NAVY SHIPBUILDING

Significant 

Investments in the 

Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid 

Substantial Unknowns 

about Capabilities, 

Use, and Cost

Report to Congressional Requesters

July 2013

GAO-13-530

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-530, a report to 

congressional requesters

July 2013

NAVY SHIPBUILDING

Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about

Capabilities, Use, and Cost

Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy’s LCS consists of the ship—

called a seaframe—and mission 

packages, which provide combat

capability. LCS is intended to be 

reconfigurable to perform three primary 

missions: surface warfare; mine 

countermeasures; and anti-submarine 

warfare. The Navy currently plans to 

buy 52 seaframes, including two 

variants being constructed at two U.S. 

shipyards, and 64 mission packages. 

The total estimated acquisition cost is

about $40 billion in 2010 dollars. 

GAO was asked to assess the status 

of the LCS program. This report 

examines (1) the progress and 

challenges associated with seaframe 

and mission module production, 

development, and testing; and (2) the 

soundness of the Navy’s business 

case for the integrated LCS program. 

GAO analyzed Navy and contractor 

documents, toured shipyards and LCS 

ships, and interviewed DOD and Navy 

officials and contractor representatives.

What GAO Recommends

To ensure that LCS investments are

informed by key information, Congress 

should consider restricting funding for 

further ships until the Navy completes

several studies about future LCS 

designs and capabilities. GAO is also 

making several recommendations, 

including that DOD limit future 

seaframe and mission package 

purchases until it achieves key 

acquisition and testing milestones. 

DOD disagreed with these 

recommendations, stating that slowing 

seaframe purchases would cause 

prices to rise and mission package

purchases are needed to equip 

operational ships. GAO believes the

Navy does not have adequate 

knowledge about LCS capabilities to 

support the planned procurement rate. 

What GAO Found

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) seaframe program continues to face challenges 

stemming from concurrent design, production, and testing activities. The Navy 

has taken steps to resolve problems with the lead ships, and the shipyards are 

beginning to realize benefits from facility improvements and experience. 

However, testing remains to be completed and the Navy is currently studying 

potentially significant design changes, such as increasing the commonality of 

systems between the two ship variants and changing ship capabilities. Changes 

at this point can compromise the positive impacts of shipyard learning, increase 

costs, and prolong schedules. The mission module program also has 

concurrency issues, and testing to date has shown considerable limitations in 

capabilities. The Navy is pursuing an incremental approach to fielding mission 

packages, but it has yet to finalize the requirements for each increment and does 

not plan to achieve the minimum performance requirements for the mine 

countermeasures and surface warfare packages until the final increments are 

fielded in 2017 and 2019, respectively.

The Navy continues to buy LCS seaframes and modules even as significant 

questions remain about the program and its underlying business case. Elements 

of the LCS business case, including its cost, the time needed to develop and field 

the system, and its anticipated capabilities have degraded over time. There are 

also significant unknowns related to key LCS operations and support concepts 

and the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two seaframe variants. 

The potential effect of these unknowns on the program is compounded by the 

Navy’s aggressive acquisition strategy. By the time key tests of integrated LCS 

capability are completed in several years, the Navy will have procured or have

under contract more than half of the planned number of seaframes. Almost half 

of the planned seaframes are already under contract, and the Navy plans to 

award further contracts in 2016, before the Department of Defense (DOD) makes 

a decision about full rate production of the ships. The Navy will not be able to 

demonstrate that mission packages integrated with the seaframes can meet the 

minimum performance requirements until operational testing for both variants 

(Freedom and Independence) is completed, currently planned for 2019.

Alignment of Planned Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Contract and Test Activities

The Navy has also essentially bypassed two major acquisition reviews for 

mission modules, purchasing 8 of the 64 planned mission packages before 

gaining approval to enter the system development and initial production phases.

View GAO-13-530. For more information, 

contact Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or 

mackinm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Letter 1 

Background 2

Seaframe Quality and Cost Should Continue to Improve, but Delays 

Persist and Potentially Significant Design Changes Could 

Disrupt Production Efficiency 11

Navy Acquisition of Mission Modules Is Risky Due to Inadequately 

Defined Early Increments and Continued Developmental 

Difficulties 25

Significant Questions Remain Regarding the LCS Business Case As 

the Navy Commits to Producing More Ships and Modules 40

Conclusions 53

Matters for Congressional Consideration 55

Recommendations for Executive Action 56

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 56

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 60

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 63

Appendix III: Mission Package Overview Illustrations from Interactive Figures 68

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 71

Tables

Table 1: Major Changes in Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

Acquisition and Contracting Strategy 7

Table 2: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes 8

Table 3: Delays in Fielding Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package 

Increments 29

Table 4: Evolution of Navy Statements about Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS) Capability 42

Table 5: Major Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Conceptual Questions 

Regarding Ship Operations and Seaframe Variants 44

Table 6: Potential Areas of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Operating 

and Support Cost Uncertainty 45

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Table 7: Planned Seaframe Contract Activities, Mission Package 

Procurement, and Operational Testing of Mission Package 

Increments on Each Variant 49

Figures

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframe Variants 5

Figure 2: Major Design Changes among Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

Seaframes 13

Figure 3: Actual and Projected Pre-outfitting and Labor Hours for 

Two Variants of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframe 16

Figure 4: Number of Deficiencies Reported at Delivery for Early 

Littoral Combat Ship Seaframes 18

Figure 5: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Construction Timeframes 19

Figure 6: Decrease in Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Design Changes 

for Both Seaframe Variants 20

Figure 7: Navy’s Progress Fielding Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine 

Countermeasures Mission Package Systems 31

Figure 8: Navy’s Progress Fielding Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

 Surface Warfare Mission Package Systems 36

Figure 9: Navy’s Progress Fielding Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) AntiSubmarine Warfare Mission Package Systems 39

Figure 10: Acquisition Frameworks for Typical Shipbuilding

 Programs and Littoral Combat Ship 51

Figure 11: Mine Countermeasures Package Overview 68

Figure 12: Surface Warfare Package Overview 69

Figure 13: Anti-Submarine Warfare Package Overview 70
Page iii GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Abbreviations

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

CONOPS Concept of Operations

DOD Department of Defense

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

INSURV Board of Inspection and Survey

LCS Littoral Combat Ship

MCM Mine Countermeasures

PSA Post Shakedown Availability 

OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

RMMV Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle

SUW Surface Warfare 

USD (AT&L) Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 Technology and Logistics

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Page 1 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 22, 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Seapower

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable J. Randy Forbes

Chairman

The Honorable Mike McIntyre

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is intended to be reconfigurable to 

perform three different primary missions: mine countermeasures (MCM), 

surface warfare (SUW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The LCS

consists of two distinct parts—the ship itself (called a seaframe because 

of its ability to carry interchangeable payloads similarly to an airframe) 

and the interchangeable package of sensors and weapons that it carries 

and deploys, called a mission package. The mission package provides 

the majority of the ship’s combat capability. Mission packages are 

composed of one or more mission modules and an aviation capability. 

The Navy has contracted for 24 seaframes, consisting of two design 

variants being constructed at two U.S. shipyards. The Navy has also 

procured 8 mission packages, with plans to procure 2 more in 2013. In its 

baselines, the Navy planned to spend over $40 billion in 2010 dollars 

through fiscal year 2034 to acquire 55 LCS seaframes and 64 mission 

packages—though it has since reduced the total number of seaframes to 

52.

The Navy has accepted delivery of the first three seaframes, and has 

spent several years completing various test and maintenance events on 

the first two—USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2); 

USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) was delivered in June 2012. During this time, we 

and others have identified a number of problems with the seaframes and 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

their equipment, as well as challenges related to the development of 

mission module technologies. In light of these issues, you asked us to 

conduct a broad evaluation of the LCS program. This report addresses 

the following: (1) the Navy’s progress in producing and testing LCS 

seaframes and any remaining risks; (2) the Navy’s progress in 

developing, producing, and testing LCS mission modules and any 

remaining risks; (3) any risks in the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the 

integrated LCS program.

To conduct our work, we evaluated the Navy’s acquisition strategies; 

requirements documentation; concepts of operations; test and delivery 

schedules; test plans; and life-cycle cost estimates for the two seaframe 

variants and the mission modules. In addition, we interviewed the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Deputy Directors for Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Director of Navy Staff; officials 

from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV, who represent 

the sponsors of the LCS program); LCS program office officials; and 

officials from Fleet Forces Command, LCS Squadron One, and the Third, 

Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Fleets; among others. We analyzed Navy and 

contractor documentation on the seaframes and mission modules 

programs related to development, production, testing, performance, and 

fielding. We discussed this information with government and contractor 

representatives responsible for managing these programs and testing key 

LCS mission systems. We also visited both shipyards and toured the 

three LCS ships that have been delivered to the Navy to date. A more 

detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented in 

appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2012 to July 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The concept for the LCS emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s as 

the Navy was trying to address two main needs. First, it had identified 

existing and emerging capability gaps in its ability to defeat large numbers 

of hostile small boats, sea mines, and quiet diesel-electric and nuclearpowered submarines, especially when these threats were present in the 

shallow waters close to shore, which are known as the littorals. Second, 

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

the Navy wanted to field an affordable utility ship that would be able to 

handle some of the day-to-day tasks and responsibilities of the Navy, 

including missions such as counter-piracy patrols and foreign nation 

training exercises that are relatively low risk. As the number of frigates 

has declined over time, these missions are increasingly being performed 

by more expensive and capable ships—destroyers and cruisers—which 

the Navy states are in high demand for more stressing operations. In 

addition, an affordable ship class was needed if the Navy hoped to 

maintain its fleet size while dealing with a tightening shipbuilding budget 

for new surface combatants.

To fulfill these goals, the Navy settled on a set of novel concepts that 

would be realized on a new class of ships—LCS. LCS would have 

interchangeable mission systems in the form of mission modules rather 

than fixed mission systems as is generally the case with other Navy 

surface combatants. These modules would give the Navy flexibility to 

change equipment in the field to meet different mission needs, and to 

incorporate new technology to address emerging threats. LCS was also 

envisioned as having a greatly reduced crew size compared to other ship 

classes, which in turn would lead to lower costs for operations and 

support. To balance these reduced manning levels with its operational, 

maintenance, support, and administrative needs, the Navy developed a 

new maintenance and support concept. Unlike other ships, LCS would 

have no onboard administrative personnel and a limited ability to conduct 

maintenance at sea; instead, it would rely heavily on shore-based 

support. The Navy also opted to use a rotational crewing concept, 

whereby multiple crews are assigned to one ship and rotate on and off 

while the ship remains forward deployed. Rotational crewing is used on 

the ballistic missile submarines, mine countermeasures ships, and 

coastal patrol craft, but it is not widely used on U.S. Navy surface 

combatants.

The Navy formally initiated the LCS acquisition program in 2004. At that 

time, the LCS seaframe and mission modules acquisition efforts were 

managed as one program. In 2011, the Navy requested that they be 

separated into two programs managed by two distinct program offices, 

which would fall under a newly formed Program Executive Office. The 

LCS seaframe program office is responsible for the hull; various 

command and control systems; core combat systems such as radars and 

the 57-millimeter gun; and launch, handling, and recovery systems that 

deploy mission module equipment. The mission modules program office 

is responsible for buying and integrating the systems that come together 

to form the three different mission packages—MCM, ASW, and SUW.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

The Navy is procuring two different seaframe designs from shipbuilding 

teams led by Lockheed Martin—which builds its ships at Marinette Marine 

in Marinette, Wisconsin—and Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama.

1 The two 

designs reflect different contractor solutions to the same set of 

performance requirements. The most notable difference is that the 

Lockheed Martin Freedom variant (LCS 1 and other odd-numbered 

seaframes, 3 through 23) is a monohull design with a steel hull and 

aluminum superstructure, while the Austal USA Independence variant 

(LCS 2 and other even-numbered seaframes, 4 through 24) is an 

aluminum trimaran.2

Figure 1 shows the first two LCS seaframes.

This report refers to the Lockheed Martin ships as 

the Freedom variant and the Austal USA ships as the Independence

variant.

 

1

For LCS 2 and LCS 4, General Dynamics was the prime contractor for the Austal USAbuilt ships. General Dynamics and Austal USA ended their teaming arrangement in 2010. 

Austal USA is the prime contractor for the 10 other even-numbered seaframes currently 

under contract.

2

A trimaran is a ship that has three separate hulls. The Navy is now referring to the 

Independence-class variant as a slender stabilized monohull design.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Figure 1: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframe Variants
 

Page 6 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Each seaframe has reconfigurable spaces where the mission modules 

are carried. These spaces are equipped with standardized connections 

for ship services including power and cooling. The mission module 

designs are based on standard shipping containers that are outfitted with 

a variety of unmanned systems, sensors, and weapons that can be 

loaded onto and off of the seaframe. Mission modules are also 

accompanied by an aviation detachment, consisting of a helicopter and its 

flight and support crew, as well as vertical take-off unmanned aerial 

vehicles. When the aviation detachment is embarked with a mission 

module and the mission module crew, it is referred to as a mission 

package. The Navy is fielding the mission packages in increments in 

order to deliver capabilities faster. The Navy plans on fielding one ASW 

increment and four MCM and SUW increments. The Navy will upgrade all 

mission packages to the same configuration once the final increment of 

each has been fielded. The Navy plans to buy 64 mission packages: 16 

ASW packages, 24 MCM packages, and 24 SUW packages.

The Navy’s acquisition strategy for LCS seaframes has changed several 

times over the past decade. The original plan was to fund one or two 

initial ships—in what the Navy called a Flight 0 configuration—based on 

the designs it selected through a conceptual design competition, and then 

spend time experimenting with the seaframes and overall LCS concept. 

This experimentation time was considered important to help inform what 

the Navy wanted and needed in the seaframe, and also to help determine 

if the LCS concept was feasible. Further, although both designs met the 

Navy’s requirements, their significant differences lent even more 

importance to the experimentation concept to inform a decision about 

which seaframe design was better suited to meet the Navy’s needs. After 

a down-select decision, the winning design was to be procured in larger 

numbers, with any design changes incorporated into a new Flight 1 

configuration. The Navy abandoned this strategy, however, after 

concluding it would be unrealistic to expect the two competing shipyards 

to build only one or two ships and then wait for the Navy to complete the 

period of experimentation before awarding additional contracts. Instead, 

the Navy opted to continue funding additional seaframes. This decision 

meant that the Navy would buy a number of seaframes without having 

completed the planned period of discovery and learning. The Navy has 

made several other revisions to the LCS acquisition strategy over time, 

including shifting back and forth between plans to down-select to one 

seaframe design or to build both. Table 1 shows the evolution of the 

Navy’s LCS acquisition strategy, and relevant contracting actions.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Table 1: Major Changes in Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Acquisition and 

Contracting Strategy

Date

Acquisition 

strategy 

action

Contracting 

action Description 

Early 

concept—

approx. 

2000-2004

● Two shipyards would each build one Flight 0 

prototype. These prototypes would be tested 

by experimentation in the fleet, which would 

inform design changes or a decision to 

down-select; that is, to buy only one variant.

December 

2004 and 

October 

2005

● Navy awards cost-reimbursable contracts for 

detailed design and construction for LCS 1 

and LCS 2, respectively. The Navy paid for 

these ships with research and development 

funds.

2005 ● The Navy decides to continue procurement 

of both Flight 0 seaframe designs at least 

through fiscal year 2009. Experimentation 

will now occur concurrently with buying 

seaframes.

June and 

December 

2006a

● Navy exercises contract options for 

construction of the LCS 3 and LCS 4, 

respectively.

April and 

November 

2007

● After unsuccessful negotiations to change 

the contracts for LCS 3 and 4 from costreimbursable type to fixed price incentive 

contracts to manage excessive cost growth, 

the Navy terminates these contracts in part.

September 

2008

● Navy decides to continue buying both 

variants with no plans to down-select to a 

single ship design, and to incorporate design 

changes and lessons learned into what it 

terms a Flight 0+ configuration.

March and 

May 2009

● Navy awards fixed price contracts to both 

shipyards for LCS 3 and 4. 

January 

2010

● Navy approves plans for a down-select in 

fiscal year 2010 to a single design to be 

procured in a block buy of up to ten ships 

over 5 years. This strategy is intended to 

obtain more competitive pricing. The Navy 

plans for two ships in fiscal year 2010 and 

two more ships per year from fiscal years 

2011-2014. The Navy strategy also included 

a requirement to bring in a second 

shipbuilder to build five ships of the winning 

design.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Date

Acquisition 

strategy 

action

Contracting 

action Description 

November 

2010

● As a result of receiving competitive pricing 

from both the shipbuilders during 

negotiations, the Navy decides to continue 

buying both designs and award a ten-ship 

block buy contract to each contractor. Navy 

requests and obtains congressional approval 

for this change.

December 

2010

● Navy awards two block buy contracts for up 

to ten ships to both shipyards; the Navy 

authorizes construction of one ship at each 

shipyard at the time of contract award, and 

plans to authorize construction of one ship at 

each shipyard in fiscal year 2011, and two 

ships at each shipyard per year, from fiscal 

years 2012-2015.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy LCS acquisition strategies.

a

From 2006-2008, 5 seaframes, including the original LCS 3 and LCS 4 which the Navy contracted for 

in June and December of 2006, respectively, were canceled by the Navy as a result of program 

restructuring or congressional action. The actions cancelling 3 of these seaframes are not included 

above because they occurred prior to a contract being awarded.

As indicated by table 2 below, the Navy has contracted for 24 LCS 

seaframes to date. Under the block buy contracts it negotiated with the 

two shipbuilders in November 2010, the Navy negotiated prices upfront 

for the seaframes. However, the shipyards cannot proceed with work in 

connection with the ships until the Navy provides written notice that funds 

are available and have been obligated to the contract.

Table 2: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes

Seaframe number Status as of March 2013 

1-3 Navy has accepted delivery

4-10 Under construction at the two shipyards

11-16 Under contract with the two shipyards; congressional funding has 

been received

17-24 Under contract but not yet congressionally funded

Source: Navy documentation.

The Navy requested funding for LCS 17-20 in its fiscal year 2014 budget 

request and plans to request funding for LCS 21-24 in its fiscal year 2015 

request. In any given fiscal year, if funds are not available to fully fund the 

ships planned for that year, the shipyards can renegotiate the prices and 

delivery schedules for those ships and any additional ships covered by 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

the block buy contracts that have not yet started construction.3 However, 

the target prices for the seaframes already funded and under construction 

would not be affected and any remaining unfunded ships are not to be 

considered terminated for the convenience of the government. According 

to the Navy, the cost of the funded ships might still increase under this 

scenario because of increases in the overhead costs applied to those 

ships. The Navy and shipbuilders would share some of these costs and 

the shipbuilders may have to absorb the remainder of these costs if the 

increases cause the total seaframe construction cost to exceed the ceiling 

price in the contract.4

In 2012, two independent Navy studies—one conducted by the Board of 

Inspection and Survey (INSURV, the Navy’s ship inspection entity) and 

one conducted by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations—identified 

concerns with the LCS and recommended steps to improve aspects of 

the program.

The Navy expects to take delivery of the last 

seaframes under these contracts in 2019. In 2013, the Navy announced it 

was reducing the number of planned seaframe purchases from 55 to 52, 

based on changing force structure requirements.

5

 

3

In the situation that funds are not available in any given fiscal year for the ships planned 

for that year, and the parties renegotiate the prices and delivery schedules for those ships 

and any additional ships covered by the block buy contracts that have not yet started 

construction, it does not constitute a termination for the convenience of the government 

and, thus, the government would not pay termination costs.

Partially in response, in August 2012, the Chief of Naval 

Operations established an LCS oversight council. The council is 

composed of vice admirals from the requirements, acquisition, and fleet 

communities, and has the mission of ensuring “the successful

procurement, development, manning, training, sustainment, and 

operational employment” of the LCS, mission packages, and shore 

4

The LCS block buy contracts include fixed-price incentive line items for seaframe 

construction. Fixed-price incentive contracts include a target cost and a target profit, which 

together equal the target price. The block buy contracts also specify an incentive ratio for 

sharing any savings in the event of underruns when the actual contract cost is less than 

the target cost, or the sharing of additional costs when the actual contract cost is greater 

than this target cost. Under the LCS block buy contracts, the Navy’s share of any cost 

savings or cost overrun is 50 percent and the shipbuilder’s share is 50 percent. This cost 

sharing arrangement ends when the actual contract cost reaches the contract ceiling 

price, at which point the contractor is responsible for all additional costs. However, if the 

Navy is responsible for the cost overruns, it may be responsible for the costs associated 

with an increase in the contract ceiling price.

5

Board of Inspection and Survey, LCS Material Condition and Maintainability Report (July 

13, 2012) and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Review of the Navy’s Readiness to 

Receive, Employ and Deploy the LCS Class Vessel, (March 9, 2012).
 

Page 10 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

infrastructure. The council’s chairman carries the authority of the Chief of 

Naval Operations, and its first task was to develop a comprehensive plan 

to address the recommendations in the independent studies and 

concepts of operations (CONOPS) and doctrine issues needed to help 

support the planned April 2013 deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore. The 

first installment of the LCS Council’s plan was issued in January 2013 

and the plan currently contains over 1,000 action items. In March 2013, 

the Chief of Naval Operations added the Joint High Speed Vessel—also 

constructed at Austal USA—to the LCS Council’s purview, citing the 

unique challenges facing both classes.6

One major activity identified in the LCS Council’s plan is for both 

seaframe variants to complete testing to demonstrate their performance.

DOD acquisition policy requires defense acquisition programs execute 

and complete developmental testing and operational testing. 

Developmental testing is intended to assist in identifying system 

performance, capabilities, limitations, and safety issues to help reduce 

design and programmatic risks. Operational testing is intended to assess 

a weapon system’s capability in a realistic environment when maintained 

and operated by warfighters, subjected to routine wear-and-tear, and 

employed in combat conditions. Operational testing also includes live-fire 

testing, which provides timely assessment of the survivability and lethality 

of a weapon system. Survivability tests are another type of test, which 

demonstrate that the ship designs can safely absorb and control damage 

and includes a full ship shock trial, where a manned ship is subjected to a 

controlled, underwater explosion at sea. Statute requires a program to 

complete realistic survivability tests and initial operational testing before 

proceeding beyond low-rate initial production.7

Prior to acceptance, ships are also typically required to go through 

various trials to verify that requirements and specifications are met. An 

acceptance trial is first conducted by INSURV to determine whether the 

ship has been completed in accordance with the contract specifications 

and is operationally ready. After further Navy tests and evaluations, 

INSURV conducts a final contract trial to operationally demonstrate that 

the ship’s systems satisfy material readiness conditions before the 

contract period ends and it is delivered to the fleet. Following acceptance 

and before initial deployment, the Navy also has the opportunity to make 

 

6

This change also adds the commander of the Military Sealift Command to the Council 

leadership. Military Sealift Command will operate the Joint High Speed Vessel.

7

10 U.S.C. §§ 2399, 2366.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

any needed additional corrections or to fix any problems that may have 

emerged in testing during a repair period called a post-shakedown 

availability (PSA). LCS 1 has completed her trials and PSA; LCS 2 has 

completed one PSA with a second one planned and has a remaining trial; 

LCS 3 has had both trials and is now entering a PSA period.

The Navy has made progress in addressing some of the early design and 

construction problems on LCS 1 and LCS 2, and is obtaining better cost 

performance from the shipyards on follow-on seaframes now that the 

seaframes are in steady production. However, schedule delays persist. 

Based on projected shipyard learning curve improvements, shipyard 

performance can be expected to continue to improve over time. But, this 

expected progress may be disrupted because the Navy is considering 

new, potentially significant seaframe design changes that could disrupt 

production efficiency and learning. Neither variant has yet completed 

developmental testing to validate its performance or shock and 

survivability testing. Late discoveries in testing while seaframes continue 

to be constructed could lead to further design changes.

The Navy has made progress in addressing some of the design and 

quality issues that have arisen on the lead ships—LCS 1 and LCS 2. We 

have previously reported that both ships had outstanding technical issues 

at the time of delivery, and the Navy has continued to discover additional 

problems.8

 

8

Additional problems include the recent reports of a fire occurring on LCS 4 during the 

shipbuilder’s initial sea trials and issues with water in the lube oil system on LCS 1. See 

also GAO, Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will 

Determine Eventual Capabilities, 

For example, 17 cracks were identified on LCS 1 following 

delivery and after a period of operations; these had been predicted to 

occur by Navy and contractor structural analyses. Of these 17 cracks, 16 

were in the topside, or deckhouse structure, and one was found in the 

hull. LCS 1 also has had issues with the failure of one of its gas turbine 

engines, corrosion, and a leaking seal on the propulsion shaft. LCS 2, 

which has spent much less time operating and has traveled fewer miles 

than LCS 1, has not reported as many major problems, but the ship has 

had corrosion in its waterjet propulsion systems that has required 

additional money to correct.

GAO-10-523 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2010).

Seaframe Quality and 

Cost Should Continue 

to Improve, but 

Delays Persist and 

Potentially Significant

Design Changes 

Could Disrupt 

Production Efficiency

Navy Making Progress on 

Resolving Early Seaframe 

Quality Issues
 

Page 12 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

According to the Navy and both shipbuilders, a number of design 

changes have been implemented on the lead ships and the follow-on 

ships of each variant to address and correct some of these problems. The 

Navy repaired the cracks on LCS 1 and implemented design changes 

(reinforcing weak areas) on LCS 3 and follow-on ships in the Freedom

class to prevent the stresses that led to cracking. The Navy has also 

made changes to the configuration of several major ship systems, 

including structure, propulsion, communications, electrical, and navigation 

systems, to correct other problems. To reduce corrosion on both variants, 

the Navy expanded the corrosion protection system on the Freedomclass variant and added new corrosion protection systems to the waterjet 

propulsion systems of the Independence-class variant. The Navy also 

made design changes to the mission module bay at the stern of the 

Freedom variant to reduce corrosion and water build-up in that space. In 

some instances, the Navy paid for these changes, while the contractor 

paid in other instances.

Figure 2 identifies several of the significant design changes made to 

follow-on ships of each variant as compared to prior ships.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Figure 2: Major Design Changes among Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes
 

Page 14 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

The Navy and the shipyards told us that they have also taken steps to 

address weight growth, particularly on LCS 1, but seaframe weight 

remains a top technical risk for the program. Weight affects the speed 

and stability of the ship, as well as how much it can carry. According to 

Navy officials, LCS 1 experienced weight growth because the Navy 

directed design changes after the initial ship design phases were 

complete; the shipbuilder also underestimated the weight of paint and 

installed parts. As a result, the Navy had to use some of the weight 

margin allocated for future growth in order for the ship to meet the 

minimum requirements for mission package carrying capacity. Program 

officials also said that they had to implement design changes on LCS 1 

and follow-on Freedom-variant ships to improve stability when damaged. 

On LCS 1, the Navy added two external ballast tanks to the stern 

following construction. For LCS 3 and subsequent Freedom-variant 

seaframes, the Navy designed these tanks into the hull, which adds 9 feet 

of length to the ship. This design change also provides added benefits of 

additional internal volume for cargo and fuel, which increases the range of 

this variant. While LCS 2 has also had issues with weight control, they 

have not been as significant as those on LCS 1.

Program officials and shipyard representatives for both seaframes said 

that they are actively managing the weight of the variants. 

Representatives from both shipyards told us that they monitor seaframe 

weight through a weight management plan, and all major design changes 

now require an estimate of weight impacts. In addition, the Navy said that 

weight control managers at each shipyard are responsible for weighing 

equipment over 50 pounds that goes on the ship. The Navy also told us 

that it has implemented design changes for lighter equipment and 

materials, such as a new electric start system for the gas turbines and 

gun fire control system. We requested updated copies of the contractually 

required weight reports that the shipyard is supposed to develop and 

provide to the Navy, but program officials told us these reports had been 

sent back to the shipyards to correct issues with the quality of the 

reported data that prevented these reports from being acceptable.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

LCS 1 and LCS 2, awarded under cost-reimbursable contracts, cost 

significantly more than expected, which is often the case for lead ships of 

a new class.9

The Navy attributes these cost improvements not only to the use of fixedprice contracts, but also to the shipyards’ experience building the ships. 

Both shipyards have worked toward improving production processes 

through the use of more automation and modularized assembly, as well 

as by increasing the amount of equipment and hardware that they install 

before the different large sections, or blocks, of the ship are assembled—

a process called pre-outfitting. By increasing the level of pre-outfitting on 

follow-on ships and decreasing labor hours spent building the ships, 

production efficiency is gained. For example, both shipyards anticipate by 

the third ship of the class, they will achieve approximately a 50 percent 

reduction in the number of labor hours needed for ship completion.

The Navy awarded fixed-price contracts for the 2010 blockbuy contracts. As part of contract negotiations, the shipyards submitted 

estimated costs that decrease on each successive seaframe, with the 

expectation that affordability would improve on subsequent seaframes.

Figure 3 depicts the actual and projected learning curves and preoutfitting levels for both shipyards, where the data for LCS 1, 2, and 3 are 

actual data and the rest are projections. As is shown, increasing preoutfitting helps decrease labor hours.

 

9

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy 

Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007). Section 125 of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 set a unit procurement cost 

cap of $460 million per ship for all LCSs procured in fiscal year 2008 and beyond. Pub. L. 

No. 110-181. Implementation of the cost cap was deferred two years, to apply to all LCSs 

procured in fiscal year 2010 and beyond by section 122 of the Duncan Hunter National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. Pub. L. No. 110-117. The cost cap was 

amended by section 121(c) and (d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010 to $480 million per ship. Pub. L. No. 111-84.

Cost, Production 

Efficiency, and Quality 

Have Started to Improve, 

but Schedule Delays 

Persist
 

Page 16 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Figure 3: Actual and Projected Pre-outfitting and Labor Hours for Two Variants of 

the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframe

Note: Total hours are presented as a percentage with LCS 1 and 2 as the baseline.

The shipyards have also begun to realize the benefits of facility 

improvements. The fiscal year 2010 block-buy contracts provide for the 

shipyards to transition from building one LCS to a higher rate of 

production, which necessitated facility expansions at both shipyards. For 

example, Marinette Marine recently completed a 5-year, multi-million 

dollar investment program that improved its fabrication facilities, including 

its plate shop, panel line, and blast and paint facilities. According to 

shipyard representatives, they have also improved the flow of production 

through their facilities by eliminating 8 miles from their production 

sequence, which saves time in the movement of ship blocks that have to 

travel in the shipyard during construction. LCS 1 and LCS 3 were built in 

a more static fashion, LCS 5 and LCS 7 will represent the transition to the 

new production processes and buildings, and LCS 9 will be the first ship 

built entirely in the upgraded facilities. Austal USA also completed a multimillion dollar facilities expansion, including building a new module 

manufacturing facility. The yard also made production improvements, 

including expanding its use of extruded aluminum panels for the decks 

instead of welding individual sections, which Austal officials say could 

save significant labor hours per ship.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Navy program office and INSURV officials, as well as shipyard 

representatives, have described seaframe quality as improving. 

Deficiencies identified by INSURV vary in significance, and INSURV 

classifies these issues into three parts based upon the professional 

judgment of the inspectors. Part 1 deficiencies are intended to represent 

very significant deficiencies that are likely to cause the ship to be 

unseaworthy or substantially reduce the ability of the ship to carry out its 

assigned mission. Starred cards are a subset of Part 1 deficiencies that, 

in INSURV’s view, require correction or a waiver by the Chief of Naval 

Operations before the ship is delivered to the Navy. Part 2 deficiencies 

are considered less significant issues that do not meet the criteria for a 

Part 1 deficiency, but should be corrected to restore the ship to required 

specifications. Part 3 deficiencies are generally categorized as those that 

prevent the ship from meeting Navy standards but are cost prohibitive to 

fix. Our analysis shows that the number of defects remaining at the time 

the ships were delivered to the Navy declined significantly from LCS 1 to 

LCS 3, but the number of seaframes delivered to date is too small to 

determine if this is a trend. LCS 2 has only had a partial acceptance trial, 

and LCS 4 has not yet conducted its acceptance trial (currently scheduled 

for June 2013), so the quality data on the Independence variant is limited 

and cannot yet be compared with follow-on seaframes. As of March 2013, 

both LCS 1 and LCS 2 each have seven outstanding starred cards that 

had not yet been resolved. Issues include the launch, handling, and 

recovery system on LCS 1 and the rescue boat and the way in which the 

engineering control system manages system trouble alarms on LCS 2.

Figure 4 shows the number of Part 1, 2, and 3 deficiencies and starred 

cards for each of the three delivered seaframes, showing a reduction in 

deficiencies between LCS 1 and LCS 3.
 

Page 18 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Figure 4: Number of Deficiencies Reported at Delivery for Early Littoral Combat 

Ship Seaframes

Notes: These data come from the Naval Sea Systems Command Technical Support Management 

system, and include all deficiencies open 7 days after the date of delivery. LCS 1 had a second 

acceptance trial after delivery, which resulted in additional starred card deficiencies.

Part 1 deficiencies are very significant deficiencies. Starred cards are a subset of Part 1 deficiencies 

that, in INSURV’s view, require correction or a waiver by the Chief of Naval Operations before the 

ship is delivered to the Navy. Part 2 deficiencies are considered less significant, while Part 3 

deficiencies are cost prohibitive to fix. Part 1, 2, and 3 deficiencies are also known as Priority 1, 2 and 

3 deficiencies. 

Deficiencies labeled as “Government” reflect those that were determined by the Navy and the 

shipbuilding contractor to be the Navy’s responsibility for correction, while those labeled as 

“Contractor” reflect those that were determined to be the shipbuilding contractor’s responsibility for 

correction.

One area of seaframe production that continues to be problematic is 

schedule performance for reasons related and unrelated to the LCS 

program. The lead ships were each delivered almost 2 years after their 

initial planned delivery dates due to various design and construction 

issues. LCS 3 delivered 2 months ahead of its contractually required date, 

but the next five ships are expected to deliver, on average, 7 months late. 

Representatives at Marinette Marine told us that LCS 5 and LCS 7 are 

both delayed due in part to a commercial ship that is behind schedule and 

blocking shipyard workflow. At Austal USA, LCS 4 has been delayed 

several times due to use of less-skilled labor and delays in obtaining 

production drawings. LCS 6 and LCS 8 are expected to be delayed due to 

the shipyard’s transition to its new production line and the workers’ 

relative inexperience with it. The Navy has adjusted its delivery schedule 

for future ships to take into account these delays and does not envision 

further delays beyond LCS 8. 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Figure 5 shows the total construction time for LCS 1 through LCS 8 and 

their delivery delays. 

Figure 5: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Construction Timeframes

Note: Dates reflect keel laying to delivery.

Even as production is underway at the two shipyards, the Navy is 

evaluating various options for changes to LCS seaframe designs. The 

program office has several studies ongoing to evaluate changes to the 

seaframes, communication networks, combat management systems, and 

hull, mechanical, and electrical systems. Shipyard experience, which 

translates into reduced labor hours expended per ship, is based on 

building repeat copies of similar ships, and design changes can disrupt 

this learning. To date, the number of design changes that the Navy is 

implementing on the two variants has been decreasing.

Figure 6 depicts the decrease in design changes on both variants.

Seaframe Designs Have 

Been Stabilizing, but Navy 

Is Considering Significant 

Changes
 

Page 20 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Figure 6: Decrease in Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Design Changes for Both 

Seaframe Variants

However, the Navy is now considering a series of potentially significant 

design changes to accommodate larger crews than initially anticipated, 

increase commonality between the seaframe variants and with other 

Navy ships, and increase the ships’ combat capabilities, among others. 

For example, prior to the deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore, the Navy 

added 20 extra berths to the ship and intends to make a similar change to 

LCS 2. However, the Navy did not add equivalent amounts of crew 

storage space; the ships will also require additional water and sanitation 

systems and food storage to meet Navy standards. The Navy is now 

evaluating how to make these additional berths better suited to both 

variant designs. The Navy also has a number of technical studies 

underway that could affect design, including an OPNAV study on potential 

capability changes and a requirements analysis for a notional LCS Flight 

1 seaframe, and a Naval Sea Systems Command Flight 1 technology 

assessment study. According to Navy program office officials, some of 

these changes could increase the acquisition cost of the seaframes due 

to disrupting shipyard learning and could also increase operations and 

support costs, due to factors such as additional crew. Other changes,

such as moving to more common equipment among both variants, could 

reduce operations and support costs due to reducing the number of 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

unique spare parts that have to be maintained and different training 

required for maintenance and training.

The design changes that the Navy is evaluating include the following:

• Changes to increase commonality: Many of the systems on the two 

seaframe variants are not common. Both contractors choose different 

ways of optimizing the cost and performance of the seaframes they 

proposed to the Navy. When the Navy chose to buy both variants, it 

committed to buying ships with differing equipment. Some systems 

are not common between the LCS variants, but are common with 

other ships in the fleet; others are not common with any other Navy 

ship. DOD’s office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

stated in its 2011 independent cost estimate of LCS seaframes that if 

the Navy down-selected to one variant and sold or decommissioned 

the variant that was not selected, it could have saved approximately 

$2.2 billion in operations and support costs in fiscal year 2010 dollars. 

A lack of commonality may also hinder effective and efficient 

maintenance, training, manning, and logistics. One of the Navy’s high 

priority changes is to select a common combat management system 

for both seaframes, since the different systems limit the ease with 

which sailors can operate each variant. The combat management 

system is an architecture that uses computers to integrate sensors 

(such as a radar) with shipboard weapon systems. INSURV identified 

36 out of 52 major systems that should be made common between 

the two variants, and the Navy is currently evaluating the business 

case for each of these changes.

• Changes to add capability and changes to requirements: The 

Navy is assessing the possibility of increasing the combat capability of 

the seaframe by adding or enhancing onboard weapon systems and 

command, control, and intelligence systems, such as radar and 

satellite communications systems. The Navy is also assessing 

potentially changing some LCS requirements. For example, a senior 

LCS council official stated that the Navy is considering a potential 

reduction in the speed requirement for some seaframes. While this 

could require significant changes to the seaframe designs and 

therefore increase the program’s acquisition cost, it might allow 

removing the gas turbines needed for high speeds, and thus could 

increase range and available payload space. Also, DOD directed the 

program office to develop an “irregular warfare” module, which 

includes medical and humanitarian relief supplies such as hospital 

beds and training facilities. Congress has not yet appropriated funding 

for this effort. The Navy is also considering additional mission 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

modules for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and 

expeditionary warfare. The purpose of LCS’s modular design is to 

help to ease the integration of new capabilities, but if additional power 

or cooling is needed or if changes are needed in the seaframe itself, 

design changes could be required.

• Changes to LCS build specifications: The Navy used American 

Bureau of Shipping rules to develop the functional designs of the LCS. 

In addition, the Navy has approved build specifications that are the 

variant specific contract requirements for detail design and 

construction. The Navy ended its relationship with the American 

Bureau of Shipping for surface combatants in June 2012, according to 

Navy officials, in order to save money. Ending this relationship should 

not on its own affect the build specifications for the ships currently 

under contract. Any requirements changes developed for a new Flight 

1 LCS will require changes to the existing Navy-approved variantspecific build specifications. Representatives from both shipyards told 

us that changing the build specification during production could result 

in cost increases and a potential regression in learning while workers 

learned how to build to the new specifications.10

We have previously reported that incorporating design changes during 

construction may disrupt a shipyard’s optimal construction sequence, 

requiring additional labor hours beyond current forecasts. In addition, 

when ship construction is initiated before a stable design is achieved, the 

risk of costly rework and out-of-sequence work increases.11 Program 

officials told us they will evaluate the business case for each of the 

changes when deciding if and when to implement them. For some 

changes, the officials noted that potential reductions in operations and 

support costs could justify making them as soon as possible. Navy 

officials also emphasized that in other cases, it may make sense for the 

Navy to wait until its next contract for seaframes planned for fiscal year 

2016 to avoid production disruptions during the current block buy.

 

10The American Bureau of Shipping is a ship classification society that provides 

independent technical assessments to ensure vessels are built to an established set of 

technical criteria.

11GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial 

Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009). 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

The Navy has not completed testing of either seaframe, and late 

discoveries of deficiencies could result in further design changes. Most 

notably, LCS 2 has not completed its acceptance trials or developmental 

and combat system testing, even though the Navy accepted delivery of 

the ship in 2009.12

LCS 1 and LCS 2 followed an unusual trial and acceptance process 

because, according to the seaframe program office, they were funded as 

research, development, test, and evaluation ships that were intended for 

experimentation and the Navy wanted to get them fielded as soon as 

possible. LCS 1 had a special trial in lieu of a final contract trial. LCS 2 

completed a partial acceptance trial in 2009, but it has not yet been 

presented for a second trial. Instead, it proceeded to an early 21-week 

post-shakedown availability, which typically occurs approximately a year 

after acceptance and is used to correct deficiencies and make needed 

improvements. The Navy plans to combine the second half of the LCS 2 

acceptance trial and the final contract trial into one special trial in the 

summer of 2013. LCS 3 was funded with procurement money, and has 

followed a more traditional acceptance process, and it is expected that 

the follow-on seaframes will do the same.

In addition, neither variant has completed 

developmental testing or undergone shock and survivability testing. In 

2012, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) noted that 

limited testing on LCS 2 precluded his office from further assessing that 

variant’s capabilities and any deficiencies. Operational testing and 

survivability testing are required by statute to be completed prior to a 

program proceeding into full rate production. Due to the unique designs of 

the two variants, the Navy still has outstanding gaps in its knowledge 

about how these designs will perform in certain conditions. Testing is 

required to resolve these gaps and to validate assumptions and models.

The limited testing to date has revealed deficiencies with core ship 

systems on both variants, including performance problems with the 57-

millimeter guns and the integrated capability of the combat systems. 

Testing has also revealed multiple single points of failure, meaning there 

are systems that lack redundancy, which could cause a system 

shutdown, on both LCS variants. This problem could become more 

pronounced in mission module testing. Most notably, the launch, 

handling, and recovery systems and hydraulic systems that are integral to 

 

12Section 128(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed 

GAO to review the Navy’s compliance with federal regulations in accepting LCS 1 and 2.

Pub. L. No. 112-239. We will issue a separate report addressing this mandate.

Testing Incomplete on 

Both Seaframe Variants
 

Page 24 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

launching the mission module vehicles lack back-up systems, and the 

ships have limited available space to carry spare parts or tools.

The Navy discovered another significant problem during testing on LCS 1 

that led to a design change. The aluminum ramp that is used to launch 

and recover vehicles from the ship started to deform when the crew left 

the SUW module’s inflatable boat on the ramp during transit, contrary to 

procedure. This in turn compromised the door seal on the stern of the 

ship and allowed water to get into the waterborne mission area. The Navy 

had intended the boat to sit in a cradle next to the ramp while in transit so 

it could be rapidly deployed and to be lifted into place for launch with an 

overhead crane system. The crew however, found that this approach 

tripled the time it took to launch the boat, to approximately 20 minutes. 

The Navy directed that the ramp on LCS 1 be replaced with a steel 

version prior to its deployment.

The Navy still has knowledge gaps on several other aspects of seaframe 

performance because testing has been deferred or delayed. For example, 

the combat management system software on LCS 2 was delivered 

incomplete. The combat management system contractor stated that the 

system was delivered with less functionality than planned due to 

developmental challenges and the Navy’s urgency to have the ship 

delivered. The combat system trials for LCS 4 will be the first time that the 

full capability of the system will be tested in a realistic environment, and 

the final combat management system software build and a hardware 

upgrade will not be available until LCS 6. When we visited LCS 2 in 

December 2012, the crew still had questions about the combat 

management system and radar because they had little operational 

experience with either, and because the weapon and sensor capabilities 

have not been integrated into the combat system. In addition, neither LCS 

1 nor LCS 2 has gone through Combat System Ship Qualification Trials 

which can be part of operational testing. These tests represent an 

opportunity to verify and validate combat and weapon systems 

performance for new ships, and the Navy and test entities use data 

collected to issue warfare qualifications and certifications. Navy program 

officials believe that they have conducted testing that is at least as 

rigorous as Combat System Ship Qualification Trials during the 

developmental testing phase. DOT&E officials disagree, emphasizing that 

operational effectiveness and suitability can be assessed only through 

operational testing.

The Navy has also not yet conducted ship shock trials and total ship 

survivability trials. The Navy plans to conduct the total ship survivability 

trials in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for the Freedom and Independence
 

Page 25 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

variants, respectively. The Navy delayed survivability tests from fiscal 

year 2011 to 2014 so that it could have time to complete damage 

scenario analysis. Shock trials for both variants have also been delayed 

by 1 year to fiscal year 2016, so they can be conducted with LCS 5 and 

LCS 6. The Navy considers these ships the most representative ships of 

each class for shock trial purposes because they include all the design 

changes from the early ships. DOT&E has reported concerns that the 

Navy deployed LCS 1 without completing shock qualification of many 

components, including gas turbines and switchboards.

Survivability testing is important because it can reveal equipment or 

system failures that may necessitate class-wide design changes. 

According to DOT&E, there are knowledge gaps related to LCS designs 

and structures, in particular the potential vulnerability of an aluminum ship 

structure to weapon-induced blast and fire damage. The Navy is planning 

to conduct surrogate tests with aluminum structures in fiscal years 2013 

and 2014 to help address these knowledge gaps. LCS is built to a limited 

survivability standard, and, like material support ships, mine 

countermeasures ships, and patrol combatants, it is not expected to 

operate in the most severe or hostile environments. DOT&E has reported 

that the LCS is not expected to maintain mission capability after taking a 

significant hit in a hostile combat environment. Program officials state that 

LCS meets the survivability requirements to which the ship was designed.

The Navy’s acquisition approach for mission modules is risky for three 

reasons: (1) the Navy continues to buy early increments of mission 

packages that lack defined requirements and clear definition of 

incremental cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) developmental 

testing to date continues to identify problems with system performance; 

and (3) concerns persist about the overall effectiveness of each mission 

package. While the program is following an evolutionary acquisition 

strategy and plans to deliver improving levels of capability over several 

increments, the program continues to buy modules for mission packages 

without first documenting the level of performance that it expects for each 

increment. By the time the Navy demonstrates that it can meet the 

minimum—termed “threshold”—requirements identified in the LCS 

programs’ capability development document in the final increments, it will 

have already bought 24 MCM and SUW mission packages.

13

 

13The Navy plans to meet the threshold performance levels defined in this document for 

the ASW mission package in the first and only increment of that package.

Further, 

Navy Acquisition of 

Mission Modules Is 

Risky Due to 

Inadequately Defined 

Early Increments and 

Continued 

Developmental 

Difficulties
 

Page 26 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

developmental testing to date—especially for the systems comprising the 

MCM mission package—has shown continued performance problems. 

Some of these systems do not meet their own performance requirements, 

which does not provide assurances that LCS-specific threshold 

requirements targets will be met when they are operated together in a 

mission package. Internal Navy studies and wargames have also raised 

concerns with the overall effectiveness of each package based on 

inherent seaframe or module limitations.

The Navy is pursuing an evolutionary acquisition strategy for the mission 

packages. This means that it plans to deliver improving levels of 

capability over several mission package increments. The Navy’s 

threshold performance requirements as currently defined in LCS 

requirements documentation will be met only when the final increment of 

each package is completed, and not by each individual increment. DOD 

acquisition guidance permits this approach, stating that the objective is to 

balance needs and available capability with resources, and to put 

capability into the hands of the user quickly. It also states that the 

success of the strategy depends on consistent and continuous definition 

of requirements, and the maturation of technologies that provide 

increasing levels of capability. Some of the mission module systems are 

pre-existing programs that predate the LCS program by up to 10 years or 

more. Therefore, these systems have their own requirements 

documentation, including threshold levels that they are expected to meet. 

However, because the Navy has not defined LCS-specific requirements 

for each mission package increment, it is unknown how the requirements 

for these separate systems will contribute to the broader LCS capability 

once they are integrated into a mission module.

DOD’s 2003 acquisition guidance, in place when the LCS program was 

initiated in 2004, did not require programs to establish separate threshold 

and objective values for each increment. Therefore, the LCS mission 

package requirements are not defined for each increment; the 

requirements documentation defines only the end-state threshold 

requirement (i.e., at the final increment) for each package. However, 

DOD’s 2008 revision to its acquisition guidance added new requirements 

for programs that use an evolutionary acquisition approach.14

 

14Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System (Dec. 8, 2008).

Specifically, 

individual increments are now defined as providing a “militarily useful and 

Navy Has Not Yet Fully 

Defined Early Increments
 

Page 27 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

supportable operational capability.” The guidance now requires each 

increment to have its own set of threshold and objective (known as 

“target”) values set by the user. These values are important because they 

provide the parameters for future operational testing. In most cases, the 

military utility of a system is assessed based on its ability to meet the end 

user’s threshold values for each key performance parameter that is set 

forth in its approved requirements documents. Although this new 

guidance was not in effect when the LCS program acquisition approach 

was approved, the revision indicates that DOD now expects programs to 

define threshold requirements for all increments.

The Navy program office believes that each mission package increment 

will provide more capability than the existing systems they are to replace. 

The program also expects that the capabilities of the MCM and SUW 

packages will improve significantly between increments I and IV, including 

in key metrics such as the clearance rates for certain mines, number of 

surface boat threats that can be negated, and the range at which the LCS 

will be able to engage these surface threats. However, DOT&E officials 

told us that they do not believe the Navy has adequate knowledge about 

how integrated mission module systems onboard an LCS will perform in 

an operational environment to be certain of this fact. Further, without 

documented requirements for each increment, there is no roadmap 

setting forth the path from the current, below-threshold level of capability 

to the expected threshold level for the final increments. Program and 

OPNAV officials have stated that the current plan is for each increment to 

have documented requirements in the form of capability production 

documents, to be approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

starting in mid calendar year 2013. Recognizing that the absence of 

documented requirements for the early increments poses a challenge for 

operational testers, OPNAV has drafted incremental performance 

clarification letters for Increment II SUW and Increment I MCM mission 

packages. These letters identify the requirements that the mission 

package should be tested against in initial operational testing. According 

to DOT&E officials, the Navy will have to update its test and evaluation 

master plan to incorporate phases of operational testing for all increments 

of mission package capability to be deployed for use in combat.

Both the 2003 and current DOD acquisition guidance state that each 

increment is to have an acquisition program baseline by Milestone B. This 

baseline establishes program goals—thresholds and objectives—for cost, 

schedule, and performance. The mission module program’s Milestone B 

review is currently scheduled for late fiscal year 2013, though this date 

has already slipped several times. Program officials have stated that they 

do not intend to fully define the goals for each increment in the Milestone 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

B acquisition program baseline. In particular, they stated that they 

consider the entire mission modules program to be a single increment 

and as such, they believe that there can be only one cost estimate for the 

entire program, and not cost estimates for each mission package 

increment. USD AT&L officials told us that they returned a draft of the 

Navy’s mission module acquisition program baseline for further revision 

because it did not provide enough detail about costs and schedules for 

each increment. It is important to note that the structure of the mission 

modules program complicates cost estimation. For example, the Navy’s 

cost estimators told us the lack of a cost estimate for each increment is, in 

part, due to the difficulty of allocating the development cost of the 

modules to each increment. The structure of the program also makes it 

difficult to determine the full cost of fielding the LCS capability, since the 

program office incorporates some systems that were developed and 

funded by other Navy sponsors, and these development costs are 

reported separately by the other programs and not by the LCS program. 

Though this type of arrangement is not unique to the LCS program, 42 

percent of systems in the LCS mission packages do not have their 

research, development, test, and evaluation costs included in the LCS 

mission modules estimate.

Developmental testing to date—especially for MCM mission package 

technologies—has shown continued performance problems which do not 

provide assurances that threshold requirements will be ultimately met in 

the final increment. These developmental challenges are notable given 

that the Navy believes many of these systems to already be mature, and 

some predate the LCS program. Further, these challenges are in 

developmental testing, not operational testing which is a more 

representative assessment of capability. In addition, continual schedule 

delays have resulted in the Navy not being able to field capabilities as 

quickly as planned. Specifically, the Navy has seen a delay in fielding 

Increment I of the SUW and MCM mission packages by 2 and 3 years, 

respectively, as compared to the test plans that it submitted in 2008.

Table 3 shows some of the delays in fielding mission module capability.

Challenges Persist in 

Mission Module 

Development
 

Page 29 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Table 3: Delays in Fielding Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Increments

In fiscal years

Increment I Increment IV

Mission package 2008 

estimate

Current 

estimate

2008 

estimate

Current 

estimate

Anti-Submarine Warfarea N/A N/A N/A 2016

Mine Countermeasures 2011 2014 2013 2017

Surface Warfare 2011 2013b 2014 2019

Legend: N/A = not applicable.

Source: GAO analysis of 2008 Navy documentation.

a

The Anti-Submarine Warfare package was restructured and the Navy now plans to field only one 

increment.

b

The Navy deployed a SUW module to Singapore in 2013.

The MCM mission package—intended to detect, classify, localize, and 

neutralize enemy sea mines while keeping the LCS and her sailors out of 

the mine field by using remotely operated vehicles—will not meet the 

threshold capability specified in the current LCS capability development 

document until Increment IV is fielded, currently planned for 2017. 

Further, most systems are behind schedule for initially planned fielding 

dates. The third increment of the package is planned to provide both 

minehunting, initially fielded with Increment I, and minesweeping 

capabilities. Minehunting is the process of using sensors to localize and 

identify individual mines for avoidance or later neutralization. 

Minesweeping uses either acoustic and magnetic emissions to detonate 

mines designed to target a ship’s acoustic or magnetic signature (called 

influence mine sweeping) or a physical device to cut the tether of moored 

mines so that they float to the surface, where they can be detonated or 

recovered for intelligence purposes (called mechanical minesweeping). 

Navy mine warfare officials stated that minehunting is the preferred mode 

of clearing mines since it is more precise, but that minesweeping is 

sometimes the only option due to time or environmental constraints. 

While the Navy has taken delivery of three Increment I MCM packages 

and plans to receive one additional Increment I package in fiscal year 

2013, very few of its capabilities have been effectively demonstrated to 

date. The modules in the package have experienced difficulties during 

development and significant shortfalls in performance, and two key 

systems have been cancelled due to safety concerns while deployed from 

a helicopter. In response, the Navy has taken a number of actions, as 

follows:

Mine Countermeasures Mission 

Package 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

• It is exploring ways to improve the performance of module 

subsystems, implementing several pre-planned product improvement 

programs.

• It has reduced key performance requirements thresholds for average 

mine clearance rates for early increments from the requirements 

defined in the capability development document.

• It has modified operational tactics, such as requiring multiple searches 

to correlate results. The modified tactics address some performance 

problems, but add significantly more time to minehunting operations 

or cover less area.

• It has decided to delay the retirement of the mine countermeasures 

ships the LCS is to replace by 3 years due to expected delays in 

mission module deployment.

Figure 7, an interactive graphic, shows the planned systems and 

employment of the MCM mission package. See appendix III for the 

overview graphic from figure 7. The Navy states that the threshold 

capability defined in the capability development document will be met by 

Increment IV.
Page 31 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 7: Navy’s Progress Fielding Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Countermeasures Mission Package Systems

 Shows when a system is initially fielded.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation (data and images).

Notes: FY = fiscal year.

 Inc = Increment.

a

Airborne Mine Neutralization System will add near surface capability in Inc 3. 

Detects, classifies, and localizes floating and 

near-surface moored mines in deep water.

Airborne Laser 

Mine Detection 

System

Mine countermeasures

mission package

FY14

Inc 1

FY15

Inc 2

FY17

Inc 3

FY19

Inc 4 Capabilities description Est. fielding date

2010 Current

2011 2014

2011 2014

2011 2014

2015 2014

2012 2015

2012

2017

Canceled

Canceled

2015 2017

N/A 2019

Airborne Mine

Neutralization 

System

AN/AQS-20A Sonar

Remote

Minehunting

System

Coastal Battlefield

Reconnaissance and

Analysis System

Organic Airborne

and Surface 

InfluenceSweep 

System

Rapid Airborne 

Mine Clearance 

System

Unmanned Surface

Vehicle with 

Unmanned Surface

Sweep System

Surface Mine 

Counter Measure 

Unmanned Undersea 

Vehicle (Knifefish)

Identifies and neutralizes unburied bottom and 

moored sea mines in shallow water that are 

impractical or unsafe to counter using existing 

minesweeping systems.

Provides identification of bottom mines in shallow 

water and detection, localization, and 

classification of bottom, close-tethered, and 

volume mines in deep water.

Remote multi-mission vehicle (underwater) 

towing the AN/AQS-20A sonar used to detect, 

classify, locate, and identify minelike objects.

Provides intelligence preparation of the battlefield 

information, which accurately depicts tactical 

objectives, minefields, and obstacles in the surf zone, 

on the beach, and through the beach exit during 

amphibious and expeditionary operations.

Provides organic, high-speed magnetic/acoustic 

influence minesweeping capability where mine 

hunting is not feasible (adverse environmental 

conditions).

Mounted 30-millimeter gun firing supercavitating 

projectiles to neutralize near-surface and floating

moored mines

Micro-turbine-powered magnetic towed cable 

and acoustical signal generator towed from an 

unmanned surface craft.

Fully autonomous unmanned undersea system 

provides buried mine detection capability. 

a

Interactive Graphic Click on “ ” to see an overview the modules. Click “ ” to close. For the printed version, please see appendix III.
 

Page 32 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Four of the Increment I systems—the AN/AQS-20A sonar, the Remote 

Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV), the Airborne Laser Mine Detection 

System, and the Airborne Mine Neutralization System—being procured 

from different system contractors, have experienced difficulties during 

tests. Two of them face difficulties significant enough to warrant a change 

in planned operational tactics to compensate for poor performance. 

Operational testing will be required to fully assess these tactics, the 

systems, and the contributions that they make to the mission package.

• AN/AQS-20A Sonar: This sonar is the primary system for LCS 

minehunting, which is the process of using sensors to locate individual 

mines in the water column that will be neutralized at a later time or 

avoided. This is a pre-existing system, and the program is over 20 

years old. During 2011 and 2012 developmental testing, this system 

experienced problems in achieving some of the threshold 

requirements defined in the system’s own requirements documents. In 

particular, this testing showed that the system faces challenges with 

accurately determining the vertical location, or distance from surface, 

of the mine in the water. The system also detected a large number of 

false contacts exceeding Navy limits in two of three search modes, 

meaning that it falsely identified non-mine objects as mines. In order 

to mitigate these two deficiencies, the Navy has modified its mine 

warfare tactics. For example, LCS operators will now use a technique 

whereby the system re-examines specific contacts and collects 

additional data to help eliminate false contacts. This tactic is effective 

in improving performance, but takes considerably more time—in some 

cases taking twice as long—and correspondingly limits the platform 

clearance rate. The Navy is also funding a performance improvement 

effort to correct these deficiencies via hardware and software 

upgrades to the system. According to the system’s contractor, these 

upgrades are the first redesign of the AN/AQS-20A sonars since 

1994. According to the contractor, some of the 30 units that the Navy 

has already purchased out of a planned inventory of 94 will be backfit 

with these improvements.

• Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle: The RMMV is an unmanned semisubmersible vehicle that tows the AN/AQS-20A sonar (together they 

are called the Remote Minehunting System). RMMV testing has 

revealed reliability shortfalls over the past 5 years. While recent efforts 

have improved reliability, the system still falls short of what is 

required. Operational testing in 2008 demonstrated the RMMV had a 

mean time between failures (ability to function before an operational 

mission failure occurred) of only 7.9 hours, well short of its 

requirement of 75 hours. The Navy and system’s contractor 

implemented a reliability growth plan in 2010, and system redesign 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

efforts have improved performance. Follow-on RMMV testing 

demonstrated the system’s mean time between failures has improved 

to 45 hours. The contractor and the Navy have continued to work on 

further performance improvements, but there is disagreement about 

their effectiveness. According to the contractor, mean time between 

failures improved to 64 hours during 509 hours of system testing 

concluded in November 2011. However, DOT&E officials reported that 

this improvement was predicated on limited test data collected in a 

minimally stressing operational environment. In addition, since the 

testing did not involve an RMMV integrated with the LCS, they believe 

it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from these results. 

The most recent Navy developmental tests of an MCM module 

operated from an LCS were completed in December 2012. These 

vehicles experienced higher than predicted failure rates, requiring 

considerable corrective maintenance by support personnel. The Navy 

plans to begin procuring vehicles in 2017, but has already purchased 

10 baseline units that will need to be backfit with improvements.

• Airborne Laser Mine Detection System: This is a laser-based 

system mounted on a helicopter that searches the water column to 

locate floating and near-surface mines. Test results have show that 

this system has significant problems with meeting some of the 

threshold requirements defined in its own requirements documents, 

including demonstrating the required ability to detect and classify 

mines at certain depths. The system also generates a high number of 

false positives, which require additional investigation. That is, it often 

incorrectly classifies non-mine objects, such as glints from the laser 

reflecting off the water surface, fish, or man-made objects (e.g., litter), 

as mines. As with the AN/AQS-20A sonar, the Navy is modifying its 

tactics to use multiple passes over the area to help correlate data and 

address these shortcomings, but while this tactic improves 

performance, Navy test reports identify that it also greatly increases 

the amount of time required to search for mines. The Navy is also 

funding additional system improvements to correct this deficiency. In 

November 2012, Navy testers reported that the system did not 

demonstrate the expected level of maturity and failed to meet several 

requirements, presenting a high risk to operational testing. In spite of 

its poor performance, the Navy has accepted delivery of 7 units and 

plans to procure an additional 15 units as part of a request for 

proposals due in July 2013.

• Airborne Mine Neutralization System: This is an underwater system 

that is deployed by a helicopter and controlled from the helicopter 

through a fiber optic cable; it moves underwater to target and destroy 

mines using onboard explosive neutralizers. Developmental testing 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

has revealed problems with the system accurately locating mines; 

according to the contractor, this is due to the movement of both the 

water and the sensor, making it appear that the mines are also 

moving. The system contractor has developed new software to 

address this issue. Developmental testing also demonstrated 

problems with loading and unloading the system from the helicopter 

due to inadequate clearance under the launch and retrieval system. 

According to Navy test officials, if this situation is not corrected prior to 

operational testing, planned for fiscal year 2014, it may be a major 

deficiency impacting the MCM package’s ability to meet search and 

clearance rates. According to the Navy, it has designed an alternative 

load and handling device for the Airborne Mine Neutralization System.

Technological and operational problems issues have led Navy officials to 

cancel other MCM systems and to make investments to replace the lost 

capability. For example, the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System—a 

cannon designed to destroy mines near the water’s surface that was 

initially intended to be fielded in 2011—was cancelled due to performance 

problems. The Navy may replace this capability with a modified Airborne 

Mine Neutralization System by 2017. According to Navy and contractor 

officials, this system has performed well in preliminary testing. 

Additionally, DOD concerns with the safety of towing the Organic Airborne 

and Surface Influence Sweep system from the MH-60 helicopter led the 

Navy to defund this system, which was planned for Increment III. The 

Unmanned Surface Vehicle with Unmanned Surface Sweep System will 

replace this system in Increment III. The Navy also decided to no longer 

tow the AN/AQS-20A sonar from the MH-60 for the same safety reasons. 

Navy officials told us that they had not envisioned frequently using the 

sonar in this manner, so they said it should not have a major impact on 

capability.

Program office officials have stated that they believe the first increment 

LCS MCM mission package will not only be more effective than the 

existing mine countermeasures fleet, but that it will also, importantly, 

remove the sailors from dangerous minefields, as is currently required to 

perform the mission. However, the LCS uses a performance metric that is 

not used by the existing fleet, so comparing performance is difficult. 

Specifically, for the LCS the Navy measures performance through a 

“sustained area coverage rate” metric that evaluates performance based 

on the amount of mines identified and/or cleared from a set area of water 

within a certain time. While the Navy states that this metric more 

accurately reflects operational requirements, it is a new approach and is 

not how the legacy fleet measures performance so direct comparisons 

are difficult. Further, no Increment I module has yet been tested in an 

operational environment, so its expected performance has not been 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

validated. Additionally, DOT&E and Navy officials told us that the model 

used to predict MCM performance has in the past contained optimistic or 

unrealistic assumptions.

The LCS will also lack any minesweeping capability until Increment III, 

which is a capability found in the current fleet. The existing mine 

countermeasures ships or allied ships may be needed to supplement the 

LCS if minesweeping is required before Increment III is fielded. Another 

difference from the legacy fleet is that LCS is planned to only deploy an 

influence sweep system. LCS does not currently have a requirement to 

employ a mechanical sweep system like that used by the existing mine 

countermeasures fleet. An influence sweep system will not detonate 

contact mines which are designed to detonate when they come into 

physical contact with a ship, so a mechanical system may be required in 

areas where contact mines are expected. Finally, the Navy notes that 

LCS will not have an “in-stride” capability—or an ability to find and 

neutralize mines at the same time—like the legacy fleet, since the LCS 

sensor data requires post-mission analysis before moving to the 

neutralization phase.

The SUW mission package—intended to detect, track, and engage small 

boat threats; escort ships; and protect operating areas—will not meet the 

threshold capability defined in the LCS capability development document 

until 2019, when Increment IV is planned to be fielded. The Navy has 

taken delivery of four SUW mission packages, each including two 30-

millimeter guns and 2 11-meter rigid-hulled inflatable boats that 

accommodate boarding teams. The program plans to introduce a surfaceto-surface missile in Increment III and a more capable missile in 

Increment IV.

Figure 8, an interactive graphic, depicts the systems and employment of 

the SUW mission package. See appendix III for the overview graphic from 

figure 8.

Surface Warfare Mission 

Package 
Page 36 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 8: Navy's Progress Fielding Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Surface Warfare Mission Package Systems

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation (data and images).

Notes: FY = fiscal year.

 Inc = Increment.

a

Prototype version of the Maritime Security Module deployed on LCS 1.

Shows when a system is initially fielded.

Two-axis stabilized chain gun that can fire up to 

250 rounds per minute employing a forward-looking 

infrared sensor, camera, and laser rangefinder.

MK 46 30-millimeter

gun system

Surface warfare mission 

package

FY14

Inc 1

FY14

Inc 2

FY15

Inc 3

FY19

Inc 4 Capabilities description Est. fielding date

2010 Current

2011 2014

2011 2014

2011 2015

2015 2019

Maritime security

module

Surface-to-surface

missile 

(Griffin Block IIB)

Surface-to-surface

missile 

(Griffin replacement)

Two teams and associated equipment on LCS that 

provide capability to conduct visit, board, search, and 

seizure operations against potential threat vessels.

Modular 45 degree launch unit provides limited 

precision attack missile for use against moving 

and stationary targets.

Modular vertical launch unit provides beyond line of 

sight precision attack missile for use against moving 

and stationary targets.

a

Interactive Graphic Click on “ ” to see an overview the package. Click “ ” to close. For the printed version, please see appendix III.
 

Page 37 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Navy and DOD weapons testers identified a number of concerns with 

SUW systems based on testing conducted with the Increment II mission 

module on the Freedom-class variant in 2012. DOT&E identified reliability 

problems with the 30-millimeter gun and associated combat system that 

need to be addressed if the module is to achieve its desired level of 

performance. The Navy has established a review board to investigate any 

additional changes required to correct any deficiencies.

The Army’s cancellation of its Non Line-of-Sight Launch System which 

had been planned for LCS means that the Navy may not be able to field a 

surface-to-surface missile as part of the SUW module that meets all the 

requirements of the SUW package until Increment IV. This missile was 

envisioned as critical to defeating surface threats at greater distances 

from the ship, and was cancelled in May 2010 due to technical problems, 

associated test failures, and rising costs. The Navy assessed over 50 

potential missile replacements for LCS, and in January 2011 selected the 

Griffin IIB missile as an interim solution based, in part, on it costing half of 

the Non Line-of-Sight Launch System. The program now intends to 

purchase one unit with a total of eight Griffin IIB missiles, to be fielded in 

2015, which leave other SUW module equipped ships with a limited ability 

to counter surface threats. However, Navy officials told us that they may 

reconsider this plan because of funding cuts related to sequestration. 

According to OPNAV, funding for Griffin development and testing has 

been suspended for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. OPNAV and the 

LCS program office, with LCS Council oversight, plan to investigate using 

a more cost-effective, government-owned, surface-to-surface missile 

system that would provide increased capability, including increased 

range. According to Navy program officials, the deployment of the 

Increment IV missile could also be delayed by over a year because 

funding reductions have delayed early engineering work and proposal 

development for the missile contract.

The current ASW mission package is early in development, and is not 

intended to be fielded until 2016. The initial increment was delivered in 

2008, but the Navy cancelled the increment after analysis showed the 

module did not contribute significantly to ASW capabilities. Based in part 

on that analysis, the Navy changed the requirements for the mission 

package to include a more effective and in-stride search capability 

(searching while moving) that could be used for deep water escort 

missions of high-value ships and submarines. The newly configured ASW 

mission package—still called Increment I and currently planned to be the 

only ASW increment—was designed to provide these capabilities using a 

completely different set of sensors and systems, and because it is 

designed to meet threshold requirements, will not require an incremental 

Anti-submarine Warfare 

Mission Package
 

Page 38 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

approach. The Navy highlights this ability to implement a shift in 

requirements as an example of the benefits of LCS’s modular design, in 

that it allowed for an easy interchange of systems and modification of 

planned capabilities. The planned technologies—consisting of a variable 

depth sonar, multi-function towed sonar array, and towed torpedo 

defense capability—are considered mature, and some are already 

operational in other navies. It will be several years, however, before the 

technologies are integrated into the planned LCS configuration. According 

to the mission modules program office, the variable depth sonar 

performed well during early testing when it was being towed off a 

research vessel, and the Navy expects it to offer a high level of ASW 

capability.

Figure 9, an interactive graphic, depicts the current concept for the ASW 

mission package. See appendix III for the overview graphic from figure 9.
Page 39 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 9: Navy's Progress Fielding Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package Systems

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation (data and images).

Notes: FY = fiscal year.

 Inc = Increment.

Shows when a system is initially fielded.

Passive towed receive array 

with deployment/retrieval 

cable to detect acoustic 

energy.

Multi-Function 

Towed Array

Anti-submarine warfare

mission package

FY16

Inc 1 Capabilities description Est. fielding date

2010 Current

Under

development 2016

Under

development 2016

Under

development 2016

Variable Depth Sonar

Light Weight Tow

Torpedo 

Countermeasure

Active towed sonar with 

launch, handling and 

recovery equipment.

Towed decoys that emits 

signals to draw a torpedo 

away from its intended 

target.

Interactive Graphic Click on “ ” to see an overview the package. Click “ ” to close. For the printed version, please see appendix III.
 

Page 40 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Internal Navy reports sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations and 

insights gleaned from Navy tabletop wargame exercises have raised 

several concerns about the limitations of the LCS mission modules. For 

example, the concept of employment for the MCM mission package 

currently does not include embarked explosive ordinance disposal teams 

that are used on the existing mine countermeasures fleet, though the 

Navy has told us that LCS could carry such personnel and that they are 

investigating how to integrate this capability. These personnel are able to 

not only render safe or to destroy mines, but can also exploit found mines 

for intelligence value, and OPNAV has identified their absence as a 

capability gap. In addition, Navy reports, wargames, and DOD Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation officials that evaluate the LCS 

program have identified classified concerns with the capability or planned 

capability and employment of the SUW, MCM, and ASW mission 

packages. Further, since LCS has only a self-defense anti-air warfare 

capability, it will require protection from a cruiser or destroyer in more 

advanced anti-air warfare environments, which reduces the LCS’s ability 

to operate independently and occupies the time of more capable surface 

combatants that might be better employed elsewhere. For the ASW 

mission package, DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

officials have raised concerns about the new ASW configuration’s deepwater escort capabilities, stating that LCS is not designed to be survivable 

enough to stay and defend the escorted ship if potential adversaries 

attack. Further, OPNAV officials told us that with this new configuration 

the LCS will still be able to conduct littoral ASW, but that the water depths 

in which the LCS could operate may be limited because of the depths 

required to support deploying the towed arrays. Any changes to improve 

the capability of LCS in these areas could result in design changes and 

cost increases.

The Navy continues to buy LCS seaframes and modules even as 

significant questions remain about the program and its underlying 

business case. Elements of the LCS business case, including its cost, the 

time needed to develop and field the system, and its anticipated 

capabilities have degraded over time. There are also significant 

unknowns related to key LCS operations and support concepts that could 

affect the cost of the program and soundness of the business case. 

Finally, the Navy continues to pursue an acquisition strategy that is not 

aligned with acquisition milestones intended to ensure that sufficient 

knowledge is in place before resources are committed. By the time key 

tests of integrated LCS capability and survivability are completed in 

several years, the Navy will have procured or have under contract more 

than half of the planned number of seaframes.

Questions Exist about the 

Effectiveness of LCS in 

Certain Warfighting Roles

Significant Questions 

Remain Regarding the 

LCS Business Case As 

the Navy Commits to 

Producing More Ships 

and Modules
 

Page 41 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

A business case is part of a knowledge-based approach to acquisition 

that, in its simplest form, is demonstrated evidence that the warfighter’s 

needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, 

and the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing 

resources—that is, proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate 

funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when it is needed. Key 

elements of the business case on which the LCS program was predicated 

have degraded, remain unproven, and continue to evolve.15

LCS has ended up being more costly and taking longer to field than 

initially planned. LCS was intended to be an affordable ship at $220 

million per seaframe. But, due to cost growth and schedule delays on 

which we have previously reported, LCS will be more expensive than 

originally planned.16 Congress increased the cost cap established for the 

program twice, first to $460 million and then to $480 million per ship.17

The Navy also wanted to accelerate the process of moving from design to 

fielding of LCS as opposed to prior ships. In the 2004 LCS capability 

development document, the Navy expected an initial operational 

capability to be fielded in 2007, 3 years after program initiation. According 

to the Navy, the LCS achieved initial operational capability in 2013, 9 

years after program initiation, with the deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore 

with an installed mission package.18

 

15We have previously reported on the soundness of the LCS business case. See GAO, 

Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Businesses Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding 

Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007) and GAO, Navy’s Proposed 

Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO-11-249R

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2010).

16GAO, Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will 

Determine Eventual Capabilities, GAO-10-523 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2010).

17The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 set a cost cap of $220 

million per ship for the fifth and sixth ships of the class, with adjustments for inflation. Pub. 

L. No. 109-163, § 124. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 set a 

cost cap of $460 million per ship for all LCSs procured in fiscal year 2008 and beyond with 

no adjustments for inflation. Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 125. The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 further increased the cap to $480 million per ship. 

Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 121. 

18In comparison, the time from program initiation to initial operational capability for the 

lead DDG 51 destroyer was approximately 12 years. The DDG 51 is a more complex ship 

than LCS.

Key Elements of the LCS 

Business Case Have 

Degraded, Remain 

Unproven, and Continue to 

Evolve

Higher Than Expected Costs 

and Longer Than Expected 

Schedules 
 

Page 42 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Navy expectations of LCS capability have weakened over time. We 

analyzed several iterations of validated LCS requirements documents on 

which the program was initially justified, as well as various system 

descriptions from program office documentation and several iterations of 

the two LCS CONOPS documents.19

Table 4: Evolution of Navy Statements about Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Capability

We found that descriptions of how 

capable LCS will be and how it will be operationally employed have 

changed over time. Expected capabilities have lessened from optimistic, 

early assumptions of high levels to more tempered and reserved 

assumptions in recent documentation. While more explicit examples of 

specific capabilities that changed are classified, table 4 depicts some of 

the more significant unclassified examples of the changes in Navy 

statements about LCS’s capability from early in the program to today.

Concept Early (2004-2008) Current (2011-2012)

LCS’s capability 

against 

adversaries

Primarily developed for use in 

major combat operations.

Will gain initial entry and provide 

assured access—or ability to 

enter contested spaces—and be 

employable and sustainable 

throughout the battlespace 

regardless of anti-access or areadenial environments.

Current LCS weapon systems are 

under-performing and offer little 

chance of survival in a combat 

scenario.

Not to be employed outside a 

benign, low-threat environment 

unless escorted by a multimission combatant providing 

credible anti-air, anti-surface, and 

anti-submarine protection.

How LCS will 

deploy

Will be a self-sufficient combatant 

designed to fight and win in 

shallow water and near-land 

environments without risking 

larger combatants in constricted 

areas.

Lacks the ability to operate 

independently in combat. Will 

have to be well protected by 

multi-mission combatants. 

Multiple LCSs will likely have to 

operate in a coordinated strike 

attack group fashion for mutual 

support.

 

19Specific concepts of operations for LCS are articulated in a classified warfighting 

CONOPS that describes how the LCS will be employed as a weapon system, and in an 

unclassified “platform wholeness” CONOPS that describes how LCS will be operationally 

supported as well as manning and training issues. The Navy has written two iterations of 

the warfighting CONOPS (2007 and 2011).

Lower Expectations about 

the System’s Capabilities
 

Page 43 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Concept Early (2004-2008) Current (2011-2012)

How mission 

packages swaps 

will be utilized

Mission packages will be quickly 

swapped out in an expeditionary

theater in a matter of days.

Mission packages can be 

swapped within 72 hours if all the 

equipment and personnel are in 

theater, which may take 

significantly longer. An LCS 

executing a package swap could 

be unavailable for between 12-29 

days.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documents.

Note: Documents reviewed include LCS capability development documents, LCS concept of 

operations, and LCS wargaming reports.

Our analysis of LCS documentation has also shown that there are a 

number of broad unknowns related to the LCS concepts that remain 

unproven and which, until resolved, will make it difficult to determine if the 

LCS business case is sound and whether the system can meet the 

warfighter needs within available resources. Several of the key concepts 

that underpin the program—such as employing modular weapon systems, 

highly reduced manning levels, and heavy reliance on off-ship 

maintenance and administrative support—represent innovative 

approaches that have not been used before by the Navy and have not yet 

been validated through operations. The Navy’s 2011 warfighting 

CONOPS for LCS reflect these unknowns, stating in several places that 

the Navy will determine how to employ LCS only once it has gained 

operational experience. Navy Fleet Forces officials also told us that there 

is not yet any LCS-specific doctrine on how an LCS is to be operated. 

Similarly, the operational support-focused platform wholeness CONOPS 

state that annual updates are expected because LCS crewing, training, 

and support strategies are constantly evolving. Some of these questions, 

discussed in table 5, are likely to have impacts on the ongoing LCS 

acquisition, including what seaframe variant should be purchased and 

how the ships will actually be operated and supported.

Key LCS Concepts Remain 

Unproven and Continue to 

Evolve 
 

Page 44 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Table 5: Major Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Conceptual Questions Regarding Ship Operations and Seaframe Variants

Conceptual questions Issue

Relative advantages of each seaframe

design

Because the Navy changed its approach from what was to be a limited initial purchase of 

seaframes followed by experimentation to concurrent acquisition and experimentation, it is 

currently unknown if the unique design attributes of each seaframe make one or the other 

more suited to specific mission sets and/or theaters of operation. The Navy acknowledges 

that the two seaframes are different ship classes with distinct capabilities and limitations 

that will affect mission tasking and deployment. For example, the former Under Secretary 

of the Navy and others have posited that the Freedom variant may be better suited to the 

Middle East region and the SUW mission given its maneuverability, while the 

Independence variant may be better suited to the western Pacific region and the ASW and 

MCM missions given its longer range and larger helicopter deck. The Navy has not yet 

determined if it will down-select to one variant or contract for mission-specific variants.

Feasibility of the reduced manning LCS is intended to operate with a crew that is one-fourth to one-fifth the size of other 

comparable-sized ships. LCS currently has a core crew of 40, plus 23 aviation detachment 

crew and 15-19 mission package crew. Internal Navy analysis has shown a concern with 

high levels of crew fatigue on the LCS due to the higher workload required to compensate 

for the fewer crew members. The LCS 1 core crew was increased to 50 for the Singapore 

deployment, and the Navy is considering permanently increasing the core crews to 50 or 

more to address crew fatigue and workload concerns. The mission module crews may 

also need to be increased as the Navy gains experience using all three modules.

Feasibility and mechanics for the novel 

shore-based contractor maintenance 

approach

The Navy is implementing a new maintenance concept for LCS, whereby it will heavily rely 

upon shore-based contractor and civilian personnel to support and maintain the LCS. The 

seaframe crew itself will conduct very little preventative maintenance; the Navy envisions 

doing this work pierside. This approach will result in more complex logistics than is usually 

required for forward deployed ships, since parts and personnel will have to be forward 

deployed. This approach is unproven; data gathered on the LCS 1 Singapore deployment 

will help the Navy to determine whether it will be feasible and cost-effective. If the Navy 

elects to have the crews conduct more preventative maintenance onboard, it may require 

additional crew and seaframe design changes to accommodate spare parts storage.

Mechanics of mission package swaps The Navy has not yet determined where mission packages might be forward-staged and 

how frequently they may be swapped out. In addition to recent wargames demonstrating 

that these swaps may take longer than initially planned, there is still deliberation on what 

types of crew qualification testing may be necessary after a swap occurs. Additional 

qualification testing could in turn require more time to get the ship back out to sea.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.

Changes to any of the above concepts could affect the LCS program and 

employment of the ships. For example, if the Navy learns that one 

seaframe variant is more useful in certain mission sets or operating areas 

than the other, the Navy could down-select to a single design or change 

planned seaframe procurement quantities. While the Navy is currently 

buying both variants, Navy program officials, as well as the LCS Council 

chair, state that all options are under consideration for the next planned 

contract award in fiscal year 2016. Similarly, if the Navy determines that 

mission package swaps are no longer feasible, the ratio of mission 

packages to seaframes that the Navy plans on buying may need to be 

reconsidered. Finally, the LCS Council chair told us LCS performance 
 

Page 45 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

requirements might change, with potential areas including reduction in 

required top speeds and increases in lethality.

There is also still significant uncertainty related to the cost of acquiring, 

fielding, and operating the LCS because of unknowns about the future 

designs of the seaframes and mission modules, and the Navy’s manning 

and maintenance strategy. While the current blocks of seaframes are 

being built under fixed price contracts, any major changes to the design 

and/or capabilities of future LCS seaframes and modules can result in 

additional research and development funding being required and 

increased procurement costs. A down-select decision—which the Navy 

has not yet ruled out—would also have implications on costs for both 

procurement and operations. Similarly, if the mission module program 

continues to add or remove systems the acquisition costs for the modules 

may also change. In addition, as with other major weapon systems 

programs, operating and support (O&S) costs represent the primary lifecycle cost driver for the LCS program. Table 6 depicts several areas of 

uncertainty that could affect LCS O&S costs.

Table 6: Potential Areas of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Operating and Support Cost Uncertainty

Reasons for cost uncertainty Issue

Evolving support plans DOD has not yet approved a revised version of the Navy’s LCS Life Cycle Sustainment 

Plan. This plan is a summary of the LCS sustainment strategy being developed by the 

LCS seaframes program office, and it includes discussion about how the LCS will 

address issues including shore support; replenishment and refueling; maintenance; and 

training. Changes to any of these areas which the Navy states may be an outcome of 

experimentation could impact operating and support costs.

Evolving manning levels The manpower concept for LCS is a departure from traditional Navy operations. For 

example, LCS will be the first ship to use such a degree of minimal manning, and one of 

the first surface combatants to use a rotational crew concepta

. The Navy has not yet 

finalized the manning for the different LCS variants and mission packages, and 

assumptions are still changing. In advance of deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore the 

Navy added 20 berths to LCS 1 and 10 additional billets to the ship. Manning is the most 

significant life cycle cost driver for ships.

Future Acquisition and 

Operations and Support Costs 

Are Uncertain 
 

Page 46 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Reasons for cost uncertainty Issue

Heavy reliance on contractor-based 

maintenance

Instead of having the ship’s crew perform most preventative maintenance while underway 

like other ship classes, LCS will return to port periodically for contractor-led maintenance 

periods. The ship will be unable to conduct most forms of preventative and corrective 

maintenance at sea, including basic activities like corrosion removal and painting, and will 

not have many spare parts on board or crew tasked to conducting repairs. For the initial 

deployments, contractor maintenance personnel will be flown in from the United States. 

The Navy is operating under an Interim Support Plan contract for this work, but it plans to 

competitively award a longer-term contract that more fully reflects its support strategy in 

2014. Until these contracts are negotiated and signed, the exact scope of work to be 

performed and the cost of performing it will be unknown. At the same time, the Navy is 

evaluating shifting some maintenance back to the ship’s crew, which indicates that its 

strategy is still evolving. Adding crew to conduct maintenance would add to O&S costs, 

though costs may be offset by reducing reliance on contractors. Further, it is unknown 

how mission module sensors and systems will be maintained. Some of these systems 

are sealed units containing sensitive electronics, and the LCS is not envisioned to be 

equipped with electronics repair technicians or appropriate parts to conduct repairs. It 

may be that any damaged or malfunctioning systems will have to be removed from the 

ship and returned to the contractor in the U.S. for repair.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.

a

Ballistic missile submarines, mine countermeasures ships, and coastal patrol craft also use rotational 

crewing.

At the Milestone B decision for the seaframe program, the Navy 

estimated O&S costs to account for 62 percent of the program’s life-cycle 

cost estimate, or $87 billion of $124 billion in total ownership costs 

through fiscal year 2057.20 The Navy’s point estimate for the LCS 

seaframe program total life-cycle cost estimate was at the 10 percent 

confidence level, meaning that there is a 90 percent chance that the costs 

could be different—and likely higher based on the data—than the point 

estimate. The confidence level is an output of the statistical risk analysis 

of the parameters and assumptions used to build the point estimate. If 

Navy leadership chose a higher confidence level, the resulting estimate 

would have been higher. The uncertainty reflected by this estimate was 

largely driven by unknowns in O&S costs and a lack of actual data about 

how LCS will operate on which to base estimates. Over the years, we 

have reported that many programs overrun their budgets because original 

point estimates are unrealistic. While no specific confidence level is 

considered a best practice, we have reported that experts agree that 

program cost estimates should be budgeted to at least the 50 percent 

confidence level, but budgeting to a higher level (for example, 70 percent 

to 80 percent, or the mean) is now common practice.21

 

20In then-year dollars. The O&S estimate would be $50.4 billion in 2010 dollars. 

The Navy believes 

21GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009).
 

Page 47 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

that it was likely budgeted at higher than the 10 percent confidence level 

with DOD’s 5-year future years defense program, but did not provide a 

percentage. Further, it stated that the majority of the estimate is outside of 

the future years defense program and has not been budgeted for yet.22

The Navy’s estimate for LCS total life cycle costs ranges from 

approximately $108 billion at a 0 percent confidence level up to 

approximately $170 billion at a 100 percent confidence level.23

As a result of the O&S unknowns, the Navy will not be able to more 

accurately estimate LCS O&S costs until after it obtains and analyzes 

operational data obtained over the course of several deployments of both 

variants and after it finalizes its LCS manning and maintenance 

strategies.24 As data continues to be gathered and more seaframes are 

deployed the quality of the data will continue to improve. Though the 

Navy provided estimates for LCS-specific support concepts, it has little or 

prior experience with these concepts on which to build accurate 

estimates. Navy cost estimators told us that the initial LCS O&S estimates 

were derived from O&S costs for other Navy surface combatants like the 

Arleigh Burke class destroyers and the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates 

which were then adjusted for LCS specific concepts such as crew size, 

maintenance and training and other O&S activities. However, they also 

told us that until some of these concepts are refined and actual data is 

obtained, it will be difficult to establish a more reliable estimate.

The Navy plans to make significant investments in seaframes and 

mission modules before completing testing designed to demonstrate 

whether the integrated ship can perform its intended missions. In addition 

to awarding contracts for almost half of the entire planned number of 

seaframes ahead of testing results, the Navy plans to procure more than 

half of the SUW and MCM mission packages before it demonstrates they 

meet LCS’s minimum performance requirements for their respective 

missions. Specifically, by 2010, the Navy had awarded contracts for 24 of 

the 52 planned seaframes, and it plans to award additional contracts in 

2016, 3 years before it completes operational testing needed to prove the 

 

22The future years defense program is DOD’s 5-year investment plan.

23In then-year dollars.

24GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and 

Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts, GAO-10-257 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 

2010). 

Production of Seaframes 

and Modules Is Proceeding 

without Key Knowledge 

about LCS Capabilities
 

Page 48 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

performance of the integrated seaframes and fully capable mission 

modules.25

As discussed above, when the Navy awarded the contracts for the first 24 

seaframes, neither of the two variants had completed developmental 

testing, and based on the current schedule, operational testing of the 

integrated capability (seaframes with mission packages) will not be 

completed until 3 years after the next planned contract award. The Navy 

does not expect to complete developmental testing for both variants until 

2015, survivability testing until 2015, and full ship shock trials until 2016. 

Results of these tests could result in identification of design deficiencies, 

and the Navy will have limited time to act on this knowledge prior to 

awarding its next block buy contracts for seaframes, currently scheduled 

for fiscal year 2016. Further, the Navy expects to procure at least 31 of 

the 64 planned mission packages while concurrently conducting 

developmental and operational tests on LCS 2 and LCS 3. Operational 

testing is currently projected to be completed in 2019, 3 years after the 

Navy plans to award its next seaframe contracts. This testing will 

represent the first time that the capability of the seaframes—equipped 

with mission packages that meet the threshold requirements defined in 

the capability development document—will be fully demonstrated in an 

operational environment.

The LCS will execute its operational testing in phases. Each planned 

increment of capability for each mission package will be tested on both 

seaframes. Operational testing will be considered complete when the final 

increments of all the modules have been tested on each seaframe. Based 

on the current acquisition strategy, the Navy will have bought 24 

seaframes, 9 SUW mission packages, and 7 MCM mission packages 

when the first phase of operational testing begins in fiscal year 2014. This 

approach puts the Navy at risk of acquiring a large number of seaframes 

with limited capability or having to retrofit a large number of systems if 

problems are discovered in testing. DOT&E has also noted that 

operational testing planned for fiscal year 2014 may not be successfully 

completed or may be delayed because of performance problems 

identified during developmental testing. Any delays to even these early 

operational test events will further limit the information the Navy has to 

support its ongoing acquisition decisions, and increases risks that the 

Navy will buy systems that cannot meet requirements.

 

25Not all of these seaframes have been funded.
 

Page 49 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Table 7 shows the Navy’s planned seaframe contract activities and actual 

and planned purchases, mission package procurements, and operational 

test dates.

Table 7: Planned Seaframe Contract Activities, Mission Package Procurement, and Operational Testing of Mission Package 

Increments on Each Variant

FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019

Planned 

total 

Seaframe 

contract 

activities

Solicit 

proposals 

and source 

selection 

for second 

block buy

Second 

block buy 

contract

award

Cumulative 

seaframes 

fundeda

12 16 20 24 26 28 30 33 52

Cumulative 

mission 

packages 

procuredb 

8 13 17 21 27 29 TBD TBD 64

 SUW 4 7 9 11 13 13 15 TBD 24

 MCM 4 6 7 9 11 13 TBD TBD 24

 ASW 0 0 1 1 3 3 TBD TBD 16

Freedom

variant 

operational 

testing

SUW Inc I

SUW Inc II

MCM Inc I

MCM Inc II

ASW 

MCM Inc III MCM Inc IV SUW Inc III

SUW Inc IV

Independence

variant 

operational 

testing

SUW Inc I

SUW Inc II

MCM Inc I

MCM Inc II

MCM Inc III

MCM Inc IV

ASW 

SUW Inc III

SUW Inc IV

Legend: FY = fiscal year; SUW = surface warfare; MCM = mine countermeasures; ASW = antisubmarine warfare; INC = mission module increment; TBD = to be determined.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.

a

Cumulative seaframes funded refers to seaframes for which the Navy has received or plans to have 

received the congressional appropriations. The 24 seaframes purchased, or planned to be purchased 

through fiscal year 2015 are under the previously awarded contracts.

b

The Navy has not finalized the acquisition strategy for the mission modules after fiscal year 2017.

We have previously reported that this type of concurrent testing and 

production can lead to cost growth and schedule delays on acquisition 

programs. For example, we reported in 2012 that most of the Joint Strike 
 

Page 50 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Fighter program’s instability was the result of highly concurrent 

development, testing, and production activities.26 We also reported that 

the Missile Defense Agency’s decisions to move into production without 

verifying performance led to extensive retrofits, redesigns, delays, and 

cost increases.27

The LCS acquisition strategy has led to major acquisition decisions being 

made well before key DOD acquisition milestones that provide the 

framework for oversight. For example, Milestone B for Navy shipbuilding 

programs typically authorizes detailed design and construction for lead 

ships. For LCS, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) authorized the final system design 

at Milestone A, which typically marks the initiation of a shipbuilding 

program’s technology development efforts, and Milestone B was not held 

until after the Navy had procured nearly half the planned number of 

seaframes. Figure 10 depicts the how the LCS program compares with 

the typical acquisition framework for shipbuilding programs.

The Navy’s current acquisition strategy for LCS puts it at 

similar risk.

 

26GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and 

Address Affordability Risks, GAO-12-437 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012)

27GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing 

Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012)
 

Page 51 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

Figure 10: Acquisition Frameworks for Typical Shipbuilding Programs and Littoral 

Combat Ship

More recently, USD AT&L rescinded the requirement for the seaframe 

program to have a Milestone C review, and also delayed the full-rate 

production decision for seaframes from 2015 to 2019 because the Navy 

will not be able to meet statutory criteria dependent on the completion of 

operational testing until then. Statutes require the Secretary of Defense to 

provide that a program complete realistic survivability testing and initial 

operational testing before proceeding beyond low-rate initial production.28

 

2810 U.S.C. §§ 2399, 2366.

Statute defines low rate initial production for naval vessel programs, such 

as the LCS seaframe program, as production of the minimum quantity 

that is feasible while preserving mobilization of the production base. For 

the LCS seaframes program, USD AT&L has defined low-rate initial 

production as the first 24 seaframes. Unless the Navy changes its plans, 

its intention to award contracts for seaframes 25 and beyond in 2016 will 

exceed the low-rate initial production quantity 3 years prior to the full-rate 

production decision and prior to the completion of operational testing. 

While DOD acquisition policy does allow for decision authorities to tailor 
 

Page 52 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

information requirements and the acquisition process to achieve cost, 

schedule, and performance goals, the Navy’s acquisition decisions on the 

LCS program are significant because each DOD acquisition milestone 

has associated criteria that are supposed to act as internal controls to 

prevent the premature commitment of resources before certain 

knowledge has been attained. The timing of this next planned seaframe 

contract award has also led USD AT&L and DOT&E to question the 

meaningfulness of the seaframe’s full-rate production decision. Even 

though the milestone decision has been delayed, the Navy plans to 

continue purchasing seaframes, and if current plans come to fruition the 

Navy will have over half the planned seaframes under contract in the 

program’s low-rate initial production phase.

The Navy has also made procurement decisions and committed 

resources to mission module production well in advance of acquisition 

milestones, essentially bypassing two major reviews. The Navy has 

procured 8 of 64 planned mission packages before Milestone B, which is 

when programs are typically authorized to begin system design and 

demonstration efforts, or Milestone C, which is when programs are 

typically authorized to begin low-rate production.29 Making procurement 

decisions prior to these milestones—in essence, while the mission 

module program is still in the pre-low rate production phase—increases 

program risk because oversight organizations will not have yet approved 

key documents, including the acquisition program baseline, requirements 

documents, and test and evaluation master plan required for Milestone 

B.30

 

29Low-rate initial production with respect to a new system that is a weapon systems is 

production of the system in the minimum quantity necessary—(1) to provide productionconfigured or representative articles for operational tests pursuant to section 2399 of title 

10; (2) to establish an initial production base for the system; and (3) to permit an orderly 

increase in the production rate for the system sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon 

the successful completion of operational testing. 10 U.S.C. § 2400(b). 

The Navy planned to hold Milestone B for the mission modules 

program in fiscal year 2011, but it has been delayed until at least the third 

or fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013 because USD AT&L has not yet 

approved the acquisition program baseline. USD AT&L has delayed the 

decision until the Navy produces stronger linkages between the mission 

modules and the seaframes program and establishes metrics for 

30The acquisition program baseline is an important document for program management 

that shall include sufficient parameters to describe the cost estimate, schedule, 

performance, supportability, and other relevant factors. The test and evaluation master 

plan describes planned developmental, operational, and live-fire testing; measures to 

evaluate the performance of the system during these test periods; an integrated test 

schedule; and the resources needed to accomplish the planned testing.
 

Page 53 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

individual mission package increments. In the meantime, the Navy 

continues to procure additional mission packages. The mission modules 

program office stated that the program’s milestone decision authority has 

approved production of mission packages in order to keep pace with 

production of seaframes. In 2012, USD AT&L delegated the responsibility 

of milestone decision authority for the mission modules program from his 

office to the Secretary of the Navy.

In order to enhance oversight of the LCS seaframes and mission modules 

procurements, the USD AT&L has established that the Defense 

Acquisition Board—the department’s senior-level forum for advising USD 

AT&L on critical decisions concerning selected programs—will conduct 

annual in-process reviews of the integrated LCS programs beginning in 

December 2012 and to be held each September thereafter. There will 

also be a Defense Acquisition Board review to coincide with the release 

of the request for proposals for seaframes LCS 25 and beyond. 

Additionally, USD AT&L has established that the Navy shall provide 

metrics to monitor progress in quarterly reports. These oversight 

mechanisms should provide USD AT&L opportunities to make decisions 

about future LCS procurements, but the information will ultimately be 

limited by the amount of operational test data available at the time.

The current LCS program is not the program envisioned over a decade 

ago. Initial cost estimates have been significantly exceeded; the Navy has 

not been able to field the ship or its planned capabilities much more 

rapidly than prior programs, as planned; and the supporting business 

case continues to evolve—including key unknowns such as how the ship 

will be used and manned. Further, the Navy will not be able to 

demonstrate that the LCS can meet the threshold capabilities defined in 

its requirements documentation with mission packages integrated with the 

seaframes until 2019. Until the Navy has solidified its requirements and 

concepts for LCS, neither Congress nor the Navy can be certain that the 

LCS is the right system to meet the warfighters’ needs. Much is still 

unknown under the new concept the Navy has set forth. The Navy has a 

great deal of learning to do about the ships, the integrated capability that 

they are intended to provide when equipped with the mission packages, 

and how the overall LCS concept will be implemented. The deficiencies 

identified in this report are not criticisms of progress in the sense that 

things should have gone smoother or faster. At issue, rather, is the 

misalignment of the program’s progress with acquisition decisions, and 

with key decisions being made well before requisite knowledge is 

available.

Conclusions 
 

Page 54 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

The apparent disconnect between the LCS acquisition strategy and the 

needs of the end user suggests that a pause is needed. The Chief of 

Naval Operations, representing the end user (the fleet), has sponsored 

several technical studies that raise fundamental questions about whether 

the program, as envisioned, will meet the Navy’s needs. The results of 

additional, ongoing studies which are expected to be completed over the 

course of the next year or so may result in changes to the program. And 

the chair of the vice admiral-level LCS Council has stated that all options 

are on the table for the future of the program. In the meantime, the 

acquisition of seaframes and mission packages continues, and the 

program office shows no signs of slowing its next planned set of seaframe 

contracts. This disconnect between requirements and acquisitions 

increases the risk that the Navy is not wisely spending its resources. The 

Navy’s request for funding for 4 additional seaframes (numbers 17-20) in 

its fiscal year 2014 budget request suggests that taxpayer money will be 

committed to 24 seaframes before important information is known about 

how the ship will be used. Congress is in a position to slow funding for 

these additional seaframes, pending the results of the technical studies 

that are already underway.

In addition, the Navy’s approach of procuring the assets before the results 

of testing—which could potentially lead to design changes—is contrary to 

acquisition best practices. The work of assessing the results operational 

testing of seaframes, mission packages, and the integrated ship, as well 

as ensuring that cost estimates are well-informed and requirements 

validated, should not be rushed in an effort to adhere to the current 

schedule of awarding the next planned seaframe contract in fiscal year 

2016. Doing so could lead to the Navy risking taxpayer investments of 

over $40 billion in 2010 dollars in systems that may not provide the 

expected—and yet to be fully defined—militarily useful capability.

Also, the Navy’s planned approach of acquiring additional seaframes prior 

to a formal DOD full rate production decision limits the ability of oversight 

entities, including USD AT&L, DOT&E, and Congress, to be adequately 

informed and able to influence the Navy’s actions. Equally important, if 

the Navy commits to a large quantity of additional seaframes before 

incorporating all of the lessons learned from fleet experimentation, it may 

end up buying equal quantities of both seaframes, when one variant may 

be in fact more suitable than the other. Likewise, the Navy’s continued 

acquisition of mission packages that do not meet threshold requirements, 

and in the absence of a defined approach to meet these requirements in 

the future, is not in accordance with best practices or DOD guidance, and 

increases the risk that the Navy could buy a number of mission modules 

that are not militarily useful.
 

Page 55 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

The Navy also still has a number of key decisions to make that could 

impact the design of the seaframes—such as increasing the level of 

manning onboard, adding additional combat capability, and moving 

towards ship system commonality—and that could significantly change 

cost estimates for the ship. The Navy may also learn via operational 

experience that each variant has better suitability to certain mission sets, 

which could influence the mix of future ships that it buys. This knowledge 

will likely not be attained until after several operational deployments with 

both seaframe variants employing all three mission packages. If the Navy 

signs contracts for another large block of ships in 2016 while these major 

questions remain, it increases the likelihood of continued design instability 

and production inefficiencies, as well as potentially fielding a reduced 

capability at a higher cost.

1. To ensure that the Navy has adequate knowledge to support moving 

forward with future seaframe construction, Congress should consider 

restricting future funding to the program for construction of additional 

seaframes until the Navy:

• completes the ongoing LCS technical and design studies,

• determines the impacts of making any changes resulting from 

these studies on the cost and designs of future LCS seaframes, 

and

• reports to Congress on cost-benefit analyses of changes to the 

seaframes to change requirements and/or capabilities and to 

improve commonality of systems, and the Navy’s plan moving 

forward to improve commonality.

2. To ensure that information on the relative capabilities of each 

seaframe variant is communicated in a timely and complete manner, 

Congress should consider requiring DOD to report on the relative 

advantages of each variant in carrying out the three primary LCS 

missions. This report should be submitted to Congress prior to the 

planned full-rate production decision and the award of any additional 

seaframe contracts.

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 
 

Page 56 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

To ensure that, going forward, relevant oversight entities are able to 

provide appropriate decision-makers with additional insight into future 

contract awards for seaframes, we recommend that the Secretary of the 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following two actions:

1. If the Navy is approved by USD AT&L to award additional seaframe 

block buy contracts for LCS 25 and beyond, ensure that it only 

procures the minimum quantity and rate of ships required to preserve 

the mobilization of the production base until the successful completion 

of the full-rate production decision review. The award of any additional 

seaframe contracts should be informed by

• a new independent cost estimate conducted by DOD’s Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation office, and

• a re-validated capabilities development document.

2. Prior to the full-rate production decision and the award of any 

additional seaframe contracts, report to Congress on the relative 

advantages of each seaframe variant for each of the three mission 

areas.

To facilitate mission module development and ensure that the Navy has 

adequate knowledge to support further module purchases, we 

recommend that the Secretary of the Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Navy to take the following two actions:

3. Ensure that the Acquisition Program Baseline submitted for the 

mission modules Milestone B establishes program goals—thresholds 

and objectives—for cost, schedule, and performance for each 

increment per current DOD acquisition policy.

4. To ensure that the purchase of mission modules do not outpace key 

milestones, buy only the minimum quantities of mission module 

systems required to support operational testing.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, which are included in appendix II, DOD non-concurred 

with two recommendations, partially concurred with one, and concurred 

with one. We also provided relevant portions of the draft report to the 

shipbuilders and several contractors developing mission module 

technologies, and incorporated their technical comments as appropriate.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 57 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

DOD non-concurred with the bulk of our first recommendation, pertaining 

to the quantity and rate of ships to be purchased under the contracts for 

LCS 25 and beyond. DOD stated that unnecessarily reducing production 

to a minimum sustaining rate would cause the price to the government to 

increase, with no value added to the program. While pricing of the 

individual seaframes is important, we believe there is greater risk in 

awarding additional seaframe contracts before key knowledge is gained 

about the LCS’s integrated capabilities and how the ship will be operated.

As we note in our report, when the Navy plans to award the next 

seaframe contracts, in fiscal year 2016, it will not have the benefit of this 

important knowledge, as operational testing is scheduled for completion 

in fiscal year 2019. DOD also stated that no major design changes are 

planned to the seaframes. But we found that there is, in fact, potential for 

such changes. As we note in our report, a number of ongoing technical 

and design studies, as well as the Navy’s plans to move to a common 

combat management system and to increase the manning on the ships, 

are likely to require design changes. DOD agreed with the portion of our 

recommendation related to the need for an independent cost estimate to 

inform the planned 2019 full-rate production decision. Regarding the 

portion of the recommendation related to the need for a re-validation of 

the capabilities development document, DOD stated that the Joint Staff, 

along with the Navy, will conduct a requirements assessment study. It is 

not clear from DOD’s response, however, whether this study will meet the 

intent of our recommendation, which is to ensure that the level of 

capability provided by LCS is militarily useful given the warfighter’s 

current capability needs and that continued investment in the program is 

warranted. We continue to believe that a more formal revalidation of the 

capabilities development document, through the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council, would achieve this goal.

DOD stated that it concurred with our second recommendation, regarding 

a report to Congress on the relative advantages of each seaframe variant 

for each of the three mission areas prior to the award of any additional 

seaframe contracts. However, DOD’s response does not directly address 

our recommendation. DOD stated that the Navy can, if requested by 

Congress, provide a report on the performance of each seaframe variant 

and mission modules against current LCS requirements. While this may 

provide useful information, it would not address the relative advantages of 

the variants in performing the three primary LCS missions as we 

recommended. As noted in our report, Navy officials have stated that one 

variant may be better suited to certain missions or tasks than the other. 

We would expect DOD’s report to Congress to contain this type of 

information to ensure that Congress is fully aware of the advantages and 

disadvantages of each seaframe variant and how these might influence 

future procurements. To help ensure that Congress is informed of the 
 

Page 58 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

relative advantages of each variant prior to key upcoming decisions about 

future procurements, we added a second Matter for Congressional 

Consideration to this report.

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation, regarding the 

establishment of cost, schedule, and performance goals for each mission 

module increment. DOD responded that the mission module program’s 

Acquisition Program Baseline will include cost, schedule, and 

performance thresholds and objectives, but stated that the entire program 

consists of a single increment. This statement is inconsistent with how 

DOD defines performance requirements and how it plans to conduct 

operational testing for the mission modules program, both of which reflect 

individual increments. In addition, as discussed in our report, current DOD 

acquisition policy defines each increment of a capability, such as a 

weapon system, as a “militarily useful and supportable operational 

capability.” Defining cost, schedule, and performance thresholds and 

objectives for each mission package increment would provide DOD and 

the Navy with information needed to effectively monitor the development 

of the increments and a baseline against which to measure performance. 

DOD did not concur with our fourth recommendation, that the Navy buy 

only the minimum quantities of mission module systems required to 

support operational testing. DOD stated that the Navy must procure 

mission packages at a rate necessary to support (1) developmental and 

operational testing of the two seaframe variants with each mission 

module increment, (2) fleet training needs, and (3) operational LCS ships. 

The purpose of our recommendation is to facilitate mission module 

development and, at the same time, ensure that the Navy has adequate 

knowledge before it purchases additional modules to operationally deploy 

on LCS ships. Further, DOD’s comments did not address the primary 

rationale for our recommendation—that the Navy is buying mission 

modules before it has met key acquisition policy and testing requirements 

and acquired the knowledge needed to validate that they work as 

intended. Instead, the pace of mission module procurements is based, in 

part, on the need to equip LCS ships currently under construction; that is, 

well before the ships would be available to be outfitted with module 

capabilities. As our recommendations point out, the way to mitigate the 

acquisition risks for the LCS program is not to maintain or speed up the 

current pace of procurements, but rather to adjust procurement plans to 

better align with the timing of operational test data availability. 

The Navy also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. The Navy also made three main points in these comments. 

First, the Navy stated that its experience in operating the LCS—over 
 

Page 59 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

100,000 nautical miles steamed on LCS 1 and 2 together—and 

conducting test events to date has provided enough information to give 

the Navy confidence that it understands the performance of the LCS and 

the program’s potential risks. However, much of the experience the Navy 

has gained with LCS has been either with just a seaframe, or with partial 

or developmental versions of mission modules—not with complete, 

integrated, and capable mission packages. We do not believe that these 

activities are a substitute for or provide the same knowledge about LCS 

capabilities as operational testing. The Navy also disagreed with our 

characterization of the LCS business case as “degraded,” stating that the 

program still meets the requirements defined in its capability development 

document. While this is true, several key assumptions about how the LCS 

would operate—that formed the initial business case—have changed. As 

we note in the report, the Navy’s own internal assessments of LCS 

capabilities support this conclusion. Finally, the Navy stated that the initial 

increments of the mission packages are based on mature technologies 

and will provide a level of performance that exceeds the Navy’s current 

capabilities and that subsequent increments will largely fill today’s gaps in 

warfighting capability. As our report states, the Navy is still addressing 

development challenges with initial mission package increments, and 

their performance has not been validated in operational testing. The exact 

capabilities of subsequent increments is unclear because the Navy has 

not defined performance requirements for each increment or provided a 

roadmap for how they will meet LCS capability needs.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 3 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional 

committees, and the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. 

In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix IV.

Michele Mackin

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 60 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

To assess the Navy’s progress in producing and testing the seaframes, 

we analyzed Navy and contractor documentation including design reports 

and construction progress briefings that addressed performance. To 

identify design changes and to understand the impact of these changes to 

the construction processes for seaframes, we reviewed Littoral Combat 

Ship (LCS) contracts and change orders; master planning schedules for 

LCS 3 through LCS 8; Supervisor of Shipbuilding reports; reports to 

Congress; and Board of Inspection and Survey reports. We also reviewed 

information from contractors outlining process improvements and capital 

investments at each of the LCS shipyards aimed at increasing capability 

and capacity needed to support efficient construction of LCS seaframes. 

To evaluate testing and system suitability and survivability, we reviewed 

test reports and test progress briefings. Further, we conducted interviews 

with relevant Navy and industry officials responsible for managing the 

design and construction of LCS seaframes, such as the LCS seaframe 

program office; LCS Program Executive Office; Supervisor of 

Shipbuilding; American Bureau of Shipbuilding; Lockheed Martin, General 

Dynamics, and Austal USA (LCS prime contractors); and Marinette 

Marine and Austal USA (LCS shipbuilders). We also held discussions 

with LCS technical authorities, testing agents, and requirements officers 

from Naval Sea Systems Command; Board of Inspection and Survey; 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and Commander, Navy 

Operational Test and Evaluation Force. We also met with officials from 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, including the deputy directors. 

To observe some of the identified deficiencies and corrections on the LCS 

seaframes, we visited and toured LCS 1, LCS 2, and LCS 3. To 

understand how LCS was being integrated into the fleet, we met with 

officials from LCS Squadron One; Fleet Forces Command; and Third, 

Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Fleets.

To assess the Navy’s progress developing, producing, and testing the 

mission modules, we reviewed documents that outline LCS mission 

module plans and performance, including program schedules; LCS 

requirements documentation; classified mission module analyses; and 

recent test reports for surface warfare (SUW) and mine countermeasures 

(MCM) systems. We held discussions with Navy program offices; and 

with key contractors for the mission module systems that comprise 

Increment I of the MCM mission package and the contractor developing 

the Griffin missile, and saw examples of systems from these modules. We 

also met with officials from the office of the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation; Navy’s Commander of Operational Test and Evaluation 

Force; Naval Undersea Warfare Center; Naval Surface Warfare Center; 

Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command; and Navy Space and 

Naval Warfare Systems Command.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 61 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

To evaluate the Navy’s business case for the LCS program and risks in 

the Navy’s acquisition strategy, we reviewed documents on the cost, 

capabilities, and potential use of the LCS. This included documentation 

related to LCS requirements, threats, and capability gaps, as well as the 

LCS Warfighting and Platform Wholeness concept of operations. We also 

analyzed warfighting and sustainment wargame reports; the Board of 

Inspection and Survey’s “LCS Material Condition and Maintainability” 

report; and the office of the Chief of Naval Operations’ “Review of the 

Navy’s Readiness to Receive, Employ and Deploy the LCS Class Vessel” 

report. We reviewed LCS cost estimates, including the seaframes 

independent cost estimate, and program lifecycle cost estimates for 

seaframes and mission modules. To understand the level of unknowns 

and potential changes with the program, we met with officials from the 

LCS Council including the Director of Navy Staff, and reviewed the LCS 

Program of Actions and Milestones document. To understand the 

conceptual underpinnings of the LCS program, we met with officials from 

the Naval War College and the Naval Warfare Development Command. 

To understand the role of the fleet in defining the LCS concept and their 

participation in the LCS wargames, we met with officials from LCS 

Squadron One; Fleet Forces Command; and the officials from the Third, 

Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Fleets.

To assess the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the integrated LCS program, 

we reviewed LCS acquisition strategies from 2007, 2008 and 2010; 

acquisition decision memos; program briefings; Navy reports to 

Congress; acquisition program baselines; test and production schedules; 

and contracts for both seaframe variants. We also reviewed relevant 

sections of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the Department of Defense’s 

acquisition policy for acquisition programs, and compared these 

guidelines to the Navy’s approach for acquiring the LCS. Additionally, we 

interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the Joint Staff; and the 

Navy, including the seaframes and mission modules program offices; the 

LCS resource sponsor in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and 

the Director of Navy Staff. Using this information, we identified how the 

LCS acquisition strategy changed over time, and assessed how these 

changes affected the alignment between the LCS programs’ key test 

events, such as initial operational test and evaluation; program reviews, 

such as the full rate production decision; and investment decisions, 

particularly contract awards. Finally, we leveraged previous GAO 

reporting on the LCS dating back to 2005 to provide historical context for 

these changes, and more recent GAO reports identifying challenges 

resulting from concurrent testing and production activities.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 62 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2012 to July 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 63 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 64 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 65 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 66 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 67 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship
Appendix III: Mission Package Overview 

Illustrations from Interactive Figures

Page 68 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

This appendix includes the overview graphics from interactive figure 7, 

figure 8, and figure 9.

Figure 11: Mine Countermeasures Package Overview

Note: Figure represents full capability, not Increment I.

Appendix III: Mission Package Overview 

Illustrations from Interactive Figures
Appendix III: Mission Package Overview 

Illustrations from Interactive Figures

Page 69 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 12: Surface Warfare Package Overview

Note: Figure represents full capability, not Increment I. However, Griffin IIB missile (or substitute) is 

an Increment III capability shown for illustration of its range only, and will not be in final package.
Appendix III: Mission Package Overview 

Illustrations from Interactive Figures

Page 70 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

Figure 13: Anti-Submarine Warfare Package Overview
Page 71 GAO-13-530 Littoral Combat Ship

Michele Mackin, 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made 

key contributions to this report: Ron Schwenn (Assistant Director); Diana 

Moldafsky (Assistant Director); Jessica Drucker; Kristine Hassinger; 

Amber Keyser; C. James Madar; W. Kendal Roberts; Roxanna Sun; 

Robert Swierczek; Molly Traci; Hai Tran; and Nathan Tranquilli.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(121050)
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