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i 

79–956 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–15] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE POSTURE OF THE 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, 

AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 6, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 6, 2013, The Posture of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. 

Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command ................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 6, 2013 ..................................................................................... 39 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2013 

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Fraser, Gen William M., III, USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ..................................................................................................................... 6 

Mattis, Gen James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command ................ 3 

McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fraser, Gen William M., III ............................................................................. 94 

Mattis, Gen James N. ...................................................................................... 47 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 43 

McRaven, ADM William H. ............................................................................. 77 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 45 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 123 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 123 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Andrews ..................................................................................................... 133 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 145 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 133 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 133 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 142 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 139 

Ms. Shea-Porter ................................................................................................ 136 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 135 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 134 
(1) 

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 6, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets 

to receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Central, Special Ops, 

and Transportation Commands. Today we have with us General 

James Mattis, Admiral William McRaven, General William Fraser. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us here today. 

General Mattis, this is your last time. What a wonderful opportunity to say whatever you want. 

The CENTCOM [Central Command] area of responsibility remains a critical focus of the U.S. military. Over the next year in 

Afghanistan, the United States will be withdrawing 34,000 troops, 

and the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] will be fully in 

the lead across Afghanistan for the first time. These major changes 

to the security context in Afghanistan, all of which will be occurring during the same time period, could present new forms of risk 

to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and in the region. 

Likewise, the broader challenges within the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility, including the conflict in Syria, the nuclear ambitions 

of Iran, and the uncertain political transition in Egypt, continue to 

pose strategic risks to U.S. interests. However, in my view, among 

the greatest strategic risks within the Middle East remains the ongoing ambiguity associated with U.S. commitment to our regional 

allies and the region itself. 

Additionally, I remain concerned about the threats posed by 

transnational terrorism. The threat from Al Qaeda is real; it is 

global, networked, and clandestine. U.S. Special Operations Command and our Special Operations Forces play a critical role in 

counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and countering weapons 

of mass destruction. 

SOCOM [Special Operations Command] has achieved extraordinary integration with each of the Services, the U.S. Interagency, 

and our international partners. However, an emphasis on direct ac-
2 

tion during the last 11 years of combat may have left our Special 

Operations Forces out of balance for a future that will increasingly 

require building partnership capacity and advisory and assistance 

efforts. 

Looking forward, our Special Operations Forces must remain 

flexible enough to counter the transnational terrorist threat with 

decisive force when warranted, but at the same time globally postured to prevent transnational terrorism from manifesting into 

operational and strategic threats, through international partnerships and regional alliances. 

Finally, TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] continues to 

execute the logistical requirements for ongoing U.S. military efforts 

across the globe. The challenges that TRANSCOM faces continue 

to grow. As our military prepares to redeploy from Afghanistan, 

and as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, we must remain ready to 

respond to contingencies elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. 

These operational necessities come as the military is being forced 

to shed force structure, curtail flying hours, and return ships to 

port, reducing the availability of the very lift capacity upon which 

TRANSCOM relies. This committee has taken steps to mitigate 

these shortfalls, but much remains to be done. 

In short, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM are executing 

vital military missions across the globe. We are extremely grateful 

for your service to our country, and we look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our witnesses 

as well, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, General Fraser. We 

thank you for your service and your great leadership in your three 

very important commands. It is appropriate that we have the three 

of you together because you have to work very, very closely together. 

As the chairman mentioned, CENTCOM continues to be our most 

important command facing the greatest challenges, number one, of 

course, being Afghanistan, where we still have troops in battle. 

And the transition over the course of the next couple of years is 

going to be critical. Look forward to hearing more from General 

Mattis, from all three of you, actually, about how that transition 

will go. 

But there are other threats in the CENTCOM region. Obviously, 

the instability in the Middle East remains, and the threat from 

Iran is also something that will continue to be a challenge, and we 

are curious any thoughts you have on how to contain that and 

what come out of the Syrian civil war as well. 

Admiral McRaven, we greatly appreciate everything the Special 

Operations Command has done. And, obviously, we are very aware 

of the work that has been done in Iraq and Afghanistan over the 

course of the last decade. Less well known is your presence in 
3 

many other places trying to contain insurgencies, in many cases before they start. 

The relatively small footprint that you offer yields a huge return 

in a number of places to great success. In the Philippines, helping 

contain insurgencies there; our work with AMISOM [African Union 

Mission in Somalia] in the Somalia area, working with partners in 

Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and Burundi, as well, has proven 

that a small-force, building-partner capacity working with the local 

population can make an enormous difference for a very small cost. 

Of course, you also have to include diplomacy and development 

pieces to make that work, but I think the partnerships that have 

been formed there have been incredibly valuable. 

Now, going forward, certainly, as the chairman mentioned, as we 

are drawing down in Afghanistan, as we have drawn down in Iraq, 

how do we reposition SOF [Special Operations Forces] to best meet 

the threat environment that is out there? 

And, General Fraser, the Transportation Command is absolutely 

critical. It is all about logistics. It is the part of fighting a battle 

and preparing for battle that most people don’t know that much 

about, but it just doesn’t happen if we don’t get the troops and the 

equipment to where they need to go. It is a very complicated process. You do an excellent job; certainly have been, you know, very, 

very helpful in Afghanistan. And the challenge now as we transition out is you are the guy who has got to get all that stuff out 

of there in a logical way. So we are anxious to hear about that. 

Of course, overall, as the chairman mentioned up front, you all 

face, you know, budget challenges. You know, we had fairly substantial cuts in what we were expected to spend starting 2011. 

Now we have sequestration kicking into to roughly double those 

cuts and to do so in a very unhelpful way, across the board, mindlessly, in a way that makes it very difficult to plan. In addition, we 

have the challenge of operating under a CR [Continuing Resolution] instead of with an appropriations bill. All of those things are 

going to make it that much more difficult to get the job done. We 

are anxious to hear about how you are meeting those challenges 

and what, hopefully, we can do to reduce them. 

So I thank the chairman. Look forward to your testimony. Appreciate your being here, and appreciate your great service for to our 

country. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, your full statements that you have given to us will 

be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

General Mattis. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General MATTIS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. It 

is my privilege to appear alongside a stalwart shipmate, a true 

friend, and a comrade in arms, Admiral Bill McRaven, and our tremendously supportive TRANSCOM Commander, General Will Fra-
4 

ser, whose outstanding team provides 100 percent of our critical 

strategic mobility and does so superbly. 

In the Middle East, we confront what is a significant risk to our 

interests in the region: a perceived lack of an enduring U.S. commitment. To counter this misperception, we must clearly communicate our intent and demonstrate our support through tangible actions. 

In Afghanistan, we are conducting a steady and deliberate transition. U.S. leadership among 50 nations fighting together in the 

largest wartime coalition in modern history provides continued support of the Afghan Security Forces to set conditions for their longterm success. 

Iran remains the single most significant regional threat to stability and prosperity in the region. Reckless behavior and bellicose 

rhetoric characterize a leadership that cannot win the affection of 

its own people or the respect of any responsible nation in the region. 

Iran’s continued support to the murderous Assad regime in 

Syria, coupled with its maligned activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Gaza, and globally in Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Thailand, India, Georgia, Bulgaria, Nigeria, and 

even here in Washington, D.C., in the attempt to kill the Saudi 

Ambassador, and elsewhere, as well as in the cyber domain raise 

the risk of Iranian miscalculation that could spark a disastrous 

conflict. 

As we address the very real challenges we collectively face, I am 

confident U.S. Central Command will continue working by, with, 

and through our regional partners to ensure a measure of stability 

in the region. 

Our military-to-military engagements, security cooperation efforts, exercise programs, and information operations will continue 

to need your support, including innovative and flexible authorities 

and the necessary funds so we can continue doing what is required 

to protect U.S. national security interests. 

As our Nation confronts a period of fiscal austerity, our ability 

to adapt our ways and means to continue to meet our operational 

objectives would be enhanced with three key factors. One is budget 

certainty; a second is time so we can adapt our changed budget levels, and we can execute them smartly; and third is the flexibility 

to determine where to shift available funds in a manner that reduces risk and is consistent with the intent of Congress. 

With your support, and with the continued devotion to duty of 

our troops, and the commitment of our military families, we will 

stand by our friends and maintain a measure of regional stability 

in defense of our values and our interests. 

I look forward to answering your questions, Chairman. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. 

Admiral. 
5 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee today and talk 

about the magnificent work being accomplished around the globe 

by the men and women of the U.S. Special Operations Command. 

It is always good to be joined by my friend Will Fraser, and I am 

particularly pleased to be joining Jim Mattis in his last testimony 

before he retires later this month after 41 years of service to this 

great Nation. 

I have known Jim Mattis for many years, and everyone who has 

ever served with him by his side feels honored and privileged to 

have done so, and I count myself in that group. Jim Mattis has 

been particularly supportive of the men and women of the U.S. 

Special Operations Command. And, Jim, on behalf of all those 

great warriors and Americans everywhere, I want to thank you for 

your incredible leadership, for all your personal sacrifice, and for 

your unmatched sense of duty, honor, and country. Good luck in retirement, Jim. 

Mr. Chairman, this is my second opportunity to address this 

committee since I took command in the summer of 2011. Since that 

time I am proud to say that we have continued the great work initiated by my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson. At the same time we 

have adapted to the changing strategic and fiscal environment to 

keep SOF relevant now and in the future. In Afghanistan, we established a new Special Operations command structure, which 

brought the various NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

and U.S. SOF elements into alignment under a two-star headquarters. This has allowed us to have a common view of the enemy, 

and has also helped synchronize our Special Operations Forces to 

achieve a common end state. It has made SOF even more effective 

than ever before. 

Partnered with our Afghan Special Operations Forces, we have 

continued to attrit the enemy leadership, while at the same time 

building and training Afghan Security Forces so they can stand on 

their own against this determined threat. 

In addition to our work in Afghanistan, SOF is in approximately 

78 countries around the world helping to build partner capacity so 

that the host nation can deal with their own security problems. In 

the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, then-Secretary Panetta 

wrote, ‘‘We are shaping a joint force for the future that will be 

smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. It will be led by the highest-quality battle-tested professionals. It will have a global presence, strengthening alliances and partnerships across the regions.’’ 

I firmly believe that the Secretary’s words speak to the core capabilities of SOF, and therefore SOCOM is working with the Joint 

Chiefs and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to ensure we 

are postured now and into the future to meet the objectives of this 

strategy. 

Finally, I have made caring for our force and families my top priority. In the past year my command sergeant major and I have met 

with the soldiers and their families from around the SOCOM enter-
6 

prise. We have listened to their concerns and, with the support of 

the Services, we are aggressively implementing programs and 

plans to help with the physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of 

the force. We have a professional and moral obligation to take care 

of our warriors and their families, and we greatly appreciate the 

support of your committee and other Members on the Hill in our 

efforts to take care of these men and women. 

Thank you again, sir, for your commitment to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of the Department of Defense, 

and specifically to those great warriors who make up the Special 

Operations Command. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in 

the Appendix on page 77.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Fraser. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, 

COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General FRASER. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

and distinguished members of this committee, it is indeed an honor 

and a privilege to be with you here today representing the men and 

women of United States Transportation Command. 

Our total force team of over 150,000 men and women, military 

and civilian, are dedicated. They are proven to be reliable every 

single day. They offer seamless logistical support to our warfighters 

and their families all around the entire globe. I am proud to report 

to you before you today that I am honored to be with you, but also 

representing them as they have met the mission every single day. 

I would also like to say that I am proud to be here with two of 

my teammates, Admiral McRaven and General Mattis. 

General Mattis, I want to take this opportunity on behalf of all 

the men and women in the United States Transportation Command to also offer my thanks, our thanks, for the many years of 

service that you have provided our Nation, for your personal sacrifices. We thank you for your leadership, but I personally want to 

thank you for your friendship for the many years that I have 

known you, and I want to wish you all the best in retirement. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

You know, our Active Duty members, National Guard, Reserves, 

civil servants, merchant mariners, commercial partners have met 

the challenges of the past year while maintaining a high operations 

tempo supporting combat operations, sustainment efforts, humanitarian relief, and crisis action responses. These efforts, from supporting folks who were in need after Superstorm Sandy to developing innovative ways to maximize our throughput into and out of 

Afghanistan, to meeting the directed 68,000 troop reduction level 

by the 30th of September 2012, were made possible by the United 

States TRANSCOM team of dedicated professionals committed to 

ensuring our joint force maintains global logistic superiority. 

Our Component and Subordinate Command Team, comprised of 

Air Mobility Command, led by General Paul Selva; Military Sealift 

Command, led by Rear Admiral Mark Buzby; Surface Deployment 

Distribution Command, led by Major General Tom Richardson; the 

Joint Naval and Capabilities Command, led by Rear Admiral Scott 
7 

Stearney; and the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit, led by Major 

General Dave Post, continued their flawless execution of our command’s mission. I have had the opportunity to observe firsthand 

during my travels throughout Europe, Central Asia, and the Pacific 

and all around the globe the support these world-class professionals provide and can tell you they are doing the Nation’s business magnificently, without fanfare, and often under stressful conditions. I could not be prouder of this total team. 

As we continue to sustain our forces abroad, we also are working 

towards our goal of becoming the Government’s transportation and 

enabling capabilities provider of choice. To meet that goal we embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative 5-year strategic plan, 

which will tackle the challenges. It will also take advantage of the 

opportunities for continuing to project national power and influence. This strategic plan positions us to respond effectively and efficiently to our rapidly changing operating environment, while accounting for the dynamic fiscal environment which we now face. 

We continue to work with our customers and the lift providers to 

pursue smart transportation solutions to reduce the costs of operations. 

Strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and leaner, 

while at the same time we must continue to be agile, flexible, and 

ready. As the global distribution synchronizer and distribution 

process owner, USTRANSCOM is committed to working with the 

military services, our component commands, other governmental 

agencies, allies and commercial partners to synchronize distribution planning and synchronize distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure we deliver scalable and resilient global distribution network from the point of origin to the point of employment. We will meet the needs of the operating environment. 

As we look towards the future, we are also assessing the mission 

impact of funding reductions for this year and potentially beyond. 

Since USTRANSCOM requirements are driven by our customer 

workload and readiness needs, as their demand signals decline, so 

will our workload. While the impacts of these reductions will not 

occur immediately, long-term results will likely affect the business 

base of our commercial partners and, therefore, our ability to support other combatant commands in the same manner as we do 

today. 

In the coming months we will continue to work closely with the 

military services, our commercial partners to mitigate second- and 

third-order effects of these reductions on our sealift, on our airlift, 

and surface capabilities, and we will keep you informed of our 

progress. Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining 

our capability to project power and provide support to our joint 

forces around the world. 

Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, all the members of this committee, I, too, want to thank you for your continued support of 

USTRANSCOM and all of our men and women, military and civilian. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the 

Appendix on page 94.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 
8 

General Mattis, I said in my opening statement that I remain 

concerned that the ambiguity associated with our U.S. commitment 

to CENTCOM region is one the greatest strategic risks to U.S. interests, if not the greatest. You also touched on this issue in your 

posture statement. Could you provide specific examples in which 

the changing, ambiguous, or lacking commitments from the United 

States within the CENTCOM area of responsibility are putting 

U.S. interests as risk? 

General MATTIS. Chairman, the drawdown of our forces can be 

misinterpreted as a lack of attention, a lack of commitment to the 

region. Obviously that is a misinterpretation of what we are doing. 

Those forces were sent there for missions that are going away. But 

what we have to do through exercises, through our mil-to-mil contacts by having their officers attend our schools is show an unwavering interest in this critical part of the world. 

I would also add, sir, that the budget ambiguity right now is 

probably the single greatest factor. I am asked about it everywhere 

I go in the region, by the regional leaders to national leaders there. 

And I think we are at a point that Senator Kaine made yesterday 

in the hearing in front of the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] where he stated that budget ambiguity is now starting to 

drive our strategy. 

And so what we could use most is some degree of budget predictability, like any household or business in America needs to run an 

operation. We need some time to make those cuts right. And we 

need a certain amount of flexibility for the Chief of Staff of the 

Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Coast Guard 

so that they can take the cuts in a way that has the least risk associated with it. Combined with that and a continuing straight message that we are committed, I think we can weather this current 

situation, and reassure our friends, and make certain none of our 

adversaries think this is an opportunity. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am hopeful that today we will pass with a good 

vote the CR, which contains also the appropriations bill for the 

DOD [Department of Defense]. 

That would give certainty, at least for the next 6 months, to the 

Department, which I think is very crucial at this time. So hopefully 

we can get that done. In fact, I understand we are going to have 

a vote within an hour on the rule as they try to expedite this process. 

General, you are retiring at the end of this month. The Nation 

owes you a great debt of gratitude for your 41 years of service, and 

this has been iterated by your colleagues there next to you. We understand that we owe that debt, and thank you. Thank you very 

much for all you have done to help the Marine Corps, and this Nation, and the people that have served with you and under you during this time. 

Reflecting back on your tenure as CENTCOM Commander, if you 

were giving advice to a future commander, what are the key policy 

decisions you believe the United States must make in order to ensure our warfighters can conduct robust planning to respond to 

contingencies in the Middle East? 
9 

General MATTIS. Chairman, I think the most important point is 

that we keep open communications with our regional partners, our 

allies out there. And they want to carry their share of the burden 

in many cases, they are eager to do so, and by good intelligence 

sharing, by good cross-component training with our various components and their components, we can put ourselves in a position 

where we are not carrying this entire burden ourselves. And I 

think that is critical right now, and it means we are going to have 

to look afresh at a region that is going through change, and we are 

going to have to make certain we are open to the opportunities that 

are presented to us as well as recognizing the very real challenges 

that are coming with the turmoil there. 

I think, too, the recognition that Iran’s role is extremely 

unhelpful is simply part of dealing with reality. I know there are 

some very good efforts under way with diplomatic initiatives and 

economic sanctions, and I completely support those. At the same 

time we have to recognize that so far they have not backed off on 

enriching plutonium beyond any plausible peaceful purpose. And 

that is a reality, too, that I think we see with the P5-plus-1 negotiations, the European Union position. I think there is a broadening international commitment to stopping what is going on there, 

and we should do everything possible to reinforce the current policies of our President and of the international organizations that are 

trying to stop this. 

Part of this, frankly, we are going to have to recognize Iran’s legitimate security interests so we can preclude them going for illegitimate means as a way to protect themselves. So it is going to 

be a balancing act, and I think we are on the right track right now, 

but so far we are not having the traction we need to throw the nuclear program into neutral. It is still progressing, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first echo the 

comments in thanking General Mattis for his service and congratulating him on his impending retirement. I understand you are planning on retiring back to the State of Washington. So we welcome 

you back, and thank you very much for your great service. And, 

personally, it has been great to work with you during my time on 

this committee and your time in command. You have always been 

very open and very helpful in keeping me informed and doing, you 

know, a great job for all of us. So I very much appreciate that. 

On the spending, I just want to make a quick editorial comment, 

then I just have one question. Certainly we do need an appropriations bill, but, you know, I realize we have reached the point where 

the sequestration numbers have simply been accepted, it seems. I 

don’t think that is acceptable, it is not the number we should be 

at, and I think as a Congress we should not forget that we still 

have a very strong obligation to address revenue and to address 

mandatory spending. And our complete inability to address those 

two issues is placing an enormous amount of pressure on the discretionary budget. 

I care about aspects of the discretionary budget that aren’t just 

defense, so certainly they should be noted. But here in the Armed 

Services Committee, we should take a look and then listen to the 
10 

generals that we have all been talking to about the decisions that 

are having to be made because we cannot address taxes and mandatory spending. It all falls on the discretionary budget and is 

doing great damage, I think, to this country. So I hope that wherever we are now, however stalemated it appears, there is a commitment at least on this committee to keep looking for ways to get 

above those sequestration numbers, and the sooner the better. 

The only question I have, I have had the opportunity to speak 

with all three of you gentlemen before the hearing, and there is 

something I wanted to ask Admiral McRaven about. It is an obscure issue, but the Leahy amendment and how it impacts your 

job. 

This amendment was passed a couple years ago that places restrictions on our ability to do train-and-equip missions with certain 

nations if they don’t meet certain human rights levels. And at first 

blush, you know, that makes perfect sense. You know, that is 

where we want to get those countries to. We want to make sure 

that their security forces are respecting human rights. In fact, I 

know, Admiral McRaven, you would tell us that is one of the first 

things you do. I was very impressed, for instance, in the Philippines that that is—you know, since it is an internal issue, training the security forces on how to work with and respect the local 

populations is a cornerstone of what you do. 

The irony of the Leahy amendment is it forces you out at a time 

when perhaps you are needed most, when there isn’t respect for 

human rights amongst the security forces. Certainly this was a difficulty in Mali, when you weren’t allowed to, you know, train as 

much as you would have liked because of those continuing concerns. 

I support the human rights concerns. I just think that SOCOM 

being able to go in and do train-and-equip missions is a way to improve human rights, and I am wondering if you could just talk a 

little bit more about that. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you. And I think you hit the nail 

on the head here. We absolutely want to ensure that the forces we 

are working with understand and appreciate their requirement to 

maintain appropriate human rights. We go in and we try to teach 

them what we think ‘‘right’’ looks like in terms of everything militarily, from good order and discipline, to civilian rule in the military, to human rights. 

So when we have a circumstance where you have an individual, 

for example, that is in the unit, we have now what is called a policy of ‘‘poison person, poison unit.’’ So if the individual has committed a human rights violation, then by default we have to go 

back and relook the entire unit, potentially step away from that 

unit at a time when, frankly, as you said, we are kind of getting 

forced out at a time when we probably need to engage them more 

than ever before. 

And I want to make absolutely clear, Congressman, we are all 

about making sure that there are appropriate human rights vetting, and that we are doing this according to the law and the policy. Unfortunately it has restricted us in a number of countries 

across the globe in our ability to train units that we think need to 

be trained, that the U.S. Ambassador in many cases thinks need 
11 

to be trained, that the host nation thinks needs to be trained, and 

yet because of some of the restrictions of the Leahy amendment, we 

are prohibited from doing that. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. That is something I think this committee 

should look at during the authorization process. 

That is all I have. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would 

prefer that we not have military funded at the lower sequestration 

level. On the other hand I know that we have an opportunity before us in just an hour or two to alleviate some of the damage that 

comes from having a CR and a sequestration together. And I hope 

that, like the chairman, we can have a strong vote to make sure 

that happens, because I am afraid we have a narrow window to get 

a defense appropriation bill done, and then we will end up with the 

worst of both. 

Thank you all for being here. I appreciate very much your service. And if I may make a brief editorial comment, it seems to me 

essential to our country’s security to have those who serve us in 

the Armed Forces to be able to and to be encouraged to offer their 

best professional military advice on the key issues we face even if 

it makes political leaders uncomfortable. I think that is a form of 

courage that is just as valuable to the country and just as admirable as the physical sort of courage that we all admire in those 

who serve. 

And I just say, General Mattis, in addition to your intellect and 

other qualities, that courage that you have displayed throughout 

your career and integrity is one of the reasons you are so admired 

on this side of the table as well as with your colleagues there. 

Moving to the weeds for just a second, General Mattis, we had 

a hearing a week or two ago on building partnership capacity; looking at the different authorities and whether there are improvements, adjustments, modifications, updates that can or should be 

made to the range of authorities we have to help other security 

forces. 

Given your experience and area of responsibility, I would be interested in any comments you have on that topic, suggestions you 

may have, especially looking forward. And then I would appreciate 

it if Admiral McRaven could make a comment on that as well. 

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir. 

I won’t reiterate what Admiral McRaven already said about 

Leahy, but that is at times stopping us perhaps more broadly than 

was the congressional intent, where one person does something, 

and now we have a large unit that is tainted and we are unable 

to work with. 

The other point I would make is, sir, that many of the organizations that conduct border security or paramilitary activities against 

terrorists in particular are in the Ministry of Interior Forces. And 

if we could get some flexibility that if an ambassador says, this organization in the Ministry of Interior is working in a de facto military realm and could use U.S. military guidance, support, training, 

we need the authority, I think, to also work with them. 
12 

Sometimes we have this arbitrary line drawn originally for a 

very good purpose, but probably because other organizations do not 

organize the same way, other nations don’t organize the same way 

we do, we get somewhat circumscribed in what we can do. That 

would be the one that leaps out at me. 

I actually have the authority to do training both here at home, 

if they want to come to Nellis Air Force base or to Fort Irwin. I 

have got the authority to do training with them overseas. I am in 

pretty good shape on the authorities right now, sir, absent those 

two points. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

In terms of Special Operations Forces and how we train and 

build partner capacity, as was mentioned in the opening comments 

by the chairman and the ranking member, our direction here as we 

push towards a vision for SOF 2020 really is a lot about building 

partner capacity. We have a number of authorities out there that 

enable us to do that. We have 1206 authorities, 1208. We have our 

Joint Capabilities NECC [Navy Expeditionary Combat Command] 

Sizes and Training program, our JSET [Joint Systems Engineering 

Team] program. 

Unfortunately, all of those have their limitations. Most of them 

are 1-year money authorities. So as you begin to build a partner’s 

capacity, you really want to be able to come in and say, look, we 

have got a 5-year plan or a 10-year plan, because it takes time to 

build capacity if you want to do it right. 

It was mentioned earlier about Colombia. We have had tremendous success in Colombia as we began really around 2002 in helping the Colombians deal with the FARC [Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia]. Same thing in the Philippines, where we have 

great success in working with our Filipino counterparts. But in 

both of those cases, which have had dramatic effects on the end of 

it, it has taken us almost 10 years to get there. 

So we are looking for an authority that is not just 1 year, so that 

we can sit down and actually develop a plan that allows us to have 

multiyear funding, that allows us in the Special Operations community to be able to deal not only with the Minister of Defense, 

but in many cases with the Minister of the Interior, because many 

of their counterterrorism forces rest in the Interior vice Defense. 

We are looking for some minor MILCON [military construction] so 

that we can build small shoot houses and maybe a small barracks 

complex, things like that that we think will give us some ability 

to again build the capacity with a longer-range plane rather than 

how we are having to do it now, which is year by year. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, General Mattis, congratulations on your career. And like 

Mr. Smith said, I look forward to having you back in Washington 

State. 

First question as well is for you and has to do with Afghanistan 

itself and the idea of the commitment the U.S. has to Afghanistan. 

But it just seems that short of a long-term, very heavy presence in 
13 

Afghanistan, folks in the region believe the U.S. won’t have a commitment to Afghanistan. And I disagree with that. 

But you mentioned a few things. But can you give, you know, 

what are three specific steps the U.S. can take to show that, yes, 

this is a long-term—we have a long-term commitment to Afghanistan that is different than the one we had, but is still a commitment to Afghanistan? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. The first point I would make is that 

the way we are drawing down right now with the President’s plan 

allows us to keep our troop strength in the field for the next year. 

That sends a message in itself. And we will then draw down after 

this fighting season. 

Further, we are going to maintain about half the troops we have 

there now through the election. That shows a commitment to an 

election that will get the country on the right path, I think, in 

terms of showing a sustained commitment to democracy and solving their problems through the democratic process rather than 

picking up AK–47s. 

The third point is there will be an enduring force there. I am 

confident there will be. The President has not made up his mind 

on what it will be, but both the President of the United States and 

the Secretary General of NATO, both at Lisbon and at Chicago, 

have said there will be a continued presence, enough to buttress 

the Afghan Security Forces and keep them strong and on the right 

track as they continue to mature. 

Further, I believe the Tokyo Donors Conference shows an international commitment, it is not all coming out of the pocketbooks of 

the American taxpayer, for a longer-term economic support as this 

country tries to get its agricultural sector back aligned, get their 

mining sector started up, that sort of thing. So I think it is a combination of international donors and a strong support for the Afghan Security Forces. So there is a positive future that the countries in the region can see there. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can you remind us of the date of the election, presidential election? 

General MATTIS. I don’t think the specific date has been set. It 

is April or May of 2014. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Thanks. 

General Fraser, I don’t want you to feel left out, so I have some 

questions for you on logistics. 

In the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 2013, we put 

some specific authorities related to sealift readiness, you mentioned 

page 15 of your testimony. Can you help us understand how you 

plan to use them? 

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it. 

The fact that as we look forward to the future, one of the things 

that we are, one, first most appreciative this last year is the recommitment to the Maritime Security Program. This Maritime Security Program is critical for us as we look forward to the future in 

maintaining U.S. flagships, U.S. mariners. And that fleet of 60 

ships is very important for us. It gives us a capability, gives us a 

capacity which we can draw upon as we move forward in the future. 
14 

It is also important as we look at the entire reserve fleet that we 

make sure that we maintain that in a state in which we could call 

upon should there be a need for it. But also, we are going to have 

to work together with our maritime partners to make sure we 

maintain the right balance. As we continue to see a drawdown of 

forces out of Afghanistan, as we saw in Iraq, we have seen the 

business come down. So our business partners are seeing less business in the maritime industry as well as the aviation industry. And 

so as we go forward in the future, how do we maintain that right 

balance? 

And so we are working with our partners through executive 

working groups in both the ground, the air, and the sea lanes there 

to make sure that we have that right balance, and they adjust 

their business plans for the future. So it is a collaborative effort, 

working with industry really across all the various modes of transportation right now. And so that is where that is. 

Mr. LARSEN. Does that relate as well to your comments on page 

17 about railcar capacity? 

General FRASER. Yes, sir, it does. As we look at the capacity that 

is needed for the Army, and to get to the ports, we are in need of 

flat railcars; in fact, the requirement is over 5,000 flat railcars are 

needed. The Army owns—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Just for the Army? 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Not TRANSCOM as a whole, but just the Army. 

General FRASER. This is TRANSCOM as a whole, what we need 

to get to the ports, from the forts to the ports. So we partner with 

the commercial industry, with the rail industry to utilize their flat 

railcars. And so we are working with industry on different ways in 

which either we could purchase more railcars, or we could servicelife-extend railcars, maintain that capacity. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, in these posture hearings we never want to miss an 

opportunity to, one, thank you for your service, but also thank you 

for the professionalism you have brought to each of your roles in 

this very unstable time. 

We also don’t want to miss an opportunity in thanking the chairman for trying to bring some stability to a very unstable military 

funding situation. Mr. Chairman, thank you for continuing to do 

that. 

We learn so much from you. Yesterday Admiral Locklear was 

here, and he told us something that we could extrapolate to our 

jobs. He said when it comes to the Pacific area, we can’t always 

make China and some other countries do the right things, the 

things we would like for them to do. So we have three roles. One 

is to deter them from bad acts; secondly, to assure our allies and 

our friends that we haven’t abandoned our principles; and, third, 

to try to prevent them when they do bad acts from having more 

harm than otherwise it would. 
15 

Well, our roles are pretty much the same way. We try to deter 

bad acts from Congress and from the Administration, and sometimes we fail. We knew, many of us in here, when we passed a very 

expensive trillion-dollar healthcare bill that it would come off the 

back of defense and out of our budget. We tried to deter that; we 

failed. We knew when we passed the stimulus bill, those $825 billion and $347 billion of interest, exactly the amount we have cut 

out of defense, we knew where it was coming, we tried to stop it 

and deter it; we failed. We knew when the Administration took 

$800 billion of cuts over the last 4 years—by the way, 19 times the 

amount of cuts that are going to come from sequestration this 

year—it was a bad policy. We tried to deter it, and we failed. And 

many of us believed when sequestration was proposed by the Administration, it was a bad policy. We tried to stop it, and we failed. 

Having done all that and failed, we want you to know and assure 

you that we haven’t abandoned our principles, and we are not 

going to accept the substitution of budget analysis for strategic 

analysis. 

The other thing we are going do is what the chairman said. Having had those bad acts, we are going to try to prevent them from 

having more harm than necessary. And the way we are going to 

do that is with that CR today, which starts us down the path to 

give you more predictability. But we are not going to stop there. 

We are going to work very, very hard in the budget process to get 

the dollars bumped back up to where they need to be in national 

defense. 

And my question to you today is this: We are looking today, we 

talked a lot about Afghanistan, we talk a lot about other areas, but 

one of the things we are hearing a lot about is Iran. And I would 

appreciate you describing your impression of Iran’s A2/AD [AntiAccess/Area-Denial] capabilities and specifically to the U.S. Navy’s 

role in keeping open vital waterways like the Straits of Hormuz. 

Do you feel CENTCOM has sufficient Navy resources to adequately 

counter Iran’s A2/AD challenges? And if not, what does this committee need to do to try to help you? 

General MATTIS. Mr. Forbes, the area access denial effort of Iran 

is pronounced. It is improving in both numbers and accuracy, capability. 

There are basically five threats out of Iran. One is the latent nuclear. One is the MOIS [Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security] Quds Force, the people and their surrogates like Lebanese 

Hezbollah. One is the ballistic missile force. Another is their cyber 

efforts. And then you have—let me think. There is a fifth one 

there. Well, that is all five, right there. 

The anti-access is best addressed by a joint force. It is not just 

the U.S. Navy’s capability. I do have what I need. I have requested 

the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard assets. I have 

them, or I have them on alert in your State, sir. And we are in a 

position that should Iran try to take advantage of this current situation, we could make it their longest day and their worst day with 

what I have there. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, gentlemen. 

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
16 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Fraser, it is good to see you again. We had a great conversation yesterday, and I very much enjoyed what we spoke about. 

One of the things I learned was we spent a lot of time talking 

about merchant marines, and it was interesting to be talking to an 

Air Force general about surface fleets. 

Could you speak a little bit here what you said to me in my offices about what would happen to the surge capacity should we 

have to lay off the merchant marine fleet and we have to move 

those ships from the readiness level they are at to the point where 

we actually have to lay off those crews, and what that would do 

to your ability to surge as needed by DOD. 

General FRASER. Thank you, ma’am, very much. I, too, appreciated the time yesterday. 

And if I might, just briefly, is the fact that we rely on commercial 

partners to meet our requirements as far as a surge capability 

goes. This is also not only in that area, but it is also through other 

maritime assets. And what I am talking about there is because we 

have to work with other agencies, speaking specifically now about 

the Maritime Administration, we coordinate work with the Maritime Administration as they work with the National Defense Sealift Fund. 

As we look at the CRs, we look at the sequestration, everybody 

is going to get hit by this, and the unintended consequence and 

second- and third-order effect of this may result—and the reason 

I say ‘‘may result,’’ because decisions have not been made—that 

they have to move some ships that are in the Ready Reserve Fleet 

to a less-ready operating status. So those ships that are in a reduced operating status of, say, 5 or 10 days right now actually 

come with crews, and they are able to surge when there is a requirement. And so those crews, those merchant mariners are ready 

to go, and they are going to be able to move forward. If they have 

to find the necessary savings, and if a decision is made to move 

them from the Ready Reserve Fleet to the National Defense Reserve Fleet, that moves them to a further reduced operating status 

of upwards of 30 to maybe 120 days. Those ships then are really 

not readily available. 

The other thing, unintended consequence, that comes with that, 

they lose the crews. They lose the merchant mariners that are then 

assigned to them. So we could upwards see loss of jobs and merchant mariners if they move to further reduced operating status. 

And that is what we spoke about. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, General. 

One of the other things we chatted about was some of the costsaving measures you have already implemented in your command. 

For example, you talked about lessons learned from commercial 

aviation with how you choose to carry or not carry fuel in your aircraft and the cost savings that come from that. 

General FRASER. Thank you. 

The command has been looking forward. We have gone through 

a strategic review this last year. We are also doing a cost-conscious 

look at everything that we do. We are developing some tools which 

will allow us to make better decisions from a cost perspective. 
17 

The one that you briefly spoke about there has to do with 

tankering fuel. We have worked with Air Mobility Command, because in the past, as aviators, and we discussed we always thought 

you wanted to carry the minimum amount of fuel on an aircraft so 

as to accomplish the mission, and then refuel once you arrive at a 

location. 

Through a best-business practice in industry, what we have actually learned, and we have now developed a matrix, is where can 

we buy fuel at a less price. And it actually shows us that when we 

fill up in other locations or do tech stops and fill up there and carrier heavier into, say, Afghanistan and not have to refuel in Afghanistan, we actually wind up and save millions of dollars. So 

using that best practice on our organic aircraft is resulting in some 

significant savings. 

There are other areas that we have looked to better load out our 

aircraft. That is a pilot bill that has gone into a training program. 

We are assembling individuals at common locations so that we can 

fill up our aircraft that are carrying passengers through TransViz, 

a new tool that we have or have had out there for some time period, to fill up the aircraft. 

The other thing that we are doing is with our containers is mandating in our contracts they be filled to a minimum of 80 percent 

full, which reduces the number of containers that we have to move. 

So there are a number of other initiatives that we are instituting 

in the command that are resulting in significant savings. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

And I would like to close by saying, General Mattis, on behalf of 

my father, who was a marine who landed on Iwo Jima, thank you 

for your many, many decades of service and devotion to this Nation. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mattis, I am going to ask you a question about the drug 

trade in Afghanistan. As we look to the trends on the production 

of poppy, it appears that it is on the way up while we are on our 

way out. But I am going to submit that question for the record, and 

I am going to yield my time to Brad Wenstrup, who, being down 

in front, usually has to wait a long time to ask a question. So I 

yield the remainder of my time to Brad. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman is recognized. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I thank you, Mr. Turner, for yielding your time. 

And thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, I want to express my gratitude and admiration for 

your lifetime of service to our country. 

We all have a concern, always, about our personnel and readiness and deterrence, and our abilities in those areas, both shortterm and long-term. And certainly those burdens weigh upon your 

shoulders, and what comes with that is our budget concerns. And, 

hopefully, we will be relieving some of those for you on behalf of 

defending our Nation. 

But you know your needs very well, and putting budget aside, 

what would you say are your top one or two priorities or needs as 
18 

we go about completing our missions over the course of the next 

year? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I will start, if you don’t mind. 

We have done an extensive study. My predecessor, Admiral Eric 

Olson, took a look at the Special Operations community, of which 

there are about 66,000 men and women in the community and 

their spouses, to take a look at the health of the force, and he conducted this about 2 years ago. The report landed on my desk after 

I took command in the summer of 2011. And he determined at the 

time that the force was fraying. And as I have said before, in the 

18 months that I have been in command, frankly, the force has 

continued to fray at a fairly rapid pace. 

But one area where I think we need to focus our attention, we 

do pretty well by our service members, but it is in terms of some 

of the family support programs and the resiliency programs. This 

is where I am working with the Services, and I am working with 

Capitol Hill, and I am working with OSD to figure out can we continue to support our families, because I have made the families a 

readiness issue. 

The Services do a magnificent job of taking care of our families 

in terms of health care and support to the families, but in these 

trying times, if you are not going above and beyond to take care 

of the spouses and the kids, then that directly affects the readiness 

of the service members. So we are trying to find out what is the 

right balance between taking care of the member himself, which, 

again, I think we do a pretty good job of, and then supporting the 

family members. 

General MATTIS. Dr. Wenstrup, right now probably my biggest 

needs are ballistic missile defense because of the growing ballistic 

missile threat in the region. That would help reassure our allies as 

well, who are also improving their defenses. 

The second one, I would say, is naval forces. It is going to be a 

more naval theater in the future than it has been in the past. And 

so by having embarked troops, by having ballistic missile defense 

at sea, mine-sweep capability, strike capability, cruisers and destroyers for escort, we send a stabilizing message throughout the 

region. 

For example, you remember you used to hear a lot about mining 

the waters, mining the Straits of Hormuz by one nation out there. 

We ran an international mine-sweeping exercise back last September, and you haven’t heard anything since. I hoped to get 12 

nations out there; we ended up with 35 nations from 5 continents. 

I was even looking for a penguin from Antarctica so I could get 

them all. 

But my point is after that point of 35 nations coming out, including nations like Canada, Estonia, Japan, Singapore, Djibouti, all 

across the world it just quieted things down. 

So right now, thanks to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, 

Marine Corps, I have what I need at this point. But those would 

be my top needs. 

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. 

First and foremost for me is taking care of our people. They are 

the ones that are making the decisions in the defense transportation system and assuring that they have the right tools, they 
19 

have the right education to be able to make those cost-conscious decisions. So ensuring that we are taking care of them and building 

that capability and capacity as we move into the future, because 

we have already seen some of the great things they can do with— 

you term them loose with innovation. 

The second thing I would say is budget certainty. And the lack 

of budget certainty right now is going to have an unintended consequence on our command. Our command is comprised, as I have 

said before, of organic and commercial capabilities, and without 

budget certainty, and without the ability to build a plan for the future, then it makes it very difficult upon the Services to build a 

solid plan. 

And that has that unintended consequence to our commercial 

partners. Those businesses that are out there making those decisions whether they are going to be with us or not as a part of the 

CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] program, or if they are going to be 

a part of the VISA program, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 

Agreement. These types of things create that uncertainty. 

The lack of budget certainty also affects me in a working capital 

fund. I think this is an unintended consequence a lot of people 

don’t realize with a working capital fund. And so when I don’t have 

my 7 to 10 days of working capital cash, and I draw down on that 

because I am not generating revenue, then what happens is that 

creates an uncertainty, is going to draw down my readiness my 

ability to respond. And so the drawdown on that and the lack of 

budget certainty is one of the things that is going to, I think, increase our risk in the future to respond in a very timely matter. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the witnesses for their excellent testimony and for their leadership and 

patriotism. 

And to you, General Mattis, I join with my colleagues and a very 

grateful Nation to thank you for your many years of service. Your 

leadership will be missed, and we wish you well in retirement. 

I do have a couple of questions for you, General, specifically with 

regard to a couple of options we have for continuing to support our 

mission even as we withdraw particularly from Afghanistan, and 

that has to do with the need for counterintelligence and human intelligence as a bedrock for our future military posture in the region. 

I am very fortunate. In my district we have Fort Huachuca, 

where a lot of the training in human intelligence takes place, an 

outstanding facility and training. As we transition, General, from 

Afghanistan, where do you see the need for American human intelligence capacities in the region, and how can we build our partners’ 

capabilities on human intelligence in the region after the planned 

drawdown from Afghanistan? 

General MATTIS. First of all, sir, I would just reinforce your judgment on this. The kind of enemies we fight today, sir, you can’t just 

count their tanks from outer space with a satellite; you need 

human intelligence, you need people who understand the culture of 
20 

those areas and can really get into what is driving people to certain 

decisions, certain actions. 

We have found, for example, in Afghanistan, under the threat of 

the insider attack, that this was the way to address it, and we have 

stood up and built up the Afghans’ internal capability. It is too 

early to say why the attacks have dropped so dramatically, but I 

am fairly confident that it was the emphasis here that has helped 

drive that number down significantly. 

I would say, too, that working with the other nations—and this 

is where we need the authorities to be able to work not just with 

their ministries of defense, because sometimes the people that they 

organize to carry out the counterintelligence mission are not in 

their ministry of defense—I need the authority to work with them, 

bring them to Fort Huachuca, in many cases, and give them the 

kind of training that we use, which allows us to adapt to the 

changing character of the threat in the area. 

But I think it is mostly a matter of training, because this is 

something you cannot mass produce. You have got to turn out skillful people on this and people who are imbued with an ethical approach to how they do this duty. 

So that is the direction I would take on it, sir, is working 

through the training effort, both at home and away, to help them 

on this. 

Mr. BARBER. Totally on the same page, General. 

Second question for you has to do with yet another way in which 

we are seeking out the enemy and taking the enemy out, and that 

has to do with our unmanned aerial systems. 

Again, I am pleased to say that two installations in my district 

are instrumental in this, Fort Huachuca and Davis-Monthan Air 

Force Base. They have been critical in the counterterrorism efforts 

in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. But I am concerned about our 

ability and our allies’ ability to target terrorists such as the 

Haqqani network along the Afghanistan and Pakistani border. 

Is there a long-term plan for American unmanned reconnaissance after the planned drawdown of our forces, and what capacity 

does the Afghan National Security Force have for unmanned aerial 

platforms to target terrorist networks? 

General MATTIS. Sir, the Afghans do not have that capability yet. 

It is one of the enablers that we are trying to build into them before we leave. I can only speak to the use of these unmanned assets 

inside Afghanistan where my forces use them. 

The long-term view is that we will continue this so long as we 

are there. We will transition this capability, standing it up inside 

the Afghan forces so when they leave, they have the ability to keep 

an eye on that border area. I have operated many years around the 

world, and I have never had more difficult military terrain to operate in than along that border. 

So what you are pointing out is critical. We will have to see what 

level the President decides to leave as far as our forces there, and 

what level of coaching, of mentoring we can give to the Afghans. 

But there is a number of ways that we can get this capability stood 

up with the Afghans from a more rudimentary level to the more 

sophisticated level, and we will just have to work on it, sir. 
21 

Mr. BARBER. General, just a final point. There is no plan at this 

stage to continue our use of those unmanned vehicles to take out 

targets after we leave? 

The CHAIRMAN. Sir, the gentleman’s time has expired. 

General MATTIS. That decision has not been made yet by the 

President, sir. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me share with the gentlemen, thank you for 

being here this morning, and, General Mattis, a heartfelt, sincere 

thank you for your dedicated service, and Godspeed on whatever 

new chapters you open in the days ahead of you. 

Yesterday in talking to the Senate committee, you talked about 

a potential collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and that you 

were working with regional partners to try to see what the responses might be. 

You also mentioned the idea of arming the opposition or the 

rebels, that you have not been tasked with knowing who to arm 

and who not to arm. Can you fill in the blanks, kind of the gaps 

there, as to how you would deal with a collapsed Assad regime, but 

not know who those folks are yet that are still in place to fight? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. Well, we are not operating inside Syria, 

of course, right now, and so the organizations that are, which are 

a pretty wide range of organizations, as you know, I don’t have 

that kind of fidelity on them right now. 

We are working with regional powers, so we are getting a pretty 

good idea of what is going on inside the country, and there are, of 

course, some regional states that are supplying weapons, and we 

believe that their weapons by and large are getting to the right 

people, and they are not—in other words, they are not going to the 

wrong people. 

The planning that I am doing has to do with countries that are 

concerned about what is going to be there the day after Assad is 

gone, and what we can do working with them and other regional 

powers that would come in to help as we deal with the day after; 

in other words, the sectarian and the ethnic divisions that are 

probably going to be rife at that point. But right now I have not 

been tasked with providing weapons or other resupply to opposition 

forces, so I have not moved those kind of forces into the region 

there to get that situational awareness. Does that answer your 

question? 

Mr. CONAWAY. It does. There are no easy, good answers in Syria. 

No one is obviously doing that. But knowing that some planning 

is in place to try to know who, because that is going to be the big 

deal, and also, you said yesterday that you think that the Iranians 

will be particularly mischievous and opposed to Assad regime as 

well with respect to the militias, and those are the same people 

that we are thinking about helping. 

Admiral McRaven, in your statement you talk about—and I will 

have to read some of this—a joint urgent operational needs statement that you use to source an ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance] platform or ISR something. And kind of a 

multipart question with respect to that. SOCOM has its own quick 
22 

response kind of ways to buy things. Can you walk us through why 

you use the DOD version, how did it get paid for, why is that— 

you also sound like you relied more on the DOD-level joint operational statements versus your own authorities. 

Can you walk the committee through, and what was the overwhelming requirement behind the—or that we need for the requirement that you took this tack on? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. The Joint Urgent Operational Needs 

Statement, or JUONS, as we refer to it, is normally initiated from 

somebody in the operational unit, so if there is a demand signal 

that comes from an operational unit in the Special Operations 

meeting around the world, that gets to us. We actually have a very 

short time frame, a couple of days, where we have to take a look 

at that JUONS. We got to validate that to determine whether or 

not that operational need is, in fact, an urgent operational need, 

and we have a couple of avenues by which we can begin to put 

money against a particular operational need. 

We can go through the joint service system, as you pointed out, 

or internal with SOCOM within some acquisition parameters if it 

is a small purchase, and we can rapidly field it and get it into the 

battlefield quickly. We have the capability to do that. If it is a larger requirement that, in fact, requires an acquisition program, then, 

sir, we have to go through the standard acquisition process. 

But SOCOM does have an accelerated means of taking an operational need from a soldier, sailor, airman, marine in the field and 

turning that pretty quickly, producing an object, and getting it 

back; the capability of getting it back to that soldier’s hands as 

quickly as possible. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In that regard are there things about that dualapproach system that we need to fine-tune? In other words, are 

there flexibilities that you need to decide which way you go? And 

how does the funding work on the particular way you pick to 

source it? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I will tell you, I think the process works 

pretty well for us right now, having the option to do it internally 

or to go through the Services, and sometimes if it is a larger acquisition program, or the demand, we think, might be a broader Service requirement after it is a SOCOM requirement or a SOF requirement, then, frankly, we will work through the Service systems. 

So, I am pretty happy with the flexibility we have right now in 

dealing with the urgent operational requirements coming from the 

field. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. 

Sorry, General Fraser, I ran out of time. 

Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for your service to the Nation, and we 

are very proud of the distinguished careers that you all have led. 

Thank you very much. 
23 

I would like to know, General Mattis, what are America’s core 

enduring interests in Afghanistan, and how would you prioritize 

those? 

General MATTIS. Sir, if we go back to 9/11 and we look at the 

situation we confronted, our enduring interests are that Afghanistan be able to govern its own country, and the kind of people that 

set up shop there to attack our country are not allowed to again 

in the future. That is the core enduring interest. 

It means that we have got to help Afghanistan get on its feet as 

a country. We are going that right now both in a security realm 

and, more broadly, through the State Department programs. 

I think that the priority would be initially, as it has been, the 

security effort so that we can protect the Afghan people from this 

enemy and allow them to set up a country again after the trauma 

they have been through for decades now. But I think once we get 

to a point where Afghanistan is under Afghans who are responsible, who do not have the medieval view of the world that some 

of the Taliban and people they allowed to come in, Al Qaeda, then 

I think that we have got it on the right track, sir. But the priority, 

I would say, is the security and then the economic and social and 

governance things that can follow. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

The Afghan security forces, of course, are key to ensuring the 

kind of stability that you just indicated. By what metrics are we 

measuring the effectiveness of the ANSF? 

General MATTIS. First of all, we have training metrics, recruiting 

and training. So we organize them, we equip them, we train them, 

and then we put them out, we graduate them. That is one set of 

metrics. 

We try to bring them up with an ethical understanding of the 

use of force, but also that the tactical skills be better than what 

they are going to confront against the enemy. 

Once in the field we rate them operationally, and there we evaluate their ability to operate on their own. Of course, it takes a little 

while to stand up an army in the middle of a war. We remember 

that from our Revolutionary War days when the French were the 

regulars, and we were the irregulars, and they had their advisors 

helping us stand up. Not much has changed, frankly, sir. It is still 

how do you mentor them, coach them, build their capability, but 

more importantly their confidence. 

Let me just give you a quick statistic that will show you a measure. Since the first of January, I have lost four of our wonderful 

troops killed in action there; 2 months, going into a third, four 

troops. 

The Afghan security forces have lost 198 killed. Nothing can 

more graphically and perhaps grimly show that the Afghan boys 

are taking the bulk of the fighting now, and I would just point out 

that this is a continuing trend; this is not just a snapshot. We have 

seen this coming for some time as they step up to do the fighting, 

sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that is indeed encouraging news, and I think 

it is just human nature that when folks are assisted as they stand 

up, they end up standing up strong and doing—they make do with 
24 

what they have. But I know they have been asking us for things 

like F–16s, armor, and other forms of advanced weaponry. 

Do you see that they are ready for that at this time or will be 

ready for that at some point in the near future before we cease our 

combat operations? 

General MATTIS. Well, sir, as you know, we are shifting from 

combat operations to advise-and-assist operations literally right 

now, and you see that in the statistics. 

We would have to look at what the threat is to them, what they 

need to defend their country. The initial threat right now is really 

an insurgent enemy, and we are building up some air transport capability so they can move troops around the country. That is under 

way. We are building up some turboprop aircraft that will allow 

them to use air support against an insurgent enemy, and we would 

have to evaluate the requirement before we went to that next level 

that you are pointing out. I have not gone to that level yet, but I 

am aware that there is interest, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General, and enjoy your retirement as 

well. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to first thank General Mattis for your leadership. I 

have had sons over in Iraq and Afghanistan, so I truly do appreciate your leadership as relates to CENTCOM. 

And to our other distinguished panelists, Admiral McRaven and 

General Fraser, I really want to thank you for your service to this 

country. 

But to General McRaven—I am sorry, Admiral McRaven. My 

apologies. Underseas mobility programs have had a troubled history, but I believe the capability to insert a SEAL [Sea, Air, Land] 

team undetected anywhere connected to an ocean is absolutely 

worth overcoming any issues that we may have had. Overcoming 

the engineering and political challenges, you know, SOCOM, I 

know, needs to replace the Mark 8 SEAL Delivery Vehicle, the wet, 

and with a new wet submersible, but also supplement that capacity 

with a dry submersible variant that can deploy underwater. 

I would like to know, if you would, talk about some of the obstacles impeding those various undersea mobility programs and what 

has caused the delay of initial operational activity or capability of 

the wet submersible; and then also, if you would, then go to the 

dry submersible vehicles, both of which I would think would give 

you added options in regards to inserting our SOF guys where they 

need to be without being noticed. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you very much. 

As you point out, really over the last decade or so as we have— 

we, the naval special warfare community—has folks on the fight in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, and we put a lot more of our emphasis in 

there, we had to kind of deemphasize our support and our look in 

the undersea mobility. That is now changing. 

Again, my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, put a fair amount of 

emphasis into this, and I am following on in that regard. And we 

have two programs, as you mentioned. The wet submersible that 

will replace the Mark 8, my understanding is we now have a prototype under contract, so that is good for us to take a hard look at 
25 

whether or not the prototype will, in fact, meet the requirements 

of the SEALs and the SEAL Delivery Vehicle teams. And we have 

two prototypes that we are working with some foreign countries to 

take a look at our dry submersible. 

We will essentially take a look at both of those, make a good 

business case, a business analysis as well as an operational analysis of the requirements of one or both of those, and then figure 

out where we go from there. 

So actually I am pretty comfortable with the track that we are 

on now in terms of both our wet and dry submersible capability. 

Mr. NUGENT. What support do you need from this committee or 

Congress to make sure that those two capabilities happen? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I think, as always, having the congressional oversight is important to us. Frankly, it makes sure that we 

stay focused on meeting our timeline for bringing a product to the 

fleet and making sure that, frankly, our business partners also are 

doing their bit to ensure that happens. So having congressional 

oversight and making sure that we are kept on task, I think, is important. 

Right now I have the funding I need, for the most part, to do 

both of those programs, and certainly if we are short of that, we 

will come back and talk to the folks on the Hill. But right now, sir, 

I am, again, comfortable with where we are in regards to both 

those programs. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I certainly understand the position that we 

had to do, I mean, where we had to be and shifting focus, but I 

am glad to see the focus is coming back on a well-rounded capability for us to insert troops. 

And lastly, for General Fraser. The Mobility Command is so important to us now and in the future. Having had sons fly back and 

forth to Afghanistan and Iraq, I certainly appreciate it, but more 

importantly, providing the support and supplies that they need to 

have. I want to make sure that you have the proper resources to 

make sure that—we don’t know where we are going to be next, and 

that we have the proper resources to meet that challenge. 

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. And I, too, am confident that we 

have what we need right now. 

But, however, I am not sure, as I look forward into the future, 

with the uncertainty and with some of the lack of flexibility with 

the budget process, that we will be able to maintain that same 

level of readiness as we move into the future. So we are going to 

have to continue to work together with all the Services and with 

other agencies to make sure that we maintain that capability and 

capacity at the right readiness level, because we don’t know when 

that next call is going to come, whether it is in response to a crisis 

somewhere or actually to a humanitarian aid requirement. But we 

will continue to work with you, but we are okay right this minute. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank all of you again 

for your service, and particularly our neighbors down to the south 

in Tampa, where I am just north of, so we want to appreciate your 

service. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
26 

Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for your testimony today and, 

as always, your extraordinary service to our Nation, and particularly to General Mattis. You have a long and distinguished career 

and a lot to be proud of, General, and I wish you all the best as 

you enter this new chapter in your life 

Admiral McRaven, if I can start with you. In terms of resourcing 

and training and equipping a global-style capability, can you talk 

about the impact that our commitments in Afghanistan have and 

your ability to provide forces to other geographic combatant commanders? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you. 

As General Mattis is wont to say frequently, most of the Department of Defense resources over the last 12 years have headed to 

CENTCOM. That is true of my Special Operations Forces as well. 

About 85 percent of my deployed Special Operations Forces are 

currently in the Central Command AO [Area of Operations]. As we 

begin to draw down in Afghanistan, and depending upon what 

those numbers look like—and that is a kind of a constant dialogue 

between myself, General Mattis, General Dunford, and obviously 

the Joint Chiefs, and the OSD and the President in terms of what 

that requirement might be—but my expectation is in either case, 

or however it unfolds, we will have additional capacity in terms of 

Special Operations capability. 

Right now, as I look at building the SOCOM strategy to support 

the Defense Strategic Guidance that was signed out by Secretary 

Panetta in 2012, it is about building partner capacity globally, and 

this is about strengthening our alliances, building a network, and 

therefore, my expectation is I will be able take some of that capacity coming out of Afghanistan and be able to push that capacity to 

other combatant commanders. 

Sir, as you know, I am a support team commander. My job really 

is to provide the resources to the geographic combatant commanders. They are the ones who actually have the operational control of the forces once they are in theater. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, can you talk more specifically, too, about 

your planned commitment of U.S. SOF’s mission in Afghanistan 

through 2014 and beyond. You just touched on it broadly but—— 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, last year we brought the three components of U.S. Special—or Special Operations in Afghanistan together under two-star headquarters, and this is really a watershed 

event for us. So we took the what we call the CFSOCC–A [Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command in Afghanistan], the Green Berets, if you will, that were building the Afghan 

SOF Security Forces, we took our direct action element, and then 

with the support of our NATO SOF brothers, we pulled all those 

together under what is called the Special Operations Joint Task 

Force, or SOJTF. That SOJTF is in place, as I mentioned in my 

opening remarks. It has been incredibly effective in taking a look 

at the common threat and then making sure that we have a SOF 

response to that threat in Afghanistan 

As we move forward, we clearly think that we will be focused on 

the counterterrorism threat, and as General Mattis mentioned earlier, we will continue to do the training of our Afghan local police, 

of our Afghan commandos, and of our Afghan Special Forces. So 
27 

the counterterrorism piece and training piece will remain enduring 

for us through 2014, sir 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Mattis, if I could turn to you. I continue to be concerned 

about the capabilities of our bases to withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electric grid, which you are dependent on, but don’t have the responsibility to or the capability really to protect. 

Last year you testified that you assessed both the more modern 

enduring bases as well as the tactical ones to ensure that they 

could continue to operate, and that you were satisfied that the 

proper mitigation networks and generators were available if needed. But can you update us on the progress that has been made in 

evaluating the ability of our bases to withstand—of our bases within USCENTCOM to operate and recover in the event of such an attack based on the increased advanced persistent threat environment, and also specifically focused on the linkages and integration 

of USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] to support your cyber efforts under your command. 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. It is a great question. Over the last 

year we have got a much tighter bond with CYBERCOM. They 

have matured capabilities and embedded some of them inside my 

command. We are constantly reviewing the vulnerability. 

I would like to take part of your question for the record and answer you with some of the classified information that shows the resilience that we have put into the various networks and the 

workarounds we have. We anticipate that it is a worsening and increasing threat, frankly, and where you cannot get complacent 

about it. 

I would even go so far as to say that where last year I told you 

I thought we were in pretty good shape, I think we have to do more 

work now, and we are doing that. We have got some very capable 

help from Cyber Command. And I will give you a more complete 

answer, including the classified details that will give you a better 

picture of what we are doing so, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would appreciate that. 

Again, General, thank you for your service, and, gentlemen, 

thank you for your testimony and your service as well. 

Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think we are just about to have three votes, 

and the chairman’s plan is to recess during those votes and reconvene as soon as possible when the last vote starts. It could be two, 

it could be three votes, but just to give Members a heads up, I 

think the chairman wants to begin as soon as possible when the 

last vote starts. 

But in the meantime I recognize Mr. Scott for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mattis, thank you for your service, and I will tell you, 

you mentioned the issue in Syria, and one of my concerns is how 

we stop—when Assad is gone, how we stop the attacks on people 

from his particular sect, if that is the proper way to put it. 

And, Admiral, thank you for your service. 

I want to focus, General Fraser, if I can, because I represent 

Georgia Robins Air Force Base, and I have Moody Air Force Base 
28 

as well. And my questions revolve around lift capacity. I know that 

one of the last questions you answered, you said that you were confident that you had the lift capacity that you need right now. Did 

I understand that correctly? 

General FRASER. Yes, sir 

Mr. SCOTT. Do we currently lease lift capacity from other countries? 

General FRASER. Sir, with respect to our strategic CRAF partners, we contract directly with them. There are some foreign companies that they subcontract to. We also maintain and retain the 

ability to do some foreign contracts. When the U.S. does not 

present the capacity or the capability in certain areas, such as 

short takeoff and landing, we have done with foreign carriers. We 

have also done some with some helicopter capacity where the U.S. 

didn’t have it within the CRAF piece. But we do retain that ability 

to do it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Which countries do we lease that capacity from? 

General FRASER. Sir, I would like to take that one for the record, 

and we will get you a more thorough list. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 123.] 

Mr. SCOTT. That is fine. Can I ask it in this way: Do we lease 

any lift capacity from Russia at this stage? 

General FRASER. Sir, we have, through some of these subcontractors. They have utilized the Antonov, the 124s, for some oversized/ 

outsized, and that was the—as I recall looking at one of the last 

contracts that we had, it was directly with one of our CRAF carriers, who then subcontracted for that capacity and that capability. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. I will appreciate that response and more detail 

on that. I guess one of my concerns is that when we do the analysis, if we are counting on the ability to lease capacity from somebody who might very well be on the other side of the conflict next 

time, obviously that ability goes away. I don’t think they would 

lease it to us if we were fighting them. 

General FRASER. We do the analysis. It is organic, and those who 

are our CRAF partners is who we build the analysis around and 

the million-ton miles per day that are needed. 

Mr. SCOTT. I know a lot of your equipment will be coming back 

into the Savannah port when it comes in from overseas, and if 

there is anything that we can do, as somebody who represents that 

area, to help you out, I hope you will stay in touch with our office. 

And my men and women at Robins Air Force Base do a great job 

of rebuilding the C–5s [Galaxy strategic airlifter] and the C–17s 

[Globemaster III strategic airlifter]. I respect all of you. I think it 

was a mistake to stop the C–17 buy. I think that is one of the best 

aircrafts we have ever had, and it didn’t cost a whole lot of money 

to keep buying just a few of them and have that line up and running if we needed more of them. 

My concern is that when we do things like that, we end up with 

a situation like we are in with the F–22 [Raptor fighter jet] and 

the F–35 [Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter], where we cancel one 

before the other one is ready to go, and who knows when we will 

be manufacturing an F–35 and putting them into use in this country. 
29 

So, thank you for your service. I look forward to the answer on 

the other. 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman. 

I think we have time for Mr. Garamendi to ask questions? 

No? You prefer to wait and come back. Okay. 

We will recess and reconvene as soon as possible after the last 

vote in the next series starts. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. We will reconvene the House Committee on 

Armed Services, and our next Member to pursue questioning is Mr. 

Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I hope you were able to get a cup 

of coffee or at least take a break, repast from all of this. 

Thank you for your service. There are many, many questions. 

Most of them revolve around the budget issues. I suspect you know 

that we are presumably going to vote on a sequestration and CR 

bill here in the next couple of hours. Apparently it deals with the 

military, but I am not sure it goes in every piece of it. And this 

question deals with the Transportation Command. 

Assuming the appropriation level that was agreed to between the 

House and the Senate but never passed in November of 2012 goes 

into place, how will that affect the maritime portions of your command, General? 

General FRASER. Sir, thank you very much. And not knowing the 

specifics of what is in the bill, of course we are responsive to the 

Services’ requirements to transport items. And so I would imagine 

this would help them with respect to their budgets, and hopefully 

that that would allow them to then communicate with us what 

level of funding they have, and give us then more predictability as 

we do planning with both organic and commercial capabilities, and 

that would be both across whether it is land, air, or maritime. 

And so the other piece tied to that, though, is what it does to 

other agencies and the unintended consequences of other agencies 

that take cuts. As we look and work with the Maritime Administration, as we work with Military Sealift Command, it is necessary 

that we maintain the right balance, and so I will have to take a 

holistic look and work with the Services as to what that impact 

would be. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If you could report back, I am on the maritime 

committee and the transportation/infrastructure committee, and so 

we cross over there. So if you could do that, that would be good. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 123.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We will probably know this afternoon at least 

what the House is going to do. As to what the Senate ultimately 

does remains to be seen. 

General Mattis, in response to Representative—a question about 

Afghanistan, you indicated that there was a drawdown that will 

occur this year and then more next year. You did not give specific 

numbers to that or even a range of numbers. Could you do so? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, I can. It will be approximately a 

34,000-person drawdown between now and February of 2014. So 
30 

that will keep the bulk of our troops there through the fighting season this year. Then there will be another drawdown that will probably commence after the election in April or May to help them get 

through their election in April/May of 2014, and they would draw 

it down to whatever the President and Secretary General determine is the enduring or post-2014 force, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, in looking at the force structure, then you 

would have 65,000 in place until next February. 

General MATTIS. About that number. We may draw it down 

slightly if we find forces we don’t need during this fighting season, 

sir. That is basically correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. So there was some, I guess, discussion 

that there would be a steady drawdown throughout 2013. That is 

not likely to be the case. 

General MATTIS. Well, I think there will be some drawdown. I 

don’t think it will be commensurate each month having the same 

percentage going down, but we will probably start shortly as fighting season closes out to start drawing down. So it would start out 

probably in the October timeframe, not waiting until January. 

They would be out by February, however. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Now, the CR that we are taking up here in another hour or two would provide about $87 billion for the 

Overseas Contingency Fund. Do you need that much, considering 

the drawdown of troops? 

General MATTIS. We anticipate we do need that much right now. 

We will look at it every month. We are not going to spend any more 

than we need to, but right now that is our best estimate that we 

need. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you. 

I yield back my time. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WITTMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

On the schedule, I am next for questioning, so I will pursue that 

prerogative, and, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, and General 

Fraser, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank all of 

you for your service to our Nation. We deeply appreciate that. 

General Mattis, thank you for your stellar career and service to 

our Nation, and we wish you all the best in your months and years 

to come. So I know it will be a time when you can look in the past 

with a smile on your face, and so will we. 

Admiral McRaven, I wanted to go to you and ask you specifically 

about our special operators, and obviously they are there pursuing 

some pretty challenging missions there with village stabilization 

operations in Afghanistan. In light of the drawdown and in light 

of the sequester, will our special operators have what they need 

both in direct resources, but also in combat support as they pursue 

these missions there in theater? 

My concern has always been is that as we begin that drawdown, 

if it is not done strategically, it could place our special operators, 

who are going to continue to pursue these very difficult in missions, it could affect them. So two questions: How will it affect 

them, and will the mission change because of that? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, right now, in working with General 

Mattis and General Dunford downrange, we have got a good plan. 

As the larger conventional forces draw down, the SOF forces will 
31 

draw down at a commensurate level, making sure that we are still 

focused on our primary missions, which are counterterrorism and 

then training the Afghan National Security Forces. 

I am very comfortable with the current plan we have, recognizing 

what our mission set will be in 2013 and 2014. So, to your first 

question, sir, we do have the resources we need. I am very comfortable with the plan. 

Tactically, as General Dunford looks at how he is going to kind 

of collapse the conventional forces as we begin to draw down, we 

will, again, have a kind of a commensurate drawdown of the Special Operations Forces so that we are always in a position to take 

advantage of the enablers that are out there. 

As you know, sir, our biggest concern is always the availability 

of MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] or CASEVAC [casualty evacuation]. We like to make sure we are within, as we refer to, the golden hour, being able to get the helicopter support in to evacuate a 

wounded soldier and get him back to a combat hospital. And so 

each and every time we look at our combat outpost and our forward 

operating bases, we make sure we are within that golden hour. 

The other enablers that are out there, ISR, route clearance packages, all of that are part and parcel to the ISAC [Information Sharing Analysis Center] plan for drawdown to make sure that not only 

are we taking care of our conventional forces, but certainly our 

Special Operations Forces are well taken care of as well. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Admiral. 

To General Mattis and General Fraser, I want to get your perspective on where you see the challenges of the difficulties in getting both equipment and personnel out of Afghanistan through the 

drawdown in face of the sequester and the pending CR that hopefully gets taken up today. So I wanted to get your perspective on 

where you see the challenges and what you are going to be facing 

with that in the months to come. 

General MATTIS. Chairman, I would defer to General Fraser on 

the Working Capital Fund and whether or not that is going to be 

impacted here, but from our perspective, as the operational force 

in the field, it is a matter of concentrating the gear, getting it 

cleaned up to the right amount of cleanliness, and then getting it 

out either using air-to-sea ports, or using the northern distribution 

network, or going over the Pakistan ground lines of communication. 

We have just completed the proofs of principle on the latter 

through Pakistan, and I think we will see the velocity pick up 

there. We do have a plan to get the gear out. There is the possibility, I don’t forecast it yet, there is the possibility we will get the 

troops out by the end of 2014. There could still be some equipment 

there still being in the process of being shipped, and I would defer 

the rest to General Fraser. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Fraser. 

General FRASER. Thank you very much. 

And as we look at sequestration and the potential hit that that 

has to the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] budget, it is 

certainly a concern. However, there has been direction by the Department to ensure that the resources are there which should cover 

the retrograde that we are talking about. 
32 

I further expand on what General Mattis has said is that we 

have built a very robust network that gives us a number of different lanes by which we can retrograde cargo, so we can go out 

in many different directions. I am encouraged, based on my visit 

to Pakistan last month, in the opening of the Pakistan border. We 

have run proofs of principle that have been very productive, and 

through my discussions and working with the theater, we are going 

to continue to ramp up that velocity in moving more through. 

The other thing is that we have given booking notice to our commercial partners, because there is foreign military sales that we 

need to move some equipment in, and this is going to help the Afghan Security Forces because they are in need of this equipment 

as they further their capacity and capability, and so we are looking 

forward to that. But everything seems to be moving in the right direction with lots of different lanes, so the capacity is there, and it 

appears right now that we do have the resources. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Gentlemen, thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Runyan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Chairman and gentlemen. Again, thank 

you all for your service. And, General Mattis, I am sure you are 

going to—knowing how most of us are wired, you are going to continue to serve either your community or this country in your own 

special way. So good luck with that. 

General Fraser, I think you know where I am probably going to 

talk about some CRAF stuff and, you know, dealing with our C– 

5s and C–17s. As you know, you responded to me in a 4 January 

letter saying that the C–5s were overflown their program or record 

by 29 percent, and the 17s by 21 percent. And I know in the letter 

and where we are in kind of the operations, some of that cargo 

doesn’t quite fit this back in to where the area of conflict. You can’t 

get those aircraft in there. 

But the point was raised also that in your letter you said there 

was some people unwilling or unable to execute the request for admissions. Do you have any specific examples of that? 

General FRASER. Sir, the request for the flying hour program, as 

we understand and have worked with the Services, is certainly 

built upon maintaining readiness. So when there are other calls for 

response in other areas, and understanding the threat situation, 

the types of loads that we are lifting, the CRAF partners are not 

able to either accept that threat area or be able to carry that type 

of load. Maybe it is outsized/oversized-type cargo. And so, therefore, 

if the flying hour program is built upon readiness levels, doesn’t 

take into account other crisis or other types of response, we are 

going to overfly those hours. So that is where we see some of that 

increase, but every opportunity that we can, we are ensuring that 

we make sure that we partner with our strategic CRAF partners 

and give them the contracts. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Because we keep pushing that, because I can say 

since 2001, we have had 13 of those partners fall off the face of actually executing that stuff, whether bankruptcy or just quit doing 

business. I mean, and whether you are talking about the merchant 

mariners and/or the CRAF program, that is a strategic asset that 

if we don’t utilize it, it is not going to be there when we need it, 
33 

and, again, costing us even more money to fly the gray tails and 

maintain them even longer down the road. 

That being said, if the type of aircraft that our CRAF partners 

have is a limiting factor, are there commercial aircraft out there 

that maybe we can have a discussion to kind of try to solve a little 

bit of this in the future, or is it just not in the commercial stockpile? 

General FRASER. Sir, based on a review of the threat areas in 

particular, they do not have defensive systems on them, and I 

would not be willing to put them at risk based on the threat. We 

do a thorough analysis, and in coordination with the theater in various locations that we are flying in, we have continued to expand 

bases. As the threat decreased, we opened up other airfields where 

we are now actually flying in commercial aircraft because of the security situation changing. It is in a positive direction, and therefore 

we have opened it up. 

We have not opened up passenger aircraft into Afghanistan, into 

the airfields, but cargo aircraft we are, and we continue to watch 

that very closely and in coordination with our CRAF partners. 

With respect to the business and it coming down, I would comment that we are working with the Executive Working Group and 

the CRAF partners. We have an ongoing study called CRAF II. 

There was a meeting last Friday with them as we laid out looking 

forward to the future what the business is looking like as we have 

come out of Iraq. We have seen changes. As we now come out of 

Afghanistan, we have seen that change. And so how do we posture 

ourselves to have the right balance of organic and commercial capabilities in the future? We will work that in partnership with them. 

Mr. RUNYAN. So in kind of in summary, it is more of a security 

issue than it is a cargo capacity issue? 

General FRASER. It has been a combination of security and oversized/outsized, sir. They don’t have that capacity in the commercial 

fleet for oversized/outsized. That is where we have to use the C– 

5s and the C–17s. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you very much. 

Yield back, Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Runyan. 

We will go to Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, General Fraser, if you wouldn’t mind copying me on the 

correspondence between you and Mr. Scott and Mr. Runyan on the 

CRAF stuff, I am interested in that, too. I think DOD spent about 

$244 million lately in foreign carriers as opposed to U.S. carriers. 

So, with that being said, just please keep me in the loop if you 

don’t mind. CC me. 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Please. Thank you. 

General Mattis, it is an honor to be on this side of the table from 

you. You will always be my general. You were there in Fallujah. 

I remember sitting outside of the city with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, and we saw this lone LAV [Light Armored Vehicle], and we 

were like, who the hell is that guy? That is ‘‘Chaos.’’ That was his 

call sign in Iraq. It was ‘‘Chaos.’’ And even sitting over here, if you 

told me to, I would go do bad things to bad people. 
34 

So I just want to say thank you for your service. It is an honor 

to even be sitting here talking with you, and you will always have 

a special place in Marine Corps lore and Marine Corps history, and 

a true representative of what it means to be a Marine warfighting 

general. And we all thank you. And you saved a lot of lives, and 

you killed a lot of bad people, and we thank you for that. 

So, with that being said, I understand in the next few days we 

are going to release our high-value detainees from our Afghan jails 

to the Afghan justice system, and I just wanted to hear your 

thoughts on that, and if that is a wise move, if you recommended 

that, and what you think that means for the warfighter that is still 

there, still fighting every day. 

General MATTIS. Thank you, Congressman. 

In this case I fully support it. Two reasons. First, Ashraf Ghani, 

who is in charge of that portfolio for the Afghan Government, very 

trusted, very knowledgeable, has identified clearly the legal authority they have to hold people in what you and I would call admin 

detention. They have a different term for it. Bottom line is they 

don’t get released. 

There is also a process, dual key I would call it, where if they 

decide to release someone, and we think it is an enduring threat, 

then obviously we can go in and stop that. In other words, we work 

together, and it takes both eventually at the highest level, both 

sides, in this effort to hold on to them or to release them. 

So, I know they will not become a force protection threat because 

we will be able to keep them in, and they have got the legal authority to do so. So based on those two premises, I do support this. 

And that is a change from if I had been up here even as short as 

2 months ago, where we were not certain we had the legal authority, and we had to work out the process to make certain that there 

was a reclama if they were going to release someone that we did 

not want released. 

That said, we released a number of these people back to their village elders. They signed for them, it is a ceremony, and so far we 

are doing very, very well, surprisingly well. But it is different category you are referring to, and I recognize that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. That is reassuring. 

Lastly, let’s just talk IEDs [improvised explosive device] for the 

next minute and 40 seconds. It is still an enduring threat. It is still 

the number one threat. We simply haven’t been able to get our 

hands around how to fight, you know, fertilizer turned explosive. 

And I guess that is just how it is. We spend billions of dollars, have 

Ph.D.s working on this day and night. Our marines and soldiers 

and sailors are trained to go fight this, and yet it is still the number one threat. 

What do you think? What are the mistakes that we have made, 

what are we doing right, and what do we need to keep doing? 

General MATTIS. It is a multifaceted campaign, as you know so 

well, of training, of technology, of scientists. I have talked to as 

many scientists as I can find. The electromagnetic spectrum is a 

big part of the problem, and it is so enormous, as you know, for 

ways to trigger one of these. 

We have ongoing efforts, improving efforts, I might add, with the 

Pakistanis here recently over the last 2 months. But ultimately I 
35 

will tell you, sir, what we are going to have to do is find a way to 

prematurely detonate these so the time and place of detonation is 

no longer determined by the enemy. That is ultimately going to be 

our way that we turn this weapon against the enemy. It will not 

win the war for us, but you know what the casualty rate has been, 

and as much as it has declined, it is still the number one casualty 

inducer on us. 

So I think that getting the premature detonation is where we 

have to go, and we have got DARPA [Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency], we have got the Navy folks down at Dahlgren, 

again, every lab we can insight to get involved with this. We are 

working with it. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, Admiral, Generals. Thank 

you for your service 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mattis, it seems a real concern I have on Afghanistan 

is the level of corruption and how I think it compromises, you 

know, not only the ability for the Afghan Government to have any 

type of capacity in terms of, you know, establishing governance 

over the country, but the military as well. I mean, all the institutions, it seems that corruption is so pervasive. In your view, are we 

making any gains on this problem? 

General MATTIS. Sir, I know we are making gains. Whether those 

are transient, and whether those are sufficient, I don’t know. 

It is a reciprocity-type society, and that is okay. We can deal 

with that. It is, as you pointed out, when it interrupts or prevents 

the provision of government services, when bribery is such a way 

of life that the poor people basically see that these chips are 

stacked against them. 

I would just say that it is really the strategic, biggest Achilles’ 

heel we have. So we are working it. We have got a task force working it. We have got active measures under way. The officers are 

told, if you suspect someone is corrupt, you do not have to work 

with them. There is no requirement to work with someone that you 

find corrupt in the field. Get the word back up the chain of command. At one time, something as simple as that, they didn’t realize 

they could just break off from that person. 

But you are dealing with a society, sir, that for decades has had 

no belief in tomorrow. And when you don’t believe in tomorrow, you 

do whatever you can today to get your family ahead. And until we 

create more of an environment where there is hope for tomorrow, 

where there are jobs and government services are provided in a 

manner that you don’t have to go the corrupt route, it is going to 

be a generational change, I think, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The green-on-blue violence, Afghan soldiers killing 

U.S. military personnel and the coalition partners, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] personnel, are those incidents—well, I assume they are down now because we have pulled 

back, it seems, in our interaction with the Afghan Security Forces. 

But it is critical for us to have that interaction in order to be able 

to move them forward. Can you comment on where we are on the 

green-on-blue violence? 
36 

General MATTIS. I can, sir. Thank you for that question. It goes 

to the very heart of trust. 

So far this year, one attack. Now, I did not get complacent. I 

think I know why it has gone down. It has to do with training, has 

to do with counterintelligence training we have given to the Afghans so they have ferreted out some of these people inside the 

ranks and caught them. And we have very good techniques for 

doing that. 

But I would tell you, if you went over there today and contrast 

it to when you were over there 2 years ago, you would probably 

find very little difference in what you saw as far as our troops 

interacting with their troops. We are very much involved with 

them, integrated with them. We are obviously taking what you 

would consider prudent measures in the field to protect ourselves. 

But at the same time they have lost more of their boys in greenon-green than we have lost on green-on-blue. So we have had 

wholehearted support from the Afghan leadership in addressing 

this problem, and it appears to be paying off. 

Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of our drawdown—and maybe, General 

Fraser, this may be to you too. In terms of our drawdown as to the 

equipment, what equipment are we leaving behind? And out of the 

equipment that we are leaving behind, what will go to the Afghan 

military? And are we, in fact, categorically looking at equipment 

that will, in fact, be destroyed, weapons or equipment? General 

Mattis? 

General MATTIS. Sir, if we have excess equipment, we will certainly look at leaving that behind. But if the Army or the Marines, 

the two Services with most of the gear over there, if they need it 

brought back, it is coming back. So it has got to be really excess 

if we leave it. 

But we are also, as you know, standing up the Afghan forces 

with equipment that is bought specifically for them. For example, 

the Light Armored Vehicle is one that is low-maintenance-intensive; it is easy to maintain. So we are not going to leave them a 

complex system that becomes more of a burden. 

So we will outfit them. We will leave behind some gear. We will 

bring most of it home. And we would probably destroy or demilitarize those things just not worth bringing home. 

Will? 

General FRASER. Sir, just briefly, we are working very closely 

with the materiel recovery element that is on the ground. They 

have a deliberate process that General Mattis is talking about 

where they actually categorize that equipment. Once we have disposition orders, then we will either turn it over to the DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] to be destroyed, or it will be transferred, as 

General Mattis said, to the Afghans. It could be declared as excess 

defense articles. There is a separate process by which that would 

go through in coordination with State and countries who are looking for excess defense articles. And then there is the rest of that 

that we will be bringing home. 

So the processes, the procedures are in place, and we are confident that we have all the guidance we need. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman. 
37 

General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, General Fraser, thank you 

again so much for joining us today. General Mattis, we wish you 

Godspeed. 

And with no further business before the committee, the House 

Committee on Armed Services stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 6, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 6, 2013 

(43) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Posture of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command 

March 6, 2013 

The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Central, Special Operations, and 

Transportation Commands. Today, we have with us General James 

Mattis, Admiral William McRaven, and General William Fraser. 

Thank you for joining us today. 

The CENTCOM area of responsibility remains a critical focus of 

the U.S. military. Over the next year in Afghanistan, the United 

States will be withdrawing 34,000 troops, and the ANSF will be 

fully in the lead across Afghanistan for the first time. These major 

changes to the security context in Afghanistan—all of which will be 

occurring during the same time period—could present new forms of 

risk to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Likewise, the 

broader challenges within the CENTCOM area of responsibility— 

including the conflict in Syria, the nuclear ambitions of Iran, and 

the uncertain political transition in Egypt—continue to pose strategic risk to U.S. interests. However, in my view, among the greatest strategic risks within the Middle East remains the ongoing ambiguity associated with U.S. commitment to our regional allies— 

and the region itself. 

Additionally, I remain concerned about the threats posed by 

transnational terrorism. The threat from Al Qaeda is real. It is 

global, networked, and clandestine. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and our Special Operations Forces play a critical 

role in counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and countering 

weapons of mass destruction. SOCOM has achieved extraordinary 

integration with each of the Services, the U.S. interagency, and our 

international partners. However, an emphasis on direct action during the last 11 years of combat may have left our Special Operations Forces out of balance for a future that will increasingly require building partnership capacity and advisory and assistance efforts. Looking forward, our Special Operations Forces must remain 

flexible enough to counter the transnational terrorist threat with 

decisive force when warranted—but, at the same time, globally postured to prevent transnational terrorism from manifesting into 

operational and strategic threats—through international partnerships and regional alliances. 
44 

Finally, TRANSCOM continues to execute the logistical requirements for ongoing U.S. military efforts across the globe. The challenges TRANSCOM faces continue to grow. As our military prepares to redeploy from Afghanistan and as we rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific, we must remain ready to respond to contingencies 

elsewhere in the Middle East—and Africa. These operational necessities come as themilitary is being forced to shed force structure, 

curtail flying hours, and return ships to port—reducing the availability of the very lift capacity upon which TRANSCOM relies. This 

Committee has taken steps to mitigate these shortfalls, but much 

remains to be done. 

In short, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM are executing 

vital military missions across the globe. We are extremely grateful 

for your service to our country. I look forward to your testimony. 
45 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Posture of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command 

March 6, 2013 

I welcome our witnesses, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, 

General Fraser. We thank you for your service and your great leadership in your three very important commands. It is appropriate 

that we have the three of you together because you have to work 

very, very closely together. 

As the chairman mentioned, CENTCOM continues to be our most 

important command facing the greatest challenges, number one, of 

course, being Afghanistan, where we still have troops in battle. 

And the transition over the course of the next couple of years is 

going to be critical. Look forward to hearing more from General 

Mattis, from all three of you, actually, about how that transition 

will go. 

But there are other threats in the CENTCOM region. Obviously, 

the instability in the Middle East remains, and the threat from 

Iran is also something that will continue to be a challenge, and we 

are curious any thoughts you have on how to contain that and 

what come out of the Syrian civil war as well. 

Admiral McRaven, we greatly appreciate everything the Special 

Operations Command has done. And, obviously, we are very aware 

of the work that has been done in Iraq and Afghanistan over the 

course of the last decade. Less well known is your presence in 

many other places trying to contain insurgencies, in many cases before they start. 

The relatively small footprint that you offer yields a huge return 

in a number of places to great success. In the Philippines, helping 

contain insurgencies there; our work with AMISOM in the Somalia 

area, working with partners in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and 

Burundi, as well, has proven that a small-force, building-partner 

capacity working with the local population can make an enormous 

difference for a very small cost. Of course, you also have to include 

diplomacy and development pieces to make that work, but I think 

the partnerships that have been formed there have been incredibly 

valuable. 

Now, going forward, certainly, as the chairman mentioned, as we 

are drawing down in Afghanistan, as we have drawn down in Iraq, 

how do we reposition SOF to best meet the threat environment 

that is out there? 

And, General Fraser, the Transportation Command is absolutely 

critical. It is all about logistics. It is the part of fighting a battle 

and preparing for battle that most people don’t know that much 

about, but it just doesn’t happen if we don’t get the troops and the 

equipment to where they need to go. It is a very complicated process. You do an excellent job; certainly have been, you know, very, 
46 

very helpful in Afghanistan. And the challenge now as we transition out is you are the guy who has got to get all that stuff out 

of there in a logical way. So we are anxious to hear about that. 

Of course, overall, as the chairman mentioned up front, you all 

face, you know, budget challenges. You know, we had fairly substantial cuts in what we were expected to spend starting 2011. 

Now we have sequestration kicking into to roughly double those 

cuts and to do so in a very unhelpful way, across the board, mindlessly, in a way that makes it very difficult to plan. In addition, we 

have the challenge of operating under a CR instead of with an appropriations bill. All of those things are going to make it that much 

more difficult to get the job done. We are anxious to hear about 

how you are meeting those challenges and what, hopefully, we can 

do to reduce them. 
47 

STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

COMMANDER 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

6 MAR 2013 
48 

Introduction: We are in the midst of a transition in the Central Command Area of 

Responsibility (A OR). With volatility a defining feature of the region, United States Central 

Command remains a command postured to respond to military crises while at the same time 

working in tandem with regional partners and American diplomats to carry out U.S. strategy in 

the region. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces continue to support the largest coalition campaign in 

modem history to ensure it will not again become a haven from which violent extremist 

organizations can plan, rehearse and execute terrorist attacks. We also work with international 

partners, and across U.S. government and Combatant Command lines, to share information and 

posture our forces to inhibit the spread of these radical and violent organizations and rapidly 

respond to protect U.S. interests. USCENTCOM works closely with our fellow Combatant 

Commands to mitigate risk collaboratively across COCOM boundaries. 

As we transition to Afghan-lead in accordance with NATO's Lisbon and Chicago agreements, 

each of the other 19 countries that comprise U.S. Central Command's Area of Responsibility 

across the Middle East and Central Asian States present both challenges and opportunities for 

our military-to-military relationships. The ongoing events of the Arab Awakening, blatant 

brutality by the Iranian-backed Syrian regime and the spillover effects of refugees and violence 

into neighboring countries, coupled with Iran's flagrant violation of United Nations security 

council resolutions, bellicose rhetoric and pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the 

persistent thrcat from both Shia (Iranian supported) and Sunni (AI Qaeda and its affiliates) 

violent extremists demand international attention. 
49 

These factors, compounded by the lack of forward progress on Middle East Peace and the 

movement toward a sustainable two-state solution and the serious economic challenges many 

nations in the region confront, require us to remain vigilant and be ready for turmoil in the 

months ahead. In fact, we are now at a point where a re-energized Middle East Peace effort 

could pay significant dividends in terms of regional security since the status quo benefits no one 

and violent extremists use the issue for their own purposes. It is essential that we maintain the 

viability of the Palestinian Authority as a partner for peace and security, and preserve the twostate solution. 

As we look to the future direction of American foreign policy, three enduring factors will keep 

U.S. attention anchored in this region: the U.S. relationship with Israel and our other partner 

nations; oil and energy resources that fuel the global economy; and the persistent threat from 

violent extremist organizations. U.S. Central Command's approach - working in tandem with 

the State Department and other agencies through a whole of govemment approach is to protect 

our interests using fewer military resources in an era of fiscal restraint and political change. 

Operating Environment: Significant factors are currently shaping and changing the region. 

The Arab Awakening will bring years of political and social changes as the demographic 

challenges of a burgeoning youth bulge collide with struggling economies. There will be 

additional pressure on govemments to respond to popular interests. We recognize the 

Awakening is what it is and not necessarily what we hope it will be: it is first a flight from 

repression and mayor may not result in an embrace of democratic principles. The future is not 

2 
50 

foreseeable, but one thing is clear: America must remain deeply engaged in the region and fully 

utilize all tools of national power as a force for stability and prosperity. 

Traditional regimes that held power for decades have been swept aside or are under siege, adding 

to the region's uncertain future. Modem communications and social media have the potential to 

both empower and endanger people. While they can enable users to better understand their 

social circumstances and provide ways to organize to improve them, they can also make people 

more vulnerable to manipulation by malevolent actors. The increasing role of our adversaries in 

cyberspace necessitates additional emphasis and urgency on a targeted expansion of our 

presence, influence, capabilities and the authorities necessary to maintain an advantage in 

cyberspace. Threat networks including those maintained by Iran are adjusting opportunistically, 

and are emboldened by regional developments to include the Arab Spring and events such as 

those in Benghazi and Syria. These networks pursue a range of destabilizing activities that 

include but are not limited to the transfer of illicit anns, as well as the provision of financial, 

lethal, and material aid support to a range of malign actors seeking to undennine regional 

security. In our efforts to counter destabilizing extremists, our international and regional 

partnerships remain one of our greatest strengths, and most potent tools. Addressing these 

activities will require our continued engagement, reassurance and commitment to work with 

other nations against extremists' violent activities. 

U.S. Central Command's operating environment is also influenced by the major and emerging 

powers bordering our region, by the increasing Sunni-Shia polarization, and by Iran's malign 

influence. U.S. government efforts led by State Department to develop more militarily capable 

3 
51 

and confident partners in the region are advancing, and contributing significantly to enhancing 

our robust regional security architecture. There is also widespread attention on how the U.S. and 

NATO will remain involved in Afghanistan post-20l4 to prevent its regression, and whether the 

U.S. will continue to remain resolute in the face of a growing Iranian threat. Finally, the threat 

of weapons of mass destruction is prevalent in the region, with both Syria and Iran possessing 

chemical weapons or the capability to produce them and Iran advancing its nuclear program. 

Pakistan has a fast growing nuclear arsenal and violent extremists continue to profess a desire to 

obtain and use weapons of mass destruction. This danger has our full attention. 

Each country in my assigned region has its own unique history, culture, religions and ethnicities 

and we treat each country on its own merits. The value of American military-to-military 

relationships is evident when you compare the transition in Egypt with events in Libya and the 

ongoing brutality in Syria. Under immense pressure both internally and externally, the Supreme 

Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt oversaw the transition and transferred power to an elected 

government. Egyptian military leaders did not attempt to protect the old regime from its 

accountability to the people or seize power for themselves. Moreover, they demonstrated 

restraint and stcady perfom1ance through difticult transition milestones including the 

appointment of new military leadership and the political upheaval following President Morsi's 

December constitutional decree. First and foremost, the military sees itself as the upholder of 

Egypt's sovereignty and national security. It has maintained its professionalism and validated 

our longstanding investment in strong military ties, sustaining the trust of the Egyptian people 

through a most tumultuous period. As this critically important country experiences significant 

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political change and confronts a dire economic situation, USCENTCOM will remain actively 

engaged with Egypt's military leadership. 

Strategic Risks to U.S. Interests: The most serious strategic risks to U.S. national security 

interests in the Central region are: 

Malign Iranian influence: Despite significant economic sanctions and increased diplomatic 

isolation within the global community, Iran continues to export instability and violence across 

the region and beyond. There are five main threats Iran continues to develop: the potential 

nuclear threat; counter maritime threat; theater ballistic missile threat; the Iranian Threat 

Network to include the Qods Force and its regional surrogates and proxies; and eyber-attack 

capabilities. 

• Potential nuclear threat. Iran continues to expand its nuclear enrichment capabilities, 

which enable Iran to quickly produce weapons-grade nuclear material, should Tehran make 

that decision. 

• Counter Maritime threat. Iran is improving its counter maritime capabilities (mines, small 

boats, cruise missiles, submarines) to threaten sea-lanes vital to the global economy. The 

occasionally provocative behavior of the Revolntionary Guard Navy is an issue with which 

we deal and we refine our operational approaches in sustaining our stabilizing maritime 

presence in the Persian Gulf. 

• Theater Ballistic Missiles. Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in 

the Middle East and is increasing medium and short range ballistic missile inventories and 

capability with ranges up to about 2,000 kilometers, sufficient to strike targets with 

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increasing precision throughout the region. While Iran has previously exaggerated its 

capabilities, there is consensus that Tehran has creatively adapted foreign technology to 

increase the quality and quantity of its arsenal. 

• IranianThreat Network. Malign influence and activities (illicit weapons, financial aid, 

trained personnel and training) in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan. Gaza, Lebanon and 

Yemen along with the 2011 attempt here in Washington to assassinate the ambassador of the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, indicate a long-ternl trend that has clear potential for murderous 

miscalculation that could spark a disastrous regional conflict. Iran continues to seek to 

establish nodes throughout the region through which to advance its destabilizing agenda. 

• Cyber. Given Iran's growing capabilities in this sensitive domain. the U.S. must recognize 

and adapt now to defend against malicious cyber activity. 

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): The focus of our military efforts over the past 

decade has largely been on Al Qaeda, its adherents and affiliates (AQAA), and we have achieved 

measurable successes in combating them. The AQAA "franchise" remains a threat however. An 

equally concerning long-term threat continues to emanate from the Iran-sponsored Shia brand of 

extremism wielded by groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah. In addition to the threat from these 

terrorists with which we are already familiar. a clash brought on by these two brands of 

extremism could pour fuel on the simmering Sunni-Shia tensions we observe from Baluchistan 

to Syria and incite a worsening cycle of violence. 

State Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): WMD proliferation and the 

potential loss of control of WMD by regional governments, for example the potential loss of 

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control of Syrian chemical weapons, pose a significant risk to the region and our most vital 

national security interests. The potential for WMD in the hands of non-state actors and extremist 

organizations cannot be addressed by traditional Cold War deterrence methods and presents a 

clear threat to our regional partners, innocent populations, and our forces and bases. 

Afghanistan Stability and Security: While progress in Afghanistan is undeniable, progress and 

violence coexist. In accordance with NATO/ISAF's campaign plan, our sustained training, 

advising and assistance have led to a counterinsurgency-focused Afghan National Security Force 

(ANSF) that has now achieved full strength in numbers. Keeping our campaign on track requires 

close collaboration and reassurance to our Allies and Afghan partners to maintain the confidence 

of the largest wartime alliance in modem history and the Afghan people. That message of 

commitment will also reassure the Central Asian States, which are understandably sharply 

focused on 2014 and beyond. The present drawdown rate leaves the campaign on a sound 

footing for the Afghan forces to assume the lead with our advisory support and training. 

Regional Instability: As savagery increases in Syria's civil war, the number of refugees fleeing 

the fighting continues to grow. The impacts on Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are severe, with 

media reports of over 4 million intemally displaced persons and the U.N. estimating over 900 

thousand refugees in neighboring countries. Refugees into Jordan alone continue to increase by 

more than 50,000 monthly since the New Year. The potential destabilizing impact is clear and 

there is a growing likelihood of unpredictable longer-term effects on regional stability. Refugee 

camps are not a permanent solution, they have not proven to be economically viable, nor do they 

give hope to younger generations. 

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Perceived Lack of U.S. Commitment: Perhaps the greatest risk to U.S. interests in the region 

is a perceived lack of an enduring U.S. commitment to collective interests and the security of our 

regional partners. This impression. if not actively and often countered, and any lack of clarity 

regarding U.S. intentions in the region, particularly with respect to Afghanistan's future, Middle 

East Peace, and shaping an acceptable outcome in Syria, could reduce our partners' commitment 

to stand with us and leave space for other actors to assume less benign leadership roles. If we 

seek to influence events, we must listen to partner concerns and continue to demonstrate our 

support through tangible actions. Our regional partners want to share the security burden with 

us, and we should actively enable them to do so, especially as we face our own fiscal realities. 

USCENTCOM's Approach: All of U.S. Central Command's military activities are finnly 

nested in four main drivers of U.S. foreign policy. First is security, and in particular, meeting the 

urgent challenges posed by Iran's reckless behavior across a wide front and being prepared to 

respond to a range of regional contingencies, as well as the related imperative of accelerating a 

transition to the new leadership which the Syrian people so deeply deserve. The second driver is 

our continued support for political openness, democratic refonns and successful postrevolutionary trru1sitions. Third, no political transition or democratic reform process can succeed 

without a sense of economic opportunity. Fourth and finally. a re-energized effort is needed to 

resolve persistent regional conflicts, and especially for renewing hope for a two-state solution 

between Israelis and Palestinians. Within this framework, USCENTCOM stands finnly 

alongside our friends and supports regional security, territorial integrity of sovereign nations. and 

the free flow of commerce. 

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CENTCOM's approach to protect the nation's interests in the Middle East is to work BY, WITH 

and THROUGH key regional partners to bolster regional security and promote stability, while 

minimizing a permanent U.S. military footprint. In so doing, we can build our partners' capacity 

to enable them to share in the security costs for the region. 

USCENTCOM uses four principal levers as we engage in the region: 

• Military to Military Engagements: These lay the foundation for and bolster our broader 

diplomatic relationships. Much of this work is ongoing, but as resources decrease and 

American forward presence in the region declines, mil-to-mil engagements and working by, 

with, and through our partners will become increasingly important. This type ofjorward 

engagement is often the bedrock of our most important relationships and builds the trust 

necessary to work closely together. 

• Plans and Operations: USCENTCOM develops and executes plans and operations in close 

collaboration with our fellow Combatant Commands, interagency organizations and 

international partners as necessary to address developing contingencies and crises. While 

providing military options for the Commander-in-Chief, these plans are designed from the 

outset to be inclusive of regional and traditional partners. 

• Security Cooperation Programs: Building partner capacity is the responsible way to 

reduce U.S. military presence and maintain the health of our force by partnering with 

regional nations to distribute more of the security burden. In order to build partner 

effectiveness, we must be more responsive to their capability needs while strategically 

aligning acquisition and training plans with regional collective security requirements. 

Combined training, multilateral exercises (resourced by OSD's Combatant Commanders' 

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Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program), defense reviews and expanded 

professional military education exchanges are cost-cffective means to enhance trust and 

interoperability while encouraging progress on rule oflaw and human rights issues. Once 

fully implemented, the Global Security Contingency Fund will offer us opportunities to 

respond to emerging security cooperation, assistance and requirements. 

• Posture and Presence: A tailored, lighter footprint supported by access to infrastructure 

that enables rapid reinforcement is the foundational concept for future military posture in the 

region. The USCENTCOM military presence will continue to become more maritime in 

character, supported by expeditionary land forces and have strong air enablers. I anticipate 

the need to sustain maritime defense, anti-fast attack craft capabilities, amphibious ships and 

mine-countermeasure capability and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

capabilities. I see the need for growth in our Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence 

(HUMINT) capacities across the region. In summary, we will need strong strategic 

relationships with our partners to enable the presence required to deter adversaries and 

reassure our friends. 

Around the Region: The Department of Defense carefully shapes military presence (U .S. and 

partners) in the Middle East to protect the global free flow of critical natural resources and to 

provide a counterbalance to Iran a balanced force presence ready to respond to a variety of 

contingencies, and to deter Iranian aggression. To maintain a right-sized American security 

footprint in the Gulf, the U.S. promotes close teamwork with the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) states. By deepening strategic ties with the Gulf and improving the capability of the 

GCC states through multilateral exercises, security assistance and training, regional stability is 

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appropriately shown to be an international responsibility. The U.S. will continue to promote the 

capabilities ofGCC partners in such missions as missile defense, maritime security, critical 

infrastructure protection and development of a common operating picture that allows us to work 

smoothly together when necessary. 

During the past year, we have seen significant progress in our military relationship with 

countries of the GCC. In support of the efforts of the Secretary of State and Secretary of 

Defense and the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, we have worked to enhance and 

deepen Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation in response to the proliferation of these weapons. 

We continue to emphasize U.S.-GCC multilateral exercises, such as our successful International 

Mine Countermeasure Exercise, wbich included participants from over 30 countries from five 

continents in 2012, and our Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise LEADING EDGE 

2013 ably hosted by UAE. The Gulf States have demonstrated the willingness to work with one 

another and with international partners to counter malign influence in the region and ensure 

freedom of commerce - a critical international issue in terms of the global economy. 

Interoperability in this framework improves U.S. defense-in-depth and our own capabilities 

become more robust by supporting partner capacity and working by. with and through the GCC. 

For decades, security cooperation has been a cornerstone of our relationship with the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia. As we face ever more sophisticated regional challenges in the Middle East, 

helping to enable the upgrade of Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities sustains our strong militaryto-military relations, improves operational interoperability, helps the Kingdom prepare to meet 

regional threats and safeguards the world's largest oil reserves. In difficult times, the Kingdom 

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has demonstrated its willingness and capability to use its military forces to fight as part of a 

coalition against regional threats. Sustaining the Saudi military capability deters hostile actors, 

increases U.S.-Saudi military interoperability and positively impacts the stability of the global 

economy. Working with Department of State, USCENTCOM helped establish the first 

interagency security assistance program to build the capabilities of the Ministry ofInterior 

Security Forces that protect Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure. This is a long-term $1 billion 

FMS Interagency Technical Cooperation Agreement, whieh has shown remarkable progress. 

A long term and strong ally in the region, Kuwait continues to build upon a long bi-lateral 

military relationship with its critical support for U.S. troops and equipment. Kuwait remains a 

valued partner and is steadily reconciling its long-standing issues with Iraq and supporting the 

region's stability. We enjoy excellent relations with the Kuwaiti military built on many years of 

trust between us since the liberation in 1991. 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been a valued partner through Operations Desert 

ShieldlDesert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Libya. The Emirates 

participated in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, flying as part of NATO's effort and the 

Emiratis have increased the number of their troops and aircraft deployed to Afghanistan even as 

other nations are drawing down. The UAE is also a leader in the Gulf for air and missile defense 

capabilities. Their Foreign Military Sales purchases total $18.1 billion and include the Theater 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, valued at approximately $3.5 billion, a highly 

capable and wholly defensive system that will contribute to regional stability and our 

interoperability. The UAE was the first foreign government to purchase this system. Their 

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many contributions to collective defense and their close military ties over decades mark UAE as 

one of our strongest friends within the region, deserving of our continued close engagement and 

tangible FMS support. 

Qatar is taking an increasingly active role within the region, supporting operations in Libya with 

both military and humanitarian aid. Qatar continues to demonstrate leadership in its foreign 

policy, including spearheading an Arab League resolution suspending Syria's membership. 

Qatar has placed wide-ranging sanctions on Syria in response to the Assad regime's violence 

against its own citizens and has played a leading role in helping the Syrian opposition to improve 

its organization and capabilities. We enjoy excellent military relations with this country that has 

generously hosted several of our forward headquarters and facilities. 

Home to our sole main naval operating base in the Middle East, Bahrain has been an important 

friend and partner for many decades, and provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. 

Navy's Fifth Fleet and providing facilities for other U.S. Forces engaged in regional security. 

The strong U.S.-Bahrain relationship is particularly critical in the face of the threat Iran poses to 

regional stability. Over the past several years, Bahrain has faced internal challenges. 

USCENTCOM works closely with others in the U.S. government to advance a message of 

support for dialogue and reform in Bahrain, which will be key to ensuring thc country's stability 

and security. The United States supports Bahrain's National Dialogue and the government's 

ongoing efforts to implement recommendations from the Bahrain Independent Commission of 

Inquiry (BICI) report. We will continue to be a strong partner of Bahrain and the Bahraini 

people in the years ahead. 

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Oman is strategically located along the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean and has played a 

steadying role and been a voice of moderation in the region for many years. We have a shared 

appreciation of the situation in the Gulf and Oman provides valued perspective for maintaining 

regional stability. We enjoy trusted military relations with the professional Omani Armed Forces 

and we are enhancing interoperability through exercises and Foreign Military Sales. 

In the face of intense regional pressure and internal economic crisis, Jordan endures as one of 

our most dependable allies in the region. Political refornl is clearly occurring even as the 

spillover of Syrian refugees severely impacts a challenging economic situation. Always a leader 

in the region, King Abdullah II continues to press forward with many political changes to 

strengthen Jordan's democratic processes. On the international front, he advocates for reenergizing the Middle East Peace. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) continue to provide 

strong leadership and perform admirably and professionally while stretched thin, and while 

continuing to deploy troops in support ofISAF in Afghanistan. The JAF provides protection and 

humanitarian relief to the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees who have fled to Jordan over the 

last two years. Our continued support for Jordan, including building the capacity of the JAF, has 

never been more critical. A stable and secure Jordan is a needed bulwark now more than ever. 

Iraq remains at the geo-strategic center of the Middle East. Iraq is also the fourth largest Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) partner in the region, and ninth in the world. As we work to develop a 

new strategic relationship with the Iraqi government, our desired end state is a sustained U.S.-

Iraqi partnership in which Iraq becomes a proactive security partner with their neighbors in the 

region. A shared border with Iran is a reality as is the spillover of Syria's civil war that can 

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reignite sectarian violence in Iraq. Our military-to-military relationship forged in recent years is 

the foundation for developing the desired strategic partnership. U.S. security assistance and 

FMS are key tools for building and shaping Iraq's defense capabilities and integrating Iraqi 

security forces into the region, anchored by U.S. materiel and training. Recently convened 

Defense and Security Joint Coordination Committees have helped in this regard and 

USCENTCOM continues expanding security cooperation activities that deepen our military-tomilitary ties with Iraq, to include opening doors for Iraqis to participate in our regional exercises. 

Internally today, the security environment in Iraq continues to present significant challenges, and 

the United States is supporting the Government ofIraq's efforts to confront these threats. The 

imperfect political processes still keep most of the tensions from creating havoc. However, 

persistent Arab-Kurd tensions and increasing Sunni discontent exacerbated by events in Syria 

and a sustained violent AQI threat - diminish their regional leadership potential as well as their 

internal stability. Now the world's third largest producer of oil and desirous of the nceded 

stability for exporting its oil, Iraq's long tcrm interests align more closely with its Arab 

neighbors in the GCC than with Iran. With our pcrsistent cfforts over time, Iraq could become a 

partner that is both a consumer and provider of security in the region. 

Egypt remains one of the most important pmtners in the pursuit of regional peace and stability in 

USCENTCOM's theater of operations. They continue to support our over-flight permissions and 

Suez Canal transit courtesies and maintain a field hospital in Afghanistan in support ofthc 

NATO campaign. The Egyptian military is also deploying peacekeeping troops in Darfur, 

Sudan. The ceasefire agreement with Israel is holding and Israeli military leaders have noted 

that Gaza is quieter today than it has been in years. In the Sinai, the Egyptians are taking steps to 

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improve security by relocating border detection equipment to counter smuggling activities and 

establishing a National Agency for Development and Reconstruction. Further. their military has 

created quick response forces to improve security for the Multinational Force and Observers 

Force stationed in the Sinai, which includes around 600 U.S. troops. The political situation 

remains fluid thus heightening the potential for further changes, and this dynamic could place 

strains on the network of relations bctwcen Egypt and its neighbors that have historically been 

critical to the anticipation and mitigation of emergent crises. Additionally, the dire state of the 

Egyptian economy remains a cause of concern and a driver of internal dissent. Our relationship 

with the Egyptian senior military leadership remains on a firm footing characterized by candid 

and professional discussions. Our military assistance plays a major role in protecting our 

interests and is crucial to the modernization and interoperability ofthe Egyptian Arnled Forces 

and USCENTCOM endorses its continued support without conditionality. 

As the sole multi-confessional security institution in Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces 

(LAF) is a unifying force and the principal governmental organization viewed positively by the 

Lebanese from all sectarian groups. In light of the ongoing situation in Syria, our various forms 

of aid to the LAF are vital to maintaining Lebanon's intemal stability and helping to guard 

against the spillover violence from across the Syrian border. Our program providing military 

training and material support to the LAF has enabled them to be a more effective counterbalance to violent extremists within Lebanon. Our shared goal is to support the Lebanese 

government to be responsive to the peoples' needs while allowing the LAF to build into the 

principal security force in a country long abused by extremists and externally supported militias. 

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In Yemen, President Hadi has made important progress implementing the GCC-sponsored 

political transition agreement. He continues to exhibit sound leadership and a strong 

commitment to reform. To support the Yemeni government's implementation of the agreement, 

we are working closely with the Ministry of Dcfense to restructure and professionalize the 

military and security apparatus to effectively deal with critical national security threats. The 

economic situation, already degraded by a long period ofuurcst, remains vulnerable and poses a 

significant threat to stability. The security situation remains fragile due to the threats posed by 

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Iran's destabilizing activities. We continue our 

support to the national unity government to reduce the opportunity for violent extremists to hold 

terrain, challenge the elected government, or conduct operations against U.S. interests in the 

region or the homeland. 

As the crisis in Syria enters its third year, there is little evidence to suggest the conflict's end is 

imminent. Russia and China's regrettable vetoes in the U.N. and Iran and Hezbollah's full 

support have helped the Asad regime to remain defiant in the face of international condemnation. 

The regime has shown a growing willingness to escalate violence in pursuit of its goal to retain 

power at all costs. The regime's use of ballistic missiles since December 2012 perhaps best 

illustrates this point: Over 80 of these largely inaccurate but highly destructive weapons have 

been launched thus far, with little regard for collateral civilian population casualties. The regime 

has used almost every conventional weapon in its arsenal and we maintain a constant watch for 

any employment of its chemical and biological weapons (CBW). As the conflict spreads, 

potentially threatening the security of the regime's CBW stockpile, it will be increasingly 

difficult to track the vulnerability and status of these weapons. 

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The conflict has already resulted in an unprecedented level of violence, with the United Nations 

assessing more than 70,000 dead and nearly one million refugees fleeing the bloodshed (as of 

mid-Feb 2013). Despite tangible gains by the opposition, the Syrian military maintains its core 

capabilities including ground forces, special operations forces, air forces, integrated air defense 

systems (lADS), and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). Moreover, while the opposition has 

inflicted significant losses on Syria's military and eroded Asad's control over many parts of the 

country, the regime has responded with paramilitary operations assisted by sustained Iranian 

financial and lethal support. Hezbollah is now heavily committed as a critical partner of the 

Syrian regime, providing training and oversight to the Shabiha militia in conjunction with Iranian 

support. This cooperation between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah stands in contrast to the relative 

disunity of the Syrian Opposition which is further encumbered by the malign influence of Al 

Nusrahl AQ-related groups. 

In Pakistan we face a confluence of issues that challenge the Pakistan government and our 

ability to provide assistance. The political and security environment in Pakistan is impacted by 

terrorist attacks and ethno-sectarianism and a civilian government with tenuous control in parts 

ofthc country, radicalization of segments of the population, overstretched military, strained 

relationships with neighbors, and dealing with frequent natural disasters. The United States has a 

vested interest in Pakistan's sustainability as a nation and despite challenges in the U.S.-Pakistan 

relationship, they are an important regional partner that has sacriticed greatly in the war on 

terror. They must playa constructive role if Afghanistan is to achieve long-term stability. 

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The U.S.-Pakistan relationship in 2012 began at a low point as Pakistan maintained the closure 

of the U.S.lISAF ground lines of communication (GLOC) to Afghanistan in response to the 

tragic November 2011 incident at Salala. The relationship has steadily improved since the 

GLOC reopened in July 2012 when we resumed security cooperation with Pakistan's Army and 

concluded an agreement that permits two-way flow on the GLOC. We also concluded a tripartite 

U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan agreement to facilitate better coordination and complementary 

operations on both sides of the border that disrupt the enemies' freedom of movement and help 

prevent another fratricide incident. In December, we held our first high-level bilateral Defense 

Consultative Group in more than 18 months. We resumed strategic-level talks and committed to 

implement a framework for defense cooperation that promotes peace and stability within the 

region, based on areas of converging interests and principles of mutual respect and transparency. 

Subsequently, we have held operational level talks, including through the recent Defense 

Resourcing Conference and Military Consultative Committee, which focused on synchronization 

of our efforts to build Pakistan's capabilities to achieve our common objectives. Continued 

support for Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and the 

Coalition Support Fund will provide the necessary tools to keep our military-to-military 

relationship on a solid footing. 

In Afghanistan, ISAF operations and an increasingly capable ANSF have degraded the enemy's 

capability. The counterinsurgency campaign has made gains and created space for the Afghan 

government to continue to make progress toward long-term stability after thirty-plus years of 

war. Transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to the ANSF continues. Tranche 4 has 

been announced and will soon move into the Transition Phase, after which 87% of the population 

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will be in areas secured by the ANSF. To that end, ANSF units are demonstrating increasing 

confidence and capability. As the ANSF assumes full security lead, the Coalition will continue 

its transition to a security force assistance (SFA) role. These SFA Teams (SFATs) will focus not 

only on the Afghan National Army (ANA) maneuver units and the Afghan Uniformed Police 

(AUP), but will also work to develop a greater level of autonomy for key higher headquarters, 

district and provinciallevcl components within the ANSF. With sustained u.s. and international 

support, in accordance with NATO's Lisbon and Chicago decisions, the ANSF will have the 

capability to prevent the return of terrorist safe havens and prevent a Taliban re-ernergence as a 

dominant force. 

However, our mission is not yet complete and our hard-fought gains must be strengthened. As 

the final tranches of security transition are implemented, Afghanistan will undergo three critical 

transitions: the assumption of full security lead by thc ANSF, elections in the spring 0[2014 

with thc transfer of authority to a new Afghan administration, and the redeployment of the 

majority ofISAF forces. The success of these transitions relies on continued financial support 

from the international community, particularly for training, advising and equipping the ANSF. 

In the current context of global fiscal austerity, demonstrated U.S. leadership through continued 

support of Afghanistan will be critical to maintaining Coalition cohesion. I greatly appreciate 

your support for the Afghan Security Forces Fund, which will continue to be a necessity through 

2018. Not supporting the ANSF will greatly limit our ability to prevent the return oftcrrorist 

safe havens and a Taliban resurgence that threatens the Afghan Government. Our enemies are 

hedging and contemplating whether the opportunity will arise for them to pursue their agendas. 

Specific tools such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program, Lift and Sustain, 

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Coalition Support Funds, Coalition Readiness Support Program and the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund need your support if we are to achieve a successful transition. 

The Central Asian States remain key supporting partners for our Afghanistan Strategic 

Partnership and are concerned about U.S. long-term engagement with the region. They share our 

priority to maintain security in the region after the transition in Afghanistan. As we transition. 

maintaining access to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for logistical resupply of the 

Afghan campaign and retrograde operations is of particular importance as we seek to promote 

stability and assure our partners of our continued commitment to the region. The development of 

the NDN has been a critical investment to that end and cooperation with our Central Asian 

partners will continue post-2014. Solidifying international support for the New Silk Road 

initiative, now and after the drawdown in Afghanistan, will increase economic development, 

contribute to stability across Central Asia, and may help mitigate the impact of a potential 

economic vacuum that illicit industries might otherwise fill. Coupled with our NDN efforts, 

USCENTCOM will continue to provide military assistance focused on building partner capacity 

and capabilities to combat terrorists and counter illegal trafficking in all its forms. In addition, 

we will work closely with several of our willing partners who are committed to developing 

deployable peacekeeping units. Programs and authorities such as Section 1206 (Global Train 

and Equip Fund) and the new Global Security Contingency Fund, together with the National 

Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) represent cost-effective means for the United States to 

respond to emerging opportunities for building partner capacity. 

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Our relationship with Kazakhstan continues to mature from one of security assistance to a 

security partnership. In November 2012, we signed a Five-Year Military Cooperation Plan 

(2013-2017) and a Three-Year Plan of Cooperation in support of Kazakhstan's Partnership for 

Peace Training Center. Both agreements will assist Kazakhstan in realizing its objective to 

deploy a company-sized unit in support of a United Nations peacekeeping operation by 2015. 

Towards this end, Kazakhstan will undergo aNA TO peacekeeping evaluation and certification 

process at STEPPE EAGLE, a peacekeeping exercise co-sponsored by Kazakhstan and the U.S. 

scheduled for August 2013. Kazakhstan remains a force for stability within the region and 

supports our efforts in Afghanistan through facilitation of the NDN. 

Kyrgyzstan continues to be a key partner for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region. Our 

military relationship continues to improve, particularly in the areas of regional security and 

military security cooperation. Kyrgyzstan aims to deploy a U.S.-trained peacekeeping mission 

within the next two years. The Kyrgyz provision of general access and over flight and use of the 

Manas Transit Center remain key factors for successful operations in Afghanistan. 

For Tajikistan, building and maintaining counter-terrorism, border security and counternarcotics capability to protect our mutual interests from the threat of YEOs are important for 

regional stability. In concert with our counter-terrorism effotis. we are working with Tajikistan 

to improve disaster response capabilities. Tajikistan is committed to deploying their U.S.-trained 

peacekeeping battalion on a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 2014. We continue to use 

the transit routes along the Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (KKT) route of the NDN and 

explore options to facilitate the transit of goods and access in the event of a crisis. 

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Turkmenistan's policy of positive neutrality governs the shape and pace of our security 

assistance relationship. This is illustrated in their preference for non-military, non-alliance 

exchanges, such as those hosted by the George C. Marshall Center and Near East Asia Center for 

Strategic Studies on broad, multilateral topics. Our bi-lateral security assistance relationship has 

seen modest growth focused on building their Caspian Sea and border security capacity. 

Our relationship with Uzbekistan continues to improve in a deliberate, balanced way driven by 

our common regional security concerns and expansion of the NON. Security cooperation 

provides increased opportunity for engagement. The bilateral agreements signed in 2012 are 

now being implemented and are beginning to produce important capabilities that support our 

campaign in Afghanistan. In November 2012, we conducted our first Bilateral Defense 

Consultations, serving to focus and strengthen our military cooperation toward security threats of 

mutual concern. We expect cooperation with Uzbekistan to continue to progress. 

Required Capabilities: America faces hard fiscal realities and the Defense Department is 

undergoing a period of transition adapting to decreased budgets. U.S. Central Command, along 

with the rest of DoD and thc interagency, will do less with less, but we will not do it less well. 

CENTCOM will remain tenacious stewards oftaxpayer resources as we seek to develop and 

employ innovative ways and means to achieve our ends. 

It is vitally important to invest in relationship development and expand the capacity and 

capability of our regional partners. To accomplish this, we must adapt USCENTCOM's 

presence and Regional Security Cooperation through strategic reposturing of our forces and by 

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providing these forces with the neccssary support. We also work to maintain access and 

presence that provide both crisis response and pre-positioning of critical combat assets and 

equipment should the need for reinforcements arise. Finally, we need to maintain robust 

international training opportunities in U.S. schools for their otlicers as well as multinational 

exercises as we work to promote regional security and stability by, with and through our 

partners. 

As the war in Afghanistan draws down and our presence reduces, it becomes increasingly 

important to cultivate strategic partnerships that enable sustained stability. We will need to 

continue to leverage combined training with our partners and build coalition integration for longterm security in the region. USCENTCOM's exercise and engagement program will enable 

critical mission rehearsals with partners across the entire military spectrum of operations -

reducing the risk of denied access while enhancing interoperability with our partners and 

creating mutual awareness. This approach will build confidence and enable lower cost mil-tomil engagement and training activities. 

Reposturing for the future, our enduring locations and projects support both a steady state and 

surge basing capacity, air-refueling, air operations, command and controL and special operations 

missions to preserve freedom of movement and strategic reach. Our presence also serves to 

demonstratc U.S. commitment to our allies, partners and foes. Our partners, in tum, provide 

locations that support critical access for current and future contingency operations while 

improving their forces and building interoperability with USCENTCOM. 

24 
72 

The Iranian Threat Network and Ballistic Missile capability continue to pose a great threat in the 

region. These threats are expanding in quantity and quality and our focus on the nuclear threat 

will not divert our attention from the larger issues related to Iran's malign influence, as 

demonstrated through Lebanese Hezbollah and others of their ilk who are working with Iran's 

support to destabilize the region. Given Iran's intent to drive us out of the region, to undercut 

our partners, and its stated threats to disrupt international oil trade, our commitment and 

reassurance to our regional partners and allies have become the lynchpins to regional security 

and stability. Our efforts to advance regional integrated air and missile defense help foster U.S. 

and GCC coordination and advances GCe capabilities in this area. This also reduces risk to U.S. 

and partner deterrence and response capabilities and preserves freedom of movement. Iran's 

bombastic threats against the Strait of Hormuz, support for violent proxies and demonstrated 

military capabilities make the goal of enhancing GCC-wide missile defense capabilities and 

strengthening collaboration with our forces all the more important. 

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be the most persistent and lethal weapon 

confronting our forces, those of our partner nations, and local populaces throughout the Area of 

Responsibility with an average of 172 incidents per month over the past two years, principally 

but not solely in Afghanistan. We continue to execute a comprehensive program with the keenly 

focused Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to deter and defeat 

the lED threat in the region and we appreciate Congress' counter-homemade explosives 

legislation provision. 

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73 

Our strategic communications and infonnation operations programs provide non-lethal tools to 

disrupt terrorist recruitment and propaganda within the region. In tenns of both outcomes and 

cost, these programs are highly-effective complementary activities vital to our strategy in the 

region: they allow us to exert presence, even while our combat forces in the region are reducing. 

They provide the human socio-cultural data, media analysis, internet video products, and multimedia campaign that include attributable social media and the Regional Web Interaction program 

(RWIP) to counter current and future threats. They also enable the dissemination ofregionally 

focused infonnation that counters violent extremist ideology and propaganda, amplifies 

moderate voices within the region, and degrades adversary dominance of the infonnation 

domain. 

These relatively inexpensive activities support interagency efforts to counter violent extremist 

ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that AI Qaeda and other terrorists exploit. To 

make this supportable across the Defense enterprise requires an enduring funding mechanism 

that DOD and OUf partners can rely on. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential 

to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the governments and populations we are trying 

to support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American 

lives, and reduce the need for expensive responses to terrorist attacks. We seek your support to 

sustain and expand these efforts. 

As T travel throughout the AOR and see the promise of new initiatives and the risk posed by 

numerous challenges, I receive requests from military leaders across the region to increase 

intelligence sharing between our militaries. Many show detennination to make tough decisions 

26 
74 

and prioritize limited resources to oppose antagonists seeking to destabilize their countries or use 

them to plan and stage attacks against the U.S. homeland. With this in mind, and in order to 

demonstrate our commitment, I requested the Intelligence Community to begin drafting 

releasable products for our most trusted partners in the Levant, on the Arabian Peninsula, in the 

Central Asian States, and in South Asia as a standard practice rather than the exception. 

I am encouraged by the personal attention the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is 

giving these matters. Director Clapper's strong emphasis and encouragement for the intelligence 

community to produce intelligence in a manner that eases our ability to responsibly share 

infom1ation with our military counterparts creates a stronger, more focused front against our 

common enemies and builds our partner nations' confidence. We are grateful for the nimble 

manner in which our intelligence community has strengthened our efforts to checkmate more of 

our enemy's designs. 

Conclusion: Thank you for your continued support to U.S. Central Command and to our troops 

engaged across the region. I recognize the difficult choices you must make as we confront fiscal 

realities. We continue to prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we 

rebalance our approach to work by, with and through our partners while continuing to build 

partner capacity and reduce our expenditures. 

As a Geographic Combatant Commander, the negative impact of a yearlong continuing 

resolution and/or sequestration would severely undercut the coherence of our efforts. As 

conveyed in recent testimony by DepSecDefCarter before this committee, "The consequences of 

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75 

sequestration and lowering of discretionary caps ar.e serious and far-reaching. In the near-term, 

reductions would create [are creating] an immediate crisis in military readiness, especially if 

coupled with an extension of the Continuing Resolution under which we currently operate. In 

the long-term, failure to replace large arbitrary budget cuts with sensible and balanced deficit 

reduction require this nation to change its defense strategy." The Department continues to 

protect operations and priority activities in high threat area~, which will result in less initial 

impact on my current operations. However, impacts on readiness, investments and the civilian 

workforce are certain as well as other areas that are necessary to support our national security 

strategy and maintain options for the President. USCENTCOM will weather the challenges we 

face in the short term. We absorbed reductions in FY12 and will do our part to reduce spending 

this year as well. We prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we balance 

our approach to work by, with and through our partners. Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will do 

its best to do what is required to protect U.S. national security interests in a region undergoing 

social and political change and in the face of declining resources for our own defense. 

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76 

General James N. Mattis, Commander 

Gen. James N. Mattis serves as commander, U.S. Central 

Command (USCENTCOM), located in Tampa, FL. 

Gen. Mattis has commanded at multiple levels. As a lieutenant, he 

served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander in the 3rd 

Marine Division. As a captain, he commanded a rifle company 

and a weapons company in the I st Marine Brigade. 

As a major, he commanded Recruiting Station Portland. As a 

lieutenant colonel, he commanded 1 st Battalion, 7th Marines, one 

of Task Force Ripper's assault battalions in Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm. As a colonel, he commanded 7th Marines (Reinforced). 

Upon becoming a brigadier general, he commanded first the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

and then Task Force 58, during Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan. As a 

major general, he commanded the 1st Marine Division during the initial attack and subsequent 

stability operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

In his first tour as a lieutenant general, he commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command and served as the deputy commandant for combat development. He also commanded 

the I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central 

Command. Previous to this assignment, he served as both NATO's Supreme Allied Commander 

Transformation from 2007-2009 and as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2007-

2010. 

Gen. Mattis, a native of the Pacific Northwest, graduated from Central Washington State 

University in 1972. He is also a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare SchooL Marine Corps 

Command and Staff College, and the National War College. 
77 

POSTURE STATEMENT OF 

ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN 

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 113"h CONGRESS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

March 6, 2013 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to address this committee, the second 

in my tenure as the 9th commander of United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM). 

USSOCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands, yet it is 

distinct in that it exercises numerous Service, military 

department, and defense agency-like responsibilities. Under 

Title 10 U.S. Code Sections 164 and 167, it is my legal 

responsibility to organize, train and equip my force; to build a 

strategy that supports the goals and obj ecti ves of the Defense 

Strategic Guidance; and to provide combat ready forces to the 

President and the Secretary of Defense to meet the challenges of 

today's security environment. 

USSOCCOM Strategy - SOF 2020 

In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued his Defense 

Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Chairman followed with his 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The DSG describes 

the Joint Force of the future as "agile, flexible, ready" and 

possessing global reach, thereby directing "the j oint force to 
78 

capitalize on networks and inter-dependency to maximize 

effectiveness in deterrence and evolving war." Building on this 

imperative, the CCJO envisions a "globally postured Joint Force .. 

that quickly combiners] capabilities with itself and mission 

partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and 

organizational affiliations." Special Operations Forces are 

uniquely suited to implement the guidance outlined in these 

documents. Specifically, SOF are "rapidly deployable ... have 

operational reach... [are] persistent ... and do not constitute an 

irreversible policy commitment." General Dempsey concluded his 

Capstone Document with the statement that military success in 

today's environment is "about building a stronger network to 

defeat the networks that confront us." 

We live in a world in which the threats have become 

increasingly networked and pose complex and dynamic risks to 

U.S. interests around the world. These networks are diversifying 

their acti vi ties, resulting in the convergence of threats that 

were once linear. In today's environment, this convergence can 

have explosive and destabilizing effects there is no such 

thing as a local problem. In the words of former Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton, "Extremist networks squeezed in one 

country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a cell in 

Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu 

virus in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and 

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79 

globalization have made our countries and our communities 

interdependent and interconnected. And today's threats have 

become so complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one 

nation could ever hope to solve them alone. u 

To address these problems, we must adopt a global perspective. 

With SOF deployed in over 75 countries on a daily basis, I can 

provide a global view of the problem and help link and 

synchronize global effects across geographic boundaries. 

However, as the SOCOM Commander, with some unique exceptions, I 

do not command and control any forces in combat or crisis. I am 

a "supporting commander u to the Geographic Combatant Commanders 

and the Chiefs of Mission (COMs). It is my job to provide them 

the best Special Operations Force in the world. It is their 

job, to employ those forces in support of U. S. policy. Special 

Operations Forces do nothing, absolutely nothing, without the 

approval of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the 

Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Mission 

nothing. To best serve the interest of the GCCs and the Chiefs 

of Mission, SOCOM is developing a plan to enhance its already 

global force by networking with our u.S. interagency 

counterparts, and our foreign allies and partners around the 

globe. We aim to provide GCCs and Chiefs of Mission with 

improved special operations capacity and are aligning 

structures, processes, and authorities that enable the network. 

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80 

The Global SOF Network 

Given strategic guidance, increasing fiscal constraints, 

and the networked and dispersed nature of conflict, SOF will 

play an increasingly critical role in the Joint Force of the 

future. And although SOF usually only garner attention for highstakes raids and rescues, direct action missions are only a 

small part of what we do, albeit a very important part. USSOCOM 

will continue to ensure our nation has the best precision strike 

force in the world. We will not let up on that front. However, 

I'd like to emphasize that, in fact, on any given day USSOF are 

working with our allies around the world, helping build 

indigenous special operations capacity so that our partners can 

effecti vely deal with the threa t of violent extremist groups, 

insurgents, and narco-terrorists themselves. Indeed, SOF 

focuses intently on building partner capacity and security force 

assistance so that local and regional threats do not become 

global and thus more costly - both in blood and treasure. 

Accordingly, with the support of the GCCs and Chiefs of 

Mission, USSOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to 

support our interagency and international partners in order to 

gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and 

opportunities. The network enables small, persistent presence in 

critical locations, and facilitates engagement where necessary 

or appropriate - all under the authority of the GCC and COM. 

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81 

Through civil-military support elements and support to 

public diplomacy, SOF directly support interagency efforts to 

counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of 

violence that al-Qa'ida and other terrorists exploit. These 

efforts to prevent terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and 

mobilization are critical to defeating this dangerous ideology 

in the future; neither we nor our partners can kill our way to 

victory in this fight. These efforts require continuity and 

perseverance. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the 

potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the 

governments and populations we are trying to support. Over the 

long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, 

protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive 

response to terrorist attacks. 

To this end, using already programmed force structure, USSOCOM 

is methodically enhancing the capabilities of the Theater 

Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) based on a multi-year 

deliberate process supported by detailed analysis and war 

gaming. The goal is to increase the capacity and capabilities of 

the TSOC and their assigned forces to the GCCs to conduct full 

spectrum special operations ranging from building partner 

capacity (particularly in austere, high-risk or sensitive 

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82 

environments) to irregular warfare and counterterrorism. 

In partnership with the GCCs, COM, TSOCs, other U. S. 

Government agencies and partner nations, USSOCOM is working to 

develop opportunities to improve our partnership with regional 

Special Operations Forces. This approach was very successful in 

NATO, with the establishment of the NATO SOF Headquarters which 

allowed U. S. and partner nations to share information, improve 

interoperability and, when necessary, work together abroad. 

While the NATO construct is unique in the world, we believe 

there are other low-key opportunities that may present 

themselves in other regions of the world. 

In addition to the SOF capacity inherent in all GCCs through 

the TSOCs, USSOCOM also employs Special Operations Liaison 

Officers (SOLOs) in key U. S. embassies around the world. SOLOs 

are in-country SOF advisors to the U.S. Country Team. They 

advise and assist partner nation SOF and help to synchronize 

activities with the host nation. Currently, there are SOLOs in 

Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Jordan, Poland, Colombia, 

France, Turkey, Kenya, and Italy. 

Similarly, as part of the global SOF network here at home, 

one-to-three person Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) 

work with our interagency partners in the National Capital 

Region (NCR). They comprise the SOF liaison network that assists 

in synchronizing DoD planning for training, exercises and 

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83 

operations. Currently, we have SOSTs working within 19 u.s. 

Government departments and agencies. 

Given the importance of interagency collaboration, USSOCOM is 

placing greater emphasis on its presence in the National Capital 

Region (NCR) to better support coordination and decision making 

wi th interagency partners. Thus, USSOCOM began to consolida te 

its presence in the NCR in early 2012. This is not a 

duplication of effort. We are focused instead on consolidating 

USSOCOM elements in the Washington D.C. 

leadership of the USSOCOM Vice-Commander 

Washington. Specifically, USSOCOM-NCR 

region under the 

who resides in 

ensures that the 

perspectives and capabilities of interagency and international 

mission partners are incorporated into all phases of SOF 

planning efforts. The SOCOM NCR also conducts outreach to 

academia, non-governmental organizations, industry and other 

private sector organizations to get their perspective on complex 

issues affecting SOF. 

At the USSOCOM headquarters in Tampa, the staff will serve as 

the focal point for coordinating information that supports 

USSOCOM warfighters. It is here that USSOCOM will maintain the 

global perspective on all SOF activities in support of the GCCs 

and U.S. Chiefs of Mission. As such, SOCOM will support 

operations, intelligence, logistics, planning, communications, 

and provide critical information to enable forward deployed SOF 

7 
84 

to meet mission requirements. SOCOM will monitor SOF supporting 

campaigns, ensure that the Command is satisfying GCC theater 

requirements, maintain the global common operating picture for 

the SOF network, and monitor the readiness and availability of 

all U.S. SOF capabilities. The entire network will be enabled by 

the existing communications infrastructure. However, 

communication and information sharing must facilitate 

interconnectedness beyond the U.S.-only realm, and improve 

partner-nation capacity, interagency coordination, and 

stakeholder situational awareness by providing information 

technology infrastructure and communications services to unite 

U. S. and partner-nation SOF, plus other mission partners. This 

communications infrastructure will leverage existing networks 

and systems to avoid duplication of effort. 

As a whole, the SOF network represents a way to improve the 

support to the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission and to empower a 

global effort with capable allies and partners. Recognizing that 

we have much to learn from each other, working with partner SOF 

will build mutual trust, foster enduring relationships, and 

provide new opportunities to affect shared challenges. 

To this end, the SECDEF's authority to support foreign forces, 

irregular forces, and groups or individuals who support or 

facilitate ongoing military operations to combat terrorism ~ 

namely Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA remains critical to 

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85 

Special Operations. The drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will 

not diminish the need for 1208 authority. In fact, GCCs' demand 

for 1208 authority has increased, and the authority's utility is 

recognized as mission essential in winning their current fight. 

Preserve the Force and Fam~l~es 

A SOF Universal Truth is that "people are more important than 

hardware." We recognize that none of the efforts described in 

preceding paragraphs are possible without having the dedicated, 

professional SOF warriors to bring them to fruition. Hence, it 

is imperative that we do all that we can to preserve the force 

and care for their families. Therefore, to lessen the strain, 

we are seeking improvements in the predictability of SOF 

schedules - training, education, deployment, and rest. 

OSSOCOM must ensure our SOF warriors and their families are 

properly cared for and that we work to help them reduce the 

stress they face related to high operational tempos. Difficulty 

also occurs as forces reconnect and reintegrate into garrison 

and family acti vi ties. DOD provides preventive and responsive 

counseling, medical, psychological, and rehabilitative care to 

institutionalize the resiliency of our SOF warriors and their 

families. 

Everyone in the fight has been significantly changed by their 

experiences. Providing the treatment our troops need and 

reducing the stigma associated with asking for help is a top 

9 
86 

priori ty for all USSOCOM leaders. For our service members and 

their families, we are implementing programs identified as best 

practices and aggressively institutionalizing education for our 

Chaplains and Mental Health professionals to emphasize 

prevention-oriented care. Through human performance improvement, 

readiness, and spiritual growth, we hope to preserve our forces 

for the duration of their careers. Recognizing that the 

readiness of many of our service members is inextricably tied to 

the well-being and happiness of their families, we have sought 

to bolster the care afforded to them. Additionally, to increase 

the predictability of service members' time, USSOCOM will 

redouble our efforts to reach out to families by opening up 

communication channels at all levels of the command through 

innovative use of varied media. We are committed to sustaining 

our force and families and will not break faith with our SOF 

family. 

Maximizing SOF readiness also requires an enhanced capacity to 

anticipate and proactively preserve and manage the future force. 

r am implementing an enterprise-wide PERSTEMPO capability that 

",ill provide commanders increased visibility, fidelity, and 

ability to manage SOF readiness down to the individual servicemember level. Once fully implemented throughout the command by 

FY14, SOF commanders from the 0-5 level and above will have a 

near real-time common operating picture of SOF readiness. This 

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87 

new capability further enhances commanders' force management 

decision making, improves the quality of life for the SOF force, 

and offers promise for maximizing force readiness through 

improved recruitment, retention, and protection of investments 

in SOF personnel and the resources that enable them. 

Acquisition Excellence 

Mobili ty, lethality, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 

and survivability remain critical SOF enablers for the full 

spectrum of SOF operations. USSOCOM's unique acquisition 

authorities remain critical to meeting the rapid, information 

sensitive and operationally peculiar demands of Special 

Operations. Specifically, USSOCOM employs rapid and tailored 

acquisition strategies to modify Service-common equipment, 

enhance commercial items, or when required develop, procure 

and field SOF-peculiar equipment and services to respond to 

global requirements. 

USSOCOM will continue its emphasis on equipping SOF operators 

as a system. Development, procurement and fielding of the SOF 

individual equipment system (i.e. individual protection, visual 

augmentation systems, weapons and sights) needs to suit the wide 

variety of SOF tasks and environments. The Tactical Combat 

Casualty Care (TCCC) system and use of Freeze Dried Plasma (FOP) 

will combine to help care for wounded operators in remote and 

11 
88 

challenging environments, often at great distance from primary 

care facilities. 

To meet the wide range of SOF missions, OSSOCOM employs 

platforms that are both versatile and agile. For example, 

current acquisition efforts focus on equipping both manned and 

unmanned fixed wing assets with intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities suitable for diverse global 

requirements. The Non-Standard Aviation fleet of aircraft 

supports SOF intra-theater mobility, Aviation Foreign Internal 

Defense (AvFID), and manned ISR. The SOF fleet of Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft (RPA) - ranging from the man-portable RQ-20A 

Puma to the medium altitude MQ-9 Reaper - provides essential ISR 

capabilities and cutting edge sensor and communication 

technologies. OSSOCOM's ability to efficiently modify service 

common ISR assets with capabilities such as high definition (HD) 

full motion video (FMV) provides game-changing, operational 

effects at relatively small investment. 

OSSOCOM is continuing to execute programs to modernize its 

rotary wing and maritime mobility fleets, replacing legacy 

equipment such as the MH-60 K/L, Mark V Naval Special Warfare 

Rigid Hull Inflatable boat (RHIB), and SEAL Delivery Vehicle in 

the coming years. On the ground, USSOCOM will maintain a family 

of special operations tactical combat vehicles with 

customizable, mission-specific payloads. A Non-Standard 

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89 

Commercial Vehicle (NSCV) capability enables SOF operators to 

maintain a low profile among indigenous populations while 

providing necessary mobility and protection. 

Global SOF rely on the SOF Information Environment (SIE) to 

achieve full operational potential. Within the SIE, USSOCOM will 

continue to incorporate a SOF Deployable Node (SDN), a family of 

Wide Band SATCOM systems, and increased access to SIE voice, 

data and video services to deployed headquarters and operational 

elements. Simultaneously, USSOCOM will continue its efforts to 

downsize system profiles and footprint through engineering 

efficiencies of common and scalable components amongst SON 

variants, provide SIE access to tactical wireless users through 

SDN, and focus current efforts on providing SIE access to 

maritime and ground mobility platforms. 

USSOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate continues 

to pursue technology innovation, and utilizes a Special 

Operations Advanced Technology collaborative process for SOFcentric, S&T development. This process allows better 

synchronization of SOF-related technology initiatives with the 

Department of Defense and other government agencies to leverage 

external capital opportunities that address SOF capability gaps. 

S&T's near-term technology development efforts are focused on 

providing SOF operators with all-digital, multi-spectral visual 

augmentation systems and advanced novel materials to improve 

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90 

protection and survivability for personnel and platforms. 

Responsible Resourcing and Service Support 

Despite an increase in operational commitments over the last 

decade, we have been able to sustain our obligation to 

appropriately organize, train, and equip the warriors from whom 

we ask so much. We are aware of current budget uncertainties, 

and are therefore committed to only prudent use of resources 

provided to us by the taxpayers. I am committed to exercising 

common-sense steps to cost-cutting and cost-avoidance. The 

Command has begun to restructure and realign resources to 

support the SOF 2020 vision which reflects the nation's 

strategic priorities. Currently, we are able to execute the 

vision I have outlined in this document without any increase in 

either civilian or military manpower outside of current 

programmed growth or additional funding. I will continue to 

manage cost-growth in acquisition programs, and implement 

requirements of the Combatant Commanders, Executive Order 

mandates, and DoD auditability guidance. 

USSOCOM has successfully used the Rapid Acquisition Authority 

to source a validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) 

Statement for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

activities. USSOCOM will rely more heavily on this authority 

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91 

within the future fiscal environment. 

The Command's ability to execute rapid acquisition of its 

materiel and service programs is essential to deliver and field 

critical requirements and new technologies. USSOCOM's capacity 

to maintain a competitive advantage on the battlefield depends 

on out-thinking and outpacing the enemy in speed, technology, 

equipment, and maneuverability. SOF capabilities are directly 

related to investments we make through our procurement budget. 

USSOCOM, like the Services, has seen an extraordinary increase 

in operational 

battlefield has 

tempo. 

become 

Through 

smaller, 

advanced technologies, the 

highlighting a need for 

continued interoperability among the Services and SOF. SOF's 

reliance on the Services for institutional training, 

installation services and support particularly in forward 

deployed locations where SOF can only sus Lain itself for short 

periods of time remains critical. The Services' support for 

SOF's global persistent presence and annual deployments to over 

100 countries is both vital and very much appreciated. 

Conclusion 

Budget uncertainties which face the Department of Defense and 

USSOCOM are of great concern in Fiscal Year 2013. The SOF 

network, as a vital tool to support the President and SECDEF's 

national defense strategy, seeks a strong and flexible global 

network of SOF, United States government partners, and partner 

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92 

nations. We are working tirelessly to provide SOF capabilities 

and capacity to GCCs and Chiefs of Mission; capabilities and 

capacities that are supported by the required structures, 

processes, and authorities necessary for success. In the 

immediate future, and as stated by Chairman Dempsey, the "Joint 

Force 2020 must protect_~gainst threats that routinely span 

regional boundaries." Notably, as presented by former Secretary 

Clinton at the International Special Operations Forces Week in 

May of last year, "Special Operations Forces exemplify the ethic 

of smart power fast and flexible, constantly adapting, 

learning new languages and cultures, dedicated to forming 

partnerships where we can work together." Your support will 

ensure USSOCOM's continued ability to successfully address the 

most challenging security demands of our nation. 

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93 

United States Navy 

Biography .. 

Admiral William H. McRaven 

Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

United States Navy 

Adm. McRaven is the ninth commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 

headquartered at MacDili Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations 

forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide. 

McRaven served from June 2008 to June 2011 as the 11 th commander of JOint Special Operations Command 

(JSOC) headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C. JSOC is charged to study special operations requirements and 

techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations 

exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics. 

McRaven served from June 2006 to March 2008 as commander, Special Operations Command Europe 

(SOCEUR). In addition to his duties as commander, SOCEUR, he was designated as the first director of the 

NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre where he was charged with enhancing the capabilities 

and interoperability of ali NATO Special Operations Forces. 

McRaven has commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as 

deputy commanding general for Operations at JSOC; commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group One; 

commander of SEAL Team Three; task group commander in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; 

task unit commander during Desert Storm and Desert Shield; squadron commander at Naval Special Warfare 

Development Group; and, SEAL platoon commander at Underwater Demolition Team 21/SEAL Team Four. 

McRaven's diverse staff and interagency experience includes aSSignments as the director for Strategic 

Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council Staff; assessment director at 

USSOCOM, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the chief of staff at Naval Special Warfare 

Group One. 

Me Raven's professional education includes assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School, where he helped 

establish, and was the first graduate from, the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum. 
94 

Statement of 

General William M. Fraser III, United States Air Force 

Commander, United States Transportation Command 

Before the House Armed Services Committee 

On the State of the Command 

March 6, 2013 
95 

INTRODUCING THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

Mission/Organization 

It is an honor to represent the men and women of the United States Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM). Our Total Force team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial 

partners, and contractors leads a world-class Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) 

providing reliable and seamless logistical support to our warfighters and their families around the globe. 

Our service component commands the Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 

(SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC); 

our functional component command the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU); and our subordinate 

command the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) provide tremendous capabilities that we 

merge into transportation solutions to deliver effective support to the combatant commanders at the best 

value to the Nation. Together, we deliver global transportation services and enabling capabilities to our 

warfighters that no other nation can match. 

Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining the Nation's capability to project power 

and influence anywhere, anytime. As the Distribution Process Owner (DPO), USTRANSCOM focuses 

on end-to-end perfonnance and on providing the most value by targeting process improvements and 

enterprise pcrfonnance measurements. Our mission as Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS) 

complements the DPO role by integrating transportation solutions into theater posture plans in the 

carliest planning phase possible. We are working with all combatant commands (COCOMs), 

interagency, Non-Governmental Organizations, supporting nations, and industry partners to develop 

regional distribution campaign plans, with an eye toward process, global touch-points, and measureable 

delivery. Additionally, we are hard at work on a series of measures to reduce the cost of operations and 

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96 

maintain effectiveness to those who depend on us-while encouraging continued and expanded use of the 

Defense Transportation System (DTS). 

Planning for the Future 

Our goal is to be the U.S. Government's transportation and enabling capabilities provider of choice. 

To meet the numerous challenges and take advantage of the enormous opportunities for continuing to 

rapidly project national power and influence well into the future, USTRANSCOM has proactively 

embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative 5-year strategic plan. This strategic plan is positioning 

us to effectively and efficiently respond to our rapidly changing operating environment while accounting 

for the dynamic fiscal landscape we now face. 

First, we will preserve enterprise readiness by ensuring unfettered access to organic and commercial 

transportation resources. Our Readiness Roadmap will better leverage our organic assets, as well as the 

unique strengths and contributions of our commercial partners, and identifies the steps we must take to 

wisely transition from a decade of conflict to become a leaner, more efficient and more collaborative 

manager oflhe defense transportation enterprise. 

Second, we will achieve excellence in information technology (IT) management, by promoting 

increased knowledge-sharing and transparency across the enterprise. In our unique roles as Distribution 

Process Owner and Global Distribution Synchronizer, we recognize we must develop and sustain a 

secure infonnation environment that ensures effective knowledge-sharing and decision-making even 

while operating in a contested cyber domain. We have already begun building a functionally-managed 

IT framework to identify and align resources to our most critical needs. 

Third, we are re-baselining our internal roles, functions and responsibilities in order to match 

human and capital resources for projected future mission activities. This realignment enhances 
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collaboration, matches skills to processes and creates a more disciplined. transparent resourcing process 

in order to achieve sound resource stewardship while remaining responsive to those who depend on us to 

effectively execute in an increasingly dynamic operational environment. 

Finally, but most importantly, we are better equipping our people with the knowledge, skills, and 

training to maintain our world-class, customer-focused professionals. The enhancements we are 

achieving in our diverse workforce of Active, Guard and Reserve military components, civilian 

employees, and contractors will further enhance support for global mobility across the transportation 

enterprise. 

Supporting Global Operations 

Current fiscal realities have resulted in funding reductions for all Services. USTRANSCOM 

requirements are driven by our customer workload and readiness requirements. If COCOM demands 

are reduced, our workload will also be reduced. While these impacts will not occur immediately, the 

long-term results may directly impact our ability to execute critical missions of our supported COCO Ms. 

The capacity to project national power, presence, and influence worldwide is unique to the United 

States. To support this vital national capability, we lead a team of dedicated professionals in providing 

global mobility and strategic enablers. USTRANSCOM provides the ideal blend of operational 

expertise and distribution know-how to move and sustain the force worldwide. Together, we deliver 

unparalleled service to multiple COCOMs in support of their theater campaign plans and contingency 

operations. Our team has an unrelenting passion to meet a vision of coordinated, synchronized, and 

responsive end-to-end logistics which ensures that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines. Coast 

Guardsmen, and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) civilians always have the support they require. 
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USTRANSCOM oversees the global mobility enterprise; our component commands execute the 

mission. In 2012, AMC and its Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard partners maintained a high 

operations tempo supporting requirements around the world. AMC deployed, to multiple locations, a 

rotational force of over 30 C-130 Hercules tactical airlift aircraft and 60 KC-135 Stratotanker and KC10 Extender aerial refueling aircraft. The strategic airlift fleet flew over 1,400 C-5 missions and 13,000 

C-17 missions supporting the full range of national interests. In total, AMC moved 584.000 tons of 

cargo, offloaded 194 million gallons of fuel, and moved 1.7 million passengers while flying 127,000 

sorties. On the surface, MSC and SDDC transported over 7.4 million tons of cargo worldwide. In 

addition, MSC's point-to-point tankers delivered 1.4 billion gallons of fuel in support of global DOD 

requirements. 

During 2012, more than 900 J10CC personnel performed 27 operational deployments and 

participated in 39 joint exercises in support of COCOM requirements. JECC's highly skilled Active and 

Reserve Component personnel rapidly deployed as mission-tailored planning teams to assist combatant 

commanders in establishing, organizing, and opcrating joint force headquarters during numerous 

operations, and provided unmatched deployable joint communications and public affairs expertise, 

whenever and wherever needed. 

OUf functional comnlanci. the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit, provided necessary augmenting 

capability to a wide array offunctions across the Command. This augmentation has been particularly 

important during numcrous surge and contingency operations when our most critical operational and 

planning functions required the highest level of activity. 
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Support to Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) 

The President directed the reduction of Afghanistan's Force Management Level to 68,000 troops by 

30 September 2012. Achieving this force reduction on schedule was possible through close 

coordination between headquarters, USTRANSCOM, our component commands, and our commercial 

partners. Innovative ways to maximize throughput included expanding options for transiting forces into 

and out of the USCENTCOM Theater. Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield, Romania, provided an additional 

transit location for deploying and redeploying forces in support of OPERATION ENDURING 

FREEDOM, resulting in the movement of approximately 10.000 troops during the height of the surge 

recovery of forces from Afghanistan. 

Working with our regional and commercial partners, we executed multiple proofs of principle to 

validate processes and capabilities. As we develop more efficient transportation routes around the 

globe, we continue witnessing the great effects of maturing routes. We continue to seek new air. 

ground, and multi-modal routes, adding flexibility and responsiveness to the DTS. 

In addition to validating two-way passenger flow through Romania, we are reaping the benefits of 

last year's initiative to flow air-direct traffic over an Arctic route. This Arctic routing, allowing both 

commercial and military aircraft to support Afghanistan from the West Coast, resulted in 2 million 

gallons of jet fuel saved last year. This is a savings of $26million. 

Our ground lines of communication continue to mature as well. The success of the distribution 

network's flexibility was demonstrated by the lack of operational impact resulting from the closure of 

the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). The Northern Distribution Network 

(NDN) absorbed a 46 percent increase in containers, moving over 30,000 containers in total. That 

capability, coupled with our multi-modal capacity, allowed us to continue uninterrupted support to our 

warfighters. Additionally, we have successfully reversed our Kazakhstan - Kyrgyzstan - Tajikistan and 

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Uzbekistan routes, allowing the movement of retrograde-cargo over the NON. We are also executing a 

reverse Trans-Siberia route, which establishes another option for the movement of retrograde cargo. 

Despite the enterprise's ability to weather the unexpected, the PAKGLOC, when fully operational, 

remains the quickest and most cost-effective route for supporting operations in theater. 

Multi-modal operations continue to provide a middle-ground option between the speed of air direct 

and the lower cost of surface movement. USTRANSCOM, working with industry and partner nations, 

continues to expand the capabilities of existing locations and add new sites where necessary. For 

example, following the recent success of air direct shipments through Baku, Azerbaijan, we developed 

processes and procedures for multi-modal operations. This effort is expected to increase volume while 

reducing transit time and costs. Hybrid multi-modal operations, leverage a blend of military and 

commercial airlift, and provide another opportunity to reduce cost without sacrificing effectiveness. 

In the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of operations (A OR). USTRANSCOM continued 

its support of the National Science Foundation's (NSF's) mission. As part of OPERA nON DEEP 

FREEZE, we coordinated for the delivery of over 4,000 passengers and 2,150 short tons (STONs) of 

cargo via C-17 and more than 6 million gallons of fuel and 3,400 STONs of cargo via sealift to 

McMurdo Station, Antarctica. In February 2012, the NSF discovered the ice pier used in previous years 

to ofnoad cargo was not capable of supporting ship off-loading operations. USTRANSCOM rapidly 

coordinated the delivery and setup of an Anny modular causeway system, which permitted the off-load 

of nearly 7 million pounds of cargo in 322 containers and the backload of more than 8.7 million pounds 

of retrograde cargo in 391 containers. This off-load operation, the first of its kind in this environment. 

spanned eight days, during sub-freezing temperatures and sustained Antarctic winds. 

In addition to ODF, USTRANSCOM supported numerous operations that enhanced the security 

and preparedness of U.S. and allied forces in the PACOM AOR. USTRANSCOM supported multiple 
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deployments and redeployments in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILLlPINES 

(OEF-P). We also provided strategic airlift and sealift to military Security Forces and Special Warfare 

Units to the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Guam in support of USPACOM's Theater Security 

Cooperation program engagement strategies and objectives. USTRANSCOM supported U.S. Special 

Operations Forces Joint Command Exercise Training (JCET) throughout the Asia-Pacific region at the 

invitation of regional governments, with strategic airlift and sealift of PAC OM assets. Support for 

USPACOM's JCS Exercises TERMINAL FURY in Hawaii, COBRA GOLD in the Kingdom of 

Thailand, COMMANDO SLING in the Republic of Singapore, BALIKATAN in the Republic of the 

Philippines, and KEY RESOLVE, and ULCHl FREEDOM GUARDlAN in the Republic of Korea 

entailed the movement of 10,452 passengers, 1,298 STONS moved by strategic airlift, and 406,270 

square fcct (or 22,114 STONS) via sealift. 

Additionally, USTRANSCOM moved 1.574 STONS of food, water, construction materials, and 

vehicles to support the USPACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) tcam from Pusan, 

Republic of Korea, to Nampo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 

In the U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM continued to support 

the secure transport of personnel for detainee movement operations. In coordination with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State, Joint StatT, and supported COCOMs, we 

successfully completed 100 percent of these sensitive missions without incident. 

[n the U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM deployed and redeployed 

more than 2,233 troops and 1,169 STONs of cargo in support of the Kosovo Balkan force. During 

December 2012, we conducted the movement planning for 326 personnel and 1,022 STONS of cargo in 

support of the Patriot Missile Battery deployment into Turkey in support of NATO defense. Support to 

USEUCOM also included numerous strategic lift missions in support of exercises in several countries to 
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include: Estonia, Georgia, Israel, Latvia, Norway, and Poland. These exercises entailed moving more 

than 2,732 personnel and over 8,000 STONs of cargo for training events aimed at exercising the ability 

to deploy, employ, and sustain forces in response to a crisis affecting the USEUCOM AOR. 

In the U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM deployed and redeployed 

3,187 troops and 1,297 STONs of cargo in support of Combined Joint Task Force Hom of Africa. We 

also coordinated and tracked 40 airlift missions moving nearly 300 personnel and over 490 STONs of 

cargo while supporting contingency operations in northern Africa. 

Finally, in the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, the Modular Airborne Fire 

Fighting System equipped C-130 aircraft, provided by our Component, AMC, tlew 922 sorties and 

released more than 22.2 million pounds of fire-retardant, combating wildfires in direct support of U.S. 

Forestry Service operations. The WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew over 120 sorties into 32 

storms collecting valuable hurricane data for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In 

support ofreliefcfforts in the wake of Super Storm Sandy, USTRANSCOM coordinated for nearly 100 

C-17 and C-5 missions moving 749 passengers and 3,762 STONs of cargo. Critical supplies delivered 

included electric utility restoration vehicles, medical personnel, search and rescue teams, blankets, 

dewatering pumps, and support equipment. Support to USNORTHCOM also included lift for training 

exercises providing realistic homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities training for joint 

and interagency partners. This entailed moving more than 3,700 personnel and over 1363 STONs of 

cargo in support of EXERCISE VIBRANT RESPONSE 13, a training event exercising the ability to 

deploy, cmploy, and sustain specialized military response forces upon the request of civilian authorities 

following a catastrophic incident. 

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Support for the Warfighter 

Global patient movement remains one of our most demanding missions requiring 100-percent 

accuracy. Last year, in partnership with the medics of AMC, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air 

National Guard, we efficiently and effectively provided en route medical care to more than 14,000 

patients. Patients requiring critical care support were moved by Critical Care Air Transport Teams, 

including six patients who were moved by the new Acute Lung Rescue Teams, one from USPACOM 

and five from USCENTCOM. 

Our partnership with the Military Health System is vital to the success of patient movement. In 

particular, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center is vital to the support o[four COCOMs: USEUCOM, 

USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, and U.S. Special Operations Command. The planned Military 

Construction (MIL CON) replacement ofthis outstanding hospital will f'lrther aid the en route medical 

care needs of ill and injured Service members and their families. 

We are working to improve the quality of life for Service members and their families by providing 

convenient and user-friendly online services for scheduling the shipment of household goods. Last year, 

the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) through the Defense Personal Property System (DPS) 

managed approximately 600,000 DOD household goods shipments. DP3 provides the procedures 

necessary to build the many online resources provided by DPS. These services include Web-enabled 

counseling, the ability for a DOD customer to score their Transportation Service Provider (TSP) via the 

customer satisfaction survey, as well as the ability to file an online claim while in direct communication 

with the TSP. 

finally, the ability to support the warfighter in Afghanistan's mountainous terrain requires reliance 

on vertical resupply via airdrop operations. Although airdrop cargo amounts decreased from 20 II to 

2012, AMC airdropped over 40 million pounds of fuel and combat supplies, significantly reducing 

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exposure to troops on surface roads. With the High Speed Container Delivery System. we are able to 

support forward deployed warfighters. increasing delivery tonnage to point of need and providing 

enhanced threat avoidance and tactical maneuverability to airlift aircraft and crews. Civilian causality 

concerns led to the development of new capabilities such as an extracted container delivery system to 

improve aerial delivery accuracy. Additionally, enhancements in existing capabilities, such as the lowcost, low-altitude airdrop system and Joint Precision Airdrop System, enhance our delivery capability to 

warfightcrs operating at ever increasing, smaller and more austere locations or in proximity to civilian 

populations. 

Interagency and Other Support 

Cyber threats posed to USTRANSCOM, our components, commercial prulners, national critical 

infrastructure, and key resources are a direct challenge to DOD global operations. Among 

USTRANSCOM's top priorities is ensuring freedom of action and protection of mission data throughout 

the cyberspace domain to plan ruld execute our global mission. To that end. we continue to strengthen 

our partnerships with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as well as the Defense Information 

Systems Agency (D1SA) and other interagency and industry partners. It is critical that wc protect our 

essential command and control systems and information from cybcr attack or exploitation. 

USTRANSCOM continues efforts to improve readiuess and strengthen lies with both our commercial 

and U.S. Government partners through improved information sharing. 

Our role as GDS facilitates enhanced opportunities to support the COCOMs illld the Department of 

State by means of engagement events focused on distribution, transportation, and logistics. Fostering 

critical relationship-building opportunities based on universal logistics interests is our unique and 

innovative approach to traditional security cooperation activities. Our GDS responsibilities provide the 

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basis and means for successful strategic engagements as we continue to expand our reach and become 

more agile. The NDN is a prime example of coordinated and synchronized activities that have 

maximized strategic distribution flexibility and reduced operational risk. The NDN has minimized 

reliance on anyone nation by offering fair and open competition that facilitates economic development 

and diplomatic engagement. The strategic impact has improved international relations and expanded 

commodity resourcing through the development of an integrated and synchronized distribution 

enterprise. 

Mobility Capabilities Assessment-lS (MCA-IS) 

MCA-18 is an assessment being conducted by USTRANSCOM in conjunction with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. We are assessing DOD's capability to project and sustain 

forces in support of the defense strategy, through 2018, by examining a range of strategic and 

operational mobility challeuges that include current operations plans, defense scenarios, seminars 

presented in Chairman Joint Chief of Staff senior leader seminars, and historical operations. MCA-18 

will identify and evaluate our capabilities, the constraints associated with projecting and sustaining 

forces in support of the strategy, and options to mitigate system constraints. We will leverage this 

assessment as we move forward to complete the congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements 

Capabilities Study 2018. 

Air Mobility Readiness 

With the delivery of the last U.S. Air Force C-17, we will have the planned air mobility force 

structure to meet the strategic airlift requirements for a single large-scale operation, while maintaining 

the flexibility and adaptability to support the Joint Force in another region. 

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Our other strategic airlifter, the C-5, is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo capability. 

Management of this fleet focuses on retirement of the C-5A, the oldest and least reliable aircraft while 

improving reliability for the remaining C-5s. The Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program 

(RERP) increases the C-5 neet mission capable rate from 55 to 75 percent while vastly increasing 

aircraft performance, range, and fuel efficiency. 

Together our C-17 and C-5 neets continue to improve availability through the replacement of aging 

components, obsolete components and the Air Force's new programmed phase inspection maintenance 

process. This change from a "failure of major components" process to a preventive replacement 

process, along with the retirement of maintenance intensive jets and RERP modifications, will 

significantly improve strategic airlift aircraft availability, velocity, and capacity to the warfighters. 

The KC-46A is critical to the entire Joint and coalition team's ability to project combat power 

around the world, and provides America and our allies with unparalleled rapid response to combat and 

humanitarian relief operations alike. The KC-46A offers more refueling capacity and increased capacity 

for cargo and aero-medical evacuation. The KC-46A will provide outstanding aircraft availability, 

highly adaptable technology, flexible employment options, and superb overall capability. 

The legacy air-refueling fleet includes the KC-IO and KC-135 aircraft providing the backbone for 

Air Mobility support to our warfighters. The KC-J 0 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance 

(CNS)!Air Traffic Management (ATM) Program addresses airspace access and near-term critical 

obsolescence issues for the 59 KC-l 0 aircraft fleet. CNS! A TM capabilities are necessary to ensure 

worldwide flight operations in civil and military air space and meet current Federal Aviation 

Administration and International Civil Aviation Organization standards. 

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C-13 Os continue to be the intra-theater workhorse for airlift operations around the globe, providing 

critical lift and airdrop capability wherever needed. This versatile aircraft will continue to play an 

integral role for airlift long into the future. 

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a voluntary commercial segment of our mobility force, 

providing additional capability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment globally. Over the past few 

years, USTRANSCOM has encouraged program improvements by way of contracting day-to-day 

business with preference to those commercial carriers who have modernized their fleet. This approach 

has provided increased reliability and greater fuel efficiency, through economy of scale and continues to 

be of value as we adjust to changes in global economic situation and anticipated changes in our future 

force deployments. We continue to examine the CRAF program for viability and cost effectiveness for 

future mission needs. 

Sealift Readiness 

During large-scale operations, roll-onlroll-off (ROIRO) vessels are the prime movers of unit 

cquipment for Army and Marine Corps forces. We rely primarily on commercial industry for sealift and 

complement it with our U.S. Government-owned vessels from the MSC's surge fleet and Maritime 

Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF) when necessary. Our partnership with 

commercial industry is fornlalized through agreements such as the Voluntary lntermodal Sealift 

Agreement (VISA). This agreement and others ensure the availability of a viable U.S. flag maritime 

industry and the required U.S. citizen mariner pool needed in times of national emergency. We also 

leverage significant capacity through the Maritime Security Program (MSP). MSP has been an 

extremely successful program since its inception in the mid 1990's; over 70 percent of the VISA 

capacity needed for a national emergency would come from our partners in MSP. Additionally, the 

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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 has ensured the continued presence of the U.S. 

flag fleet in international commerce while providing DOD critical continued access to militarily useful 

RO/RO and other cargo vessels. Preserving these programs preserves the U.S. merchant mariner base, a 

vital national asset that provides the manpower needed for surge operations. 

The National Defense Sealift Fund provides funding for 9 Large Medium-Speed Roll-OniRoll-Off 

vessels, 5 Roll-OniRoll-Off~Container vessels, and the 46 RRF vessels of our U.S. Government-owned 

surge fleets. All vessels are critical for the DOD's ability to surge to meet future global requirements. 

USTRANSCOM is working with our commercial and U.S. Government sealift partners to find the most 

cost effective means to fund these fleets and the critical capacity they provide. Finally, with the average 

age of the RRF exceeding 36 years, and nearly 1.6 million square feet of RO/RO capacity retiring over 

the next 10 years, it is important to begin the process of recapitalizing our organic fleets. 

Surface Readiuess 

Successful execution of our mission and the daily support we provide to the warfighter rely on a 

complex global enterprise of interdependent critical infrastructure. Our Critical Infrastructure Program 

aligns resources in managing both a COCOM program and a Defense Infrastructure Transportation 

Sector program, the latter focusing on building relationships and trust among non-DOD critical 

infrastructure stakeholders, sharing information and collaborating where appropriate. Our critical 

infrastructure stakeholders range from other Federal agencies to State and local entities, foreign 

countries, and the private sector. 

We continuously monitor the infrastructure network based on threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities. 

We augment teams who assess risks to infrastructure, advocate initiatives to economically reduce risk, 

and help develop solutions to preserve our readiness. These efforts are aimed at ensuring that 

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infrastructure is available when required. Through coordination and cooperation with the commercial 

sector, the National Port Readiness Network delivers an important link between commercial port 

operations and military readiness at 17 strategic ports. These ports provide the critical services and 

intermodallinks needed to ensure rapid, secure, and effective military mobilization. Improving the 

resiliency and modernizing our seaports. air nodes. and critical rail and road networks is a 

USTRANSCOM focus area that ensures our ability to support all geographic combatant commanders 

and respond to emergencies within the homeland, now and far into the future. 

Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Concord 

(MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to USTRANSCOM's support of US PAC OM's operational 

plans and DOD's military capability in the Pacific Theater. Due to the nature and size of this military 

mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We continue to work within DOD 

to find resources to reduce or eliminate any capability gaps and risk at MOTCO to alleviate throughput 

issues to the Pacific Theater. DOD's current efforts are centered on preserving existing throughput 

capability at MOTCO's only operational pier configured for movement of containerized ammunition 

through comprehensive structural engineering assessments. Although the requisite resourcing processes 

have not yet run their full course, we are working with the U.S. Army to address the deteriorating 

infrastructure at MOTCO to allow for sufficient and uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the Pacific 

Theater. 

Recently completed and ongoing infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military 

Ocean Ternlinal Sunny Point (MOTSU), in Sunny Point, NC, are essential to USTRANSCOM's support 

of US CENT COM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in multiple theaters. Specifically, 

MOTSU's Center Wharf was recently upgraded to support the installation of two new container gantry 

cranes, which became operational in 2012. These improvements enhance MOTSU's ability to conduct 

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missions and allow the tenninal to meet documented throughput requirements, contributing to a resilient 

capability. 

In addition to improving critical infrastructure, DOD must maintain railcar capacity to meet military 

transportation requirements. USTRANSeOM through our Army component, SDDe, is executing an 

Anny program established to preserve and assure access to commercial railcars needcd to augment U.S. 

Government-owned capabilities and meet contingency deployment requirements. 

Joint Enabling Capabilities 

USTRANSeOM ensures the readiness and timely deployment of mission-tailored joint capability 

packages to assist all eOeOMs across seven unique functional areas-joint planning, operations, 

logistics, knowledge management, intelligence support, communications, and public affairs-within 

hours of notification . .IEee forces provide these enabling capabilities and are designated as part of the 

Secretary of Defense's Global Response Force. As a result of a changing, complex operational 

environment, the geographic combatant commanders have relied on and will increasingly depend upon 

USTRANSeOM's low density-high demand JEee forces to accelerate the fonnation and the 

cffectiveness of joint force headquarters and assist joint force commanders in the planning and execution 

of joint operations. We recognize that JECC's ability to effectively assist COCOMs on short notice 

depends on the development and maintenance of strong, close relationships with our mission partners 

and stakeholders. 

Enhancements to USTRANSCOM Readiness and DOD Supply Chain Management 

As the GDS and DPO, USTRANSeOM is committed to working with the military Scrvices, 

eOeOMs, governmental agencies, allied, and commercial partners to synchronize distribution planning 

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and synergize distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure we deliver a scalable and 

resilient Global Distribution Network from point of origin to point of employment, meeting needs 

dictated by the operating environment. 

A robust global infrastructure network is essential to our Nation's ability to project and sustain its 

power and influence; therefore, a commitment to obtain the access and agreements necessary to 

maintain this capability and adequately resource it is imperative. Using strategic-level analysis and 

subsequent modeling, we have identified requirements in the En Route Infrastructure Master Plan 

(ERIMP) as both current and anticipated capability gaps and requirements. We will continue to utilize 

the ERIMP process to identify access requirements and construction projects that will improve our 

ability to support COCOM global routes. 

At USTRANSCOM we are constantly focused on reducing costs within the DOD supply chain 

while simultaneously sustaining or improving service levels to the warlighter. Last year, in 

collaboration with mission partners from Defense Logistics Agency, General Services Administration, 

COCOMs, and the Services, we achieved over $500 million in cumulative cost avoidance due to better 

surface container utilization and better pallet and planeload utilization. This simply better optimized 

business practices. We have set another target this year to continue finding savings opportunities and 

will seek to identify an additional $500 million in cost avoidance by the end of fiscal year 2015; to date, 

we have reached $721 million in cumulative cost avoidance. Our collective efforts earned the 

prestigious Defense Logistics 2012 Cost Savings and Performance Improvement Award. 

To enhance readiness we are identifying new ways to leverage the existing DTS infrastructure and 

indnstry resources in support of our global demands, as well as formulating better solutions to improve 

DIS capabilities. This will not only benefit military aircrew proficiency but will contribute to our 

organic and commercial viability. In order to accomplish these objectives, the command stood up thc 

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Enterprise Readiness Center (ERC) to help capitalize on opportunities to increase DTS volume. The 

ERC will also seek to improve transportation services to existing customers and drive responsiveness to 

improved levels by applying enterprise-proven methods. We understand mUltiple transportation 

providers exist in today's global distribution network. To that point and with the ERC in place, 

USTRANSCOM will endeavor to become the transportation provider of choice. 

We continue to partner with USCYBERCOM, DISA, industry, and academia to improve and 

harden our information technology resources, strengthen cyber defense, and improve our capability to 

operate effectively in cyberspace. Because of our strong reliance on commercial partners, over 90 

percent of DOD deployment and distribution information transactions are handled on unclassified 

systems, leaving us vulnerable to possible cyber attacks. We are defining standards for processing and 

handling data that will improve the security of our information through our continued collaboration 

fomms, including our cybcr summit, industry day, and an exercise involving the Department of 

Homeland Security that improved our information sharing processes and relationships. 

In order to fully support the needs of the warfighter, we are working with our joint enterprise 

partners to measure distribution performance. Our focus is to measure the right events at a sufficient 

level of detail to pursue supply chain optimization opportunities. For example, we are leveraging 

technology such as electronic data transmitted from commercial partners and system of record database 

incorporation to capture appropriate time-stamps. This data facilitates performance measurements and 

root-cause analysis as requisitions flow from suppliers to the warfighter. Through continual 

collaboration across the DOD, we are developing common and meaningful performance metrics that 

incorporate best-practices from the commercial and U.S. Government sectors. 

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Business Transformation--Efficiencies 

We continue seeking methods to achieve cost avoidance and improve processes for container 

management. We have implemented several initiatives to include container detention fee reductions 

through increased use of U.S. Government owned containers where cost effective, improving contract 

provisions with carriers through the recently awarded Universal Services Contract (USC)-7 and 

accomplishing container buyouts earlier when carrier owned containers are required to meet mission 

objectives. USC-7 is also enabling us to transform other business areas. This multiple award program, 

with 22 contracted ocean carriers, supports our worldwide surface shipments. Some changes of 

significance from USC-6 to USC-7 include measuring carrier perfonnance regionally by COCOM 

versus global basis; this allows for more relevant "best-value" booking decisions and provides 

leadership visibility on carriers' performance in each COCOM. We added four electronic data 

interchange codes, assisting in more accurate measurement of carriers' performance, ensures carriers are 

appropriately compensated for validated and compensable delays by providing more detailed visibility 

into the status of shipments. 

Our operations focus foremost on effective support to the warfighter; we constantly search for the 

best, most efficient methods to provide seamless and responsive support. Many times, these transparent 

efficiencies also result in increased effectiveness. Deployment and Distribution Cost Based Decision 

Support (D2 CBDS) practice ensures USTRANSCOM and COCOM operational decision-making 

incorporates cost consciousness with mission effectiveness through vetted, standardized, and codified 

operational cost methodologies. D2 CBDS methodologies encompass end-to-end nodes and 

transportation legs. To ensure second- and third-order etfects are adequately considered, all required 

stakeholders are engaged throughout the D2 CBDS process. D2 CBDS has already produced significant 

cost avoidance, included under our DPO Strategic Opportunities umbrella, through a number of 

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emerging efforts, including the Tankering Decision Matrix, monitored by the AMC Fuel Efficiency 

Office, that informs the Tanker Airlift Control Center when it is cost effective to carry fuel to 

downrange locations due to the prohibitively high costs to deliver fuel in theater. 

Going forward, the D2 CnDS Working Group composed of US TRANS COM directorates, 

COCOMs, and network partners will provide rapid response and subject matter expertise for emerging 

complex operational costing opportunities. 

Training, Educatiou, and Exercises 

USTRANSCOM's participation in the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training 

Transformation (CE2T2) Program directly supports U.S. national security interests by ensuring joint 

force readiness, increasing military capabilities, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and retaining 

strategic access around the globe. Maintaining freedom of action and global access is as much a 

requirement for the functioning of our JDDE as it is for the conduct of military operations and requires 

continuous engagement worldwide. CE2T2 enables this critical engagement; contributes to strategic 

and logistical access for the U.S. Government; increases readiness across combatant commands; and 

sustains partnerships with commercial industry and our global core partners in order to provide reliable 

and seamless logistical support at time of need. As we move forward with a refocus on the Pacific and 

our forces become more CONUS-based, we will see an even greater reliance on the CE2T2 program to 

maintain our freedom of action and the readiness to project that force to meet national security 

objectives. Maintaining the CE2T2 Program is critical to USTRANSCOM's readiness. 

21 
115 

Platform Enhancements 

Joint Logistics Over the Shore (.fLOTS) provides the capability to load and discharge vessels in 

austere environments into Army and Navy watercraft or lighterage, where ports are damaged, 

unavailable, or inadequate or access is denied. Among the improvements JLOTS provides is a 

telescopic crane system that has stabilization technology to permit the selective retrieval of containers to 

be transferred between vessels or lighterage even under heavy sea states. The second is an interface 

module that will enhance Army Modular Causeway and the Navy Improved Lighterage Systems, which 

have differing freeboards. 

JLOTS operations are extremely complex and require a detailed working knowledge of 

requirements, capabilities, and limitations among the Services to successfully plan and execute. As part 

of our oversight authority tor JLOTS, this year we established the JLOTS Working Group with the 

primary mission to facilitate and streamline the coordination between Services and COCOMs and within 

the JLOTS community of interest. This group will lead the review of JLOTS initiatives. doctrine, and 

training as well as advocate for sustained JLOTS capabilities in support of COCOM requirements. 

JLOTS and Service Logistics Over the Shore capabilities continue to provide a necessary capability to 

support combatant commanders. 

Hybrid airships represent a transformational capability, bridging the longstanding gap between 

high-speed, lower-capacity airlift, and low-speed, higher-capacity sealift. Across the range of military 

operations, this capability can be leveraged from strategic to tactical distances. From switl crisis action 

support to enduring logistical sustainment operations, hybrid airship technology has the potential to 

fulfill "factory to foxhole" cargo delivery. We encourage development of commercial technologies that 

may lead to enhanced mobility capabilities in the future. 

22 
116 

Final Thoughts 

We arc entrusted with the authority to lead and transform the Joint Deployment and Distribution 

Enterprise and the incredible responsibility of serving the geographic combatant commanders as they 

execute our Nation's most demanding military missions. To ensure that we can repeat our successes of 

the past as we move into a dynamic, resource-constrained future, we must transfoml the way that we 

manage the enterprise and make significant cultural changes in the way that we think. train, and execute 

our missions. Our strategic plan is guiding us in this transfonnation so that we are postured to support 

our forces worldwide with all available resources within the U.S. Government and offered by our 

commercial partners. We will continue to challenge ourselves to be ready for any contingency, 

peacetime or during conflict, and to meet the needs of our war fighters across thc globe. I am extremely 

proud of the USTRANSCOM team and our enterprise partners and the fantastic work they do to support 

our national security objectives. They know, better than anyone. that "Together, we deliver!" 

23 
117 

BIOGRAPHY 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

GENERAL WILLIAM M. FRASER III 

Gen. William M. Fraser III is commander, U.S. 

Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, III. 

USTRANSCOM is the single manager for global 

air, land and sea transportation for the Department 

of Defense. 

General Fraser entered the Air Force in 1974 as a 

distinguished graduate of the Texas A&M 

University ROTC program. His operational 

assignments include duty as a T-37, B-52, B-1, 

and B-2 instructor pilot and evaluator. General 

Fraser has commanded an operations group, two 

bomb wings and a major command. His staff duties 

include tours on the Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Joint 

Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Force 

Base, Neb, He has also served as chief of staff for 

U,S, Strategic Command, as the Assistant to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 34th 

Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 

Washington, D,C. 

General Fraser has extensive wartime, contingency, 

and humanitarian relief operational experience. During Operation Enduring Freedom he led an intelligence 

fusion organization that provided direct support to the warfighter. 

Prior to assuming his current position, General Fraser was the commander, Air Combat Command, Langley 

Air Force Base, Va., and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command, where he led over 

130,000 Total Force Airmen. 

EDUCATION 

1974 Bachelor of Science degree in engineering technology, Texas A&M University 

1977 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1980 Master of Science degree in management information systems, University of Northern Colorado, 

Greeley 

1983 Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va, 

1985 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

1987 National Security Management Course, Syracuse University, N.Y. 

1991 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1995 Executive Development Program, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, 

NY. 

1999 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala, 

1999 Senior Information Warfare Applications Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

2000 National Security Leadership Course, National Security Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and 

Public Affairs, Syracuse University, N.Y. 

2002 Executive Program for Russian and U,S, General Officers, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass, 

2002 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala, 

2002 Senior Intelligence Fellows Program, Wye River, Md. 
118 

2003 Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

2005 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

1. November 1974 - October 1975, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz. 

2. October 1975 - March 1976, student, instructor pilot training, Randolph AFB, Texas 

3. March 1976 - February 1978, T-37 instructor pilot and T-37 check pilot, 96th Flying Training Squadron, 

Williams AFB, Ariz. 

4. March 1978 March 1980, T-37 instructor pilot and flight examiner, 82nd Flying Training Wing, Williams 

AFB, Ariz. 

5. March 1980 - October 1980, Operational Support Aircraft Program Element Monitor, Air Staff Training 

Program, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

6. October 1980 - April 1981, Worldwide Military Command, Control and Communications Program Element 

Monitor, Air Staff Training Program, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

7. May 1981 - October 1981, B-52H student, 4017th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Castle AFB, Calif. 

8. October 1981 March 1983, B-52H aircraft commander, later B-52G aircraft commander and instructor 

pilot, 46th Bomb Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, N.D. 

9. March 1983 December 1984, Chief, B-52G Standardization and Evaluation Branch, 319th Bomb Wing, 

Grand Forks AFB, N.D. 

10. January 1985 - June 1985, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 

11. June 1985 - March 1986, Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic 

Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

12. April 1986 - October 1987, executive officer to the Strategic Air Command Chief of Staff, Headquarters 

SAC, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

13. October 1987 - July 1990, Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium 

14. July 1990 - July 1991, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

15. July 1991 - July 1993, Deputy Commander, 384th Operations Group, McConnell AFB, Kan. 

16. July 1993 - January 1995, Commander, 509th Operations Group, Whiteman AFB, Mo. 

17. January 1995 - August 1995, Vice Commander, 509th Bomb Wing, Wihiteman AFB, Mo. 

18. August 1995 - January 1997, special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, 

Belgium 

19. February 1997 - May 1998, Commander, 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth AFB, S.D. 

20. May 1998 - May 1999, Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

21. May 1999 - December 2000, Commander, 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, La. 

22. December 2000 - December 2002, Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff; 

Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program; and Deputy Director for Military Support, National 

Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C. 

23. January 2003 - October 2004, Director of Operations, Headquarters AETC, Randolph AFB, Texas 

24. November 2004 - February 2005, special assistant to the Commander, Air Force Command and Control, 

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, 

Langley AFB. Va. 

25. February 2005 - May 2006, Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va. 

26. May 2006 - October 2008, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C. 

27. October 2008 - September 2009, Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

28. September 2009 - September 2011, Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va., 

and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command 

29. October 2011 - present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, III. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. June 1985 - March 1986, Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic 

Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a major 

2. October 1987 - July 1990, Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, as a lieutenant 

colonel 

3. August 1995 - January 1997, special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, 

Belgium, as a colonel 

4. May 1998 - May 1999, Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a colonel 

5. December 2000 - December 2002, Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff; 

Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program; and Deputy Director for Military Support, National 

Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C., as a brigadier general 
119 

6, May 2006 - October 2008, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., as a 

lieutenant general 

7, October 2011 - Present, Commander, U,S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, III., as a 

general 

FLIGHT INFORMATION 

Rating: Command pilot 

Flight hours: More than 4,200 

Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, T-1, KC-135R, B-1B, B-2, B-52G/H and C-21 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

National Intelligence Medal of Achievement 

Secretary's Distinguished Service Award, Department of State 

Combat Readiness Medal 

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal Global War on Terrorism Service Medal Armed Forces Service Medal 

Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal 

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 

Officer training award, undergraduate pilot training 

Top graduate, T-37 pilot instructor training 

T-37 Instructor Pilot of the Year 

Distinguished graduate, B-52 G/H combat crew training 

Air Force Public Affairs Directors Special Achievement Award for commander support 

Joseph A, Moller Award, Outstanding Wing Commander, Air Combat Command 

Gold Medal, National Reconnaissance Office 

Honorary Tuskegee Airman 

Order of the Sword, Air Combat Command 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant Nov. 8, 1974 

First Lieutenant Nov, 8, 1976 

Captain Nov. 8, 1978 

Major Oct. 1, 1983 

Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1988 

Colonel Jan, 1, 1992 

Brigadier General Jan, 1, 2000 

Major General Oct. 1, 2003 

Lieutenant General Feb. 3, 2005 

General Oct. 8, 2008 

(Current as of November 2011) 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 6, 2013 

(123) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

General FRASER. The passage of the ‘‘Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013’’ since the March 06, 2013 hearing has removed a portion of the 

uncertainties we are facing from continuously working under Continuing Resolutions and pending sequestration cuts. The National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) 

was funded to the FY2013 budget request and until recently was facing a sequestration reduction. We are pleased that Office of Secretary of Defense and the Navy had 

the flexibility to eliminate the NDSF cut, as it would have caused a reduction in 

the readiness and responsiveness of our organic fleet. 

Additionally, the Maritime Security Program (MSP), which falls under the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, ensures the Department of 

Defense has access to militarily useful U.S. flagged merchant vessels to support the 

transportation of supplies to support our deployed forces. Under the recent budget 

resolution for FY2013, MSP is funded at the FY2012 appropriated level of $174 million, $12 million less than the authorized level, and will be reduced further by a 

7.8% sequestration cut. The Maritime Administration will be unable to fully fund 

this program. 

The impact of the funding reductions to the commercial portion of our fleets could 

decrease the capability of USTRANSCOM to respond to the requirements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. [See page 29.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

General FRASER. Afghanistan Helicopter (Rotary Wing) Program, contracted directly with the foreign carrier: Canadian Helicopters, Canada. CHC Global Operations, Canada. Vertical De Aviacion, Columbia. 

Thule Airlift (Fixed Wing Aircraft), contracted directly with the foreign carrier: 

Air Greenland, Greenland. 

International Airlift Subcontracted through CRAF Carriers: Volga Dnepr, Russia 

(subcontracted through Atlas Air). Polet, Russia (subcontracted through UPS). Silk 

Way, Azerbaijan (subcontracted through World Airways Inc.). [See page 28.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 6, 2013 

(127) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. During the SASC posture hearing on 5 March 2013, you stated that 

you want 13,600 troops to remain in Afghanistan following the end of the NATO 

mission on December 31, 2014. What would you envision should be the associated 

mission sets for a 13,600 troops presence in Afghanistan? 

General MATTIS. During his State of the Union address, President Obama outlined two specific missions for U.S. forces in post-2014 Afghanistan. First, the training and equipping of Afghan forces so that Afghanistan does not again slip into 

chaos; and secondly, a counterterrorism effort that allows us to pursue the remnants 

of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. I also consider our support of other U.S. Government 

agency efforts in Afghanistan an inherent and critical mission. 

Mr. MCKEON. What value do you put on area weapons, such as the Sensor-Fused 

Weapon (SFW), in deterring enemy forces from considering massing military assets 

to attack our allied forces? 

General MATTIS. Area weapons allow us to engage a large number of enemy assets assembled in one area with a limited number of munitions. This should provide 

some form of deterrent to an enemy planning to mass forces. Therefore, area weapons such as the SFW are valuable in deterring enemy forces from massing military 

assets. 

Mr. MCKEON. Is it anticipated that area weapons would contribute in defending 

against hostile action by Iranian land and/or maritime forces should deterrence fail? 

General MATTIS. Yes. Area weapons are effective against fielded forces including 

military personnel and armored vehicles. They would be one of the available options 

to defend against hostile actions. They would be less effective against maritime 

forces at sea but could be used against maritime forces in port. 

Mr. MCKEON. Can you outline the current threats posed by the Haqqani network 

to our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the region? How do we expect that 

threat to morph as we withdraw our forces? How best can we mitigate this threat? 

General MATTIS. The Haqqani Network, proportionately, remains the most lethal 

and cohesive insurgent group operating in Afghanistan. Its areas of operation and 

influence continue to expand outside of its traditionally defined operating areas, affecting the Transition and Afghan stability. 

As our retrograde in Afghanistan proceeds, we anticipate the Haqqani Network 

will attempt to exploit security vulnerabilities, particularly in Eastern Afghanistan. 

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other targets perceived as vulnerable could fall victim to attacks; however, Kabul will be the primary operational effort. Absent sustained pressure and international enforcement of United Nations 

sanctions, the Haqqani Network will remain resilient in its Pakistani sanctuary. 

The Haqqani Network clearly understands the value of high-profile attacks that garner significant media attention, and will attempt to increase the frequency and 

lethality of attacks in key population centers as we draw down our forces. This network is directly linked to the majority of high-profile attacks in Kabul and eastern 

Afghanistan and responsible for numerous U.S casualties. The Haqqani Network 

has the closest relationship with Al Qaeda of any other militant group operating in 

Afghanistan or Pakistan. 

We are maintaining pressure on the Haqqani Network through the combination 

of persistent Combined Team operations and interagency and international partnerships, challenging the Haqqani Network’s command and control and operational effectiveness. A security environment that is manageable by the Government of Afghanistan and its security forces will limit the ability of terrorists to use Afghan 

territory to plot, resource, and conduct terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, 

our interests, and the interests of our allies worldwide. Aggressive targeting and 

international partnerships are essential to limit the travel of senior leaders to the 

Gulf States for fundraising purposes. 

Mr. MCKEON. What is the role of area versus unitary munitions in addressing 

this threat? 

General MATTIS. Unitary munitions give precision deployment capability against 

a single point target. Area munitions allow the engagement of multiple targets 
128 

across a defined area. This can include denying or disrupting the enemy’s use of 

that area or destruction of enemy fielded forces and armored vehicles. 

Mr. MCKEON. What capability does the SFW provide that other munitions in the 

U.S. inventory cannot in this environment? How does the SFW address the humanitarian concerns that have been raised about the use of other munitions? 

General MATTIS. The SFW provides the ability to disable multiple armored vehicles with a limited number of aircraft sorties. In comparison, multiple missions with 

unitary weapons would be required to disable the same number of armored vehicles. 

Sensor Fuzed Weapons would address concerns regarding collateral damage or unnecessary human suffering by more directly targeting enemy vehicles versus personnel. Because the weapon is designed to disable a vehicle’s motor, it is less likely 

to cause undue suffering to personnel in the open vs. indiscriminant use of cluster 

munitions or unitary munitions that miss their targets. 

Mr. MCKEON. What type of consequences would you foresee if U.S. forces could 

rely only on unitary systems to defend against an Iranian ground or maritime attack? What costs in terms of protecting friendly forces, materiel, and dollars would 

be incurred? 

General MATTIS. The consequences would be felt in three primary areas by U.S. 

forces. First, aircraft that attack from high altitude would be required to fly more 

missions across the target area because they would be unable to target as many 

enemy forces per mission as they would with cluster munitions. Second, aircraft 

that work in the low-altitude environment, such as the A–10, which can carry large 

numbers of unitary munitions, would be exposed to the threat environment for a 

longer period of time. Finally, it would take longer to prepare the battle space in 

advance of U.S. backed ground forces taking the field of battle. Additionally, the 

ability to rapidly repel an advancing enemy ground force would be reduced in a 

troops-in-contact scenario. 

The exact cost would be difficult to pinpoint, but the primary factors involved 

would be the increased risk to U.S. aircraft, potentially high battlefield losses of 

U.S. troops, and a loss of popular support for an operation incurring high loss rates. 

While unitary munitions are extremely useful against a variety of targets, cluster 

munitions exists as a viable option to reduce battle losses. 

Mr. MCKEON. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated to remove 

by 2018 munitions available to the Central Command that are prohibited by the 

2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians? 

General MATTIS. We do not anticipate any difficulties meeting the requirements 

of the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians. Cluster 

munitions are not identified as primary targeting weapon solutions in any of our 

plans although we do not rule out their use in a dynamic environment where they 

might be the most appropriate weapon for the target. A comprehensive search of our 

munitions database records indicates that only seven types of munitions out of a 

total of 44 covered by the policy are currently located within the CENTCOM Area 

of Responsibility (AOR) and our Service components will schedule retrograde of select munitions from theater as their parent military service priorities dictate. 

Mr. MCKEON. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated to procure 

capabilities to mitigate shortfalls resulting from implementation of the 2008 policy? 

What further steps would be required if legislation were enacted requiring implementation of the 2008 policy prior to 2018? 

General MATTIS. CENTCOM does not manage munitions acquisition. As capability 

documents are staffed for review, we follow the 2008 policy in providing input to 

the comment matrix, however the Service components drive procurement and would 

be in a better position to answer this question. 

Mr. MCKEON. What is the expected impact on the Central Command’s theater objectives and operational plans if these shortfalls are not mitigated? 

General MATTIS. Failure to mitigate resourcing shortfalls would force us to accept 

a higher level of risk to the successful accomplishment of our objectives and missions. We will continue to prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we balance our approach to work by, with and through our partners. 

While the effects of these shortfalls would negatively impact all of the Services and 

combatant commanders, it will arguably have the greatest operational impact in the 

CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) due to geography, the pace of ongoing combat operations and the likelihood of numerous contingencies. Certainly we can expect that those units required to address these emerging challenges will be less 

ready than in the past or will have less capability due to reduced readiness levels 

in training and equipping. 

Mr. MCKEON. What are CENTCOM’s current highest priority intelligence requirements? How well are these requirements being addressed? What is the current divi-
129 

sion of labor between theater-level assets and national-level assets? Please describe 

for both collection requirements as well as analytical support. 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. MCKEON. What are CENTCOM’s key intelligence gaps? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. MCKEON. How do you assess national intelligence support to CENTCOM? 

Please specifically discuss support from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National 

Reconnaissance Office, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you 

have any recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies? 

General MATTIS. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial 

Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the rest of the Intelligence Community provide excellent support to CENTCOM. The majority of my Intelligence staff civilians are DIA 

employees and DIA provides a host of training environments for specialty areas of 

Intelligence, including Intelligence Collection Management, Intelligence Analysis 

and tailored courses for utilizing software tools developed by DIA. DIA also provides 

the Intelligence Collection Manager interface for CENTCOM with the Joint Staff 

and with elements of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

NGA and NRO have highly proficient liaison officers embedded within my staff, 

with in-depth geospatial intelligence knowledge and advanced technical skills. Their 

ability to reach back to their parent organizations and rapidly support CENTCOM 

requirements has been a major asset in maintaining situational awareness across 

our region. Both organizations have proven very agile over the last five years in providing personnel that directly support my staff and forward elements in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

NSA support has also been excellent, with embedded liaison officers that rapidly 

turn our needs and requirements into collection. They are essential in providing exceptionally precise indications of potential hostile intent and Indications and Warning for our toughest problem sets in Iran, Syria and Afghanistan. 

Mr. MCKEON. Please describe CENTCOM’s current ISR needs and your most recent request for ISR allocation. 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. MCKEON. Please describe the value of HUMINT to CENTCOM 

General MATTIS. HUMINT is a critical enabler. It plays a key role in ascertaining 

information in support of CENTCOM requirements and mission objectives. The ability of HUMINT to penetrate hard targets and access denied areas within the 

CENTCOM AOR and answer intelligence requirements (particularly those related 

to plans and intentions) are vital to the CENTCOM mission. HUMINT is uniquely 

valuable to CENTCOM in validating and complementing intelligence from other disciplines by providing information that is beyond the capabilities of technical sensors, 

and often incorporates the values and qualitative judgments of the source. HUMINT 

includes non-tangible information such as insights into adversary plans and intentions, deliberations and decisions, research and development goals and strategies, 

doctrine and leadership, and morale. HUMINT assets collect information that is not 

communicated electronically, such as troop movements conducted under radio silence; or equipment and facilities concealed or shielded from overhead or airborne 

imagery systems. This dedicated capability has been instrumental in the success of 

numerous CENTCOM operations. 

Mr. MCKEON. Have CENTCOM’s needs been fully incorporated and integrated 

into planning for the Defense Clandestine Service? 

General MATTIS. Yes. CENTCOM requirements for Defense Clandestine Service 

(DCS) capabilities are fully captured in tasks to The Defense Intelligence Agency’s 

(DIA) Directorate of Operations within the HUMINT Appendices to CENTCOM approved plans and orders. Defense HUMINT Enterprise councils and boards (of 

which DCS is a core member) also sufficiently detail combatant command HUMINT 

requirements. 

Mr. MCKEON. What are SOCOM’s current highest priority intelligence requirements? How well are these requirements being addressed? What is the current division of labor between theater-level assets and national-level assets? Please describe 

for both collection requirements as well as analytical support. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM has four enduring priority intelligence requirements that directly support the commander’s top strategic global security concerns, 

including 1) countering transnational violent extremist organizations, 2) regional in-
130 

stability and state aggression, 3) threats to sovereignty that may threaten the stability of our interests and/or partner nations, and 4) WMD counterproliferation. In 

addition, USSOCOM supports the GCC’s SOF-specific priority intelligence requirements in their respective theaters of operations, including countering violent extremist organizations, setting conditions for long-term stability, developing regional 

access, and building security force assistance capacity through partner-nation security initiatives. 

USSOCOM collection requirements are submitted at the national-level. Our collection requirements are received from our component commands and from the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. We do not task theater-level CCMDs 

assets. USSOCOM relies heavily on its deployed subcomponents, the other GCCs, 

and the greater IC to fulfill our collection needs. Therefore, requirements in theaters 

where greater theater and national collection resources are available are more likely 

to be addressed. USSOCOM as force provider does not have theater-level collection 

assets under its control. We provide SOF assets to the GCCs and the GCCs then 

allocate assets in theater to the TSOCs based on the commander’s priorities. 

Analysis of collection done by USSOCOM intelligence professionals is focused on 

providing unique SOF-specific assessments. SOCOM depends heavily on GCC and 

national level analytic resources for all non SOF-specific analysis. 

Mr. MCKEON. What are SOCOM’s key intelligence gaps? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM intelligence gaps are captured under the DIA intelligence requirements process through multiple mission management boards conducted on a monthly basis. Additionally, SOCOM contributes to the DNI annual intelligence collection gaps discussions to address current and projected intelligence 

gaps and requirements. To fulfill its Intelligence Requirements, USSOCOM would 

greatly benefit from greater authorities in applying SOF intelligence assets against 

specific targets, networks, organizations, and entities; increased priority of 

USSOCOM requirements within the IC; and expanded/enhanced IC partner capabilities. 

Mr. MCKEON. How do you assess national intelligence support to SOCOM? Please 

specifically discuss support from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National 

Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you have 

any recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. National intelligence support to USSOCOM has been superb, 

and provides the commander with daily, relevant intelligence that informs the command of ongoing threats, regional instability, counterproliferation, and WMD issues. 

These assessments help shape the commander’s critical decisions pertaining to SOF 

employment, deployment, and global activities. DIA, NGA, and NSA have full-time 

embedded analysts in the J2 who provide daily intelligence support to the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). Additionally, the CIA, NRO, NGA, and NSA have dedicated 

senior representatives who provide valuable reach back to their parent organizations in support of SOF activities. 

Mr. MCKEON. The present authorized funding ceiling for Section 1208 CT authorities is $50 million. In your testimony you say that this authority, ‘‘remains critical 

to Special Operations,’’ and that, ‘‘demand for 1208 authority has increased.’’ 

a. How much of this authority have you used this year? 

b. Is the present amount of $50 million sufficient? 

c. Given today’s tight fiscal environment, is it too much? How would a reduction 

in this funding impact your operations? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. BLUF: $50 million is adequate to cover anticipated FY2013 

requirements. USSOCOM continues to assess the need for an increase beyond the 

current $50 million authority. Discussion: As of 22 Mar 2013, USSOCOM has $43.5 

million committed to support ongoing operations. Additional requirements currently 

in staffing to support one ongoing operation and two emerging operations will bring 

the total amount committed to $47.9 million . A separate additional operational requirement is under development, and if approved during FY2013, is anticipated to 

fully commit the remainder of the $50 million authority. While most or all of the 

FY2013 $50 million authority is likely to be committed, historical execution trends 

indicate that USSOCOM will only expend roughly 82% of that amount. Since 1208’s 

inception in 2005, USSOCOM’s execution shows a year-over-year upward trend as 

the program and authority matures. Operational planning that spans up to 14 distinct operations requires some flexibility in authority versus actual execution. 

USSOCOM, in conjunction with the GCCs, TSOCs and Task Forces is assessing: a) 

whether or not the ongoing FY2013 operations are expected to continue into FY2014 

and beyond at their current level, and b) the potential for additional emerging future requirements. The preliminary assessment is that $50 million is required (not 
131 

too much authority), and that an increase (amount TBD) would be prudent to avoid 

the potential to negatively impact future operations. 

Historical Authority, Programs and Execution of 1208 since inception in 2005. 

($M) FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

FY 

2008 

FY 

2009 

FY 

2010 

FY 

2011 

FY 

2012 

FY 

2013* 

Authority $25.0 $25.0 $25.0 $25.0 $35.0 $40.0 $45.0 $50.0 $50.0 

Approved 

Program 

$ 0.4 $19.4 $22.6 $19.6 $24.7 $38.6 $34.6 $43.6 $50.0 

Obligations $ 0.3 $ 7.5 $19.6 $11.5 $15.1 $27.1 $24.6 $33.1 $41.2 

Number of 

Operations 

1 8 10 11 11 12 10 10 14 

Mr. MCKEON. We understand that SOCOM has been working to have its own Special Operations security force assistance authority—in addition to those SFA authorities that are already available to your forces. 

a. Can you provide us with more detail on this requirement? Why are current authorities NOT satisfying your needs? What are the legal limitations that constrain 

you? 

b. What is the State Department’s opinion of this initiative? 

c. What do the Geographic Combatant Commanders say about this initiative? 

d. Do you expect to have OSD and OMB support for this initiative? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. MCKEON. What changes if any would you recommend to Title 10 Section 

167—the foundational statutory authority for U.S. Special Operations Command? 

a. Are there areas that require our attention more so than others? Perhaps personnel issues, such as the management of Professional Military Education for Special Operations Forces? Do you require modifications to your personnel authorities 

so that you are more Service-like, as an example, so that you have more of a say 

in the careers of our Special Operations Forces? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. At this time we do not intend to recommend any revisions to 

10 USC 167. 

Mr. MCKEON. Can you outline the current threats posed by the Haqqani network 

to our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the region? How do we expect that 

threat to morph as we withdraw our forces? How best can we mitigate this threat? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. The Haqqani Network’s (HQN) goal is to degrade security and 

the effectiveness of GIRoA through harassing and persistent attacks in Southeastern Afghanistan, and to use these corridors to project violence into Kabul by 

launching spectacular attacks there. The HQN hopes to translate successful attacks 

into continued support that draws money, materials and manpower from the 

Taliban and the international jihadist community. The loss of their operations chief, 

Baddruddin Haqqani, and increased security in Kabul have diminished the number 

and frequency of successful spectacular attacks conducted by the network. However, 

their intent and resources remain intact. 

As the U.S. withdraws forces, HQN may benefit from degraded GIRoA/Coalition 

security in the HQN dominated areas of Paktika, Paktya, and Khowst as well as 

areas where they have expanded influence such as Logar and Wardak. Continuing 

to disrupt HQN leadership such as Haji Mali Khan, who could augment the network’s capabilities, will help mitigate the threat. 

Mr. MCKEON. Your forces just like all of our military forces are beholden to the 

Leahy Amendment that prohibits U.S. military assistance to foreign military units 

that violate human rights. 

a. What changes to this human rights policy would you propose? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. While I certainly appreciate the opportunity to answer this 

question directly to members of the HASC, I want to emphasize that I am only one 

of the seven Combatant Commanders who must operate on a regular basis in accordance with the Leahy vetting laws. Within the Department we are looking ways 

to make human rights vetting more effective and more consistent with the goals of 

the legislation. The Department has assembled a working group to accomplish this 

task and all the Global Combatant Commanders and the Special Operations Command support this effort. 
132 

With that being said, I want to underscore several important points: 

1. I fully concur with the decision that there must be appropriate human 

rights vetting for our engagement activities and that we are doing this according to the law and the policy. 

2. In my opinion, the concept of ‘‘poison-person-poison-unit’’ may unnecessarily 

restrict U.S. Forces from engaging with units that are beneficial to U.S. interests. 

3. In my opinion, Ambassadors ought to have significant input in the decision 

on whether or not to engage with a particular unit. 

4. Allowing limited human rights and rule-of-law training for units and personnel considered trained due to violations of human rights, particularly 

when there is the political will within the country’s leadership to change, 

could be a positive first step in improving conditions in that country. 

Mr. MCKEON. Women have been very active in U.S. Special Operations Command 

and across the globe—working on the ground in Afghanistan as part of Cultural Engagement Teams, filling critical Civil-Military roles in Africa and the Pacific area, 

even flying Air Force Special Operations aircraft. 

a. Can you outline how the new Department of Defense policy will impact your 

force? What concerns do you have? 

b. How will you ensure that standards are not lowered? 

c. Will there be a cultural challenge within your force? 

d. Do you expect to seek any waivers or exceptions to the policy? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. a) The new Department of Defense policy will enable SOF elements to be more effective in conducting operations worldwide. We regularly augment tactical action units with women in a wide spectrum of operations and I foresee a continuing need to employ women in our missions. In order to properly incorporate women, USSOCOM will conduct an in-depth analysis on the impacts of integrating women to include ensuring all personnel, men and women, are provided the 

opportunities to succeed while still maintaining the high standards that are bedrock 

to our success. 

b) We will continue to maintain the highest standards by ensuring our occupational standards are related directly to operational requirements. We believe the 

standards are currently well-linked to requirements and will validate them with a 

detailed analysis throughout the SOF enterprise. In addition, we are commissioning 

an un-biased, third party to review to ensure they remain gender-neutral and reflect 

operational requirements. 

c) Women have served and continue to perform a vital role in SOF. USSOCOM 

will address any lingering cultural challenges as part of the independent study by 

analyzing the impacts of the psycho-social-behavioral effects of women incorporated 

into small teams. We have the highest expectations for our Force and I’ll ensure 

they uphold the requirement to treat any women as professional, skilled, co-equal 

teammates. 

d) We will not make any decisions until the completion of the detailed studies. 

Once we have gathered the data and are certain of the facts, we will develop a 

course of action and inform the relevant parties. 

Mr. MCKEON. As a component of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), Azerbaijan provides ground and naval transit for roughly 40 percent of the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition’s supplies bound for Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has extended important over-flight clearance, landing and refueling operations for U.S. and NATO flights to support ISAF. In 2012, more than 150 

aeromedical evacuation flights of U.S. Air Mobility Command were flown over Azerbaijan, rushing more than 2,200 patients to a higher level of medical care. How do 

you assess current U.S.-Azerbaijan military-to-military relations, specifically in 

terms of supporting our troops in Afghanistan? Given that NDN passing through 

Azerbaijan and Georgia is more secure and stable route in comparison with Pakistan route do you plan to use it for retrograding U.S. troops and equipment from 

Afghanistan as we move towards 2014? 

General FRASER. The U.S.-Azerbaijan defense relationship is strong—but still has 

room to grow. USTRANSCOM continues to build on existing cooperation and engage 

in regular consultations at high levels with Azerbaijani counterparts to identify 

areas where we can strengthen our cooperation and partnership. Azerbaijan is part 

of a key transit corridor which TRANSCOM is incorporating into its retrograde operations. Azerbaijan’s willingness to build wash racks and make other infrastructure 

improvements to support multimodal operations in Baku is illustrative of the level 

of cooperation that Azerbaijan and TRANSCOM enjoy. Since April 2012, approximately 600 short tons of cargo have retrograded through Azerbaijan bound for locations in Europe and 540 short tons of cargo has returned to the U.S.. Azerbaijan 
133 

is a stable, reliable partner and TRANSCOM will continue to partner with Azerbaijan until 2014 and beyond. There are no plans to move troops through Azerbaijan. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS 

Mr. ANDREWS. TRANSCOM manages the Transportation Working Capital Fund, 

which supports airlift services. Each of the Services and agencies bear some of the 

costs to fly missions and support the Air Mobility Command’s budgeted flying hour 

program. Working Capital Fund policies require the Services to transfer funds about 

2 years before the actual missions are flown. When TRANSCOM overflies its flying 

hour program—which it has for the past several years—what happens to the excess 

funds paid by the Services and the agencies? Who in TRANSCOM controls the operational tempo of Air Mobility Command aircraft in this instance? 

General FRASER. Working Capital Fund rates are set 2 years in advance of actual 

execution. USTRANSCOM bills Services and Agencies (customers) for missions as 

they are flown. The Working Capital Fund policy dictates that any operational 

gains/losses are returned to customers in the form of lower/higher rates two years 

out. In the case of Air Mobility Command (AMC), these gains/losses are put toward 

the Airlift Readiness Account. 

The Services and Agencies and world events drive the operational tempo at AMC. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet augments military aircraft, creating 

a larger transport network that we can call on as needed. The CRAF program has 

been activated during two major contingency operations and has provided critical 

supplemental airlift services to the Department of Defense. Even when CRAF is not 

activated, its members provide direct support to the U.S. military in day-to-day operations. 

In light of a shrinking defense budget and withdrawal from Afghanistan under 

way, what is TRANSCOM’s plan to keep the CRAF program viable? 

General FRASER. The Air Mobility Command is in the final phase of a two-phase 

post Operation ENDURING FREEDOM CRAF study. This expansive body of work 

will assess the near-term health and future viability of the CRAF program. Upon 

the study’s conclusion, we will have formulated the recommendations for the most 

effective methodology for restructuring policy, practices, and procedures that most 

accurately reflect the changing business environment. We have integrated our industry partners throughout this process to fully vet their concerns, ensuring we 

maintain a collaborative approach. Furthermore, we’ve been proactive by providing 

our industry partners requirements and forecasts of the drawdown period via semiannual Executive Working Groups. Finally, with the creation of the Enterprise 

Readiness Center, we seek to leverage new business for the future health of the Defense Transportation System. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, I continue to be concerned about the capabilities of our 

bases to withstand a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, 

such as the electrical grid. Last year you testified that you assessed both the more 

modern enduring bases as well as the tactical ones to ensure they could continue 

to operate and that you were satisfied that the proper mitigation networks and generators were available if needed. Can you update us on the progress that has been 

made in evaluating the ability of our bases within USCENTCOM to operate and recover in the event of such an attack, based on the increased advanced persistent 

threat environment, and also specifically focus on the linkages and integration of 

USCYBERCOM to support your cyber efforts under your command? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, is operational energy a priority? If so, why? And, can you 

please describe what actions you are taking in CENTCOM to reduce overall energy 

consumption in order to extend combat capability? 

General MATTIS. Yes. Forces currently operating in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) consume over 3 million gallons of fuel per day with recent consumption as high as 5 million gallons of fuel per day. Satisfying that demand has 

required immense logistical support, susceptible to attack. It is the CENTCOM pol-
134 

icy to shape its use of operational energy effectively as a strategic advantage, improving our operational capability and effectiveness by increasing operational energy performance and efficiency. To date, we have made great strides ensuring increased efficiencies and improved combat effectiveness by focusing on the development of policies, process improvements, and incorporation of energy efficient technologies in camp facilities, ground vehicles, and ground and aviation operations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, does a requirement for persistent surveillance and integrated fire control still persist in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)? 

General MATTIS. Yes. CENTCOM forces and coalition partners will have only 

minimal time to react to missile launches in the Arabian Gulf. Rapid identification, 

verification, geolocation, and kinetic targeting of such threats are a must. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, what would the addition of a persistent surveillance and 

integrated fire control orbit add to CENTCOM’s ability to address cruise missile and 

surface moving threats to the Fifth Fleet and missile defense assets in the region? 

General MATTIS. Persistent surveillance systems such as the Joint Land Attack 

Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS), specifically designed for 

missile detection and tracking, would help to counter threats such as those posed 

to U.S. Forces in the Gulf. However, JLENS is not currently a program of record 

and is still in testing. If this system does become available for worldwide operational 

use, JLENS will offer persistent and multi-sensor capabilities optimized for point 

area defense. The fact that JLENS is tethered will prove a limitation requiring substantial planning and de-confliction to overcome the impact to air navigation, especially in nations who only grant the U.S. limited use of their airspace. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, you have commented on the need to create a globally 

networked force of international partners and allies that could rapidly respond to 

and address regional challenges. Your command is promoting a concept of regional 

SOF coordination centers designed to promote regional SOF partnering, similar to 

the NATO SOF Headquarters in Mons, Belgium. Can you comment on this proposal, 

and HOW you intend to accomplish this? Given such a strong regional emphasis 

would require engagements and commitments with other countries broader than 

U.S. Special Operations Command, how has the Department of State reacted to 

your proposals? How have the Geographic Combatant Commanders reacted? And 

how would you propose paying for such a commitment? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK 

GLOC), when open, remains the quickest and most cost-effective route (i.e. cheapest) for surface transportation into Afghanistan. As we are all aware ground transportation through Pakistan was curtailed in November 2011, and then in early July 

2012 the PAK GLOC was reopened after extensive negotiations. The reliability of 

the PAK GLOC to remain open is questionable and linked to any potential future 

disagreements with the U.S. or NATO. Can you speak to the importance of Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and how USTRANSCOM is posturing to support 

operations as we bring our forces home after many years of war? 

General FRASER. The NDN is an instrumental piece of the Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM (OEF) Distribution Enterprise. During the closure of the PAKGLOC and 

subsequent negotiations of its reopening, the NDN was a critical means of getting 

supplies and equipment into Afghanistan. Because of these routes, as well as 

multimodal and air-direct options, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) saw no 

operational impact resulting from the closure of the PAKGLOC. Maintaining a balance among our various distribution routes continues to be a focus of 

USTRANSCOM, reducing risk and increasing flexibility in our support of the 

warfighter. 

As the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSCOM will be a part of all planning 

efforts in conjunction with USCENTCOM to redeploy personnel and equipment from 

OEF to ensure transportation feasibility. Maintaining a balanced distribution network ensures continuity of the transportation enterprise and avoids any single point 

of failure, enabling the redeployment of OEF forces and the retrograde of OEF materiel within the prescribed timelines. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. In 2006 General James Jones (then the Supreme Allied Commander 

of Europe) stated that ‘‘the Achilles’ heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. 

The uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the 

money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, 

anything to bring chaos and disorder.’’ When discussed in previous hearings, you in-
135 

dicated that ‘‘DOD supports capacity building within the Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan and specialized units such as the DEA-sponsored National Interdiction 

and Special Investigative Units.’’ 

This 2012 UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) report shows 

that the past 5 years have produced the largest crops in decades. According to the 

study, the dropoff in 2010 is largely attributed to plant blight that reduced the annual yield. 

Given the fact that narcotics production actually increased during our surge of 

forces, do you believe that the Afghan Army will be able to effectively conduct 

counternarcotic operations? What do you expect to happen when we further reduce 

our forces? Can we truly claim success if we leave the nation in this condition? 

General MATTIS. I agree that the illicit narcotics problem remains one of the 

greatest challenges to our future success in Afghanistan. Secretary Panetta, just 

prior to leaving as Secretary of Defense, endorsed a Commander ISAF request to 

identify counternarcotics as a Department of Defense enduring priority for Afghanistan after the 2014 transition. 

In response to your concerns, the Afghan Army does not have a counternarcotics 

mission. Afghan drug laws are enforced by the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, a component of the Ministry of Interior. In the past, the Afghan Army has occasionally provided security for counternarcotics police operations. As we further reduce military forces, our U.S. Government law enforcement partners will lose much 

of the security umbrella U.S. and Coalition military forces provide and will have 

less freedom of movement within Afghanistan. This will restrict U.S. law enforcement partnered activities with the Afghan counternarcotics police. 

Success in Afghanistan is ultimately an Afghan responsibility. We have trained, 

equipped, and mentored their forces to a level which we assess can provide the environment for a secure and stable Afghanistan. They must have the resolve to do so. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. Air Mobility Command maintains a list of about 136 companies 

that are approved to transport military cargo. However, only about 30 companies 

on this list are CRAF participants; the rest are freight forwarders and non-CRAF 

carriers. Despite stated and well-known polices and regulations to use CRAF carriers, TRANSCOM has repeatedly allowed DOD to contract with these other companies 

Please explain the list of Approved Air Carriers. Who are these companies? How 

do they get on this list? How do you use this list? 

How can TRANSCOM ignore stated policy—from a Department of Defense Instruction and United States Code—to assign missions that transport military cargo 

to non-CRAF carriers? 

General FRASER. The referenced list, Approved Air Carriers, is comprised of transportation service providers which provide transportation partly or wholly via air. Air 

tenders and Air Transportation Service Provider Rules (Section F of the Military 

Freight Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP–1)) are managed by AMC. 

Companies apply for ‘‘DOD-Approved Status’’ through a process outlined in the 

MFTURP–1. As long as companies meet the requirements of the MFTURP–1, air 

transportation providers may include air freight forwarders and air taxis as well as 

conventional air freight carriers operating under Federal Aviation Administration 

rules. Once approved, these domestic air carriers are given access to the Global 

Freight Management (GFM) system where they can submit tenders (rates) based on 

their approved service category (air carrier, motor carrier, rail, etc). 

The process outlined in the MFTURP–1 is used to determine which transportation 

service providers are certified and governs the validation process by which transportation service providers become DOD-approved air carriers listed in the GFM system. Transportation officers use the GFM system to choose the transportation service providers for their domestic tender requirements. Business conducted through 

the GFM system is not subject to the requirements of the Fly America and Fly 

CRAF acts. Therefore, customers are able to utilize the additional non-CRAF transportation service providers for air delivery services. 

Air Mobility Command manages the movement of DOD airlift missions using a 

combination of organic and commercial airlift. Commercial airlift missions are acquired through Federal Acquisition Regulation based contracts. 
136 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. It has been said that Al Qaeda’s strategy is to draw the United 

States into an extended global conflict that validates the narrative that the United 

States is permanently at war with Islam. What are we doing to counter this dangerous narrative against the United States and our allies? Are we making any 

progress in this area and if so, how are you measuring success? Do you have sufficient tools and authorities to wage this battle of the narrative? 

General MATTIS. We are working hard with our interagency and international 

partners to counter this very dangerous narrative. CENTCOM is conducting groundbreaking, online activities to undermine Al Qaeda’s narrative throughout our Area 

of Responsibility (AOR) in order to reduce recruiting, fund-raising, and the spread 

of its ideology. The idea that the West is at War with Islam is a complicated milieu 

of supporting narratives that effectively draw regional audiences to the conclusion 

that U.S. policy toward the region serves only Western interests. Deconstructing 

and defeating this multi-faceted narrative requires a multi-faceted approach which 

the USG must address holistically. CENTCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) activities designed to counter the Al Qaeda narrative have established a digital footprint in the AORs Internet information environment to provide 

focused credible information that counters and undermines Al Qaeda’s violent jihad 

ideology and calls to violence. CENTCOM also has programs that find, fix, and degrade the credibility of Al Qaeda operatives that are promoting Al Qaeda in the 

mainstream Internet environment. Additionally, CENTCOM is working in close collaboration with the Center for Strategic Counterterror Communications, Department of State’s Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Bureau, and 

Other Governmental Organizations to synchronize and coordinate these messaging 

activities. 

We assess that we are making progress, albeit slowly, to degrade the core tenets 

of Al-Qaeda’s narrative. We assess that we are seeing a steady degradation in popular acceptance of the Al Qaeda brand and violent jihad ideology. Programmatically, 

we apply industry best practice to measure the effectiveness of each of our programs 

and then look to larger-scale assessments to determine their holistic effectiveness. 

On a program-by-program basis, we assess monthly changes in sentiment toward 

key topics within the Internet information environment in our AOR as well as other 

metrics such as growth of viewership, audience interaction, viral spread of our online content and qualitative assessments of our online interactions where we have 

a digital footprint. 

We have the tools sufficient for the task but they are underdeveloped and limited 

in breadth. These types of operations are habitually underfunded, slowing their 

maturation and growth dramatically. As our military footprint within the AOR continues to shrink, programs like these become more and more important to 

CENTCOM to meet these and similar tasks. With your support, we can continue 

to develop and mature our counterterror programs and more effectively fight this 

battle of the narrative with our partners. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How do we ensure ANA/ANP forces can counter the Taliban 

forces without ISAF assistance, when only one in 23 ANA kandaks (battalions) can 

currently operate independently? 

General MATTIS. The operational effectiveness of the ANSF continues a general 

upward trend and they are performing well. They have fought hard and are holding 

their own. Afghan forces are increasingly partnering and leading offensive operations. The ANSF are now unilaterally conducting over 80% of the total operations 

and are leading roughly 85% of total operations. Over 87% of the population is now 

under Afghan security. Sizewise, the ANSF has reached their object level of 352,000. 

The focus of the training mission now is on the quality of the force, developing the 

right balance of seniority, skills, and specializations that are vital to their long-term 

sustainability and success. Although ANSF resources will be challenged once U.S. 

and Coalition forces have withdrawn, I do believe they will be sufficient to defeat 

the Taliban. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Is operational energy a priority? If so, why? And, can you 

please describe what actions you are taking in CENTCOM to reduce overall energy 

consumption in order to extend combat capability? 

How do you incentivize the military to reduce energy consumption? And, what renewable energy technologies have been effectively employed in CENTCOM and 

what is the return on investment? 

What achievements have you made in the CENTCOM AOR to reduce operational 

energy? What is your biggest energy challenge? And, how do you define energy security in the context of the COCOM? 
137 

General MATTIS. Yes. Forces currently operating in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) consume over 3 million gallons of fuel per day (1.4 million gallons 

of fuel per day in Afghanistan). Our operational energy policy and efforts fully nest 

with our Theater Campaign Plan by enabling the conduct of operations necessary 

to achieve our intermediate military objectives, thus establishing the conditions for 

regional security, stability, and prosperity. 

I have challenged commanders at all levels throughout the CENTCOM AOR to 

develop and implement operational energy programs focused on reducing energy demand while maintaining or increasing operational effectiveness. I have also charged 

commanders to push for the rapid fielding of emerging technologies that have proven methods to reduce energy demand, to include proven alternative energy technologies. CENTCOM has employed several renewable technologies in the AOR such 

as solar powered light carts and street lighting along with the Ground Renewable 

Expeditionary Energy Network System—a portable hybrid photovoltaic/rechargeable 

battery power system capable of providing up to 300 watts of continuous power. 

Current operational energy includes centralizing power plants on bases, insulating tents with energy-saving liners and the replacement of metal halide light fixtures with light emitting diode fixtures in gyms, just to name a few. Our biggest 

energy challenge remains harnessed to fuel which is our most valued commodity 

and is the most difficult to move, store, and distribute. In particular, getting energy 

to our forward operating bases places an incredible demand on our forces. And finally, energy security means a reliable, secure, and affordable supply of energy for 

CENTCOM’s missions, today and in the future. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How do we encourage Pakistani involvement in efforts to deter 

Taliban aggression and encourage diplomatic solutions? 

General MATTIS. We continue to encourage Pakistan to deter Taliban aggression 

by providing much needed security assistance to their military forces. This security 

assistance has played a critical role in enhancing the Pakistan military’s ability to 

develop more effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities. Diplomatic solutions are hampered though because the Pakistanis are under extreme 

pressure by the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that continue to target government entities and citizens within their borders. They’ve had devastating losses 

of life in VEO attacks that occur almost daily. However, Pakistan understands the 

importance of regional security and thus, the importance of working with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the United States. 

Through this tri-lateral relationship, there’s been some success in finding diplomatic solutions toward ending the reign of terror that is being prosecuted by the 

numerous VEOs along the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders 

have publicly called on the Taliban to participate in peace negotiations. In addition, 

Pakistan also participates in the U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan Core Group and two 

sub-working groups to facilitate a reconciliation process. We must continue to encourage Pakistan to engage with us and GIRoA in order to further advance diplomatic solutions. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How do we ensure ANA/ANP forces can counter the Taliban 

forces without ISAF assistance, when only one in 23 ANA kandaks (battalions) can 

currently operate independently? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Certainly challenges remain for both the Afghan government 

and its supporting security architecture. However, building an effective security apparatus requires time and enduring advisory and financial support. GEN Dunford 

has implemented a sound plan to ensure a smooth security transition in 2014. One 

supporting aspect of this plan, designed to provide time for the ANA and ANP to 

evolve leverages Afghan Special Operations Forces and the Afghan Local Police 

(ALP) Program. This covering force approach maintains pressure on insurgent networks and simultaneously enables local communities to address their unique security concerns. 

This covering force approach is working; improving security for an estimated 17% 

of the Afghan population (5 million). Today ALP are 21,346 strong and projected to 

continue growing after transition to an Afghan Government goal of 45K. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been successful in defending their communities 

against insurgent attacks 88% of the time. The layered support of Afghan special 

operations elements, time and space combined with the efforts of the ANA and ANP 

will continue to evolve, enabling relative stability in the post-transitional environment. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. It has been said that Al Qaeda’s strategy is to draw the United 

States into an extended global conflict that validates the narrative that the United 

States is permanently at war with Islam. What are we doing to counter this dangerous narrative against the United States and our allies? Are we making any 
138 

progress in this area and if so, how are you measuring success? Do you have sufficient tools and authorities to wage this battle of the narrative? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM, in conjunction with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) has a variety of 

influence programs to counter Al Qaeda’s narrative. The Trans-Regional MISO Program (TRMP) is one of SOCOM’s priority influence programs to counter violent extremist (CVE) ideology around the globe. The TRMP is nested with the objectives 

in Campaign Plan 7500, DOD’s global plan to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The program provides guidance and authorities to GCCs to execute MISO in 

support of their CT operations in their AORs, as well as support partner nation 

MISO activities that align with U.S. objectives. Our primary technique in countering this narrative is not to directly address it (and thus give it credibility), but 

rather to isolate and discredit Al Qaeda in the eyes of their intended audience, thus 

nullifying their message. At the same time, SOCOM’s trans-regional MISO efforts 

emphasize the host nation/partner nation counter-AQ efforts to divide AQ out as the 

real enemy. We also highlight host nation/partner nation efforts which address underlying conditions and contributors to extremism. 

Additionally, USSOCOM deploys Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in 

over 20 nations globally. MISTs work with U.S. Embassy Country Teams and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) to counter violent extremist messaging, 

among other issues, using the full spectrum of inform and influence activities. Additionally, MISTs often address the upstream factors leading to violent extremism 

through partnership with our allies. Building partner capacity, persistent engagement, and working by, with, and through our allies is crucial in long-term success 

in countering AQ’s narrative that the U.S. is at war with Islam. 

Complementary to the MISTs, USSOCOM continues to operate two enterprise capabilities which provide a globally synchronized and mutually supporting network: 

the Trans-Regional Web Initiative (TRWI) and the Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI). These two MISO programs provide the GCC Commanders with the 

ability to conduct U.S. unilateral MISO supporting CT and GCC Theater Security 

Cooperation objectives. 

TRWI currently operates 10 Web sites across 6 geographic regions, providing a 

global network of influence Web sites. These Web sites publish factual content 6 

days/week, 24 hours per day, in 23 languages. Such content undermines and indirectly counters the Al Qaeda narrative that the U.S. is at war with Islam, while 

maintaining a focus on the pragmatic aspects of regional and local economic and social improvements. TRWI Web sites also leverage various social media outlets, 

greatly expanding the reach and influence of the messaging. 

SOCOM’s Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI), is designed to develop, synchronize, and coordinate senior military-to-military information and influence message in support of SOCOM and GCC objectives. The program supports all six GCC 

contingency operations and theater security cooperation objectives through the publication of influence products that reach more than 90,000 senior military leaders 

and defense official in 12 languages across 171 countries worldwide. The magazines 

serve as a tool to not only counter AQ propaganda, but to promote stability and security and build support for U.S. Government activities. Through the use of these 

magazines, SOCOM achieved an economy of force solution for a small ‘‘boot-print,’’ 

high-yield engagement in the ongoing war of ideas. 

We are making progress as indicated by the House Appropriations Committee-Defense decision in FY13 appropriations to move TRWI funding from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to USSOCOMs baseline budget. The MISO community has worked over recent years to better assess the effectiveness of influence operations. Per guidance in DOD Appropriations Acts 2010 and 2012, DOD reports 

quarterly to Congress of the effectiveness of MISO activities. While measuring behavioral change in humans is a complex effort, SOCOM has been working closely 

with the Joint Staff, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC), 

and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to continue to improve our 

efforts of assessment. 

MISO inherently includes an assessment phase as part of the influence process, 

and MIST teams incorporate polling, surveys and assessments in the execution of 

their operations to determine program effectiveness. Additionally, SOCOM’s Global 

Assessment Program (GAP) explicitly measures the extent to which Al Qaeda’s narrative resonates with populations of interest through the use of large-scale quantitative surveys as well as multiple qualitative focus groups. GAP has completed 

baseline assessments in Yemen, Algeria, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Maldives 

as well as follow-up studies in Yemen and Bangladesh. SOCOM uses these baseline 

assessments with reassessments to gauge the effectiveness of our efforts at a strategic level. 
139 

TRWI Web sites have also provided us the ability to gauge our success in changing attitudes and perceptions. Using both quantitative methods (article reads and 

unique site visitors) along with qualitative methods (reader comments, online surveys and polls), we’re able to measure performance and behavioral data on a daily, 

monthly and quarterly basis to determine messaging effectiveness. The sites content 

and performance data is shared with Department of State in order to compare behavioral changes with target audiences in each region. 

TRMI uses target audience member feedback to assess the level of influence in 

countering AQ. TRMI receives numerous submissions for publication of reader developed content, as well as requests to use the magazines in numerous training 

events and conferences. In addition, SOCOM completed a quantitative and qualitative assessment study in 2011 which researchers used to compare the effectiveness of one magazine’s impact on a control group across a 2-year exposure. Researchers found significant changes in attitude regarding reader support of their 

country’s cooperation with the UN, EU, NATO, and UN Peacekeeping missions as 

a direct result of readership. These are all indicators of TRMIs credibility and effectiveness with the target audience. 

USSOCOM has sufficient authorities to counter the Al Qaeda and violent extremist narrative. However, compliance requirements are in some cases overly cumbersome and impact the responsiveness and flexibility necessary to gain the advantage and exploit the OPTEMPO of digital discourse. 

Reduced funding for MISO is also limiting our ability to counter the enemy’s narrative. The recent defense strategy outlining the future move towards low-cost and 

small-footprint options for global, persistent engagement should include a reliance 

on MISO to accomplish U.S. DOD objectives. However, SOCOM MISO funding in 

the FY13 appropriation remains largely in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) 

line. This funding strategy places at risk long-term sustainment for enduring MISO 

programs. Additionally, Resource Management Decision (RMD) 700a eliminated all 

funding for the Trans Regional Magazine Initiative, and imposed a 20% reduction 

on funding for the Trans Regional Web Initiative. At little cost, both programs have 

global reach, targeting large and diverse audiences, and require no U.S. presence 

on the ground. 

Since 2008, SOCOM has refocused the priority to the indirect approach and in the 

use of non-kinetic operations as critical to achieving long-term objectives. While the 

need for non-lethal influence operations has risen since this shift, budgets for MISO 

and influence operations have been decreasing. When compared to other DOD capabilities, MISO is a low-cost, small footprint, persistent Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) capability that when combined with other capabilities can achieve lasting effects. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. As it relates to the planned Air Mobility Command airlift force 

structure, what is your greatest concern in providing airlift capabilities to support 

the National Military Strategy and contingency operations to other combatant commanders? And, can you please highlight the potential impacts to organic fleet readiness and ability to respond to contingencies in light of a possible yearlong CR and 

sequestration? 

General FRASER. Our greatest concern in providing airlift capabilities remains retaining the ability to support combatant commanders with timely deliveries of their 

requirements at acceptable levels of risk as we go forward. Organic fleet readiness 

may be impacted by sequestration reductions in weapon system support accounts 

designed to ensure availability of those aircraft in the Active, guard, and Reserve 

force structure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Fraser, listening to your answer to the question from my 

colleague, Mr. Scott, regarding use of foreign carriers, I have some concerns. 

It is my understanding that TRANSCOM has contracted for at least $244M in 

2012 for Russian AN–124 aircraft (as listed in the COINS system), albeit as subcontracts to CRAF carriers. Is that accurate? 

I also understand you use these aircraft for what is referred to as ‘‘outsize/oversize’’ cargo that may not fit onto a CRAF carrier. However, I’m concerned you may 

not be maximizing the use of our own C–5 fleet for outsize/oversize and then putting 

pallets and smaller equipment on CRAF carriers. Does that make sense? 

Can you explain what systems you have in place to ensure we’re maximizing the 

use of C–5s for outsize/oversize, then putting pallets on our CRAF carriers? 

Further, I understand you may be flying CRAF carriers into Baku, Azerbaijan, 

instead of flying CRAF all the way into Afghanistan, even though CRAF is cleared 
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to do so. Isn’t it true that uploading CRAF cargo to these IL–76s costs 3x the price 

of CRAF carrier and supports a foreign carrier? Why would you do that? Do you 

feel you have the authority to make this decision to not use CRAF? Does that comply with the Fly CRAF Act? 

General FRASER. When organic capability is not available and commercial support 

is required, we utilize Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) carriers to the maximum extent possible. All DOD commercial missions are conducted in compliance with the 

Fly America and Fly CRAF Acts. For outsized, oversized, or battle-damaged cargo, 

occasional use of contract AN–124 and IL–76 aircraft is required to augment our 

C–5 fleet. DOD assigns those missions to foreign carriers only when the missions 

cannot be performed by a U.S. commercial carrier. As a matter of policy, the contracts for these aircraft are through CRAF carriers who subsequently use foreign 

carrier subcontractors. Additionally, Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2399), provides 

authority to acquire products and services (to include airlift services) produced in 

countries along a major route of supply to Afghanistan. This authority is used in 

the case of IL–76 aircraft flying from Baku, Azerbaijan. The business provided 

through these aircraft contributes to our continued access of Baku and the rest of 

Azerbaijan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. I understand that TRANSCOM can use multimodal contracts to accomplish door-to-door transportation solutions using all commercial assets. For example, cargo imported into Afghanistan is sealifted to the UAE and then transported by air to its final destination. Instead of using multimodal contracts, however, I understand TRANSCOM has been shipping cargo through the Northern Distribution Network which costs 21⁄2 times more than if TRANSCOM shipped cargo 

through the Pakistani transportation network. Shipping cargo through the NDN 

also burns more fuel. The Army has said unexpectedly high transportation costs 

have partly caused its $5–7 billion shortfall in the fiscal year 2013 budget. Since 

the UAE is the closest multimodal country to Afghanistan, why hasn’t TRANSCOM 

considered shipping more military cargo on commercial carriers through these 

multimodal contracts? How does TRANSCOM plan its flight routes to most effectively transport cargo into and out of Afghanistan? 

In the coming months, which countries does TRANSCOM plan to transport cargo 

through on C–5s, C–17s, and C–130s? How does TRANSCOM decide whether to fly 

cargo on military aircraft or use commercial aircraft under existing multimodal contracts? Approximately how many hours does TRANSCOM waste flying military aircraft, when commercial aircraft could more quickly and efficiently fly cargo through 

the UAE? 

General FRASER. As the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSOM, in concert 

with the DOD, interagency, and our partner nations, is responsible for setting the 

global logistics enterprise to ensure reliable and redundant lines of communication 

(LOCs) for strategic cargo and passenger transport in support of combatant commands worldwide. In our role as the supporting command to U.S. Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), we have deliberately 

established multiple routes and modes to deploy, sustain, and redeploy/retrograde 

U.S. and coalition partners (Lift & Sustain nations) to meet warfighter requirements, while ensuring system efficiencies to the maximum extent possible. Thus, as 

the transportation provider supporting USCENTCOM and its components, we continually assess and refine our enterprise processes to realize cost avoidances in our 

commitment to make the best use of taxpayer dollars. Most importantly, this must 

be accomplished while effectively enabling USCENTCOM operations by providing 

multiple lanes of transportation, ensuring our mission will not fail due to loss of one 

or more routes. 

Over the past year, approximately 75% of our Defense Transportation System 

cargo moving to and from Afghanistan in support of OEF has moved via our commercial partners in the Commercial Multimodal system (CMM). The other 25% 

moved through other routes that we’ve established over time and continue to modify, including organic/commercial air direct delivery and the Northern Distribution 

Network (NDN). Due to cost, USCENTCOM prefers ground routing over CMM or 

air direct. Of the ground LOCs supporting OEF, the Pakistan Ground LOC 

(PAKGLOC) is the least expensive. Use of the PAKGLOC at its fullest capacity has 

been interrupted by its recent closure and subsequent reopening. While technically 

reopened in July 2012, new cargo bookings were held pending intergovernmental negotiations on the specific Memorandum of Understanding and Terms of Reference. 

These were approved 31 Jul 12 and 1 Nov 12 respectively. In the interim between 

the reopening in July 2012 and the conclusion of negotiations in November 2012, 

cargo that had been stranded along the route and in the port was being cleared. 

We recently completed proofs of principle with new cargo bookings to ensure smooth 
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cargo flow under the new procedures. Because the rates are preferable to other 

available routes, we expect the PAKGLOC to reach higher, sustainable volumes and 

become the primary logistic LOC supporting OEF by the summer of 2013. 

While the PAKGLOC was closed we relied heavily on our commercial partners 

and the CMM system, along with the NDN, to move cargo into theater. While 

USTRANSCOM is responsible for establishing and monitoring LOC capacity and capability to meet OEF delivery requirements, USCENTCOM, as the supported command, in coordination with force providers (services and other combatant commands), issues guidance to subordinate commands for LOC selection when moving 

cargo to and from Afghanistan, with the primary goal of effective operational execution. USCENTCOM’s guidance to its subordinate commands for strategic movement 

includes directives on LOC selection and mode selection (i.e. air direct, CMM, NDN, 

etc.). Once the requirement is given to USTRANSCOM, we source and execute the 

specified transportation solution to meet these USCENTCOM requirements, while 

advising them on low-cost options for cargo delivery that will meet their operational 

needs if applicable. 

Organic and commercial air direct delivery to and from Afghanistan is another 

critical capability utilized by USTRANSCOM to meet OEF warfighter requirements. 

Validated USCENTCOM strategic airlift requirements are allocated to either organic or commercial airlift by USTRANSCOM’s air component, Air Mobility Command (AMC). Our organic strategic airlift aircraft (C–5 & C–17 assets) are national 

assets, which are low-density platforms in continuous high-demand throughout the 

globe. These aircraft are typically utilized to fly equipment that USCENTCOM 

deems critical and/or sensitive, in addition to other critical requirements that cannot 

be met by our commercial partners (i.e. helicopters, secure communications equipment, etc). Thus, if AMC does not have organic assets available for lift upon receipt 

of a validated USCENTCOM requirement, our commercial partners are contracted 

through USTRANSCOM to fulfill the airlift requirement appropriately. C–130s are 

not utilized for strategic airlift due to capacity, velocity and intratheater demand. 

For organic assets, the missions are sourced, planned, and executed by AMC to 

meet USCENTCOM directed delivery timelines. Utilizing industry-standard flight 

planning software that accounts for aircraft specifications, fuel burn, winds aloft, 

etc., AMC plans the mission for the most efficient route possible, while also accounting for aircrew duty-day limitations, diplomatic overflight clearance and international flow-control restrictions. For OEF support, these routes can be accomplished with either air refueling tanker support to fly cargo non-stop to/from continental U.S. (CONUS) and Afghanistan (most expensive option), or the more typical 

method of stopping at enroute locations in Europe. International routes for these 

missions change daily based on a number of other factors, but typically involve European overflight followed by a southern arrival (via Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, and 

Pakistan) or northern arrival (via Turkey and Central Asian States) into Afghanistan proper. Nations overflown by our organic assets each have their own diplomatic 

clearance procedures—some have standing agreements with the DOD for overflight 

in support of OEF, while others require specific clearances for individual missions. 

On rare occasions, our organic airlift assets will be used to deploy and/or redeploy 

units from bases in the western U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater, which 

will move direct from the USPACOM region to Afghanistan (i.e. not routed east over 

the CONUS and Europe). AMC synchronizes and manages these overflight requirements to ensure disciplined global aircraft movement. 

With the requirement to use strategic organic airlift assets to move specific, 

USCENTCOM-validated critical cargo, USTRANSCOM and AMC continually assess 

aircraft utilization while meeting combatant commanders’ requirements. These efforts at efficiency consistently result in over 80% cargo-fill utilization for our aircraft 

departing Afghanistan (including unit redeployment, retrograde and intratheater 

missions). This includes missions that depart Afghanistan with suboptimal cargo 

loads due to operational requirements such as intratheater repositioning, destination cargo handling capabilities, operational retasking, etc. When these missions, as 

well as those with physical cargo restraints (i.e. helicopters), are factored out of the 

assessment, we consistently realize over 95% cargo utilization for organic cargo missions moving OEF cargo. As the weight of airlift effort shifts to a primarily redeploy/ 

retrograde mission for OEF drawdown, we anticipate that cargo utilization will decrease on missions entering Afghanistan, but increase to nearly 100% as aircraft are 

used to bring equipment and troops out of theater. These missions will be used to 

support movement of critical items that are ineligible for commercial ground or air 

lift. The vast majority of cargo is eligible for commercial ground or air lift and will 

therefore be moved via surface or multimodal options. 

Our commercial partners and the capabilities they provide via the CMM system 

are absolutely critical in our efforts to support the OEF warfighter. They have 
142 

moved thousands of tons of vital deployment, sustainment, and retrograde/redeploy 

cargo by providing door to door logistics solutions for the warfighter. Thus, they are 

and will be critical partners to successfully fulfill continuing USCENTCOM requirements for a successful OEF drawdown. When the PAKGLOC capacity increases to 

its full utilization, we anticipate a majority of cargo will move via this route as lift 

costs continue to stress service budgets. However, we also predict that successful 

OEF drawdown will require utilization of the CMM system at levels the enterprise 

has not experienced thus far, which will require concerted effort from our commercial partners to meet substantial lift requirements forecasted by USCENTCOM. 

USTRANSCOM will continue to coordinate with USCENTCOM to ensure global surface, air, and multimodal capacity exists to meet operational requirements, while 

working with our commercial partners to ensure they remain fully informed on 

planned global lift requirements for their use in business modeling and commercial 

enterprise sizing. 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Fraser, how do you use this Approved Air Carrier list? How 

can TRANSCOM ignore stated policy—from a Department of Defense Instruction 

and United States Code—to assign missions that transport military cargo to nonCRAF carriers? 

General FRASER. The process outlined in the Military Freight Traffic Unified 

Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP–1) is used to determine which transportation service 

providers are certified. The MFTURP–1 governs the validation process by which 

transportation service providers become DOD-approved air carriers listed in the 

Global Freight Management (GFM) system. Transportation officers use the GFM 

system to choose the transportation service providers for their domestic tender requirements. Business conducted through the GFM system is not subject to the requirements of the Fly America and Fly CRAF acts. Therefore, customers are able 

to utilize the additional non-CRAF transportation service providers for air delivery 

services. 

Air Mobility Command manages the movement of DOD airlift missions using a 

combination of organic and commercial airlift. Commercial airlift missions are acquired through Federal Acquisition Regulation based contracts. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Air Mobility Command maintains a list of about 136 companies that 

are approved to transport military cargo. However, only about 30 companies on this 

list are CRAF participants; the rest are freight forwarders and non-CRAF carriers. 

Despite stated and well-known policies and regulations to use CRAF carriers, 

TRANSCOM has repeatedly allowed DOD to contract with these other companies 

Please explain the list of Approved Air Carriers. Who specifically are these companies? How do they get on this list? 

General FRASER. The referenced list, Approved Air Carriers, is comprised of transportation service providers which provide transportation partly or wholly via air. Air 

tenders and Air Transportation Service Provider Rules (Section F of the Military 

Freight Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP–1)) are managed by AMC. 

Companies apply for ‘‘DOD-Approved Status’’ through a process outlined in the 

MFTURP–1. As long as companies meet the requirements of the MFTURP–1, air 

transportation providers may include air freight forwarders and air taxis as well as 

conventional air freight carriers operating under Federal Aviation Administration 

rules. Once approved, these domestic air carriers are given access to the Global 

Freight Management system where they can submit tenders (rates) based on their 

approved service category (air carrier, motor carrier, rail, etc). 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. I know there is talk that the (ANP) Afghan National Police and the 

(ANA) Afghan National Army are going to be capable of maintaining stability in the 

Area of Operation (AO). How real is this? 

General MATTIS. Despite the nature of the resilient insurgency in Afghanistan, 

the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with limited support from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), continues to improve across all levels. 

The ANSF capability to maintain stability in the area of operations is real. Successful operations like KALAK KHODE, a large-scale ANSF-led series of operations in 

Regional Command South, are just one example of how the ANSF continues to 

make demonstrable progress each day at the brigade, corps, and institutional levels. 

Since July 2012, the ANSF has not only grown in size, but has developed in capabilities and performance as well. Afghan security forces are now leading 80 percent 

of all conventional and special operations and, with the implementation of Tranche 

4 in March 2013, the ANSF will have security lead for approximately 87 percent 

of the population. I am confident the ANSF is poised to assume the lead for all secu-
143 

rity operations this spring commensurate with Milestone 2013 as ISAF shifts to a 

supporting role. ISAF expects that Tranche 5 will be announced concurrent with 

Milestone 2013. With the implementation of this final Tranche this summer, the 

ANSF will have the lead for security for 100 percent of the Afghan population. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The constant has been U.S. support for Afghan force in contact, the 

variables are what I believe need to be addressed. One has always been the duration that support would last, and the second is the Taliban. In your opinion, is it 

a likely possibility that the forces will regress once there is a total U.S. withdrawal? 

General MATTIS. No. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) operational effectiveness continues a general upward trend as they continue to improve and professionalize. The Afghan Army is performing well, they have fought hard and held 

their own. Currently, over 87% of the Afghan population is under Afghan control 

and Afghan security. The ANSF remains on track to support transition allowing 

them to take the lead for security across Afghanistan by the first half of 2013, and 

have responsibility for all security by the end of December 2014, per the Lisbon 

Agreement. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Syria and Lebanon have always been in the mix, so to speak. There 

are small factions of Al Qaeda extremists, but for the most part they have been of 

little concern with respect to the other two larger threats. Is there more concern 

that one of these two countries will try to follow Iran’s current nuclear push? 

General MATTIS. With Syria currently embroiled in a full-scale civil war, the regime is focused entirely on its survival and defeating the insurgency. Syria is a signatory to the treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has a declared 

civilian nuclear research program, and there are no indications the regime is pursuing a nuclear program along the lines of the current Iranian ‘‘push.’’ As Syrian 

state infrastructure and regime control continues to erode in the civil war, development of a nuclear program inside Syria becomes increasingly unlikely. 

Neither the Government of Lebanon nor any entity within Lebanon (i.e., Lebanese 

Hizballah) has the capability or willingness to develop a nuclear weapons program. 

Lebanon struggles with its own internal stability issues, now exacerbated by sectarian spillover from the Syrian civil war, making nuclear development an implausible scenario. 

Mr. PALAZZO. What is the U.S. stance with the actions of Israel? I know we have 

long since been allies with this very powerful military presence in the region. They 

are aggressively advocating against the Iranian push to nuclear power. If they were 

to act on the threat on their own, will our stance be to still support such actions? 

With that being said, and the looking to follow through with the ‘‘Shift to the Pacific,’’ will we have enough of a force to redeploy to this area of operations? 

General MATTIS. For the first part of this question, ‘‘What is the U.S. stance with 

the actions of Israel’’ I would defer to the European Combatant Commander and to 

the State Department. As for CENTCOM’s ability to defend our interests and partners in the Arabian Gulf, CENTCOM is working closely with the Joint Staff and 

the Services to ensure we retain the necessary capabilities to carry out our responsibilities as directed by the President. 

Mr. PALAZZO. With the sequester under way, what in your mind is the order of 

priority as far as cuts go and what drives that decision? Is it current operations or 

a projection of where the SOF needs to be? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM will achieve all FY13 sequester reductions by reducing the period of performance on several contracts. This was the only way to 

achieve the savings with only 6 months remaining in the fiscal year without impacting current capability. The Department has not issued guidance on the sequester 

implementation for fiscal year 2014 and beyond so we have not been able to fully 

assess what capabilities will be impacted. When we do know the impact of sequester 

we will strike a balance: we must protect readiness for the operators in the fight 

while we consider our future capabilities. 

Lastly, but just as important, USSOCOM receives critical support from the Services and we are already feeling the impact of sequester with the reduction in flying 

hours, ISR and CJCS exercises. This will negatively impact global operations and 

SOF efforts to build partnership capacity and current counter terrorism operations. 

Mr. PALAZZO. A particular interest to me and my district is the proposed procurement of a piece of real estate in South Mississippi to facilitate the training of our 

elite Navy SEALs and (SBU) Small Boat Units. 

a. Do these efforts come to a standstill? 

b. What do you need to ensure that your forces have the best training facilities 

available to them? 

c. How do we expedite this process? 
144 

Admiral MCRAVEN. The query about ‘‘procurement of a piece of real estate in 

South Mississippi to facilitate the training of our elite Navy SEALs and (SBU) 

Small Boat Units’’ is referring to the planned land acquisition adjacent to NASA’s 

Stennis Space Center (SSC) to support the Navy Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

Jungle and Riverine Training Western Maneuver Area (WMA). The WMA land acquisition of 5,200 acres is scheduled to be completed in three phases. Phase One has 

been completed with Phase Two and Three programmed for FY15. 

a. The WMA land acquisition is on track as planned. Environmental compliance 

was covered in a Record of Decision signed by Mr. Wayne Arny, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy (DASN) for Installations and Facilities, on October 6, 2004. 

A property value assessment is underway as required within one year of acquisition. 

Currently, Phase Two and Three remain on track and approved for FY15 in our 

FY2014 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). 

b. U.S. Special Operations Command has projects planned to ensure our forces 

training at SSC have the best training facilities available. Among the projects is a 

Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) Applied Instructor Facility to be constructed in 2015 per the FY2014 FYDP. 

While there are training improvements in the works, Naval Special Warfare Command is investing in an assessment of NSW ranges, training and support facility 

shortfalls at SSC and developing a detailed Military Construction (MILCON) and 

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) investment strategy to mitigate identified gaps. 

Provided funding is available under sequestration, this assessment will be complete 

by the end of CY2013 to help guide the efficient programming of future year resources to ensure our forces training at SSC have the best training facilities available. 

c. U.S. Special Operations Command has a structured Strategic Planning Process 

that guides the programming and expenditure of resources to efficiently support the 

entire Special Operations enterprise. Expediting the process is not warranted, provided U.S. Special Operations Command is fully resourced to execute its deliberate 

development plans. 

Mr. PALAZZO. How is the Air Force prioritizing the airlift capabilities under the 

constraints of a limited budget. With the Asia-Pacific shift will we have the lift capabilities here at home for things such as rapid deployment of National Guard and 

Reserve assets should they be needed? 

General FRASER. Airlift capabilities are prioritized under the strategic guidance 

provided by our National Defense Strategy. As illustrated in the Mobility Capability 

Requirements Study-2016 and the more recent Mobility Capabilities Assessment2018, our anticipated airlift capabilities are adequate to satisfy all national strategy 

requirements, including the Asia-Pacific shift, as well as domestic deployment requirements. 

Mr. PALAZZO. There has been a lot of talk about moving planes from base to base 

over the past year under the different changes to the total force proposal; in some 

cases there have been exhaustive arguments made to discredit the moves or argue 

for why certain planes should stay at certain bases. I know you have looked at all 

of those and weighed those options. 

How much of a factor did cost play in that analysis? 

In some cases we are talking about new construction, moving simulators and 

other major components that is bound to cost millions upon millions of dollars. 

In our current sequestration environment do you believe that we can afford to 

move planes and crews that are accomplishing everything that we ask of them, 

without cost saving being a top factor? 

Under a sequester and with the possibility of another yearlong continuing resolution is the Air Force still planning on following through with the FY14 shift of airlift 

capabilities? 

General FRASER. Due to the fiscal constraints mentioned, Air Mobility Command, 

as the air component to USTRANSCOM, was forced to make tough decisions to retire or divest mobility force structure as part of their initial FY13 Program Objective 

Memorandum submission to HQ U.S. Air Force. While I am not involved in the Air 

Force basing decisions or budgeting decisions to support aircraft force structure, I 

have previewed the results of the FY13 NDAA and determined that airlift force 

structure is sufficient to meet Defense Strategy requirements. 

The current fiscal environment and looming additional fiscal pressure will impact 

future budget decisions. While the Air Force has agreed to extend the C–130 floor 

through FY14, any necessary future intratheater airlift force structure actions for 

FY15 and beyond will be announced in conjunction with the FY15 PB. 
145 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I am concerned about Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP) activities in Yemen. I believe we must have a comprehensive strategy in 

Yemen and that we cannot simply kill our way to success. Do we have a strategy 

for Yemen that leverages your interagency partners? 

General MATTIS. Yes. The CENTCOM strategy in conjunction with other U.S. 

Government (USG) agencies is to conduct regional operations, activities, and actions 

to achieve regional stability. The success of this plan depends on our ability to integrate military planning efforts with those of the broader federal interagency (IA). 

Essential tasks inherent to the Yemen Country Plan have been developed in consultation and coordination with the Interagency Action Group (IAG) liaison officers 

(LNO) representing their respective Federal agencies. These LNOs are assigned or 

detailed to CENTCOM and serve as the conduit for continued collaboration and coordinated planning between CENTCOM and the IA community. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. From my understanding, the Department of Defense supports 

retaining the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) authority and other military 

aid programs to Pakistan. It is also my understanding that PCF depends on the 

Government of Pakistan allowing U.S. trainers in the country. Can you provide an 

update on the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and other military aid programs to Pakistan? 

General MATTIS. The PCF and PCCF authorities have been essential in improving 

Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations 

against militant groups. PCF and PCCF are the primary funding sources for the development and modernization of Pakistan’s combat forces deployed in the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These units help advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region by attacking violent extremists 

and limiting cross-border attacks. The acquisition of items such as night-vision devices, radios, and medical equipment has made Pakistan military operations more 

effective in targeting these violent extremists. PCF/PCCF-funded counterinsurgency 

training has prepared the Pakistan military and Frontier Scouts for the fight 

against insurgents by providing courses in small-unit tactics, intelligence analysis, 

and law of armed conflict. As more of the PCF/PCCF-funded major end items are 

delivered to Pakistan, Pakistan’s military will gain improved capabilities to conduct 

close air support, night operations, and organic intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance operations. Moving forward, our PCF/PCCF-funded efforts to build Pakistan’s 

CT and COIN capabilities do not depend on Pakistan permitting U.S. trainers in 

country. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. While much of our attention focuses on Afghanistan and Iran, 

we cannot forget our continuing commitments in Iraq, particularly our military personnel at the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC–I). What is the future of 

OSC–I? Does OSC–I have the authorities it needs for ‘‘train and assist’’ missions? 

General MATTIS. OSC–I currently maintains necessary ‘‘train and advise’’ authorities, but there is a concern that those authorities will lapse in the next fiscal year. 

The authorities have allowed OSC–I to provide the training and advice needed to 

advance U.S. interests such as developing the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. We remain mindful of our enduring commitments in Iraq. OSC–I is an integral component 

of the U.S. Mission in Iraq and will continue to advance U.S. interests for the foreseeable future. OSC–I’s Security Assistance and Security Cooperation activities increase U.S. leverage and access within the nascent Iraqi government. In the near 

term, OSC–I is transitioning to a model that will be uniform to other U.S. Embassies in the Middle East. We are seeking an extension to the FY13 authorities 

through FY14 in order to complete the train and advise functions. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. While direct-action missions—such as the Bin Laden raid— 

often get the headlines, we cannot lose our capability to conduct ‘‘indirect’’ Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) missions. How are you rebalancing your forces to execute 

these core SOF activities? Are there any core SOF activities that could be turned 

over to Conventional Forces? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOF direct action missions do garner the majority of the headlines, despite the fact that the majority of SOF efforts fall into the category of ‘‘indirect’’ or nonkinetic missions. Over the past decade, the priority for our country (and 

thus SOF) shifted to Southwest Asia. This focus on Iraq and Afghanistan resulted 

in a conscious decision to accept risk in other Geographic Combatant Commanders’ 

(GCCs’) Areas of Responsibility (AORs) by retasking previously regionally aligned 

SOF units to rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simultaneously during this period, 

GCC requirements for SOF have actually increased. With drawdowns in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, SOF will be able to meet some of the GCCs’ demand for SOF which 

has been suppressed for a decade. USSOCOM’s deliberate and rigorous analysis 
146 

over the past year has identified this demand, and we are developing a plan with 

our GCC and Service partners to resource the demand to the best of our ability, taking into account that the demand exceeds the supply. This effort, combined with reinvigorated education and training programs, comprises the core of our ‘‘rebalance’’ 

initiatives. 

With regard to conventional forces, their assistance is absolutely essential for SOF 

to conduct our core activities. However, SOF should not divest itself of any of its 

core missions at this time. SOF units and operators are unique in many aspects. 

Size of the unit, rank structure, and training are some of the primary elements 

which differentiate SOF from conventional forces. The required level of training and 

maturity allows SOF to deploy to locations where large conventional units cannot 

be supported by the host nation, and they interact with both senior-level U.S. and 

foreign officials as part of their daily missions. SOF are uniquely suited to operate 

in austere and/or ambiguous environments. In short, they achieve strategic results 

with tactical operations. But it is important to reiterate that conventional forces’ 

high-demand/low-density skills and resources, such as aviation, logistics, and intelligence greatly improve SOF’s capabilities with only a limited footprint. 

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