

subservient to the colonial state, which finally annexed Aceh 
 

 

Among the last conflicts were those in Bali and Lombok, 

the intervention of colonial forces after 1840 had been limit

part by fierce Balinese resistance. After the mid-1880s, how

warfare and rebellion in a number of Balinese kingdoms, and 

interest in controlling the important, ongoing local trade in 

and opium, led the colonial state to apply increasing military 

sure. It conquered Lombok in 1894, and, between 1906 and 

the last independent Balinese rulers submitted. In the kingdo

Badung, Tabanan, Klungkung, and others, the rajas and their 

lies and followers sacrificed themselves in dramatic frontal as

on the KNIL guns. These puputan, or ritual suicides, killed hun

of men, women, and children, decimating the aristocracy and o

ating all meaningful further resistance to the expansion of co

rule in Bali. With smaller campaigns to establish claims of co

sovereignty in Timor and Flores between 1908 and 1910, the N

lands East Indies reached, at least in outline, its final extent, in

ing far-off territories such as the Kai Islands (in southe

Maluku) and Papua (on the island of New Guinea). 

The Cultivation System 

A colonial state aimed at managing the territories and p

acquired as a result of these conquests—or “pacifications,” as 

preferred to describe them—emerged gradually and piecem

first began to take shape around the time of Diponegoro’s d

with the inauguration in Java of policies that came to be kno

the Cultivation System (Cultuurstelsel). This was the brainch

Johannes van den Bosch, a military man and social reforme

became governor general (1830–34) and later minister of co

(1834–39). He sought to solve the fiscal problems of Batavia a

Netherlands, both of which were on the brink of bankruptcy, a

as those of a populace devastated by warfare on Java. Van den B

believed that Java was a rich but underproductive land, prim

because Javanese farmers, even when their own prosperity w

stake, would not or could not produce beyond a subsistence 

unless guided, even compelled, to do so. “Force,” he wrot

everywhere the basis of industry ... where it does not exist th

neither industry nor civilization.” 

Van den Bosch’s plan forced Java’s farmers either to use ex

agricultural lands or open new ones in order to cultivate cro

export, deliver them to the government at fixed prices, and utili

income to offset or pay the government taxes on their land

crops first targeted were sugar and indigo, but coffee and p

were soon added, followed by newer crops, such as tea, tobacc

34 
 

Dutch official’s home in Surab

Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 

LC–USZ62–105190, digital ID cph 

cinnamon. Unlike the system that Raffles had contemplated

Bosch proposed dealing with whole villages rather than ind

and using government officials and local authorities (who re

percentage of revenues their areas generated) to regula

crops would be grown, on which and how much land, wi

and how much labor, and at what prices. Bringing the produ

world market through the Netherlands became the monopo

Netherlands Trading Association (NHM), a private com

which the Dutch king was a major stockholder. Entrepre

general were locked out of the state-run system. This appro

den Bosch argued, would assure production and profits grea

not only to subsidize the colonial administration and c

handsomely to the treasury of the Netherlands but also to 

tially improve the well-being of the Javanese. Scholars an

cians alike have been arguing ever since over what ex

results were. 

There is little doubt that fiscally, and from a government 

tive, the Cultivation System was an enormous success. Betw

and 1870, Java’s exports increased more than tenfold, an

nearly sevenfold; the colonial government regained solvenc

immediately and between 1832 and 1877 remitted a budgetar
 

(batig slot) totaling 823 million Dutch guilders to the treasury 

Netherlands, on average about 18 million guilders annually, ab

third of the national budget. It is no exaggeration to say that 

teenth-century Dutch prosperity rested very largely upon these f

Whether the Javanese benefited from or were impoverished 

Cultivation System, however, is much less clear. Generalization 

this question is made particularly difficult by the fact that the s

as actually implemented was not very systematic and varied con

ably according to time, place, and circumstance. In some region

example, 40 percent of the adult population labored for the s

and in others, 100 percent; in some areas, less than 4 percent o

cultural land was used and in others, 15 percent. Abuses of th

tem’s provisions, including official corruption, also varied sharp

locale. The principal criticisms were, and continue to be today, 

ones. The Cultivation System was portrayed as having been fo

on greed and as being not only coercive and exploitative bu

prone to a range of abuses, all of which produced, for the averag

lager, only impoverishment. This view was put forth most memo

in the 1860 Dutch novel Max Havelaar by Eduard Douwes D

(1820–77), an embittered former colonial official who wrote 

the pseudonym Multatuli (“I have suffered much”). Douwes De

account was widely understood, probably not entirely accuratel

thoroughgoing indictment of colonial rule in general and the Cu

tion System in particular, which he accused of having created 

formly desperate, destitute peasantry. This, or something much l

became the received view. Recent studies, however, based on r

ings of old evidence as well as on archival information that be

available only in the mid-twentieth century, suggest a far more 

plex picture. While acknowledging that the burdens of the Culti

System fell on the laboring Javanese populace, they also argu

the majority probably saw at least limited economic improveme

took advantage of new economic opportunities, although at th

of a more regimented and government-controlled existence, and 

the added risk of dependency on world markets. This was a fo

circumscribed change that shaped Java’s village world far in

future. 

The Cultivation System had not required an elaborate state 

ratus. It was deliberately a form of indirect rule using an ex

hierarchy of the Javanese priyayi (see Glossary) elite, especial

upper ranks of traditional local officeholders known as the pa

praja (rulers of the realm) and village heads. As late as the 

1850s, European officials and regional supervisors numbered 

than 300 for an indigenous population of more than 10 milli

36 
Rubber plantation workers, Java, between 1900 a

Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, F

Frances Carpenter Collection, LC–USZ62–100045, digital ID cph 
 

 

small number of freelance European engineers and locally re

tioned laborers undertook the construction of roads and irrig

works needed for the new plantations. This began to change, 

ever, as the system grew, underwent reform, and then, espe

after the Sugar Act and Agrarian Act of 1870, gradually gave w

private enterprise. The responsibilities of the colonial govern

burgeoned, and in order to meet them, it expanded pangreh 

ranks by dividing and standardizing their administrative terri

and tightened control, by rescinding their traditional rights to 

bols of status and access to villagers’ labor and services, tying 

to government salaries and procedures. Alongside the pangreh 

now served a growing parallel hierarchy of European offic

ostensibly functioning as advisers or “elder brothers” of their 

counterparts but increasingly directing them—whose reac

1882, extended as far down as the subdistrict level, just abov

village head. In addition, more specialized government offices 

into being: a Bureau of Public Works (with its own corps of 

neers and an irrigation division), as well as departments of ag

ture, education, finance, justice, and religion, all with their 

structures and technical staffs. 

The Ethical Policy 

In 1901 Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands announced the 

ernment’s acceptance of the idea that it owed a “debt of honor” 

East Indies because of the profits generated by the Cultivation Sy

and its intention of henceforth basing its colonial policies on a “

duty” to them. This new direction, commonly referred to by hist

as the Ethical Policy, called for new and extensive government 

tives to expand public schooling, improve health care, mod

infrastructure (communications, transportation, and irrigation

reduce poverty. The administrative system was to be overhau

favor of a more modern, efficient structure. Colonial authorities 

decentralizing fiscal and administrative responsibilities (in 190

1922, respectively), forming local and colony-wide semirepre

tive political bodies (among them the Peoples’ Council, or Volk

in 1918), and ending, or at least modifying, the dualism inherent 

interior administrative service with its parallel lines of Europea

indigenous officials. In addition, for the first time, the colonia

attempted to simplify and standardize the administrative features 

rule in the Outer Islands (see Glossary), using what was being do

Java (and Madura and Bali) as a rough template. 

Although Ethicists, as supporters of the policy were called

sometimes have been seen as arguing for a weakening of co

38 
 

 

rule and lessening of European influence, this was not the ca

aimed at modernizing the imperial state, which also meant 

anizing, or at least Westernizing, it. It is fair to say that in 

matters the Ethicists were more successful than with social a

ical questions: food production generally kept pace with po

growth, and distribution improved; efforts to combat the pl

other diseases were moderately effective; and irrigation a

portation facilities (roads, railroads, and shipping lines) g

idly. The problem of administrative dualism could not be 

however, largely because European officialdom was unw

surrender its position. Political decentralization and the intr

of some form of representation for Europeans and indige

cated in Europe were limited by, among other things, th

government’s reluctance to surrender its ultimate control o

ary and legal affairs. Likewise, legal standardization foun

the increasingly heated debate over whether non-European

be subject to Western law or to other legal principles such as 

local unwritten custom (adat) or the sharia (see Glossary)

law, called syariah in Bahasa Indonesia. 

The Racial Issue 

The unresolved issue of greatest importance was that of rac

fication, which the modern Dutch historian Cees Fasseur has 

as both the “cornerstone and stumbling block” of the colon

Under the VOC, people were classified mainly on the basis o

rather than race, Christianized indigenes generally falling u

same laws as Protestant Europeans. In the early nineteenth 

however, “enlightened” ideas began to emphasize—often on 

tarian” grounds that sought protection of indigenous peoples—

tion between native and European rights, and the Cultivation 

with its clear distinction between rulers and ruled, emphas

divide. In practice, if not yet in law, non-Europeans were tre

differently from Europeans in judicial and penal matters, and 

legal and commercial codes appeared that were applicable to E

only. Statutes of 1854 made a formal (but not very specific) d

between Europeans and natives (inlanders), at the same time a

them “equal” protection. Everyday understanding and practi

ever, was that “equal” did not mean “the same,” and that, in p

Europeans and Asians occupied separate legal spheres. Almost 

ately, however, there were difficulties. The category of Asians 

ther divided into “natives” and “foreign orientals,” among w

Chinese, ostensibly for business reasons, in 1885 were deter

fall under European commercial law. The category “European
distinguish between full-blooded Europeans—the so-called 

Dutch—and those of mixed European and indigenous parentage

Eurasians, or so-called Indos. In 1899, for political reasons, the Jap

were accorded European public and private legal status, and in 19

same was done for those whose country of origin adopted Western 

ily laws, such as Turkey and Siam (after 1939, Thailand). “Na

remained a separate, and lower, category. 

One might think that these circumstances would soon have 

the abandonment of all racial or national distinctions and a un

tion of colonial law and policy in general, but instead a fundam

dualism—native and European—remained. This outcome is a

more remarkable because it was at odds with important realit

colonial life. In the early twentieth century, Europeans increa

married across racial categories. In 1905 about 15 percent w

interracial marriages, rising to 27.5 percent by 1925. And, alth

by the mid-1920s the older mix of dress and sensibilities kno

“Indies” (Indische) culture was rapidly giving way to more mo

urbanized, European- and American-influenced forms, num

memoirs of Europeans, Eurasians, Chinese, and Indonesians m

clear that, despite obvious racial tensions and divisions, a new s

Dutch-speaking, racially mixed, and culturally modern societ

coming into being, mostly in the largest cities and mostly amon

upper and upper-middle economic classes. 

A powerful countercurrent was also developing, however. In 

this was the result of the stubborn refusal of the colonial state 

to surrender the formal dualism on which it had been built, or t

squarely the many anomalies created by its insistence on legal c

fication. Especially as the specters of nationalism and comm

came into focus after 1918, the idea of emancipation for all s

could not be accepted, either in the abstract or for practical re

Other factors included the greater numbers of newcomer, 

blooded Europeans, including women, arriving in the colony, 

of whom had the notion that colonial life there should adjust it

their standards, not the other way around. The resentmen

resulted among Eurasians and indigenes, already chafing again

effects of both formal and informal discrimination, the 

Depression of the 1930s, and the approach of World War II (

45) in different ways deepened existing fears. After 1930, r

became more visible in all corners of colonial society. To all o

the colonial government remained strangely cold, taking mere

attitude of watchfulness and determination to “keep the p

When, in 1940, the governor general appointed the Visman Com

sion to determine what the public really thought about issues 

nected with the constitutional development of the colony

40 
 

 

clearest finding was that discrimination was universally con

serious problem, and that all other groups wished to ho

equality with Europeans. The commission’s own sugges

solving the problem by replacing racial criteria with e

financial, and other measures were unworkable, and in any c

had run out. On December 7, 1941, two days after the com

submitted its report, Japan attacked the United States nava

Pearl Harbor. 

Modernism and Nationalism in the Colonia

The Rise of Education and Student Associations, 1

1920 

At the dawn of the twentieth century, the young daughter o

nese pangreh praja, Raden Ajeng (R. A.) Kartini (187

expressed in letters to Dutch friends her enthusiasm for the 

the Age ... [before which] solid ancient structures tottered,” 

joy at witnessing the “transition from old to new” that was 

around her. Her main concern, however, was how her own 

whom she described as “grown-up children,” might progr

precisely on a European model, but certainly with Dutch assi

and concluded that the only way forward was through Dutc

tion. Kartini was only in part echoing ideas close to the hea

Ethicists who befriended and later lionized her and her effor

mote modern education for women as splendid examples 

cause; it is clear that she rebelled against her traditional env

early on, and also did not always agree with her Ethicist frie

was not alone. At roughly the same time, young male contem

from the Javanese privileged classes who attended gov

schools were coming to similar conclusions, and were in a be

tion to take more public, activist positions. Like Minke, th

the 1980 novel set in Kartini’s day by Pramudya Ananta Tu

2006) in his Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind), they w

ated from their parents’ generation, saw no future in aristocra

or careers as pangreh praja, and felt drawn to all that was ne

tific, and modern. They did not yet have the idea of a nation 

but they were busy trying to imagine a modern society of th

and how to make it a reality. In the process, they began to co

a new priyayi class—a class based on achievement rather th

devotion to modernity rather than tradition—that would deter

course of their country’s history for the remainder of the cent

That was not, of course, exactly what the Ethicists had 

when they promoted Western education. They had hoped to 
broad new priyayi class, which, thanks to a modern Western e

tion, would take a cooperative, associationist path. Such was th

behind the extensive education reforms that, beginning in 1900, 

hauled the limited training available for medical personnel, ver

lar primary school teachers, and prospective pangreh praja. The 

important institutions to appear were the School for Training N

Government Officials (OSVIA) and the School for Training N

Doctors (STOVIA), both established in 1900, and the Dutch–N

Schools (HIS), established in 1914, which were Dutch-languag

mary schools for the upper classes. There was also a signi

expansion of vernacular primary village schools (sekolah desa)

Looking at the colony as a whole, these advances may seem 

gible. As late as 1930, about 10,000 sekolah desa enrolled ro

1.6 million students, or 2.8 percent of a population estimated 

million. Dutch-language education enrolled far fewer indig

students: about 85,000 or roughly 0.14 percent of the total po

tion. General literacy was estimated at 7.5 percent and in D

about 0.3 percent. The Dutch-language schools with Western

curricula created a small but motivated group, however, 

emerged with a changed outlook. The schools were located p

pally on Java, where they gathered together students from al

the archipelago and gave them a shared experience. More conv

than ever of the power of Western education, they also grew di

fied. Although Dutch-language schools above the HIS en

Europeans as well as indigenes, the latter were a compara

small minority, and they often felt the sting of prejudice, bot

and perceived. Equal in education, indigenous students beg

chafe under obvious inequalities: legal, economic, and social. 

also quickly became aware of what a tiny minority they were in 

own society, and that the demand for Dutch-language educ

widely seen as key to social and economic advancement, w

beyond the colonial government’s ability or willingness to pr

Rather than generations of grateful and subservient graduate

colonial schools quickly produced a significant number of m

tents, whose most common message was not that the colonia

was modernizing indigenous society too quickly, but precise

opposite. They believed they could, and had the duty to, do bet

Students from Dutch-language schools founded the first in

nous groups organized along Western-influenced lines and aim

modernization and education. Probably the first person to do th

the pangreh praja son, ex-STOVIA student, and pioneer jou

Raden Mas Tirtoadisuryo (1880–1918), who in 1906 establish

Serikat Priyayi (Priyayi Association), aimed at convincing the 

nial authorities to expand educational opportunities for priyay

42 
 

best-known and officially recognized organization, howe

Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor), founded in 1908 by Wahidin 

husodo (1857–1917), also a pangreh praja son, gradu

STOVIA predecessor school, and journalist. Wahidin’s goa

organize financial support that would allow more priyayi 

Dutch-medium schools; he discovered his most enthusiastic 

ers were found among STOVIA students, who formed the 

Budi Utomo. In 1909 a Surakarta batik merchant, Samanhud

1956), asked Tirtoadisuryo to organize native businessme

ently in response to Chinese competition in the trade. The r

the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association), which 

became the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association). Now under 

ership of Haji Umar Said (H. U. S.) Cokroaminoto (1882–

OSVIA graduate who had left government service, the Sare

had as one of its major goals the expansion of education of, e

lower priyayi, and as a result the colonial government initiall

approvingly, as it had done with Budi Utomo. 

Cokroaminoto’s personal charisma, and his ability to use 

to attract wide public interest, helped the organization exp

idly—perhaps to 2 million members in 1919—and this mas

turn attracted those with quite different political interests. 

in 1913 by the Dutch radical socialist Hendrik Sneevlie

1942), the Indies Social-Democratic Association (ISDV), 

leftist party that had at first sought an audience in Eurasia

and among laborers in modern industries, turned to Sarek

The young Javanese railway worker Semaun (1899–1971) 

Minangkabau journalist Abdul Muis (1890–1959) propaga

cal Marxist ideas among followers of Sarekat Islam, which 

ally split over political issues. The ISDV in 1920 bec

Communist Association of the Indies (PKH), which after 1

known as the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI—see G

The Muslim organization Muhammadiyah (Followers of 

mad) was founded in Yogyakarta in 1912 by Kiyai Haji Mu

Dahlan (1869–1933), a reforming “modernist” who had joi

Utomo three years earlier and had been encouraged by its 

to establish modern Muslim schools. Muhammadiyah, and i

tionalist” counterpart Nahdlatul Ulama, founded in Surabay

by Kiyai Haji Hasyim Asyari (1871–1947), became very l

important associations, but their focus was primarily on ed

and social affairs. 
 

 

 

 

Formation of Political Parties, 1911–27 

All of these organizations, and the myriad student group

sprang up after 1915 under names such as Young Java (Jong 

the Young Sumatrans’ Association (Jong Sumatranen Bond

Minahasa Students’ Association (Studerende Vereniging Mina

had similar Western-oriented, upper-class, younger-generation

priyayi outlooks and expressed similar dissatisfactions with

sought one or another degree of emancipation from—the co

state. Initially none of them articulated a national idea. The

organization ventured down that path: the Indies Party (Ind

Partij), founded in 1911 by the radical Eurasian E. F. E. Do

Dekker (1879–1950), grandson of Multatuli’s brother Jan

younger Douwes Dekker was later joined by two Javanese, 

Mangunkusumo (1886–1943), a STOVIA graduate and c

member of Budi Utomo, and Raden Mas Suwardi Suryan

(1889–1959), an aristocrat of the Pakualaman, STOVIA studen

journalist. After 1922, under the name Ki Hajar Dewantara, Su

became an important leader in the field of education by establ

the private Taman Siswa (Student Garden) schools. 

Douwes Dekker and the Indies Party not only called for ind

dence of the colony but argued, using Austria-Hungary, Switze

and the United States as supporting examples, that all those 

called the archipelago home should be citizens regardless of rac

called for a nation and nationalism that were modern and multie

In 1913 Suwardi published an article entitled “Als ik eens een N

lander was” (If I were a Dutchman), which, with famously 

humor, suggested that, if he were a Dutch person celebrating th

tennial of liberation from Napoleonic rule in that year, he wou

let the natives of the colony know about it, as they might get 

about freedom, too. This was too much for the colonial govern

which promptly banned the party and exiled its three leaders 

Netherlands for six years. 

It was precisely there and at that time, however, that the id

Indonesia (from the Greek indos—for India—and nesos—for i

was taking shape. The term was coined by mid-nineteenth-ce

English observers, who meant it in a general ethnographic or 

graphic sense. Europeans, including the Dutch, found the 

descriptively handy, and it was used in learned circles in the 

twentieth century. That is when the small number of indigenou

dents who came from the Netherlands Indies encountered it. A

lian historian Robert E. Elson reports that the first recorded u

the words “Indonesia” and “Indonesians” by an indigenous sp

were in 1917 public talks by the musicologist Raden Mas S

44 
 

 

Suryaputra in The Hague and Baginda Dahlan Abdullah in 

They used the phrase “we Indonesians” and spoke of the 

Indonesians “to share in the government of the country.” In 

organization of Indonesian students in the Netherlands ch

name from the Indies Association (Indische Vereniging) to 

sian Association (Indonesische Vereniging), the first organi

use the word “Indonesia” (in Dutch) in its name. When 

gave a speech at Leiden University using the term a few 

later, it was clear that both the idea and name of Indonesia h

hold, and the struggle to give it intellectual and practical 

had truly begun. 

It has become customary to describe Indonesia’s formativ

alist discourse in terms of three distinct streams of thought 

and to emphasize the discord among the “secular” or “ter

Marxist, and Muslim streams; a further division sometimes 

to is between “radical” and “moderate” followers. This sor

gorization is not entirely beside the point, for it indeed refle

of the tensions and debates that filled the air. The colon

which founded the Political Intelligence Service (PID) in 19

effort to understand the burgeoning political activity among 

sians, borrowed these categories from the writings and spe

those whom they watched and used them to organize their 

The separation, however, was in some respects artificial. 

thing, Indonesians began rather early to speak of the m

(pergerakan), by which they meant all efforts that aimed a

supposed obtaining freedom (merdeka, kemerdekaan) fro

rule. Among both sophisticates and more ordinary folk, me

in two or more organizations that straddled categories 

uncommon, and leaders made a variety of attempts to brid

for example Muslim and Marxist ideas by the Javanese “R

Mohamad Misbach (?–1926), or Marxist and nationalist p

by the Minangkabau Tan Malaka (1897–1949). Still, there w

thing thrilling about both the discord and the struggle to fin

out of it, something that suggested not just an intellectual 

motion but physical action. 

Already, in 1919 bloody uprisings in Tolitoli, Manado 

Sulawesi), and Cimareme, Garut (western Java), Sarekat I

been implicated and the specter of a radical, activist Islam 

The colonial state moved in quickly with investigations an

In 1925 PKI labor organizers led strikes in the principaliti

the cities of Semarang and Surabaya, and in 1926 and 19

PKI leaders prompted sabotage and rebellion in western 

western Sumatra, respectively. The colonial state respo

arresting more than 13,000 people, of whom 4,500 were giv
 

sentences, and nearly one-third of these were sent to a newly 

structed prison camp in remote Boven Digul known as Tanah M

(Red Earth), in Papua. 

The Rise of Sukarno, 1921–26 

At the same time as the colonial government was repressing 

lim- and Marxist-tinted movements, the “secular” stream was u

going significant change. This was principally the work of Su

(1901–70), son of a Javanese lower priyayi school teacher 

middle-class Balinese woman. He attended Dutch-language sc

in Surabaya, where he boarded in the home of Cokroaminoto, 

Bandung, western Java, where he graduated as an architect fro

new Technical College, one of the best and most expensive sc

in the colony. Well-read and acquainted with many of the 

prominent Indonesian political figures of the day, Sukarno 

established a political study club on the model begun in Suraba

the early Budi Utomo leader Dr. Sutomo (1888–1938), an op

mologist, and then, in 1927, a political group which a year 

became known as the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). The f

mental idea that Sukarno invested in the PNI was that achievin

nation—acquiring independence from Dutch rule—came befor

above everything else, which meant in turn that unity was nece

Quarrels about the role of Islam or Marxist ideas or even demo

in an eventual Indonesia were at the moment beside the point. S

class was beside the point. All differences dissolved before the 

for unity in reaching the goal of merdeka. 

In 1921 Sukarno had fashioned the idea of marhaen, the “ord

person” representing all Indonesians, as a substitute for the M

concept of proletariat, which he found too divisive, and argue

developing a mass following among ordinary folk was the k

defeating colonial rule. And in 1926 he published a long essay 

tled “Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism,” in which he laid the 

dation for a new nationalism, one that was neither Muslim 

Marxist but comprised its own—national—ideology, largely by 

gesting that significant differences could not exist among thos

were serious about struggling for freedom. This extravagant 

siveness did not, however, extend to race. Sukarno pitched the 

gle as between us (Indonesians) and others, sini or sana (lit

here or there), a “brown front” against a “white front.” With re

to the colonial state, one was either ko or non-ko (cooperat

not). Sukarno specified in the PNI statutes that non-Indonesi

Eurasians, Chinese, whites—could aspire only to associate me

ship at best. In his 1930 defense oration when on trial by the co

46 
 

 

authorities, entitled “Indonesia Menggugat!” (Indonesia A

Sukarno also depicted the Indonesian nation as not merely a

tion of the present but rather a reality of the historical past n

revived. It was a glorious (racial) past leading through a dar

to a bright and shining future. 

These ideas, delivered in Sukarno’s famously charisma

were both radical and seductive. Part of their attraction was 

stirred deep emotions; in part, too, they permitted, even enc

the denial of genuine differences among Indonesians, and 

lighting of those between Indonesians and others. Not 

agreed with the PNI program, even among those who joined. 

mad Hatta (1902–80) and Sutan Syahrir (1909–66), Sumat

were among Sukarno’s closest associates and later served him 

president and prime minister, respectively, both had misgivin

the “mass action” approach and warned as early as 1929 aga

agoguery and the growth of an intellectually shallow nat

Syahrir also was scathing about the sini or sana concept, e

for the way it implied an unbridgeable gap between East an

concept Syahrir thought both mythical and dangerous. Hatta 

haps more equivocal, for in the Netherlands in 1926, as pre

the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association), which 

ceeded the Indonesische Vereniging, he had specifically p

Eurasians from membership. 

The encompassing, driving sense of national unity and th

stand against colonial rule were, nevertheless, widely appe

influenced Indonesians everywhere. They were clearly an in

behind the decisions of the Second Youth Congress in 192

adopted the red-and-white flag and the anthem “Indonesia Ray

Indonesia) as official national icons, and on October 28, 192

the resolution known as the Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemud

proclaimed loyalty to “one birthplace/fatherland (bertumpah da

tanah air): Indonesia; one people/nation (satu bangsa): Indon

one unifying language (bahasa persatuan): Indonesian.” Litt

that, for example, the Malay language on which this new “Ind

was to be based was at the time little spoken among the Dutch

students who proclaimed it the national language; they would 

develop it as they developed the nation itself. 

Colonial Government Reactions, 1927–40 

The colonial government found this new Indonesian natio

least as revolutionary, and at least as frightening, as it had the 

of Muslim or Marxist revolution. In 1927–28 Hatta and seve

Perhimpunan Indonesia members were arrested in the Nether
 

 

 

charged with fomenting armed rebellion, but acquitted. In the 

Indies, after his arrest and trial in 1929–30, Sukarno served two 

in prison. Taken into custody again in 1933, he was held under 

arrest, first in remote Ende, Flores, then in Bengkulu, western Su

until the Japanese occupation (see The Japanese Occupation, 194

this ch.). Hatta and Syahrir were arrested in 1934 and sent to B

Digul, and two years later to Banda Neira, Maluku, also fo

remainder of Dutch rule. These and other arrests of leaders, alon

ever-tighter political surveillance, crippled noncooperating partie

curbed public anticolonial expression but did not halt the spre

nationalist sentiment. 

In 1932 the government, convinced—with some justificat

that privately run Indonesian schools (for example, Ki Hajar D

tara’s Taman Siswa schools and schools supported by Muham

yah and by various political parties like the PNI) were natio

breeding grounds, attempted to subject them to strict state con

a so-called Wild Schools Ordinance. The outcry was so loud a

unequivocal, even among the most cooperative groups, that the 

nance had to be modified, and in the following decade the num

Indonesian-run and -financed private schools grew rapidly. Far 

Indonesians, particularly those from an expanding urban m

class, sought a modern education than the colonial governmen

able or willing to satisfy; the Indonesian intelligentsia took the 

tive themselves, and effectively used the opportunity to fur

nationalist agenda. History lessons, for example, did not follo

colonial curriculum but emphasized the glories of Majapah

made national heroes of all those who had fought Dutch forces

as Diponegoro. These schools had a significant impact. By th

of the 1930s in the city of Surabaya, for instance, they enrolle

times as many students as the government schools. 

The attempts of the colonial government during the 193

repress Indonesian nationalism were associated particularly 

Governor General B. C. de Jonge (in office 1931–36), infamo

his remark that the Dutch had already ruled the Indies for 350 

and were going to do so for 350 years more. Not everyone 

European community agreed with these hardline views, and 

supported greater autonomy from The Hague so that they cou

the Indies as they wished. Some voted in favor of the Sutarjo 

tion of 1936, which modestly sought approval for a conferen

consider dominion status for the Netherlands East Indies in 10 

time (it was later rejected by the Dutch government); others 

plained aloud that the East Indies had become a police state. B

approaching war made the thought of change even less, not 

48 
 

Royal Netherlands Indies Army 

soldiers in training during 

World War II 

Courtesy Library of Congress 

Prints and Photographs Division, 

U.S. Office of War Information 

Collection, LC–USE613–D– 

010623, digital ID fsa 8b13123 

likely. The Netherlands fell to Hitler’s forces on May 10, 19

ing the colony more or less to its own devices. Six months 

colonial government made it clear that it was unalterably op

Indonesia merdeka—a free Indonesia—and therefore to the 

sian national idea as it had developed to that time; no real ac

dation was possible. Little wonder that by that time a gre

thoughtful Indonesians, even the most moderate, had conclu

only the shock and dislocation of war in the archipelago 

possibly—bring about changes favorable to them. 

War and Early Independence 

The Japanese Occupation, 1942–45 

Japan’s decision to occupy the Netherlands East Indies w

primarily on the need for raw materials, especially oil from 

and Kalimantan. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 

forces moved into Southeast Asia. The occupation of the arc

took place in stages, beginning in the east with landings in 

northeastern Kalimantan, and Kendari, southeastern Sula

early January 1942, and Ambon, Maluku, at the end of tha

At the beginning of February, Japanese forces invaded Sum

the north, and at the end of the month, the Battle of the 

cleared the way for landings near Bantam, Cirebon, and T

Java, on March 1; Japanese forces met with little resistance

KNIL announced its surrender on March 8, 1942. 

The occupation was to last for 42 months, from March 1

mid-August 1945, and this period properly belongs to Ind

colonial era. Indonesians who had cautiously welcomed the 

Japanese victory because it might advance a nationalist age
 

disappointed by Japan’s initial actions. The idea that the c

might form a national unit did not appeal to the new power, 

divided the territory administratively between the Japanese Im

Army and the Japanese Imperial Navy, with the Sixteenth Ar

Java, the Twenty-fifth Army in Sumatra (but headquartered 

1943 in Singapore, afterwards in Bukittinggi, western Sumatra

the navy in the eastern archipelago. As late as May 1943, these 

were—unlike the Philippines and Burma—slated to remain p

nent imperial possessions, colonial territories rather than au

mous states, within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sp

Some Japanese pan-Asianists and national idealists did have n

that Japan’s true duty was to bring independence to Indonesi

they had little real influence on imperial policy. And less tha

weeks after the Dutch surrender, the Japanese military govern

on Java not only banned all political organizations but prohibit

use of the red-and-white flag and the anthem “Indonesia Raya.” 

ilar restrictions were enforced even more stringently in the 

administrative areas. 

Generalizing about Indonesia during the 1942–45 occup

period is extraordinarily difficult, not only because of varying 

cies and conditions in the separate administrative divisions, bu

because circumstances changed rapidly over time, particularly 

war turned against Japan, and because Indonesians’ experienc

ied widely according to, among other things, their social statu

economic position. 

The occupation is remembered as a harsh time. Japanese m

rule was severe, and fear of arrest by the Kenpeitai (military p

and of the torture and execution of those who defied or wer

pected of defying the Japanese was widespread. Particularly 

mid-1943, economic conditions worsened markedly as a result 

wartime disruption of transportation and commerce, as well a

guided economic policies. Most urban populations were pro

from extremes by government rationing of necessities, but s

food shortages and malnutrition developed in some areas, and 

and clothing became so scarce by 1944 that villagers in some re

were reduced to wearing crude coverings made of old sacki

sheets of latex. The unrelenting mobilization of laborers—gen

lumped under the infamous Japanese term rōmusha (literally, 

ual workers but in Indonesia always taken to mean forced lab

came to represent in both official and public Indonesian memo

cruelty and repression of Japanese rule. Exact numbers are im

ble to determine, but the Japanese drafted several million Jav

for varying lengths of time, mostly for local projects. As ma

300,000 may have been sent outside of Java, nearly half of th

50 
 

 

Sumatra and others as far away as Thailand. It is not kno

many actually returned at the end of the war, although abou

are recorded as being repatriated from places other than Su

Dutch services; nor is it clear how many rōmusha died, were 

or fell ill. But the casualties were undoubtedly very high, fo

cases the conditions were extremely grim. 

The new priyayi and the urban middle classes, howev

often shielded from these extremes and often took a more e

attitude toward Japanese rule. They filled many of the posi

vacant by Dutch civil servants interned by the Japanese, and 

for pangreh praja positions dominated by members of the tr

elite or those who had attended government schools. T

applauded the Japanese policies that ended dualism in educ

the courts, and were receptive to Japanese pan-Asian Eas

West sensibilities (“Asia for the Asians” as opposed to white 

acy, and “Asian values” as opposed to “Western materialis

priyayi and the middle classes also recognized the enormou

tages nationalist leaders had, however much the Japanese s

control them, when they appeared before huge crowds and w

tured in the newspapers or on the radio. Few expected much 

obviously propagandistic Japanese efforts to mobilize publi

through a series of mass organizations, such as the Center of 

ple’s Power (Putera) and the Jawa Hōkōkai (Java Service 

tion), or from the “political participation” promised through 

groups formed at several administrative levels, including t

Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) for Java. Observers 

notice, however, that Sukarno and Hatta, both of whom h

released from Dutch internment by the Japanese in 1942, ma

slip nationalist language into their speeches, and the formati

volunteer army known as Defenders of the Fatherland (Pet

1943 was seen as an enormous step in furthering national

one that of course could never have taken place under the Du

Both Sukarno and Hatta agreed to cooperate with the Jap

the belief that Tokyo was serious about leading Indonesi

independence; they were, in any case, convinced that outrigh

was too dangerous. (Syahrir declined to play a public rol

cooperation was a dangerous game, which later earned bot

criticism, especially from the Dutch and the Indonesian poli

for having been “collaborators.” Sukarno’s role in r

rōmusha became a particularly sore issue, although he la

bornly defended his actions as necessary to the national 

Some Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama leaders 

Sukarno’s cooperative lead, seeing no reason why, if the 

were trying to use them to mobilize Muslim support, they sh
 

use the Japanese to advance Muslims’ agenda. They saw 

advantage in the formation of the Consultative Council of In

sian Muslims (Masyumi), which brought modernist and traditio

Muslim leaders together, and of its military wing, the Barisan 

bullah (Army of God), intended as a kind of Muslim version of 

But on the whole, Muslim enthusiasm for cooperation with the 

nese did not match Sukarno’s. 

Another group that was initially enthusiastic about the Jap

victory was made up of somewhat younger (mostly under 30

established, but educated, urban, and mostly male, indivi

Many had been jailed or under surveillance in the late Dutch p

for their political activism. They were courted by the Japanes

filled positions in news agencies, publishing, and the product

propaganda. Referred to loosely as pemuda (young men), the

idly developed nationalist sentiments, eventually turning b

against Japanese tutelage and coming to play an important r

events after the occupation. 

In April 1944, U.S. forces occupied the town of Hollandia 

called Jayapura) in Papua, and in mid-September Australian 

landed on Morotai, Halmahera (Maluku); toward the end o

month, Allied planes bombed Jakarta (as Batavia had been ren

for the first time. Mindful of this new, critical stage of the co

Japan’s new prime minister, Koiso Kuniaki, announced on Sept

7, 1944, that the Indies (which he did not define) would be pre

for independence “in the near future,” a statement that appea

last to vindicate Sukarno’s cooperative policies. Occupation au

ties were instructed to further encourage nationalist sentime

order to calm public restlessness and to retain the loyalty of coo

ing nationalist leaders and their followers. Their response was 

paratively slow, but spurred perhaps by evidence of growing 

Japanese sentiment—in mid-February 1945, for example, a Pet

in Blitar (eastern Java) revolted—the authorities on Java anno

on March 1, 1945, their intention to form the Commission to In

gate Preparatory Measures for Independence (BPUPK); the 

“Indonesia” was initially not used. Its membership—54 Indone

four Chinese, one Arab, and one Eurasian, plus eight Japanese 

cial members”—was announced on April 29. Meetings beg

May 28. 

The BPUPK took up questions such as the philosophy, ter

and structure of the state. Sukarno’s speech on June 1 laid out 

he called the Pancasila (see Glossary) or Five Principles, which 

acclaimed as the philosophical basis of an independent Indone

the original formulation, true to Sukarno’s prewar thinking, na

unity came first, and while religion (“belief in a One and Sup

52 
 

 

God”) was recognized in the fifth principle, one religion w

edly not favored over another, and the state would be neithe

nor theocratic in nature. Thirty-nine of 60 voting membe

BPUPK voted to define the new state as comprising th

Netherlands East Indies as well as Portuguese Timor, New 

and British territories on Borneo and the Malay Peninsula

debate on the structure of the state led finally to the accept

unitary republic. An informal subcommittee, in a decisio

quently dubbed the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter), sugge

Muslim concerns about the role of Islam in the new 

addressed by placing Sukarno’s last principle first, requiring 

head of state be a Muslim, and adding a phrase requiring al

citizens to follow the sharia. This declaration was to be the 

continuing misunderstanding. 

The United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima a

saki, respectively, on August 6 and 8, 1945, and the Japane

to prepare Indonesian independence. Vetoing the “Greater In

idea, military authorities required that the new state be limit

former Netherlands East Indies and called for the establishm

Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPK

Sukarno as chairman. This group was established on Au

1945, but Japan surrendered three days later, before it had an 

nity to meet. The established Indonesian leadership, led by 

and Hatta, greeted the surrender with initial disbelief and cau

some pemuda, many of them followers of Sutan Syahrir, too

radical stance, kidnapping Sukarno and Hatta on the night o

15–16 in an effort to force them to declare independence imm

and without Japanese permission. Their efforts may actua

delayed matters slightly, as Hatta later accused, but in any c

simple ceremony held before a small group in the front ya

home at 10:00 AM on August 17, 1945, Sukarno, after a brie

delivered a two-sentence statement officially proclaiming 

dence and noting that “details concerning the transfer of a

etc., would be worked out as quickly and thoroughly as poss

The next day, the PPKI met for the first time to adopt a 

tion. Some key stipulations of the Jakarta Charter were c

with the suggestion that such issues be revisited later, but th

of Pancasila that now became the official creed of the Re

Indonesia began with the principle of “belief in [one suprem

followed by humanitarianism, national unity, popular sov

arrived at through deliberation and representative or con

democracy, and social justice. Such was the idealistic vis

national civic society with which Indonesia began its indepen
 

The National Revolution, 1945–49 

The struggle that followed the proclamation of independen

August 17, 1945, and lasted until the Dutch recognition of Indon

sovereignty on December 27, 1949, is generally referred to as 

nesia’s National Revolution. It remains the modern nation’s c

event, and its world significance, although often underapprecia

real. The National Revolution was the first and most immed

effective of the violent postwar struggles with European co

powers, bringing political independence and, under the ci

stances, a remarkable degree of unity to a diverse and far-flung 

of then 70 million people and geographically the most fragmen

the former colonies in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, the Revo

accomplished this in the comparatively short period of slightly 

than four years and at a human cost estimated at about 250,000 

far fewer than the several million suffered by India or Vietnam

example. Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia were th

former colonial subjects to successfully use the United Nations 

and world opinion as decisive tools in achieving independenc

they carried on a sophisticated and often deft diplomacy to ad

their cause. At home, it can certainly be argued that Repu

forces fought a well-armed, determined European power to a 

still, and to the realization that further colonial mastery could n

achieved. Finally, although this point is much debated, it c

argued that the National Revolution generated irreversible curre

social and economic change marking the final disappearance 

colonial world and—for better or worse—serving as the foun

for crucial national developments over the next several genera

These were no mean achievements. 

The new Republic’s prospects were at best uncertain, how

The war had ended very suddenly, and the Dutch—themselve

recently freed from Nazi rule—were unable to reestablish co

authority, a task that in Sumatra and Java fell to British and B

Indian troops, the first of which did not arrive until Septemb

1945. In the interval of nearly six weeks, the Republic of Indo

was able to disarm a great many Japanese troops and form a go

ment with Sukarno as president and Hatta as vice president

Central National Committee (KNIP) was established as the pri

decision-making body. It had regional and local subcomm

based largely on the structure and personnel of the Jawa Hōkō

comparatively smooth transition to an Indonesian-controlled bu

cracy and civil service took place in most areas, especially of 

Australian troops continued occupying the eastern archipela

late 1944 and, in 1945, accompanied by Dutch military and ci

54 
Street scene with a military truck and walls wit

during the Indonesia war for independenc

Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 

Lot 9033, LC–USZ62–43524, digital ID cph 

personnel of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 

which had formed in Australia during the war. 

At the same time, however, tensions arising in part from 

with Japanese troops, now charged by Allied commander E

Mountbatten (1900–79) with keeping the peace until his ow

could arrive, and in part from the release of Europeans who 

imprisoned by the Japanese and now sought to resume th

exploded. Radical pemuda initiated, and encouraged other

part in, violence against all those—not only Dutch and Eura

also Chinese and fellow Indonesians—who might be susp

opposing independence. Sukarno’s government was pow

stop this bloodletting, which by the end of September w

underway on Java. It grew in intensity and spread to deadl

on local elites as Allied troops moved to secure the main 

Java and Sumatra. This sort of violence did not endear the 

tion to the outside world or, for that matter, to many Indones

at the same time it was clear that closely allied to it was 

determination to defend independence. When Allied troops 

Surabaya in late October 1945, their plans to occupy the c

thwarted by tens of thousands of armed Indonesians and c

city residents mobilized by pemuda, resulting in the dea

British commander and hundreds of his men. The ferociou

counterattack that began on November 10, enshrined in In
 

nationalist history as Heroes’ Day, is estimated to have killed 

Indonesians and others, a terrible defeat that nevertheless conv

the British that they must plan for eventual withdrawal. A year 

the British turned military affairs over to the Dutch, who were 

mined to restore their rule throughout the archipelago. 

In general, the Dutch view in late 1945 had been that the Rep

of Indonesia was a sham, controlled largely by those who had c

orated with the Japanese, with no legitimacy whatsoever. A year 

this outlook had been modified somewhat, but only to conced

nationalist sentiment was more widespread than they had a

allowed; the complaint grew that, whatever its nature, the Rep

could not control its violent supporters (especially pemuda and 

munists), making it unfit to rule. Attempts to broker a peaceful 

ment of this postcolonial conflict were unsuccessful. The firs

Linggajati Agreement of November 12, 1946, acknowledged R

lican control on Sumatra, Java, and Madura, as well as a federat

states under the Dutch crown in the eastern archipelago. The 

ment also called for the formation, by January 1, 1949, of a fed

state comprising the entire former Netherlands Indies, a Netherl

Indonesian Union, or the so-called United States of Indonesia, 

was also to be part of a larger commonwealth (including Sur

and the Dutch Antilles) under the Dutch crown. The Ling

Agreement was not popular on either side and was not ratified 

months later. Among many Indonesian nationalists of various 

cal stripes, the agreement was seen as a capitulation by the Re

can government. Pemuda of both left and right championed th

of “100 percent Independence” (Seratus Persen Merdeka), an

communist-nationalist Tan Malaka coupled this with accusation

both Sukarno and Hatta had betrayed the nation once with the

laboration with the Japanese, and were doing so once again by 

promising with the Dutch. Tan Malaka formed a united front k

as the Struggle Coalition (Persatuan Perjuangan), which used th

of total opposition to the Dutch to gather support for his own po

agenda. 

Less than two months after the KNIP had, following bitter d

and maneuvering, approved the agreement, Dutch forces lau

what they euphemistically called a “police action” again

Republic, claiming it had violated or allowed violations of the 

gajati Agreement. They secured most of the large cities and va

plantation areas of Sumatra and Java and arbitrarily estab

boundaries between their territories and the Republic, known 

Van Mook Line, after Lieutenant Governor General H. J. van M

The Republican military, the Indonesian National Army (TNI

56 
 

its affiliated militia (laskar) were humiliated, and yet grea

cism of the government arose, now even from within the 

itself and from Muslim leaders. 

The Republic had from the start of the Revolution pursu

orous if informal diplomacy to win other powers to its sid

that now bore fruit. The UN listened sympathetically to Pri

ister Syahrir’s account of the situation in mid-August 194

month later announced the establishment of a Committee 

Offices, with members from Australia, Belgium, and th

States, to assist in reaching a settlement. The result was the 

Agreement, named for the U.S. Navy ship—considered neu

tory—on which it was negotiated and signed between Ja

and 19, 1948. But this accord proved even less popular in th

lic than its predecessor, as it appeared to accept both the V

Line, which in fact left numbers of TNI troops inside Dutch

territories, requiring their withdrawal, and the Dutch notion 

eration rather than a unitary state pending eventual pl

Republican leaders reluctantly signed it because they believ

essential to retaining international goodwill, especially th

United States. In the long run, they may have been correc

short-term costs were enormous. 

Internally the Republic was threatening to disintegrate

confidence in the Republic began to erode because of the w

economic situation, caused in part by the Dutch blockade of 

and seizure of principal revenue-producing plantation re

well as by a confused monetary situation in which Dutch, 

can, and sometimes locally issued currencies competed. 

became more frequent between the TNI and laskar and 

laskar, as they competed for territory and resources or arg

tactics and political affiliation. The KNIP initiated a reorg

and rationalization program in December 1947, seeking t

regular and irregular armed forces drastically in order the 

supply, train, and control them. To patriots as well as those w

motives, this move seemed no better than treason, and the r

chaos. In addition, tensions mounted rapidly and at all levels 

Muslims and both the government and leftist forces. Loca

were reported in eastern and western Java after early 1948

most immediate challenge to the Republic was the moveme

S. M. Kartosuwiryo (1905–62), a foster son of H. U. S. Co

oto, who had supported the 1928 Youth Pledge and pemuda 

ists in 1945 but later felt betrayed by the Renville Agreem

took up arms against the Republic, with himself at the he

Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII). In the Garut-Tasikmalaya 
western Java in May 1948, Kartosuwiryo declared a sepa

administrated area, Darul Islam (Abode of Islam), which in 19

called the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). He was captured an

cuted in 1962 by units of the armed forces. 

Most serious of all, however, was the upheaval precipita

September 1948 by the return from the Soviet Union of the p

communist leader Muso (1897–1948), and his efforts to prop

PKI to a position of leadership in the Revolution. He berate

Sukarno–Hatta leadership for compromising with the Dutc

called for, among other things, an agrarian revolution. Driv

these new tensions, and animosities generated by the reorgani

of the TNI, fighting broke out in Surakarta, central Java, be

forces sympathetic to the PKI and the Republic. On Septemb

PKI-affiliated laskar took over the eastern Java city of M

where they murdered civil and military figures, announc

National Front government, and asked for popular support

Republic responded immediately with a dramatic radio spee

Sukarno calling on the masses to choose between him—an

nation—or Muso. The TNI, especially western Java’s Sili

Division under Abdul Haris Nasution (1918–2001), mounted 

tally successful campaign against the rebel forces. Muso and 

PKI leaders were killed, and all told approximately 30,000 p

lost their lives on both sides in the conflict. 

The Madiun Affair remains controversial today, but its ou

strengthened the Republican government’s efforts to control 

who opposed it and changed the way in which Sukarno an

Republic were seen overseas, especially in the United States, wh

the Cold War paradigm Indonesia now appeared as an anticomm

power. In the months after Madiun, the Dutch grew increasingly 

trated. Their negative portrayal of the Republic had lost interna

credibility, and on the ground their military position was deter

ing. Intelligence indicated as many as 12,000 Indonesian troops 

ating inside the Van Mook Line. On December 19, 1948, Dutch 

launched an attack—styled a second “police action”—design

destroy the Republic, occupying its capital of Yogyakarta and c

ing and imprisoning Sukarno, Hatta, five other cabinet member

Syahrir (then an adviser). In response to this outright defianc

UN Security Council demanded the reinstatement of the Repu

government, and a full transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia no 

than July 1, 1950. International pressure, which included a U.S. 

to withdraw Marshall Plan aid from the Netherlands, was too gre

The Hague to withstand. At the same time, the Republic had in

a guerrilla war (gerilya) against Dutch forces immediately aft

58 
 

People’s Security Forces machine gun

Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 

LC–USZ62–137192, digital ID cph 

fall of Yogyakarta. The significance of this gerilya has been 

underestimated, largely because it involved TNI struggle

armed internal opposition (for example, by the NII in wes

and by those loyal to Tan Malaka, who was captured and 

eastern Java in February 1949) as well as Dutch forces. Bu

sian resistance was sufficiently effective to convince Dut

manders that this was a war that could not be won on the gro

After two efforts at cease-fires between May and Augu

the Round Table Conference met in The Hague from Aug

November 2 to reach the final terms of a settlement. Th

Table Agreement provided that the Republic and 15 federa

tories established by the Dutch would be merged into a 

Republic of Indonesia (RIS). The Dutch recognized the sov

of Indonesia on December 27, 1949. Because of widesprea

nationalists in the Republic and in some of the federated t

that the structural arrangements of the RIS would favor p

control, and because the TNI also found it unthinkable 

should be required to merge with the very army and poli

they had been fighting against, there was considerable sen

favor of scrapping the federal arrangement. This, and ofte

handed pressure from within the Republican civilian bur
 

 

and army, produced within five months a dissolution of the RI

a new, unitary Republic of Indonesia, which was officially de

on the symbolic date of August 17, 1950. Only the break

Republic of South Maluku (RMS) resisted this incorporation

forces opposed and largely defeated the RMS in the second h

1950, but about 12,000 of its supporters were relocated to the 

erlands, and there and in Maluku itself separatist voices were 

for the next half-century. 

The Road to Guided Democracy, 1950–65 

Recovery 

Developments during the first 15 years of Indonesia’s ind

dent history have been comparatively little studied in recent 

and tend to be explained in rather simple, dichotomous terms o

example, a struggle between “liberal democracy” and “prim

authoritarianism,” between pragmatic “problem solvers” and id

tic “solidarity builders,” or between political left and right. 

analyses are not entirely wrong, for Indonesia was indeed pol

during these years, but they tend to oversimplify the poles, a

ignore other parts of the story, such as the remarkable flourish

literature and painting that drew on the sense of personal and cu

liberation produced by the National Revolution. The new go

ment also had extraordinary success, despite a lack of fund

expertise, in the field of education: in 1930 adult literacy sto

less than 7.5 percent, whereas in 1961 about 47 percent of thos

the age of 10 were literate. It was a considerable achievemen

that Indonesia in 1955 held honest, well-organized, and l

peaceful elections for an eligible voting public of nearly 38 m

people scattered throughout the archipelago, more than 91 perc

whom cast a ballot. Still, it is fair to characterize the period as o

heavy disillusion as well, in which the enormously high expect

that leaders and the public had for independence could not be 

and in which the search for solutions was both intense and 

mented. While it may be true, as historian Anthony Reid ha

gested, that the Revolution succeeded in “the creation of a u

nation,” in 1950 that nation was still no more than a vision, 

remained to be seen whether the same ideas that had brought it 

could also be used to give it substance. 

Perhaps the greatest expectation of independence, shared by 

dle and lower classes, rural as well as urban dwellers, was 

would bring dramatic economic improvement. This hope had 

embedded in the nationalist message since at least the 1920s, 

60 
had played heavily on the exploitative nature of the colon

omy and implied that removal of colonial rule would also 

obstacles to economic improvement and modernization. But 

ditions Indonesia inherited from the eras of occupation and 

tion were grim, far grimmer than those of neighboring Burm

Philippines, for example, despite the fact that unlike them i

been a wartime battlefield. The Japanese had left the econo

and in disarray, but the Revolution had laid waste, through 

and scorched-earth tactics, much of what remained. In 1

gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) and rice pr

were well below 1939 levels, and estimated foreign reser

equivalent to about one month’s imports (and only about th

what they had been in 1945). In addition, provisions in th

Table Agreement had burdened Indonesia with a debt to the 

lands of US$1.125 billion dollars and saddled it with the 

integrating thousands of colonial administrative and military 

nel. (No other ex-colony in the postwar era was faced wit

debt, 80 percent of which Indonesia had paid when it abro

agreement in 1956.) 

Economic Pressures 

In the early 1950s, Indonesia’s economy experienced a 

principally as a result of Korean War (1950–53) trade, espe

oil and rubber; taxes on this trade supplied nearly 70 perce

government’s revenues. Between 1950 and 1955, the gross 

product (GNP—see Glossary) is thought to have grown at a

rate of about 5.5 percent, and it increased 23 percent 

1953—when real GDP again reached the 1938 level—and 

retrospect, economists seem agreed that, against heavy o

immediate postcolonial economy was not hopeless. Neve

what most Indonesians saw and felt did not seem like e

progress at all: wages rose, but prices rose faster, and the 

ranks of urban workers and government employees were e

vulnerable to the resulting squeeze. The government a

squeezed between falling trade-tax revenues and rising e

especially those required to support a bureaucracy that nea

bled in size between 1950 and 1960. Infrastructure, badly 

rehabilitation, was neglected, adversely affecting produc

trade. Corruption and crime spread. In 1956 rice made up 1

of Indonesia’s imports, compared to self-sufficiency in 

1960 only 10 percent of the national income derived from m

turing, compared to 12 percent in 1938. In economists’ te

was “structural regression,” but in everyday experience it m
 

the economy was not modernizing, and it was increasingly una

provide for a population estimated to have grown from 77 mill

1950 to 97 million a decade later. 

In order to solve these problems, the government at 

embarked on plans—many of which had been initiated by the 

in the late 1930s and again in territories they held in the imm

postwar years—for large- and small-scale industrialization, im

substitution manufacturing, and private and foreign capitalizat

was not long, however, before policies more familiar to the p

generation of nationalists, now firmly in power, took preced

These were already visible in the Benteng (Fortress) Pro

(1950–57), one aspect of which was discrimination against 

Chinese and Dutch entrepreneurs in order to foster an indig

class of businessmen. 

The Benteng Program failed, leading instead to more corru

but the call for “Indonesianization” of the economy was very s

Policies increasingly favored a high degree of centralization, go

ment development of state enterprises, discouragement of fo

investment, and, at least for a time, the encouragement of v

cooperatives, all of which harkened back to provisions of the 

constitution and had been pursued in a limited fashion durin

National Revolution. Gradual nationalization of some Dutch 

prises, the central bank, the rail and postal services, and air an

transport firms began in the early 1950s, but the pace quickened 

1955 because of the continuing dispute over West New Guinea

trol of which had not been settled in 1949. In 1957 and 1958, n

1,000 Dutch companies were nationalized and seized by the 

forces or, less frequently, by labor groups; in a corresponding 

dus, nearly 90 percent of remaining Dutch citizens voluntarily 

triated. A year later, a decree banning “foreign nationals” resul

100,000 Chinese repatriating to mainland China. A victory f

nationalist perspective, this was from an economic standpoint

least of all because Indonesia lacked capital and credit, as w

modern management and entrepreneurial skills—a setback 

which recovery would be difficult. 

Political Developments and Divisiveness 

Independence had also brought with it expectations of a m

political framework for the nation. The Republic’s founder

rejected colonialism, of course, and monarchy, settling on a va

defined democracy that leaned heavily on presidential authority

constitution of the RIS and a third (provisional) constitution ad

in 1950 by the unitary state called for a prime ministerial, multi

62 
 

parliamentary democracy and free elections. When voters 

the polls in September 1955, there was considerable hope th

system would provide solutions to the political divisiven

freed from the limitations of the common anticolonial strug

begun to spread well beyond the mostly urbanized educated 

In the event, however, the national elections proved disap

The four major winners among the 28 parties obtaining pa

tary seats were the secular nationalist PNI (22 percent, wit

cent of that from Java), the modernist Muslim Masyumi (21 

with 51 percent from Java), the traditional Muslim Nahdlatu

(18 percent, with 86 percent from Java), and the PKI (16 

with 89 percent from Java). After the PKI, the next most s

party, the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), received le

percent of the vote, and 18 of 28 parties received less than 

of the vote. Both Nahdlatul Ulama and the PKI, which had e

strong followings in central and eastern Java, dramatically i

their representation compared with what they had held in t

sional parliament (8 to 45 seats, and 17 to 39 seats, respect

eastern Java, the vote was split almost evenly among the P

and Nahdlatul Ulama. The elections thus exposed and s

existing divides between Java and the other islands, raising 

domination by Jakarta, and between the rapidly rising PKI 

ticularly, Muslim parties, raising fears of communist (inter

antireligious) and populist ascendancy. 

To make matters worse, there was a general perception th

30-month run-up to the elections, the political process had p

villages as parties sought votes. There were many reports of 

being pressured and even threatened to vote for one or anoth

and of clashes between Muslim and communist adherent

educated voters tended to take hardened ideological posit

the eve of the elections, Sukarno had declared that any

“tried to put obstacles in the way of holding them ... is a trai

Revolution.” Barely six months later, he was urging the ne

ment to avoid “50 percent + 1 democracy,” and in October 

“burying” the political parties and of his desire to see 

Democracy (demokrasi terpimpin, a term Sukarno had be

since 1954) in Indonesia. 

Military Involvement and Rebellion 

Into this deteriorating situation, the military increasingly 

itself. During the Revolution, the armed forces had dev

strong distrust for—indeed, taken up arms against—both co

and Muslim movements that had opposed the central gov
 

The military had also itself exhibited a resistance to control b

central government and, especially after the second “police a

and subsequent gerilya, a high level of disapproval of civilian 

tics and politicians in general. Further, the armed forces had 

been united, even on these issues, which made for extremely 

plex struggles in which military leaders often ended up opp

each other. These tensions surfaced, for example, when a d

over demobilization plans resulted in a dangerous confron

between some army commanders and parliament in Jakarta on 

ber 17, 1952. 

In 1956, in reaction to Jakarta’s continued efforts to curb 

supported smuggling of oil, rubber, copra, and other export pro

commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi bolted from both govern

and central TNI control, arguing that their regions were prod

more than their share of exports but receiving too little in return 

the central government. The army was also growing increa

concerned about the PKI’s rise to power. PKI membership had 

from about 100,000 in 1952 to a purported 1 million at the e

1955, and, more successfully than any other party, it had cult

village interests with community projects and support, partic

on Java. At the end of 1956, a dissident TNI commander, Z

Lubis (1923–94?), wrote that Sukarno himself, recently ret

from a visit to the People’s Republic of China, had chosen that 

try as a political model. On February 21, 1957, Sukarno, supp

by army chief Nasution, proposed instituting a system of G

Democracy, which he now conceptualized as based on a polit

mutual cooperation (gotong royong) and deliberation with cons

(musyawarah mufakat) among functional groups (golongan k

rather than political parties, which he believed was more in ke

with the national character. This seemed to many dissidents to 

both the end of any hope of improving regional prospects, an

beginning of, at the very least, a communist-tinted authoritarian 

In early March 1957, the TNI commander of East Indo

announced Universal Struggle (Permesta) and declared martial 

his region, claiming a goal of completing the National Revol

Nasution then proposed that Sukarno declare martial law for 

Indonesia, which he did on March 14. In the repression of susp

dissidents in Java, especially of Masyumi leaders, who had vigo

opposed the institution of Guided Democracy, a number of 

prominent figures fled to Sumatra. They included the former 

minister from 1950–51, Mohammad Natsir (1908–93); former c

bank president Syafruddin Prawiranegara (1911–89); and forme

ister of finance Sumitro Joyohadikusumo (1917–2001), who j

army dissidents in Sumatra, eventually declaring, in mid-Feb

64 
 

1958, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of I

(PRRI). They were immediately joined by the Permesta re

also attracted the clandestine support of the United States (re

May when an American pilot was shot down during a rebel 

government forces). The central government acted swiftly, 

forces broke the rebellion in no more than two months, altho

radic guerrilla fighting continued until the early 1960s. 

It has been pointed out many times that the PRRI did n

sent a true separatist movement and sought instead wh

would be termed “regime change.” Be that as it may, the rev

watershed of some importance. Official figures estimate tha

30,000 people lost their lives in the fighting, and Indonesian 

life, far from being improved and stabilized as so fondly ho

instead gripped by regional, religious, and ideological tur

bitterness made worse by economic decay. 

Political Paralysis 

Symbolic of the paralysis that gripped political life at the 

Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), which had been elect

1955 and began meeting a year later, by mid-1959 had 

reach agreement on major issues that had troubled the BPU

PPKI a decade earlier: whether the form of the state should 

ative or unitary and whether the state should be based on 

Pancasila. In May, Jakarta granted the northern Sumatra pro

Aceh semiautonomous status (and thus the freedom to estab

ernment by Islamic law) as the price of at last ending the 

there with Darul Islam forces. The way seemed open for a 

tion of the unitary state. Sukarno’s response on July 5, 1

unilaterally to dismiss the Constituent Assembly and to dec

the nation would return to the constitution of August 18, 194

edly without the Jakarta Charter and its Islamic provision

although it may have been, this was not an entirely un

move. Many, although by no means all, Indonesians belie

their nation had lost its way, and a return to first principles a

ments—now rather romantically misimagined—sounded 

ways attractive. 

What followed, however, was the rapid development of an 

tarian state in which tensions were not reduced but greatly exa

On August 17, 1959, Sukarno attempted to give Guided De

some precise content by announcing his Political Manifesto (M

which included the ideas of “returning to the rails of the Re

and “retooling” in the name of unity and progress. Manipol 

plemented with the announcement of a kind of second 

describing the foundations of the new state: the 1945 con
 

Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy

Indonesian Identity, expressed in the acronym USDEK. These tw

mulations were followed in mid-1960 with a third, known by th

traction Nasakom, in which Sukarno returned to his 1920s attem

work out a synthesis of nationalism (nasionalisme), religion (ag

and communism (komunisme). These ideas formed the basis of 

was increasingly seen as a state ideology, printed up in fat, red-co

books to be used in obligatory indoctrination sessions for civil se

and students, and expressed in a rising rhetoric that excoriate

nation’s internal and external enemies. 

What was once Sukarno’s gift for effecting conciliation and 

able synthesis now turned sour, and, even to many of its earlie

porters, the promise of Guided Democracy seemed empty

economy worsened and fell into a spiral of uncontrolled inflat

more than 100 percent annually. The army, after 1962 part of a 

bined Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI), an

PKI confronted each other increasingly aggressively for cont

state and society. Sukarno, although casting himself as the 

mediator and attempting to balance all ideological forces, app

to grow more radically inclined, drawing closer to the PKI a

leader, D. N. Aidit (1923–65), and away from Nasution’s 

Widespread arrests of dissidents, censorship of media, and pr

tion of “unhealthy” Western cultural influences (for example, 

ing the Twist and listening to the Beatles) darkened Indon

social and intellectual world. 

Worldview 

Indonesian nationalists had the strong expectation that ind

dence would also bring Indonesia international recognition 

place in the family of nations. Admission to the UN in Septe

1950 was a first step, and Indonesia quickly adopted an “ind

dent and active” foreign policy, first articulated in 1948 by then 

President Mohammad Hatta, who wished to steer a course be

the Cold War powers but to do so in a way that was not merely 

tral.” The first fruit of this outlook was the Asia–Africa Confe

held in Bandung, Jawa Barat Province, in April 1955. This gath

of 29 new nations sought to avoid entanglement in the Cold W

to promote peace and cooperation; to many it represented the s

coming of age of the formerly colonized world. It is generally 

sidered the beginning of the Nonaligned Movement (see Glos

although the movement itself was not formalized until 1961. 

Sukarno was in his element at Bandung, speaking eloqu

about ex-colonial peoples “awakening from slumber” and pr

66 
 

 

Sukarno, president of Indonesia from 194

This photograph was taken during his trip to Washington, DC, on May 

Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 

U.S. News and World Review Collection, digital ID cp

ing—true to his homegrown pattern—an ideology of neithe

ism nor communism but one that merged the nationalism, 

and humanism of Asia and Africa. As at home, however, th

attempt at balance and synthesis did not hold. The failure o

sian nonalignment policies during the Cold War came abou

because of the unwillingness of the superpowers, perhaps e

the United States, to view the decolonized world in anyt

friend-or-foe terms. Sukarno’s willingness to use Cold War 

for what he viewed as Indonesia’s national interests, which 

precisely in the spirit of Bandung, also led to the abando

neutrality. 

In the ongoing dispute with the Dutch over West New Gu

example, Sukarno had tentatively used the support of the Sov

and China, and of the PKI at home, to encourage the United 

pressure the Dutch to abandon the territory, implicitly in 

forestalling an Indonesian slide toward the communist bloc

and UN-brokered agreement turned over control to Indonesi

1963, which was confirmed in the much-disputed Act of Fre

in 1969. In the issues that arose over the formation of Mala
 

idea that had surfaced in 1961 as a solution to British decoloni

problems involving Malaya, Singapore, and British Borneo, but 

appeared in Jakarta’s eyes to be a neocolonial plot against the re

and its ongoing revolution—Sukarno at first merely meddle

then, when the new state was formed in 1963, declared Confron

(see Glossary), or Konfrontasi as it was called in Indonesian, 

that led the nation to the brink of war. Confrontation had suppor

both China and the Soviet Union (by then themselves estrang

well as the PKI but was opposed by Britain and the United State

surreptitiously, by elements of ABRI. Sukarno was now faced 

increasing isolation from the Western powers, and the deep

unpredictability of interlocking power struggles on both interna

and domestic fronts. This was not the “joining the world” for 

most nationalists had hoped. 

Years of Crisis 

These tensions had escalated by late 1964, to the point tha

ernment was paralyzed and the nation seethed with fears and ru

of an impending explosion. In the countryside, especially in Jav

Bali, the “unilateral actions” the PKI began a year earlier to 

fully redistribute village agricultural lands had resulted in th

break of violence along both religious and economic class 

Especially in Jawa Timur Province, Nahdlatul Ulama mobiliz

youth wing, known as Ansor (Helpers of Muhammad), and d

fighting began to spread between and within now thoroughly 

ized villages. ABRI increasingly revealed divisions among pro

anti-PKI, and pro-Sukarno officers, some of whom reportedly 

to involve themselves in rural conflicts. In the big cities, demo

tions against the West reached fever pitch, spilling over into int

tual and cultural affairs as poets and artists confronted each 

with diametrically opposed views on the nature and proper 

role of the arts. The domestic economic crisis deepened as the 

of rice soared beyond the means of most urban residents, espe

those of the middle classes on government salaries, and the b

market rate of exchange exceeded the official rate by 2,000 per

Sukarno was furious that the newly formed Malaysia had 

granted a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Counc

on January 1, 1965, he withdrew Indonesia from the UN, and 

from other world bodies such as the International Monetary 

(IMF) and the World Bank. In April, China announced that i

ported the idea, proposed earlier by Aidit, of arming a “fifth for

peasants and workers under PKI leadership to balance the pow

ABRI’s four armed services, and that it could supply 100,000 

68 
 

arms for the purpose. Then on August 17, 1965, Sukarno, 

weeks earlier had collapsed during a public appearance 

thought to be gravely ill, delivered an Independence Day 

which addressed joining a “Jakarta–Phnom Penh–Beijing

Pyongyang Axis” and creating an armed fifth force in order 

plete Indonesia’s revolution. It seemed to many that the 

poised to seize power, at the same time that the whole con

of competing forces swirling around Sukarno was about to 

with consequences that could only be guessed. On Septembe

army chief of staff, Ahmad Yani (1922–65), who was 

Sukarno and shared his anti-neo-imperialist outlook, nev

informed him that he and Nasution unequivocally refused to 

“fifth force,” a stand that brought them in direct oppositio

PKI, Sukarno, and even some ABRI officers. Air Force Vice 

Omar Dhani (1924–2009), for example, had begun to offer 

tary training to groups of PKI civilians, apparently at Sukar

ing. The balancing act was over. 

The “Coup” and Its Aftermath, 1965–66 

In the early morning hours of October 1, 1965, troops f

ABRI companies, including one from the Cakrabirawa Pre

Guard, deployed in air force motor vehicles through the s

Jakarta to the homes of Nasution, Yani, and five other 

known to be opposed to the PKI. Three were killed resisting 

and three were later murdered at the nearby Halim Perdan

Military Air Base, where, it was later learned, their bod

thrown into an abandoned well in an area known as Luban

(Crocodile Hole). The remaining general, then-Minister of 

Nasution, narrowly escaped, but his adjutant was captured 

and also murdered at Lubang Buaya, and Nasution’s daug

injured in the intrusion and later died. Not long thereafter, J

awoke to a radio announcement that the September 30 M

(Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, later referred to by the 

Gestapu by opponents) had acted to protect Sukarno and th

from corrupt military officers, members of a Council of 

that secretly planned, with U.S. Central Intelligence Agen

help, to take over the government. The announcement stre

the action was an internal ABRI affair. At noon a Decree N

broadcast, announcing the formation of a Revolutionary C

the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia. 

Faced with the news of this apparent coup attempt, t

mander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad)

Suharto (1921–2008), who had not been on the list of tho
 

captured, moved swiftly, and, less than 24 hours after events b

a radio broadcast announced that Suharto had taken temporary 

ership of ABRI, controlled central Jakarta, and would crush w

described as a counterrevolutionary movement that had kidn

six generals of the republic. (Their bodies were not discovered 

October 3.) When the communist daily Harian Rakjat publish

editorial supportive of the Revolutionary Council on Octob

1965, it was already too late. In Jakarta, the coup attempt had 

broken, and anti-PKI, anti-Sukarno commanders of ABRI w

charge. Within a few days, the same was true of the few area

side of the capital where Gestapu had raised its head. 

These momentous events, which triggered not only a r

change but also the destruction of the largest communist part

side the Soviet Union and China, hundreds of thousands of d

and a generation of military rule in what was then the world’

(now fourth) most populous country, have long eluded satisfa

explanation by scholars. Debate over many points, both in an

side of Indonesia, continues to be stubborn, polarized, and 

nated by intricate and often improbable tales of intrigue

circumstances and available data are such that a wide varie

explanations are equally plausible. Scholarly opinion has been 

cially skeptical of the conclusion drawn almost immediate

Suharto (and later the government he headed) and the CIA, th

PKI was to blame for Gestapu. Experts have offered numerou

narios instead, suggesting that the (anti-PKI) military, and pe

even Suharto himself, were in fact the real masterminds. 

More recently, however, a view that has gained credence (

nally posited in an early CIA report and raised by captured PKI 

ers) is that Gestapu was in fact the result of highly secret plann

secret even within the PKI leadership structure—by party head 

Aidit and his close friend since pemuda days in 1945, “S

Kamaruzaman (ca. 1924–86), head of the party’s supersecret S

Bureau. For reasons that are not entirely clear but were pro

connected with Aidit’s fears that Sukarno was near death an

without his protection the party could not survive, Syam was 

responsibility for constructing a plot to neutralize army opposit

is generally acknowledged that the plans were ill-conceived a

poorly executed that investigators often found comparatively s

errors unbelievable, taking them instead as clues to hidden con

cies. The movement collapsed almost instantaneously, more fr

own weaknesses than as a result of any brilliance or preparatio

might be ascribed to Suharto’s response. 

Whether or not the Aidit–Syam thesis is accepted, there re

the very important question of who, or what factors, should 

70 
 

 

 

responsibility for the mass killings that took place, mostly 

October 1965 and March 1966 and then in occasional outb

several years thereafter. Although there are no satisfactory 

which reliable national calculations can be made, and In

government estimates have varied from 78,500 to 1 million 

figure of approximately 500,000 deaths was accepted in 

1970s by the head of the Operational Command for the Re

of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) and is widely used in 

sources. As many as 250,000 persons may have been impri

well. As to who carried out these killings, the available ev

meager and mostly anecdotal and suggests a complex pi

some areas, clearly Muslim (in central and eastern Java, 

nantly Nahdlatul Ulama) vigilantes began the murders s

ously and, in a few places, even had to be reined in by army 

others, army contacts either acquiesced to or encourag

actions, and in a number of these there was a clear coordi

efforts. In what seems to have been a smaller number of plac

units alone were responsible. People participated in the ki

looked the other way, for a wide variety of reasons, person

munity-related, and ideological. 

Whatever the case, the mass killings amounted to a cat

ideological cleansing in which not only communists but 

pected communists (and in some areas miscellaneous o

ceived enemies, including Chinese) lost their lives. Violenc

type and on this scale, although perhaps foretold in episod

National Revolution, was new to Indonesia. It is perhaps tru

torian Robert B. Cribb has suggested, that after the disillu

of the struggle for independence, and the deprivations and h

of Guided Democracy, Indonesians were “ready for a culp

the fury unleashed seems too intense and too broad to be e

in this way alone. Similar questions about the origins of extr

lence in Indonesia were to arise a generation later, at the e

regime that in 1965–66 was just beginning to take hold. 

The abrupt narrative break of the violent events that imm

followed Gestapu gives the impression that the transition 

Old Order to the New Order (as they came to be called, firs

PKI, anti-Sukarno student protesters) was swift. In reality, S

power and Guided Democracy policies dissolved more 

despite fierce opposition in some circles to his continued d

the PKI and his refusal to concede that Guided Democ

failed. Suharto and his supporters were aware that Sukarn

ued to have loyal followers, and they did not wish to r

upheaval, much less a backlash against the army. Military 

began holding well-managed trials of PKI figures, and a 
removal began of ABRI officers and troops thought to be stron

or Sukarno loyalists. 

In early 1966, Sukarno, still the acknowledged president

pressured into signing the Letter of Instruction of March 11 

Perintah Sebelas Maret, later known by the acronym Supersem

see Glossary), turning over to Suharto his executive authorit

among other reasons, to keep law and order and to safegua

Revolution. The next day, the PKI was officially banned and it

viving leaders, as well as prominent pro-Sukarno figures, ar

and imprisoned. Over the next few months, the new govern

largely dismantled Sukarno’s foreign policy as Jakarta broke i

with Beijing, abandoned confrontation with Malaysia, rejoine

UN and other international bodies, and made overtures to the 

especially for economic assistance. The Inter-Governmental G

on Indonesia (IGGI—see Glossary) was formed to coordinat

aid. In mid-1966, the Provisional People’s Consultative Asse

(MPR(S)) demanded that Sukarno account for his behavior re

ing Gestapu, but he stubbornly refused; only early the next ye

he directly claim that he had known nothing in advance of 

events. But by then, even many of his supporters had lost pat

On March 12, 1967, the MPR(S) formally removed Sukarno 

power and appointed Suharto acting president in his stead. The 

Order thus officially began as the Old Order withered away. 

and bitter, Sukarno lived under virtual house arrest in the pre

tial palace in Bogor, Jawa Barat Province, until his death in 

and he was buried far from the nation’s capital in his home to

Blitar in Jawa Timur Province. 

Contemporary Indonesia 

Rise of the New Order, 1966–85 

On the surface, and particularly through a Cold War lens, the 

Order appeared to be the antithesis of the Old Order: anticomm

as opposed to communist-leaning, pro-Western as opposed to 

Western, procapitalist rather than anticapitalist, and so on. A

head of state, Suharto seemed to reflect these differences by b

as historian Theodore Friend put it, “cold and reclusive 

Sukarno had been hot and expansive.” And certainly many In

sians saw the change of regime as representing a great deal 

than a mere shift or transition. Separated from the Old Order 

national trauma, the New Order was unabashedly dominated b

military, focused on economic development (pembangunan)

determined to create stability. The promoters of the New Orde

72 
 

themselves as pragmatic and realistic, generally apolit

opposed to all ideologies, characteristics that, in the wak

Guided Democracy years, were by no means unpopular eve

those who were nervous about the prospects of military rule

It became obvious in time, however, that alongside the di

there were a number of important similarities between 

regimes. For example, both Sukarno and Suharto develo

authoritarian rulers, compared by critics to ancient Javane

and seen as unique and uniquely potent figures—the sol

(puppet master)—on whom everything depended. Both men 

in a strong, highly centralized, and religiously neutral state, 

found established political parties and organized public o

difficult to tolerate. Both searched for and hoped to define a

priate national identity, looking back to Indonesia’s beginni

independent nation for inspiration in so doing. Both men 

mated their own powers and were in the end forced from o

publicly disgraced in ways and for reasons they could not gr

two “orders,” like the two individuals who epitomized them

viewed not in either/or terms, but in the light of nuance and a

ness of similarities and differences, changes and continuities

It was still far from clear in 1966, either to Suharto him

his civilian and military supporters, what the New Order was 

going to look like. At a seminar entitled “In Search of a N

held at Jakarta’s Universitas Indonesia in May that year, stud

intellectuals grappled primarily with problems associated 

economy, focusing on the role that could be played by those 

cialized training in economic development and finance, 

technocrats. Three months later, the armed forces, under S

leadership, held their own seminar in Bandung, entitled “Br

icy Outlines and Implementation Plans for Political and E

Stability.” There was extended discussion, with civilian le

attendance, of the appropriate role of the military in rebuild

nesia. They settled on “safeguarding the Revolution,” and e

dwifungsi (dual function) of national defense and participati

nation’s political and social affairs, twin responsibilities s

rooted in the army’s experience during the struggle for indep

(see Suharto’s New Order, 1965–98, ch. 5). 

There were vague references at this time to elections, but it 

sonably clear that there would be no return to the open party p

the early 1950s, which military, and many civilian, leaders co

divisive because they either tapped into “primordial” loya

identities or created such loyalties on the basis of inappropria

gies. On the other hand, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy ha
unworkable. The New Order solution was to attempt an apo

nonideological, quasi- or pseudo-democratic system that woul

mote unity, prevent both internal conflict and the obstruction o

nomic development, and satisfy some of the basic requireme

world opinion. 

Political Structure 

What came to be called Pancasila Democracy appears to 

been constructed principally by Ali Murtopo (1924–84), a long

army associate of Suharto. Of modest social and educational 

ground, Ali Murtopo rose to prominence in the military, primar

an “operator” with strategic sense and a “can do” attitude. His r

a leading military intelligence officer earned him a reputation 

unscrupulous and rather mysterious manipulator, but in 

respects he mirrored views held far beyond a small group of m

leaders and shared among the civilian middle classes, and his a

ties were widely known. His plan had three key elements. First

ernment control of the parliamentary process would be achiev

stipulating that a certain percentage of the membership of the 

legislative body, the People’s Representative Council (DPR), a

chief representative body, the People’s Consultative Ass

(MPR), were to be government civilian appointees, with an 

tional group of appointed members from the armed forces. Se

control of the electoral process would come by limiting the nu

of political parties and prying them away from ethnic, reli

regional, or personal identities, as well as by establishing a go

ment-backed parliamentary representative group (pointedly 

“political party”) of government employees and other groups, su

Golkar (see Glossary), an organization of functional groups, to p

ipate in elections. Third, control over the majority of the voting 

lic would result from limiting the periods of political campai

and restricting such activities to the district level. The inhabita

villages and small towns—the majority of Indonesians—were 

“freed” from mass political mobilization, manipulation, and pol

tion, becoming instead a more or less depoliticized “floating m

They would be encouraged to vote for whichever party or grou

thought might best answer their needs at the moment, but not to 

their choices on the basis of “primordial” or personal identifiers

An additional component, designed initially under the direct

Ruslan Abdulgani (1914–2005), who had served as Sukarno’s 

ideological adviser a decade earlier, was a national indoctri

program intended to give Pancasila clarity and application, a

ensure that all Indonesians uniformly understood and accepted i

74 
Suharto, president of 

Indonesia from 1967 to 1998 

Courtesy Embassy of 

Indonesia, Washington, DC 

military, the extraconstitutional Kopkamtib, and the civilian 

Intelligence Coordinating Board (Bakin) all exerted de

watchfulness and enforcement. 

These arrangements, which came to characterize the New O

not emerge suddenly and fully formed but rather were the p

gradual change and, generally, pragmatic adjustment. The c

tion of political parties, for example, did not take place until 1

years after the first elections (in which Golkar won nearly 63 p

the vote). Government strategists seem to have thought cons

might be preferable to the direct but clumsy manipulation 

leadership attempted before the elections. A strong fear persi

even with communism outlawed, potential threats to order rem

the form of religiously identified parties and the former foll

Sukarno. Islamic parties had to combine, for this reason, in a 

ment-created Development Unity Party (PPP), and other 

including Sukarno’s old PNI, amalgamated in the Indonesian 

racy Party (PDI). Where Pancasila was concerned, the go

attempted to introduce draft bills on the subject in 1969 and 

nothing came of them. It was only in 1978 that moral instruc

so-called Guide to Realizing and Experiencing the Pancasila (

shape, and Pancasila education began to enter school curri

civil service training in earnest. Not until 1985 did all organ
 

including political groups, have to adopt the Pancasila as thei

tunggal (underlying principle). 

Particularly after its first decade and down until its final yea

New Order’s political design gave the impression that it had pro

a tight, highly centralized, and closely managed system, and on

depended to an extraordinary degree on the political genius o

individual, Suharto. Scholars and others, especially those who op

the rise of the New Order, struggled to find an appropriate term 

which to describe it—autocratic, militarist, neofeudal, patrim

paternalist, neofascist, corporatist, military-bureaucratic, develop

talist, or command-pragmatist—and periodically announced th

demise was imminent. None of the terms proved altogether sa

tory, but even so the New Order lasted for 32 years. 

The continuity of the New Order was not achieved solely, o

haps even largely, by force or the threat of force. For one thing, 

nesia was far too large and too diverse to be ruled entirely unif

by a single institution, much less a single person. As political 

tist Donald K. Emmerson noted in 1999, “‘Suharto’s Indonesia

never been more than a metaphor.” Further, the military itsel

neither monolithic nor a caste apart from civilian society. The 

practice of dwifungsi, which by 1969 had, for example, placed 

tary men as governors in nearly 70 percent of the nation’s prov

and as mayors and district heads in more than half of all citie

districts, did more to “civilianize” the military than to militariz

society. And it was under “military rule” that the civilian bu

cracy ballooned, between 1975 and 1988 more than doubling 

million. It is also true that the New Order was founded, and c

ued to depend upon, a rough and largely unspoken consensus a

the middle classes, military as well as civilian, that economic d

opment came before everything else. The New Order govern

had a great deal of leeway as long as it could make good on pro

of economic growth.

 None of this meant, however, that government policies and a

went unopposed. Indeed, the period of greatest political stru

change and economic expansion saw serious outbursts of dissen

1974 Malari riots over big business and the burgeoning Japanes

nomic presence were followed in 1976 by the Sawito Affair acc

Suharto and the government of corruption. In 1980 came the Pe

of 50 in which notables, many of them former ABRI officer

close allies of Suharto, protested that the New Order had mi

preted Pancasila and misunderstood the proper mission of the 

services, and in 1984 the Tanjung Priok riots protested corruptio

ABRI’s handling of Islam. These upheavals were handled in c

often coercive, ways. But they could be weathered because a 

76 
public feared unrest and had made a certain peace with the 

tion, long nursed in both military and some civilian circ

potential enemies to national order included not only commu

Islam but also unfettered Western-style liberal democracy. 

Economic Growth 

The New Order’s primary goal and justification was rapid e

growth, to be achieved not by a thorough-going reversal from 

Democracy’s state-centered socialist ideals to liberal capitalis

finding a realistic, flexible way to deliver results without entir

doning those ideals. This was a formidable task. Economic 

Pierre van der Eng has estimated that at the start of the Ne

Indonesia’s per capita GDP was below what it had been in 1

probably below the level of 1913. The country was also sad

an enormous foreign debt and crippling inflation (see The 

Government, ch. 3). The strategy drawn up and managed by 

Western-educated economists headed by Wijoyo Nitisastro 

2005) was ambitious but fiscally cautious and uninterested 

nomic nationalism or dogma. Beginning in 1969, Repelita (

sary)—five-year plans that were really more guidelines than e

plans—laid out broad priorities but left much room for polic

vering and adjustment to changing conditions. The focus was 

on alleviating poverty, and in the simplest terms the approac

improve agricultural productivity and rural incomes. Succes

would then provide the dynamic for industrialization, which 

turn bring the nation to a point of “takeoff” to full and self-s

modernization. 

Remarkably, and despite widespread skepticism, the Ne

did succeed in bringing about a rapid transformation of Ind

economy. During the roughly 30-year period, for example, I

averaged a real GDP growth of roughly 5 percent. and real p

GDP trebled. Average caloric intake increased by 70 perce

age life expectancy rose from about 47 to 67 years, and the m

turing and industrial sectors’ combined share of GDP rose 

percent to roughly 65 percent while agriculture’s share drop

53 percent to 19 percent. The incidence of poverty dropped 

percent to 10 percent on Java, and from 52 percent to 7 perc

where in the country. In 1993 the World Bank placed I

among the highest-performing developing economies and p

its success in achieving both rapid growth and improved equ

This was an astounding performance, and understandin

occasioned heated and continuing academic debate. Some 

point out that Indonesia’s accomplishments must be evalu
broader, comparative context. Surpassing Nigeria in virtual

macroindicators, and India and China in some of them, Indo

nevertheless lagged behind neighboring Malaysia, Thailand, an

Philippines in others. Especially considering the point from wh

began, Indonesia performed remarkably well, but on a world sc

a long generation of economic improvement, it is important to 

tify both comparative strengths (sustained growth rate, stru

change) and weaknesses (inflation, terms of trade, and debt ser

Other writers have questioned the accuracy of the statistica

used to support many of the findings about New Order econ

development, suggesting among other things that the ways po

was measured were flawed and that methods of gauging ineq

simply did not match up with either observation or public com

tary. Between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s, for example, 

was a common assumption that the gap between rich and po

Indonesia grew fairly rapidly, although during the same perio

nation’s Gini index (see Glossary), based on household expend

remained relatively steady at about 0.34, well below Thailand (

the Philippines (0.48), and Malaysia (0.50). It seems likely, how

that the divergence is best explained not by flawed methods of 

surement, but by changing perceptions. New Order Indon

were the first to acquire wealth in significant numbers, and 

vastly better-informed society with rising expectations it app

that the rich were getting richer and the poor poorer even thoug

was not statistically the case. 

Some critics have also characterized Indonesia’s economic 

ress during the New Order as ephemeral because it was depend

foreign aid, state investment (and control), and/or the exploitat

nonrenewable resources, especially oil and gas. Such argumen

difficult to support with real data. Oil revenues, for instance, sup

much of Indonesia’s budgetary income during the boom 

between 1973 and 1981, but agriculture did so before that tim

by the end of the New Order, non-oil revenues, bolstered large

industrial and manufacturing growth, accounted for nearly 70 p

of the budget. Oil and oil prices did not determine growth throu

the period, and the New Order is widely credited among econo

for managing the oil windfall more wisely than other newly o

nations, such as Nigeria and Venezuela, in order to head off d

dency on that source. 

Economic development during the New Order was more t

mere façade or, as one of Indonesia’s most prominent public in

tuals, Gunawan Mohammad, once characterized it, an “epic illu

The gains were real and widely shared, and there can be no doub

the average Indonesian was economically better off toward the e

78 
 

 

the New Order than at its start. (Nor were these gains entire

by the economic crisis of the late 1990s, as some predicted.

problems, however, rooted as much in the development p

successes as in its failures, were of great long-term significa

most obvious was corruption, the scale of which burgeone

economy grew. A notorious harbinger of things to come wa

cal scandal surrounding Colonel Ibnu Sutowo (1914–2001)

the State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company (Pertamina)

1975 had sunk the corporation into enormous international d

personally enjoying a luxurious lifestyle that reportedly in

US$1 million wedding for his daughter. By the early 1990s, t

cial dealings of Suharto’s own children, particularly his elde

ter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, better known as Tutut (born 19

youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, nicknamed Tomm

1962), attracted widespread attention because of their scale 

family conglomerates’ dependence on privilege. And, wel

financial circles, corruption extended far into the bureauc

courts, and the police. Despite numerous campaigns prop

deal with corruption in various corners of society, governm

forces and investigations made little headway; corruption a

sively at the New Order from the inside. 

Other difficulties were less straightforward. For examp

Order technocrats had sought to address the economic im

between Java and the Outer Islands, whose natural resou

contributed disproportionately to the national income, a s

rebellion in the 1950s and early 1960s. New Order industri

policies, depending heavily on the relatively cheap labor av

densely populated Java, changed this. By the mid-1990s, J

duced 40 percent of the country’s exports, double the figure 

decade earlier and, for the first time since independence, co

a portion of the national economic output—roughly 60 p

equivalent to its share of the population. But this shift pro

own imbalance as the economy of the Outer Islands slipped 

atively and some regions began to see widening poverty

source of heightened tension between the regions and Ja

similar irony can be seen in the changing role of the private 

the economy, a goal sanctioned by the New Order governm

pushed especially hard by the IMF and World Bank. During 

four Repelita (1969–88), private investment, foreign as 

domestic, provided a very modest percentage of national in

funding, but by the end of Repelita V in 1993, it made up m

70 percent of the total, a rapid shift. The change was particu

nificant, however, because it went unaccompanied by ap

reforms in fiscal regulation. The economy became inc
 

driven by the market, and, among other things, private entrepre

began to make decisions not always in the best interests o

national economy, for example by greatly increasing risky bo

ing from overseas sources and from loosely regulated dom

banks, factors that contributed in a major way to the economic 

of 1997–98. 

Challenges to the State 

Underlying these New Order initiatives for political and 

nomic change was an important but largely undiscussed cont

in some fundamental ideas about the nature of both the natio

the state. Consistent with the ideas of the founders of indepe

Indonesia, New Order architects viewed the state as necessaril

tary and powerful, having little patience with notions of feder

or decentralization of powers. Indeed, civilian and military le

alike appear to have assumed that only this highly centric fo

state authority could bring about the political stability and econ

growth they sought. The same leaders also inherited assum

about the extent and unity of a national territory generally acc

as comprising the former Netherlands East Indies and did no

other suggestions tolerable. 

These convictions led among other things to raising an enl

more centralized bureaucratic structure for the New Order stat

requiring administrative authorities to apply centrally develope

icies on matters ranging from taxes to traditional performances

cation to elections, firmly and uniformly throughout the nation

from the government perspective, the effort represented a rat

modern approach, while to critics it often appeared narrow, op

sive, and self-serving. Resentment and debate, as well as lega

physical struggles, over such issues were a regular feature o

under New Order governance. 

Inherited sensitivity to potential challenges to national unit

led to military involvement—and long-term enmities—in s

corners of the archipelago. The first of these took place in Wes

Guinea (later called Irian Jaya, now the provinces of Papu

Papua Barat). During the 1949 Round Table Conference, the 

had refused to discuss the status of this territory, which, upon r

nition of Indonesian independence, was still unresolved. Co

over the issue escalated during the early 1960s, as the Dutch 

pared to declare a separate state, and Sukarno responded with a 

tary campaign. In August 1962, the Dutch were pressed by 

opinion to turn over West New Guinea to the UN, which perm

Indonesia to administer the territory for a five-year period un

80 
 

unspecified “Act of Free Choice” could be held (see Local 

ment, ch. 4). 

Thus it fell to the New Order to complete a project begu

Old Order. Ali Murtopo—with the military support of troo

manded by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo (1927–89)—arranged 

paign that, in mid-1969, produced a consensus among m

1,000 designated local leaders in favor of integration with 

nesian state. This decision was soon approved by the UN

territory became Indonesia’s twenty-sixth province before th

the year. 

The integration process did not go unopposed, howeve

bitterness came from Papuans who had stood to benefi

Dutch-sponsored independence and who formed the Fre

Organization (OPM) in 1965. But resentment soon spread be

Jakarta’s placement of thousands of troops and officials in 

tory, exploitation of natural resources (for example, by sign

tracts for mining rights with the U.S. corporation F

McMoRan Copper and Gold in 1967), encouragement o

from Java and elsewhere, and interference with local traditi

as dress and religious beliefs. OPM leaders declared Papua

sion in 1971 and began a guerrilla resistance. Despite intern

OPM resistance continued throughout the New Order era, p

the mid-1980s and again in the mid-1990s, attracting a si

ABRI presence. 

In Aceh, northern Sumatra, resistance to Jakarta’s exte

authority arose in the mid-1970s. This area, known for its 

struggle against Dutch rule in the nineteenth century, had al

it necessary to fight for its autonomy after independence, in 

ment led by the Muslim political figure Muhammad Daud B

(1899–1987) and affiliated with Darul Islam. Aceh won st

separate province in 1957 and as a semiautonomous special 

with greater local control of religious matters in 1959. In 

1970s, however, the discovery of natural gas in Lhoks

Aceh, and the fact that this location could be more readily d

than other deposits found in eastern Kalimantan and the 

Islands, meant that for Jakarta Acehnese autonomy was now 

erable. By 1976 armed resistance to the central governme

under the banner of a Free Aceh Movement (GAM), led by 

Tiro (1925–2010), a former Darul Islam leader who claimed 

from a hero of the 1873–1903 Aceh war against the Dutch

responded with limited military force that crushed the sma

ment, but a decade later, when GAM reappeared with grea

support and funding from Libya and Iran, both the movem

the Jakarta response were far more extensive and brutal: e
 

 

were of between 2,000 and 10,000 deaths, mostly civilian. 

mid-1990s, Jakarta claimed to have defeated GAM’s gu

forces, but resentment ran deep, and thousands of government t

remained posted in Aceh. 

The military involvement of greatest significance during the 

Order, however, was that in East Timor. The status of this 

imperial remnant changed when a radically new, democratic go

ment came to power in Lisbon in 1974, and Portugal soon deci

shed its colonial holdings. Local political parties quickly form

favor of different visions of the future, the most prominent bei

leftist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (

lin—see Glossary) and the Timorese Popular Democratic As

tion (Apodeti), which sought integration with Indonesia as a 

autonomous province. By mid-1975, it appeared that Fretilin w

be the likely winner in an upcoming general election, a prospe

brought internal political violence as well as escalating conc

Jakarta that a “communist” government (a designation gen

considered inaccurate) might plant itself in the midst of the In

sian nation. On November 28, 1975, Fretilin announced the ind

dence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (as of 200

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste), which it controlled. D

by ideological fears rather than a desire for national expa

Jakarta reversed its earlier avowed policy of noninterference 

with the implicit consent of Australia and the United State

December 7 launched an assault on East Timor and soon be

brutal “pacification” requiring more than 30,000 ABRI troop

July 15, 1976, East Timor, as Timor Timur, became the twenty

enth province of Indonesia, and Jakarta began both exploitin

limited natural resources—coffee, sandalwood, marble, and 

pects for vanilla and oil—and undertaking rebuilding and dev

ment programs. 

In the late 1980s, the province opened to foreign observers, 

1990 ABRI finally captured the charismatic Fretilin leader 

Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão (born 1946), but widespread r

ment of the occupation festered. Then, in November 1991, In

sian soldiers fired on a crowd of demonstrators at the Santa 

Cemetery in Dili, the capital, and dramatic video footage o

event, in which between 50 and 250 civilians were killed, wa

tributed worldwide. The majority of Indonesians knew and car

tle about East Timor and had not basically disagreed with New 

policies there, but the outside world felt very differently. Indo

found itself increasingly pressured—for example, by the U

States, the European Union (EU), the Roman Catholic Church

the UN—to change course. Indonesia resisted, and, indeed, m

82 
pressures in East Timor tightened, and Muslim migration, e

from Java, increased rapidly in this largely Catholic and 

area. Not surprisingly, indigenous opposition increased, e

among a younger generation born in the 1970s. Jakarta did 

ognize this response as either legitimate protest or nascent 

ism, which it had unwittingly done much to foster. 

Decline and Fall of the New Order, 1985–98 

The New Order probably reached the peak of its powe

mid- to late 1980s. The clear success of its agricultural 

achieving self-sufficiency in rice in 1985, and its policies in 

ficult fields as family planning—Indonesia’s birthrate 

exceptionally rapidly from 5.5 percent to 3.3 percent 

between 1967 and 1987—earned it international admirati

nomic progress for the middle and lower classes had seeme

ance any domestic discontent. In retrospect, however, 

serious weakness were discernible by about the same time. A

there had always been a certain level of public and private d

under New Order rule, by the early 1990s it had grown stro

the government appeared increasingly unable to finesse thi

tion with force (veiled or otherwise) or cooptation. In 

intense international disapproval, particularly over Eas

proved increasingly difficult to deflect. 

Several important shifts had taken place, which in turn al

New Order in fundamental ways. One was international: the 

of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War b

vided New Order leaders with frightening examples of 

upheaval and religious and ethnic conflict following in the w

relaxation of centralized power, and these events also left I

more vulnerable to pressures from the West. An important r

a new uncertainty in domestic policy, for example, toward pu

icism, Islam, and ethnic and religious conflict. In the milita

ions grew more varied, many of them frankly disapproving o

government policies, including those toward the armed ser

second important change took place as the advice of “tech

responsible for the successfully cautious economic strategizi

1970s and 1980s began to give way to that of “technicians

Suharto protégé Bacharuddin J. (B. J.) Habibie (born 19

became a technology czar favoring huge, risky expenditures 

technology research and production, for example by attem

construct an indigenous aeronautics industry. 

Some observers detected a third area of change in the a

Suharto himself. He grew more fearful of opposition and les
 

 

of criticism, careless in regard to the multiplying financial ex

of associates and his own children, and increasingly insensit

pressures to arrange a peaceful transition of power to new leade

And, by the late 1990s, he seemed to lose the sense of propri

had professed earlier. Circumventing all normal procedures, Su

had himself appointed a five-star general, a rank previously acc

only the great revolutionary leader Sudirman (1916–50) and hi

cessor, Nasution. Further, he not only ignored his own earlier a

against running for a seventh term but also placed daughter 

son-in-law General Prabowo Subianto (born 1952, and married 

time to Suharto’s second daughter, Siti Hediati Hariyadi—kno

Titiek, born 1959), and a host of individuals close to the fam

important civilian and military positions. These and other tran

sions lost Suharto and many of those around him the trust of ev

most loyal supporters, civilian as well as military. 

The changes of greatest long-term significance, however

have been social and cultural. New Order architects had plann

controlling the nation’s politics and transforming its econom

they had given comparatively little consideration to how, if the

ceeded, society—their own generation’s and their children’s—

change as a result. If economic improvement expanded the m

classes and produced an improved standard of living, for exa

would these Indonesians begin to acquire new outlooks and ex

tions, new values? What might be the cultural results of 

greater openness to the outside, especially the Western, w

Although the New Order became infamous for efforts to incul

conservative, nationalist Pancasila social ideology, and to prom

homogenized, vaguely national culture, these endeavors we

from successful. Despite a penchant for banning the works of 

considered to be influenced by communism (author Pram

Ananta Tur became the world-famous example) and an undisg

distaste for “low,” popular culture (a high government officia

disparaged dangdut, a new and wildly popular music style ble

modern Western, Indian, Islamic, and indigenous influenc

“dog-shit” music), the New Order’s leaders turned a compara

blind eye to cultural developments and seemingly had little 

what such changes might reflect of shifting social values. 

Indonesianist Barbara Hatley has pointed to “a vigorous pr

of reinterpretation” of tradition during the New Order period, a

as new reflections of the present. For example, in a series o

novels about the lives of young, urban, middle-class Indonesi

the late 1970s and early 1980s, Yudhistira Ardhi Nugraha 

1954) satirized the world of their pompous, hypocritical pa

84 
 

 

 

 

civilian as well as military. Playwright Nobertus “Nano” R

(born 1949) used mocking language and absurdist humor 

fun of the world of politicians and government bureaucra

1985 Cockroach Opera, which was finally banned five ye

By the late 1980s, many of the older generation had begun 

tion the implicit bargain they had struck with the New Or

children, who had little or no memory of the Sukarno peri

dark days of the mid-1960s, merely saw the limitations a

tices around them and resisted, often with humor and cynici

More openly and widely challenged than ever before, 

Order was in 1997 confronted with economic collapse in the 

a wider Asian financial crisis. The government’s response w

and inadequate, pleasing neither liberals nor nationalist c

tives. Over an eight-month period, the value of the rupiah (s

sary) fell 70 percent. Over the course of a year, the econo

whole shrank nearly 14 percent, 40 percent of the nation’s bu

went bankrupt, per capita income fell an estimated 40 per

the number of people living in poverty catapulted, by some a

to as much as 40 percent of the population. By March 199

Suharto and his chosen running mate, Habibie, became pres

vice president, respectively, it was clear that a line had been 

Public calls for reform turned angry, and within weeks bitt

government, anti-Suharto student demonstrations spilled ou

puses across the nation. On May 12, at Trisakti University in 

members of the police force, then under ABRI command, 

demonstrating students, killing four (and two bystand

wounding at least 20 others. This event, which created ins

tyrs and removed any lingering hesitancy for a broad spe

Indonesians, launched several days of horrific violence, whi

could not or would not control. In Indonesia as a whole, an e

2,400 people are said to have died; as much as US$1 billion 

erty was damaged; and tens of thousands of foreign resid

Indonesian Chinese fled the country. The government that h

to power promising stability and economic growth now de

bly could deliver neither, and its leader was precipitously ab

by even his closest associates. In a simple ceremony held on 

at 9:00 a.m., Suharto resigned, bringing a symbolic end to 

jaded and discredited New Order leadership. 

Reformasi and the Post–New Order Era, 1998–2009 

Suharto’s departure, however, brought neither relief nor 

Indonesia, instead ushering in an extended period of uphe

escalating violence. This took many forms—interethnic, inter
 

 

political, both neighborhood and military-organized vigilantism

even bizarre mob attacks on “ninjas” and sorcerers—and was s

throughout the country, most notably in Kalimantan, Maluku, c

Sulawesi, and eastern Java. Everywhere sensational examples o

agery were recorded in the media: piles of human heads in Kal

tan, suspected sorcerers dragged through the streets by motorcyc

eastern Java, petty thieves beaten and burned alive in many place

killers in Kalimantan and Ambon reportedly drinking their vi

blood and eating their organs. As many as 20,000 people may 

been killed between 1998 and 2001 and more than 200,000 disp

from their homes. There was vigorous debate over the causes 

violence, and widespread talk of revolution, civil war, and the d

gration of the nation as it descended into a surreal and barbarous 

(see Violence, Vengeance, and Law, ch. 2). 

These paroxysms did not deter, and remarkably indeed may 

done much to propel, movement in the direction of dismantlin

political structure built by the New Order. Even before it bega

post-Suharto era had been called a time of reformasi (see Glo

by a broad spectrum of activists, and the name stuck despite u

tainty over exactly what it might mean. Perhaps the greatest su

in the early days of this reformasi proved to be Habibie, Suh

constitutional successor and by virtually all sides considered 

cally suspect, incompetent, or both. During his brief interim 

dency (May 1998 to October 1999), however, Habibie oversa

start of fundamental change in Indonesia’s political and econ

structure and attempted conciliatory solutions to the confli

Papua, Aceh, and most notably East Timor, to which he offer

option of voting for independence. He reduced many pow

ABRI (which was separated from the police in April 199

became known again as the TNI); began decentralizing civilian 

ernment; and countermanded discriminatory laws aimed at Ch

Indonesians (see Political Dynamics, ch. 4). 

None of these fundamental changes was completed without 

culty. East Timor, for example, passed through an agony of civi

flict and military-backed violence after voting to separate 

Indonesia in August 1999; independence as Timor-Leste finally 

in May 2002 after a long and difficult transition under UN aus

Genuine reform measures had been launched, however, and, f

most part, the nation responded positively to them. The sche

general elections from June to October 1999 occurred amidst co

but under the circumstances it was remarkable that they could b

at all. In the end, a politically intricate but reasonably peaceful t

tion was made to the presidency of Nahdlatul Ulama leade

prominent intellectual figure Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009)

86 
 

B. J. Habibie, president of 

Indonesia, 1998–99 

Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, 

Washington, DC 

maneuvered to have his main opponent, Sukarno’s daughte

wati Sukarnoputri (born 1948), selected as his vice president

During the interelection period 1999–2004, Indonesia se

danger of losing its way as the pace of reformasi slackened 

problems arose. Wahid, known familiarly as Gus Dur, was 

ling of many liberal Muslims and, particularly, Western In

watchers, many of whom knew him personally and saw h

exponent of liberal democracy, pluralism, openness, and inf

the antithesis of everything they had despised about New O

ernment. To some degree, he was all those things, but bot

those around him proved managerially and politically inep

to satisfy a diverse following. Many conservative Mus

expected him to further their agenda of an Islamic state, a

appalled by Wahid’s insistence on religious tolerance and 

Israel. Military leaders were shocked to discover that he int

follow through on plans to hold them accountable for vio

armed forces had sponsored in East Timor, and they joi

some Muslim politicians in bitter opposition to his effort to 

long-silenced trauma of 1965–66 to public scrutiny and re

tion. In July 2001, a special session of the MPR voted Wah

office and recognized Megawati as his successor. 

This second interim presidency in three years suggested 

that, whatever reformasi was going to amount to would b

and slow in coming. Some declared it dead altogether, for 

did Megawati lack her father’s charisma (which might h

harnessed to promote change), she possessed—irony of i

more of a New Order outlook than many of her supporters su

and was little inclined to challenge the status quo. She 

much influenced by conservative military leaders who arg

revived separatist movements of the OPM and GAM could 

fully be met with force. Jakarta declared martial law in A

deployed 50,000 troops, which predictably only served to 

more Acehnese than ever before. The economy began to 

(with an annual growth rate of more than 7 percent), but co
 

flourished, and many of the financial practices and busines

works continued to operate as before, at least in part becau

tainted judicial system remained unchanged. 

During this period, however, two fundamental reforms q

took hold. The first was a Decentralization Law that went into 

in early January 2001. This sweeping legislation (with some 

sions in 2004) made the Indonesian state system one of the w

most decentralized, with budgetary and most other bureaucrat

electoral matters being turned over to local authorities down 

district level. This dramatic change carried risks, as it left ple

room for misuse, but it represented real movement toward tran

ency and away from the accumulation of centralized power. Th

ond important reform, a major overhaul of the nation’s consti

undertaken in four stages between 1999 and 2002, called for, a

other things, the direct election of the president and vice presid

limitation of the president to two terms in office; free and 

elections of regional legislatures and a two-house MPR cons

entirely of elected members; establishment of the Constitu

Court; and a much expanded delineation of human rights (se

Structure of Government, ch. 4). Only slightly more than 10 p

of the original constitution of 1945, the cornerstone of New 

legal thought, remained unchanged. Together, these develop

laid the groundwork for a thorough refashioning of the way the 

nesian state functioned. 

One issue not directly addressed by the reformasi movemen

cerned the rise of Islamic politics and, increasingly since 1998, 

use of violence by extremist Muslims, some of them seeking to 

ate Indonesia as an Islamic state. The best-known group was Je

Islamiyah (Congregation of Islam), one of whose founders appe

have been the Javanese cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (born 

believed to have ties to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organiza

Between 2000 and 2005, members of Jemaah Islamiyah were re

sible for a number of bombings, the most infamous being the O

12, 2002, explosions in Bali, which killed 202 people and in

more than 300, including many foreign visitors. Attacks in J

(2003, 2004, and 2009) and Bali (2005) killed 49 people and wo

458, mostly Indonesians (see Terrorism, ch. 5). In part because o

was perceived as hype and hatred behind the American “global w

terrorism” after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United S

and in part because of a reluctance to criticize fellow Muslims pr

ing to act on behalf of their religion, most Indonesians initially re

to believe that Islamist terror had come to their nation or that it 

be of any genuine political importance. Many subscribed to fan

conspiracy theories to explain events, and some public figures, in

88 
 

 

ing Megawati’s vice president, Hamzah Haz (born 1940), atte

make political use of such ideas. As a proliferation of Islami

jostled for position in the more open political arena, many wo

the new democratization might end up benefiting precisely th

intolerant of religious diversity, sought to curtail it. 

The complex electoral contest of 2004, in which more 

million voters cast ballots for tens of thousands of local and 

candidates and then returned to the polls twice more in th

direct presidential election in world history, was widely vie

critical test for both reformasi and the future of Islamist 

Although local contests generated some violence, the elec

cess itself went far more smoothly than generally predicted

results did much to suggest that reformasi had indeed broug

nesia to the threshold of a sustainable, moderate, democrat

the world’s third largest. Against all expectations, the pre

winner, with 61 percent of the vote, was Susilo Bamba

hoyono (born 1949), a retired general who abandoned Suh

the 1998 Trisakti University shootings, later refused then-P

Wahid’s order to declare a state of emergency in order to for

impeachment, and went on to form the small, independent D

Party (PD). This victory was part of a pattern suggesting to 

that, given both chance and choice, Indonesian voters w

inclined to vote individualistically than along familiar party 

logical lines. The outcome also suggested that in this Muslim

ity nation, most voters had little real interest in parties or ca

that identified themselves primarily with Islamic aims ra

national or local goals such as development and reform. So

observers in the West, who only two years earlier had seen 

sociopolitical future for Indonesia, now gushed about the c

transformation with the advent of a robust democracy. 

It soon became clear, however, that after the momentous 2

tions, Indonesia passed into a post–New Order, post-reformas

character and direction of which were still uncertain. On the o

concern that the nation was still very fragile proved in many 

unfounded. The new administration was able, with internatio

tance, to cope reasonably competently and transparently 

December 2004 tsunami, thought to be the most destruc

recorded and responsible in Indonesia alone for at least 

deaths and 203,817 displaced persons, mostly in Aceh, as 

untold devastation. A combination of skill and goodwill also 

possible for Jakarta to turn the catastrophe to some good ac

negotiating a peace settlement with GAM the next year. The 

ernment also proved itself unexpectedly determined and 

bringing to justice those responsible for various terrorist acti
 

 

 

November 2008, it proceeded with the execution of the three 

responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, who had been held 

their capture and conviction in 2003. The administration also sh

it could make difficult economic decisions when it announce

matic cuts to subsidies on gasoline and cooking fuel in order to 

troubled budget; significantly, this move did not result in angr

tests and demonstrations. And despite a much curtailed presid

authority, far more circumscribed military powers, and rapid tur

in local governance (between 2004 and 2008, voters removed 

40 percent of all governors, mayors, and district heads), Indon

showed that they could function in a less authoritarian, less pr

able structure than New Order leaders had supposed was necess

Disquieting questions remained, on the other hand, about th

of Islam in Indonesian society. The opening of politics in the 

New Order era had, along with world developments, served to 

sify and complicate the struggle between radical conservative 

and progressive liberal Islam in Indonesia. This contest has 

many different forms and has come to inform a wide and varie

course throughout the nation. Radical conservative groups hav

liferated. They have used print and electronic media to give vo

their ideas and in some areas have been effective in using local 

tions to get approval for instituting the sharia in local govern

(More than a dozen provinces are said to have considered or ad

such laws, but in many cases the laws have either been qu

rescinded or gone unenforced.) In a long debate over a so-calle

nography law, proposed in 2005 and finally passed in late 2008

ical conservative Muslim parties and supporting groups framed 

arguments in ways to gather support from secularist natio

groups, who found it difficult politically not to support such le

tion—who could be seen as being “for” pornography?—even th

it threatened pluralism and had been opposed by a range of hu

rights and feminist groups. 

It is important to realize that this is not a contest between Mu

and non- or merely nominal Muslims, but among Muslims. Som

ical conservative groups have gone so far as to declare death f

on their moderate opponents, who in turn have publically deno

such acts as “stupid.” And radical conservative groups have 

very loud public stands against government messages about th

rality of Islam in Indonesia and against progressive Muslim pu

tions, such as a Paramadina Foundation book arguing the value

pluralist understanding of modern Islam (even supporting inte

marriage and inheritance rights). What these disputes will me

the nation is as yet far from obvious. 

90 
 

 

 

It can be argued that even the controversies over Islam h

carried out very much in the public view (not possible 

before), and neither the nation nor national society has b

apart, as some have feared. In many respects, Indonesian 

appears to have settled on new and calmer middle ground, r

comfortable with new freedoms and also with the debate 

conflicts that come with them (see Islam, ch. 2). On the who

nesians of the younger generation seem more at ease than t

ents with plurality and individuality, and less in need 

fashioned nationalism, ideological guidance, or state le

Some of these attitudes are reflected in the enormously popu

novel Laskar Pelangi (Rainbow Warriors) by Andrea Hir

refuses to reveal his age but is a child of the New Order er

version appeared in 2008. Hirata’s work is autobiograph

traces his childhood and education in a poor Muslim commu

a run-down Muhammadiyah school on the tin-mining island 

tung. It is essentially a personal success story of overcom

erty, making the most of schooling under difficult conditi

(we learn in three later volumes) becoming a modern In

who is also a citizen of the world. Government, bureaucr

hierarchy are of little relevance; neither, in the end, are 

gender, and religion. What matters is understanding that a

have talent, and that individual determination, education, 

bonds of common humanity can develop it. Anyone can 

and success is not necessarily defined by wealth or power 

status. Some commentators have seen this novel as a key to 

values of the post-Suharto, post-reformasi generation; oth

gone much further, suggesting that it shows clearly for the 

that Indonesian hopes for the future are, in fact, universal 

merely national ones, and that Indonesians, after 65 years 

pendence, are at last joining the world. 

* * * 

The literature on Indonesian history is quite large, and 

materials in many languages. This bibliographic essay ment

works in English. The most satisfactory summaries of In

history are Colin Brown’s A Short History of Indone

Unlikely Nation? and the short but sophisticated chapter b

B. Cribb, “Nation: Making Indonesia.” The basic referenc

any serious student of Indonesian history will find indispen

Cribb’s and Audrey R. Kahin’s Historical Dictionary of In

Cribb’s Historical Atlas of Indonesia, and the relevant po

Jan M. Pluvier’s Historical Atlas of South-East Asia. 
 

The most comprehensive guide to pre- and proto-history i

Peter Bellwood’s Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelag

this is a field that changes very rapidly, and the best informat

contained in articles in specialist journals. The volume Ancien

tory (edited by John N. Miksic) in the Indonesian Heritage Se

a wonderful summary and is superbly illustrated. It can be su

mented with the more comprehensive and academic work by 

Michel Munoz, Early Kingdoms of the Indonesian Archipelag

the Malay Peninsula. 

For a general guide to the period after 1200, the standard w

Merle C. Ricklefs’s A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 12

detailed guide to the following few centuries is the Early M

History volume, edited by Anthony J. S. Reid, in the Indon

Heritage Series. Reid’s Southeast Asia in the Age of Comm

1450–1680 and Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeas

contain very helpful information on Indonesia, as well as cha

ing interpretations. Merle C. Ricklefs’s works on Java in the s

teenth through nineteenth centuries, beginning with War, Cu

and Economy in Java, 1677–1726, set high standards of schol

in that difficult field. 

The literature on Dutch expansion and the Netherlands East 

is extensive. The most comprehensive work on the Cultivation 

tem is perhaps Robert E. Elson’s Village Java under the Culti

System. The 1860 novel Max Havelaar: Or the Coffee Auctions 

Dutch Trading Company by Multatuli, penname of Eduard Do

Dekker, is still captivating reading. A History of Modern Indone

Adrian Vickers begins its coverage with the late nineteenth ce

and the collection of papers edited by Robert B. Cribb in The 

Colonial State in Indonesia is very useful. The subjects of nation

and modernism are woven together in Robert E. Elson’s valuabl

sideration of The Idea of Indonesia: A History and can also be s

through the lens of biography in, among many available works

D. Legge’s Sukarno: A Political Biography and Rudolf Mr

Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia. The periods of Jap

occupation and revolution are the subject of a great many pu

tions, but few attempt a comprehensive view. The essays by Ke

Gotō in Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Co

and Postcolonial World are mostly about Indonesia, and, co

with Remco Raben’s volume entitled Representing the Jap

Occupation of Indonesia, are good places to begin. Peter Post

Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War is a valuable 

resource on the World War II period. On the years 1945–50, An

Reid’s brief but comprehensive The Indonesian National Revol

1945–1950 is still the best overall treatment. 

92 
There is no entirely satisfactory general history cove

entire post–1945 period, beyond the excellent relevant ch

Ricklefs and in Vickers, mentioned above, but Robert B. C

Colin Brown’s Modern Indonesia. A History Since 1945 

great deal of information and analysis in a very short book, 

odore Friend’s colorful Indonesian Destinies offers an intim

A number of works illuminate aspects of each of the politica

of Liberal Democracy, Guided Democracy, the New Or

reformasi, but none of these periods yet has found a compr

treatment. 

Scholarly articles in English on various aspects of Indonesia

can be found in specialized journals such as Bijdragen tot Taal-, 

Volkenkunde (Leiden, Netherlands) (http://www.kitlv-journals

nell University’s Indonesia (http://cip.cornell.edu/Indonesia); J

Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) (http://journals.camb

action/displayJournal?jid=SEA); and South East Asia Resear

don) (http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/0967-828X). 

There are numerous useful Web sites on various aspec

Indonesian past, many of them in the Dutch and Indone

guages. A well-known English-language site offering a deta

sometimes annotated chronology (up to 2004) is Charles A. 

Sejarah Indonesia: An Online Timeline of Indonesian Histor

www.gimonca.com/sejarah). A useful collection of relev

sites is maintained by the International Institute of Socia

(http://www.iisg.nl/w3vlindonesia/). (For further informa

complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environ
Papuan pontoon boat 
INDONESIA’S SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONM

one of the most complex and varied in the world. By one 

least 731 distinct languages and more than 1,100 different di

spoken in the archipelago. The nation encompasses som

islands; the landscape ranges from rain forests and steam

grove swamps to arid plains and snowcapped mountain

world religions—Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hindu

represented, as well as many varieties of animistic pract

ancestor worship. Systems of local political authority vary 

ornate sultans’ courts of central Java to the egalitarian com

of hunter-gatherers in the jungles of Kalimantan. A variety 

nomic patterns also can be found within Indonesia’s bord

rudimentary slash-and-burn agriculture to highly sophistica

puter microchip industries. Some Indonesian communities 

traditional feasting systems and marriage exchange for econ

tribution, while others act as sophisticated brokers in inte

trading networks operating throughout the world. Indones

have a variety of living arrangements. Some go home at 

extended families living in isolated bamboo longhouses; othe

to hamlets of tiny houses clustered around a mosque; still o

home to nuclear families in urban high-rise apartment compl

There are, however, striking similarities among the nation

groups. Besides citizenship in a common nation-state, the sin

unifying cultural characteristic is a shared linguistic heritage

all of the nation’s estimated 240 million people speak at lea

several Austronesian languages, which, although often not 

intelligible, share many vocabulary items and have similar 

patterns. Most important, an estimated 83 percent of the po

can speak Bahasa Indonesia (see Glossary), the official nati

guage. Used in government, schools, print and electronic m

multiethnic cities, this Malay-derived language is both an i

unifying symbol and a vehicle of national integration. 

The national average population density, according to the 2

sus, was 109 persons per square kilometer. However, in 2007 

percent of Indonesians lived in cities, defined by the gove

Central Statistical Office (BPS; for this and other acronyms, 

A) as areas with population densities greater than 5,000 pe

square kilometer or where fewer than 25 percent of house

employed in the agricultural sector. The percentage of Ind

who live in rural areas, and who are closely associated with ag
 

 

stockbreeding, forestry, or fishing, has been declining steadil

example, about 53 percent of the workforce was employed in ag

ture, hunting, forestry, and fishing as recently as the mid-1980

2005 that figure had decreased to 44 percent. As the Indonesian 

lation has grown, become more educated, and moved increa

toward urban centers, small-scale agriculture and trading have p

decreasing roles in defining people’s lifestyles. The rapid expans

the manufacturing, retail, and service industries has led to ways 

ing defined more by social, cultural, and economic interests th

geographic and environmental forces. 

The mobility, educational achievement, and urbanization 

Indonesian population have increased overall since the mid-1

Indonesians have become increasingly exposed to the variety o

nation’s cultures through television, the Internet, newspapers, sc

and cultural activities. Links to indigenous geographic region

sociocultural heritage have weakened, and the contexts for the e

sion of those links have narrowed. Ethnicity is a means of iden

tion in certain situations but not in others. For example, d

Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, peasants from Java 

emphasize their Islamic faith and affiliation, whereas in other se

they emphasize their membership in the national state by atte

school, participating in family-planning programs, and belong

village cooperatives, and by invoking the Pancasila (five princ

see Glossary), the state ideology, as a moral justification for pe

and family choices. In a similar way, isolated hill tribes living 

interior of islands such as Sulawesi, Seram, or Timor might ex

devotion to ancestral spirits through animal sacrifice at hom

swear loyalty to the Indonesian state in school or at the polls. A 

son’s identity as an Indonesian is richly interwoven with fam

regional, and ethnic heritage. 

The Geographic Context 

Indonesia’s variations in culture have been shaped by centur

complex interactions with the physical environment. Although 

nesians in general are now less vulnerable to the vicissitud

nature as a result of improved technology and social program

still possible to discern ways in which cultural variations are l

to traditional patterns of adjustment to their physical circumsta

Geographic Regions 

Indonesia is a vast archipelagic country extending 5,120 ki

ters from east to west and 1,760 kilometers from north to 

According to the Indonesian Naval Hydro-Oceanographic O

98 
the country encompasses 17,508 islands, about 6,000 of w

inhabited. There are five main islands (Sumatra, Java, Kal

Sulawesi, and Papua), two major archipelagos (Nusa Ten

also known as the Lesser Sunda Islands—and the Maluku I

also called the Moluccas), and 60 smaller archipelagos. Thr

islands are shared with other nations: Kalimantan, the worl

largest island—also known as Borneo—is shared with Mala

Brunei; Papua and Papua Barat provinces (two province

from what was formerly called West New Guinea or, la

Jaya) share the island of New Guinea with the nation of Pa

Guinea; and the island of Timor is divided between Tim

(former East Timor) and Indonesia’s Nusa Tenggara Timur 

(see fig. 6). Indonesia’s total land area is 1,811,569 square 

ters. Included in the nation’s total territory are another 93,00

kilometers of inland waters (straits, bays, and other bodie

areas, plus the seas and oceans immediately surrounding In

bring the country’s generally recognized territory (land and 

about 5 million square kilometers. The government, howe

claims a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (see G

that brings the total to about 7.9 million square kilometers. 

Geographers have conventionally labeled Sumatra, Ja

Madura, a small island near Java’s northeast coast), Kalima

Sulawesi collectively as the Greater Sunda Islands. These 

except for Sulawesi, lie on the Sunda Shelf, an extensio

Malay Peninsula and the Southeast Asian mainland. Far to 

are Papua and Papua Barat provinces, which take up the we

of the world’s second-largest island, New Guinea, which li

Sahul Shelf. Sea depths on the Sunda and Sahul shelves ave

meters or less. Between these two shelves lie Sulawesi, Nu

gara, and the Maluku Islands, whose adjacent seas are 4,50

deep in some places. The term Outer Islands (see Glossary

inconsistently by various writers but is usually taken to me

islands other than Java, Bali, and Madura. 

Volcanoes and Earthquakes 

The islands that make up Indonesia are highly unstable tec

and although the resultant volcanic ash has provided the basi

tile soils, it makes agricultural conditions unpredictable in so

The nation has numerous mountains and some 400 volcano

25 percent of which are active. Well-known examples are Mo

api (Gunung Merapi), in Jawa Tengah Province, which last e

2007, and Soputan, in Sulawesi Utara Province, which last e

2008. Between 2000 and 2009 alone, 110 new or continuous 
 

�

�

Equator10 

100 110 120 130 140 100 110 120 130 

Equator

10 

3,800 

3,265 

3,142

3,726 

2,000 

3,440 3,019 

5,030 

Padang 

Pontianak

Palembang

Yogyakarta 

Surabaya 

Jakarta

THAILAND 

MALAYSIA 

VIETNAM 

BRUNEI 

SINGAPORE 

TIMOR-LESTE 

MALAYSIA 

PHILIPPINES 

AUSTRALIA 

PAPUA

NEW

GUINEA 

SUMATRA 

Bali Lombok 

SULAWESI 

TIMOR 

Seram 

MALUKU 

NEW

GUINEA 

JAVA 

KALIMANTAN

GREATER SUNDA ISLANDS

NUSA TENGGARA

(Lesser Sunda Islands) 

FOJA

MOUNTAINS 

Java Sea 

South China Sea 

Sulawesi Sea 

Banda Sea

Timor Sea 

Flores Sea Bali Sea 

Seram Sea 

Makassar Strait 

Strait of Malacca 

Maluku Sea 

Halmahera Sea 

Madura Strait

Sunda Strait 

Sape Strait 

Lombok Strait Sawu Sea

Teluk

Bone 

Torres Strait 

Arafura Sea 

Philippine Sea 

Pacific Ocean 

Sulu Sea 

Indian Ocean

Lake Toba 

Musi 

Solo 

Lorentz 

200 400 Kilometers

400 Miles 200

0 

0

International boundaryNational capitalPopulated place

Spot elevation in meters 

Boundary representationnot necessarily authoritative

Figure 6. Topography and Drainage 

100 
 

eruptions were recorded in Indonesia, mostly in Java. The m

lent geologic events in modern times have occurred in Indo

1815 the explosion of Mount Tambora (Gunung Tambora), a 

volcano in Nusa Tenggara Barat Province on the island of S

reportedly killed an estimated 60,000 people. It last erupted 

Krakatau, a volcano situated on an island between Java and 

erupted in 1883, and more than 36,000 died in the resulting t

which were felt as far away as the Arabian Peninsula, and ch

the water level were reported as far away as Wales. Krakat

active, having erupted as recently as March 2009. The Lump

arjo (Lusi) mud volcano in Jawa Timur Province, which beg

May 2006 coincident with natural gas exploration drilling 

some believe, an offshore earthquake, is an eruption of hydr

phide gas and hot mud rather than a traditional volcano with 

sive ejections and flows of lava. 

Earthquakes also frequently shake Indonesia. Thirty-eig

earthquakes, measuring between 6.5 and 9.1 magnitude—26 

greater than 7.0—hit throughout most of the archipelago 

2000 and 2009. On the morning of December 26, 2004, an 

earthquake registering 9.1 magnitude created a massive tsun

hit the northwestern coast of Sumatra, primarily the Special R

Aceh (called Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 1999–2009)

166,561 people and displacing another 203,817. Other 

caused by this earthquake also devastated coastal and island 

the Indian Ocean as far west as the east coast of Africa a

north as Burma. Overall, the earthquake and tsunamis kil

than 227,898 persons and displaced more than 1.7 million in 

sia and 13 other countries. On March 28, 2005, another de

earthquake, registering a magnitude of 8.6, struck the island 

and nearby islands in Sumatera Utara Province. It killed m

1,300 persons and displaced 40,000. More than 5,700 peo

killed, 38,000 injured, and 600,000 left homeless when a 6

quake hit offshore of the coast of the Special Region of Yo

on May 27, 2006. Then, on September 2, 2009, a 7.0 magnitu

quake struck Jawa Barat Province, causing severe damag

deaths, and was felt widely on Java. Several weeks later, on 

ber 30, 2009, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake hit Padang, Sumat

Province, and was felt throughout Sumatra and Java, as w

Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. It caused at least 1,10

more than 2,180 were injured, and thousands were missing 

severe structural damage. 
Climate 

The main variable in Indonesia’s climate is not temperature 

pressure but rainfall. The almost uniformly warm waters that 

up 81 percent of Indonesia’s area ensure that temperatures on 

remain fairly constant. Traversed by the equator, the archipel

almost entirely tropical in climate. Temperatures average 28 ̊ 

the coastal plains, 26 ̊ C in inland and mountain areas, and 23

the higher mountain regions. Winds are moderate and generall

dictable; monsoons usually blow in from the south and east be

June and September and from the northwest between Decembe

March. Typhoons and other large storms pose little hazard to 

ners in Indonesia’s waters; the primary danger comes from swi

rents in channels such as the Lombok, Sape, and Sunda straits. 

Extreme variations in rainfall are linked with the mons

There is a dry season (June to September), influenced by the A

lian continental air masses, and a rainy season (December to M

that is influenced by air masses from mainland Asia and the P

Ocean. Local conditions in Indonesia, however, can greatly m

these patterns, especially in the central islands of the Maluku g

This oscillating seasonal pattern of wind and rain is related to 

nesia’s geographic location as an archipelago between two 

nents and astride the equator. During the dry monsoon, high pre

over the Australian deserts moves winds from Australia towa

northwest. As the winds reach the equator, the Earth’s ro

causes them to veer off their original course in a northeasterly 

tion toward the Southeast Asian mainland. During the wet mon

a corresponding high-pressure system over the Asian mai

causes the pattern to reverse. The resultant monsoon is augm

by humid breezes from the Indian Ocean, producing signi

amounts of rain throughout many parts of the archipelago. 

Prevailing wind patterns interact with local topographic c

tions to produce significant variations in rainfall throughou

archipelago. In general, the western and northern parts of Indo

experience the most precipitation because the northward- and 

ward-moving monsoon clouds are heavy with moisture by the 

they reach these more distant regions. The average annual ra

for Indonesia is around 3,175 millimeters. Western Sumatra, 

Bali, and the interiors of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua a

most consistently damp regions of Indonesia, with rainfall m

ing more than 2,000 millimeters per year. In part, this moisture 

inates on certain high mountain peaks that, because of their loc

trap damp air and experience more than 6,000 millimeters of 

year. The city of Bogor, near Jakarta, has a high rainfall rate of 

102 
 

Small fishing boats with view of Manado Tu

Sulawesi Utara 

Courtesy Anast

to 4,000 millimeters annually. On the other hand, the areas c

Australia—including Nusa Tenggara and the eastern tip o

tend to be dry, with some areas experiencing less than 1,0

meters of rainfall per year. Some of the islands of southern 

experience highly unpredictable rainfall patterns, depending 

wind currents. 

The air temperature changes little from season to season 

one region to the next, but cooler temperatures prevail at high

tions. In general, temperatures drop approximately 1 ̊ C per 9

of increase in elevation from sea level; night frosts occur in s

interior mountain regions. The highest mountain ranges in P

permanently capped with snow. 

Located on the equator, the archipelago experiences relat

tle change in the length of daylight hours from one seaso

next; the difference between the longest day of the year 

shortest is only 48 minutes. The archipelago stretches acr

time zones: Western Indonesian Time—seven hours in ad

Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)—applies to Sumatra, Java, 

and central Kalimantan; Central Indonesian Time—eig

ahead of GMT—is observed in Bali, Nusa Tenggara, south 
Kalimantan, and Sulawesi; clocks are set to Eastern Indon

Time—nine hours ahead of GMT—in the Malukus and Papua

boundary between the western and central time zones—estab

in 1988—is a line running north between Java and Bali throug

center of Kalimantan. The border between the central and e

time zones runs north from the eastern tip of Timor to the easte

of Sulawesi. Indonesia does not operate daylight-saving time 

summer. 

Environmental Concerns 

Centuries-old patterns of resource exploitation in Indonesia 

to change very rapidly in the late twentieth and early twent

centuries. The rice-growing peasantry is shrinking as a res

mechanization, fertilizer use, and intensification of agricultur

coastal commercial sector has been transformed by overfishin

new technology for interisland commerce; and traditional sw

farming communities of the upland forest have been increa

crowded out by industrial logging. 

The cumulative effects of rising population density, urbaniz

agricultural intensification, resource extraction, and manufac

have had a significant impact on the Indonesian environm

recent decades. Home to the world’s largest reef system, one 

largest expanses of rain forest, and some of its richest areas o

diversity, Indonesia is now experiencing serious environmental 

rioration. Air pollution, caused by rapidly rising levels of m

vehicle emissions (90 percent of vehicles still use leaded fue

by forest fires linked to palm-oil plantation development, have 

rise to respiratory problems that have become the country’s 

most common cause of death. Forest fires in Kalimantan d

1997–98 produced a thick, smoky haze that covered much of S

east Asia, resulting in closed schools and businesses as w

deaths and illnesses related to respiratory disorders. The fire

drew worldwide attention to the uncertain future of the region

est resources. 

Indonesia has some of the worst water pollution in Asia

shortage of sewerage facilities is an especially serious problem

example, because less than 3 percent of Jakarta’s population i

nected to a sewerage system, the city’s waste is typically disch

either into private septic tanks or directly into rivers or canals. 

age disposal into such bodies of water is linked in particular 

repeated epidemics of gastrointestinal infection. In rural areas

off from increased use of pesticides and fertilizers has resul

raised levels of toxicity in the water supply, excessive accumu

104 
 

of algae in riverbeds, and the consequent destruction of ma

The coastal commercial sector suffers from environmental p

originating in the highland interiors of the islands. Soil eros

upland deforestation exacerbates the problem of silting dow

and into the sea. Silt deposits cover and kill once-lively co

creating mangrove thickets and making harbor access inc

difficult, if not impossible, without massive and expensive 

operations. 

National Territory: Rights, Responsibilities, and

Challenges 

The legal rights to, and responsibility for, Indonesia’s t

environment are a matter of controversy. Among the continu

cerns are the exact boundaries between Indonesia and Tim

another issue of concern between the two states is sovereign

tiny uninhabited island off the coast of Timor that is call

Batek by Indonesia but known locally as Fatu Sinai. Di

over the precise maritime boundaries between Australia and 

sia in the Timor Gap remain an area in need of reconcili

another dispute, the International Court of Justice ruled in 

Malaysia in 2002 regarding jurisdiction over the Sipadan an

islands (off northeastern Kalimantan). However, Indonesia c

to assert a claim to the outer islands of the Ligitan group 

established a presence on them. In 2005 tensions flar

between Indonesia and Malaysia concerning Ambalat Island

in the Sulawesi Sea (Celebes Sea) on the boundary between 

states, off the northeast corner of Kalimantan Timur Provin

ing its claim on a doctrine of the political and security unity 

pelagic land and waters (wawasan nusantara), the In

government has asserted its rights to marine and geologic r

within a coastal zone of 200 nautical miles. Indonesia, Mala

Singapore each consider the Strait of Malacca (Selat M

Bahasa Indonesia), one of the most heavily traveled sea-lan

world, to be their primary responsibility. At a conference i

pore in 2004, the United States recognized the right of 

countries to organize security as they saw fit, while at the s

offering assistance for their efforts. 

Since the late 1990s, Indonesia has experienced major chal

its territorial integrity. The most profound resulted from 

Nations (UN)–monitored referendum in August 1999 in East 

whether to accept special autonomy within Indonesia or to 

from Indonesia and declare independence. After 78.5 percen

Timorese voted for independence, pro-Indonesia and pro-inde
forces fought each other, and thousands died or fled to West 

(Nusa Tenggara Timur Province) to avoid the fighting. The vio

began shortly after President Bacharuddin J. (B. J.) Habibie anno

the referendum and continued until well after the vote. On Octob

1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNT

was established, and on May 20, 2002, East Timor, as the Demo

Republic of Timor-Leste, became fully independent of Indonesia

of the estimated 200,000 refugees who went to West Timo

returned by 2003 (see Relations with Neighboring Nations, ch. 4

Timor, ch. 5). 

Two other regional struggles in recent times were in the S

Region of Aceh, in northwestern Sumatra, and in Papua. In 

the long-standing conflict between the Free Aceh Mov

(GAM—see Glossary) and the Indonesian military intensifie

an open secessionist effort. The struggle escalated in 1998, bu

years later secret negotiations held in Geneva led to a Cessat

Hostilities Agreement signed on December 9, 2002. 

The parties had agreed to a dialogue leading to democratic 

tions and a cessation of hostilities. Within six months, howeve

agreement had broken down, and martial law was declared 

province until May 2004. Following the December 2004 earth

and tsunami, a much more comprehensive peace agreement, bro

by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, was officially sig

Helsinki on August 15, 2005, by chief Indonesian negotiator H

Awaluddin and GAM leader Malik Mahmud. The Indonesian go

ment agreed to facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based po

parties and to allow 70 percent of the income from local n

resources to stay within Aceh. On December 27, 2005, GAM le

announced that they had disbanded their military wing and 

itself was dissolved the next month (see Separatist Rebellions, c

Another important challenge to Indonesia’s sovereignty c

from the Free Papua Organization (OPM). After years of sab

secret meetings, and public demonstrations, OPM gained con

able international attention in January 1996 when members 

group kidnapped 14 members of a multinational World W

Fund for Nature scientific expedition. All except two hostages 

freed following negotiations; later a rescue operation was cond

in which six OPM members and the two remaining Indonesian 

tages were killed. Although in 2001 local leaders were granted 

financial and political autonomy and had been permitted a yea

lier to change the name of their province from Irian Jaya 

locally more acceptable Papua, tension persists. (In 2003 Papu

subdivided into Papua and Irian Jaya Barat provinces; the latte

106 
 

renamed Papua Barat in 2007.) Amnesty International 

grave concern about acts of torture and prisoner abuse in 20

Indonesian military. Demonstrations for Papuan independen

sified in 2006 in the wake of revelations of pollution cause

Grasberg mine, a source of copper, gold, and silver ope

Phoenix, Arizona–based Freeport-McMoRan Copper and 

2008 Indonesian police arrested separatist leader Buchtar T

he was about to attend a massive rally in Jayapura, the c

Papua, to show support for an international legislative ca

Papua Barat. 

Even as Indonesia defended its claims to various territori

national environmental groups were pressing Jakarta to acc

ronmental responsibility for those territories. Indonesia wa

aged to monitor pollution in its national territorial waters an

legal action to prevent the destruction of its rain forests. Sinc

1960s, the government has addressed increasing environmen

lems by establishing resource-management programs, co

environmental-impact analyses, developing better policy 

ment, and enacting appropriate laws to give government 

proper authority. Despite these efforts, corruption, overlapp

petencies among government departments, and legal unc

about departmental jurisdictions have slowed progress agai

ronmental degradation. 

Emerging Dynamics of Indonesian Commu

Population 

Indonesia’s population was estimated by U.S. governmen

at 240,271,522 in July 2009. (The next Indonesian census w

uled for 2010.) This marked an increase of 37.6 million sin

The annual growth rate had changed slightly, from 1.3 p

2000 to an estimated 1.1 percent in 2009, with a birthrate est

18.8 per 1,000 population. Life expectancy at birth for the to

lation stood at an estimated 70.8 years (versus 67.9 years 

with males projected to live 68.3 years and females 73.4 yea

ity rates for women, based on births per woman, decreased 

from 2.6 in 2000 to an estimated 2.3 in 2009, and the infant 

rate improved from 40.9 deaths per 1,000 live births in 20

estimated 29.9 deaths per 1,000 in 2009. The overall death 

estimated in 2009 at 6.2 deaths per 1,000 of the population. 

Indonesia is a young nation. In 2008 it was estimated 

median age was 27.6 years for the total population (mal

females, 28.1). The overall age structure was such that 28 p
 

12 10 8 6 4 2 20 4 6 8 10 12

12 10 8 6 4 2 20 4 6 8 10 12

80 and older 

80 and older 

AGE-GROUP 

MALES FEMALES 

POPULATION IN MILLIONS 

2009 

0–4 

5–9 

10–14 

15–19 

20–24 

25–29 

30–34 

35–39 

40–44 

45–49 

50–54 

55–59 

60–64 

65–69 

70–74 

75–79 

0–4 

5–9 

10–14 

15–19 

20–24 

25–29 

30–34 

35–39 

40–44 

45–49 

50–54 

55–59 

60–64 

65–69 

70–74 

75–79 

AGE-GROUP 

MALES FEMALES 

POPULATION IN MILLIONS 

2029 

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Commerce, Census Bu

International Programs Center, International Data Base Population Pyramids (In

(Washington, DC, 2008), http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb. 

Figure 7. Age-Sex Ratio, 2009, and Projected Ratio, 2029 

108 
the population was age 14 or younger, 66 percent was 15–

old, and 6 percent was 65 or older. Based on estimates for 20

nesians aged nine or younger represent the largest age cohort

some 44.9 million, or nearly 19 percent of the population (se

Indonesia’s gender ratio is fairly balanced, and comparable 

its regional neighbors: the 2009 estimate was 1.05 males 

every female born, the same as for Australia, Brunei, Pap

Guinea, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste. Malaysia’s gen

stood at 1.07:1 and Singapore’s at 1.08:1. 

Family 

The structure, size, and function of the Indonesian famil

considerable variation in the country’s hundreds of differe

linguistic groups. Enshrined in official rhetoric and docum

model for the nation as a whole, the family is regarded as 

dation of morality, justice, and duty concerning public b

Although Indonesians in different parts of the archipelago 

ferent traditional notions about inheritance, marriage, a

rights and responsibilities, certain commonalities are begi

emerge, in part as a result of the influence of national laws

tions, and policies, as well as the increasing integration of t

lation into a national economy. 

One of the most striking and far-reaching changes since 

1970s has been the continued decline in fertility. As a 

improved education, an effective family-planning progr

reduced child mortality, the average number of children 

Indonesian woman has steadily declined, from approximate

1970 to an estimated 2.3 in 2009. The decline has been st

Java and Bali. Despite the reduction in family size, the archi

increasingly overcrowded, with an estimated population d

131 persons per square kilometer in 2009 (compared with 

square kilometer in the United States). In Java, Madura, a

population densities are more than 900 per square kilometer

Since the early 1990s, Indonesian women have tended 

fewer children as infant mortality has decreased. In 1991 

mated infant mortality rate was 59 deaths per 1,000 live b

1995 that figure had declined to 48 deaths; it then dipped to 

2000. In 2009 the infant mortality rate was estimated at 29

per 1,000 live births. Strikingly, even as the number of b

woman has declined in Indonesia, there has been no evide

preference for sons in the number of children born or who s

infants. Another factor influencing Indonesian families is 

trend toward equality in inheritance patterns and allocation 
 

resources. The gap between the amounts inherited by son

daughters appears to have shrunk over the course of the 1980

1990s, and by 2009 it had probably nearly closed. 

The mobility of working-age adults has increased greatly, me

that households have become more dynamic in the early twent

century. The structure and size of households fluctuate more r

than in the past. This trend is both a cause and a consequence 

economic, social, and demographic changes that have occurred, a

as the result of transportation improvements (see Migration, this 

Despite these forces of rapid change, Indonesian marriages 

tinue to exhibit a typical pattern in which wives exert contro

household finances and overall management of children and h

hold affairs while husbands and unmarried young adults are res

ble for discretionary spending and ties to the larger comm

Polygamy is permitted but relatively rare. The law states that me

women are equal, and that both are responsible for maintainin

home and caring for the children. The rate of participation of w

in the workforce has remained more or less stable, and, overall, 

nesian marriages have experienced a decline in the divorce r

less than 40 percent. This contrasts with the 1960s, when th

peaked at nearly 60 percent. The reasons for this decline are c

versial, but financial, political, and social insecurity, combined 

growing religious conservatism, may be factors in keeping mar

together. The actual divorce process exhibits considerable variat

different parts of the archipelago, but in general a divorce is rela

easy to obtain in Islamic courts by either a man or a woman. Ju

divorces are harder to get. 

National, Religious, and Local Authority 

Most Indonesians have a strong sense of citizenship in the 

Indonesian state and its various levels of government in addit

feeling attached to their family and household. Three generatio

schoolchildren have worn similar uniforms, sung common 

learned a common language, and recited similar facts of history

ics, and the Pancasila ideology. The red and white Indonesian fl

common sight throughout the archipelago. Uniformed state em

ees and ordinary citizens alike have all grown accustomed to ca

their kartu tanda penduduk, or national identification card. 

In 1998, however, after nearly 32 years of gradual centralizat

power and authority under Suharto (1967–98), the relationsh

ordinary Indonesians to their vast nation-state began to change r

(see The Political Process, ch. 4). One of the most noticeable ch

was a trend toward challenging central authority occurring at the 

110 
 

 

 

time as a move toward decentralization. Assertions of loca

and authority became more frequent in the early twenty-firs

In some cases, such assertions took the form of vigilante viol

protests, as local citizens bypassed the courts and took the s

justice into their own hands. As protests and unrest increased

began monitoring calls for change (generally dubbed reform

Glossary) in newly uncensored newspapers and Internet sour

circulation and Internet subscriptions both increased rapidly. 

These challenges often took the form of assertions of 

rather than secular authority, as the leadership of Islamic gro

suppressed during the New Order government of Suharto, 

find its voice. One striking trend was visible in Java amon

women, who, in increasing numbers, began to wear the jilbab

ditional Islamic women’s head covering. Anthropologist 

Brenner has argued, based on extensive interviews with 

women, that this was less a statement of submission to an ide

male-dominated tradition than an assertion of independenc

perceived status quo of secular authoritarianism. Young w

other words, were employing the veil or head covering as 

making a statement about their feelings toward what they reg

the moral laxity and corruption of the state, and of society mo

ally. It did not necessarily signal a stance in favor of an Islam

Urbanization and Decentralization 

One of the most significant trends in Indonesia since the 1

been toward urbanization. The segment of the population 

urban areas grew from 17 percent in 1971, to 31 percent in 1

to 46 percent in 2003. In 2006 Indonesia’s Urban and Region

opment Institute projected that the nation’s urban populati

reach more than 50 percent by 2010 and 60 percent by 2025

showed that the movement toward urban areas, particularly 

Jawa Barat Province, southwestern Sulawesi, and Kalimanta

other areas, stemmed not from the innate lure of the cities 

the lack of employment in the countryside. Migrants seemed 

the pollution, crime, anonymity, and grinding poverty of th

short-term discomforts that would eventually give way to a b

For high school and college graduates with no prospects for 

ment in the rural areas, this may in fact have been a correct 

tion. But for those migrants without capital or qualifications, 

hope for employment was in the so-called informal secto

offered work such as street vending, scavenging, and short-

labor (see Employment and Income, ch. 3). Many migrants a

vated tiny but nutritionally important gardens. 
Much urban growth has been in mid-sized cities. Jakarta’s po

tion (8.5 million, with a population density of nearly 12,900 pe

per square kilometer in 2009) has experienced a rate of incre

about 1 percent a year, but there were signs of decentralizing tre

the early twenty-first century. For example, much growth has occ

in the greater Jakarta metropolitan area, known as Jabodetabe

Jakarta–Bogor–Depok–Tangerang–Bekasi), home to an esti

24.3 million in 2007, rather than in Jakarta proper. While the c

enjoyed a disproportionate amount of the nation’s resources in 

nology, health care, wealth, and political power during the Su

era, after 1998 provincial governments began to demand a 

share. On January 1, 2001, a rapid decentralization program 

that placed more authority at the level of the regency (kabupa

subprovincial but nonmunicipal unit of government) and munici

(kota) (see Local Government, ch. 4). This process reportedl

going well in the mid-2000s. 

The transformation of a well-established pattern of urbani

may have been possible because, as anthropologist Pauline D. M

observed in the mid-1960s, Jakarta has never been a true prima

in terms of being the only center for economic, political, admin

tive, higher education, and technical functions in the way tha

example, Bangkok has been for Thailand. In Java, Surabay

always been a major import-export center and has long been ho

an important naval station, and Bandung has been a center for 

portation, higher education, and industry. Nonetheless, in ter

population growth and as a symbol of the centralization of pow

the nation, Jakarta has grown steadily in size and importance. 

Migration 

Indonesians, particularly Javanese, are sometimes stereotyp

highly immobile, rarely venturing beyond the confines of the

lage environment, but this image may be due to a lack of clea

and an extraordinarily complex pattern of movement in the po

tion. By the early 1990s, out-migration had become a com

response to overcrowded conditions caused by population gr

Some of these resettlements resulted in conflicts with the indig

populations, and by the late 1990s, many transmigrants were f

conflicts in Aceh, Kalimantan, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Timor

result, by 2000 the government’s long-standing Transmigration 

gram (see Glossary) was discontinued. 

Many communities, particularly in Sumatra, have a long tra

of sending young adult males on merantau (cyclical out-migr

as a means for them to gain experience and income and r

112 
 

Javanese dancer at the Exposition 

universelle in Paris, 1889 

Courtesy Library of Congress 

Prints and Photographs Division, 

Lot 6634, LC–USZ62–109527, 

digital ID cph 3c09527 

household expenses. Since the 1970s, however, interp

migration has increased dramatically for all regions. In add

financial crisis of 1997–98 resulted in a major increase in m

overseas in search of work, and the violence in Aceh, Kal

Maluku, Sulawesi, and Timor has resulted in some 1.2 mill

nally displaced persons, about half of whom are living in 

camps. According to the 2000 census, some 7.1 million of 

nesian males living in urban areas (16.6 percent of this po

category) were migrants. Among individual localities, Ja

with 42.6 percent of its male population being migrant, 

closely by Kalimantan Timur Province, with 41.3 percent, a

and Riau, each with 39.0 percent. The proportion in rural a

much less; overall, only 6.1 percent of males in these area

wide were emigrants. Kalimantan Timur and the province 

had the greatest proportions, with 30.7 percent and 28.2 

respectively. 

Indonesians were also engaging in what demographers c

lar migration and other kinds of commuting in greater num
 

ever before. This trend was linked in part to the steep increase 

number of motor vehicles, from 3.0 per 1,000 population in the 

to 26.2 in 1980, 46.3 in 1990, 78.1 in 2000, and 132 in 2007. Wi

widespread availability of public bus transportation connecting 

and villages, many workers commute 50 kilometers or more da

work. Others live away from their homes for several days at a ti

order to work. The World Bank has estimated that 25 percent o

households have at least one family member working for part 

year in an urban area. 

In part because of increasing migration, Indonesians of dif

ethnic backgrounds and occupations are increasingly intermin

They more frequently find themselves in circumstances in 

they cannot rely on kin and village networks for social suppor

so they look to government services for help, particularly in the 

of education and health care (see Education; Health, this ch.). 

Social Class 

The experience of population mobility in the archipelago h

necessarily resulted in social mobility in terms of social 

Indeed, recent studies underscore the continuing importan

social stratification in Indonesia, as least as measured by reg

inequalities in income and consumption. However, scholars an

icy analysts continue to debate the degree to which social class

be defined in ethnic, economic, religious, or political terms. W

is clear that Indonesia is a highly stratified society, and that sen

ity to prestige or status (gengsi) is widespread, it is nonetheless 

cult to identify an upper class. Hereditary ruling classe

traditional elites reinforced by their positions in the Dutch co

bureaucracy no longer possess unchallenged access to po

power and wealth (see Modernism and Nationalism in the Co

Age, ch. 1). Indeed, they cannot even claim to form an elite. Th

power holders—generals, politicians, and wealthy capitalists 

postindependence period—are newcomers to their positions

apart from extravagant conspicuous consumption and cosmopo

ism, they demonstrate few clear institutional and cultural pa

that suggest they constitute a unitary group. 

Defining a lower class in Indonesia is equally difficult. 

before the banning of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI

Glossary) in 1966, Indonesia’s poor formed alliances that had l

do with class than with economics, religion, and community ti

some cases, the poor peasantry identified across class lines 

orthodox Muslim landowners on the basis of their common rel

ideologies or aliran kepercayaan (streams of belief). This al

114 
 

was particularly evident in lowland Jawa Timur Province. 

cases, small landowners united against both the Islamic ri

and Chinese entrepreneurs. There also were divisions betw

indigenous, or long-settled, peoples (pribumi—see Gloss

later Chinese and Arab immigrants. The oil boom of th

affected society and income distribution in ways that bene

landed peasantry and the urban middle class. However, no 

dent social group based on lower-class affiliations emer

major political force. 

Income disparities between the Outer Islands and the re

country and between rural and urban areas remain a major 

concern, although the productivity gap between Java and t

Islands has narrowed. While the urban areas of Indonesia, e

Java and Bali, grew disproportionately wealthy in relation 

counterparts in more rural areas and the Outer Islands throu

of the 1990s, they were also hit particularly hard by the 

financial crisis. By 2000, income and consumption inequali

back to levels experienced in the 1980s. United Nations D

ment Programme data based on the Gini index (see Glossa

cate that Indonesia stands comparatively well regarding 

inequality. For example, the Gini index for Indonesia in 2

estimated at 0.34, significantly lower than the indexes fo

neighboring countries: Singapore (0.42), the Philippine

Malaysia (0.49), and Papua New Guinea (0.51). 

Between the nation’s poor and privileged classes lies a 

mosaic of groups forming what might loosely be called 

class. Not characterized by a common political vision, a se

nomic interests, ethnic identification, or even income le

notion of a middle class in Indonesia is invoked by outsi

analysts but rarely defined, especially by Indonesians the

While middle-income Indonesians appear to share some c

tion patterns—the purchase and exclusive use of consumer 

such as televisions, motorcycles, newspapers, cell phones, a

players—the decentralization of power after 1998 does not 

have resulted in an empowered middle class. As Richard 

and Vedi Hadiz argued in 2004, the Indonesian oligarchy a

the collapse of the New Order and the financial crisis in s

ways but continues to use state power for private interests. 

Civil Society 

Although the family, the community, and the governm

important sources of authority in Indonesia, nongovernmen

nizations (lembaga swadaya masyarakat, or LSM, or also so
 

organisasi nonpemerintah, or ornop), such as foundations or ch

ble organizations (yayasan), associations (perserikatan), and m

ments (gerakan), play an increasingly important role in definin

shaping social life. While some yayasan, for example, provide 

plex but significant financial loopholes for businesses, sinc

1980s, environmental, legal aid, and women’s groups have play

increasingly important public role. 

The increasingly free news media are an important mea

expression for Indonesian civil society. Immediately precedin

fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesians began to enjoy expanded a

to print and electronic news sources. Although not completely 

tered, the news media were vibrant and played an increa

important role in informing public debate. Immediately 

Suharto’s departure, however, the media were openly reporti

strikes, popular demonstrations, and other expressions of oppo

to government authority. Intimidation by officials and private 

ests remained a serious problem, but journalists reported and 

cated positions at odds with those of the government, sometim

their peril. Media observers, such as Krishna Sen and David T

believe that the Internet may also have played a role in thi

openness, as the freedom it offered during the waning days 

Suharto era became a constant reminder of the absence of ope

and freedom in other media. 

Islamic civic organizations constitute another important ma

tation of civil society in Indonesia. In the period following the 

98 economic crisis and the downfall of Suharto, these organiz

played an important role in filling the vacuum of authority. 

before the term civil society became widespread in the 1

Islamic organizations in Indonesia participated in activitie

mediated between the state and the family. For instance, Mu

madiyah (Followers of Muhammad) is one of the two most i

tant, modern Islamic social-religious organizations in Indo

Established in 1912, it has played an increasingly important r

social and cultural spheres of Indonesian life, such as educ

finance, socioeconomic development, health care, and care for 

gent people and orphans. After the collapse of the New Or

1998, when new political parties were being established acro

archipelago, Muhammadiyah had the opportunity to transform 

from a social and cultural organization into a political party. 

ever, the membership rejected this change, and in 2008 no o

link existed between Muhammadiyah and any political party. 

Indonesia’s other first-rank Muslim organization, the Nah

Ulama (literally, “revival of the religious teachers,” but often 

116 
 

lated as Council of Scholars), was founded in 1926 as a relig

untary organization by traditional Muslim religious scholars

largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, with a membe

approximately 35 million. Unlike Muhammadiyah, the mo

dox Sunni (see Glossary) Nahdlatul Ulama in the 1950s w

political party, but it now is strongly oriented toward civic a

activities. Its base is rural and traditional, practicing forms 

strongly linked to legal, theological, and mystical tradition

nurtured in traditional boarding schools (pondok pesantren

latul Ulama emphasizes tolerance in its view of society. In 

decided to accept the Indonesian state ideology, Pancasil

foundation of its social programs, and to work for a just so

all Indonesians, not just Muslims. In 1998 Nahdlatul Ulam

cially backed the formation of the National Awakening Part

and its leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, was elected presiden

People’s Representative Council (DPR) in 1999. However, th

moderate stance, and opposition to an Islamic state, led mor

vative members to leave the party. Although Wahid was ous

power in 2001, he and Nahdlatul Ulama continued (until 

death in 2009) to be voices for tolerance, secular governm

democracy. 

As in many other societies, civil-society organizations in 

sia ideally promote peace, justice, and social tolerance, but t

always the reality. For instance, on October 12, 2002, terror

ciated with the radical group Jemaah Islamiyah (Congreg

Islam) blew up two Bali nightclubs, killing 202 people. On 

5, 2003, individuals allegedly linked to the same group s

Jakarta JW Marriott Hotel, killing 14. Nonetheless, a nation

2003 suggested that politically militant Islam was not on 

Fully 85 percent of the respondents indicated that they did 

port the idea of an Islamic state or rollbacks of democratic f

In spite of high-publicity attacks by militant Muslim groups

conservatives play a far smaller role in national politics than 

in the 1950s (see Islamic Political Culture, ch. 4; Terrorism, 

Violence, Vengeance, and Law 

Indonesia experienced a high level of civil violence fro

1996 to 2003. Instances included ethnic conflict in Sumb

Tenggara Timur); apparently ethnic and religious strife in K

tan, Sulawesi, Ambon, and Halmahera (in the Malukus); 

rioting in the cities of Situbondo (Jawa Timur) and Tas

(Jawa Barat); race rioting in Jakarta; gang warfare in Tim

government repression of student protests at Trisakti Univ
Jakarta on May 12, 1998. The cumulative casualty toll was 

thousands, and the number of displaced persons rose to more 

500,000, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees. 

The predominant theme to this unrest, according to some ana

was not religion, ethnicity, or politics, but rather a tendency 

extralegal means to exact vengeance and retaliate against ene

As the Suharto administration began to assume power, i

involved in a bloody retaliation against alleged communist a

during 1965–66; for the next 30 years, vigilante neighborhood 

groups consisting of young men routinely captured and 

alleged thieves without legal process but with the implicit app

of the government. Because the court system was viewed as c

and susceptible to bribery, and many law enforcement agencies 

nearly bankrupt because of the financial crisis, many Indon

came to believe that violence was the only route to justice. Th

lence of 1996–2003 represented a continuation and intensificat

these patterns. 

Religion and Worldview 

Religion in Indonesia is a complex and volatile issue, not 

analyzed in terms of social class, region, or ethnic group. Lon

couraged by the New Order government (1966–98) from po

participation, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and 

religions were increasingly influential frameworks for de

social participation after 1998. The state guaranteed tolerance o

tain religions (agama) regarded as monotheistic by the govern

but popular violence between Christians and Muslims in 

Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Ambon, and Halmahera made those gu

tees difficult to honor. In some cases, the police and army we

different sides of clashes defined in religious terms. 

Islam 

Islam is the dominant religion by far in Indonesia, with the 

est number of adherents: around 86.1 percent of the popu

according to the 2000 census; in 2009 this would have been 

207 million people. No other country in the world has more Mu

than Indonesia. 

The main strand of Islamic practice in Indonesia by far is S

with only a very small number of Shia (also Shiite—see Glos

Differing understandings of the role of the clergy are a key di

tion between Sunni and Shia. Emphasizing predestination and p

termination by Allah, Sunni clerics interpret the sunna within 

118 
 

Cows being readied for slaughter for the Muslim holiday 

(Feast of Sacrifice at the end of Hajj), in front of al Istiqla

Manado, Sulawesi Utara 

Courtesy Anast

imposed by centuries of learning and scholarship. Shi

emphasize free will and the infallibility of divinely inspire

to interpret ancient texts. Cutting across the difference 

Sunni and Shia groups, a small minority of Indonesians can 

acterized in terms of what Australian scholar Greg Fealy c

cal Islam, although even mainstream Muslims sympathize w

aspects of their teachings, if not their practices. Among thes

groups in Indonesia are Darul Islam (House of Islam), 

Islamiyah (internationally regarded as a terrorist organ

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Warrior

cil), and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders’ Front

groups share a sense that the West (that is, Christians and J

used economic and military power to enfeeble Islam; their 

is to call for a return to the pure Islam of the righteous ance

salaf as-salih), or Salafism. Varieties of Salafism include 

bism, the official form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. 

According to orthodox practice, Islam is a strictly mon

religion in which God (Allah, or, in Indonesian, Tuhan, whi
 

used to refer to the Christian God and other gods) is both a perv

presence and a somewhat distant figure. The Prophet Muhamm

not deified but rather is regarded as a human who was select

God to spread the word to others through the Quran, Islam’s 

book, the revealed word of God. Islam is a religion based on 

moral principles, and an important part of being a Muslim is 

mitment to these principles. Islamic law (sharia, or syariah in 

nesian) is based on the Quran; the sunna, which includes the h

(hadis in Indonesian), the actions and sayings of Muhammad; 

the consensus of local Islamic jurisprudence and, sometime

whole Muslim community; and qiyas, or reasoning through an

Islam is universalist, and in theory there are no national, rac

ethnic criteria for conversion. 

Over the course of the mostly peaceful introduction of Isl

Indonesia beginning in the ninth century AD, tensions period

arose between orthodox Muslims and practitioners of more syn

tic, locally based religions. These tensions are still evident in the 

twenty-first century. In Java, for instance, they are expressed 

contrast between a santri (see Glossary), a pious Muslim, a

abangan (see Glossary), an adherent to a syncretistic blend of in

nous, Hindu-Buddhist beliefs with Islamic practices, some

called kejawen (Javanism), agama Jawa (Javanese religion), or 

tinan (mysticism—see Glossary). In Java, santri not only refer

person who is consciously and exclusively Muslim, but also des

persons who have removed themselves from the secular world t

centrate on devotional activities in Islamic schools called pesant

literally, the place of the santri, but meaning Islamic school. Alt

these religious boarding schools, typically headed by a charis

kiai (Muslim religious scholar), provide education for only a mi

of Indonesian children (less than 10 percent), they remain an i

tant symbol of Muslim piety, particularly in rural areas. 

There is also a long history of religious practice associated 

more mystical and often highly syncretistic beliefs. Drawing 

ously on Hindu-Buddhist ideas about self-control and intell

contemplation, as well as more animistically inclined ideas abo

spiritual character of nature, and often based on miraculous r

tions, various kinds of hybrid Islamic beliefs flourished in Java 

a presidential decree in 1965 urged consolidation under the rub

the main scriptural religions (agama), including Islam, Christ

Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Several of the more m

cal varieties of Islam continued to flourish under the Suharto re

and some continued to struggle for autonomy and recognition b

government, eventually receiving recognition in 1973 as k

120 
cayaan (faiths), albeit under the umbrella of one of the s

agama. Among the more prominent of these faiths was ke

Only nominally Muslim, kebatinan is an amalgam of 

Hindu-Buddhist, and Muslim, mostly Sufi (see Glossary), 

practices concerned with harmonizing the inner self with 

material world. Spirits are believed to inhabit natural object

beings, artifacts, and grave sites of important wali (Muslim 

Illness and other misfortunes are traced to such spirits, and 

fices or pilgrimages fail to placate angry deities, the adv

dukun, or healer, is sought. While it connotes a turning aw

the militant universalism of orthodox Islam, kebatinan 

toward a more internalized universalism. In this way, it 

eliminate distinctions between the universal and the local, 

munal and the individual. 

Another important tension dividing Indonesian Muslim

between traditionalism and modernism. The nature of this an

complex and a matter of considerable debate. One key issue 

the self-sufficiency of scripture and the moral responsibili

individual. Modernists emphasize the absolute and transparen

ity of the Quran and the responsibility of individuals to f

teachings; traditionalists contend that Quranic texts can be am

and that it is wiser to trust in the collective wisdom of past 

While traditionalists accept a variety of ritual forms, they un

the responsibility of believers to the community, and are 

cerned with individual responsibility to interpret scripture. 

cally, traditionalists are suspicious of modernists’ support of 

madrassa (madrasah in Bahasa Indonesia), a reformist sc

includes the teaching of secular topics. The modernists’ goal 

Islam and carrying it more directly to the people has been op

traditionalists because it threatens to undermine the authori

kiai. On the other hand, some modernists accuse tradition

escapist tendencies and of failing to directly confront the i

responsibility to make sense of a changing world. One point 

ment is that both modernists and traditionalists have sough

cessfully, to add a clause to the first tenet of the In

constitution requiring that, in effect, all Muslims adhere to th

In fact, some even hint that modernist and traditionalist sant

greater loyalty toward the ummah (community of believers) 

than to the Indonesian state. 

Christianity 

Christianity—Roman Catholicism and Protestantism—is 

rapidly growing religion in Indonesia, although Christians ar
 

in number compared to adherents to Islam (8.7 percent of the po

tion versus 86.1 percent according to the 2000 census). Christ

has a long history in the islands, with Portuguese Jesuits and Do

cans operating in Maluku, southern Sulawesi, and Timor sin

sixteenth century. When the Dutch defeated Portuguese forc

1605 and began what was to be more than 350 years of Dutch 

ence in the Indonesian archipelago, however, the Catholic miss

ies were expelled, and the Dutch Reformed Church, a Ca

denomination, became the dominant Christian presence in the r

as it would be until Indonesia became independent (see The Na

Revolution, 1945–49, ch. 1). Because the United East Indies 

pany (VOC) was a secular enterprise, and Calvinism was a stri

intellectually uncompromising interpretation of Christianity 

demanded a thorough understanding of what, for Indonesians

foreign scriptures, Christianity advanced little in Indonesia un

nineteenth century. Only a few small communities endured, in 

Maluku, northern Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara (primarily o

islands of Roti and Timor). After the dissolution of the VOC in 

and the adoption of a more comprehensive view of their miss

the archipelago, the Dutch permitted Christian proselytizing 

territory. This evangelical freedom was put to use by the more 

ant German Lutherans, who began work in Sumatra among the 

Batak in 1861, and by the Dutch Rhenish Mission in central Kal

tan in 1845. In addition, Jesuits established successful Catholic 

sions, schools, and hospitals throughout the islands of Flores, T

and Alor in the late nineteenth century. 

The twentieth century witnessed the influx of many new Prot

missionary groups, as well as the continued growth of Catho

and of large regional and reformed Lutheran churches. Followi

1965 coup attempt, all nonreligious persons were labeled atheis

hence were vulnerable to accusations of harboring communist 

pathies (see The “Coup” and Its Aftermath, ch. 1). At that 

Christian churches of all varieties experienced explosive grow

membership, particularly among people who felt uncomfortabl

the political aspirations of Islamic parties. 

Most Christians in Indonesia are Protestants (about 19 mill

2009) of one denomination or another, with particularly large co

trations located in the provinces of Sumatera Utara, Papua, 

Barat, Maluku, Kalimantan Tengah, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi 

and Nusa Tenggara Timur. Large concentrations of Roman Cat

(a total of about 8 million in 2009) live in Jawa Tengah, Kalim

Barat, Papua, Papua Barat, and Nusa Tenggara Timur. In addit

substantial number of ethnic Chinese Indonesians are Roman C

122 
Nativity scene in front of a Roman Catholic Church on 

Courtesy Anasta

lic. Catholic congregations grew less rapidly in the 1980s an

in part because of the church’s heavy reliance on European p

These Europeans experienced increasing restrictions on their 

ary activities imposed by the Muslim-dominated Departmen

gion (later called the Department of Religious Affairs). 

Hinduism 

Indonesian Hinduism, an amalgam of related traditions 

that explains the nature of the universe in terms of interaction

numerous gods, is strongly associated with Bali. In 1953, in 

to the central government’s exclusion of Balinese Hinduism 

list of officially recognized religions, religious leaders on th

sought official recognition of Agama Hindu Bali (Hindu 

Religion) as a creed equivalent to Islam, Catholicism, and Pr

ism. Led by Pandit Shastri, various Hindu reform organiz

Bali agreed in 1958 on the Hindu Dharma (Principles of Hi

which emphasized the Catur Veda (religious poems), the Up

(treatises of Brahmanic knowledge), and the Bhagavad Gita

as two Old Javanese texts (Sarasamuccaya and Sanghyan

hayanikan). Together, these works came to form the holy 

Balinese Hinduism. Other Hindu sacred texts, such as the 
 

(Sanskrit cosmogonic histories), were relegated to a minor po

In addition, a daily prayer called the trisandhya was devised by 

dit Shastri to correspond to the five daily prayers of Muslims. 

reforms were accepted by Sukarno in 1959, and Balinese Hin

gained full recognition in 1963. 

Arriving in the archipelago before the second century AD 

traders and missionaries from India, Hindu beliefs were greatly 

ified when adapted to Indonesian society. The central concept 

ual purity, maintained through a division of society into occupa

groups, or castes (varna, literally color), was never rigidly appl

Indonesia. The categories of Brahman (priests; brahmana in In

sian), Kshatriya (ruler-warrior; satria in Indonesian), Vaishya 

chant-farmer; waisya in Indonesian), and Shudra (commoner-se

sudra in Indonesian) do exist in Bali; besides the category of 

man, however, they appear to have little influence over occupa

choices, or even over social status and marital opportunities

Hindu epics, the Mahabharata (Great Battle of the Descenda

Bharata) and the Ramayana (The Travels of Rama), have be

classics among Indonesians, both Hindu believers and others, 

cially in Java, and are rendered in wayang (see Glossary) and 

performances. 

Indonesian Hindu believers are relatively few outside Bali, 

they make up more than 93 percent of the population. Others are 

tered throughout the other 32 provinces and special regions, 

diverse, and largely indigenous, religious practices have sough

gained recognition as Hindu by the Department of Religious A

On a nationwide basis, only about 1.8 percent of the populatio

Hindu according to the 2000 census, although the U.S. Departm

State reported 10 million adherents in 2009. Because lacking an 

cial agama was associated with communism during the New O

and being communist was a crime punishable by death or exile, 

of Indonesia’s heterogeneous animist, ancestor worship, and syn

cults sought refuge under the tolerant Hindu aegis. Among these 

Balinese communities, one finds, for example, the adherents 

Kaharingan religion in Kalimantan Tengah, where government 

tics generally have counted them among Hindus as 7.8 percent 

local population. In addition, there are significant commu

labeled Hindu among the Toraja in Sulawesi Tengah and Sul

Selatan provinces, among the Karo Batak in northern Sumatra, 

Jawa Tengah and Jawa Timur provinces, most notably amon

Tenggerese. 

Anthropologist Robert Hefner has noted that significant ch

in state policy occurred with respect to Javanese Hinduism in th

1980s and early 1990s. During the early phases of the New O

124 
 

 

Ruins of a Hindu temple in Y

Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 

Lot 11356, LC–USZ62–95443, digital ID cph 

syncretically and mystically inclined Javanese previously 

loosely with Islam had converted to Hinduism. While there 

ernment support initially for such groups, including the ke

pressure from conservative Muslim groups on the one hand 

ernment leadership on the other resulted in an increasingly 

between the syncretic practice of Javanese Hinduism and th

Hindu dharma. 

Buddhism 

Introduced before the second century AD by the same 

traders and scholars who brought Hinduism, Indonesian Bud

now overwhelmingly associated with the ethnic Chinese a

unstable product of complex accommodations among relig

ology, Chinese ethnic identification, and a gradually more 

policy by the central government. Traditionally, Chinese 

Confucianism (agama Konghucu), and Buddhism, as we

mass Buddhist organization Perhimpunan Buddhis Indone

buddhi), founded in 1958, all had adherents in the ethnic 

community. Following the events of 1965, with any deviat

the monotheistic tenets of the Pancasila regarded as trea
founder of Perbuddhi, Bhikku Ashin Jinarakkhita, proposed 

there was a single supreme deity, Sang Hyang Adi Buddha. H

cessfully sought confirmation for this striking innovation to 

dhist beliefs in ancient Javanese texts, and even in the shape 

Borobudur temple in Jawa Tengah Province. After 1965 the nu

of Buddhists swelled; some 90 new monasteries were built, m

supported by Indonesia’s Chinese population, but also drawin

nificant numbers from syncretistically oriented Javanese disaf

by the increasingly strict emphasis on doctrinaire forms of Isla

1987 there were seven schools of Buddhism affiliated with th

wakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia (Walubi): Theravada, Buddha

Mahayana, Tridharma, Kasogatan, Maitreya, and Nichiren. In 

Buddhism had an estimated 2 million followers in Indonesia 

than 1 percent of the population), with a growing presence in 

mantan Barat Province, home to large numbers of ethnic Chine

Confucianism and Daoism 

The New Order administration officially tolerated Confucia

However, because it was regarded as a system of ethical rel

rather than a religion per se, it was not represented in the Depar

of Religion. Daoism, which is practiced both as a philosophy 

religion, is recognized by the department as an official religion

The Emerging National Culture 

Living Environments 

The government of Indonesia saw itself as having a respons

to advance a national culture throughout most of the New 

period, a project that was linked to requirements of national dev

ment and political integration. Government mandates aside, how

as more and more of the Indonesian population sought emplo

in large, poorly integrated cities consisting of diverse ethnic g

the concept of a national culture had great appeal as a way of re

ing these changing urban environments. Although the central go

ment attempted to guide the formation of this culture th

educational curricula, celebrations of national holidays, and c

control of the national media (popular art, television, and 

media), this emerging culture came about only partly through c

planning. Evidence of an emerging national culture also appea

the far less controlled layout and social organization of cities

tines of social interaction using the official national language, B

Indonesia; patterns of eating and preparing food; the viewing of 

126 
 

Altar in a Buddhist temple, Tomohon, Sulawesi Utara 

Courtesy Anast

sports, such as soccer, badminton, and volleyball; movies an

sion programming; and material displays of wealth. 

In smaller Indonesian cities, the heart of urban culture b

mid-twentieth century was a commercial sector surroundin

tral square. The Dutch left a legacy of a basic civil architec

street plans for large cities and towns in Java, Sumatra, and 

after World War II most failed to experience a level of i

urban design and services commensurate with their tremend

ulation growth. Many cities, as a result, had minimal or m

services, with very simple sanitation, transportation facili

fire protection. 

Indonesian cities are internally segmented in complex, 

ping ways that differentiate ethnic groups, income levels, 

fessional specializations. Some older neighborhoods tend 

well-to-do business owners and high-level government 

whereas other newer areas tend to be home to migrant com

from the rural areas. Some of these areas retain their system 

knit social networks and are distinguished by the label kamp

lage). However, the boundaries between one area and an

often unclear. 
 

 

Language 

The major languages of Indonesia belong to the Austronesian 

ily, a group of agglutinative languages spoken in the area bound

Madagascar in the western Indian Ocean and Easter Island 

eastern Pacific Ocean. There is a considerable diversity in th

guages used in Indonesia. No fewer than 731 languages—th

majority Austronesian, the rest Papuan and used in parts of T

Papua, and Halmahera—existed in the early twenty-first centur

Based on reports of ethnic self-identification in the 2000 c

the primary languages spoken by 2 million or more people were 

nese (83 million), Sundanese (30 million), Malay/Indonesian (1

lion), Madurese (6.7 million), Batak (6.1 million), Minangkaba

million), Buginese (5.1 million), Balinese (3 million), and Ace

(2.2 million). In addition, some 2 million inhabitants spoke o

several dialects of Chinese. Arabic and languages of India and E

also are used. 

The central and most successful feature of the Indonesian na

culture is probably the Indonesian language. Malay was used fo

turies as a lingua franca in many parts of the archipelago. The 

Bahasa Indonesia, which refers to a modified form of Malay

coined by Indonesian nationalists in 1928 and became a sym

national unity during the struggle for independence. Bahasa In

sia is spoken in more than 90 percent of households in Jakarta

side the capital, only 10 to 15 percent of the population spea

language at home, but this number appears to be on the rise. In 

nese areas, only 1 percent to 5 percent of the people speak B

Indonesia in the home. Nationwide, some 17 million Indonesia

Bahasa Indonesia as a primary language, while more than 150 m

to 180 million others use it as a second language. It is now ind

ably the language of government, schools, national print and 

tronic media, and interethnic communication. In many province

the primary language of communication between ethnic Ch

shopkeepers and their non-Chinese patrons. 

Bahasa Indonesia is infused with highly distinctive ac

vocabularies, and styles in some regions (particularly Maluku

of Nusa Tenggara, and Jakarta), but there are many similarit

patterns of use across the archipelago. For example, it is comm

vary the use of address forms depending on the rank or status 

individual to whom one is speaking. This variation is not as com

as in the elaborately hierarchical Javanese language, but it is 

theless important. For instance, in Bahasa Indonesia respected 

are typically addressed in kinship terms—bapak (father or eld

ibu (mother). The use of second-person pronouns in direct addr

128 
generally avoided in favor of more indirect references unles

and listeners are on intimate terms. In casual contexts, howe

as when one is speaking to taxicab drivers, street peddlers, a

friends, formal textbook Indonesian often gives way to t

ironic, sly, and earthy urban forms of address and reference

Food, Clothing, and Popular Culture 

Although Indonesia has a varied environment, and many 

ethnic cuisines, rice is a national staple, even in areas such a

Indonesia, where the main source of starch is corn, cassava

sago. On ceremonial occasions such as funerals, modern w

and state functions, foods such as sate (small pieces of mea

on a skewer), krupuk (fried chips made with rice flour and 

with fish or fried shrimp), and highly spiced curries of chi

goat are commonly served. At public events, these foods 

placed on a table from which guests serve themselves buf

Rice is placed in the center of the plate, with meats or oth

ments around the edges. Food is eaten—usually quite rap

without speaking—with the fingertips or with a spoon a

Water is generally drunk only after the meal, when me

women) smoke their distinctive clove-scented kretek cigaret

On many formal national occasions, men wear untuck

shirts with no tie. Head wear usually consists of a peci, a b

cap once associated with Muslims or Malays but which ac

more secular, national meaning during the struggle for 

dence. Indonesian men generally wear sarongs only at hom

informal occasions. Women wear sarongs on formal o

along with the kebaya, a tight-fitting, low-cut, long-sleeve

On these occasions, women often tie their hair into a bun, so

adding a hairpiece. In addition, they often carry a selendang

narrow cloth draped over the shoulder, which on less form

sions is used to carry babies or objects. Increasing numbers 

women have adopted traditional Islamic clothing such as t

(head scarf) or other head covering. 

Urban Indonesian nightlife centers on night markets, wh

ple shop in toko (stores) and warung (food stalls). Also po

forms of the performing arts such as pop music concerts

shows, and the cinema. American and Indian films are popu

Indonesian motion pictures selectively emphasize certain a

Indonesian life. Indonesian-made films are set in citi

though the population has traditionally been largely rural—

films employ Bahasa Indonesia even though most viewers 

nese. There is rarely mention of religion or ethnicity, eve

most of the population has a religious affiliation (see Reli
 

 

Worldview, this ch.). Anthropologist Karl Heider has observe

Westerners in general are unambiguously presented as moder

having no tradition whatsoever. Western women are present

having few constraints on their sexuality. The audiences for 

consist almost entirely of teenagers and young adults and are 

male than female. 

Television use in Indonesian households increased dramatica

the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, as did the v

of broadcast stations and programming, especially after the e

the New Order in 1998. Public and private radio stations also b

range of popular culture programs to people throughout the arc

ago (see Post and Telecommunications, ch. 3). 

Popular programs include sinetron (television dramas), whi

serialized, Indonesian-language dramas about everyday life. In 

tion, variety news and entertainment shows are available, su

Selamat Pagi Indonesia (Good Morning Indonesia) and the 

news” program Seputar Indonesia (Around Indonesia). Popula

eign dramatic serials from Australia, India, Japan, and the U

States also appear in dubbed, subtitled, or original-language 

sions. Most programming is in Bahasa Indonesia, although 

local arts programs are presented in regional languages. N

Indonesia regularly conducts rating surveys of the Indonesian t

sion market, and the results are influential in determining pro

ming. Recent figures suggest that Indonesia is one of the fa

growing markets for television advertising as well as for burge

private and commercial television networks (see Media, ch. 4)

Sources of Local Identification 

Tradition and Multiethnicity 

Indonesian society comprises numerous ethnic groups. The 

nese are the largest, at 41.0 percent of the total population. S

nese make up 15.0 percent, followed by Malays (3.4 percen

Madurese (3.3 percent). More than 14 percent of the population 

sists of numerous small ethnic groups or minorities. The p

extent of this diversity is unknown, however, because the Indon

census stopped reporting data on ethnicity in 1930, under the D

and only started again in 2000. In that year’s census, nine cate

of ethnicity were reported (by age-group and province): Jawa, 

and Priangan, Madura, Minangkabau, Betawi, Bugis and Ugi

ten, Banjar and Melayu Banjar, and lainnya (other). 

As this increasingly mobile, multiethnic nation moves into it

enth decade of independence, Indonesians are becoming aw

130 
 

through education, television, cinema, print media, and 

parks—of the diversity of their own society. When Indones

about their cultural differences with one another, one of 

words they use is adat. The term is roughly translated as “cu

“tradition,” but its meaning has undergone a number of tra

tions in Indonesia. In some circumstances, for instance, ad

kind of legal status—certain adat laws (hukum adat) are re

by the government as legitimate. These ancestral guideli

pertain to a wide range of activities: agricultural product

gious practices, marriage arrangements, legal practices, poli

cession, or artistic expression. 

Even though the vast majority of them are Muslims, Ind

maintain very different systems of social identification. For 

when Javanese try to explain the behavior of a Sundanese o

nese counterpart, they might say “because it is his adat.” Di

in the ways ethnic groups practice Islam are often ascribed 

Each group may have different patterns of observing religi

days, attending the mosque, expressing respect, or burying th

Adat in the sense of “custom” is often viewed as one of 

est—even sacred—sources of consensus within an ethnic gro

ever, the word itself is from Arabic. Through centuries of con

outsiders, Indonesians have a long history of contrasting th

and their traditions with those of others, and their notions of 

are as a people have been shaped in basic ways by these en

On some of the more isolated islands in eastern Indon

instance, one finds ethnic groups that have no word equivalen

because they have had very little contact with outsiders. 

Early in the New Order, the notion of adat came to t

national significance in touristic settings such as Balines

performances and museum displays. Taman Mini, a kind o

graphic theme park on the outskirts of Jakarta, seeks to dis

interpret the cultural diversity of Indonesia. This 100-hectar

landscaped to look like the Indonesian archipelago in m

when viewed from an overhead tramway. There is a house 

province, to represent vernacular architecture. The park sell

tive local hand weapons, textiles, and books explaining the 

of the province. One powerful message of the park is tha

contained in objective, material culture, which is aesthetica

ing and indeed marketable, but which is more or less disti

everyday social life. Furthermore, the exhibits convey the 

sion to some observers that ethnicity is a simple aesthetic 

regional and spatial variations rather than an issue of deep e

or political attachments. However, the park provides visito
vivid and attractive (if not always convincing) model for ho

Indonesian national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in D

sity, a Javanese slogan dating to fourteenth-century Kediri poe

Tantular’s poem “Sutasoma”) might be understood. 

When Indonesians talk about their society in inclusive terms

are more likely to use a word such as budaya (culture) than 

One speaks of kebudayaan Indonesia, the “culture of Indonesi

something grand, that refers to traditions of refinement and hig

ilization. The dances, music, and literature of Java and Bali an

great monuments associated with these islands’ religion are 

described as examples of “culture” or “civilization” but not 

tom” (or adat). However, as the following descriptions show

variety of sources of local identification underscore the div

rather than the unity of the Indonesian population. 

Javanese 

There are approximately 83 million Javanese, the major

whom live in Jawa Timur and Jawa Tengah provinces; most 

rest live in Jawa Barat Province and on Sumatra, Kalim

Sulawesi, and other islands. (Altogether, some 110 million p

live on Java.) Although many Javanese express pride at the 

achievements of the illustrious courts of Surakarta and Yogy

and admire the traditional arts associated with them, most Jav

tend to identify not with that elite tradition, or even with a line

clan, but with their own village of residence or origin. Thes

lages, or desa, are typically situated on the edge of rice field

rounding a mosque, or strung along a road. 

Most Javanese villages are divided into smaller administ

units, each known as either a rukun kampung (village mutual 

tance association) or rukun tetangga (neighborhood associa

Rukun is an important Javanese word of Arabic origin desc

both “state of being and a mode of action .... a state in which a

ties are at least overtly at social peace with one another,” acco

to anthropologist Robert Jay; it is “a process of sharing throug

lective action.” Anthropologist Mary Hawkins has argued that 

modern forms of contract labor and technology may have erod

rural communalism implied in earlier senses of rukun, the 

remains important as an ideological construct for representin

ued aspects of collective life. Australian anthropologist P

Guinness has written that the neighborhood is the “largest 

grouping, whose members participate in household rituals, gath

rituals, organize working bees, whose youth band together for 

teams and organizations, who maintain arisan (rotating credit 

132 
ciations) and who hold certain property such as funeral equ

In rural areas, these groups also sometimes collaborate on h

their rice. The rukun associations were rooted in the idea

family but became official administrative units during the 

occupation in World War II. Many of these local communit

nized security arrangements called ronda malam (night w

Neighbors watched closely for any suspicious activity and 

pated vigorously in the apprehension of thieves, even 

immediate justice on their own. The heads of these orga

were elected or appointed officials and were considered re

tives of the government. 

Differences in social class are less elaborate and less pro

in Javanese rural villages than in urban areas. In villages w

is relatively evenly distributed, some form of mutual labor e

is common; in villages where there are large numbers of 

peasants, however, there also are relationships of a clear clien

nature with landowners, who themselves rarely own more 

hectares. In urban centers, the distinctions among a refine

tional elite, an intermediate-level bourgeoisie sharing pattern

sumption, and a more collectivist peasantry are more pronou

Leaders are usually male, in both the village and the urba

borhood. Although some are political appointees, these le

theoretically chosen by popular consensus. This consensu

proceeds—ideally—through a discussion of different points 

after which a senior-level participant makes a final decision. A

there is increasing acceptance of competitive elections, in m

sion-making contexts it is not uncommon to make use of a 

referred to as musyawarah mufakat (deliberation with consen

Javanese kinship ties are reckoned through the mother a

equally. The nuclear family of mother, father, and children i

less independent; formal obligations between kin groups 

much greater than in Western societies. The reduced occu

divorce—rates were as high as 60 percent in some area

1960s—has made the shifting of responsibility for children

ularly among the mother’s kin—less likely in recent ye

three-decade trend toward more stable marriages is attribute

in the level of educational attainment, age at first marri

income level. Migrations during the 1997–98 financial cris

toll on marriages, but stricter laws and a more conservative 

ethos have mitigated some of those effects. Javanese have 

lineages, or other kin-based social groupings that, among so

ethnic groups, form the basis of corporate entities such a

businesses. Sons tend to treat their fathers with great form
deference. Although the mother is the focus of the family in 

respects—she usually handles the finances—she is often depic

suffering the most when the family experiences any loss. She i

ally the one who disciplines the children, while the father is m

occupied outside the home. 

The Javanese view childhood as a series of shocks from 

children must be protected. Although the youngest childre

much indulged, major transitions can be sharp and radical. Th

cess of weaning, for instance, is traditionally a rapid one in 

the mother simply leaves the child with a relative and then ret

few days later. Overall, however, a baby’s general contentmen

resistance to disease and misfortune are viewed as dependent o

child’s being protected from any form of emotional upset. Babi

constantly held and nursed on demand; babies must not be 

pointed. Once weaned, they are often released into the care 

older sibling or relative who indulges and protects them. 

Children become increasingly capable of withstanding the s

and stresses of life as they grow older, in part because they 

become more aware of the rules defining social interaction. The 

of etiquette help a child learn self-control. For example, children 

learn to address their father respectfully, using refined speech. F

to comply properly with the rules will result in a sharp repriman

Javanese, learning the proper degree of shame, according to a

pologist Ward Keeler, is a matter of becoming aware of one’s vu

bility in interaction. Children learn that dealing with others in a 

to-face encounter always poses a threat to one’s sense of self. 

Many of the rules of etiquette center on the proper use o

guage, which is more problematic in Javanese than in most othe

guages. When addressing someone, Javanese speakers must c

from several different levels of politeness. These “speech le

comprise words that have the same meaning but are stylisticall

ferent. For instance, among the Javanese variations of the 

“now,” saiki is the least refined, while saniki is a little fancie

samenika is the most elegant. Javanese has many such triad

many that people cannot speak for long in the language withou

ing to decide whether the situation is formal or informal and 

the relations among the participants are. 

People generally use the highest level of language to spe

high-status people in formal situations and the lower levels to 

to people of lower rank or with whom they are most int

Although children learn to speak at the lowest level first, they g

ally are socialized to speak to some of their more distant ki

respected strangers in higher-level forms of Javanese. This form

134 
Javanese gamela

Javanese New Year festival, Ponorogo, Jawa Timur 

Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, Washing
 

 

is particularly common in cities, where there are marked distin

in status. However, there is evidence that these practices are s

changing. Many children who go elsewhere in Indonesia for w

school or who live overseas refuse to write letters home to their 

in Javanese because of their fear of making a glaring error. In

ingly, in formal situations, they use Bahasa Indonesia because 

are no longer sure of the social situation at home. Although B

Indonesia possesses a relatively simple system for indicating 

distinctions, it is regarded as a foreign idiom among many Java

An expectation that women would use the higher levels mor

men would be valid within the domestic environment—and pr

ily for the purpose of showing deference among their relatives

use more politeness levels in public than women do. Moreov

the public sphere, the use of Javanese politeness levels is n

much associated with humility as it is with efforts to raise o

above another. Men are more likely to see the use of politenes

els as a strategy for negotiating status. 

There is great diversity among Javanese religious prac

Although most Javanese are Muslims, the wide variations in Is

beliefs and practices are associated with complex factors su

regional history and social class. The most pious, and recogn

Muslim, varieties of Javanese religion are associated with the 

tradition, nurtured by traditional Muslim schools. Santri hold 

tightly to the moralistic tone of Islam and express the fundam

universalism of its teachings. They may make a pilgrimage (h

Indonesian) to Mecca, teach their children the Quran, and wo

the social, spiritual, and even political advancement of the um

In contrast to the santri tradition, varieties of kejawen (“Java

religious practice variously incorporate pre-Islamic, animistic

aesthetic forms of spirituality. Although some observers have d

guished between elite and common varieties of kejawen pra

many now see the traditional aristocracy and peasantry losing 

distinctiveness in this regard. Religiosity is expressed through 

trances, visits to graves, and performance genres such as w

kulit (a form of shadow theater employing flat leather puppets)

certs by gamelans (Javanese orchestras featuring percussive i

ments), dance, and other arts of the courtly tradition, whic

widely appreciated by the Javanese community as a whole. 

Most observers of Javanese religion agree that the core Jav

religious ritual is a brief feast known as the slametan. Neighbor

atives, and coworkers may be invited to attend on the occasio

birth, marriage, death, or change in status. The host typically g

speech in high Javanese explaining the purpose of the event 

136 
guests, after which some incense is burned, a prayer is r

Arabic, and the special festive food is consumed, at leas

Then, what is left is divided among the guests and take

Believers seek to protect themselves against harmful spirits 

ing offerings, enlisting the aid of a dukun (healer), or eng

spiritual acts of self-control and right thinking. 

Balinese 

There is probably no group in Indonesia more conscio

own ethnic identity than the nearly 3 million Balinese. Inhab

the islands of Bali and Lombok and the western half of S

Balinese are often portrayed as a graceful, poised, and aest

inclined people. Although such descriptions date back six 

or more and are at least partially based on legend, this char

tion is also partly based on the realities in contemporary In

Virtually no part of Bali has escaped the gaze of tourists, w

in increasing numbers each year to enjoy the island’s 

beaches and stately temples and to seek out an “authentic

ence of its “traditional” culture. The market for “tradition

ings, dance performances, and paintings has boomed, an

Balinese successfully reinvest their earnings in further deve

of these highly profitable art forms. 

Balinese have a long history of contrasting themselves p

with outsiders. The contemporary distinctive Hindu religio

tices of the Balinese date back at least to the fifteenth and 

centuries, when Javanese princes from Majapahit fled the 

of Islam and sought refuge in Bali, where they were abso

the local culture. Since that time, Balinese, with the excep

minority of Muslims in the north, have maintained great 

their own distinctiveness from the surrounding Muslim 

Since the terrorist bombing of two nightclubs in the Baline

town of Kuta in 2002 by Muslim extremists, tensions betw

nese and non-Balinese Muslims have increased. 

Balinese society is stratified, as with the Javanese. In 

society, however, the social hierarchy is described in d

Hindu terms: there is a small hereditary Brahman class, a

small groups of Vaishya and Kshatriya classes. However, 

nese caste system involves no occupational specializations 

about ritual contamination between the ranks. It does not 

marriage between ranks but does forbid women to marry 

their class. The vast majority of Balinese, including many 

entrepreneurs and prominent politicians, belong to the Shud

moner-servant) class. 
 

Unlike most Javanese, Balinese participate enthusiastica

several interlocking corporate groups beyond the immediate f

One of the most important of these is the dadia, or patri

descent group. This is a group of people who claim descent th

the male line from a common ancestor. The group maintains a 

ple to that ancestor, a treasury to support rituals associated w

and certain chosen leaders. The prestige of a dadia depends i

on how widespread and powerful its members are. However, m

these organized groups tend to be localized, because it is eas

maintain local support for their activities and temple. Balinese 

to draw spouses from within this group. These corporate kin g

can also be the basis for organizing important economic acti

such as carving cooperatives, gold- and silversmithing coopera

painting studios, and dance troupes. 

Another important affiliation for Balinese is with the banj

village compound, which overlaps with, but is not identical t

dadia. The banjar and the dadia share responsibility for security

nomic cooperation in the tourist trade, and the formation of 

village alliances. The banjar is a council of household head

oversees marriage, divorce, and inheritance transactions. In add

it is the unit for mobilizing resources and labor for the spect

cremations for which Bali has become increasingly well known

banjar may have individual orchestra, dance, and weaving club

Yet another important corporate group is the agricultural so

or subak, each of which corresponds to a section of wet-rice pa

Each subak is not only a congregation of members who are j

responsible for sacrificing at a temple placed in the center of 

particular group of paddies, but also a unit that organizes the fl

water, planting, and harvesting. Because 50 or more societies 

times tap into a common stream of water for the irrigation of 

land, complex coordination of planting and harvesting schedu

required. This complexity arises because each subak is indepe

Although the government has attempted periodically to take c

of the irrigation schedule, these efforts have produced mixed re

leading to a successful movement in the early 1990s to retu

authority for the agricultural schedule to the traditional and h

successful interlocking subak arrangement. 

The very complexity of Balinese social organization has pro

it with the flexibility to adapt to the pressures of modern life a

requirements for the accumulation, distribution, and mobilizat

capital and technological resources. Although the Balinese r

self-consciously “traditional,” they have been neither rigid i

tradition nor resistant to change. 

138 
 

 

Peoples of Sumatra 

The large island of Sumatra forms the southwestern sho

Strait of Malacca. Although nearly all of the approximatel

nolinguistic groups of Sumatra are devout practitioners o

they nonetheless differ strikingly from one another, partic

their family structures. 

Acehnese 

Residing in the Special Region of Aceh, Sumatra’s north

provincial-level jurisdiction, the more than 2 million Aceh

most famous throughout the archipelago for their devotion 

their militant resistance to colonial and republican rule, 

tragic experience as victims of the tsunami that struck Ace

ern coast on December 26, 2004. Although the Acehne

renowned throughout the nineteenth century for their peppe

tions, most are now rice growers in the coastal regions. 

Acehnese do not have large descent groups; the nuclea

consisting of mother, father, and children is the central so

Unlike that of the Javanese or Balinese, the Acehnese famil

shows marked separation of men’s and women’s spheres of 

Traditionally, males are directed outward toward the world 

In the practice of merantau—going away from one’s birth

order to return later—young adult males seek fortune, ex

and commercial repute. This may involve travel to anothe

province, or island. This maturation process among males i

as growing out of the domestic female-dominated world o

indulgence and into the male world of reasoned rationality, 

tice of which is expressed through trade. One model of A

family life is that a woman sends a man out of the house to 

welcomes him back when he brings home money. Whe

exhausted his money, she sends him out again. Meanwhile

and their kin are responsible for working the fields and kee

gardens and rice fields productive. This oscillating pattern o

tion encountered some difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s as 

ing numbers of men failed to return to the Acehnese h

instead remaining and marrying in remote locations, such a

or Kalimantan. In addition, many Acehnese felt pressure 

continuing influx of temporary workers seeking employme

natural gas and timber industries, and the conflict between 

nesian army and Acehnese separatists. 

The August 16, 2005, peace agreement between the Fr

Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian central government 

pelled by the desire on both sides to smooth the flow of aid t
 

of the December 2004 tsunami. The rebels dropped their sec

demands, and the government agreed to give them some fo

political representation. Since 2006 ex-GAM members have 

elected as governor and to many lower-level posts in Aceh, a

2009 the remnants of GAM had splintered into several parties. 

Batak 

The term “Batak” designates any one of several groups inha

the interior of Sumatera Utara Province, south of Aceh: the An

Karo, Mandailing, Pakpak, Simalungun, Toba, and others

Batak number around 6 million and are mostly Christian, with 

Muslim groups in the south and east. Historically isolated 

Hindu-Buddhist and Muslim influence, they bear closer resemb

culturally to highland swidden cultivators elsewhere in Sou

Asia, even though most practice wet-rice farming. Unlike the 

nese, who have several different traditional group affiliatio

once, or the Javanese, who affiliate with their village or neig

hood, the Batak traditionally orient themselves primarily t

marga, a landowning patrilineal descent group. Traditionally

marga is a wife-giving and wife-taking unit. Whereas a young 

takes a wife from his mother’s clan (men must seek wives o

their own marga), a young woman marries into a clan within 

her paternal aunts live. 

The marga has proved to be a flexible social unit in contemp

Indonesian society. Batak who resettle in urban areas, such as M

or Jakarta, draw on marga affiliations for financial support and 

ical alliances. While many of the corporate aspects of the m

have undergone major changes, Batak migrants to other are

Indonesia retain pride in their ethnic identity. Batak have s

themselves to be creative in drawing on modern media to c

express, and preserve their “traditional” adat. Anthropologist 

Rodgers has shown how audiotaped cassette dramas with 

soap-opera elements circulated widely in the 1980s and 1990s 

Batak region to dramatize the moral and cultural dilemmas of 

kinship obligations in a rapidly changing world. In addition, 

have been prodigious producers of written handbooks design

show young, urbanized, and secular lineage members how to 

gate the complexities of their marriage and funeral customs. 

Minangkabau 

The Minangkabau—who predominate in the coastal are

Sumatera Utara Province, Sumatera Barat Province, the inter

Riau Province, and northern Bengkulu Province—number mor

140 
 

 

5.4 million. Like the Batak, they have large corporate 

groups, but unlike the Batak, the Minangkabau traditionall

descent matrilineally. A young boy, for instance, has his 

responsibility to his mother’s and sisters’ clans. It is co

“customary” and ideal for married sisters to remain in their 

home, with their husbands having a sort of visiting status. N

one lives up to this ideal, however. In the 1990s, anthropolo

lyn Blackwood studied a relatively conservative village in S

Barat where only about 22 percent of the households wer

houses,” consisting of a mother and a married daughter or d

Nonetheless, there is a shared ideal among Minangkabau 

sisters and unmarried lineage members try to live clos

another or even in the same house. 

Landholding is one of the crucial functions of the suku (fe

eage unit). Because Minangkabau men, like Acehnese m

migrate to seek experience, wealth, and commercial suc

women’s kin group is responsible for maintaining the continu

family and the distribution and cultivation of the land. The

groups, however, are typically led by a penghulu (headman

by groups of lineage leaders. With the agrarian base of the M

bau economy in decline, the suku—as a landholding unit—

been declining somewhat in importance, especially in urb

Indeed, the position of penghulu is not always filled after the 

the incumbent, particularly if lineage members are not willin

the expense of the ceremony required to install a new penghu

The traditions of sharia—in which inheritance laws favor 

and indigenous female-oriented adat are often depicted as 

ing forces in Minangkabau society. The male-oriented sharia 

to offer young men something of a balance against the dom

law in local villages, which forces a young man to wait pass

a marriage proposal from some young woman’s family. By a

property and education through merantau experience, a yo

can attempt to influence his own destiny in positive ways. 

Increasingly, married couples go off on merantau; in su

tions, the woman’s role tends to change. When married 

reside in urban areas or outside the Minangkabau region

lose some of their social and economic rights in property. On

ent consequence is an increased likelihood of divorce. 

Minangkabau were prominent among the intellectual f

the Indonesian independence movement. Not only w

strongly Islamic, they spoke a language closely related to 

Indonesia, which was considerably freer of hierarchical con

than Javanese. Partly because of their tradition of m
Minangkabau developed a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie that r

adopted and promoted the ideas of an emerging nation-state. 

Ethnic Minorities 

In Indonesia, the concept of ethnic minorities is often disc

not in numerical but in religious terms. Although the major 

groups claim adherence to one of the major world religions (ag

recognized by the Department of Religious Affairs—Islam, C

anity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Daoism—millions of other In

sians engage in religious or cultural practices that fall outside 

categories. These practices are sometimes labeled animist or 

(pagan). In general, these Indonesians inhabit the more re

sparsely populated islands of the archipelago. Following the ma

of tens of thousands associated with the alleged 1965 coup attem

“atheist” communists, mandatory religious affiliation became an 

more intense political issue among minority groups. The g

described in the following sections represent a broad sample, c

for their geographic and cultural diversity. 

Toraja 

The Toraja of Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Barat, and Sul

Tengah provinces are one minority group that has been success

gaining national and international attention. This group be

prominent in the 1980s, largely because of the tourist industry, 

was attracted to the region because of the picturesque village

the group’s spectacular mortuary rites involving the slaugh

water buffalo. 

Inhabiting the wet, rugged mountains of the interior of sou

Sulawesi, the Toraja grow rice for subsistence and coffee for 

Traditionally, they lived in fortified hilltop villages with from t

40 houses featuring large, dramatically sweeping roofs resem

buffalo horns. Until the late 1960s, many of these villages 

politically and economically self-sufficient. This autonomy d

oped in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries par

protection against the depredations of the slave trade and partl

result of intervillage feuding associated with headhunting. 

The Toraja have strong emotional, economic, and political tie

number of different kinds of corporate groups. The most basic 

that of the rarabuku, which might be translated as “family.” T

view this grouping as encompassing relations of “blood and b

that is, relations between parents and children—the nuclear f

Since Toraja reckon kinship bilaterally, through both mothe

father, the possibilities for extending the concept of rarabuku i

142 
 

 

eral different directions are many. Another important kind 

with which Toraja have close affiliations is the tongkonan (

house), which contrasts with the banua (ordinary house). T

konan is a group of people who reckon descent from an 

ancestor. The physical structures belonging to the tongkonan 

odically renewed by replacing their distinctively shaped ro

ritual is attended by members of the social group and accomp

trancelike dances in which the spirits are asked to visit. 

important kind of affiliation is the saroan, or village wor

originally probably an agricultural work group based in a p

hamlet. Beginning as a medium for labor and credit exch

saroan has since evolved into a unit of cooperation in ritual 

as well. When sacrifices and funerals take place, groups o

exchange meat and other foods. 

The flexibility of these affiliations is partly responsibl

intensity of the mortuary performances. Because there is som

guity about one’s affiliation (that is, one’s claims to descen

only based on blood relationships but also on social recogniti

relationship through public acts), Toraja may attempt to dem

the importance of a relationship through elaborate contribut

funeral, which provides an opportunity not only to show dev

deceased parent but also to claim a share of that parent’s l

amount of land an individual inherits from the decease

depend on the number of buffalo sacrificed at that person’s 

Sometimes people even pawn land to get buffalo to kill at a f

that they can claim the land of the deceased. Thus, feasting a

is highly competitive. 

With the oil boom in the 1960s and 1970s, there was mas

migration among young upland Sulawesi men looking fo

northeastern Kalimantan. During this period, many of thes

became Christians. Although proselytization began among 

the nineteenth century, mass conversions were provoked 

abortive 1965 coup and mass labor migrations in the 1970s an

a move that implied a rejection of many Toraja beliefs and p

But when these migrants returned to their villages as weal

they often wanted to hold large status displays in the form of 

causing what anthropologist Toby Alice Volkman has calle

inflation” as well as intense debates about the authenticity 

conversion to Christianity. Because of the successful efforts 

placed Toraja officials in the central government, Toraja feast

tices have been granted official status, loosely described a

Hindu. 
Dayak 

Another group of ethnic minorities struggling for recognitio

the peoples of southern, central, and eastern Kalimantan. Fro

outsider’s perspective, most of the scattered ethnolinguistic g

inhabiting the interior of the vast island have been referred 

Dayak. The word is a collective term used by outsiders since 18

indicate the indigenous peoples of Kalimantan. Among the p

labeled as Dayak, however, one finds Ngaju Dayak, Maanyan

Lawangan, among others. Although they reside in longhouse

traditionally served as a means of protection against slave ra

and intervillage conflict, the Dayak are not communalistic. 

have bilateral kinship, and the basic unit of ownership and 

organization is the nuclear family. The various Dayak peoples 

typically made a living through swidden agriculture. In reg

religion, they tend to practice either Protestantism or Kaharin

form of indigenous religious practice blending animism and an

worship classified by the government as Hindu. The Dayak pe

elaborate death ceremonies in which the bones are disinterre

secondary reburial. 

Through its healing performances, Kaharingan serves to mo

scattered agricultural residences into a community, and it is at 

of ritual that the Dayak peoples coalesce as a group. There is 

ritual leader, nor is there a fixed ritual presentation. Specific ce

nies may be held in the home of the sponsor. Shamanic curi

balian, is one of the core features of these ritual practices. Be

illness is thought to result in a loss of the soul, the ritual h

practices are devoted to its spiritual and ceremonial retrieval. In 

eral, religious practices focus on the body, and on the health 

body politic more broadly. Sickness results from giving offe

one of the many spirits inhabiting the earth and fields, usually f

failure to sacrifice to them. The goal of the balian is to call ba

wayward soul and restore the health of the community th

trance, dance, and possession. 

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, reassertions of ethnic 

tity and land claims caused tensions leading to violence with M

migrants. Violent clashes between Dayaks and migrants had s

even earlier, in December 1996, when a Madurese migrant ac

of raping a Dayak woman was killed, and province-wide r

occurred. In the following months, violence escalated, troops 

flown in, a crackdown took place, and the cycle of violence c

ued with schools, homes, and businesses burned by Dayak

migrants in retaliation against one another. Hundreds died in 

clashes, and thousands were displaced or reported missing. 

144 
 

Couple in wedding garb, 

Nusa Tengarra Timur 

Courtesy Embassy of 

Indonesia, Washington, DC 

Long-simmering feuds between Dayaks and mostly M

Muslim migrants erupted again over issues of land and e

competition in mid-2001, causing massive displacements o

tion. Angry Dayaks, dressed in traditional clothing, sometim

boyantly displayed symbols of their headhunting tradition in 

of defiance toward what they perceived as a flood of migr

toward the central government as a whole. 

Weyewa 

The Weyewa inhabit the western highlands of Sumba a

Tenggara Timur Province, where they cultivate rice, corn, 

sava using both slash-and-burn methods and continuous irri

paddy fields. They supplement this income through the sal

stock, coffee, vanilla, cloves, and their distinctive brightly 

textiles. 

There were few challenges to Weyewa notions of poli

religious identity until the 1970s. Because Sumba is a rathe

infertile island, located away from the ports of call of the sp

it was comparatively insulated from the Hindu-Buddhist, 

and later Dutch influences, each of which helped shape the 
 

 

 

 

 

of Indonesia’s cultures. Each Weyewa belongs to a kabizu, a pa

eal clan whose founding ancestors are spirits requiring freque

ual propitiation, gifts, and respect in exchange for cont

prosperity among the descendants. Each clan is headquartere

fortified hilltop wanno kalada (ancestral village); the most 

tional villages are characterized by houses with spectacular 

pointed thatch roofs. Young people are supposed to seek sp

outside their clan, and clan members assist with the often subst

marriage payments that are required. 

The Weyewa system of ritual production and exchange beg

undergo major technological development and an economic sh

the 1970s and 1980s that resulted in a gradual weakening 

authority of lineages. With greater amounts of arable land ava

as a result of improved irrigation techniques and more crop

duced because of the use of faster-growing and higher-yielding 

eties of rice, the legal and cultural rights to these new resources 

to be assigned to individuals rather than to clans. Younger fa

were increasingly reluctant to invest in costly, large-scale 

feasts honoring the spirits. Meanwhile, government officials pu

ther pressure on traditional leaders to give up ritual feasting pra

as “wasteful” and “backward.” Furthermore, as with the Kahar

adherents of Kalimantan, failure to affiliate with an approved 

gion was regarded as potentially treasonous. Unlike the Toraj

others, however, the Weyewa were not politically organized f

preservation of their indigenous religion. Most people simply 

verted to Christianity as a symbolic gesture of participation 

nation-state. Indeed, whole villages in the late 1980s and early 

conducted feasts in which residents settled their debts with anc

spirits and became Christians. The number of Weyewa profe

affiliation with the Christian religion (either Roman Catholic o

vinist Protestant) jumped from approximately 20 percent in 19

more than 90 percent in 2005. 

Sumba did not escape violence during the post-Suharto r

period, but the rioting took on distinctive forms. Because the c

government was generally perceived in eastern Indonesia as a 

tiful—if inequitable—source of funds for education, develop

and jobs, the collapse of central authority resulted in open dis

In November 1998, conflict broke out along ethnic lines as We

men sought to defend the reputation of an ethnic Weyewa go

ment official accused of corruption. The ensuing riots left at le

people dead and more than 600 homes destroyed. The public p

mance of peace rituals in 1999 began a slow, painful proce

rebuilding trust between aggrieved parties. 

146 
 

 

Asmat 

The approximately 65,000 Asmat people of the south-cen

vial swamps of Papua Province are of a Papuan genetic 

They live in villages with populations that vary in size fro

2,000 inhabitants. Until the 1950s, warfare, headhunting, an

balism were constant features of Asmat social life. The peop

build their houses along river bends so that an enemy attack 

seen in advance. Houses in coastal areas still are generally 

pilings two or more meters high, to protect residents fro

flooding by the surging tides of the brackish rivers. In the fo

the Jayawijaya Mountains, Asmat live in tree houses that a

25 meters off the ground. In some areas, they also build 

watchtowers as much as 30 meters above the ground. 

The Asmat are primarily hunters and foragers who subsist 

ering and processing the starchy pulp of the sago palm, findi

and hunting down the occasional wild pig, cassowary, or c

Although the Asmat population has steadily increased since 

into contact with missionaries and government health worker

est continues to yield an adequate supply and variety of food

ing to anthropologist Tobias Schneebaum, “Some Asmat hav

to grow small patches of vegetables, such as string beans, a

raise the descendants of recently imported chickens. The intr

of a limited cash economy through the sale of logs to timbe

nies and carvings to outsiders has led many Asmat to co

necessities such foods as rice and tinned fish; most have also 

accustomed to wearing Western-style clothing and using met

Many Asmat have converted to Christianity, although 

number continue to practice the religion of their ances

example, many believe that all deaths—except those of the 

and very young—come about through acts of malevolence, 

magic or actual physical force. Ancestral spirits demand ve

for these deaths. The ancestors to whom they feel obligated 

resented in shields, in large, spectacular wood carvings o

and in ancestor poles consisting of human figurines. Unti

1980s, the preferred way for a young man to fulfill his oblig

his kin and his ancestors and prove his sexual prowess wa

the head of an enemy and offer the body for cannibalistic c

tion by other members of the village. 

The first Dutch colonial government post was not estab

Asmat territory until 1938, and a Catholic mission began 

there only in 1958, but the pace of change in this once remo

greatly increased after the 1960s. Beginning in the earl

many Asmat enrolled their children in Indonesian schools, a
 

 

 

 

 

converted to Christianity. As large timber, oil, and mining comp

expanded their operations in the region, the fragile, low-lying 

grove forests that were home to many Asmat came under threa

industrial waste and soil erosion. The Asmat appear to be ga

some national and international recognition for their artwork; 

ever, this fame has not resulted in their acquiring any signi

political input into decisions of the Indonesian government aff

the use of land in traditional Asmat territory. Although there i

rently little evidence of Free Papua Organization (OPM) ac

among the Asmat, there has been a history of resistance to lo

companies and other outside intruders, often in the form of 

cults and other ritual activity. 

Chinese 

Identifying someone in Indonesia as a member of the Ch

(Tionghoa) ethnic group is not an easy matter, because the ph

characteristics, languages, names, areas of residence, and life

of Chinese Indonesians are not always distinct from those of th

of the population. The national census does not record the Chin

a special group, and there are no simple racial criteria for me

ship in this group. There are some people who consider them

Chinese but who, as a result of intermarriage with the local po

tion, are less than one-quarter Chinese in ancestry. On the 

hand, there are some people who by ancestry could be consi

half-Chinese or more but who regard themselves as fully Indon

Furthermore, many people who identify themselves as Chinese 

nesians cannot read or write the Chinese language. 

The policy of the Indonesian government by the early 

strongly advocated the assimilation of the Chinese populatio

the communities in which they lived, but the Chinese had a lon

tory of enforced separation from their non-Chinese neighbor

nearly a century prior to 1919, Chinese were forced to live in 

rate urban neighborhoods and could travel out of them only 

government permits. Most Chinese continued to settle in urban 

of Indonesia even after this “quarter system” was discontinu

1919. In some areas, such as the city of Pontianak in Kalim

Barat and Bagansiapiapi in Riau Province, Chinese even ca

form a majority of the population. They began to settle in rural 

of Java in the 1920s and 1930s, but in the 1960s the govern

again prohibited the Chinese from exercising free choice of 

dence, requiring them to live in cities and towns. 

The Chinese who immigrated to Indonesia were not linguis

homogeneous. The dominant languages among these immi

were Hokkien, Hakka, and Cantonese. There was great occupa

148 
 

Papuan men, 

Papua Province 

Courtesy Embassy of 

Indonesia, Washington, DC 

diversity among the Chinese in the late nineteenth and early 

centuries, but Dutch colonial policies channeled them into tr

ing, or skilled artisanship. In the twenty-first century, Chin

tinue to dominate the Indonesian economy’s private sector

central government policies designed to promote non-Chine

preneurs. Nonetheless, Chinese are not a monolithic group. N

rich and urban. They seldom share a common language besid

nesian or Javanese. One of the historical distinctions among 

sian Chinese in the 1960s and 1970s—between the peranaka

born Chinese with some Indonesian ancestry) and totok (full

Chinese, usually foreign-born)—has begun to fade as fewer 

born Chinese immigrate to Indonesia. Although the distin

and social significance of this division vary considerably fr

to place in the archipelago, ties to the Chinese homeland ar

within the peranakan community, and there is stronger evi

Indonesian influence. Unlike the more strictly male-domina

peranakan families recognize descent along both female a

lines. Peranakan are more likely to have converted to Ch

(although some became Muslims) and to have assimilated 

ways to the norms of Indonesian culture. They typically spea

Indonesia as their first language. 
 

The Suharto government’s program of assimilation for the 

nese began to be phased out in 1998. Long-discouraged symb

Chinese identity such as Chinese-language newspapers, school

public rituals, and the use of Chinese names, are no longer subj

strict regulation. During the Suharto years, nearly all Chinese 

nesians obtained Indonesian citizenship, often at high cost an

result of considerable government pressure. 

Popular resentment persisted toward Chinese economic su

however, and nurtured a perception of Chinese complicity 

Suharto regime’s corruption. In May 1998, riots broke out in 

hundreds of Chinese stores were burned and Chinese women 

raped and murdered. When many Chinese Indonesians fled th

lence, the subsequent capital flight resulted in further economic 

ship in a country already suffering a financial crisis. By 2005 

had returned, but the economic and social confidence of many 

nese in the country was badly shaken by the experience. 

Education 

The character of Indonesia’s education system reflects the cou

diverse religious heritage, its struggle for a national identity, an

challenge of resource allocation in a poor but developing archip

nation with a population that is young (median age 27.6 year

growing (at an estimated annual rate of about 1.1 percent) in 

Tremendous progress has been made toward the goal of universa

cation since 1973, when nearly 20 percent of youth were illitera

that time, then-President Suharto issued an order to set aside po

of oil revenues for the construction of new primary schools. Th

resulted in the construction or repair of nearly 40,000 primary-s

facilities by the late 1980s, and literacy rates improved signifi

nationwide. During 1997–98, the financial crisis affected the p

families the most, resulting in their selectively cutting back on 

education expenditures. Government funding struggled to ke

with rising costs during this period, but by 2002, according 

World Bank, only 2 percent of those between the ages of 15 a

could not read, and by 2009, the adult literacy rate was 90.4 perc

Primary and Secondary Education 

Indonesians are required to attend nine years of school. The

choose between state-run, nonsectarian public schools supervis

the Department of National Education (Depdiknas) or private or 

private religious (usually Islamic) schools supervised and financ

the Department of Religious Affairs. However, although 86.1 p

150 
 

 

of the Indonesian population is registered as Muslim, accord

2000 census only 15 percent of school-age individuals atten

gious schools. Overall enrollment figures are slightly higher 

than boys and much higher in Java than the rest of Indonesia

A central goal of the national education system is not m

impart secular wisdom about the world but also to instruct 

in the principles of participation in the modern nation-

bureaucracies, and its moral and ideological foundations. B

under Guided Democracy (1959–65) and strengthened in 

Order after 1975, a key feature of the national curriculum—

the case for other national institutions—has been instructi

Pancasila. Children age six and older learned by rote its fiv

ples—belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity

racy, and social justice—and were instructed daily to a

meanings of this key national symbol to their lives. But wit

of the New Order in 1998 and the beginning of the cam

decentralize the national government, provincial and dist

administrators obtained increasing autonomy in determi

content of schooling, and Pancasila began to play a diminis

in the curriculum. 

A style of pedagogy prevails inside public-school classro

emphasizes rote learning and deference to the authority of th

Although the youngest children are sometimes allowed to 

local language, by the third year of primary school nearly al

tion is conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. Teachers customari

ask questions of individual students; rather, a standard teach

nique is to narrate a historical event or to describe a math

problem, pausing at key junctures to allow the students to 

responses that “fill in the blanks.” By not identifying individ

lems of students and retaining an emotionally distanced d

teachers are said to show themselves to be sabar (patient), 

considered admirable behavior. 

After completion of the six-year primary-school progra

years of junior secondary school may be followed by three 

senior secondary school; or students can choose among a v

vocational and pre-professional junior and senior secondary 

each level of which requires three years of study. After s

school, students may choose either three years of posts

vocational and pre-professional schools or three years of hig

There are academic and vocational junior high schools tha

senior-level diplomas. There are also “domestic science” ju

schools for girls. At the senior high school level, three-year 

tural, veterinary, and forestry schools are open to students w
 

graduated from an academic junior high school. Special schools 

junior and senior levels teach hotel management, legal clerking

tic arts, and music. 

The completion rate for Indonesian primary schools is exc

Indeed, 100 percent of the relevant age-group had completed pr

education as of 2003, according to World Bank data. The gross e

ment rate for primary schools was 100 percent, but it decreased 

percent for secondary schools and 16 percent for postseco

schools. There were nearly equal numbers of girls and boys in pr

and secondary schools; in the late 2000s, the ratio was 96.7 g

100 boys. Depdiknas reported that in school year 2007–8 there 

63,444 kindergartens, with a total enrollment of 2.8 million pupi

176,061 teachers. Later statistics are available for primary and se

ary levels for school year 2008–9. They indicate that there 

144,228 primary schools, with a total enrollment of 26.9 millio

dents and 1.5 million teachers; 28,777 junior secondary schools

a total enrollment of 8.9 million students and 629,036 teachers; 1

general senior secondary schools, with a total enrollment of 3.

lion students and 314,389 teachers; and 7,592 vocational senio

ondary schools, with a total enrollment of 3 million student

246,018 teachers. Additionally, there were 1,686 special edu

schools from kindergarten to senior secondary levels, with a 

enrollment of 73,322 and 18,047 teachers. 

Teacher-training programs are varied and gradually 

upgraded. For example, in the 1950s anyone completing a te

training program at the junior high school level could ob

teacher’s certificate. Since the 1970s, however, primary-school 

ers have been required to have graduated from a senior high scho

teachers, and teachers of higher grades have been required to 

completed a university-level education course. Remuneration fo

mary- and secondary-school teachers, although low, compares 

ably with that in other Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indi

Thailand. Student–teacher ratios also compare satisfactorily with 

in many Asian nations: They were 23.4 to 1 and 18.8 to 1, re

tively, for primary and secondary schools in 2004; that same ye

overall averages for Asia-Pacific countries were 22 to 1 and 18 

respectively. 

By 2008 the staff shortage in Indonesia’s schools was no lon

acute as in the 1980s, but serious difficulties remain, particula

the areas of teacher salaries, teacher certification, and finding 

fied personnel. In many remote areas of the Outer Islands, in pa

lar, there is a severe shortage of qualified teachers, and some vi

have school buildings but no teachers, books, or supplies. Prov

152 
 

Elementary school children on Madura, Jawa Timur 

Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, used with p

© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University o

textbooks and other school equipment to Indonesia’s 37 

schoolchildren throughout the far-flung archipelago contin

a significant problem as well, especially in more remote are

Islamic Schools 

The secular and nationalist emphasis in public schools 

resisted by some of the Muslim majority. A distinct and vocal 

of these Muslims prefer to place their children in a pesa

Islamic school. Usually located in rural areas and directed by 

scholar, pesantren are attended by young people seeking a 

understanding of the Quran, the Arabic language, the sharia, a

lim traditions and history, as well as more modern subject

English, mathematics, and geography. Students can enter and 

pesantren any time of the year, and the studies are not organ

progression of courses leading to graduation. Although the c

of pesantren is to produce good Muslims, they do not share 

stance toward Islam or a position on secularism. Some p

emphasize the autonomy of modern students to think for th

and to interpret scripture and modern knowledge in a way th

sistent with the teachings of Islam. Others are more traditi
 

stress the importance of following the wisdom of elders, incl

their teachings on science, religion, and family life. Although th

rorist bombings in Kuta, Bali, in 2002 raised suspicions about w

pesantren promote extremist views, the majority of these scho

Indonesia are theologically moderate, reflecting the views of the 

nesian population as a whole. For those who opt for a pesantren e

tion, a sixth-grade equivalency certificate is available after succ

completion of a state test. 

In order for students to adapt to life in the modern nation-st

the 1970s the Muslim-dominated Department of Religion (no

Department of Religious Affairs) advocated the spread of a 

variety of Muslim school, the madrassa. This kind of school 

grates religious subjects from the pesantren with secular su

from the Western-style public-education system. Although in g

the public believes that Islamic schools offer lower-quality educ

among Islamic schools a madrassa is ranked lower than a pesan

Higher Education 

Indonesia’s institutions of higher education have experience

matic growth since independence. In 1950 there were 10 instit

of higher learning with a total of about 6,500 students. In 1970

private and state institutions enrolled about 237,000 students, a

1990 there were 900 institutions with about 141,000 teacher

nearly 1.5 million students. By 2009 there were 2,975 institutio

higher education and more than 4.2 million students. Of these in

tions, 3 percent were public, with 57.1 percent of the student e

ment, and 97 percent were private, with 42.9 of the student enrol

Even though government subsidies finance approximately 80 

percent of state-university budgets, universities have consid

more autonomy in curriculum and internal structure than primar

secondary schools. Whereas tuition in such state institutions is 

affordable for average students than private-university tuition, f

salaries are low by international standards. Lecturers often have 

jobs outside the university to supplement their wages. 

Private universities are generally operated by foundations. U

state universities, private institutions have budgets that are a

entirely tuition-driven. A onetime registration fee (which c

quite high) is determined at the time of entry. If a university 

religious affiliation, it can cover some of its costs with donatio

grants from international religious organizations. The govern

provides only limited scholarship support for students wishi

attend private universities. 

154 
Muslim girls in school uniforms, Madura, Jawa Timur 

Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, used with p

© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University o

Indonesian institutions of higher education offer a wide 

programs. However, about 52 percent of all non-teacher-trai

dents enrolled in higher education were social sciences majo

2008–9 academic year, while only 3 percent majored in lab

intensive fields of study, largely because universities prefe

social science courses that do not require expensive laborat

equipment. The major academic degree programs are the 

(literally “scholar,” roughly corresponding to a bachelor’s 

and the pasca sarjana (master’s or doctoral degree). Pro

schools offer “diploma” and “specialist” degrees, the latte

either “SP1" or “SP2," depending on the level of advanceme

2001 to 2004, the number of students completing their 

degrees grew dramatically from about 308,000 in 2001 t

683,000 in 2004, a 122-percent increase. This level stood at 

graduates at the end of academic year 2008–9. 

Discussion about how to improve Indonesian higher e

focuses on the issues of teacher salaries, laboratory and 

facilities, and professors’ qualifications. Only 7 percent of u

faculty overall held a Ph.D. in the mid-2000s, although the 

tion was greater (11 percent) in state institutions. Because 
programs are few in Indonesia and there is little money to su

education overseas, this situation is improving only slowly. D

these difficulties, most institutions of higher education receive 

numbers of applications; in state institutions, less than one in 

applications was accepted in 2004; in private institutions, the a

tance rate was nearly two out of three. One of the most serious 

lems for graduates with advanced degrees, however, is fi

employment suited to their newly acquired education. In 200

unemployment rate for college graduates with the sarjana d

was approximately 20 percent, and 10 percent for graduates o

fessional schools. 

The Republic of Indonesia Institute for Higher Education (BP

was founded in Jakarta shortly after independence was decla

1945. When the Dutch returned in force, BPTRI dispersed its v

schools to other parts of Java. The Dutch established Nood U

siteit (Emergency University) in Jakarta in 1946, and the foll

year changed its name to Universiteit van Indonesië (UVI), or 

versity of Indonesia. On February 2, 1950, in the wake of the w

independence, the government established a state univers

Jakarta called Universiteit Indonesia. It was composed of un

BPTRI and UVI; the name Universiteit Indonesia was later ch

to Universitas Indonesia. This institution enrolls about 37,00

dents per year. Universitas Gadjah Mada lays claim to being th

est Indonesian university. It was founded in Yogyakarta on Dec

9, 1949, but was giving its first lectures in early 1946 (when Y

karta was the Republican capital). State-owned Gadjah Mada h

annual enrollment of about 54,000 students. Other major unive

include Catholic University and the Institut Teknologi Bandung

in Bandung; and the Institut Pertanian Bogor, in Bogor. There al

important regional universities in Sulawesi Selatan, Sumatera 

Jawa Barat, and Papua. Approximately 15 percent of Indonesia

dents of higher education attend a public or private Islamic univ

institute, academy, or polytechnic institute. Among these is the 

Muslim University (UIN)—formerly called the State Institu

Islamic Religion (IAIN)—which has been an important venu

progressive debates about Islam. 

Health 

Services and Infrastructure 

As access to education has improved throughout the archip

use of modern forms of health care also has increased. For exam

2003 the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported t

156 
percent of births in Indonesia were attended by a trained m

other health specialist. Recent studies show a correlation bet

rise of education levels and the increased use of hospitals, ph

and other health resources. Indeed, since the 1980s, health in 

sia has shown overall improvement. Life expectancy was est

70.8 years in 2009, a substantial increase since 1980, when i

52.9 years. However, the distribution of improvements, like t

bution of resources for health maintenance and improvement, 

unequal. In 2003 life expectancy was 72 years in Jakarta an

karta but only 63 years in Nusa Tenggara Barat Province. 

infant mortality nationwide decreased from an average of 105

per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 75.2 in 1990, to 36.0 in 2000, 

estimated 29.9 in 2009, local rates varied dramatically. The po

and less-educated classes generally suffered much higher 

rates than their educated urban counterparts. 

Community and preventive health programs form anothe

nent of Indonesia’s health system. Established in 1969 as p

first Repelita (see Glossary), the government’s five-year e

development plan, community health services are organi

three-tier system with puskesmas (community health cente

top. Usually staffed by a physician, these centers provide 

and child health care, general outpatient curative and pr

health care, pre- and postnatal care, immunization, and com

ble disease–control programs. Specialized clinic services ar

ically available at some of the larger clinics. 

Second-level community health centers include subpu

(community health subcenters) consisting of small clinics an

nal and child health centers staffed with one to three nurses 

ited weekly or monthly by a physician. Toward the middle o

decade of the twenty-first century, the World Health Org

(WHO) reported that there were 3.6 health centers per 100,0

lation. Since the early 1990s, the Department of Health pl

have three to four subcenters per health center, dependin

region, and this plan has been largely realized in the twenty-

tury. The third level of community health services consists o

level posyandu (integrated service posts). These posts are no

nently staffed facilities but rather monthly clinics on rented p

in which a visiting team from the regional health center 

local health volunteers. 

The distribution of Indonesian health-care workers is als

uneven. To alleviate the problem of physician maldistribu

government requires two to five years of public service by a

ates of medical schools, whether public or private. In ord
 

admitted for specialist training, physicians first have to comple

service, which is normally fulfilled by staffing puskesmas. Onl

years of public service are required for those physicians work

remote areas such as the provinces of Nusa Tenggara T

Sulawesi Tenggara, Kalimantan Timur, Maluku, Papua, and 

Barat, whereas three to five years of service are required for a 

ing in Java, Bali, or Sumatra. Despite such requirements, it is 

cult to attract medical-school graduates to these remote, unders

regions, particularly without additional cash incentives. Wi

average of only about 0.1 physicians, 0.8 nurses or midwive

0.6 hospital beds per 1,000 population, Indonesia compares un

ably with all of its Southeast Asian neighbors. 

Government Support 

One of the most notable features of Indonesia’s health-care sy

in comparison with those of other Southeast Asian nations, is th

level of government support. For example, in 2006 the Philip

expended 3.3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP—see 

sary) on health care, Malaysia 4.3 percent, Singapore 3.4 percen

Timor-Leste 16.4 percent. That same year, only 2.2 percent 

GDP of Indonesia was devoted to health care, far less than the 

cent recommended by the WHO. Of these percentages, howev

of 2006, the Indonesian government provided 50.4 percent 

total national expenditure on health care. This compares favo

with Malaysia’s 45.2 percent, Philippines’ 39.6 percent, and S

pore’s 33.6 percent but not with Timor-Leste’s 88.8 percent. 

The modern health-care system continues the Dutch colonia

tern of low levels of investment in health care. The Dutch did 

tively little in the field of public health prior to 1910, wit

exception of giving smallpox vaccinations. In the 1930s, how

the government devoted increased attention to health educatio

disease prevention, particularly in rural areas. An elaborate p

health infrastructure had developed by 1939, including a partic

sophisticated model program in Purwokerto in central Java. Bu

public-health system collapsed after the Japanese invasion in 

During World War II, the mortality rate rose dramatically, an

general health situation of the country deteriorated. 

In the postwar period, a network of maternal and child health 

ters was established, but resources were extremely limited, wit

one physician for every 100,000 people. The first dramatic imp

ments resulted from the establishment of the network of comm

health centers in 1969. Although at first the general popu

strongly resisted using these facilities, by the time of the 1980 

sus, 40 percent of people reporting illness in the prior wee

158 
 

sought treatment at one. By 2005 the community health 

catered largely to the rural and urban poor, and most urban 

who could afford to do so sought health care from private ph

and clinics. 

Traditional and Modern Health Practices 

Dukun—traditional healers—continue to play an importa

health care, particularly in rural areas. Often, the services of 

are used in conjunction with Western-style medicine. In so

areas, these healers represent a treatment option of first reso

cially when there is no community health center nearby, or if 

modern health care available is expensive, or the facility 

staffed. Ideas about healing differ greatly among the hundred

nic groups, but often healers use extensive knowledge o

medicines and invoke supernatural legitimacy for their pract

Following childbirth, women in many parts of the arc

engage in “roasting.” Although different ethnic groups hav

ent explanations for the practice, it usually involves the sec

the mother and her child for a period following childbirth—

few weeks to months—so that she might submit herself to p

exposure to the warmth of a hearth or other source of heat

eral, it is believed that this speeds the process of recovery, b

believe it helps replace a woman’s lost blood, returns her b

trim and fit shape, and helps “dry her out.” 

Major Health Problems 

The major cause of death in Indonesia is from communic

eases, mainly resulting from a lack of clean water. Tuberc

the second-leading cause of death and the first among infec

eases. Malaria also is a major public-health problem, as are 

episodes of dengue hemorrhagic fever in both urban and ru

according to the WHO. 

Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficie

drome (HIV/AIDS) poses a major public-health threat in In

Although in an April 1992 report the Department of Health 

only 47 documented cases of individuals whose blood tested 

for HIV, by 2007 there were an estimated 270,000 people liv

HIV/AIDS, the highest rate among its neighbors and third h

Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s estimated 8,700 deaths from H

by 2007 also placed it far above the figures for any of its n

and fourth highest in Southeast Asia. The rate of infection i

larly high in Papua. The Ford Foundation and the U.S. Ag

International Development have funded HIV/AIDS preven
awareness programs in Bali and Papua, and Family Health In

tional was operating a program, Aksi Stop AIDS (ASA), in 

parts of the archipelago in 2009. 

Two other important public-health concerns are avian infl

and polio. The first outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza in Indo

occurred in 2004, when cases in poultry were reported in 11 

inces. In 2005 the Department of Health reported that a 38-ye

man who had died on July 12 was the country’s first laboratory

firmed positive human case of H5N1 avian influenza. By the e

the year, 19 more cases had been confirmed. By January 2009, 

nesia had confirmed 140 cases of avian influenza in humans in 

ous parts of the country. The Department of Health, working wi

WHO, presents seminars and workshops with the goal of streng

ing surveillance of influenza-like illness, outbreak investigatio

appropriate isolation and barrier nursing. The National Committ

Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza Prepare

(Komnas FPBI) coordinates the Indonesian government respo

the H5N1 avian influenza virus. Stockpiling of personal prot

equipment to protect the health of veterinary workers, as well 

general health, and procurement of antivirals for treatment an

phylaxis, as appropriate, are continuing. Prevention guidelines f

general Indonesian community emphasize practices such as fre

hand washing, avoidance of contact with sick animals, and saf

hygienic handling and cooking of poultry. Although some mas

ings have taken place in Indonesia, they have not been as extens

in other countries. Although there were more than 1,800 dea

Southeast Asia as a result of the 2009 pandemic influenza H

Indonesia was largely spared. Only a few fatal cases were repor

Kalimantan by the end of 2009. To confront the threat of the 

pandemic, Komnas FPBI established an H1N1 Command Post 

Office of the Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare. As o

2005, there were 122 polio cases confirmed in Indonesia, prima

Jawa Barat and Jawa Tengah, and in Sumatra. Two emergency 

nation campaigns were conducted by the government in Ma

June 2005. 

Pharmaceuticals 

Indonesia achieved self-sufficiency in basic pharmaceutica

duction by the early 1990s, but as the twenty-first century b

Indonesians still had one of the lowest per capita expenditur

modern drugs among the members of the Association of Sou

Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary). According to one est

in 2000, Indonesia’s annual consumption of medicine was US$

160 
capita, compared to US$6 in the Philippines and US$11 in 

and Malaysia. Many Indonesians continue to rely at least pa

traditional herbal medicines, in part because modern phar

cals are expensive. When modern medicines are used, ongo

lems include overprescription of antibiotics, overuse of in

poor patient compliance, use of unlabeled drugs, and inatt

drug interactions. By 2005 Indonesia had about 200 pharm

companies and nearly 1,000 pharmaceutical wholesalers. M

located on Java. 

Public Sanitation 

In 2008 about 89 percent of the urban population in Indon

access to clean water, and about 60 percent had access 

water, mostly from a shared faucet. The number of urban 

with a household connection rose between 1990 and 2008, 

percent to 37 percent. In rural areas, the proportions were 

approximately 71 percent had access to an improved wate

and about 8 percent had a household connection in 2008. M

dle- and lower-class Indonesians continue to rely on the c

frequently polluted streams, canals, and water catchment 

many coastal cities, the freshwater table is being threatene

drilling of private wells, which become contaminated by 

septic tanks. This situation has given rise to the popularity 

mercially purified water sold in sealed plastic containers. 

According to the WHO, 82 percent of urban residents an

cent of rural residents had access to modern sanitation fac

2007, but only 67 percent and 36 percent, respectively, u

improved facilities in 2008. Even in urban areas, the WHO e

that 16 percent of residents were without proper sanitatio

commercial and residential areas are served by a waterborne 

system of open drainage canals discharging raw wastes dire

rivers or the sea. In the slum areas of Jakarta, residents are 

to frequent flooding and the outbreak of waterborne diseases 

from clogged sewers. 

Society’s Prospects 

As the world’s largest archipelago, and fourth most 

country, the diverse nation of Indonesia faces environme

social challenges of breathtaking scope. While improved 

education has resulted in lower birthrates, rising income

health, and greater levels of political participation, it has also 

a severe cost to the environment. The preservation of the 
 

rich ethnic, linguistic, and ecological diversity must increasing

negotiated in relation to the homogenizing influences of the 

more integrated and interconnected national and international e

mies. Achieving a sustainable balance among these interests w

one of the central challenges facing Indonesia in the coming dec

* * * 

Several sources give a broad, useful perspective on the cultu

Indonesia. The Potent Dead: Ancestors, Saints and Heroes in 

temporary Indonesia, edited by Henri Chambert-Loir and An

Reid, has several good articles on the role of religion in Indo

Andrew Beatty’s Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropolo

Account provides a useful analysis of varieties of Muslim pract

Java. Martin Ramstedt’s volume, Hinduism in Modern Indone

Minority Religion Between Local, National, and Global Inte

contains several useful essays, particularly his introductory a

The contributors to Chinese Indonesians: State Policy, Monocu

and Multiculturalism, edited by Leo A. Suryadinata, discuss th

lution of state policies toward the religion and culture of Ch

Indonesians. A good survey of history, beliefs, and practices a

ated with sex and gender in Indonesia can be found in Fanta

the Feminine in Indonesia, edited by Laurie Sears. Diane W

Factory Daughters: Gender, Household Dynamics, and Rural I

trialization in Java provides a particularly useful analysis of a s

icant aspect of economic growth in Indonesia. Freek Colombij

J. Thomas Lindblad place Indonesia’s unrest in historical an

tural context in Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporar

lence in Historical Perspective. James N. Sneddon’s The Indon

Language provides a survey of its subject’s history and role in 

temporary society. Christopher Bjork’s Indonesian Education 

vides a contemporary picture of the struggle among tea

schools, and the central educational bureaucracy. A particularl

ful compilation of current essays pertaining to recent violence, 

ical and religious developments, and environmental proble

contained in John McDougall’s Indonesia Publications: Online 

versity Course. 

For a description of the history behind current environm

debates, Environmental Challenges in South-east Asia, edited b

tor King, is the best source. A demographic perspective on popu

growth, health, labor, and migration is the focus of The Demogr

Dimension in Indonesian Development, by Graeme Hugo et al

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

162 
Chapter 3. The Eco
Perahu pinisi—indigenous trading vessels—moored in Jakarta’s old h

of Sunda Kelepa 
 

 

 

THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY, BY MANY MEASURE

pered during the New Order government of President Suhart

long tenure, from 1966 to 1998, both began and ended in pol

social upheaval. Rapid growth of Indonesia’s gross domestic 

(GDP—see Glossary) endured over a long period of time

cantly raising the standard of living. Social achievements u

New Order are widely considered to have been far less im

however. The most urgent challenge facing Suharto’s four im

successors, who took office between 1998 and 2004, was to 

the fast-paced economic expansion of the New Order years. 

The role of government has been absolutely crucial in the s

economic development in Indonesia since the 1960s. The mai

of government economic policy during the latter part of the 

period were liberalization and deregulation, which in the 1

1990s radically changed the economic landscape as well as the 

ship between private capital and political power. The financ

that started in Thailand in the summer of 1997 soon reached 

sia—and other Asian nations—and crisis management with 

tional assistance became the most pressing topic of economic 

Jakarta over the next several years. In the early years of the 

tury, the government started putting economic reforms in place

other new policies, these reforms included a far-reaching dec

tion of economic authority and policy making. Central go

finance and the execution of monetary and exchange-rate pol

drew special attention. A resumption of economic growth, th

at the same torrid pace experienced prior to the 1997 crisis, a

nied the implementation of the reforms. 

Three trends characterize the changes that have occurred in 

nesian economy since the late 1960s: increasing integration 

world economy, profound structural change, and intense di

tion. These trends are highlighted in discussions about major a

the Indonesian economy, such as international trade, aid, and p

employment and income development; and the main sector

nomic activity. The economy has experienced a fundamental r

tion from agriculture to industry, and within the industrial sec

from oil and gas production to other branches of manufactur

labor-intensive (for example, textiles and food processing) an

intensive (for example, chemicals and electrical and electroni

Modernization has enabled the services sector and the trans

and communication infrastructures to make a greater contri
 

 

economic growth. In the early twenty-first century, the national 

omy no longer depends only on natural resources such as oil and 

The Role of Government 

The government pursued policies to support pribumi (see 

sary) businessmen in the early years of nation building, from 

pendence in 1945 to 1957. These included subsidized credit fro

state-owned Indonesian People’s Bank (BRI—for this and other 

nyms, see table A), and positive discrimination in favor of indig

traders in the allocation of scarce foreign exchange for import

first five-year development plan (1956–60) proposed a realistic 

of government investment in physical infrastructure but offered 

regulation or overall guidance to the private sector. This pla

superseded by dramatic developments in the political and eco

sphere, in particular the takeover of virtually all remaining D

owned private enterprises in December 1957, which led to nat

ization and state control of key sectors of the economy. Indon

civil servants and military officers, most of whom had little ma

rial experience, replaced Dutch management personnel. 

The expansion of the state’s role in the economy was sustain

general policy shifts. The Guided Economy of President Sukar

office 1945–67) was initiated in a new eight-year developmen

begun in 1959, which entailed a twelvefold increase in spendi

government projects without a clear indication of sources of fin

By the mid-1960s, credit from Bank Indonesia—the central b

accounted for half of government expenditures. This situation 

budget deficits and a mounting foreign debt, as well as gall

inflation, which peaked at an annual rate of 900 percent in 19

spite of a highly visible public building campaign, the economy 

nated, and by 1965 per capita GDP was back at its 1957 level. 

Following the downfall of Sukarno in 1967, the New 

regime under Suharto drew upon financial assistance from the 

national Monetary Fund (IMF) in the pursuit of a variety of 

gency stabilization measures. During the late 1960s, a team o

economists from the Faculty of Economics at the Universitas 

nesia (University of Indonesia) in Jakarta became influential 

dential advisers, even gaining cabinet-level posts. Because th

the advisers were graduates of the University of California at B

ley, the group, led by Widjoyo Nitisastro, who headed the Na

Development Planning Board (Bappenas), became colloq

known as the Berkeley Mafia. Foremost among this group’s re

mended reforms was a balanced budget, although foreign borro

and aid counted as sources of revenue. In a radical break fro

166 
 

socialist tenor of Sukarno’s Guided Economy, Suharto’s Ne

heralded a return to private-market development. 

The New Order remained committed to a stable econom

ronment encouraged by responsible fiscal and monetary po

concerns over foreign economic dominance, the limited 

industrial base, and the need for pribumi economic deve

mandated increased government regulation during the 19

economy continued to prosper throughout that decade, w

growing at an average rate of 8 percent annually. In the ear

a precipitous drop in the growth rate pointed to limits in the 

alization strategy, and a new generation of reformers adv

more limited role for the government. When the oil market c

in 1986, the balance was tipped in favor of these advocates 

fight” economic competition. 

The Political Economy of Reform 

Two main forces of influence within the New Order go

battled to shape economic policy: the technocrats, favorin

reform and little intervention by the government; and the e

nationalists, arguing that trade protection and direct governm

trol and regulation were necessary. The leaders of the technoc

the original members of the Berkeley Mafia. After Nitisastro, 

influential technocrat was Ali Wardhana, initially minister o

and later coordinating minister of economics, finance, and 

Although retired by 1988, both men remained influential be

scenes advisers until the early 1990s. Beneficiaries of the tu

Sumitro Joyohadikusumo, former cabinet member and found

of the Faculty of Economics at the Universitas Indonesia, the

ern-trained economists were advocates of economic liberalism

The economic nationalists included prominent official

Department of Industry, which was headed by Hartarto; Bacha

(B. J.) Habibie, minister of research and technology, who sin

hood had enjoyed Suharto’s special protection; and officers on 

ital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). The balance 

between the technocrats and the economic nationalists was fo

decades mediated by Suharto, but around 1993 the nationalists 

decisive influence over economic policy and increasingly pu

technocrats into the background. This change reflected Suhart

confidence that he was capable of managing economic dev

without much advice from others, his great trust in Habibie’s 

to stage major economic advances, and the rise of his childre

ness empires in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 

 

The technocrats had initially gained a great deal of credibil

curbing rampant inflation and restoring financial stability aft

New Order government came to power in 1966. As oil rev

increased, starting in 1974, government agencies responsib

trade and industrial policy sought to extend Indonesia’s dom

industrial base by investing in basic industries, especially steel 

ufacturing, and by erecting trade barriers to protect domestic pr

ers from foreign competition. Government regulations prolife

and oil taxes fueled investment in development projects and 

enterprises. 

The private sector became dominated by large conglome

often owned by Indonesians of Chinese descent who had suff

wealth and know-how to assist the government with large-scale 

ernization projects. During the 1970s, Chinese Indonesian con

erates were estimated to account for 75 percent of private-

investment. Around 1990, the top 200 conglomerates account

sales that taken together corresponded to 25 percent of GDP. 

over of the five largest, including the Salim and Astra Interna

groups, amounted to Rp16 trillion (US$6.8 billion; for value 

rupiah—Rp—see Glossary), and 18 of the 22 largest conglom

were owned by Indonesians of Chinese descent. Among them, t

200 conglomerates controlled almost 45,000 individual firms

growth of the conglomerates throughout the 1970s and 1980s w

most cases highly dependent on political patronage. In exchan

monopoly privileges related to production and imports of key 

trial products, conglomerates would undertake large-scale inves

projects that helped the government reach its industrialization g

By the mid-1980s, about 1,500 items representing 35 perc

the value of imports were either imported by licensed import

controlled through a quota system. Nontariff barriers affected 

ally all manufactured imports but were a particular impedim

foreign-made textiles, paper and paper products, and chemical 

ucts. As a result, domestic firms in these lines of production 

effectively protected from foreign competition or were able t

their products at a higher cost. Firms that obtained import lic

were also highly profitable, but costs were borne by the entire 

omy because imports were often key inputs for other manufact

Popular resentment grew as gains from the restrictions enric

privileged minority and added to a long-standing public sens

toward the prominent economic position of the Indonesian Ch

minority. 

In the 1980s, Suharto’s six children came of age and q

became the most visible beneficiaries of direct access to the ap

political power. Each of them was connected with one or more 

168 
 

glomerates that based their business success at least partly 

tive government contracts. For example, the Bimantara Citr

run by Suharto’s second son, Bambang Trihatmojo, starte

selling allocations of imported oil to Pertamina (the State 

Natural Gas Mining Company, sometimes translated as 

Company). Around 1990, the business groups of Suharto’s 

were among the foremost non-Chinese conglomerates in Ind

Examples from two vital industries illustrate the symbi

tionship between government and business in Indonesia. 

Suharto’s long-time personal friend Liem Sioe Liong, found

Salim Group, agreed to invest US$800 million to expand th

tions of a government-owned company, Krakatau Steel, in 

Banten Province, by adding production of cold-rolled sheet 

return, a company partly owned by Liem received a mon

imports of cold-rolled steel. Once domestic production wa

way, Liem’s imports were restricted to ensure demand for th

tau product. In a similar way, imports of plastic raw mater

monopolized through a government license issued to Panca 

which had two Suharto sons, Bambang Trihatmojo and S

joyudanto, on its board of directors. In each case, the pri

important commodity for Indonesian users—either steel pro

plastics—was artificially and significantly raised. 

Oil prices fell from US$25 to US$13 per barrel in 198

resulted in a 5-percent decline in national income. Sudden

was a great need to promote non-oil exports. Meanwhile, di

tion had been growing over the Suharto administration’s t

industrial policies; in particular, local chambers of comm

industry voiced criticism of the “high-cost” economy. Some 

had been in preparation before 1986, but without provis

would directly affect trade restrictions. Major trade dere

began in 1986 but left the main import monopolies untouc

1988. This very gradual approach to reform became charact

the later years of the Suharto regime. The first sector to ex

reform in the 1980s was finance and banking. 

Financial Reform 

The Suharto administration inherited a system dominated 

state banks in which private banking had virtually ceased 

The New Order government immediately revived the lega

tion for commercial banking, and by 1983 Indonesia had 8

banks, including 11 foreign or joint-venture institutions. N

less, the banking sector remained highly regulated until 

1980s, when the technocrats spearheaded a return to m
 

 

 

development. Their sweeping reforms were aimed at transfo

Indonesia’s financial sector into a competitive source of credit a

ket-determined interest rates, with a much greater role for p

banks and a growing stock exchange. By the 1990s, critics 

plained that deregulation had gone too far, introducing excessiv

So-called liquidity credits extended by Bank Indonesia at 

low interest rates subsidized state bank lending during the 198

1983 such credits represented more than half of all state bank 

ing, which in turn made up three-quarters of all bank lendi

Indonesia. Lending by private commercial banks had been sev

curtailed, even though such institutions offered better servic

competitive interest rates on deposits. In addition, Bank Indo

imposed credit quotas on all banks, ostensibly to reduce inflati

pressures. In June 1983, credit quotas were lifted, and state 

began to offer market-determined interest rates on deposits. I

tant restrictions remained, however, and by 1988 state bank

accounted for almost 70 percent of total bank credit, with liq

credits still constituting one-third of total state bank credit. In 

ber 1988, further financial deregulation eliminated the rema

restrictions on bank competition. 

The number of banks increased as limitations on licenses lift

1990 there were 103 private banks, including 12 new foreign 

venture banks. The expansion accelerated in the early and 

1990s, and by 1997 Indonesia counted 237 banks, more than J

These institutions included 203 private commercial banks, 

which were foreign or joint-venture banks and 34 state b

including 27 that were run by provincial governments. 

Two spectacular bank scandals demonstrated that profess

uncorrupted regulation and oversight were sorely needed. In 

Bank Duta, Indonesia’s second-largest private bank, had to be 

out after losing more than US$400 million in foreign-exchange 

ings. Bank Indonesia organized a rescue operation with the m

raised from the shareholders of Bank Duta, including several fo

tions chaired by Suharto. In late 1992, Bank Summa found itse

similar predicament, but the government did not come to the r

possibly because of the honorable public image of the bank’s o

William Suryajaya (Tjia Kian Liong), founder of Astra Internat

who had consistently declined to enter into dubious deals with 

ernment agencies. Liquidation of assets for the recovery of los

Bank Summa in fact paved the way for a takeover of Astra In

tional by a group of Suharto cronies, including Liem Sioe Liong

A few idiosyncrasies of Indonesian banking deserve special 

tion. One is the option for banks to offer deposits denominated 

eign currency, usually U.S. dollars. This gave rise to the so-

170 
 

Rush-hour traffic i

Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, Washin

Jakarta dollar market, and in 1990 Bank Indonesia determin

bank’s net foreign position (the difference between foreign a

foreign liabilities) could correspond to as much as 25 perce

bank’s total outstanding capital. Also characteristic was the c

between banks and conglomerates. Prior to the reforms of 

was often the case that a private bank was virtually the finan

of a large conglomerate and only lent money to firms conne

the bank’s owners. The reforms constrained such loans, altho

remained difficult to control. In addition, starting in 1990 the 

ment requested that banks lend 20 percent of their loan por

small businesses. This policy reflected a growing concern 

public might perceive the benefits of economic growth as 

only to the well-connected, wealthy few. 

The Jakarta Stock Exchange, which operated for several 

a small and ineffective institution, experienced a spectacula

sion once various restrictions were lifted in the 1980s. The 

of listed firms rose from 24 in 1988 to 125 in 1991, and mar

talization (total market value of issued stocks) climbed abo

billion (about US$6.2 million). Although market capitaliza

responded to less than 15 percent of total bank credit to 

firms, the stock market promised to become an important s

finance. However, the early 1990s saw extreme swings 

euphoric expansion and virtual collapse, and at one point 

one stock brokerage firm was even charged with swindli
 

brokers by issuing bad checks. The Jakarta Stock Exchange s

into a more stable existence in the mid-1990s as the public an

kers grew more familiar with procedures. (The Jakarta 

Exchange merged with the Surabaya Stock Exchange in 20

form the new Indonesia Stock Exchange.) 

Deregulation and liberalization of the financial sector led 

very rapid enlargement of credit in Indonesia. Total outsta

credit by 1997 reached Rp306 trillion (US$105 billion), 80 p

of which was denominated in rupiah. Interest rates at domestic 

remained high, at around 15 to 16 percent on deposits, which 

borrowing from foreign banks all the more attractive. 

Industrial and Trade Reform 

Indonesia’s industrialization during the 1970s and 1980s occ

with many trade restrictions and government regulations that 

private businesses hostage to government approval or protectio

a consequence, almost all of Indonesia’s industrial productio

sold in the domestic market, leaving exports to be dominated 

and agricultural products. Trade policy reforms in the mid-

proved successful in promoting the growth of new export indu

but the large conglomerates were in the best position to benefit 

the more competitive business environment. The uneven distrib

of gains from economic growth caused mounting popular di

faction by the mid-1990s. 

The Indonesian government favored a strategy of import-sub

tion industrialization that did not expose domestic manufactur

competition in world markets (see Industry, this ch.). This str

was supported by a great variety of barriers to imports: almost 

nontariff restrictions and tariffs ranging up to 200 percent o

value of imported goods. Inefficiencies plagued the import-sub

tion approach, and it offered generous opportunities for corru

Case studies of import substitution in manufacturing showed 

generated only 25 percent of the jobs export-oriented produ

would have provided. 

The government initiated trade reforms in May 1986, when 

refunds compensated for tariffs paid on goods imported by dom

producers that exported a substantial share of their output. A 

trade reform in November 1988 began the dismantling of the e

rate nontariff barriers and the simplification and reduction of t

The reforms reduced the share of domestic manufacturing pro

by nontariff barriers from 50 percent in 1986 to 35 percent in 

By 1990, some 60 percent of nontariff barriers had been abol

and import tariffs had a maximum rate of 40 percent. 

172 
 

There were important exceptions to the credo of economi

ism that accompanied the series of deregulation packages in

between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Strict governmen

remained in key sectors, notably natural-resource exploitati

nology, and the sensitive area of pribumi entrepreneurship. 

The exploitation of oil and natural gas (marketed in the 

liquefied natural gas, or LNG) remained tightly controlle

government through contractual agreements between Pertam

foreign oil companies (see Petroleum and Natural Gas, thi

the early 1980s, restrictions also increasingly restricted the 

industry, culminating in a total ban on log exports in 19

strategy, aimed at fostering a domestic plywood and sawm

try, proved successful and was later extended to exports of s

ber in order to bolster wood furniture manufacturing. 

Ten state-owned enterprises entrusted with the strategi

raising the level of Indonesia’s technological sophisticati

fited from special protection. They included Krakatau Stee

embryonic Archipelago Aircraft Industry (IPTN) and were u

direct supervision of the powerful minister of research and 

ogy, Habibie, a talented aircraft engineer. The strategic i

enjoyed extrabudgetary funding and were accountable on

president himself. 

In order to counter resentment of the privileges of the co

ates, President Suharto urged large corporations to divest par

equity to employee-owned cooperatives on credit supplie

employer and also to sponsor smaller pribumi firms that co

as subcontractors. None of these actions were legally mand

Suharto made it clear to the Chinese Indonesian tycoons 

expected them to comply if they were to continue getting 

access to lucrative government contracts. A survey of the 

family’s corporate wealth, published in the Hong Kong–b

Eastern Economic Review in 1992, demonstrated that publi

ment of the ruling elite was growing, although government 

and businessmen still declined to voice criticism openly. 

Corruption scandals involving members of the Suharto fam

erated in the mid-1990s, and there were frequent public ou

indignation. Some of the most notorious cases concerned the p

youngest son, Tommy Suharto (Hutomo Mandala Putra). In bla

tradiction of the prevailing general policies of deregulation

granted monopoly rights to purchase and distribute cloves n

Indonesia’s cigarette industry, and before long his agency obtai

credits from state banks, despite outstanding debts to Bank I

Even more infamous was his involvement with the national car 
 

 

set up as a joint venture with the automobile manufacturer Kia 

Republic of Korea (South Korea). In 1996 Tommy Suharto’s com

National Son Timor (TPN), was exempted from payment of impo

iffs when importing South Korean–made sedans that were subseq

marketed as a domestic product called the Timor. Because of th

grant violation of its own trade legislation, the Indonesian gover

was brought before the World Trade Organization (WTO—see 

sary) by Japanese, U.S., and European car manufacturers operat

Indonesia. The Indonesian government predictably lost the case, a

to the considerable damage already done to its prestige, both in

tionally and at home. 

In The East Asian Miracle, a well-known analysis of spect

economic success in East Asia published in 1993, the World 

classified Indonesia as a “high-performing Asian economy,” 

with Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Ta

and Thailand. Indonesia’s GDP growth had indeed been impre

averaging 5.5 percent annually during the preceding decade (

93). A growth acceleration occurred in the mid-1990s, wit

annual average approaching 8 percent over the years 199

Exports grew by 8 percent per year, and growth figures were h

still in finance, construction, utilities, and various branches of m

facturing. As late as May 1997, only a few months before the 

financial crisis spread to Indonesia, the World Bank, in its a

assessment, expressed confidence in the growth prospects and 

roeconomic fundamentals of the Indonesian economy. 

Crisis Management 

No one foresaw that when Bank Indonesia floated the rupi

August 14, 1997, this would be the starting point of a severe 

cial crisis with profound social and political ramifications

downward adjustment in the value of the currency turned into 

fall of the exchange rate, a near collapse of the stock market, 

sive capital flight, an abrupt end to growth in almost all sect

the economy, mass layoffs, galloping inflation, and a rapidly in

ing incidence of poverty. In May 1998, riots and political uph

culminated in the downfall of Suharto. The key issues surrou

the financial crisis that struck Indonesia relate to the reasons w

crisis became so severe and the ways in which crisis manag

was executed. 

There is general agreement among scholars that high ra

growth and apparently healthy macroeconomic indicators, not

balanced budget and moderate rates of inflation, masked stru

weaknesses that made Indonesia highly vulnerable to a financi

174 
The headquarters of Bank Indonesia

Courtesy 

sis imported from abroad. Such weaknesses included rapidly 

ing private debt, a quasi-fixed exchange rate despite large in

mobile short-run capital, a poorly supervised banking system 

much room for reckless lending and widespread collusion, 

ruption in the allocation of government contracts. Private 

debt grew from US$7.5 billion in 1991 to nearly US$58 b

1997, an almost eightfold increase. Much of this debt was sh

and lacked hedging in the form of safeguards against fluctu

the exchange rate. Banks and conglomerates tacitly assumed 

government would step in and bail them out if they were u

meet their foreign obligations. Such behavior, commonly reg

constituting a “moral hazard,” was a characteristic featur

Asian crisis in general, but in the case of Indonesia it w

strongly linked than elsewhere to the political economy, in p

the nexus between private economic interests and the apex 

cal power. Corruption and poor governance did not cause t

cial crisis in Indonesia, but these factors did make the crisis w

Predicaments in the financial sector became acute becau

run loans from foreign creditors had to be repaid in internati

rency, whereas revenues were generated from long-run in

and denominated in domestic currency. The sharp depreciati

rupiah led to an instant increase in the number of nonpe

loans. The government had little choice but to turn to the 

assistance. From late October 1997 until December 200

management and postcrisis recovery policies were determin

interplay between the IMF and the Indonesian government. 
 

The rescue package envisaged a huge standby assistance fu

US$38 billion, at the time the largest sum of this kind ever offer

the IMF to an individual nation, with disbursement conditional 

implementation of specific reforms. The IMF concluded no 

than four consecutive agreements with Indonesia, on Octob

1997, and January 15, April 10, and July 29, 1998. The agree

required the establishment of facilities for bank and debt restr

ing, prudence in fiscal and monetary policies, and the purs

deregulation with greater vigor than in the past. However, actio

lowing the first IMF agreement backfired as the closure of 16 

banks triggered large-scale capital flight that put the rupiah 

even greater strain than before. Doubts arose about Suharto’s 

mitment to reform, especially after one of the shuttered institu

Bank Andromeda, owned by his second son, Bambang Trihat

reopened under a new name. It took a telephone call from U.S. 

dent William J. Clinton in January 1998 to persuade Suharto to 

second agreement with the IMF, which more forcefully comm

the Indonesian government to reform and, in particular, did 

with monopoly privileges such as those enjoyed by Tommy Suh

national car project and B. J. Habibie’s aircraft company. The 

also permitted the government to run a deficit, corresponding 

percent of GDP, to allow for aid to the large numbers of peopl

struck by poverty. 

Lack of cooperation on the part of the central authorities c

ued into the first half of 1998, Indonesia’s worst year of econ

crisis, when GDP contracted by an unprecedented 13.7 pe

more than during the entire depression of the 1930s. Suharto’s 

tion of Habibie as vice president, and the appointment of 

known cronies and his own daughter as cabinet ministers, e

confidence in the long-serving president’s ability to deliver In

sia from crisis. The IMF grew alarmed by Suharto’s toying wi

idea of a currency board that would operate on the basis of a 

rate of exchange. This arrangement would have been in direct 

tion of the reform agreements, but the rumor was that it would 

the Suharto family to get assets out of the country without s

damage to their value. 

The third IMF agreement (April 10, 1998) reiterated the co

ments made in the two previous agreements but raised the perm

deficit on the budget to 3.5 percent of GDP and pressed ane

determined action by the Indonesian government. By that time

Suharto’s most ardent supporters were realizing that the aging 

dent was part of the problem rather than the means for its solution

fourth and final IMF agreement (July 29, 1998) followed Hab

176 
installation as Suharto’s successor. The extreme increase in 

necessitated a far larger budget deficit; in fiscal year (FY—

sary) 1999, it would correspond to 8.5 percent of GDP and 

financed with a loan provided by an international aid consor

Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI—see Glossary; see 

ment Finance, this ch.). 

Precious time was lost between the onset of the financial 

August 1997 and the fourth IMF agreement in July 1998. T

reason was the Suharto administration's inability to confron

damental problems of the crisis. This delay understandabl

serious doubts on the part of the IMF, which deferred disburs

the pledged assistance. By July 1998, only a small proporti

huge rescue package had actually been paid out. Cooperation 

IMF improved significantly under President Habibie and 

immediate successors, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawa

noputri. Two key members of the Megawati cabinet, Mi

Finance Budiono and Coordinating Minister for the Econom

jatun Kuncoro-Yakti, were both Western-trained and highly 

sive to IMF recommendations. The IMF also displayed an in

sensitivity to the demands of the specific crisis in Indonesia

by abandoning the priority of a balanced budget in fiscal p

by recognizing the need for social safety-net programs to pr

most vulnerable groups in society from the effects of the cris

Postcrisis Reform 

The most pressing problems of structural reform in the wa

financial crisis fell to two newly established institutions, the 

sian Bank Restructuring Agency (BPPN, also IBRA) and the 

sian Debt Restructuring Agency (Indra), established in Jan

July 1998, respectively. The BPPN had the task of taking ov

of bankrupt banks and arranging recapitalization of ailing ban

focused on corporate debts but was superseded by another ag

so-called Jakarta Initiative, set up jointly by the governmen

World Bank in September 1998, which smoothed debt s

through bilateral negotiations and debt–equity swapping. As 

the government acquired substantial holdings of assets that w

sold off gradually so as to retroactively finance the debt set

Privatization became a key strategy of economic policy. 

The BPPN took over 10 private banks in 1998 and 199

down another 66, and merged four troubled state banks into 

institution, Bank Mandiri, which became the single largest 

Indonesia. In May 1999, the total cost of bailing out and re

ing troubled banks was estimated at Rp406 trillion (US$51.4 
 

 

By 2002 the total amount needed for bailout and recapitalizatio

reached Rp660 trillion (US$70.8 billion). The country then ha

banks remaining, 93 of which were scheduled for restruct

including 31 state-owned, 57 joint ventures, and 5 privately o

Progress was slow, however, especially in terms of divestin

assets that had been taken over from these institutions. By the 

the BPPN was dissolved in February 2004, it had recovered 2

cent of the nominal value of loans it had taken over but had bee

to return only 25 percent of the value of the bonds the gover

had issued to pay the banks’ creditors. Remaining assets, carry

book value of US$8.3 billion, came directly under the auspices 

Department of Finance. Assessments of BPPN’s performance p

out that it would have been unrealistic to expect the agency 

more for assets that had been grossly overvalued in the first pla

Bank and debt restructuring in the period from 1998 to 200

fered from two problems beyond the strict confines of financial 

and management. One problem was in the legal sphere and conc

bankruptcy. A 1998 bankruptcy law finally replaced one dating 

Dutch colonial times, but it still proved very difficult to get deb

den firms declared bankrupt. Creditors won very few cases, in a 

cial system widely known to be rife with corruption. The 

problem concerned the divestment of seized corporate assets. 

assets were sold off, there was a real risk that the BPPN would 

across former owners trying to buy back their assets at low p

possibly under other names. Whenever foreign buyers were inv

political opposition was likely in the legislature or through pr

groups. In 2001 nationalist opposition in Sumatera Barat Pro

successfully blocked the sale of a majority equity share in a 

owned cement factory to the Mexican cement giant CEMEX 

merly Cementos Mexicanos). Eventually, CEMEX bought 25 p

of the shares, but it expressed a wish to pull out in 2006. 

Good governance became a top priority of postcrisis reform

recent administrations have, in varying degrees, pledged to c

corruption and enhance democracy and the transparency of go

ment affairs. One of the most sweeping reforms entailed a far-rea

delegation of authority to subnational levels of governmen

Decentralization, this ch.). Although implementation was quic

complete, with maximum involvement of democratic institution

cess was limited, largely because of great variation in the capac

local governments to exercise their authority in taxation and fisca

icy. Even though he supported democratic reforms, including arr

ment of Indonesia’s first fully free general elections since 

Habibie enjoyed little credibility, as he himself was the produc

178 
corrupt and despised system. A scandal in September 1999 i

secret money transfers from the private Bank Bali to the ruling 

party erased any remaining faith in Habibie’s commitment to 

reform. 

Elected to the presidency by the People’s Consultative A

(MPR) in October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid initially prof

much goodwill both at home and abroad, but this support 

as a result of his erratic style of government and lack of 

accomplishments (see The Political Process, ch. 4). Direct 

trative intervention by the president frequently had un

results. For example, in April 2000 Wahid dismissed La

Sukardi as minister for investment and state enterprises deve

without offering any clear explanation. Sukardi had an un

image of integrity and was in fact the first cabinet-level m

expose the way Suharto had abused his power in order to giv

icant favors to his business associates. Shortly afterward, W

had the governor of Bank Indonesia, Syahril Sabirin, plac

detention out of displeasure with the central bank’s ind

action. Wahid’s successor, his vice president, Megawati Su

tri, had the good fortune of being surrounded by some very 

economic advisers. During her presidency, economic recov

ceeded reasonably smoothly, but strikingly little was ach

combating corruption, including that in the judicial system. 

Two institutions in particular had a mandate to combat co

the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the C

Crimes Court (Tipikor), both established in 2002 on the rec

dation of the IMF. After a relatively slow start, they beca

active in 2005. In that year alone, 450 corruption cases we

cuted, compared with only about 200 during the three years 

wati’s presidency (2001–4). This increase seemed to reflect a 

commitment on the part of Megawati’s successor, Susilo B

Yudhoyono (known colloquially by his initials, SBY), to w

corrupt practices from public administration in Indonesia

cantly, by early 2006 Yudhoyono had allowed corruption c

be levied against 52 high-ranking government officials at th

cial and district levels, as well as against seven governors, n

ors, and 36 district heads. 

The Yudhoyono administration also sought to improve th

ment climate in Indonesia by presenting a reform package i

ary 2006 that included a new investment law, tax in

facilities for training personnel, and financial aid to small-sc

ness enterprises. The reform package also proposed the e

ment of eight new special economic zones for export produ
 

 

mid-decade, economic reform policies pursued by the Indon

government seemed to have a new momentum. By 2008, how

there was again mounting disappointment with the slow pa

reform, especially in local governments, state-owned enterp

and some central government departments. 

Government Finance 

Central Government Budget 

Five-year development plans (Repelita—see Glossary) we

important tool in economic planning beginning in the 1960s. 

plans offered broad guidelines and set general priorities. The em

sis was on rehabilitation in Repelita I (1969–73), but it then shif

increasing productivity in agriculture and improving infrastruct

particular during the 1970s. After the drop in oil prices in the 

and mid-1980s, consecutive Repelitas stressed industrializatio

export promotion. By the time of Repelita V (1989–93), the 

objectives included continued export diversification and reduce

ance on foreign aid. The 1980s and early 1990s also saw incre

attention given to social development issues, such as educ

health, and family planning. Repelita VI (1994–98) stresse

expansion of manufacturing and set growth targets that were 

taken by actual developments on the eve of the 1997–98 financi

sis. The government abandoned conventional Repelitas in the w

the crisis and thereafter replaced them with national medium

development plans (NMDPs), also set out in five-year increm

The main objectives of the 2004–9 NMDP included a sharp red

in poverty and registered unemployment and an average annual r

growth of 6.6 percent. 

The Repelitas served as general indicators of the direction o

ernment policy rather than concrete priorities (the latter being 

vided by the annual budget of the central government). Indo

traditionally had a fiscal year that ran from April 1 to March 31

the national government’s draft budget for a particular year u

submitted to the People’s Representative Council (DPR) in Ja

only months before the budget was to become effective (see Le

tive Bodies, ch. 4). Beginning in 2000, the fiscal year coincided 

the calendar year, with the budget now sent to the DPR at mid

As a consequence, the budget for 2000 covered only nine m

Public spending historically was divided into two broad categ

routine and development expenditures. Routine expenditures inc

the salaries of civil servants and most spending on materials, o

tions, and maintenance, whereas development expenditures con

180 
 

of project-related spending in areas such as investment, rese

training. Over time, however, the line dividing the two c

became somewhat arbitrary in practice. Starting with the 

budget, the distinction between routine and development exp

was abandoned entirely and replaced by a classification sy

ommended by the IMF that differentiated more carefully betw

rent and capital outlays and among levels of government 

The distinction between spending by the central government 

by regional governments has become ever more important 

decentralization reforms that followed the collapse of the Ne

government. 

Since the 1980s, the total government budget has been rath

about or slightly less than 20 percent of GDP. In 2003 total go

expenditures amounted to Rp371 trillion (US$43.2 billion)

percent of GDP, against a total revenue of Rp336 trillion (US$

lion), or 17.3 percent of GDP. The resulting deficit correspond

percent of GDP. The 2009 budget envisaged government re

21.2 percent of GDP and government expenditure at 23.4 p

GDP. Deficit spending has been the exception rather than th

Indonesian government finance since the late 1960s. Fiscal 

and rapid economic growth resulted in balanced budgets th

the 1980s and early and mid-1990s. Even the initial draft budg

crisis year 1998–99, prepared in mid-1997, included projec

small surplus, which proved entirely unrealistic. Combating c

staging economic recovery necessitated deficit spending by th

government starting in 1998. The budget deficit rose to 6.8 p

GDP in FY 1999 (12 months) and was 5 percent of GDP in 

(nine months). It then fell gradually, reaching 2.5 percent in 

and creeping below 1 percent in FY 2005 and FY 2006. The b

FY 2008 displayed a deficit of Rp73 trillion (US$8.1 billio

sponding to 1.7 percent of GDP, whereas the one agreed for 

showed a slightly higher deficit at 2.2 percent of GDP. 

A bottleneck in central government finance in Indones

because of the heavy reliance on sources of revenue based 

and gas sector. Taxes paid by foreign oil companies burgeone

the oil boom of the 1970s, raising oil’s contribution to total go

revenue from one-third in 1974 to more than two-thirds by 19

in the early 1980s, at least half of government income came 

related taxes. A major tax reform in 1984 introduced a value-a

(VAT) on consumer goods and a moderately progressive inc

Although 85 percent of households did not earn enough to be 

the income tax, the contribution of non-oil tax revenue did inc

nificantly, climbing from less than Rp10 trillion (about US$
annually in the mid-1980s to almost Rp60 trillion (about US$2

lion) by the mid-1990s. As a consequence, revenues from oil an

dropped to 20 percent of total domestic revenue, but the dow

trend was reversed by the steep decline in incomes during the 

financial crisis. The contribution of oil and gas revenues again r

about 30 percent of total government revenue and oscillated a

that level in the years immediately following the turn of the ce

even rising somewhat as a result of high oil prices on the world m

in 2005 and 2006. Oil and gas contributed 20 percent of total go

ment revenue in the agreed budget for FY 2008. 

The tax-revenue bottleneck has been reflected in a high d

dence on foreign aid and borrowing abroad. Foreign public 

increased sharply in the 1980s, approaching US$50 billion b

decade’s end. In the early 1990s, the government shifted from i

ditional reliance on long-term public debt to allowing more p

and short-run lending. The stock of foreign debt declined from 

80 percent of GDP to less than 60 percent as a result, and 

because of simultaneous rapid economic growth. On the eve of 

in 1997, Indonesia’s public debt amounted to US$58 billion

downward trend was reversed by the crisis, which saw another 

increase in foreign indebtedness, up to more than 100 perc

GDP. Foreign funding was vital to finance two-thirds of the d

on the FY 1999 (April 1999–March 2000) budget and half 

deficit on the budget for FY 2000 (April–December 2000); the 

nesian government had little choice. Tax revenues were constr

by the real decline in GDP, proceeds from the sale of seized c

rate assets were slow in coming, and it was next to impossible 

expenditures in the midst of a severe economic crisis. Prior 

crisis, routine expenditures usually made up about two-thirds o

public spending, but this proportion rose to 85 percent at the ti

the crisis. The traditional expenditure ratio of roughly two-

routine and one-third development was restored around 2000, b

allocation now needed for debt servicing represented a far h

burden than before. The distribution between routine and dev

ment expenditures stabilized at 75 percent for the former and 2

cent for the latter during the 2002–4 period, preceding the chan

the system of budgetary classification. 

The budget for FY 2002, in part designed by ministers Bu

and Dorojatun of the newly inaugurated Megawati cabinet

serve to illustrate some typical features of public finance in In

sia that held true for the most part in subsequent years. Tax re

was expected to contribute 73 percent of total government in

corresponding to less than 13 percent of GDP, which was lo

182 
 

international standards. Most other government revenue 

jected to derive from the exploitation of oil and nat

resources, an assumption that implied a continued depend

strong world oil prices in government financial planning. 

tures, corresponding to 20 percent of GDP, were divided 

routine and development purposes at a ratio of 78 percent t

cent. The central government assumed responsibility for 72 

and regional governments for 28 percent of total outlays, a 

testifies to the strong start of the decentralization reform

development spending at the central level was set at Rp5

(about US$5.3 billion), about 25 percent of which was de

for education and culture but only 10 percent for health and 

The scope for expenditure on social-development projects r

severely constrained. Interest payments would make up m

25 percent of central government outlays in the FY 2002 

whereas around 12 percent would go to subsidies on consum

particular fuel use. Neither expenditure lent itself to easy r

The interest payments were a legacy of the crisis manageme

late 1990s, which entailed the buildup of a large public debt

subsidies were politically untouchable because no adminis

search of popular support would tamper with a benefit en

large segments of the population. The subsidies on fuel con

were substantially reduced in October 2005 after many ye

the change was motivated—and justified—by the finding 

percent of this entitlement represented a generous handout 

in the top 60 percent of income distribution. Fuel subsidies i

again in early 2009, arguably with an eye to the upcoming p

tial elections. 

Decentralization 

Under Suharto’s administration, Indonesia had one of 

centralized governments among developing nations. Spendi

regional level was highly dependent on transfers of funds 

top level of government through a complex system of dire

from both the routine and development budgets, complem

special allocations made at the direction of the president. On

of the short-lived Habibie administration in the late 1990s 

transformation of this arrangement into its virtual opposite

the most decentralized public-finance systems among th

nations of the world. The basis for this far-reaching reform 

down in two laws promulgated in 1999—Law 22, on regio

ernment, and Law 25, on the financial balance between th

and the regions. Law 22 did away with the hierarchical rel
between the central government and the provinces and rege

The most striking feature of the new system, which took eff

January 2001, is that it granted considerable discretionary aut

in public finance to the regencies and municipalities, which b

time numbered 353. The provincial level was virtually byp

Law 25 enumerates categories of revenue for activities und

direct responsibility of the district government. They include th

trict’s own sources of income through local taxation; so-called 

ization grants, which replaced transfers from Jakarta; and borr

at home and abroad. The equalization grants contain a genera

allocation, a special fund allocation, and provisions for revenue 

ing in the exploitation of natural resources within the borders 

district. This revenue sharing ranges from 15 percent of revenu

oil exploitation and 30 percent for natural gas, up to 80 perce

logging, fisheries, and non-oil, non-gas mining. This provision 

that certain districts located in resource-rich jurisdictions such 

Special Region of Aceh (called Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 

2009) and the provinces of Kalimantan Timur and Papua qu

started to receive substantially more income than previously. 

The decentralization reform enjoyed considerable popular su

from the outset. It was generally regarded as having gotten of

strong start, but the authorities were criticized for proceedin

hastily. Rules for allocating funding preceded a precise definit

tasks under district responsibility, and the distinctions amon

various levels of government remained blurred by liberal use 

term region (daerah) in legislation and official instructions

direct consequence of the reform was the reassignment of 1.9 m

civil servants from the central government to local authorities, 

out these individuals actually having to move physically. The 

fer affected almost 50 percent of all civil servants in Indo

including large numbers of teachers and health-care worker

2005 two out of three civil servants in Indonesia were working 

local government. 

The overall allocation of budgetary expenditures to the centr

local governments stabilized at a ratio of 70 percent to 30 percen

ing the five years immediately following the decentralization re

This division implies that as much as 6 to 7 percent of GDP was 

ally being transferred annually by the central government to be 

by a local authority. Intergovernmental transfers form the chief s

of income for local governments, accounting for an average of 7

cent of disposable funds at the local level. Moreover, bypassin

provincial level of government, in accordance with the 1999 le

tion, led to the expenditure of 75 percent of decentralized re

184 
 

Rambutan fruit selle

Courtesy of Anast

according to the priorities of district administrative heads o

(bupati) in rural regencies and mayors in the municipali

direct link between budget authority and locally elected offi

have a positive impact in terms of enhancing democracy, b

equally well offer enlarged opportunities for corruption. Su

revisions to decentralization legislation restored some aut

provincial governments. 

Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policy 

Bank Indonesia, the nation’s central bank, was founded in 

the successor to the Java Bank, which had been national

years earlier. Bank Indonesia has since then been supervi

monetary board chaired by the minister of finance, which ha

difficult for the central bank to pursue monetary policies 

dently of the current administration. Although this arra

remained unchanged in 2008, legislation in 1999 had strength

position of the governor of Bank Indonesia vis-à-vis the gov

notably by precluding dismissal unless criminal charges we

The bank’s major tasks are regulating the money supply, se
 

 

 

 

exchange-rate policy, and supervising the financial sector. A 

instrument for monetary policy was established in 1984 when 

Indonesia started issuing its own debt in the form of certificates

tifikat Bank Indonesia (SBIs). Because commercial banks have 

encouraged to invest short-term funds in SBIs, Bank Indones

been able to influence the volume of bank reserves by buyin

selling SBIs. Bank Indonesia also has supported the developm

other privately issued short-term debt instruments. A sophist

market in short-term securities has offered banks a tool for more 

ible management of their total assets and has encouraged them t

short-term funds in rupiah rather than in international currency d

its, which had become the practice in the 1970s and early 1

Because the Indonesian government maintained a balanced b

no securities were made available until crisis management req

financing by means of large-scale issuing of government bonds

Very high inflation was a major problem during the final ye

the Sukarno administration, when budget deficits were increa

financed by Bank Indonesia in compliance with instructions fro

monetary board but in flagrant violation of the bank’s own ch

which limited central bank credit to 20 percent of gold and fo

exchange reserves. The Suharto government curbed inflation, r

ing it from about 900 percent in 1966 to 9 percent by 1970. Wh

revenues surged in 1974, the central bank found itself, in es

printing rupiah currency in exchange for oil revenues denomina

U.S. dollars. Bank credit increased precipitously once the cur

was deposited in domestic banks. Inflation shot to more than 4

cent annually, and Bank Indonesia responded by imposing direc

trols on the volume of credit issued by individual banks, a polic

made it harder for private banks to compete with the favored 

banks. By 1978 inflation had come down to less than 10 perce

year, but four years of double-digit increases had seriously u

mined the competitiveness of Indonesia’s exports. 

The liberalization of the financial sector was accompani

measures to contain inflationary pressures, such as imposing 

rates of interest on domestic bank credit. Bank Indonesia also 

vened directly by controlling the availability of SBIs. On two 

sions, in late 1987 and early 1991, the central bank required 

owned corporations to withdraw large sums from their dep

Rp800 billion (about US$486 million) in 1987 and Rp8 t

(about US$4.1 billion) in 1991, to purchase SBIs, which dep

banks of a major source of funds to be used for speculative purp

As a result, inflation in Indonesia continued at an average of 

14 percent per year throughout the 1980s, which was low b

186 
standards of many developing countries but above that of 

Indonesia’s industrialized trading partners. Rapid growth in 

and mid-1990s reintroduced inflationary pressures, but 

monetary policies resulted in a relatively moderate rate of 

averaging 9 percent per year during the 1991–96 period. 

The immediate inflationary impact of the Asian financ

severely eroded purchasing power, bringing whole segmen

economy to a virtual standstill and pushing millions of peo

just above to below the poverty line (see Employment and 

this ch.). Controlling inflation became a top priority during th

quent economic recovery. In 2002 the IMF assumed that 9 t

cent per year would be a manageable rate of inflation. In b

planning for 2001–3, the government projected a lower rat

percent, which was generally sustained despite a spike to 1

in early 2002. By 2004 restrictive monetary policies had red

rate of inflation to 5 percent annually, and in its planning for 

2006 the government chose less-than-ambitious targets in t

of 6 to 8 percent. Actual inflation in 2007 amounted to 6.6 

and, for 2008, the central bank targeted 4 to 6 percent inflati

Bank Indonesia also managed the exchange rate betw

rupiah and foreign currencies, a responsibility that sometim

flicted with its tasks of regulating the volume of bank credi

size of the base money supply. After floating the rupiah from 

1971, Bank Indonesia pegged the exchange rate at Rp415 p

To maintain this exchange rate, the central bank had to buy 

much foreign currency as necessary at the predetermined ra

major devaluations occurred in the following years. Bank I

set new rates of exchange at, respectively, Rp625 per dollar 

Rp970 per dollar in 1983, and Rp1,641 per dollar in 1986. T

objective was to address the eroding competitiveness of 

exports resulting from Indonesia’s rate of inflation being hig

the rate in the home countries of important buyers of In

manufactured products. The exchange-rate strategy bec

important instrument supporting the industrialization p

reduce dependence on oil and natural gas. 

From the late 1980s onward, the rupiah was effectively, if 

cially, pegged to the U.S. dollar in such a way that it was al

depreciate in a smooth but highly predictable manner at a rat

above 5 percent per year. The nominal value of the rupiah f

percent against the dollar, from Rp1,840 per dollar in 1990 to 

per dollar in mid-1997. Then came the financial crisis, and w

urgent need to control the free fall of the rupiah and mit

extreme short-run fluctuations in the exchange rate. By a
with the IMF, Indonesia became committed to a floating exc

rate under which the value of the currency would be deter

exclusively by market forces. This commitment was retained 

after direct involvement by the IMF in Indonesian economic 

came to a conclusion, thus precluding pursuit of an active exch

rate policy by Bank Indonesia. Assumptions underlying the c

government budget during the period of economic recovery in th

years of the twenty-first century stayed within a narrow range

Rp8,600 per dollar in 2004 to Rp9,900 per dollar in 2006. The 

of the currency averaged Rp8,875 per dollar during the period 

4, stabilized at Rp9,250 per dollar in August 2007, but increa

Rp12,000 during the emerging world economic crisis in 2008. 

Market interventions with SBIs served to secure a stable inc

in the base money supply of about 7 percent per year, which 

incidentally, also the target that the IMF had recommended 

wake of the financial crisis. Continuous monetary expansion 

accompanied by an increase in credits made available by com

cial banks. In 2000 total outstanding commercial credit re

Rp720 trillion (US$86 billion), 140 percent above the level of M

1997, and by 2004 it amounted to Rp965 trillion (US$110 bi

The annual increase during the intervening period had been 8.

cent, which may be contrasted with the 26.0 percent increa

banking credit in FY 1996 alone. Stability returned to monetar

exchange-rate developments as soon as the recovery from the 

gained momentum. 

Indonesia in the Global Economy 

The Changing Nature of Trade and Aid 

Indonesia is highly integrated into the global economy

exports are vital to its economic development. By the 1980s, ex

accounted for about 25 percent of GDP, and this proportio

stayed remarkably stable over time. In 2004 total foreign ex

amounted to Rp625,295 trillion (US$71.6 billion), correspond

27 percent of GDP, and in 2007 the total value of exports appro

Rp1,100,000 trillion (US$114 billion), or about 31 percent of 

Expressed in current market prices, export revenues rose thre

between 1980 and 2004. During the next several years, 20

exports increased by an average of 17 percent per year. The 

tional range of exports, consisting almost exclusively of oil, n

gas, and other primary products, has broadened to include man

tured goods. The most vital distinction in the structure of ex

refers to the division between oil and natural gas on the one han

188 
 

all other products on the other. The share of oil and na

reached nearly 80 percent around 1980 but fell to about 50 p

the late 1980s, 32 percent in the early 1990s, and 22 pe

1997. After the 1990s, scarcely more than 20 percent of Ind

export revenues originated from deliveries of oil and natura

The export sector’s traditional reliance on the country’s r

ral resources made the economy vulnerable to the viciss

changing world prices for these products. The need to shift 

factured exports became especially urgent when world oil p

sharply in the mid-1980s. This shift having been successfull

plished, Indonesia now faces increasingly stiff competiti

other low-cost producers of manufactured goods, especiall

Initially, plywood was the most important manufactured e

production having been facilitated by a total ban on log expo

early 1980s. However, by the late 1990s plywood accounted 

10 percent of manufacturing exports, and textiles, in partic

ments, and electrical appliances were both of greater im

whereas paper products, footwear, and chemical goods each 

plywood among manufactured exports. In 2007 the total 

manufactured exports amounted to US$76 billion, with thre

ries of products accounting for 28 percent of this total: text

percent and electrical goods and wood products at 7 and 8 

each. Although manufactured exports have come to domin

nesian deliveries to the world market, the emphasis has rem

labor-intensive production. An estimate from just before the 

financial crisis suggested that only 15 percent of Indonesia

factured exports originated from industries characterized by 

sive use of technology and know-how. Access to local raw 

and cheap labor have remained the main sources of compet

for Indonesian manufactured exports in world markets. 

Steady growth in non-oil exports has helped Indonesia to 

imports, in particular inputs needed for manufacturing produ

exports. During the 1980s and early 1990s, imports increa

rapidly than exports, but this trend reversed radically du

financial crisis as the depreciated Indonesian currency ef

reduced the volume of purchases from abroad. As a result

plus on the commodity balance of trade improved from abou

cent of total export earnings in the first half of the 199

percent in 1999, only to stabilize at a slightly lower level in 

years of the twenty-first century. On the eve of the crisis

consisted of about 71 percent raw materials and intermedia

22 percent capital goods, and only 7 percent consumer goo

pattern has remained unchanged, reflecting an increasing dep
 

for export production on foreign imports as well as far-rea

import substitution. 

The positive trade balance notwithstanding, Indonesia has 

suffered from a deficit on the current account because of incre

service costs and interest payments on outstanding foreign deb

deficit on the current account worsened from scarcely more 

US$1 billion in 1989 to almost US$8 billion in 1996. Driven b

idly declining imports, the huge improvement in the balance of 

during the financial crisis turned the deficit on the current ac

into a surplus. The surplus on the current account grew to US$5

lion in 2000 and stayed at that level until 2003, when outflows 

to increase as a result of economic recovery. One consequence 

crisis for the surplus on the current account was that interna

reserves were not depleted but actually increased between 199

2000. A key factor in the state of Indonesia’s capital account ha

the inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment. 

Export growth has also contributed to Indonesia’s ability to b

from world financial markets and to obtain foreign aid. Publi

grew in particular during the 1980s, whereas private debt exp

dramatically during the 1990s, providing a major cause of the 

cial crisis that struck Indonesia in 1997–98. Increasing fo

indebtedness as a means of combating the crisis and staging an 

nomic recovery implied a heavy burden on the government bud

the early twenty-first century. Successive repayments reduce

total outstanding foreign debt from almost US$150 billion in 20

US$113 billion by 2004. The reduction applied fully to p

indebtedness, whereas the public foreign debt increased from U

billion in 2001 to US$80 billion in 2004. These trends reversed 

2004, as private debt increased by US$35 billion in the face 

decline in public debt to US$69 billion. As a result, Indonesia’

foreign indebtedness amounted to US$137 billion in December 

Multilateral aid to Indonesia has traditionally been an ar

international interest, particularly on the part of the Nether

Indonesia’s former colonial ruler. Starting in 1967, the bulk of 

nesia’s multilateral aid was coordinated by a consortium of fo

governments and international financial organizations, the 

Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI—see Glossary). The 

met annually under Dutch leadership, although aid from the N

lands accounted for an ever-smaller proportion of the total

Netherlands suspended aid to Indonesia following the shootin

the Indonesian army of between 50 and 270 demonstrators in 

Timor Timur Province, in November 1991; in turn, in March 

the Indonesian government said it would henceforth refuse all 

190 
 

aid. The IGGI was replaced by the Consultative Group on I

(CGI), formed on the initiative of the World Bank and ch

Japan, Indonesia’s single largest aid donor. The CGI was in

tal in facilitating international debt restructuring during t

financial crisis. The volume of annual commitments of a

declined gradually from a peak of US$8 billion during the c

stable level of US$3 billion during the period 2002–4. An a

US$5.1 billion for tsunami relief reached Indonesia in 2005 

canos and Earthquakes, ch. 2). 

Principal Trade Relationships 

Indonesia’s trading partners have traditionally included n

countries throughout the world. At the end of the twentieth 

most imports came from just three places: the European Un

26 percent), Japan (18 percent), and the United States (18 

Member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 

(ASEAN—see Glossary) supplied only 10 percent. In the 

first century, China has also emerged as a major supplier o

to Indonesia. The growth in Indonesia’s production of manu

products has contributed to a diversification of export mark

cially in Asia. In 2006 more than 50 percent of all exports 

Asian trading partners, in particular to Japan, the ASEA

China and India, whereas the United States and the EU betw

purchased 27 percent of all Indonesian exports. Oil and lique

ural gas (LNG), however, continued to be supplied to a rathe

number of customers. In the late 1990s, Japan bought one

Indonesia’s oil and two-thirds of its LNG; South Korea and 

also figured prominently among customers for Indonesian L

leading trading partners, China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore

United States, accounted for more than 50 percent of all no

natural gas exports in 2004. The United States and Japan bec

markets as the development of manufacturing export prod

Indonesia gained momentum, while Singapore retained its tr

role as an intermediary in trade with third countries. Rapid 

in non-oil, non-gas exports to China and ASEAN neighbor

Malaysia signified new trends in Indonesian trade. 

Diplomatic relations with China were reestablished in 1

exports to that country doubled over the next six years (see R

with East Asia, ch. 4). Bilateral trade declined during the 199

sis but recovered by 2000. Indonesian imports from China i

by more than 60 percent in the year 2000 alone, reflecting a 

among Indonesian importers to replace expensive imports fro

with cheaper goods from China. Bilateral trade experience
 

expansion starting in 2002, and already by 2005 the value of In

sian exports to China was 150 percent above the 1997 leve

expansion of Indonesian imports from China was even more sp

ular. In 2005 their level was almost four times that of 1997. Th

from a trading relationship based on Indonesian exports to one 

on Indonesian imports in bilateral trade with China testified 

dynamic nature of international commerce in the region. 

ASEAN was founded in 1967 to promote regional stability

nomic development, and cultural exchange in Southeast Asia. It

inal members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sing

and Thailand; starting in the mid-1980s, Brunei, Burma (Myan

Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam also joined. Not until the late 197

the ASEAN states give serious attention to matters of economic 

gration, such as the establishment of joint industrial projects. In 

ary 1993, preparations began for an ASEAN Free Trade 

(AFTA). Originally scheduled for 2008, implementation was m

forward to 2002, and by 2006 most import tariffs in intra-AS

trade were 2 percent or less. Intra-ASEAN exports doubled be

2002 and 2006, rising from US$ 9.9 billion to US$ 18.5 billion

priority areas were designated for further rapid expansion: electr

agro-processing, rubber-based products, and transport vehicles, 

which were important branches of manufacturing for Indones

2003 Bank Indonesia predicted that full implementation of A

would increase competition and reduce prices in the domestic m

while offering new opportunities for Indonesian exporters. C

dence in the growth potential of both large and small enterprise

also voiced in 2006 by then ASEAN secretary general Ong 

Yong. The association’s stated ultimate goal is to establish an AS

Economic Community by 2015. 

Employment and Income 

The world’s fourth most populous nation, Indonesia had an 

mated 240.3 million inhabitants in 2009, 60 percent of whom 

in Java, 21 percent in Sumatra, and another 12 percent in Kalim

and Sulawesi taken together. The increase in population over th

ceding 18 years alone amounted to almost 50 million peop

least 60 percent of all persons 15 years of age and older were 

fully employed. The labor force grew from 75 million in 1988 

million in 1993 and 106 million in 2006, or 117 million when in

ing those who were economically active but not at work. The 

growth reflected both the increase in the working-age popul

estimated at 2.7 percent per year, and an increasing rate of econ

participation by women. It has been a major challenge for the 

192 
 

nesian economy to offer employment to such large number

ple entering the labor market each year. 

Structural change in the Indonesian economy has had fun

repercussions for employment patterns and especially the 

tion of national income. In 1985 agriculture contributed onl

cent of GDP but provided employment for 53 percent of 

force. In addition to the agricultural employment in the 1980

cent of the labor force worked in manufacturing, 18 percen

ing, 14 percent in finance and other services, and 4 pe

construction. A milestone was reached around 1990 when 

ture’s share of employment fell below 50 percent, and Indon

no longer a predominantly agrarian economy. Further expa

employment outside agriculture, particularly in services, red

agricultural proportion of the labor force to 43 percent by 19

ernization of employment patterns came to a halt in the wa

1997–98 financial crisis; for instance, the share of the wor

agriculture was 44 percent in 2005, up a point from 1997. T

been a tendency for the labor force in the primary sector, co

agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, to increase somewhat in 

terms at the expense of manufacturing and services. The int

of the trend toward restructuring of the economy away from 

tional predominance of the primary sector in employment p

one of the most serious consequences of the financial crisis. 

In a developing country such as Indonesia, official open u

ment is a statistic with much less meaning than in an industrial 

Registration as being unemployed carries no benefits, and thos

from jobs in the formal sector are likely to work fewer hours o

some kind of pursuit in the informal sector. Open unemploym

registered at only 3 percent of the labor force around 1990, but t

ignored much underemployment. Official unemployment incre

marginally even during the worst year of the financial crisis, 

percent in 1997 to 5.5 percent in 1998. Supplementary data offe

ent impression. During the first crisis year alone, the number o

declined 15 percent in medium-sized and large manufacturi

prises and 20 percent in small manufacturing firms and cotta

tries. More than 300,000 workers in the textiles and garment ind

already lost their jobs by March 1998. The International Labou

zation (ILO) estimated conservatively that 7 percent of the In

labor force would be out of work by the end of 1998. The inform

in rural areas had to absorb more than 3 million workers who 

laid off in the cities. 

In 2001 the Central Statistical Office (BPS) tried to obtain 

representation of actual unemployment by applying a wider d
that included discouraged workers. As a result, the official unem

ment figures, 5.8 percent in 2000 and 6.5 percent in 2004, were ad

upward to 8.1 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively. The rate of u

ployment stayed at a stubbornly high level after the initial rec

from the financial crisis, and in late 2004 the newly installed ad

tration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono pledged to reduce officia

unemployment by half by 2009. However, in 2007 officially regi

unemployment was still as high as 9.1 percent. 

The introduction of minimum-wage legislation in 1992 app

contradictory to the prevailing mode of deregulation at the time

Indonesian government took this measure partly in response to 

cism from the ILO and the American Federation of Labor abou

working conditions in Indonesian manufacturing. Implementat

this policy led to considerable regional differences in nominal 

wage rates, which ranged in 1995 from Rp3,100 (about US$1.

Sulawesi Selatan Province to Rp4,600 (about US$2.04) in Jawa 

Province. Real wage rates, after correction for inflation, increas

more than 200 percent in Jawa Barat and Jawa Tengah provinc

by less than 100 percent in the capital, Jakarta, and in Sumatera 

Province. Earnings outside the industrial sector were typically 

with the exception of services such as finance and banking. 

The financial crisis, with its concomitant rapid inflation, bro

sharp dip in real minimum wages in 1998 and 1999; only in 200

the pre-crisis level of the real minimum-wage rate restored. Ye

was the outcome of political and administrative change rather 

sign of economic recovery. The decentralization reform that be

effective in January 2001 vested the power to set minimum-wage 

with provincial authorities, which caused an immediate increase 

minimum-wage rate in many provinces. Jakarta led the way w

wage hike of 38 percent, followed by adjacent districts in Jawa 

Province. Other centers of labor-intensive manufacturing industr

ited increases to 20 percent. After 2001 real minimum-wage rate

continued to rise, but the pace of increase remained smooth and 

erate. In 2004 the highest nominal wages were paid in the g

Jakarta metropolitan area—then known as Jabotabek (for the 

adjacent population centers of Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Be

now known as Jabodetabek to include Depok—where rates we

average 72 percent higher than in the city of Surabaya in Jawa 

Province, or 144 percent higher than in the Special Region of Y

karta in central Java. Workers in non-oil mining were likely to 

three times as much as employees in highly labor-intensive lin

manufacturing production such as textiles. 

194 
Chili vendors, Karambosan market, Sulawesi Utara 

Courtesy Anast

Effective enforcement of minimum-wage rates was diffic

the start. Attempts by employers to circumvent the legisla

already become a frequent cause of labor unrest in the m

The problem of enforcement survived the collapse of the 

regime. Statistics for 2000 show that only 43 percent of 

employees actually received more than the minimum wage. T

was especially bad for female workers, 75 percent of whom 

less than the minimum wage. Rural workers were also disadv
 

and wages in manufacturing were found to be seriously la

behind those in the services sector. 

Labor unrest increased significantly in the 1990s, although ther

only one officially sanctioned trade organization, the All-Indo

Workers’ Union (SPSI), which was converted in 1995 into th

Indonesian Workers’ Union Federation (FSPSI). Activism wa

thered by the rise of two rival independent unions. One, the Indo

Prosperous Workers’ Union (SBSI), was founded in 1992 and r

Muchtar Pakpahan, who was exceptionally outspoken in his cri

of the government. Confrontations between the Suharto administ

and the SBSI culminated in a rising number of strikes during the 

1990s, and the imprisonment of Pakpahan. Frequent violent s

accompanied the financial crisis and other events leading up 

change of government during 1997–98. Labor unrest subsided 

what in 1999 but flared up again in 2000. That year there wer

major strikes—compared with 125 in 1999—involving more 

60,000 workers. Demands for higher wages were the main reas

trade-union action, but other grievances, such as dismissals, m

food provisions, the cost of transportation, and failure to pa

accrued social-security benefits, were other causes. Most strikes 

in the labor-intensive branches of manufacturing. Trade unionism 

in the more liberal political climate prevailing immediately after t

of the Suharto regime. In 2001 some 36 trade unions were operat

a national level, but many more restricted themselves to indi

regions or even districts. Several unions, including the SBS

FSPSI, maintained close links with political parties, which ha

mushroomed in the wake of reformism after 1998. Some trade u

expressed a strong Muslim identity. These developments signi

belated ideological awakening within organized labor in Indonesi

Observers saw an impressive increase in per-capita incom

Indonesia up to 1997. The nominal average income increase

percent between 1991 and 1996. But the financial crisis had a s

impact on incomes, reducing the real per-capita level 13 p

between 1997 and 1999 alone, and it was well into the first ye

the twenty-first century before Indonesians’ per-capita GDP ret

to the 1997 level. However, doubts have frequently been voiced 

the unequal distribution of income, especially in light of the co

uous consumption by wealthy Chinese Indonesians and memb

the Suharto family. Studies have shown the Gini coefficient, 

measures the degree of inequality in income distribution, to 

remained stubbornly constant over time. The coefficient fell sl

during the first two decades of the Suharto era, from 0.35 in the 

1960s to 0.32 in the late 1980s, but rose to 0.34 in the mid-1990

196 
 

 

 

0.37 during the financial crisis. Indonesia’s long-run stabili

Gini index (see Glossary) may be interpreted both as an ach

by government policies, in the sense that inequality did not g

and as a failure, in the sense that rapid growth should have re

relatively more gains accruing to low-income groups rather 

taining existing discrepancies in income levels. 

Reduction of poverty was invariably listed as one of t

achievements of the Suharto government. The BPS defined a

poverty line on the basis of the expenditure needed to mainta

intake of 2,100 calories and to meet other basic needs. The p

of Indonesians living below that line declined from 40 percen

to 17 percent in 1987 and to 11 percent by 1996. However, i

noted that the official criteria were set at far lower levels than 

boring countries in Southeast Asia, and that considerable reg

ferences were concealed by the nationwide averages. The inc

poverty was higher in rural areas than in cities, and the 11 per

istered as poor in 1996 corresponded to more than 22 millio

The full onslaught of the economic crisis in 1998 occasioned 

of projections about the resulting increase in poverty. In Au

September 1998, a team from the ILO and the United Nation

opment Programme (UNDP) predicted that a staggering 48 p

the Indonesian population, 94 million people, would be co

poor by the end of the year, and that this number was likely to 

to increase in 1999. A few months later, in December 1998

estimates by BPS produced a figure of about 20 percent, sti

that it corresponded to 40 million people, but nonetheless 

reality than the alarming ILO–UNDP forecast. 

The recovery of the Indonesian economy in the early yea

twenty-first century was slow and at best partial. As a re

incidence of poverty declined slowly, from 18.4 percent in 

16.7 percent in 2004. These figures again conceal much di

tion by region. Rural areas were especially severely struck 

erty. There the incidence by official measure averaged 20 p

2004, against 12 percent for cities. In 2006 the governm

observers were alarmed by an unexpected increase in the i

of poverty in the face of resumed economic growth. Pocket

erty existed in a number of regions where the economic 

failed to generate jobs. The poverty rate climbed to 17.8 pe

again reduced, touching 16.6 per cent by 2007. 

Agriculture 

Indonesia has followed a well-recognized trend among de

nations, in which agriculture’s share of GDP has declined o
even though the sector still provides employment for a large p

tion of the labor force. The agricultural sector in Indonesi

remained vital for several reasons. A significant segment of the 

lation lives and works in rural areas, and rice, the chief food crop

staple nutrient for most households, urban and rural alike. Ade

supplies of affordable rice are deemed essential to preventing po

instability. 

The share of agriculture in GDP oscillated around 25 p

throughout the 1970s and early 1980s but then fell sharply, rea

16 percent by 1995. This trend was temporarily reversed wi

financial crisis, with agriculture’s contribution reaching almo

percent of GDP in 1999. Economic recovery reduced the sh

agriculture again; the average remained stable around 16 p

during the first years of the twenty-first century and by U.S. go

ment estimates was about 14.4 percent in 2008—as compared 

the Central Statistical Office figure for 2007, of 13.8 percent. M

while, the share of agriculture in the total labor force dropped

from more than 50 percent to a little above 40 percent. Within 

culture, food crops have always accounted for the predominant 

of output, leaving considerably smaller proportions to tree-cro

tivation, fisheries, and forestry. 

Food Crops 

A total land area of about 42 million hectares was being cult

for agricultural purposes in Indonesia around the turn of the tw

first century. Slightly more than 50 percent was dedicated to 

crop cultivation, both intensive sawah (irrigated or wetland) cu

tion in Java (8.5 million hectares) and ladang (not irrigated) cu

tion on other islands (16.0 million hectares; see fig. 8). Estates 

state-owned or private units of production with a high degree o

cialization of tasks) accounted for 25 percent of the land in 

Since around 1960, expansion of output in food-crop cultivatio

been attained through intensified land use and application of 

yield seed varieties. By 2000 total rice output exceeded 50 m

tons per year, largely realized in sawah cultivation. Ladang cu

tion was responsible for most of the non-rice food-crop outp

particular the production of cassava and corn, which tog

accounted for an annual yield of more than 25 million tons by 

In the 1980s, rice cultivation covered a total of around 10 m

hectares, primarily on sawah land. About 60 percent was irri

which was crucial to the productivity of land when planted 

high-yield seed varieties. Output grew at a spectacular rate of 

cent annually from 1977 to 1982, and by 1985, Indonesia, on

198 
 

 

 

world’s single largest importer of rice, was self-sufficient in 

important foodstuff. Annual production grew from about 2

tons in the late 1970s to some 50 million tons in the mid-19

it then continued at about that level thereafter. The governm

intensely involved, both in stabilizing prices for urban co

and expanding domestic output to achieve national self-su

in rice production. Various government policies included the 

ination of high-yield seed varieties through the governme

sored Mass Guidance System (Bimas) in agriculture, wh

subsidized the use of fertilizer and pesticides and provid

credit. Moreover, government intervention included contr

domestic rice price through the National Logistical Supply 

zation (Bulog). Government investment in irrigation also ma

nificant contribution. Between 1970 and 1990, about 2.5 

hectares of existing irrigated land were rehabilitated, and i

was extended to another 1.2 million hectares. 

Expansion of food-crop cultivation slowed in the late 1

early 1990s as a result of ecological constraints on the inten

of cropping ratios and lower government investment in irrig

Also, markets for agricultural commodities were depress

harvests in the mid-1990s necessitated a temporary retur

imports, and the situation during the crisis was aggrav

repeated droughts during 1997–98 caused by El Niño. By 

years of the twenty-first century, it was apparent that the Gr

olution, started in the late 1960s, had run its course in Indon

also that it had had a lasting impact on productivity in f

agriculture. 

Although rice is by far the most important food crop, cas

corn have remained major sources of calories for large groups 

nesians. Corn cultivation is concentrated in Java and Madura

on rain-fed land (tegalan), and much of the output is gener

sumed as a staple food. Both corn and cassava have increased 

tance as major supplements to rice. Between 2000 and 2005, p

of these two crops increased by 15 and 20 percent, respectivel

Export Crops 

Indonesia has a strong tradition of export crops culti

estates and smallholders. Java was once the world’s thir

producer of sugarcane, and rubber from Sumatra and Ka

provided important non-oil export revenues during the 19

1960s. Sugar no longer is an export crop; in fact, Indon

imports sugar. Rubber lost its strong position in the world m

synthetic rubber, and palm oil overtook agricultural export
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Palembang Palembang 

Padang

MALAYSIA 

BRUNEI 

SINGAPORE 

TIMOR-LESTE 

MALAYSIA 

PHILIPPINES 

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PAPUA

NEW

GUINEA 

THAILAND 

SULAWESI 

MALUKU 

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KALIMANTAN 

NEW GUINEA 

SUMATRA 

MADURA 

SUMBAWA

SUMBA 

BALI FLORES 

TIMOR 

Banda

Aceh 

Medan 

Surabaya 

Yogyakarta 

Makassar 

Samarinda Pontianak 

Padang

Palembang 

Jakarta

200 400 Kilometers

400 Miles 200

0 

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CornRiceCorn and rice 

Estate rubberSmallholder rubberPalm oil 

Boundary representationnot necessarily authoritative

Figure 8. Major Crop Production, 2009 
beginning of the twenty-first century, rubber and palm oil a

for more than 5 million hectares of arable land, with produ

smallholders as well as by government-owned estates app

in the nationalization of Dutch properties in the late 1950s. R

cultivated on 3 million hectares, of which about 80 percen

owned by smallholders with holdings of two hectares or les

holder cultivation is concentrated in Sumatra. 

Palm-oil estates, primarily in Kalimantan and Sumatra, e

rapidly, covering 2.2 million hectares by the mid-1990s. Th

represented major investments by leading domestic congl

and also increasing investment by estate companies based i

sia. In 2005 Indonesia was the world’s second-largest pro

palm oil, behind Malaysia, accounting for more than one

world output. Palm-oil production in Indonesia climbed 

million tons in 2000 to 10.3 million tons in 2004, an impre

percent increase. Estates provided the largest part of produc

the contribution of smallholders increased at a faster rate, e

one-third by 2004. In 2006 total output amounted to 16 mill

Government efforts to transfer new technologies and incr

ductivity in export-crop cultivation were less successful t

were with food crops. The Nucleus People’s Estate (PIR) 

which provided small plots of high-yield tree crops to par

farmers in predetermined locations, was the main governme

taking. One anticipated advantage was the sharing of bene

centralized technological and managerial assistance. Howeve

few cultivators participated, and little success was achieved, e

in rubber cultivation by smallholders. The centralization of 

which in turn remained seriously understaffed, allegedly sti

vidual initiative. 

Other export crops, notably cocoa, coconuts, coffee, and t

far smaller planted areas and contribute only marginally to th

gate earnings of the overall Indonesian economy. Coconuts 

vated almost exclusively by smallholders, with production ce

Sulawesi. High prices on the world market secured rising inc

some local producers even in the midst of the 1997–98 fina

sis. The main source of Indonesian coffee beans has tradition

the southern Sumatran province of Lampung, where sma

strongly dominate production. The predominance of smallho

increased since the late 1990s; in the early twenty-first cent

accounted for at least 95 percent of output. A temporary d

smallholder production in 2001 was followed by an impressi

ery during 2002. Annual coffee production by smallholders 

remained rather stable, averaging about 660,000 tons. Nev
 

Indonesian output has not increased as fast as that of chief riv

the world market. By 2005 Indonesia not only ranked behind B

Colombia, and Mexico but also had been overtaken by Vietnam

Livestock 

Smallholders own nearly all the livestock in Indonesia; thes

mals are sources of draft power, manure, meat for home consum

and, if sold, revenue. The livestock population in Indonesia in th

years of the twenty-first century included 35 million ducks, 21 m

goats and sheep, 11 million cows, 7 million pigs, 2.5 million bu

and 500,000 horses. Numbering in the hundreds of millions, chi

were the fastest-growing type of commercial livestock, notwith

ing the spread of avian influenza in Indonesia since 2004. Go

ment-sponsored programs to increase productivity through exte

services to livestock farmers and the expansion of ranching 

operation in the Outer Islands (see Glossary) in the early 1990s. 

Fishing and Forestry 

Fishing 

Fish has traditionally been a main source of animal protein 

average Indonesian diet, being generally far more available than 

The fishing industry engages more than 2 million households wo

in Indonesia’s large archipelagic sea area, about 50 percent of th

Java and 25 percent in Sumatra (see Geographic Regions, ch. 2

industry is divided into two widely different branches, marin

inland, of which the latter includes harvesting from open water a

as ponds and aquatic cages. Productivity is far greater in marine 

ies, which employ only 25 percent of the producer households but 

ate 75 percent of all fishing boats and account for almost 80 perc

total output. Total annual production of fish in Indonesian waters 

lated between 2 million and 3 million tons during the 1980s, re

4.5 million tons in 1996, and continued to increase, albeit slowly

ing the years of crisis. The annual total surpassed 5.6 million to

2003. Foreign-owned fishing enterprises, which must be licensed

ate on a much smaller scale than the domestic industry. Fish e

consist primarily of shrimp and tuna for the Japanese market. 

Enormous changes have taken place in Indonesian fisheries 

around 1980, when the physical possibility of extending catch 

began to be exhausted. The government designated offshore w

as exclusive economic zones closed to fishing, and it banned 

ing in the waters surrounding Java and Bali. The frontier of e

sion was thus literally closing, and output could increase on

202 
 

Planting rice, Banyumas, Jawa Tengah 

Courtesy E

A fishing boat under construction, Madura, Jawa Tengah 

Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, used with pe

©Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of 
 

intensification and overfishing. By the mid-1990s, the trawlin

had ceased to be effective, having resulted in numerous incide

which small-scale Indonesian fishers took matters into their 

hands, attacking intruding Thai and Taiwanese trawlers. Man

forests all along the eastern coastline of Sumatra have been 

formed into shrimp ponds; large fish-catching stakes tended by 

age boys have been put into operation in Sumatran estuarie

coral reefs off Papua have been severely damaged by the use o

nide poisoning and fish blasting as harvesting practices. Wi

biodiversity of Indonesian waters seriously threatened, the go

ment doubled its efforts between 1999 and 2006 to reduce fo

fishing in order to at least reserve the scarce resources for the 

domestic industry. 

Forestry 

Forests cover 110 million hectares, or 57 percent, of Indon

land area; two-thirds of the forested area is tropical rain for

Kalimantan and Papua. Estimates of the rate of depletion reac

million hectares per year during the mid-1980s, while targe

reforestation and afforestation were set at 95,000 and 250,000 

ares, respectively. The government revised these targets signifi

downward in the late 1980s but increased them again durin

1990s, reaching a combined level of nearly 200,000 hectares b

late 1990s. Official logging output fell by two-thirds durin

period 1998–2002, but targets for rehabilitation of forests 

reduced even further, being restored to 250,000 hectares in 

339,000 hectares in 2004, and as little as 27,000 hectares by 20

1999 estimates put the extent of endangered forest land at 23.

lion hectares, of which only 1.2 million hectares, or about 5 pe

had been rehabilitated four years later. Forest Watch Indonesi

Indonesian Forum for Environment, and the Department of Fo

estimated that the rate of deforestation rose to a staggering 4 m

hectares per year in 2003. Replenishment of forest resources in 

nesia clearly was lagging far behind both ecological and comm

needs and official targets. 

Uncontrolled expansion of logging operations, both legal an

gal, has magnified the ecological issues in Indonesian forestry

1970s witnessed a boom in logging concessions, both large

and small-scale, whereas a ban on log exports put in place b

government in 1983 fostered the emergence of timber congl

ates. The expansion was fueled by liberal regulation of conces

extremely low taxation, lax enforcement of reforestation obliga

and widespread corruption. During the 1980s alone, large bu

groups acquired concessions covering millions of hectares, an

204 
production capacity of Indonesia’s 100 or so plywood pl

eightfold. Together with Malaysia, Indonesia then suppli

than 90 percent of the world’s tropical plywood exports. 

ment promotion of the domestic timber-processing indu

seen as the most immediate threat to Indonesia’s forests, b

long run, settlement by migrants under government-sponsor

migration programs may have had an even greater impact. 

In the 1990s, the gap between total demand from the 

industry and officially authorized logging output widened, 

new impetus to illegal logging. In 2001 the total timber h

Indonesia amounted to 60 million cubic meters, 50 million 

may have been obtained illegally. Possibly 10 million cubi

was smuggled abroad, mostly to Malaysia. The Indonesian p

politicians generally have put the blame for illegal logging 

ber smuggling on small-scale loggers and Malaysian and eth

nese traders. In the early twenty-first century, they were 

responsible for the haze of smoke that regularly emanated 

ests burning in Sumatra and Kalimantan, causing both health 

and irritation in neighboring countries. Yet such viewpoin

overlook the far-reaching involvement of Indonesian congl

in large-scale logging and plywood production and also div

tion from a long history of forest mismanagement dating ba

boom of the 1970s. This history entered a new phase with th

tralization of responsibility for forest policies in 2001. The 

tion of authority had the potential to enhance local involv

the terms of implementation, but it could equally well prov

cive to further corruption at the local level. 

Industry 

Indonesia was a late starter in industrialization, laggin

regional neighbors such as Malaysia and Thailand by at least 

This delay may be attributed to the generous revenues from e

natural resources that effectively postponed a sense of urgenc

ing rapid industrialization. The first phase of import substitut

on labor-intensive production with a low level of tech

sophistication and took place in the 1970s, but its impact on 

omy was limited. By the early 1980s, manufacturing not rela

and gas still accounted for only 11 percent of GDP, and pr

catered almost exclusively to the domestic market. In the 198

ond phase of import substitution shifted the focus to sele

upstream industries with a relatively high level of tech

sophistication, including heavy industries such as petroleum 

steel, and cement, in which state-owned enterprises often do
 

The next shift in industrial policy favored private investment a

export orientation. Between 1987 and 1997, a rapid industriali

took place that caused a surge in manufacturing exports while r

the share of non-oil and gas manufacturing to 25 percent of G

level sustained into the twenty-first century. 

A detailed study by Australian economist Hal Hill of the ind

structure in Indonesia in the 1980s underscored the continuin

dominance of oil and natural gas processing and showed the s

major industrial activity to be the production of kretek cigare

popular Indonesian product made from tobacco blended with c

Most of the 13,000 firms Hill surveyed were privately owned

generally much smaller than the joint ventures with either the go

ment or foreign investors, which employed, on average, six tim

many people. Government enterprises controlled all processing 

and natural gas and were important in other heavy industries, su

basic metals, cement, paper products, fertilizer, and transpor

equipment. The growing industries manufacturing for export o

far more employment opportunities than the capital-intensive 

industries dominated by government and joint ventures with fo

capital. 

As the twenty-first century began, the three leading industrie

side the oil and gas sector contributed 18 percent of GDP. They 

in descending order of size, food (including beverages and tob

transportation equipment (including electrical appliances), and 

ical products (including fertilizer and rubber goods). By 2005 

were 20,700 individual large and medium-size manufacturing 

prises employing a total work force of 4.3 million people. 

Industrial development has been unevenly distributed acro

archipelago (see fig. 9). Significant oil and LNG production o

mainly in the Special Region of Aceh and in the provinces of S

tera Selatan, Riau, Jawa Tengah, Kalimantan Timur, and Papua 

In western Java, manufacturing outside the oil and gas sector c

on Jabodetabek, and in and around Surabaya, Indonesia’s second

est city, in Jawa Timur Province. Regional forms of specializat

industrial production include batik printing and furniture mak

the Special Region of Yogyakarta and in Jepara, as well as kretek 

rette manufacturing in Kudus, the latter two in Jawa Tengah Pro

Foreign Inputs 

Foreign direct investment (FDI) has particularly targete

industrial sector since the beginning of Suharto’s New Ord

1966. There have been several marked shifts in the climate fo

over time. The launch of new FDI legislation by the Suharto go

206 
 

ment in 1967 initiated a liberal period of seven years, aft

came 20 years of restrictive policies prompted by nationa

during the visit of Japan’s prime minister to Jakarta in Janua

Regulations in effect from 1974 to 1994 precluded majori

ownership in a firm by a foreign investor in the long run a

gradual divestment of such holdings. Although these re

produced a slowdown in investment, the new opportun

export-oriented manufacturing that opened up in the la

proved highly attractive to foreign investors. A deregulation 

announced in June 1994 radically liberalized foreign inv

Foreign majority control of equity again became legal, an

ment rules relaxed. An immediate surge in FDI followed t

persisted far into the 1997–98 financial crisis. 

Total realized FDI from 1991 to 2005 exceeded US$75 

US$31 billion of which dated to the five years from 1996 

which included the worst of the financial crisis years. This 

be compared to the aggregate for realized domestic investm

ing the 1991–2005 period, which was closer to US$215 bil

United States remained the chief investor in the oil and na

sector but played only a marginal role in other branches of 

(see Other Minerals, this ch.). Japan traditionally was the fi

ing foreign investor outside the oil and natural gas indu

investment from the newly industrializing economies of Hon

Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan became equally impor

ing the rapid enlargement of incoming FDI in the 1990s. 

from the EU made only a belated entry, or in some cases ree

the Indonesian capital market on the eve of the 1997–98 

took some time before FDI inflows were restored after the 

crisis. Total approved FDI rose from US$14 billion in 

US$40 billion by 2007. 

Foreign investment has often been crucial to the develo

capital-intensive heavy industries. A prime example is the 

Hydroelectric and Aluminum Project, a government joint ven

a consortium of Japanese companies. Investment in an a

smelter and two hydroelectric power stations, located in 

Utara Province, was worth a total of US$2.2 billion, a welcom

from the relative stagnation that characterized Japanese inve

Indonesia from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. In anothe

project, the development of special economic zones on the Ri

pelago islands of Batam, Bintan, and Karimun was entrusted 

sortium consisting of a state-owned Singapore company 

private Indonesian firms, in an agreement signed June 28, 200

80 percent of Indonesia’s oil-equipment industry is located o
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200 400 Kilometers

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International boundaryNational capitalPopulated place 

Boundary representationnot necessarily authoritative

 Nickel

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 Bauxite

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Island, and the project will likely lead to further developmen

facilities as well as others involving electronics, chemicals, 

equipment, garments, and other manufactures. 

In many industries, foreign firms have supplied technic

tance and arranged for domestic production under licensin

ments without direct equity participation in the domestic f

example, domestic Indonesian plants have produced automo

about 20 international car makers, foremost among them 

some of whose vehicles are built in Indonesia by Astra Inter

the country’s largest auto manufacturer. Other Japanese co

as well as South Korean, European, and American firms, 

their vehicles in Indonesia. The Indonesian automotive ind

grown amid heavily protected markets. 

Foreign inputs of a different nature have been applied in h

nology enterprises, particularly ones headed by B. J. Habibi

minister of research and technology and later as presiden

established in 1976, assembled helicopters and small fixed-

craft under licenses from French, German, and Spanish fir

by imported personnel and know-how. Many people co

IPTN a premature leap into advanced technology. Extra-b

support and credit privileges stopped at the request of the IM

uary 1998, and operations at IPTN all but ceased subsequent

Small-Scale Industry 

The modern sector of large and medium-sized firms is 

focus of government policy, but small-scale factories em

fewer than 20 workers and cottage industries with up to five 

are far more numerous and crucial in terms of providing 

ment. Small-scale establishments engage in a wide range o

ties from traditional bamboo weaving to metal and leather 

Many of these industries offer part-time employment to rur

ers during off-peak seasons. In 1986 small-scale industries e

3.9 million workers, corresponding to 67 percent of total i

employment, twice as many as in large and medium-size

Still, this figure reflected a significant decline from the 197

small-scale industry accounted for 86 percent of total i

employment. By 2004 the number of small-scale enterpr

around 250,000, and together they employed 1.8 million wo

percent of the industrial labor force. The foremost branc

food and beverages, including tobacco, with about 33 pe

these workers, followed by wood and textiles, including f

each of which accounted for slightly more than 20 percen

productivity has remained relatively low in small-scale ind
 

 

 

 

 

2004 value-added contributions in this sector amounted to 

Rp12 million (about US$1,342) per worker, as compared with 

million (about US$8,614) in large and medium-sized firms. F

ing small-scale manufacturing is especially important in ter

generating employment, whereas a successive upgrading of tec

ogy is more easily achieved by stimulating large and medium

units of production. 

The considerable productivity gap compared to larger indu

enterprises has slowed in the development of small-scale ind

Differentials of 1:10, or even more, have been reported, wit

signs of improvement. The New Order policy of supporting 

scale industry through sponsorship or partnership relationship

bigger firms evolved in the early 1990s and officially launch

1996, but it had little effect when the financial crisis caused prio

to be shifted elsewhere. 

Minerals 

Indonesia is the leading producer of petroleum in Southeas

and has the world’s tenth-largest proven natural gas reserves, 7

cent of which are offshore. It exported 16 percent of the world’

volume of LNG in 2005, but more recent reports indicate th

share is diminishing. It also has significant reserves of other va

minerals, such as bauxite, coal, copper, gold, nickel, and tin. 

of the nation’s industrial development, however, is based on th

cessing of oil and natural gas. Most mineral production, after 

degree of domestic processing, is exported to industrial na

especially Japan. Some of Indonesia’s own mineral-intensive i

tries, notably, steel and aluminum, rely on imports of raw mat

On balance, however, Indonesia is a net exporter of minera

large part because of large-scale exports of LNG. 

Petroleum and Natural Gas 

Between 1962 and 2009, Indonesia’s oil production was for

governed by a quota allocation from the Organization of the 

leum Exporting Countries (OPEC—see Glossary). In 2005 In

sian output of crude oil amounted to about 1.1 million barre

day, corresponding to 3.5 percent of OPEC’s total production

was about 20 percent less than the level of crude output in 199

also failed to meet the allocated OPEC quota of 1.4 million b

per day. In 2006 the crude oil output fell below 1 million barre

day. Experts attribute the decline in output to a slowdown in i

ment and declining productivity. With oil exports governed a

210 
 

in part by long-run contractual agreements and domestic 

sumption increasing rapidly as Indonesia shook off the effe

Asian financial crisis, oil imports into the country in t

twenty-first century were rising at a rate considered alarmin

side observers. The increase from 2004 to 2005 amounted t

cent, and purchases of foreign oil, in both crude and refine

corresponded to 22 percent of total expenditures on impor

latter year. Exports looked likely to increase with product

mencing from the Cepu oil field in Jawa Tengah Province. 

Indonesia’s oil industry is one of the oldest in the world. 

pioneering oil firms in the then-Dutch colony, Royal Dutch 

British company Shell, exploited reserves in eastern Kalima

northern Sumatra starting in the late 1890s. The firms, which 

forged an alliance, Royal Dutch Shell, virtually monopolize

sector through joint subsidiaries for production and distrib

several decades in the twentieth century. Two American riv

dard-Vacuum Oil Company (Stanvac) and California Texas O

pany (Caltex), gained prominence shortly after independence 

and survived into the Suharto era; Royal Dutch Shell withd

Indonesia in 1965. By the 1990s, five of the six largest foreign 

panies operating in Indonesia were American-owned. For 

exploitation of Indonesia’s oil and gas reserves has taken plac

production-sharing arrangement between the government an

oil companies, by which the state-owned enterprise Pertam

burses the bulk of output, retaining for itself the proceeds from 

international markets. A smaller part of output serves to re

costs of investment and operations incurred by the foreign f

tially the ratio was 65:35, but the Suharto government neg

shift to 85:15. Contract terms for Indonesian oil have been co

among the toughest in the world. 

Annual oil production expanded quickly in response 

world prices during the 1970s, reaching a peak of almost 1.

barrels per day in 1977. Prices continued to soar until 1982

gradual decline set in, culminating in the sharp drop in w

prices of 1986. Total production in the late 1980s amo

around 1.2 million barrels per day. Production then increas

aging 1.35 million barrels per day over the 1991–99 period

ual decline followed, to slightly more than 1 million barrel

by 2003–5, dropping below that benchmark in early 2006. I

probable that Indonesia might become a net importer of c

which indeed occurred temporarily in 2008, and since Janu

Indonesia has suspended its membership in OPEC. 
 

By the 1990s, Pertamina was operating eight large oil refin

in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Java. Major investments negotia

the first years of the twenty-first century involved the new exp

tion of offshore oil reserves in Jawa Timur and Kalimantan Tim

well as the construction of long pipelines connecting southern S

tra, Java, and eastern Kalimantan. The Indonesian governmen

tinues to subsidize domestic fuel prices at well below interna

market prices. 

Natural gas fields exist in the Special Region of Aceh, the N

Islands in Kepulauan Riau Province, and in Kalimantan Timu

Papua Barat provinces. After conversion to LNG—a refrige

process that reduces it to 1/600th of its volume—the gas is exp

primarily to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and increasin

China. Conversion facilities were constructed in the late 197

Lhokseumawe (in Aceh) and Bontang (in Kalimantan Timur) a

the late 2000s, in Bintuni Bay (in Papua Barat). The total capac

these plants reached 23 million tons by 1990. Continued expa

brought the total to a peak of 32 million tons in 1999, and b

beginning of the twenty-first century the level of output had 

lized at an annual average of 27.5 million tons. Indonesia supp

much as 15 percent of the natural gas produced by OPEC mem

Most output goes to liquefying plants for export, although a 

ing proportion is needed for domestic consumption, especia

fertilizer, the production of which requires that natural gas b

cessed into ammonia and urea. Growing domestic and e

demand have encouraged the development of the gas field 

Natuna Islands in the South China Sea and the Tangguh gas fi

Bintuni Bay. 

Other Minerals 

The New Order government made efforts to rejuvenate th

industry, mainly located in the provinces of Sumatera Barat, Sum

Selatan, and Kalimantan Timur, so as to encourage coal use b

example, cement and electric-power plants. Joint ventures be

the state and foreign investors have resulted in a steady incre

production. Output exceeded 50 million tons in 1997 and climb

more than 100 million tons in 2002. 

Another extractive industry dating from the colonial period 

mining, based on the islands of Bangka and Belitung (Bangka-Be

Province) in the Java Sea off the southeastern coast of Sumatra. 

with Malaysia and Bolivia, Indonesia is one of the world’s top

producers of tin. Production was fully controlled by the gover

starting in the late 1950s, but it stagnated in the early Suharto p

212 
Freeport-McMoRan’s Grasberg copper and gold mine, Papua 

A bulk carrier ship at Timika, upriver from the seaport of Am

Courtesy Freeport-M
 

 

with output falling below 30 million tons annually throughout m

the 1980s. A gradual increase followed in the 1990s as a result o

investment in production capacity, and by 2000 Indonesia was pr

ing 50 million tons per year. Rising tin prices on the world m

caused a further increase by 2006 to a level in excess of 81 million 

Another postindependence development in the mineral ind

was nickel mining in Sulawesi Tenggara Province, where a Can

investor entered into a joint venture with the government. I

1980s, Indonesia emerged as one of the world’s top-five prod

of nickel. Capacity increased to 2.5 million tons per year in the 

1990s and substantially enlarged during the first couple of ye

the twenty-first century, nearing a level of 4.4 million tons by 2

One of the world’s most spectacular mines is the huge P. T. 

port-Indonesia copper and gold mine, located atop Ertsberg M

tain near Tembagapura, Papua Province. Since the beginning 

Suharto period, the mine has been run by a joint venture wi

U.S.-based Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold. The ore is 

ported by pipeline 96 kilometers down the mountain slope

through the rain forest to Freeport’s port of Amamapare for e

A second mine, on nearby Grasberg Mountain, came online 

early 1990s. Both Ertsberg and Grasberg are north of the c

Tembagapura. Much attention has been given in the news me

the environmental degradation resulting from this kind of ope

mining and also to confrontations between the American 

prise—protected by the Indonesian military—and the local 

population concerning land use and the exploitation of the re

natural resources. Given its participation in the equity of the Fre

subsidiary, the Indonesian government has always had high pro

stake. Total copper production has risen rapidly, climbing to 

than 1 million tons in 1994, reaching 2.5 million tons per year 

late 1990s, and approaching 4 million tons per year by 200

2007, however, total output fell below 3 million tons. 

Other Indonesian mineral products also are important. 

include gold, mainly extracted as a by-product at the Freeport c

mines, and bauxite found on Bintan Island in Kepulauan Riau 

ince, used in the domestic production of aluminum. 

Services and Infrastructure 

In the first years of the twenty-first century, service industrie

vided jobs for about 40 million Indonesians, corresponding to 3

cent of the total labor force, a proportion that had risen 

marginally since the 1990s. About 50 percent of these jobs w

trading, hotels, and restaurants; 33 percent were in a variety of 

214 
 

munity, social, and personal services; and the remainder, 

mately 17 percent, were mostly in the transportation, commun

and storage sectors. Jobs in finance accounted for less than 

of total employment in the services sector. Indonesia also ha

million civil servants at all levels of government. A large p

of work in the services sector, about 70 percent, consisted of 

employment. Petty traders made up the majority of the info

tor, and unincorporated establishments accounted for as mu

percent of employment in commerce. Ubiquitous self-e

small-scale traders plied their wares in village markets and 

streets. 

The government’s attitude toward the informal sector h

been ambivalent. On the one hand, its importance as a s

employment required support as part of the overall effort to 

pribumi entrepreneurship. On the other hand, policies often 

informal-sector activities. For example, the once commo

(pedicab) was restricted to small side streets in many urban a

phased out altogether in Jakarta. 

Transportation 

An elaborate upgrade of the long-neglected transportati

structure began in the 1970s. The physical infrastructure

roads, railroads, ports, and airports, was significantly expa

improved with the aid of burgeoning revenues from oil expo

process slowed in the 1990s and came to a complete halt d

financial crisis and subsequent recovery. In 2005 attention 

on reconstruction in the Special Region of Aceh after the 

caused by the December 26, 2004, tsunami. Outlays for in

ture alone in 2005 were estimated at US$660 million. In ea

the government announced a new package for infrastructu

opment at a total cost of US$48 billion during the subsequ

year period. 

Roads 

Indonesia had some 437,760 kilometers of roads by 

which 59 percent were paved, and about 60 percent were l

Java, Madura, Bali, and Sumatra (see fig. 10). There are le

sive networks of roads in Sulawesi and Kalimantan, while 

islands often have just a few roads within or connecting maj

ments. About 40,000 kilometers of roads administered by the 

and provincial governments were considered to be in good c

another 35,000 kilometers were in varying stages of repair. A

percent of the nation’s roads are classified as highways. 
 

 

The nation’s roads and highways are used annually by som

million passengers cars, 1.2 million buses, 2.9 million truck

28.5 million motorcycles. Motor vehicles increasingly dom

urban transit, and in major cities the policy is to increase the r

larger public buses over that of privately owned, smaller-ca

vehicles such as the nine-seat Opelet microbus and the si

Bemo. The formerly ubiquitous becak has been largely replac

the major cities by the bajaj, a three-wheeled, multipassenger m

cycle, which itself is losing ground to minibuses and automobi

Jakarta the increased use of private vehicles contributes to 

sprawl, ever-greater traffic congestion, and air pollution. 

Vehicular congestion and automotive emissions are incre

particularly in urban areas. Some new toll roads were construc

the 1990s, such as the one between Jakarta city center and Suk

Hatta International Airport to the west and the industrial areas a

Cikarang and Cikampek to the east. However, such developmen

far short of keeping up with rapidly expanding demand, and new 

ects were shelved altogether when the financial crisis struck in 

resuming only after several years of recovery. A toll road open

2005 significantly reduced travel time between Jakarta and Ban

the nearest major city to the capital. Newly constructed toll road

nect Semarang and Surakarta (also known as Solo) in Jawa T

Province and improve access to Pasuruan in Jawa Timur. Inves

in a mass public-transport system in Jakarta lagged behind dev

ments in other Southeast Asian capitals such as Bangkok, Kuala 

pur, Manila, and Singapore. A system of priority bus lanes intro

in 2005 has offered a temporary solution. In 2004 construction s

on an elevated, two-line monorail serving Jakarta’s central bu

district and suburban areas east and west of the city. Complet

the monorail, scheduled for 2007, was delayed with constr

barely underway in 2008, and little progress was made ther

Administrative hurdles and disputes over land generally are ci

factors that severely slow down investment in the transportation 

structure in Indonesia. 

Railroads 

In 2008 Indonesia had 8,529 kilometers of railroad track, al

owned by the government and operated by the Department of T

port, a gain of more than 30 percent since 2006. About 75 perc

railroad track is located in Java. In 2006 most of the track (5,961 

meters) was 1.067-meter narrow gauge, 125 kilometers of whic

electrified in 2006; the rest (497 kilometers) was 0.750-meter g

Although trains are used mostly for passenger transportation, f

216 
 

haulage has made significant advances, having increased 

than 17 million tons by 2005, a gain of 50 percent over the 

the early 1990s. Rail transportation is especially suited to 

bulk items such as fertilizer, cement, and coal, and freight ha

more profitable than passenger service. Sumatra accounts fo

cent of freight handling. In 2007 railroads carried about 17

passengers, 97 percent of whom boarded trains in Java. 

Shipping 

Maritime transportation experienced major investments an

reforms in the 1980s after growing increasingly restrictive an

cratic during preceding decades. The Indonesian National 

Company (Pelni) had been established in 1952 but gained t

hand in interisland shipping only after the nationalizatio

Dutch-owned shipping company in 1959. By 1965 Pelni acco

50 percent of tonnage in interisland shipping, but its mar

declined sharply despite a virtual monopoly on passenger 

1982 a “gateway policy” was introduced in order to discoura

shipment via Singapore and direct Indonesia’s nonbulk 

through four designated deep-sea ports: Tanjung Priok (Jaka

jung Perak (Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province), Belawan 

Sumatera Utara Province), and Makassar (formerly Ujungpa

Sulawesi Selatan Province). The protectionist measures wer

panied by a US$4 billion investment plan launched in 1983 th

ticular favored upgrading facilities at the four gatewa

However, such a gateway policy became irrelevant as expo

increasingly handled by container shipping. By 1987 Indones

with North America and Europe moved almost exclusively 

shipment in Singapore. In fact, the closing of Indonesian 

feeder vessels denied Indonesian shippers the benefits of low

rates made possible by the cargo consolidation at Singapor

late 1980s, the gateway policy had been abandoned. 

Total freight volume handled by some 95 commercial In

ports reached a total of 1.2 billion tons by 2004, 75 percent 

went to foreign destinations. The greatest volume passed 

ports adjacent to oil refineries: 30 million tons at Dumai, Ri

ince, and 22 million tons at Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur P

By contrast, the four main ports in Java—Tanjung Priok (

Tanjung Perak (Surabaya), Semarang, and Cilacap—were 

responsible for just 30 million tons. In addition to major po

are more than 30 other significant ports supporting interisla

time trade throughout the archipelago. 
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Dumai 

Belinyu

Toboali

CilacapYogyakarta 

Surabaya 

Pasuruan 

Semarang 

Solo 

Banyuwangi 

Bandung

Pangkalpinang 

Paloh 

Singkawang

Pontianak 

Telukbatang 

Sintang

Kendawangan

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Sangkulirang

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Bitung 

Biak 

Manado

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Majene

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Makassar 

Larantuka 

Labuhanbajo

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Sumbawa

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Denpasar 

Cirebon 

Maumere 

Kolaka Kendari 

Malili

Kolonodale

Kupang 

Sarmi

Amamapare 

Jayapura 

Bengkulu 

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Figure 10. Major Transportation Facilities, 2009 

218 
Civil Aviation 

Although passenger transportation by sea still exceeded 

air travel in 2002, with 17 million passengers compared to 12 

by 2007 civil aviation had become of far greater importanc

year, 31 million passengers boarded an airplane compared w

6 million using sea transport. The phenomenal increase in 

air travel in the early twenty-first century was caused by a p

tion of private budget airlines linking all parts of the archipe

making air travel affordable for large groups of new custo

comparison, international arrivals by air increased from 4.

passengers in 2000 to 5.3 million in 2004 and then declin

million by 2007. Civil aviation is handled by the state-owned 

carrier, Garuda Indonesia, which dates from 1949; its su

Merpati Nusantara Airlines; and a host of private budget 

which expanded from three in 2000 to 29 by 2005. 

The enlargement of physical infrastructure in the late 1

early 1980s included construction of airports throughout the 

ago so that every provincial capital was within hours of Jak

hub, Sukarno-Hatta International Airport at Jakarta, opened 

and was followed by international airports in Denpasar, Bali 

Rai), Surabaya, Jawa Timur (Juanda), and Medan, Sumate

(Polonia). In 2009 Indonesia had 683 airfields, 164 of wh

full-fledged airports, including at least 22 designated as inter

There also were 36 heliports. The largest numbers of passen

embarked at Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, and Denpasar. Ru

least 3,000 meters long were available in Medan, Padang

Surabaya, Denpasar, and Biak (Papua Barat Province). Besi

major airports, Indonesia is well served by 35 or more signif

ports. In this regard, Papua is particularly well served. 

Post and Telecommunications 

The national postal system is the most important means of 

nication for the majority of citizens. Postal services are availa

subdistricts, and, by the first years of the twenty-first century

number of post offices had increased to 7,000 from fewer than 

1980. Having invested early in satellite communications, 

1980s Indonesia has possessed a sophisticated telecommu

infrastructure. It is supported by the Palapa system of satel

name signifies unity). The first two Palapa-A satellites were 

in 1976; they were successfully replaced by Palapa-B sat

1987. The first Palapa-C was launched in January 1996, and 

in May 1996, providing coverage not only for the Indonesian 

ago but also for Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. 
government-owned, the Palapa system was acquired by a pr

sector company, Satelindo, established in 1993. The system in

international direct-dialing facilities and a fully integrated nationa

phone system. By 2007 there were 17.8 million main telephone li

use, and the number of mobile phones had reached 81.8 m

Although there are more than 200,000 telephone kiosks, many lo

in remote areas, recent expansion has almost entirely been in m

phone connections. The number of mobile-phone subscribers 

than doubled between 2004 and 2007, whereas only 12 million in

ants, less than 6 percent of the total population, had access to a 

telephone line. Privatization of the telecommunications secto

facilitated competition and reduced costs for the consumer. 

Television and radio traditionally have been dominated by go

ment networks, but private commercial channels have been em

since the introduction of Hawk Television Indonesia (RCTI) 

Jakarta area in 1988. By early in the new century, the improved 

munications system had brought television signals to every vill

the country, and most Indonesians could choose from 11 chann

addition to the state-owned Television of the Republic of Ind

(TVRI), there were 10 national private channels in 2009. Th

known are Indosiar, RCTI, Sun Television (SCTV), Metro TV

Trans 7. Some channels have a specific orientation, for instance, G

TV, which initially offered broadcasts from MTV Indonesia, and 

nesian Educational Television (TPI), which originally carried onl

cational programming but expanded into quiz programs, sports, 

shows, and other popular entertainment. There also were 54 loca

vision stations in 2009, such as Bali TV in Bali, Jak TV in Jakart

Pacific TV in Manado. There were about 3,000 live radio st

throughout Indonesia, but only a few broadcast nationally. Exa

include Jakarta News, Sonara, and Prambors in the nation’s c

JJFM, Radio DJ, and Radio Istra in Surabaya; Swaragama in Y

karta; and Global FM Bali in Denpasar. 

Internet usage has surged since 2000, when there were 2 m

users. In 2009 there were nearly 30 million users, a 1,500-p

increase since the start of the twenty-first century. Indonesia h

most Internet users among all other Southeast Asian nations. 

Electric Power 

As it had been for many years, the government-owned Na

Electric Company (PLN) was virtually the sole source of elec

for domestic consumption in the early twenty-first century. Ca

had been growing at a rate of 15 percent per year since the 1970

was especially enhanced by the addition of large coal-fired gene

220 
facilities at Paiton, Jawa Timur Province, in the late 1990s. 

tended to use almost 50 percent of domestically generated p

2004 total installed capacity amounted to 22,000 megaw

PLN had more than 40,000 employees. There was a slowdow

expansion of capacity and production during the Asian fina

sis, but starting in 2000 production growth again achieve

increases of 10 percent or more. 

Economic Prospects 

The big challenge for Indonesia in the early twenty-first c

to resume rapid economic growth while retaining the achieve

reform and democratization won since the collapse of the N

government in 1998. This is no easy task. Short-run pros

major macroeconomic variables looked quite favorable at th

the first decade of the twenty-first century. Production capa

being enlarged as a result of new investment, the current ac

the balance of payments was improving, the exchange 

reached a stable level, inflation was slowing, and the governm

get deficit had been significantly reduced. An average annua

rate in the 6 to 6.5 percent range appeared possible, with 6.

specified as the target for 2010. That would be sufficient t

poverty and official unemployment to the levels laid dow

long-run economic plans. But such positive prospects were 

external and internal uncertainties. Continued high oil pric

world economy could have an adverse effect on the prices o

in general and put an additional strain on foreign-exchange ea

Indonesia were indeed to stay a net importer of fuels. Another 

source of uncertainty was the excessive dependence of the In

capital market on short-run foreign portfolio investments 

inclination toward high sensitivity to sudden fluctuations in 

tions. The most crucial internal source of uncertainty conce

government’s capability to create sound business conditions. 

was urgently needed in combating corruption and guarantee

security for both foreign and domestic firms. The administ

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who took office in 

was reelected in 2009, initially enjoyed considerable cred

determination to tackle these huge problems, but signs of di

ment with the slow pace of progress have been mounting. 

The three chief trends in Indonesian economic developm

the late 1960s—increasing integration with the world econo

found structural change, and intense diversification—rem

vant to an assessment of long-term prospects in the tw

century. Further integration with the world economy is exp
 

 

 

be strengthened, in particular, following the accelerated implem

tion of AFTA, which was moved up from 2008 to 2002. Alrea

2006 the average tariff rate on imports in the five original AS

member states (plus Brunei) for goods covered by the AFTA a

ment had declined to less than 2 percent from 12 percent in the 

1990s. The successful reduction of tariffs prompted the formu

of a single market, the ASEAN Economic Community, as an o

target to be achieved by 2015. Structural change, notably the s

resources from the primary to the secondary sector, was tempo

halted by the 1997–98 financial crisis and its aftermath but is 

to gain momentum as rapid economic growth resumes. F

diversification of the economy is likely to occur and may be 

forced when economic effects materialize from the far-rea

decentralization of government authority that became effect

2001. In the process, however, regional disparities may be wid

It will be a major challenge for the central government to giv

stance to its motto “Unity in diversity,” which has so often 

applied to the Indonesian society and economy. 

* * * 

The quality of statistics on the Indonesian economy has imp

substantially, and a wide range of publications, often in bilingual f

are available from the BPS Web site in Jakarta (http://www.bps.g

The annual reports issued by the central bank, Bank Indonesia, con

wealth of information on current economic conditions. In additio

World Bank prepares an elaborate analysis of the nation’s eco

prospects each year. The Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong 

formerly published weekly and now monthly) and daily Asian 

Street Journal (Hong Kong) offer less scholarly but more up-t

information. Most informative journals published in Indonesia are 

Indonesian language. 

The most accessible and up-to-date source in the secondary lite

is the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, published by the In

sia Project at the Australian National University in Canberra. Each 

opens with a “Survey of Recent Developments,” a tradition sus

since the journal was founded in the 1960s that provides a succinc

view of the most current data and issues. The Indonesia Projec

organizes an annual conference on various aspects of the Indonesia

ity and economy, the “Indonesia Update,” which has resulted in a 

of conference proceedings published under the title “Indonesia A

ment” until 2001 and thereafter as “Indonesia Update Series,” ava

at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/economics/ip/publications.php. 

222 
 

Authoritative surveys of Indonesian economic history inc

written by Anne Booth, The Indonesian Economy in the N

and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed Opportuni

another by an international team of scholars, Howard Dick

J. H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Thee Kian Wie, Th

gence of a National Economy: An Economic History of In

1800–2000. Anne Booth’s The Oil Boom and After: Indones

nomic Policy and Performance in the Soeharto Era is a com

sive summary of economic developments. It replaced a

version coedited with Peter McCawley, The Indonesian E

During the Soeharto Era, but was itself superseded by a ful

monograph, Hal Hill’s The Indonesian Economy. The vast 

on the Asian financial crisis includes numerous publica

Indonesia. An early and especially useful summary was of

Hal Hill in The Indonesian Economy in Crisis. Two othe

graphs on more specific topics were of particular importan

chapter, one on political economy, Richard Robison’s In

The Rise of Capital, and the other on labor relations by Ch

ning, Indonesian Labour in Transition: An East Asian Succe

Authoritative and durable Web sites posted in Indonesia incl

of the Central Statistical Office (http://www.bps.go.id), the 

Development Planning Board (http://www.bappenas.go.id), B

nesia (http://www.bi.go.id), and the Capital Investment Coo

Board (http://www.bkpm.go.id). A highly useful nongovernme

umentation center is the Centre for Strategic and International S

Jakarta (http://www.csis.or.id); the best university collection of 

is found at the Web site of the Universitas Indonesia in Jakar

www.ui.ac.id). Several international organizations maintain W

offering a wealth of information on Indonesia. Two leading exa

the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta (http://www.aseansecr.org) 

Asian Development Bank in Manila (http://www.adb.org). (F

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

Chapter 4. Government and P
A precolonial Javanese jong 
PRESIDENT SUHARTO RESIGNED IN 1998, and Indone

a transition to democracy, a process that has had the count

gling to establish a new political identity. This struggle h

place on four fronts: executive–legislative relations, cente

relations, religion–state relations, and interethnic relations

but eventually successful process of constitutional reforms fr

to 2002 addressed the first three fronts. Political elites in the 

Consultative Assembly (MPR; for this and other acronyms, 

A) established a strongly presidential system with directly 

national and local chief executives, stronger legislatures, and 

pendent judiciary, as well as a decentralized political system 

nificant local autonomy. They also maintained Indonesia’s id

a plural, tolerant, and moderate Muslim-majority society wit

cant non-Muslim minorities, but not an Islamic state. This vi

sorely tested by the passage in some districts of local re

implementing parts of Islamic law—sharia, or syariah in 

Indonesia (see Glossary)—and by the Al Qaeda–linked 

attacks in Bali and Jakarta from 2002 to 2009. Indonesian 

heartily endorsed these changes through their broad, enthusia

largely nonviolent participation in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 

processes. The constitutional reform process indicated littl

fourth front, interethnic relations, except that Indonesia was 

a state based on Pancasila (see Glossary), the five-point pan-r

pan-ethnic state ideology created by the first president, Suk

office 1945–67). Indonesians have struggled to overcom

communal strife in Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, amo

places, but by 2009 much of this violence had receded. 

Consolidation of the new democracy remains a signific

lenge. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 

reforms in the national-security sector were only partial at 

military and police remained neutral in elections between 

2009, and they were stripped of their appointed seats in legis

all levels. The system of secondment of military officers to th

bureaucracy was also abolished. However, the roots of the m

political influence—the territorial system, business ventures

lack of democratic civilian oversight—only began to be a

under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyo

took office in 2004. The police were organizationally separa

the military in 1999 and have done a respectable job of addre

threat of terrorism, but for most Indonesian citizens, daily int
 

with the police have not been reformed: overall, corruption and 

fectiveness remain widespread. The implementation of decentr

tion, including revised autonomy laws passed in 2004 and the 

election of regional chief executives (governors, mayors, and d

administrative heads or regents—bupatis) beginning in 2005, c

its own problems, as corruption also has been decentralized, an

national government is confronted with a host of local regulation

are inconsistent with national laws and the constitution. Exec

legislative relations are frequently contentious, as the presiden

the legislative branch establish a working relationship within th

constitutional parameters and the legislature itself adjusts to the 

ence of a new upper house, the Regional Representative C

(DPD), established in 2004. Internal reform of these entities, to u

the process of enacting laws and strengthen institutional capacit

pressing need. 

Corruption has tainted every branch and level of the state: the 

ian bureaucracy, the military and police, the legislatures, and the 

ciary. Efforts to root out corruption, including the passage of new 

and regulations and the establishment of an array of commis

have been only partially effective. Nonetheless, for ordinary cit

fighting corruption remains a matter of primary concern, partic

the corruption they experience on a day-to-day basis at the vill

ward offices, schools, government offices, courts, and police sta

Private investors, both domestic and foreign, are reluctant to co

their capital to Indonesia because of the high cost of doing bu

and the lack of consistent contract enforcement by a clean and i

tial judiciary. 

The new political system that President Yudhoyono inherite

made dealing with these pressing issues more complex than 

ously. Legislatures are more independent of the executive branc

there are now two legislative bodies at the national level. Prov

and district governments are more powerful and have greater 

omy vis-à-vis the central government. The judicial system is no l

under the administrative and political control of the executive b

The military retains significant latent political influence. Noneth

the success of the 2004 electoral process gave the new system 

legitimacy, and, again in 2009, Yudhoyono enjoyed a strong po

mandate from voters to move the country forward. 

Foreign policy is frequently a significant issue in domestic po

particularly when it concerns relations with the United States, A

lia, or the complex tangle of problems in the Middle East. Yudh

has had to navigate these political minefields, given his ties 

United States from his prior military career and his cultivatio

228 
 

profile as a secular nationalist rather than an Islamist p

(although he is personally pious). When Indonesia cooper

the United States and Australia on counterterrorism meas

Yudhoyono administration has to be careful not to be labe

agent of a perceived Western “war on Islam.” Indonesia has 

to balance maintaining good relations with the West with su

the Palestinian cause and opposing the U.S.–led war in Iraq

sia has contributed troops, including Yudhoyono’s elder so

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Lebanon, while 

neously preventing private citizens from volunteering to fig

Hezbollah in the 2006 war with Israel. 

When Indonesia’s international treaty obligations have c

conflict with expressing solidarity with a fellow Muslim na

example, its March 2007 vote to approve UN Security Coun

lution 1747 on Iran’s nuclear-weapons program—the govern

been harshly criticized at home as a tool of Western inter

legislature has also attempted to force the president to face 

ing regarding this vote. In the late New Order period under 

Suharto (in office 1967–98), Indonesia had begun to projec

assertive presence in the international arena, correspondi

large population, strategic location, abundant natural resour

nomic success, and growing nationalism. After a setback of 

of focusing inward to solve its political and economic crisis

Indonesia began to reassert itself on the global stage as a 

constructive force, offering to help solve conflicts ranging 

Korean Peninsula to Iran, from Burma (Myanmar) to Iraq

sia’s good relations with independent Timor-Leste (East Ti

merly Timor Timur Province of Indonesia), and its implemen

a peace agreement in the Special Region of Aceh, have helpe

its case to play this role, largely free of criticism over its own 

human-rights issues. 

The Political Debate 

Indonesia has been a magnet for students of comparativ

as well as foreign diplomats and policy makers ever since 

dence from the Netherlands was declared in 1945. Fascina

Indonesia stems in part from its large population (estimated 

than 240 million people in 2009), strategic location, econom

tial, great cultural and ethnic diversity, and fragmented arc

geography confounding centralized administration. Equally 

ling is Indonesia’s tumultuous political history, from Indi

and Islamization to Dutch colonialism and an often violent d

zation process. 
Contemporary Indonesian political history can be divided int

periods, each defined by a central issue. First, during the 1950s

was the question of the political integrity of the state itself, bese

was by religious, regionalist, and ethnic revolts and rebellions

ond, and of great concern to U.S. policy makers, was the dri

became a rush to the left and the Indonesian Communist 

(PKI—see Glossary) during the period of Sukarno’s Guided D

racy (1959–65). Third, from 1966 to 1998, there was the dev

mentalist authoritarianism of Suharto’s army-dominated New O

Finally, since 1998, the year Suharto left the presidency, the su

ful transition to and ongoing consolidation of liberal democrac

provided inspiration for reformers and democrats in other Mu

majority societies. 

The political transition in Indonesia has produced a req

change among academic observers of Indonesian politics: Indo

has become a “normal” country that can be examined with all 

standard theoretical and methodological tools available. As b

some continue to debate the basic nature of the Indonesian 

Others, however, adopt a more micro-analytical approach, ex

ing trends in various policy areas, public opinion, etc., an app

that had been greatly hampered under the previous authori

regime. In addition to providing more varied empirical fodd

research, democratization in Indonesia has also resulted in 

greater freedom for researchers to conduct their studies. One co

sion on which most observers have agreed is that the comp

number, and interdependence of various social, cultural, econ

and political factors are so great that no single theory suffices. 

Harking back to previous debates regarding the basic nature 

Indonesian state, one of the broadest current discussions con

whether the still-fragile democratic order can be consolidated an

tained. Some scholars argue that the relatively nonviolent and g

nature of the transition bodes well for the future of Indonesian d

racy. As positive signs in this regard, they point to the success 

national elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009; the acquiescence (ho

grudging) of the security forces to the establishment of demo

and the consensual process and broad scope of the constitu

reforms passed between 1999 and 2002. Others posit that it i

cisely the lack of a cleaner and deeper break with the past that ha

ated internal contradictions that may doom the new democrac

instance, a substantial level of continuity in the political, mi

bureaucratic, and economic elite has meant that old habits have 

adapted to the new institutions and retained their strength, ensuri

superficiality of institutional change. There has been little accoun

ity, especially at the highest levels, for the political and economi

230 
 

 

of the New Order, fostering simmering resentments that could 

be tapped as a reservoir of opposition to democracy itse

importantly, despite a number of successful high-level pros

rampant bureaucratic, military, legislative, and judicial c

remains the most significant factor keeping private foreign 

on the sidelines. Their absence lowers economic growth rate

in turn hampers the performance legitimacy of the new de

regime. Whatever approach is used to describe and analyze In

government and politics, it requires an understanding of the le

and institutional structures of the system. 

The Constitutional Framework 

The legal basis of the Indonesian state is the 1945 con

promulgated the day after the August 17, 1945, proclamation 

pendence from the Netherlands and amended four times 

1999 and 2002. The original constitution was essentially a te

instrument hurriedly crafted by the Independence Preparato

mittee in the last months before the Japanese surrender (see T

nese Occupation, ch. 1). According to George McTurna

whose 1952 book Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia 

pioneering study of modern Indonesian politics, the constitu

considered “definitely provisional.” Provisional or not, the 

tion provided structural continuity in a period of political di

ity after 1998. Beginning with the preamble, which inv

principles of the Pancasila, the 37 articles of the constitution 

the boundaries of both Sukarno’s Old Order and Suhart

Order. Amendment of the 1945 constitution was one of the 

demands of the student movement that forced Suharto to 

1998, and as of 2009 was one of the few of those demands 

been largely fulfilled. Four amendments eliminated many am

and transformed the constitution into a more democratic fra

with extensive separation of powers and checks and balance

The Japanese efforts to establish an independent Indone

encouraged the writing of the 1945 constitution, which w

soon temporarily put aside and had not been fully imp

when the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands took 

December 27, 1949. The 1949 agreement called for the e

ment of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (RIS). Subseq

provisional constitution adopted in February 1950 provide

election of a constituent assembly to write a permanent con

(see The National Revolution, 1945–49, ch. 1). A rising tide 

radical nationalism, driven partly by perceptions that the R

Dutch scheme to divide and reconquer their former colony
 

 

moved political leaders in the direction of a unitary republic

Committee for the Preparation of the Constitution of the U

State was established on May 19, 1950, and on August 14 a 

constitution (technically an amendment to the RIS constitution

ratified, to be in force until an elected constituent assembly 

pleted its work. The new, interim constitution provided for a p

mentary system of government, in which the cabinet and the 

minister were responsible to a unicameral legislature. The pre

was to be head of state but without real executive power excep

catalyst in forming a cabinet. 

As the political parties wrestled ineffectually in the parliam

forum, dissident ethnic politicians and army officers joined in 

ing central authority and even engaged in armed rebellions in v

provinces between 1949 and 1962 (see The Road to Guided D

racy, 1950–65, ch. 1). Sukarno assumed an extra-constitutional 

tion from which he wielded paramount authority in imposin

more defined concept of Guided Democracy in 1959. This mov

backed by the senior military leaders whose revolutionary e

ences had already made them suspicious, even contemptuo

civilian politicians, and who were now dismayed by the disinteg

forces at work in the nation. The military moved to the politica

front, where it remained until 1998. 

Sukarno sought to legitimize his authority by returning to the 

constitution. He would have preferred to accomplish this goal c

tutionally by having the 402-member Constituent Assembly for

adopt the 1945 constitution. However, the Constituent Asse

elected in 1955 and divided along secular and religious lines, 

not muster the required two-thirds majority necessary to approv

constitutional provisions. According to political scientist Dan

Lev, the body deadlocked on two fundamental issues: the role of 

in the state and the question of federalism. Furthermore, divisi

these issues meant that ideological consensus among the antico

nist parties could not be translated into effective political cooper

As long as the Constituent Assembly failed to agree on a new c

tutional form, the interim constitution with its weak presidency 

tinued in force. Backed by the Indonesian National Armed F

(TNI—see Glossary) and a large part of the public, which was 

tient with the political impasse and the government’s failure to i

ment the promises of independence, on July 5, 1959, Sukarno de

the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and a return to the 

constitution. Martial law had already been proclaimed on Mar

1957, and Sukarno claimed that under martial law his legal aut

stemmed from his position as supreme commander of the TNI. 

232 
The national coat of arms of Indonesia depicts the Garuda—a

mythical bird—which symbolizes creative energy, the greatn

nation, and nature. The 8 feathers on the tail, 17 on each wing, a

the neck stand for the date of Indonesia’s independence (August 1

The shield symbolizes self-defense and protection in struggle

symbols on the shield represent the state philosophy of Panc

Glossary). The motto “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (“Unity in Dive

the banner signifies the unity of the Indonesian people des

diverse ethnic and cultural bac

Courtesy of Embassy of Indonesia, Washin

The original 1945 constitution proved to be extremely el

provisional legal framework for a modern state, subject 

interpretation depending upon the constellation of political 

control at any given time. Other than outlining the major st

tures, the document contained few specifics about relations 

citizens and the government and left open basic questio

rights and responsibilities of citizen and state. For example

28 states that “The freedom to associate and to assemble, to 

written and oral opinions, etc., shall be established by law

quent laws, however, did not fully recognize the fundamen

of the individual citizen stipulated by the constitution. The

have now been enshrined and further delineated in a new ch

human rights immediately following the original Article 2

cles 28A to 28J, approved in 2000. However, the 1945 docum

is an expression of revolutionary expectations about social 

nomic justice. The original Article 33 states that the econo

be organized cooperatively, that important branches of pr
affecting the lives of most people shall be controlled by the stat

that the state shall control natural resources for exploitation f

general welfare of the people. An additional clause introduc

2002 now states that the national “economic democracy” sh

organized on the basis of such principles as togetherness, effic

justice, sustainability, environmental perspectives, self-suffic

and balance. 

The political struggle from 1945 to 1959 over the constitu

framework of the state stemmed not from the ambiguities of the 

document nor its heavy weighting of executive power, but over 

disagreements about the nature of the state itself, particular

issues of federalism and the role of Islam. Once the common 

against Dutch imperialism had been won, the passionate differ

dividing various nationalist groups about the future of Indonesi

faced. The possibility of a federation of loosely knit region

denied by the use of force, first in crushing the Republic of 

Maluku (RMS) in 1950, then in suppressing the Darul Islam insu

cies in Jawa Barat, Aceh, and Sulawesi Selatan between 194

1962, and finally in defeating the Revolutionary Government 

Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and the Universal Struggle C

(Permesta) regional rebellions of 1957 to 1961. In subsequent de

the central government was always sensitive to the issue of se

ism, and the existence of a unitary republic, expressed through 

mary “Indonesian” national identity, seemed secure. The difficu

integrating an Islamic political identity with the Indonesian Pan

identity was no longer of primary importance by the late 1990

although hotly debated at times, was never a major stumbling bl

the constitutional-amendment process from 1999 to 2002 (see 

casila: The State Ideology, this ch.). 

The Structure of Government 

The original 1945 constitution established a presidential system 

significant parliamentary characteristics, whereas the amended c

tution establishes a pure presidential system with extensive sepa

of powers and checks and balances. Sovereignty in Indonesia is 

in the people, who exercise their will through six organs of st

roughly equal stature. The president and vice president lead the e

tive branch and are chosen as a team through direct, popular elec

the president is both head of state and head of government (see fi

Legislative power is vested in the People’s Representative C

(DPR) and the new but less powerful upper house, the Regional R

sentative Council (DPD). Although the People’s Consultative A

bly (MPR) is now no more than a joint sitting of the DPR and D

234 
retains separate powers that have been restricted to sweari

president and vice president, amending the constitution, an

final say in the impeachment process. At the apex of the jud

tem are the Supreme Court and the new Constitutional Cou

powers include reviewing the constitutionality of laws, reachi

dict on articles of impeachment, resolving disputes among sta

tions, dissolving political parties, and resolving electoral 

Significant decentralization of power to subnational autho

also been enshrined and delineated in the amended constitutio

Legislative Bodies 

People’s Representative Council 

Primary legislative authority is constitutionally vested in 

ple’s Representative Council (DPR; often referred to as the 

Representatives), which had 500 members in 1999, 550 me

2004, and 560 members in 2009. Members are elected for a 

term from multimember districts under an open-list system o

tional representation. These electoral districts consist either 

provinces (propinsi) or of several municipalities (kota) and r

(kabupaten) within the same province (see Elections, this ch

must win at least 2.5 percent of the national vote in order to 

seats. Thirty-eight national parties contested the 2009 elect

nine of those parties won seats in the DPR. Since 2004 the 

and police no longer have appointed seats in any legislati

Active members of these security forces were still disenfran

2009 but may be allowed to vote beginning in 2014. 

The DPR is led by a speaker and four deputy speakers elect

from the membership, and each has a policy portfolio. Work 

nized through 11 permanent commissions (like U.S. congressio

mittees), each with specific functional areas of government

corresponding to one or more ministries, and a budget comm

DPR also has other bodies that specialize in interparliamentary 

tion, the legislative agenda, ethics violations, and internal fina

administrative management. The DPR secretariat includes 

research unit designed to provide nonpartisan information to m

Individual members have only one or two staff members, who 

handle administrative tasks. Commissions also have a limited n

staff, mainly for administration. Party blocs have a handful o

sional staff supported by the DPR budget. The DPR’s budge

inadequate to support a professional legislature, and employe

secretariat are still technically civil servants in the Department 

Affairs. 
236 JUDICIAL

LOCAL GOVERNMENT 

CONSTITUTIONAL

COURT

ISLAMIC

HIGH COURT

HIGH

COURTS

RELIGIOUS

COURTS

PROVINCIAL

GOVERNMENT 

PROVINCIAL

GOVERNOR 

REGIONAL PEOPLE’S

REPRESENTATIVE

COUNCIL (DPRD)

REGIONAL PEOPLE’S

REPRESENTATIVE

COUNCIL (DPRD)

REGIONAL PEOPLE’S

REPRESENTATIVE

COUNCIL (DPRD) 

DISTRICT

GOVERNMENT 

MUNICIPAL

MAYOR

REGENT

SUBDISTRICT

HEAD 

VILLAGE

VILLAGE

VILLAGE

DISTRICT

COURTS 

MILITARY

COURTS 

STATE

ADMINISTRATIVE

COURTS 

TAXATION

REVIEW BOARD 

PEOPLE’S

CONSULTATIVE

ASSEMBLY (MPR)

PEOPLE’S

REPRESENTATIVE

COUNCIL (DPR)

REGIONAL

REPRESENTATIVE

COUNCIL (DPD) 

SUPREME

COURT 

BANK

INDONESIA 

PROVINCIAL

BRANCHES

PROVINCIAL

BRANCHES

GENERAL

ELECTIONS

COMMISSION 

ELECTION

OVERSIGHT

COMMISSION

CORRUPTION

ERADICATION

COMMISSION

JUDICIAL

COMMISSION

FINANCE

AUDIT BOARD 

LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE

PRESIDENT

VICE PRESIDENT

MINISTERS

DEPARTMENTS 

CABINET

COORDINATING

MINISTERSMINISTERS

OF STATE

ATTORNEY

GENERAL

STATE

SECRETARY

CABINET

SECRETARY

PRESIDENTIAL

ADVISORY

COUNCIL

COMMANDER

IN CHIEF,

ARMED FORCES

NATIONAL

POLICE CHIEF

SPECIALIZED

AGENCIES

INDEPENDENT BODIES
The legislative process in Indonesia has an extraordinary p

in Article 20(2) of the amended 1945 constitution, which 

bills to achieve the “joint approval” of the DPR and the pre

order to become law. The unique twist is that approval by t

dent takes place as part of the legislative committee delibera

when the bill is sent to the president for signature. Bills may 

ated by either the executive or the DPR; most still origina

executive branch. The president must issue a separate “pre

mandate” for each bill to the relevant cabinet minister to repr

executive branch in legislative deliberations. Issuance of this 

is normally not a problem when the government initiates a 

can be when the DPR is the initiating branch. Withholding t

date in essence gives the president a veto that cannot be ov

by the DPR, which cannot deliberate on a bill without e

branch participation. 

Legislative deliberations generally follow a four-step pro

first two of the four steps are a reading of the bill in a plenar

by a representative of the initiating branch, followed by 

response from the other branch. In the third step, the bill is re

further discussion and amendment to one of the permanent 

sions, or often instead to a working committee (panitia kerja 

or special committee (panitia khusus or pansus) formed on a

basis for the purpose of addressing that bill. This step is the 

the achievement of joint approval, and the executive branc

pates directly in these committee deliberations in the person o

evant minister or department officials. This step is also th

source of the president’s untrammeled veto power; if the 

withholds approval of the bill, it cannot move forward. In t

step, when a bill has achieved joint approval in committee

back to the plenary session for a final vote. The approved 

goes to the president for signature; Article 20(5) of the co

ensures that this is a formality, for any bill not signed by the 

within 30 days of its approval by the DPR automatically beco

(The president cannot exercise a veto at this point, as there 

third option of rejecting the bill and sending it back to th

Occasionally, circumstances compel the president to issue em

regulations rather than wait for this lengthy legislative proce

its course. In this case, during the legislative session immedi

lowing the issuance of such regulations, the DPR must appro

lacking such approval, they must be revoked. 

DPR deliberations are designed to produce consensus. 

political preference of the leadership to avoid overt expre

opposition or less than complete support. This practice is just

cultural predisposition to avoid, if possible, votes in which m
minority opposing positions are recorded. If votes are necessary

ever, a quorum requires a two-thirds majority. On issues of no

tion and appointment, voting is by secret ballot; on all other mat

is by a show of hands. 

The DPR also has an important role in various nonlegislative 

ters under the amended constitution. The DPR begins the impeac

process by approving an indictment that is sent to the Constitu

Court for trial. The DPR must approve declarations of war and 

treaties, and other international agreements initiated by the presid

also must approve the president’s appointment and dismissal 

commander in chief of the armed forces, the national police chie

members of the Judicial Commission. The DPR selects members 

Finance Audit Board (BPK) and three of the nine members of the 

stitutional Court; it also approves the Judicial Commission’s no

tions for Supreme Court justices. Finally, the president must co

the DPR’s views regarding Indonesia’s ambassadors to other cou

foreign ambassadors in Indonesia, and the granting of amnestie

pardons. In one of the few remaining vestiges of the parliam

characteristics of the political system under the original 1945 co

tion, the DPR has the right of interpellation, the power to summ

president before the legislature to answer questions. In practice, 

ever, the DPR has found this power difficult to enforce. 

The legislature has become a more vibrant, vocal branch o

ernment with increasing pluralism and freedom and the expans

the DPR’s constitutional authority. Nonetheless, most legislatio

originates in the executive branch. The DPR continues to lack 

cient professional research staff—whether attached to indiv

members, party blocs, commissions, or the legislature as a wh

and its constituency-outreach efforts remain limited as well. Th

islative process itself remains slow, and the DPR suffers fr

backlog of proposed bills waiting to enter the process. How

approximately 65 percent of the members elected in 2009 wer

to the DPR, and even among those reelected there is a group 

ested in reforming the institution, revising the standing ord

streamline the legislative process, and expanding the DPR bud

give it the resources to begin to study policy issues and draft le

tion on its own. 

Regional Representative Council 

The DPR’s less-powerful partner in the legislative proces

body established in October 2004 to represent regional interests 

national level: the Regional Representative Council (DPD; 

times referred to colloquially as the Senate). This 132-member 

238 
Main assembly building of Indonesia’s legislature, with the legislati

complex to 

Part of Indonesia’s legislative complex, including staff offices and 

rooms for the MPR, DPR, a

Courtesy Ya
meets on the same calendar as the DPR, which is required by th

stitution to hold sessions at least once every year. Four members 

each province are elected directly by voters for the same fiv

term as the DPR. To be eligible for nomination for the 2004 ele

candidates could not be affiliated with political parties, must 

collected 1,000 to 5,000 signatures from verified registered 

(depending on the size of the province), and must have resided 

province for five years. The DPR tried to strip the nonpartisa

residency requirements for the 2009 elections. However, the 

petitioned the Constitutional Court to overturn this decision as i

sistent with the constitutional intent for the DPD; the court sided 

the DPD and restored the provincial-residency requirement but 

that it was constitutional to allow for partisan DPD candidates

didates’ photographs appear on the ballot paper, and voters are 

ble to vote for one candidate; the four candidates with the h

vote totals win. 

The DPD is led by a speaker and two deputy speakers; one o

of the three leaders represents western, central, and eastern Indo

The DPD has divided itself into four committees, each of which 

with a set of policy areas. Its role in the legislative process is 

indirect than and subordinate to the DPR’s. The DPD can pr

bills to the DPR in the areas of regional autonomy; center–r

relations; the formation, division, and merger of regions; the ma

ment of natural resources and other economic resources; an

financial balance between the center and the regions. The consti

also specifies that the DPD may participate in the deliber

regarding bills in these areas, but it does not indicate how this s

happen, leaving that up to the two bodies to negotiate. The DPD 

also provide its opinion to the DPR on the state budget and on 

regarding taxation, education, and religion. Finally, the DPD 

oversight authority related to all of these policy areas; howe

cannot take action on the results of its inquiries, which go to the 

for further action. 

One of the first acts of the DPD after its establishment w

begin work on a constitutional amendment to increase its po

Passage of any amendments requires the support of a substantia

tion of the DPR, and it is not likely that the DPR would supp

amendment that would require it to share legislative power. 

2004 term, the proposal failed to garner sufficient support, 

commission has been established to study the issue, and it was 

the DPD would try again in the 2009 term. 

240 
 

 

 

People’s Consultative Assembly 

No longer the highest constitutional body, the People’s C

tive Assembly (MPR) nonetheless retains important roles in 

ical process. The MPR inaugurates the president and vice p

has the final say in the impeachment process, and remains 

body permitted to amend the constitution. The “Broad Ou

State Policy,” a document that theoretically established polic

lines for the next five years and was subject to MPR approv

the Suharto years, has been abolished because competing pre

candidates are expected to present their policy platforms to t

during the campaign. The MPR now consists solely of the 

of the DPR and DPD, having dropped the vague “function

delegates” as part of the constitutional reform process. The 

led by a speaker (who also must be a DPR member) and fou

speakers, two each from the DPR and the DPD. 

The Executive 

President and Vice President 

Indonesia’s government is a strong presidential system w

2004, significant checks and balances by the legislative and 

branches as well as by local authorities. The president and v

ident are directly elected as a ticket for a five-year term i

round system; if no ticket wins a simple majority in the fir

the two tickets that received the most votes advance to th

round. The winning presidential ticket must gain at least 20 

of the vote in half of the provinces. A president is limite

terms in office. The only qualifications for office provide

constitution are that the president be a native-born Indone

zen, never have acquired another citizenship, never have co

treason, and be “spiritually and physically capable” of th

Although the DPR is vested with primary legislative power, 

ident has de facto veto power over any legislation, with no 

ity of override by the DPR. The president serves as the 

commander of the armed forces. The president appoints 

members, with no requirement for legislative confirmation. 

Between 1945 and 2009, Indonesia had six presidents: 

(1945–67), Suharto (1967–98), Bacharuddin J. (B. J.) Habibi

99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001; also known as G

Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–4; Sukarnoputri means “dau

Sukarno”; it is not a family name), and Susilo Bambang Yu

(since 2004; often referred to as SBY). When Suharto was 

resign on May 21, 1998, Vice President Habibie became 
 

and immediately announced a package of political reform

included new legislative elections in June 1999. Although M

wati’s Indonesian Democracy Party–Struggle (PDI–P) won a p

ity in those elections, she was defeated in the MPR vote for pre

in October 1999 by Wahid when Habibie withdrew his candidac

lowing a vote of no confidence. The MPR then elected Megaw

Wahid’s vice president. Two years later, the MPR removed W

from office following allegations of corruption and incompe

and Megawati became president. Yudhoyono and vice presid

candidate Muhammad Yusuf Kalla defeated Megawati and 

other tickets in Indonesia’s first direct presidential elections in 

and September 2004. Yudhoyono was reelected, this time ru

with Bank Indonesia governor Budiono, in one round in July 20

Although the vice president is elected on a ticket with the pres

the question of their relationship is a political issue. This is i

because the level of political pluralism forces parties and cand

to form coalitions: in 2004 Yudhoyono, from the Democrat 

(PD), chose Kalla to obtain support from the much larger, better 

nized, and wealthier Golkar Party. This dynamic became even 

pronounced two months after they were inaugurated, when Kall

elected Golkar chairman at its party congress. During their adm

tration, Kalla was wont on occasion to take a different stance 

Yudhoyono on certain issues. Although privately Yudhoyono 

times admonished Kalla for this behavior, in public he insiste

they remained a solid team. Nonetheless, in early 2009 Yudh

began to distance himself from Kalla, signaling his intention to c

a different running mate. Following the April 2009 legislative 

tions, Yudhoyono surprised many by bucking the logic of party 

tions when he chose the technocratic, nonpartisan central b

Budiono as his vice presidential candidate; nonetheless, they 

easily elected with 60.8 percent of the vote. Kalla was unsucces

forming a ticket with Megawati, and instead ran with retired G

Wiranto, coming in a distant third place with 12 percent. Meg

and retired Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s f

son-in-law, placed second with 27 percent. 

The Cabinet 

The president appoints and is assisted by a cabinet of ministe

October 2009, Yudhoyono named his second “United Indonesia

inet, with 34 ministers representing six parties (the five that fo

the nominating coalition for his presidential ticket plus Go

Twenty departments were headed by ministers, and these depart

were grouped under three coordinating ministers: political, lega

242 
security affairs; economic affairs; and people’s welfare. The 

retary, who supports the president’s role as head of state, al

minister. There were 10 ministers of state, that is, ministers w

folios but without full departments. Yudhoyono also revive

of vice ministers, a practice allowed by law since 2008, appo

to ministries with particularly heavy workloads. Most of th

ministers were career bureaucrats rather than partisan or reti

tary appointees. In addition to the ministers, two high-rank

officials were accorded cabinet rank: the attorney general 

cabinet secretary. 

Specialized Agencies 

Specialized agencies and boards at the central government 

numerous and diverse. They include the National Developm

ning Board (Bappenas), the National Family Planning Coo

Agency (BKKBN), the Capital Investment Coordinatin

(BKPM), and the Agency for the Study and Application of Te

(BPPT). At lower levels there are regional planning agencie

ment boards, and development banks under the aegis of th

government. 

Presidential Advisory Council 

Article 16 of the amended constitution authorizes the pre

establish an advisory council, and a law passed in 2006 furth

fies this provision. Yudhoyono established the nine-member P

tial Advisory Council in 2007, but in 2009 this body was still 

determine what its role would be in relation to the cabine

advisers in the office of the president. The larger Supreme 

Council was abolished in 2002 by the Fourth Amendment. 

The Security Forces 

Article 30 of the constitution establishes the existence of 

nesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the National P

Indonesia (Polri). The constitution further specifies that th

the military is national defense, and the role of the police 

order and domestic security. However, the constitution 

explicitly establish the principle of civilian control of the 

forces, leaving this matter to the laws on the military an

Both of these institutions report directly to the president ra

through a cabinet minister, such as (for the military) the m

defense or (for the police) the minister of home affairs or th

ter of justice and human rights (see The Armed Forces in 

Life; The National Police, ch. 5). 
The Judiciary 

The Indonesian legal system is extraordinarily complex, the 

pendent state having inherited three sources of law: customa

adat law, traditionally the basis for resolving interpersonal dispu

the village environment; Islamic law (sharia), often applied t

putes between Muslims; and Dutch colonial law. Adat courts 

abolished in 1951, although customary means of dispute reso

are still in use in villages. The return to the 1945 constitution in 

meant that Dutch laws remained in force except as subsequ

altered or found to be inconsistent with the constitution. A cri

code enacted in 1981 expanded the legal rights of criminal d

dants. The government in 2009 was still reviewing its lega

Dutch civil and commercial laws in an effort to codify them in 

nesian terms. The types of law recognized in MPR Decree No

1999 include the constitution, MPR decrees, statutes passed b

DPR and ratified by the president, government regulations pr

gated by the president to implement a statute, presidential dec

to implement the constitution or government regulations, other i

menting regulations such as ministerial regulations and instruc

and local (provincial and district) regulations. Obviously, the e

tive enjoys enormous discretion in determining what is law. 

Article 24 of the amended constitution states that judicial powe

be vested in the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and su

nate courts established by law, and that the organization and comp

of courts shall be established by law. In Sukarno’s Guided Demo

the justice system became a tool of the revolution, and any prete

an independent judiciary was abandoned. Although in theory one 

goals of the New Order was to restore the rule of law, in practi

judiciary remained both corrupt and a means for suppressing po

dissent. Judicial reform was thus a key demand of the 1998 s

movement and remains one of the most important items on the po

reform agenda. Important steps were taken in this regard as part 

1999–2002 constitutional-amendment process. A new body, the C

tutional Court, was established to review the constitutionality of 

resolve disputes among the various branches and levels of govern

have final say in the dissolution of political parties, and decide di

over election results. The Constitutional Court also plays a role 

presidential-impeachment process by issuing a verdict on an indic

made by the DPR. The court has nine justices, three each nomina

the Supreme Court, the DPR, and the president. Justices must be k

edgeable about the constitution and may not be state officials. The 

stitutional Court chief justice and deputy chief justices are chos

and from among the justices. 

244 
 

 

 

The judicial branch stands coequal with the executive an

tive branches. Justices of the Supreme Court are nominate

independent Judicial Commission for approval by the DPR 

mal appointment by the president. The chief justice and dep

justice are elected by and from among the justices. Membe

Judicial Commission must have a legal background or ex

and are appointed and dismissed by the president with the 

of the DPR. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdictio

putes between courts of the different court systems and 

courts located in different regions. It can annul decisions 

(appellate) courts on points of law, not fact. On request, it 

advisory opinions to the government and guidance to lowe

However, its powers of judicial review are limited to dec

whether administrative regulations and local regulations co

the laws as passed by the DPR. Another reform to streng

system of checks and balances was the 2004 shift of admin

and financial control over the lower courts from the Depar

Justice (now called the Department of Justice and Human R

the Supreme Court. 

Four different court systems operate below the Suprem

First, there are courts of general civil and criminal jurisdict

trict courts are the courts of first instance. High courts (at th

cial level) are appellate courts. Following the Dutch lega

cases are decided by panels of judges rather than juries. So

law on which parties to a dispute may base their claims 

international law (to date rarely used); modern Indonesian 

which has replaced but is often rooted in colonial-era Rom

civil law; and adat (customary) law, which differs widel

ethnic groups (see Tradition and Multiethnicity, ch. 2). T

system remains highly corrupt, with verdicts in both civil an

nal cases influenced by bribery by both plaintiffs and de

Although judicial reform is key to consolidating democ

establishing a more favorable investment climate, efforts a

reform have so far been half-hearted and largely ineffective

Second, religious courts exist throughout Indonesia to res

putes between Muslims in matters of marriage, divorce, inh

and gifts. These district-level courts base their decisions on 

law. As in the secular court system, religious high courts are 

courts at the provincial level. One of the persistent tensions 

Muslims and the state arises from efforts to expand the jurisd

the religious courts. 

Third, the state administrative court system resolves matter

ing to the decisions of government officials. In addition, the 
 

 

Review Board adjudicates taxation disputes. Other adminis

courts were eliminated as part of the government’s effort to sim

and standardize the court system. 

Fourth, military courts have jurisdiction over TNI members. 

the 1965 coup attempt, temporary special military courts were 

authority to try military personnel and civilians alleged to be inv

in the abortive coup (see The Coup and Its Aftermath, 1965–66, 

Hundreds of sentences ranging from 20 years’ imprisonment to 

were meted out by the special military courts, with executions 

ring more than two decades after the event. The DPR has inclu

provision in a draft military law that would require all military p

nel accused of nonmilitary crimes to be investigated by civilian 

cutors and tried by the civil court system. The military lead

opposed this provision, and it is still being debated. 

Another court, the Corruption Crimes Court (Tipikor Court

established in 2003 to confront widespread corruption in Indo

especially in cases of financial loss to the state and as a deterr

future corruption. In 2006, however, the Constitutional Court 

that the Tipikor had no legal basis and gave the DPR and the go

ment until December 2009 to pass a law to justify the court’s c

ued existence. Tipikor was allowed to continue to function d

this period, and in September 2009 the DPR complied with app

ate enabling legislation, thus ensuring the court’s constitutiona

Independent Bodies 

The Finance Audit Board is specified in Chapter VIIIA of th

stitution as an independent body existing at both the national an

vincial levels to conduct official examinations of the governm

finances. The board reports to the DPR and DPD, which appro

national budget, and to each Regional People’s Representative 

cil (DPRD), the legislative body that approves the budget at th

vincial, municipality, or regency level of government. The b

members are chosen by the DPR with nonbinding input by the D

The constitution established a number of independent b

besides the Finance Audit Board and the Judicial Commissi

Article 22E(5), the constitution requires that elections shall be 

aged by an independent commission. The electoral law establish

General Elections Commission (KPU), whose members are 

nated by the president and chosen by the DPR following a hearin

confirmation process called in Indonesia a “fit and proper test.

weakness of this system, as with the selection process for many 

bodies in Indonesia, is that the president nominates multiple 

dates for each position on the commission, from which the DPR 

246 
 

 

 

to select. Nominating multiple rather than single candidates m

process much more vulnerable to favoritism and corruptio

fact the DPR was widely criticized for choosing inexperien

much more qualified candidates in its selections of KPU com

ers in 2007. In Article 23D, the constitution also established 

bank, known as Bank Indonesia (see Monetary and Excha

Policy, ch. 3). The constitution only establishes the existen

bank, leaving all of the details on its composition, status, 

accountability and independence to the central bank law. 

Local Government 

Government administration operates through descending 

administrative subunits. Indonesia is made up of 33 provinces 

cial regions (each led by a governor), up from 27 at the end of 

Order in 1998, as some provinces were subdivided, a process 

yet continue. There are two special regions (daerah istimew

and Yogyakarta) and one special capital-city region (daerah 

Jakarta). The 30 provinces (propinsi), in turn, are subdivided 

tricts, called municipalities (kota, led by a mayor) in urban 

regencies (kabupaten, led by a regent or bupati) in rural a

below that into subdistricts (kecamatan, led by a camat). At th

tier of the administrative hierarchy is the village (desa). Acc

the Department of Home Affairs, Indonesia in 2009 had 34

cies, 91 municipalities, 5,263 subdistricts, and 66,979 village

The New Order was a highly centralized system, but su

governance has undergone significant change since 1999

year, the Habibie administration introduced two new law

tively known as “regional autonomy policy,” one on region

nance and the other on the financial relationship between t

and the regions. This policy was further codified between 

2002 in amendments to Chapter VI of the 1945 constitution

revised regional autonomy laws replaced the 1999 laws. Th

legal framework remains based on Indonesia as a unitary sta

the Dutch-imposed RIS in 1949–50, federalism has been ana

Indonesian politicians and the public. At the end of the 1945

as part of the negotiations over the terms of independence, t

insisted that the nationalist Republic of Indonesia join with 

ous puppet states they had established around the archipelag

the RIS. Nationalists saw this action as an attempt to main

rect Dutch control over Indonesia, and Sukarno ended th

experiment only eight months later. One of the initial agree

1999, at the outset of the constitutional amendment proces

maintain Indonesia as a unitary state, as it has been since 195
 

 

Indonesia, nonetheless, now enjoys a level of political decent

tion greater even than some federal systems. Regional auto

reserves six policy areas to the central government: foreign rela

national defense, internal security, justice, monetary policy, and re

All other policy areas are primarily handled by provincial and d

governments, with the central government’s role limited to interre

coordination, setting service-delivery standards, and providing 

grants. The 1999 laws bypassed the provincial governments and 

district governments the primary locus of decentralized authority

was because, at the time, the overriding concern was that the unf

democratic transition might lead to the breakup of the nation, a

happened in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The assumption w

districts would not have the size, resources, or distinctive ethnic id

sufficient to mount a separatist challenge to the center. This conce

receded significantly by the 2004 legal reforms, and provincial go

ments regained some measure of authority. 

Service design, planning, and delivery are concentrated at th

vincial and district levels, although these subnational authorities 

have the power to raise much revenue on their own. Taxation re

primarily the prerogative of the central government, which the

vides block grants to local authorities. The size of these grants fo

province or district is determined by a complex formula that take

account the geographic size, population, and natural resource b

each unit. Although provinces and districts rich in natural reso

cannot keep all of the revenues associated with those resources

receive a much higher share than under the New Order. 

Another reform introduced in the revised regional autonomy 

of 2004 is that governors, mayors, and bupatis are now di

elected for the first time in Indonesia’s history. Under the New O

they had been appointed by the central government, and beginn

1999 they were elected by the local assembly. Since 2005, 

terms of these local chief executives expired, elections for 

replacements for five-year terms have occurred on a rolling 

Despite fears of administrative chaos, fraud, or violence, these 

elections have generally proceeded smoothly, as was the case w

national elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009. 

Parallel to their chief executives, each province, municipalit

regency also has a local assembly, similar to the DPR, calle

Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD). These co

range in size from 20 to 100 members, depending on the admi

tive level and the population of the region. They are elected at the 

time as the DPR and for the same five-year term, which means th

terms of the regional assemblies and their corresponding regiona

executives are never the same. The DPRDs have powers similar 

248 
Political grafitti, “We are forced 

to cultivate on the moon,” 

Yogyakarta, 2002 

Courtesy Eric Stein 

DPR: approving the regional government budget, passing 

statutes, and providing oversight of the regional government. 

Five provincial-level units have special status, in additio

devolution of power to all provinces under regional autonom

and Papua (which was divided in two in 2005), the two r

provincial-level units with active separatist movements o

Timor separated from Indonesia in 1999, were granted “speci

omy.” Jakarta and Yogyakarta have “special-region” status, 

in practice they are not much different from other provin

main difference in Jakarta is that its five municipalities, w

have mayors, do not have corresponding assemblies (the onl

bly is at the provincial level). In Yogyakarta the primary diff

that the sultan of the larger of the two palaces or kratons 

Sultan Hamengkubuwono X) automatically becomes govern

Indonesia’s experience in East Timor (Timor Timur Prov

the course of which President Habibie offered the province a 

dum on special autonomy, Timorese voters defeated that ref

and Indonesia was forced to acknowledge its independenc

concerns for the government that this would set an example 

provinces. This fear has turned out to be largely unjustified, ho

no significant new separatist movements appeared in any p

where they did not already exist prior to 1999. The main 

impact of Timor-Leste’s independence was to somewhat e

existing separatist sentiments in Aceh and Papua. In Aceh in p

a student-led group called the Aceh Referendum Informatio

(SIRA) sprang up not long after Habibie’s offer to East T

posted banners in the province calling for a referendum. Non

Aceh subsequently turned its focus to special autonomy an

peace negotiations (see Separatist Rebellions, ch. 5). In Papua 
 

 

of a UN-administered referendum reminded many of the region’

decolonization process in the 1960s, the legitimacy of which 

questioned by many Papuans. As in Aceh, however, the focus in 

then turned to a debate over special autonomy. 

Aceh 

The Special Region of Aceh (called Nanggroe Aceh Daruss

meaning the State of Aceh, Abode of Peace, from 1999 to 200

northwestern Sumatra, is the area of Indonesia where the Is

character of the population is the most pronounced. The Ace

demand for autonomy, expressed in support for the 1950s 

Islam rebellion, was partially met by the central government’s a

tance of a “special-region” status for the province in 1959, allo

a higher-than-usual official Indonesian respect for Islamic law 

custom. This special-region status, together with growing prosp

brought Aceh into the Indonesian mainstream. Nevertheless, 

early twenty-first century the idea of an independent state wa

alive by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Thought to have 

crushed in the mid-1970s, the guerrilla campaign of the insur

under the leadership of Swedish-based Hasan di Tiro and with 

yan support, renewed its hit-and-run warfare in the late 1980s

ing to build on economic and social grievances. The military re

with crushing force but never was able to defeat the separatists 

President Habibie’s offer in 1999 to revive the railroad 

Medan in Sumatera Utara Province to Aceh’s capital, Banda 

and other economic-development projects in exchange for Ace

loyalty to Jakarta was seen as a continuation of the patronizing

tralistic politics of the New Order. Habibie’s policy on East 

led to growing calls among Acehnese civilians for a similar re

dum. In response, the central government hurriedly passed a 

law updating Aceh’s “special-autonomy” status, including pa

larly the right to incorporate elements of Islamic law into local 

codes, which had not actually been a demand of most Aceh

President Wahid involved international participants in resolut

the conflict for the first time by inviting the Geneva-based 

Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to help mediate a C

tion of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). Although Vice Pre

Megawati was not particularly supportive of this policy, she al

the process to continue after she became president in July 200

the COHA was signed in December 2002. Nonetheless, by 

2003 the agreement had broken down. President Megawati de

martial law in Aceh and unleashed the military once again. 

250 
 

The military had much more success than previously in bre

GAM cells, but it still could not achieve final victory. Follo

party’s defeat in the legislative elections of April 2004, M

lifted martial law in May. In December 2004, a massive ea

and tsunami struck Aceh, following which both the governm

newly elected President Yudhoyono and the rebels returne

negotiating table, this time with facilitation by former Finn

dent Martti Ahtisaari through his nongovernmental organizati

Management Initiative. A memorandum of understanding 

the peace agreement was signed in August 2005 and beg

implemented in September. A joint civilian effort between t

pean Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian 

(ASEAN), called the Aceh Monitoring Mission, monitored t

process. Ahtisaari was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 200

for his efforts in Aceh. 

For its part, GAM relinquished the goal of independenc

fighters were demobilized and their arms destroyed in public 

nies between September and December 2005. The central gov

withdrew some military forces and paramilitary police units 

province. Funds were set up to provide cash or land (or both

ous categories of demobilized GAM ex-combatants and supp

well as (in a controversial move) pro-Indonesian militias, and 

programs were established to provide job skills. A new law o

nance in Aceh replaced the special-autonomy law, and direct 

for governor, mayors, and bupatis occurred in December 200

formally dissolved itself in January 2006, but remnants may 

A GAM-affiliated ticket running as independents, Irwandi Y

Muhammad Nazar (the former leader of SIRA), were electe

ernor and vice governor, respectively, and GAM-affiliated c

also won in 11 of the 19 districts holding elections (in two 

districts the bupati’s term had not yet expired). Acehnese w

allowed to form local political parties, unlike in the remaind

country, to contest the 2009 special-region and district le

elections. Although the Aceh–Nias Rehabilitation and Recon

Agency (BRR), set up in the wake of the tsunami, was dis

early 2009, the central government and international donor

heavily invested in reinforcing the peace process and su

reconstruction in Aceh. 

Papua 

Papua—formerly called at various times Irian Jaya, West Ir

Papua, Dutch New Guinea, and West New Guinea—remain

Dutch control after Indonesian independence in 1949. A com
 

of Indonesian political and military pressure and international e

led to an October 1962 Dutch transfer of sovereignty to the UN 

porary Executive Authority, which was supported by a military 

vation force that oversaw the cease-fire. In May 1963, the UN 

Indonesia full administrative control. After a controversial 1969 

of Free Choice,” the territory, which the Indonesians called Irian 

(West Irian) until 1972, was integrated into the republic as Indon

twenty-sixth province and later renamed Irian Jaya (Victorious 

In 2000, in a vain attempt to dampen separatist sentiments, Pre

Wahid renamed the province Papua. In a move widely perceiv

Papua as an effort to divide and conquer, President Megawati in 

set in motion a tortuous three-year process by which the northw

portion was split off to form the new province of Irian Jaya Barat 

Irian Jaya), with the eastern two-thirds retaining the name Papua. 

Jaya Barat was renamed Papua Barat in 2007.) Further division 

rump Papua was blocked at the time, although various proposals 

many as four new provinces remain in circulation. Rich in n

resources, this is Indonesia’s least densely populated region. Th

tral government’s efforts to exploit these resources and to assi

indigenous Papuans, who are racially Melanesian, into the na

administration and culture have met with sporadic armed resi

from the Free Papua Organization (OPM) and have aroused in

tional concerns. 

Although the OPM is a marginal domestic actor, more visi

an international symbol, the fact of its existence has been used 

central government to justify suspicions about Papuan loyaltie

an intimidating Indonesian military presence in the region, lead

human-rights abuses. Cultural differences between Indonesian

the indigenous population, and complaints about the “Indonesi

tion” of Papua, have exacerbated tensions. The cultural conf

aggravated by resentment of racially Malay in-migrants (Jav

Buginese, Bataks, and other groups) from other parts of Indo

who dominate the state bureaucracy and urban economies. D

human-rights abuses and ethnic tensions, charges by some in

tional activists that the central government is waging genoc

Papua are overblown. 

As in Aceh, the central government has responded to unr

Papua with both repression and a new “special-autonomy” law

law, passed in December 2002, provided for a much greater sh

Papua’s natural resource wealth to return to the region as block 

and specifies that these funds should prioritize the infrastructure

cation, and health sectors. The law also provided for the establis

of a special upper house of the local legislature, the Papuan Pe

252 
Council (MRP). This body consists of representatives of 

leaders, traditional (adat) leaders, and women. The MRP is 

in all decisions regarding special autonomy, in any proposals 

vide Papua, and in vetting candidates for governor, mayor, an

to ensure that they are native Papuans. Implementation of thi

been slow and partial. The enhanced fiscal resources began t

the region immediately, but without local-government capac

these funds properly, much has been wasted in corruption or 

priate projects. The MRP did not form until November 2005 

immediately thrust into the uncomfortable position of havin

on the formation of the new province of Irian Jaya Barat and 

torial candidates in both provinces. In February 2006, the fi

elections for governor proceeded in both Irian Jaya Barat an

despite continued controversy regarding the sheer existenc

new province. At first the provincial government of Irian Ja

did not receive special-autonomy funds (instead relying for 

tence solely on support provided by the central governmen

July 2008 the DPR passed a law mandating that special a

also be implemented fully in the renamed Papua Barat. 

Problems in Papua have implications for Indonesia’s fore

tions as well, particularly with neighboring Papua New Gu

Australia. The border crossing with Papua New Guinea on 

coast near Jayapura reopened in late 2005, but relations with 

lia soured after it granted 42 Papuan boat people temporar

tion visas in March 2006. Despite resolution of the separatist 

in East Timor and Aceh, albeit via very different outcomes, i

that problems in Papua will continue to fester for many yea

central government does not yet seem serious about addressi

there in a systematic manner. 

Political Culture 

Following the constitutional amendments of 1999 to 2

reformed Indonesian political system is characterized by 

institutions labeled a “difficult combination” in many oth

tries: a powerful presidency and multiparty politics. There i

term for the president as well as separate popular elections, 

roughly equal democratic legitimacy, for the president 

national legislature. Some of the dangers inherent in this sy

divided government, in which the presidency and the legisl

controlled by different political parties, and the possibility 

ing as president a political outsider who has no experienc

political compromises in the legislature. These dangers are 

bated in a multiparty polity, in which the likelihood of a sin
 

controlling the legislature is much lower than in a two-party sy

Under this difficult combination of institutions, deadlock can 

between the president and the legislature, leading one or both 

tempted to use extra-constitutional means to break the dea

When that occurs, democracy itself can be threatened. 

The strong presidential system tends to be associated with 

more of a “winner-take-all” political culture than has been evid

Indonesia since 1999. One of the hallmarks of the new Indon

democracy is that although its institutions are strongly presid

many of its practices are much more common in multiparty p

mentary government, including numerous possible inclusi

coalitions as well as consensus-based decision making. These 

sionary and consensual practices have contributed positively to 

ing the blending of a strong presidency with multiparty p

function fairly well so far in Indonesia. This style of governanc

be linked to other political cultures in Indonesia, particularly 

nese and Islamic, as well as to the cultural roots of Pancasila. 

Inclusionary Coalitions 

The Indonesian political party system is as highly fragmented 

the 2009 elections as it was in the 1950s. According to the La

Taagepera Index (see Glossary), there are 6.1 “effective” po

parties in the 2009 DPR versus 6.4 in the legislature followin

1955 elections. Nonetheless, all of the major parties (and even 

of the minor ones) cluster around the middle of the political spec

Thus, although the contemporary party system is equally fragm

it is less polarized than in the 1950s. At that time, on the right e

the spectrum, both of the two major Muslim-based parties—N

latul Ulama and the Consultative Council of Indonesian Mu

(Masyumi)—were Islamist, favoring the implementation of Is

law. Now, of the four major Muslim-based parties, only two ar

mist, and only one of these as a matter of principle, the other 

political expediency. The other two parties take a much more m

ate stance (see Muslim Parties, this ch.). On the left end of the 

trum, in the 1950s the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) w

most organized and grassroots-based of all the major parties, an

the largest communist party outside of the Soviet bloc and C

There is no radical leftist equivalent in the contemporary Indon

party system. In 1999 the Democratic People’s Party (PRD), 

was the only party to include a hammer and sickle in its symbo

barely 0.1 percent of the national vote, and its founder, Bu

Sujatmiko, joined the national leadership board of, and in 200

elected to, the DPR from Megawati’s PDI–P. 

254 
The consequence of this clustering around the middle in 

temporary party system is that parties mainly compete for 

spoils rather than act on a programmatic basis. Coalition-bu

thus a key element in determining political prosperity and e

vival. High fragmentation means that in order to build even 

icant bloc of votes (much less an outright majority), the 

often must include several partners. Low polarization mean

three major and six smaller parties are potential coalition 

with each other. Both of these rules have proven to hold in 

sia. With decentralization and the inauguration of direct el

governors, mayors, and bupatis beginning in 2005, there 

hundreds of examples from around the nation of numerous

coalitions being formed based on parties’ local strength

these local coalitions often do not match the parties’ politi

tions at the national level. The two parties that are farthest 

the political spectrum—the strongly secular PDI–P and the 

Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)—have even form

coalitions when it suited their needs. 

The coalition pattern at the national level has set the tone 

local alliances. The presidential election process in the MPR 

saw intense jockeying among most of the parties other than th

in a successful effort to deny front-runner Megawati the pr

The newly elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, then 

some of these erstwhile supporters by reaching out to Mega

supporting her nomination for vice president, which she 

Their first cabinet included ministers from all five major pa

this pattern was maintained throughout subsequent reshu

Megawati’s rise to the presidency in 2001. Prior to the 2004 l

elections, most parties did not reveal their preferred president

date in order to maximize their coalitional possibilities in 

round of the direct presidential elections later in the year. Tha

included some strange bedfellows, such as former military co

General Wiranto, accused by many of human-rights abuses in 

transition and the 1999 East Timor referendum, gaining supp

former President Wahid (a long-time human-rights activist) 

latter was disqualified from becoming a candidate himself. 

brother Salahuddin Wahid even resigned from the Nationa

Rights Commission to be Wiranto’s running mate. The c

shifted again for the second round, with the parties behind 

losing tickets having to support either Megawati or Susilo B

Yudhoyono. The inclusionary pattern broke down briefly f

Yudhoyono’s election, when Golkar, the PDI–P, the National 

ing Party (PKB), and the Reform Star Party (PBR) formed the 
Front and took all DPR leadership positions for themselves

exception proved the rule, however, as this maneuver was percei

inappropriate, and within weeks the committee leaderships had 

reshuffled to include all parties. In addition, Yudhoyono’s first c

even included some figures affiliated with some of the National 

parties, creating links “across the aisle,” even if these people ten

be marginal within their parties and were not officially repres

their parties in the cabinet. Yudhoyono also worked assiduou

bring more and more of those parties over into his camp, leavin

PDI–P as the only steadfast opposition to his administration. 

This inclusionary political culture was less prominent durin

2009 presidential elections but, after those elections, once 

returned to the fore. Despite Golkar’s position as the second-l

party after Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party (PD), Yudhoyono deci

jettison Muhammad Yusuf Kalla as his running mate for reele

Following the logic of the inclusionary political culture, all of 

hoyono’s presidential coalition partners expected him to choos

of their leaders as his new running mate. Instead, Yudhoyono 

the nonpartisan, technocratic economist Budiono, who had serv

his coordinating minister for economic policy before becoming 

ernor of Bank Indonesia. Kalla and Megawati failed to form a 

tion of the second- and third-largest parties, instead settlin

coalitions with Wiranto of the People’s Conscience Party (H

Party) and Prabowo Subianto of the Great Indonesia Movement 

(Gerindra Party), respectively. Nonetheless, after Yudhoyono w

presidential election with exactly the same large majority as in 

(60.8 percent), he still turned to Kalla and Megawati to negoti

inclusionary cabinet. Megawati rebuffed him, and so the c

formed in October 2009 did not include representatives fro

PDI–P, the Hanura Party, or the Gerindra Party, but it did includ

resentatives from Golkar as well as the five parties that nominat

Yudhoyono-Budiono ticket: the PD, PKS, National Mandate 

(PAN), Development Unity Party (PPP), and PKB. 

Consensus-Based Decision Making 

One of the ironies of Indonesian political culture is that 

Suharto’s New Order paid lip service to the achievement of co

sus through deliberation as being an integral part of “Pan

Democracy,” in reality the system was then highly centralized, 

cratic, and nonparticipatory, and instead it is the new democrac

has actually adopted consultative consensus. The preferenc

deliberation and consensus is partly driven by the exigenc

shifting inclusionary coalitions described above. However, ev

256 
 

situations in which a strong majority coalition already exis

nesian political elites have preferred to continue to work to 

consensus where practical. 

This cultural predilection was strongly evident in t

debates over constitutional reforms from 1999 to 2002 and 

the main reasons those reforms took three years to achie

than one, as originally planned. In this case, the achievemen

sensus also has an instrumental rationale: because the const

the source of the basic rules of politics, the wider the accep

those rules, the more likely they are to be followed in pract

tributing to democratic stability. Nevertheless, this predile

also manifested itself even when an instrumental rationale is 

such as in the DPR. The DPR has continued the New Order 

of dividing all leadership positions—from speaker down t

committee chair—among all parties proportional to each 

share of seats, rather than just a majority coalition. There is 

to form an all-party coalition in support of the speaker or t

dent; rather, this practice is rooted in a desire to give ever

voice in the legislative process. Legislators have also seen v

majority rule as a last resort, preferring to achieve consensu

islation among all party blocs, even if this means extended 

tions and compromises. This practice has been one of th

contributing to the DPR’s very low legislative output. 

Traditional Political Culture 

Public tolerance of President Yudhoyono’s careful, del

decision-making style and of the slow, consensus-based le

process is partly due to the way these political practice

shared cultural values and expectations about leadership. In 

as ethnically diverse as Indonesia—from Melanesian tribes 

to Chinese-Indonesian billionaires in Jakarta—and with its 

tion differentially incorporated into the modern political eco

is difficult to identify a political culture shared by all Ind

(see Sources of Local Identification, ch. 2). Nevertheless, 

major cultural forces at work that do influence the politi

ments of large groups of Indonesians. 

There are numerous traditional political cultures in Indon

many aspects of modern Indonesian government and bureaucra

Javanese cultural underpinnings. Even though Indonesia is 

mosaic, the Javanese, with about 41 percent of the total populati

far the largest single ethnic group. Moreover, they fill—to a deg

what greater than their population ratio—the most important rol

ernment and the military. Javanese cultural predispositions 
influence the way the government appeals to and interacts with the 

lation. Although the Javanese kingship model was particularly app

ate for understanding Suharto and the authoritarian New Or

continues to have relevance in democratic Indonesia (see Javanese, 

Political power on Java historically was deployed through a 

monial bureaucratic state in which proximity to the ruler was th

to command and rewards. This power can be described in term

patron–client relationship in which the patron is the bapak (fat

elder). The terms of deference and obedience to the ruler are 

ceived in the Javanese gusti–kawula (lord–subject) formul

which describes man’s relationship to God as well as the sub

relationship to his ruler. The reciprocal trait for obedience is be

lence. In other words, benefits flow from the center to the obe

By extension, government’s developmental activities are a bo

the loyal. Bureaucratically, Javanese culture is suffused with a

tude of obedience—respect for those more senior, conform

hierarchical authority, and avoidance of confrontation—charac

tics of the preindependence priyayi (see Glossary) class whose 

go back to the traditional Javanese courts. 

Javanism (kejawen) also has a mystical, magical dimension 

religiously syncretic belief system, which integrates pre-Indian, I

and Islamic beliefs. Its practices include animistic beliefs, which 

sacred heirlooms (pusaka) with animating spirits, and rites of pa

whose antecedents are pre-Islamic. Javanism also encompass

introspective ascetic practices of kebatinan (see Glossary), mys

as related to one’s inner self, that seek to connect the microcos

the self to the macrocosms of the universe (see Islam, ch. 2). The 

tics of Javanism have been defensive, seeking to preserve its par

heterogeneous practices from demands for Islamic orthodoxy. 

Islamic Political Culture 

According to the 2000 census, 86.1 percent of the populati

2009 an estimated 240.3 million people) identified themselv

Muslim, making Indonesia the largest Muslim nation in the w

united with the universal Islamic community (ummah) in the p

sion and practice of the faith (see Religion and Worldview, c

The appeal of Islam did not weaken when modern secular nat

ism became the predominant basis for the independent Indon

state. In fact, given the prominence of Islamic proselytizatio

reinvigoration, the people’s desire to maintain Islamic instit

and moral values arguably is at an all-time high in Indonesia. 

is, however, a distinction between Islam as a cultural value s

and Islam as a political movement. 

258 
 

 

 

 

Islam in Indonesia is not monolithic. Indonesia’s nomin

tistical Muslims, referred to as abangan (see Glossary), ar

with varying degrees of self-awareness, believers in kebati

notoriously difficult to parse out the percentage of Indones

lims who are abangan and those who are santri (see Gloss

term for orthodox believers. What is clear is that the latter h

gaining ground since the 1970s and are probably now a ma

the population as a whole. The vote totals of Muslim and 

political parties, about 37 percent in both 1999 and 2004 a

26 percent in 2009, are not a very good measurement of th

of orthodox Islam, as many santri are personally pious bu

that religion should be kept out of politics and thus suppor

nationalist parties (see Muslim Parties, this ch.). Furtherm

orthodox are themselves divided into traditionalists and mo

and each of these streams then subdivides into extremist, c

tive, moderate, and liberal camps (see Political Dynamics, t

The principal organization reflecting the traditionalist o

Nahdlatul Ulama (literally, “revival of the religious te

founded in 1926. Nahdlatul Ulama has its roots in the traditio

Islamic schools (pesantren) of central and eastern Java. 

more than 40 million members, Nahdlatul Ulama is the larg

lim organization in the world. Modernist, or reformist, Islam 

nesia is best exemplified by the Muhammadiyah (Follo

Muhammad), which claims 30 million members. The latter 

tion was founded in 1912, when the spirit of the Islamic refor

ment born in Egypt in the late nineteenth century reached S

Asia. In addition to their reform agenda, modernists sought 

(critics argue Arabize) Indonesian Islam. 

Both santri streams found formal political expressio

postindependence multiparty system. Masyumi was the main 

vehicle for the modernists. However, its apparent suppor

PRRI–Permesta regional rebellions between 1957 and 196

constraints on its activities, and the party was banned in 195

latul Ulama directly competed as a party in the politics of t

and, seeking to capitalize on Masyumi’s banning, collabora

Sukarno in the hope of winning patronage and followers. N

Ulama also hoped to stop the seemingly inexorable advan

secular left under the leadership of the PKI. Islamic politic

were prohibited from advancing an explicitly Islamist messa

New Order, but traditional systems of communication w

community of believers, including instruction in Islamic sch

mosque sermons, passed judgments on politics and politici

so-called “hard” dakwah (vigorous promotion of Islam). 
 

The followers of the hard dakwah form a minority, albeit a 

one. Some Islamists might be disaffected with the state; howev

goal of urban, middle-class Muslims, who share in the benef

government economic policies and are relatively untouched b

preaching of rural Muslim teachers, is not to overthrow demo

They want to transform the government from within to make it

conform more with Islamic values, a focus not on the state itse

on reforming policies and practices that are offensive. The 

that energize middle-class Muslims include not just the pers

Muslim complaints about secularization, Christianization, and 

decline, but also contemporary political grievances about the in

table distribution of income, corruption, and concentration of w

and power in the hands of Chinese Indonesians to the detrim

indigenous (pribumi—see Glossary) entrepreneurship. These 

of issues cut across religious boundaries and unite moderate m

class Muslims with more secular members of the middle class. 

Pancasila: The State Ideology 

The government undertook at independence the major eff

subsuming all of Indonesia’s political cultures, with their dif

and often incompatible criteria for legitimacy, into a national po

culture based on the values set forth in the Pancasila. The pream

the 1945 constitution establishes the Pancasila as the embodim

basic principles of an independent Indonesian state. These five p

ples were announced by Sukarno in a speech on June 1, 19

brief, and in the order given in the constitution, the Pancasila p

ples are belief in one supreme God, humanitarianism, nation

expressed in the unity of Indonesia, representative democracy

social justice. Sukarno’s statement of the Pancasila, while sim

form, resulted from a complex and sophisticated appreciation 

ideological needs of the new nation. In contrast to Muslim nat

ists who insisted on an Islamic identity for the new state, the fr

of the Pancasila insisted on a culturally neutral identity, comp

with democratic or Marxist ideologies, and overarching the va

tural differences of the heterogeneous population. Like the na

language, Bahasa Indonesia, which Sukarno also promoted, the 

casila did not come from any particular ethnic group and 

intended to define the basic values for a national political cultur

The Pancasila has its modern aspects, although Sukarno pres

it in terms of a traditional Indonesian society in which the natio

allels an idealized village: society is egalitarian, the economy is 

nized on the basis of mutual cooperation (gotong royong)

decision making is by deliberation (musyawarah) leading to co

260 
 

sus (mufakat). In Sukarno’s version of the Pancasila—furthe

by Suharto—political and social dissidence constituted 

behavior. 

One reason why both Sukarno and Suharto were succ

using the Pancasila to support their authority, despite their 

ferent policy orientations, is the generalized nature of the p

of the Pancasila. The Pancasila has been less successful as a 

concept when leadership has tried to give it policy content

greatly expanded a national indoctrination program establ

Sukarno to inculcate a regime-justifying interpretation of 

casila in all citizens, especially schoolchildren and civil 

The Pancasila was thus transformed from an abstract stat

national goals into an instrument of social and political co

oppose the government was to oppose the Pancasila. To op

Pancasila was to oppose the foundation of the state. The 

enforce conformity to the government’s interpretation of P

ideological correctness was not without controversy. The i

persistently tested the limits of the government’s tolerance 

native or even competitive systems of political thought was 

tion of religion, especially Islam. 

Islam and the Indonesian state had a tense political rel

from the very outset of independence. The Pancasila’s prom

monotheism is a religiously neutral and tolerant statement tha

Islam with the other religious systems: Christianity, Buddh

Hindu-Balinese beliefs. However, Muslim political forces 

betrayed since signing the June 1945 Jakarta Charter, und

they accepted a pluralist republic in return for agreement that 

would be based upon belief in one God “with Muslims obl

follow the sharia.” The decision two months later to rem

seven-word phrase from the preamble of the 1945 constit

keep predominantly Christian areas of eastern Indonesia fro

ing away from the nationalist movement and declaring their o

pendence, set the agenda for future Islamic politics. At the 

were the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s, which sought 

lish a Muslim theocracy. 

Orthodox Muslim groups saw the New Order’s emphas

Pancasila as an effort to subordinate Islam to a secular sta

ogy, even a “civil religion” manipulated by a regime in

biased against the full expression of Muslim life. By the 198

ever, within the legal and politically acceptable boundaries 

lim involvement, the state had become a major promoter o

institutions. The government even subsidized numerous 

community activities. Within the overall value structure of 
 

casila, Islamic moral teaching and personal codes of conduc

anced the materialism inherent in secular economic developme

wooing Islamic leaders and teachers, the state won broad suppo

its developmental policies. There is no question but that Islam 

state-favored religion in Indonesia, but it was not a state rel

That reality defined the most critical political issue for many 

dox Muslims. The so-called “hard” dakwah, departing from ser

and texts tightly confined to matters of faith and Islamic law

uncompromisingly antigovernment. The Islamists called for p

to die as martyrs in a “struggle until Islam rules.” This call, f

government, was incitement to “extremism of the right,” subve

and terrorism. The government reaction to radical Islamic pro

tions was unyielding: arrest and jail. 

The democratic transition has entirely dismantled the New 

structures that institutionalized politicization of the Pancasila. Alt

the Pancasila is still taught in schools, the national indoctrinatio

gram for adults and the agency charged with managing it have 

been abolished. Most importantly, political parties and social org

tions are no longer required to adopt the Pancasila as their unde

ideological principle (asas tunggal). Prominent Muslim organiz

in particular immediately took advantage of this change. For ins

the Development Unity Party (PPP) reestablished Islam as its ide

cal basis and returned to its pre-1984 party symbol, the Kaa

Mecca. Secular nationalist parties and organizations, however

retained the Pancasila as their ideological basis. In the early twent

century, the Pancasila thus remains alive in Indonesian politica

course in two ways. Harkening back to the pattern in the 1940

early 1950s, it is one among several ideological strands underp

political conflicts that have many other dimensions as well: econ

social, regional, and ethnic. On occasion, however, it is still use

unifying force that can tie all Indonesians together within a na

political culture. For example, President Yudhoyono has made s

major speeches extolling the Pancasila’s virtues in this regard. 

generally still aimed at countering the influence of Islamist disc

this latter usage elevates the Pancasila above the fray of mundane 

ical squabbles. 

The Political Process 

Many political parties representing all parts of the Indonesian 

cultural spectrum contest national and local elections. Smaller p

disappear, and larger parties split and recombine, no longer beca

government interference, but rather, simply, because of the harsh 

or-swim logic of the free political marketplace: election results a

262 
internal dynamics of these parties. In other words, although In

democracy is not yet fully consolidated and faces many chal

is well on its way to becoming “the only game in town.” 

The Multiparty System: Significant Pluralism 

Indonesian voters have clearly rejected the controlled part

of Guided Democracy and the New Order. Since 1998 hun

parties have been founded; 48 qualified to take part in the 1

tions, 24 for the 2004 elections, and 38 for the 2009 election

ter not including the six local parties that contested only in A

the 38 national parties, nine won seats in the 2009 DPR. The 

political pluralism (as measured by the Laakso-Taagepera 

effective political parties) increased from 4.7 in 1999 to 7.1 

(compared to 6.4 in 1955). Efforts to engineer the electoral fr

in order to consolidate the party system, by reducing distric

tude and instituting an electoral threshold of 2.5 percent, were 

ful: the level of pluralism in 2009 dropped to 6.1 effective 

parties. This remains, however, a comparatively high level o

ism for a presidential system. Party registration criteria in ess

hibit regional parties and force parties to be national in scope. 

and so far only exception to this rule was made as a conc

GAM in the Aceh peace negotiations. Ex-GAM supporters 

exception to form numerous parties, and six qualified to co

2009 provincial and district legislative elections. 

The largest political parties are secular nationalist partie

espouse Pancasila as their ideological foundation and have d

platforms that appeal to all Indonesians regardless of religio

an overwhelming Muslim-majority population, most of thes

supporters are Muslim by faith, but they do not believe in mix

and politics. These parties include the Golkar Party (the Ne

ruling party), the Indonesian Democracy Party–Struggle (PD

the Democrat Party (PD). Muslim parties draw their support 

through informal linkages with mass-based Muslim social 

tions such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, but they 

ular nationalist in ideology and platform. These parties inc

National Awakening Party (PKB), associated with Nahdlatu

and the National Mandate Party (PAN), associated with Muh

yah. Islamist parties are those that proclaim Islam as their id

foundation and base their platforms on Islam, including su

Islamic law. This category includes the Development Un

(PPP) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). 

Although links can be made between these contemporar

and their predecessors from the 1950s, two differences s
 

First, the Muslim/Islamist end of the spectrum is much more di

and moderate. Second, there is no direct heir to the Indonesian 

munist Party (PKI), and in fact parties professing Marxism-Len

continued to be outlawed until the Constitutional Court declare

ban unconstitutional in 2005. Despite this decision, it is not 

the PKI will be revived any time soon because of the strong 

tions it engenders among many Indonesians and because its f

constituency has found a home within several parties, partic

Golkar, the PDI–P, the PD, and the PKB. Most of the major p

draw their strength from association with one or another of In

sia’s socioreligious streams of belief (aliran kepercayaan) 

popular individual leader. The parties tend to be highly centr

and riven with internal factionalism. It is very common for fa

that lose out in internal party leadership elections to leave to f

rival party. However, few of these splinter parties have fared w

national elections. 

Secular Nationalist Parties 

Golkar Party 

The Golkar Party is the revamped, democratic version of the 

Order authoritarian ruling party Golongan Karya (Golkar), the mi

backed organization of “functional groups.” The longer original 

has been dropped, and now the party is simply known as Golkar. I

ditionally very close ties to the military and civil service no 

exist, although many officers and bureaucrats have chosen to co

to support the party rather than join another. However, this supp

now personal and private, as the election laws prohibit the use o

resources to support any party, and individual military officers an

ernment officials must resign their positions in order to stand as 

cal candidates. Despite these new restrictions on Golkar’s ability 

its traditional constituencies, the party enjoys advantages over its 

as a result of its national network, which extends to every villa

experienced politicians; and its strong fund-raising capabilities

party no longer commands the electoral majorities of 60 to 70 p

that it engineered under the New Order, but it still makes a 

showing, winning 22.4 percent of the vote (120 of 500 DPR se

come in second to the PDI–P in the 1999 legislative elections, th

est share of the votes in 2004 (21.6 percent, 128 of 550 DPR seats

in 2009 the second-largest share (14.5 percent of the vote, 106 o

DPR seats). Golkar has also won some of the direct elections for g

nor, mayor, and bupati, and the party’s chair, Muhammad Yusuf 

held the vice presidency from 2004 to 2009. 

264 
 

 

A Yogyakarta storefront display, in June 2000, of portraits of Abd

Wahid (Indonesia's third president, 1999–2001), Sukarno (Indon

president, 1945–66), and Megawati Sukarnoputri (Wahid’s vice 

1999–2001, Indonesia’s fourth president, 2001–4,and daughter of 

Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, © Center for Southeast Asia

University o

Golkar had its roots in Sukarno’s Guided Democracy as 

sponsored coalition of nearly 100 anticommunist organizat

Sukarno’s Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) to balance the w

the PKI. After 1966 it was reorganized by Suharto as an o

nonpartisan civilian constituency for the New Order’s auth

core membership was the military, police, civil service, and 

ees of state-owned enterprises. Over the course of the New O

balance of power in the party slowly shifted to civilians, pa

those such as future party chairman Akbar Tanjung who 

organizational teeth in the Islamic University Student As

(HMI) and later the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ As

(ICMI). As chair from 1983 to 1988, Sudharmono, who serve

president of Indonesia from 1988 to 1993, attempted to mak

a more effective political instrument by shifting from a “f

group” basis to individual cadre membership. As a mass-mo

cadre party loyal to Suharto, Golkar emerged as an autonomo

ical force in society, no longer fully responsive to the military

Following Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, at a spec

congress in July, Golkar took its first major step toward tran
itself into a more dynamic and viable democratic party by cho

Akbar Tanjung over Lieutenant General (retired) Edi Sudrajat 

new chair. Akbar retained control over the party, installing ma

his HMI/ICMI faction colleagues in leadership positions and 

ing the party successfully through the political minefields o

1999 and 2004 elections, until losing the chairmanship to 

elected Vice President Kalla at the party congress in December 

With Kalla’s political fortunes declining in 2009, Golkar’s el

of outgoing Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare Ab

Bakrie as its new chairman in October 2009, just weeks befo

announcement of the new cabinet, was an attempt by the pa

retain some national political power. Golkar is generally str

outside Java and Bali, as reflected by two of its most recent c

Akbar is from Sumatera Utara, and Kalla is from Sulawesi Se

Kalla and Bakrie also represent an important constituency w

Golkar: wealthy pribumi (see Glossary) private businessp

whose family fortunes are largely a product of Sukarno’s prote

ist economic policies and Suharto’s patronage politics. 

Indonesian Democracy Party–Struggle 

The PDI–P is the successor party to one of the two other p

besides Golkar allowed to exist by the New Order: the Indon

Democracy Party (PDI). The PDI emerged in 1973 from a fus

two Christian parties: the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo

the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik); and three secular partie

Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the League of the Support

Indonesian Independence (IPKI), and the Party of the Masses (

Murba). With no common ideological link among these const

parties other than a commitment to Pancasila, the PDI was highl

tionalized, torn by personality disputes, and held together on

direct government intervention into its internal affairs. For exa

the IPKI had been strongly anti-PKI in the Old Order in contr

the once-leftist Partai Murba. The PNI, strongest in Jawa Timu

Jawa Tengah, was the largest of the five parties and the legatee 

late President Sukarno. With Sukarno’s gradual public rehabili

as an “Independence Proclamation Hero” and the father of Panc

the PDI was not reluctant to trade upon the Sukarnoist heritage 

PNI, including recruiting several of Sukarno’s children as cand

and campaigners. Most prominent among them was his eldest d

ter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose presence helped expand the 

vote total in the 1992 elections. After she was elected party ch

1993, Suharto began to see her as a greater threat and tried to ha

removed, but she stood her ground. In 1996 the government bac

266 
 

rival faction to forcibly eject Megawati and her supporters fr

offices. She responded by founding the PDI–P to distinguis

the New Order–backed PDI, which garnered only 3 perce

vote in the 1997 elections. Because the PDI–P was not allow

in those elections, Megawati instructed her supporters to p

rump PDI by voting for the PPP, which grew enormously as 

Both the PDI–P and the rump PDI competed in the 1999 e

but with vastly different results. The PDI–P won the larg

with 33.7 percent (153 DPR seats), while the PDI languis

only 0.6 percent (two seats). Megawati became the frontru

the October 1999 presidential selection process in the MPR b

Abdurrahman Wahid, who then helped her get selected as v

dent. When Wahid was removed from office in 2001, she 

president until 2004, when she was defeated in direct elec

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The PDI–P’s vote in the 2004 

tive elections suffered as well, losing almost half of its supp

to 18.5 percent (109 DPR seats), as a result of public disapp

with her performance as president, her husband Taufik Kiem

utation for corruption, and the party as a whole. Despite t

backs, Megawati was reelected party chair at the 2005 

prompting some disaffected leaders led by Laksamana Sukar

and found the Democracy Renewal Party (PDP). In the 200

tive elections, the PDI–P’s support dropped further to 14 pe

DPR seats) as a result of competition from the Democrat, G

and Hanura parties. Megawati, this time running with Prabo

anto, was defeated in a rematch with Yudhoyono in the 20

dential election. 

Democrat Party 

The Democrat Party (PD) was founded by then-Coordinatin

ter of Politics and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2

his political vehicle. He broke with the usual pattern in Indone

ever, and did not become the party’s chairman. The bulk of th

initial cadres were mostly mid-level ex-Golkar and former 

leaders. Although the party’s local branch structure remained 

the time of the April 2004 legislative elections, the PD still ma

capture 7.5 percent of the vote (57 DPR seats), and thus becom

the seven largest parties, largely on the strength of Yudhoyo

sonal popularity. Between 2004 and 2009, the success of the 

Yudhoyono’s presidential bid attracted new cadres, who expa

party’s structure into a truly national presence. This expansi

bined with Yudhoyono’s continuing popularity, gave the PD 

votes in the April 2009 legislative elections, with 20.9 perce
 

 

vote (148 of 560 DPR seats). The party’s prospects in 2014 and b

remain unclear, however, with Yudhoyono no longer eligible to r

reelection at that time. 

Gerindra and Hanura Parties 

The two smallest of the nine parties to win DPR seats in the 

elections were new parties both founded by retired army ge

with highly tainted human-rights records. The Great Indonesia M

ment Party (Gerindra Party) is the political vehicle for retired 

tenant General Prabowo Subianto, the son of famed economi

finance minister Sumitro Joyohadikusumo and the former son-i

of Suharto. Prabowo has a particularly cruel reputation fro

career in the Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus) an

been implicated in severe human-rights abuses in East Timo

temporary or permanent disappearance and death of 23 prod

racy activists in 1997 and 1998, and the Jakarta riots, as wel

coup attempt against newly installed President Habibie, in May 

Despite this record, Prabowo was able to convince three of the 

ists he is alleged to have kidnapped and tortured to run under th

indra Party banner, and the party won 4.5 percent of the vote a

DPR seats. Prabowo ran as Megawati’s vice presidential cand

but they placed a distant second to Yudhoyono. 

The People’s Conscience Party (Hanura Party) was found

retired General Wiranto, who helped force Suharto from p

quash Prabowo’s attempted coup, and begin military reform

also was in command during the Indonesian army–backed m

rampage in East Timor in September 1999 as well as during s

bloody incidents with demonstrators in Jakarta. In 2009 the H

Party won 3.8 percent of the vote and 17 DPR seats. Wiranto 

Kalla’s vice presidential candidate, but the ticket won only 1

cent of the vote to place third. 

Muslim Parties 

National Awakening Party 

Founded by Abdurrahman Wahid in 1998 as the heir to the N

latul Ulama political party from the 1950s, the National Awak

Party (PKB) is the most successful of the Muslim parties that 

tried to draw on Nahdlatul Ulama’s vast organizational str

Although formally Nahdlatul Ulama is not associated with a

these parties, it is the backbone of them all, including the 

Nonetheless, the PKB certainly does not have a monopoly o

political loyalties of Nahdlatul Ulama supporters, who are sca

268 
Supporters of the Indonesian Democracy Party–Struggle 

march in a campaign parade, Sulawesi Utara Provin

The banner, shown here in reverse, touts the No. 12 candidate on 

for the Regional Representative Counc

Courtesy Anasta

among nearly all the major and some minor parties. Follo

geographic pattern of Nahdlatul Ulama’s organizational d

Wahid’s personal cachet, the PKB’s electoral strength is 

trated in Jawa Timur and Jawa Tengah. 

The PKB does not support the rigid implementation of Isl

and is an open party with support in parts of Indonesia with s

Christian populations, such as in Sulawesi Utara, Kalimantan B

Papua. Because of Wahid’s personal control over the PKB, hi

party’s fortunes moved more or less in tandem. He used the PK

formance in the 1999 legislative elections (third-largest party 

percent of the vote and 51 DPR seats) as a springboard to buil

tion behind his successful presidential bid that year in the MP

Wahid’s erratic administration reflected poorly on the PKB as 

the party lost some of its public support, as well as access to p

and the bully pulpit, when he was removed from office in July 

a result, in 2004 the PKB lost two percentage points of its 1

share, dropping to 10.6 percent in 2004. (Nonetheless, becaus
 

 

 

of the major parties from 1999 lost support in 2004, the PKB re

the third-largest party share of the popular vote.) After Wahid lo

presidency, the party began to splinter, and the 2004 election r

caused a major split, with both pro- and anti-Wahid factions cla

the PKB’s mantle. At the outset of the new administration, the 

took an independent stance vis-à-vis President Yudhoyono, some

supporting and sometimes opposing his policies. However, by 20

PKB had swung around much more solidly in support of the admi

tion because of Yudhoyono’s success and Wahid’s complete loss o

trol over the party. As a result of party splintering, reduced su

overall for Muslim and Islamist parties, and greater competition 

secular nationalist parties, the PKB vote share was more than hal

2009 to 4.9 percent (28 DPR seats). 

National Mandate Party 

Paralleling the PKB’s relationship with Nahdlatul Ulam

Wahid, the National Mandate Party (PAN) is strongly associated 

Muhammadiyah and political-science professor Amien Rais from 

yakarta. Beginning in the early 1990s, Rais became a thorn in Suh

side, calling for presidential succession and highlighting cases o

ruption and other malfeasance. Despite (or perhaps because o

vocal opposition, he was elected chair of Muhammadiyah in 19

1998 he became the most prominent adult face of the student-led 

masi (see Glossary) movement, which succeeded in forcing Suh

resignation. (Wahid had had a stroke in January 1998, and Meg

remained on the sidelines.) Following the founding of the PA

August 1998, Rais had to step down as Muhammadiyah’s 

Although founded as an open party, with Christians and ethnic C

prominent among its leadership, the PAN also has a significant 

line Islamist wing. As that wing gained ascendancy within the 

many of the PAN’s initial secular and Christian leaders began to 

don it. While few of these leaders were linked to mass-based org

tions that could deliver votes, they were among the key intell

capital in the party, and their departure also fostered the perceptio

party in trouble. 

In the 1999 elections, the PAN fared worse than had been exp

given Rais’s prominence in opposing Suharto, winning only 7.

cent of the popular vote (34 DPR seats). Although this result d

his presidential ambitions, it was enough, combined with clever 

ical maneuvering, for Rais to be elected speaker of the MPR. 

this position, Rais chose to involve himself more in polit

against presidents Wahid and Megawati than in the constitut

reform process being undertaken by the MPR. This strategy may 

270 
hurt the PAN, for it reinforced the public perception of Rai

dent, divisive, and having abandoned the reformasi move

sheer power politics. In addition, the PAN’s poor showing w

Rais’s position within the party, enhancing the ascendancy of 

mist wing and leading to further defections by members of 

lar/Christian wing. 

The Islamist wing’s hypothesis that a more focused alb

narrowly based party would attract more voters than a less 

but broader-based, party was proven wrong in the 2004 ele

which the PAN’s share of the popular vote shrank to 6.4 pe

DPR seats), making it the smallest of the seven major part

PAN’s support in 2004 was more evenly spread around the 

than in 1999, and so its share of DPR seats actually increa

7.4 percent to 9.5 percent.) Although Rais tried his hand in 

direct presidential election, he lost in the first round and subs

left the political scene after completing his term as MPR sp

October 2004. He was replaced as PAN chair by a much l

known figure, Sutrisno Bachir, and returned to his former l

academic at Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta. With s

its leaders holding cabinet posts in the Yudhoyono administr

PAN mostly supported the administration, although it has 

the right to criticize on occasion. In 2009 the PAN’s support 

to 6.0 percent of the vote (46 DPR seats), because of wanin

support for Muslim and Islamist parties as well as greater com

from the DP, Gerindra, and Hanura parties. 

Islamist Parties 

Development Unity Party 

The Development Unity Party (PPP; often erroneously refe

the United Development Party) was the umbrella grouping 

when the government compelled four Muslim parties to mer

1973 restructuring of the party system. The four components w

dlatul Ulama, the Muslim Party of Indonesia (PMI), the Islami

ation Party of Indonesia (PSII), and the Islamic Educational M

(Perti). The PPP’s constituent parties neither submerged their 

nor merged their programs. As a result, no single PPP leader 

with a platform acceptable to all the sectarian and regional inte

resented by the PPP. Despite their manifest differences rep

divergent santri streams, however, the PPP’s parties had the 

bond of Islam, and it was this that gained them the governme

attention. 
 

 

The dominant partners were Nahdlatul Ulama and the PMI; t

ter was a resurrected but emasculated version of Masyumi, whic

been banned in the Sukarno era and continued to be proscribed 

Suharto. The return of modernist Islamic interests (represented 

PMI) to mainstream politics was stage-managed by the govern

which apparently favored the PMI within the PPP to counterb

the appeal of Nahdlatul Ulama. In 1984 the government forced th

to adopt Pancasila (as opposed to Islam) as its basic ideological p

ple. The decline in Nahdlatul Ulama’s influence in the PPP, to

with constraints on the Islamic content of the PPP’s message

firmed the traditionalists’ perception that Nahdlatul Ulama s

withdraw from the political process and concentrate on its reli

social, and educational activities. The theme of Nahdlatul Ul

1984 congress was “Back to Nahdlatul Ulama’s Original Progr

Action of 1926.” While constitutionally accepting Pancasila as i

ideological principle, Nahdlatul Ulama opted out of the Pancasila 

ical competition by holding that political party membership was 

sonal decision and that individual Nahdlatul Ulama members h

obligation to support the PPP. 

Nahdlatul Ulama’s withdrawal from the PPP combined with M

wati’s rise in the PDI to shift some of the opposition votes fro

PPP to the PDI in the 1987 and 1992 elections. In the 1997 elec

after her forcible ejection from the PDI offices in 1996, Meg

instructed her supporters to vote for the PPP. This was calle

“Mega-Bintang” campaign (bintang means “star,” the party sy

for the PPP, which after 1984 was no longer allowed to use the K

in Mecca as its symbol), and it greatly weakened the PDI, to the 

benefit. One consequence of these election results was that i

1998 and early 1999, as the DPR debated the package of laws f

1999 democratic elections, the PPP positioned itself as the vo

the reformasi movement within the legislature and forced s

important changes to those laws. For instance, Golkar propos

electoral system it called “proportional plus” that would in es

have established single-member districts in many parts of the co

Given Golkar’s overwhelming resource advantage at the tim

could have swept many of these seats and possibly maintained i

on power. Instead, the PPP was able to use its position in the D

mobilize public opposition to this proposal, which was dropp

favor of retaining proportional representation in order to enco

political pluralism. In light of the founding of rival parties such 

PKB and the PAN, this tactic helped save the PPP from fadin

political obscurity as has the PDI. 

272 
In 1999 the PPP was allowed to restore Islam as its ideolog

and the Kaaba as its symbol, and it won 10.7 percent of the 

vote (58 DPR seats) to become the fourth-largest party. The 

ported Wahid for president and was rewarded with severa

positions. During the constitutional-reform process followi

elections, the party supported the reinsertion of language c

Islamic law to be established for Indonesian Muslims, in part 

its right flank from smaller but harder-line Islamist parties. T

of the markers that distinguishes “Muslim” from “Islamist” pa

PKB and the PAN opposed this proposal, which eventu

soundly defeated. Party leadership rivalries caused a faction 

off and form the Reform Star Party (PBR). The PBR proved 

of the few splinter parties to gain any significant share of vo

2004 legislative elections, winning 2.4 percent (13 DPR se

split, combined with voter disappointment with the performa

the major parties, caused the PPP’s vote share to drop to 8.

(58 DPR seats), but it still maintained its position as the four

party by popular vote. The PPP supported a rival ticket in 

round of the 2004 presidential election, although it threw i

behind Yudhoyono and Kalla in the second round and again 

several cabinet seats as a result. In 2009, although the PBR w

1.2 percent of the vote and no DPR seats because of the 

threshold, the PPP vote share slid to 5.3 percent (38 DPR se

result of overall voter dissatisfaction with Muslim and Islamis

Prosperous Justice Party 

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) contested the 1999 

as the Justice Party (PK), founded in 1998. Because the PK w

1.4 percent of the popular vote in 1999 (seven DPR seats)

required it to change its name in order to contest the 2004 e

The PK drew on networks of university campus-based Qura

groups as its organizational backbone. Nearly all of its lea

advanced degrees, mostly from universities in the Middle 

the United States. The party’s emphasis on Islamic law li

appeal in 1999. The PK spoke frequently of its vision for m

religious pluralism in Indonesia as being based on the Medi

ter, promulgated in AD 622 by the Prophet Muhammad, w

anteed protection for Christian and Jewish communities. M

Muslims in Indonesia, however, interpreted this as a form o

class citizenship under Islamist rule. Despite the party’s 

total, President Wahid appointed its leader, Nur Mahmudi 

minister of forestry. Nur Mahmudi set an unusual precedent 

nesian politics by stepping down from the party presiden
 

 

 

entering the government, in order to concentrate on his role as a 

ister. The PK also enhanced its influence by joining the PAN to 

the Reformasi Bloc in the DPR and the MPR. 

The party also set about expanding its base as part of its tra

mation from the PK to the PKS. The PKS is unusual in that it 

only true cadre party in Indonesia. It requires prospective me

to study party doctrine and regulations and to take an oath of lo

to those principles. The party has disciplined or expelled me

for violating these principles. Party members may also attend re

training programs. The party’s support base remains more h

urban and more highly educated than the general voting popul

but it has begun to make inroads in rural areas. 

The PKS quintupled the PK’s 1999 share of the vote in 20

7.3 percent of the popular vote (45 DPR seats), largely by emp

ing themes of anticorruption and good governance in its cam

and de-emphasizing Islamic law. Although all the parties 

paigned on fighting corruption, the PKS came across as the 

credible in this regard, for two reasons. First, the party exploi

reputation for religiosity as a source of morally based and clean 

ernance, and some voters differentiated between this and the 

lishment of Islamic law. Second, PK leaders and legislator

developed a track record in the 1999–2004 term. Minister o

estry Nur Mahmudi attempted to purge the industry of some 

most unsavory practices and business partners. Although he d

last long in office, and his efforts met with only limited success

helped burnish the PKS’s reformist credentials. Provincial an

trict legislators across the country had continued the New 

practice of voting themselves large allowances, often ostensib

official vehicles or uniforms. PK legislators made a point of 

publicly returning these questionable allowances to the local 

sury or donating them to a mosque or community group. The 

used the newspaper clippings describing these actions in its 

campaign. The PKS also developed a reputation for condu

peaceful and orderly campaign rallies, and for cleaning up af

followers when the rallies were over. These actions made the 

especially popular in Jakarta, where it won the largest share of 

in the 2004 legislative elections. 

The party’s success landed its president, Hidayat Nur Wahi

position of MPR speaker for the 2004 term. Following party re

tions, he stepped down from his leadership role upon acceptin

government position. In 2005 Nur Mahmudi Isma’il was di

elected mayor of Depok, the city on the western outskirts of J

that is home to Universitas Indonesia. The party intended t

274 
these positions to demonstrate its commitment to clean gov

setting its sights on eventually winning the presidency. The p

to contend, however, with widespread voter suspicion, am

non-Muslims and moderate Muslims, that the PKS’s de-em

Islamic law was simply a tactical rather than a truly strate

The party’s stated support for such radical figures as Jemaa

yah spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir reinforced these c

These limits on the party’s appeal were vividly demons

2007, when it failed to win the governor’s race in Jakarta d

2004 plurality victory in the city’s legislative elections. 

The PKS has won more positions in various levels of gov

inevitably finding that it has to make hard choices and comp

and its appeal to its more puritanical core constituency has 

suffer. The PKS no longer enjoys the same level of cred

fighting corruption, and thus it has lost its uniqueness and 

ingly come to be viewed as just one more party on the s

Although in 2009 it bucked the overall trend of major parti

voter support, its gains were hardly as spectacular as in 

2009 its vote share rose slightly to 7.9 percent (57 DPR sea

ing the PKS Indonesia’s fourth-largest party. 

Elections 

Indonesia has now held three sets of democratic natio

tions, in 1999, 2004, and 2009, following decades of stage-

elections under the New Order. The 1999 elections were 

democratic national elections since 1955. Local direct elec

governor, mayor, and bupati have been held on a rolling ba

parts of the country since 2005. The political maturity of In

voters, combined with extensive monitoring by civil-society 

helped make all of these elections largely free of violence a

despite great concerns beforehand to the contrary. 

To be eligible to participate in 1999, parties had to be n

scope, with party branches established in at least one-third of 

inces and one-half of the administrative districts within those p

A reconstituted General Elections Commission (KPU) admini

elections. It consisted of 48 representatives of the parties and f

ernment” representatives. (To avoid perceptions of continuity 

authoritarian management of elections under the New O

Habibie government chose to fill these positions with member

society and academia.) Although this structure functioned well 

a clean break with the past and a level playing field for all 

broke down both in the run-up to the elections (when many of 

representatives were off campaigning) and following the 
(when most of the 48 parties won few votes or seats and began m

unfounded allegations of fraud and boycotting KPU meetings). 

Since 2002 the KPU has consisted of nine nonpartisan com

sioners selected by the DPR from a longer list of candidates 

nated by the president from civil society and academia. The 

elections continued the New Order practice of a closed-list pr

tional-representation system with the provinces as the electora

tricts for the DPR; thus, the districts ranged in size from four 

(in former Timor Timur Province, now independent Timor-Le

82 seats (Jawa Barat). These were simultaneous elections f

national DPR and the provincial and local DPRDs; each voter u

nail to punch a hole in one of the 48 party symbols on each 

three ballots. These legislative elections were followed by the 

dential selection process within the MPR in October. Gove

mayors, and bupatis were selected by their respective DPRD. 

The 2004 and 2009 elections were more complicated than th

1999. There were three electoral processes: legislative electio

early April, the first round of the presidential election in early Jul

the second round in September (necessary in 2004 but not in 2

The vote for the legislative entities consisted of four separat

simultaneous elections, not just three as in 1999 and througho

New Order. In addition to the DPR and the provincial and d

DPRDs, voters now also elected representatives to the new 

house of the national legislature, the Regional Representative C

(DPD). 

Two reforms addressed the complaint that representatives 

DPR and DPRDs had been too detached from their constituents

electoral districts were limited to between three and 10 seats (for 

in 2004 the upper limit was 12 seats). In the 19 least populated 

inces, this rule meant that the province remained the electoral d

The other 14 provinces were divided along municipality and re

boundaries into between two and 11 electoral districts in order 

into the mandated seat range. (All of these electoral districts con

of more than one administrative district; in no case was an ele

district made up of a single administrative district.) The average 

district across the 77 electoral districts nationwide had approxim

seven representatives. Second, voters could choose a candidate 

anywhere on the party’s list rather than just voting for a party

open-list proportional-representation system is designed to mak

resentatives more beholden to voters than to party leaders for 

seats, and, in fact, nearly 20 percent of DPR members in 2009 (

560) were chosen by voters from lower positions on the can

lists. This method does make election logistics incredibly co

276 
Ballot with party logos for 2004 

Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, Washin

cated; ballots look like newspapers, and each electoral distr

have a separate ballot listing its candidates. 

A further complication for voters was that the election sy

the DPD was entirely different from that for the DPR and 

DPD candidates, who represented entire provinces, cam

more as individuals, even if they were affiliated with a politi

(DPD candidates had to have been residing in the province 

resented and obtain thousands of signatures of registered 

order to be nominated. For the 2004 elections, candidates 

allowed to have a political-party affiliation, but for the 20

tions, candidates could be—but did not have to be—partisan

dates’ names and photographs appeared on the ballot. Ea

marked one candidate, and the four candidates with the m

were elected. 

The DPR elections served as a sort of primary for the pre

election. Parties or coalitions thereof with at least 20 percen

seats, or 25 percent of the national DPR vote, were eligible 

nate presidential and vice-presidential tickets (this threshold 

3 percent of DPR seats in 2004). In 2004 five tickets were no
 

 

 

 

 

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Muhammad Yusuf Kalla (wi

33.6 percent of the vote in the first round) by the PD, Indonesia

tice and Unity Party (PKPI), and Star and Moon Party (PBB); M

wati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi (26.2 percent) by the P

Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid (22.2 percent) by Golkar; Amien 

and Siswono Yudohusodo (14.9 percent) by the PAN, PKS, an

eral smaller parties; and Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar (3.

cent) by the PPP. The PKB did not nominate a ticket becau

presidential candidate, former President Wahid, was declared p

cally unfit for the position (a new criterion instituted in reaction 

administration). Because no ticket won more than 50 percent 

first round, a second round occurred in which Yudhoyono and 

soundly defeated Megawati and Hasyim, 60.9 percent to 39.

cent, respectively. Three tickets were nominated in 2009: Yudh

and Budiono by the PD, PKS, PAN, PPP, and PKB (winning 60.

cent of the vote in the first round); Megawati and Prabowo Sub

by the PDI–P and Gerindra (26.8 percent); and Kalla and Wiran

Golkar and Hanura (12.4 percent). Because Yudhoyono and Bu

won more than 50 percent in the first round, a second round w

necessary. 

The huge rallies of motorcycles, automobiles, and trucks cr

around cities, hallmarks of previous Indonesian campaigning, 

banned beginning in 2004. Mass rallies in stadiums and other v

were still one of the most popular campaign techniques, althou

open-list system for the DPR and the DPD elections did p

more frequent door-to-door campaigning than had been the cas

viously. Television proved to be a significant campaign medi

the presidential election, and Yudhoyono used it particularly 

tively in 2004 to overtake other, better-known candidates. Othe

didates were busy lining up endorsements from political partie

political elites, but Yudhoyono tried to get coverage of his cam

rallies on the news every evening. In this way, he turned a nom

ing coalition that together had won only 11.4 percent of the v

the legislative elections in April into convincing victories in 

rounds of the presidential election. 

Political finance continues to be problematic in Indonesia. 

parties and candidates fund raise for executive and legislative 

tions. Election laws include limits on donations, although these 

lations are poorly enforced, and spending is not limited. Most p

require legislative candidates to donate to party coffers in exc

for a place on the list; as a general rule, the higher the financial 

tion, the closer a candidate is placed to the top of the list. Even 

open-list system, placement near the top is advantageous. Sim

most parties require local executive candidates to donate in exc

278 
for nomination, a situation that creates incentives for electe

dates to engage in corruption in order to recoup these paym

begin amassing funds for future elections. The process has b

seen, in all the national and local elections since 1999, by a

Election Oversight Committee (Panwaslu) system. However

has granted this system few real powers except to be a repo

complaints; any serious matters must still be handled by th

and the judicial system. The system is also underfunded, ha

its efficiency. More effective monitoring and observation of 

tions since 1999 have been conducted by political parties, 

civil-society groups, the media, and international organizati

parties and domestic groups in particular have mobilized an

hundreds of thousands of volunteers to monitor the process a

election results. 

Political Dynamics 

Political Opposition 

President Yudhoyono’s first term in office was marked by 

natural and other environmental disasters. These included 

earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, the Yogyakar

quake in May 2006, the Lumpur Sidoarjo (Lusi) mud volcan

Timur beginning in May 2006, the Pangandaran earthquake 

nami in July 2006, forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan th

choking haze in Malaysia and Singapore in October 2006 a

massive floods in Jakarta in February 2007, and the Tasikma

Padang earthquakes in September 2009. Despite these and ot

lenges, Yudhoyono remained quite popular; public-opinion p

erally gave him an approval rating between 40 and 60 per

continued popularity created problems for the formation 

tained opposition, and he exploited this situation to shore up 

lative support. Having only Megawati as a strong challenge

easily reelected in 2009. 

The Yudhoyono-Kalla administration’s consolidation of 

cal position began within months of taking office. Golkar, th

the PKB, and the PBR had formed the National Front in opp

the new administration and had swept all DPR leadership p

At Golkar’s December 2004 congress, however, Kalla was e

be the new party chairman just days before the Aceh tsuna

broke up the National Front and brought the largest part

behind the vice president (if not always the president himsel

Yudhoyono also managed to neutralize the PKB, PAN, an

that even though these parties were not solid supporters, neit

they strident opponents. The PKB has suffered from internal 
 

 

 

between pro- and anti-Wahid factions, both of which have cl

control of the party. Wahid remained a frequent critic of the pres

although even his own faction in the party leadership drew clo

the administration in order to sideline their opponents with

party. Wahid himself suffered further health problems and d

December 2009. PAN leaders had held several seats in the c

since the beginning of the Yudhoyono administration, but the 

remained at arm’s length from the president until its founder, one

presidential rival and frequent critic Amien Rais, stepped do

chair and retired from active engagement in politics at the party 

gress in 2005. A similar dynamic occurred within the PPP, led 

the party congress in 2007 by former Vice President Hamzah 

another of Yudhoyono’s rivals in the 2004 election. The party e

then-Minister for Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enter

Suryadharma Ali to be its new chairman over Arief Mudatsir 

dan, a DPR member supported by Haz. This left the PDI–P 

only one of the seven major parties remaining as a consistent m

of the opposition. Following the 2009 elections, the PDI–P was j

in opposition only by the two smallest parties in the DPR, Ge

and Hanura. 

Islam 

The reformasi period has witnessed a great debate among 

camps within Islam in Indonesia: extremists, conservatives, m

ates, and liberals. These camps exist within both the traditio

and modernist streams of Islam in Indonesia. The smaller and 

marginalized of these camps are the extremists and the liber

the right and left fringes of the debate, respectively; the bulk 

debate is thus in the center of this spectrum between the con

tives and the moderates. 

The extremists are the groups and individuals that have 

involved in acts of terrorism, communal violence, and small

thuggery and extortion; what sets them apart from the other 

camps is their use of violence. These groups and individuals p

pate in the debate mainly through actions rather than words; su

ingly, their information campaigns have been limited. Terroris

mainly been associated with Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda’s S

east Asian affiliate, whose spiritual leader is Abu Bakar Ba

Jemaah Islamiyah has been associated with the five most prom

terrorist bombings in Indonesia in recent years: in the Kuta t

district in southern Bali in October 2002 and October 2005, th

Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, the Australian Emba

280 
 

 

 

Jakarta in September 2004, and the JW Marriott and Ritz

hotels in Jakarta in July 2009. 

Communal violence has been associated mainly with orga

such as Laskar Jihad, a Java-based group that involved itself in 

flicts in Maluku and Sulawesi Tengah. These organizations of

fied their actions by claiming that they intervened to defend 

from physical attack by Christians. In all of these communal 

however, while religious affiliations were used to mobilize p

all sides, the roots of the conflicts were much deeper and m

plex; religion was and continues to be layered with ethnic, e

political, and personal rivalries. The involvement of these orga

thus simply served to polarize and extend the conflict even fur

Thuggery and extortion are the realm of groups suc

Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), which consists of crimin

posing as social organizations in a very similar manner 

Order–era groups such as Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancas

main difference is that the FPI uses Islamic rather than n

symbols and slogans to mobilize supporters and neutraliz

The FPI and similar groups have raided bars and discos, hel

demonstrations at the offices of the Indonesian edition of 

and so forth. These groups likely have numerous motives 

actions, including both religious convictions and the desire 

tection money in exchange for leaving such businesses alon

Conservatives have concentrated their efforts on inco

Islamic law into Indonesian daily life in various ways. Th

efforts focused on reinserting the phrase from the Jakarta Char

Muslims obligated to follow the sharia”) into the 1945 const

part of the amendment process from 1999–2002. This propo

strongly supported by the PK and the PBB, but also by the PPP 

its right flank from these two smaller parties, was soundly de

the MPR in 2002. The conservatives then took advantage of d

ization to win approval by various district and municipality a

of local regulations implementing several aspects of Islamic l

cially those commonly used to regulate women’s dress and 

These regulations may be unconstitutional, as religion is one 

major policy areas reserved for the central government under d

ization; however, as of 2009 none of these regulations had b

lenged before the Constitutional Court. 

Local implementation of Islamic law became institutionaliz

special-autonomy law for Aceh, despite the fact that this was 

mary Acehnese demand. Resulting developments include a 

police force for Aceh and the drafting of regional regulations, 

punishment for theft that involves cutting off the perpetrato
 

 

 

 

 

Aceh governor Irwandi Yusuf, a former rebel leader, has vowed 

enforce such regulations even if they are approved. 

Moderates still represent the vast majority of Indonesian Mu

Although large organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Mu

madiyah are internally diverse, including conservatives, mode

and liberals among their members, they remain dominated by m

ates. Of the two, however, Muhammadiyah has tended to be 

conservative than Nahdlatul Ulama. As the dominant majority 

with rising extremism and a newly resurgent conservative min

moderates have been put on the defensive. They have often stru

to make their voices heard without being labeled lackeys of the 

or apostates. The main distinction between conservatives and m

ates is that the former want Islamic law codified and enforced a

of Indonesian law, whereas the latter see it more as a set of rul

personal behavior, enforced only by one’s faith and self-disci

Moderates are also much more likely to engage with non-Musl

interfaith initiatives and to speak publicly of tolerance of differ

and the equality of believers of all faiths. 

There is a small but highly visible group of mostly young int

tuals and activists from both the traditionalist and modernist st

that can be characterized as liberals, pushing the envelope of i

(exegesis) with innovative and often highly controversial ideas

sistent with this cutting-edge profile, the most prominent org

tional home for this group is virtual, the Liberal Islam Ne

(JIL), an online discussion forum. The JIL’s physical headquar

in the Utan Kayu complex in East Jakarta. This complex was 

lished in the late New Order period by Gunawan Mohamma

leading intellectual and journalist who helped found the news m

zine Tempo) as an incubator for a wide range of creative, oppos

minded young people. Many conservatives and extremists h

visceral negative reaction to the liberals and have demonstra

the Utan Kayu complex, threatening to expel and shut down th

and calling for the death of JIL leader Ulil Abshar Abdalla

temporarily fled the country for his own safety. 

The Military 

More than a decade after the beginning of the democratic t

tion, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) retains the p

tial for significant political influence. This latent influence is 

used in public, however, and may not even be that effective b

the scenes. Nonetheless, it exists. The sources of this influen

twofold: institutional and cultural. Although the military has 

stripped of many of the direct powers it enjoyed under the 

282 
 

Order, the institutional core of its power—the army’s territo

tem and the network of off-budget companies, foundati

cooperatives supported by that system—remains intact (see 

istrative and Command Structure, ch. 5). The Yudhoyono 

tration has made an inventory of these military enterprises, 

aim of transferring them all to civilian state control for priv

or closure, a process not complete in 2009. No serious p

have been made to dismantle the territorial system as pa

effort to reorient the military to focus on external defen

important not to overstate the power of this system, which 

effective as a subtle threat than in actual use. In fact, the m

small relative to the population as a whole, and the territoria

is staffed by the more poorly trained and equipped half of t

limiting its ability to move in more than a few cities simulta

These limitations were clearly evident in 1998 in the f

nationwide, grassroots student movement, and that was a ti

the military still enjoyed its more direct levers of power. 

The cultural source of the military’s latent political inf

the public’s perception, rightly or wrongly, of officers as fi

sion makers who consider the national interest in those dec

opposed to the stereotype of bickering civilian politicians 

only their parochial interests into consideration. This percep

has its limitations, for the public does not prefer just any 

When given a choice, voters have clearly expressed their pr

for those with less baggage in terms of human-rights viol

corruption. Thus, while it is a sign of this source of influ

someone with retired General Wiranto’s dismal human-righ

could gain 22.2 percent of the vote in the first round of 

presidential election, missing moving forward into the seco

by only four percentage points, he was soundly defeated by 

date with many fewer allegations of human-rights violat

much greater credibility in fighting corruption, retired L

General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. This pattern repeated 

2009, when Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto, who has an ev

human-rights record, were unable to help their presidenti

against Yudhoyono. At the subnational level, there are no

fewer governors, mayors, and bupatis with a military bac

than in the New Order. Furthermore, these individuals (li

dential and legislative candidates) have had to retire from th

forces in order to become involved in politics, and their elec

not seem to have directly benefited the military as an institu

Despite the limitations on the military’s institutional and 

sources of political influence, this latent power could be cal
 

 

were Indonesia to have a populist demagogue leader, som

along the lines of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. Under the right ci

stances (such as economic stagnation), such a leader could off

Indonesian public relief from their economic woes at the cos

rollback of democratic freedoms. Recent commanders have 

significant progress in instilling a culture of professionalism 

political neutrality in the military. However, more reforms w

necessary to ensure that less scrupulous leaders could no long

the military as a tool of political repression. 

Communal Violence 

One of the greatest fears among the political elite in 1998 wa

Indonesia would break apart into smaller countries, as had hap

in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This did not happen, but i

ious parts of the archipelago other developments did begin to m

events in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Communities that had prev

coexisted in relative harmony rapidly spiraled into conflict, alth

in Indonesia none of these tensions ever approached the sc

communal violence in the former Yugoslavia. 

Sporadic incidents had already begun in 1996 when the New 

still appeared quite solid, with church burnings in such plac

Pasuruan (in Jawa Timur) and Tasikmalaya (in Jawa Barat). The 

and geographic spread of violence ramped up significantly, how

following Suharto’s resignation, as the national government be

preoccupied with the political transition and security forces cou

longer repress long-simmering local grievances. In January 199

lowing the expulsion of Ambonese gangs from Jakarta to Amb

well as the breakdown of informal ethnic power-sharing agree

in Maluku Province, a minor traffic accident in Ambon explode

terrible and sustained violence between Muslims and Christi

that city. Over the next three years, several thousand members o

communities were killed, and parts of the city became no-go 

for one group or the other. Extremist Muslim groups such as L

Jihad—allegedly supported by like-minded senior military offic

flocked to Ambon and played a major role in the dramatic expa

of violence in that city. The violence that erupted in Kalimantan 

was even more horrific, as indigenous (Christian) Dayaks in 

Sambas District went on a rampage against Muslim Madure

migrants who had taken a prominent role in local commerce and 

culture. Hundreds were killed, some of their severed heads l

poles as a warning to others, and many houses burned to the gr

Sustained violence also erupted between Muslims and Christi

Sulawesi Tengah around the cities of Poso and Tentena, where L

284 
 

Jihad and the more sinister Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist g

established a training camp. At the end of the first decad

twenty-first century, this conflict continues to fester, with 

incidents of violence by one community on the other. 

Many of these conflicts appear, on the surface, to be betw

nic or religious communities, particularly Muslims and C

However, deeper analysis reveals that very localized strug

political and economic power are the underlying cause. 

nately, these political and economic struggles have often bee

by conflict entrepreneurs as being rooted in ethnic or religio

ages, making it easier to mobilize communities against one 

External forces have also exacerbated such conflicts. In 

security forces were perceived as taking sides, the army with 

communities and police mobile brigades with Christian com

Yusuf Kalla gained greater political prominence when, a

nating minister of public welfare in President Megawati’s ca

helped mediate negotiations to resolve the longer-running 

conflicts in Poso and Ambon. The resulting agreements we

Malino I (for Poso) and Malino II (for Ambon), after the lo

the negotiations. Malino II has largely held, but peace ha

fully returned to Poso. Kalla trumpeted his role in these ac

helping Yudhoyono win the 2004 presidential election and 

these experiences in dealings with Aceh as vice president. 

Civil Society 

Indonesia’s post–New Order democracy has a civil socie

vibrant but that also has fairly shallow roots in the broader 

with certain important exceptions. Most Indonesian nongove

organizations (NGOs) are small urban organizations foun

staffed by a handful of former student activists (see Civil So

2). They tend to claim to speak on behalf of “the people” 

broadly or of certain communities, but often they have not 

to reach out to, educate, or mobilize those communities. 

these organizations fail to attract significant support and a

lived; those with larger budgets are often dependent on forei

funding. This leaves them open to charges by conservative 

ists that they are puppets of foreign governmental interests. 

The proliferation of NGOs since the late 1970s is an ind

the increased diversity of society, the growth of a moder

class, and the penetration of the political culture by issues 

concern. These organizations raise issues ranging from hum

and the rule of law to corruption and environmental deg

Despite the fact that most NGOs are small grassroots orga
 

 

that focus on economic development and social-welfare issues, 

of the more prominent NGOs are aggressively intervening in ar

agrarian or other fundamental human rights. In the 1990s, these 

nizations also provided a new outlet for student activism, con

since the 1970s to nonpolitical behavior. University students 

both a cause and a vehicle for renewed social involvement. This 

liticization and organizing experience laid the groundwork f

student movement of 1998 that toppled Suharto. 

Religious organizations of all denominations are the pr

exceptions to the rule regarding the shallow nature of Indon

civil society. These organizations, most prominently the two l

Muslim associations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah

been the most successful at resisting New Order control. It is 

coincidence that two of the most prominent leaders of the refo

movement, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, were the na

chairs of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, respectively. 

1980s and 1990s, religious organizations also had spawned d

of affiliated NGOs, as younger leaders wanted to translate thei

into social activism but found that the parent organizations we

nimble enough to do so. However, the parent organizations’ na

networks and penetration down to the village level became a 

able resource during the transition to democracy, as they pla

prominent role in such activities as civic and voter education a

as election monitoring. This involvement demonstrated to both 

nesian citizens and the world at large that religion (partic

Islam) and democracy are not incompatible. 

The legal framework supporting a healthy civil society is 

stronger than during the Suharto era. President Habibie scrapp

rule forcing all organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole ide

ical basis. The new chapter in the constitution on human right

tains unequivocal statements guaranteeing the freedoms of s

and assembly. Equally important, these clauses do not just ex

paper but also are being enforced. For instance, in two separate 

mark rulings in 2006 and 2007, the Constitutional Court struck 

the sections of the criminal code that outlawed defamation 

president and other political leaders and criticism of the state. 

sections derived from Dutch colonial laws designed to muzzle n

alist leaders, and authoritarian and democratic leaders alike had 

them against government critics. 

The Media 

Indonesia’s new-found freedoms have been felt most strong

the media. Long suppressed and harassed by the New Order, the 

286 
 

 

nesian press is now among the freest and liveliest in Asia. T

toward somewhat greater pluralism and openness had begu

late New Order, when the regime allowed the founding of a n

new television and radio stations. (The television stations all 

Jakarta-based at first.) Many of the new television stations 

penetration rates of around 70 to 80 percent of the population 

few years. Although the television licenses were all given t

Suharto family members, cronies, and other wealthy conglo

competition for advertising revenue and a large potential 

audience meant that some of these stations were tempted to 

boundaries, especially regarding the ban on news programs o

those produced by the state-run Television of the Republic o

sia (TVRI). These stations were very lucrative, so it became 

for the regime to punish its own cronies by shutting down a 

it crossed the line by broadcasting independently produced n

Television (SCTV) and Hawk Television Indonesia (RCTI) n

grams, in particular, were very popular with viewers across t

try as an alternative, albeit still relatively tame, to the s

TVRI (see Post and Telecommunications, ch. 3). Broadcastin

ulated by the government through the Directorate General o

Television, and Film. 

Thousands of new print publications and radio stations hav

up across the country, and more television broadcasters, 

regional stations, have licenses since the transition to democ

government cannot revoke these publishing and broadcasting 

based on what the outlets write and say. President Wahid furth

ened the government’s ability to control the media when he a

the Department of Information at the outset of his administra

censorship board for motion pictures remained in existence, 

mainly to police “public morality” (nudity, sexuality) rather th

ical statements, and President Megawati reestablished the De

of Information on her ascension to power. In the absence of si

government repression, spurious defamation lawsuits by priv

viduals have become the principal means of stifling media 

The most prominent of these cases involved businessma

Winata, who sued Tempo editor in chief Bambang Harymur

murti was convicted and given a one-year prison sentence, w

Supreme Court overturned. 

More than 50 principal daily newspapers are published th

the archipelago, the majority in Java. Those with the larges

ship are Kompas (Jakarta), circulation of 523,000; Suara 

(Semarang), circulation of 200,000; Berita Buana (Jakarta)

tion of 150,000; Pikiran Rakyat (Bandung), circulation of 
 

 

 

and Sinar Indonesia Baru (Medan), also with a circulati

150,000. The largest English-language dailies, both publish

Jakarta with print runs of 40,000, are the Jakarta Post and the Ja

Globe. The principal weekly news magazines are Tempo, whic

produces an English-language edition, and Gatra. All of these 

papers and magazines have online editions as well. 

Foreign Policy 

Political Considerations 

The internal dynamics of Indonesian politics since indepen

have been linked to an external environment perceived as inhe

dangerous. Indonesian foreign policy has had as its most imp

goals security of the state and territorial integrity. The jurisdic

boundaries of the state were greatly expanded with the incorpo

of the “archipelago principle” into the new international law 

sea, a new regime codified as the UN Convention on the Law 

Sea in 1982. The archipelago principle effectively territorializ

ocean space inside straight baselines drawn from the farthest 

of the most distant islands of Indonesia, thus giving new sanct

the Indonesian doctrine of the political and security unity of ar

lagic land and sea space (wawasan nusantara), first promulga

the 1950s (see National Territory: Rights, Responsibilities, and 

lenges, ch. 2). 

Sukarno’s response to challenge was to attack the status q

“live dangerously,” to cite his 1964 Independence Day addres

Year of Living Dangerously.” Beginning with Suharto, the app

of subsequent governments has been one of cooperation and ac

modation in order to gain international support for Indonesia’s 

ical stability and economic development while, at the same 

maintaining its freedom of action. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s le

engagement with the rest of the world has fluctuated, mainly d

dent on domestic developments: it was high under Sukarno, 

latter half of Suharto’s three decades in power, and again in the 

twenty-first century, but low in the first half of the New Order 

the transitional period after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. 

Sukarno relished leading the “new emerging forces” again

“old established forces,” whereas subsequent governments 

turned to the Western developed economies for assistance. 

1967 to 1991, countries aiding Indonesia organized as a conso

in the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI—see 

sary), subsequently reorganized in 1992 without the Netherla

and with Japan as chair—as the Consultative Group on Indo

288 
(CGI—see Glossary). These countries, along with the Wo

and the Asian Development Bank (see Glossary), gave mas

nomic assistance, amounting in the 2006 budget to m

US$5.4 billion in loans and grants. Even after the Indones

ernment disbanded the CGI in 2007, foreign assistance con

a bilateral basis. The pragmatic, low-profile style of post

administrations has been a far cry from the radical internat

and confrontational anti-imperialism of his foreign policy, 

there has been some continuity in a nationalism that colored 

sia’s perceptions of its role in the region. The promotion o

international political interests has not been high on the In

foreign-policy agenda, despite Indonesia’s having the world

Muslim population. Indonesia is a member of the Organi

the Islamic Conference (OIC), but, unlike Malaysia, has no

to a major role in that organization. 

Following two decades of New Order “low-profile” foreig

by Suharto’s fourth term (1983–88) a more assertive Indones

on foreign policy was heard, as Jakarta began to reaffirm its c

leadership position, both regionally and worldwide, correspo

its geographic vastness, resource endowment, population, and 

stability. After an international rehabilitative period, Indonesia 

the community of nations, broke the Jakarta–Phnom Penh–Ha

jing–Pyongyang axis, ended the Indonesian–Malaysian Conf

(Konfrontasi—see Glossary), worked to strengthen ASEAN

cooperative nonthreatening links with its neighbors, and b

moderating voice in developing world forums. By the earl

Indonesia, which American scholar Donald K. Emmerson c

describe as “invisible” in 1987, had become apparent both as a 

power and a major developing world voice in the global pol

economic arenas. In 1992 Indonesian foreign policy reflected 

national identity and what British scholar Michael Leifer 

“sense of regional entitlement.” 

Indonesia’s full reemergence on the world stage was highl

September 1992 when it hosted the Nonaligned Movement su

acknowledgment of its credentials to speak authoritativel

developing world. Indonesia had hosted the Asia–Africa Co

in Bandung in 1955 and was a founding member of the No

Movement in 1961. Its adherence to and promotion of the 

nonalignment had been one of the few consistencies betwee

eign policies of the Old Order and New Order government

same time, Indonesia was the only founding member that 

hosted a Nonaligned Movement summit, as a result of the un

ity in the developing world of some of its policy positions: its 
 

anticommunism, cold relations with China, incorporation of 

Timor as Timor Timur Province, and solidarity with ASEAN o

Cambodian issue. Suharto used the summit to begin the effort of 

ing the Nonaligned Movement agenda from its traditional conce

the economic and social issues confronting the developing world

Jakarta Message, the summit’s final communiqué, reflected Suh

call in his opening speech for a constructive dialog between the 

oped and developing nations, warning that North–South polari

loomed as “the central unresolved issue of our time.” In an expr

of Indonesia’s pride in its own development, Suharto offered tec

assistance to countries with food and population problems. As 

man of the Nonaligned Movement, Suharto brought the Jakarta 

sage to the 1992 session of the UN General Assembly. 

All of this new-found constructive activism ended in 1997–98 

economy collapsed under the weight of the Asian financial crisi

Suharto was forced to resign. With the exception of President Hab

engagement with the UN on a referendum for East Timor, Ind

once again slipped into the shadows of the world stage as it sort

its economic woes and domestic political transition. This shro

invisibility only began to lift—for all the wrong reasons—in O

2002, with the first Bali bombing and the subsequent roughly a

terrorist attacks in Jakarta and Bali from 2003 to 2005, which co

uted to making Southeast Asia the “second front” in President G

W. Bush’s “global war on terrorism.” Only under President Yudh

has Indonesia once again returned to a constructively activist f

policy profile. This shift has been most evident in Indonesia’s con

tion of troops, including Yudhoyono’s elder son, Agus Harim

junior army officer, to the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon af

2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Indonesian military or 

contingents also were deployed in Congo and Sudan. The shift ha

been reflected in Yudhoyono’s offers to assist with resolution o

flicts in Iraq, Iran, the Korean Peninsula, and Burma. 

Participation in ASEAN 

Since its founding on August 8, 1967, ASEAN has been a 

focus of Indonesia’s regional international relations, and Jaka

the site of ASEAN’s general secretariat. Founding members In

sia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand helped 

struct a regional multinational framework to facilitate econ

cooperation, diminish intra-ASEAN conflict, and formulate AS

positions regarding potential external threats. Brunei joined in 

and ASEAN further expanded in the late 1990s with the access

Vietnam (1995), Laos and Burma (1997), and Cambodia (199

290 
 

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 

president of Indonesia since 2004 

Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, 

Washington, DC 

2009 the organization was considering Timor-Leste’s applic

membership. 

These countries were not always so cooperative with one 

In 1963 the Philippines and Indonesia both tried to prevent 

the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, the Philippines 

it had its own claim to Sabah (formerly North Borneo) and I

because it suspected a British imperialist plot. Indonesia soo

to political and military confrontation, an attempt to under

new state of Malaysia. Sukarno’s radical anti-Western rheto

bined with the growing strength of the PKI, marked Indon

disturber of the regional international order rather than a 

tive, peaceful contributor to it. 

By 1967 Indonesia’s disruptive stance had changed. ASE

vided a framework for the termination of the Confrontatio

ing Indonesia to rejoin the regional community of nati

nonthreatening setting. Furthermore, the five founding me

ASEAN now shared common policies of domestic anticom

The ASEAN process of decision making by consensus 

Indonesia to dictate the pace of change within the orga

Some observers asserted that ASEAN moved only at the p

slowest member, which often was Indonesia. With ASEAN 

ingly seen as a symbol of regional peace and stability, its 

became an end in itself in Indonesian foreign policy. Suharto 

ASEAN’s elder statesman by the time of ASEAN’s Fourth 

held in Singapore January 27–29, 1992. He was the only 

government at ASEAN’s 1967 establishment to attend the 
First Summit, held in Bali, February 23–24, 1976, who was stil

of government in the early 1990s. In the meantime, Indonesi

played a key role in resolving the Cambodian conflict, settin

stage for ASEAN’s expansion to encompass nearly all of the r

by the end of the millennium. 

Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Cambodian Conflict 

The official ASEAN response, formulated by Indonesia, to 

nam’s December 1978 invasion of Cambodia, was to deplo

invasion and call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Ca

dia. Indonesia and other ASEAN members immediately place

issue on the agenda of the UN Security Council. However, dee

ferences soon arose between Indonesia and Thailand. Although 

pelled to make a show of solidarity with Thailand by its inter

sustaining ASEAN, Indonesia began to see the prolongation 

war in Cambodia, the “bleeding Vietnam white” strategy, a

being in its or the region’s interests. Although never retreating 

ASEAN’s central demands of Vietnamese withdrawal from Ca

dia and Khmer self-determination, Indonesia actively soug

engage the Khmers and Vietnamese and their external sponsor

search of a settlement that would recognize legitimate interests 

sides. Indonesia opened what came to be called “dual-track” 

macy, in which it pursued bilateral political communication 

Vietnam while maintaining its commitment to the ASEAN for

By 1986 ASEAN had accepted Indonesia as its official “inte

tor” with Vietnam. From 1982 to the signing of the Final Act 

Paris International Conference on Cambodia on October 23, 

Indonesian diplomacy played a central role in peace negoti

that led to the deployment of forces of the UN Transitional Aut

in Cambodia (UNTAC). 

Indonesia’s sense of achievement and pride in its role in bri

peace to Indochina was reflected in three events. On Novemb

1990, Suharto arrived in Hanoi for the first meeting betwe

ASEAN head of government and a Vietnamese counterpart sinc

mier Pham Van Dong visited Thailand’s Prime Minister Kria

Chomanan in 1977. On March 15, 1992, Japan’s Akashi Yasush

UN undersecretary general for disarmament and newly app

head of UNTAC, arrived in Phnom Penh to be greeted by a 

guard of Indonesian troops who were part of the first full batt

sized contingent of UNTAC peacekeepers dispatched to Cambod

the peak deployment of foreign peacekeeping forces in late 

Indonesia had the largest force in Cambodia with nearly 2,000 

tary and police personnel, representing 10 percent of the total. F

292 
in mid-1991, fresh from diplomatic success in helping to 

Cambodian civil war, Indonesia took the initiative in seeking 

multilateral negotiations on competitive South China Sea 

especially those claims involving jurisdictional disputes 

Spratly Islands. Indonesia’s gradually assertive role in the Ca

peace effort demonstrated that Jakarta was not entirely willing 

its commitment to ASEAN solidarity above its own national 

According to leading Indonesian academic Dewi Fortuna A

“challenge for Indonesian foreign policy in the future is how 

tain a balance between an ASEAN policy which requires goo

trust of the other members, and satisfying some of the intern

aspirations of a growing number of the Indonesian political e

Reorienting ASEAN in a Post–Cold War Context 

The resolution of the Cambodian conflict, combined with 

matically altered balance of power in the region, raised the 

of what new political cement might hold ASEAN togeth

post–Cold War environment throughout the 1990s and 200

petitive claims by the nations involved in the jurisdictional 

tion in the South China Sea had the potential for conflict bu

pose a direct threat to ASEAN’s collective security interes

the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia (see R

with East Asia, this ch.). The answer has come in the natu

post–Cold War environment itself: global unipolarity combi

regional multipolarity. The end of the global bipolarity of 

War has resulted in the hegemony of the United States and e

ability of Southeast Asian states to play off one superpowe

the other. Regional solidarity has come to be seen as the ap

response to counterbalance a global hegemon. The impor

regional solidarity has been enhanced by the political, mili

economic rise since the 1980s of China and more recently 

joining longtime powers Russia, Japan, and Australia in in

Asia’s geostrategic complexity. Indonesia has decided tha

part of a regional bloc can it (and Southeast Asia as a whole) 

itself in this increasingly competitive environment. 

Indonesia has been solidly supportive of ASEAN’s respon

has been first to expand to encompass nearly all of Southeas

the 1990s) and then to deepen both its internal cooperation a

its relationships with regional and global powers (in the tw

century). To facilitate internal cooperation, the member state

streamlined the organization’s various efforts into three pi

ASEAN Security Community, building on the 1971 Zone 

Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the 1976 Treaty of A
 

Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), and the 1997 Treaty o

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone; the ASEAN Eco

Community Blueprint; and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Comm

This legal and institutional framework was further strengthened 

the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, which came into for

December 15, 2008. External relationships include: since 1987 a

ing non-Southeast Asian states to accede to the TAC (those tha

done so include Australia, Britain, China, France, India, Japan, 

golia, New Zealand, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (

Korea), Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Republic of 

(South Korea), Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and the United States); 

lishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994; and inaugu

ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) in 1999. 

Indonesia’s support for the internal and external expansi

ASEAN’s reach represented an important shift in its strategic 

ing; in ASEAN’s first three decades, Indonesia was reluctant to 

any significant authority to the supranational organization or 

other powers too closely to it; for example, Indonesia had prev

resisted the urging of some ASEAN members that the organi

formally adopt a more explicit common political-security id

Indonesia successfully opposed Singapore’s proposal at the AS

Fourth Summit in 1992 that would have invited the UN Se

Council’s five permanent members to accede to the TAC. In 

Indonesian ambivalence about an ASEAN security role, togethe

its reluctance to mesh its economy with an ASEAN regional 

omy, had arisen from Indonesia’s desire to keep its options ope

pursued its interests, not just as an ASEAN member, but 

increasingly important Asia–Pacific regional power. 

The economic and political turmoil generated by the 19

Asian financial crisis sidetracked Indonesia’s efforts to enhance i

tus as an important middle power for about a decade. In the afte

of that crisis, as well as in the context of post–Cold War glob

regional power structures, Indonesia has concluded that its own 

cal and economic security interests are best served by strength

ASEAN. To avoid a repeat of the financial crisis, within the org

tion Indonesia has supported the Roadmap for Financial and Mo

Integration of ASEAN (a part of the ASEAN Economic Commu

and externally the ASEAN Plus Three forum has launched the C

Mai Initiative to address regional financial stability. 

Indonesia’s fundamental interests have not changed substan

and Indonesian nationalism retains a xenophobic streak. One 

country’s most consistent foreign-policy goals has been to r

regional dependence on external military powers. It has also w

assiduously to dampen or end regional conflicts that often hav

294 
 

ated openings for greater external meddling in the region’

What has changed is Indonesia’s perception of the most 

means to serve these interests. As a valuable instrument for 

noncoercive regional influence and gaining attention in t

international arena, ASEAN has become one of the platfor

which Indonesia can enhance its profile as a middle power w

national aspirations. 

Relations with Neighboring Nations 

Fears on the part of Indonesia’s neighbors in previous dec

its desire to play a larger international role would also carry w

inclination to become a regional hegemon have been much re

the twenty-first century. Indonesia’s abandonment of suppo

East Timorese pro-integration militias after their forcible ejec

West Timor (Nusa Tenggara Timur Province) in late 1999 by 

mandated International Force in East Timor (INTERFET

2000), its positive response to the independent government o

Leste’s proffer of peace, and its efforts to convince Burma’

pursue meaningful national reconciliation have helped erase t

ories of Sukarno’s and Suharto’s more expansive foreign pol

Timor-Leste 

Timor-Leste, the former Portuguese Timor and then Ea

was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1976 

Timur Province, although Portugal never recognized what 

forcible annexation. The status of East Timor also remaine

UN agenda. Indonesia had invaded in December 1975 in rea

chaotic decolonization process that had led to civil war. Th

cost of the civil war, Indonesian military actions, and the fam

followed was heavy. Estimates of Timorese deaths between 

1999 because of the conflict range from 100,000 to 250,000

total population of less than 1 million. The ability of the Re

ary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin—see Glo

mount a low-intensity resistance, the draconian counter

adopted by Indonesian military forces against suspected Fret

pathizers, and charges of Indonesian aggression combined 

the status of East Timor a continuing foreign-policy pro

Indonesia through the late 1990s. 

When President Habibie took over in May 1998, his advi

gested bold initiatives to address the problem. In early 1999

announced that Indonesia would allow the UN to administe

endum in the province on August 30. Although formally the 

posed to the East Timorese was whether or not they supporte
 

 

special autonomous status within Indonesia, it was understood 

“No” vote meant support for independence. The referendum offe

apparently based on faulty intelligence that claimed majority su

in the province for integration. Instead of emphasizing the bene

remaining a province of Indonesia, the military and intelligence 

ratus supported pro-integration militia forces that used threat

force in an attempt to frighten the populace into a pro-Indonesia 

The use of cellular phones, camcorders, and the Internet br

scenes of violence and intimidation to the outside world and cau

storm of criticism against Indonesia’s government and its 

forces. Despite the intimidation, the referendum itself proc

smoothly, with 98.6 percent turnout and 78.5 percent voting a

integration. Within days of the referendum, as these results be

increasingly clear, the pro-integration militias went on a ram

implementing a well-planned scorched-earth campaign. Althoug

tial reports of mass killings later turned out to be exaggerated

dreds of thousands of Timorese were internally displaced or be

refugees streaming across the land border into West Timor. Arm

militia forces destroyed much of East Timor’s infrastructure 

process. The situation only stabilized when INTERFET, led by 

tralia, arrived to restore order. The UN then established a ci

administration, the UN Transitional Administration in East 

(UNTAET), to run the country and prepare it for independence, 

came on May 20, 2002. 

Despite the brutal history shared by Indonesia and Timor-

the two nations’ relations since 2002 have been surprisingly co

Given Timor-Leste’s small size, geographic isolation, and d

dence on Indonesia for imports of foodstuffs, fuel, and other 

commodities, it has not wished to antagonize its much more p

ful neighbor. Indonesia, to its credit, since September 1999 h

attempted further military or militia interference in Timor-Les

has welcomed the latter’s offer of reconciliation as a way to co

criticism by international human-rights groups, block attempts 

up an international criminal tribunal, and burnish its reputati

the world stage. However, Indonesia has not been cooperative 

various efforts regarding truth, justice, and accountability fo

serious crimes against humanity that took place in the pro

between 1975 and 1999 (see East Timor, ch. 5). 

Papua New Guinea 

In 1975 Papua New Guinea gained independence from an Aust

administered UN trusteeship. Since then the 760-kilometer-long bo

shares with Indonesia’s Papua Province has been a focus of mutu

296 
picion. Indonesia has sought through diplomacy and intimidati

vent Papua New Guinea from becoming a cross-border sanc

Free Papua Organization (OPM) separatists. Port Moresby’s 

the border situation was conditioned by fears of Indonesian ex

ism and sympathy for West Papuan efforts to defend their cult

tity against Indonesianization. The Papua New Guinea govern

also keenly aware of the military imbalance between the two co

Talks to draw up a new agreement to regulate relations an

rights and obligations along the border culminated in the si

October 27, 1986, of the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Coopera

Friendship. The treaty was, in effect, a bilateral nonaggres

in which the two sides agreed to “avoid, reduce and contain 

or conflicts between their nations and settle any differences 

arise only by peaceful means” (Article 2), and promised 

“shall not threaten or use force against each other” (Article 

treaty also provided a basis for building a lasting frame

peace and cooperation. The structure for peace was enhanc

1987 ASEAN decision to allow Papua New Guinea to bec

first non-ASEAN country to accede to the TAC. Indonesia 

tinued, however, to block Papua New Guinea’s promoti

observer status to full ASEAN membership. 

The 1986 treaty left many issues unresolved. It did not s

example, the problem of Indonesian Papuan refugees in Pa

Guinea. Furthermore, Papua New Guinea did not agree to join

operations in the border regions, and Indonesia did not give ca

assurance that its military, in all circumstances, would not 

border. Criticism of Jakarta’s policies in Papua persisted 

Moresby. In addition, Indonesia was accused of covert interv

Papua New Guinea’s domestic politics. Nevertheless, the ten

threat-filled atmosphere that clouded the first decade of bilat

tions dissipated considerably. In 1990 the two countries sign

10-year border agreement. In January 1992, in the course of a 

by Papua New Guinea’s prime minister, Rabbie Namaliu, th

ministers of the two countries signed a “status of forces” a

regulating rights and obligations when on each other’s 

Although the two parties denied that the agreement provided 

security operations, the possibility of rights for Indonesian 

suit” seemed to exist. At that time, Namaliu, reviewing the 

relations since the 1986 treaty, said, “ties have never been bett

Further improvement in the bilateral relationship was m

Vice President Megawati’s state visit to celebrate the twe

anniversary of Papua New Guinea’s independence on Septe

2000, at which time the two countries signed a trade ag
 

Indonesia and Papua New Guinea also established a joint com

sion to improve bilateral communications; the first meeting 

place on June 6–8, 2004. At the same time, the two foreign min

agreed to the establishment of a mechanism for occasional join

inet meetings. Nonetheless, despite Papua New Guinea’s sta

one of only three countries with which Indonesia shares a lan

der, Indonesia places a much higher priority on its relationship

its other neighbors, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia

Singapore and Malaysia 

Singapore, ASEAN’s own ethnic Chinese financial and eco

powerhouse, is geostrategically locked in the often suspicious em

of its Indonesian and Malaysian neighbors. More than 40 year

the end of Confrontation, a racially tinged, jealous Indonesian am

lence toward Singapore remains strong. On the one hand, Jakar

sought to link Singapore’s capital, technology, and managerial 

tise to its own abundant natural resources, land, and labor in an 

nomically integrative process. On the other hand, when the relatio

has been perceived as imbalanced or harmful, old suspicions have 

revived. For instance, the Indonesian government has welcomed S

porean investment in its telecommunications sector. However, be

those investments issue from Singaporean government-owned 

and have involved purchases of shares of the two leading Indo

telecommunications firms, Indosat and Telkomsel, the invest

have come under the scrutiny of Indonesia’s Commission for the 

sight of Business Competition (KPPU). Former MPR speaker, 

presidential candidate, and PAN chair Amien Rais, well-know

sometimes virulent economic nationalist, has publicly supporte

KPPU’s scrutiny of the investments. There is also great resentm

Indonesia that Singapore has served as the most prominent of

haven for Indonesian crony capital flight, exacerbating the 19

financial crisis, and for harboring the fleeing cronies themselv

April 2007, the two countries signed an extradition treaty, whic

warmly welcomed in Indonesia as a means of helping bring to j

some of the worst offenders in the financial crisis. However, a str

nationalism surfaced again in the DPR, where enough me

objected to certain provisions of a parallel defense arrangement th

DPR refused to approve the treaty. 

This pattern of ambivalence has been replicated at the subna

level over the now largely stalled development of the SIJORI g

triangle, which includes Singapore, Malaysia’s state of Joho

Indonesia’s Riau Province (see Industry, ch. 3). Through the 1

Indonesia continued to perceive the growth triangle in terms of 

298 
tional interdependence in joint economic development at the 

core of ASEAN, and local and regionalized economic co

strengthened a common interest in good relations. Since the tu

century, however, Indonesia has viewed aggressive Singapor

and state capital as taking on exploitative characteristics, th

to turn Indonesian cheap labor, land, and water into a colo

dependency. Jakarta has thus banned any further exports of 

had been feeding Singapore’s unquenchable construction app

New interdependencies between Indonesia and Singapore 

been forged in the unlikely area of security cooperation, 

these have demonstrated their limits as well. An unprecedente

of military cooperation through personnel exchanges, joint 

exercises, and a joint air-combat range has allowed Singapor

onstrate its value as an ally in a South China Sea security env

(see Branches of Service, ch. 5). Influential nongovernmenta

sian voices openly promoted military trilateralism among In

Singapore, and Malaysia. In 1995 Indonesia and Singapore 

treaty allowing the use of Indonesian airspace and territorial w

training by Singapore’s air force and navy. Negotiations bega

to extend this treaty into a broader bilateral defense cooperati

ment, which was bundled into a package with the extraditio

Nonetheless, the new defense treaty, signed with much fanfar

2007, was set aside in October because of objections raise

DPR during the ratification process that it only benefited S

The treaty was still pending at the decade’s end. 

In the years after the end of Confrontation, Indonesian–M

relations improved as both governments became comm

development and cooperation in ASEAN. This new war

reinforced by the natural affinities of race, religion, culture, 

guage. Although intensive and extensive bilateral ties have g

promoted good relations, these have been tested by irritant

Indonesian concerns about Malaysia’s handling of illegal In

temporary workers, and Malaysian (and Singapore) concer

chronic haze during the dry season produced by Indonesia

tion owners setting fires to clear the land for planting. The m

ciliatory tone set by Malaysian prime minister Abdullah 

helped in overcoming these irritants. 

Australia 

The most problematic of Indonesia’s neighborly relations 

with Australia. The tension inherent in the population di

between the two countries in such close geostrategic pro

exacerbated by their very different political cultures. Cri
Indonesia under Suharto in the 1980s and 1990s by the Aust

press, academics, and politicians provoked angry retorts from Ja

More recently, East Timor and Papua have been the primary irr

in the bilateral relationship. Since 1975 Australia had served as 

the primary locations for the East Timorese diaspora, and many 

nesians suspected Australia of wanting to break up the count

supporting East Timor’s independence movement, including d

the 1999 referendum. For many Indonesians, these suspicions 

confirmed when Australian troops were the first to arrive in D

September 1999 and made up the largest contingent within IN

FET, which was commanded by an Australian. Indonesian fear

Australian attention had turned to Papua once Timor-Leste ach

independence were heightened when Australia granted temp

protection visas to 43 Papuan asylum seekers who landed on 

York Peninsula in northeastern Australia in January 2006, a de

denounced by Jakarta in harsh terms. 

The victimization of Australians in the first Bali bombing in 

and the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta in 2004 did not 

substantial Indonesian public sympathy, although the Indonesian 

ernment did allow for significant assistance by Australian 

investigators. Bilateral relations were particularly poor under 

Minister John Howard because of his close relationship with Pre

George W. Bush, illustrated by Howard’s strong support for the 

Iraq and the persistent misperception that he had once stated tha

tralia was America’s “deputy sheriff” in Asia. The implicit long

Indonesian “threat,” as it appeared in Australia’s defense-pla

documents, underlined a latent suspicion in Jakarta that Aust

policy toward Indonesia was based on fear, not friendship. Thi

ception had to be constantly allayed by official Australian vi

Jakarta, and it was the driving force behind the signing of a bi

security pact in 2006 (see Foreign Military Relations, ch. 5). 

The Philippines 

The Philippines is a contiguous state and an ASEAN partne

Indonesia’s relations with it are more distant than with its other i

diate neighbors. The Philippines’ aligned status with the United 

and its territorial dispute with Malaysia over the sovereignty of 

inhibit a close relationship with Indonesia and other ASEAN mem

Nonetheless, when President Ferdinand Marcos resigned in 

Jakarta joined other ASEAN states in welcoming a peaceful tr

of power to Corazon Aquino. Jakarta was the first capital visit

the Philippines’ new president, unprecedentedly even before W

ington, and Suharto took the opportunity to press the urgen

300 
 

defeating the communist New People’s Army in the Philip

show support for Aquino’s government, Suharto insisted that 

ASEAN Manila Summit meeting go forward despite apprehe

other ASEAN capitals about the security situation. Jakarta 

displeased that Aquino was succeeded in 1992 by Fidel Ram

as chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 

retary of national defense, was well known to the Indones

tary’s senior leadership. In more recent years, Indonesia 

concerned about chronic political instability in the Philippin

presidents Joseph Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 

Most worrisome for Jakarta is the seeming inability of th

pines to put an end to its internal wars. Indonesia viewed th

of the New People’s Army as destabilizing for the region. M

the Muslim insurrection in the south of the Philippines has h

cations for global terrorism, regional territorial integrity, and 

sian Muslim politics. Post–September 11, 2001, revelat

Indonesian terrorists had trained in camps in Mindanao and 

traveled between the Philippines and Indonesia have p

greater security cooperation between the two countries, 

Indonesia was uncomfortable with the George W. Bush ad

tion’s designation of Southeast Asia as the “second front in t

war on terrorism” and with the U.S. military’s significant eng

in Mindanao as a result. 

Relations with East Asia 

China 

Bilateral relations between Indonesia and China have war

siderably since the resumption of diplomatic ties in 1990, 

residual suspicion remains about China’s ultimate security 

nomic goals in the region. Trade that once had to be tran

through Singapore or Hong Kong has become direct and has 

exponentially. China has become an important market for In

natural gas and minerals. There have even been efforts to 

bilateral defense and security cooperation through direct mi

military ties. Nonetheless, Indonesia has largely preferred t

China’s regional expansionism via ASEAN rather than bilat

establishing forums such as ASEAN Plus Three in 1997 and 

ing China’s accession to the TAC in 2003. 

Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with China were susp

1967 in the aftermath of the 1965 attempted coup d’état. Be

suspected of complicity with the PKI in planning the coup 

viewed by the new military-dominated government as 

through its possible support of a resurgent underground P
 

 

 

directly and through a “fifth column” of Chinese Indonesians. J

repeatedly demanded an explicit disavowal by Beijing of suppo

communist insurgents in Southeast Asia as its sine qua non for 

malization process. Underlying the Indonesian policy was u

about China’s long-range goals in Southeast Asia. The break in 

tions persisted until 1990, when, in the face of shifting globa

regional realities as well as renewed mutual confidence, th

countries resumed their formal ties. An exchange of visits by Ch

premier Li Peng to Jakarta in August 1990 and by Suharto to B

in November 1990 symbolized the dramatic alteration that had 

place. In particular, normalization was driven by four factors: C

market reforms had made it less threatening ideologically and 

formidable as an economic force; the end of the Cold War had 

ened the Soviet Union and thus strengthened China’s regional 

tion; Indonesia’s deep involvement in the Cambodian peace pr

was hampered by a lack of direct relations with the Khmer Ro

main sponsor; and Indonesia’s desire to mediate the South Chin

disputes was similarly hampered in the absence of direct rel

with the largest party to the disputes. 

Japan 

The quality of Indonesia–Japan relations is best measured by 

tics on trade, investment, and the flow of assistance. In 2008 

was the single-largest destination of Indonesia’s exports, the se

largest source (after China) of its imports, the single-largest fo

investor, and by far the most important donor of development 

tance (see The Changing Nature of Trade and Aid, ch. 3). In retu

the dominant foreign economic presence in Indonesia, Japan is s

to all the expectations and resentments attendant on that statu

example, Indonesia has sought greater technology transfer as p

Japanese investment. The association of Japanese firms with 

cally well-connected Indonesians has led to charges of exploi

With their memories of World War II and the anti-Japanese de

strations during Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s 1974 visit, the 

nesian leadership was keenly sensitive to the possibility of a disr

anti-Japanese backlash (see Rise of the New Order, 1966–98, c

However, the issues of Japan’s version of World War II history 

comfort women, so critical to its relations with China and 

Korea, do not weigh as heavily in the relationship with Indonesi

In the long term, the critical issue for Indonesia in the 

twenty-first century is access to Japan’s markets for manufac

goods. Yet, Indonesia shares the ASEAN-wide concern abo

implications for Southeast Asia of Japanese remilitarization an

302 
ambivalent about Japanese military participation in UN pe

ing operations in Cambodia. From Tokyo’s point of view

only an indirect linkage between Japan’s economic presenc

political relationship between the two countries, but Japan 

of Indonesia’s geostrategic straddling of the main commerc

to the Middle East and Europe. In addition, Japan struggles 

nesia, as elsewhere in the region and the world, to compe

resurgent China. 

Relations with the United States 

Indonesian relations with the United States are in some 

the warmest they have ever been. Ironically, this rapport c

time when Southeast Asia as a whole, including Indone

dropped significantly in terms of U.S. global priorities. Th

mental underpinning of the warm relations is Indonesia’s s

transition to democracy. Not only do the two countries now 

political system and political values, but also human-rights v

and restrictions on bilateral military ties have become a m

prominent impediment to good relations. It has certainly als

that President Yudhoyono spent several stints in his milita

obtaining training and education in the United States, inc

Fort Benning in 1975 and 1982 and at Fort Leavenworth in 

during which time he earned a master’s degree in managem

Webster University, which has a campus at Fort Leavenwo

2008 election as president of Barack H. Obama, who lived i

for several years as a child, has dramatically raised expect

even closer ties with the United States. The importance of t

to the Obama Administration was signaled in February 2009 

retary of State Hillary Clinton’s addition of Indonesia to the N

Asian itinerary of her first overseas trip. 

To the extent Indonesia was a priority for the United Sta

the George W. Bush administration, it was primarily through a 

lens. This focus included counterterrorism, maritime security

sia’s utility as a voice for moderation in the Muslim world, an

ditional security threats such as avian influenza. The 2002–5 b

in Jakarta and Bali drove home for both Indonesia and th

States that international terrorism is a significant problem in S

Asia. Indonesian security forces, particularly the police, 

unprecedented access to American investigators and trainers, 

in the killing or capture and conviction of hundreds of militan

time security mainly focuses on the Strait of Malacca, w

emphasis is on piracy and international shipping, and on the S

Sulu corridor, where the focus is on counterterrorism. Th
 

States also appreciated Indonesian support in March 2007 fo

Security Council Resolution 1747 on Iran’s nuclear-weapons pro

Indonesia, for its part, resented the narrow focus of American 

est in it. Indonesia certainly shares many of these security con

but its interests in the bilateral relationship are much broader, in

ing reviving military ties, increasing trade and investment, addr

climate change, and expanding access to American educational 

tutions for Indonesian postsecondary students. Under rules kno

the Leahy Amendment, the U.S. Congress totally cut off bilatera

itary sales and assistance following the violence accompanyin

East Timor referendum in 1999. This cutoff expanded restrictio

in place after the 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre in Dili. Indones

made the case that these sanctions are anachronistic given its tran

to democracy. The George W. Bush administration began to re

lish the military relationship, but the U.S. Congress continues to 

some restrictions in response to pressure from human-rights g

(see Post–Suharto Reforms, ch. 5). Indonesia’s interests in a br

bilateral relationship were given concrete form in President 

hoyono’s proposal for a “comprehensive partnership” in a Nov

2008 speech at the United States–Indonesia Society (USIND

Washington, DC. The emphasis of this partnership would not 

U.S. assistance to Indonesia, which would nonetheless continu

rather on global and regional issues that the two countries coul

solve together. The Obama administration, while maintaining th

nificant levels of security cooperation established under the 

administration, welcomed this initiative by proposing that, in ad

to existing security concerns, the partnership should focus on e

the environment, and climate change; economic, trade, and inves

cooperation; democracy and good governance; education; and h

The United States is the second-largest destination (after Jap

Indonesia’s exports, and the third-largest source (after Chin

Japan) of its imports. American investment in Indonesia’s oi

and mining sectors is significant but remains quite low in othe

tors as a result of American companies’ concerns about corru

low labor productivity, an inflexible labor law, and uncertain 

tract enforcement. Indonesia has assumed global leadership on 

ronmental issues by hosting the UN Climate Change Conferen

Bali in December 2007 and has continued to press the United 

on this issue. Finally, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist a

on the United States, Washington tightened its visa policies, m

it much harder for foreign students wishing to study in America

ticularly from Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia

change, combined with the slow decline over several decad

304 
 

American scholarships for foreign students, has made it mu

difficult for Indonesians to access U.S. institutions of high

ing. Indonesia places a high priority on education as a mean

its development, and the United States remains a favorite de

for Indonesian students. All of these issues are important t

in further improving the bilateral relationship, but none has 

a serious impediment to the increasingly warm connection. 

Consolidating Democracy, Contributing to 

Global Peace 

Indonesia has made substantial progress toward democr

since 1998. It has successfully navigated a transition to de

minimizing the military’s direct political influence, amen

constitution, holding multiple credible elections, and embark

unprecedented decentralization of power. It is also making si

progress in consolidating this new democracy, and the 2009 

cycle was another significant milestone in this regard. Ad

corruption, improving economic performance, strengtheni

governance, and fixing the judicial system will also cont

democratic consolidation. Indonesia has rebounded from th

of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, but its growth rates n

higher in order to reduce poverty and make the leap to the n

of development. A stable democracy and a prosperous 

would provide Indonesia with strong foundations for its d

playing a middle-power role regionally and even globally 

interest areas. Its peacekeeping role in Lebanon in 2007, as w

offers to help address conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, Bur

and Iraq, are emblematic of the constructive role Indonesia e

for itself in a post–Cold War, post–September 11 world. 

* * * 

Useful general surveys of contemporary Indonesian politic

Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre’s Indonesia: Democ

the Promise of Good Governance; John Bresnan’s Indone

Great Transition; and Donald K. Emmerson’s Indonesia 

Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition. Blair A. King 

constitutional reform in “Empowering the Presidency: Inte

Perceptions in Indonesia’s Constitutional Reforms, 1999–200

tary reform is addressed in John B. Haseman and Eduardo L

two works: Toward a Stronger U.S.–Indonesia Security Rel

and The U.S.–Indonesia Security Relationship: The Next Step
as in Marcus Mietzner’s The Politics of Military Reform in 

Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institu

Resistance and Dewi Fortuna Anwar’s Negotiating and Consolid

Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military. A

MacIntyre’s The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and 

ernance offers contemporary analyses of Indonesia’s political 

omy, as does Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen’s Indone

Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis. 

Decentralization is the subject of many studies, such as 

Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken’s Renegotiating Bou

ies: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia. East Timor’s ach

ment of independence is analyzed by Richard Tanter, Gerr

Klinken, and Desmond Ball in Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s 

tary and Violence in East Timor. Edward Aspinall studies the 

peace process in Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Bas

Peace in Aceh? Blair A. King’s Peace in Papua: Widening a W

of Opportunity addresses the challenges of resolving separatism 

poor governance in Papua. The communal violence that has pl

Indonesia is the subject of Jacques Bertrand’s Nationalism and E

Conflict in Indonesia and Gerry van Klinken’s Communal Vio

and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars. 

Political Islam is also the subject of numerous studies, su

Bahtiar Effendy’s Islam and the State in Indonesia, Robert W. He

Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Za

Abuza’s Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, and Azyu

Azra’s Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Globa

text. R. William Liddle gives a succinct overview of Indonesian po

culture in Politics and Culture in Indonesia. Mikaela Nyman con

contemporary developments in Indonesian civil society in Demo

ing Indonesia: The Challenges of Civil Society in the Era of Refor

Indonesian foreign policy and regional implications are analy

Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Harold A. Crouch’s Indonesia: Foreig

icy and Domestic Politics, Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk’s In

sia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia, and An

L. Smith’s Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in AS

Gerald L. Houseman’s Researching Indonesia: A Guide to Po

Analysis is an overall guide to the analysis of Indonesian po

Annual surveys of Indonesian political events can be found in th

uary–February issue of Asian Survey and the annual Southeast 

Affairs (Singapore). For current politics, the Asian Wall Street Jo

(Hong Kong) and the Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kon

extremely useful. The Indonesian government also offers a vari

Web sites, many of which are listed on http://indonesia.go.id/en

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

306 
Chapter 5. National Se
PC–40 type fast patrol craft underway 
 

 

INDONESIA’S MILITARY AND NATIONAL POLICE hav

gone important changes since the Suharto era ended in 19

ever, they retain a role in national society that is perhaps u

the world. Historically, the Indonesian military has been inv

many affairs of state that elsewhere are not normally associ

the armed forces. Since the Netherlands recognized Indone

ereignty in 1949, the military has been the dominant politica

tion in Indonesia. In comparison with the armed forces of n

comparable background and state of development, the In

military is cautious in its exercise of traditional military 

over society. However, until discarded in 1999, its do

dwifungsi (dual function) gave the military a role in virtua

aspect of civil society, from village-level politics through 

spectrum of security and intelligence missions. This legacy 

a major factor in the military’s effort to define its role in the 

the nation’s transition from autocracy to democracy in 

Suharto era. 

From Suharto’s assumption of power in 1966 to his forc

ment 32 years later, the armed forces accepted and supported 

nale behind his regime, namely, that economic and social dev

was the nation’s first priority and that social and political stab

absolutely essential if that goal were to be achieved. Regime p

and maintenance of internal stability were the primary missio

Indonesian National Armed Forces (see Glossary). The arm

are currently called Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI but earli

for these and other acronyms, see Table A). They were emine

cessful in this regard, leading the nation out of a period of pol

social upheaval in the mid-1960s into a period of relatively lon

domestic order and unprecedented economic growth. The pric

society was tight control of the citizenry, intolerance of cri

other forms of opposition to the regime, and heavy censorsh

news media. 

Suharto’s resignation from the presidency in May 19

amid a combination of regional economic recession and pop

content. The long-serving president’s removal gathered eve

impetus from his inattentiveness to outbreaks of violence 

trated mainly in Jakarta, and from the popular perception th

his family were involved in corrupt activities. The arme

establishment, Suharto’s primary instrument of political co

more than three decades, was also a crucial element in his 
 

 

 

power. The military leadership declined to take control of the 

ernment to keep Suharto in office and acted with restraint 

overseeing a constitutional transfer of leadership to his vice 

dent, Bacharuddin J. (B. J.) Habibie. Many analysts felt at the 

that the ambitious commander in chief of the armed forces, G

Wiranto, believed that Habibie would resign along with Suhart

that he himself would be asked to take the presidency in a 

eerily similar to Suharto’s own accession to power in 1966. In 

subsequent public interviews, Wiranto said that he had been 

twice by Suharto to take power but had declined to do so. W

subsequently was credited with supporting the constitutional c

of leadership. 

The fall of Suharto prompted a reconsideration of the military

in government and society over the long period of his rule. A 

press and a newly empowered national legislature—the People’s 

sultative Assembly (MPR)—focused on abuses by the military d

the Suharto years. Revelations of human-rights abuses, improp

of power, corruption, economic intimidation, and other unprofes

conduct caused the military acute embarrassment and loss of pre

But the years immediately following Suharto’s fall brought di

nized civilian government, widening corruption, and, in a num

different parts of the country, religious and ethnic violence on a 

not seen for a generation. The apparent inability of the civilian a

istration to impose order on society, combined with widespread y

ing for the stability that had characterized most of the Suhart

resulted in popular demands for a more effective and decisive go

ment. By assuming a lower profile and engaging in a series of ref

the military regained much of its lost stature. Furthermore, it rem

the most organized and disciplined element of Indonesian societ

Throughout the Suharto years, the central government had pro

insufficient funding for the military, with only about one-third 

administrative and operational costs covered by the defense b

The rest of the military’s financial requirements were met by re

from its extensive business empire or diversions from other go

ment institutions. But the 1997–98 financial crisis, compound

arms embargoes imposed by Indonesia’s traditional military sup

had an immediate effect on force readiness. Within a few year

armed forces’ primary weapons systems had deteriorated as a re

lack of maintenance and an inability to purchase spare parts for 

systems. International reaction to human-rights violations perpe

during the 1990s in East Timor (Timor Timur Province; since M

2002, the independent Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste) ha

ticularly severe consequences, prompting the United States and 

310 
 

nations to embargo arms sales and military training. Indones

quently turned to nontraditional suppliers, primarily in Easter

and Asia, to upgrade its aging ground, air, and naval systems. 

the deterioration of the TNI’s capabilities was demonstrate

military’s deficient performance in the aftermath of the Dece

2004, tsunami that devastated the coast of the Special Region 

(called Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 1999–2000, in an 

assuage separatist sentiment in the region). Although the T

sonnel performed very well on the ground, where the large 

presence turned largely from combat to recovery efforts a

forms of civic action, its air-transport systems were woeful

pared to confront such a massive natural disaster. That outcom

with the visible deterioration of the TNI’s capabilities, figure

in the U.S. decision to reestablish military ties with Indonesia

The inauguration in October 2004 of Susilo Bambang Yu

as Indonesia’s sixth president, and the fourth since the fall of 

came at an important juncture for Indonesia’s national-secu

ture. The election of a retired general by a majority of more 

percent of the votes cast reflected not only respect for him as 

perceived to be free of corruption, but also a yearning fo

focused and active government. President Yudhoyono benef

his reputation as a “thinking general,” who supported refor

military and whose independence from preceding admin

appealed to an electorate weary of continued corruption, ine

and generally uninspired government. 

The biggest challenge facing Yudhoyono as he began his 

tration may have been to meet excessive popular expectatio

showing competence with the practical matters of governm

national leadership would have to address the issues of e

growth and political change in a security environment ma

tenuous by the threat of international and domestic terrorism

as by long-standing separatist rebellions at its eastern and 

extremes, Papua Province and the Special Region of Aceh

transition to democracy reinforced by peaceful and honest le

and presidential elections, Indonesia still had to address th

cant domestic security issues of separatism; sectarian and et

lence and its causes; and Islamic extremism, the effect of w

to help sustain international terrorism. 
Historical Context 

Independence and the Sukarno Period, 1945–65 

The Indonesian armed forces grew out of the diverse experie

the Dutch colonial period (the early seventeenth through the 

twentieth centuries), the Japanese occupation (1942–45) d

World War II, and the struggle for independence (1945–49). D

the colonial period, a small number of Indonesians were rec

into the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). Subsequently, 

nese occupation forces recruited Indonesians, often former KNI

diers, for use as military auxiliaries (heiho) and as supply and su

personnel attached to the Japanese army. These Indonesian en

personnel frequently were sent to the front in the Pacific, the P

pines, and other war zones, such as Burma. The deteriorating m

situation in 1943 led the Japanese occupation authorities to org

an indigenous volunteer self-defense force called the Defend

the Fatherland (Peta). In Java some 37,000 Peta recruits, incl

officers, received training in combat tactics. The number of 

troops trained in Sumatra, where the forces were usually know

their Japanese name—Giyūgun (volunteer army)—is unknow

knowledgeable sources estimate about one-third of the nu

trained for Java’s Peta. 

Along with former heiho and KNIL troops, Peta provide

emergent Indonesian state with a ready source of trained militar

sonnel following Japan’s defeat in 1945. This force was su

mented by large numbers of young people with experience in v

paramilitary youth corps that had been organized by the Jap

they mobilized the population and provided a recruiting base for 

An embryonic military organization, with these elements 

nucleus, the People’s Security Forces (BKR), was formed on A

22, 1945. Just five days earlier, on August 17, Sukarno and Mo

mad Hatta had proclaimed Indonesian independence. Thousan

members of various local militias (laskar) also joined the newly 

solidated national armed forces. From the beginning, the W

ideal of a politically neutral military had few proponents. Ma

those who joined the new force, called the Indonesian Na

Armed Forces (TNI) from 1947 to 1962 (also APRIS—A

Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia—from 1949 to 

and APRI—Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia—in 1

were nationalists who sought both military victory and po

change for their nation. 

The disparate forces fought a largely guerrilla-style war again

returning Dutch troops. Commanded by the young and charis

312 
Circa 1923 image of the 

bodyguard of the 

sultan of Yogyakarta 

Courtesy Library of Congress 

Prints and Photographs 

Division, LC–USZ62–106137, 

digital ID cph 3c06137 

General Sudirman, the newly formed army avoided entrapm

fought on even after the Dutch forces captured Sukarno and 

ian government at Yogyakarta. Sudirman, Indonesia’s youn

general, was the first commander in chief of Indonesia

forces. He led the army in battle from 1945 to 1949 even th

suffered from tuberculosis and had to be carried from place 

in a modified palanquin. He remained in command until his 

January 1950 at the age of 35. Sudirman has been honore

founding father of the Indonesian military ever since, a natio

whose spirit and nationalism are invoked as key ingredien

Indonesian military ethos. 

Experiences during the armed struggle against the Dutch 

ened the military’s political involvement in national affair

with better-trained and better-equipped Dutch forces, the 

sians conducted a guerrilla war in which fighters had to rely 

on the support of the local population. This tie to the popul

forced the concept of perjuangan (the struggle), which stre

ance on the people for support, intelligence, and succor aga

external threats and internal divisiveness. This concept w

heart of army chief of staff and former KNIL soldier Gener

Haris Nasution’s ideas about guerrilla warfare or total peop

Dwifungsi, later used by Suharto to justify his use of th

forces as the primary pillar of support of his lengthy rule, re

the military’s right, drawn from the revolutionary experien

both military and civilian political and civil roles in society. 

An attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 

power at Madiun, East Java, in September 1948 turned the 

against the communist movement. Considered a treason
treacherous betrayal because it occurred during the indepen

struggle against the Dutch, the incident—commonly called the M

Affair—caused a deep and permanent suspicion within the m

not only of communism but of leftist movements in general. 

At the end of the independence war in 1949, the governmen

as many as 500,000 armed fighters potentially at its disposal. D

bilization reduced this number to 200,000 by mid-1950, whe

military was officially designated the Armed Forces of the Rep

of Indonesia (APRI). The first priority of the military leadershi

to form some semblance of a unified structure from numerous 

rate elements—many of them loyal to local leaders and re

power holders—and to establish central control over these elem

General Nasution made progress in this direction, overseein

restructuring of operational units in all three military servic

accordance with organizational charts borrowed from Western 

forces, and instituting formal training programs. Similar ch

occurred in the structure of the National Police of Indonesia (Po

After 1955, Nasution initiated a series of personnel transfer

instituted several reforms to gain control over local comma

Between 1950 and 1958, several opponents of Nasution’s po

joined local rebellions in the Outer Islands (see Glossary; The 

to Guided Democracy, 1957– 65, ch. 1). Any one of these dis

movements, such as the Universal Struggle (Permesta) rebell

central and western Sumatra and Sulawesi, the Darul Islam (H

of Islam) rebellion in western Java, and the establishment o

short-lived Republic of South Maluku (RMS), could have f

splintered the young republic, had it succeeded. Deploying 

rebellious regions, the army overcame these various uprisin

members often fighting against former comrades. These oper

were another national success cited by the armed forces in just

a leadership role in national affairs. 

The armed forces’ position in the government became instit

alized during the period of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957

Vowing that it would neither be a “dead tool of the governmen

assume total control of the nation, the military took what G

Nasution referred to as the “middle way,” working coopera

with the civilian leadership through its representation in the ca

the MPR, and the civil service. The services became, along wi

PKI, a “junior partner” to Sukarno in ruling the nation. Unifo

personnel held positions throughout the nation down to the v

level, in both the administration of martial law and the manag

of economic enterprises (mostly nationalized former Dutch p

ties), and in the deployment of regional cadre units assign

mobilize local resistance in the event of a threat to national sec

314 
 

To support the activist foreign policy of the Guided De

period, especially the 1962 campaign against Dutch forces 

New Guinea (also called West Irian or Irian Barat, and renam

Jaya—Victorious Irian—in 1972 by the national governm

called Papua and Papua Barat) and the 1963–66 armed C

tion (see Glossary), or Konfrontasi, with Malaysia, Sukarn

enlarged the armed forces (see Relations with Neighboring 

ch. 4). Most affected were the formerly tiny air force a

which greatly expanded and acquired advanced arms and eq

by means of military credits from the Soviet Union and th

bloc states of Eastern Europe. By the mid-1960s, Indonesia 

of the largest and best-equipped armed forces in Southeast A

Trying to contain the army’s expanding political influen

early 1960s, Sukarno encouraged the air force, navy, and po

latter was a fourth branch of the armed forces until 1999) to 

pendently of the army. The army leadership became alarme

resulting divisions among the services, the growing influen

PKI in all four branches, and Sukarno’s increasing suppor

PKI. Tension within the armed forces increased following p

by the PKI in early 1965 to place political advisers in each 

unit (as in the Chinese and Soviet systems) and to establish 

force” of armed peasants and workers outside the contro

existing armed services. 

Suharto’s New Order, 1966–98 

An attempted coup d’état on the last day of September 

alleged communist sympathizers in the military—the Septe

Movement (Gestapu)—was the seminal event in the evoluti

modern Indonesian armed forces. The details of the even

clouded and controversial even as post-Suharto research contin

accepted government version is that General Suharto, at the 

widely regarded as part of the most powerful senior military e

nized quick and effective resistance to a PKI-organized a

coup. The precise nature and significance of his role in th

affair remain matters of considerable debate, but whatever 

Suharto rose rapidly to a position of paramount nationa

Sukarno was obliged to relinquish de facto authority to S

March 1966, and Suharto was appointed acting president one y

Along with unrestrained violence, in which hundreds of thou

civilians died, and a subsequent wave of arrests, the coup attem

the suppression of the PKI. The expansionist military doctri

Sukarno era was ended, and national expenditures began to b

on economic development. 
 

The military establishment, led by the army, has been the 

try’s premier institution since 1966, when, in its own vi

answered the summons of the people and moved to center 

Comprising the three military services and the police, the a

forces operated according to the dwifungsi doctrine, enacted in

in 1982, which gave the military a dual role—traditional respon

ity as defenders of the nation, plus duty as a sociopolitical forc

moting stability, order, and national development. Under this 

broad charter, active-duty and retired military personnel 

assigned throughout the government to posts filled in most 

countries by civil servants or politically appointed civilians. M

personnel most frequently received postings as provincial gove

district heads, members of legislative bodies, functionaries in a 

ety of civilian governmental departments, and ambassadors

armed forces became a dominant factor in the social—incl

even sports and entertainment—and political life of the countr

acted as a major executive agent of government policies. 

To understand fully the role of the armed forces in contemp

Indonesian society, one must understand the absolute priori

government and the military leadership gave to internal securit

national stability during the New Order (1966–98). Having e

enced attempted coups in 1948 and 1965, which they identif

communist-inspired, as well as a number of regional separatist 

gles and instability created by radical religious movements, the 

Order government had little tolerance for public disorder. 

The Suharto government brought the nation unprecedented 

ity, remaining in firm control and without serious challenge 

1966 to 1998. The leadership remained alert to real or potentia

versive threats, maintaining surveillance—and sometimes con

over the activities and programs of a wide range of groups and 

tutions. The government was acutely sensitive to any signs of 

sition to its policies. In general, it seemed to label as subv

anything not supportive of the national ideology, the Pancasil

Glossary; Pancasila: The State Ideology, ch. 4). The extent of c

in the years after the fall of Suharto can be fully realized on

comparing that environment of close control of society and r

sion of dissent with the openness experienced in the period 

1998, with its robust free news media and aggressive debate 

national legislature. 

Separatist insurgencies have long been the most serious thr

national security. The Suharto government referred to such insu

activity as a Security Disturbance Movement (GPK). Three 

movements, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 

316 
(Fretilin—see Glossary) in Timor Timur Province, the Fr

Movement (GAM) in Aceh, and the Free Papua Organizatio

in Papua Province, have important roles in the nation’s mod

rity history (see Post-Suharto Reforms, this ch.). 

Groups advocating the establishment of an Islamic sta

over the whole national territory or over discrete areas, were 

sional security threat in the 1970s and 1980s. Such organiz

Darul Islam, Bangsa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Nation o

and Komando Jihad (Commando Jihad) carried out insurg

terrorist operations against the secular state. Komando Jihad 

responsible for bombings of churches and theaters in 1976 a

attacks on police stations in 1980 and 1981, and the 1981 hij

Bangkok of a Garuda Indonesia domestic flight. 

During the 1980s, Indonesia’s rapid economic develo

with annual growth rates approaching 9 percent—caused so

sures on society that brought new domestic tensions. These 

including improved educational opportunities, rising expe

industrialization, unemployment, and crowded cities, were 

for generating urban crime, student and political activism, a

strikes. One example of government action to address the

occurred in the early 1980s, when an alarming rise in viole

in Jakarta and other large cities on Java prompted the n

undercover “Petrus” (penembakan misterius—mysteriou

ings—or pembunuhan misterius—mysterious killings) cam

which known criminals were killed by handpicked executio

and their bodies dumped in public places as a warning. De

number of killings, which human-rights groups estimated at 

8,000 nationwide, most of the public expressed cautious ap

the Petrus campaign, usually accompanied by criticism of t

for being unable to stop the rise in crime. 

Government operations had driven extremist groups und

by the early 1990s. Interestingly, some of these groups had 

an existence for decades, undercover and largely throug

connections and generational transfers, before reemerging i

1990s as a recruiting base for resurgent domestic and inte

terrorist organizations (see Terrorism, this ch.). 

Violent ethnic disputes generally were kept to a minimu

the Suharto years because of the assurance of a quick an

response by security forces. Most such outbreaks were directe

Indonesians of Chinese descent. The nation’s ethnic Chinese 

estimated at 4 million or more in the early twenty-first cen

evoked popular resentment since the colonial era, when Chin

viduals often served as business intermediaries between the D
 

and the indigenous population (see Ethnic Minorities, ch. 2). 

modern period, resentment has continued over Chinese Indone

wealth and domination of the economy, including their roles as 

mediaries for foreign investors and as advisers and silent partne

senior armed forces personnel and civilian government leader

business interests. These ethnic Chinese businesspeople, kno

cukong (see Glossary), were particularly important in the Suharto 

ily’s increasingly rapacious commercial arrangements. 

Anti-Chinese feeling surfaced violently in the turmoil im

ately preceding Suharto’s May 1998 resignation, when large 

bers of ethnic Chinese homes and businesses were destroyed

dozens of ethnic Chinese women were raped by mobs of rioter

violence caused a major flight of ethnic Chinese capital from 

nesia, which worsened the economic depression that started in 

The continued slow repatriation of that capital remains an imp

reason for Indonesia’s delayed economic recovery (see Pos

Reform, ch. 3). 

The absence of a perceived external threat has been widely 

ited with allowing Indonesia to concentrate on its internal de

and national development priorities. Successive armed forces 

manders stressed military readiness and training even as econ

realities constrained new equipment purchases. Until 2007, 

new armored personnel carriers were purchased from France to 

port Indonesia’s United Nations (UN) deployment to Lebano

only major acquisition for the ground forces was the 1981 pur

through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, of new 

millimeter towed howitzers. New acquisitions for the other se

during the late 1970s and early 1980s included F–5 fighter and 

ground-attack aircraft for the air force and used, but still servic

ships for the navy. Twelve F–16 fighters, also purchased fro

United States, were not delivered until 1989. Over the year

armed forces had been seriously weakened by national spendin

orities that stressed economic development and relegated de

spending to a much lower priority than in most developing na

The low priority given to defense spending continued into the 

years of the twenty-first century. This situation has compromis

military’s readiness posture even further, because income fro

military business empire is far less than in the past, as a result 

1990s regional recession, corruption, and inept management (se

ticipation in the Economy, this ch.). In 2008, for example, the 

house of the national legislature, the People’s Representative C

(DPR), provided the TNI and Department of Defense (Dephan

less than one-third of the funding requested. 

318 
 

 

Suharto deliberately underfunded the military for several 

First, national development claimed first priority for funding

there was, realistically, no external threat to Indonesia’s sec

thus no need for top-of-the-line military arms. Third, by requ

military to rely on its extensive business empire for an estim

thirds of its operational and administrative requirements, 

encouraged off-budget income and expenditures and acce

inevitable corruption as a way to ensure the loyalty of the 

through financial gain. The major disadvantage of this sys

that it loosened the central government’s control over th

forces. A military that obtains two-thirds of its funding from 

resources is far less responsive to government control than a 

establishment fully funded by the central government. It i

reason that proponents of military reform focused on the nee

civilian governmental control over the military business em

Defense Spending and the Defense Industry, this ch.). 

Post-Suharto Reforms 

The military establishment was pilloried by both the pres

populace over a series of revelations of human-rights ab

came out after the fall of Suharto in May 1998. Furtherm

armed forces leadership had become disillusioned by 

demands by Suharto for unprofessional conduct, such as inte

in most aspects of civil society and tight control over every 

political activity. Indonesia’s military leaders responded 

developments by embarking on a process of change. Th

forces assumed a lower political profile and began a revisio

trine to meet some—but by no means all—of the calls fo

This process of change was a major part of national reform

Glossary), and both the process and the pace of change bec

jects of analysis and criticism (see The Political Process, ch

The military introduced reforms in an attempt to meet 

demands of a democratic society. The National Police, w

been a coequal branch of the armed forces since 1960, was s

from the military in 1999 and placed under the president. T

of the military establishment was changed from Armed Forc

Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) to Indonesian National Arme

(TNI). The name change signaled a change in focus by w

National Police took the country’s internal security as its 

responsibility. The Department of Defense and Security (H

was redesignated simply the Department of Defense (De

move that underscored how the military’s primary mis

changed (see fig. 12). 
 

MINISTER OF 

DEFENSE 

FISCAL 

CENTER 

CODES 

CENTER 

SECRETARY 

GENERAL 

INSPECTOR 

GENERAL 

DEFENSE 

STRATEGY 

DIRECTORATE 

RESEARCH AND 

DEVELOPMENT 

AGENCY 

DATA AND 

INFORMATION 

CENTER 

CASUALTY 

REHABILITATION 

CENTER 

EDUCATION AND 

TRAINING 

AGENCY 

DEFENSE 

PLANNING 

DIRECTORATE 

DEFENSE 

POTENTIAL 

DIRECTORATE 

DEFENSE 

STRENGTH 

DIRECTORATE 

DEFENS

FACILITI

DIRECTOR

SPECIAL 

ADVISERS 

Figure 12. Organization of the Department of Defense, 2009 

The TNI leadership discarded dwifungsi and replaced it with 

trine called the New Paradigm (Paradigma Baru), which emph

“leading from behind” rather than domination of the political pr

Constitutional reforms eliminated the TNI’s blocs of reserved se

the national and local legislatures. The TNI redirected its primar

sion from internal security to external defense, although the D

passage of a new military law in 2004 granted the armed forces s

icant responsibilities for counterterrorism and counterinsurg

because of the inability of the understaffed and poorly trained po

meet these intense challenges to domestic security. 

In 1999 Indonesia took one of the initial steps toward demo

civilian control of the military when, for the first time sinc

1950s, President B. J. Habibie appointed a civilian acade

Yuwono Sudarsono—as minister of defense. Other civilians fol

him in that post during the presidencies of Abdurrahman Wahi

Megawati Sukarnoputri. In 2004 President Susilo Bambang 

hoyono appointed Sudarsono as minister of defense a second 

Despite starting a trend of civilian ministers of defense, howev

TNI commander retained full command authority and rem

directly responsible to the president. The DPR recognized the co

of civilian leadership of the armed forces, however, and it inc

this principle in the 2004 military law but did not specify wh

320 
 

how, it would be implemented. Military officers now mu

from the armed forces before taking civilian government p

The military withdrew from day-to-day politics and remaine

in the legislative and presidential elections of 1999, 2004, an

East Timor 

East Timor was a colony of Portugal for more than 350 y

Portuguese first came to the island of Timor in the sixteenth 

finding sandalwood in considerable quantity. The colony 

made profitable by the introduction of coffee, which rem

island’s principal crop. Portuguese traders, backed by smal

ments of soldiers, quickly conquered or established relation

number of small Timorese kingdoms. The Dutch arrive

island in the early seventeenth century, and surrogates of the 

ments of Portugal and the Netherlands competed for po

influence for 200 years. The partition of the island of Ti

Dutch and Portuguese colonies in 1859 laid the basis for e

and social hardship that lasted into the early twenty-first cen

In 1974, after a liberal military coup d’état in Lisbon, the Po

government withdrew from its overseas colonial empire. C

after the fall of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to communis

Indonesia—as well as some other regional and internationa

especially Australia and the United States—feared that East 

leftist Fretilin, the dominant political power in East Timor, m

vide a haven for communist infiltration. Indonesia consequen

neered a formal request by four of the five East Timorese 

parties for integration into Indonesia, known as the Balibo De

On November 28, 1975, Fretilin declared East Timor’s inde

from Portugal; nine days later, Indonesia’s armed forces la

full-scale invasion, and East Timor was incorporated as In

twenty-seventh province. ABRI treated its military campaig

Fretilin guerrillas as an internal security operation, and the 

was closed to the news media and foreign observers until 198

The UN never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over 

tory, and Australia was the only country to formally recog

integration of East Timor into Indonesia. The United State

middle position that accepted the integration of East Ti

Indonesia but held that the Balibo Declaration and a subsequ

erendum” were not legitimate. This political issue dogged I

for years. Fretilin forces withdrew to the rugged mountai

interior and waged guerrilla warfare against the Indonesi

During the next 20 years, at least 100,000 and possibly as 

250,000 East Timorese died in combat or from disease and p
 

 

The majority of East Timorese did not support integrati

quickly became apparent that discontent was far more wides

than the Indonesian government and armed forces acknowl

publicly. Although Indonesian military operations reduced Fre

strength to only several hundred armed partisans, the resi

movement was supported by what the armed forces terme

klandestin, a large clandestine apparatus that provided intellig

shelter, food, and supplies. The Indonesian army was unable to 

due the military force, even though over the years it killed or cap

a succession of Fretilin military and political leaders. ABR

never able to win the hearts and minds of the East Timorese p

because of mutual mistrust and misunderstanding, and the pers

use of the military to force the civilian populace into submissi

series of major human-rights abuses and atrocities kept an in

tional focus on East Timor. Western criticism increased as imp

communications and access to the province revealed the extent 

army’s violence against civilians. 

In November 1991, Indonesian soldiers killed between 50 an

civilians and wounded others participating in a funeral process

the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili, East Timor’s capital. This in

proved to be the turning point that focused international opposit

Indonesian military operations in East Timor. In an effort to ad

the problem, the army implemented for the first time the princi

command responsibility. The respected armed forces comman

chief, General Edi Sudrajat, disciplined five levels in the m

chain of command involved in the incident, including two gene

the highest ranking in the East Timor operations—and a num

field-grade officers. The platoon leaders involved were court 

tialed and imprisoned. But both the military and the civilian go

ment, apparently obeying orders from Suharto himself, persis

failed to give a full accounting of the number of civilians killed 

disposition of the remains of the dead. The attack at Santa Cruz 

etery, and the government’s refusal to reveal the true number of 

ians killed in the incident, led to a dramatic decline in milita

military relations between the United States and Indonesia, incl

an end to the International Military Education and Training (I

Program for Indonesia. 

In January 1999, President Habibie proposed an expansive 

autonomy package for East Timor. He added controversy to the 

by promising “separation” of East Timor if the people voted a

his proposal. There followed a campaign of vicious intimidati

pro-Indonesian militia groups, supported by elements of the In

sian army, intended to persuade the populace to approve the a

322 
 

 

omy package. Despite the intense intimidation, however, o

30, 1999, the East Timorese voted against autonomy by a m

78.5 percent to 21.5 percent, and thus began a process of t

toward independence. 

The violence worsened following the vote against auton

they withdrew, pro-Indonesia militia forces, in many cases as

Indonesian troops, systematically destroyed most of the tow

and infrastructure of East Timor. Estimates vary, but militias 

diers may have killed more than 1,300 civilians and forced m

200,000 people across the border into Indonesian West Tim

Tenggara Timur Province). Violence was so widespread, and 

nesian security forces so deeply involved, that worldwide 

compelled Indonesia to accept the entry of an international 

armed peacekeepers. The International Force in East Timor 

FET), led by Australian troops and recognized by the UN—al

was not designated as a UN force—restored order in East T

October 1999, the MPR formally detached East Timor from 

sia. The next month, INTERFET turned over control to the U

sitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which, al

the advisory Timorese National Council, ran the territory u

pendence—as the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste—on 

2002. 

The egregious behavior of army-backed militias, and th

ingness of armed forces commander in chief General W

accept any responsibility for it or to discipline those i

caused Australia, Britain, the United States, and other natio

ther limit military relations with Indonesia. The United St

pended arms sales, halted the few remaining education and 

programs, and imposed political conditions on the restoratio

itary-to-military relations. Only after the December 2004 

struck Aceh did the United States restore Indonesia’s eligi

IMET funding and allow the sale of spare parts for transpor

under Foreign Military Financing (FMF) beneficial pricing. 

Separatist Rebellions 

The primary threat to Indonesia’s national security has be

by separatist guerrilla insurgencies in East Timor, Aceh, 

lesser extent, Papua and by extremist and terrorist organizati

separation of East Timor in 1999 removed what Indonesia

foreign minister Ali Alatas once injudiciously described as “

in Indonesia’s shoe.” The peaceful political settlement of 

separatist insurgency ended a major security threat as well

sia’s primary security threat is now posed by Islamic extre
terrorist organizations opposed to the moderate secular govern

system in Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiyah (Congregation of Isla

regional terrorist organization with links to Al Qaeda, whose g

to create a Muslim state in Southeast Asia, has conducted sever

rorist attacks around the country and has been deeply involv

communal violence in Maluku and Sulawesi Tengah provinces

Aceh 

Aceh, on the northern end of the island of Sumatra, w

decades the most troubled and insecure province of Indonesia, 

history of opposition to outside rule from its time as an indepe

sultanate. Acehnese maintained a broad range of grievances a

the central government that included a desire to keep a greate

centage of the revenue from the rich natural resources in the 

ince, resentment over brutal tactics by police and military force

a desire for more native Acehnese to be employed in the luc

natural resources sector. 

A small minority of Acehnese have demanded independence

separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began guerrilla warf

Aceh in the mid-1970s. Its political and military wings were di

A succession of GAM military commanders had given allegia

the GAM’s political leader, Hasan di Tiro, a longtime refug

Sweden. However, years of separation and the resentment caus

the relative safety of political leaders in Europe while GAM pe

nel in Aceh faced daily danger, led to a split that persists to thi

Attacks on public facilities and transportation, reprisal operatio

both sides, and a lack of skill in combating insurgency on the p

the military and the police contributed to a high level of nonco

tant casualties and insecurity throughout the province. By 200

GAM had made extensive advances in the countryside and wa

viding government services in several areas of the province. 

The first three post-Suharto administrations attempted to n

ate a political settlement with the GAM. In early 2002, Pre

Megawati Sukarnoputri authorized negotiations for a political 

ment while maintaining military pressure on the GAM. In Dece

2002, the two sides signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agree

The situation on the ground was fragile from the start, and the a

ment collapsed in May 2003 over the basic issue of the futu

Aceh—whether it should be a province of Indonesia or an ind

dent state. 

In May 2003, after the collapse of the agreement, the centra

ernment implemented a year of martial law in Aceh, and co

operations resumed immediately. The subsequent joint mil

324 
Antiterrorism sign, Sulawesi 

Courtesy Anastasia Riehl 

police action was the largest security operation since Ind

1975 invasion of East Timor, with an estimated 30,000 mil

sonnel and 20,000 police deployed against the GAM. Secur

ations resulted in the death, capture, or surrender of thou

alleged GAM cadre and supporters and drove armed GA

into remote areas of the province. Human-rights orga

charged that many of the casualties were innocent civilians. 

of heavy casualties, the GAM reverted to classic guerrilla 

tactics. Nonetheless, it remained a potent military adver

political force. 

When the devastating earthquake and tsunami struck 

2004, more than 166,000 people died. The tragedy struck b

of the insurgency, with heavy casualties among both guerr

government security forces and their families. The sheer m

of the tragedy created the conditions conducive to a compr

political settlement. As a result of the tragedy and the reli

tions that followed, Aceh finally reached the beginning of a 

hensive solution to the long-running insurgency. After sec

between representatives of the Indonesian government and th

by mutual agreement between Indonesian President Yudhoy

the GAM leadership, representatives of the two sides met in 

Finland, under the auspices of Crisis Management Initiative 

nongovernmental organization, led by the former Finnish p

Martti Ahtisaari. 

Both sides made significant concessions: The GAM a

accept the principle of autonomy and dropped its demand for 

independence, while the Indonesian government agreed 

GAM members to run for elective office. The two sides signe

agreement on August 15, 2005. Disarmament of GAM fo
removal of police and military forces went smoothly, with decom

sioning and demobilization completed on schedule by Decemb

2005. The GAM formally dissolved itself in January 2006, altho

is possible that remnants continue to exist. Indonesia’s legis

passed a revised local autonomy law for Aceh in June 2006, 

contained many of the provisions in the Helsinki agreement. Ace

political leaders vowed to continue to strive for additional legis

concessions in the future. 

Successful province-wide elections took place in December 

in which former GAM figures competed for office with ex

political parties. The election for governor resulted in a resou

victory for a former GAM spokesman, who defeated seven othe

didates and won almost 40 percent of the total votes cast. His c

competitor received only 17 percent. The election was significa

several reasons. First, it was peaceful, with virtually no violenc

ing the campaign and vote. Second, the victor was a “local GA

one who stayed in Aceh during the insurgency—who defeated 

dates representing the long-exiled international GAM leade

Third, the winner defeated candidates supported by the existing 

ical parties in Aceh. And fourth, there was no challenge to his vi

and national leaders and legislators in Jakarta pledged support f

tenure in office. District-level elections held at the same time br

many former GAM fighters into political office as well (see 

tions, ch. 4). By 2009 Aceh’s government and administration 

tioned much as those in other provinces, although disputes ov

application and enforcement of Islamic law or sharia (see Glo

were here more strident than anywhere else in the nation. 

Papua 

Indonesia no longer faces a significant secessionist movem

its easternmost provinces of Papua and Papua Barat. Rathe

rapid changes at the start of the twenty-first century have exacer

the preexisting problems of poverty, high unemployment, en

mental degradation, and the poor quality of many governmen

vices. The greatest threat to security is posed not by secess

violence but by increased social, ethnic, and religious ten

between the indigenous Papuan population and the swelling t

non-Papuans from elsewhere in Indonesia, drawn by opportuni

the commercial, agricultural, and extractive industries in th

provinces. 

The remaining small secessionist movement in Papua is r

and fragmented. The Free Papua Organization (OPM) form

1969 and has been conducting a low-level armed insurgency 

326 
 

then. The OPM is fragmented into several factions who

range from independence to a merger with neighboring Pa

Guinea, autonomy, or better treatment by the central gov

The influx of new residents resettled under the governmen

defunct Transmigration Program (see Glossary) caused re

among the indigenous population and brought new recruits 

the OPM’s political and military structures. However, since 

2000s that resentment has manifested itself in mostly urban 

demonstrations, and the OPM has steadily lost strength. In

military operations in Papua have claimed many lives over t

and nonviolent pro-independence OPM spokespersons ha

jailed on charges of subversion. 

The fight between the OPM and the security forces pits a 

tary force against a high-technology police and military. The 

ing OPM guerrilla bands were concentrated in the hinter

Jayapura, Merauke, Mimika, and Paniai by late 2008. The g

coordinate few, if any, of their operations; instead, they s

strike at targets as resources and opportunities become a

OPM targets include small police and military posts and pa

unarmed, nonmilitary groups, such as civilian timber work

last significant attack by the OPM occurred in 2002, when a 

by admitted OPM guerrillas attacked a group of mostly A

teachers near Tembagapura, site of a huge open-face mine 

by Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold—known locally 

Freeport-Indonesia—and protected by Indonesian milit

police, who are paid by Freeport. Two Americans and one In

were killed, and eight Americans and Indonesians were wou

2006 the leaders of the attack had been captured, tried, and c

of assault and murder. There were other attacks, also near 

port mine in 2009. 

The OPM is believed to have fewer than 1,000 armed g

Many of its unarmed supporters have turned their attention 

ful urban demonstrations to express grievances. Active, 

OPM activity is limited to those guerrillas living in the jung

ing with spears, bows, arrows, bush knives, and stolen and 

guns, mostly of military and police origin. The OPM is vie

political movement with an extremely limited military capab

poses no threat to Jakarta. However, it is another centripe

encouraging the fragmentation of Indonesia. The central gov

maintains approximately 10,000 military and police in Pa

missions of these forces include the destruction of OPM 

units, general law and order and security, and protection of t

nated strategic industry locations that include the Freeport 
 

Tembagapura and the growing development of the BP Tangguh 

ral gas field around Bintuni Bay, in Papua Barat Province. 

Ethnic and Religious Conflict 

A key characteristic of Suharto’s New Order regime was the 

alence of security and order throughout the nation. Any outbre

violence between ethnic or religious groups was quickly and s

repressed. Tensions simmered below the surface, however, and 

Suharto’s fall in 1998, ethnic and religious conflict erupted in s

regions. Security forces were initially ineffective in regaining 

trol because the police, poorly trained, poorly equipped, and u

staffed, were ill prepared to handle large-scale unrest. The 

stung by accusations of human-rights abuses, and resentful 

change in mission responsibility, was reluctant to intervene wit

formal request for assistance from local authorities. 

In Kalimantan Barat Province, the relative harmony that ha

vailed among native Malays, ethnic Chinese, and Dayaks for g

tions was upset by the influx of hundreds of thousands of Mad

under the Transmigration Program in the 1970s and 1980s. Co

nal violence in the 1990s was triggered by Dayak discontent wi

Madurese community’s hold on the economic balance of power 

region, and by a perception that the Madurese were illegally 

Dayak land. Hundreds of settlers were killed in the Sambas a

Kalimantan Barat in early 1999 and the Sampit area of Kalim

Tengah Province in February 2001. By April 2001, almost 10

Madurese, many of whom had resided in Kalimantan for severa

erations, had been evacuated to Madura and Java. Dayak leade

government officials conducted reconciliation talks, but the ret

the Madurese was slow to occur. 

Conflict broke out in Maluku Province in 1999 after a seem

minor clash between a bus driver and a passenger who refused 

his fare exploded into wide-ranging Muslim–Christian violen

Ambon that quickly expanded throughout the Maluku Islands. 

than 5,000 people were killed between 1999 and 2002. Islamic 

tants in Jakarta called for jihad to support their coreligionists o

islands. Similar Muslim–Christian violence flared around the Sul

Tengah city of Poso during the same period. Hard-line civilia

military sympathizers, who wanted to destabilize the regime of 

President Abdurrahman Wahid, collaborated to organize, train, 

and arm the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Militia) and arranged the unim

transfer of several thousand members of the militia to both Ambo

Poso. This caused a major escalation of the conflict. The gover

declared a civil emergency, one step short of martial law. In Feb

328 
2002, leaders of the Christian and Muslim communities in 

Maluku Province signed two separate peace agreements aime

ing three years of sectarian fighting. Both agreements were 

by Muhammad Yusuf Kalla, who, two years later, was ele

president of Indonesia. The level of conflict quickly fell, but 

violence remained endemic to the entire region. 

Terrorism 

Religious extremism has disturbed Indonesia’s domestic 

as far back as the 1950s and 1960s, when organizations 

Darul Islam and Bangsa Islam Indonesia fought for the e

ment of an Islamic state. It was not until the early twenty-

tury that terrorism, both domestic and international, was re

as a major internal threat. In 2000 dozens of people died in 

of urban terrorist attacks on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 

churches and shopping malls on Sumatra and Java. In Singa

Malaysia, authorities uncovered plots by the regional terro

nization Jemaah Islamiyah. Suspects arrested in Singapore 

the existence of Jemaah Islamiyah cells in Indonesia. 

Indonesian authorities initially ignored intelligence 

about terrorists inside Indonesia. Then, on October 12, 2002

Islamiyah terrorists bombed two nightclubs in Kuta, Bali, ki

people and injuring around 300, many of them foreign touri

sequent Jemaah Islamiyah attacks in Jakarta in August 2

September 2004, as well as other bombings in Bali in Octob

killed 49 more and injured 458, almost all Indonesian

attacks finally led to recognition throughout Indonesia that 

terrorists were active in the country. Indonesian and inte

investigators tied earlier domestic terrorist attacks to Jemaa

yah as well, and Indonesian leaders acknowledged the thre

by international as well as domestic terrorists. In late 2004, 

hoyono government adopted a more confrontational polic

terrorism, which appeared likely to remain a significant 

Indonesia’s security. 

Several security units have been specifically assigned a 

terrorism mission. The newest of these is the National Police 

terrorism unit, usually called Detachment 88, which was f

2002 with extensive funding, training, and equipment 

United States. It has both investigative and tactical-response 

ities (see The National Police, this ch.). Detachment 88 has b

cessful in tracking down and arresting scores of accu

suspected terrorists and support personnel. Several high-valu

ists were killed in armed shootouts. The Indonesian judicia
has convicted and imprisoned dozens of terrorists since 2005

three men who planned the Bali bombings were executed in No

ber 2008 after more than three years of investigation, trials, co

tions, and legal appeals. Indonesian authorities have made imp

progress against both organized terrorist organizations, su

Jemaah Islamiyah, and affiliated splinter terrorist cells. 

Each of the three branches of the TNI has at least one special 

ations unit with a counterterrorism mission. The largest of these

81, is part of the Army Special Forces Command (Komando Pa

Khusus—Kopassus). There are also smaller counterterrorism u

the air force and navy. Unit 81 is highly trained in intelligence, 

tion, and tactical-assault counterterrorist tactics. The navy’s 

man” unit trains for counterterrorism raids against such ma

targets as offshore oil platforms, docks and harbor targets, and 

that have been seized by terrorists. 

The Armed Forces in National Life 

The armed forces did not initially seek to play a dominant po

position, even though they played a role in the establishment 

republic, in the formative years of Indonesian parliamentary d

racy. Circumstances, rather than deliberate planning, pressed the 

forces to gradually enlarge their role in national life. As it consol

each stage of its growing political power, however, the military l

ship grew protective of its gains. Suharto skillfully used the milit

his primary instrument of power during his 32-year rule. In retur

military leadership was handsomely rewarded. The inculcation o

casila and the institutionalization of dwifungsi brought the milit

its most powerful position in the early 1990s. 

Some influential senior officers had, however, become conc

by the mid-1990s that the prestige and honor of the military 

being compromised by excessive involvement in the day-t

political and social affairs of the nation. Many moderate of

pressed for change, including former armed forces comman

chief General Edi Sudrajat, former National Defense Institute 

mandant Lieutenant General Sofian Effendi, the late Lieu

General Agus Wirahadikusumah, and leading military intell

Lieutenant General Agus Wijoyo. All four became leaders 

military reform movement after their retirement. 

Suharto’s forced resignation in May 1998 was discreetly faci

by the military leadership, which refused to seize power to prote

president’s position. From its earliest days, the Indonesian m

had never contemplated a coup d’état in Indonesia; that traditio

the growing reformist element in the military played an imp

330 
Training in the field 

Courtesy U.S. Defense 

Attaché’s Office, Jakarta 

Special forces troops in formation 

Courtesy Indonesian 

Department of Defense 
role in keeping the armed forces from taking power even th

Suharto reportedly offered the presidency to General Wiranto

the armed forces commander in chief. Since then, the armed 

have supported the transition to democracy, implemented a num

reforms, displayed a more moderate face to the populace, and 

tained discipline and a leadership image in contrast to that 

often corrupt and hapless post-Suharto civilian officialdom. Th

remains the most powerful element in Indonesian society and r

significant influence over the country’s political life. 

Political and Administrative Role 

Indonesia’s transition from autocracy to democracy has 

lengthy and difficult, with various power centers vying for a r

the new political environment. Enlightened leadership by Ad

Widodo Adi Sucipto (appointed by President Abdurrahman W

as the first naval officer to head the armed forces) and G

Endriartono Sutarto, whose tenure as TNI commander in 

spanned the presidencies of Megawati Sukarnoputri and the 

months of the first Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration

firmed the relatively restrained and more moderate role of the 

tary at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The armed f

perception of their political role has developed into that of a na

institution above partisan interests and closely tied to the p

with a duty to foster conditions of order and security in whic

habits of a stable and institutionalized political process can de

This self-perception identifies a force far different from the on

fought for independence in the 1940s, evolved through the tum

ous political changes of the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequ

engaged in a complex process of give-and-take with the auto

Suharto during his long rule. 

Participation in the Economy 

The military has never been as dominant in the economic s

as in the political sphere. Total military expenditures as a perce

of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) began a s

decline in the 1960s, with the military share of the budget shri

from 29 percent in 1970 to just over 1 percent by 2009. 

The military’s primary means of economic influence derives 

operation of a business empire, comprising both legal and 

enterprises, which had its beginnings in the struggle for ind

dence. It expanded in December 1957, when Dutch enterprise

agricultural estates were taken over by local trade unions and i

diately put under direct military supervision. December 1958 le

332 
 

tion led to the nationalization of these enterprises and estate

the first half of 1959. This involvement in commercial en

projected the military, especially the army, into a new s

activity, where it acquired entrepreneurial expertise, a vas

age, and a source of enrichment for many of its personne

1990s, the military business empire may have provided as 

two-thirds of the total military budget. However, the reg

economic crisis that began in 1997 had a significant adver

on the TNI’s income from off-budget sources. While the 

economic involvement continued through the 1990s and 

twenty-first century, it was estimated that the large military 

empire, and diversions from other budgetary resources, had 

significantly in the first decade of the 2000s. Although no d

information has ever been provided on the amount of funds 

from the military’s business enterprises, it was estimated 

shrunk to less than half of the total funding received by the 

Engaged in enterprises such as air and highway transp

shopping centers, and mines, many military-owned busines

ate in the open market much like any private company. In an 

gain greater control over the military-run business empire, 

the DPR mandated that such military businesses be civilia

2009, a process that was not 100- percent completed on sche

TNI will continue to operate military-supervised cooperativ

lar to the U.S. military’s post-exchange and commissary syst

Far more controversial than these legitimate enterprise

illicit businesses run by both the military and the police. 

information on such activities is understandably difficult t

Both the armed forces and the police allegedly are involved 

businesses ranging from extortion, gambling, and “securit

tion” rackets to more substantial enterprises such as illegal 

support of renegade mining operations, and trafficking in m

Subsequent to the separation of the police and the military 

there have been occasional outbreaks of violence as person

the two institutions strive to protect “turf” and at the sa

poach on the illegal enterprises of the other side. 

Another kind of military enterprise was the service-ow

tory, which had as its primary purpose the production of 

and equipment for the armed forces. By the mid-1980s, how

government had taken over and managed as public-sector en

such major concerns as the navy’s P. T. PAL shipyard in S

Jawa Timur Province, and the army’s munitions factories. 

While they cannot be singled out from other actors in the 

economy, the armed forces of the early twenty-first century 
 

 

to face the problem of coping with a legacy of corruption. The 

tary, though, is still viewed by Indonesian society as generall

corrupt than other sectors of the government. Nonetheless, th

salaries of military personnel require that they take up “constr

employment” to make ends meet. 

Total People’s Defense 

Indonesia’s military operations rely on a well-developed do

of national security called Total People’s Defense (Hankam

Based on experiences during the struggle for independence, thi

trine proclaims that Indonesia can neither afford to maintain a 

military apparatus nor compromise its hard-won independen

sacrificing its nonaligned status and depending on other natio

provide its defense. Instead, the nation will defend itself thro

strategy of territorial guerrilla warfare in which the armed f

deployed throughout the nation, serve as a cadre force to rall

lead the entire population in a people’s war of defense. Military 

ners envision a three-stage war, comprising a short initial per

which an invader might defeat conventional Indonesian resi

and establish its own control, a long period of unconvent

regionally based fighting, and a final phase in which the inv

eventually are repelled. 

The success of this strategy, according to the doctrine, re

that a close bond be maintained between citizen and sold

encourage the support of the entire population and enable the 

tary to manage all war-related resources. The people would pr

logistical support, intelligence, and upkeep in this scenario, a

resources permit, some civilians would be organized, trained

armed to join the guerrilla struggle. To support these objective

TNI maintains the army’s territorial organization, comprisin

military regional commands (Komando Daerah Militer—Ko

encompassing an estimated two-thirds of the army’s strength

territorial commands parallel the civilian governmental stru

with units at the province, district, and village level. Armed 

personnel also engage in large-scale civic-action projects invo

community and rural development in order to draw closer to th

ple, ensure the continued support of the populace, and de

among army personnel a detailed knowledge of the region to 

they are assigned. (Finally, and doctrine aside, the territorial 

ture provided the base upon which most of the army business e

flourished.) 

Attention to potential external threats grew during the 197

planners became concerned with the growing military power 

334 
Army medics on 

civil-disaster duty 

Courtesy Indonesian 

Department of Defense 

newly unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its allies, i

the Soviet Union. At the same time, China began publishi

that made a claim to virtually all of the South China Sea, i

the Natuna Islands, a chain off the western tip of Kalimant

nesia responded with a major intraservice military exercise 

Gabungan—LatGap—Joint Exercise) in the Natuna Island

soon withdrew the map, and relations between the two 

remained stable. 

Political developments in the late 1980s and early 1990

quently relieved tensions in Southeast Asia. These deve

included efforts to bring peace to Cambodia, during which 

sia’s three-battalion deployment was the largest military con

to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); 

drawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; and the redu

ception of a general threat from Vietnam and China. Noneth

potential for regional conflict—for example, over territorial 

the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea—continued to tro

tegic planners (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). In the post–Cold 

Indonesia has quietly continued to support the maintenance 

regional security presence to prevent a vacuum that could be 

potentially less benevolent outsiders. 

Defense Spending and the Defense Industry 

Indonesia is unique among developing countries, and 

among other Asian countries, in the relatively low priority 
 

defense spending. In 2009 there were some 302,000 person

Indonesia’s active armed forces, and the military budget t

US$3.4 billion, about the same military budget and force le

Thailand, a country with less than one-third of Indonesia’s po

tion, and Burma (Myanmar), which has only one-quarter of In

sia’s population. Singapore, with a population less than 2 perc

Indonesia’s, has more than 72,000 active-duty military personn

force more than nine times larger than Indonesia’s on a per-

basis. The results of Indonesia’s relatively limited commitment 

military are aged weapons systems, poor maintenance, and low 

of combat readiness. The TNI’s readiness posture was also 

affected by the arms embargo imposed by the United States and 

arms suppliers. Chronic poor maintenance was compounded by 

nesia’s inability to purchase spare parts, which resulted in the in

ability of most of the air force C–130 transport fleet, most 

transport helicopter fleet, and many of the navy’s logistics and 

port ships. The effect of these shortcomings was sadly demons

in the TNI’s inability to respond quickly to the devastation caus

the 2004 tsunami. 

By the late 1970s, Indonesia had retired most of the Sovie

military hardware left over from the Sukarno era. Between 197

1982, national allocations to the Department of Defense and Se

and armed forces doubled in absolute terms, and modest upg

took place in all three military services. Ensuing years saw the 

tary portion of the budget stabilize at between 6 and 7 percent 

overall state budget. However, with the military having to obt

much as two-thirds of its total revenues from its own bu

empire, the official budget figures were misleading. 

The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the purchase of 

riel such as F–5 and F–16 fighter aircraft (in 1978 and 1988, re

tively) and A–4 ground attack aircraft (in 1981); several used fr

and destroyers; and tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 

howitzers. The most controversial acquisition was the purcha

the mid-1990s, of nearly the entire navy of the former Demo

Republic of Germany (East Germany—DDR). While the price f

39 ships was relatively low, the costs to upgrade, acclimatize

maintain these aging vessels soon became prohibitive. The pur

strained the defense budget for many years, and by the early tw

first century most of the ships were no longer operational. Thi

chase was arranged by then-Minister of Research and Technolo

J. Habibie, thus straining his relationship with the military. 

Many traditional military suppliers began to reduce the scop

breadth of military relations with Indonesia in the 1990s, to p

336 
human-rights abuses in East Timor. The violence there 

caused the United States, the European Union (EU), and Au

cease arms sales entirely. As a result, Indonesia’s military eq

deteriorated dramatically because of a lack of spare parts and 

nance. Only after the December 2004 tsunami disaster in A

those countries resume progress toward normalization of the

tive military-to-military relations. Because of that experienc

avoid the potential of any future military embargo, Indon

deliberately broadened its sources of military equipment an

ons systems. In the early twenty-first century, Indonesia c

agreements to acquire major weapons systems from Russi

several East European nations, the Republic of Korea (South 

and the Netherlands, among others. 

Indonesia is far from self-sufficient in the production of 

and defense-related matériel. Domestic facilities remain in

for the repair of certain complex weapons systems, and eq

inventories often represent considerable overstatements of 

actually in functioning order. Moreover, although defense g

favor the standardization of weaponry and other defense 

such as communications equipment and ground and air trans

tems, the armed forces still possess and continue to procu

ment from a variety of sources. This situation has caused 

problems in obtaining and stocking spare parts and training 

maintenance personnel. 

Major defense industries were transferred from the arme

to civilian control in the 1980s. Under a new policy, these pl

served the commercial and civilian sectors. For example, w

operational in the 1990s, the aircraft industry produced p

equipment for commercial aviation. Although the aircraft 

was for decades the favorite project of Suharto and his mi

research and technology (and successor as president), B. J. 

it was another money-wasting effort that cost hundreds of b

dollars. After Suharto’s 1998 resignation, the aircraft indus

nated; and, by the early 2000s, it was producing very little, 

spare parts. The army’s former munitions plants, by contrast

very successful, manufacturing commercial explosives for 

ing and petroleum industries as well as defense-related pro

T. Pindad, another former army plant, now produces muc

TNI’s small arms as well as several models of wheeled and 

vehicles. The P. T. PAL shipyard also manufactures com

ships and maritime equipment, in addition to naval vessels. 
 

Personnel 

The size of the armed services—approximately 302,0

2009—is small in relation to Indonesia’s large population. The 

tary is also small in comparison to the forces of other natio

comparable population, and in comparison to the forces of 

Asian countries. The army is by far the dominant branch of the 

nesian military, with approximately 233,000 personnel; the nav

marine corps total about 45,000 and the air force, about 24,000

The Indonesian constitution states that every citizen has the 

and obligation to defend the nation. Conscription is provided 

law, but in light of limited civilian-sector employment opportu

the armed forces have been able to attract sufficient numbers to 

tain mandated strength levels without resorting to a draft. By 

almost all service members were volunteers who had met the c

set for conscription. However, officer specialists, such as physi

are occasionally conscripted for short-term service. Most en

personnel are recruited in their own regions and generally trai

serve most of their time in units near their homes. Each servic

small women’s units (see Women in the Armed Forces, this ch.)

The combined officer corps for the three services was estima

total some 53,000 personnel in 2008. Until 2005 the mandatory 

ment age for officers was 55, but a 2004 military act passed b

DPR provided for a gradual extension to age 60. Virtually all 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) serve 20 years and retire in 

mid-forties, thereafter often going into private business. With p

nel strength mandated to remain static, a steady balance betwee

officer accessions and losses (through death, attrition, and retire

seems likely to be maintained. 

For the first 20 years of independence, entry into the officer 

was very competitive. According to both patriotic and traditiona

ues, a military education and military career were regarded as h

desirable. Since the late 1970s, however, the armed forces have 

rienced difficulty attracting a sufficient number of the best-qua

candidates to the Armed Forces Military Academy (Akmil

national service academy at Magelang, Jawa Tengah Province. 

commanders have long complained of not getting enough high-q

young officers from Akmil. Improved job opportunities in Indon

advancing economy have persuaded many of the brightest and 

qualified high-school graduates to attend civilian degree-grantin

versities (Akmil does not grant academic degrees). In the late 1

the armed forces began to expand their source of officers by in

ing a program similar to the U.S. Reserve Officers’ Training 

338 
(ROTC) and experimented with educating a small number of 

overseas civilian colleges. 

The armed forces have maintained cohesion and a pro

esprit de corps, in spite of problems with officer recruitment

tion through institutionalization, increased education, and an 

sis on national (rather than regional) loyalty have produced a 

that is a far cry from the factionalized and ideologically dive

that existed at the time of the 1965 coup attempt. Uniting the 

under a strong central command and eliminating “warlord

regionalism by routine rotational assignments have contribut

cohesion and minimized the impact of the occasional emer

personality-driven cliques. 

The senior officer corps reflects the ethnic compositio

national population. The TNI does not publish data on ethni

personnel rosters, but a review of the names of 60 top office

headquarters and the three services suggested that in 2008 

percent were from Java (ethnically Javanese, Sundanese, or M

a proportion approximately reflective of the national populati

is a continued trend toward assignments based on ability ra

ethnic or religious considerations. 

Organization and Equipment of the Armed 

Forces 

Administrative and Command Structure 

The TNI consists of three military services—the army, n

air force. The Department of Defense (Dephan) is respon

planning, acquisition, and management tasks, but has no com

control of troop units (see fig. 13). As part of the post-Suhart

program, each of Suharto’s successors as president has app

civilian as minister of defense. However, each of these min

remained outside the military chain of command. A majo

political reformers is to restructure the chain of command to 

TNI under genuine civilian control. This intent was reflect

policy guidance contained in the military law passed by the 

2004, but there was no time schedule for effecting such 

change. The TNI commander retains command and contr

armed forces, in the meantime, and continues by tradition 

senior Indonesian military officer. Since the separation of the 

ment of Defense from the armed forces headquarters in 1

department’s staff has been composed largely of active-

retired military personnel. The structure of Dephan consis

offices of the minister of defense, a secretary general, an 
PRESIDENT, SUPREME 

COMMANDER OF THE 

ARMED FORCES 

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, 

ARMED FORCES 

INSPECTOR GENERAL PERSONAL STAFF 

CHIEF OF THE 

GENERAL STAFF 

ASSISTANT FOR 

COMMUNICATIONSELECTRONICS 

ASSISTANT FOR 

INTELLIGENCE 

ASSISTANT FOR 

LOGISTICS 

ASSISTANT FOR 

OPERATIONS 

ASSISTANT FOR 

PERSONNEL 

ASSISTANT FOR 

TERRITORIAL 

AFFAIRS 

ARMED FORCES CENTE

AGENCIES, AND SCHOO

ASSISTANT FOR 

GENERAL PLANNING 

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF 

MILITARY REGIONAL 

COMMANDS (12) 

(KODAMS) 

ARMY STRATEGIC 

RESERVE COMMAND 

(KOSTRAD) 

ARMY SPECIAL 

FORCES COMMAND 

(KOPASSUS) 

AIR FORCE 

OPERATION COMMANDS 

(KO-OP I, KO-OP-II) 

NATIONAL AIR 

DEFENSE COMMAND 

(KOHANUDNAS) 

AIR MATÉRIEL 

COMMAND 

AIR TRAINING 

COMMAND 

NAVY FLEETS 

(ARMADAS) 

MARINE CORP

COMMAND 

AIR ARM 

COMMAND 

MILITARY SEAL

COMMAND 

AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF NAVY CHIEF OF S

HEAD, ARMED FORCES STR

INTELLIGENCE AGEN

Operational Com

Training, Adminis

 and Personnel 

Figure 13. Organization of the Armed Forces, 2009
 

340 
 

 

general, and five directors general, as well as several functi

ters and institutes. In 2009 the minister of defense was a 

while the secretary general was an active-duty military off

inspector general and five directors general were a mix of a

retired senior military officers. 

The role of the individual armed services has not chang

1969, when the heads of the army, navy, and air force were re

chiefs of staff. At that time, operational control of almost al

units was vested in the armed forces commander in chief. T

quarters of each military service functions primarily as an ad

tive and support center. 

The TNI staff and its functions remain directly subordina

commander in chief of the armed forces, who remains, in turn

responsible to the president, who holds the formal title of 

commander of the armed forces. Directly under the TNI com

are the chief of the general staff (Kasum), the TNI’s next mo

officer; the inspector general; the assistant for general plann

the heads of a number of agencies and institutes. The TNI K

assistants for communications and electronics, intelligence, 

operations, personnel, and territorial affairs. The TNI gen

supports the headquarters of each of the three services, and it

nel are drawn from all three services. 

The army territorial structure focuses on the 12 military 

commands (Kodams), with the chain of command flowing 

from the armed forces commander in chief to the Kodam com

and from them to subordinate army territorial commands (see 

The senior operational air force commands are the Nati

Defense Command (Kohanudnas) and the East Operations C

and West Operations Command (Komando Operasi—Ko-O

navy has an Eastern Fleet and a Western Fleet (each called an 

The armed forces commander in chief exercises control o

of the combat elements of the army, navy, and air force throu

army Kodams, the two air force Ko-Ops, and the two navy A

The commander in chief also exercises operational control 

air force’s Kohanudnas and the two army strike force comma

Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) and the Army 

Forces Command (Kopassus). 

Kostrad was formed in the early 1960s during the West Ir

paign. It was from his position as Kostrad commander tha

organized opposition to the 1965 coup attempt. The powerful 

been filled since then by officers considered particularly loy

president. In 2009 Kostrad had a strength of approximatel

personnel. It consists of two divisions, each containing airb
 

I 

II 

III 

IV V 

VI 

VII 

XVII 

XVI 

XII 

IX 

KODAM

ISKANDAR

MUDA 

KODAMJAYA 

MALAYSIA 

BRUNEI 

SINGAPORE 

TIMOR-LESTE 

MALAYSIA 

PHILIPPINES 

AUSTRALIA 

PAPUA

NEW

GUINEA 

THAILAND

Boundary representationnot necessarily authoritative

200 400 Kilometers

400 Miles 200

0 

0

International boundary

Province boundaryKodam boundaryKodam headquarters 

Kodam I: Bukit BarisanKodam II: SriwijayaKodam III: Siliwangi 

Kodam IV: DiponegoroKodam V: BrawijayaKodam VI: Mulawarman 

Kodam VII: WirabuanaKodam IX: UdayanaKodam XII: Tanjungpura 

Kodam XVI: PattimuraKodam XVII: CendrawasihKodam Iskandar Muda 

Kodam Jaya 

KODAMS 

Note: All Kodams have a name reflecting local history and pride; not all have a number. 

342 
 

infantry brigades; a separate airborne brigade; one cavalry 

two field artillery regiments; and several combat support an

support units. In early 2005, the armed forces commander 

announced plans to expand the independent brigade, ba

Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan Province, into a third division to 

primarily in Papua. 

Kopassus numbered some 5,000 military personnel in 20

tifiable by their distinctive red berets. Organized into thre

tional groups, a counterterrorism unit, and a training center, K

personnel receive training in intelligence gathering, speci

tions techniques, sabotage, and airborne and seaborne landin

There are official and unofficial militia-style paramilitar

tions throughout Indonesia in addition to the regular arme

Once a formidable force estimated between 70,000 and 

strong, the official militia units have been largely disbanded 

grated into the army. The far more dangerous unofficial mil

units act as surrogate forces, usually for Kopassus, and have 

tion for violence and intimidation. Many are little more than 

gangs protecting their “turf,” often around markets and shop

ters, where they collect “security and protection” money. T

have provided manpower for political demonstrations and 

tion. Militia units trained by army cadre were responsible for 

the wave of violence that swept East Timor in 1999. 

Military Education 

The TNI operates a central military academy headquarter

with curriculum standardization, but the three service acade

under the control of their respective service chiefs of staf

begin a one-year training program at the Armed Forces Milita

emy (Akmil) in Magelang, which is followed by three-year c

the specialized branches of Akmil run by each service. T

branch, referred to simply as the Military Academy, is lo

Magelang as well. The Air Force Academy is located in Yo

and the Naval Academy, in Surabaya. 

The TNI also maintains a joint headquarters for the Arme

Command and Staff School (Mako Sesko) and the three serv

mand and staff schools, but control of the individual comm

staff colleges is under the service chiefs of staff. Cohort ties f

the service academies and at the command and staff school a

unifying elements among officers. The joint TNI Command 

College (Sesko TNI) trains officers at the lieutenant colon

and the National Resiliency Institute (Lemhanas) provides tr

the colonel and brigadier general levels. Half of each Lemha
 

is filled by senior civil servants and leaders of the business co

nity. In 2009 Dephan established the Indonesian Defense Univ

(Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia), modeled on the U.S. Na

Defense University in Washington, DC. It is the first military s

in Indonesia to award academic degrees. 

Branches of Service 

Army 

The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AD) histor

has been the dominant military service, headed by the army ch

staff, a four-star general. His staff includes a vice chief of sta

inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for logistics, o

tions, personnel, planning and budget, security, and territorial a

Army strength in 2009 was approximately 233,000. 

The chief of staff is responsible for personnel, training, admin

tion, and logistical support of the army. Commanders and staff o

Kodam are responsible for administration, logistics, personnel, 

ing, and the general welfare of assigned and attached combat 

Each Kodam is divided into successively smaller administrative 

These include the Military Resort, or Garrison, Command (Ko

Military District Command (Kodim); and Military Subdistrict 

mand (Koramil). At the bottom of the structure, noncommiss

officers (NCOs) are assigned to every village in the country, 

they are known as the village NCO (babinsa). 

Military operations are rarely, if ever, conducted in any form

larger than a battalion. Each Korem has control of at least one bat

and one or more battalions come under the direct control of the K

Army doctrine distinguishes between centrally controlled unit

regionally controlled units. Centrally controlled units are fou

Kostrad and Kopassus. Regionally controlled units by definitio

those assigned to the 12 Kodams. The battalions have a pl

strength of nearly 700 personnel, although many—those in the Ko

in particular—are under strength. Each Kodam has at least one 

nated quick-reaction force battalion; these are the best-trained 

equipped units in the territorial structure. Both types of battalion

experienced frequent temporary deployments to areas of inse

including East Timor (prior to 1999), Aceh (prior to 2005), and P

The army has an aviation arm that performs liaison and li

transport duties. The unit operates several rotary-wing squa

with helicopters of various national origins and one composite 

wing squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and small 

ports, such as the domestically produced CASA–235. 

344 
 

 

The army is equipped with a variety of weapons systems 

from several European and Asian countries and the United 

well as domestically manufactured items. Because of fund

straints, emphasis is placed on maintenance and rehabilitation 

equipment. The mainstays of the armored force are its Fre

AMX–13 light tanks and the variant AMX–VCI reconditioned 

personnel carrier, mostly acquired in the late 1970s. Domestic 

supplies nearly all of the army’s small-arms requirements, a

substantial number of M–16 rifles purchased from the United 

the 1980s remained in the inventory two decades later. Dom

produced arms include Belgian-licensed FNC rifles, submach

and machine guns. Ammunition is in short supply. 

Although army recruits receive their basic training in a lo

ing facility located in each Kodam area, specialist corps tr

provided at the appropriate national corps centers. NCOs mu

training courses and pass examinations in their specializ

prior to promotion. The army maintains a large tactical trai

at Baturaja, Sumatera Selatan Province, where selected units 

small-unit training on a rotational basis. 

Navy 

The Navy of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AL) becam

rate service in 1946, after the National Revolution began. It

come from a variety of countries, including the United St

fleet includes submarines from the Federal Republic of G

light frigates from the Netherlands and Britain, and fast-att

from South Korea. In 1992 the Indonesian government acq

used ships of various types from the navy of the former De

Republic of Germany (East Germany). The acquisition prove

mistake of major proportions. The ships were in poor cond

suited for operations in the tropics, and difficult to staff and m

By 2005 many of them had been mothballed. The Indones

itself produces numerous small coastal craft in national shipy

In 2009 the fleet consisted of more than 90 ships and n

smaller vessels. The newest warships are four Sigma-class 

from the Netherlands, three of which were delivered by 200

fourth, by 2009. As newer warships and patrol craft entered t

tory, the navy decommissioned older vessels. Nevertheless, 

was underequipped and under strength for its mission of prote

nation’s huge maritime expanse against piracy, poaching, an

gling. Specifically, it needed a large infusion of fast-patro

cover its wide internal seas and coastlines, as well as increas
capacity to move marine corps and army units and equipment to 

ble spots across the archipelago. 

Structurally, the navy comprises the headquarters staff at J

under the overall command of the navy chief of staff, two fleet 

mands (the Eastern Fleet at Surabaya and the Western Fl

Jakarta), the marine corps, a small air arm, and a military 

command (see fig. 15). About 45,000 uniformed personnel 

serving in the navy in 2009, including about 20,000 marines

marines are organized into two divisions (formerly designated a

gades), one stationed in Jakarta and the other in Surabaya. A 

independent brigade is planned to become the core of a third 

sion, once funds and manpower become available. The marine 

is equipped with light tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 

aircraft guns. Most of the corps’ heavy equipment consists of 

outdated former Soviet-origin armored vehicles. 

The navy began maintaining a small air arm in 1958. Headqua

at Surabaya, it had about 1,000 personnel in 2009. It is equippe

marily for naval reconnaissance and coastal patrol duties, flying 

squadrons of light airplanes, as well as several transports and he

ters. The military sealift command coordinates the navy’s log

support systems. 

The navy’s missions include providing strategic sealift fo

army and marine corps and support for operations responding to 

ral disasters. Other responsibilities include patrolling the str

straits through which a major portion of the world’s shipping p

between the Pacific and Indian oceans, particularly the Strait o

lacca. That crucial waterway carries an estimated 80 percent of 

mercial and military traffic between the Pacific and Indian o

Formerly a haven for piracy, the Strait of Malacca is now patrol

the cooperative efforts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore

piracy incidents have declined. Another naval mission focus

halting smuggling and illegal fishing, both of which are espe

prevalent near the Natuna Islands and in the seas around Sul

and Maluku. In support of this latter mission, the navy anno

plans in the late 1980s to construct a number of limited-role ba

isolated areas in the eastern and western sections of the national 

tory. Funding restrictions, however, have kept this project from 

fillment. Some new bases have been built, including Tual 

southeastern part of Maluku Province, and the naval stations on 

and Manokwari in Papua Barat Province have been upgraded. 

activity in the Sulu Sea and Sulawesi Sea (Celebes Sea) has incr

as part of operations to detect and interdict movement by ter

and maritime criminal activities where the maritime borders of 

nesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines meet. 

346 
 

 

The P. T. PAL shipyard, operated since the 1980s by the 

government, along with other facilities in Surabaya, contin

the navy’s primary training, repair, and industrial center. 

craft construction facilities are located at shipyards in Jakart

rang (Jawa Tengah Province), Manokwari (Papua Barat P

and Ambon (Maluku Province). P. T. PAL also constructs 

cial ships in a variety of sizes and types. The navy has b

innovative acquisition program by which individual provin

ernments fund the purchase of fast-patrol craft to be turne

the navy. Those ships are used for maritime security, genera

territorial waters bordering the donor province. 

Air Force 

The Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AU), like 

was established as a separate service in 1946. The influence a

bility of the air force decreased sharply after the 1965 coup atte

service was heavily purged because of the alleged involvem

chief of staff, General Omar Dhani, in the Indonesian Commu

(PKI). Significant modernization did not get under way unti

1970s, with acquisition of F–5 and A–4 aircraft from the Unit

and in the 1980s, with the acquisition of F–16 fighters from th

States and Hawk fighters from Britain. The imposition in the l

of arms embargoes by the United States and other countries in 

to Indonesia’s human-rights violations, particularly in Eas

resulted in a very low readiness level in the air force. In the ear

Indonesia began to seek nontraditional suppliers, purchasing S

fighters from Russia and obtaining jet trainers from Singapore 

tion) and South Korea (primarily through countertrade). Th

States ended its arms embargo of Indonesia in 2005, and the 

began a high-priority program to restore the readiness of i

transport fleet and the F–16 fighter force. 

Air force strength was about 24,000 in 2009. Approximat

of these personnel formed four battalions of “quick-action” p

ers. Structurally, the air force consists of a headquarters staff i

supporting the chief of staff; three operational commands: 

West, Ko-Op II/East, and the National Air Defense Command

support commands: the Air Matériel Command and the Air 

Command (see fig. 16). The Air Matériel Command is head

in Bandung, Jawa Barat Province, and the Air Training Comm

Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province. Air operations are covere

area commands, with the boundary between Jawa Tengah 

Timur provinces being the east–west dividing line. The larg

operational commands is Ko-Op II, headquartered in M
 

 

MALAYSIA 

MALAYSIA 

MALAYSIA 

THAILAND 

BRUNEI 

PHILIPPINES 

Interna

 bound

Fleet

 bound

Armad

 headq

SINGAPORE 

Jakarta Surabaya 

WESTERN FLEET 

EASTERN FLEET TIMOR-LESTE 

Boundary representation 

not necessarily authoritative AUSTRAL

Figure 15. Navy Fleet Commands, 2009 

MALAYSIA 

THAILAND 

BRUNEI 

PHILIPPINES 

Internation

 boundary 

Air force

SINGAPORE 

 region bo

Ko-Op

 headqua

I II 

Jakarta Makassar 

TIMOR-LESTE 

Boundary representation
 

not necessarily authoritative AUSTRAL

Figure 16. Air Force Operations Commands, 2009 

Sulawesi Selatan Province. Ko-Op I is headquartered in Jakarta

National Air Defense Command, also headquartered in Jakart

operational control over all fighter and counterinsurgency aircraf

Most of the major weapons systems operated by the air for

manufactured in the United States. The C–130 Hercules, OV

Bronco, F–5E Tiger II, A–4E Skyhawk, and F–16 Fighting F

aircraft are all U.S.–made. Aircraft manufactured elsewhere in

the British Hawk and Russian Sukhoi fighters. The air forc

deploys several B–737 aircraft for maritime reconnaissance, a 

ber of domestically produced small transports, and a fleet of he

ters. During the modernization period of the 1980s, the air forc

purchased the Automated Logistics Management System (A

from the United States to upgrade its ability to track and requi

spare parts and other materials. 

348 
In 1980 the air force enunciated a forward defense stra

required it to build or upgrade air bases throughout Indonesi

as main bases in Java. Most of those upgrades affected civ

fields also used by the air force. A major upgrade at Ranai Ai

the Natuna Islands provided a post for improved surveillan

South China Sea. Iswahyudi Air Base in Jawa Timur Prov

upgraded to enable it to handle modern jet fighter aircraft. 

tion of the F–16 and Hawk systems resulted in further up

Pekanbaru Air Base, Riau Province, and at Hasanuddin Air B

Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan Province. 

New pilots generally begin flight instruction in propell

T–34 Turbo-Mentors. A squadron of British Aerospace T–5

is used for advanced training. Acquisition of the KT–1 W

from South Korea, the SF260 SIAI Marchetti from Singap

training versions of the F–16 has significantly expanded the 

base. However, competition with higher-paying civilian air

led to a chronic shortage of pilots and aviation support perso

Conditions of Service 

Compensation of all TNI personnel is on a sliding scale a

to rank and is uniform nationally and across the three servic

cers and enlisted personnel receive housing for married servi

bers of appropriate rank, subsistence items and rations paid 

and a variety of allowances in addition to base pay. Especia

lower ranks, compensation is so low that the need for suppl

income is a significant factor in service members’ involv

outside, often unsavory, employment. 

The retirement age for officers was 55 until passage of 

military laws, which raised the retirement age to 60 effective 

Retirement at age 42 is mandatory for enlisted personnel. T

dent has the authority to grant an unlimited number of 

extensions to active duty; these usually go to officers in ke

ship posts. Officers are eligible for small pensions at age 4

who have failed to gain promotion to lieutenant colonel are 

to retire at that time. Two years before retirement, personn

placed on preretirement status, in which they draw full pay an

ances while beginning to develop civilian careers. 

Women in the Armed Forces 

Each branch of the TNI and the National Police has a 

component: the Women’s Army Corps, the Navy Women

the Air Force Women’s Corps, and the Women’s Polic

According to official publications, women members of th
 

 

 

forces are “set to work at places and in functions conform[in

their feminine disposition.” More specifically, women are ass

to administrative work, intelligence work, English-language in

tion, and activities to improve the health and social conditio

armed forces members and their families.They also specialize 

welfare of women and children. Despite the advance of wom

the civilian workplace, including one former president, several 

net members and legislators, and important business leaders, w

do not advance to comparable rank in the armed forces. W

police officers are said to “play an important role in solving 

lems [of] drug addicts and juvenile delinquents.” Some police 

mands in large cities also have rape/gender-based violence 

staffed by female officers, but these are still rare. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Grade and rank structure is standard throughout the three m

services and corresponds to that common to most military sys

One title unique to Indonesia is panglima, a traditional heroic 

revived during the National Revolution. Although panglima is 

translated as “commander,” it has a stronger connotation of 

and power. In the 1980s, tradition evolved to limit the title pan

to the armed forces commander in chief and the Kostrad and K

commanders. 

Uniforms of the three services are distinguished by colo

style, with variations in headgear and other details distingu

some elite troops, who wear berets of various colors. Army wo

and ceremonial uniforms are olive drab. Air force uniform

medium blue, and navy uniforms are navy blue. Rank insign

standardized among the services (see fig. 17; fig. 18). In cerem

and service dress, officers wear rank insignia on the shoulder 

let. Field-uniform insignia were moved in 1991 from the front 

fatigue shirt to the collar tip. Rank insignia are worn on the sl

by NCOs and enlisted personnel. 

Foreign Military Relations 

Consistent with its foreign policy of nonalignment, Indonesia 

not maintain defense pacts with other nations. It has security 

ments with a broad range of countries (not including the U

States), and it does participate in combined military exercises 

several other countries. Over the years, Indonesia also has contr

troop contingents—some including either military or police pers

or both—to most UN peacekeeping forces deployed to global tr

350 
INDONESIAN

RANK

LETNAN

DUA

LETNAN

SATU KAPTEN MAYOR LETNAN KOLONEL KOLONEL BRIGADIR JENDERAL MAYOR JENDERAL LETNAN JENDERAL JENDERAL

ARMY

TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI 

U.S. RANK

TITLE 

2D

LIEUTENANT

1ST

LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN MAJOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL COLONEL BRIGADIER GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL GENERAL

INDONESIAN

RANK

LETNAN

DUA

LETNAN

SATU KAPTEN MAYOR LETNAN KOLONEL KOLONEL MARSEKAL PERTAMA MARSEKAL MUDA MARSEKAL MADYA MARSEKAL

AIR

FORCE 

TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI 

U.S. RANK

TITLE 

2D

LIEUTENANT 

1ST

LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN MAJOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL COLONEL BRIGADIER GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL GENERAL

INDONESIAN

RANK

LETNAN

DUA 

LETNAN

SATU KAPTEN MAYOR LETNAN KOLONEL KOLONEL LAKSAMANA PERTAMA LAKSAMANA MUDA LAKSAMANA MADYA LAKSAMANA 

NAVY* 

TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI TNI 

U.S. RANK

TITLE ENSIGN LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT COMMANDER COMMANDER CAPTAIN REAR ADMIRAL 

REAR ADMIRAL 

VICE ADMIRAL ADMIRAL 
 

 

spots. Among other places, Indonesia has sent forces to the 

Canal–Sinai Peninsula area (1957 and 1973–79), Democratic R

lic of the Congo (1960–64), Iran–Iraq border (1988–90), Na

(1989–90), Kuwait–Iraq border (1991), Somalia (1991), Cam

(1991–93), Bosnia–Herzegovina (2000), and Lebanon (200

Indonesia was a founding member of the Association of Sou

Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary), and although the org

tion was not established as a defense alliance, there is a history o

itary cooperation between Indonesia and its ASEAN partners

cooperation is manifested both frequently and bilaterally and inc

exchanges of military representatives at national defense institu

periodic security consultations, and a series of joint military exe

with individual ASEAN states. ASEAN countries pledge thei

port for the security of each of the other ASEAN nations bu

short of discussing formation of a military alliance. The Indon

government stresses that defense cooperation among ASEAN n

is a function of each nation’s right to protect itself and that bi

cooperation will not lead to any bilateral or ASEAN-wide de

pact. Indonesia plays a leading role in the ASEAN Regional F

(ARF), a non-treaty security umbrella organization that inc

nations and organizations as members—including the United S

China, the EU, and Russia—that are not ASEAN states. 

Indonesia also conducts combined military exercises with 

ASEAN nations, including Australia, Britain, France, India, New 

land, and the United States. During the 1980s, defense official

gested that joint border patrols might be set up with Papua 

Guinea, and the two countries signed a status-of-forces agreem

January 1992. Indonesian troops sometimes cross the border 

Papua Province into Papua New Guinea in pursuit of armed insur

Indonesia has maintained military-assistance agreements wit

eral countries. It received funded security assistance from the U

States every year between 1950 and 1992 except 1965 and 

when relations were at a low ebb. Most security-assistance pro

were restored after 2005. Grant aid for military equipment, 

ended in 1978, averaged US$13 million per year and was used m

to procure logistics equipment, communications systems, and c

matériel for internal security. The United States also provided 

aid training under the International Military Education and Tr

(IMET) program from 1950 until 1992, when the U.S. Congre

the aid in reaction to the human-rights situation in East Timor. I

42-year period, more than 4,000 Indonesian military pers

received IMET training in the United States. The IMET pro

resumed in 2005. U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits 

352 
INDONESIAN

RANK

PRAJURIT

DUA

PRAJURIT

SATU

PRAJURIT

KEPALA

KOPRAL

DUA

KOPRAL

SATU

KOPRAL

KEPALA

SERSAN

DUA

SERSAN

SATU

SERSAN

KEPALA

SERSAN

MAYOR 

PEMBANTU

LETNAN DUA

PEMBANTU

LETNAN SATU

ARMY

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI TNI 

U.S. RANK

TITLE PRIVATE (E-1) PRIVATE (E-2)

PRIVATE

1ST CLASS 

CORPORAL/

SPECIALIST SERGEANT STAFF SERGEANT SERGEANT 1ST CLASS MASTER SERGEANT/ FIRST SERGEANT SERGEANT MAJOR/ COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR WARRANT OFFICER W-1 CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER W-2

INDONESIAN

RANK

PRAJURIT

DUA

PRAJURIT

SATU

PRAJURIT

KEPALA

KOPRAL

DUA

KOPRAL

SATU

KOPRAL

KEPALA

SERSAN

DUA

SERSAN

SATU

SERSAN

KEPALA

SERSAN

MAYOR

PEMBANTU

LETNAN DUA

PEMBANTU

LETNAN SATU

AIR

FORCE 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI TNI 

U.S. RANK

TITLE 

AIRMAN

BASIC AIRMAN AIRMAN 1ST CLASS SENIOR AIRMAN STAFF SERGEANT TECHNICAL SERGEANT MASTER SERGEANT SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT NO RANK NO RANK 

INDONESIAN

RANK

KELASI

DUA 

KELASI

SATU 

KELASI

KEPALA 

KOPRAL

DUA 

KOPRAL

SATU 

KOPRAL

KEPALA 

SERSAN

DUA 

SERSAN

SATU 

SERSAN

KEPALA 

SERSAN

MAYOR 

PEMBANTU

LETNAN DUA 

PEMBANTU

LETNAN SATU 

NAVY* 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI 

TNI TNI 

U.S. RANK

TITLE 

SEAMAN

RECRUIT

SEAMAN

APPRENTICE SEAMAN 

PETTY

OFFICER

3D CLASS 

PETTY

OFFICER

2D CLASS 

PETTY

OFFICER

1ST CLASS 

CHIEF

PETTY

OFFICER 

SENIOR CHIEF

PETTY

OFFICER 

MASTER CHIEF

PETTY OFFICER 

WARRANT

OFFICER W-1 

CHIEF

WARRANT

OFFICER W-2 
periodically made available to Indonesia starting in 1974 and 

helped defray the cost of procuring U.S.-made military equip

U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants or loa

the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and traini

Indonesia. Indonesia has also received military aid from Aus

Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia, among o

In the early 1960s, Indonesia acquired equipment from the S

Union, and though most of it was inoperative by the 1970s, J

continued to make payments to the Russian government aft

demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since the late 1990s, Russ

again become an important arms supplier for the Indonesian 

forces, including a US$1 billion loan that Indonesia is using t

among other items, attack and transport helicopters and jet fight

The military relationship with the United States went into d

starting in 1992 and worsened in 1999, when the United State

pended all military cooperation programs to protest the TNI’s su

of militia forces that rampaged across East Timor in the wake o

former province’s vote for independence. Australia, Britain, an

eral other countries also reduced or suspended their military 

grams with Indonesia at the same time. However, the terrorist a

against the United States on September 11, 2001, began the 

return of some cooperation programs because of the perceived 

to enlist the support of the world’s most populous Muslim nat

the global war against terrorism. The December 2004 earthquak

tsunami that devastated parts of Aceh prompted the U.S. gover

to reexamine its policy of isolating the TNI from training, educ

and other aspects of the military-to-military relationship. In M

2005, the United States began FMS sales of nonlethal spare pa

transport aircraft. By 2008 Indonesia had regained eligibility t

ticipate in most aspects of a military-to-military relationship wi

United States. 

Security and Intelligence Agencies 

Only very general information has been made public rega

the organization and activities of Indonesia’s intelligence and 

rity bodies. In 2001 the name of the central intelligence-gath

institution was changed from the National Intelligence Coordin

Body (Bakin) to the National Intelligence Agency (BIN). Prim

cosmetic, the name change was designed to reflect the changes 

ciated with the end of the Suharto era. BIN analyzes both dom

and foreign intelligence gathered by its own personnel as well 

the military services and the police. It is directly under the cont

354 
 

the president and maintains its own communications netw

side the civilian and military administrations. 

In 2004, after a series of devastating terrorist bombings in I

the president strengthened the authority of the BIN chief to c

all intelligence activities conducted by the military, police, an

intelligence agencies. In practice, such coordination has pro

cult to achieve because of inherent conflicts of interest and zea

tection of turf by the various agencies. BIN also was auth

establish branch offices at the provincial level throughout I

and to direct all counterterrorism intelligence operations. 

The TNI’s agency for intelligence collection relating to 

defense and internal security, processing, and operational fun

the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Body (Bais). Comm

a major general, Bais is directly subordinate to the TNI comm

The National Police 

The National Police of Indonesia (Polri) has been 

directed, and organized by the central government since 194

main duties are to maintain public order and security. How

personnel strength is far below the UN-prescribed police-to-

ratio of 1:350 (the Indonesian ratio is approximately 1:6

many decades, Polri was a fourth branch of the armed for

known as ABRI. In 1999, after the fall of Suharto, the pol

was separated from the military and placed directly under t

dent. As part of this reorganization, the police did away with 

ranks and titles and adopted standard international police n

ture. In the 10 years since Polri ceased being part of the arme

it has enjoyed a resurgence in professionalism and an in

strength. In 2009 Polri’s estimated strength was around 280,

The national chief of police is the highest-ranking police 

the nation. Like the TNI commander, he is appointed by the 

and must be confirmed by the DPR. Assigned to Polri headq

Jakarta are a deputy police chief, extensive staff, and several 

administrative bodies that handle specialized police functio

has its own territorial organization, with a police unit and po

for each province (Regional Police—Polda). Each Polda unit 

istratively subdivided at the district, subdistrict, and villag

Polda Metrojaya, which has responsibility for metropolitan J

subdivided into precincts, sections, and police posts. 

Each province is assigned police units varying in stre

composition according to the needs dictated by the characte

the different areas within that province. These forces are org

municipal police forces or rural units and are under the op
direction of the Polda commander, who in turn is directly respo

to Polri headquarters. All police elements are charged with su

ing the local government in their respective areas. 

Polri has maintained its centralized chain of command but ha

been made responsive to the individual provincial governors sin

rise of sustained democratic governance. Each governor is auth

to call on the police to respond to emergencies, for example, and 

the police chief of an affected region and the governor may re

military assistance if police resources prove insufficient. 

Police forces are functionally organized into a number of sp

ized elements. The largest of these is the uniformed police, 

includes both the general police, who perform conventional 

duties relating to the control and prevention of crime and the prot

of property, and the traffic police, who patrol the nation’s road

and supervise the licensing of drivers and the registration of 

vehicles. Also part of the uniformed force are the Women’s 

Corps, which has been increasingly integrated into the Polri stru

Female police officers have been transformed from their old or

tion, which was primarily directed toward the provision of soci

vices, to a situation in which female police officers are involv

virtually every aspect of Polri missions, including counterterroris

antiriot duties. The first female provincial police chief was app

in 2007, in Banten Province. Elite units of special police enforce 

in terrorist situations beyond the capability of the regular forces. 

units had about 14,000 personnel in 2009, were better armed and 

mobile than the general police, and lived in separate barracks 

stricter discipline. The special police wear the same uniform as 

police but are distinguished by special badges. Plainclothes police 

the primary responsibility for criminal investigations, especia

complex cases or in cases involving several jurisdictions. The

handle forensics, intelligence, security, and the technical aspe

crime fighting, such as fingerprinting and identification. 

A small unit, the Sea and Air Police, patrols the national w

and airspace, providing tactical aid to other elements by regu

traffic, guarding against smuggling and illegal fishing, and su

ing personnel transport. The unit also participates in disaster 

Its equipment includes a few helicopters and light airplanes an

ious small seacraft. 

The Mobile Brigade, one of the oldest Polri units, was form

late 1945. Its original tasks were disarming remnants of the Jap

Imperial Army and protecting the chief of state and the capita

The brigade fought in the Revolution, and its troops took part 

military confrontation with Malaysia in the early 1960s and in th

356 
 

 

 

flict in East Timor from the mid-1970s through 1999. The E

Ordnance Devices Unit, formed in 1981, is part of the Mobile 

The exigencies of fighting separatist insurgents in Aceh a

required the rapid expansion of the Mobile Brigade. Between 

2005, it grew from 7,500 to approximately 34,000 personne

rapid expansion brought problems in training and discipline

Mobile Brigade has come to be regarded by many observe

least disciplined and most brutal of all forces deployed agai

gents. It is essentially a paramilitary organization trained and o

along military lines. The brigade is used primarily as a de

combat force in emergencies, aiding in police operations 

quick action. It also works in domestic security and defense o

and has special riot-control equipment. Elements of the force 

trained for airborne operations. 

The need to forge a capable police counterterrorism unit in 

to the spread of international terrorism resulted in the establis

2002 of another elite element, the National Police counter

unit, better known as Detachment 88. This unit was largely fu

trained by the United States and graduated its first cadre in 20

the capability to conduct counterterrorism and modern foren

tigations, and it includes a quick-reaction counterterror

Detachment 88 has been particularly successful in its counte

operations. Its personnel, supported by technical assistance a

ing from the United States and Australia in particular, have ca

killed many of the most-wanted terrorists in the country, 

those responsible for bombings in Bali and Jakarta, terr

Sulawesi Tengah Province, and attacks against civilian targ

where in Indonesia. 

Rank-and-file police service is voluntary. Recruits mus

least a sixth-grade education and pass a competitive exam

Other qualifications include physical fitness and good moral c

After three years’ service as ordinary police, personnel w

junior secondary-school diplomas can enter training to becom

Those with three years’ experience as NCOs are eligible fo

training to enable them to become candidate officers and e

enter the officer corps. The majority of the police officer cor

the force as graduates of the National Police Academy, loc

Sukabumi, Jawa Barat Province. The Polri working and ce

uniforms are dark brown. 

Advanced training in vocational and technical subjects is 

to regular police, NCOs, and officers. Promotions often are 

performance in advanced education. The Police Command 

School at Semarang, Jawa Tengah Province, offers advanced 
 

in administration and logistics to police officers assigned to com

units at the subdistrict, district, and Polda levels. 

The Criminal Justice System 

The nation’s criminal jurisprudence and its institutions of cri

justice derive from Indonesia’s experience as an independent 

and from the Dutch colonial heritage. Dutch-based criminal 

one of three systems of law in operation in the nation since the 

teenth century, the other two being a system of European-de

commercial codes and civil law based on customary law (

which includes Islamic law or sharia (see Islam, ch. 2). Crimin

is the only one of these three systems that is essentially codifie

applied uniformly throughout the national territory. Criminal j

is administered through a system that includes a hierarchy o

and appellate courts with the Supreme Court at the top of the 

mid; a prosecutorial arm of the national government; and an 

pendent bar. Indonesians and outside observers have long consi

the criminal justice system one of the most corrupt branches 

Indonesian government. 

Several factors limit the use of formal legal channels in d

with activity defined as criminal. Owing in large part to a g

shortage of trained legal personnel, the infrastructure of the cri

justice system is more extensive in urban locales and in Java th

rural or remote areas. In any case, the system’s procedures oft

not apply to military, security, and intelligence organizations, 

in practice sometimes deal with both political and ordinary 

Indonesians do not always resort to the formal legal system to re

their conflicts, however, because many do not share Western 

regarding the nature of individual rights and the efficacy of la

procedural justice but prefer to settle disputes by arbitration or a

modation. Retribution and revenge, moreover, are still common 

of settling disputes, especially away from the big cities and town

In rural areas, many conflicts, including some (mostly m

criminal cases, are settled by village chiefs. Complaints oft

unfiled with authorities, even in villages and cities, and case

quently settle out of court in order to save time and money 

avoid attracting public or official attention. In criminal cases

settlements typically entail accommodation between the accuse

the police or prosecutors, whose roles in the criminal justice s

are generally more critical than those of courts or judges. Weal

status are apt to be important factors in the outcome. 

358 
 

Crime and Political Offenses 

Indonesia, like many nations, has experienced a rising c

as a by-product of increased urbanization and the social 

nomic dislocations associated with national development. T

of the crime problem is difficult to gauge, but conditions 

large numbers of unemployed or underemployed people in t

a lack of jobs for high school and university graduates, and 

down in traditional systems of social control often are 

responsible for the increase in crime. By the start of the tw

century, the annual increase in crime was moderate. Both th

ities and the public, however, continued to be concerned a

increasingly violent nature of Indonesian society. 

Certain categories of crime are handled under special stat

side the penal code under Indonesian law. After the fall of 

offenses such as bribery, the assessment of pungli (a contr

pungutan liar—illegal levies), and the diversion of public 

private use by business figures or officials were grouped in 

class of crimes under the jurisdiction of anticorruption court

Commission to Investigate Public Officials’ Wealth. The t

to democracy also included abolition of an internal subve

that had been used to jail critics of the Suharto government. 

Criminal Law and Proceedings 

The Indonesian criminal code in force at independence w

cally the Netherlands Indies Criminal Code, adopted in 19

certain amendments promulgated by the revolutionary gov

in 1946. Known as the Code of Criminal Law, since 1958 it 

applied uniformly throughout the national territory. 

The Code of Criminal Law has three chapters. Chapter 

the terms and procedures to be followed in criminal cases a

fies mitigating circumstances that may affect the severity 

tence. Chapters II and III, respectively, define the categ

felonies and misdemeanors and prescribe the penalties for e

of offense. The distinction between felonies and misdemean

erally conforms to that in Western countries. Several othe

dealing with criminal offenses are also in force, the most si

of which are laws concerning economic offenses, subversiv

ties, and corruption. 

Penalties for major offenses include death (infrequently 

for treason, drug trafficking, and—since 2002—terrorism, am

crimes), imprisonment for periods up to life, local detention, a

Total confiscation of property is not permitted. Penalties f
 

 

crimes and misdemeanors include deprivation of specified right

feiture of personal property, and publication of the sentence 

court. Punishments listed in the code are the maximum allow

judges have discretionary authority to impose a lesser punishmen

New guidelines on criminal proceedings were promulgat

December 31, 1981. These new guidelines, known collectively 

Code of Criminal Procedures, replaced a 1941 code that was i

revision of an 1848 Dutch colonial regulation that stipulated 

procedures to be used in both criminal and civil cases. Both na

jurists and government officials had complained that statutory 

guity in the old code and certain of its provisions in some case

led to abuses of authority by law enforcement and judicial off

Under the old system, several authorities, including the polic

regional military commands, and the public prosecutors, shared 

ers of arrest, detention, and interrogation—an often confusing 

tion that sometimes led plaintiffs to file complaints with the part

agency they believed would deal most favorably with their case

viduals could be arrested and detained on suspicion alone, and 

were broad limits on how long a suspect could be held before 

charged or brought to trial. Moreover, the accused could reques

counsel only when that individual’s case was submitted to a j

and not during any pretrial proceedings. 

The 1981 code represents a considerable step forward in the 

lishment of clear norms of procedural justice. Under it, cri

investigation powers lie almost entirely with the police. A suspe

be held only 24 hours before the investigating officials presen

charges and obtain a detention order from a judge. Specific lim

established on how long a suspect can be held before a trial. The 

code expressly grants the accused the right to learn the ch

against him or her, to be examined immediately by investigatin

cials, and to have the case referred to a prosecutor, submitte

court, and tried before a judge. The accused also has the ri

obtain legal counsel in all of the proceedings. Should it turn out 

person has been wrongly charged or detained under the 1981 

that individual has the right to sue for compensation and for the 

ration of rights and status. 

Administration of Criminal Justice 

The prosecutorial function rests with the attorney general

holds the position of supreme public prosecutor. The president 

times grants the attorney general cabinet-level status, and the att

general has direct access to the president. The Attorney Gen

Office is separate from the Department of Justice and Human R

360 
The Attorney General’s Office

Courtesy Y

The public prosecutor’s principal functions are to examin

of felonious conduct or misdemeanors brought by indiv

other parties, and then either to dismiss a charge or refer it f

the state court having jurisdiction. The prosecutor’s offic

responsible for presenting the case against the accused in c

for executing the sentence of the court. 

The Code of Criminal Procedures of 1981 made a clear 

between the investigation function, solely the preserve of th

and the prosecution function, which remained with the pro

office. The only exception was in the case of “special crimes

gory that was not further defined but that was believed to be 

for unusually sensitive cases such as espionage and subve

which the prosecutor could also take an investigatory role. 

ing tension between the prosecutor and the police was evide

debate over a new prosecution service law in 1991. The law 

gave the attorney general the power to conduct limited inves

in cases that were determined to be incomplete. The 1991 

established deputy and associate attorney general positions 

ble for civil cases and administrative affairs. 

The court system has four branches: general courts, 

courts, military courts, and administrative courts (see The J

ch. 4). All criminal cases are tried in the general courts. The 
Criminal Procedures set forth rules to determine the court in w

case must be tried, should military and general court jurisd

combine or overlap. In 2004 the armed forces accepted Sup

Court jurisdiction over the military court system, and in 200

DPR introduced legislation stipulating that all crimes committ

military personnel outside of operational military duties will be 

ecuted in the civil court system. The TNI has opposed this ne

by claiming that the civilian court system neither understands th

itary justice system nor is capable of taking over responsibili

prosecution of military personnel accused of nonmilitary crime

vice members remain subject solely to the military legal syste

all crimes allegedly committed while in the pursuit of military d

Penal System 

Indonesia’s prisons are administered by the Department of 

rections within the Department of Justice and Human Right

include three categories of prisons based mainly on the numb

inmates they can hold. The nine largest prisons, designated C

hold prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment or death. 

The U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human R

Practices for 2009 found prison conditions harsh throughout the 

nesian penal system. Poor food, unsanitary conditions, and inade

medical care were common, as were mistreatment and corru

“Money talks,” and wealthy inmates were able to purchase 

prison accommodations, food, and treatment. Overcrowding in a

and inadequate facilities also occurred. The report indicated that 

conditions had existed for a very long time and noted the need fo

ter training of prison personnel and renovation of prison facilitie

Several specialized prisons for women and two for youth

located in Java. Where it is not possible to confine such prison

separate institutions, as is usually the case outside Java, effor

made to segregate juvenile from adult offenders and females 

males in separate sections of the same institution. Ordinarily, p

ers are permitted visits by family members and may receive li

amounts of food and other articles to supplement the minimal su

they are issued. Under some circumstances, prisoners are permit

spend their nights at home. Most prisons try to provide medica

of some kind, although it is generally regarded as insufficient. 

Rehabilitation provisions include literacy classes, moral an

gious training, and workshops to teach crafts and skills. Some 

ons operate small industries or agricultural enterprises that sel

products on the local market. Proceeds are used to pay a small 

to the working inmates, to buy recreational equipment, and to 

362 
tain buildings and grounds. In some prisons, inmates work 

outside the prison confines. 

Narcotics and Counternarcotics Operations 

Production of narcotics, particularly opiate-derived produ

the “Golden Triangle” where Thailand, Burma, and Laos m

stantially increased in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite its p

Indonesia is neither a major producer nor a major user of illi

although there is an increasingly broad niche for designer dr

as methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, or Ecstasy

wealthy youth in the larger cities. There is, however, con

concern on the part of the national leadership and police offi

Indonesia might become an important drug-trafficking c

major drug routes in mainland Southeast Asia shift to take a

of Indonesia’s relatively innocent reputation. 

Bali, which has become a booming international tourist de

provides a base for individual traffickers and transactions. A

there is no extradition treaty between the United States and In

Indonesian authorities are cooperative in deporting drug susp

ticularly if the International Criminal Police Organization (In

involved. During 1991, for example, a suspected American d

ficker was deported to the United States with the cooperati

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the National Police 

nesia, and Interpol. In addition, there have been periodic po

paigns in Aceh and Sumatera Utara Province, which are hi

the country’s leading producers of marijuana (some of which 

been used traditionally in the local cuisine). 

Narcotics trafficking is a severe offense in Indonesia, 

case in neighboring Singapore and Malaysia. A considerable 

of traffickers—mostly foreigners—have received death s

from the courts; most executions in Indonesia are for crime

ing narcotics trafficking. 

National Security in the Contemporary Era 

Indonesia has changed dramatically since the fall of Su

1998, and the military and police forces have changed with 

try. No longer an autocracy, Indonesia is now the world’s thir

democracy. The Indonesian military has implemented an im

array of reforms that have removed the armed forces from an 

role in virtually every aspect of civil society and taken the

day-to-day political involvement. At the same time, the milita

the most powerful institution in Indonesia and will likely rem
 

 

some time. This is due both to the slow development of viable ci

institutions—repressed during the 32-year rule of Suharto—an

military’s inherent power. Similarly, the National Police is evo

thanks to extensive international assistance and a core of re

minded police leaders determined to improve both the image 

police force and its professionalism in maintaining law and orde

Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority nation 

world, and its practice of Islam the world’s most moderate

dynamic changes since 1998 have shown that democracy and 

can coexist peacefully in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society

world’s fourth most populous country, Indonesia can play a 

role in international and regional political, economic, and 

affairs. By 2008 Indonesia had become a valued, long-standin

ticipant in the war against international terrorism. 

Neither the armed forces nor the police has implemented th

range of reforms called for by their most vocal critics. Vested 

ests remain in play, and resistance to change is as natural to the 

nesian security forces as to those of other countries. But a 

president and minister of defense, a newly empowered MPR, S

east Asia’s most free press establishment, and a civilian society 

ious to realize its potential have combined to make continued c

in the security and military institutions inevitable. Greater ci

control over military and police forces, realizable only when 

better budget control can be achieved, is a longer-term goa

might take as long as 10 to 20 years to attain. 

Many challenges remain. The military and, to a lesser degre

police have an ingrained culture of impunity that can be broken 

by implementation of clear accountability for misdeeds, succ

implementation of the rule of law, and reform of the national ju

system. These are system-wide reform objectives not achievab

the military and police alone. 

* * * 

Several works treat the development of the Indonesian armed 

before 1970, the most balanced and comprehensive being Ulf 

haussen’s The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 

1967. Ernst Utrecht’s The Indonesian Army: A Socio-Political St

an Armed Privileged Group in the Developing Countries of

detailed and often critical view from the perspective of a former in

Ruth T. McVey’s two-part “The Post-Revolutionary Transformat

the Indonesian Army” focuses mainly on the military’s shortcomi

its early years. The Indonesian Tragedy, by Brian May, and The 

364 
and Politics in Indonesia, by Harold A. Crouch, are more c

with the causes and effects of the 1965 coup attempt; they also 

the armed forces in a somewhat negative light. The National 

and the Armed Forces in Indonesia, a collection of essays by 

former official historian, Nugroho Notosusanto, presents the v

of the armed forces and the government regarding ABRI’s 

development, its role, and its doctrine. The most comprehensiv

Indonesian military organization, the dwifungsi concept, and t

the military in Indonesian society is Robert Lowry’s 1986 w

Armed Forces of Indonesia. 

A number of books examine recent developments. Kevin O

Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia 

background on economic and political issues as well as deta

chaos surrounding Suharto’s resignation. Adam Schwarz’s A 

Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s covers Indonesian political m

ing during that decade. Two recent accounts of the issues facin

in the transition to democracy are The Military and Democracy 

nesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, by Angel Rabasa and 

Haseman, and Toward a Stronger U.S.–Indonesia Security Rela

by John B. Haseman and Eduardo Lachica. Readers inte

detailed histories of the TNI’s intelligence-gathering and spec

tions will find Kenneth J. Conboy’s books of particular interes

ing Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces; Intel: Ins

nesia’s Intelligence Services; and Elite: The Special Forces of I

1950–2008. A particularly useful account of modern Indonesia

is Indonesian Destinies, by Theodore Friend. 

Current reportage is available in the Indonesian chapter 

Sentinel Security Risk Assessments: Southeast Asia, regularly 

and available on-line by subscription (http://sentinel.janes.co

hard copy. The Van Zorge Report, published fortnightly in 

provides excellent reportage and analysis on all aspects of In

political, economic, and security affairs. The periodically 

“Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite,” compiled in 

University’s journal Indonesia, is helpful in keeping up with 

current assignments of senior military officers. The periodic r

Indonesia published by the International Crisis Group are d

for their depth and accuracy of research and reporting. Data o

and composition of the armed forces are collected by the Inte

Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual publication, The 

Balance, and in an annual U.S. Department of Defense reso

Congressional Presentation Document. Dephan offers a pub

nesian-language Web site (http://www.dephan.go.id), part 

includes its Defense Media Centre with an English-language 
Annual reports by Amnesty International and Human R

Watch examine the state of human rights practices in Indones

do the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices pre

for the U.S. Congress by the Department of State. (For further 

mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 

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404 
Glo

abangan—Refers to people who are nominally Muslim but 

generally followers of kebatinan (q.v.). The word is derived 

Javanese abang, which means “red.” 

Asian Development Bank—Established in 1967, the bank 

economic development and promotes growth and coope

regional member countries. The bank is owned by its 48 

member governments, including Indonesia, as well as 18 no

members in Western Europe plus the United States. 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Founded in 

the purpose of promoting regional stability, economic dev

and cultural exchange. ASEAN’s founding members were I

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brun

ASEAN in 1984, Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Burma 

and Cambodia in 1999. Papua New Guinea has observer s

there are 11 dialogue partners: Australia, Canada, China, the 

Union, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, th

States, and the United Nations Development Programme 

Timor-Leste has requested to be considered for member

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 

constructive dialogue and consultation on political and secur

of common interest and concern. In 2009 it had 26 members, 

the 10 ASEAN member states, Papua New Guinea, and Timo

Bahasa Indonesia—The Indonesian national language, also k

Indonesian; an Austronesian language thought to have its 

Riau Malay and 80 percent cognate with Standard Malay

called perfected or new spelling of Bahasa Indonesia—ej

disempurnakan (EYD)—was adopted in 1972. 

Confrontation (Konfrontasi)—In 1963 then-President Sukarno 

“confrontation” with the emerging new state of Malaysia, 

distract attention from Indonesia’s increasingly dire econom

Guerrilla warfare and intelligence operations involving In

forces, British commandos, and the nascent Malaysian arm

ensued, mostly on both sides of the two countries’ land b

Kalimantan; went on for two years; and was only ha

Sukarno lost power in October 1965. 
 

 

Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI)—Formed after the March 

demise of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI

Except for the Netherlands, the membership was the same as f

IGGI. The Indonesia government disbanded the CGI in 2007. 

cukong—A Chinese term from Hokkien dialect, meaning “maste

taken in the Indonesian context to mean a Chinese businessm

middleman cooperating closely with native Indonesian legal l

holders, especially the military, during the New Order period. 

exclusive economic zone—Per Act No. 3 of 1983, enacted Octob

1983, the outer strip bordering the Indonesian territorial sea as 

mined by the law applicable to the Indonesian waters, coveri

seabed, the subsoil of the seabed, and the water above it w

outermost limit of 200 nautical miles, measured from the baseline 

Indonesian territorial sea. Within this zone, Indonesia claims sov

rights to conduct the exploration, exploitation, management, an

servation of the living and nonliving resources on the seabed and 

subsoil thereof, as well as the water above it, including other activit

the purpose of economic exploration and exploitation of the zone, s

the generation of power by means of water, current, and wind. 

fiscal year (FY)—Calendar year. Prior to 2001, the fiscal year ran 

April 1 to March 31. The change meant that FY 2000 covered onl

months. 

Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka—GAM)—A sep

group that fought for Acehnese independence between 1976 and 

Also known as Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNL

table A). 

Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente; 

olutionary Front for an Independent East Timor)—A gu

movement that fought for the independence of East Timor. F

was established in 1974, suppressed during the ensuing 25 yea

endured Indonesian occupation and emerged as the first gov

party of independent East Timor in 1999. 

Gini index—The Gini coefficient expressed as a percentage. Th

coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income 

some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or 

holds within an economy or society deviates from a perfectly 

distribution. It measures the degree to which two frequency (perce

distributions correspond. The Gini index is a number between 0 

where 0 means perfect equality (everyone has the same income) 

means perfect inequality (one person has all the income, everyon

406 
earns nothing). It was developed by Corrado Gini (1884–

Italian statistician. 

Golkar—Originally golongan karya, which literally means f

groups within society, such as peasants, workers, and women

taken to be Golongan Karya or Golkar (an organization of f

groups), the government party during Suharto’s New Or

Golkar Party, with many changes, is one of many parties in 

New Order period. 

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of 

goods and services produced by an economy over a period 

such as a year. Only output of goods for final consump

intermediate production are assumed to be included in the fin

GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, 

that indirect taxes and subsidies are included: when these di

and subsidies have been eliminated, the result is GDP at fa

The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation o

assets have not been made. Income arising from investm

possessions owned abroad is not included, only domestic prod

hence the use of the word domestic to distinguish GDP fr

national product (GNP; q.v.). 

gross national product (GNP)—The gross domestic product (q.v

income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign 

including income received from abroad by residents and s

payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP is the broadest 

ment of the output of goods and services by an economy. 

calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and 

Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payme

often is calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and 

Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia—

Founded in 1913 as the Indies Social-Democratic Association 

which became the Communist Association of the Indies (PKH

and was renamed the Indonesian Communist Party in 1924. 

flourished during the Sukarno years of the 1950s and ear

Accused of attempting a coup d’état on September 30, 196

which five senior military officers were killed, the p

suppressed in an ensuing pogrom by the armed forces and 

citizens. The actual role of the PKI in the September 30 incid

the subject of historical examination in the wake of the resig

former president Suharto in May 1998. 
 

Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia—T

This official designation of the Indonesian armed forces was adop

April 1999 after the National Police of Indonesia (Kepolisian Re

Indonesia—Polri) was removed from the armed forces (it had bee

equal fourth branch since 1960). The former name for the armed 

from 1962 to 1999, was Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Ind

(ABRI; Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). TNI was als

between 1947 and 1962 for the army. 

Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI)—An international gr

lenders established in 1967 by the Netherlands to coordinate mult

aid to Indonesia. The other members included the Asian Develo

Bank (q.v.), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United N

Development Programme, World Bank, Australia, Belgium, B

Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerlan

the United States. In March 1992, Indonesia announced that 

rejecting further IGGI aid as long as the Netherlands was a mem

the organization. The IGGI was replaced by the Consultative Gro

Indonesia (q.v.), with the original members minus the Netherlands

kebatinan (mysticism)—An amalgam of animist, Hindu-Buddhis

Islamic (especially Sufi) mystical elements that combine to 

Javanese mysticism. Not a single body of faith, but an ali

“stream” of beliefs held by a number of groups, kebatinan is off

recognized by the government, and its schools are administered 

Department of National Education rather than by the Departm

Religious Affairs. Also known as kejawen, agama Jawa, or Jav

Konfrontasi—Confrontation (q.v.). 

Laakso-Taagepera Index—A commonly used measure to determi

effective number of political parties when parties vary substanti

their vote or share of seats. It is named after political scientists M

Laakso and Rein Taagepera, who developed the index in 1979. 

Nonaligned Movement—Established in September 1961 with the 

promoting political and military cooperation apart from the trad

East and West blocs. Indonesia was among the original members

2009, there were 118 members, 15 observers, and 24 guests. Ind

held the chair of the Nonaligned Movement from 1992 to 1995. 

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—Fo

in Baghdad, Iraq, on September 14, 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 

Arabia, and Venezuela with the aim of coordinating petr

policies of its member countries. OPEC membership increase

the addition of Qatar in 1961, Indonesia and Libya in 1962, the U

408 
Arab Emirates in 1967, Algeria in 1969, Nigeria in 1971, E

1973, Gabon in 1975, and Angola in 2007. Ecuador susp

membership from 1992 to 2007; Gabon terminated its memb

1995; Indonesia, when it became a net importer of oil, susp

membership effective January 2009. 

Outer Islands—Older term used by some sources to refer to all isla

Indonesian archipelago other than Java and Madura. Othe

however, use the term to refer to all islands except Java, Mad

and Sumatra; still others say except Java and Bali or excl

Madura, and Bali. The term as translated from Dutch—buitenge

means outer territories or regions, while a similar term from 

Indonesia (q.v.)–tanah seberang—means land (or lands) over 

across the seas. The term is sometimes considered pejorative 

people living on the islands indicated. 

Pancasila—State philosophy based on five interrelated principles

one supreme God; just and civilized humanitarianism; natio

expressed in the unity of Indonesia; popular sovereignty 

through deliberation and representation or consultative democ

social justice for all the Indonesian people. The Pancasila was a

by Sukarno on June 1, 1945. From Sanskrit: panca (five) 

(principle). It became the country’s official doctrine under Suha

all military and civil servants were required to attend a c

Pancasila principles. While still a part of the national do

importance has waned in the post-Suharto years. 

pribumi—Literally, an indigene, or native. A term coined in 

colonial period to replace the Dutch word inlander, a term 

meant “native” but which did not refer to Arabs, Chinese, or 

who might have been born in the Indies. The distinction 

pribumi and non-pribumi has had significant implica

economic development policy. 

priyayi—Traditional aristocratic, bureaucratic elite of Java. 

reformasi—An Indonesian blanket term for democratic reform

and implemented by all elements of government after the 19

Suharto, up until around 2004. 

Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun)—A five-year 

development plan: Repelita I (FY [q.v.] 1969–73), Repelita II (F

78), Repelita III (FY 1979–83), Repelita IV (FY 1984–88), R

(FY 1989–93), and Repelita VI (FY 1994–98). 

rupiah (Rp)—Basic unit of currency. The exchange rate was fixed 

to US$1 from 1971 to 1978, when the rupiah was devalued 
Following two devaluations in 1983 and 1986, the rupiah was gra

depreciated at an average rate of about 5 percent per year up 

financial crisis in 1997–98, when the Indonesian currency was f

and the exchange rate fell dramatically. During the recovery af

crisis, the rupiah stabilized at a level of about Rp11,000–12,00

US$1, and in the early twenty-first century it improved to about Rp

9,000 per US$1. At the end of July 2011, the interbank exchange ra

valued at Rp8,481.76 per US$1, or Rp1 = US$0.00012. The rup

issued in 1, 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1,000 coins and 1,000, 5

10,000, 20,000, 50,000, and 100,000 notes. 

santri—Orthodox Muslims. In the Javanese context, the santri ar

sometimes referred to as putihan (white ones), an allusion to 

purity, especially as contrasted to abangan (q.v.) in Javanese. 

sharia (Arabic; syariah in Bahasa Indonesia, q.v.)—Islamic cano

Among Shia (q.v.) Muslims, the sharia includes the Quran a

authenticated sayings of the Prophet (hadith) and the Twelve Im

Shia (or Shiite)—A member of the smaller of two great divisions of 

The Shias supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptiv

to the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community, and o

issue they divided from the Sunnis (q.v.) in the first great sch

Islam. Later disagreements have produced further schisms amo

Shias. Shias revere 12 imams, most of whom are believed to be h

from view. 

Sufi—From suf, the Arabic word for “wool.” The term derives fro

practice of wearing a woolen robe, a sign of dedicating oneself 

mystical life, known in Islam as becoming a Sufi. Sufis, who 

mystical union with God, have been condemned by some Sunn

legal schools. 

Sunni—From the Arabic sunna meaning “custom,” with the connota

orthodoxy or tradition based on the Prophet Muhammad’s exampl

of the two great divisions of Islam, the Sunnis supported the trad

method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad lin

this issue, they divided from the Shia (q.v.) discipline in the firs

schism within Islam. 

Supersemar (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret)—The Letter of Instruct

March 11, 1966, in which Sukarno signed over his executive aut

in the wake of the September 30, 1965, coup attempt, to General S

Transmigration Program—A voluntary rural resettlement plan that 

to move large numbers of Javanese to Indonesia’s underpop

Outer Islands (q.v.); transmigrasi in Bahasa Indonesia (q.v.). 

410 
wayang (theater)—A dramatic form in several major variations

puppets or human performers portray gods, heroes, villains, 

characters in literary epics. The wayang kulit is shadow the

highly decorated flat leather puppets. 

World Trade Organization (WTO)—Established in 1994 as suc

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 

from January 1, 1995, the WTO has the goal to provide a 

resolve trade conflicts between members and to carry on ne

with the goal of further lowering and/or eliminating tariffs 

trade barriers. The WTO has 153 members, including Indon

30 observers. 

 

 

 

abangan (nominal Muslim), 120, 259
 

Abdalla, Ulil Abshar, 282
 

Abdulgani, Ruslan, 74
 

Abdullah, Baginda Dahlan, 45
 

Abu Sayyaf, l 

Aceh, preindependence, 21–23, 33, 81
 

Aceh, Special Region of, 65, 81, 86, 87, 101,
 

106, 139, 229, 234, 247–51, 285, 324–26,
 

357, 363; Acehnese language and people, 128,
 

139–40, 250; agriculture in, 139; elections in,
 

251; and Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 81–
 

82, 317, 324–26; industry in, 206; Islamic law 

and practice in, l, li, 65, 139; militant jihadist 

group in, lvii; military forces in, 344; natural 

resources of, 106, 184, 212, 324; and tsunami 

(2004), 89, 106, 215, 251, 279, 311, 323
 

Aceh Monitoring Mission, 251
 

Aceh–Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 

Agency (BRR), 251
 

Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA), 

249, 251
 

Act of Free Choice (1969), 67, 81, 252
 

adat (custom or tradition, unwritten), 39, 131–
 

32, 140, 141, 253
 

adat courts, 245
 

adat laws (hukum adat), 131, 244–45, 358
 

agama (religion or religions), 66, 120–21, 124,
 

142
 

Agama Hindu (see also Balinese Hinduism),
 

123, 143
 

agama Jawa (a syncretistic religion), 120
 

agama Konghucu (Confucianism), 125
 

Agency for the Study and Application of Technology (BPPT), 243
 

Agrarian Act (1870), 38
 

agriculture, 7, 77, 78, 83, 97–98, 104, 144, 145, 

180, 193, 197–99; coffee, 142; in colonial 

period, 34–38; food crops, 138, 139, 140, 142, 

198–200; palm oil, 104, 199–200; rain-fed 

agricultural land (tegalan), 68, 199; rubber, 

61, 201; sugar, 30, 34, 199
 

Agung, Sultan, of Mataram, 25
 

Ahmadiyah, lviii 

Ahtisaari, Martti, 106, 251, 325
 

aid, 166, 180, 182, 190–91
 

Aidit, D.N. (Dipa Nusantara), 66, 68, 70
 

Air Force of the Republic of Ind

AU), 347–49; air bases, 349; airc

copters of, 347–49; Air Matérie

347; Air Training Command, 34

structure of, 340–41; East and We

Commands (Ko-Ops), 341, 347; 

343; matériel, 336; National Air D

mand, 347–48; personnel, 338, 3

uniforms, 350–51, 353; women in

Airlangga, 12
 

airports, 218–19 

Akashi Yasushi, 292
 

Aksi Stop AIDS (ASA), 160 

Alatas, Ali, 323
 

Albuquerque, Alfonso de, 18
 

Ali, Suryadharma, 280
 

Alie, Marzuki, liv 

aliran kepercayaan (streams of be

264
 

All-Indonesian Workers’ Union (

All-Indonesian Workers’ Union Fede

196
 

Alliance of Independent Journalis

Allied forces, 52, 55
 

Alor, 122
 

Al Qaeda, 88, 227, 280, 324
 

“Als ik eens een Nederlander was

Dutchman), 44
 

Alwi, Des, lx 

Amamapare, 214
 

Amangkurat I, 26–27 

Ambalat Island, 105
 

Ambon, 49, 86, 117, 118, 284–85

American Federation of Labor, 19

Americanization, xlv 

Amnesty International, 107
 

Angkola, 140
 

animism, 120, 121, 124, 142, 144

Ansor (Helpers of Muhammad), 

Detachment 99, lix 

antipornography law (2008), xlix

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, 293
 

Anwar, Rosihan, lx 

Aquino, Corazon, 300–301 

Arab Indonesians, 115
 

Arabian Peninsula, 101
 

Arabic, 128, 131, 153
 
 

 

archipelagic land and sea space (wawasan 

nusantara), 105, 288 

archipelago (nusantara), 15 

Archipelago Aircraft Industry (IPTN), 173, 

176, 209, 337 

Ariel. See Irham, Nazril 

Arifinto, lv 

arisan (credit association), 132 

Armadas. See Navy of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AL) 

Armed Forces Military Academy (Akmil), 

338, 343 

Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of 

Indonesia (APRIS), 312 

Armed Forces of the Philippines, 301 

Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia 

(APRI, then ABRI; see also Indonesian National Armed Forces—TNI), 66, 68, 69–70, 72, 

81, 83, 86, 314, 319, 355; antecedents of, 312; 

and civil conflict, 85; and corruption, 64, 318– 

19; in East Timor, 82, 321; economic role of, 

333; Latihan Gabungan (LatGap exercise), 

335; matériel, 318; and politics, 63–65, 74, 

330; role of, 316, 330–33 

Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Body 

(Bais), 355 

Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AD), 

344–45; Army Special Forces Command 

(Kopassus), 330; education in, 338, 343; and 

human rights, 283; matériel, 344–45; personnel, 338, 345; and politics, 282–84; ranks and 

uniforms, 350–51, 353; recruitment, 338–39; 

territorial system, 283, 334, 341–42, 344; 

women in, 349–50 

Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus), 

268, 341, 343; Unit 81, 330 

Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), 

69, 341 

Asahan Hydroelectric and Aluminum Project, 

207 

asas tunggal (underlying principle), 76, 262 

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations 

Asia–Africa Conference (1955), 66–67, 289 

Asian Development Bank, 289 

Asian financial crisis (1997–98), xl, 85, 113, 

115, 133, 150, 165, 174–77, 181–82, 187, 

189, 191, 193, 197, 207, 215–16, 288, 290, 

294, 298, 310, 318 

Asmat, 147–48 

as-salaf as salih (Islam of the righteous ancestors), 119 

Association of Southeast Asian 

(ASEAN), 160, 191–92, 251, 288, 

297, 299–302, 352; aims and ende

290–93, 295; ASEAN Economic Com

192, 222, 294; ASEAN Free Tra

(AFTA), 192, 222; ASEAN Plus Thre

Japan, and South Korea), 293, 301; 

Regional Forum (ARF), 294, 352; 

Security Community, 293; ASEAN So

tural Community, 294; Charter, 294; e

investment from member countries, l

nesia as chair, lix; military cooperat

Roadmap for Financial and Monetary 

tion of ASEAN, 294; Summit, Firs

292; Summit, Third (1987), 301; 

Fourth, (1992), 291, 294 

Astra International, 168, 170, 209 

Asyari, Kiyai Haji Hasyim, 43 

Attorney General’s Office (AGO), x

360–61 

Australia, 52, 55, 57, 293; armed force

and East Timor, 82, 296, 337; emb

bombing, 280–81, 300; military aid 

tions with, 228–29, 253, 299–300, 3

354, 357; territorial disputes with, 10

Austria-Hungary, 44 

Austronesian people and languages, 5

Automated Logistics Management 

(ALMS), 348 

automotive industry, 209 

avian influenza, 160, 202, 303 

Awaluddin, Hamid, 106 

Azhar, Antasari, xlvii 

Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar, lvii, 88, 275, 28

babinsa (village NCO), 344 

Babullah, Sultan, of Ternate, 21 

Bachir, Sutrisno, 271 

“Back to Nahdlatul Ulama’s Original 

of Action of 1926,” 272 

Badawi, Abdullah, 299 

Badung, 34 

Bagansiapiapi, 148 

Bahasa Indonesia, 9, 97, 126, 128, 1

136, 149, 260 

bajaj (three-wheeled, multipassenger 

cycle), 216 

Bakrie, Aburizal, 266 

Bali, 14, 68, 99, 115, 132, 137, 158, 1

363; agriculture on, 138; bombings (

lvii, 88, 90, 117, 137, 154, 227, 280, 2

303, 329–30, 357; and population iss

414 
219 

and religion on, 123–24; resistance of, to colonists, 34; tourism on, 137; transport on, 215,
 

Bali TV, 220
 

balian (shamanic curing), 144
 

Balibo Declaration, 321
 

Balikpapan, 217
 

Balinese Hinduism, 123–24 

Balinese language and people, liii, 128, 131,
 

137–38
 

Banda Aceh, 250
 

Banda Archipelago, 19, 21
 

Banda Neira, 48
 

Bandung, 66–67, 156, 216, 289, 347
 

Bangka, 212
 

Bangka-Belitung, 212
 

Bangkok, 216
 

Bangsa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Nation of
 

Islam), 317, 329
 

banjar (village compound), 138
 

Banjar (ethnic group), 130
 

Banjarmasin, 25, 33
 

Bank Andromeda, 176
 

Bank Bali, 179
 

Bank Century, xlvii 

Bank Duta, 170
 

Bank Indonesia, xlii, xlvi, 166, 170, 173, 174,
 

179, 185–88, 247
 

Bank Mandiri, 177
 

Bank Summa, 170
 

banking system, 169–72, 174–78 

Bantam, 49
 

Banten, lviii, 18, 21, 25, 130, 356
 

banua (ordinary house), 143
 

bapak (father or elder), 128, 258
 

Bappenas. See National Development Planning Board 

Barisan Hisbullah (Army of God; see also
 

Hezbollah), 52
 

Bashir, Abu Bakar. See Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar 

Batak, people and language, 128, 140, 252
 

Batam, 207, 209
 

Batavia. See Jakarta 

batig slot (budgetary surplus), 36
 

batik, liii 

Battle of the Java Sea (1942), 49
 

Baturaja, 345
 

Baud, Jean Chrétien, 31
 

bauxite, 210, 214
 

Beatles, the, 66
 

becak (pedicab), 215–16 

Beijing, 301–2 

Bekasi (see also Jabodetabek), lv

Belawan, 217
 

Belgium, 57
 

Belitung, 91, 212
 

Bellwood, Peter, 6
 

Bemo, 216
 

“Bengawan Solo,” liii 

Bengkulu, 48, 140
 

Benteng (Fortress) Program, 62
 

Berita Buana, 287
 

“Berkeley Mafia,” 166, 167
 

Betawi, 130
 

Beureueh, Muhammad Daud, 81
 

Bhagavad Gita, 123
 

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity i

15, 132, 233
 

bhumi (land or realm), 11
 

Biak, 219, 346
 

Bima, lvii 

Bimantara Citra Group, 169
 

Bintan Island, 207, 214
 

bintang (star), 272
 

Bintuni Bay, 212, 328
 

birthrate, 83, 107
 

“Black Friday” (see also terrorism

Blackberry, lv 

Blackwood, Evelyn, 141
 

Blambangan, 25
 

Blasphemy Law (1965), li 

Blitar, 72
 

Boediono. See Budiono 

Bogor, 72, 102, 112, 156, 194
 

Bolivia, 212
 

Bone (see also Buginese people an

24
 

Bontang, 212
 

book banning, lvi 

Borneo (see also Kalimantan), 53

Borobudur, 9, 13, 126
 

Bosch, Johannes van den, 34–35 

Bosnia–Herzegovina, 352
 

Boven Digul, 46, 48
 

BP Tangguh natural gas field, 328

brahmana (Brahman priests and c

Hinduism), 124, 137
 

Brantas Lapindo, lii 

Brantas River, 12
 

Brazil, xl 

Brenner, Suzanne, 111
 

Britain, 29, 68, 323, 345, 347, 352

British troops, 54, 55–56 

“Broad Outlines of State Policy,” 
 

 

 

 

“Broad Policy Outlines and Implementation 

Plans for Political and Economic Stability” 

(1966), 73
 

Brunei, 99, 290
 

buaya (crocodile), xlviii 

budaya (culture), 132
 

Buddhism, 8–9, 16–18, 25, 118, 125–26; Buddhayana, 126; Kasogatan, 126; Mahayana, 9, 

126; Maitreya, 126; Nichiren, 126; Theravada,
 

126; Tridharma, 126
 

budget (see also defense spending), 180–83,
 

185–88, 221, 240
 

Budiono, xlii, xlvi, xlvii, 177, 182, 242, 256,
 

278
 

Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor), 43, 44, 46
 

Buginese people and language, 24, 128, 130,
 

252
 

Bukittinggi, 50
 

Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind), 41
 

bupati (district administrative heads, or regents), 

185, 228, 247–48, 251, 264
 

Bureau of Public Works, 38
 

Burma (Myanmar), 50, 61, 101, 229, 290,
 

312, 336, 363
 

bus transport, 114
 

Bush, George W., 290, 300, 301, 303–4
 

business conglomerates, 169–70, 172–73, 175,
 

204–5
 

cabinet, 242–43 

Cakrabirawa Presidential Guard, 69
 

California Texas Oil Company (Caltex), 211
 

Calvinism, 122, 146
 

camat (head of subdistrict), 247
 

Cambodia (see also Khmers), 11, 14, 290,
 

293, 321; peace process, 292, 302, 303, 352; 

Vietnamese invasion of, 292, 335
 

candi (stone structures), 9
 

Cantonese, 148
 

Cape York Peninsula, 300
 

Capital Investment Coordinating Board 

(BKPM), 167, 243 

CASA–235, 344
 

castes (varna), 124
 

Catholic Party (Partai Katolik), 266
 

Catholic University, 156
 

Catur Veda, 123
 

Celebes Sea. See Sulawesi Sea 

CEMEX (formerly Cementos Mexicanos),
 

178
 

censorship. See media, censorship of 

Center of the People’s Power (Putera), 51
 

Central National Committee (KNIP)

57
 

Central Statistical Office (BPS), 97, 1

198
 

Cepu oil field, 211
 

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 

2002), 106, 250, 324
 

Cham, 17
 

Chávez, Hugo, 284
 

chemical products, 168, 206
 

Chevron, liv 

Chiang Mai Initiative, 294
 

chief of the general staff (Kasum), 34

chiefs (datu), 8
 

children. See family life 

China, 14, 16; influence of, 7; relatio

8, 10
 

China, People’s Republic of, 63, 64, 72

competition with, xl, 189; exports to, 

301; imports from, 191–92, 337; relati

67–68, 290, 301–2, 335; territorial 

with, 335
 

Chinese (Tionghoa), 148
 

Chinese Indonesians, 85, 115, 148–50, 

328; in business, 128, 168–69, 173, 

crimination against, 62, 71, 86, 317

politics, 270; and religion, 122–23, 

wealth of, 196, 257
 

Chinese people and languages, 17, 30

55, 128, 148, 317
 

Christianity (see also Protestantism; 

Catholic Church), 18, 39, 118, 121–

142, 143, 146, 148, 149, 273, 281; 

tics, 269, 270; and religious tensions, 

328–29
 

Chūō Sangi-In (Central Advisory Cou

cicak (house lizard), xlviii 

Cikampek, 216
 

Cikarang, 216
 

Cilacap, 217
 

Cilegon, 169
 

Cimareme, Garut, 45
 

cinema, 129–30 

Cirebon, lvii, lix, 49
 

civil emergencies, 328
 

civil society, 115–17, 285
 

climate, 102–4 

Clinton, Hillary R., 303
 

Clinton, William J., 176
 

clothing, 129
 

cloves trade, 6, 19, 21, 24, 173, 206
 

coal industry, 212
 

416 
 

Cockroach Opera, 85 

Code of Criminal Law (1946), 359 

Code of Criminal Procedures (1981), li, 244, 

360–62 

Coen, J. P. (Jan Pieterzoon), 25 

coffee, 24, 30, 34, 82, 142, 145, 201, 321 

Cokroaminoto, Haji Umar Said (H. U. S.), 43, 

46, 57 

Cola, 12 

Cold War, 58, 66–67, 72, 83, 293, 302 

Commando Jihad. See Komando Jihad 

Commission for the Oversight of Business 

Competition (KPPU), 298 

Commission to Investigate Preparatory Measures for Independence (BPUPK), 52, 65 

Commission to Investigate Public Officials’ 

Wealth, 359 

Committee for the Preparation of the Constitution of the Unitary State, 232 

Committee of Good Offices, 57 

communal violence, 284–85, 318 

communism (komunisme; see also Indonesian Communist Party—PKI), 40, 66, 71, 

75, 84, 124, 142, 291, 314, 321 

Communist Association of the Indies (PKH; 

see also Indonesian Communist Party), 43 

Confrontation (Konfrontasi), 68, 289, 291, 

299, 315, 356 

Confucianism (agama Konghucu), 125, 126 

conglomerates. See business conglomerates 

Congo, Democratic Republic of (former 

Zaire), 290, 352 

Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), 65, 232 

constitution (1945), 53, 62, 65, 88, 231–33, 244, 

260; as amended (1999–2002), 88, 230, 281, 

286, 338; Fourth Amendment (2002), 243 

constitution (1950), 62–63, 231–32 

Constitutional Court, xlvi, li, lii, lvi, 88, 235, 

238, 240, 244, 264, 281, 286 

constitutional reform, 227, 247, 257, 273, 281, 

305, 320 

Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims 

(Masyumi), 52, 63, 64, 254, 259, 272 

Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), 191, 

288–89 

copper mining, 214 

corruption, xlvi–xlviii, liv, 61, 62, 84, 150, 172, 

204–5, 221, 228, 231, 246, 304–5, 362; in 

armed forces, 64, 283, 310, 319, 333–34; in 

bureaucracy, 79, 175–76, 253; in business, 79, 

87; in colonial period, 36; fight against, 179, 

274; in judicial system, 178, 24

police, 333; in politics, 76, 279 

Corruption Crimes Court (Tip

xlvi, xlvii, 179, 246, 359 

Corruption Eradication Commis

xlvi–xlvii, liv, 179 

Council of Generals, 69 

counterterrorism (see also Natio

Indonesia—Polri; terrorism), 22

30, 355–57 

coups d’état: attempted (1948

attempted (1965), 69–72, 122, 1

301, 315, 341, 347; attempted (

court system, 244–46, 358, 361–6

in the, 79, 118, 244–45, 358 

court, royal (kedatuan, keratuan, 

11 

Cribb, Robert B., 71 

crime (see also corruption), 30, 6

358, 359; crime rate, 359 

Crime Investigation Agency 

xlviii 

Criminal Code. See Code of C

(1946); Code of Criminal Proce

criminal justice system (see also c

358–63 

Crisis Management Initiative (CM

cukong (Chinese capitalists), 318 

Cultivation System (Cultuurstelse

“culture wars,” liii 

currency (see also rupiah), 16, 

174–75, 186, 187, 189; board o

national deposits of, 186 

custom, unwritten (adat), 39, 1

141, 253 

customary law (adat), 131, 244–4

dadia (patrilineal descent group), 

Daendels, Herman Willem, 29–30 

daerah (region), 184, 247 

daerah istimewa (special region), 

daerah khusus (capital-city region

Dahara, Radhas Panca, lvi 

Dahlan, Kiyai Haji Muhammad, 4

dakwah (vigorous promotion of 

262 

dalang (puppet master), 73 

dangdut (a pop music style), 84 

Danish Embassy (Jakarta), l 

Daoism (or Taoism), 125, 126, 14

Darul Islam (House of Islam), 58

234, 250, 261, 314, 317, 329 
 

 

datu (chief, chiefs), 8
 

Dayak people, 144–45, 254, 328
 

death, causes of, 159–60
 

debt, 175–77, 182–83, 186; foreign, 77, 166,
 

175, 182, 190
 

decentralization, xl, 86, 88, 111, 112, 151, 165, 

178, 181, 183–85, 194, 205, 228, 248, 255, 

281, 305
 

Decentralization Law (2001), 88
 

Decree No. 1 (1965), 69
 

Defenders of the Fatherland (Peta), 51, 312
 

defense industries, 337
 

defense spending, 310, 318, 332, 335–37
 

deforestation, lii, 105, 204–5
 

deliberation with consensus (musyawarah
 

mufakat), 64, 133
 

Demak, 18
 

Democracy Renewal Party (PDP), 267
 

Democrat Party (PD), xlvi, liv, 89, 242, 256,
 

263, 267–68, 278
 

Democratic People’s Party (PRD), 254
 

Democratic Republic of Germany. See East 

Germany 

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. See 

Timor-Leste
 

Denpasar, 219, 220
 

Department of Communications and Information, xlix, lv 

Department of Defense (Dephan), 319–20,
 

339; budget of, 310, 318; personnel of, 339; 

structure of, 320
 

Department of Defense and Security (Hankam), 319, 336
 

Department of Finance, 178
 

Department of Forestry, 204
 

Department of Health, 157, 159–60
 

Department of Home Affairs, li, 235, 247
 

Department of Industry, 167
 

Department of Information, 287
 

Department of Justice and Human Rights, lvi,
 

245, 360; Department of Corrections, 362
 

Department of National Education (Depdiknas), 150, 152
 

Department of Religion. See Department of Religious Affairs
 

Department of Religious Affairs, 123, 124,
 

142, 150
 

Department of Transport, 216
 

Depok, 112, 194, 274
 

desa (villages), 132
 

Desawarnaña [Nāgarakertāgama], 15 

Detachment 88, lix, 329, 357
 

Detachment 99, lix 

Development Unity Party (PPP), 75, 2

263, 267, 271–73, 278–81
 

Dewantara, Ki Hajar (Raden Mas 

Suryaningrat), 44–45, 48
 

dewaprabu (god-king), 14
 

Dhani, Omar, 69, 347
 

Dieng temples, 13
 

Dili, 82, 190, 300, 304, 322
 

Dimara, Johannes Abraham, lvii 

Diponegoro, Prince, 30–31, 33, 48
 

Directorate General of Radio, Televis

Film, 287
 

Discovery Channel, liii 

district chiefs, hereditary (uleëbalang)

district courts and governance, 245, 24

Dominicans, 122
 

Dong Son, 6
 

Douwes Dekker, Eduard (Multatuli), 

Douwes Dekker, Ernest François Eu

F. E.), 44
 

Douwes Dekker, Jan, 44
 

drugs, illegal, 333, 363
 

Duaji, Susno, xlviii, liv
 

dukun (traditional healer or healers), 1

159
 

Dulmatin, l 

Dumai, 217
 

Dutch Antilles, 56
 

Dutch colonial period, 20–27, 46–49, 1

149, 158, 321; conclusion of, 54–

312, 315
 

Dutch guilders, 36
 

Dutch language, 42
 

Dutch laws, 244–45, 358, 360
 

Dutch people, 33, 62
 

Dutch–Native Schools (HIS), 42
 

Dutch New Guinea, 251
 

Dutch Reformed Church, 122
 

Dutch Rhenish Mission, 122
 

dwifungsi (dual function), xli, 73, 76, 3

316, 320, 329
 

earliest habitation, 3–6
 

earthquakes, lii, lx, 101, 106, 279
 

East Asian Miracle, The, 174
 

East Germany, 336, 345
 

East India Company, 23, 25, 29
 

East Indies. See Netherlands East Indi

East Indonesia, 64
 

East Javanese kingdoms, 10
 

418 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

East Timor (see also Timor-Leste), xl, xlii, 

82–83, 86, 99, 105, 249–50, 255, 268, 295– 

96, 300, 304, 310, 321–23, 337, 343, 344, 

352, 354, 357 

East Timorese, 105, 295–96, 300 

Easter Island, 128 

Eastern Europe, 337 

Eastern Fleet. See Navy of the Republic of 

Indonesia (TNI–AL) 

economic development (pembangunan), 72, 

73, 76, 78, 165, 167 

economic reforms, 165, 172, 177–80 

economy (see also Asian financial crisis), lix, 

61–62, 68, 73, 83, 85, 87; Chinese in, 16–19, 

30, 39, 43, 149; in the Dutch colony, 30, 34– 

38; early commerce in the, 19, 21–22; government intervention in, 165, 166–67; growth in, 

77; at independence, 60; in the Japanese occupation, 50, 52; role of armed forces in, 310, 

332–34; the VOC in the, 23–30 

Ecstasy, 363 

education, 98, 150–56, 240, 305; availability of, 

152–53; in colonial period, 41–43, 51, 60; 

expenditure, 150, 180, 183; of girls, 151; 

higher, 154–56; Islamic, 150–51, 153–54; in 

kindergarten, 152; and literacy, 60, 150; policy, 

80; primary, 150–53; secondary, 151–53; and 

teachers, 151–52; vocational, 151 

Effendi, Sofian, 330 

eight-year development plan (1959), 166 

El Niño, 199 

election laws, 264, 272, 275, 278 

Election Oversight Commission (Panwaslu), 

279 

elections, xlii, xliii, xlvi, 73, 80, 230, 234, 259, 

264, 266–79, 305; in 1955, 60, 63; in 1971, 

75; in 1992, 266–67; in 1999, 86, 275–76; in 

2004, 89, 255, 269, 277–78; in 2009, 256, 

267–68, 276–77; local, 248, 251, 255, 275 

electric power, 220–21 

Elson, Robert E., 44 

Emmerson, Donald K., 76, 288 

employment patterns, 193, 198, 206, 209–10, 

215 

Ende, 48 

Eng, Pierre van der, 77 

environmental concerns (see also deforestation), 104–5, 214, 326; air pollution, 104; preindependence, 23, 25; water pollution, 104, 

107 

Ertsberg Mountain, 214 

Estrada, Joseph, 301 

Ethical Policy, 38–39 

Ethicists, 38–39, 41 

ethnic groups and languages, 127, 

257; Balinese, 137–38; Chin

conflict among, 83; Javanese, 

257–58; Madurese, 130; Mal

minorities, 142–50; Sumatran, 

danese, 130 

ethnic tensions, xl, 284–85, 317, 3

Eurasians, 33, 40, 43, 46–47, 55 

Europe, 19 

European Union (EU), 251; relati

207, 337; trade with, 191 

Europeans, 30, 39–41 

exclusive economic zone, 99, 202 

executive branch, 241–43 

exports, 64, 174, 180, 186–89, 1

201, 206, 210–12 

Facebook, xlviii, xlix 

Family Health International, 160 

family life, 109–10, 133–34, 159; 

on Kalimantan, 144; on Sulaw

on Sumatra, 139, 140 

family planning, 83, 98, 109, 180 

Far Eastern Economic Review, 1

Fasseur, Cees, 39 

Fatu Sinai (Pulau Batek), 105 

Fealy, Greg, 119 

Federal Republic of Germany. S

Federal Republic of 

Federal Republic of Indonesia (

62, 231, 247 

federalism, 56, 59, 80, 232, 234, 2

Federation of Malaysia. See Mala

Republic of 

“50 percent + 1 democracy,” xli, 

Finance Audit Board (BPK), 238

financial crisis. See Asian fin

(1997–98) 

Finland, 325 

fiscal year, 180 

fishing industry, 98, 202–4, 346 

five-year plan. See Repelita 

Flores, 34, 122 

Foja Mountains, lii 

food (see also nutrition), 129 

food processing, 165 

Ford Foundation, 159 

Ford Motor Company, liv 

foreign direct investment (FDI), 

212, 214, 302, 304 
 

 

Foreign Military Financing. See United States 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 

foreign reserves, 61
 

forest fires, 205, 279, 299
 

Forest Watch Indonesia, 204
 

forestry (see also deforestation), 98, 104, 147–
 

48, 204–5; illegal, 333
 

Fort Benning, 303
 

Fort Leavenworth, 303
 

France, 352, 354
 

Free Aceh Movement (GAM), liii, 81–82, 87,
 

89, 106, 139–40, 250–51, 263, 317, 324–26
 

“free-fight liberalism,” xli 

Free Papua Organization (OPM), 81, 87, 106,
 

148, 252, 297, 317, 326–28
 

Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, 81,
 

213–14, 327–28
 

Fretilin. See Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 

Friend, Theodore, 72
 

Front Pembela Islam. See Islamic Defenders’ 

Front 

Gadjah Mada University. See Universitas 

Gadjah Mada 

Gajah Mada, 14, 15
 

gamelan, 135, 136
 

Garuda, 233
 

Garuda Indonesia, 219, 317
 

Garut-Tasikmalaya region, 57
 

gas, natural, 78, 81, 165, 173, 212; liquefied 

(LNG), 173, 191, 206, 212
 

gas industry taxes, 181
 

Gatra, 288
 

General Elections Commission (KPU), xlvi, 

246–47, 275–76 

gengsi (status), 114
 

gerakan (movement or movements), 116
 

gerilya (guerrilla war), 58–59, 64–65, 313,
 

321
 

Gerindra Party (Great Indonesia Movement 

Party), 256, 268, 278, 280
 

Germany, Democratic Republic of (DDR; 

East Germany), 336, 345
 

Germany, Federal Republic of, 345, 354
 

Gesang, liii 

Gestapu (September 30 Movement), 69–72,
 

315
 

Gini index, liii, 78, 115, 196–97
 

Giyūgun, 312
 

Global FM Bali, 220
 

Global TV, 220
 

“global war on terrorism,” 88, 301 

gold mining, 210, 213–14
 

“The Golden Girls,” xlv
 

“Golden Triangle,” 363
 

Golkar Party, xlvi, l, 242, 255–56, 26

66, 267, 272, 278–79
 

Golongan Karya (Golkar—functional 

64, 74, 75, 264
 

gotong royong (politics of mutual 

tion), 64, 260
 

Gowa, 24
 

Grasberg Mountain mine, 214
 

Great Depression, 40
 

Great Indonesia Movement Party (

Party), 256, 268, 278, 280
 

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphe

Greater Indonesia, 53
 

Greater Sunda Islands, 99
 

Green Revolution, 199
 

Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 103
 

gross domestic product (GDP), liii, 61, 

165, 167, 176–77, 181–82, 184; ag

in, 193, 198; exports and, 188; ind

205–6
 

gross national product (GNP), 61, 332

guerrilla warfare, 58–59, 64–65, 313, 3

327, 334
 

Guided Democracy (demokrasi ker

xli, 63–66, 71, 73, 230, 232, 244, 26

Guided Economy, 66, 166–67
 

Guide to Realizing and Experiencing 

casila (P4), 75
 

Guinness, Patrick, 132
 

Gujarat, 16
 

Gumelar, Agum, 278
 

Gunung Kawi (Mount Kawi), 12
 

Gunung Merapi (Mount Merapi), 9, 9

Gunung Tambora, 101
 

Gus Dur. See Wahid, Abdurrahman
 

Gusmão, José Alexandre (Xanana), 82

gusti–kawula (lord–subject), 258
 

Guyana: passports, liv
 

H1N1 pandemic influenza, 160
 

H5N1 avian influenza, 160, 202, 303
 

Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B. J.), 83

167, 173, 176–79, 183, 209, 241–

249–50, 268, 275, 286, 295, 310, 3

336–37
 

hadis (hadith), 120
 

Hadiz, Vedi, 115
 

Hague, The, 45, 48, 58, 59
 

420 
 

 

hajj, 136
 

Hakka, 148
 

Halim Perdanakusuma Military Air Base, 69
 

Halmahera, 19, 52, 117, 118, 128
 

Hamengkubuwono X, Sultan, 249
 

Hamzah, Chandra, xlvii 

Hanoi, 292
 

Hanura Party (People’s Conscience Party),
 

256, 267, 268, 278, 280
 

Harian Rakjat, 70
 

Harimurti, Agus, 290
 

Harjoyudanto, Sigit. See Suharto, Sigit Harjoyudanto 

Harsono, Yuli, l 

Hartarto, 167
 

Harymurti, Bambang, 287
 

Hasanuddin Air Base, 349
 

Hatley, Barbara, 84
 

Hatta, Mohammad, lx, 47, 51, 53, 312; arrested,
 

48; as vice president, 54, 56, 58, 66
 

Hawk Television Indonesia (RCTI), 220, 287
 

Hawkins, Mary, 132
 

Hayam Wuruk (Rajasanagara), 14, 15
 

Haz, Hamzah, 89, 278, 280
 

health care, 156–61; challenges in, 159–61; 

government support for, 158, 180, 183; pharmaceuticals in, 160–61; resource distribution 

and, 157–58; sanitation and, 159; traditional, 

159
 

Heeren XVII (Seventeen Gentlemen), 23
 

Hefner, Robert, 124
 

Heider, Karl, 130
 

heiho (military auxiliaries), 312
 

heliports, 219
 

Helsinki, 325–26 

Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 250
 

Heroes’ Day (November 10), 56
 

Heryanto, Ariel, xlv 

Hezbollah (Party of God; see also Barisan 

Hisbullah), 229, 290
 

Hill, David T., 116
 

Hill, Hal, 206
 

Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, state cults, 8, 15,
 

16–18, 25
 

Hindu Dharma (Principles of Hinduism), 123
 

Hinduism, 8, 118, 123–25, 142; on Bali, 123–
 

24, 137; on Java, Shivaist, 9; temples of, 9,
 

13; varieties of, 143, 144
 

Hinduization, 7
 

Hirata, Andrea, 91
 

Hiroshima, 53
 

Hitler, Adolf, 49
 

Hitu, 24
 

Hoamoal, 24
 

Hokkien, 148
 

Hollandia (Jayapura), 52
 

hominids, 4–5 

homo erectus, 4
 

Hong Kong, 174, 207, 301
 

House of Representatives. See P

resentative Council (DPR) 

Howard, John, 300
 

hukum adat (adat laws), 131
 

human immunodeficiency virus/

mune deficiency syndrome (HIV

60
 

human rights, xliv, li, 88, 90, 25

283, 286, 303–4, 310, 317, 31

328, 337, 352
 

Hutomo Mandala Putra. See Suha

ibu (mother), 128
 

ijma (consensus of local Islam

dence), 120
 

ijtihad (exegesis), 282
 

“I Love Lucy,” xlv 

imports, 61–62, 168–69, 189, 191

income, 194–97; distribution, 

capita, lii 

independence, 53–54, 233, 312; 

53, 54; expectations of 60–61, 6

ment, 46–48, 51–53
 

Independence Day, l, 69, 288
 

Independence Preparatory Comm

independent state institutions, 246

India, xl, 54, 78, 293; influence 

with, 191
 

Indian Ocean, 16, 101, 128
 

Indianization, 7, 229
 

Indic concepts, 7, 9, 11
 

Indies (Indische in Dutch) culture

Indies Association (Indische Ver

47
 

Indies Party (Indische Partij), 44
 

Indies Social-Democratic Associa

43
 

indigo, 34
 

Indonesia, as name and idea, 44
 

Indonesia Menggugat! (Indonesi

46
 

Indonesia merdeka (free Indonesi

“Indonesia Raya” (Great Indones

Indonesia Stock Exchange, 172
 
 

 

Indonesian Association (Indonesische Vereeniging), 45 

Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA, 

or BPPN), 177–78 

Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), 266 

Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), 43, 45, 58, 64, 

66–69, 114, 254, 263, 265, 291, 301, 313–15, 

347; actions against, 70–72, 232, 259; in armed 

forces, 69; in elections, 63; Special Bureau of, 

70; support for, 230 

Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency 

(Indra), 177 

Indonesian Defense University, 344 

Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI), 75, 266– 

67 

Indonesian Democracy Party–Struggle (PDI– 

P), 242, 254–56, 263, 264, 266–67, 269, 

278–80 

Indonesian Forum for Environment, 204 

Indonesian identity, 3–4, 46–47, 52, 60, 66, 

73, 80, 98, 110–11, 130–32 

Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI), 53, 65 

Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), 63 

Indonesian Islamic Warriors’ Council (Majelis 

Mujahidin Indonesia), 119 

Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), 

278 

Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association 

(ICMI), 265–66 

Indonesian Nation of Islam (Bangsa Islam 

Indonesia), 317 

Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI; see 

also Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia—ABRI; Department of Defense—Dephan; 

and individual service branches), 56, 57–60, 

86, 243, 309, 312, 319, 328, 333–35, 344–50, 

363–64; business activities of, 310, 332–33, 

334; chain of command, 340–41; and civic 

action, 344; conditions of service, 349; corruption in, 333–34; education and training in, 343– 

44; funding for, 318–19, 333; matériel, 336–37, 

344–45; and military courts, 246, 362; personnel, 338–39, 344, 350–51, 353; readiness, 336– 

37, 347; reforms of, 310, 320–21; and political 

influence, 282–84; women in, 349–50 

Indonesian National Shipping Company 

(Pelni), 217 

Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), 46–48, 63, 

75, 265, 266 

Indonesian Naval Hydro-Oceanographic Office, 

98 

Indonesian People’s Bank (BRI), 166 

Indonesian Prosperous Workers’ Union 

196 

Indonesian socialism, 66 

“Indonesianization,” 62, 252, 297 

Indosat, 298 

Indosiar, 220 

Indrawati, Sri Mulyani, xlvii 

industry, 77, 205–10; development of, 

210; distribution of, 208; employmen

government enterprises in, 206, 207, 

import-substitution, 168–69, 172, 20

scale, 209–10 

infant mortality, 157 

inflation, 66, 77, 166, 170, 174, 186–

221 

informal sector, 111, 193, 215 

Information and Electronic Transact

(2008), liv 

inlanders (indigenous people, natives)

“In Search of a New Path” (1966), 73 

Institut Pertanian Bogor, 156 

Institut Teknologi Bandung, 156 

Inter-Governmental Group on I

(IGGI), 72, 190–91, 288 

internally displaced persons, 106, 1

296, 323 

International Court of Justice, 105 

International Criminal Police Orga

(Interpol), 363 

International Force in East Timor (

FET), 295–96, 300, 323 

International Institute for Managemen

opment, lii 

International Labour Organisation (IL

94, 197 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 

166, 175–77, 181, 187–88 

Internet, xlviii, xlix, l, lv, 98, 111, 1

296, 

Iran, 81, 229, 290, 304, 352 

Iraq, 229, 290, 300, 352 

Irham, Nazril (Ariel), xlix, liv–lv 

Irian Jaya. See Papua 

Irian Jaya Barat. See Papua Barat 

irrigation, 10, 11, 38, 138, 145, 198, 1

Iskandar Muda, Sultan, 22 

Islam (see also sharia), 16–18, 19, 21–2

53, 65, 76, 83, 90–91, 118–21, 131, 

education, 150–51, 153–54, 259; infl

116–17; kebatinan, 120–21, 125; a

casila, 261–62; political, 88, 258–60, 

422 
 

 

 

 

 

 

280–82; proselytizing, 22; radical, 117, 119, 

311, 317, 323, 328–29; role of, 232, 234, 364; 

Shia, 118–19; Sufism and, 121; Sunni, 118– 

19; traditional, 119 

Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII), 57 

Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam), 43, 45 

Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), 

271 

Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), lvii, lviii, 119, 

281 

Islamic Educational Movement (Perti), 271 

Islamic law (see also sharia), 244–45, 250, 

254, 273, 275, 281–82, 358 

Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), 58, 59 

Islamic Trade Association (Sarekat Dagang 

Islam), 43 

Islamic University Student Association (HMI), 

265–66 

Islamization, 18, 229 

Isma’il, Nur Mahmudi, 273–75 

Israel, 87, 290 

Iswahyudi Air Base, 349 

Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, 

and Bekasi), 112, 194, 206 

Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and 

Bekasi), 194 

Jak TV, 220 

Jakarta, 69–70, 128, 156, 157, 194, 220, 247, 

249, 274–75, 279, 347–48; bombings, l, 88, 

357; in colonial period, 24, 26, 31, 34; importance of, 63, 64, 290; pollution in, 104, 161, 

216; population of, 112–13; Stock Exchange, 

171–72, 329; transport links, 215–19; violence 

in 117–18, 227, 268, 280–81, 290, 300, 329 

Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta, June 1945), 

53, 65, 261, 281 

Jakarta Globe, 288 

Jakarta Initiative, 177 

Jakarta Message (1992), 290 

Jakarta News, 220 

Jakarta Post, xl, 288 

Jambi (Melayu), 14 

Japan, 9, 41, 174; aid from, 191, 293; exports 

to, 191, 210, 212, 302; imports from, 191, 

302; investment by, 76; relations with, 207, 

302–3 

Japanese Imperial Army, 50, 356; Sixteenth 

Army, 50; Twenty-fifth Army, 50 

Japanese Imperial Navy, 50 

Japanese wartime occupation, 48, 49–53, 133, 

312; conditions under, 61 

Java, 49–52, 54–59, 68, 77, 79, 

151, 158, 257–58, 329; agricult

200; climate on, 102–3; Dutch e

24, 27–29; early records of, 8–18

lii, 101; Japanese on, 312; and m

328; minerals on, 212; politics on

ulation issues on, 109, 132, 192

120, 122, 124; transport on, 215

ism on, 57–58, 314; volcanoes on

Java Bank, 185 

Java Sea, 212 

Java War (1825–30), 30–31, 33 

Javanese, 50–51, 126, 129, 257; la

134, 136; people, 111, 125, 1

252, 257 

Javanism (kejawen), 120, 136, 25

Jawa Barat, lviii, 101, 111, 117, 1

194, 234, 276 

Jawa Hōkōkai (Java Service Ass

54 

Jawa Tengah, lvii, 99, 124, 132, 1

211, 216, 269, 347 

Jawa Timur, 68, 115, 117, 124, 1

216, 269, 347, 349 

Jay, Robert, 132 

Jayakerta, 24 

Jayapura, 52, 253, 327 

Jayawijaya Mountains, 147 

Jemaah Islamiyah (Congregation 

lvii, 88, 117, 119, 275, 280, 28

30 

Jepara, 206 

Jesuits (Society of Jesus), 122 

Jews, 119, 273 

jihad, 31, 328 

jilbab (woman’s head scarf), l, 11

Jinarakkhita, Bhikku Ashin, 126 

JJFM (radio station), 220 

Johor, 298 

Joint Exercise (LatGap), 335 

Jonge, Bonafacius B. de (B. B.), 4

Joyohadikusumo, Sumitro, 64, 16

Juanda, 219 

Judicial Commission, 238, 245 

judicial system, 228, 244–46; refo

Justice Party (PK), 273–74, 281 

JW Marriott (hotel in Jakarta), l, 1

kabizu (patrilineal clan), 146 

kabupaten (regency), 112, 235, 24

kafir (pagan), 142 

Kaharingan, 124, 144, 146 
 

Kahin, George McTurnan, 231
 

Kahuripan, 12
 

Kai Islands, 34
 

kakawin (long narrative poem), 12
 

Kalimantan (see also Borneo), 86, 97, 99, 104,
 

143, 144–45, 215; agriculture on, 144, 199; in 

colonial period, 33; early records of, 8, 12, 14,
 

25; and environmental problems, 279; forestry 

on, 204–5; migration to, 144–45, 328; natural 

gas on, 81; oil industry on, 49, 211–12; religion on, 122; urbanization on 111; violence 

on, 117, 118, 227
 

Kalimantan Barat, 122, 126, 148, 284, 328
 

Kalimantan Tengah, 122, 126, 328
 

Kalimantan Timur, 105, 113, 158, 184, 206, 212, 

217
 

Kalla, Muhammad Yusuf, xxxix, xlii, xlvi,
 

242, 264, 266, 268, 278–79, 285, 329
 

Kamaruzaman,“Syam,” 70
 

kampung (village), 127
 

Karimun, 207
 

Karo, lx 

Karo Batak, 124, 140
 

Kartini, Raden Ajeng (R. A.), 41
 

Kartosuwiryo, Sekarmaji Marijan (S. M.), 57–
 

58
 

kartu tanda penduduk (national identity card), 

110
 

Kasogatan Buddhism, 120, 121
 

kebatinan (mysticism), 120–21, 125, 258, 259
 

kebaya (blouse), 129
 

kebudayaan Indonesia (culture of Indonesia),
 

132
 

kecamatan (subdistrict), 247
 

kedatuan, keratuan, or keraton (royal court),
 

11
 

Kediri, 12, 14, 15, 18
 

Kedu Plain, 9
 

Keeler, Ward, 133
 

kejawen (Javanism), 120, 136, 258
 

kemerdekaan (freedom), 45
 

Kendari, 49
 

Kenpeitai, 50
 

kepercayaan (faiths), 120–21 

Kepulauan Riau (see also Riau Archipelago), 

212, 214
 

keris (asymmetrical dagger), liii 

Kertanagara, 14
 

Kertarajasa (reign name of Raden Wijaya), 14
 

Khmer Rouge, 302
 

Khmers (Cambodians), 292
 

Kia, 174
 

kiai (Muslim scholar) 120, 121
 

Kiemas, Taufik, 267
 

klandestin (clandestine apparatus), 32

Klungkung, 34
 

ko or non-ko (cooperative or not), 46
 

Koiso Kuniaki, 52
 

Komando Jihad (Commando Jihad) 3

Kompas (Jakarta) 287
 

komunisme. See communism 

Konfrontasi. See Confrontation 

Konstituante. See Constituent Assemb

Ko-Op. See Air Force of the Republic 

nesia (TIN–AU) 

Kopassandha. See Army of the Rep

Indonesia (TNI–AD) 

Korea, Democratic People’s Repu

(DPRK, North Korea), 294
 

Korea, Republic of (South Korea), 

191, 207, 212, 337, 345, 347, 349
 

Korean Peninsula, 229, 290
 

Korean War (1950–53), 61
 

kota or kotamadya (municipality), 1

247–49
 

Krakatau, 101
 

Krakatau Steel, 169, 173
 

kretek cigarettes (clove-scented), 12

206
 

kraton (royal court), 12, 249
 

Kriangsak Chomanan, 292
 

krupuk (fried shrimp- or fish-flavore

129
 

Kshatriya (ruler-warrior caste, satriya 

nesian), 124, 137
 

Kuala Lumpur, 216
 

Kudus, 206
 

Kuncoro-Yakti, Dorojatun, 177, 182
 

Kuta, 137, 154, 280, 329
 

Kutai, 8
 

Kuwait, 352
 

Laakso-Taagepera Index, 254, 263
 

labor force (see also employment p

192–93 

ladang (dryland, nonirrigated), 198
 

Lais, Sultan Abu, of Ternate, 21
 

Lakalena, Melki, lvi 

Lampung, 201
 

Lamreh, 16
 

land or realm (bhumi), 11
 

language, 128–29, 134–36 

Laos, 290, 321, 363
 

laskar (militia forces), 57, 58, 312
 

424 
 

 

 

 

 

Laskar Jihad, 281, 284–85, 328
 

Laskar Pelangi (Rainbow Warriors), 91
 

Law 22 (1999), 183–84 

Law 25 (1999), 183–84 

Lawangan, 144
 

League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), 266
 

Leahy Amendment, 304
 

Lebanon, 290, 318, 352
 

Leiden, 45
 

Leifer, Michael, 289
 

Leimena, Johannes, lvii 

lembaga swadaya masyarakat. See nongovernmental organizations 

Lesser Sunda Islands. See Nusa Tenggara 

Letter of Instruction of March 11 (Supersemar), 

72
 

Lev, Daniel S., 232
 

Lhokseumawe, 81, 212
 

Liberal Islam Network (JIL), 282
 

Libya, 81, 250
 

Liem Sioe Liong, 169
 

life expectancy, 77, 107, 157
 

literacy, 42, 60, 150
 

Ligitan Islands, 105 

Linggajati Agreement (1946), 56
 

Li Peng, 302
 

liquefied natural gas (LGN). See gas, natural 

Lisbon, 321
 

livestock, 202
 

local government, 184, 247–50, 255
 

logging. See forestry 

Lombok, 34, 137
 

Lombok Strait, 102
 

lower classes, 83, 111, 114–15, 157
 

Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole), 69
 

Lubis, Zulkifli, 64
 

Lumpur Sidoarjo (Lusi) mud volcano, lii, 101,
 

279,
 

Lutherans, 122
 

Maanyan, 144
 

Maarif, Ahmed Syafii, lviii 

Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, 301
 

Madagascar, 128
 

Madiun Affair, 58, 313
 

madrasah (madrassa), 121, 154
 

Madura, 14, 25, 56, 99, 109, 130, 215; agriculture on, 199; migration from, 328
 

Madurese people and language, 128, 130, 145,
 

284, 328
 

Magelang, 338, 343
 

Mahabharata (Great Battle of the 

of Bharata), 124
 

Mahayana Buddhism, 9
 

Mahmud, Malik, 106
 

Mahmud, Sultan, of Melaka, 18
 

Maitreya Buddhism, 126
 

Majapahit, 14–16, 18, 48, 137
 

Majapahit Park (Taman Majapah

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indon

Warriors’ Council), 119
 

Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat

People’s Consultative Assembl

Makassar (formerly Ujungpanda

217, 343, 347, 349
 

Makassarese (Gowa), 24, 26
 

Malacca, Strait of. See Strait of M

Malaka, Tan. See Tan Malaka 

Malari riots, 76
 

Malay language, 47, 97, 128
 

Malay Peninsula, 8, 14, 15, 18, 53

Malay people, 130, 205, 252, 328

Malay/Indonesian language, 9, 15

Malaya, 68
 

Malaysia, Federal Republic of, lii

99, 101, 158, 161, 174, 201, 2

288, 300, 329, 363; Confrontatio

291; economy of, lii; Ministry o

liii; relations with, 72, 105, 298–

Malino I (for Poso), 285
 

Malino II (for Ambon), 285
 

Maluku, lvii, 158, 281, 284, 324, 

Maluku Islands (or the Moluccas), 

19, 24, 34, 49, 52, 60, 86, 99, 34

102–3; language on, 128; relig

violence on, 117, 227
 

Manado, 119, 220
 

Manado Tua, 103
 

Mandailing, 140
 

Mandan, Arief Mudatsir, 280
 

Mandar, Sultan, of Ternate, 24
 

Mangkunegaran, 27
 

Mangunkusumo, Cipto, 44
 

Manila, 216, 301
 

Manipol (Political Manifesto), 65

Manokwari, 346, 347
 

manufacturing, 61, 77, 188–89, 1

for export, 206, 207
 

Mansur, Sultan, of Tidore, 21
 

Marcos, Ferdinand, 300
 

Marriott. See JW Marriott 

marga (patrilineal descent group)

marble, 82
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

marhaen (ordinary person), 46
 

marijuana, 333, 363
 

marine corps (see also Navy of the Republic
 

of Indonesia (TNI–AL), 338, 346
 

Marshall Plan, 58
 

martial law, 64, 87, 106, 232, 250–51, 314,
 

324
 

Marxism-Leninism, 43, 45, 46, 264
 

Mass Guidance System (Bimas), 199
 

Mataram, 9–12, 22, 25–28, 31
 

Max Havelaar, 36
 

“McGyver,” xlv 

Mecca, 136
 

Medan, 217, 219, 250
 

media, 66, 86, 90, 98, 111, 116, 130, 286–88,
 

310, 316, 364; censorship of, xliii, 66, 126, 

309, 321
 

Medina Charter, 273
 

“Mega–Bintang” campaign, 272
 

Megawati. See Sukarnoputri, Megawati 

Melaka (Malacca), 15, 18, 22–23
 

Melanesians, 252, 257
 

Melayu (Jambi), 14
 

Melayu Banjar, 130
 

Mentawai Islands, lx 

menyelusuri sejarah (to straighten out history),
 

4
 

merantau (practice of going away temporarily 

or permanently), 112, 139, 141
 

Merauke, 327
 

merdeka (freedom), 45, 46
 

Merpati Nusantara Airlines, 219
 

Metro TV, 220
 

middle classes, xlv, 48, 51, 68, 83–84, 115
 

Middle East, 228
 

migration, 112–14, 133, 139, 141, 143, 144–45,
 

205, 252, 284, 326–27, 328
 

Miharja, Akhdiat, lx 

Military District Command (Kodim), 344
 

military courts, 246, 361–62 

military law (2004), 320, 339
 

military regional commands (Kodams), 283,
 

334, 341, 344
 

Military Resort (or Garrison) Command 

(Korem), 344
 

Military Subdistrict Command (Koramil), 344
 

militia forces (laskar), 57, 58, 312, 323, 343,
 

354
 

Milone, Pauline D., 112
 

Mimika, 327
 

Minahasa Students’ Association (Studerende 

Vereniging Minahasa), 44
 

Minangkabau, 33, 45, 128; people 

140–42
 

Mindanao, 301
 

Ming Dynasty, 16, 19
 

mineral industries, 210–14 

mining, 148; coal, 212; copper, 214; go

14; illegal, 333; nickel, 214; tin, 212, 

Ministry of Colonies (Dutch), 31
 

Minke, 41
 

Misbach, Mohamad (Red Haji), 45
 

Mohammad, Gunawan, 78, 282
 

Moluccas. See Maluku Islands 

Mongolia, 294
 

Mongols, 14, 16
 

monsoons, 102–3 

Moody’s Corporation, lix 

Mook, Hubertus Johannes van (H. J.), 

Morotai, 52
 

Mountbatten, Earl Louis, 55
 

Mount Kawi (Gunung Kawi), 12
 

Mount Merapi (Gunung Merapi), lx, 9

Mount Sinabung, lx 

Mount Tambora (Gunung Tambora), 

MTV Indonesia, 220
 

Muhammad (Prophet), 120, 273
 

Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muh

lviii, 43, 48, 51, 91, 116–17, 259, 2

282, 286
 

Muis, Abdul, 43
 

Multatuli. See Douwes Dekker, Eduar

Mulyani, Sri, xlvii 

Mulyasari, Prita, xlviii–xlix, lv 

municipality (kotamadya or kota), 1

247–49
 

Murtopo, Ali, 74, 81
 

Musi River, 8
 

Muslims (see also Islam), 30, 136; politi

75, 254, 258–60, 268–75; in populat

and religious tensions, 137, 144, 281, 

328
 

Muslim Party of Indonesia (PMI), 271

Muso, 58
 

musyawarah mufakat (deliberation w

sensus), 64, 133, 260
 

mutual cooperation (gotong royong), 6

Muzadi, Hasyim, 278
 

Myanmar. See Burma 

Myristica fragrans, 19
 

Nāgaratertāgama [Desawarnaña], 15

Nagasaki, 53
 

426 
 

Nahdlatul Ulama (Council of Scholars; see 

also Ansor), lviii–lix, 43, 51, 63, 68, 71, 86,
 

116–17, 254, 259, 263, 268–72, 282, 286
 

Namaliu, Rabbie, 297
 

Namibia, 352
 

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD; see also
 

Aceh, Special Region of), 420
 

Napoleon, 29
 

Nasution, Abdul Haris, 58, 64, 66, 69, 84,
 

313–14
 

National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas; see also Air Force of the Republic of
 

Indonesia (TIN–AU), 341
 

National Awakening Party (PKB), 117, 255–
 

56, 263, 268–70, 272, 278–80
 

National Committee for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 

(Komnas FBPI), 160
 

National Day. See Independence Day 

National Defense Institute, 330
 

National Development Planning Board (Bappenas), 166, 243
 

National Electric Company (PLN), 220
 

National Family Planning Coordinating Agency 

(BKKBN), 243
 

National Front, 255–56, 279
 

National Human Rights Commission, 255
 

National Intelligence Agency (BIN), 354–55 

National Intelligence Coordinating Board (Bakin),
 

75, 354
 

National Logistical Supply Organization, (Bulog),
 

199
 

National Mandate Party (PAN), 256, 263, 270–
 

71, 272, 278–80
 

national medium-term development plan (NMDP),
 

180
 

National Police of Indonesia (Polri), 243, 314, 

317, 319, 355–58, 361, 363–64; corruption 

and, xlvii, 79, 333; counterterrorism and, l–li, 

329, 357; Detachment 88, 357; ethnic violence and, 328; Explosive Ordnance Devices 

Unit, 357; Mobile Brigade, 356–57; National 

Police Academy, 357; personnel, 355; Polda 

Metrojaya, 355; Police Command and Staff 

School, 357–58; Regional Police (Polda), 

355–56; Sea and Air Police, 356; training of, 

357–58; women in, 349, 356
 

National Resiliency Institute (Lemhanas), 343–
 

44
 

National Revolution (1945–49), xl, 54–60, 62,
 

64, 71, 73, 345, 350, 356
 

National Son Timor (TPN), 174, 176
 

nationalism (nasionalisme), 3, 40

53, 56, 66, 247, 258, 289, 298
 

“Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism

Nationalism and Revolution in In

nationalization, 62, 332–33 

Natsir, Mohammad, 64
 

Natuna Islands, 81, 212, 335, 3

field in, 81
 

Navy of the Republic of Indones

see also marine corps), 345–4

structure, 340–41; education an

343; fleets of, 341, 346; ranks a

350–51, 353; matériel, 336, 345; 

338, 346; ships of, 345; women i

Nazar, Muhammad, 251
 

Nazaruddin, Muhammad, liv 

Netherlands, 29, 58–60; aid from, 

nial power, 31–49, 321; debt t

prises of, 23, 332; relations with, 

345, 354
 

Netherlands East Indies, 23, 30–3

Netherlands Indies Civil Administr

55
 

Netherlands Indies Criminal Cod

Netherlands Trading Association 

Netherlands–Indonesian Union, 5

“new emerging forces,” 288
 

New Guinea, 34, 53, 99
 

New Order (see also Suharto), xli, 

liii, lvi, 3, 72–88, 111, 130, 131, 

229, 231, 247, 250, 258, 259, 264

286–88, 315–19; characteristics of

corruption under, 244, 274, 287; ec

77, 206–7, 210; and Pancasila, 

under, 118, 124–26; resistance to, 2

New Paradigm (Paradigma Baru)

New People’s Army, 301
 

newspapers, 287–88 

New Zealand, 352
 

Ngaju Dayak, 144
 

Ngandong, 4
 

Ngurah Rai, 219
 

Nias, 101
 

Nichiren Buddhism, 126
 

nickel mining, 214
 

Nielsen Indonesia, 130
 

Nigeria, 78
 

Nine Saints (wali songo), 17
 

Nitisastro, Wijoyo, 77, 166, 167
 

Nobel Peace Prize, 251
 

Nonaligned Movement, 66–67, 2
 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs; in 

Indonesia, LSM or ornop), 115, 285–86, 299 

Nood Universiteit (Emergency University), 

156 

North Borneo (Sabah), 291, 300 

North Korea. See Korea, Democratic People’s 

Republic of 

Nucleus People’s Estate (PIR), 201 

Nugraha, Yudhistira Ardhi, 84 

nusantara (archipelago), 15 

Nusa Tenggara (Lesser Sunda Islands), 99, 

103, 122, 128 

Nusa Tenggara Barat, lvii, 101, 157 

Nusa Tenggara Timur, 99, 106, 117, 122, 145, 

158, 295–96, 322 

nutmeg, 19, 24 

nutrition, 77 

“100 percent Independence” (Seratus Persen 

Merdeka), 56 

Obama, Barack H., lx, 303–4; “New Beginning” speech (2009), lx 

oil industry, 49, 61, 78, 82, 143, 148, 165, 167– 

69, 173, 191, 206; pipelines, 212; prices and 

taxes, 180–83, 211, 221; production, 210–11 

“old established forces,” 288 

Old Order (see also Sukarno), lvi, 72, 81, 231, 

266, 289 

one people/nation (satu bangsa), 47 

one unifying language (bahasa persatuan), 47 

Ong Keng Yong, 192 

Onishi, Norimitsu, xlv 

Opelet microbus, 216 

Operational Command for the Restoration of 

Security and Order (Kopkamtib), 71, 75 

opium trade, 34 

orang kaya (merchant elite), 22 

orang laut (sea people), 9 

ornop. See nongovernmental organizations 

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 

289 

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC), 210, 212 

Outer Islands, 38, 79, 99, 115, 152–53, 157–58, 

202, 314 

P4 (Guide to Realizing and Experiencing the 

Pancasila), 75 

Pacific Ocean, 128, 312 

Pacific TV, 220 

Padang, 101; earthquake (2009), 279 

Padri Wars (1821–37), 33 

Paiton, 221 

Pakpahan, Muchtar, 196 

Pakpak, 140 

Pakualaman, 27, 30, 44 

Pakubuwana II, 27 

Palakka, Arung, 24 

Palapa (communications satellites), 1

20 

Palembang, 8, 16 

Palestinians, 229 

Pallava script, 8, 9 

palm-oil plantations, 104, 199–201 

Panca Holding, 169 

Pancasila (five principles), xliii, xliv

52–53, 65, 74, 76, 84, 98, 110, 117, 1

231, 233, 260–62, 266; constitution a

democracy and, 316; indoctrination 

151, 261–62, 330; Pancasila Democ

256; Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pa

281; political parties and, 263, 272 

Pangandaran, 279 

panglima (commander), 350 

pangreh praja (rulers of the realm), 

41–43, 51 

Paniai, 327 

panitia kerja (working committee—

237 

panitia khusus (special committee—

237 

Panji tales, 15 

Panwaslu. See Election Oversight C

sion 

paper, 168 

Papua, lii, 19, 34, 46, 52, 86, 99, 103, 

158, 159–60, 214, 219, 249–53, 2

326–28, 352; armed forces on, 343, 

estry on, 204; languages and people 

128, 147–48, 149, 214, 250, 252; m

and, 113; natural resources on, 184, 2

and separatism on, 106–7, 310, 317, 3

religion on, 122 

Papua Barat, 99, 122, 158, 206, 2

252–53, 326, 328, 346 

Papua New Guinea, 99, 253, 296–98, 3

Papuan People’s Council (MRP), 252

Paramadina Foundation, 90 

Paregreg War (1401–5), 16 

Paris International Conference on Ca

Final Act of the (October 23, 1991), 

Parkindo. See Indonesian Christian Pa

Partai Gerindra. See Gerindra Party 

Partai Golkar. See Golkar Party 

428 
 

Partai Katolik. See Catholic Party 

Partindo. See Indonesian Party 

Party of the Masses (Partai Murba), 266
 

Pasai, 15
 

pasca sarjana (postgraduate degree), 155
 

Pasisir, 16, 26–27 

Pasuruan, 216, 284
 

Patek, Umar, lvii 

Pearl Harbor, 41, 49
 

peci (black felt cap), 129
 

Pekanbaru Air Base, 349
 

pembangunan (economic development), 72
 

pemuda (young men), 52, 53, 55–56
 

Pemuda Pancasila, 281
 

penghulu (headman), 141
 

People’s Conscience Party (Hanura Party),
 

256, 268, 278, 280
 

People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), liv,
 

74, 87, 88, 179, 234–35, 240–41, 257, 271,
 

274, 276, 364; elections for, 255; and president’s role, 227
 

Peoples’ Council (Volksraad), 38
 

People’s Representative Council (DPR), liv,
 

74, 117, 180, 234–41, 244–47, 254, 255–56,
 

257, 263, 264, 272, 274, 276, 278–79, 318,
 

320, 333
 

People’s Republic of China. See China, People’s Republic of 

People’s Security Forces (BKR), 312
 

peranakan (native-born Chinese with some 

Indonesian ancestry), 149
 

Perbuddhi (Perhimpunan Buddhis Indonesia),
 

125
 

pergerakan (movement for freedom from
 

Dutch rule), 45
 

Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association), 47
 

perjuangan (the struggle), 313
 

Permesta, 64–65, 234, 259, 314
 

Persatuan Perjuangan. See Struggle Coalition 

perserikatan (associations), 116
 

Pertamina (State Oil and Gas Mining Company, 

or State Oil Company), 79, 169, 173, 211–12
 

Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia (Walubi),
 

126
 

pesantren (Islamic school), 120, 153–54, 259
 

Petition of 50 (1980), 76
 

Petrus (mysterious killings, or shootings, campaign), 317
 

Pham Van Dong, 292
 

Philippines, the, l, lii, 11, 50, 61, 78, 158, 161,
 

219, 291, 312, 346; relations with, 300–301
 

Phnom Penh, 292
 

Piagam Jakarta. See Jakarta Chart

Pikiran Rakyat, 287
 

Piper nigrum (black pepper), 19, 

piracy, 345 

pisis or picis (Chinese copper and 

16
 

plantations, 57, 198; coffee, 30; 

palm-oil, 104, 199–201; rubber, 

Playboy, 281
 

plywood exports, 173, 189, 205
 

poaching, 202, 345
 

Polda Metrojaya, 355
 

police. See National Police o

(Polri) 

political culture, 253–62, 282–84 

Political Intelligence Service (PID

Political Manifesto (Manipol), 65

political parties (see also under in

ties), 254–56, 263–75; and finan

polling, xlviii 

pollution, 104–5, 107, 111, 148, 1

Polonia, 219
 

polygamy, 110
 

pondok pesantren (traditional board

117
 

Pontianak, 148
 

population, 62, 107–9, 132, 229; 

107; density, 97, 109; growth, 10

and life expectancy, 107; project

111, 113–14, 132; urban, 111–13

Port Moresby, 297
 

ports, 217–18 

Portugal, 82, 295, 321; early invo

18, 19–22, 122
 

Portuguese Timor (see also East 

295
 

Poso, 284–85, 328–29 

postal services, 219
 

posyandu (service post or posts), 

poverty, lii, 77–79, 85, 111, 15

197, 221, 326
 

Prambanan, 9, 11
 

Prambors, 220
 

Prapañca, Mpu, 15
 

Prawiranegara, Syafruddin, 64
 

prehistory, 3–6 

Presidential Advisory Council, 24

Priangan, 130
 

pribumi (indigene), 115, 166, 16

260, 266
 

prisons, 362–63 
 

priyayi (Javanese elite), 36, 41–44, 51, 258; 

Serikat Priyayi (Priyayi Association), 42
 

propinsi (province), 235, 247–49 

Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), lv, 255–56,
 

263, 273–75, 278
 

Protestantism, 121, 122, 144
 

Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly 

(MPR(S)), 72
 

P. T. Freeport-Indonesia. See Freeport-McMoRan 

Copper and Gold 

P. T. PAL, 333, 337, 347
 

P. T. Pindad, 337
 

public opinion, xlviii, liv, lvii, lviii
 

Pulau Batek (Fatu Sinai), 105
 

pungutan liar (pungli; illegal levies), 359
 

puppetry, liii, 15, 124, 136
 

puputan (ritual suicides), 34
 

Puranas (Sanskrit cosmogonic histories), 123
 

Purwokerto, 158
 

pusaka (sacred heirlooms), 258
 

puskesmas (community health centers), 157–
 

59
 

qiyas (reasoning through analogy), 120
 

Quran, 120–21, 136, 153
 

Quranic study groups, 273
 

racism, 39–41, 46–47, 117
 

radio stations, 220, 287
 

Raffles, Thomas Stamford, 29–30 

railroads, 216–17 

rainfall, 102–3 

Rais, Amien, 270–71, 278, 280, 286, 298
 

Rajasanagara (Hayam Wuruk), 14
 

Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI; Hawk 

Television), 220, 287
 

rakai or rakryan (leaders of local communities 

in Mataram), 9
 

rakyat (the people), 285
 

Ramadan, liv, lviii, 98
 

Ramayana (Rama’s Journey, or The Travels
 

of Rama), 124
 

Ramos, Fidel, 301
 

Ranai Air Base, 349
 

rarabuku (family), 142
 

Ratu Adil (just king), 31
 

Red Haji. See Mohamad Misbach 

Reform Star Party (PBR), 255–56, 273
 

reformasi, xli, xliv, 86–90, 111, 270–72, 280,
 

283, 286, 319 

Reformasi Bloc, 274
 

refugees. See internally displaced persons 

regency, regencies (kabupaten), 112, 2

regents (bupati), 185, 228, 247–48, 25

region (daerah), 184, 247
 

“regional autonomy policy,” 247
 

Regional People’s Representative 

(DPRD), 246, 248–49, 276–77 

Regional Police (Polda), 355–56 

Regional Representative Council (DP

234, 238–41, 246, 276–77
 

Reid, Anthony, 60
 

religion (agama), 66, 68, 118–26, 240

religious courts, 245
 

religious tensions, xl, 83, 118, 328–29

Rendra, W. S., liii 

Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun. S

lita 

Renville Agreement (1948), 57
 

Repelita (five-year plan), 77, 79, 180
 

Repelita I (1969–73), 157, 166, 180
 

Repelita V (1989–93), 79, 180
 

Repelita VI (1994–98), 180
 

Republic of Indonesia, 60
 

Republic of Indonesia Institute for Hig

cation (BPTRI), 156
 

Republic of Korea (South Korea). Se

Republic of 

Republic of South Maluku (RMS), 

314
 

Research in Motion, lv 

Revolution. See National Revolution 

Revolutionary Council, 69, 70
 

Revolutionary Front for an Independ

Timor (Fretilin), 82, 295–96, 316, 3

Revolutionary Government of the Rep

Indonesia (PRRI), 65, 234, 259
 

Rhenish Mission, 122
 

Riantiarno, Nobertus (Nano), 85
 

Riau (see also Kepulauan Riau Pr

113, 140, 148, 206, 217, 298, 349
 

Riau Archipelago (or Riau Islands), 2

rice, 34, 61, 68, 129, 138, 139, 142, 1

99; harvest, 133; price of, 198; plant

self-sufficiency in, 83
 

Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Jakarta, l, 281
 

Riyanto, Bibit Samad, xlvii 

roads, 215–16 

Robison, Richard, 115
 

Rodgers, Susan, 140
 

Roman Catholic Church, 82, 121–23, 

rōmusha (manual workers), 50–51 

ronda malam (night watch), 133
 

Roosa, John, lvi 

430 
Roti, 122
 

Round Table Agreement (1949), 59, 61
 

Round Table Conference (1949), 59, 80
 

Royal Dutch Company for Exploration of 

Petroleum Reserves in the Netherlands Indies, 

211
 

Royal Dutch Shell, 211
 

Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), 33,
 

49, 312
 

rubber, 61, 201; export of, 199; plantations, 37
 

Rukmana, Siti Hardiyanti. See Suharto, Tutut 

rukun kampung (village mutual assistance association), 132
 

rukun tetangga (neighborhood association),
 

132
 

rupiah (Rp), xl, lix, 85, 168, 172, 174–76, 186–
 

88, 189
 

Russia (see also Soviet Union), xl, 293, 337,
 

347
 

rural life, 133, 195, 198, 209, 358
 

rust en orde (tranquility and order), 33
 

Sabah (formerly North Borneo), 291, 300
 

sabar (patient), 151
 

Sabirin, Syahril, 179
 

Sahilatua, Franky, lx 

Sahul Shelf, 4, 99
 

Sailendra, 9
 

Salafism, 119
 

Salim Group, 168
 

Samanhudi, 43
 

Sambas District, 284, 328
 

Sampit, 328
 

sandalwood, 82, 321
 

Sang Hyang Adi Buddha, 126
 

Sanghyang Kamahayanikan, 123
 

Sangiran, 4
 

sanitation, 161
 

Sanjaya, 9, 12
 

Sanskrit, 7–8, 124
 

Santa Cruz Massacre (1991), 82, 304, 322
 

santri (orthodox Muslims), 120, 136, 259, 271
 

Sape Strait, 102
 

Sarasamuccaya, 123
 

Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association), 43
 

Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), 43, 45
 

sarjana (academic degree), 55–56 

saroan (village work group), 143
 

sate (small pieces of meat roasted on a skewer),
 

129
 

Satelindo, 220
 

Saudi Arabia, 119
 

sawah (wetland, irrigated), 198
 

Sawito Affair, 76
 

Schneebaum, Tobias, 147
 

School for Training Native Doctor

42–43, 44
 

School for Training Native Gove

cials (OSVIA), 42–43 

schools (see also education), 42, 

120, 150–54
 

Sea and Air Police, 356
 

Security Disturbance Movement 

sekolah desa (vernacular villa

schools), 42
 

Selamat Pagi Indonesia (Good M

nesia, TV program), 130
 

Selat Malaka. See Strait of Malac

selendang (item of attire), 129
 

semangat (charisma), 11
 

Semarang, 45, 216, 217, 347, 357

Semaun, 43
 

Sembiring, Tifatul, xlix, l, lv 

Sen, Krishna, 116
 

Senate. See Regional Representat

September 30 Movement. See Ge

Seputar Indonesia (Around Indon

gram), 130
 

Seram, 98
 

Serikat Priyayi (Priyayi Associati

Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (SBI), 1

service sector, 165, 196, 214–15
 

shadow puppet theater (wayang k

sharia (syariah in Indonesian), lvi

120–21, 141, 153, 227, 358; i

lviii, 326 

Shastri, Pandit, 123
 

Shell, 211
 

Shia, Shiite, 118–19 

shipping, 217–19 

Shivaist Hinduism, 9
 

Shudra (commoner-servant, sudr

sian), 124, 137
 

Siam (see also Thailand), 40
 

Sidoarjo mud volcano. See Lum

(Lusi) mud volcano 

SIJORI (Singapore, Johor, Riau), 

Siliwangi Division, 58
 

Simalungun, 140
 

Sinai Peninsula, 352
 

Sinar Indonesia Baru, 288
 

sinetron (television drama or dram
 

 

 

Singapore, liii, 50, 68, 101, 158, 174, 216, 217, 

219, 279, 294, 301, 329, 336, 363; exports
 

to, 191, 299; relations with, 105, 191, 207,
 

298–99, 346, 349
 

Singhasari, 12, 14
 

sini or sana (here or there), 46–47 

Sipadan Islands, 105
 

Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana. See Suharto, Tutut 

Siti Hediati Hariyadi. See Suharto, Titiek 

Situbondo, 117
 

slametan (religious feast), 136
 

slave trade, 34, 142
 

smuggling, 64, 345–46 

Sneevliet, Hendrik, 43
 

social class and status, 40–42, 46, 48, 51, 60,
 

83, 84, 114–15; and language, 134, 136
 

Socialist Republic of Vietnam. See Vietnam 

Solo. See Surakarta 

Somalia, 352
 

Sonara, 220
 

Soputan, 99
 

South China Sea, 212, 293, 299, 335, 349
 

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of 

Soviet Union (USSR; see also Russia), 83,
 

248, 284, 302, 335; relations with, 67–68,
 

354
 

Spain, colonial relations with, 21
 

special committee (panitia khusus or pansus),
 

237
 

Special Region of Aceh. See Aceh, Special 

Region of 

Special Region of Nanggru. See Nanggroe 

Aceh Darussalam; Aceh, Special Region of 

Special Region of Yogyakarta. See Yogyakarta 

specialized agencies, 243
 

spice trade, 16, 18, 21, 24, 35
 

Spratly Islands, 293, 335
 

Sri Lanka, 7
 

Srivijaya, 8–12 

Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (Stanvac),
 

211
 

Standard and Poor’s, lix 

Star and Moon Party (PBB), 278, 281
 

State Institute for Islamic Religion (IAIN),
 

156
 

State Muslim University (UIN), 156
 

State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company 

(Pertamina; State Oil Company), 79, 169, 173,
 

211–12
 

“straighten out history” (menyelusuri sejarah),
 

4
 

Strait of Malacca (Selat Melaka), 9, 1

303, 346
 

Struggle Coalition (Persatuan Perjuan

Suara Merdeka, 287
 

subak (agricultural society), 138
 

subdistricts (kecamatan), 247
 

Subianto, Prabowo, xlii, xlvi, 84, 2

268, 278, 283
 

subpuskesmas (health subcenters), 157

subsidies, 90
 

Sucipto, Widodo Adi, 332
 

Sudan, 290
 

Sudarsono, Yuwono, 320
 

Sudharmono, 265
 

Sudirman, 84, 313
 

Sudirohusodo, Wahidin, 43
 

Sudrajat, Edi, 266, 322, 330
 

Suez Canal, 352
 

Sufism, 121
 

sugar, 30, 34, 199
 

Sugar Act (1870), 38
 

Suharto (see also New Order), li, xli, 

lvi, lxi, 69–76, 83–89, 110–11, 120, 

176, 196, 206–7, 211, 227, 231, 2

266–67, 284, 309–10, 315–19; an

forces, 330, 337; and ASEAN, 289

corruption, 79, 84, 150, 167, 169, 1

270, 287, 309, 318; foreign policy un

290–93, 300–302; and Golkar, 26

“Indonesia’s Best President,” lvii; as 

hero,” lvi–lvii; and Pancasila, 261; 

lence, 118
 

Suharto, Sigit Harjoyudanto, 169
 

Suharto, Titiek (Siti Hediati Hariyadi)

Suharto, Tommy (Hutomo Mandala 

79, 174, 176
 

Suharto, Tutut (Siti Hardiyanti Rukm

84
 

suicide bombing (see also terrorism), 

Sujatmiko, Budiman, 254
 

Sukabumi, 357
 

Sukadana, 25
 

Sukardi, Laksamana, 179, 267
 

Sukarno (see also Guided Democra

Order), xxxix, xli, lvi, 54–56, 58, 63

75, 80, 124, 166, 227, 231, 241, 288, 2

15; and Dutch colonial government

247; exiled, 48, 72; and Japanese oc

51–53, 54; and Pancasila, 52–53, 260–

and politics, 64, 259, 266; powers of, 

Sukarno–Hatta International Airport, 

432 
 

 

 

Sukarnoputri, Megawati, xlii, 177, 241–42, 250– 

51, 255, 266–67, 270, 272; and 2004 elections, 

278; and 2009 elections, xxxix, xlvi, 256; as 

president, 182, 252, 287, 324; as vice president, 87, 179, 297 

suku (female lineage unit), 141 

Sulaiman, Sultan, of Lamreh, 16 

Sulawesi, 64, 86, 99, 142–43, 192, 201, 215, 

303, 346; Christianity on, 122; colonial era on, 

32, 49; early records of, 8, 12, 14, 21, 30; separatist movements on, 64–65, 314; urbanization 

on, 111; violence on, 117, 118, 227; volcanic 

activity on, lx, 99 

Sulawesi Barat, 142 

Sulawesi Sea (Celebes Sea), 105, 346 

Sulawesi Selatan, 124, 142, 156, 194, 234, 266 

Sulawesi Tengah, 122, 124, 142, 281, 284, 

324, 328, 357 

Sulawesi Tenggara, 158, 214 

Sulawesi Utara, 99, 122 

Sulu Sea, 303, 346 

Sumatera Barat, lii, lx, 101, 140–41, 212 

Sumatera Selatan, 8, 206, 212 

Sumatera Utara, 99, 122 

Sumatra (see also Aceh, Special Region of), 64, 

99, 158, 160, 192, 329; agriculture on, 199, 

201; colonial era on, 33, 49–50, 54–56; early 

records of, 8–12, 14–16; environmental problems on, 205, 279; fishing on, 202; Hinduism 

and, 124; migration and, 112; oil production 

on, 49, 211–12; peoples on, 139–42; separatist 

movements on, 64–65, 314; transport on, 215, 

217–19; tsunamis and earthquakes on, 101, 

139 

Sumba, 117, 145–46 

Sumbawa, 101, 137 

Sun Television (SCTV), 220, 287 

Sunata, Abdullah, l 

Sunda, 14, 130 

Sunda Kelapa, 24 

Sunda Shelf, 4, 99 

Sunda Strait, 102 

Sundanese people and language, 128, 130 

sunna (Islamic custom), 118, 120 

Sunni, 117, 118–19 

Supersemar (Letter of Instruction of May 11), 

72 

Supreme Advisory Council, 243 

Supreme Court, li, lv, lvii, 235, 238, 244–45, 

287, 358, 362 

Surabaya, 12, 25, 45, 48, 55, 19

343, 347; Stock Exchange, 1

links, 217, 219 

Surakarta (Solo), 27, 29, 30, 58, 1

Suriname, 56 

Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV), 287 

Suryajaya, William (Tjia Kian Li

Suryaningrat, Raden Mas Suwar

Dewantara), 44–45, 48 

Suryaputra, Raden Mas Sonder, 4

Sutarjo Petition (1936), 48 

Sutarto, Endriartono, 332

 “Sutasoma,” 15, 132 

Sutomo, Dr., 46 

Sutowo, Ibnu, 79 

Swaragama (radio station), 220 

Sweden, 324 

Switzerland, lix, 44 

Syahrir, Sutan, lx, 47, 48, 51, 53, 

syariah. See sharia 

Syria, 6 

Syzygium aromaticum, 19 

Tabanan, 34 

Tabuni, Buchtar, 107 

Taiwan, lix, 174, 191, 204, 207, 2

Taman Mini, 131 

Taman Siswa (Student Garden; 

48 

Tambunan, Gayus Halomoan, liv 

Tamil, 12 

Tan Malaka, 45, 56, 59 

Tanah Merah (Red Earth), 46 

Tanaka Kakuei, 302 

Tangerang, 112, 194 

Tangguh natural gas field, 212 

Tanjung, Akbar, 265–66 

Tanjung Perak, 217 

Tanjung Priok, 217 

Tanjung Priok riots (1984), 76 

Tantular, Mpu, 15, 132 

Tarakan, 49 

Taruma, 8 

Tasikmalaya, 117, 279, 284 

Tasikmalaya earthquake (2009), 2

Taxation Review Board, 245–46 

taxes, 9, 30, 61, 80, 178, 240, 248; 

enues from, 182–83, 184–85, 18

tea, 34 

teak, 26 

Technical College, Bandung, 46 

tegalan (rain-fed agricultural land
 

 

 

telecommunications, 219–20, 298 

telenovelas, xlv 

telephones, 220, 296 

television, xxxix, xlv, 130, 220, 278, 287 

Television of the Republic of Indonesia (TVRI), 

220, 287 

Telkomsel, 298 

Tembagapura, 214, 327 

Tempo, xlviii, 282, 287–88 

Tenggerese, 124 

Tentena, 284 

Ternate, 17, 18, 20–21, 24 

Terror of the Universe, 22 

terrorism, xl, l, lvii, 227, 280–81, 290, 310, 

317, 329–30, 346, 356–57; and “global war 

on terrorism,” 88, 290, 301; and international 

links, 303, 324, 354, 364 

textiles and garment industry, 165, 168, 189, 

193, 194 

Thailand, liii, 8, 14, 51, 78, 101, 161, 165, 174, 

336, 363; relations with, 204, 292 

Theravada Buddhism, 126 

Tibet, 9 

Tidore, 20–21 

time zones, 103–4 

Tjia Kian Liong. See Suryajaya, William 

Timor (automobile), 174 

Timor (island), 34, 99, 105, 122, 128, 321 

Timor Gap, 105 

Timor-Leste (see also East Timor), 82, 86, 99, 

105–6, 158, 291, 295–96, 300; annexed by 

Indonesia, xl; relations with, 229, 296; and 

struggle for independence, 249, 323; and the 

United Nations (UN), 105–6 

Timor Timur Province, 82, 229, 249, 276, 

295, 310, 317 

Timorese National Council, 323 

Timorese Popular Democratic Association 

(Apodeti), 82 

tin mining, 212, 214 

Tiongha, 148 

Tiro, Hasan di, liii, 81, 250, 324 

Tirta, Iwan, lx 

Tirtoadisuryo, Raden Mas, 42–43 

TNI Command and Staff College (Sesko TNI), 

343 

TNI Command and Staff School (Mako Sesko), 

343 

Toba Batak, 122, 140 

tobacco, 34, 206 

toko (stores), 129 

Tokyo, 51 

Tolitoli, Manado, 45 

tongkonan (ancestral house), 143 

Top, Noordin Muhammad, l 

Toraja people and lands, 124, 142–43 

Total People’s Defense (Hankamrata)

totok (full-blooded), 40, 149 

tourism, 137, 142 

Toyota, 209 

trade: barriers, 168–69, 172; earliest, 

exports, 64, 174, 180, 186–89, 191–

201, 206, 210–12; imports, 61–62, 

189, 191–92, 211 

trade unions, 196 

Tralaya, 16 

Trans 7, 220 

Transmigration Program, 112, 205, 32

transportation infrastructure, 215–19 

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in S

Asia (TAC; 1976), 293–94, 297, 30

Treaty of Giyanti (1755), 27 

Treaty of Mutual Respect, Cooperat

Friendship (1986), 297 

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear W

Free Zone (1997), 294 

Trenggana, 18 

Tridharma Buddhism, 126 

Trihatmojo, Bambang, 169, 176 

Trisakti University, 85, 89, 117 

trisandhya (Hindu daily prayer), 124 

Trowulan, 15, 16 

Trunajaya, Raden, 26 

tsunamis, 101; in 2004, 89, 101, 106, 2

279, 311; in 2006, 279 

Tual, 346 

Tuban, 49 

Tuhan, 119–20 

Tur, Pramudya Ananta, 41, 84 

Turkey, 40 

Twist, the (dance), 66 

Twitter, xlviii, xlix 

Ugi ethnicity, 130 

Ujungpandang. See Makassar 

uleëbalang (hereditary district chiefs)

ummah (community of believers), 17, 

258 

unemployment and underemployme

180, 193–94, 221, 326, 359 

Unit 81, 330 

United Development Party. See Deve

Unity Party 

United East Indies Company (VOC), 

434 
 

 

 

 

 

“United Indonesia” cabinet, 242
 

United Kingdom. See Britain 

United Nations (UN), xliii, 54, 57, 80–82, 86, 

321, 323; General Assembly, 290; membership in, 66, 68, 72; peacekeeping forces, 290, 

296, 303, 318, 350–51; Security Council, 58, 

68, 292, 294
 

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
 

156
 

United Nations Climate Change Conference in
 

Bali (December 2007), 304
 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea (1982), 288
 

United Nations Development Programme 

(UNDP), 115, 197
 

United Nations Educational Scientific, and 

Cultural Organization (UNESCO), liii 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1747, 229, 304
 

United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, 252
 

United Nations Transitional Administration in 

East Timor (UNTAET), 106, 296, 323
 

United Nations Transitional Authority in 

Cambodia (UNTAC), 292, 335
 

United States Agency for International Development, 159
 

United States Central Intelligence Agency, liv,
 

69, 70
 

United States Committee for Refugees, 118
 

United States Congress, 304
 

United States Department of State, 124; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 362
 

United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 363
 

United States Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 

323, 354
 

United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS),
 

318, 337, 352, 354
 

United States National Defense University,
 

344
 

United States of America, 44, 52, 57, 58, 65,
 

293, 300–301, 321, 357; aid from, 352; investment from, 207; military relations with, 310–
 

11, 322–23, 329, 345, 347–48, 352, 354; relations with, 67–68, 82, 88, 228–29, 303–5; 

rivalry with China, lix–lx; security cooperation with, 335, 357; trade with, 191, 304
 

United States of Indonesia, 56
 

United States Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 

(ROTC), 338
 

United States–Indonesia Society 

304
 

United States–Indonesian Compre

nership, lx
 

“Unity in Diversity” (Bhinneka T

15, 222, 233
 

Universal Struggle (Universal St

ter—Permesta), 64–65, 234, 25

Universitas Gadjah Mada, 156, 27

Universitas Indonesia, lx, 73, 15

274
 

Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia

Universiteit Indonesia, 156
 

Universiteit van Indonesië (UVI; 

versiteit Indonesia), 156
 

University of California at Berkel

University of Indonesia. See Univ

nesia
 

Upanishads (literary work), 123
 

Urban and Regional Developm

111
 

urban life and urbanization, 111–

140, 148, 317, 329, 358–59
 

Utan Kayu (enclave in Jakarta are

Vaishya (merchant-farmers, waisy

sian), 137
 

value-added tax (VAT), 181
 

Van Mook Line (see also Mook

56–58
 

vanilla, 82
 

varna (caste or castes), 124
 

Venezuela, 78
 

Vietnam, 9, 11, 14, 54, 290, 3

invasion of Cambodia by, 292–

village (desa), 132
 

Visman Commission, 40–41
 

volcanoes, lx, 99, 101
 

Volkman, Toby Alice, 143
 

Volksraad. See Peoples’ Council
 

vorstenlanden (principalities), 31
 

wages, 194–95
 

Wahhabism (see also Islam), 33, 

Wahid, Abdurrahman (Gus Dur

117, 177, 179, 241–42, 250, 25

268–70, 273, 278, 280, 286, 28

of, liii
 

Wahid, Hidayat Nur, 274
 

Wahid, Salahuddin, 255, 278
 

Wales, 101
 

wali (Muslim saints), 17, 121
 
Wallace’s Line, 4
 

wanno kalada (ancestral village), 146
 

warung (food stalls), 129
 

Wardhana, Ali, 167
 

watak (regional chief or overlords), 11
 

wawasan nusantara (archipelagic land and
 

waters), 105, 288
 

wayang (puppet performance), l5, 124
 

wayang kulit (shadow puppet theater), liii, 136
 

Webster University, 303
 

West Irian (see also Papua) 251–52, 315
 

West Irian campaign, 341
 

West Irian Jaya (see also Papua), 252
 

West New Guinea (see also Papua), 62, 67, 

80, 99, 251, 315
 

West Papua (Irian Jaya) 251, 297
 

West Timor (see also Nusa Tenggara Timur), 

106, 295–96, 323
 

Western Fleet. See Navy of the Republic of 

Indonesia (TNI–AL) 

Weyewa, 145–46 

Wibowo, Sarwo Edhie, 81
 

Wijaya, Raden (Kertarajasa), 14
 

Wijoyo, Lieutenant General Agus, 330
 

Wild Schools Ordinance, 48
 

Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands, 38
 

Winata, Tomy, 287
 

Wirahadikusumah, Lieutenant General Agus, 

330
 

Wiranto, General, xlii, 242, 255–56, 268, 278, 

283, 310, 323, 332
 

Witular, Wimar, xxxix–xl 

Women’s Army Corps, 349–50 

Women’s Police Corps, 349–50, 356
 

Wonosobo hoard, 11
 

working committee (panitia kerja or panja),
 

237
 

World Bank, xlvii, 68, 77, 79, 114, 174, 177, 

191, 289
 

World Economic Forum (Davos), lix 

World Health Organization (WHO)

160, 161
 

World Trade Organization (WTO), 

World War II, 40–41, 49–53, 158, 3

World Wildlife Fund for Nature, 10

Yani, Ahmad, 69
 

Yasadipura I, 29
 

Yasadipura II, 29
 

yayasan (foundation), 116

 “A Year of Living Dangerously” (1

Yijing, 9
 

Yogyakarta, 9, 27, 29, 30–31, 58–59

157, 220, 313, 343; Special Regi

194, 206, 247, 249; earthquakes 

noes and, lx, 279; transport links o

Young Java (Jong Java), 44
 

Young Sumatrans’ Association (Jo

tranen Bond), 44
 

Youth Congress, Second (October 1

Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda; Yo

47, 57
 

Yuan Dynasty, 14
 

Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, xlvii, 

221, 241–43, 257, 303–4, 310; 

forces, 320; and counterterrorism

domestic policies, xliv, xlvi, xlix

227–28, 251, 255–56, 262, 283, 32

tion campaigns, xxxix, xlii, 255, 26

278; and foreign policy, 290
 

Yudohusodo, Siswono, 278
 

Yugoslavia, 248, 284
 

Yusuf, Irwandi, 251, 282
 

Zaire. See Congo, Democratic Repu

Zheng He, 16
 

Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutra

FAN), 293
 

436 
Contrib

William H. Frederick is Associate Professor of History, Depa

History, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio. 

John B. Haseman is a retired U.S. Army colonel, former U.S

Attaché in Jakarta, and now a consultant and writer. 

Blair A. King is a foreign service officer at the U.S. Agency for Int

Development. 

Joel C. Kuipers is Associate Professor of Anthropology, Depa

Anthropology, The George Washington University, Washin

J. Thomas Lindblad is Associate Professor in Economic Histor

History of Indonesia, University of Leiden, The Netherlands. 

Robert L. Worden is retired chief of and now consultant to th

Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 

Published Country St

(Area Handbook S

Afghanistan Côte d’Ivoire (Ivor

Albania Coast) 

Algeria Cuba 

Angola Cyprus 

Argentina Czechoslovakia 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Dominican Republ

and Georgia and Haiti 

Australia Ecuador 

Austria Egypt 

Bangladesh El Salvador 

Belarus and Moldova Estonia, Latvia, an

Belgium Lithuania 

Bolivia Ethiopia 

Brazil Finland 

Bulgaria Germany 

Burma Ghana 

Cambodia Greece 

Cameroon Guatemala 

Chad Guinea 

Chile Guyana and Belize 

China Honduras 

Colombia Hungary 

Commonwealth Caribbean, India 

Islands of the Indian Ocean 

Congo Indonesia 

Costa Rica Iran 
Iraq Philippines 

Israel Poland 

Italy Portugal 

Japan Romania 

Jordan Russia 

Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rwanda and Burundi 

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia 

and Uzbekistan Senegal 

Kenya Sierra Leone 

Korea, North Singapore 

Korea, South Somalia 

Laos South Africa 

Lebanon Soviet Union 

Liberia Spain 

Libya Sri Lanka 

Malawi Sudan 

Malaysia Syria 

Mauritania Tanzania 

Mexico Thailand 

Mongolia Tunisia 

Morocco Turkey 

Mozambique Uganda 

Nepal and Bhutan Uruguay 

Nicaragua Venezuela 

Nigeria Vietnam 

Oceania Yemens, The 

Pakistan Yugoslavia 

Panama Zaire 

Paraguay Zambia 

Persian Gulf States Zimbabwe 

Peru 

440